Sitting of 8 March 1859

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Bury St. Edmund's, Lord Alfred Hervey; For Oxford University, Right Hon. William Ewart Gladstone.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1o Poor Relief (Ireland) Act Amendment; Combination of Workmen; Law Ascertainment; Registration of Births, &c. (Ireland); Oaths Act Amendment.
2o Mutiny; Marine Mutiny.

EXTENSION OF THE CAPITATION GRANT TO SCHOOLS (SCOTLAND).

  QUESTION.
  SIR ANDREW AGNEWsaid, he wished to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council for Education whether it is his intention to propose the ex-

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  tension of the Capitation Grant to Schools in Scotland. He would also inquire whether the Grant will be applicable to Ragged and Industrial Schools in Scotland.
  MR. ADDERLEYsaid, that several applications had been made from Scotland for an extension of the Grant. The reason why it had not been extended, not merely to Scotland, but at first to large towns in England, was that legislative measures were being attempted in both cases, when Capitation Grants were introduced, for providing funds for National Education in other ways. If it might be presumed that these measures were now dropped, there could be no reason why Scotland, as already the large towns in England, should not be put on the same footing as other places with respect to the Grant. No estimate, however, would be proposed this year on the subject, because the Committee of Council on Education contemplated the revision of the Capitation and some other Grants with the view of limiting their excessive accumulation in the case of very large and rich schools, and thus preventing that which was primarily intended for poor schools from being mischievously wasted. The Committee of Council deemed it desirable that a Minute for that purpose should be laid before Parliament; after which Scotland would be included with England in one and the same provision as to the Capitation Grant. The Ragged Schools in Scotland would, of course, be entitled, like the Ranged Schools in England, to the Capitation Grants allotted to such Schools.
  SIR ANDREW AGNEW: Will no Grant be available this year for Scotland?
  MR. ADDERLEY: There cannot be, for the reason I have stated.

ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. BERKELEYsaid, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in the event of certain conditions being accepted by the Atlantic Telegraph Company, it is intended to confer upon them exclusively a guarantee or subvention, or whether the same privilege will not be extended to any other Company that may be the first to establish an efficient line of communication across the Atlantic?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, it is not the intention of the Government to grant any exclusive privilege to any Company.

CLEARING OF THE SERPENTINE.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN SHELLEYsaid, he rose to ask the First Commissioner of Works whether it is his intention to take a Vote in the next Estimates for clearing the Serpentine in Hyde Park?
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: Sir, it is my intention to propose a Vote this year for the purification of the Serpentine.

SARDINIA—ENROLMENT OF DESERTERS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. BOWYERsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is true that military deserters and other fugitives, subjects of the Emperor of Austria, are being, or have been, lately received and enrolled as soldiers by the Sardinian Government; also, whether Her Majesty's Government have any information regarding the object of that enrolment; and whether Her Majesty's Government have offered any and what advice to the Sardinian Government on the subject with reference to the preservation of the peace of Europe?
  MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDsaid, he regretted to say that Her Majesty's Government had been informed that arrangements had been made by the Sardinian Government for the reception and enrolment of military deserters or refugees from the Austrian army. With respect to the object of that enrolment, the hon. Member was as able to judge as Her Majesty's Government. With regard to the advice which had been tendered on the subject, he had to state that Her Majesty's Government had in the most urgent way impressed on the Sardinian Government that they ought, in the present delicate state of affairs, to take no step that should give umbrage or cause any remonstrance on the part of Austria—that it was absolutely necessary for the preservation of the peace of Europe that the most pacific measures should be pursued.

LANDED ESTATES COURT (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  MR. J. D. FITZGERALDsaid, he rose to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether it is the intention of Government to recommend the appointment of a third Judge of the Landed Estates Court (Ireland), in the room of the Judge Martley,

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  lately deceased, having regard to the Return contained in Parliamentary Paper, No. 83, of the present Session?
  LORD NAASreplied, that no appointment had yet been made to the vacant seat, and that the matter was under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

THE ENFIELD ESTABLISHMENT.

  QUESTION.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary of State for War whether the Balance Sheet, showing the total cost and total production of the Enfield Establishment from the period of re-construction in 1854, has been prepared?
  GENERAL PEELreplied that the Balance Sheet had been prepared and would be laid on the table.

  ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSION BILL.
  On Question, "That the House at rising adjourn till To-morrow at two o'clock.
  MR. KNATCHBULL - HUGESSENsaid, he must appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to postpone the Ecclesiastical Commission Bill, which had been introduced by the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge, and which was one of the Orders for Wednesday.
  MR. WALPOLE: I have put it off till Wednesday week.
  MR. KNATCHBULL - HUGESSENsaid, an important Bill had already been set down for discussion on Wednesday week, and he hoped the Ecclesiastical Commission Bill would be fixed for some other day.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would consider the matter.

THE NEAPOLITAN EXILES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. J. D. FITZGERALDsaid, he wished to know whether Her Majesty's Government had received any information of the arrival in Cork Harbour of an American vessel, having on board Poerio and other exiles from Naples, and whether it was true that they had murdered the master of the vessel on its way to America, and then brought the vessel to Cork?
  LORD NAASsaid, he had received an account of the circumstances to which the right hon. Gentleman alluded, but that account was merely to the effect that an American vessel, with sixty-two Neapolitan
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  exiles on board, had arrived in Cork Harbour. It did not state that they had seized the vessel on its passage, but merely that they had requested the captain to take them to Cork Harbour instead of to America.
  Motion agreed to.
  House at rising to adjourn till To-morrow at Two o'clock.

PREPAYMENT OF LETTERS.

  RESOLUTION.
  MR. RICH,who had given notice of his intention to move a Resolution condemning the order of the Postmaster General which made the prepayment of all inland letters compulsory said, he was happy to know that the Government had withdrawn their obnoxious order with regard to the inland letters; therefore on that point he had not a word to say. But the attention of the public had been much roused on this question, and it was found there were some fixed principles as to the conduct of a Post Office, from which that establishment had departed most widely. They had forgotten that the convenience of the Post Office was quite secondary to the interests of the public; in fact, that the Post Office was made for the public, not the public for the Post Office. A still weightier forgetfulness was of the reverence due to the sanctity of the seal of every letter that passed through the Post; no letter should be opened unless in case of sheer necessity—a necessity not growing out of the rules of the establishment, but from circumstances entirely external to it. The order with regard to home letters, which so grossly sinned against this principle, had been rescinded, but the Colonies still suffered under the same infliction. The public was not so much interested in what affected the colonial and foreign as in what touched its home letters; but the Government should not inflict on the Colonies an injury to which we would not submit ourselves. Foreign and colonial letters were often written at the last moment, and if by accident a stamp were omitted or displaced, then a fortnight, or even a month, was frequently lost. He hoped the Government would take the regulations affecting these letters into consideration. It had reverted to the old successful and practical system of enforcing double payment for unstamped letters at home, why not adopt the same rule for letters to the Colonies? The responsibility for these

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  matters rested entirely with the Government; alterations of the postage could only be made by the formal authority of the Treasury; it was not fair to throw the blame on Mr. Rowland Hill. The House attached the responsibility to the heads and not to the subordinates. He, therefore, thought Mr. Rowland Hill had been very unfairly dealt with by being put forward as a kind of scape-goat in this matter. In conclusion he would move his Resolution, merely to bring himself within the forms of the House, leaving it then to drop or not, as the House might desire; for he had no wish to pursue the matter further at present. His Resolution was as follows:—
  "That while this House will support measures for the correction of any abuses of the privilege of transmitting letters through the post without previous payment, and for the gradual restraint of the practice itself, yet it considers that the Order by the Postmaster General of the 27th day of January last, under the authority of a Treasury Warrant of the 29th day of January last, which absolutely deprives the public of this privilege, by directing that all home letters posted after the 10th day of February last, and not prepaid, shall be opened at the Post Office and returned to the writers, will expose individuals to serious inconvenience and injury; and further, that the compulsory prepayment of foreign and colonial letters, under like penalties, requires revision."
  The Motion not being seconded, the matter dropped.

JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES.

  LEAVE.
  MR. COXsaid, he rose to move for leave to bring in a Bill to empower joint-stock companies who were unable to register, with limited liability, under the provisions of the Act 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, to do so at any time during the present year. Some companies had been utterly unable to register at the time prescribed, and he desired simply to extend the period of making the register.
  Motion made, and Question proposed—
  "That this House will immediately resolve itself into Committee, to consider the Act 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, for the Incorporation and Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies and other Associations."
  THE SOLICITOR GENERALremarked, that if the circumstances of the case had remained unchanged no person would have objected to the Bill. He did not wonder that there should be a misapprehension with regard to the state of the law upon this subject, and that the hon. Gentleman should have fallen into it.
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  There was no doubt that the Act of Parliament referred to required that companies to have the benefit of it, should register before the last day of December in the year in which it was passed; but there was nothing whatever in the Act which prevented a company from registering after the last day of December in that year. On the contrary, all the Act said was that if they did not register before the last day of the year they must not pay dividends or exercise tire corporate rights which were given by the Act; but there was no provision in the Act which would disable a company from registering after the expiration of the year, and in point of fact many companies had registered after the end of the year. If, however, there were any doubt upon this point there was a Bill which he hoped to see come down shortly from the other House of Parliament consolidating into one Act the whole of the law with regard to the constitution, the regulation, and the winding up of joint-stock companies. If the hon. Gentleman then adhered to the same opinion that a practical impediment stood in the way of the registration of these bodies, any Amendment which the hon. Member could satisfy the House was desirable would be naturally introduced into that Bill. He hoped, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman would net insist upon bringing in a Bill which would only add one more to the dreadful crowd of enactments on joint-stock banks, which already encumbered the Statute-book.
  MR. COXsaid, that he happened to be a member of a company which could not register itself, and which, upon consulting eminent counsel, had been advised that it was impossible to register under the law of limited liability. As, however, there would be an opportunity, when the Bill came down from the House of Lords, to bring the question under the notice of the House he would adopt the suggestion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and withdraw his Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

THE "CHARLES ET GEORGES."

  ADDRESS MOVED.
  MR. KINGLAKEsaid, that in drawing the attention of the House to the correspondence which had taken place respecting the Charles et Georges, he desired to say that it was his intention to treat the matter temperately, and with a complete avoidance of all topics justly calculated to create

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  irritation in any Foreign States. He could not venture to predict, and of course he could not suggest, the course which any hon. Member might take who followed him in the debate, but he was anxious to declare that in his view any discussion which tended to throw blame upon any foreign potentate was alien to the question which he sought to raise; for the question which he was now asking the House to consider was not one involving our friendly relations with foreign states, but was a question which, in one sense, was purely domestic. No question was at present pending, well or ill—the whole matter had been settled; but it still remained for the House to say whether the manner in which the negotiation had been conducted on the part of England was such as the House could approve. It remained for them to say whether the Foreign Secretary had conducted that negotiation with a fair amount of diligence, a fair amount of firmness, and a due attention to existing treaties, and to those other obligations, not actual treaties, but not less sacred, which we had incurred in consequence of arrangements between Portugal and this country with respect to the slave trade. It appeared to him that the House could not shrink from the discussion of this question. Official documents had been laid before the Legislative Assembly of a foreign State. Those documents had been republished in journals whose liberty of printing was not very large, but which, nevertheless, had been permitted to waft from one end of the Continent to the other impressions not altogether favourable to the honour of England. Unfortunately it was difficult to attempt even to discuss the questions which arose upon this matter without glancing at the treaties in existence between this country and Portugal. Quite lately we were congratulating ourselves that at a time when our empire in Bengal appeared to be failing us the fidelity of the western Presidency remained unimpaired. At that time few of us, perhaps, recollected that the territory of Bombay was ceded to us nearly two centuries ago by the Portuguese Government, and that it was in consequence of the relations which began at that period, or, rather, which were then continued and from that period rendered more close, that our character as a guaranteeing State towards Portugal had arisen. By the treaty of 1661, made on the marriage of Charles II. with a Princess of the house of Braganza,
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  the island of Bombay was ceded to this country, and amongst the considerations for which that cession was made there was a guarantee binding this country in very large terms to defend Portugal against all foreign enemies. The kind of alliance thus created, though in terms somewhat too large, was nevertheless maintained in practice, and in 1703 another treaty of a more definite sort was entered into between England and Portugal. That treaty was in Latin, and it seemed to him that the translation of it ordinarily given fell a little short of the strenuous language in which the terms of the original treaty were couched. That treaty was between Great Britain and the States General on the one part, and Portugal on the other; and its object was to effect a defensive alliance between the two States first mentioned and Portugal. Now, when a defensive alliance was entered into, it of course followed—and common sense would suggest—that the guaranteeing State must necessarily have an opportunity of looking into the state of affairs which existed previously to actual hostilities. But this treaty seemed not to have left that inference to the common sense of the parties; for it provided, in very express terms, that if there should be even a suspicion or fear of hostilities against Portugal it should be the duty of Great Britian and the States General to urge the case of Portugal against the Power so threatening her. That provision had been translated, be observed, as a mere engagement to give Portugal the good offices of the two guaranteeing States. The original Latin, however, went further than that the words amicé contendent. That was, that it was agreed that the guaranteeing States should strenuously urge by peaceful means the attainment of the object, which, failing those peaceful means, they might have to attain by the use of their forces. The treaty provided that, failing the success of peaceful means, the guaranteeing States should be obliged to support Portugal with all their forces, and that for the purpose of carrying on hostilities—as he read the instrument—in the kingdom of Portugal there should be a force of 12,000 men. This stipulation had been interpreted as if 12,000 men only were to be employed on the whole continent of Europe. As he understood the treaty, it meant that they were to defend Portugal with all their forces—totis viribus; but that for the purpose of defence in Portugal itself the amount should be limited to

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  12,000 men. In 1810, when Lord Weblington was preparing the lines of Torres Vedras, we entered into the treaty of Rio Janeiro, which was afterwards abrogated; but which engaged Portugal to prohibit the slave trade in all her possessions north of the line. In 1815, England at Vienna, fresh from the triumphs she had achieved in Portugal—triumphs which she owed in great part to the bravery of the Portuguese soldiery—deliberately, and in the face of Europe, renewed her engagements with Portugal, and in very clear and emphatic terms, engaged that the former treaties should be considered as still in full force, and that the terms of friendship, alliance, and guarantee should still subsist. Here it seemed necessary to pause for a moment, and to consider what was the liability which England had incurred by entering into those large engagements with Portugal. According to the opinion of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs—an opinion given after these events had occurred, and which was to be found in the papers before the House—this was a guarantee which bound England, under all circumstances, to defend the territory of Portugal against all aggression. He (Mr. Kinglake) did not give such a broad interpretation to that treaty. He thought that, under this treaty England was bound to aid Portugal in ally just cause, but not to aid her if she were engaged in a defensive war which she had brought upon herself by undue resistance to just demands. Having thus noticed the position in which England was placed by her political treaties with Portugal, he had next to glance at the arrangements which were wade with a view to the prevention of the slave trade. In 1810, as he had before stated, Portugal engaged to prohibit the slave trade north of the line. In 1815 she renewed that engagement. But it was not until 1836 that she extended that provision to her territories south of the line. In 1836 she made a decree which also prohibited the slave trade south of the line, and that prohibition extended to the coast of Mozambique, the territory near which the vessel in question was taken. For many years after the prohibition of the slave trade on the Mozambique coast there continued a practice of carrying the negroes from that coast to employ them, he would not say as slaves, bat as workmen in the French island of Bourbon or Réunion. After a time it occurred to that great body of humane men who in this country watch
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  ed the slave trade, and exerted themselves to put an end to it, that under the semblance of importing free labourers to the French colonies, there was going on, in point of fact, a practice very nearly akin to that of the slave trade. He did not wish to impart into this discussion those warm and strong feelings which were associated with our horror of the slave trade, and he would admit that there was much to be said on both sides of the question. On the one hand the French were able to say that these people being probably slaves in their own country became freemen when imported into Réunion; while, on the other hand, the enemies of the practice maintained that, though theoretically free when on board a French ship, they were practically in subjection, and that the demand for them upon the coasts led to the carrying on of slave wars in the interior. The result was that a strong pressure was put upon Portugal, both by France and England. France strenuously contended for a continuance of this practice of importing free colonists, England as strenuously resisted. Ultimately the counsels of England prevailed, and Portugal, at our instance, was induced to prohibit the exportation of negroes from the Mozambique coast. The contest was renewed, and renewed with great vigour, in 1857, when Count Walewski wrote a despatch pressing upon Portugal in the strongest terms the policy and good sense of submitting herself to the practice which he advised her to enter upon. On the other hand, the Earl of Clarendon pressed Portugal to maintain a firm resistance to the deportation of negroes from Mozambique, and in the end Portugal repealed the decree that she had issued against the practice, and finally resolved to prohibit the practice altogether. But the contest did not end there. It was sometimes easier to make laws than to enforce them, and it was found by England, that although Portugal had made these laws against the deportation of negroes from the coast, those laws were systematically evaded. The Earl of Clarendon remonstrated in strong terms against the connivance of Portugal at the practice, and called upon her in the most energetic language to be faithful in her determination to carry out her prohibition. Accordingly, a Portuguese Governor who was supposed, and justly he believed, to have connived at the evasion of the law, was recalled, and at our desire a Governor was sent out with stringent instructions to enforce the prohibition which Portugal

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  had issued at the instance of this country. Now, although the Government of France had strenuously resisted this determination on the part of Portugal, it was only just towards the French Government to say that they acted at that time with great loyalty, and that, having been defeated in the contest with England as to which of the Powers should carry out her views in the matter, she loyally acceded to the determination which Portugal had arrived at, and sent out distinct orders to her naval commanders in those waters, informing them that Portugal had prohibited the traffic, and ordering them to give effect to the prohibition. In a despatch written by the Earl of Clarendon, and dated the 17th of November, 1857—a despatch he would not read, because if he once commenced to read documents, he knew not when lie should come to an end—his Lordship cordially thanked the Portuguese Government for the firmness with which they had acted in maintaining their prohibition; and whilst he was writing that despatch the vessel to which the present Motion related, the Charles et Georges, was nearing the Mozambique coast. The Charles et Georges was a vessel freighted for the purpose of obtaining negro workmen. Her papers were made out in such a way as to indicate that she was to obtain those workmen in portions of the African territory where she might lawfully do so. She had on board a person called a "delegate." Now, the House would observe that this delegate was a person employed by the French Government, but not armed with that kind of authority which, under similar circumstances, a naval or military officer would possess. This delegate was charged with the duty of seeing, so far as he could, that the regulations prescribed by his Government were adhered to, and that unnecessary hardships were not inflicted upon the negroes. This vessel, on the 17th of November, came near the Mozambique coast, and entered Conducia Bay. There could be no doubt that she was in constant communication with the shore and anchored very near it. The British Consul stated that she was anchored within two miles of his house, and therefore, as the House would be aware, quite within the range of cannon-shot, that being the distance over which international law has extended the sovereignty of a State beyond the actual shore. This vessel being in Conducia Bay, and having already taken some negroes on board at
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  places where he might lawfully obtain them, Captain Rouxel appeared to have thought that he might also transact a little business of the same description on the Portuguese territory. He accordingly sent his interpreter ashore and obtained fifty-nine negroes from the Mozambique coast, eleven of whom were brought on board with their hands pinioned. The French documents, while they admitted that these men were brought on board with their hands pinioned, yet said it was by their own free consent. This seemed a strange demand to make upon one's credulity, that they should voluntarily submit to be bound; but so it was stated in these papers. On the 23rd the French vessel sailed away, the negroes having been taken on board on the 21st and 23rd, and there was reason to believe that her departure was occasioned by a suspicion that some Portuguese vessels were on the look-out for her. The fact was that on the 21st of November, a day or two after she came into the Bay, her transactions were denounced to the Portuguese Government as an infraction of the law. Now, who thus denounced her? It was the British Consul and the result was that in consequence of his representations, instructions were given that cruisers should be sent to look for the vessel. Captain Rouxel remained at sea for some days, but on the 29th of that month the Charles et Georges returned to Conducia Bay; and on the result of her second visit there might be something like a question whether she anchored within cannon range, for it was said that she was then three or four miles from the shore; but this much was certain—that at the time she was boarded by the Portuguese Consul, her boats were actually on shore, so that she was in actual communication with the land. The French contended that she was anchored outside of cannon range, which might be true of the main land, but she was within cannon range of the island of Quintangonia, which was a portion of the Portuguese territory. The vessel was boarded, and 110 negroes were found on board, all of whom declared that they were there against their will. There were, besides, those peculiar arrangements for water and food, and all the other indications which are usually regarded as marking the slaver. Under such circumstances the captain who commanded the Portuguese vessel, could do no less, and he did no more, than bring the vessel to Mozambique, where a Commission was assembled, which unanimously reported that this vessel

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  was caught in flagrante delicto, not only in an infraction of the Portuguese law, which prohibited the shipment of negroes from that part of the world, but of an infraction of the law against the slave trade. The vessel was accordingly condemned as a slaver. Captain Rouxel was convicted of carrying on the Slave Trade, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, while the vessel was sent on to Lisbon. The captain in the meantime entered an appeal to the Supreme Court of Lisbon. As soon as the French Government was made aware of the seizure of this vessel considerable irritation not unnaturally arose. He would therefore ask the House carefully to bear in mind the date of the 6th of March, 1858; for on that day the 6th of March, 1858, a despatch was written to our Foreign Secretary informing him of the claim which the French Government had made against Portugal in respect of the seizure of the vessel, and that it was going to be a very grave affair. The proposition he would maintain was this:—That from the 6th of March, when the Earl of Malmesbury was first informed of it in a despatch from our Minister at Lisbon (Mr. Howard), down to the middle of October, the Earl of Malmesbury, knowing that this was a very grave affair, involving the safety of a State to which we were bound in a treaty of defensive alliance took simply no steps whatever. On the 6th of March, 1858, Mr. Howard wrote that the Marquis de Loulé had stated to him that the Portuguese Minister at Paris, then Baron de Paiva, had seen Count Walewski, who held that this would be a grave affair. About that time the French Minister at the Court of Lisbon, the Marquis de Lisle, raised the question respecting the presence of a delegate, which the French subsequently insisted upon—namely, that the presence of a delegate of France on board the vessel showed the character of the transaction, and totally excluded the idea of the vessel being engaged in the Slave Trade, which was so rashly admitted by the Portuguese authorities. According to the view which he (Mr. Kinglake) took of the transaction, it was not necessary for the House to inquire into the question whether the French Government was right or wrong in the course it took, because the Earl of Malmesbury never took the trouble for a moment to inquire into the question whether France was right or wrong. He never looked to the side either of the Portuguese or the French; he took a course peculiarly his own, and therefore, it was open to any
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  hon. Member to criticise the conduct of the Earl of Malmesbury without impugning the conduct either of the French or the Portuguese. The claim of the French was no doubt one of a rather startling character. It did seem strange that the sovereignty of a State should be capable of being so dispersed throughout the world that wherever an agent of that State was present it must be assumed, not only that he was innocent and free from blame, but that every one who was on board with him must be also innocent and fair in their dealings. The proposition, he repeated, did bear a startling character, but he was not there to canvass it. For the purposes of his argument he cared not whether it was right or wrong. On the other hand, he was equally indifferent to the correctness of the view taken by Earl Cowley. Earl Cowley was of opinion that though, upon the whole, the claim of the French Government could not be supported, yet still the comity of nations might require that the ship, in whatever transactions she might be engaged, seeing she had such an agent on board, ought to be treated as a vessel acting under the authority of the State to which it belonged, and the persons on board ought not to have been treated as ordinary criminals; but should have been left to the operations of diplomacy. But, whichever of these opinions be the correct one, the Earl of Malmesbury acted upon neither, and did nothing, though the question of the delegate, upon which they both hinged, was first raised on the 6th of May. On the 13th of August the Charles et Georges was brought into the Tagus, with her captain and crew and all the ship's papers; and it was not at all unnatural that the irritation and excitement in France, which had been occasioned by the seizure of the vessel, was greatly increased when she arrived in Europe. The Marquis de Lisle, the French Minister at the Court of Lisbon, wrote a despatch on the 15th August, 1858, in which, after referring to former demands upon the same subject, he stated he was now instructed to demand, in the name of the Emperor, the immediate release of the vessel and her crew, and insisting upon prompt attention to his request. Now, then, when the matter had arrived at this point, he maintained it was the duty of the Earl of Malmesbury, as the representative of a country which was bound by treaty to give aid to Portugal in a defensive war—it was his duty, seriously and deliberately, to inquire into the merits of the dispute

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  between France and Portugal. It became him, formally and officially, to inform himself of the nature of the French demands; and if he came to the conclusion that the French were right in the main—if he agreed with the Earl Cowley that it was contrary to the comity of nations to treat this vessel, with a Government agent on board, as if she were an ordinary vessel, his duty then was to tell Portugal, with all the authority that England could use, that she was wrong—that she had made a mistake. Had he done so there was every probability that this miserable contest would have been instantly brought to an end. On the other hand, if he could not see his way to this conclusion—if he felt that the claim of France was one which it was impossible for him to admit—it then became his duty fearlessly to inform France that she was engaged in a dangerous quarrel which might impose upon England the necessity of raising up out of their obscurity the ancient treaties that exist between England and Portugal. It would be his duty to inform France that England, as the ally of Portugal, must have a voice in the settlement of the matter. Could any one doubt that had the Earl of Malmesbury arrived at such a conclusion as this, he might have brought the question to an early and amicable conclusion? At that period there was no violent irritation on the part of the French Government; and he should show that the subsequent irritation of the French Government was occasioned by the delays of which the Earl of Malmesbury was guilty. On the 28th of August, 1858, Mr. Howard wrote to the Earl of Mahnesbury—
  "The French Minister at this Court (Lisbon), the Marquis de Lisle, treats as a very serious affair the condemnation as a slaver, by the tribunal at Mozambique, of the French vessel Charles et Georges:"
  and the despatch went on to state the grounds on which France disputed the legality of the seizure. Still there was no action on the part of the Earl of Malmesbury. The summer months passed away; and as no decided reply was given to the French demands, it was not to be wondered at that the irritation in France was every day increasing. At length on the 14th of September, 1858, the Marquis de Lisle addressed a note to the Portuguese Government, in which he stated that acting upon instructions recently received from his Government he forwarded a peremptory demand for the release of the vessel and
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  of the master, Captain Rouxel. He dwelt upon the serious influence which the affair might have upon the amicable relations of the two countries; referred to previous notes which he had written to the Portuguese Government on the subject, urging the liberation of the vessel; and laid down the principle that as there was a delegate of the French Government on board the vessel, the French Government could not admit the possibility of her having been engaged in the slave trade. He proceeded to state that the French Government reserved to themselves the right to determine the degree of responsibility involved in this affair, and to bring forward hereafter the demand for compensation; but that they now required the immediate release of the vessel and captain. He concluded with an urgent request for a speedy reply, and sent it in with a verbal intimation that if he did not receive an answer in the course of the next four or five days, he should consider that as equivalent to a refusal to accede to the demand of the French Government. He would ask the House to consider what great misfortune had now befallen Portugal. There were many men in this House who knew something of Asiatic countries devastated by arbitrary Governments. If there were one principle more than another that distinguished Asiatic despotisms from well-ordered European States, it was the barrier which existed between the Executive Government and the judicial authority. In despotic States the executive power and the judicial power were pretty nearly one and the same, but in European countries liberty depended on the fact that the one could not interfere with the other. No misfortune more cruel could be imagined than that a European State should be obliged by pressure from without, or any other circumstance, to interfere with the regular course of its judicial proceedings. Therefore Portugal was justified in hesitating before she consented to give way to the demand which called on her to interrupt legal proceedings, and with a strong and lawless hand to interfere with a pending trial. Portugal hesitated, examined the question apparently with great care, and seemed to have come to the conclusion that the demand was not founded in justice. Still, there was total inaction on the part of the Foreign Office, and on September 18, 1858, Mr. Howard, our Minister, addressed a despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, recounting these details, and commencing his statement with the

