Sitting of 12 July 1860

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Anchors and Chain Cables; Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856) Amendment.
2° Crown Debts and Judgments; Inclosure (No. 2); Railways Act (Ireland) (1851) Amendment; Weights and Measures (Ireland).
3° Annuity Tax Abolition (Edinburgh): Registration of Births, &c. (Scotland); Tramways (Ireland).

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY BILL.

  COMMITTEE.
  Order for Committee read.
  House in Committee.
  Clauses 78 to 83 agreed to.
  Clause 84 (Abolition of Office of Accountant).
  MR. MURRAYobserved that the office of Accountant was perfectly useless, and ought at once to be abolished. The clause proposed the abolition of the office on the death of the present occupant, but he thought that when an office was to be abolished it was a bad principle to wait till death. This business might very well be
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  done by the Registrar. He, therefore, proposed the omission of that part of the clause which would retain the present Accountant in office.
  Amendment proposed, in page 18, line 15, to leave out the words "the person now discharging the duties."
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEsaid, the Amendment, so far from promoting economy, would place an additional charge npon the funds of the court, as they could not abolish the office of the Accountant in Bankruptcy without giving the present possessor of it compensation. Besides, he doubted whether it would be prudent to abolish the office of the responsible individual in whose name the enormous sums passing through the court were now paid; but at any rate, the most economical plan was that proposed in the clause, namely, allowing this gentleman to hold the office as long as he lived, and afterwards to entrust the duties to the chief registrar.
  MR. EDWIN JAMESsaid, he hoped the hon. Member would take the sense of the Committee upon his Amendment. The Bill assumed that the office should be abolished when it next became vacant, and he, for one, could not understand why it should not be abolished at once. It was a most flagitious sinecure, and although the holder of it was called an accountant, he kept no accounts whatever. He trusted the Committee, in considering the Amendment, would not be alarmed by the question of compensation, which could be dealt with separately.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALasked the Committee to consider that if the office of Accountant was to be at once abolished they would have to pay the present possessor of it his full salary, while they left him nothing to do. That gentleman would, no doubt, in such a case feel that they had conferred on him a great benefit, for he would be relieved from the discharge of his duties, and yet be in the receipt of full salary. It was in these circumstances thought more prudent and more economical to retain that gentleman in his office, and avail themselves of his services, taking care that no future appointment should be made. He was quite willing to admit that there was no necessity for a separate officer of this kind, and therefore it was proposed to abolish such an appointment on the first vacancy that took place.
  MR. MURRAYsaid, he did not object to give fair compensation to gentlemen in the position of the Accountant in Bank-

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  ruptcy; but under Lord John Russell's Act it was provided that if that office were abolished the Lords of the Treasury should be empowered to determine what was the amount of compensation to which, under the circumstances, the holder was to be entitled; and it did not, therefore, necessarily follow that he should retire on the full amount of his salary—namely, £1,500 a year. He was quite willing to accept this proposition of the Act, and he trusted the House would assist him in procuring the immediate abolition of the office.
  MR. HUNTsaid, he wished to remind the Committee that if the office was abolished the present accountant might receive some other Appointment under the Bill; and the amount of his compensation might in that way be considerably diminished, if indeed any compensation at all should be necessary.
  MR. HENLEYsaid, he hoped the hon. and learned Attorney General would tell them what the duties of this gentleman really were. It was admitted on all sides that such an office was useless, and in these circumstances he should like to know why the present Accountant was to be retained.
  SIR FITZROY KELLYobserved that great injustice would be done to this gentleman if his office was to be abolished without giving him adequate compensation; and the effect would be that in future great difficulty would be found in obtaining the services of able and efficient public servants for similar offices. He thought the proposal of the Attorney General was the best that could be adopted. It would be better to leave the present Accountant to discharge the duties, instead of dismissing him, and then conferring upon him compensation.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he could not characterize the proposal that had come from the other side of the House as other than a most extravagant democratical proposition. The office had been originated by an Act of Parliament, and the duties were designated and the salary fixed by that Act. It was, in truth, a freehold office, and one to which the words of the Duke of Wellington in 1831, when speaking of the proposed abolition of the office of Patentee of Bankrupts, were in every respect applicable. The Duke, speaking of the Rev. Mr. Thurlow, the holder of that office, said in "another place" that he was as much entitled to retain his office as any one of their Lordships was to retain his seat. It would be an outrage on jus-
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  tice and a violent and democratic measure to deprive the present Accountant of the rights guaranteed to him by Act of Parliament, and he believed that the adoption of such a course would ensure the rejection of the Bill in "another place."
  MR. HENLEYdenied that there was the slightest ground for the imputation cast on the Opposition side of the House. He had no right to assume that it was proposed to abolish this office without compensation. On the contrary, he had been told by the Mover of the Amendment that he was willing to accept the proposition in the Bill of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) on that point. Neither had the hon. and learned Gentleman any right to charge them with violent and democratic conduct. The hon. and learned Gentleman had not condescended to argue the subject or to answer the question he had put as to what were the duties of this office, but he had heaped upon them the most violent abuse. He would ask the hon. and learned Gentleman if indulgence in that kind of language was the way to get on with his Bill? It was the very way to stop it. He could tell the hon. and learned Gentleman that he would not be permitted to make such charges unanswered if he (Mr. Henley) was present. And he would ask those hon. Gentlemen who were anxious to proceed with the Bill to keep the Attorney General quiet if they expected to do so.
  MR. CONINGHAMsaid, he would rather accept the proposal of the Attorney General than give in to the principle of compensation as it had been laid down by hon. Members.
  MR. GLYNsaid, he would support the proposal of the Attorney General, but he must protest against being considered in any way favourable to the principle that they were bound to give the full salary to retiring officials. He hoped that in future the banking transactions of the Court of Bankruptcy would be placed on a more satisfactory footing than hitherto they had been.
  MR. EDWIN JAMESsaid, he thought that the same justice which was meted out to the messengers in bankruptcy ought to be applied to the Accountant. He admitted that the messengers had been a scandalous abuse, and that their charges must be moderated. But the messengers did something for their money, while the Accountant did nothing. He trusted the Committee would record its opinion in opposition to these sinecures.
  Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
  The Committee divided:—Ayes 89; Noes 37; Majority 52.
  Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 85 to 92.
  Clause 93 (Official Assignee to take possession of Bankrupt's Estate).
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEsaid, that the state of the law at present was this—All the personal property of the bankrupt was given into the possession of the official assignee to be paid by him into the Bank of England on the bankruptcy fund account. There was, therefore, a security that the funds coming into the possession of the officer of the Court would be retained for the benefit of the proper parties. The Bill entirely altered that arrangement, as instead of the official assignee paying the property into the bankruptcy fund account it was to be handed over to the creditors' assignee, who was not an officer of the Court, upon his appointment. What he should propose was—that the property should be paid over by the official assignee to the bankruptcy fund account, there to be retained for the benefit of the persons entitled therein.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that the object of the hon. Member for Kilmarnock was that which he himself intended to carry out by a subsequent clause.
  Amendment agreed to; the Clause agreed to.
  Clauses 94 and 95 agreed to.
  Clause 96 (Duties of Official Assignee to cease on Appointment of Creditors' Assignee).
  SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMIDsaid, he thought it would be much safer to retain the power of getting in the estate in the hands of the official assignee, who was a responsible officer, than to transfer it to the creditors' assignee. He should therefore propose so to amend the clause as to carry out that object.
  MR. HORSFALLopposed the Amendment. The commercial community were quite agreed on the propriety of the proposed change.
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALopposed the Amendment, which was withdrawn.
  Clause agreed to: as were also Clauses 97 to 111.
  Clause 112 (Disqualification of Officers).
  Mr. ROEBUCKsaid, he could not understand why the Master of the Rolls and the Recorder of London were eligible to
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  sit in Parliament, and the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy was not to be so.
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEsaid, the Master of the Rolls by long custom had been permitted to sit in Parliament, but the course of modern legislation had been to exclude Judges from seats in that House, and he saw no reason why the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy should be excepted.
  Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 113 to 128.
  House resumed.
  Committee report Progress, to sit again on Monday next.

THE GALWAY CONTRACT.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CORRYsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the assignment of the Galway Contract has been purchased by the Montreal and Ocean Steam Packet Company; if so, on what terms the purchase has been effected, and what modifications of the conditions of the Contract have been sanctioned by the Government?
  MR. HORSFALLsaid, he would also beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a pledge was given by the Treasury to Mr. Inman, as the representative of the Liverpool and Philadelphia Steam Ship Company, that no transfer of the Galway Contract should take place without affording him the opportunity of showing cause why such Contract should not be transferred; and, if so, whether it is true that the Contract has been transferred without affording Mr. Inman the opportunity which had been promised. And whether the statement with regard to the Mails contained in the following advertisement, published on Monday last, has been authorized by Her Majesty's Government:—
  "The Galway Contract having been transferred to the Montreal Ocean Steam Ship Company, the North Briton, which sails on Wednesday, will call at Galway for the Newfoundland, United States, and Canadian Mails."
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, in replying to the question of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry) I may at the same time refer to the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall). It is not necessary, as he will see, that I should at present enter into any details on the subject. An arrangement was made between the Montreal and Ocean Steam Packet Company

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  on the one side, and the Galway Packet Company, as I may call it for the sake of clearness, on the other, for an assignment of the Galway Contract to the Montreal and Ocean Steam Packet Company; but that arrangement was of necessity subject to the consent of the Government, and an application was made two or three days ago for that consent, a copy of the assignment being also placed in the hands of the Government. At the same time an intimation was made to the Government that the answer must be an immediate one, as the matter would not bear giving time for consideration. Under these circumstances the Government really were precluded from giving any full consideration of the question upon its merits, and they did not hesitate to reply that without at all indicating what would have been the result if full time had been given for consideration, they could not sanction the assignment. The two gentlemen who hold office in Canada, and who had given Government to understand that the question was thus pressing, were to have quitted England, I believe, yesterday evening, and the answer then sent to them was considered by Government as a definitive reply, which indeed, it was, to the application made to them. This day, however, I have learned, only within the last few minutes, that one of those gentlemen has not quitted England. That gentleman, Mr. Smith, I believe, holds the office of Postmaster-General in Canada, and he has sent in a letter requesting that a more full consideration might be given by the Government to the subject. I have had no opportunity of communicating with my Colleagues since that letter was received, and I am not, therefore, enabled to make any statement in regard to it. With respect to the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, I need hardly say that the advertisement he has quoted in his notice intimating that the Galway Contract had been transferred to the Montreal Ocean Steam Ship Company has not been authorized or sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, and therefore it must be understood, of course, as meaning merely that the arrangement had been completed between the parties so far as they were concerned. With regard to the pledge stated to have been given to Mr. Inman, that no transfer of the Galway Contract should take place without affording him the opportunity of showing cause why such contract should not be transferred, it is perfectly
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  true that a pledge of that kind was given to Mr. Inman, and, of course, the Government will take care that that pledge is redeemed.
  MR. BAXTERsaid, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, if the Government has sanctioned the sale of the contract and subsidy for conveying the mails between Galway and America; if the four new steamers, on the faith of the performance of which the large subsidy of £78,000 per annum was promised, are not after all to be placed upon the station; if it is true that the Atlantic Royal Mail Company are unable to fulfil the conditions under which they undertook the service, and have resorted to this sale or assignment in order to secure to their shareholders a large sum of public money without rendering any service; what is the sum for which the contract has been sold, and what course the Government mean to take, with a view to ascertaining the opinion of the House of Commons on these transactions?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, with respect to the information my hon. Friend has asked for, all I can tell him is this:—He is already aware that the assignment of the Contract has not been sanctioned by the Government. As to the four new steamers, on the faith of providing which the subsidy was promised, they would not, under the assignment, have been placed on the station; but other new steamers would have been provided by the Canadian Company, which, of course, would have been subject to certain conditions of inspection and approval. With regard to the alleged inability of the Atlantic Royal Mail Company to complete the service, Government have no official notice whatever. The sum stated in the assignment was £35,000 a year, to be paid for seven years; and with regard to the course which the Government intend to take in order to obtain the opinion of this House, that will depend on the decision yet to be come to, and therefore it is premature as yet to give any reply.
  MR. HANKEYsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary of State for War, When further Copies of the Report on the Defences will be delived to the House for sale, as numerous applications have been made for the purchase of Copies which cannot now be obtained?
  MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that 2,250 copies of the Report of the Commission on Natiohal Defences had been printed, and 500 distributed.

OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GENERAL.

  QUESTION.
  SIR GEORGE BOWYERsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, When a Postmaster General will be appointed; and when the Report on the Post Office will be laid upon the Table?
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, the duties of the Postmaster General had been performed by the Duke of Argyll in the absence of Lord Elgin. That arrangement had been made on the alternative that when Lord Elgin arrived at Ceylon be might find that his services were not wanted, and that he might return. Unfortunately the Chinese difficulty had not been settled, and it would fall to the duty of the Government to appoint a successor.

THE LEBANON MASSACRES.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he wished to put a question to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary on the subject of the recent massacres in Syria, and that he might put himself in order, he would move that the House do now adjourn. The House would not be surprised that, having taken some part in the war in Syria some years ago, he should sympathize with the unfortunate victims of the massacres which had lately been committed in that country. He understood from a statement which had been made in "another place," that the Government had sent a squadron, under Admiral Martin, to Syria; but that force, although it might protect the inhabitants of Beyrout, Sidon, and other parts of the coast, would be of little advantage to the population of the interior. This was not the first time that atrocities of this kind had occurred in Mount Lebanon; and attacks made by the Druses upon the Maronites had been encouraged by the Turks. During the war of 1840 the allied forces saw a large party of Druses marching through the country with the heads of thirty Christians upon pikes. Unhappily no reliance could be placed on the Turks, who thought they had an interest in setting the Druses and Maronites by the ears, and were in the habit of standing by, and looking on complacently, while they destroyed each other. Unless the Maronites of the Lebanon had come forward in the gallant manner they did during the war in Syria, and assisted his small force in driving the Egyptians out of the country, that object could not
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  have been accomplished. These unfortunate people were detested whenever they came into contact with the Druses, and he therefore, begged to ask the noble Lord the Foreign Minister for an assurance that some effectual steps would be taken to prevent further massacres among the Christians in the interior of Syria as well as on the coast, and also to afford protection to British subjects.
  SIR JAMES FERGUSSONsaid, he rose to second the Motion, not for the purpose of making a speech, but of asking the noble Lord for some information, which he thought would be most acceptable, on this subject. The House, in common with the rest of the country, must have seen with deep pain and regret the accounts given by the newspapers of the recent shocking occurrences in Syria. He was anxious to induce the House, and if possible the country, while their information was still necessarily so imperfect, to suspend their judgment upon the responsibility for those events until it received more authentic intelligence. Great injustice would be done, and possibly great and permanent evil inflicted on that country if people here ran away with the idea that one party only had been to blame in this unhappy matter, or if the influence of England should cause vengeance to be taken upon one race alone, while others who were as much or perhaps more in fault than those who were at present victorious remained unpunished. Two years ago he spent some time on Mount Labanon, where he resided for a short period with these very Druses, now accused of being concerned in the recent disturbances; and he thought the House would commit a very great mistake if it concluded that these disturbances had had in the main a religious foundation. He believed that they originated in an irreconcilable quarrel between antagonistic races, and that religion had in fact had very little to do with them. It was well known that two great races, the Druses and Maronites, divided between them the chief part of that fertile region, and he feared there must always exist a deep-seated hostility between them. Nor should it be forgotten that it was the interest, not only of the Turks, but of some European Powers to foment their contentions. He was sure the noble Lord, whose attention had been so much directed to this question, must be aware that other nations in Europe had constantly encouraged these disputes on Mount Labanon with a view to

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  establish their own influence in that quarter. While he was there himself two years ago it was well known that efforts were made by French and Russian agents to rouse hostile passions and excite disturbances in the mountain. From living there for a short time he became so sensible of the imminent danger thus threatened that he was induced to make a communication to the noble Lord, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject. He was sure the Government must have received intimations from the intelligent gentleman who was our Consul General at Beyrout, which must have placed them in possession of important information on this question. But great injustice would be done if the European Powers did no more than to leave these people to the tender mercies of their Mussulman rulers. If the Turks were enabled to establish their authority in the Lebanon in a more sovereign manner than they had lately exercised it, not only would that fertile and flourishing region be seriously injured, but there was great risk of its being reduced to the same state of misery as prevailed in other parts of Syria and to a great extent throughout the Turkish dominions. In most districts of Syria the traveller was struck with the squalid and wretched condition of the villages; but when he arrived in the Lebanon he observed evidences of the greatest wealth and prosperity among the inhabitants. On inquiry he would find the reason of this to be that the Porte had no immediate authority there, and the people were, so to speak, self-governed. But if the Turkish Pashas were now to be sent down to those regions for the purpose, as it was called, of allaying disturbances and checking disorder, they would be glad to have the opportunity of fleecing the unfortunate population and enriching themselves at their expense, producing under the name of tranquillity what was merely ruin and desolation. He was satisfied Her Majesty's Government must also see that other dangers were impending. France would probably not be unwilling to gain the means of establishing her power in the East. He had seen a report in the newspapers, and he believed the Government had made statements to the same effect, that assurances had been received from the French Government that it was their determination not to interfere in this matter beyond securing protection to French subjects. But could they depend upon such assurances? Had not similar assurances
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  been given respecting countries nearer home? And, knowing that the interest which Franco took in this question was not only political but religious, were they sure that these disturbances would not be fomented by French agents as affording an opportunity for establishing that influence which she had long been anxious to gain in the East? The question was so interesting, and involved considerations of such magnitude and importance, that he trusted the House would pardon him for having seized that somewhat irregular occasion for claiming its attention.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, that having had a personal acquaintance with these regions, he wished to corroborate what had been so well stated by the hon. Baronet, and to express his hope that the House and the Government would not hastily espouse the cause of either of these contending races.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I quite agree with the hon. Baronet (Sir James Fergusson) that no doubt we must be very cautious in imputing the blame of these unhappy transactions to one of the parties concerned rather than the other. It is well known that the Druses and the Maronite Christians have long been divided by sentiments of deep-seated hostility; and those sentiments have from time to time broken out in wars and contentions. Unfortunately there has lately been such an occurrence. With regard to the immediate cause, one party lays the blame upon the other, while the other party says that it was the first who attacked them. No doubt there have been individual murders on both sides. Whatever may be the cause of the outbreak, and whatever measures it may be desirable to adopt, I think the House can have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that, the European Powers are bound to do their utmost to put a stop to the massacres which have been going on. We have been told first one village and then another has been attacked by the Druses, and that great slaughter had ensued, and our Consul informed us that he believed that not less than 20,000 people were wandering in the mountains in a state of the greatest distress. The hon. and gallant Officer (Sir Charles Napier) says, that merely sending ships to the sea coast will not save those who are in the mountains. Undoubtedly that is true, but when the Turks are reproached with regard to the apparent indifference that they have shown, or at all

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  events the very little exertion they have made, there is this to be said, that during the winter reports have been very current and very prevalent indeed, that in Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, there would be risings in the course of the spring. The Sultan naturally directed regular troops to be sent to those districts, and his army not being very large, I am told by the Turkish Ambassador in London that at the time of this outbreak there were only 400 regular troops in Syria, Of course it was not to be expected that 15,000 or 20,000 armed men should be put down by this small number of regulars, but even allowing for that, I am afraid it is too true that the Turks have showed but little activity or desire to put down these disturbances. It appeared to us that it was desirable to have ships on the coast, not only for the protection of British subjects, but in order that the Pasha who might be sent from Constantinople should be better enabled to send troops into the interior, and to relieve Damascus from the apprehensions of an attack which have lately prevailed there. We were informed that at Damascus there was the greatest apprehension of an attack by the Druses, and, of course, the British Consul and British subjects there were in the utmost danger. The Pasha who was sent from Constantinople might have said, "I should be ready to put an end to the massacres in the mountains and to relieve Damascus, but it will be necessary to keep all the troops on the coast, in order to prevent the Christians and the foreign subjects there being murdered." Therefore, it will be a great satisfaction to him if he is enabled by the presence of foreign ships of war to feel quite at ease with respect to Sidon, Beyrout, and other places on the coast, and to transfer his troops to the neighbourhood of Damascus. To show the effect that may be produced by even a very small force, I will state that while these massacres were occurring an English gentleman was cruising in the neighbourhood of Tyre with his yacht. Repeated messages were sent requesting him to approach the harbour, and place himself in a position to protect the town, and ultimately, although his guns were of very small calibre, and could be of little use, he warped in and placed them in a position to command the entrance to the town. It afterwards appeared that there were then in the town two spies of the Druses, who that same night sent word to the camp that an Eng-
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  lish ship of war was in the harbour, and that an attack in the face of such a force would be of no use. There was no attack, and the place was saved. This shows that not only a British naval force, but what may be taken to be a British naval force, may save the lives of the inhabitants of the seaports, and prevent massacres which were likely to take place. The graver subject to which the hon. Baronet has adverted is one of very large extent, and one into which I cannot properly enter now. It is one which must be considered by the representatives of all the Powers at Constantinople. I do not believe that those jealousies or those wishes to obtain influence on the part of European Powers which have acted so powerfully in former days would now be detrimental to the settlement of the question, and I quite agree that the Turks ought not to be allowed to extend their power, which frequently does not so much establish order as corruption and venality, over this district. At the same time it is very desirable to provide, if possible, that these very hostile parties should live in peace together.
  MR. GREGORYsaid, he wished to call the attention of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the fact, that there was a servant of Her Majesty who, if he was upon the spot, would have more influence upon the tribes of the Lebanon than any demonstration, naval or military, which the noble Lord might propose to send out. The gentleman to whom he alluded, and who was, be believed, well known to every one who travelled in Syria a few years ago, was Mr. Wood, our Cousul-General at Beyrout. He was a gentleman of great ability, and when Consul at Damascus obtained an influence among the mountain tribes such as had been possessed by no other European. He spoke the language like a native. He was thoroughly acquainted with Oriental sentiment and opinion, and by means of various good offices which he had done to different sheiks and rulers of tribes in the mountains he had obtained a personal influence among that people which was perfectly extraordinary. He believed that if that gentleman was sent to Syria in the present emergency he would be able to exert an influence most material to the settlement of this question, and would afford to Her Majesty's Government information which, amid the conflicting testimony that would be received, would be most important and most reliable.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he understood that the Turks were in 1846, by a Treaty with what were called the Five Powers, bound not to occupy the district in which these massacres took place with troops, and it therefore seemed rather hard to blame them for these occurrences.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: The hon. Baronet is wrong in his statement. There is no treaty which excludes the Turks from Lebanon in the same manner in which they are excluded from the Principalities. There was an arrangement made a good many years ago according to which no Turkish administrative authority was to be paramount in Lebanon, but the people of that district were to be left to govern themselves under officers appointed from the races therein. For a long time great endeavours were made by the Turks to get out of that engagement, but they were held to it, and I believe that it is still in existence. It docs not, however, preclude them from appointing a Pasha to represent the Turkish authority in those districts.
  Motion made, and Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and negatived.