  1489
  remark that the affair had assumed a very serious aspect. He added—
  "I saw the Marquis de Loulé yesterday just before the Cabinet Council met, at which the Attorney General was to be heard, and the answer to be returned to the French Minister was to be decided on. His Excellency dwelt upon the embarrassing position in which the Portuguese Government was placed. He observed that it appeared from the papers in possession of the Government that the case was not one of an engagement of free labourers, but of the positive purchase of slaves, and that the Government was not authorized by the laws of the country to withdraw the vessel from the action of the judicial power under whose control she now is."
  Again—
  "His Excellency did not make any application to me for your Lordship's valuable assistance, but I feel persuaded that he would be very grateful should your Lordship be able to afford the Portuguese Government any aid in the treatment of this question with the French Government."
  He added that the Marquis de Loulé had confidentially informed him that it was proposed to refer the question in dispute to the mediation of a friendly power, and that he would be disposed to leave the choice of the mediator to the French Government. On the 20th of September Earl Cowley wrote that M. Benedetti complained of the Portuguese Government in a manner which made him apprehend the possibility of a serious misunderstanding between France and Portugal if matters remained as represented by that Gentleman. Well, on the 25th of September, the Earl of Malmesbury did at last begin to speak. On the 25th September he wrote to Mr. Howard, in answer to this despatch, that the British Government
  "Have learnt with satisfaction that the Portuguese Government propose to refer the question in dispute to the mediation of a friendly Power. I have transmitted to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris copies of your despatches above referred to, and I have to instruct you to assure the Portuguese Government that the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government will not be wanting for the purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement of the difference between the French and Portuguese Governments on this subject."
  Having this promise, the Portuguese Government naturally relaxed their efforts, and left the matter in the hands of the English Government. He did not find that anything had been done in pursuance of the promise then made to the Portuguese Government. The matter had been going on from the 6th March until the 25th September; and on that latter day all that was given was not a tender of good offices made to the French Government, but a
  promise of good offices addressed to the
  1490
  Government of Lisbon. On the 28th September there came to our Foreign Office an actual application for assistance. He did not think himself that any such application was needed, because the relations which subsisted between England and France must be supposed to have been universally known, and it could hardly have been necessary for Portugal to have demanded our aid. But as the Portuguese Government found that the contest was still prolonged, and that no active steps had been taken by our Foreign Office, they addressed to Lord Malmesbury, on the 28th September, a formal application for assistance. The Portuguese Government thus addressed the noble Lord, through Mr. Howard:—
  "The Marquis de Loulé, in communicating to me the papers in question, begged me to express to your Lordship how grateful the Portuguese Government would feel if your Lordship would afford them your assistance, and employ your good offices with the French Government in order to bring about an amicable settlement of this serious affair. His Excellency said that he trusted your Lordship would be the more ready to do so, because the case was evidently not one of the engagement of free labourers, but of the purchase of slaves, that is to say, a case of slave trade. In reply, I promised to report his Excellency's request to your Lordship by this mail. I remarked, at the same time, that the French Government denied that it was a case of slave trade, and professed to have proved that it was not so."
  Now, the first act which was done, the first approach towards anything like good offices, and, indeed, the first conversation, as far as it appeared from the published papers, which had passed between the English and the French Governments upon the subject, had taken place on the 30th September; and the House would see that even then the conversation did not amount to anything which could be called an assertion of good offices towards the Government of France. This conversation took place between Earl Cowley and Count Walewski. Earl Cowley said on that day he asked Count Walewski if he had any later intelligence from Lisbon; and he then assured the Count that Mr. Howard had given the Portuguese Government the best advice in his power. He (Mr. Kinglake) had not the slightest doubt but that Earl Cowley, when he had made that assertion, had been firmly convinced of its accuracy; and, indeed, he was justified in believing that it must have been true, because he could not have supposed that an English Minister would have left Mr. Howard at Lisbon without such instructions as would have induced him to

  1491
  give wholesome advice to the Portuguese Government. But it would be seen from the papers that Mr. Howard expressly stated, that from the commencement of the transaction to the 21st October he had never given any advice whatever to the Government of Portugal. Earl Cowley went on to describe the interview:—
  "Count Walewski replied, that the whole question turned on the legality of the original capture. If the reports received by the French Government were correct, the capture was effected beyond the jurisdiction of Portugal, and the Portuguese tribunals, therefore, were incompetent to judge the case. I asked who was to decide this point, but could obtain no satisfactory answer to my question."
  Was it possible to suppose that when the Earl Cowley asked that vague question he had any idea of mediation? On the 2nd October the noble Lord sent the following telegrams to the Foreign Office:—
  "At the Council, this morning, the determination was taken to demand the release of the Charles et Georges This determination was come to on the ground that she has been condemned as a slaver, when there was a delegate of the French Government on board."
  He (Mr. Kinglake) prayed the House to observe, that the dispute might at that time almost be said to have been brought to an inevitable termination, because the French Emperor in Council had conic to a resolution, from which he had never afterwards swerved, and the French ships must then have been nearing the Tagus. Had he not fulfilled the engagement which he undertook when he had promised to show that from the 6th March until the period when intervention could be of any use, the Earl of Malmesbury had entirely neglected to make any attempt to arrange that dangerous question? On the 3rd October Earl Cowley did really, and for the first time, endeavour to use his good offices with the French Government. He did so, as far as he (Mr. Kinglake) was aware, entirely from his own sense of what was right, and without any instruction or any authority from the English Government. He then told the Earl of Malmesbury that he did not think the decision to which the French Government had come on the preceding day would be revoked. On the 5th October Earl Cowley again wrote to the Earl of Malmesbury, and informed hint that "the French Government declined to submit to arbitration." He (Mr. Kinglake) had said, that an examination of the dates showed that the Earl of Malmesbury had been guilty of a grievous delay,
  1492
  or rather of a complete neglect in that matter; and he had to add, upon the authority of Count Walewski, that it was owing to that miserable delay that the dispute had grown to the unsatisfactory state at which it had arrived. Count Walewski stated, in a despatch written at a later period, that—
  "The British Government seemed to forget that the measure to which they adverted had not been resorted to until friendly offices had been exhausted."
  From the 3rd March to the 6th October there had been a total inaction on the part of the English Government, and that inaction had been assigned by the French Government themselves as one of the causes which had led to the serious aspect the dispute had ultimately assumed. It was on the 6th October that the repose of the Foreign Office was broken, and he knew of nothing that could make one less regret the cessation of that repose than the way in which the Earl of Malmesbury had afterwards passed to a state of action. On the 6th October the Earl of Malmesbury addressed to Earl Cowley the following telegraphic message:—
  "Any hostile proceedings by France against Portugal should be strongly deprecated by your Excellency, and you should put forward the Paris Protocol at a suitable time."
  The noble Earl deprecated "any hostile proceeding." Why, the French vessels were nearing the Tagus, and to "deprecate hostilities" after the dispute had been going on for months, and when the patience of the French Government was almost exhausted, was to engage in a fruitless attempt. Then, as to putting forward the Paris Protocol "at a suitable time," surely the suitable time would have been the earliest moment after the commencement of the dispute. The Earl of Malmesbury had chosen to say in one of the papers that it was an "immortal truth"—that was the phrase he believed—that time was the great preventer as well as the healer of all disputes. He supposed it was very true that people, when they ceased to be in a passion, were less dangerous than when they were in a rage. He should imagine that that was what in dialectics would be called an identical proposition, but what he, in humble English, should be content to call a very familiar truism. He could not but think that it was this immortal truth as to the value of time which ensnared the Earl of Malmesbury into the mistake of neglecting to put forward the

  1493
  Paris Protocol until the seventh month after the commencement of the dispute. The next effort of that noble Lord was to write a despatch to the Admiralty, desiring them to send a force to the Tagus; and, at first sight, that bore the semblance of something like energy; but any one who looked a little more closely at the document, must be struck by a passage in which the Lords of the Admiralty were specially expressed to take care that the force should be a small one. Now, could there be a greater error in transactions of that kind than to send out a small fleet? What could be more unwise than to send out a force at all, and not to send one which by its magnitude would be a worthy representative of England? But it seemed to have been afterwards thought by Her Majesty's Government, that the order which re-required that the force should be a small one was too bold an act, for he found that, although the Lords of the Admiralty stated on the 7th or the 8th of October that the vessels were to depart on the following day, from some cause or another—and he believed it must have been some cause which had its origin, not at the Admiralty, but at the Foreign Office—the ships did not quit the shores of England until the middle of the month of November. But to proceed. M. de Paiva, who was then Portuguese Minister at Paris, joined his exertions to those of the Earl of Malmesbury for the purpose of inducing the French Government to accept the idea of mediation; but when Earl Cowley pressed a proposal to that effect on the notice of Count Walewski; the Count told him that—
  "The Resolution of the Imperial Government was taken to demand the restitution of the Charles et Georges without further delay, and that they were prepared to uphold their assertion that they were in the right against all who might dispute it."
  Now, he wished to say a few words in reference to the connection of the 23rd Protocol of the Treaty of Paris with the question to which he was directing the attention of the House. It would be unjust to the French Government to say that in declining to be bound by the terms of that Protocol, they were violating any treaty. There was clearly an error in that respect in the speech of the King of Portugal, who stated that he had appealed in vain to the Treaty of Paris, by which he meant the Protocol in that Treaty. But it was only fair to the French Government to declare that when the high contracting Powers assembled at the Congress in Paris
  1494
  agreed, at the suggestion of the Earl of Clarendon, to express a wish in favour of arbitration in cases of international dispute, Count Walewski stated that he would not be bound by anything like an obligation to adopt upon any particular occasion that principle. He believed that the contracting Powers were right in thinking that it would be impossible for them to undertake to be bound by such an obligation; but it was very naturally supposed that the fate of the Protocol would depend very much on the course which might be taken by any of the great Powers of Europe when the first opportunity of carrying out its principle might arise. Now, it so happened that last year, two years after the signing of the Protocol, an opportunity did occur for carrying it into effect. Some English subjects had been, as everybody in this country believed, exposed to grievous ill-treatment by the King of Naples; a great dispute had in consequence arisen between Her Majesty's Government and the Neapolitan Government, and the representatives of this country, took upon themselves to propose that that dispute, although it excited a very strong feeling in this country, should be made a subject of arbitration. It so happened that from some whim, or from some predilection in favour of Her Majesty's present Government, the King of Naples chose not to put them to the trouble of referring the matter, and at once and in the most handsome manner undertook to do all that, if we had succeeded in an arbitration, he could have been called upon to do. He had entirely acceded to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government; and the result was that Her Majesty's Government did not encounter that indignation which they would have encountered if it had been found that they had surrendered the rights of English subjects in subservience to this very new principle of arbitration. The result was, that the principle of referring questions of that kind to mediation, took great hold on Europe. It was, no doubt, a splendid instance in which a country, possessing an undoubted superiority, magnanimously determined on resorting to mediation for the settlement of a misunderstanding with a weaker Power; and the weaker States, who were greatly interested in the question, began to look forward with confidence to the day when all international disputes would be brought to the same pacific termination. Now, he (Mr. Kinglake) believed in his conscience, that if the Emperor of the French had been

  1495
  asked to submit to that principle of arbitration in March, in April, in May last, or even at almost any period anterior to the 1st of October, he would have acceded to the proposal. But no such request had ever been addressed to him until the 6th of October. Earl Cowley had, three days previously, made such an appeal; but it was not until the 6th of October that the Earl of Malmesbury had made any allusion to the Protocol; and even then he only expressed a desire that it should be put forward at a "suitable time." In his (Mr. Kinglake's) opinion the "suitable time" was several months before. He came next to another feature in these transactions. Her Majesty's Government, as he had said, had wholly failed to obtain any terms from the French Government. Count Lavradio, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, then went to Paris, and had an interview with Baron de Paiva, the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, at which they both came to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Ministers were wholly unwilling or unable to help them. M. Lavradio and M. de Paiva despairing of any efficient assistance from England, did what people were often inclined to do when disappointed in obtaining help—they exerted themselves. They went to Count Walewski, and obtained from him something like terms. That was a point upon which he desired to be particularly careful. He understood that many persons thought the terms obtained by Count Lavradio and Baron de Paiva had been obtained by the aid of the English Government. [Mr. S. FITZGERALD: Hear, hear!] The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs seemed, from his cheers, to entertain that opinion; but he (Mr. Kinglake) could only say that he found no confirmation of it in the papers which had been laid before Parliament. He should be glad to find that the hon. Gentleman could come to the table and point to some document which should show that Earl Cowley was an active negotiator in these transactions. He thought, however, that he could say that there was no proof whatever of anything of that kind in the papers produced; and notwithstanding the affirmative cheer of the hon. Gentleman, there was a despatch of Earl Cowley which ought to raise a doubt in the mind of every one as to whether Earl Cowley was actively engaged in those transactions. The House would judge whether the despatch was consistent with the theory of the Under Secretary for Fo-
  1496
  reign Affairs, that Earl Cowley was actively engaged in negotiating these arrangements. Earl Cowley writes:—
  "Paris, Oct. 13, 1858.
  "I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that there is every probability of the affair of the Charles et Georges receiving an amicable solution. The Marquis de Pavia and M. de Lavradio, seeing that the French Government were determined on pushing matters to extremities, sounded Count Walewski as to the likelihood of the following proposal being accepted by the Imperial Government:—The Charles et Georges to be given up, and the captain to be released; the French men of war having previously quitted the waters of Lisbon. The legality of the seizure to be afterwards determined by mediation.
  "Count Walewski replied that he thought he saw in this proposal the germs of an arrangement. The Council was held this morning at St. Cloud, and I saw Count Walewski on his return. I questioned him in general terms as to the state of the affair. He told me that he had seen M. de Lavradio, who had said that the affair might be arranged by the surrender of the ship, if the French men of war were previously withdrawn. The French Government, Count Walewski added, had no wish to appear to impose terms upon Portugal. The honour of France would be satisfied by the release of the ship and her captain. A messenger, therefore, would be sent to-night to Lisbon, to give full powers to M. de Lisle to enter into any arrangement for the future settlement of this affair, provided the ship was set at liberty at once. It is only in case of the impossibility of arriving at any understanding that he is allowed to addres an ultimatum to the Portuguese Government.
  "Although Count Walewski did not enter into any particulars, being pressed for time, I augur from his general tone that, provided the Charles et Georges is released, the legality of her capture, as well as the other questions arising out of it, may be subject of future mediation."
  Was that the language of an English Minister who was himself taking an active part in negotiations? Would he in that case content himself with merely auguring from the tone of the French Minister? On the contrary, was it not quite clear, from the language which Earl Cowley used, that he was going beyond his instructions when he was reduced to the necessity of auguring merely from the tone of the French Minister, instead of asking him what it was that he meant to do? Every word that he had read showed that this treaty was being negotiated by M. de Lavradio and M. de Lisle, and that Earl Cowley had nothing to do with the negotiation, that he heard of it only as a matter of hearsay and spoke of it in the same way. The fact was, that when this feud sprung up between the French and Portuguese Governments the Earl of Malmesbury took a course entirely one of his own, and it would be for the House to say whether that course was

  1497
  a proper one or not. He had now exhausted all that the Earl of Mahmesbury did up to the 9th of October, 1858. On that day he sent a telegraphic despatch to Mr. Howard, in which be said—
  "Foreign Office, Oct. 9, 1858.
  "The good offices of Her Majesty's Government will gladly be given to prevent a collision between France and Portugal, but they have no decisive information on the case of the ship. The Portuguese Government had better drop the prosecution if there were informalities during or after the seizure."
  Why, there was no prosecution intended if there were informalities during or after the seizure, and therefore there was no justification for what the Earl of Malmesbury called dropping the prosecution. If he were to accept the statement of Mr. Howard, there was a despatch of the 16th of October described by him as a telegraphic message from the Earl of Malmesbury, and which recommended the surrender of the vessel. From some cause that despatch had been withheld, but on the 15th of October there was not a mere telegraphic message, but a deliberate despatch, to which he particularly wished to draw the attention of the House, because it was one of those which was not made public until the Government consented that the papers should be printed. It would be recollected that Her Majesty's Ministers had stated that when these papers were produced they would redound greatly to the honour and credit of the Government. Now, the despatch which he was about to read was one of the most important documents in the whole list. It was from the Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Howard, and was as follows:—
  "Foreign Office, Oct. 15, 1858.
  "Sir,—Her Majesty's Government have read with much concern your Despatches referring to the dispute between France and Portugal, and cannot but regret that the French Government, without first attempting to obtain their object by diplomatic means, have at once sent an imposing force to menace the port of Lisbon.
  "As far as they are at present informed, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, on the one hand, the French captain and delegate on board of the Charles et Georges violated the municipal laws of Portugal by anchoring at a forbidden point within Portuguese waters, and being there found with a cargo of negroes, who had all the appearance of being slaves, and a portion of whom stated themselves to have been abducted from a dependency of Portugal; on the other hand, that the French captain and delegate had obtained from the Sheik of Matabane a permission to engage and export labourers of his tribe; and that in a document (which is published in the Daily News of the 12th inst.) the contract declares
  1498
  itself' to have been made and passed at the court of the said Sheik.'"
  The contract was then quoted, and the despatch went on to say—
  "Your Excellency is aware that Her Majesty's Government have never altered their opinion as to the analogous nature of the French scheme for exporting negroes with that of avowed slave trade. It is not, however, with a view to support that opinion, fortified by the present case, that I address you, but in the hope that a suggestion may be accepted which may solve this question of national honour."
  Now, the House would hear what suggestion presented itself to the mind of the Earl of Malinesbury:—
  "If the above statement is correct, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that Portugal, without any sacrifice of her dignity and rights, may admit that the French delegate and captain, when negotiating for labourers with the Sheik of Matabane, believed him to be an independent chief, and were ignorant of his being a dependent subject of the Portuguese Government; for their contract speaks of him as an independent ruler, having a court of his own. Should the Portuguese Government see the transaction in this light, it
  appears to Her Majesty's Government to be consistent with a wise indulgence to drop the prosecution of a case which originated in an error, and which might, if imprudently urged against France, be the cause of the gravest complications.
  "Such a course on the part of the Portuguese Government would be accompanied by a note distinctly recapitulating the details of the municipal law of Portugal on the Mozambique coast, and to what extent the Portuguese dependencies are claimed to extend.
  "You will take the earliest opportunity of expressing to the Portuguese Government the view which Her Majesty's Government take of this case, and urge upon them the policy and wisdom of accepting the advice which I have the honour to tender through Her Majesty's Minister at the Court of Lisbon."
  Now, what was that but to instruct the British Minister to advise the Portuguese Government to make believe that the French captain had been mistaken when he entered the Portuguese waters? Was that a course which a British Minister ought to have pursued? He rejoiced to say that, although these instructions were actually addressed to our British Minister at Lisbon, and though a duplicate of the Despatch was sent to our Ambassador at Paris, yet they both declined to adopt the recommendation. Neither of them, if he might say so, would soil his lips by presenting such advice to the Government to which he was accredited. It was true that after receiving the suggestion Mr. Howard informed the Marquis de Loulé of it, and told him that the British Government had recommended the Portuguese Government

  1499
  to drop the prosecution, on the state of facts assumed, but he added that it appeared to him that they were nut applicable to the case; that the French captain was quite aware at the time that he was on forbidden ground, but justified it, and produced his authority of the 25th of September from the Governor General of Mozambique. Here were the exact words of the Despatch:—
  "I informed the Marquis de Loulé that your Lordship had directed me to recommend to the Portugese Government to drop the prosecution, on the ground that the French captain believed the Sheik of Matabane to be an independent chief; and although this recommendation was not quite applicable to the case, as the French captain was aware that Matabane was Portuguese territory, and grounds his defence of the legitimacy of his proceedings upon the fact of the Sheik having produced an authority, dated the 25th of September, 1856, from the late Governor General of Mozambique, to supply the French vessels with negroes, I observed, that although your Lordship's recommendation might not be applicable to the exact form in which it was made, yet I thought the Portuguese Government would be acting up to its spirit if they were to consent to give up the vessel on the ground that when the captain purchased the blacks he did so under the persuasion, in consequence of the above-mentioned authority, produced by the Sheik from the late Governor General, that their exportation was permitted by the Portuguese Government."
  Therefore, the Earl of Malmesbury having suggested one loophole to Mr. Howard, which Mr. Howard did not think applicable to the circumstances of the case, Mr. Howard thought that he should be acting up to the spirit of the suggestion in the noble Earl's despatch if he suggested another loophole of quite a contrary character. But what said Earl Cowley when he was asked to convey this strange suggestion to the French Government? "Count Walewski has never attempted," said Earl Cowley, "in his conversations with me on this matter, to call in doubt the Sovereignty of Portugal over the district of Matabane. I am afraid, therefore, that the mode of settling this misunderstanding between the French and Portuguese Governments, suggested by your Lordship, will not apply to the case." The sore went on festering and festering, and at length, on the 21st of October, the French vessels having come into the Tagus, and the demand of the French Government baying been made in a peremptory way, the Portuguese Government addressed themselves to the English Minister. The Marquis de Loulé said:
  "In presence of the demands presented by the French Government for the release of the vessel
  1500
  Charles et Georges, you will understand how great is the desire I have to hear the enlightened opinion of the representative of the nation, our most ancient and faithful Ally, on the subject. I hope that you will not hesitate to give to the explanations which I have had the honour of hearing from you the necessary complement, informing me what is, in your judgment, the best decision to adopt. The good relations which have so long subsisted between the two countries make me hope that you will not hesitate to satisfy, in this respect, the wishes of the Portuguese Government.
  What must Portugal have felt under such circumstances? Who instigated Portugal to make these laws, first against the slave trade, and then against the importation of negroes from the Mozambique coast? Who urged Portugal to enforce those laws? Who induced Portugal to recall the Governor who was lax in the enforcement of this prohibition? Lastly, who was it that denounced the traffic created by this Charles et Georges? It was the British consul. From first to last it was England that was acting in these transactions. Well, then, might Portugal, with a silent dignity, apply to England and say, "What am I to do in this case, in which I have been acting upon your advice?" On the same day, the 21st October, Mr. Howard addressed this despatch to the Marquis de Loulé:—
  Lisbon, Oct. 21, 1858.
  "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of this day's date, expressing to me the wish to hear my opinion on the subject of the demands of the French Government, which were conveyed to your Excellency yesterday by the French Minister, as contained in a despatch from Count Walewski dated the 13th instant, and of which your Excellency was so good as to show me an extract, for the restitution of the vessel Charles et Georges, and the liberation of the captain.
  "In reply I beg to repeat what I already had the honour of stating verbally to your Excellency yesterday, that I am without instructions from my Government concerning the particular proposals in question, but that having already communicated to your Excellency a message of the 9th instant from the Earl of Malmesbury, by which, whilst announcing to me that Her Majesty's Government would gladly give their good offices to prevent a collision between France and Portugal, and stating that they had no decisive information on the subject, his Lordship directed me to recommend to His Most Faithful Majesty's Government to drop the prosecution if there were informalities during or after the capture, I considered that I should be only acting up to the spirit of those instructions in now giving my opinion in favour of the acceptation by His Most Faithful Majesty's Government of the present proposals of the French Government for an amicable settlement, which I know my Government to have so much at heart, of the unfortunate differences which have arisen between the French and Portuguese Governments on the subject of

  1501
  the above-mentioned vessel. I likewise referred your Excellency to a further message of the 16th instant from the Earl of Malmesbury, repeating his former advice to drop the prosecution.
  "My reasons for giving this opinion Were that it really does appear that there were informalities in the judicial proceedings at Mozambique, and that the French captain had reason to suppose that the Arab Sheik of Matabane had the authorization of the Portuguese authorities to supply him with negroes; moreover, that the question has now been placed on the ground of an international one, and that it His Most Faithful Majesty's Government reject the present proposals of the French Minister, more serious demands may be put forward, to which His Most Faithful Majesty's Government will no doubt eventually be obliged to yield.
  "I also stated, in giving this opinion, that I thought His Most Faithful Majesty's Government would be fully justified, if they thought proper to accede to the proposals in question, to ask of the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French the assurance, which I feel persuaded will be readily given, that stringent orders will be issued by the latter Government to prevent hereafter the infringement by French vessels of the legal prohibition of His Most Faithful Majesty's Government of the exportation of negroes from the recognized Portuguese colonial possessions.
  "In view, therefore, of the foregoing considerations, and of the importance for Portugal to maintain her amicable relations with France, and to avoid the grave complications which might result from the rejection of the proffered amicable settlement of the dispute, I cannot but declare that I still adhere to the opinion which I yesterday conveyed to your Excellency, and which I have thus taken it upon my own responsibility to record.
  "I beg to add that I consider an essential point would be gained by the acceptation of the present proposals, inasmuch as the French Government thereby consent so far to accede to the wishes of His Most Faithful Majesty's Government as to agree to submit the question of indemnity to the mediation of a friendly power.
  "I will further remark that I feel convinced that no better terms could have been obtained, because it is within my knowledge that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has exerted his influence as much as was in his power to moderate the decisions of the French Government.
  "In conclusion, I am sure I need not repeat to your Excellency, how deep art interest Her Majesty's Government feel in everything concerning the honour and welfare of Portugal."
  Now, what was the purport of that despatch? The terms thus imposed on Portugal were that the proceedings of the tribunal should be instantly interrupted, and that, though she believed herself to be in the right, she should give up the vessel, liberate the captain, and consent to a mediation merely to determine how much she should pay by way of indemnity for having detained the Charles a Georges at all! That was the proposal which an English Minister seriously designated as "an amicable settlement!" Portugal was better advised than
  1502
  to accept these miserable counsels. Deserted by her ancient Ally, she still believed herself to be strong in the justice of her cause. The Portuguese Minister, representing a constitutional country like our own, governed by law, felt that he would not be justified in interrupting the course of the constituted tribunal and giving up the vessel, unless he was able to say that he did so under the pressure of force. Portugal accordingly determined, with great dignity, not to adopt our counsels, but to release the vessel, to literate the captain, and pay the indemnity demanded; declining altogether an arbitration which went only upon the supposition that she was in the wrong, when she felt herself in the right, and thus making it patent to all Europe that she only yielded to the violence with which she was menaced. He thought that the House would be of opinion that from the first Portugal had acted with great deference to and thoughtfulness of this country, and had at last yielded with great dignity, and with perfect honour. [Cheers] Those cheers would he very welcome to Portugal. Portugal would rejoice to hear that her conduct in this transaction—though it differed from that which was counselled to her by an English Minister—had been approved by the English House of Commons. Yes, it was true that Portugal had maintained her honour throughout this affair, and that she had maintained it, not by following the counsels of a British Minister, but by bravely rejecting them. On the 26th of October the French men-of-war left the Tagus with the Charles et Georges in company, and there ended this transaction. And, strange to say, no sooner was it terminated than the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs began to see the advantage of raking up the whole question. On the 30th of October he addressed a letter to Earl Cowley, pressing upon him the importance of that 23rd Protocol of Paristo which he had so signally failed to give effect, and, for the first time, desiring him to inform Count Walewski that there were subsisting between England and Portugal some ancient defensive treaties. Count Walewski heard this with great surprise, and with some displeasure. He said that he hoped there was nothing of the kind, but at all events he supposed they were not treaties which bound England to support a cause which was clearly wrong. So far as the House could judge from the papers which were before it, the dispute having lasted from the 6th of March, it

  1503
  was not until the 30th October that the Earl of Malmesbury ever referred to the existence of these treaties between England and Portugal. That it was only then that they were first mentioned to Count Walewski was certain, because he expressed his surprise and some polite displeasure at the suggestion of their existence. He must now cordially thank the House for the kindness with which they had listened to him. He hoped he had succeeded in showing that during a period of many months there was a failure of diligence on the part of the Earl of Malmesbury, and that every entire step which he took was one that could not be viewed by that House otherwise than with pain and displeasure. He trusted that he had furnished some materials for a debate which would be of more importance than his own speech, and had afforded some grounds for the decision of what, in the present state of Europe, was a most important question—namely, whether the honour of England should be left in the hands of the noble Lord who now held the seals of the Foreign Office.
  Motion made, and Question proposed—
  "That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copies of Despatches and Documents sent by or communicated to Her Majesty's Government respecting the deportation of Negroes from the Mozambique Coast, including the Despatches from the British Minister at Lisbon to the Portuguese Government, dated respectively the 22nd day of July and the 17th day of November, 1857:
  "Of all the Correspondence which has taken place up to the present time respecting the Charles et Georges between Ber Majesty's Government and Mr. M'Leod, now or late Her Majesty's Consul at Mozambique:
  "Of the Message of the 16th day of October, which is described in Mr. Howard's Despatch of the 21st day of October, in the following words: 'A further Message, of the 16th instant, from the Earl of Malmesbury respecting his former advice to drop the prosecution:'
  "Of any Instructions respecting the charles et Georges which may have been addressed by the Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Cowley in the interval between the 18th day of March, 1858, and the 3rd day of October in the same year:
  "And, of any Correspondence which may have taken place between Count Lavradio and the Earl of Malmesbury subsequently, on the same subject."
  MR. BUXTONsaid, he rose to second the Motion, not because he felt the least interest in showing up the Earl of Malmesbury's shortcomings, nor because he cared to embarrass the Government, but because
  1504
  in these transactions a principle of incalculable value to the welfare of Europe and the peace of the world, a principle which ought to have been insisted upon with the most strenuous energy, had been miserably slurred over, and could only be raised from the abeyance into which it had fallen, by a firm expression of opinion on the part of that House. Of course if, incidentally, the feelings of a Tory Minister could be wounded, or a Tory Government disgraced, why that must be a source of comfort to every well-regulated mind. But all he should seek would be to vindicate, if possible, the principle to which he had referred. But at the outset, he would most earnestly deprecate the idea that the Government were to be blamed for not having threatened to draw the sword on behalf of Portugal. There was nothing in this case to call for such a course; and for his part he should have deemed it no less than a crime on the part of the Government had they lit up the flame of war without a necessity it was impossible to resist. And plainly, if the case did not justify war it could not justify a threat of war. No statesman could wish the Government to hold out a threat which it was not determined to fulfil. No, the one main essential error of the Government did not lie in their not saying to France, "We shall stand by Portugal at all risks;" but it lay in their not urging upon France, with the most emphatic and strenuous and persevering energy, the duty of accepting Portugal's offer of referring the case to mediation. Every one was aware that in April, 1856, all the great Powers signed a Protocol, according to which any difference that might arise between two European nations was to be referred to the arbitration of a third. He need not expatiate to the House on the infinite value of that Protocol, had it once become a living part of the international law of Christendom. As the Earl of Malmesbury himself said,
  "The British Government had always considered that act as one of the most important to civilization, and to the security of the peace of Europe."
  Wars undoubtedly might arise, as they saw now, where such a reference of the vexata quœstio would be impossible. But if any one would think over the history of the wars of the last 200 years, he would see that at least two-thirds of them arose upon some question of right, each party deeming it a breach of his honour to yield, and thus recourse was at length had to arms. Whereas, if it were an acknow-

  1505
  ledged custom to refer the case to mediation, there would be no slur on either country's honour in giving way to such a decision. Such a custom was sure some day to prevail among civilized nations, but the first planting it was a delicate task, and required the strong adhesion to the rule of those who hail laid it down. Had they owned their allegiance to it on but two or three occasions, it would have become consolidated with the fixed customs of Europe. And England having submitted to that rule in the case of the Cagliari, it was only needed that France should obey it too to have rendered it binding in all after time. Clearly then it was of near concern to the peace, and therefore to the happiness and welfare, of Europe that on this occasion France should have been persuaded to exercise a noble self-control in agreeing to the proposal made to her by Portugal, and referring the case to mediation. Had she done so, that rule would have become a law to Europe; not having done so, having flung the rule aside on so striking an occasion, its authority was destroyed. Other lands, instead of feeling bound by the precedent of her moderation, could now point to the example of her breach of the Protocol. He believed that to be a real calamity for Europe; and he would show strong reasons for thinking that this calamity might have been escaped had our Government done its duty. The French had some cause for irritation. Other disputes had been going on between them and Portugal, which had been enough to annoy a thinskinned people, and when upon those grievances one of their ships was seized, no wonder they were angered, and in their anger refused the Portuguese demand for mediation. On the other hand, however, the reasons for referring the case to mediation were so powerful, that had they been at once calmly and strenuously urged upon the Emperor, it England had not only put them forward herself, but hail called on the other Powers that signed the Protocol to join their remonstances to hers, he could hardly by any possibility have persisted in his refusal. The only ground upon which France refused Portugal's request to refer the case to mediation was that, as a delegate was on board the Charles et Georges, her conviction as a slaver involved France in the charge of slave trading. France, therefore, insisted upon it that she was not a slaver, and had been wrongly condemned as a slaver, and on that ground demanded her release. No other ground whatever
  1506
  was put forward by France at last, though others had been touched upon before, but had been abandoned. Now, this ground was utterly untenable. The negroes on board declared that they had been forced there against their will. Some were manacled. The usual slave-trading apparatus was discovered. Finally, the delegate himself declared that he was aware that half the negroes had been wrongfully detained, and that he meant to report that circumstance to the Governor of Bourbon on his return. It would then have been impossible for France to persist in refusing mediation on the ground that the Charles et Georges was not a slaver, if England and the other Powers had strongly urged mediation, while, at the same time, giving France the very strongest possible assurances that no one supposed her Government to have been in any way conniving at a revival of the slave trade. Had the case been clearly and strongly urged, Count Walewski could not have stood upon the preposterous ground that the ship was not a slaver, when the delegate himself had declared that she was so. But, even had he persisted in refusing upon that ground, still, at any rate, we should have felt that we had done our best; that the whole guilt lay elsewhere. And the fact that we had laid such a stress on the Protocol, and that France had only refused to obey it, because, in this case, she thought that by so doing she would acquiesce in a charge against her of slave trading, would have rather increased than lowered the prestige of the Protocol. It might be said that England had no business to urge and importune the French Government, but he would remind the House that the scrape into which Portugal had got was directly owing to the strong pressure which England had put upon her. It was entirely owing to her treaties with us and the arrangements we had forced upon her for the suppression of the slave trade, that she was brought into collision with France. England, therefore, was bound to be most strenuous in pleading for a reference to mediation. Let the House now look at what was actually done by the British Government. On the 20th of September, Earl Cowley wrote home that he apprehended the possibility of a serious misunderstanding between France and Portugal. On the 2nd of October, Earl Cowley announced the resolution of the French Government to demand the release of the Charles et Georges. On the 10th of October

  1507
  he wrote that Count Walewski had repeated to him that the resolution of the Imperial Government was taken to demand the restitution of the vessel without delay. The twelve days between the 20th of September and the 2nd of October would have been the best time for action, but it was only finally closed on the 10th of October. During those twenty-one days, of what did the action of the British Government consist? It consisted of this:—During the first twelve days the Earl of Malmesbury never hinted at mediation. Having on the 2nd of October heard that the Emperor and his Council had discussed and decided the case, four days afterwards, on the 6th of October, at the end of a telegraphic message, he says, "You should put forward the Paris Protocol at a suitable time." That tail of a message was the alpha and omega of the action of our Government in behalf of mediation. Of course, it was not to be looked for that when the Government scarcely touched the matter with the tip of their fingers, Earl Cowley would bestir himself strongly. It was not wonderful, therefore, to find that all he did during that period was this,—that on the 3rd of October, when he knew that the Emperor had resolved that the release of the Charles et Georges should be peremptorily demanded,—when, as he said himself, he could not hope that that decision would be revoked,—he said, "I have asked Count Walewski whether he would be willing to refer the affair to the arbitration of a friendly Power. He has not as yet given me an answer, but I have little expectation that my suggestion will be attended to." That poor, weak, plaintive suggestion, thrown out, it would seem, in conversation, contained the whole pressure that was placed upon France by England to persuade her to maintain inviolate that great Protocol. Earl Cowley, on the 10th of October, after hearing once more that the matter was settled, again threw out the idea of mediation, and three days afterwards—but only in consequence of the solicitations of the Portuguese themselves—France agreed that if the ship were at once released the question as to the legality of the capture might be referred to mediation. That only showed how willing the French Government would have been to listen to reason if reason had been set before them. It was not until all was over and done, and the Charles et Georges was on her way to France, that the Earl of Malmesbury complained bitterly that the French had not referred the
  1508
  case to mediation. What right had he to complain bitterly, he who had done nothing, absolutely nothing, to obtain that mediation from France? The House must see that, had France been persuaded to refer the case to mediation, such a precedent might have caused boundless good to Europe; England had the amplest grounds for demanding mediation, and, if she had done so, France would have had the utmost difficulty in refusing it. Yet the papers proved how poor, how inane, what a more nothing the action of the Government had been, although the credit of England, the claims of Portugal, and the interest of Europe presented extraordinary motives to a display of vigour. He had no wish to attack the Earl of Malmesbury, who had had much less information than was now before the House, and who, no doubt, now that the case could be seen as a whole, would wish that his conduct, as the farmer's wife said, in Adam Bede, could be "hatched over again, and hatched different." But Europe had lost a rare chance of henceforth setting things to rights by mediation, instead of arms. That was a great calamity, and a calamity which might have been warded off, had our Foreign Minister been more prompt and bold. The only hope now was that by speaking out its mind that House might restore to the invaluable Paris Protocol the prestige which had been so recklessly flung away.
  MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDsaid, that, in one point of view, he might be content to leave the debate almost as it stood, inasmuch as the observations of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down were to a great extent a reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake). The argument of the hon. Member for Bridgewater was that the action of the British Government was not spirited enough to answer to the position which England held as a country bound, under all circumstances, to draw the sword in defence of Portugal; but the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had told the House that Ministers would have deserved the severest blame, not only if they had put forward such a pretension, but if they had done anything whatever to imperil the peace of Europe. However, as the hon. Member for Bridgewater had made a speech of considerable length, it was but right and proper that he should receive a reply. In some of his sentiments and opinions every one must cordially con-

  1509
  cur; for it was undoubtedly incumbent upon a British Minister to take care, not only that the letter of treaties was observed, but that England should not be supposed wanting either in the letter or in the spirit of the obligations which she had incurred towards foreign States. If that was true under ordinary circumstances, it must be doubly so when these obligations were contracted towards one of the weaker Powers of Europe, whose course of action might, to a considerable extent, have been influenced by a prospect of English sympathy and aid. He could not, therefore, complain of the Motion of the hon. Gentleman. It was not only the right, but the duty of Parliament to watch jealously the conduct of those who were intrusted with the administration of affairs, and to see, that in all circumstances the honour and good faith of England did not suffer in their hands; but he maintained, at the same time, that it was equally the duty of Parliament, not to confining its attention to the bare statement of facts presented to it in blue-books, but acting as they were to a certain extent judicially, when they considered the conduct of Government it was their duty to take into view all the surrounding circumstances of a particular policy, all the considerations which might have influenced the conduct and decision of the Minister at the time, and all the possible results which, although they might not have been realized, might have been present to his mind when he was called upon to act. He agreed with the hon. Proposer of the Motion, that it was not necessary to go into all the details of this question, and consider whether the Portuguese Government or the French Government were right. The question before the House was, whether the conduct of Her Majesty's Government was right. It was no question as to the character of the free immigration system, so long patronized by the Government of France; and it was agreed that the language of the British Government had always been uniform on the subject. It had uniformly and uncompromisingly been the language of remonstrance and condemnation. These and similar questions were not those with which the House should on the present occasion interest itself. He repeated, that all the House had to consider was the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. It was possible that the conduct of the Freach Government was right; it was possible that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government
  1510
  had been injudicious. It was possible that the conduct of the French Government was wrong, and yet that the course taken by Her Majesty's Government was, not only justifiable, but that which in the interests of all concerned they were bound to pursue. Let the House distinctly understand what was the accusation brought against the Government by the hon. Gentleman. The accusation was twofold. The hon. Gentleman imputed to the Government, on the one hand, that they did not with proper efficiency act up to the letter and spirit of our treaties with Portugal, and on the other, as he understood the hon. Gentleman, he said further, that beyond that Her Majesty's Government did not show, with that energy, with that promptitude, with that care which they ought, the sympathy which was due to Portugal, considering that Portugal had been an ancient Ally, and more especially considering that in tins case prompt and energetic sympathy was her due, because the collision or misunderstanding between France and Portugal had, to a certain extent, been caused by the urgent representations of the British Government. He believed that he stated fairly and accurately the accusations of the hon. Gentleman. If he had stated those accusations accurately and fairly, he took issue on both points, and he challenged the verdict of the House. He would, like the hon. Gentleman, not refer at any great length to the treaties which had been alluded to. The first treaty of 1661 was, as the hon. Gentleman stated, conceived in very large terms, for it declared that the King of England would take the interests of the King of Portugal to heart, and defend the State of Portugal and all its dominions with his utmost power, both by sea and laud, even as England itself. That treaty pointed to the case of a direct invasion of Portugal. The second treaty, signed on the 16th of May, 1703, was different. The hon. Gentleman said that the Latin originally meant something more than the English translation; but he could not appreciate the hon. Gentleman's criticism, for it seemed to that the terms pointed to nothing more than the offer of good offices. The second article stipulated that if the Kings of Spain and France, either present or future, together or separate, should make war, or give occasion to suspect that they intended to make war on Portugal, either on the Continent of Europe or on her dependencies, then the King of Great Britain and the

  1511
  States General engaged to use their friendly offices in order to make them observe terms of peace towards Portugal. Those were the stipulations of the treaty, and when it was said that the British Government had not sufficiently acted up to the letter and spirit of the treaty, he must observe that no one in the House or out of it would contend that this country was bound to support Portugal whether she was right or wrong. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the Earl of Malmesbury's impression of the effect of this treaty, but if he referred with a little more care to the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch, he would find that that noble Lord put forward the position that obviously it could not be affirmed that this country was called on to support Portugal when she was the aggressor, or unless she were clearly in the right. If this were not the case he was sure that every hon. Gentleman would agree that the sooner this country got rid of so indefinite and so perilous a liability the better. In the statement to which the hon. Gentleman had himself alluded, that point of view was pointedly put forward by the Prime Minister of Portugal, who admitted that England could not interfere to support Portugal was right. It was to be observed that the hon. Gentleman from the beginning to the end of his speech never ventured to say that Portugal was in the right, or in such a position that England was called on to act upon treaties, and which she was only called on to put in force when it was clear that Portugal was in the right. He was not going to argue whether France or Portugal was right; but how stood the circumstances? The case of Portugal was, that a French ship had been captured in Portuguese waters, and condemned for slave-trading. Now, let the House examine how far this country was in a position to say that that point was established. Why, the first question raised was the question of jurisdiction—whether the vessel was captured in Portuguese waters or not? It might suit those gentlemen who entertained certain views to say that, on the face of the Portuguese papers, it was clear that the vessel was captured in Portuguese waters; but that was a statement, which, from the first, was met by a direct contradiction from the French Government. At the very time of the capture the point was raised by the captain of the Charles et Georges, and up to the present time, neither by the papers presented to the
  1512
  House, nor by any information which had come to Her Majesty's Government, were Ministers in a position to say whether the capture took place in the Portuguese waters or not. That was a point of no small difficulty. He begged hon. Gentlemen to remember that during the discussions respecting the Cagliari it was acknowledged on all hands that the whole question turned on the point whether she was captured within or beyond the Neapolitan jurisdiction. Every hon. Gentleman who attended to public affairs was aware, that when questions had arisen between the English Government and the Government of France, or the Government of America, the most delicate point that could be raised was whether a vessel was not, as in this case, captured and seized, but even visited out of the waters over which the Power exercising the visitation had jurisdiction. That point, then, was in this matter at the very basis of the whole affair, and it was impossible for the British Government to say that the French Government was wrong and the Portuguese Government was right. But there was another point. He would refer the hon. Gentleman to one of the first interviews of Mr. Howard with the Marquis de Loulé. Mr. Howard wrote,
  "The Marquis de Loulé admitted to me that he thought that, although the transaction was near akin to the slave trade, it could not be punished as such; and I inferred from the Viscount de Sa' s language that he doubted the legality of the condemnation, which it is thought will not be confirmed by the Superior Court."
  On the 6th of September, Mr. Howard wrote that,
  "His Excellency has found reason to alter the opinion which he expressed to me during our former conversation, and which he said had likewise been the view of the Viscount de Sa, that the traffic in which the vessel was engaged at Mozambique was not the slave trade, because there were, it appeared, grounds for believing that the papers which had now been brought forward by the French captain to prove the legitimacy of her transactions, but which were not produced at the trial at Mozambique—namely, the contracts with the Arab chief, acting, as bad been represented, under the authority of the late Governor General, and the receipts of the chief, were subsequent fabrications."
  But what did that amount to? That if they were not fabrications, but true, the condemnation of the vessel was illegal. But there was nothing but the mere suspicion of the Marquis de Loulé to persuade the Government that those documents were forged. There was not a tittle of evidence to justify the suspicion from beginning to end. That being so, what course could

  1513
  the Government take? Could they say, merely on the suggestion of the possible fabrication of documents, to which he humbly suggested it was not likely the Government of France would lend their countenance that the ground taken by the French was invalid? The only course which the British Government could take they did take. They said, "Here are points of difference we can't decide upon the merits, but the whole case ought to be referred to some third party, who should investigate the merits and say, as between the two Governments, whether either was called upon to make reparation, or to cease from the pretensions which it had put forth." Well, that was the course taken by Her Majesty's Government. [Mr. KINGLAKE: When?] If the hon. Gentleman would have patience he would tell him when. He was not going to shirk or to blink any part of this case, and he would show to the House that that was the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, and that it was the only course which in their mind could have satisfied the justice of the case. The hon. Gentleman asked "When?" implying that the Government had not with sufficient promptness shown that sympathy which was due to Portugal as an ally carrying out British policy with regard to the slave trade. The hon. Gentleman had referred back as far as the 6th of March, and it was perfectly true that at that time the Government were informed that there was a cause of misunderstanding between France and Portugal; but suppose that it had gone no further, did the hon. Gentleman contend that Mr. Howard's despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury of the 6th March was of a nature to cause apprehension, or to call for interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government? No such account of the transaction reached the Government until the despatch of the 28th August, in which Mr. Howard called it a "serious affair." But it was still treated both by M. de Lisle and the Portuguese Government as a matter capable of arrangement there among themselves. M. de Lisle, for instance, proposed that the captain should be let out on bail, and there were no indications of that extreme irritation and anger which afterwards led to the supposition that dangerous consequences might arise. It was not until the despatch, written on the 18th September, which did not reach the Government here till the 24th September, that they were made aware of the serious
  1514
  nature of the case. This was a question of dates, and when accusing the Government of inaction it was useless to speak of the date when a despatch was written conveying information to the Government, but the date of its arrival must be considered. Well, that despatch, written on the 18th September, was received at the Foreign Office on the 24th, and the hon. Gentleman said that the Portuguese Government took steps of their own because they had received no instructions from us by the 28th September, as if it were possible for that letter of the 18th to have been considered and a reply sent which could have reached Lisbon by the 28th. The despatch which reached the Government on the 24th September told them that the affair began to assume a very serious aspect. What was the course taken by the Government? On the very next day—on the 25th September—before any demand or request or even suggestion had been made by the Portuguese Government for the intervention of the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government, they stepped forth frankly and said that their friendly offices should not be wanting. [Mr. KINGLAKE: Read.] The hon. Gentleman cried "Read." He would read. What the Government said was this:—
  "I have transmitted to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris copies of your despatches above referred to, and I have to instruct you to assure the Portuguese Government that the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government will not be wanting for the purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement of the difference between the French and Portuguese Governments upon this subject."
  Now, the hon. Gentleman who moved the Address stated, that for a lengthened period the Government of this country forwarded no instruction on the subject to their Minister at Paris; but he (Mr. S. FitzGerald) would appeal to any hon. Member who was acquainted with the course of public business, whether the transmission of that despatch to Earl Cowley was not in the fullest way an instruction to him to use those friendly offices which the Government stated should not be wanting for the purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement of the differences between the French and Portuguese Governments. The hon. Gentleman had asked where the covering letter to that despatch was. That covering letter should be forthcoming, and it had only been omitted from the present papers by the merest accident on the part of the printer; but in every paper that succeeded

  1515
  it would be seen that Earl Cowley acted upon that letter, and that day by day his Lordship was in communication with the French Government, doing all he could to exercise those good offices which they had promised, the Portuguese Government should not be wanting. The hon. Gentleman said, that there was nothing in the whole of these papers to show that Earl Cowley had exerted himself in the use of good offices to obtain an amicable settlement of the question in dispute; but surely the hon. Gentleman when he made that statement must have omitted to read the observations of M. de Loulé himself, contained at page 75 of the papers:—
  "His Excellency readily confirmed the statements made in my communications to him—namely, that Her Majesty's Government had offered their good offices before they had even been requested by Portugal; that the only request for assistance which had been made by the Portuguese Government of Her Majesty's Government was for their good offices in order to bring about an amicable settlement of the question, and that he had charged me to convey to your Lordship the thanks of the Portuguese Government for the tender and for the employment of the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, and likewise to Earl Cowley for his exertions to induce the French Government to consent to a mediation of the dispute."
  And with that paper in his hand the hon. Gentleman boldly stood up and said that it was nothing but a promise of good offices; nothing but a tender of good offices; that the British Government had never employed those good offices; and that Earl Cowley did nothing more than stand by. That despatch was, as he had said, acted on by Earl Cowley; but even then Her Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that the case was going to take that angry aspect which it afterwards assumed, because Earl Cowley, writing home on the 30th September, said:—
  "Count Walewski's language was very conciliatory. I feel certain that he regrets that the case has arisen, and will gladly see it settled."
  He paused here for a minute to ask the House to consider what was the position which Her Majesty's Government had occupied down to that period. On that day they heard that the Minister for Foreign Affairs in France used most conciliatory language, and that he regretted that the case had arisen; but before that they had tendered their good offices, and he would presently show how, for a time, the effect of those good offices had been frustrated. However, that was the way in which matters stood on the 30th of Sep-
  1516
  tember, and it was only by a telegram on the 2nd of October, the substance of which was amplified in a despatch of the 3rd of October, that they had any reason to suppose that the French Government had changed their view, and that the matter was becoming one of serious international consequence. Immediately afterwards the Government desired Earl Cowley to urge upon the French Government, in the strongest way, the adoption of the principle of arbitration. The hon. Gentleman said that that should have been done long before, and that the Protocol of Paris should have been referred to in the first instance; but the Protocol of Paris was at that time utterly inapplicable, because even when it was adopted by any Power it was only applicable as a last resource, and when it afforded the sole means of avoiding an appeal to arms. If the hon. Gentleman would refer to the terms of the Protocol he would find the Plenipotentiaries did not hesitate to express, in the names of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding might arise, should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly power. It was not, until the French Government were about to appeal to arms, possible for Her Majesty's Government to urge open them the adoption of the Protocol. On the 7th of October ships were sent on the part of the British Government to Lisbon, and he must here say that he knew not from what source the hon. Gentleman had learnt that it was not till the middle of November that those ships started from British shores. All he could say was that that knowledge was not possessed by himself or by any Member of the Government. If the hon. Gentleman would refer to the papers he would find that the Secretary of the Admiralty, in a letter addressed to himself on the 8th of October, said that the Victor Emmanuel and Racoon would proceed to Lisbon according to instructions. And if the hon. Gentleman would refer to the public journals of that date, he would find that the departure of those vessels from British shores was announced in The Times. [Mr. KINGLAKE: On what day did they arrive at Lisbon?] He was unable to say; but the hon. Gentleman was now shifting his ground. The hon. Gentleman, when he mentioned the middle of November, was speaking, not of the arrival of the vessels at Lisbon, but of their departure from this country. The