THE NELSON MONUMENT.

  QUESTION.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
  ADMIRAL WALCOTT: It has long been subject of reproach, not wholly undeserved, that this country, with all its generosity and undoubted reverence for the memory of those who have reflected honour on the name of Englishmen, is generally slow in rearing monuments to preserve her sense of their high merits. On the Continent the battle has scarcely been won, the laurel earned by the living, or the grave closed above the last resting-place of the heroic dead, than the statue is erected, or the scene of victory pourtrayed. Half a century has elapsed, however, since the great conquest, of Trafalgar, and the entombment of the man who won it in the crypt of St. Paul's, and still in the greatest thoroughfare of this Metropolis, his Monument, to our shame, remains unfinished. This House has done its duty in furnishing the funds sufficient to render it complete; but for some inexplicable cause, hitherto, the eyesore remains, although the design was entrusted to the charge of an accom-
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  plished artist, who, I should have thought, with his fertile genius and great capacity for the work, would have found no difficulty in furnishing it without a delay so protracted. I must, therefore, ask, with whom, or with what department the blame rests? "I bear it for immortality," said an old Roman, when he held one handle of the plough, whilst Death held the other. Such was the spirit which animated Nelson, the greatest of English Admirals, whose memorable signal is still the watchword for every successor of the profession he so largely adorned, and whose name needs neither statue of bronze, or tomb of granite; for it is written not only in the living hearts of his countrymen, but also in the memory and history of every civilized nation in the world. When I turn my eyes to the stupendous works and materials of our naval ports and harbours; when I bring before my eyes the number of our ships built and maintained at so great a charge to present an armed front and impenetrable barrier to our enemies, I still cannot but recollect that to secure that end we must man those wooden walls with hearts such as beat in the breast of Nelson, and that the highest incentive to duty which a country can offer to the living, lies in the gratitude which she has displayed to her worthy and heroic dead. In such a spirit, and for this reason, I ask, why is the Monument of Nelson suffered to remain incomplete?
  MR. COWPERassured the hon. and gallant Admiral that the delay in the completion of the Nelson column was not to be attributed to any want of veneration for the character or exploits of Lord Nelson. The delay had arisen from a contrary feeling, from a desire that the lions which were to adorn the base of the column should be worthy of the position in which they were to be placed, and worthy also to represent the British Lion. Sir Edward Landseer, whose acquaintance with animals in general was well known, had now been selected for the purpose; and the House might rest assured that in producing representatives of the British Lion, his patriotic feeling would not suffer him to exert himself less than he had done in making likenesses of all other animals.

  ITALY.—SARDINIA AND SICILY.
  SIR ROBERT PEEL: I rise, Sir, according to notice, to move an Address for copies or extracts of papers relating to

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  the threatened annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, and to any information received by Her Majesty's Government as to the probable demands of Prance consequent upon the event of that annexation taking place; also for any papers showing that Her Majesty's Government have within the last few weeks intimated to the Government of Turin that the continued aggressive policy of that Government would not be viewed with indifference by Great Britain. I trust the House will not think I have selected an inopportune moment for calling its attention to the threatened annexation of Sicily to Piedmont and the probable demands of France, and I trust also the House will concur with me in the hope that Her Majesty's Government may have intimated to the Cabinet of Turin their apprehensions with respect to the aggressive policy of Piedmont. The latter part of my notice I am bound in fairness to say is taken almost word for word from a question which was asked in 1848 by the Earl of Aberdeen with reference to the affairs of Sardinia. It applies with tenfold force to the circumstances of the present time, and I hope the House will not grudge me a few minutes while I direct its attention to the State of European affairs, particularly those of Italy.
  In referring to the threatened annexation of Sicily, and the probable demands of France, it is impossible not to cast a glance for a moment over the course and history of the events which are occurring on the shores of the Mediterranean, fraught as they are with the deepest interest, and calculated to give rise to serious complications among the different States of Europe. The question of Sicily directly and immediately concerns England, both commercially and in a, maritime and political point of view. It concerns England commercially, because, of course, she cannot withdraw from commercial intercourse with other countries, nor, with a due regard to her material interests, can she remain an indifferent spectator of the fate of European nations. It also concerns England in a maritime and political point of view to an infinitely greater extent than those questions which have recently given rise to so much discussion, such as the cession of Nice, the sale of the poor Savoyards, and the outrage upon the integrity and independence of Switzerland. The Mediterranean is and ever has been the great highway for the traffic of Europe. Dr. Johnson said it ought to be the centre of trade and civil-
  1778
  ization, for upon its shores all the greatest empires of the world had flourished—Assyria, Persia, Greece, Rome, and Carthage—and from its shores we had derived our laws, our arts, everything which raised us above the savage and the slave. If the Mediterranean was of such immense importance in former times, what must be its position and character now? I do not hesitate to say that the maintenance of our commercial and political interest in the Mediterranean at the present moment is almost of as great importance as the maintenance of our maritime supremacy in St. George's Channel or the Irish Sea. In that opinion I only concur with every English statesman of modern times. A debate took place in this House in 1810 upon the condition of Sicily, the independence of which we maintained against the aggressive power of Bonaparte. Mr. Perceval was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he said in words of great force and singularly applicable to the present moment that all Governments in this country—men of all parties—had held that our connection with Sicily was of value in a political point of view, as well as with reference to our commercial interests at Malta and other parts of the Mediterranean. He added, "There is no difference of opinion as to the importance of preserving the independence of Sicily from the grasp of Bonaparte." We want to do that now. We know from the experience of the last few months that Sardinia is merely a tool in the hands of the Emperor of the French. We know that by opposing to the utmost extent of our power the influence which France wishes to acquire, both in Syria and in Sicily, we are maintaining that political influence which we are entitled to exercise in those parts of the world.
  The question being so important, I want the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office to give us a frank explanation of the policy he is pursuing. I do not want it to be said, as it has been said on recent occasions, "Oh! you are too late; the thing is done; the annexation has taken place." I want to warn the noble Lord that he must not be too late in the present instance, that he must not tell us some weeks hence, "Oh! we have been deceived by Earl Cowley, or outwitted by M. Thouvenel and Count Cavour, or duped by the franchise and cordality of the French Emperor." The noble Lord told me the other day that I should not pay any attention to newspaper reports, and that if I only listened to what

  1779
  he said I should know the truth. I want to know the truth above all things, and, therefore, I address myself to the noble Lord. But I do not think the noble Lord can say that we are over-anxious or overcurious on the subject of our foreign relations. The state of Europe is alarming, and would justify far more discussion than has yet taken place in either House of Parliament. It is calculated to cause us great anxiety and even distress of mind. Italy is in a ferment. There is no cohesion in Italy. From the Prussian Provinces on the Rhine I get letters which assure me that there is a general feeling of mistrust and apprehension, as against a common enemy. In Germany there is an attempt at union, which I hope may be successful—also against a common enemy. In Switzerland there are 176,000 men ready to rally round the standard of the Republic in defence of its rights and interests. Solely in consequence, I believe, of the unsettled state of affairs on the Continent, we are arming to a greater extent than we have done for the last forty years, and we are contributing more of our money than we ever did before for improving and extending our maritime and military defences. We talk not only of the defence of our ports but of the Metropolis. We have even called out Volunteers—a force which has not been seen among us for half a century, and I am glad of this opportunity, as some remarks which I made on a recent occasion have been misunderstood, to pay my tribute of admiration to the zeal, discipline, and efficiency of which we had so magnificent a display in the presence of the Queen some weeks ago in Hyde Park. I hope their services may never be required in the field; but I firmly believe that our Volunteers would prove themselves, if necessary, no unworthy defenders of the interests and institutions of England. But to return—I think the posture of affairs on the Continent is more serious at the present moment than it was in 1848. In that year we had a Sicilian revolution and the mission of Lord Minto. I was abroad at the time, and well recollect the visit of Lord Minto to Italy. I have always retained a very agreeable souvenir of the kind and friendly manner in which he received me, but, looking at his visit in a political point of view, I say it was theatrical. It was a revolutionary fiasco. At the time of the Sicilian revolution Lord Minto went to Rome. He coquetted with the Roman Liberals, visited
  1780
  Ciceroachio, praised Pio Nono, and patted Ferdinand of Naples on the back; but he deceived the Sicilian patriots and compromised the British Government. Though Foreign Affairs were not half so important in 1848 as at present, yet these subjects relating to Italy were then the occasion of no less than fifteen separate debates, while in the present year, such has been the forbearance of Parliament, that we have hardly had one debate on the affairs of Italy. I therefore call upon the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to make a statement of his views to-night on this important subject. The noble Lord has spirit and capacity to do so when he chooses. I have read the despatches which he has laid on the table, and I take pride in thinking them worthy of an English Minister. As a Member of the English Parliament I thank the noble Lord in the name of Switzerland for the manner in which he has defended the interests of that country and of Europe, and if the noble Lord would only go on like that, he will find in me as vigorous and generous a supporter as in any hon. Gentleman in this House.
  In casting a glance over the course of events on the Italian shores of the Mediterrranean, it is impossible not to advert to the achievements of Garibaldi, which have been universally accompanied by the sympathy of public opinion. The career of Garibaldi has been the subject of manifestations in this country—in Glasgow, Manchester, and other places—and he has elicited unqualified approbation from all classes in this country. Nevertheless, his progress and success have given rise to great difference of opinion in Italy; yet I am bound to say, as regards the expedition to Sicily, that, putting aside all political considerations, I can conceive nothing more glorious than the exploits of Garibaldi from the time of his leaving Genoa, with the revolutionary connivance of the King of Sardinia, up to the moment of his becoming Dictator at Palermo. All these details have been so admirably laid before the public by a correspondent, that I feel it would be a work of supererogation now to dwell on them. Garibaldi's rapid progress shows what the perseverance and prestige of one energetic man can accomplish. But when we read that an army of 20,000 men, well equipped and furnished with all the appliances of war, capitulated and laid down their arms before 2,000 men, ill equipped, with a bad commissariat, but who gained possession of the forts, the

  1781
  harbour, and the treasury, then, I say, the achievements of Garibaldi assumed a character of such moment as forbade the Powers of Europe to remain indifferent spectators of them. I do not lay so much stress on the mere fact of 20,000 men laying down their arms, for we all know what influence a panic has sometimes on men. At Milan, in 1848, the whole Austrian army under Radetzky ran away before a wholly unarmed population; and yet that same army marched back from the Mincio to the Ticino in a few months, annihilated the whole Sardinian army, and recovered the position they had before lost. In saying this I do not wish to diminish the splendour of Garibaldi's achievements. I could almost liken him to Miltiades, who with a handful of men obtained on the plains of Marathon immortal renown for his success against all the hordes of Asia. Garibaldi has perplexed all the calculations of warfare. But we must not be dazzled by his triumphs; we must look to the political consequences which would infallibly ensue from them. After Garibaldi was made Dictator at Palermo there were cries of not only "Viva Italia!" but also of "Viva Vittore Emmanuele!" I suppose all was arranged between France and Turin; but when Garibaldi allows the people to cry out "Long live Victor Emmanuel, King of Sicily," I ask, can this be the same king who only the other day sold like sheep in the shambles, or slaves in the market-place, so many thousands of his most devoted subjects? Before this man is taken for a King of Sicily a warning voice should ring from the valleys of Savoy to teach the people of Sicily, before it is too late, what he who sold the liberties and interests of his Savoyese subjects—a race devoted for generations, for centuries to his family, and the rock and mainstay of his inheritance—is capable of doing towards newly acquired subjects. We have in this country a strong feeling of patriotism—and I know what the feeling is—but if I were a Sicilian patriot I would almost consent to continue for some time longer in the dungeons of Castellamare, rather than bow before such a false god of patriotism. They call him "Il Rè galantuomo;" and if you want a translation of that term, you may ask the citizens of Nice, or the mountaineers of the Alps. I deeply deplore the fact that the salvation of Italy is to be worked out between political treason on the one hand, and a military despotism on the other. I cannot see how the interests of
  1782
  Italy can profit by such a junction. They want Victor Emmanuel to be King of Sicily; and I will therefore show what its condition was when a Prince of the House of Savoy was sovereign of the island. By the treaty of Utrecht, Sardinia was ceded to Austria, and Sicily to the Duke of Savoy. In 1714 Victor Amadeus II. was crowned King of Sicily. He went to his new kingdom, proclaimed a parliament, and promised all kinds of liberties, after which he went away, and soon began to intrigue, as it seemed to be the habit of all the Savoy Princes. In 1718 he intrigued with the Spaniards to drive out the Austrians from the Milanese territory. The Spaniards did so, but then they turned round on their allies and drove them also from Sicily. The domination of the Spanish Bourbons thus began in 1736; and it is now in its very last agony. I make no allusion to the time when Sicily was in the hands of England, in 1806, and when we held it against the whole force of Prance until we gave it up at the peace. I wish to allude for a moment to the mission of Lord Minto, which took place in 1847 and 1848. By the advice of the present Prime Minister, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he went to Naples, and recommended the separation of Sicily from the dynasty of Naples. He allowed Admial Parker to salute the flag of Sicilian independence and took other steps to make that independence complete. Allow me for a moment to call the attention of the House to an extract from a despatch which was written by the present Prime Minister to Mr. Abercromby with respect to that offer. The noble Lord, on the 8th of May, 1848 wrote in the following terms:—
  "With reference to the offer of the Crown of Sicily to the Duke of Genoa, you will state to the Sardinian Government that it is, of course, for the Duke of Genoa to determine whether it will or will not suit him to accept this flattering offer; but that it might be satisfactory to him to know that if he should wish to do so he would, at the proper time, be acknowledged by Her Majesty."
  In 1848, therefore, the Government of this country distinctly stated that they were prepared to see a separation of Sicily from the Crown of the two Sicilies effected, and the sovereignty of the island committed into the hands of a Prince of the House of Savoy. Now, what I want to know is whether the policy of the noble Lord with regard to the question is the same to-day as it was at the period to which I am referring? Does he now desire that Sicily should not only be separated from Naples,

  1783
  but united to Sardinia, and thus thrown into the grasp of a man who is the mere tool and instrument of the Emperor of the French?
  I do not wish to trouble the House by quoting at length from the recent despatches of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in reference to the affairs of Italy, and I am happy to think it is unnecessary for me to do so, inasmuch as the great majority of hon. Members have no doubt read them with the attention which they merit. The noble Lord, however, I am bound to say, has not shown the same vigour in his despatches upon the affairs of Naples which he has manifested in those which relate to the House of Savoy. The noble Lord in one of the former despatches uses a somewhat curious expression. He says he always wished well to the dynasty on the throne of the Two Sicilies. But in 1848 the noble Lord did not wish well to the throne of the Two Sicilies, because he told Lord Minto that Her Majesty' s Government would support a separation. Again, on the 22nd of June I find the noble Lord writing to Mr. Elliot in these words:—"Her Majesty"—he does not say Her Majesty's Government— "is sincerely desirous to see the dynasty now on the throne of the Two Sicilies maintained and consolidated." These sentiments, I repeat, are not in accordance with the policy of 1848, and I wish the noble Lord would be good enough to inform us what is the cause of the change. But to proceed—Mr. Elliot turns round upon the noble Lord, and informs him that the Government of the two Sicilies persists in maintaining itself by a direct violation of the law. This statement does not, however, appear to exercise much influence over the mind of the noble Lord, for on the 2nd of July he writes to say "Her Majesty's Government"—not simply Her Majesty as before—"desire to see the present dynasty of Naples maintained on the throne." But we have Mr. Elliot on the 17th of July again stating that the King's Government was based on a continued denial of justice, and, more than that, the noble Lord himself on the 16th of January, admitted that "the commonest rules of justice were not observed." The noble Lord in that very same despatch proceeds to say, "We wish well to the Neapolitan dynasty. We recommend the establishment of a representative constitution. We do not offer any opinion on the details of such a measure,"—it would perhaps have
  1784
  been appropriate that the noble Lord should not do so at the time, because we were then upon the point of having our own £6 and £10 debates—"but we recommend free discussion, a popular assembly, and public opinion as the chief ingredients." Now it appears to me that if the noble Lord was anxious to stand forward as the advocate of those blessings, he need not have gone quite so far as Naples for the purpose. In thus criticising these despatches, no one of course, will for a moment suppose that I entertain any feeling in favour of acts of cruelties so atrocious as those which the King of Naples is said to have committed. I have read authentic reports of those acts, and have learnt upon indisputable evidence the crimes which this military despot has perpetrated. I cannot understand how now, in the nineteenth century, the people of a nation which had once tasted the blessings of constitutional freedom could be content to submit without a murmur to a rule which maintained no semblance of liberty or of law. The noble Lord recommends them to try "free discussion, popular assemblies, and public opinion;" but, as I said before, he need not go so far as Naples to seek fitting objects for such advice. He has only to look across the Channel to perceive that those despatches which he sent to the Court of Naples may with great force be addressed to the Emperor of the French. Now, let me add that almost every one of us—laying aside all political meaning—sympathize with the proceedings of the heroic Garibaldi. Such, however, let it be clearly understood is not the case with the noble Lord, who has done everything he could to stop him in his career. Let there be no mistake on this matter. I think it was the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Bowyer) who, on the 4th of May last, put a question to the noble Lord with respect to Naples, to which he returned the following reply:—
  "The Ministers of the King of the Two Sicilies have from time to time communicated with us, which shows a reliance, a great reliance on the friendship of Her Majesty's Government. Upon one occasion there was a report that General Garibaldi was going to Sicily with armed ships. The Government of the Two Sicilies immediately applied to Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to stop that expedition, and I lost no time in applying to the Sardinian Government, asking them, if they had any authority over Garibaldi, not to allow him to proceed."
  It is quite evident that the course which Garibaldi has taken has not the approval of the noble Lord; but, be that as it may,

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  I trust he has no desire to see Sicily united to Sardinia, which is intriguing under the cover of Garibaldi. But while these intrigues are going on promises are, it seems, being made of a free Constitution and every sort of good to the Sicilians if they will only give way. I, however, very much doubt whether the Sicilian patriots will be disposed to place much reliance on those promises, seeing how often they have been already deceived. In 1848, on the recommendation of the noble Lord, a Constitution was offered to the Sicilians, an offer which, when matters assumed a more favourable aspect, was ignored. Nay, more, the King of Naples sent General Filangieri to bombard and destroy Messina, while those very men who supported him in his constitutional policy—Poeri and Settembrini—were consigned to spend years of misery in a dungeon because they had shown themselves faithful to the liberties of their country. In 1821, also, a Constitution was promised, as it is to-day, and immediately withdrawn. I repeat, therefore, that I hope the Sicilian patriots will not be deceived by those promises, and that we shall have that independence secured to Sicily—either through the medium of a guarantee on the part of the Powers of Europe, or by some other means—which she has shown herself so fit to enjoy. The noble Lord at the head of the Government, when asked the other evening what course Her Majesty's Ministers would be prepared to take with reference to any suggestions that might be made to them on this subject from the Court of Naples, made use of the following remarkable words:—
  "It is the fault and fortune of such Governments as that of Naples, when, by the cruelties and atrocities committed under their authority, their subjects have been driven to desperation and have revolted, that they appeal to all friendly Powers for assistance to remove the men who are the authors and instigators of those revolutionary movements, and if their prayers were granted, and steps taken to accomplish the object they desired—unless, which is very unlikely, they were prepared to alter their own course—the first, most effectual, and only necessary step would be their own removal."
  Now, that was a straightforward and generous answer to return, and on the sentiments which it expresses I, for one, fully participate. I have now to thank the House for allowing me to address them at such length. I will merely say in conclusion that I do not profess to see any solution of the existing difficulties of Sicily. I can only hope, as I said before, that Her Majesty's
  1786
  Government will not sanction the union of that island with the Crown of Sardinia. We have already enough on our hands without encountering the complications which such a policy must involve. The state of Europe is sufficiently alarming, and, more than that, we know that great danger will be likely to result if the influence of France is allowed to acquire in Sicily predominant power. Now, I want to see the political influence of England maintained. Much has been said during the Session of her power and resources, and no one can deny their greatness at home. I, however, should wish to behold her enjoying abroad that influence which she is entitled to exercise, and employing it for good, for we know that, whatever may he the extension of our wealth or the growth of our commerce, the prosperity of the country cannot in reality be said to be based upon a sound footing unless we maintain due political weight in Europe. I do earnestly trust, then, that Her Majesty's Government will take every opportunity to secure and consolidate that political influence; for, if one iota of it be abated, if you allow the prestige of the country to be dwarfed and narrowed, in the same proportion will her greatness undergo diminution. But if, upon the other hand, you are prepared to act upon the policy which I have pointed out and to uphold unimpaired that influence "which has grown with our growth and strengthened with our strength"—then will the Parliament and people of England be able to look with confidence to the progress of passing events, while she herself will continue to retain that high position among the nations of Europe which, during the last half century has shed so magnificent a lustre on the annals of her history.
  Amendment proposed,
  "To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copies or Extracts of Papers relating to the threatened annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, and to any information received by Her Majesty's Government as to the probable demands of France consequent upon the event of that annexation taking place; also any Papers showing that Her Majesty's Government have within the last few weeks intimated to the Government of Turin that the continued aggressive policy of that Government would not be viewed with indifference by Great Britain,"
  —instead thereof.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I cannot deny—indeed—I freely admit the