  1517
  hon. Gentleman's statement was this, that, owing not to any fault of the First Lord of the Admiralty, but to some impediment created by the Foreign Office, these vessels did not leave England until the month of November. The hon. Gentleman also complained that there had been no communications between Earl Cowley and Count Walewski. But if the hon. Gentleman would refer to the papers he would see that there were constant communications between Earl Cowley, M. Lavradio, M. de Paiva, and Count Walewski between the 7th of October and the conclusion of this affair; that M. de Loulé acknowledged that Earl Cowley was entitled to the greatest thanks for his exertions on behalf of Portugal, and that he (Mr. Kinglake) was not justified in his inference that during the whole of the time Earl Cowley was doing nothing at Paris. The fact was, that not only from day to day, but from hour to hour, Earl Cowley attended carefully and sedulously to this matter, and it was mainly owing to Earl Cowley's exertions that Count Walewski eventually agreed to refer it to arbitration. On the 13th of October Earl Cowley wrote to Her Majesty's Government to say that he expected an amicable solution would take place. Upon this the hon. Gentleman said that the proposition on behalf of Portugal did not come from Earl Cowley, but from the representatives of the Portuguese Government. Well, he, (Mr. FitzGerald) appealed to any hon. Member whether, if he were British Minister at Paris, and there were on the spot most accomplished, able, and experienced Portuguese diplomatists, he would think it his duty in such a case as this to make a suggestion to the French Government as to the course the Portuguese Government would take. The hon. Gentleman would find, on looking to the papers, that it was not till the 3rd of October that Earl Cowley sent a despatch (which did not reach Her Majesty's Government till the 4th) to the effect that he had no reason to suppose till then that the matter would have assumed the serious, he might almost say dangerous, complexion which it then had; and in nine days after the arrival of that despatch—namely, on the 13th of October—Earl Cowley had succeeded by his active exertions (for which he received the praise of M. de Loulé) in inducing the French Government to send full powers to M. de Lisle for the entire arrangement of the affair and its reference to the arbitration of a third party. And yet this was the case which the hon.
  1518
  Gentleman had represented as one in which no step had been taken by Her Majesty's Government—as one in which from beginning to end there had been nothing but negligence, incompetence, and delay; the fact being that, from the time Her Majesty's Government first knew that this was becoming a dangerous question until what ought to have proved its satisfactory solution was agreed to, only nine days had elapsed; which result was mainly owing to the exertions of Her Majesty's Government. He would briefly relate the history. On the 13th of October the Government were informed that the whole matter was in course of amicable solution. On the 15th of October, Her Majesty's Government received a despatch stating that the Portuguese Minister at Paris had set out for Lisbon, but they heard nothing, to lead them to alter their opinion on this matter. On the contrary, they learnt from Earl Cowley on the 23rd that the French Government were sincerely desirous of terminating the business in a manner which should not wound the honour of either France or Portugal; and they continued under that impression until the 26th of October, when suddenly for the first time they learnt that there had been a misunderstanding at Lisbon, and that the ship had been seized by the French. The hon. Gentleman said that Count Walewski expressed his surprise on hearing that treaties existed between England and Portugal; but if he would refer to the papers he would find not that Count Walewski had expressed his surprise at the existence of such treaties, but had expressed his regret that reference was made to them. [Mr. KINGLAKE: "Hear, hear!"] But was the expression of his regret at their mention the same thing as an expression of surprise that they existed? Count Walewski said that he did not exactly know the nature of those treaties, but was perfectly convinced that they did not impose any obligation on England, to assist Portugal when Portugal was in the wrong, and he expressed a hope that nothing would take place which would imperil the good understanding existing between England and France. The fair inference was that Count Walewski never for a moment anticipated that the good understanding between France and England would be imperilled; and though he did not know the exact nature of the treaties, he was quite aware they existed. It could not be supposed Count Walewski would say he had no ap-

  1519
  pretensions of the good understanding between the two countries being imperilled, when, according to the hon. Gentleman, all the British Government had done was to interpose its good offices in a friendly spirit to prevent the dispute from growing up into formidable dimensions. It was clear from M. Walewski's statement that he was aware of the existence of the treaties, though he was ignorant of their exact nature. Certainly no candid man could infer from the statement that Count Walewski received with extreme surprise the information that the treaties existed. [Mr. KINGLAKE: "No, no!"] He would repeat the words—extreme surprise—received with the most extreme surprise the announcement that any treaties of the kind were in existence between England and Portugal. He had now tested the case brought forward upon the statements of the hon. Gentleman. He had shown that, from beginning to end, there were such doubts with regard to the statement of facts both on the one side and on the other that it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to put themselves in that position in which alone they could act with safety—namely, that they could say that Portugal was in the right. He had stated that Her Majesty's Government had suggested, with a view to that, an arbitration by means of reference to a third power. He had shown that, throughout the whole course of these transactions, the moment that Her Majesty's Government heard that the matter was becoming serious, and before even their good offices were asked for, they had tendered them. Day by day they were employed by Earl Cowley, and the British Government had every reason to suppose the matter would be amicably settled; and from the time it first heard the dispute was assuming a serious complexion, till the time it had reason to believe it would be satisfactorily arranged, there elapsed only a period of nine days. Now, he would ask whether the hon. Gentleman was justified in the indictment he had brought against Her Majesty's Government, charging it with neglecting its obligations to a friendly Power, leaving an old and faithful Ally in the lurch, and even with having soiled the honour and character of England? That being the position of the hon. Gentleman, he must say his Motion was one of the most curious he had ever seen. The hon. Gentleman made an accusation against Her Majesty's Government, of which, if one
  1520
  half were true, the Government ought no longer to sit on these benches. The hon. Gentleman made an accusation of the gravest kind against the Government, and having thought it his duty as an independent Member of Parliament to bring the matter before the House, he thought he fulfilled that duty to his country—the honour of which it was as much the hon. Gentleman's province to uphold as it was that of the Government—by reading out this long indictment, and concluding moving for papers. The House would permit him to go a little further, and note what were the papers for which the hon. Gentleman moved. First, he moved for
  "Copies of despatches and documents sent by or communicated to Her Majesty's Government respecting the deportation of negroes from the Mozambique coast, including the despatches from the British Minister at Lisbon to the Portuguese Government, dated respectively the 22nd day of July and the 17th day of November, 1857."
  These documents, he could inform the hon. Gentleman, were in his possession already, among the papers on the Portuguese slave trade. Until Her Majesty's present Ministers came into office these papers had not been presented for a series of years; and the hon. Gentleman would find that he had not only had them in his possession, but that they were also collected in a most concise form, and one that was very easy of access. He would have given the despatch of the 17th of November, 1857, if he could find that such a despatch existed, but as far as he knew there was no despatch of that date, or near that date, or one of a description to which he could suppose the hon. Gentleman had referred; and all he could say was that if the hon. Gentleman would point out where the document was to be found he should be happy to furnish it. The hon. Gentleman next moved for copies of all the correspondence which had taken place up to the present time respecting the Charles et Georges between Her Majesty's Government and Mr. M'Leod, now or late Her Majesty's consul at Mozambique. In judging of this case the House ought to put itself into the position of the Government at the time the affair of the Charles et Georges occurred, and subsequent to its occurrence. Up to the time of the conclusion of this affair, the only paper in possession of the Government front Mr. M 'Leod was a short statement of four lines, to the effect that a French vessel had been lying at anchor in Conducia Bay, but that he had no idea it was a French ship. The

  1521
  only other correspondence consisted of two letters that had reached the Government since the return of Mr. M'Leod to England from Mozambique whence he had been driven by the persecution of its inhabitants. The next paper moved for is
  "The message of the 16th day of October, which is described in Mr. Howard's despatch of the 21st day of October, 1858, in the following words:—'A further message, of the 16th inst., from the Earl of Malmesbury respecting his former advice to drop the prosecution.'"
  That message was a telegram, given in the fewest possible words, the substance of the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch to Mr. Howard, of the 15th of October; the despatch itself was printed in extenso among the papers on the table. As these telegrams were always sent in cipher, it was important that they should not be unnecessarily published, that the secret cipher of the Government should not be made known to foreign countries. It was obviously important that as few telegrams should be printed as possible, and when they were, the words were always transposed in order to conceal the cipher. If the hon. Gentleman had the slightest curiosity on the subject, however, the paper was at his service, and from it he would see that it was like the heading at the top of a chapter in the Bible—it simply gave in a few short sentences, the contents of the more amplified despatch of the 16th of October. The next paper moved for was a copy of
  "Any instructions respecting the Charles et Georges which may have been addressed by the Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Cowley in the interval between the 18th day of March, 1858, and the 3rd day of October in the same year; and of any correspondence which may have taken place between Count Lavradio and the Earl of Malmesbury subsequently, on the same subject."
  He thought he had already sufficiently explained that such instructions were unnecessary. The only paper not given already was a short note to Earl Cowley covering the despatch dated the 26th of September; that was at the hon. Gentleman's service; he would see it was sufficient to put Earl Cowley in motion, as proved by the fact that he immediately used those exertions for which he received the thanks of the Portuguese Government. Since it was originally given the hon. Gentleman had altered the tennis of his notice. What had induced him to make that alteration he knew not. The hon. Gentleman first moved for copies of a correspondence, which took place between his noble Friend and the Foreign Minister of Portugal re-
  1522
  specting an expression of the Portuguese Minister quoted by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) in this House, that this was not a casus belli. He was at a loss to understand how the hon. Member should have been informed of the existence of a private and confidential correspondence which neither the Portuguese Minister nor his noble Friend had thought to be such as could be placed in the archives of the Portuguese Legation, or in those of Her Majesty's Foreign Office. How the hon. Gentleman had obtained information which could only be supposed to have come from either of the parties that such a correspondence existed, it was more than he could divine. The hon. Gentleman would see that, being entirely confidential, it was utterly impossible for him to produce it. It was not in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. This however, he might say, that the statement of his right hon. Friend was substantially correct, and he supposed that would meet the views of the hon. Gentleman. The Marquis de Loulé did state—he was now speaking from a translation of his speech made in the Portuguese Chamber—that some members appeared to be of opinion that the assistance of England ought to have been asked for, but that it was not clear to him that a casus belli had actually arisen. The hon. Seconder of the present Motion had adopted a totally different view from that of the hon. Member of Bridgewater. The ground of complaint of the former against Her Majesty's Government was that they had not sufficiently urged mediation. Now, if the hon. Member would refer to the fly-page of the printed papers he would find the "sketch of an agreement produced by the Marquis de Lisle to the Marquis de Loulé, October 23rd, 1858." The third article of that sketch stated that,
  "The subsidiary questions, that is to say, especially those which relate to the indemnity claimed by the interested parties, and to the seizure of blacks voluntarily engaged at Mayotte, which is a French possession, and at the Comoro Islands, which are an independent country, will be submitted to the mediation of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, in conformity with the wish expressed in the 23rd Protocol of the Paris Conferences."
  Thus, the hon. Member's objection that Her Majesty's Government did not urge the adoption of the Protocol of the Paris Conferences entirely fell to the ground. If the hon. Gentleman wished for a proof that by the exertions of the British Government

  1523
  the value of that Protocol was recognized by France, he had only to look at these papers, and he would find that the object which he asserted had not been obtained, bad, in fact, been substantially obtained, and that through the efforts of Her Majesty's Government. At page 70 of the Correspondence an account was given of a conversation between Count Walewski and Earl Cowley, in which the latter observed that "the 23rd Protocol was exactly framed to meet questions of this nature, where both parties claimed to be in the right;" but Count Walewski interrupted him by declaring that "the French Government had never declined to submit the question of right to friendly mediation." So that not only in the draught proposal submitted by M. de Lisle to the Portuguese Government was there a distinct reference to the Protocol of Paris, but Count Walewski himself, when his attention was called to it, in various interviews stated that he had never refused, to have recourse to its principle. Again in page 58, the Earl of Malmesbury addressing Lord Cowley, said:—
  "It was, therefore, with great concern that I had seen that when, on the late occasion, Portugal requested Her Majesty's Government to use her good offices between the disputants—and, by the authority of Her Majesty's Government, your Excellency proposed and earnestly advocated mediation—The French Government refused the mediation of any third Power, and considered the question as a point of national honour which admitted of no friendly hand to assist in its settlement."
  Thus, this ground of indictment against Her Majesty's Government entirely failed. He had now gone through the whole case as presented to the House by the hon. Members for Bridgewater and Newport, and the position he was content to take was, not merely that the Government were entitled to have fair allowances made for them, but that in a moment of great doubt and embarrassment they had taken the only course which could secure a proper solution of the difficulties in which the French and Portuguese Governments were involved—the course, also, which was best calculated to secure the honour of both those Governments, and to maintain the peace of Europe, and in consequence the peace of the world. In the speech addressed to the Portuguese Parliament by the Marquis de Loulé on the occasion to which he had already referred, that Minister used these emphatic words:—
  "England is not bound to support us in every controversy, and, besides, the circumstances were
  1524
  not of such a nature as to lead us to expect war' or as to entitle us fairly to demand the assistance of England. For if she had acceded to our request a European war might have been the result, which on our part as a member of the European family of nations, and interested in the continuance of peace, we were bound to avoid."
  The hon. Gentleman took a position more Portuguese than the Portuguese themselves. Her Majesty's Government had received the thanks of the Portuguese Government for their good offices in its behalf. Besides the statement of the Portuguese Prime Minister that he could not have formally demanded the assistance of England, and that if such assistance had been rendered precipitately it might have caused a European war—a result which the Portuguese Government felt itself bound to avoid, though the hon. Gentleman would not seem to think that a duty of the same kind rested on Her Majesty's Government—besides that declaration M. de Loulé thanked the Earl of Malmesbury, on the part of the Portuguese Government, "for the tender and for the employment of the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, and likewise Earl Cowley for his exertions to induce the French Government to consent to a mediation of the disepute." He was content, then, to place the question on this issue, that Her Majesty's Government had done their duty to their ally, had preserved unimpaired the honour and dignity of England, and maintained the peace and tranquillity of Europe.
  MR. LOWE, said, that the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. S. FitzGerald) had accused the hon. Member for Bridgewater of being more Portuguese than the Portuguese. It might be retorted on the hon. Gentleman opposite himself that he was more French than the French, for he had begun his speech by arguing strenuously against the jurisdiction of the Portuguese Courts, over the spot where the vessel was seized. The hon. Gentleman said, that on consideration the French Government did not think it worth while to press that point; and surely we, the allies of Portugal, need not be more astute in hunting out objections against her than the French themselves. The question of jurisdiction was not raised at the time of the capture. There was no mention of it until it was referred to in Earl Cowley's despatch of the 20th of September, alluding to the statement of M. Benedetti. The French captain and the agent both submitted to the jurisdiction of the Portuguese courts; and it was insisted upon as a part of the

  1525
  Portuguese Government's case that France, after having admitted the authority of the Portuguese tribunal, ought not to have recourse to measures of violence. The ground upon which the Portuguese Government put the question of jurisdiction was, that the logs of the ships of war and that of the Charles et Georges showed different things; and they argued, not unreasonably, that the logs of the ships of war were more entitled to credit than that of the slaver. There the matter rested, because, as the French Government had not pursued this point further, there were no means of obtaining any more information upon it. The hon. Gentleman seemed much astonished that the documents referred to in the Earl of Maltnesbury's letter of the 15th of October should be treated as forgeries, but he could give him a reason why they should be so treated. In his examination before the Portuguese Commission, the captain of the Charles et Georges stated that, the mate having fallen sick, he put into Quitangonha, and, finding labourers there, bought them. He was asked by the President whether he met with any Portuguese authority at that place, and he replied in the negative, saying that he only saw some individuals who brought labourers, and from whom he bought them, having still in his possession 4,000 dollars with which to engage men. The captain having stated this at the end of the year 1857, and documents, purporting to be engagements taken before the Sheikh of Matabane, having been subsequently produced, was it unreasonable to conclude that they were forgeries? Was it, indeed, possible to come to any other conclusion? If the captain's evidence was true, he could not have had these documents; and if he had had them he had every interest to produce them, because they would have tended very greatly, if not entirely, to exonerate him from the charge of slaving. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. FitzGerald) when speaking of Protocols, had laid down a most singular doctrine—namely, that the 23rd Protocol of the Congress of Paris was not to be applied until the parties had taken up arms; that was, that it was never to be applied until it was too late. He could not in fewer words express the absurdity of that argument. The hon. Gentleman had also said that his hon. Friend (Mr. Kinglake) was wrong as to the time at which the British ships arrived at Lisbon. These papers contained nothing to guide the House as to the period at
  1526
  which that event occurred, nor was it, in his opinion, of much importance, because, from whatever part of the world they had gone, he believed that they would have been better employed there in supporting the honour and credit of this country than in going to the Tagus to be witness of our dishonour and disgrace. The next point upon which the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had dwelt was, that Her Majesty's Government had received, or rather, he should say, had extorted, thanks, from the Portuguese Government. Now, really it surprised him that his hon. Friend should have put that forward again and again without informing the House how those thanks came to be rendered. Ingratitude, no doubt, was a very prevalent sin, and the Portuguese Government must have been very ungrateful, because, after all the splendid services which they had received from the British Government, they published in the Diaria do Governo an account of these transactions without mentioning one of those services. He supposed that they were so much impressed with them that they did not know how suitably to acknowledge them, and therefore made no attempt to do so. There upon the Earl of Malmesbory. upon whose proceedings the hon. Gentleman opposite had observed a discreet silence, confining himself entirely to those of Earl Cowley, became very vigilant. When the mischief had all been done he woke up like a man from sleep, or a giant refreshed with wine, and, addressing the Portuguese Government, said,—"How dare you give an account of these transactions without acknowledging our good offices?" And the Portuguese Government said,—"Well, then, if you will have it, we do thank you; you are thanked accordingly." And these were the thinks which his hon. Friend had thought it worth his while to trumpet over and over again, as if they had been the spontaneous outpouring of the feelings of a great nation. Then they came to the magnanimity of our Consul, which seemed to have met with the highest admiration of his hon. Friend. The Consul saw a ship evidently engaged in slaving, he reported it to the Government of Mozambique, put them in motion, and thus caused all the mischief. But he would not have done it on his own account. Like Sir Andrew Aguecheek, had he known he had been so cunning a fencer, he would have had nothing to do with it. He knew the Government with which he had to deal, and

  1527
  felt it necessary to apologize for being jealous in the cause of humanity, of the observation of treaties, and of the honour of his country. His hon. Friend's next point, stripped of diplomatic language, was that Earl Cowley obtained for Portugal very good terms. She was to give up the ship, and the whole matter was to go to arbitration. But then, somehow or other, these terms were never carried out. Of course not. Whatever Count Walewski might have said to Earl Cowley, his despatch, a précis of which was given by Mr. Howard in the papers which had been produced, distinctly contradicted that understanding, and stated that the principle was on no account to be left to arbitration. That assurance, which the hon. Gentleman said so completely deceived the Earl of Malmesbury and accounted for his subsequent supineness, was given on the 13th of October. How came it, then, that two days after receiving that assurance, which settled the whole question, the noble Lord wrote the charming despatch of the 15th of October? Did that look as if he considered the matter settled? If the whole thing was arranged, why did he not write to say, "We have arranged the whole affair; you are to give up the ship and captain, and it is all to go to mediation. We strongly advise you to accept those terms." That would have been a course of some sort; it might have been right or wrong. Instead of that, however, he wrote to the Portuguese Government a despatch which rakes up all the merits or demerits of the transaction, and so anxious was he that it should arrive that he sent the heads of it by telegraph to Mr. Howard. This abridgment his hon. Friend (Mr. S. FitzGerald) said was like the heading of a chapter in the Bible. If so, the abridgment was a great deal better than the work in extenso, for anything more unlike a chapter of the Bible than this despatch, which was founded on a gross error and mistake, and suggested a course which any ingenuous man would be ashamed to take, he never saw in his life. So far from the Earl of Malmesbury's vigilance having been lulled to sleep by the assurance of Count Walewski as to the terms he was going to offer to Portugal that was the only period at which he appeared to have been awake, and this was the only step which he had taken in the matter worth mentioning or considering for a moment. Therefore the ground on which the hon. Gentleman opposite had rested the matter entirely failed
  1528
  him. He was sorry that they were not to have this telegraphic despatch, because he should have liked to have seen this heading of a chapter of the Bible; that it was in cipher, and that its production would enable parties to read the Government cipher was a reason that could never be admitted to prevail against the production of a despatch. There was another reason given by his hon. Friend—namely, that it was transposed. He supposed it was a little prudery of style which withheld his hon. Friend from producing it. He had himself formed such an opinion of the style of the documents relating to this affair that he did not think that any of them would suffer by transposition. [Mr. S. FITZGERALD threw the despatch upon the table, and requested the hon. Gentleman to read it for himself.] The hon. Gentleman could not expect him to read it while he was addressing the House. Had these despatches been so transposed as to be absolutely incoherent and nonsensical, they would not have suffered in the estimation of those who read them. Having now answered as far as he was able what had been alleged by hon. Gentlemen, he wished to recal the House to what was the real issue before it, because the hon. Gentleman who boasted of having followed the hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) through his speech, had omitted all the points which were most relevant and telling. The issue, as he understood it, was not as to what Earl Cowley did, but as to what the Earl of Malmesbury did. He wanted to trace—and it could be done in very few words—all the Earl of Maltmesbury's exploits in these transactions from first to last, and to form their opinion upon them and them only. He wanted to see what the Earl of Malmesbury did, and to ascertain how much this country gained in this very delicate and difficult affair by having a Secretary for Foreign Affairs at all. In order to ascertain what was the real issue which the House had to try, he would refer his hon. Friend to an authority which he would admit was much higher even than his own. On the first night of the Session the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, referring to this subject said:—
  "I will take a very early opportunity of laying the papers on the table of the House, but I may be permitted to say, as so much has appeared in the newspapers of a very unauthorized character, accompanied by garbled extracts from official documents connected with other countries, that I shah lay these papers on the table, with the full

  1529
  conviction that they will prove that the advisers of Her Majesty have done their duty to their Sovereign and to their country in respect to that question."—[3 Hansard, clii., p. 83.]
  No issue could be fairer than that, and he much preferred it to the narrower one which his hon. Friend seemed disposed to substitute for it. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:—
  "When the papers are placed on the table it will be seen, and, I believe, accepted by the House, that the proper advice was given by the Government to our ancient Ally; that all the good offices which, considering the relations which subsist beteen Portugal and this country, would have been expected of us, were exercised in the right quarter in her behalf, and that terms were obtained which might have been accepted by Portugal with honour to herself and with satisfaction to Europe."—[3 Hansard, clii., p. 83.]
  He did not understand the last words. Did they refer to the terms which were obtained by Earl Cowley from Count Walewski, but which were never carried out? If so, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had surely taken an unwarrantable liberty with the House, which must necessarily have understood him to refer to terms which were really within the reach of Portugal. Or did the right hon. Gentleman allude to the terms which were actually vouchsafed by France to Portugal—terms which obtained for Portugal the liberty of seeing the Charles et Georges seized before the eyes of her people, and carried away by a French steamer, appropriately called the Requin? Did he refer to the terms which compelled Portugal to allow a convicted slaver—Captain Rouxel—to go free after the crimes he had committed; and did he mean to assert that the injustice suffered by Portugal was compensated by the insulting offer of fixing her indemnity by arbitration? Was it a great thing to obtain for Portugal, which was not permitted to be heard upon the question of her own rights, the liberty of chaffering for the dirty dross which it was supposed would heal the wound inflicted upon her honour? He wished to lay clearly before the House the dilemma in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer was placed, and he hoped the House would watch the way in which the right hon. Gentleman might attempt to escape from it. But, after all, what the House had to consider upon the present occasion were the acts of the Earl of Malmesbury himself. On the 23rd of August, according to the printed papers, the Charles et Georges arrived in the Tagus; and here it would facilitate the understanding of the whole case, if the House
  1530
  were clearly to comprehend what were the charges and facts in regard to that vessel. Her conviction had nothing whatever to do with the French system of free emigration from Africa. She was convicted for slave trading pure and simple, without regard to Portuguese regulations or anything else; and, what was more, she was justly convicted. The evidence was so overwhelming that it would be impossible for any impartial person to come to a contrary conclusion. What were the facts? In the first place, she went into a place where ships were forbidden to go at all, and that, too, close to a large town, where she might have gone if she had liked—a circumstance which showed, at all events, that she had some object for secrecy. The captain stated that he was obliged to go there on account of foul winds, but it appeared that the wind was fair. He next said that he went for provisions, but it had been proved that be had plenty of provisions on board to last 300 men for two months. Then he asserted that he went for a surgeon, but the truth was, there was not a single surgeon at Quitangonha, though there were plenty at Mozambique, two leagues off. He contradicted himself as to the manner in which he obtained possession of the negroes, and upon that point no papers were produced upon his trial, nor till long afterwards. One of his assertions was, that he got the negroes at Quitangonha, but nothing could be more clearly proved than the fact—which, indeed, was admitted in the French documents themselves—that eleven were put on board at Matabane, with their arms pinioned. It was said that their arms were pinioned with their own consent; but, though that might be so, at first sight it did not seem very probable. The negroes themselves, upon being examined, stated that they were put on board against their will, and they were identified as the slaves of persons in the neighbourhood, some of them having been sold directly by their masters, and others through the agency of a Moor. Then it was urged that Captain Rouxel was entitled to do what did in virtue of a licence which he held from the Governor to trade with the Sheik of Matabane, but the truth was there was no such licence in existence, and the only document of the kind produced, expressly provided that the Sheik of Matabane should not trade with any place but Mosambique itself. Finally, the question relative to the delegate was raised, but what was the evidence of that personage him-