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  ability, sincerity, and generosity of the hon. Baronet who has just spoken. I will readily admit likewise that I have to thank not only him and others who share his political views, but also hon. Members opposite for the forbearance which they have shown in a very difficult period of foreign policy. I have not to complain, therefore, that the hon. Baronet should take this occasion, on going into Committee of Supply, to ask what are the views of the Government with regard to the present state of Italy. At the same time I must say that, as the hon. Baronet went on from one topic to another, I was much at a loss to gather from his observations what was the policy he would recommend. I own I was puzzled to know whether he wished that the King of Naples should be enabled to assert his authority in Sicily, and that the influence of Her Majesty's Government should be used for that purpose, or whether he desired that the people of Naples and Sicily should be free to choose for themselves that kind of government which they prefer. Sir, in looking at this subject, one must consider what has happened since 1815, and more particularly the events of last year. In 1815 Austria had allotted to her Lombardy and Venetia, but her influence was not confined to those territories. From 1815 to 1859 she extended her influence over every part of the peninsula; and when the political influence, which a great country such as Austria possesses, was not sufficient, she sent her armies to put down the institutions which the people had chosen for themselves, and to restore absolute dominion. The present Prime Minister of Austria has been obliged to confess that that system has failed. Well-intentioned, as he maintains it was, towards the people of Italy and the general state and balance of power in Europe, he cannot deny that the result of that policy has been such as to make the Italians averse from Austrian rule and to compel Austria to renounce that policy for the future. Well then, Sir, what has happened. From 1848 to 1859 France and Austria occupied by their arms parts of the Roman States. In 1859 it happened, as it was very likely to happen in some year or other, without any one being able to fix the precise epoch, the King of Sardinia excited the people of Italy to resist foreign domination. He assured them that he felt for their agony, and that he sympathized with their griefs; and at that time he obtained the assistance
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  of France to enable him to oppose Austria. This country, under the guidance of the Ministry of the Earl of Derby, refrained from taking any part in that war, and that neutrality was applauded and supported by all parties in Parliament and all classes in the country. Assuming that position, therefore, it was not for us to expect any of the rewards or spoils which might be the results of the contest. It appears now that at the very commencement of the war France had stipulated, not in a formal treaty, but in an agreement so binding that Sardinia could not afterwards free herself from it, that if a considerable part of Italy were transferred to the King of Sardinia, Savoy and Nice should be annexed to France for the security of her frontier. Well, the hon. Baronet says that we interfered too late. The first we heard of such a project was naturally, almost immediately (at most three weeks) after our coming into office, when the French Government said that they would not entertain this project if the Treaty of Villafranca was to be carried into effect, but they wore of opinion that as that treaty had placed the King of Sardinia in possession of a great portion of Italy, then the security of France required that Savoy and Nice should be given up. We stated at once, in the beginning of July last, the mischievous effects such an annexation would produce. We believed it would have a mischievous effect; but we did not say then, we have never said, that we should oppose that annexation by force of arms. We informed the French Government that, in our opinion, a grave mistake in policy would be committed if these provinces were annexed to France. We pointed out that the distrust which would thereby be created in Europe, on the Rhine, and elsewhere, rendered the annexation in every way objectionable. That was the course we pursued and the opinion we maintained. It is an opinion we have never concealed from the Emperor of the French, or from any of the other Powers of Europe. But we never proposed to carry that protest to the extremity of war in the event of the annexation being carried out.
  In considering the conduct of Sardinia and of the Italians, it must be borne in mind that the people of Italy have, not merely since 1815, but for hundreds of years, been suffering from the effect of their own dissensions. They have been subdued by foreign Powers, they have been kept in subjection to tyrants whom they

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  have despised, they have been misgoverned to the utmost extent, their national genius has been silenced; and all these misfortunes have sprung from the same cause. It has been a reproach to them in the eyes of foreign nations, and one which they have felt deeply, that to their own disunion, dissensions, and jealousies they owed the miseries they suffered. Such being the case, what was more natural than that the men who wished that their country should be independent, and that she should play her part once-more in the great theatre of the world, should apply the antidote where they found the poison at work, and attempt by union to remedy the disease from which their country languished? That was the feeling even in Tuscany, where there was no violent tyranny to complain of. The Government was mild, though no encouragement was given to political or even to literary exertion, and had it been only a question of driving away one Sovereign and putting another in his place the people would not have been disposed for revolution; but the feeling in Tuscany, as well as elsewhere, was that, unless they could have union and range themselves under the banner of a single Sovereign, there would be no chance of security and independence for them as a nation. The King of Sardinia is a brave and gallant man, a soldier who has distinguished himself in the field; but it is not so much his personal merits as his being the Sovereign who has evinced a desire to assert the independence of Italy which has rallied the Italians round him and induced them to unite themselves under his sceptre. It was the same feeling that induced the people of Italy to place themselves under the protection of France. What, then, was France to do in such a case? The Emperor of the French had signed a treaty by which the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena had their rights reserved to them; but he had declared at the same time that he would neither use force himself nor permit others to use it to coerce the will of the people of Italy. The Italians were encouraged by that declaration, and proclaimed that their wish was to be annexed to Sardinia. Austria, enfeebled by the war she had just passed through, and dispirited by the reverses she had sustained, although she still maintained her former views as to the rights which were derived from legitimate sovereignty and rights derived from treaties, agreed to make no attack on what
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  she would call the revolted parts of Italy and to confine herself to the defence of her own dominions. What was the course, then, which Her Majesty's Government took? Seeing that the people of Italy had suffered from their former disunion, and from the foreign intervention which had taken place in 1821, in 1848, and on other occasions, they deemed that the time had now come when it was right to see whether the Italians could not form and sustain a Government for themselves. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, laid it down as a principle by which they would abide, that the Italians should be allowed to make their own choice of a Government and that no foreign Power should be interposed to coerce them. I could not gather the view of the hon. Baronet on this subject, but the view I have stated is a broad and simple view. We have found hitherto that the people of Italy who have rallied under the King of Sardinia have shown no disposition to break into tumult. There has been but one outrage, but one murder committed during the revolution in Central Italy, and nothing like anarchy has displayed itself there. On the contrary, there has everywhere been submission to the new form of Government, and the people have ranged themselves under the banner of order.
  Well, then, I come to that which formed the theme of the greater part of the speech of the hon. Baronet—the case of Naples and Sicily. And here I must say I could have wished that the hon. Baronet had spared the memory of one who is now no more—Lord Minto. His representations of Lord Minto's conduct are entirely erroneous. Lord Minto went to Italy at the desire of my noble Friend, who was then Foreign Secretary, with the view of reconciling the Sovereigns of Italy to make reasonable and useful improvements, and of recommending the chief persons of the Liberal party to remain tranquil under their respective Sovereigns, and to look for internal improvement from those Sovereigns, rather than attempt revolution.
  SIR ROBERT PEEL,in explanation, said, I should be sorry to allow the noble Lord to remain for a moment under a misapprehension. I said that I had the most agreeable souvenir of the kindness and amiability with which Lord Minto treated me personally, but that his political mission was a failure; that the Government who sent him had deceived the Sicilian patriots. That was all I said,

  1791
  I did not say a word against the personal character and conduct of Lord Minto.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: The hon. Gentleman having represented certain facts, and having declared that Lord Minto was the instrument of deceiving the Sicilian patriots, it is necessary to state exactly what occurred with respect to Naples and Sicily. Lord Minto, when he went to Naples, found that the King had given a Constitution to his people and that a Liberal Ministry were in office. He assisted at a Council with the King of Naples that sat many hours, and the result of which was that certain concessions were made to the people of Sicily, which it was hoped would induce them to remain under the sceptre of the King of Naples. Lord Minto was authorized to make these proposals to the Sicilians; but when he arrived there two circumstances had occurred which contributed to the failure of his endeavours, both of which were beyond Lord Minto's control. One was, that the French revolution had broken out, and that the French people had proclaimed a republic. The minds of men were agitated throughout Europe, as we all remember, by that news. The people of Sicily among others were discontented with their former Government, and, wishing for a change, they began to think that so me republican change would be more advantageous than the institutions they had formerly lived under, or than a return to the sway of the King of Naples. Another circumstance had occurred which I may relate, as so many circumstances of a similar character are known that it can be no additional reproach upon the late King of Naples to mention it. Lord Minto's only chance was in carrying these concessions with him as a British Minister, and recommending them in that capacity to the Sicilians as a sufficient guarantee for their liberty. But when he arrived in Sicily he found that these conditions had been known some days, and that they had been sent without any recommendation from the King of Naples. The people of Sicily had deliberated upon those proposals, and had determined to reject them, and thus his mission failed at the moment of his arrival.
  Now let us see what have been our relations with respect to that Spanish branch of the House of Bourbon which now sits upon the throne of Naples. In 1806 the British Government refused to make peace with France almost solely because the Emperor of the French demanded Sicily, and
  1792
  the British Government to its honour refused to surrender the territory of an ally. Thus the house of Bourbon owed to the Government of Great Britain the preservation of Sicily. A constitution was at that time established in Sicily, which Lord William Bentinck did much to confirm. By that constitution the kingdom of Sicily was to be separated from the kingdom of Naples. If the eldest son of the King of the Two Sicilies chose Sicily he was to abandon the crown of Naples, while if he chose Naples he was to give up Sicily, and the second son was to succeed to the throne of that country. In 1814 the King of the Two Sicilies procured an article to be inserted in the Treaty of Vienna, in which he was recognized as King of the Two Sicilies, whereby the constitution of 1812 was torn to pieces and scattered to the winds. In 1815 the King of the Two Sicilies made a Treaty with Austria, by which he engaged not introduce into his dominions any other Government than that which the Emperor of Austria might think fit to introduce into Lombardy. By this Treaty he not only destroyed the constitution of 1812, but he made a compact with a Foreign Power that he would not restore liberty to Sicily. In 1821, when that country had a constitution, it was overthrown by the presence of a foreign force, and 40,000 Austrian troops were left to occupy Naples and Sicily, and I believe did occupy those countries for three or four years. In 1848, again, the King of Naples gave a constitution to his subjects, which he afterwards destroyed by his own hands. From 1848 to 1859 the people of Naples and Sicily suffered under—not the absolute Government of the monarch and the despotic conduct of his Ministers, but under an arbitrary and vexatious police, which made every man's house a prison, which tracked men as they walked the streets, and followed them into the privacy of domestic life, and which made the whole kingdom such a scene of misery and tyranny as has hardly any example. The present King succeeded to the throne. The late Government of this country thereupon sent Mr. Elliot to Naples, and told him verbally—for I believe he had no written instructions—to advise a liberal Prime Minister and a constitution to the King of Naples. When we succeeded to the Government we likewise advised the King to make concessions of popular institutions, and, above all, to establish a just administration of the law. The Ministers of the King of

  1793
  Naples said "We do not mean to grant a constitution; we disapprove of popular constitutions, but we mean to administer the law." Upon this we inquired, if they meant to administer the law, why they kept so many persons in prison against the law? They rejoined that the law was intended for the people, and not for the Government; that the Government might arrest anybody it pleased, and that it was necessary for the purposes of the State that the Government should not be compelled to bring them before the tribunals. Thus we went on, always advising concessions and a liberal constitution, or at the least an administration of the law, and if our advice has not been taken, and the concessions lately made have not succeeded, it only proves that those concessions were made too late. We at least cannot reproach ourselves that we have concealed from the King of Naples the policy that would have saved his throne and given security to his dynasty in future. Even a few months ago the King of Naples might have secured both Naples and Sicily. An expedition went out to Sicily—and here I must explain the particular fact to which the hon. Baronet alludes. He adverted to a speech made by me in this House in answer to the hon. Member for Dundalk (Mr. Bowyer) relative to Garibaldi; but the hon. Baronet did not state, and probably did not know, the date when that occurrence took place. It took place in the summer of last year, when the King had just ascended the throne and had ascertained the existence of much discontent in Sicily, and when it was desirable he should take every opportunity of meeting this discontent by just concessions and the establishment of a free constitution in that island. The Government of Naples wished us to represent to Sardinia that it ought not to invade a friendly State. It so happened that the King of Sardinia had no such design or intention, and we received a communication to that effect. What happened lately took place without our knowledge. I know not whether it was without the knowledge of the Sardinian Government, but so far from their having inspired the expedition, my accounts all tell me that they looked upon it as a wild and mad enterprise, and thought they would soon receive inteligence of its utter failure. I have stated on former occasions, when Garibaldi was reproached with being a filibuster, that the name could not justly be applied to a man
  1794
  who had rescued a country from slavery, and placed it in a position of liberty and happiness. Garibaldi is, at least, a man of very extraordinary character. He landed with between 1,000 and 2,000 men, and in the course, I believe, of a fortnight, 18,000 or 20,000 of the forces of the King of Naples agreed to evacuate. Palermo, and the people of Sicily followed him as their deliverer. Well, then, again comes a new position of affairs. It may be that the people of Sicily will declare in favour of annexation. It may be, and I think it likely, that an attempt to annex Sicily and then to annex Naples, and, I suppose, the Roman States, would not end in the consolidation of a firm Government. For my own part, I doubt very much whether the people of the north of Italy can, under the same sceptre with the people of southern Italy, form a firm and permanent Government, which would act in harmony for the welfare of the Peninsula. These are my doubts and my opinions. If the King of Naples is able by the concessions which he has made to conciliate the Neapolitans, and induce them to live under his rule with free institutions, Her Majesty's Government cannot find fault with such a result. Again, if the people of Sicily can obtain the constitution of 1812, and are satisfied with the constitution, it is not for us to find fault with the arrangement. But, on the other hand, we will never lose sight of the principle which we have before enunciated, and which we think is a sacred principle—one to which there are indeed some, but very rare, exceptions—namely, that with regard to the internal government of a country the people of that country are the best judges, and that no foreigner should interfere by force to coerce and to overwhelm their decision. It is not only a nice question, but it is one of the most extreme difficulty, for foreigners to declare, "Such a man is worthy of your confidence; such a Prince may be safely followed; such a chief is a good political adviser, such another will give you a constitution under which you may live happy." A foreigner should speak on such matters with great measure and with great reserve, and can only give an opinion according to the imperfect lights which he may possess. It is, therefore, for the people of Sicily and of Naples, and I must add also—whoever may be offended by that expression—it is for the people of the Roman States themselves to say what is the form of government under which they choose to live.

  1795
  With regard to the policy of the British Government, we may from day to day have to treat of matters in which our relations with other Powers may induce us to recommend a particular measure at one time, or a certain course at another; but I can assure the House, and it is the only word and the last word I have to say, that, as far as concerns the people of Italy, we have no other policy than to leave them to decide for themselves their own fate. If their decision should be such as tends to the future happiness and independence of Italy, I feel confident we shall rejoice at it, and not on account of Italy alone,
  "Who values liberty confines
  His love for her within no narrow bounds;
  and I believe that for the liberty and happiness of Europe, as well as for "the balance of power" in Europe—a phrase which is often abused, but which yet has a clear and significant meaning—there can be no better guarantee and no greater security than the independence of Italy.
  MR. KINGLAKE: It was, I think, quite unnecessary for my hon. Friend (Sir Robert Peel) to deprecate any possible opinion on the part of the House that his Motion would be in any way inopportune, for the attitude taken by Sardinia is certainly one well calculated to give great anxiety to every man who feels an interest in the maintenance of the peace of Europe. An aggression by any one European State is always a matter of deep importance, but the experience of the last few months has taught us that an aggression by Sardinia is an operation which draws with it very peculiar consequences. Sardinia, as we know, is a neighbour of France; and when Sardinia, going forth in quest of prey, succeeds in aggrandizing herself, it seems that the Emperor of the French instantly comes before Europe and claims to be indemnified for the additional strength which she has acquired. This is obviously a consideration which gives great importance to all such transactions as those which have lately occurred. Given, that Sardinia is to possess herself of the island of Sicily, we may then have to make out, according to some new Rule of Three, what country will be sufficiently rich to compensate the Emperor of the French for this aggrandizement of his neighbour. Is it Genoa which is to be given up? Rumour says so. That would be an acquisition by the Emperor of the French which would be vastly more than equivalent to the doubtful advantage
  1796
  expected by Sardinia in the annexation of Sicily. The Emperor's plan for the territorial re-arrangement of Europe seems to be to put forward another State to make claims for herself, and then to seek the kind of compensation I have suggested. My hon. Friend used an expression in speaking of the Austrian army in 1848 which was, I think, rather a slip of the tongue, and which probably he would be glad to have corrected. He talked about the Austrian army running away from Milan. It certainly did retire from the city at the time of the insurrection; but that very retirement was the beginning of a scries of most masterly military operations which ended in a campaign, in the course of which Marshal Radetsky was able to roll back the tide of war, and to gain for himself, at the great age of 86, the just reputation of being—I will not say the first, because the Duke of Wellington was then alive—but the second commander in Europe. The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) has made to-night one statement which has given me most unfeigned satisfaction. He has told us that Count Rechberg, the enlightened Prime Minister of Austria, has at length announced his abandonment of that one unhappy line of policy which tended greatly to separate this country from her ancient ally. I rejoice that that cause of difference is now entirely removed. The noble Lord seemed inclined to excuse or palliate the peculiar position in which General Garibaldi is placed, by referring to the good which he seems able to do; and the noble Lord said that many a man might be called a filibuster who, in point of fact, was greatly benefiting a country. But I cannot feel that that is a satisfactory mode of explaining the position in which Garibaldi stands, for it seems to me that if there be any palliation for the kind of enterprise which he has undertaken, it lies in this—that he is one of a great people who aim at being a nation. It is in that light, and not because he is simply doing good, that his enterprise is viewed with approbation by so many Englishmen.
  The question that is suggested to my mind by the Motion of my hon. Friend is this—is Sardinia a country truly independent—is she a country, I will not say lawfully, but honestly, labouring to put together the scattered members of Italy, or is she in point of fact the vassal—the mere vassal of Franco? Now, I regret to be obliged to come to the conclusion that the

  1797
  latter description is the true one. Up to March last no doubt it was possible to hope and believe that Sardinia was actually independent. At that time Count Cavour assured not only the Foreign Minister of his country, but also his own most intimate friends, that no consideration should induce him or the King he represented to sell or to surrender either Savoy or Nice, and yet within a fortnight from that time he was devising a scheme to secure the Treaty of Zurich. The only excuse for such a departure from a pledged word was, that he was acting under pressure; but, if so, why does he now claim to stand before Europe as the Minister of an independent State? I am free to admit that a Power of second-rate importance like Sardinia, placed under compulsion by a great Power like France, does demand our compassion, but it does not form a reason for our becoming the ally of a Power which confesses she has lost her independence. The ties which bound the King of Sardinia to the provinces of Savoy and Nice were most sacred. Those provinces had not only been from time immemorial a part of the sovereignty of his ancestors, but they were the territories which had given them rank as sovereign Princes in Europe. Not only from that circumstance, but also from the fact that his ancestor regained those provinces in 1814 under solemn pledges to retain them, was he bound to consider the ties sacred. We know that in 1814–15 those provinces were in the hands of the belligerent Powers, who were then bringing to a conclusion the war they had been waging against France. It was competent to those powers to dispose of those provinces as they pleased, and they thought fit to restore them to the King of Sardinia, an independent sovereign, in order that, being on the frontier of France, they might form a part of the system of the balance of power in Europe. They even advanced a large sum of money to the King of Sardinia to enable him to fortify those provinces against the very Power into whose hands the present King has thought fit to surrender them. The King of Sardinia has parted with the ancient possessions of his family, he has given up his military frontier—he has lost the best battalions of his army—he has abandoned a great portion of his seaboard, in order that he might preside, or seem to preside, over the great endeavours now being made to reconstruct the kingdom of Italy. I
  1798
  admit that the hope of attaining such an object might well excite a manly ambition; but I think that the abdication of a part of his own territories was but a sorry step towards that end. In the position which Sardinia occupied in Europe it was the duty of the King to cultivate the friendship of France, of Austria, and of England; but he has so acted that he has no other ally than France, if that country can be called an ally, which is, in fact, his master. When he awakes from the dream for which he has abandoned so much he will find his position is like that of King Joseph or King Jerome, who had territories assigned to them, but whose dominion was merely nominal, and whose kingdoms soon disappeared. For the sake of Italy, Sardinia has been pardoned much, but let her beware how she so operates in Italy as that her conduct may have an influence on the affairs of Central Europe. It is obviously possible for Sardinia so to operate with her troops on the Mincio as to be able to influence events upon the Rhine. I happen to know that Count Cavour announced a policy of this kind in March last. He then deliberately stated that Sardinia was looking to the possession of Venetia, but her first duty would be to keep Austri in check on the Mincio while the Emperor acted on the Rhine. It is one thing that Europe should assent to Sardinia extending herself in Italy, but it is another thing to assent to her using the power gained in Italy to influence events in Central Europe, We must never forget that the great "Quadrilateral," of which Verona is a part, is a barrier or rampart for Germany. The policy of which the King of Sardinia has consented to be the instrument has been suggested to another Potentate. It is well known that since 1857 the French Government has pressed upon the Prince of Prussia the idea of his taking some of the minor States of Germany and giving up to France, as compensation, the Rhenish provinces. To obtain that object was, I believe, the hope of the Emperor when he went the other day to Baden: but he found there an insuperable difficulty—he found there an honest man. It would, indeed, hardly have been possible for the Prince of Prussia to act otherwise than his honourable, straightforward nature, dictated on that occasion, for he was in possession of a fact which I will mention to the House, and can do so with perfect confidence on its accuracy. The House will do me the justice to remember that I have on former