  1531
  self? The very man whose presence, in the opinion of the French, exonerated the Charles et Georges from any imputation of guilt, solemnly deposed that Captain Rouxel was guilty of slave trading, inasmuch as he took the negroes on board in violation of his instructions, and that he, the delegate himself, intended to report the case as soon as he arrived at Bourbon. It was impossible for any man to look at that array of facts and doubt for a moment that here was a decided case of slave trading. He did not impute discredit to the French Government. Traffic in slaves was not contemplated by them; but the fact was undoubted that a French vessel, sent out for one purpose, abused its flag to effect another. The delegate himself could not control the captain, which showed that his presence could give the vessel no impunity from crime and its consequences. On the 28th August, the Charles et Georges having been justly condemned for engaging in the slave trade, the Marquis de Lisle demanded peremptorily that it should be given up to the French Government, and gave various reasons why his demand should be complied with. But up to the 25th of September the Earl of Malmesbury took no step whatever. Seven months he remained inert, except by acting as a postoffice for the transmission of letters and despatches between the different diplomatic personages engaged in the affair. Upon that day, however, he took a step which announced the coming vigour of his operations, for he pronounced an opinion that the case was beginning to be very serious. That was a true and important observation, only it was not original, for the House would find in a despatch addressed to the Earl of Malmesbury, on the 18th September, the same expression used by Mr. Howard. The first great stroke on the Earl of Malmesbury's part was the copying those words out of a despatch of Mr. Howard. However, everything must have a beginning, and great bodies could not be got into motion in a hurry. The next document of importance was a despatch from Earl Cowley on the 30th of September, stating that Count Walewski had referred the question to the Comité des Contentieux, that the Comité had not given in its report, but that in anticipation of its decision he had sent the Donauwerth and the Austerlitz to Lisbon. The despatch added that if the Comité reported in favour of the release of the ship a demand would be made for that release
  1532
  within the twenty-four hours, and would be enforced, if not complied with. On the other hand, if the report advised an appeal to the higher tribunals of Lisbon the release of the captain on bail would be required. That despatch must have reached the Earl of Malmesbury on the 1st of October. It announced a proceeding of the most startling character, on the part of the French Government, and showed that, as soon as the Comité des Contentieux should have given its decision in their favour, they intended to strike with the utmost promptitude. Such, moreover, was the precise course subsequently taken by the French Government; and yet, the Earl of Malmesbury, as usual, did nothing whatever. If he wished to hear something still more stirring before he interposed, he had not to wait long, for on the 2nd of October there came a telegram that the Comité des Contentieux had decided against Portugal, and on the following day the French ships of war arrived in the Tagus. Still the Earl of Malmesbury did nothing, though here he was bound to mention what he had before unintentionally omitted, that in his despatch of the 25th of September, in addition to stating that the affair began to assume a serious aspect, the Earl of Malmesbury offered the good offices of England. On the 5th of October nothing more was done. Then came a telegram announcing that arbitration had been refused, and on the 6th, after the whole matter had been settled, the Earl of Malmesbury for the first time wrote that despatch in which he stated that the Paris Protocol might be referred to at a suitable time. That was the way in which the matter seemed to stand. He would venture to make a criticism on the conduct of the British Government in respect to this matter. He thought that it was their duty at least by the 6th of October to have made up their minds to some course. They had ample materials on which to form a decision and it was their imperative duty to this country and its Ally to make up their mind whether this was a case of treaty; whether the attitude of Portugal was founded in right, what course they would advise Portugal to pursue, and what course they would pursue themselves. He did not say that under all circumstances they should have gone to war; but he should have been satisfied if they had recommended to Portugal any definite and honourable course. He complained that no definite course was recommended. He thought that when a

  1533
  doctrine such as that laid down by the Comité des Contentieux was broached for the first time as the public law of Europe, it was the duty of the Government, as soon as so startling a proposition came to their knowledge, to take it into consideration and deliver in the most authoritative and authentic manner their opinion as to the nature of the new claim. That claim was serious enough. Let them consider what the consequences would be if the presence of a person as delegate and intrusted with the power of controlling the ship and keeping it within the dominion of the law was to exempt it from all municipal law whatever. It would then be easy for every country, by merely investing the captains of merchant ships with that character, to make a complete abrogation of the law of nations with respect to the liability of foreign merchants to the law of the places where they happened to trade. Whether this were right or wrong. the consequences were so serious that, instead of being allowed to be drawn into a precedent, it was the duty of the Government to direct their minds to it, and deliver an opinion on it. He did not feel bound to offer an opinion on the law, but he would refer Gentlemen who wished to be enlightened on the subject to Mr. Justice Marshall, an American Judge, who thus stated the principle of the law with respect to ships of war:—In the ports of foreign countries ships of war had always been considered to be exempt from the local jurisdiction, and the reason was, that there was implied the consent of the Sovereign to the derogation of his sovereign rights in respect to such vessels: the derogation rested on the assumed assent of the Sovereign. If that were good law, and it was sanctioned by reason and authority, the necessary inference was, that the matter rested on consent and on usage; and a new thing like this plan of having a delegate on board of a ship could not possibly be invested with that consent which rested on usage, and which nothing but time and frequent repetition could give. There was another point which the Government should have considered. Admitting, for the sake of argument, this authority, was it an authority which no amount of abuse could take away? There were questions of far larger importance than the immediate case under consideration, and it would have been gratifying to observe symptoms of their having been grasped in the Foreign Office. Then came the despatch of the 15th October, and one thing he in-
  1534
  ferred from that despatch was, that the Earl of Malmesbury had never read these papers. He was not going to be very exact as to what a Secretary of State should be; but it was not too much to ask that he should read the papers in his office, and if he read them that he should form a judgment on them, or at least have sufficient industry to refer to them. The Earl of Malmesbury, in that despatch, said:—
  "It appears to Her Majesty's Government that, on the one hand, the French captain and delegate on board the Charles et Georges violated the municipal laws of Portugal by anchoring at a forbidden point within Portuguese waters, and being there found with a cargo of negroes, who had all the appearance of being slaves, and a portion of whom stated themselves to have been abducted from a dependency of Portugal; on the other hand, that the French captain and delegate had obtained from the Sheik of Matabane a permission to engage and export labourers of his tribe; and that in a document (which is published in the Daily News of the 12th instant), the contract declares itself 'to have been made and passed at the Court of the said Sheik.'"
  Now, if the Earl of Malmesbury had read the papers he would have seen that this idea of the Sheik was preposterous, and that there was no evidence for it. He would proceed to give a brief history of the Earl of Malmesbury's proceedings. On the 25th September the noble Lord promised his good offices, saying things were very serious; on the 6th October the noble Lord deprecated violence, and put forward the Protocol of the Paris Conference; and on the 9th he said Her Majesty's Government had no decisive information on the case of the ship. He maintained that the noble Lord ought to have done a great deal more; he ought to have made up his mind what course he would recommend to Portugal to adopt, and the British Government were bound to decide what course they would take themselves. If they decided that it was not a case respecting which Europe should be involved in war, they might have told Portugal that, for her own sake, it was not desirable to go to war with France and be overrun without the possibility of this country protecting her in time, but that, under the circumstances, they would give Portugal the moral support of their conviction that she was right; that they would solemnly assure France to that effect, not by loose conversation, but by a formal written document, bearing with it the whole weight of the Government, and would call on France to submit the

  1535
  whole question to a third party under the Protocol of the Congress of Paris. He thought the Government were bound to have done so much. He came now to what he considered the real gravamen of the case, to that which was alone fatal and condemnatory of the Minister, and which, if he had done nothing else, would entitle him to the heaviest censure of that House, but to which the hon. Gentleman opposite had never alluded even in the most distant manner. In Mr. Howard's letter of the 21st October, he said:—
  "In reply, I beg to repeat what I already had the honour of stating verbally to your Excellency Yesterday, that I am without instructions from my Government concerning the particular proposals in question."
  "Without instructions!" On the 30th September, as he (Mr. Lowe) had already observed, Earl Cowley stated Count Walewski's view of the case. The French Government said:—
  "Count Walewski considered that the ship had been illegally captured, and under that conviction had demanded its release, leaving the question of compensation for future settlement. This demand had been refused in a note not over courteous, and the question of future proceedings was now under the consideration of the Imperial Government; he (Couut Walewski) had insisted, with success, that the question should be referred to the 'Comité des Contentieux,' in his department, whose province it was to give an opinion upon transactions of this nature. The report would not be ready for a few days more, but in the meantime some ships had been despatched towards the Tagus, since, in case the report should be in favour of the release of the ship, a demand would be made for that release within the twenty-four hours, and would be enforced, if not complied with. On the other hand, if the report advised an appeal to the higher tribunals of Lisbon, the release of the captain on bail would be required."
  Then, he asked, what right had the Earl of Malmesbury to say that he had not been forewarned in the matter? The Earl of Malmesbury and the Cabinet had three weeks in which they might have maturely deliberated on the subject, and have decided whether they should advise Portugal that it was a case for war, and in which they would offer their assistance, or whether, deeming that it was not a case for war, they should have communicated that resolution to Portugal, and have said, "We advise you to protest against the violence which has been used towards you; admit your inability to cope with France, and let them do as they will." Either ease would have been defensible in that House. No doubt there would have been those who would have found fault
  1536
  whatever had been done; but in neither case should they have had to blush for their Government. He trusted that some one would get up on the other side who would not deal in minute points, but would stand forward and tell them on what principle they could justify the conduct of a Government which, seeing this matter growing day by day into one of great magnitude, stood aside, threw the responsibility upon subordinates, and had not the honesty or the courage to express an opinion of its own. For what purpose were Governments, if, when principles which regulated the law of nations were violated and trampled upon, they stood back and were speechless, and threw upon others the responsibility of duties which devolved upon themselves? He rested upon this point, and he hoped to be boldly and fairly met. He hoped to be told bow the Government could be justified which, with a perfect knowledge of the magnitude of this affair, had shrunk from its duty, and had endeavoured to throw the responsibility upon subordinates. He would not say one word of Mr. Howard, for that gentleman had been placed in a most unpleasant position. Certainly no Englishman could read the advice which Mr. Howard had given without experiencing a tingling sensation of shame; but no doubt he had properly interpreted the mind of his masters, and had tendered that advice which they themselves, had they been shut up like a jury in a box, without coal or candle, and compelled to give advice, would have offered. As he had protested against the inaction of the Earl of Malmesbury when action was required, so he must also protest against the spirit which suddenly came over that noble Lord on the 30th of October. When nothing was to be lost by being a little violent, the Earl of Malmesbury took upon himself to remonstrate in a most ferocious manner. Had he been "a man of war from his youth upward," he could not have been more violent; but, without dwelling upon that passage, he (Mr. Lowe) could not help referring, as others had done before him, to what he regarded as the bijou of the whole correspondence, and which must be sufficient to satisfy the House that if we had not in our Foreign Minister a great and accurate administrator, we had what the ancients would have called a great nomade philosopher? The noble Lord had declared it to be an immortal truth that time was as much a preventer as a healer of

  1537
  differences, and therefore he recommended recourse to arbitration. He (Mr. Lowe) had always thought that the use of arbitration was to make an end of differences; but the Earl of Malmesbury avowed that the object of arbitration was delay—that it was a contrivance for spinning out time. Delay an immortal truth! Certainly they had heard this maxim imputed to the practice of lawyers, but it remained to find it elevated by the eloquence of a Foreign Secretary into an immortal truth. One word more and he had done. The Earl of Malmesbury, writing to Lord Cowley, on the 11th of November, said,—
  "It is not desirable that you should at present revert to the conversation with Count Walewski as reported in your despatch above mentioned. I must, however, protest against the Count's statement that the cases of the Cagliari and the Charles et Georges are not similar. In my opinion they are strictly analogous."
  Protest to whom? The noble Lord first imposed the seal of secrecy upon the Ambassador, and then indulged in a protest which could have no earthly effect upon any one. Without pretending to lay down immortal truths, he (Mr. Lowe) ventured to say, although the Government had not secured for Portugal the opinion of any neutral Power, and although France had taken from her both her rights and her money also, yet that happily there was a tribunal of public opinion before which Portugal stood in a more distinguished, a nobler, and a firmer attitude than either the country that had deprived her of her rights by violence, or the Ministry that had lent themselves to her oppressoin.
  MR. BOVILLsaid, he desired to acknowledge the courteous and complimentary language of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and must congratulate the House that the administration of our foreign affairs had not been left to his tender care on this occasion. It was not often that they found a result so gratifying as that which had been produced—namely, the preservation of the whole of Europe from a general war. The right hon. Gentleman had charged the Earl of Malmesbury, in no measured terms, with ignorance of the department under his peculiar care, with want of attention and not perusing the despatches, and with want of capacity to grasp the questions submitted to his consideration. Before he made those charges the right hon. Gentleman ought to have made the inquiry of himself, whether he had read the papers so carefully as to en-
  1538
  title him to make those charges. When he heard the right hon. Gentleman declare that the vessel was condemned simply and solely on the ground of being a slaver, and that there was no question of any breach of the fiscal regulations, it struck him that the right hon. Gentleman could not have the Report of the Commission, for if he had done so he would have found it stated at page 11—
  "The Commission were of opinion that the French barque Charles et Georges had not only incurred the penalties of the fiscal laws of the port and of the custom-house, in having neglected the legal bar and entrance, and in seeking an anchorage in a prohibited port, when not forced to it by stress of weather, but also in having there bought and shipped negroes; and, moreover, from the circumstances set forth the said vessel and her crew were liable to the penalties enacted in the Decree of the 10th of December, 1836."
  In another page the statement was repeated. Was it possible, then, that the right hon. Gentleman could have read those papers?
  MR. LOWEsaid, that he had referred to the sentence, which stated that the captain was sentenced for the capturing of negroes, and the vessel was condemned to be broken up and sold on the ground of being a slaver.
  MR. BOVILLsaid, that did not preclude him from the observation he had made that the vessel had broken the fiscal regulations of the country. He had read the statement of the sentence itself, and in that there was a reference to the statement made in page 11. The character and known candour of the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, compelled him to infer that he could not have read these papers. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke of a want of capacity on the part of the Earl of Malmesbury to grasp the questions submitted to his consideration, and at the same time himself endeavoured most elaborately to prove a point in this discussion upon which the real question did not depend, and entirely ignored and omitted to notice one or two most important matters connected with it, he (Mr. Bovill) would leave it to the House to say whether that omission on the part of the right hon. Gentleman was owing to want of attention or to want of capacity to grapple with the question. When the right hon. Gentleman talked of the incompetency, the ignorance, and the inattention of the Earl of Malmesbury, and almost attacked that noble Lord's personal honour, he should be a little careful of the mode in which he himself dealt with

  1539
  the question. They had heard expressions from the right hon. Gentleman about the law of nations having been trampled upon. If that were the issue, and the question, before the House, they were at least entitled to know upon what ground those expressions were used. He would venture to show the right hon. Gentleman and the House that the law of nations, so far as could be ascertained from the facts disclosed in these papers, had not been trampled upon in this instance. The right hon. Gentleman's imputation also was that the Ministers of the Crown, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, had shrunk from the performance of their duty. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say, that at that moment either he or any Member of the House knew exactly what were the precise circumstances of this case? Was he or any one in that House or elsewhere entitled to tell the Ministers of the Crown that, with a full knowledge of the circumstances, they had shrunk from the performance of their duty, unless he could point out distinctly what were the facts upon which the Ministers were to act? He (Mr. Bovill) ventured to say that from the very outset of this case the difficult question arose whether the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of Portugal. Where was the evidence that this vessel was clearly and incontestably within gunshot, or three miles from the Portuguese territory? That was one vital point on which the question as to the infringement of the law of nations depended. If this vessel was not within three miles of the Portuguese territory, Portugal had no jurisdiction whatever. If that was the case, France was entitled to demand its restitution, and was not bound to submit to the decision of the Portuguese courts, either in the first instance or upon appeal. At the very outset, then, it became necessary to inquire what were the facts with reference to the position of this vessel. On looking at these papers it would be found that there was the greatest difficulty in coming to any conclusion on that point. For his part, he was convinced that that point was one upon which the greatest doubts were entertained, because Mr. Howard, in a despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, stated that in a conversation he had with M. de Lisle, the French Minister laid great stress on the violation of the French flag, because the vessel was not within gunshot of the coast, and he commented on the circumstances of M. de Loulé passing over that fact. That was
  1540
  the first question that ought to be decided. How did the hon. Gentleman meet that? He started with the assumption that the vessel was within the Portuguese jurisdiction, and argued that the Earl of Malmesbury, with full knowledge of that fact, shrunk from the performance of his duties as Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the despatch of the Governor General of Mozambique, it was stated that soon after sunrise the vessel Charles et Georges was seen, and the circumstances of the chase and capture are stated, but from this account it was impossible to say the vessel was within that distance from the Portuguese coast which would bring her legally under Portuguese jurisdiction. That matter being in doubt, how could the Earl of Malmesbury be said to have full knowledge? If not under Portuguese jurisdiction at the time of the capture, the Portuguese Government bad no right whatever to seize the ship, and France was as much entitled to demand that the vessel should be delivered up, as England was in making a similar demand with respect to the Cagliari. The right hon. Gentleman had also assumed that the vessel was commanded by a merchant captain, and that the French delegate on board was not representing the French Government. The papers showed the contrary. It plainly appeared from them that the vessel was commissioned by the French Government for the purpose of obtaining free emigrants, and that the French delegate was on board as an officer of the French Government. On that ground also, therefore, the Portuguese would have no jurisdiction. Every vessel, of course, was amenable to the law of nations; but unless directly within the jurisdiction of a foreign country, it could be made amenable to the law of nations only through the medium of diplomacy. The hon. Gentleman had treated the question as if the French had contended that the Charles et Georges was not a slaver, because there was a French delegate on board. But that was not the case. The fact was, that if a French delegate was on board the vessel, and in charge of the expedition, the vessel would be entirely taken out of Portuguese jurisdiction. In three different despatches Earl Cowley himself had expressed a doubt whether it would not have been more in accordance with the law of nations if the vessel had been allowed to go home and the dispute had been dealt with by the representatives of each country, and there was no doubt that was the manner in which the affair

  1541
  ought to have been treated. The right hon. Gentleman had also withheld from the House all mention of the view taken by the French Government, who had raised two distinct and important questions; first, with reference to the fact of the Sheik having himself been engaged in the slave trade, or having given facilities for the carrying on of that trade; and, secondly, as to the doubtful right of the Governor of Mozambique to undertake the decision of the question. He would ask whether the proceedings at Mozambique were of that character which entitled them to be considered as binding in accordance with international law? In the first place, one of the leading principles was that the decision must be by the ordinary tribunals of the country. But in this instance the tribunal was a mere Commission specially appointed to consider the circumstances connected with the seizure of this ship. Again, it was suggested in the papers that there ought to have been an appeal to the Prize Court of Loanda. If there was an original want of jurisdiction, the appeal to the Court at Lisbon, prosecuted by the master could not defeat any right that his owners or the French Government might possess. But the condition of the ship was decided simply by a Commission appointed to inquire into the matter. What respect would be paid by any foreign country to the simple decision of a body of Commissioners specially appointed for a particular occasion even by the Crown of England? Again, the Earl of Malmesbury had been most unwarrantably charged with having, he might say almost fraudulently, suggested that there was some irregularity, and with having asked the Portuguese Government to invent some irregularity, and make that a pretext to get out of the embarrassment. This charge was entirely unsupported by anything to be found in the papers. So far from there not having been any irregularity, the suggestion that there had been some irregularities occurred to the Portuguese representative himself, and was communicated by him to the British Government. Mr. Howard stated that the Marquis de Loulé admitted to him, that he thought, though the transaction was near akin to the slave trade, it could not be punished as such. Mr. Howard also "inferred from the Viscount de Sa's language that he doubted the legality of the condemnation, which it was thought would not be confirmed by the Superior Court." Was not that, then, sufficient to raise a doubt
  1542
  of the same nature in the minds of the Ministers of this country? But, again, Mr. Howard, in his despatch of the 10th September, recalled the attention of the Earl of Malmesbury to the existence of that doubt; for he said—
  "There is a weak point in the Portuguese case, which is, that it appears the judge at Mozambique ought to have referred the decision of the matter to the port of Loanda which is the competent tribunal for such matters, and not to have undertaken it himself:"
  And again, Earl Cowley wrote on the 30th of September—
  "It appears clear from Mr. Howard's despatches there is a doubt as to the legality of some of the proceedings after the calyure was made."
  And it was not until after the matter was brought to a conclusion that the letter arrived from Mr. Howard to Lord Malmesbury in which it appeared that there was some doubt as to whether the irregularity existed or not. It certainly was set right afterwards in the despatch of the 18th October, 1856, when it was said, "the only informality was that the witnesses, after making their depositions, were not called upon to confirm them in open court." Then, under these circumstances of doubt and difficulty as to the position of the vessel—of the French delegate—and as to the proceedings of the court of Mozambique and of the Sheik of Matabane could it be said with certainty that the Portuguese throughout the affair were quite right, and the English ministers quite wrong? It was of the essence of this question that the House should consider these various circumstances. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Earl of Malmesbury was incapable of grappling with these questions; but who was to grapple with them? If it turned out that there had been doubt upon every one of these particulars, why was it to have been assumed that Portugal was entirely in the right, and that we were bound by treaty or otherwise to enforce the rights which she supposed herself to possess? The gravamen, however, of the right hon. Gentleman's charge was, that Mr. Howard was left without instructions, and this was founded on Mr. Howard's communication to the Marquis de Loulé on the 21st of October, in which Mr. Howard said—
  "I beg to repeat what I already had the honour of stating verbally to your Excellency yesterday that I am without instructions from my Government concerning the particular proposals in question."
  But what were the proposals here referred to? They were quite new—they had only

  1543
  arrived by the last mail from Paris, and had been communicated to the Portuguese Government only the day before, and this appears on the despatch itself; was it therefore to be wondered at that Mr. Howard should have been left without instructions as to those particular demands. Had the right hon. Gentleman read that despatch he could scarcely have made such a charge. [Mr. LOWE: I read it.] Then there must be a great failure on the part either of himself or the right hon. Gentleman of ability to grasp the meaning of the despatch. The hon. Member (Mr. Kinglake) when he opened his case—he meant his notice of Motion—told the House that the general impression abroad was unfavourable to the honour of England, and it was natural to suppose that the only object of the Motion was to remove that unfavourable impression. But instead of that the whole scope and tendency of his speech was to increase throughout Europe that unfavourable impression, and he seemed to think it consistent with his patriotism to indulge the House, the country, and the world at large for two hours and a half with an attack on the honour of his country. [Cries of "No, no!" from the Opposition.] Then what did he mean by saying that the country had dishonoured itself? The concluding words of the hon. Gentleman's speech were, "this is a most momentous question affecting the honour of England." If that and every sentence of his speech did not mean condemnation of the Earl of Malmesbury, and that through the Earl of Malmesbury England bad dishonoured herself, it meant nothing. Then the hon. Member (Mr. Kinglake) introduced his Motion by saying there was no question pending upon the matter at present. If so, why did he rake up past differences which ought never to have been disturbed? The only effect of the discussion would be to create ill will between Portugal and this country, or Her Majesty's Government and on the other hand between France, England, and Portugal. Of course, in going through the various points upon which he (Mr. Bovill) had touched, he had necessarily alluded to arguments which France would adduce in her own favour, and which prevented England from taking a more active part in the affair; he guarded the House, however, against supposing that he supported the conduct of the French Government throughout. Everybody who read the papers would see that France would have done better for herself
  1544
  and for the interests of Europe and of civilization if she had at once consented to refer the question at issue to the mediation of another power, as England had previously done under similar circumstances, Nor would he have it for a moment supposed that he advocated the peculiar system of emigration which was involved in this case. He desired only to discuss those rights which existed according to international law. England was now solemnly charged with a direct breach of treaty entered into with Portugal, our faithful Ally; and the hon. Mover stood forward as the advocate of Portugal, or some one interested in her cause, and who must have supplied him with the confidential documents to which reference had been made. But it was an extraordinary thing that the Government was charged with a breach of treaty, which Portugal, the party to the treaty, had never complained of! According to the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman, we must intrude ourselves into the affairs of every foreign nation which happened to be our ally, whether we were asked or not. But were those principles to be advocated with regard to all the sovereigns of Europe? Were we, because Portugal was our ally, to throw ourselves into the gap and endeavour to effect a settlement of her grievances? If so, France was equally our ally, and we were equally bound to interfere on behalf of France. We had no right to interfere with one more than with another; and unless we were satisfied that right was clearly on one side, he submitted that we ought not to take part with either. But this charge of breach of treaty was not once made by Portugal, nor did it appear from the papers, that Portugal had ever appealed to treaties with England. The first reference to the interference of England was in a despatch from Mr. Howard on the 18th of September, detailing a conversation which he had with the Marquis de Loulé, in which he said:—
  "His Excellency did not make any application to me for your Lordship's valuable assistance, but I feel persuaded that he would be very grateful should your Lordship be able to afford the Portuguese Government any aid in the treatment of this question with the French Government."
  That despatch arrived on the 24th, and on the 25th a despatch was sent by the Earl of Malmesbury to Earl Cowley on the subject, and also to Mr. Howard, desiring him to inform the Portuguese Government that the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government would not be wanting for the

  1545
  purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement. In another despatch of the 28th of September, Mr. Howard said that the Portuguese Government would feel grateful to the Earl of Malmesbury if he would employ his good offices with the Portuguese Government, and which were freely and immediately given; in fact the only request for assistance ever made by the Portuguese Minister was for the good offices of our Government. How, therefore, any complaint could be made that we had not sent our Channel fleet at once into the Tagus he was at a loss to understand. The consequences of such an act must have been disastrous to Portugal. The interference would certainly have been regarded by France as a casus belli, and might have involved Europe in war. But it was not this case alone that was the cause of difference. There were insults to the Sisters of Charity. And when it was said that France was wrong to send vessels to the Tagus and menace a weak Power with great force, the French replied, "Why, Portugal by force keeps possession of our ship. Give up the ship, and then we will leave the question between us to mediation." There was at least some irritation which was natural on the part of France. Both nations held out for what they conceived to be their rights; but the facts were in dispute, and so they remained. Looking, then, to the uncertain state of the facts, to the doubts which surrounded many of the chief points of the case, it was a little too much to charge the Government with having wilfully shrunk from performing their duty. If they had acted on the rule laid down by the right hon. Gentleman, the consequence must have been a general war, but the policy which they had pursued had preserved the peace of Europe. On a calm review of the facts, the House, he was sure, would be of opinion with Earl Cowley that the case was one to be settled by diplomacy, and not by sending the Channel fleet into the Tagus.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I don't wish to take an exaggerated view of the question, but I must say that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bridgewater, (Mr. Kinglake) need not be afraid of the censure which the hon. and learned Member who has just sat down passed upon him. The hon. and learned Member says that for an hon. Member of this House to find fault with the official who is placed in the high position of Secretary of State is to
  1546
  sacrifice the honour of England, and to expose his country to be blamed throughout all Europe as a country which has lost its honour. I had always understood that the way in which the honour of England was to be preserved was that this House, if at any time it were a question whether a Minister had duly maintained that honour, should inquire, criticise, and, it may be, censure such a Minister. But the hon. and learned Member tells us that, departing from the practice of our ancestors, and our own practice too, whenever a Minister has laid down in a despatch what he thinks to be right, every hon. Member of this House is to concur in that sentiment simply because the Minister has said it. There is, no doubt, much to be said on behalf of the Government with regard to a great many points of the case. A Minister would have been quite wrong if he had advised the Portuguese Government to resist by force of arms the demands made upon them by France. The demand was a violent one, no doubt. But when the Government of France said a compliance with it was necessary for her honour, it would have been a risk to which this country ought not to have exposed Portugal, or Europe, or herself, to advise hostilities. I think, therefore, that the question is not one for censure, and my hon. Friend has not made it one of censure, but it is an occasion for comment and criticism on the mode in which the negotiations have been managed by the Secretary of State. Passing over all that occurred in March and May, I take the despatch of Mr. Howard on the lath of September, in which he says this case is assuming a very serious aspect. The Earl of Malmesbury desires him to tell the Portuguese Government that we will use our good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement of the difficulty; but what is the despatch which he writes the same day to Earl Cowley, the ambassador at Paris? Does he instruct Earl Cowley to tell the French Government that we were bound by treaties to offer our good offices; that he required to know what was the complaint of the French Government, and that we were bound to offer every mode of reparation if wrong had been done, and every explanation, if explanation were necessary, in order to prevent a rupture or serious difference between France and Portugal? Here is the despatch in which he gives his instructions to Earl Cowley:—
  "With reference to my despatch of the 23rd ult., I transmit to your Excellency herewith, for