  1799
  occasions ventured to make statements which I think time has shown to be accurate, and therefore the House may feel inclined to believe the fact which I am about to state. I assert this, and it is a fact of deep importance for those who still retain the idea that the Emperor of the French is the sincere champion of Italy. I assert that at the second meeting at Villafranca the Emperor of the French proposed to the Emperor Francis Joseph to give him back Lombardy upon condition that Austria should acquiesce in operations which he then intended to attempt on the Rhine. I repeat that the Prince of Prussia was in possession of this fact, and it is not to be wondered at that he met the proposal of the Emperor in the same spirit of straightforward honesty as inspired the answer of the Emperor Francis Joseph. That answer was very short and very simple. He said, "No, I am a German Prince!"
  Now, Sir, I believe that even if the German Princes were not so high minded, if they were to waver on this subject, the feeling of the people of Germany is of such a kind that they would be compelled to do their duty. In Germany, although there are differences on a thousand subjects, there is one subject on which all are united. You can always secure the concurrence of every German around you when you say that the French shall never have the German Rhine. In truth, the Germans seem to have determined that they will not again go through the humiliations and disasters which they suffered in the early part of this century, but they will begin with that noble uprising of the people which characterized the close of the last war—they will begin with the year 1813. But even if the people of Germany had forgotten the disasters to which they were exposed by French invasion, her Princes could not be ignorant of modern history, as to the manner in which a Bonapartean Sovereign is accustomed to make peace. From the Peace of Campo Formio, in 1796, down to the Peace of Villafranca, in the last year, you always find this to be the characteristic mark of the Bonapartean mode of making peace—that they make a peace not on the terms merely of arranging the relations of the two belligerents, but on the plan of deliberately sacrificing the interests of neutrals and friends. So it was at Villafranca. The scheme of the Emperor of the French was to make peace with the Emperor of Austria by delivering up to him Lombardy,
  1800
  and to induce him to accept it as the price of treachery on his part against her German confederates. Well, now, I ask, why is it that, from one end of Europe to the other, we have nothing but rumours of war? France has no quarrel that I know of—no dispute, even, with Belgium or with Prussia, or with the Mecklenburg, or Saxony, or Denmark, or Bavaria, or Sardinia; and yet there is not one of these States whose territories are not in some way threatened by the rumours now prevailing in Europe. It is notorious that along the whole eastern frontier of France agitators are at work endeavouring to sow the seeds of discontent, and prepare the minds of the people for a change of the rule under which they live. I have seen a letter from a gentleman of high character, whose name I will mention confidentially to any hon. Gentleman who is accustomed to take part in these debates, though I do not think it would be right to mention it publicly—I have seen a letter from a gentleman residing in one of the States thus threatened, and he gives an account of an interview which had taken place between him and one of those French emissaries, a passage from which I will quote as somewhat interesting to the House. The emissary says to him,
  "There is not a country which France does not hold in her hand, not a country without some internal question on which it is possible to found a strong and immediate action. In Prussia and Denmark, the hostility of the small States; in Austria, Hungary; in Russia, serfage; in England—in England—"
  [The hon. Gentleman here paused significantly, during which an hon. Member called out "Ireland! Ireland!"] The House seems surprised when I pause at the mention of England, but the truth is this emissary, as the ground on which the French Government founded their hopes as regards this country, had mentioned the name of an hon. Gentleman, a Member of this House—[Cries of "Name!"]—and as he is not present it would perhaps be right to abstain from naming him. It is unnecessary to say that the French emissary did not at all mean that the Member to whom he referred was engaged in any sort of intrigue that would bring upon him any kind of blame; all that was meant was that the policy pursued by that hon. Member was of such a kind as to give great reliance and gratification to the Emperor of the French.
  Well, I ask, why is Europe thus dis-

  1801
  turbed? I say the answer lies in the internal state of France. The internal state of France is such that it becomes absolutely necessary for the ruler of that country to divert attention from home affairs by giving to the people of France the habit of looking abroad. We most of us know that M. Paradol is now lying in prison for having written what in most countries would be considered a very moderate pamphlet; and the passage for which he was thrown into prison is one in which he expressed what I believe is the feeling of many Frenchmen—a yearning for peace on their part, a desire to turn their attention to home affairs, and give up this habit of causing disturbance in the neighbouring States. The passage for which M. Paradol was prosecuted is this—
  "France is like a man standing at a window, and so utterly engrossed by what is passing in the street, that he cannot be induced to mind what is going on in his own house."
  Well, now, it is in order to make it possible to keep a man in prison for writing words like these that Europe is disturbed by wars or rumours of wars, or some miserable annexation of territory undertaken by the French Emperor. Among the statesmen and orators of France there used to be something which was called a foreign policy; but now there seems to be no more a foreign policy, but a mere series of small conspiracies. The foreign policy of France has degenerated into a mere system for the disturbance of neighbouring States. The kind of agitation now being carried on over the whole eastern frontier of France, may substantially and truly be said to be the operation, not of the French Foreign Office, but of the French police. Was there ever a more singular spectacle than that now presented? Here is France possessed with an idea that there is to he speedily a war with some Power—and yet, so singularly situated is she as not to know with whom she was to fight. France, as it seems to me, is, as it were, led forward like some mere dumb animal that has been taught to pull a trigger and fire a musket, without knowing why or wherefore, except that she was under the orders of her master. Our own foreign policy is at present in a somewhat labyrinthine state, but for this labyrinth there is an effectual clue, and that is one which the words of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs himself gave us on the 26th of March, words which delighted every section of the House, and which have been
  1802
  responded to throughout the country. After stating his wish to live on the most friendly terms with the Government of France, he went on to say—
  "We ought not to keep ourselves apart from the other nations of Europe, but when future questions arise—as future questions may arise—we should he ready to act with others."
  Sir, I consider that these assuring words contain a true indication of the policy which England ought to pursue.
  MR. WHITESIDE: I wish to call the attention of the House to the practical part of this subject. The hon. Baronet opposite put a question to the noble Lord, to which I was not so fortunate as to hear the answer. He asked for information as to the probable demands of France in the event of the annexation of Sicily to the Kingdom of Sardinia. No doubt, as the noble Lord truly observed, delicacy and reserve ought to be observed in respect to a future foreign policy, when you are ignorant of what that policy may be and have no knowledge of the facts. But the noble Lord gave no answer to the direct question put to him. He, however, made a statement full of interest, and I only regret that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not here at the time to he instructed by it. It was declared some months since in this House—although it was not then admitted by the Treasury Bench—that long ago a bargain was struck between the Minister of Sardinia and the French Emperor, that in the event of the Kingdom of Sardinia being considerably enlarged compensation should be made to the injured and terrified ruler of France. The noble Lord, however, is the first Minister of the Crown who has acknowledged the truth of this statement, and he has truly added that this policy of the French Government was calculated to disturb Germany and fill Europe with distrust, and that that opinion was conveyed by our Minister to the Government of the Emperor. That I hold to be a very important announcement. It is an announcement of the view which Her Majesty's Government took of that transaction. But I beg the House to remember that, while the noble Foreign Secretary has made that significant statement as to the recent policy of France, we have had the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer announcing to us for weeks and months past, with his extraordinary powers of eloquence, that nothing but peace and happiness were to flow from

  1803
  our commercial arrangements with that country the policy of which the noble Lord tells us fills Europe with alarm and distrust. Which of these two Ministers is in the right I do not pretend to say, except to hint as delicately as I can that I think it is the noble Foreign Secretary, and not his right hon. Colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As, however, the noble Lord has expressed his opinion, it is only fair that the right hon. Gentleman should have an opportunity of favouring us with the opposite view of the question, and of depicting the general confidence and tranquillity consequent upon the conclusion of the French Commercial Treaty. I agree with the noble Lord that a policy of peace, to be pursued, I presume, consistently with honour, is the policy worthy of a British Minister. I was not in this House when the discussion took place upon the conduct of Lord Minto; but I have read what was said on that occasion, and I learnt that the noble Viscount defended that noble Lord from attacks then made upon him, as I understand, by certain Members of his present Administration. It is a remarkable circumstance that the hon. Baronet (Sir Robert Peel) should commend the patriotic spirit displayed by the Volunteers of this country, and that the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Kinglake) should tell us that Europe is disturbed by rumours of war, changes of dynasty, and possible revolutions; while for months past we have been assured by the most eloquent Members of the Ministry that if we only acquiesced in his schemes we might calculate upon a secure and prolonged European peace.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELLexplained that the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly right in saying he had declined giving the information referred to in this Motion, which he felt it his duty to oppose.
  MR. MONSELLsaid, that he could not collect from the noble Lord's speech whether Her Majesty's Government were encouraging or discouraging the annexation of Sicily to Sardinia. If the inquiry addressed to the noble Lord had been whether the Government were in favour of leaving the people of Sicily to choose for themselves what form of domestic Government they would live under, the noble Lord's speech would have been perfectly satisfactory, and everybody present might have concurred in it. That, however, was not the question put by his hon. Friend, who wished to know whether the policy of an-
  1804
  nexing Sicily to Sardinia was to be pursued, and whether the consent of Her Majesty's Government was again to be given to principles which must lead to continual changes in the map of Europe, putting every small State in perpetual trepidation lest it should be transferred to some other Power. In the neighbourhood of the Rhine the question was perpetually asked, were the provinces to continue to belong to themselves, or were they to be annexed to some other power! Of all questions that came before the House, this was the most important. Undoubtedly the principle was sanctioned in the first instance by our Government in regard to Northern Italy. Take, for example, the case of Parma. Nobody pretended that there was the slightest cause of complaint against the Government of that Duchy, where justice was equally administered, and the Sovereign trusted and beloved by her subjects, on whom she had conferred innumerable benefits. Yet, merely to gratify the ambition of a neighbouring Power she was driven from her throne and her dominions annexed. The Emperor of the French, as Count Cavour had distinctly stated, following the example set in the annexation of Parma, Tuscany, and Modena, proceeded to apply the same principle to Savoy and Nice, where nobody supposed that the favour of "universal suffrage" adopted expressed the real opinions of the people. Let the same system be followed in Belgium. Suppose a bad harvest, a dearth of employment for the manufacturers, and great consequent discontent to exist in that country,—what would be more easy, under such circumstances, than for French gold and active French emissaries to get up some kind of a popular demonstration, and thus to bring on a repetition of the transactions lately witnessed in Parma or in Nice? Again, take the Christian provinces of Turkey. No doubt the majority of the House would be glad to hear that those provinces had vindicated their freedom. It was, however, a totally different question whether we could sanction their annexation to Russia. But if we did not choose to sanction it, would not every logical ground of resistance to such an annexation have been cut from under our feet by our conduct in regard to the Italian States? This was a matter on which the whole peace and tranquillity of Europe depended. The principle upon which he was animadverting had never before been recognized by this country. It was violated in the case

  1805
  of Cracow by Austria, whose proceedings were denounced in the memorable debates which took place on the subject in that House. It was opposed to the doctrines laid down by Sir James Mackintosh, in his remarkable speech on the annexation of Genoa to Sardinia, in which that eminent man declared that the great idea of a Christian commonwealth of nations was that every small State should be as much secured against the aggression of a large State as every private individual in a well-governed community was secured against the aggression of his neighbour. That was the only true principle; the setting up of any other would overturn the foundations of international law, bring back a heathen sentiment instead of a Christian one, and substitute for the dictates of right and justice the motto of the proudest of the ancient Irish chieftains—"the strongest hand uppermost."
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, he thought the hon. Baronet opposite, led away by his laudable feelings in favour of the liberties of one country, had rather overlooked the rights and interests; of another. It would be most unfair, because of their natural indignation at the recent transactions connected with Savoy and Nice, to visit the sins of Sardinia and France upon the people of Sicily and the rest of Italy. The transfer of Savoy and Nice to France was attributable to Count Cavour and to him only, and he must be responsible for it to his country and to posterity. In his opinion the feeling in Sardinia was so much opposed to France that the extension of that kingdom and the formation of an united Italy would rather counteract than advance French views. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office bad only erred in one respect in regard to these transactions. Dazzled by the light of the Commercial Treaty, he and his colleagues had turned a blind eye upon the proceedings of France towards Sardinia, and had given delusive and evasive answers in the other House of Parliament; but since the period at which that annexation took place, nothing could be more suitable than the terms in which the noble Lord had expressed the policy of this country.
  MR. VINCENT SCULLYbegged to call attention to the very broad political doctrine laid down by the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs—a doctrine that might increase in importance before long—that people were to be allowed to choose their own
  1806
  Governments. The noble Lord apologised to Roman Catholic Members for suggesting that they might also apply the doctrine to the Roman States, but he (Mr. Scully) took no offence, because he felt that the noble Lord must have been laughing at them in his sleeve when he talked of such a doctrine as that. Would the noble Lord or his Government apply it to India? Would the noble Lord or the Government direct their Minister to ascertain by the votes of the people of India whether they would have England as their ruler? All he (Mr. Scully) could say was, that England did not act upon or tolerate that doctrine, and never would act upon it. He believed that the principle of allowing the people to decide for themselves who should govern them might be safely applied to Ireland. [A laugh.] At all events, no man who had a shilling to lose would vote for annexation to France, though the fact of pamphlets on the subject being published simultaneously in Paris and Dublin showed that there were people infatuated enough to pay attention to it; but would the Government apply the doctrine to Ireland? He believed not. He would not defend the late or the present King of Naples, but no doubt it was difficult for the people of England to understand the position of the Neapoliton Government. So with respect to the Sovereign of the Roman States, who he supposed all would allow was a most beneficent ruler; he was not disliked by the Roman people, but beset by a host of foreign rabble. He had never himself, so far as he was aware, entertained an illiberal sentiment or given an illiberal vote; but he did not like to hear noble Lords propounding sham doctrines for the purpose of gaining a little clap-trap applause, when everybody knew that England never had acted, and never would act, upon them.
  Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.

  PAPER DUTY REPEAL BILL.
  SIR JOHN TRELAWNYsaid, he rose to move
  "That this House, in consequence of the House of Lords having interfered with the arrangement of Supplies for the year, recommended by Her Majesty's advisers, and by such interference assumed responsibility for the conduct of finance, postpones the consideration of further proposals by the Ministers of the Crown towards meeting public expenses until the period when the authority of the House of Commons shall have been asserted, and the Bill for the repeal of the Excise on Paper shall have become law."
  MR. SPEAKERstated that, one Amendment upon the Motion for going into Committee of Supply having been put and negatived, it would be contrary to the rules of the House to propose another.
  SIR JOHN TRELAWNYsaid, he understood that the forms of the House would not allow of a second Motion being made on the proposal to go into Committee; but he wished to call attention to the subject of his intended Motion. He had refused to have anything to do with the Resolutions which the Government proposed to the House on the conduct of the Peers, believing them to be unworthy of the occasion. He held it to be the duty of the House not to be satisfied with mere words, but to take some active step beyond the passing of an abstract Resolution, which did not meet the case. In his opinion, the House had placed itself in a very degraded position, and lowered its authority in the eyes of the country. Take the case of a gentleman whose estate was claimed by a person having no legal title would not the proper course for him to adopt be to defend his rights in a Court of Justice? But suppose he called his tenantry together, and then proposed and carried a resolution that his title was perfectly good, and that there was no danger in future of his position being attacked, and that if it should be he had the means of defeating the aggression. What would be thought of this? Would not the credit of his title sink in the estimation of his neighbours? But such was the position in which the House of Commons stood. Resolutions had been passed which were totally unnecessary, unless something had taken place which was deserving of censure; and if so, other steps were equally called for. It was not a question as to whether the paper duties was the best tax to repeal—and he frankly admitted that he was himself disposed to concur with those who thought that the abolition of the tea and sugar duties would have been more satisfactory to the largest number of people; but the House of Commons thought that on various accounts it was best that the paper tax should be taken off at this time, and consequently the noble individuals in "another place" were bound, according to constitutional usages, to accept the conclusion at which the Commons had arrived. Suppose an hon. Member of that House were the owner of a ship, to which he appointed a captain, and that in the course of its voyage it got near the rocks
  1808
  and in the midst of dangers, and that the captain was about to take in a sail when the owner ordered it to remain set, would not the owner from that moment have the charge of the vessel, and be responsible for its fate? That was precisely the position which noble Lords had taken in reference to one of the provisions of the Budget; and they were, therefore, responsible for the whole. Consequently, it would seem that in future the Lords were to have a control over the finances of the country. If so, he believed the House had a good case for postponing the consideration of Supply until the authority of the Commons should have been asserted, and the Bill for the repeal of the excise on paper should have become law. It was a good opportunity for warning the Lords that if they persisted in their present course of resisting popular measures passed by the Commons, the time would soon come when the people would discuss, in a different spirit than at present, the question of privilege, and it might become an important question whether we should not do well to substitute an elective for an hereditary peerage. Knowing, however, the value of the time of the House at that period of the Session, he would not now prolong his observations on the subject, which was, nevertheless, one of deep and urgent importance.

  THE CHINA VOTE—OBSERVATIONS.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, that though he was prevented by the rules of the House from moving the Amendment of which he had given notice, still he must express a hope that the House would require Estimates of the expenditure for the China operations to be produced in detail, for a portion of the money had been already spent. This Vote of £3,800,000 was called a Vote of Credit, and yet £443,000 had been spent in payment of outstanding debt. This was an important matter, because by such a proceeding the functions of that House in matters of expenditure might be defeated. The best way to extend the privileges of the House was to show a just jealousy of expenditure; but, unfortunately, in the present Session, before deciding what the expenditure was to be, the House had dealt with taxation in a very rough way, making marvellous changes in various directions. In calculating the expenditure for the year at £70,100,000, it was quite clear, from the present Estimate, without saying anything

  1809
  of the sum that might be required for the defence of the kingdom, that that calculation was wrong to the extent of nearly £3,800,000. The sum of £443,000 to which he had alluded had no business in the present Estimate, for it had reference to a China war long gone by, and must be the settlement of an old account. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer knew of this outstanding debt when he was estimating his surplus for the year at £500,000, it was a matter that ought to have been mentioned. The House ought to know what portion of the present Estimate had been spent, and how it had been spent, for it was impossible that there could be an audit unless an appropriation was made. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War would give some explanation on this head, for if he found in Committee that the Estimate was not more satisfactory to him than it was at present, he should move that the Chairman report progress.
  GENERAL PEELsaid, he little thought that the statement he made on the 19th of March with respect to the Army Estimates, and the insufficiency of the money voted for the expense of the China war, would so soon have been verified by the facts. He then stated that the sum of £500,000 would be far from meeting the excess of expenditure over the Army Estimates for 1859, and that at least £500,000 more would be required. He also stated that it would require ten times the amount then asked for to defray the excess of expenditure on the China war. He showed that the excess on five Votes depending on the number of men, would more than absorb the whole of the money in the Vote of Credit assigned for the excess on the whole of the army expenditure. What he now wished to know was, whether one single shilling of the sum of money voted to meet the expense of the China war, had been paid to the Indian Treasury. It must be recollected that the whole of the expenditure connected with the Chinese war, had taken place in India. The munitions of war and the transport for the troops were taken up in India at, he believed, prices so exorbitant, that this Vote alone would require nearly the whole of the £500,000. The whole of the Native troops, moreover, employed in the Chinese expedition, were chargeable on that Vote of Credit, not a shilling having been taken for them in the Estimates of last year. They were raised in India; and he himself had seen the Order
  1810
  in Council, which declared that, from the moment they volunteered for service in China, they were to receive half batta and additional allowances. It was evident that those men became from the same moment chargeable to the British, and not to the Indian, Establishment. It could not be expected that the Indian revenue was to maintain troops which were going to do duty in China; nay, more, the Government must pay for their transport to the scene of operations. With that portion of the force which was drawn from Her Majesty's army the case was different, and an arrangement had been made that, instead of sending the regiments to England, as they were bound to do, the Indian Establishment should defray the expense of their transit to China, which was about equal in amount. They were under no such obligation, however, with respect to the Native troops; the whole expense of which must consequently be chargeable either on the £500,000 voted last year, or on the like sum which had this year been granted to defray the cost of the Chinese war. It was impossible to disconnect the army expenses from the Budget. The Budget represented and included—at least it professed to cover—the whole expense of the country, including that of the Chinese war. If it did not do so, it was, to use the expression of the right hon. Gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, "a gigantic delusion"—and he had no hesitation in saying the repeal of the paper duties was obtained under false pretences. He knew it might be urged that it was impossible to give estimates for prospective charges. He had never asked for any such estimate. All he had asked the Government to do was, to find means to meet the liabilities they had entered into; and that certainly might be fairly expected at their hands. Although evidence had been lately given before the Organization Committee as to the laxity of the accounts between the Indian Government and the Treasury, it was still hardly possible to believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury were not aware that the expenses of the Chinese war were to become chargeable in the course of the present year. To believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not prepared for this charge of £400,000, when he brought forward his Budget, required an exercise of that charity, "which believeth all things, and comprehendeth all things." The laxity of which he had spoken was not visible merely in the esti-

  1811
  mates for the Chinese war, but existed equally in those for the present year. On the 27th of February he had pointed out that there were charged on the Indian revenue for the present financial year 92,500 men, for whom it was perfectly preposterous to suppose that the Indian Government would pay. These 92,500 men were entirely independent of those troops who were going to China, and who, according to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War, were already transferred to the British establishment. It was, therefore, evident that this excess of men must become chargeable on the Estimates of the present year. He did not wish to make any charge against his right hon. Friend; but within a month after these Estimates were laid on the table they were withdrawn, and subsequently to the passing of the Budget the revised Estimates were produced. The additional sum which it became necessary to take in those corrected Estimates for pay and allowances was met by a reduction in the other Votes. That reduction, however, consisted, not in a diminution of expenditure, but in the postponement of services till next year, which he believed it would have been found vastly better to perform in the present. For instance, £80,000 had been taken from the carriage department at Woolwich, though it was notorious that if there was any one department more than another in arrear at the present moment, it was the carriage department at Woolwich. Why, it was in evidence that at this instant there were a number of guns which could not be issued till their carriages were completed. He made no complaint of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War; it was necessary that he should make his Estimates square with the sum which had been introduced into the Budget. He repeated the protest which he had before uttered against introducing the Budget before the Estimates for the year were laid upon the table; he believed that the statement thereby presented was delusive, and that, by giving a false colour to the sum actually required, the service of the country was prejudicially affected.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, he found that by the forms of the House he should be unable to move the Motion of which he had given notice, and which was to this effect, that, in order to remove one great obstacle to peace with China, the British Plenipotentiary be instructed not
  1812
  to insist on the fulfilment of the third article of the treaty of Tien-tsin, by which his Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that the ambassador, minister, or other diplomatic agent appointed by her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain may reside, with his family and establishment, permanently at the capital, or may visit it occasionally, at the option of the British Government. He should, however, move it on the first Supply night. He should do so, not merely to raise a discussion, but because he considered that if it was agreed to that would go far to promote peace with China. At all events he thought that if the third article of the treaty was insisted on there was great danger that any peace we might make with China would not be of long duration.
  MR. WARNERsaid, the war in which we were now engaged with China was not one in which the House of Commons could be supposed to take an interest, for it was carried on by the Ministers of the Crown in defiance of a deliberate vote of the House of Commons, which had never been reversed. They had heard of an aggression by the House of Peers; but this was an aggression of far greater moment to the interests of the House. An opportunity ought to be taken of putting on record the sentiments of the House with respect to the manner in which the war had been commenced. As it had been undertaken, he hoped it might be attended with success; but he could scarcely hope for any very good results, and he trusted Her Majesty's Government would take advantage of any opportunity that might arise for coming to an amicable arrangement with the rulers of the Chinese Empire. It would, no doubt, be easy, with the resources at our command, to put down the brutal despotism which there prevailed, but the anarchy which would ensue might prove even worse. If results equally beneficial might be expected from our interference in China as in India, all would be well; but he looked forward with apprehension to the result of the pending conflict.
  Main Question put,
  The House divided:—Ayes 198; Noes 13: Majority 185.
  Motion agreed to.