  1547
  your information, copies of further despatches, as noted in the margin, which I have received from Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, respecting the question in dispute between the French and Portuguese Governments, arising out of the condemnation as a slaver, by the tribunal of Mozambique, of the French vessel Charles et Georges, from which your Excellency will perceive that this affair has assumed a very serious aspect."
  And there the despatch ends. There is no instruction whatever to offer our good offices or to impress on the French Government the seriousness of the case, and the intimate alliance between this country and Portugal. Indeed, my hon. Friend is quite justified in what he said with respect to the conversation between the Earl of Malmesbury and the Duke of Malakhoff at Windsor, when the Minister for France said he was not aware of the exact nature of the treaties between England and Portugal. I think that in the first instance Earl Cowley should have been instructed to call Count Walewski's attention to those treaties. No doubt Count Walewski was well acquainted with them. A man would be hardly fit to hold the high office of Minister for Foreign Affairs in France without being acquainted with all the treaties of Europe. He must have been acquainted with the important treaties between this country and Portugal, upon which so many wars had hung; and Earl Cowley should have been instructed to call Count Walewski's attention to the obligations imposed on England, and to impress earnestly the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government that Portugal should not be wronged, instead of which he simply sends Mr. Howard's despatches. I should say that nothing could be more cold, nothing more neglectful, than merely to send those despatches. With regard to the question itself, I will not pretend to deny the allegations of the hon. and learned Gentleman. It seems to me that the case was by no means a simple one—that it was a case in which a great deal of difficulty existed. I cannot admit that the first allegation of the French Government, that this vessel was four miles from the shore is at all supported, because I find in the diplomatic correspondence this statement by the captain himself. Captain Rouxel says:—
  "On the morning, of the 29th, the majority of my crew being sick, more especially the first and second mates, and the current running in shore, I dropped anchor in Conducia Bay to give the men rest and to secure professional assistance. I anchored at noon, and had no sooner come within range than a vessel of war fired a gun, and hoisted a flag. Whereupon I hoisted our flag. Before I
  1548
  had dropped anchor a boat was sent, and an officer came on board."
  He does not deny that he was in the Bay of Conducia. He does not pretend that he was out at sea. He was evidently near the shore, and his statement, so far as it goes, supports the statement of the Portuguese commander, that he was in fact within cannon-shot of the shore. But, more than this, the French Government abandoned that ground. Any Minister may receive at first an incorrect account of a transaction; but they did not pretend that they relied at all in their subsequent decision that the ship was out of the Portuguese jurisdiction. On the 2nd of October the French Government came to the determination to ask for an immediate surrender of the vessel, on the ground that a delegate of the French Government was on board the ship; and the Foreign Minister of France afterwards says that persons—not a single law officer, like the Queen's Advocate, but several persons learned in international law—decided, after three weeks deliberation, that the French Government had a right to require the surrender of the ship under those circumstances. I am not the person to treat with disrespect a statement officially made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. I think, on the contrary, that such a statement is entitled to respect. It may be a ground to treat the question diplomatically; it may be not. I own it is a question of considerable doubt. If a French man-of-war had gone to Mozambique, and the captain had taken slaves on board, undoubtedly the Governor of Mozambique would not have thought himself justified in interfering with that man-of-war. He would have sent home a despatch complaining of a French man-of-war carrying on the slave trade in a Portuguese port. If it had been a merchant ship simply, that was slave-trading, contrary to the laws of Portugal, and contrary to the repeated applications and desires of the British Government, no doubt he would have been justified in seizing that merchant ship so laden with slaves. But this is a case of a mixed character. The ship is itself a merchant ship, but there is an officer on board who is the delegate of the French Government. But the reason why they would not interfere with a man-of-war is that the captain of a man-of-war is answerable to his Government, and has complete control over the officers and crew of his ship. Therefore he is responsible to his Government alone, and they cannot

  1549
  bring him before the tribunals of a foreign nation on such a charge. But this delegate of the French Government seems to have had no such powers as a captain of a man-of-war would have. On the contrary, he seems to have stated that he disapproved the conduct of the captain, and that the captain had bought slaves from a Sheik dependent on the Government of Portugal. What is the result of this? Is it a reason that the French Government should use means of violence to obtain the surrender of that ship without further question? On the contrary, it seems to me exactly one of those cases referred to in the Protocol of Paris—one of those doubtful cases in which the honour of both nations was Concerned—the honour of the Portuguese Government in preventing slave trading in their ports and the honour of the French Government in not having their flag interfered with. It was the very case in which there should have been an arbitration. But it is also a case in which, I think, if the English Government had had proper influence with our Ally—if the Earl of Malmesbury had spoken fairly and firmly, and at the same time in conciliatory language instead of indulging in that sort of bombast about immortal truths, he would have been listened to by our Ally. I have always stated that, I believed the Emperor of the French to be a faithful Ally to this country, and I cannot but attribute to the manner in which the Earl of Malmesbury conducted this case that it was not finally referred to the arbitration of a friendly Power. And be it observed, that the mode in which Count Lavradio proposed that it should be settled, when he found that the French Government thought their honour concerned, was that the vessel should be given up, but that the whole case, the legality or illegality, should be referred to a friendly power. The proposal made by Count Lavradio was not likely to be wanting in good sense or good temper, or in due regard to the dignity of both nations, and that was the proposal which the Earl of Malmesbury ought to have supported with all the influence of this country. It was a fair and moderate proposal, and should have met with every support which this Government could have given it. Instead of which we find the Earl of Malmesbury, from the first cold despatch of the 25th September down to the very last, apparently almost indifferent, and above all suggesting both at Paris and Lisbon that the Portuguese Government must have been in the wrong;
  1550
  that there must have been some informality; that there must have been a Sheik on the coast whom the French captain thought independent, who was not independent, though neither the French Government nor the French captain knew he was not independent, but which neither Earl Cowley nor Mr. Howard would venture to assert. It all shows in the Earl of Malmesbury a wish to make out a case in favour of the strong power against the weak, and to suggest any pretence true or false for the Portuguese Government to give up their case and yield to the demands of France. I must say that the Portuguese Government had a much better sense of their own honour. The proposal which was laid before them by the French Minister at Lisbon was this—let the Charles et Georges be surrendered, and let the question of indemnity be afterwards referred to a mediating Power. What was that but asking the Portuguese Government to say, "we give up the question of right, but as to whether we shall pay £2,000, or £3,000, or £4,000 as indemnity we will refer the decision to the King of the Netherlands?" Why, it was incompatible with the honour of the Portuguese Government to accept such an appeal. Whether it was one sum or another was a matter of total indifference. That which was the concern of the Portuguese Government as a question of honour was the question whether they had been in the right or not. As to that question the French Government insisted upon a total surrender, and the English Government advised them to make that surrender. The Portuguese Government said, and I think very truly, "We cannot admit ourselves to be in the wrong; we will make no surrender of that which we conceive to be our honour; we will yield, but we will yield plainly and avowedly to force. We give up the ship, we will not make it a question of peace or war; we will not call upon our ally the Queen of England for assistance"—a forbearance for which I think we ought to honour them—"we will not ask for her interference, we will give way, but we will not give way in the manner which the English Minister and the English Government proposes. We will give way in the only manner in which we can do it with honour. We will give up the ship, and we will have no mediation as to the amount of the indemnity. We will make no terms; we will make it a plain yielding to force, a plain cession of the weaker to the stronger Power." That

  1551
  was the conduct of Portugal. I wish I could say that the conduct of England had been at all commensurate in dignity and character with that of this weak State. I confess, Sir, that I was somewhat shocked when I read the argument which was used by Mr. Howard at Lisbon. In his despatch of the 21st of October there is a great deal about informalities in the judicial proceedings, and the French having reason to suppose that the Arab Sheik of Matabane had an authorization to supply them with negroes. That is entire supposition—entire assumption. I really do not believe that the French captain had any such notion. He wished to pursue his trade, which was properly denounced by our Government as the slave trade under another name, and which the French Government itself has now abandoned—he wished to pursue that trade, and whether the Arab Sheik had or had not any such authorization was a matter of perfect indifference to him. But Mr. Howard goes on—
  "Moreover, that the question has now been placed on the ground of an international one, and that if His Most Faithful Majesty's Government reject the present proposals of the French Minister, more serious demands may be put forward, to which His Most Faithful Majesty's Government will no doubt eventually be obliged to yield."
  Now, I never heard of such degrading advice given to a foreign nation by a British Minister. This demand of giving up the ship could be complied with, and there would be no great loss to Portugal after the ship had been given up and the captain set free. England might very well consent or advise that that concession should be made, but "more serious demands may be put forward." Why, even supposing the French Government to have been entirely in the right, those serious demands would have been such an abuse of power that I should say that, so far from His Most Faithful Majesty being advised to yield, we should in such a case have been forced to interfere. It would have been according to our treaties, and according to our alliance. Supposing a demand had been made that the forts of Lisbon should be put into the possession of French troops; supposing that the independence of Portugal had been threatened, was the British Minister to say to Portugal, "You are to yield to everything that may be demanded. If you do not yield to this you will have further demands made upon you, and there is no demand which England will assist you in resisting; there shall be
  1552
  no demand to which you shall not be compelled to submit." Is this proper language for a British Minister to hold? I thought it would have called down the censure of the Earl of Malmesbury, and I looked to see what that noble Lord said about it, and I found these words:—"Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the judicious course which you have pursued." That was a judicious course. I cannot say that it is a judicious course to speak in such language as that to an Ally; and I think that the chief use of such discussions as this is to prevent a British Minister using such language again. I trust that in future more dignified advice will be given, and a more dignified line of conduct adopted. Perhaps, however, the worst fact which appears upon this correspondence is the indisposition which the French Government shows to adopt the spirit of the 23rd Protocol of Paris. It is, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France says, entirely a matter of will whether the course recommended in that Protocol should be adopted; but I must say that if in such a case as this, where the question itself was not of very great importance, where it was really a matter more of punctilio on both sides than anything else, the French Government, a powerful Government, refuses to submit the affair to arbitration, there is very little hope that that Protocol can hereafter be of any use. I had looked to that Protocol as a means, not of gaining time, as the Earl of Malmesbury represents it, but as a means of bringing to arbitration those questions, often trivial in themselves, in which the feelings of nations and of Governments get engaged, and which frequently, from slight causes, lead to the most aggravated and bloody wars. I had hoped that in such cases as those that Protocol would have been of use, because we cannot expect that in more serious cases it should be appealed to, or be of any advantage whatever. If one nation attacks another, if it be a question of conquest on one side and independence on the other, no one could suppose that a proposal to refer so serious a question to arbitration would be of any avail. It is in such cases as that now under discussion that the Protocol of Paris might really have been of use, and I cannot but be convinced from the perusal of these papers that if the Earl of Malmesbury, instead of discussing the question in the way he did, instead of always advising the Portuguese Government to yield upon some futile or false pretence, had seriously

  1553
  and honestly undertaken their cause at Paris with the French Government, if he had spoken friendly language, if he had pointed out to the Government of France how much their reputation in Europe must suffer by their using this violence against a small State,—if he had done all this, I cannot but believe that the French Government would have yielded to his remonstrances. I gather from all this correspondence, not certainly that the Government of this country were wrong in not making this a question of peace or war,—I think, on the contrary, that in that they were perfectly right—but I do gather from it that the Government of this country has not at Paris that influence which a faithful Ally ought to possess, and which the Government of so powerful a country as Great Britain ought to have with one who professes to wish for her welfare, and regard her friendship.
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: —Sir, a Motion for Papers, although not the most convenient one on which to impeach a Minister, has at all events some advantages for its supporters. It leaves them free to adopt each for himself any course which he may think fit, without any apprehension of coining into contest with his friends in the debate. And I think, Sir, that if ever that was exemplified it has been so in the discussion which we have heard to-night in support of this Motion. The hon. Member who moved the Resolution represents what I may call the warlike view of the question. He says that there was one occasion, and one only during the whole of these transactions on which the Government had taken any decided step, but that step they took in such a way as to make it altogether useless; because, although they asked the Admiralty to prepare a force to send to the Tagus, they took care to direct that it should be a small force; and, says the hon. Member, "It was quite right to send ships there, but you ought to have sent ships that would have answered the purpose." Answered what purpose? I think the House will spare me the trouble of answering that question. That is the view of the mover of the Resolution; but what did its Seconder, the hon. Member for Newport (Mr. Buxton) say in the speech to which we all listened with so much pleasure? He said,—"I do not think the Government should have used force. I think they would have been criminal if they had used force; but I advocate this Resolution because I think it is a good opportunity for expressing
  1554
  the regret of the House that the principle of mediation indicated in the Protocol of Paris was not attended to in this case." I shall have occasion, in a few moments, if the House will permit me, to consider in detail the reasons why that mediation was not resorted to, but, if he will allow me, I will now ask the hon. Gentleman this question—has he considered to whom principally in this case the impossibility of resorting to mediation was attributable? because, according to my judgment, the quarter from which the most serious objection to mediation came was Portugal itself. What did the Government of Portugal say? It said to both France and England, "We can do nothing in this matter; it is before our Court of Appeal, and we cannot stop the process of that Court. It is there and there only that it must be decided, and our constitution prevents our interfering." Of course, if that was so, mediation was out of the question; the Protocol of Paris could not be brought into action. Well, then, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) supports the Resolution upon another ground. He supports it as if it were a personal matter directed against the Earl of Malmesbury. He grants that Earl Cowley exerted himself, that every day he applied to the French Government, and urged such arguments as were proper to obtain the end in view; but the right hon. Gentleman contends that, as Earl Cowley did this, and not the Earl of Malmesbury, the Government ought to be blamed. He says that there ought to have been letters from the Earl of Malmesbury himself, and, as they cannot be found, he says, "Do, not listen to what Earl Cowley said." And the right hon. Gentleman allowed himself to be carried so far in his accusations against the Earl of Malmesbury that he finally adopted this view:—The Earl of Malmesbury had referred to the statement of Mr. M'Leod, who said that at the time he saw the ship she was in the bay of Conducia, that he did not suspect her to be French, or he would not have put the Mozambique Government in motion, and the right hon. Gentleman then added that Mr. M'Leod in so acting rightly interpreted the spirit of the Government that employed him. But did the right hon. Gentleman know when this occurred? It occurred in the month of November, 1857. Sir, I have heard observations made upon the spirit of the Government at that time, with regard to some of the States concerned in this discussion, but I am sur-

  1555
  prised to hear these reflections endorsed by the right hon. Gentleman, who was a Member of the Government at that time. Well, we have heard in the last place the observations of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) who says that this is not a case for censure, but for criticism. To some of the criticisms of the noble Lord I must give my adhesion. He says that the Government were placed in a situation of great difficulty, that it was not a case in which they could have gone to war, that it was matter of the greatest embarrassment to know how any definite step was to be taken. In those opinions I concur; but I cannot concur with the noble Lord in other points, where his criticisms are founded on assertions of facts different from those which really occurred. If the House will permit me, I will endeavour to ascertain the view which the country and those who come after us are likely to adopt. In the first place, let us see, in a few words, the bearing of the treaty between Portugal and England. I put all the treaties aside, except that of 1703, on which the rights of Portugal to demand the assistance of England depend. That was a tripartite treaty between England, Portugal, and Holland, and it says that if the Kings of France or Spain threatened war, or gave cause to suspect that they intended to make war upon Portugal, England and Holland were to use their good offices with the said kings to prevent war. Secondly, it provided that if those good offices proved ineffectual Holland and Great Britain were to assist Portugal in defending herself in that war. My first observation is that the mode of applying for assistance under treaties is perfectly well known. Portugal was not ignorant upon this point. In 1826, the Princess Regent of Portugal addressed a letter to the Sovereign of this country, reminding him of the existence of this treaty, informing him that armed bands were pouring into Portugal from Spain, and applying for assistance under the treaty. What did this country do? Mr. Canning came down to this House, laid upon the table a message from the Sovereign, and called the attention of the House to that message. No doubt, many hon. Members remember that speech of Mr. Canning, and what were his arguments? He said it was necessary to show that a casus fœoederis had arisen, and that he was prepared to prove it. He proceeded to point out the facts in detail, he showed that a case had
  1556
  arisen, that Portugal had appealed under the treaty, and then he asked the House of Commons to lend assistance to Portugal. But was anything of that kind done here? Was the treaty of 1703 mentioned from first to last? No one would pretend to say it was, and the Prime Minister of Portugal himself stated that he did not think a casus fœderis had arisen. I put aside any charge against the Government for having neglected the literal obligation of the treaty. I admit that the spirit of the treaty called upon this country to take an interest in everything that affected the welfare of Portugal, and if our good offices could be appealed to under the treaty we should be called upon to render them. The next point is as to the question of international law. If a casus fœderis is made out, are you, without inquiry into the merits of the cause, bound to interfere in the quarrel? I maintain that you are not. Even where a treaty confessedly applies you are bound to look and see if your Ally was in the right or the wrong. But what are the facts of this case? The noble Lord the Member for the City of London says that the matters in dispute between Portugal and France involved questions of very considerable doubt. At any rate these doubts were sufficient to make a Government pause in any step they might take. In the first place the proclamation of the Governor of Mozambique warned the cruisers upon the coast to be cautious, that certain vessels had French delegates on board, and were not to be confounded with slavers. That is a document to which the French Government might have appealed. In the next place there were doubts at first, though these were afterwards cleared up, as to the ship being within the limits of the Portuguese waters at the time of her seizure. Then there is a doubt whether the Arab Shiek referred to had authority, and exercised it duly, in permitting the embarcation of negroes on board the Charles et Georges. These doubts were sufficient to make the Government pause before they acted. I will not, however, rest upon them, I will go to the ultimate ground relied on by France, on which the French Government demurred to the jurisdiction of Portugal. This ship had on board a delegate commissioned by the French Government. I will not enter into an international argument on this subject, but I will only say that we are interested as much as France can be in preserving the international law

  1557
  on this subject intact. The case of France to-day may be our case to-morrow, and I should regret if the house of Commons should declare the French statement of international law to be incorrect, that the municipal law ought not to judge a delegate and a ship under these circumstances. What is the case of this delegate? Why was he on board the ship? Baron Paiva, the Portuguese Minister at Paris, in one line admits that the "French Government had had on board a delegate for the express purpose of guaranteeing that the vessel was not engaged in the Slave Trade." The delegate was the officer of the French Government. He was not on board casually as a passenger, but as the ostensible representative of the French Government, to see that the vessel did not infringe the law of Portugal with regard to the Slave Trade. The French Government admitted the acts of that delegate, and there is no proposition clearer in international law than that, in such a case, the matter is withdrawn from the cognizance of the municipal courts, and becomes the subject of diplomatic negotiation. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe), has referred to authorities in the United States. He will find these principles clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Invincible, and also affirmed by that eminent authority Mr. Justice Storey. The concurrent authority of that court and of that jurist establish the principle that where the Sovereign of a country has an agent and adopts the acts of that agent no municipal court has jurisdiction, and the matter in dispute becomes matter for diplomatic negotiation only. I will take the opinion of Earl Cowley himself, and we all recognize the great experience and sagacity of that noble Lord. He says again and again that he cannot absolve the Portuguese Government from blame, and that in his view the French Government having had a delegate on board, and having recognized the acts of that delegate, it was a matter that should be dealt with according to the country of nations, and ought not to be the subject of any prosecution before the Portuguese courts. The hon. Member for Bridgewater has asked how we could stop the proceedings in the Portuguese courts, and has said that no principle can be more sacred than this—that no executive Government can arrest the action of municipal courts. I quite agree with him as far as a suit between one person and ano-
  1558
  ther is concerned, but where is his authority for saying that when a State is itself the prosecutor, and its proceedings are contrary to the law of nations, there is anything inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution of any country in the world in requiring the State so situate to arrest the action of its courts, and submit the matter in dispute to diplomatic negotiation? What was done by ourselves in the case of the Caroline? During the disturbances in Canada a party of Loyalists heard that a steamboat called the Caroline was carrying provisions and arms from the American shore to the Canadian rebels. They formed themselves into a body, cut out the Caroline from the American shore, and allowed her to drift over the falls of the river. In that operation one American subject was killed. A few years afterwards—in 1840—a Mr. M'Leod happened to be in New York, and, though a British Canadian, he was arrested by the State officers upon the charge of the murder of the man so killed, and put upon his trial. Our Minister in America, Mr. Fox, without instructions in the first instance from his Government, protested against the arrest and trial of Mr. M'Leod, on the ground that the English Government recognized and were responsible for his acts. Mr. Forsyth, the American Minister, controverted that doctrine of international law, but the Government at home approved what Mr. Fox had done, acknowledged their responsibility for the acts of Mr. M'Leod, whom they represented to be their recognized agent, and for whose release they made a formal demand upon the American Government, thus clearly claiming to put a stop to the action of the American courts. How was that spirited remonstrance received on the other side of the Atlantic? Mr. Webster, who had succeeded Mr. Forsyth, and than whom a more eminent jurist never lived, fully admitted the principle laid down by the English Government, and, although there was some difficulty in applying it, owing to the peculiar constitution of the American Republic, which gave the Federal Union no power over the State of New York, yet Mr. Webster told the local Attorney General that he might proceed with the prosecution of Mr. M'Leod if he pleased, but that the case would be brought by appeal to the Supreme Court (where the doctrines of international law would come into operation), and that the Federal Union would then order the prisoner to be discharged.

  1559
  I have said so much because I am unwilling to let it be supposed that the Government acquiesce in the statements which have been made to-night with respect to the power of municipal courts as against the sovereign power of other countries. But I must remind the hon. Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) when he talks of Portugal being unable to stop the action of its courts, of a case which occurred only last year, and in which we ourselves were deeply interested—the case of the Cagliari. The argument of the King of Naples in that case was exactly that of the hon. Member. He said that the courts of Naples had got jurisdiction of the matter, and he could not arrest their proceedings, but our Government demurred to the jurisdiction of the Neapolitan courts, and demanded that justice should be done by the King himself, as the Sovereign of Naples, to the country which he had wronged. That is exactly the case of which we are now speaking, because if it be true, as the French Government allege, in accordance with the doctrines of international law, that for the acts of their delegate on board the Charles et Georges they were alone responsible, there was no jurisdiction on the part of the Portuguese municipal courts to carry on a prosecution against the ruling power of another State. But the right hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) has asked why the English Government did not form an opinion at the time upon the position of the French delegate and announce it to the parties concerned. I do not think it was at all necessary to do so. It would have been necessary if any of our own acts had been called in question, but in the case which actually occurred all we had to do was—without pronouncing a definite opinion where one was not required—to see that reasonable, earnest, and proper steps were taken for effecting an amicable arrangement between France and Portugal. And here I come to what I admit to be the main point of the case. Did the Earl of Malmesbury make fair and reasonable exertions for accommodating the matter in dispute between the two countries? The noble Lord the Member for the City is persuaded that if the Foreign Secretary had firmly, but with conciliatory language, exhorted the French Government to settle the question by mediation, he would have succeeded. Will the House permit me to ask its attention to a few dates? I put aside altogether everything that occurred
  1560
  before the end of September, because, although it is true that on the 6th of March the fact was communicated to us that in the opinion of the French Minister the affair of the Charles et Georges was assuming a grave aspect, yet a few days afterwards we were informed—what appeared to be quite inconsistent with the idea of there being a grave quarrel between the two countries—that the question had been brought by appeal before the courts of Lisbon, and that no objection had been taken by the French Minister, and it was not till the 28th of August that we heard of anything more having occurred between France and Portugal on the subject. Upon the 28th of August, Mr. Howard, for the first time, sent home a long account of the steps which had been taken with regard to the Charles et Georges up to that time; but in that despatch we are not told that the French Government objected or demurred to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts of Portugal. The first time we heard that was upon the 24th or 25th of September, when Lord Malmesbury received a letter from Mr. Howard dated the 18th, stating not that he was authorized to demand our good offices in pursuance of the treaty of 1703, but that he thought or conjectured the Marquis de Loulé would be glad if we offered our good offices towards procuring an amicable settlement with the French Government. Upon the 25th of September, the very day on which that letter was received, the Earl of Malmesbury replied to Mr. Howard, commissioning him to offer our good offices to Portugal if she should desire them. The noble Lord the Member for the City asks why we did not use our good offices at once, or do anything more than enclose the correspondence to Earl Cowley. My answer is twofold. In the first place, we only offered our good offices to Portugal if she should desire them; and, assuming that diplomatic matters are managed pretty much upon the same principle as the affairs of common life, I have yet to learn that it is customary for a man, when he is willing to mediate between two disputants, to go immediately to one of the parties without consulting the other as to whether his good offices are wanted. Portugal had not asked for our good offices, and we had no pretence, therefore, for commencing negotiations at Paris. But in the second place, we sent the correspondence to Earl Cowley that he might use it in whatever way his great experience and sagacity might suggest. Let the House re-