  SUPPLY.—OPERATIONS IN CHINA.
  House in Committee.
  Mr. MASSEY in the Chair.
  MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, at this

  1813
  late hour (half-past ten), I will endeavour to make the statement which it is my duty to lay before the House as concise as I can consistently with the explanation which I have to give of the Vote of Credit which has been laid on the table of the House. But before I do so perhaps I may be allowed to take some notice of the observations which have been made by my right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (General Peel). The gallant General says that he prophesied that five times £500,000 would he requisite to make up the deficiency between the Estimates and the expenditure for last year, and for the China war generally, and he asks me whether every sixpence of the £500,000 which we took has not been expended in making up the deficiency on the ordinary Estimates of last year? In the first place I have to reply that not one sixpence of that sum was applicable to making up any deficiency which might have occurred in the ordinary Estimates of last year. My gallant Friend, who is well acquainted with these matters, must have spoken without reflection, for he must have known that you cannot apply one farthing of a Vote of Credit to any purpose but that for which it was voted. You cannot spend it in making up an ordinary deficiency in the ordinary Estimate of the year. If his vaticinations, therefore, should prove correct, which I trust they will not, the deficiency will have to be made up by a Vote next year, specially taken to cover it. But so far from all that sum being spent in that way, we have reason to believe that a large portion of it still remains unexpended. We cannot tell yet—until we receive accounts from China it is difficult to say how much of that money has been spent. Some of the regiments embarked later than we thought they would, and rather than being all spent, I should say that there was a surplus left on that Vote. The gallant General also says that he pointed out that we were quite wrong in our Estimate for the Chinese war, that £850,000 followed by £500,000 would be quite insufficient, that the war would inevitably come on, and that the Indian Government—and here he was right—would inevitably send home many more troops than we had expected, and he blames us for not having had the foresight to provide for this. Nobody knows better than the right hon. and gallant Gentleman how much safer it is not to trust to private or anything but official information. We have reason to recollect the circumstances in which we were placed in the last autumn.
  1814
  The state of India was anything but satisfactory; nothing but gloom pervaded European society in India; and Earl Canning then said, in answer to letters from myself, that he could not part with European troops, and he could not say how soon a state of circumstances would arrive which would justify him in parting with any great number of European troops. We listened to that statement—we framed an estimate upon it. Great changes, however, for the better took place in India. The Punjaub had been quieted; the pacification of Oude seemed complete, and in consequence six battalions were promised from India, which induced us to withdraw the Estimate and to produce a revised Estimate. I will not go into detail upon the subject, but pass on to the observations of the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir Henry Willoughby). And there I must confess that to some great extent I agree with him. But when he says that the Estimate is unsatisfactory, I am surprised that it is not to the amount that he takes exception—which I confess is unsatisfactory—but rather to the manner and the time of proposing it. He says it is not made in the shape we like or at the moment we like. He is silent as to the amount, and I trust that he will derive some consolation from the extent of the Estimate which is laid before the House. In the Committee upstairs, of which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) was chairman, we took a great deal of evidence with regard to the state of the account pending between this country and India, and it was shown to be extremely unsatisfactory. I will read just a passage from the Report, because I wish to show the principle upon which the Government have acted in applying for this Vote of Credit.
  "The state of the account between the British Exchequer and Indian territory is most unsatisfactory. The account for the Persian expedition is not yet closed. The account of the first China war is hardly completed yet. The account of the second China war, which ended in 1856, is not yet balanced. There are four or five different accounts still open with disputed balances to a large amount; and with respect to the new expedition to China, India, in the midst of the great financial difficulties, has been required to make advances in the current year for all expenses incurred in taking up transports in India, in paying the men, and in providing cattle, horses, and other necessaries, as well as equipments for the army. There does not appear to be any estimate of the amount of these advances, but, while Indian territory is overwhelmed with debt, it will be unseemly that Great Britian should make war on China out of Indian resources.

  1815
  The repayment of these advances ought to be prompt, and within the present financial year."
  I entirely concur in every sentence in that passage of the Report. This first Estimate of 443,896 for past transactions, which I will explain in a moment, is a sum for which I am at any rate not in any way responsible. It is an arrear owing to the East India Company. The accounts have not been audited. The amount has not been entirely agreed upon, but, as the East India Company are not so rich that they can overlook these little debts, and as they are anxious we should pay them, it is necessary to pay something to them on account of these past transactions. Would it be seemly this year to make war on Indian resources? I think not. I think it is wise and right that we should lay before the House of Commons, as far as we can form—I will not call it an estimate, but a guess of what possibly may be the amount required to repay the Indian Government, and to pay the army and navy engaged in these operations. The hon. Baronet says, "But you should give us this estimate in detail." I do not think it is possible to give that estimate in detail. I asked the East Indian Government to send me, not an account of the sums already expended for providing and equipping the expedition, but an estimate of the sums so expended, not however in detail, because they do not know the exact sums. They refused to send the information officially, upon the ground that they ought not to send officially anything pretending to be an account which, after all, was only an estimate of an account. I accepted that which they would give unofficially, because I thought it very important that the Government should lay before the House a rough and approximate estimate of what the cost may be. I think it better to dispense with accuracy rather than follow the system which has hitherto prevailed, of first spending the money, saying nothing to Parliament, and after all the transactions are ended coming to Parliament to make good a deficiency over which they have no possible check or control.
  I will not weary the Committee by citing precedents, but I have carefully examined the precedents of the Votes for the China wars (that is, the first and second expeditions), of the Votes for the Caffre wars and the Crimean war, and in every case I find a lump sum presented to the House and voted as a Vote of Credit without details. The reason is obvious. You cannot fore-
  1816
  see in a particular war what the expenditure will be. You have in your estimates the actual cost of the pay of the men and the cost of their keep. You may put an approximate estimate of what it will be when the men are on Indian allowances as well as English; you may put an approximate estimate of the cost of Indian Native troops, but you cannot make an estimate of the cost of the followers attached to these regiments. Therefore, if I were to depart from the precedent of putting the Estimate in a lump sum, I should depart from it for the purpose of laying before the House an estimate which would be illusory, and one which would deceive the House as to the sums which they were voting. What is the use of laying items before the House? Obviously that the House may exercise its discretion, and accept them or not—that they may put their finger on one item and say this is too much—you have too many troops, too many camp followers, too many coolies. Then it turns out in practice that they are much less—that the excess of expenditure is under some other head—and thus the interference becomes as illusory as the subject to which it is applied. I may really say that the very term "vote of credit" shows what is intended. It is not an estimate—not sums of money approved by the House of Commons—but a Vote given in confidence to the Government that they will spend it for purposes which are requisite, to the best of their ability. And I do not believe we could carry on war otherwise, unless we chose to accept knowingly, and with our eyes open, delusive Estimates, delusive criticisms, and delusive Votes. I have in this case so far departed from precedent that, instead of voting for the past, I am asking you to vote for the future. According to practice, I might have called upon the Committee to vote £400,000 or £500,000, after peace has been made and broken and there is a fresh war, but I think it much better to put the whole expenditure as estimated before the House of Commons. Let us face it at once and see what will be the cost in the course of the year, and should circumstances fortunately occur which would lead to an early termination of these unhappy hostilities, we shall have so much to the good. Probably the Committee will not be afraid, as the money cannot be applied to any other purpose, and it will be very fortunate if the money be not applied to this.

  1817
  First, I ought to state what are the sums of which the items of £443,896 for past transactions are composed. In the last China war there was an arrangement between the Treasury and the East India Company that the Company should bear all the ordinary charges of the force sent in aid of the expedition, but that they should be reimbursed by the Imperial Government all extraordinary payments. The accounts were settled a few years ago, up to 1847–48. We have still the balance remaining unsettled, from 1848–49 to 1858–59, of £281,000, upon which questions will arise. We have £82,000 on account of Indian military forces stationed in China, and about £80,000 the estimated cost of Indian Native troops which form part of the garrison of Canton. The great evil of the system, to my mind, is, that in point of fact you have no power over the Executive as to the number of troops you employ. You can vote every man under the Mutiny Act, and not a man more can be employed as long as you do not vote more money for their pay; but if you employ Indian troops you have no check on the amount, except in the gross sum which you are afterwards called upon to pay. No doubt this has been a very wrong system, and part of this sum, no less than £82,000, is for the cost of troops at Canton in the time of the gallant Officer opposite, and £80,000 is for the continuance of the garrison of Hong Kong up to the time this war broke out. The present Estimate, therefore, applicable to the war, in which, I believe unhappily we are now engaged, is less than £3,800,000 by £443,896, which sum applies to past transactions.
  The Committee would probably like to know the sums directly or indirectly voted for the China expedition. In enumerating them I will follow the form of the Returns moved for by my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), who asks what are the sums put upon the ordinary Army and Navy Estimates for 1860–61, which are applicable to the operations in China. Now, I believe that practically, except in the large consumption of stores, and the transport, the men are not necessarily an increased charge on the country for that expedition. We have, for instance, nine battalions of infantry in China; but, if there were no Chinese war, one or two battalions will be doing garrison duty abroad, and the other seven would be in England, where they would be useful enough. In the same way there would
  1818
  have been no considerable disbandment of seamen in our navy had there been no war. I will, however, give the information the hon. Baronet requires. The items in the Army Estimates for 1860–61 applicable to the China expedition were as follows:—Cost of forces of all ranks, £399,588; clothing and necessaries, £42,500, provisions, forage, fuel, light, &c, £22,740—total, £464,828. The Navy Estimates for 1860–61 included the following sums:—Hire of transports, £107,000; coals, £76,000; freight of stores, £17,000; making, with provisions, bedding, &c, £217,900; adding the pay of men in China (£463,000) it gave a total of £680,900. These two totals in items in the Army and Navy Estimates together made £ 1,145,728. Of the Vote of Credit taken last year to the amount of £850,000, the total apportioned for the army was £578,648, and for the navy £268,452. These amounts, together with the Vote of Credit for £500,000, give a grand total of about £2,500,000. We now come to the Vote before us. I have already explained that the sum of £443,896 in arrear due to Her Majesty's Government from the East India Company has no relation to the China war. They have so little confidence in the statement they have drawn up, that they have forwarded it to me, not officially, but privately, as an approximation to the real amount. The cost of horses, bullocks, and ponies comes to £88,600; ammunition, £16,000; advance of pay to the force on embarcation, £145,702; value of stores issued £30,000. Altogether, with the hire of the Indian Government steamships, with rations and allowances to troops on board ship, coals, &c, we have a total of £1,900,922. That is the amount of the East India claim due to us in the course of the year, supposing that the war lasts for a year, and that the ships are kept on for that time. The War Office Estimate includes the following items:—Difference between British and India rates of pay, allowances to wives and children, cost of Natives attached to the force, &c, for 10,985 Europeans, £526,355; cost of 7,623 Native troops, including pay, allowances, provisions, &c, £182,715; extra clothing and necessaries £50,000; extra provisions, forage, land transport, &c, £268,000; extra warlike and other stores, £150,000; extra hospital charges, including hospital ships, £284,208; sanitary establishments at the Cape, £23,792; estimated cost of Native Indian troops

  1819
  previously in China, £67,666—making a total of £1,552,736. Then there is the Admiralty Estimate to the amount of £359,017. From the total a deduction must be made of the sums which may not come into payment during the year 1860–61. The Estimate had been fixed roughly, as I have stated, at £3,800,000.
  I will not now enter into the policy of the war, because I have already had an opportunity of expressing my own opinions on that matter when the question was raised at the earlier part of the Session. At one time there was every reason to hope from the advices which were received from China that hostilities would have come to an end, and that a great demonstration of force would alone have proved sufficient to procure us redress for the outrages which had been committed at the mouth of the Peiho. We have been disappointed in that hope. Those, however, who are best informed on the subject still maintain that the Tartar Chief who is at the head of the war party in China, and who distinguished himself by the arrangements he made for our repulse at the Peiho, stands too near the Throne to be-agreeable to the Emperor of China. He derives great power from the party of which he is the organ, and till some defeat or disaster happens to him, there is little likelihood of a change in the policy of the Chinese Government. But should any reverse befall him, it would be gladly made use of by the Government to reverse a policy which has been originated by one of whom they are so jealous. These are mere speculations, it may be said, but they come from an authoritative source. Her Majesty's Government would certainly receive with the greatest delight and satisfaction any news that would encourage us in the hope that we are likely to enter into a better state of relations with the Chinese. In the meanwhile I think no one can deny that we are bound to provide for the possibility of continuing hostile operations. We have very large forces in China exposed to a deadly climate, and we are bound to provide them with every means to enable them to bring the contest to a speedy and successful issue. Under these circumstances, I do not believe the House will be staggered even by the large amount of this Estimate. Our Commanders in China are men in whom we have a right to repose the greatest confidence, for they are tried men. I have received from General Sir Hope Grant the expression of his confidence in and admiration for the activity, resources,
  1820
  and forethought which he sees displayed by Admiral Hope. Of General Sir Hope Grant's own judgment, prudence, and energy I have formed the highest opinion from the communications I have had with him. I think that the view he took of the question as to the pay of the troops showed great judgment, and on another instance he also displayed a wise discretion. When ordered to occupy Chusan as a depôt, he found that the lodgings for the troops were small, inconvenient, damp, and excessively unhealthy. He therefore decided not to endanger the health of his men by leaving them at Chusan, and, taking upon himself the responsibility of disobeying instructions, he at once carried them to a neighbouring island of sandy soil, well watered, and wholesome. Indeed, in all his actions it was impossible not to be struck with the judgment and foresight displayed by General Sir Hope Grant, as well as by Sir John Michel], his second in command; and we may safely rely upon it that whatever can be done by brave and practised soldiers, will be accomplished by our forces in China. Looking at the late period of the Session, it is important for the Government and for the country that this matter should be decided as soon as possible; and, without making any further observations, I beg to move that a sum of £3,800,000 be granted to Her Majesty for the China War.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £3,800,000, be granted to Her Majesty towards defraying the Expenses of Naval and Military Operations in China, beyond the ordinary Grants for Army and Naval Services for the year 1860–1, including a repayment of £443,896 to the Government of India for Advances on Account of former Expeditions in China."
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he thought that the Committee had some reason to be surprised at the amount of the Vote now asked when they remembered that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 10th of February in the present year, estimated the expenditure on account of the China war at £500,000. He ventured to say that at the beginning of the present Session the House had no conception that it was about to be involved in an expenditure of nearly £4,000,000. Such, however, was the fact, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have been, he was certain, among the first to regret that he had framed his Budget on the notion that an expenditure really of £4,000,000, would only be £500,000. Various branches of

  1821
  taxation were handled by the right hon. Gentleman in a very decided way, to which, if there had been a clear surplus, there would have been little objection. But remissions of duties had been made in the face of an enormous expenditure, which must have been well anticipated. The right hon. Gentleman might perhaps, be able to explain that to the House, but the item of £443,896, belonging to the last China war, must have been well known. It was inexplicable to him how the right hon. Gentleman could assume a surplus of £500,000 when there was that outstanding Indian claim, that was sure to come in whether they had a China war or not. The statement of the Secretary of State for War was clear as far as it went, but it showed the danger that was impending over English finance. The House could not fail to perceive how Indian and English finance were getting mixed up together. He submitted that the proposed Vote of £3,800,000 ought to be divided into two separate portions, the sum of £433,000 for the outstanding Indian debt forming one Vote and the balance another. If the Vote of credit now demanded were added to the 850,000 already voted in March, the China Vote would be brought up to £4,600,000, excluding the old India Bill. He could not, however, admit that the Vote before the House was to be a Vote of credit, and it would be good policy to try and divide the £4,600,000 under certain heads of expenditure. The House might not be able to have an estimate of each branch of expenditure, but unless they had such an estimate what security was there that the money would be spent under these heads, or how was there to be any appropriation or any audit? The Earl of Ellenborough stated the other day in "another place" that he found no difficulty in making out an estimate for a former Chinese war. [Mr. S. HERBERT: The result was voted in a lump sum.] He would not enter upon the policy of the present China war except to say that he believed they could not enter upon a more ruinous war. The great power of two Empires of Europe was about to be brought to bear against the kingdom of China, and he feared that the result would be to involve that kingdom in anarchy and ruin rather than to extend our commerce. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would undertake on the Report to make a detailed estimate, with a large margin for contingencies.
  MR. HANKEYsaid, he wished to know how far the estimate for outstanding Indian accounts was carried up to the present day. It was said that the war could not be carried on by means of the troops in India, except at the expense in the first instance of the Government of India; but the right hon. Gentleman proposed to alter this system. [Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: I said it ought to be paid within the year.] As soon as the troops left this country every item was paid by the Government of India, but the charge for recruiting, which amounted to a large sum was paid in this country, and repaid by the East India Government, He wished to know whether the charge for recruiting had been taken into the account.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, he did not know how far it might be possible to adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir Henry Willoughby), and divide the Vote of Credit for the actual expenses of the war into various items. The difficulty might be that, in appropriating a certain portion for stores, transports, and freights, they might allot too much for one head and too little for another. But the item of £443,896 in payment of an old debt might be and ought to be separated from the rest. The House knew how much was wanted for that account and could appropriate it, but unless that were done the money might all be spent in stores, transports, or freights. Whether a further separation were possible he did not know, but it was important to get those old debts settled.
  MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that in answer to the question of the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Hankey) he wished to state that the outstanding account between the East India Government and the War Department relative to recruiting was not included in the Estimate, because it was a running account which was charged on the ordinary Estimates.
  GENERAL PEELsaid, there was a fixed charge for every infantry soldier in excess of the Indian establishment, and that in consequence of the great number sent out in excess of that establishment there were certain amounts due from the Indian to the British revenue. Those amounts, however, became repayable from the latter to the former when the men were sent back, so that for every infantry soldier who had been despatched from India to China a sum of £17, for every calvary soldier a sum of £30, and for every artilleryman a sum of £50 would have to be refunded, and those

  1823
  sums were not, he contended, included in the present Estimates. He should also wish to ascertain from his right hon. Friend how much of the £3,800,000, for which a Vote was to be taken, had been already expended. He might add that he thought his right hon. Friend was hardly justified in deducting from the expenses of the China war the amount paid to troops who were represented here by a force of embodied Militia, which could be disembodied if those troops were available at home.
  MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he would try to explain, although he could not give any very satisfactory answer to the hon. Baronet's suggestion of framing the Estimate under various heads of expenditure, distinguishing the expenses on account of the British and Native forces, with a statement of what monies had already been drawn on account of the war in China. The latter could not possibly be ascertained until the accounts for the Indian army for 1859–60 were sent home. Until then the Government could not tell under what heads there was a deficiency or an excess. Not a sixpence, however, of the Vote asked for was applicable to any deficiency or excess in the last year. That would be covered out of the £850,000 voted at the beginning of the Session; but if there was any sufficient saving over the ordinary Estimate to cover it then the Vote of Credit would not be applied, or applied only to meet the deficiency; otherwise the money would be applicable to the expenses of the war in the present year. The Government at home did not know what had been actually spent. The East India Government had told them what may have been spent, and the Government wished only to take such a sum as would enable them in the course of the year to pay expenses on account, either previously to or after audit, instead of postponing the settlement for three or four years.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he should propose to diminish the Vote for £3,800,000 by £443,896, the amount due to the Indian Government, and to leave the surplus applicable for the purposes intended.
  SIR FRANCIS BARINGconcurred in the expediency of acceding to the proposition of the hon. Baronet.
  MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsignified his assent.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The hon. Baronet the Member
  1824
  for Evesham has expressed his surprise at the large amount of money which the House is asked to grant on account of the war with China, and in that surprise I myself was, I must confess, disposed to share, when the enormous amount required was first brought under my notice. The present state of things has. however, been with the Government only a recent discovery, for although it was obvious ever since our ultimatum or proposals had been rejected by the Chinese, that war would in all likelihood ensue, and a Vote required, yet it was only within a short period that we were enabled to form anything like an accurate conjecture as to the probable expenditure which would be rendered necessary, and I need scarcely add that every fresh communication tends to show that the limits of the probable demand must be extended. But the hon. Baronet contends that it was wrong to state in the House of Commons in February last that there would he a surplus of half a million in round numbers on the balance of revenue and expenditure, when outstanding debts to about the same amount were due to the East India Company which the Government must have known would become payable. Now, on that point, the hon. Baronet is entirely in error, for the Government had not the smallest knowledge that the money would become payable, nor am I aware they could possess any such information. The fact is that this money was found to have become payable after a close inquiry into running accounts, consisting of a great variety of items and a lengthened correspondence and discussions with respect to them, which extended over a number of years. For my own part, I had no knowledge whatever when the Estimates of the year were framed, as to what sums were likely to become payable between the East India and the Home Government, nor did I think any officer of the Government could have furnished me with any prospective information on the subject. That is my answer with regard to the £500,000 in question. But the hon. Baronet has gone further, and contends that the Government ought not to have entertained any project for the general reconstruction or modification of the taxation of the country at a time when there was so large an expenditure as that for the China war in prospect. Now, the answer to that charge must, in a great measure, depend upon how far this expenditure could safely be said to be in pros-

  1825
  pect at the time, and how far the Government were in possession of information on the subject beyond that which was open to every Member of the House. Let me for a moment suppose that we had peculiar means of estimating the probable amount of the expenditure in question, and that we had in consequence known in February last that it would be necessary to make provision for £3,800,000; it is obvious that in order to do so we must have asked the House, even though no tax were repealed and no commercial treaty with France were concluded, to impose ,£2,000,000 or £3,000,000 in the shape of fresh taxes on the country, a proposal which, in my opinion, it would he most unreasonable on our part to make. The truth of the matter is—and this, however, is the moral to be drawn from discussions such as this in which we are engaged—that it is utterly and absolutely impossible to estimate the entire charge for a war arising under circumstances such as those in which that with China has originated. There were but two elements of the case upon which to found a decision in our possession in February, the one being that we knew the terms which we meant to propose to China; the other, that we were aware of the amount of force which the Cabinet had decided on sending to that country. The terms embraced a demand for explanation of the attack on our ships, and the ratification of the treaty which the Earl of Elgin had made; but did not include any demand for compensation in money over and above that which the Chinese had already promised to pay. The amount of force which the Cabinet decided on sending out was 10,000 men, in case the whole force consisted of Europeans, but in the event of any small portion of it being composed of Native Indian troops, its numbers were to be proportionately increased, so as to render it equal in point of efficiency to an army of 10,000 Europeans. That was the knowledge which the Government possessed in February. I do not know whether the House was also in possession of the terms that had been proposed to China, but it did know the intentions of the Government as to the number of men to be sent. Now, just see what the intentions of the Government at home are worth as to proceedings of this nature at the other end of the world. The terms we intended to send to China were essentially altered, and a compensation was demanded for reasons of policy which appeared con-
  1826
  elusive to our representative in China. I do not cast any blame upon that gentleman, but the fact illustrates the necessary feebleness and inefficiency of control which the Cabinet in London can exercise over transactions of this kind. Then, as to the amount of force. The amount of the forces under orders for China, which have left the ports of England and India for that country, is nearly twice the amount upon which the Cabinet had decided. Under these circumstances the hon. Baronet can easily judge bow impossible it was for the Cabinet at home to form a clear judgment of the likelihood of a war, and of its scale of cost. Besides this the Committee must recollect that this mode of providing the cost of these wars is quite new to our annals.
  We have unfortunately had a variety of these wars, but they have been paid for almost entirely through the medium of the finance of the East India Company, the demands made upon this House at the commencement of those wars being very insignificant, and, for the most part, the cost has been repaid when the wars were concluded. The first of these wars was in 1840, and the sum voted by this House in that year was £173,000. In 1841 it only grew to £400,000. In 1842 it increased to nearly £1,100,000, and in 1843 a further sum of £821,000 was voted, and even then a large balance remained, a great part of which was not disposed of until years after. Now, we are in a different state of circumstances. A large portion of the expenditure is still to be defrayed through the medium of the East India Government; but in consequence of the change which has taken place in the Government of the East Indies, as well as the circumstances of the country, it has become our duty to ask the House to provide at once the means to meet, as far as we can estimate it, the whole expenditure that will be incurred either directly by ourselves or indirectly by the Indian Government.
  The Committee must remember that in respect of a good deal of this expenditure it is in advance. The hon. Baronet has given notice of a Motion to ask what advances have already been made on account of the war in China. I do not apprehend that it will be possible to answer that Motion, because the great bulk of the expenditure is paid either through the medium of the East India Government, of whose account we are not in possession, or through the me-

  1827
  dium of the Treasury-chest in China. The payments made from the Treasury-chest in China are made in this way:—The persons having charge of the chest seeing that a great demand upon it is likely to occur, will not wait for the occurrence of that demand, but take steps beforehand to place themselves in funds to meet it. They make a demand, not formally, for the special purposes of the Chinese war, but to meet whatever lawful and proper demand may he made upon the chest. These sums are, to a great extent, sent in advance; some portion is paid through bills, negotiated there, and sent home by the officers of the Treasury-chest; but it is their duty not to be dependent upon the negotiation of bills, as that might cause embarrassment, if not loss to the country. It is their duty to provide funds under all circumstances, and with this they must go on as long as the war is likely to continue, and therefore one of the incidents of a war of this nature is that a large portion of the draughts made upon this country must be paid in advance, and probably when the war in China shall terminate, especially if it terminates rapidly or suddenly, the Treasury-chest may have a large amount of funds which will be unnecessary, and which will be returned home. I mention these things to show how impossible it is even now to frame what is called an estimate, but at a time when Parliament is about to separate it is our duty to make the best conjectural statement we can, and to ask as large a sum as will make us independent until the close of the campaign—that is, practically until the close of the financial year. The hon. Baronet will see how different are the circumstances now from what they were on former occasions.
  The hon. Baronet says, however, that in my financial statement I proposed£500,000 as a Vote of Credit for the war in China. He is inaccurate in that statement, and on a point that forms the essence of it. What I did say was this, I referred to the Votes we had already taken in the course of the Session before the 10th of February for the financial year, which had not then expired; I referred to the Votes included in the Estimates for the present year; and I said also, as to the extraordinary expenditure of the expedition, we ask for£500,000, in order to defray the cost of an expedition that was to bear, in the first instance, a peaceful remonstrance. That was clearly a declaration that I was not asking for a sum of money that would suffice to defray
  1828
  the cost of a war in China through the financial year. I do not hesitate to say it would have been wrong to make any such request. The hon. Baronet addresses the question to me, but he knows as well as I do that it is not the business of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to frame Military Estimates. They are framed by the Cabinet, and I am willing to take my share of responsibility for them. But in the month of February, having six months of the Parliamentary Session before us, having sent out certain terms, having directed an expedition, and having the power of applying to Parliament for the charges of the war, if a war should break out, Parliament being as good a judge as ourselves of the probability of such an event, it would have been not only unnecessary, but a decided breach of our duty, if we had applied to Parliament to defray the expenditure for a war that had not commenced, that might not commence, and of the chance of which Parliament could judge as well as we could. The demand we made on account of that expedition was very large, in some respects larger than is stated by my right hon. Friend, because of some items of expenditure that had been incurred by this country which did not directly appear as part of the expenditure for the Chinese expedition, and yet were entirely and in substance due to it. I will mention one instance. In the course of last autumn the Admiralty made application to the Treasury to sanction the formation of certain contracts for gunboats which were not included in the Estimates of last Session. The Treasury acceded, on the ground that a demand had been made on the fleet for gunboats with a view to service in China, and the cost of building them—I do not recollect the exact amount—although not appearing as set down to the expedition, was really a part of its charge. I hope that the Vote we ask will cover all charges during the financial year; but, after what has occurred, I do not think the Government can with prudence make itself responsible for what may be the expenditure for such a war. The scene is so distant, the circumstances vary so from time to time, that it must be left to others on the spot to take decisions which otherwise would be taken with the immediate authority of the Government. If, unhappily, it should be prolonged beyond the present year, the charge for the second year will in all likelihood be greater; at all events, it will be as great as that we now ask for the first year of that war. And

  1829
  what is the lesson we ought to draw from that circumstance? It is very desirable that we should, if possible, draw some lesson from it; and I confess the lesson I draw is this—that it is impossible to check proceedings of this kind, growing out of transactions such as the deplorable events at the mouth of the Peiho, when once they begin. What you should really look to is the mode of conducting your ordinary communications with such distant Powers, and the responsibility under which they are conducted. It is an extremely dangerous system of policy that sends forth treaties to be exchanged at the sword's point and at the cannon's mouth. By that system of policy you necessarily place in the hands of the remote agents of your power an amount of discretion and responsibility which I think too great for men to bear, and certainly much greater than you would ever consent to place in the hands of your Cabinet at home. If I am to look for the immediate cause of this unhappy outbreak, I might say I find it in the instructions of the Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce—["Oh, oh!"]—hear me out—instructions which desired him to proceed to the Peiho for the purpose of exchanging the treaties attended by a sufficient naval force; but—and this is the sequel of my sentence—in my opinion, it would be most unjust to place the responsibility on the Earl of Malmesbury, because, in sending these instructions—although his was the immediate responsibility, being at the Foreign Office at the time—I do not think he acted on grounds peculiar to himself or the Administration of which he was a Member, but rather in conformity with what we may say had been more or less very unfortunately the recent tradition of this country with regard to the conduct of such transactions. I do not wish, therefore, to be misunderstood as if, in naming the Earl of Malmesbury, I was in the slightest degree charging upon him peculiar responsibility. I cannot venture to hold out any expectations, now that we have reason to believe the war has actually broken out, with regard to the limits or amount of the demands that may be made on the House, or the period at which those hostilities happily may be brought to a termination. I trust and pray that may be at an early period. I believe there is he alternative but to submit, however reluctantly, to this large demand, which we have submitted at the earliest period at which we could place it before you. I trust we shall listen to
  1830
  the lesson which is taught us by these transactions, by considering the manner in which we have been accustomed to transact business of this kind in distant quarters of the globe, and under circumstances of grave and serious loss, as at the outbreak in the Peiho; I trust the country will take that matter into serious consideration, and that for the future we may be less likely to incur the repetition of such a deplorable calamity.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: There is much in the present state of public affairs of a serious character, but nothing in my opinion is so gravely anxious as this most unhappy Chinese war; and it appears to me the House has a right to expect further explanations from the Government than we have yet received with regard to the enormous expenditure involved in it. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War said in his speech he would not enter into the policy of this war; but I must say, I think, with regard to the policy of the war and the intentions of the Government in regard to that policy, we have a right to demand further explanations than we have yet received. What was the language of the noble Lord the Minister for Foreign Affairs when this subject was under consideration on the 16th of March? The language of the noble Lord was this:—
  "The terms of the negotiations have not yet been settled. Instructions have been drawn up, but there are some points on which we still wish for further explanations."
  Further on the noble Lord said, "What we have to do there is merely to trade"—I wish the Government and country would bear that in mind—"but for the purpose of trading we must have security for the persons and property of our countrymen." The noble Lord at the head of the Government held similar language. He said:—
  "We have been called upon to state what our policy is, and what are the instructions we have given, but I respectfully beg leave to decline answering these questions; we cannot do so, lest we should defeat the purpose we have in view."
  Here then, we have on the part of both noble Lords a refusal, which might have been judicious and proper at that moment, to enter into what were their intentions in regard to that unfortunate war. To-night we have been told by the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer that the sole object of this expedition to China was to demand the ratification of the treaty, and what he called au explanation—in a former

  1831
  debate it was called an apology. Well then, here we find the Government not regarding sufficiently that important object of trade, as to which I quite agree with the noble Lord, but embarking in those ruinous wars in order to force on that distant and half-civilized empire the forms of European diplomacy. I confess we cannot regard our present position with respect to China with too much anxiety. It is not only that beyond all questions serious doubts have long been entertained, and are at this moment entertained with regard to the whole justice and propriety of our policy. It is not only that we are asked now to embark in what, to use the popular phrase of the day, is a "gigantic" expenditure; but, unhappily in addition to all this, at a moment when we ought to have our resources of all kinds concentrated at home, we find our pecuniary resources and our military resources divided and distracted by embarking in this unfortunate struggle. ["Hear, hear!"] I am glad to hear that cheer from the Treasury Bench. I am glad to see that they feel the magnitude of this evil, because they cannot recognize it without seeing the immense responsibility that rests on them if they are pressing demands on China one iota beyond what the strictest view of the justice of the case, and the commercial interests of this country demand. What is the expense involved? It is perfectly frightful. I believe at this moment we are committed by this unhappy struggle to an expenditure amounting to between £5,000,000 and £6,000,000. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Nearly £6,000,000.] There was £850,000 from the last financial year; the additions to the Army and Navy Estimates for the current year, and now this enormous Vote of nearly £4,000,000. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War sought to reduce the amount of this expenditure by telling us that if a large proportion of this force had not been engaged in this struggle in China they would have been on the establishment at home, but he forgot the regiments of embodied militia in this country represented seven battalions that might have been dispensed with. The statement of the right hon Gentleman was perfectly fair, but this raises another question of considerable interest, and that is whether or not we ought not to have heard a little more of this enormons amount of expenditure when the finances of the year were explained. I have no right or inclination to accuse the right
  1832
  hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer with having dealt in the least unfairly by the House; but I must say, after hearing the explanations given this evening, the impression does remain on my mind that Government ought to have given more detailed information on this matter when the Budget was brought forward. I remember nothing in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman in connection with the expenditure in China but the Vote of Credit for £500,000 which he then proposed to take. And what has his argument been to-night? In answer to my hon. Friend (Sir H. Willoughby) he has just told us that it was impossible for the Government to foresee that they would be involved in an expenditure of nearly £4,000,000, and that therefore he would not have been justified on the 10th of February in proposing taxes to meet so uncertain an expenditure. But that is not the issue raised. The question is whether, in the state of our relations with China at that moment, the Government were justified in proposing to remit taxation; whether they were justified in tampering with the finances of this country as they did on the 10th of February, when they must have known that this immense expenditure was at least a probability. The right hon. Gentleman tells us that all they then knew of was what he called a peaceful remonstrance, and he says the magnitude of these expenses is a recent discovery. But let me ask him whether the cost of the peaceful remonstrance was not at that time incurred. What was the form of the peaceful remonstrance? It was the despatch of a very powerful force, in order to give weight and dignity to the representations which we intended to make to the Chinese Government. I stated long before that I attached no blame to the Government in this respect. On the contrary, I think they were right in making this peaceful remonstrance in a formidable shape; that they were right in considering the prestige and the power of England, and in sending to China a force competent to support their demands. But they must have known that even in the event of their proposals being accepted, a peaceful remonstrance of this kind would be a most costly proceeding, and that its expenses must be defrayed from the revenue of the current year. I must say, therefore, that the explanation given by the right hon. Gentleman upon this point has not been satisfactory. The Government ought to have foreseen—I

  1833
  really do not know how they could have avoided foreseeing—that there was no reasonable chance of £500,000 covering the cost incurred, and I repeat that they were not justified in tampering with the resources of the country when they had the probability of this war hanging over them. We have also, I think, a right to some further explanation. The Committee have been told with great candour that if this war goes on they must not suppose £6,000,000 will last very long, and that in all probability the second year will be even more costly than the first. Well now, what are you going to fight for? What practical advantages to this country are you seeking to obtain? Are you fighting for an apology? Are you fighting for the ratification of a treaty which we know is worth little when you have got it? These are questions of the gravest character. We are embarking in an expenditure which is fearful in amount. The Government ask us to commit ourselves to an outlay of not less than £6,000,000 for the current year, with the prospect that unless matters are managed with the grestest wisdom, delicacy, and success we may be involved in still larger expenses in future years. I say, then, in the name of the British public that we are entitled to a fuller explanation than we have yet received as to the definite objects of the Chinese expedition, the intentions of the Government, the mode in which they propose to carry out those intentions, the instructions they have given, and the security which the public will have that these enormous sums of money will produce satisfactory results.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a sum, not exceeding £3,356,104, be granted to Her Majesty, towards defraying the Expenses of Naval and Military Operations in China, beyond the ordinary grants for Army and Navy Services for the year 1860–1."
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEmoved that the Chairman report Progress.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Whatever may be done with regard to the Motion, I cannot allow the statement of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down to pass entirely unnoticed, I am quite aware of the grave responsibility which hangs over the Government, but we have sharers in that responsibility. I am not about to
  1834
  blame the right hon. Gentleman, or the Government to which he belonged, but the Committee must take into account the orders given and the course pursued by the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues when in office. The news of the Treaty of Tien-tsin was received by the Earl of Derby's Government with very great joy. We heard everywhere, where the Earl of Derby appeared, great commendation of the Earl of Elgin for signing that treaty. The late Government therefore made the signing of the treaty no matter of blame. But what did they proceed to do? According to the views which some hon. Gentlemen entertain—views which I do not adopt, and with which I do not agree—they might have instructed Mr. Bruce to come to any agreement with the Chinese, who are much better acquainted with diplomacy than the right hon. Gentleman seems to suppose. The Chinese were quite ready to negotiate the treaty over again, and to ask that the Articles which were disagreeable to them should be revised and the objectionable parts omitted. Mr. Bruce might then have gone to Pekin as Mr. Ward went, and he might have been sent back to procure a ratification of the treaty elsewhere. All this might have been done, but that was not the course which the Earl of Malmesbury and the right hon. Gentleman followed. They desired Mr. Bruce to go in force to the mouth of the Peiho. Two months before we came into office there was a meeting at Hong Kong, at which Mr. Bruce attended with Sir Charles Van Stranbenzee and Rear Admiral Hope, to consider what were the instructions of the Government and what it behoved them to do; and they came to the unanimous conclusion that it was their duty to go with an imposing force to the mouth of the Peiho. This is the statement made—"Sir Charles Van Straubenzee and Admiral Hope concurrred in this view. The latter said that his instructions contemplated the Minister being escorted with an imposing force." What was the meaning of that? From whence did Admiral Hope receive these instructions? Why, from the Admiralty, at which the right hon. Gentleman presided; and, therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman comes down now with an air of surprise, wondering how it is that the present Ministry have involved the country in a war, calling us to an account for so doing, and delivering solemn warnings, I must say that it is hardly in keeping with the position he has

  1835
  filled and the course he has followed upon this question. Our commanders thought it right to do what they had been commanded to do, and went to the mouth of the Peiho with an imposing force. They had then no further instructions. The Earl of Malmesbury was quite right when he said he had given no instructions to Mr. Bruce and Admiral Hope to enter the Peiho, clear the river, and proceed to Tientsin by force. But these gentlemen, being without instructions, found themselves, as a British Plenipotentiary and Admiral, in a considerable difficulty. The Chinese are in the habit of carrying shields upon which frightful heads are represented, and they suppose that on beholding those terrible countenances the enemy will run away, but if the enemy does not run away they are very apt to run away themselves. Now, if our commanders, arriving off the Peiho with an imposing force, had turned round on finding that it did not impose on the Chinese, and had set sail in the other direction for Hong Kong, this would have been an imitation of the Chinese in what is not the most honourable or distinguished part of the Chinese policy. I say, then, that the right hon. Gentleman is himself in a great degree responsible for what was done on this occasion by Mr. Bruce and Admiral Hope; men, we must remember, with English hearts and feelings, with English pride, and desirous to uphold the national honour. Then, what was it we desired? As my right hon. Friend has said, we desired first an explanation; but, when we found that the Emperor sanctioned these proceedings, although everybody pretended that he knew nothing of what was going on, and that they were fighting on their own account, we then demanded an apology for these proceedings. The right hon. Gentleman says I stated that our only business in China was trade; but he added, most truly, that it must be trade, with security to the persons and the property of British subjects. Now, when a British force had attempted to go up the river, with a view to obtain the ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin; and when they had been treacherously attacked—their loss in killed and wounded being 400 or 500 men—the Cabinet felt that if they had then sent humbly to ask permission to have the treaty ratified, without a word more being said on our part, they would have been exposing the lives and property of every British trader in China to certain risk, and, probably, in most cases, to certain
  1836
  destruction. Is there anything wrong in that supposition? The right hon. Gentleman asks a further question—what is our present policy in China? Surely, he must have read the despatches. We asked, in the first place, that the whole Treaty of Tien-tsin should be accepted with an apology, and that then no indemnity or compensation would be sought for. It appeared the French Government had sent orders that their representative should claim compensation. Mr. Bruce informed us, by a despatch of the 6th of February, that he had considered the danger there would be in making a separate demand from that of the French; and that therefore he had included in his demands a claim for compensation likewise. It does not seem that this claim to compensation made any difference to the Chinese answer, which amounted to a total refusal of our terms. Will any man say, then, that these terms are not moderate and reasonable? The question, then, came to be whether the force that we have sent out must not proceed, and must not insist on compliance with our demands. The question to be considered tonight is, whether you will sanction the expenses we have incurred, in pursuance of a policy which I hold to be right, and which I am ready to defend, but for which the right hon. Gentleman opposite and his colleagues are as much responsible as Her Majesty's Government.
  SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEsaid, there could be no doubt whatever that we were now at war with China, and that that war was the result of twenty years of the most flagrant policy on our part. But the more immediate question before the Committee was whether they would grant a sum of £3,800,000 to Her Majesty's Government, and upon what pretence they should grant it. That money he believed had been spent, and they would never see a farthing of it. By the ordinary mode of proceeding the delivery of the troops would have been taken from Chatham, but now it was taken at Singapore, whither the men had gone from Bengal, and at Singapore they would come upon the finances of India. Now we could see the result of taking India under our protection. The two accounts would run one into the other to such a degree that a clever Chancellor of the Exchequer would easily be able so to mystify the House that they would not be aware where the one began or the other ended. That conviction had weighed on his mind all this Session, and guided his votes. Nothing

  1837
  could have been more reckless or improvivident than the right hon. Gentleman's Budget. They had the French Treaty brought forward to throw dust in their eyes. They also had a remission of taxes, and that in the face of a deficiency which was certain to arise from this cause. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them of the considerations which influenced the Government in this matter, one of which considerations was that the Chinese had gained a great and palpable victory. Would anybody say it was an easy thing to deal with Asiatics when they had gained a victory? That being so, the Government ought not to have wantonly thrown away the resources at their command. They were entering on a course of warfare with the Chinese of which no man could see the end. It was the height of imprudence to have had anything to do with the Peiho or Pekin. It was the greatest fallacy to say our going to the Peiho was for the protection of British lives and property in China. The Gulf of Pechelee was a sealed hook to our commerce. Where British subjects and British property really were, there alone they could be and ought to be protected. If we took up a good strategical position at the points where our trade was actually carried on, or one that commanded the internal navigation of China, no doubt we could induce the Chinese Government to allow that trade to be satisfactorily pursued, which was our only justification for going to China at all.
  SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he would tell the House why they were fighting in China. They were fighting because they had sent a diplomatist to China, and given him a great deal too much power. If the Admiral and General had been left to themselves, and not goaded on by Mr. Bruce, we should never have had the Peiho business, nor had to pay the money for this war. The Earl of Elgin when in China tried to exercise the same power over his gallant Friend near him (Admiral Seymour) as Mr. Bruce did over Admiral Hope; but his gallant Friend, who knew best how operations in that country should be carried on, resisted the pressure put upon him, and the consequence was that he succeeded in everything he attempted at the Peiho. If Admiral Hope and General Straubenzee had been left to themselves, no doubt the results would have been the same. A diplomatist sent out with such large powers was sure to make a mess of it.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I hope the House will not agree to this Motion. By dividing the Vote my right hon. Friend has taken away all reason for reporting progress, because the second Vote will enable those hon. Gentlemen who still wish to speak on the general subject to deliver their sentiments on the second Vote. Hon. Gentlemen go on as if they imagined the Session would be eternal—as if the year was to be devoted entirely to the proceedings of this House. We go on from day to day, with a solemn air, putting off business when really there is not a day to spare. Hon. Gentlemen ought to recollect that there is a great deal of business he-fore us, and that if we go on putting off these Votes from day to day there will be no end of the Session, I shall, therefore, certainly oppose the Motion, and I will take the sense of the House on the subject.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANEsaid, the reason he had moved to report progress was that he and his Friends on that side had been taken by surprise at the magnitude of the Vote, which was what none of them had ever imagined before it was laid on the table. He also complained that no Foreign-Office despatches on this subject had been produced of later date than the 10th of November.
  MR. DISRAELI: I think if the noble Lord had made his speech on the value of time at the beginning of the Session it would have had some effect on the House, and might have exercised a beneficial influence on our proceedings. Unfortunately the Government were not then impressed with the truth which the noble Lord has now embraced. But we cannot conceal from ourselves that we have now considerably passed Midsummer-day, and I believe there is every wish on the part of the House to assist the Government in carrying on the business of the country, provided that it can he done with a fair exercise of our Parliamentary rights and our public duties, which, I trust, however advanced may be the period of the Session, we shall not be induced to forget. It certainly does appear that by dividing the Vote into two an opportunity will be afforded to hon. Gentlemen to make their not unnatural comments on the unsatisfactory state of our affairs in China; and, therefore, I venture to ask my hon. Friend not to press his Motion. But the noble Lord ought to recollect that this important discussion began late in the evening, and

  1839
  therefore the Motion of my hon. Friend is not unreasonable. It is only because I feel that another opportunity will be afforded to my hon. Friend, and those who think with him, to express their opinions that I venture to take the responsibility now of asking him not to press his Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn; Original Question put, and agreed to.
  House resumed. Resolutions to be reported To-morrow. Committee to sit again To-morrow.