  1561
  member that we were not dealing with a child or a more clerk, who required to be told how to act under all conceivable circumstances, but with an able and experienced Minister, who would see from the correspondence how the matter stood, and who, if he could judiciously, would carry into effect that which the Earl of Malmesbury said he was willing should be done, though not as if it had been asked by the Portuguese Government. That was on the 26th of September, and on the 30th of September, which appears to be the day when Earl Cowley had his first interview with Count Walewski on this matter, Earl Cowley broached the subject, in pursuance of the Earl of Malmesbury's letter, asked what tidings he had from Portugal, and then pointed out those matters which he thought might smooth down any irritation in the mind of the French Government. The result was that, on the whole, Count Walewski's language was very conciliatory; and Earl Cowley felt certain that the Count regretted that the case had arisen, and would gladly see it settled. The conversation at that interview therefore led Earl Cowley and the Government to hope for a conciliatory solution of the matter. Again, on the 28th of September the Marquis de Louié, we are informed, asks the English Government to render their good offices. On the 3rd of October Earl Cowley armed with this authorization proposed arbitration, not mediation, under the Protocol of Paris, to Count Walewski. Did Count Walewski refuse? No, he said he would consider it; and on the 5th of October, the moment Earl Cowley got Count Walewski's answer, he telegraphed that arbitration was refused. The right hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had said that, strangely enough, as soon as arbitration was refused Earl Cowley proposed arbitration. The right hon. Member confounds "arbitration" with "mediation." The two things are perfectly distinct. In "arbitration" both parties are bound by the result, but in "mediation," which is what the Paris Protocol recommends, neither are. When arbitration was refused the Earl Cowley, therefore, proposed mediation by the Protocol of Paris. That was on the 6th of October, and on the same day he received a telegram stating that Portugal had adopted exactly the same course. Therefore, up to that time not a day was lost. On the next day but one, on October 8th, Earl Cowley says that he had had one interview with Count Walewski, and was to have another on the sub-
  1562
  ject of mediation; and that it was M. de Paiva's intention to address a further note to Count Walewski, offering to submit the question to the mediation of a friendly Power. On the 10th of October we have the ultimate result of the second proposition to Count Walewski to submit the question to mediation, which was a refusal. It has been said that this was the time for the English Government to have taken a decided step. But singularly enough, on the same day Count Lavradio comes upon the scene, and he and Earl Cowley commence a new negotiation. On the 13th of October, Earl Cowley writes that there was then every probability of the affair receiving a satisfactory solution. On the 14th of October the Portuguese Minister sets out for Lisbon to explain the proposal to his Government and ensure their consent. On the 16th of October a despatch is sent to Mr. Howard to apprize him of the terms agreed on in Paris. With respect to the despatch of the 15th of October, the hon. Member for Bridgewater said that such a solution of the difficulty was unworthy of a British Minister who was in possession of Earl Cowley's letter, detailing the new terms. But the explanation was very simple. Though the despatch went through the Foreign Office, yet it was written by the Earl of Malmesbury in Scotland before he had seen Earl Cowley's letter, but that letter of Lord Cowley was sent to Mr. Howard at the same time with the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch, so that Mr. Howard was in possession of the latest information. Some informality in the proceedings was all that was wanted by Portugal to afford her fair ground for an honourable exit out of the difficulty; and what the Earl of Mahnesbury did was to point out the means of getting out of it. On the 18th of October M. Lavradio, who is in London, comes to the Foreign Office, sees my hon. Friend (Mr. FitzGerald), and tells him the arrangement is satisfactory. On that day, the 18th of October, Mr. Howard writes to the Earl of Malmesbury, returning the thanks of the Portuguese Government for the offer of our good offices, and with that ends the whole of the information in this country as to what was being done in Portugal. We are then told the matter is arranged, and that the terms on which it is arranged that the Charles et Georges is to be given up are to be left to the mediation of a friendly power. From the 18th of October until the 25th we have no information on the subject. The right

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  hon. Gentleman asks, what did the Chancellor of the Exchequer mean by saying we had obtained favourable terms for Portugal. I say, we obtained through the intervention of Earl Cowley, assisting the Count Lavradio, those terms which were pronounced satisfactory at Paris, and which were obtained in that way. It is true these were not carried out, but that was not the fault of Her Majesty's Government. On the 25th of October we hear that the ship is released, and on the 27th of that month Mr. Howard writes us a narrative of the extraordinary circumstances that took place at Lisbon. It turned out that M. de Lisle had received a letter from Count Walewski authorizing him to make terms with the Portuguese Government with regard to the giving up of the Charles et Georges. That letter went on to say there was to be a mediation, but a mediation only as to indemnity, and that the French Government would admit of no mediation on the question of principle. "We decline that mediation," said Portugal, "if it is only to be on the question of indemnity, because that will involve the admission that we were in the wrong." If it had rested there the Portuguese Government were right; but the noble Lord has overlooked a state of things related by Mr. Howard in his letter of the 27th of October. Mr. Howard says, although the Marquis de Lisle began by saying on the 23rd he was bound by a letter of Count Walewski, which limited the proposal of mediation to the question of the amount of indemnity for the interested parties, yet on the 24th, after reconsidering the question he proposed new terms. Those new terms are, to my mind, very different from a mere mediation as to indemnity. Up to this time the French Minister at Lisbon had confined himself to the matter of mediation as to indemnity; but at last he enlarges his proposal, and seeks to carry the mediation to the question of the legality of the embarkation of the negroes. I think that, at all events, was a very substantial alteration in the proposal. But when the Marquis de Lisle was willing to go so far, what should have been the course of the Portuguese Government? They ought to have said, "We will take what you now give, though we object to some of the details; but, as you go so far, the rest is a matter that may be arranged." The course, however, taken by the Portuguese Government was entirely wrong. Mr. Howard says:—
  "The Marquis de Lisle saw the Marquis de
  1564
  Loulé shortly after his reception of this note, and expressed his regret at the non-acceptation by Portugal of the proposed partial mediation. He produced, at the same time, the sketch of an arrangement, in three articles, herewith enclosed, containing a wording on that subject slightly varying from the letter of Count Walewski's despatch of the 13th inst., and to which as a proof of his anxiety to contribute to a conciliatory settlement, he said he would take it upon himself to agree. The Marquis de Loulé replied, that the Portuguese Government had already taken their decision in this matter, and also declined M. de Lisle's offer to present him with the ultimatum of the French Government."
  I hope the hon. Member for Newport (Mr. Buxton) who attaches so much importance to the Paris Protocol, will consider this. Does he concur in the course taken at Lisbon by the Portuguese Government? I have heard a great deal about the spirited appeal which the Portuguese Government made to public opinion upon the subject; but I have not heard why they refused this altered proposal for mediation, or, at all events, why they did not give some reason for declining it. I regret to find that according to my view of the transaction what took place is not by any means accurately stated. This is what they said:—
  "With regard to the mediation suggested by the Imperial Government for fixing the sum to be demanded as compensation, the Government considered that, as mediation was not accepted by the French Government with reference to the question of right, the only one which affected the honour and dignity of this country, the Portuguese Government ought not to accept it upon a pecuniary question, leaving it to France to proceed on this point as she might think fit.
  I say that is not an accurate statement of what took place. It was unfair to keep the Portuguese people in ignorance of the second offer that had been made to the Government of Portugal; and although I am not here to urge that the course taken by the French Government was right, we should award blame where blame is due, and I cannot help censuring the Portuguese authorities for putting aside the greatly modified proposal which was made to them by the Marquis de Lisle. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) has also criticised the letter of Mr. Howard of the 21st October to the Marquis de Loulé in which that Gentleman said, "I am without instructions from my Government concerning the particular proposals in question." The right hon. Gentleman said that alone was sufficient to condemn the Government. But it turns out these were not the proposals agreed to at Paris but the altered proposals; and if the right hon. Gentleman refers to another page of

  1565
  the papers he will find that there was sent to Mr. Howard the whole narrative of what took place at Paris, so that he was not without instructions as to the propositions to which he might safely have assented. I say he had instructions because there was sent Earl Cowley's despatch, which stated how the whole matter had been agreed to in Paris by the Portuguese representatives. I have gone through these points, because of the noble Lord's criticisms; and now I have to state the conclusions at which I have arrived, and at which I think the House will also arrive. I agree, in the first place in all that has been said as to the objectionable nature of the traffic which was the foundation of these transactions. I must add, however, that the objection seems to me to come with rather a bad grace from Portugal when we remember that these papers show that the main ground of the Portuguese complaint is that slaves—branded slaves belonging to Portuguese subjects—were stolen away from their owners or were sold by them to be sent to a colony where, in theory at least, they would be free men. I agree that the French Government may perhaps regret the too summary manner in which they acted, and I regret, too, that the Portuguese Government did not agree to a mediation according to the Protocol of Paris. I maintain, however, that, as a matter of international law, the French Government were right when they insisted that the presence and recognition of a French delegate withdrew the vessel from the jurisdiction of the Portuguese Courts. I maintain that Portugal never applied to us and never could have applied to us under the treaty of 1703. I maintain that we had secured for Portugal in Paris favourable terms, by which this dispute might have been settled; and, moreover, that Portugal refused at Lisbon terms which in substance were little short of what her representative had agreed to in Paris. I maintain that even if Portugal had objected to assent to these modified terms, yet still she was bound to have stated her reasons, and not to have closed the door to further negotiation. Sir, I maintain further that Her Majesty's Government throughout these discussions, availing themselves of the valuable services of Earl Cowley in Paris, did consistently from day to day exhibit their good offices in favour of Potugal. I think that these results are the same as those at which the House will arrive; and I must add that they appear to me to be in substance the results which
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  must have been arrived at by the hon. Member for Bridgewater, who, on an imputation against Her Majesty's Ministers of non-adherence to national faith, contents himself by placing in your hands a Motion for papers.
  SIR RICHARD BETHELLsaid, he would move the adjournment of the debate.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that he thought it was desirable that the debate should be adjourned as hon. Members who were anxious to address the House upon the subject were not very likely at that hour to receive a very patient hearing.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he thought they ought to understand what was the question before the House. He believed his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had stated that he was prepared to give any papers upon that subject which had an actual existence. But of course, if hon. Gentlemen opposite wished to continue the conversation, it was not for them to throw any impediment in their way. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bridgewater would probably in that case be able to find some day for going on with his Motion.
  MR. KINGLAKEsaid, that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had refused to produce a portion of the correspondence.
  Debate adjourned till Thursday.

POOR RELIEF (IRELAND) ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

  LEAVE. FIRST READING.
  Order for Committee read.
  House in Committee.
  MR. GREGORYasked for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act in relation to the religion in which deserted children should be registered and educated.
  LORD NAASsaid, he would not object to the introduction of the measure.
  MR. VANCEsaid, he must express his regret that the Government should have consented to the introduction of such a Bill. He took it for granted that its object must be to alter the existing law under which deserted children were brought up in the religion of the State.
  "Resolved—That the Chairman be directed to move the House. That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Acts for the Relief of the

  1567
  Destitute Poor in Ireland, by removing doubts as to the Religious Registration in Workhouses of Deserted Children, and providing for the Out-door Maintenance of Orphan and Deserted Children."
  House resumed.
  Resolution reported.
  Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. FITZROY, Mr. GREGORY, and Lord JOHN BROWNE.
  Bill presented, and read 1o.
  House adjourned at One o'clock.

MINUTES
. Sat First in Parliament.—The Lord Saltersford, after the death of his Father.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Manor Courts, &c. (Ireland).
2a Trading Companies Winding-up.
3a Ecton and Welton Exchange; Burial Places.

"CHARLES ET GEORGES."

  PAPERS MOVED FOR.
  LORD WODEHOUSEin rising to move, according to notice, that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for a Copy of the telegraphic Despatch of the 16th of October, 1858, referred to in Mr. Howard's Despatch of the 27th of October to the Earl of Malmesbury, as printed in the Correspondence respecting the Charles et Georges, said that he should take the opportunity of calling attention to the transactions detailed in that Correspondence. The case therein displayed appeared to him so important, and the course which Her Majesty's Government had pursued was so unsatisfactory, that it ought not to pass without mention in their Lordships' House. He wished that it had fallen into more competent hands than his, and he assured their Lordships that it was with diffidence that he ventured to bring it under their notice. He wished in the first place to invite the notice of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to an omission which made the examination of this Correspondence extremely perplexing—the omission of the dates at which the despatches from abroad were received. In all similar Correspondence presented to Parliament, those dates had invariably been given, and he could not understand why the slovenly practice of omitting them should have crept in upon this occasion. Now, he might be asked, in limine, why the British Government should be called on to interfere in a dispute between two independent States? The answer was simple enough. We were bound by certain ancient treaties, which were confirmed
  1416
  in an unreserved and complete manner by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. He did not mean, nor had it been asserted, that a casus fœderis had actually arisen in this case; but looking especially at the relations between us and Portugal since the treaty of 1703, and considering that our "good offices" were tendered on this occasion before they were asked, and that they were afterwards formally asked for by Portugal, he thought the House would agree that our good offices should have been given in such a manner as to secure to Portugal an efficient support. He should be able to show that, on the contrary, our good offices were not tendered in such a manner as to render Portugal that support which she had a right to expect. There was, indeed, a further and very powerful reason for our interfering in this case on behalf of Portugal; and it was this—that we ourselves had repeatedly urged on Portugal in the strongest manner, that a policy should be vigorously carried out which involved Portugal in antagonism with France. Now, although in order to make this case intelligible he must necessarily refer to the course taken by the French Government, and he must refer to it in terms of condemnation, he was sure their Lordships would agree with him that they were not called upon there to discuss the conduct of two independent States between each other, except so far as the interests of this country were directly concerned, and so far as Her Majesty's Government were mixed up in these transactions. In the first place, then, he begged to call attention to some correspondence which took place anterior to the case of the Charles et Georges. The French Government had introduced a scheme for procuring negro labourers for their colonies, which they asserted was a scheme of free emigration; but which we maintained, notwithstanding their intentions, and notwithstanding all the precautions that might be taken, must eventually degenerate into a disguised slave trade. A portion of the scheme was to procure a supply of negro labourers for the French colony of La Réunion. Those labourers were to be procured from the Portuguese possessions on the eastern coast of Africa. His noble Friend the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon) did not omit any opportunity of pressing on the Portuguese Government in the strongest manner to take the most vigorous measures for the frustration of the French scheme. So far back as July 13, 1857, his noble

  1417
  friend addressed instructions to Mr. Howard, Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, directing him to urge the Portuguese Government to take more vigorous measures. Acting in the absence of Mr. Howard, the Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon, Mr. Paget, presented on the 22nd of July a note to the Portuguese Government, which M. de Loulé, the Portuguese minister, answered in so satisfactory manner that his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) directed Mr. Howard to express the sense which Her Majesty's Government entertained of what he justly termed the vigorous and humane intentions of the Portuguese Government. This being the case, the Portuguese Government, naturally confiding in the support they would receive from Her Majesty's Government, in thee vent of any difficulty arising, proceeded to take the vigorous measures that we had recommended. They displaced the Governor, who, they thought, was disposed to treat the slave trade with too little rigour, and they sent out another Governor, furnished with instructions which, though cautiously worded, left no doubt as to the intentions of the Portuguese Government. Acting on these instructions, the new Governor detained two French vessels, which however, not being found under circumstances of flagrant suspicion, were subsequently released. Then came the case of the Charles et Georges. It was not a little remarkable that information was given by an agent of the British Government of the presence of that French vessel. A despatch, written on the 8th of October, 1858, by Mr. M'Leod, the British Consul at Mozambique, informed the Portuguese authorities there that the Charles et Georges would anchor in Conducia Bay, and that it was suspected that she was shipping slaves. He did not know, by the way, why the reports of Mr. M'Leod were not given in this Correspondence, but if they were of importance, he supposed the Secretary of State would have no objection to their production. Thereupon, however, the Portuguese Governor, furnished with the instructions of his own Government, and urged on by the British Government, proceeded to send a Portuguese ship of war in search of the Charles et Georges. He need not describe the circumstances of the capture of that vessel. He need only say that she was taken to Mozambique, examined, and condemned as a slaver by the Commission appointed for the purpose—no, not by the Commission, but by the Portuguese Court—and her cap-
  1418
  tain was condemned to two years' imprisonment. The grounds upon which that condemnation was made were simple, and, as he should have thought, they were abundantly strong. It was, in the first place, proved by the Portuguese authorities that the ship was in Portuguese waters when captured, that she was within cannon-shot of the shore, and subject consequently to Portuguese municipal jurisdiction. Then there was the fact that she had 110 negroes on board, who, on being interrogated, declared that they were not there by their own will, and some of them were mentioned as having been kidnapped and sold by the native chiefs. No papers were produced by the captain to justify his proceedings, and the ship was condemned. The French captain of the vessel appealed, however, to the Supreme Court at Lisbon; to Lisbon the ship was sent, and the matter became the subject of discussions between the French and Portuguese Governments. In the first place, there was a note presented by the Marquess de Lisle, the French Minister at Lisbon, in which the restitution of the vessel and the release of the captain were demanded. And upon what grounds did he base this demand? The principal grounds were, that no notice had been received in the Island of Réunion of the prohibition to export labourers front the Portuguese possessions at Mozambique; and that the captain was provided with papers justifying his proceedings, which he had received from an Arab sheik whom he believed to be a Portuguese authority. With regard to the first ground, nothing more need now be said, because the French Minister subsequently admitted that it must be entirely abandoned; and as for the second ground, no such papers were produced before the Commission at Mozambique, and Mr. Howard mentioned, in one of his reports, that, it was confidently believed by the Portuguese authorities that those papers were neither more nor less than a forgery. Soon afterwards, however, M. Benedetti, in the absence of Count Walewski, made the statement to Lord Cowley, that the Charles et Georges was not within the Portuguese territory when captured, but about four miles from the shore, and not subject to Portuguese jurisdiction. But all this while nothing was said of the true ground on which the French subsequently based their claim. It appeared, however, from a despatch of Mr. Howard's soon afterwards, that M. de Lisle laid it down that because there was a dele-

  1419
  gate of the French Government on board the vessel, the French Government could not admit the possibility of her being engaged in the slave trade, for which she had been condemned. That was the only and sole ground on which, the French Government rested their claim—that the presence of a French delegate exempted the ship from Portuguese jurisdiction. But the exemption of a ship of one country from the municipal law of another, could by the law of nations be urged upon only one ground. Wheaton, who was a first-rate authority, stated the only ground of an exemption as follows:—
  "If there be no express prohibition, the ports of a friendly State are open to the public armed and commissioned ships belonging to another nation with which that State shall be at peace, and such ships are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local tribunals."
  Now, it could scarcely be maintained that the mere presence of a French delegate on board, whose duty simply was to superintend the emigration of free negroes, but who was not a commissioned officer commanding the ship, could put the ship in such a peculiar position that she should be thereby relieved from municipal jurisdiction. But the real ground was that, as the French Government contended, it was impossible, with a French delegate on board, there could be an imputation of slave trading. Now, that was an argument altogether unprecedented in the law of nations. The fact was, that the slaves were found on board by the Portuguese cruiser, and it was known from their own statement that they were slaves; it was even admitted by M. de Lisle that some of them came on board with their arms tied behind them. Well, even at this period of this affair the Portuguese Government stated their intention to propose to refer the question in dispute to the mediation of a friendly Power. Mr. Howard, in a despatch dated Lisbon, September 18, said:—
  "In the event which appears most probable of the French Government insisting upon their demands, the Portuguese Government having assented to the principle laid down in the Protocol of the Paris Conferences of the 14th April, 1858, will, as the Marquis de Loulé has confidentially informed me, propose to refer the question in dispute to the mediation of a friendly Power, a course of which I ventured to express a favourable opinion."
  It would thus be seen that the Government had early information of the ground on which the French Government based their claims. Now, let their Lordships see what course the Government had taken.
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  In a despatch to Mr. Howard, dated September 25th, the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) said:—
  "I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in this matter, and that they have learnt with satisfaction that the Portuguese Government propose to refer the question to the mediation of a friendly Power. I have transmitted to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris copies of your despatches above referred to, and I have to instruct you to assure the Portuguese Government that the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government will not be wanting for the purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement of the difference between the French and Portuguese Governments upon this subject."
  The Portuguese Government was naturally satisfied with the prospect of obtaining the good offices of Her Majesty's Government; but how was this engagement carried out? A despatch was written by the noble Earl opposite on the same day to Her Majesty's Minister at Paris. One would have thought it would have contained instructions to use our good offices with the French Court, and to endeavour to bring about a friendly settlement; but all the noble Earl did was, to transmit to Lord Cowley copies of Mr. Howard's despatches, and add—
  "From which your Excellency will perceive that this affair has assumed a very serious aspect."
  Why, Lord Cowley might have discovered that by himself, without the despatch of the noble Earl; and it was very strange Her Majesty's Government did not see the necessity of proceeding somewhat further. Lord Cowley next reported, in a despatch dated September 30, a conversation with Count Walewski:—
  "He then went into a history of the case of the Charles et Georges. 'The French Government,' he said, 'considered that the ship had been illegally captured, and under that conviction had demanded its release, leaving the question of compensation for future settlement.' This demand had been refused in a note not over courteous, and the question of future proceedings was now under the consideration of the Imperial Government; he (Count Walewski) had insisted, with success, that the question should be referred to the Comité des Contentieux, in his Department, whose province it was to give an opinion upon transactions of this nature. The Report would not be ready for a few days more, but in the meantime some ships had been despatched towards the Tagus, since, in case the report should be in favour of the release of the ship, a demand would be made for that release within the twenty-four hours, and would be enforced if not complied with. On the other hand if the report advised an appeal to the higher tribunals of Lisbon, the release of the captain on bail would be required."

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  On the 2nd of October Lord Cowley sent a telegraphic despatch to the noble Earl, to announce that the French Government had come to the determination to demand the release of the Charles et Georges, on the ground that she had been condemned as a slaver when there was a delegate of the French Government on board. What did the noble Earl (the Foreign Secretary) do at this critical period? He did absolutely nothing. At this moment the case admitted of a friendly and peaceful settlement, but the noble Earl did not send a single instruction to our Ambassador at Paris as to the course he was to pursue. Looking at the high value the Emperor of the French had always said he placed on au alliance with this country, at the interest which the people of this country took in the question of the slave trade, at the peculiar position of this country with regard to Portugal, and at the fact that the Emperor of the French, after this affair was over, had now, in a manner which did him great honour, spontaneous given up the whole of this immigration scheme, could it be doubted that if the noble Earl had instructed Lord Cowley to bring the whole question seriously under the notice of the French Government, time would have been obtained for reflection, and the whole might have been settled in a friendly and peaceable manner. The next step in the affair was, however, that Mr. Howard reported that the Portuguese Government had resolved to propose a mediation. He informed the noble Earl by telegraph on the 5th of October that the Portuguese Government had directed their Minister at Paris to propose to the French Government to submit the difference to the mediation of a friendly Power, the choice to be left to France. Upon this, the noble Earl sent an instruction to our Ambassador at Paris in which he said that, "any hostile proceeding by France against Portugal should be strongly deprecated by your Excellency, and you should put forward the Paris Protocol at a suitable time." But not a word was said as to Portugal being in the right, and no opinion was expressed in her favour. He only deprecated hostilities and in a vague manner referred to the Paris Protocol. Their Lordships knew that in these diplomatic transactions very much depended on the form in which communications were made from one Government to another. There were various forms which might be adopted. A despatch might be sent to our Minister at a foreign Court, directing him to read that despatch
  1422
  to the Government to which he was accredited, or if it were a more serious case, to leave a copy of that despatch. Nothing of the kind was done here. Lord Cowley was practically left in the position of an Ambassador without any definite instructions, and he must have found his hands exceedingly weakened. He did nevertheless all he could do by himself; but after all, an Ambassador, even one holding so high a position, was but an agent—he must have instructions from Ids chief, or he could not have his full weight with the Government to which he was accredited. The noble Earl, however, did take another step, and in order to show that he had acted with energy, he sent two British ships to the Tagus. But what that was done for, he (Lord Wodehouse) really could not imagine. It could not be said that it was done for the protection of British subjects, since none were in danger; and as for watching the French squadron, there could be no use in that, when no instructions were given to interfere with its proceedings. He did think Her Majesty's Government might well have spared the officers of those British ships the mortification of looking on, and witnessing what he must call the humiliation of our Ally. The Portuguese Minister at Paris (M. de Paiva) proceeded meanwhile to propose arbitration to the French Government; he did this in a document which was calm, temperate, and unanswerable. It might have been thought that Her Majesty's Government, having been apprised of the intention to refer the matter to arbitration, and having promised their good offices, would have instructed our Minister at Paris to support that proposition. But we might judge what support was given by referring to the noble Earl's despatch to Mr. Howard dated October 9th, in which the noble Earl said, "The good offices of Her Majesty's Government will gladly be given to prevent a collision between France and Portugal, but they have no decisive information on the case of the ship." He would ask whether no decisive information was contained in the despatches which Her Majesty's Government had received from Mr. Howard, dated the 26th of August, the 6th, the 8th, and the 28th of September? The noble Earl went on to say that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, "the Portuguese Government had better drop the prosecution, if there were informalities during or after the seizure." So, the good offices of the

  1423
  noble Earl came to this—that he recommended the Portuguese Government to abandon the whole of the case. Why could it be supposed that this was not known at Paris—that the French Government was not aware that we were, instead of supporting Portugal practically pressing her to yield? Of course it was known, and the French claim was pressed without intermission. The Portuguese Minister at Paris, assisted by M. Lavradio, the Portuguese Minister at our own Court, who went to Paris, then effected an arrangement, or thought they had done so, which would have been satisfactory—it was, that the ship should be given up, and that the whole case of the legality of the capture, and the question of indemnity should be referred to the mediation of a friendly Power. That would have been a fair and honourable arrangement. What was the course pursued by the noble Earl? After having pondered upon the matter, he evidently thought that he had hit on an admirable expedient, which he (Lord Wodehouse) would state in the noble Earl's own words. In a despatch of the 15th Oct. to Mr. Howard, after saying—
  "That the French captain and delegate had obtained from the Sheik of Matabane a permission to engage and export labourers of his tribe; and that in a document (which is published in the Daily News of the 12th instant) the contract declared itself 'to have been made and passed at the Court of the said Sheik.'"
  The noble Earl goes on to say—
  "The document runs thus:—'It is agreed and understood that you hire yourself for five years to go to the isle of Bourbon, in the ship, Captain You are hired at the rate of two piastres per month during the whole period of your engagement. As soon as the engagement shall be terminated, you will be free, either to remain in Bourbon, or to return to your country. The present contract is made and passed at the court of the Sheik of the Matabane tribe, in the presence of the Sheik Ali, of the agents Ali Mouro, Sidi Sidi, the interpreter of the ship, and the captain, and signed by witnesses in the presence of the above hired labourers, after having been read by the interpreter.' You are aware that Her Majesty's Government have never altered their opinion as to the analogous nature of the French scheme for exporting negroes with that of avowed slave trade. It is not, however, with a view to support that opinion, fortified by the present case, that I address you, but in the hope that a suggestion may be accepted which may solve this question of national honour. If the above statement is correct, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that Portugal, without any sacrifice of her dignity and rights, may admit that the French delegate and captain, when negotiating with the Sheik of Matabane, believed him to be an independent chief, and were ignorant of his being and pendent subject of the Portuguese Government; for their contract
  1424
  speaks of him as of an independent ruler, having a court of his own. Should the Portuguese Government see the transaction in this light, it appears to Her Majesty's Government to be consistent with a wise indulgence to drop the prosecution of a case, which originated in an error, and which might, if imprudently urged against France, be the cause of the gravest complications."
  To show how this suggestion was treated, he need only read the answer returned by our Ambassador. He said:—
  "Count Walewski has never attempted, in his conversation with me on this matter, to call in doubt the sovereignty of Portugal over the district of Matabane. I am afraid, therefore, that the mode of settling this misunderstanding between the French and Portuguese Governments, suggested by your Lordship, will not apply to the case. But I feel confident that if M. de Lisle will act up to the conciliatory instructions which were transmitted to him on the 12th instant, means will be found at Lisbon of settling the dispute."
  The only suggestion made by the noble Earl was that the Portuguese Government should submit, and by what he (Lord Wodehouse) must be permitted to call a miserable subterfuge creep by a back-door out of the matter, instead of settling it in a manner consistent with their honour and dignity. While the noble Earl was wasting time in useless suggestions, the matter was settled at Lisbon. M. de Lisle made a peremptory demand for the restoration of the ship, and the only point which he consented to have referred to arbitration was the amount of the indemnity, adding that if his demand was not complied with he should quit Lisbon with his suite, and leave the matter in the hands of the French Admiral. The Portuguese Government under these circumstances naturally had recourse to the Minister of their faithful Ally for counsel and support. Would their Lordships believe that Her Majesty's Minister was altogether without instruction. The noble Earl might say that he had not time to give instructions. Now it happened that the answer to that assertion was extremely easy. Their Lordships would find that Mr. Howard, in a despatch of the 27th October, said:—
  "The Marquis de Loulé communicated to the Marquis de Lisle, on the 22nd instant, the foregoing statement of Count Lavradio, concerning the assent of Count Walewski to his proposal that, after the release of the vessel and captain, the whole question should be submitted to arbitration, with a view to ascertain whether the Marquis de Lisle was disposed to agree to such an arrangement. But the French Minister replied that, notwithstanding his great wish to do what was in his power to facilitate a conciliatory settlement, he was precluded by the terms of his instructions, as contained in Coast Walewski's despatch of the 13th