PEACE PRESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT, 1856, AMENDMENT BILL.

  LEAVE.—FIRST READING.
  MR. CARDWELLmoved for leave to introduce a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856.)"
  MR. MAGUIREmoved the adjournment of the House.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
  LORD FERMOYobjected to the Bill, as a libel on the condition of Ireland. That country was just as peaceable, and law was as well preserved, as in England. There was no reason for a coercion Bill, and he should vote against the introduction of the Bill.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONinquired of the hon. Member for Dungarvan whether he would withdraw the Amendment and test the question on the Motion for the introduction of the Bill.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Question again proposed, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856)."
  MR. HENNESSYwarned the House against passing another coercion Bill for Ireland, and moved the adjournment of the Debate.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
  The House divided:—Ayes 11; Noes 60: Majority 49.
  Question again proposed, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856)."
  MR. BRADYsaid, he was sorry to oppose a large number of Members of the House who had decided that the Bill should
  1840
  be introduced, but he did so from conscientious motives, and believing the Bill altogether unnecessary, and a degradation to Ireland, he should move that the House should adjourn.
  MR. CARDWELLsaid, that nothing could be more reasonable than to express his opinion against the Bill, but why not do so at once, by voting against its introduction.
  MR. P. O'BRIENsaid, he had opposed the Bill when introduced by the Government of the Earl of Derby and he should oppose it now.
  MR. MAGUIREsaid, that the Bill was a stain and a disgrace, and he considered himself justified in taking advantage of every form of obstruction which the rules of the House afforded.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONcomplained that hon. Members who were against the Bill would not vote against it, but shirked the question.
  MR. BLAKEpointed out that it was all very well for the noble Lord to accuse them of shirking the matter, when he knew he had the majority with him. Irish Members were entitled to use every mode of combating this odious Bill.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That this House do now adjourn."
  The House divided:—Ayes 9; Noes 61: Majority 52.
  Question again proposed, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856)."
  MR. SULLIVANmoved the adjournment of the Debate.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he could quite understand the sincere objection to the Bill felt by the hon. Members, but did they hope to tire out the majority? He hardly thought that they would, on reflection, consider that persistence in such a course was consistent with the due discharge of their duty.
  MR. VINCENT SCULLYtaunted the Government with not having said a word of the character of the Bill, but wanted to get it through a stage without any explanation.
  MR. CARDWELLstated that though it was true that the cases of putting the act in force were not frequent, a barbarous murder had recently been committed on the borders of Galway and Mayo, and he was sure that the peaceable inhabitants of that district would be very much alarmed if they had not the protection of the House.
  MR. MAGUIREopposed the introduction of the measure on the grounds alleged, and said that a persistence in the course they had taken was the only way to meet a tyrannical majority.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
  The House divided:—Ayes 11; Noes 59: Majority 48.
  Question again proposed, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856)."
  MR. MAGUIREthought it was time for them all to go to-bed, as they had to be there again at twelve, and it was now half-past three, so he would move that the House do adjourn. At all events they ought to have mercy on the Speaker.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that if possible, he would rather move that the minority should have leave to go to bed.
  Motion made, and Question put, "That this House do now adjourn."
  The House divided:Ayes 7; Noes 59: Majority 52.
  MR. BLAKEmoved the adjournment of the Debate.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that as the Gentlemen opposite were reduced to seven, he should suggest whether it would not be well that they should show themselves the seven wise men of England, and permit a division on the main Question.
  MR. HENNESSYsaid, out of consideration for the Speaker he should suggest that they should divide on the introduction of the Bill.
  MR. BLAKEwithdrew the Motion for Adjournment.
  Question put, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to continue and amend the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (1856.)"
  The House divided:—Ayes 53; Noes 15: Majority 38.
  Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. CARDWELL and Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL for Ireland.
  Bill presented, and read 1° to be read 2° on Monday next, and to be printed [No. 260.]
  House adjourned at Four o'clock in the morning.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Dominica Hurricane Loan; Admiralty Court Jurisdiction.
2a Indemnity; Local Taxation Returns.
3a Law and Equity.

INDIA—PRIZE MONEY.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he wished to ask the Lord Privy Seal, Whether he was in a position to state the cause of the delay which had arisen in the distribution of the booty taken by Sir George Whitlock's force at Kirwee. The circumstances were these. Kirwee had been in the possession of two chiefs named Nardain Rao and Madho Rao, relatives of the late Peishwah, and cousins of Nana Sahib. On the occurrence of the outbreak or mutiny they declared themselves against us, cast fifty guns, raised troops, and corresponded with Nana Sahib, gave assistance to the defeated troops of the Nawab of Banda, and were in all respects rebels. On the advance of Sir George Whitlock their force dispersed, and they ultimately gave themselves up. That was on the 3rd of June, 1858, and all their property was taken possession of by the British troops. The treasure found in their palace amounted to a large sum. They had in coin and bullion £430,000, and jewels of the estimated value of £300,000, in addition to a sum of £90,000 which they had plundered from the ryots. The latter amount was paid over to Mr. Commissioner Mayne, of Banda. They possessed also £325,000 in the Government 5 per Cents, which were confiscated. The sum of £430,000 and the jewels were placed in the treasury at Allahabad; the money was credited to Sir George Whitlock's force, and 5 per cent interest was allowed. Not one rupee of the amount, however, had yet been distributed, it remained in the treasury; and, like many other sums over which the State had no honest control, he was afraid it had figured in the statement of Mr. Wilson as money which might be disposable by

1743
the Government so as to enable them to dispense with a further loan. The Governor General stated early in 1858, or towards the end of 1857, that all movable property of the rebels, such as was ordinarily treated as prize, was in this case to be so considered; but to this hour he had never seen any Order in Council—and if any such existed he was totally unaware of it—declaring under what conditions the booty taken in India was to be distributed. He must say that in this case, as well as in that of the Delhi and Lucknow prize money, a very great want of consideration for the army had been shown by the authorities. Such a state of things was of great public detriment. It was considered in a certain degree to have contributed to that lamentable catastrophe, the mutiny of one half of the local European army, an event most deplorable in itself, but still more deplorable from the course which Her Majesty's Government had pursued in consequence of it. In reference to this subject he would read to their Lordships a paragraph from the one of the papers laid on the table on the subject of amalgamation of the two European armies:—
"For years past a painful conviction had pervaded the army that the Government had not behaved fairly to it in the matter of prize, a conviction which led to the destruction in Lucknow alone of property to the extent of many thousands of pounds, to the destruction, indeed, of all frangible property which could not be appropriated by the captors, who (and the men were not Company's soldiers) declared 'Government should make nothing by it.'"
This was the state of feeling which was produced in the army by a neglect of their interests. The soldier was naturally desirous to possess at once that which he had gained, sometimes to be at once employed—in many cases to be sent home to his family. Certainly nothing could be more important to the public interest than that the sums gained gloriously in war should be at once distributed to the soldiers. It was as necessary for the Government of India to be on good terms with the army, as it was for the Government of England to be on good terms with the people, for it was by the army alone that we maintained that empire.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, that having received notice of his noble Friend's question, he made application to the Secretary of State for India, and the answer he received was that no report whatever had been received by the Indian Govern-
1744
ment with reference to the distribution of booty in question. His noble Friend was aware that the Secretary for India had no power to move in the matter, that the Indian Council were the ordinary judges in the matter of prize, and that the home Government could only review. He had received no information whatever of the circumstances connected with the capture of Kirwee.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, this statement of the noble Duke showed that the state of things was a great deal worse than he had supposed. There was booty captured to the extent of £1,150,000 so far back as June, 1858, and yet, not a word respecting it had been sent to the home Government.
LORD MONTEAGLEsaid, this was only one of a series of disrespectful acts of the Indian Government towards Parliament. In the face of the statutory law, which called for an annual production of all matters relating to the Indian revenue, they were left for years and years in perfect ignorance of these affairs. When his noble Friend was connected with the India Board he was at great pains to obtain the information—in fact, he was bound to do so, because he and the noble Earl were parties to the passing of the Bill which compelled the Indian Government to furnish information. But this was the second year in which he called their Lordships' attention to the wilful neglect and contemptuous disregard of their statutory duty which the Indian Government exhibited. This year there was not even that attempt at excuse which was made last year for the neglect of the form in which these accounts were to be furnished. He thought the Government at home were in some measure responsible for this contempt and disregard of the statute law.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, that the last time the noble Lord complained of the non-production of these accounts the noble Earl opposite declared that it was physically impossible to furnish them in the time. Whether that were so or not, this matter now under discussion had nothing whatever to do with those accounts.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: The Government of India is better off in cash by pretty nearly a million, to say nothing of the paper money, than it was before, and has never said a word about it.
LORD MONTEAGLE: And they are bound to give us all information as to their finances.

JEWS ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

  COMMITTEE.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee on the Jews Act Amendment Bill read.
  LORD LYNDHURSTsaid, that when first this Bill came up from the other House it was not his desire to have anything to do with it. He certainly did not approve the form in which the Jewish Disabilities Bill went down to the other House, but he did not think it respectful to their Lordships to ask them so soon to reverse their decision. When, however, he found that the Amendments which he suggested and which he now intended to move would be assented to, he consented to take charge of the Bill. It was their Lordships' intention, in passing the Jewish Dissabilities Act, that a Resolution by the House of Commons should become a permanent provision. It turned out afterwards that the House of Commons had no power to make such a provision permanent and that the Resolution must be renewed every Session. To obviate the inconvenience it was thought that the Resolution might be turned into a Standing Order. But the Speaker was of opinion that the House of Commons had no power to convert a Resolution originating in an Act of Parliament into a Standing Order. This Bill did not go further than to carry into effect the intention of their Lordships, and to enable the House of Commons to convert the Resolution into a Standing Order. The Amendment which he should propose in Committee would be this—
  "Whenever the House of Commons shall order that any Resolution, pursuant to the first Section of the said recited Act in the same Session, shall be a Standing Order of the House, any Member professing the Jewish religion may thenceforth be sworn pursuant to such Standing Order as long as the same shall continue in force."
  Their Lordships would perceive that in fact the Bill would enable the House of Commons to do that which it was supposed by this House, when the Act passed, they had the power of effecting—namely, converting the Resolution into a Standing Order, so as to prevent the necessity of renewing it at the commencement of every Session. After the Bill had passed through Committee pro formâ and the Amendment was inserted he proposed to reprint it.
  LORD CHELMSFORDsaid, that the Bill, although a short one, and apparently of a very unpretending character, was nevertheless one of considerable import-
  1746
  ance, and which certainly ought not to have arrived at this stage without receiving more notice than had yet been given to it. He had given an intimation to his noble and learned Friend that although he did not intend to oppose the Bill, he wished to make some observations upon it. He supposed he was not understood, for the second reading had taken place without his having had the opportunity of making his remarks; and therefore, although what he had to say would have been more applicable to the second reading, he trusted their Lordships would indulge him in the few observations which he wished to offer on the kind of legislation which the House of Commons proposed by this Bill. Their Lordships must recollect that, pending the discussions which took place in that House on the long-agitated question of the admission of the Jews into Parliament, a noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan) came forward as a peacemaker, and proposed an arrangement by which each House would be at liberty to exercise an independent course of action by a Resolution, and if it thought fit, when any person professing the Jewish religion presented himself at the table to be sworn, those important and well-known words "On the true faith of a Christian" might be omitted. As he understood the compromise, it was not the intention of the Legislature that any Resolution passed by the House of Commons should have the force of an Act of Parliament. The intention, as he understood it, was that the Resolution should be binding on the House of Commons during the Parliament in which it was adopted, and not beyond. From the part which he (Lord Chelmsford) had taken for so many years in this important question, he was not at all pleased with the arrangement; but finding that a great majority of their Lordships were anxious for some settlement, he offered no opposition, although he felt at the time it never could be considered anything more than a temporary arrangement, not a final settlement of the question. However, the Act of Parliament passed; and he certainly was very much astonished to hear that any difficulty had arisen as to its construction. It seemed to him to be so very clear and plain that it required great ingenuity to find a different meaning from that which the Legislature intended. It was the intention—and he thought the intention was very clearly expressed in the Act—that the Resolution should continue in force

  1747
  during the Parliament in which it was passed if not repealed. But he understood it was the opinion of a very high authority in the House of Commons that the Resolution was only operative in the particular Session in which it was passed, and that it would not continue in operation during the continuance of a Parliament. He (Lord Chelmsford) on the contrary apprehended that the Resolution would have the effect which every Resolution passed by the House of Commons would have, which was, as he understood, that it would continue during the continuance of the Parliament which passed it, unless previously repealed. And that was the intention of the Legislature in passing the Act. The words of the Act were,
  "Where it shall appear to either House of Parliament that a Person professing the Jewish Religion, otherwise entitled to sit and vote in such a House is prevented from so sitting and voting by his conscientious Objection to take the Oath which by an Act passed or to be passed in the present Session of Parliament has been or maybe substituted for the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration in the Form therein required, such House, if it think fit, may resolve that thenceforth any Person professing the Jewish Religion, on taking the said Oath to entitle him to sit and vote as aforesaid, may omit the Words 'and I make this Declaration upon the true Faith of a Christian,' and so long as such Resolution shall continue in force the said Oath, when taken and subscribed by any Person professing the Jewish Religion to entitle him to sit and vote in that House of Parliament may be modified accordingly."
  However, it was the opinion of a high authority in the Commons that this Resolution would only have this effect during the Session in which it was passed; and accordingly they appealed to their Lordships for some assistance to obviate this unsettled state of things, and they had sent down this Bill, which certainly went very far beyond their Lordships' original intention that neither House should interfere with the other, and that each might independently pass a Resolution to enable a Jew to take his seat: whereas the House of Commons applied to their Lordships to consent to a law by which permanently any person professing the Jewish religion might omit the words "upon the true faith of a Christian." He was not surprised that his noble and learned Friend had positively refused to take charge of the Bill unless the Amendment which he had read were introduced. They had, of course, entire confidence in his noble and learned Friend, and, therefore, it might be assumed that that would be the shape of
  1748
  the Bill. As he had already intimated he considered the Bill in that form entirely unobjectionable. But he could not withhold a remark or two on the unnecessary character of this Amendment. If he were right in his construction of the Act, the Resolution which the House of Commons was enabled to pass was binding during the Parliament, unless there was a decision to the contrary. It was proposed by the Amendment that the House of Commons should have the power of making their Resolution a Standing Order. He did not know that any greater effect would be given to their Resolution when it was converted into a Standing Order than what it had during the time it existed in the original form of a Resolution. Upon that point there was a great authority in their Lordships' House, to whom he would appeal.
  LORD EVERSLEY: A Resolution of the House, strictly speaking, would not be valid beyond the Session during which it was passed. A Standing Order would remain valid in succeeding Sessions until repealed.
  LORD CHELMSFORD: If that was the case, there could be no objection whatever to their Lordships agreeing to the Amendment of his noble and learned Friend. As they were treading on rather delicate ground in legislating with regard to the House of Commons, he trusted, however, that his noble and learned Friend had the sanction of the authorities of that House for the alteration he proposed.
  LORD BROUGHAMstrongly recommended their Lordships not to dissent from the Bill as proposed to be amended by his noble and learned Friend. That their Lordships had the clear and undoubted right to reject the Bill, he held to be so clear a proposition as to require no enforcement by argument. That their Lordships had the power to reject any Bill sent up from the other House, in the whole or in part, he held to be incontrovertible. A Bill sent up from the House of Commons for imposing a tax, they had a right to refuse—to refuse the tax. A Bill sent up to repeal a tax, their Lordships had a right to refuse, and thereby to insist that the tax continue. If a Bill was sent up from the Commons enacting one tax and repealing another their Lordships had a right either to reject that Bill altogether, and require the tax to remain in its existing shape, or to reject part and adopt part—to reject the part which imposed a new tax and to adopt the part which repealed an old tax. He knew that it was not

  1749
  usual to do so. He knew that it was contrary to the usual course of legislation in the two Houses that their Lordships should take that course; it was contrary to precedent, right or wrong, to take that course; but that it was their undeniable right he had not the shadow of a doubt. Nay, he would go further, and say that their Lordships had a right to originate in their own House a measure enacting a tax and to send it to the other House: "Whereas it is expedient that a certain sum shall be levied by a tax on the people in order to meet the exigencies of the public service: be it, therefore, enacted;" and the Lords passed a "tax" Bill. He (Lord Brougham) would not say that the other House would give such Bill a very cordial reception: he would not take upon himself to say that they would give it even a respectful reception: probably the Commons would reject it altogether. They might reject it in not the most courteous manner. Nay, probably they might treat it as Bills of this description had been treated before in the other House, and actually throw it out by bodily force. And so also it was the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to refuse the Royal Assent to any Bill, even though sent up from both Houses of Parliament without a dissentient voice in either. It was an undeniable right of the Crown to refuse its assent. No doubt the Ministers who advised the Crown so to refuse assent to such a Bill would be answerable to the country for the advice which they gave their Sovereign; but that the Sovereign had an undoubted right so to refuse assent he held to be a perfectly clear proposition.
  LORD TEIGNMOUTHrose to call the noble and learned Lord to order. His observations had nothing to do with the question before the House.
  LORD BROUGHAMsaid, it would be seen to be applicable enough when he came to apply his argument to the Bill before them. He would not say he should make it clear to the understanding of the noble Lord, but he would undertake that it should be clear to the understanding of 99 out of every 100 who might hear or read what he was now saying. He held it to be the right of every branch of the Legislature—of the Crown, of the Lords, of the Commons—to take such a course; but it was a different thing to say that in any given case that power should be exercised, and he held that in some cases the exercise of an undeniable right might be as inexpedient though not so illegal or
  1750
  unjust, as the exercise of that which was no right but a wrong; and he held that to reject this Bill, which dealt entirely and singly with proceedings of the other House of Parliament, which applied to the manner of taking their seat by Members of that House, which carefully excluded all reference to the House of Lords, which was simply and solely a Bill for regulating matters respecting only Members of the other House of Parliament taking their seats; to reject this Bill he held would not only be inconsistent with former precedent, but inconsistent with the respect due to the House of Commons, and inexpedient in every point of view. The right of their Lordships to do any act did not prove any the least justification of doing that act. Their proceedings, though quite lawful, might be both inexpedient and unconstitutional. The Bill gave effect to what was understood at the time to be the intention of this as well as the other House of Parliament; and he (Lord Brougham) thought that the mode in which the Bill intended to give effect to that intention, now that a difficulty had arisen, was unexceptionable.
  House in Committee.
  LORD LYNDHURSTproposed the Amendment of which he had given notice.
  Amendment agreed to.
  The Report thereof to be received Tomorrow.

HOLYHEAD HARBOUR OF REFUGE.

  SELECT COMMITTEE MOVED FOR.
  THE EARL OF MAYO,in moving for a Select Committee to inquire into the state and efficiency of the Harbour of Refuge at Holyhead, said he should arrange the statement he had to make under four heads:—first, the number of shipwrecks that have occurred during the last twelve months inside the harbour; second, the principal defects of the harbour; thirdly, the silting up of the harbour; and fourthly, the enormous increase on the original estimate. And as to the first point, the number of vessels wrecked within the harbour, the following account of the vessels that were wrecked inside the new Refuge Harbour at Holyhead on the 27th and 28th of April, 1859, is taken from The Shipping Gazette of the 29th of that month:—
  "April 27: The Richard, of Whitehaven, sunk. The Mary Anne, of Preston, stranded in the New Harbour. April 28: The Royal William, from Dublin for Liverpool, sunk in the New Harbour. The Anne, of Swansea, sunk. The Byzantium

  1751
  received considerable damage in New Harbour last night, by the brig Queen, running athwart hawse. The brig Richard, of Whitehaven, drove against the upper sea wall and fills with the tide; supposed to be much damaged. The smack Amlwch Packet, employed carrying stone for the harbour works, sunk at the same place. The schooner Js. Annie, of Swansea, on shore at the upper part of the harbour. The brig Reaper, of Whitehaven, on shore on the beach. The above vessels, either by parting their cables or driving from their anchors, have come into collision with others and damaged them, but in consequence of the storm continuing, particulars cannot be obtained at present. The Queen, Wilton, of and from Chepstow, for Whitehaven, was towed in with loss of both masts, bowsprit, and all the gear attached thereto, a complete wreck, by dragging foul of the barque Byzantium, Harris, from Matanzas for Liverpool, in the bay last night; she slipped both anchors. The Vigilant, Belgian ship, slipped both anchors, and was towed in from the bay with loss of mainboom, boat, and bowsprit sprung, and bowsprit-shrouds carried away. The Gipsy was towed in with loss of both anchors, having slipped them in the bay. The Royal William, brigantine, parted from her anchors in the New Harbour last night, drifted alongside the quay and sunk. The Mary Anne, schooner, which drove on shore in the New Harbour last night, fills with the tide, and must dis. charge. The Mary Elizabeth sunk in the New Harbour; and a small smack in the Old Harbour also sunk."
  It thus appeared that on the 28th of April, 1859, no fewer than seven vessels were sunk and five others seriously damaged inside the New Refuge at Holyhead. The next occasion that them erits of the harbour were tested was on the 26th of October last. The effect of the gale is thus described by The Times:—
  "A large part of the breakwater works at Holyhead have been destroyed, and vessels anchored far inside and sheltered, compared to where the Great Eastern lay, have either gone down bodily or been driven high and dry ashore. … Within the very extremity of the breakwater, where one would have thought the Channel fleet might have ridden through any gale, much damage had been done. High and dry ashore under Holyhead mountain lay a fine barque, and around her, in the same predicament, were three smaller vessels. Out in the centre of the harbour the tops of two slender tapering masts showed where Captain Henry's beautiful schooner yacht, the Mariquita, had gone down bodily. Immediately behind this last was another and larger vessel, which had apparently only escaped the same fate by driving on the rocks."
  On the same occasion the Great Eastern had narrowly escaped destruction; and upon two occasions (26th and 27th) when it was deemed advisable to remove her to more sheltered positions, her anchors could not be raised until they broke. Again, on the occasion of her departure for Southampton on the 4th of November follow-
  1752
  ing, Captain Harrison was again obliged to strain the chains until the anchor broke:
  "And from the marks," says The Times reporter, "upon the anchor and chains, both of which were deeply scratched, it was supposed that the anchor had sunk through the mud until it nipped in rocky ground, and then held till the last strain broke it."
  The following Return from the Board of Trade shows that three other vessels were wrecked in the Harbour in January and February last:—
  Jan. 27, 1860.—The barque Robert Mills, lying with two anchors down in heavy gale of wind, dragged broadside on to the breakwater, and lay there thumping and making water until the wind shifted to the W.N.W., when she swung to her anchors again, and was towed for safety to Old Harbour.
  Jan. 30.—The schooner William Henry put into Holyhead New Harbour for safety, and when beating out and endeavouring to clear a brig, ran upon the rocks and filled.
  Feb. 27.—The barque Robert Mills let go anchors off the new breakwater Holyhead, but she drove and continued driving until she got on the Penrhyn Rock in Holyhead Bay, when she became a total loss.
  So well, indeed, was the danger of the harbour understood, that he was informed that the Liverpool merchants had warned their captains against entering it, and the Royal Charter passed it in a heavy gale of wind the evening before she was wrecked, and would have entered it had it been a safe harbour. He would now proceed to show what were the principal defects of the harbour, and also that they were brought before the Government before the measure had received the sanction of Parliament. When the Bill for forming the Harbour of Refuge was introduced in the Commons in 1847, the citizens of Dublin petitioned against it on the following grounds, as stated in the Report of the Naval Commissioners, 1847:—
  "First, That Holyhead being situated on a bold coast, and bounded by dangerous rocks on a lee-shore, exposed to the violent action of the prevailing winds, and to unusually rapid tides, is not a fit place for a Harbour of Refuge.
  "Second, That the entrance being in the teeth of the prevailing winds, no vessel could enter the harbour at such times when shelter is most required.
  "Third, That, as by far the largest portion of the bottom of the area proposed to be enclosed by Mr. Rendel was found, after careful examination, to consist of rock, it would be impossible that vessels could, in storms or rough weather, anchor with facility or security within the proposed harbour.
  "Fourth, That from the rapid increase of the Stanley Sands in the direction of the proposed harbour, there would be great liability to its being choked up with silt, or a bar being formed at its entrance."

  1753
  The shipowners of Liverpool also presented a petition to Parliament, and which contained the following paragraph:—
  "That your petitioners are strongly impressed with the inexpediency of laying out the immense sum of money necessary for the construction of an Harbour of Refuge (so desirable on some part of that coast), at the port of Holyhead, on the ground that the rocky nature of the bottom of the greatest part of such harbour would render it unsafe, if even possible to anchor ships there; and they venture to hope that Her Majesty's Government, before finally adopting that port for such purpose, will institute further inquiries on the subject."
  Shortly after these petitions had been presented, and in consequence of them, a Commission, consisting of three naval officers, was appointed to inquire into the merits and demerits of the plan. The Commission sat on the 14th of June, and closed their inquiries on the 16th; but in the meanwhile the Bill had been read a second time on the understanding that no further proceedings should be taken until the Report of the Commissioners had been a reasonable time in the hands of Members. Notwithstanding this arrangement the Government appointed a Select Committee on the Bill, which sat three days before the Report of the Commission was in the hands of the Members; and in consequence, the citizens of Dublin and Liverpool and those who opposed the scheme, had no opportunity of being heard. The civil engineers and nautical authorities who were examined before the Naval Commissioners were, Mr. Rendel, Sir John Bennie; Mr. Bald, Tidal Harbour Surveyor to the Admiralty; Mr. Page, Engineer to the Woods and Forests; Mr. Williams, Managing Director of the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company; Captain Christie, R.N. Mr. Williams stated, on behalf of his Company, that there appeared to be great doubts of the harbour being safe, on account of the bad anchorage shown by the Admiralty charts; the principal part of the site appeared to consist of a floor of rock; and in many cases the naked rock projected above the covering, and was so rough and uneven as to chafe the hawsers. Captain Christie stated that of 369 operations only four appeared to afford good holding-ground. Mr. Bald, being examined as to the anchorage ground, stated:—
  "The edge of the coast from Ynys Wellt is low and rocky, as far as Holyhead Harbour." "There is a channel inside the Outer Platters; but as foul ground extends for some distance from both Tnys Cribi and Ynys Wellt, it would be imprudent to use it without the assistance of a pilot."
  1754
  "And it is this space of water, with its foul rocky bottom, which has been proposed to be formed into an asylum harbour.
  "It is unnecessary to mention that any asylum harbour which shall be formed at Holyhead without possessing good anchoring ground within it, will be a failure, and the case of Howth Harbour ought to be a sufficient warning. I am quite satisfied that had the important subject of the bottom and anchoring ground been sufficiently investigated, as to its being clean or foul, no asylum harbour would have ever been proposed and designed in a place so extremely objectionable. I examined the nature of the bottom; an iron chain 100 feet long, with a very heavy lead attached to it, was dropped down; the impression upon my mind at the time, upon looking at the nature of the shore and going over it was, that it was a floor of rocks."
  The evidence of Sir John Bennie, Mr. George Bennie, and Mr. Page will be found confirmatory of Mr. Bald's.
  He had now to draw their Lordships' attention to the evidence of the witnesses who were examined before the Naval Commissioners on the part of the Shipping interest of Liverpool. The first witness examined was Mr. Lockett, the Chairman of the Shipowners' Association of that Port. His evidence is as follows:—
  Mr. Lockett: We have had many discussions before our board of shipowners respecting this harbour and the nautical gentlemen connected with it. We wish, first, to be certain as to the anchorage; because, if it is, as represented, a rocky bottom, if it is going to be enclosed in the manner laid down in this chart, it is considered it will be anything but a harbour of refuge for ships from Liverpool. Many gentlemen say, instead of its being a harbour of refuge in certain gales of wind, it will be a harbour of destruction.
  Captain Askew, Harbour Master of Liverpool: My opinion of the bottom of the anchorage, is that which has been already represented, and I can only follow the language of Mr. Lockett in saying, that so far from its being a harbour of refuge, it will be one of destruction. I think the north breakwater, instead of being a protection, will be an injury. In a gale of wind from the north-west to the east-north-east, I defy any man to go along that wall. I am also given to understand it is principally rocky, with the exception of some patches of sand; if you take a vessel in there, and let go her anchor, and the anchor did not hold, as you cannot immediately take the canvass off, she must either go on the vessels which are there, or upon the rocks.
  Mr. Irwin: On behalf of the shipowners of Liverpool I may add to what has already been observed, that I am quite certain they never would avail themselves of this intended harbour from the fact of its insecurity."
  "Mr. Askew: It would be impossible to lay in safety in it."
  The next point to which he desired to draw their Lordships' attention was that of the silting up of the harbour. The engineers examined before the Naval Com-

  1755
  missioners in 1847 objected to the site chosen for the harbour of refuge on the ground of there being every probability that it was filling up. Mr. Bald stated that the Stanley Sands, through which the river Alaw runs, had advanced half a nautical mile in twenty-four years, and that in fact the proposed asylum harbour would prove only a cesspool to receive the silt and alluvium discharged by the Alaw; and a chart recently published, by Mr. Calver, one of the surveying officers of the Admiralty showed that diminution of ten feet in the depth of the new harbour had taken place since Captain Beechey surveyed the bay in 1840.
  The importance which the late Sir Robert Peel attached to questions of setting may be gathered from his remarks on the Harbour of Dovor in 1847:—
  "With respect to Harbours of Refuge, he could assure the hon. Member for Dovor, that the subject had not escaped the attention of Her Majesty's Government. But if there were any one thing in respect to which the utmost precautions were unusually necessary, it was the spending of £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 of money in erecting Harbours of Refuge. He had himself lived to see a Harbour of Refuge constructed at an expense of hundreds of thousands of pounds, which harbour had become almost utterly valueless, because sufficient precaution had not been taken to ascertain the nature of its sedimentary deposits. The construction of such a work as Dovor might involve an outlay, not of hundreds of thousands, but of millions; and before that work was undertaken, it was manifestly desirable that they should have the most reasonable grounds for believing that it would attain its purpose. He could not, however, deem it consistent with his duty to propose to the House of Commons an enormous outlay, without being able to show that every precaution had been taken; first, to insure the selection of the best place; and next, that every guarantee had been afforded that a work of that kind would, if undertaken, be so constructed as to afford the greatest possible amount of advantage to the public."
  He now came to his fourth and last point, the great increase on the original estimate. Mr. Rendel originally estimated the cost at £600,000; but the engineers who were examined before the Naval Commissioners gave estimates in detail to show that, instead of £600,000, it would cost little short of two millions:—

  Mr. Page estimated the cost at

  £1,500,000

  Sir John Rennie at

  1,800,000

  Mr. George Rennie at

  1,800,000

  Mr. Bald at

  1,900,000

  Again, it will be found that the testimony of those eminent authorities has been borne out by the result; for, according to Mr. Hawkshaw's last Report to Parliament, the sum of £1,158,000 has
  1756
  already been voted for the works, and £762,000 more will be required to complete them, making the total aggregate estimate to the present time £1,920,000; but, according to the evidence of Captain Washington, Hydrographer to the Admiralty, before the Select Committee on Harbours of Refuge, 1858, it is clear that the total cost of the Harbour will be little short of three millions. He (the Earl of Mayo) had known the harbour since 1808; but in 1852, in consequence of a proposition to make it a great Atlantic harbour, he determined to make himself thoroughly acquainted with it. Accordingly, on his way from Ireland he stopped at Holyhead; saw the Engineer, or the gentleman who acted for him, and attentively examined the maps. He found rock, rock, rock, everywhere, and his study of the map increased his surprise that any one should recommend a large expenditure of money on such a place. On coming to London, he sent some papers on the subject to the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), who was then Premier. In 1859, a part of the great breakwater in course of erection was swept away, and the sea swept over it. Under all the circumstances, he could not but think it very much to be regretted that £1,500,000 should be spent upon this harbour, not of refuge, but of destruction. The citizens of Dublin and the merchants of Liverpool had petitioned against the expenditure of the public money in the formation of the harbour. The most experienced captains asserted that it was most unsafe for vessels in bad weather without the construction of a proper breakwater, which was estimated to cost £400,000; but if Holyhead was a safe harbour, what did they want with a breakwater? He trusted that the Government would grant him the Committee he asked for, because he believed he should be able to prove that the harbour of Holyhead, instead of being a harbour of refuge was really a harbour of destruction; and that there was no use in throwing good money after bad in the vain hope of making it truly effective for its purpose. The noble Earl concluded by moving—
  "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the State and Efficiency or otherwise of the new Refuge Harbour at Holyhead, the Cause or Causes of the Number of Wrecks that occurred therein during the last Year; also to inquire into the Plan as now sanctioned by the Admiralty for the Construction of a Packet Harbour for the Accommodation of the large Class of Steamers about to be employed for the Irish Mail Service."
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he could not take on himself any of the responsibility for the construction of the harbour at Holyhead, which had been undertaken at the recommendation of a Royal Commission appointed to report on the most suitable site for a harbour of refuge on that coast. He believed, however, that the outline of the harbour proposed by the late Mr. Rendel would have cost less, and would have afforded greater shelter, than the plan subsequently agreed to. But it was no use to regret what had taken place; their Lordships ought rather to determine whether Holyhead was really so defective as a harbour of refuge. After the great gale of the 25th or 26th of October, a letter was written from the Admiralty to the officer in charge to inquire what damage had been done to the breakwater, and likewise to the shipping. In reply it was stated that—
  "The breakwater was uninjured. The sea did not break into the harbour; but at high water the crest of the waves came over the unfinished part of the breakwater. Some 600 feet of wooden staging was washed away, and a wooden building in which the red light was kept was destroyed. There were fifty-six vessels inside the Platters (rocks), and the Great Eastern lay outside in the roads."
  The following casualties were reported:—
  "The England, bark, deep laden with salt, having already lost an anchor off Liverpool, put into Holyhead to get another, and had not supplied herself when the gale came on. She broke the fluke of her remaining anchor, and, falling foul of three smacks and a schooner, landed herself and them on the beach. They were got off with little damage. The Gipsy, schooner, ran in during height of gale, let go both her anchors, swung foul of a vessel, slipped one anchor in order to clear her, parted the chain of the other, and went on the rocks; she was much damaged. The Mcraquita, schooner yacht, was run foul of by a steam-tug, and thrown on the rocks. One or two other collisions occurred among the small craft, but no vessels dragged their anchors. The sea, with wind at east, was heavy for boats, but nothing to hurt a wholesome vessel, properly provided with anchors and chains. The harbour is easy of access, and proved itself perfectly safe. The Great Eastern was the only vessel in the outer roads, and was at single anchor; when the wind came to the north-east she swung and rode outside the shelter of the breakwater. She dropped a second anchor, and rode well all night. Next day she weighed one anchor, and, having steamed ahead for this purpose, her remaining anchor broke across the shank. On the 2nd of November she broke another anchor."
  But it was the opinion of the officer on the spot that she never was in any danger. Admitting that the money spent at Holyhead might have been laid out to greater advantage, that a larger area might have
  1758
  been enclosed, and that rocks which would now have to be blown up with gunpowder might have been avoided, he still thought the evidence went to prove that as a harbour of refuge it was not unsafe. As regarded its present condition, he felt it would be desirable in any case to complete the outer work, to prevent what had been already done from going to ruin; but before any new and expensive works were undertaken the matter should be submitted to the consideration of Parliament. Application had been made last autumn for the construction of a pier or jetty to accommodate the large new steamers which were to run between England and Ireland. In the original plan a solid pier was contemplated, which would have taken four or five years to complete, and the advantages of which would in the end have been very questionable. He therefore refused to countenance the outlay requisite for that purpose; but, regarding it as highly desirable that the public should enjoy the benefit of those vessels, he had sanctioned the erection of a wooden jetty at a cost of £9,000, which would be available for their passengers. If this did not prove sufficient, it would be necessary to consider the matter carefully next year; for, cost what it might, it would be requisite to establish a good communication between England and Ireland. He promised that the works in progress at Holyhead should not go beyond what he had now stated, and that the subject should receive the attention of Government. Under the circumstances, he hoped the noble Earl would not press his Motion.
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwould not go into the general subject of harbours of refuge, but he thought it was perfectly clear that if in a harbour like Holyhead twenty vessels were lost in ordinary gales, that the prevailing winds were such that vessels could not enter, and that when in there was no good holding-ground or anchorage, there were certainly good grounds for refusing to expend larger sums of money than had already been expended. If the noble Duke would undertake to say that he would himself carefully and vigilantly look to the future progress of the work he had no desire to relieve the Government of the responsibility. The information they had was the only information they could acquire, and it required nothing but a sound judgment to take such measures as would prevent the public witnessing a further expenditure of public money, and of

  1759
  finding that they had no harbour of refuge after all.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEwas of opinion that in a matter of such national importance a minister required a great deal more than merely sound judgment—he required considerable vigour in order to deal with and overthrow the proceedings of professional individuals, who domineered over men of sound judgment who were too apt to defer to those professional persons. The noble Duke had not contradicted any one of the statements that had been made. There was an expenditure of millions of money, and what was the justification for it?—that it was expended under the authority of the most eminent men. An eminent man, in fact, one who expended an immense sum of money, which made him still more eminent, and when the thing failed, who was responsible? Not the political head of the Government, because he had the best advice of the eminent man. Who, he wanted to know, was the eminent man to be condemned? He never heard of one. He had never heard of a Minister being censured, or of a public officer being dismissed, for all the money that had been thrown away. It had been mentioned before their Lordships' Committee that several of these harbours were useless, and that the money might just as well have been thrown into the sea. It was a poor consolation to tell them that they were to proceed with sound judgment if sound judgment was still to be fettered by professional engineers, who always would go on expending money on plans and systems which had failed for the last 3,000 years in all parts of the world. There were two harbours in existence at Holyhead. One was a harbour of refuge, built at an enormous expense, but not usable by packets, so that another had to be constructed for that purpose. He trusted that the noble Duke would take this question up with a determination to examine the matter and act for himself. After all this expenditure at Holyhead, the passengers had to embark and to disembark at a common wooden jetty, such as existed on the Thames, or at any watering place. He hardly knew of any harbour excepting Kingstown that had succeeded. He trusted the public money would not be further wasted on a work that was a monument of the folly of those eminent professional men who became eminent, not by the display of any skill, but by recommending enormous
  1760
  works to be constructed at an enormous expenditure.
  LORD VIVIANsaid, if anybody was responsible for the large expenditure, it was Parliament, which had sanctioned it. He recollected well a Select Committee of their Lordships sitting to decide as to the construction of a harbour of refuge at Holyhead for the Liverpool shipping. He did not know whether that exhibited "sound judgment," but having sanctioned the work, their Lordships must be held to have some share in the responsibility.
  THE EARL OF SHREWSBURYsaid, they had it on the authority of Sir Edward Belcher, that the great fault was that Mr. Rendel's plan had not been carried out. He feared that an enormous outlay had been made for very little purpose; and that to have a harbour worth anything, they must revert to the original plan. He could conceive no inquiry more legitimate than that they should endeavour to ascertain the best plan for making the harbour. It had been suggested to refer the question to the Committee now sitting upon Breakwaters; but he thought it would be as well to refer it to the Admiralty, and that they should take care that no more money should be wasted on it and thrown into the sea. It was in evidence that the harbour was gradually silting up; and it was right an investigation should be gone into on that point, before there was a greater expenditure.
  VISCOUNT DUNGANNONtrusted the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government would be directed to the subject. From all he had heard respecting the construction of the harbour, he thought it would be a difficult matter to elongate the pier in such a manner as to render it a safe retreat for vessels. The Breakwater, winter after winter, had been washed away, and never could get a firm holding. It was highly desirable for the traffic between England and Ireland that improved accommodation should be given; but he doubted, notwithstanding all this expenditure, whether they were not going from a bad Scylla into a worse Charybdis. He hoped that next Session the subject would be inquired into by a Committee.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREsaid, he did not deny that Holyhead had not answered their expectation. But referring to what the noble Marquess had said with reference to eminent men, in fairness to the memory of the late Mr. Rendel, he must say that, first, his plan had not been

  1761
  followed out; that, secondly, it was not fair to expect that the harbour could resist every heavy gale, seeing that it was not completed. Excepting when the wind was from one particular point, Holyhead did afford a fair shelter for vessels. The question of a pier for packets was quite distinct from the question of the harbour as a place of refuge, and formed no part of the plan of Mr. Rendel.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, that his observation upon engineers was a general one, and that he had no intention to apply it particularly to Mr. Rendel.
  EARL GRANVILEEsaid, that having been acquainted with the eminent engineer, Mr. Rendel, it was impossible not to know how high he stood in the estimation of the profession, and how singularly clearheaded and able a man he was. If they were to avoid all professional advice, and especially eminent professional advice, he did not know how great national works were to be undertaken.
  Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.
  House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, Half-past Ten o'clock.