  1425
  instant, which limited the proposal of mediation to the question of the amount of the indemnity for the interested parties, from admitting it for the whole question. As Earl Cowley had in his despatch of the 13th instant, a copy of which was enclosed to me in your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant (received on the 22nd), reported Count Lavradio's proposal, as learnt from him, as extending the mediation to the legality of the seizure of the vessel.…I called upon the Marquis de Lisle and urged him to agree to extend the mediation to the whole question."
  On turning to the noble Earl's despatch of the 16th, what did he find? A mere transmitting despatches without one word of comment or instruction. Of course, our Minister, being without instructions, or rather worse than without instructions, for he had been told to answer that the prosecution should be dropped, could only come to the conclusion that the course pursued by the Portuguese Government was not approved by Her Majesty's Government. He was wrong; the noble Earl did send some instructions on the day in question; he sent a telegraphic despatch on the 16th, for the production of which he (Lord Wodehouse) was now moving. There could be no doubt, however, of the tenor of that despatch, for Mr. Howard, in his letter of the 21st of October, said:—
  "I likewise referred your Excellency to a further message of the 16th instant, from the Earl of Malmesbury, repeating Ids former advice to drop the prosecution."
  Drop the prosecution!—that was the only instruction sent by the noble Earl. For God's sake give up the vessel which had been seized by the French, and let there be no more trouble about the matter. Our Minister at Lisbon, who it appeared to him had acted throughout the matter with ability and judgment, had no alternative, under these circumstances, but to write a letter to M. do Loulé, which few persons, he (Lord Wodehouse) thought, could read without shame, in which he said:—
  "I am without instructions from my Government concerning the particular proposals in question, but that having already communicated to your Excellency a message of the 9th inst., from the Earl of Malmesbury, by which, whilst announcing to me that Her Majesty's Government would gladly give their good offices to prevent a collision between France and Portugal, and stating that they had no decisive information on the subject, his Lordship directed me to recommend to His Most Faithful Majesty's Government to drop the prosecution, if there were informalities during or after the capture, I considered that I should be only acting up to the spirit of those instructions in now giving my opinion in favour of the acceptation, by His Most Faithful Majesty's Government, of the present proposals of the French Go-
  1426
  vernment for an amicable settlement, which I know my Government to have so much at heart, of the unfortunate differences which have arisen between the French and Portuguese Governments on the subject of the above mentioned vessel. I likewise referred your Excellency to a further message of the 16th instant from the Earl of Malmesbury, repeating his former advice to drop the prosecution."
  So the "good offices" of this country offered by die noble Earl resulted only in telling the Portuguese Government that they had better give up the vessel and yield the whole question, and that if they did not do so, they would probably be compelled. The Portuguese Government then had no other alternative but to give up the vessel under the pressure of superior force; but they had this consolation—they had vindicated the honour and dignity of their country throughout the transaction, and he (Lord Wodehouse) was convinced that the verdict of Europe would be with them. At this point the drama naturally concluded; but as some managers thought it good policy to vary the tone of their entertainments, and after a tragedy to give a farce, the noble Earl accordingly, moved to vigorous action, four days after die news of the surrender of the vessel had been published in the Moniteur, saw the French Ambassador in this country, and wrote the magniloquent despatch, a portion of which he would read. It was dated October 30, addressed to Lord Cowley, and was as follows:—
  "While in attendance upon Her Majesty at Windsor, I took the first opportunity which occurred, the day before yesterday, of addressing some observations to the Duke of Malakoff relative to the manner in which the Government of His Imperial Majesty had enforced their demands upon the Portuguese Government for the release of the Charles et Georges and her captain. I began by expressing the satisfaction I felt that the dispute appeared to be terminated, and that Her Majesty's Government, not being in possession of all the facts of the case, it was not my intention, as, indeed, it was not my province, to enter into the contending views of the two parties."
  What satisfaction the noble Earl could have felt, how it was that he was not in possession of information as to the facts of the case, and why it was not his province to enter into the contending views of the parties he (Lord Wodehouse) was at a loss to understand. The noble Earl, however, proceeded, and wrote that sentence in the despatch which would probably be immortal, After referring to the Protocol of Paris, the noble Earl said:—
  "I pointed out to his Excellency how highly Her Majesty's Government valued the great prin-

  1427
  ciple established by the 23rd Protocol of Paris, which was signed by all the Plenipotentiaries on 14th of April, 1856. We had always considered that act as one of the most important to civilization, and to the security of the peace of Europe; for although it left the propounders and adherents of that principle undoubtedly free to act with all the vigour of independent nations, it recognised and established the immortal truth that time, by giving place for reason to operate, is as much a preventive as a healer of hostilities."
  When he (Lord Wodehouse) read that sentence he was reminded of some lines of one of our poets,—
  "Can it be Fortune's work that in your head
  The curious net that is for fancies spread
  Lets through its meshes every meaner thought,
  While rich ideas there are only caught;
  Sure that's not all, this is a piece too fair
  To be the child of chance and not of care."
  The noble Earl transmitted to Lord Cowley on account of his conversation with the Duke of Malakoff, and directed him to read his despatch to Count Walewski. Count Walewski was naturally struck with a passage which referred to the existence of treaties between this country and Portugal. This would have been a very proper reference during the progress of the transaction, but after the affair was concluded it was, to say the least of it, injudicious. It produced from Count Walewski a sharp reply, to the effect that France would always do what she thought right, and would vindicate her honour without any fear of consequences. The noble Earl then took another step. He resolved that his good offices towards Portugal should be acknowledged, and finding that nothing was said about it in the King of Portugal's Speech, he wrote to Mr. Howard, and asked why no reference was made in the King's Speech to the good offices which had been exercised by this country in that matter. It might, however, have occurred to the noble Earl that no reference to those good offices had been made, because, in fact, they had been afforded in such a manner as to be wholly illusory. The Portuguese Government, however, was too magnanimous to say so, and they gave the noble Earl a certificate of good conduct, which was of about as much value as a vote of thanks to a chairman of a public meeting, or a testimonial to a retiring parish officer. This concluded what he must call an extremely painful case. He had endeavoured to make his observations as brief and in as moderate a tone as possible, but upon a calm review of all the circumstances, he thought their Lordships
  1428
  would agree with him that of the three States which were engaged in this question, England remained in the most unsatisfactory position. Portugal had nothing to regret in the course she took. She had maintained throughout her own dignity and honour. France, if she had incurred the reproach of having compelled a weaker State by force to yield to her demands, had at least, in the words of Count Walewski, acted as she thought best suited her own honour, and had not been deterred by any fear of consequences from pursuing her own course. To England alone remained the discredit, that after having strongly urged a course of policy by which Portugal was involved in antagonism with a stronger Power, she offered to Portugal her good offices in such a manner as to amount really to a mockery, or rather to a virtual abandonment of an old and faithful Ally.
  The noble Lord concluded by moving—
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for Copy of the Telegraphic Despatch of the 16th of October, 1858, referred to in Mr. Howard's Despatch of the 27th of October, to the Earl of Malmesbury, as printed in the Correspondence respecting the Charles et Georges."
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid,—My Lords, I certainly, as a Member of Her Majesty's Government, do not at all find fault with the noble Lord for bringing forward this subject. It is his duty, as a member of the Opposition, to watch carefully whether the Ministers of the Crown faithfully maintain the honour of the country and the faith of treaties. I will go further, and thank the noble Lord personally for having brought forward this subject, because I do not remember any case which has been more mistaken and misapprehended than this. I am therefore obliged to him for giving me an opportunity of setting the House and the country right upon many points involved in this case, upon which, as I have said, there have been grave misapprehensions. I will begin by explaining why the despatch for which the noble Lord has moved was omitted from the papers placed before Parliament. The explanation is very simple. That despatch was in the same sense as the one of the 15th of October, to which the noble Lord has referred, and was, in fact, a telegraphic despatch, which anticipated the other, containing the same sentiments in a necessarily abbreviated form. Your Lordships are aware that diplomatic correspondence is now conducted somewhat differently from what used formerly to be

  1429
  the case, much of it being conveyed through the telegraph; and there is this inconvenience involved, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a Minister to produce to Parliament entire and faithful copies of those despatches, for this reason—that he would run a very great risk of allowing our cipher to be discovered—a consequence of too great importance not to be deeply considered. In laying such papers before Parliament, therefore, a Minister is obliged to alter the terms and expressions, at the same time that he furnishes, as far as possible, a true and faithful outline of the sense of the despatch. In that, of course, Parliament must trust to the honour of the Minister to give the real sense; and I am sure any Minister of this country will be always willing, if it is supposed that he has mistaken or imperfectly stated the sense of a particular despatch, to show the exact terms to any Member who may desire it. But it is much more difficult to alter the terms of any despatch, if written at any length and placed in juxtaposition with another despatch, as this was with that of the 15th of October. I can only say that if the noble Lord wishes to see that despatch, which I hold in my hand at this moment, it is at his service, and that of any noble Lords opposite; or, if it should be thought likely to be for the benefit of the public service, I will have it printed and added to the papers before Parliament.
  My Lords,—I will now enter upon the case of the Charles et Georges, to which the noble Lord has called attention. In the first place I must remark that if the Government is to be judged justly for its action in these proceedings, they must be judged according to the knowledge which they had at the time, and nut by the facts which have become subsequently known to them. The noble Lord has alluded to several points connected with the case of the Charles et Georges which have become known since the matter has been settled and which were not known at the period when those matters were under discussion. The whole conduct of the Government depends upon the truth of their allegation—and truth it is—that the case was at the time utterly obscure and uncertain. We had only one side of the case, and that full of contradiction from beginning to end, so that it was impossible to find any evidence upon which to decide whether Portugal had entirely right on her side, or whether she could justify the peremptory step she had taken of seizing the ship and
  1430
  imprisoning the captain. Now, my Lords, what are the proofs that came before the Government at the time, and what came to their knowledge subsequently? When the point first came before me I could not discover whether the captain of the vessel was aware at the time of the new proclamation that had been issued against the slave trade. It is probable, indeed, that he was not, for that proclamation was not issued until the 20th of November, and the vessel was seized on the 27th of that month. There is the statement of Mr. Howard on the 28th of August upon that point:—
  "It is necessary that I should here state that the late Governor of Mozambique, Senhor Menezes, not having given due effect to the prohibition of the exportation of negroes as free labourers, contained in the Portarias of the Minister of Marine and Colonies of February 27, 1855, and July 30, 1856, was recalled on that account, as I reported at the time, and Colonel Tavarez d'Almeida was sent out as governor by the Viscount de Sa for the express purpose of enforcing that prohibition, and of otherwise suppressing the slave trade. Colonel Almeida arrived, it appears, at Mozambique about fifteen days or three weeks before the affair of the Charles et Georges took place, and it was under his directions that the measures for her apprehension were taken."
  Your Lordships perceive that the new governor only arrived a fortnight or three weeks before, and it was by his direction that these measures were taken. At page 8 your Lordships will find that the date of the proclamation was November 20, and the vessel was seized on the 27th, many miles away from the Mozambique. It struck me that the first point to consider was, whether the captain might not have been ignorant of the policy of the new Governor, the former Governor having been dismissed for conniving at, if he had not actually taken part in the slave trade. At page 48 of the papers there is the French account of the matter:—
  "What had happened, his excellency said, was this: The captain of the Charles et Georges had received orders from the Governor of Réunion to procure negroes under the emigration system; but he was expressly forbidden by his instructions to take any from Mozambique, the Portuguese Government having prohibited all emigration from thence. The captain, however, received information that this prohibition did not extend to the district of Matabane, the Sheik of which had authority from the Portuguese Government to furnish negroes for emigration. He went there accordingly, and the Sheik furnished a certain number."
  Well, then there was the custom-house question; for your Lordships must remem-

  1431
  ber that there were two complaints made by the Portuguese Government,—first, that the municipal laws had been violated by the ship anchoring in a place where vessels were forbidden to enter; and next, that she was engaged in the slave trade. It must also be borne in mind that the Portuguese Government subsequently dropped the first ground of complaint, and confined themselves to the latter. Now, my Lords, if I may refer to subsequent proof, it seems to me to be extremely doubtful even at this moment whether the French captain violated the municipal law of Portugal,—that is to say, whether his vessel was ever anchored within three miles of the shore, as alleged. In support of that view I would refer to the evidence of the captain himself, which has never been refuted by the Governor of Mozambique, or by any one else, and which has been published by the Portuguese:—
  "Those," alluding to the negro labourers, "which I took at Matabane and Conducia were procured for me by the Sheik named Ali Kery, who holds an authorization of his Excellency the Governor General of Mozambique, dated September 25, 1856, and who has taken a commission of 6 piastres or 30f. per head."
  Now, it is true that the authorization in question is said to have been a forgery; but there was at the time nothing to prove to us that such was the case, and Her Majesty's Government could only form a judgment in the matter from the ex parte reports. The statements made by the Portuguese were met by counter statements by the French, so that your Lordships will perceive Her Majesty's Government had no data upon which they could rely in order to enable them to arrive at a correct decision as to which of the contending parties was in the right and which was in the wrong. [Earl GREY: Hear, hear!] The noble Earl cheers, because, no doubt, it is in accordance with his opinion that a rapid, and therefore, in all probability, a rash decision should be arrived at on a question of this nature. But what, my Lords, does the French captain say in answer to the questions put to him by the commander of the Portuguese cruiser? He was asked:—
  "Was the Charles et Georges above a gunshot from the shore?—Most assuredly, if you take in the Island of Quintangonia, which is not part of the continent.
  "Captain, was your gun shotted?—Yes, captain.
  "Did the ball touch the shore?—Almost.
  "But did you send the ball from the spot when
  1432
  you dropped your anchor?—I am not compelled to do that; the rule is, when you are within range you fire your gun and board the ship.
  "My impression has always been that when a man of-war is in sight of several ships or boats and also in sight of land, and if he does not hoist his flag, he ought at least to have the streamers of his nation?—True, but nevertheless not obligatory.
  "But would the ball have reached the shore if fired from the place where I was anchored?—No; but you lay on Portuguese ground with eleven or twelve fathoms of water.
  "The fact is, you are pretty certain that the ball would not have reached the coast if fired from the place where I lay, and it did not reach it from the place where you lay?—No answer.
  "How far does the Portuguese territory extend to the S.E, or the S. ¼S. from the Isle of Quintangonia?—No answer."
  Now, I do not mean to give any opinion as to whether the French captain was right or wrong. All I say is that Her Majesty's Government had during the progress of those transactions—nay, have not up to this eleventh hour—any data upon which a sound opinion in reference to this
  question could be formed. The noble Lord who has just spoken has a great horror of the system of immigration with which these events are mixed up. I am as much opposed to it as he can possibly be; but the question is not a matter of mere feeling, it is whether we as responsible Ministers of the Crown were to be led away by considerations of that description, and not to form an unbiassed judgment upon the rights themselves which were involved in a case of this immense importance. You do not suppose, my Lords, that I was ignorant of the treaties which exist between this country and Portugal; nor can you, I am sure, fail to be of opinion that before we resolved to commit ourselves to a course involving serious consequences it was our duty to make ourselves perfectly certain that Portugal was in the right and France in the wrong in the dispute in which they were engaged. And, my Lords, I repeat that even up to the present moment we have been furnished with no data upon which such a decision could fairly be pronounced.
  Now, my Lords, what, let me ask, was the course which, under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government adopted? I am accused by the noble Lord opposite with respect to two points. He charges me with having lost time in proceeding with this matter, and with not having written enough. Well, the first intimation which I received that this matter had assumed a serious aspect was upon

  1433
  the 18th of September, when Mr. Howard wrote to me to the following effect:—
  "The affair of the French vessel Charles et Georges, condemned at Mozambique as a slaver, treated of in my despatches of the 6th and 7th inst., has assumed a very serious aspect."
  That despatch was received on the 24th, and I might, perhaps, have telegraphed on that day to Lord Cowley. But be that as it may, I lost scarcely any time in the matter, inasmuch as I telegraphed to that noble Lord on the 25th. Now, Lord Cowley, as your Lordships are aware, is one of those Ministers who do not require that a long rigmarole—if I may so terns it—of phrases and instructions, which are generally, I believe, written rather for Parliament than for the Minister himself—should be addressed to him. It was therefore quite sufficient, I am sure you will think in this instance, to inform him that our good offices were offered for the settlement of the misunderstanding between France and Portugal, and that to enter upon any lengthened explanation as to what the words "good offices" meant would be as useless as absurd. Well, my Lords, I telegraphed, as I mentioned, to Lord Cowley on the 25th, and within five days from that time he informs us—as you will observe by referring to page 17 of the papers—that the case, he believes, may be settled. He writes:—
  "Count Walewski's language was very conciliatory. I feel certain he regrets that the case has arisen, and will gladly see it settled."
  But the noble Lord seems to think that, having received that announcement on the 30th of September, Her Majesty's Government ought to have written some eloquent despatch, reminding the French Government of treaties in existence, and expressing in strong language the views which we entertained. Now, I do not pretend to know human nature so well as the noble Lord, who is a diplomatist, and has represented this country in that capacity at one of the great Courts of Europe; but I doubt whether, in using the petulant language which the noble Lord appears to regret we did not use, we should have been acting wisely, particularly when we were told that the language employed by the French Minister was of a most conciliatory character. But to proceed, my Lords, Her Majesty's Government had every reason to believe on the 30th of September that this question would be satisfactorily settled. Upon the 3rd of October, however, Lord Cowley complained that a change
  1434
  had taken place in the language of the French Government. He says:—
  "It seems now that at a Council of Ministers held yesterday morning, and presided over by the Emperor, the first that the vessel had been condemned as a slaver was first broached, and it was decided that the condemnation as a slaver of a French ship having a Government delegate on board, authorized to hire African labourers, was tantamount to connecting the Imperial Government with the traffic in slaves, and was derogatory to the honour of France. It was resolved, therefore, that the release of the Charles et Georges and of her captain should be peremptorily demanded and insisted upon."
  You will perceive from this despatch, my Lords, that the affair had assumed the aspect in the eyes of the French Minister of one in which a point of national honour was involved. The noble Lord opposite, however, seems to sneer at the axiom laid clown by the Government of France—for it is laid down—that if a vessel has a French agent on board her, who is responsible for his acts to the Government which he represents, she is no longer to be looked upon in the light of a mere private ship, liable to be confiscated for an infringement of municipal law. That is an axiom which, in my opinion, however erroneous I may be, is borne out by international law, and the noble Lord will find that it is supported by much higher authority than mine. But there is involved in this view of the subject another point, which is of considerable importance; it is that in the case of a vessel seized for an infraction of municipal or international law, if she be a Government ship, the custom has been established by the comity of nations that the question at issue must be solved by diplomacy, and not by a peremptory Act such as that which was resorted to by the Portuguese Government. Such I believe to be the opinion of the best lawyers of our day, and if that practice were not followed, as it has been in almost every instance, constant disputes would be the result. Such questions are to be settled by argument and reason—not by force, but by international law. The Portuguese themselves have not always been so prudent on these points as they may, perhaps, expect others to be, and one of the greatest outrages committed of late years upon a British ship, has at this moment been committed by them not far from this very sea. The fact is, that this system of negro immigration is not to be put down by force; and I feel sure, that had Her Majesty's Government acted in the spirit which characterized the noble Lord's speech, the result would have been very different, and

  1435
  we should not now have been able to enter into negotiations which it may be hoped will lead to the abandonment of this system. I said that on the 3rd of October a change took place in the language of Count Walewski. I felt it my duty on the instant to put forward the Protocol of 1856, which, I submit, was quite sufficient without any despatch accompanying it (the despatch which the noble Lord regrets) inasmuch as Lord Cowley was present when it was signed, and must have known its sense and its full value; and I am rather surprised that the noble Lord should have treated so very cavalierly my reference to so important a document, your Lordships well knowing that that Protocol was one of the most beneficent and useful public acts on record- It is a document which I am sure will prevent a great effusion of blood hereafter, and it has already tended to put an end to more than one dispute between nations. I say I am surprised that the noble Lord should treat so cavalierly the instructions given by me with reference to the Protocol, and considering that he may be regarded in some sort as the political pupil of the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon), I am still less able to understand the views he has expressed on this point. This was on the 6th October. Acting, then, on the instructions which he received to insist on the Protocol of Paris, Lord Cowley put himself in communication with Count Lavradio and the Marquis de Paiva, and on the 13th he reports that an amicable solution will be arrived at. He says—
  "I have the satisfaction of informing you that there is every probability of the affair of the Charles et Georges receiving an amicable solution."
  Her Majesty's Government were induced by his despatches to believe that if the Charles et Georges were given up and the captain released, the French Ministry would admit the mediation of a friendly Power, both as regards the legality of the seizure and the question of indemnity. There is no doubt that the French Government acceded to this proposed arrangement, for Count Walewski himself says, that he did so. Lord Cowley in reporting (November 9) an interview which he had with the French Minister says—
  "I said that the 23rd Protocol was exactly framed to meet questions of this nature, where both parties claimed to be in the right; but Count Walewski interrupted me by declaring that the French Government had never declined to submit the question of right to friendly mediation. What they had refused was mediation of any kind so
  1436
  long as the Charles et Georges was detained, but he could give me the positive assurances that if, even at the eleventh hour, the Portuguese Government had released the ship, and proposed to settle the question of right and wrong, through a mediator, the proposal would have met with the assent of the Imperial Government. But Portugal could not retain the ship and propose mediation at the same time; at all events, it was impossible for the Imperial Government to entertain such a proposition. I remarked to Count Walewski that it was to be regretted that M. de Lisle had not better understood the sentiments of his Government, for that on inquiry being made of him, he had stated that the only point on which his instructions would permit him to accept the principle of mediation was that of the amount of the indemnity to be paid for the detention of the Charles et Georges. Count Walewski replied that it was true that the instructions addrsssed to M. de Lisle, only mentioned indemnity as the subject for mediation, but that it stood to reason that the question of indemnity carried with it the question of right, since before a mediator could say what amount of indemnity was due, he must satisfy himself that the right to receive an indemnity existed. I rejoined that although it was of little value now as regarded the main question, I rejoiced to receive this assurance from his Excellency, because it showed that I had faithfully reported his intentions to Her Majesty's Government in saying, that if the ship was released, the French Government would consent to submit all the questions arising out of it to friendly mediation. 'Beyond doubt,' said Count Walewski, 'such was our intention.'"
  Now, my Lords, what blame can be attached to Her Majesty's Government for not expecting that that agreement would be fulfilled? We did not possess the gift of prophecy, and could not predict that the French Minister at Lisbon would mistake his orders, or evade them. Lord Cowley, as I have said, obtained a positive assurance that an arrangement would be come to, and surely we were justified in crediting it. A great deal has been made of a despatch which I wrote subsequently on the 16th of October. My explanation with regard to this despatch is very simple. I was out of town at the time, and when I wrote it, I had not received the despatch of the 13th, stating that an amicable solution would be come to. I wrote that despatch, thinking its contents might be useful in the way of suggestion to Lord Cowley, if be failed in his offer of the good offices of this country; but as it was, it was never acted upon, and has no bearing whatever upon the results which followed. Having received the assurance that a mediation would be admitted by the French Ministry, I do not deny that Her Majesty's Government were greatly astonished when, a week afterwards, they heard of what had happened, and that the question had been suddenly and summarily

  1437
  settled. The noble Lord says that Mr. Howard was without any instructions. Of course he was. We could not give him instructions upon a case which we never could have foreseen. We could not give his instructions in this sense:—"If the French Government eat their words—if the French Minister makes a mistake—you must do so and so." He was equally taken by surprise when he was told that the question was one of indemnity, and did not involve any question of right which could be made the subject of mediation. When, at last, Mr. Howard's advice was sought for by the Portuguese Government, he was perfectly right in giving it as he did, and in suggesting, as a matter of common sense, that they would do well to accept at once the offer to refuse the question of indemnity without the question of right. This is the last place in which I should attempt to lay down any principles with regard either to individual or to national honour. A man's honour can best be judged by himself, and so it is with a nation. I do not blame the Portuguese Government or its Minister if they thought that the only honourable course was to refuse the offer which was at last made to them; but, at the same time, when they asked the advice of a calm and disinterested friend, as the English Minister should be regarded, I think Mr. Howard was right in saying, "accept the mediation." It was impossible that they could avoid the question of right, for no damages at all could be given by the mediator unless he decided first that Portugal was in the wrong. In that point of view Portugal would have lost nothing by the concession which Mr. Howard suggested; and this was the view which, as I have shown, Count Walewski himself took on the question. We have been blamed for not acting with sufficient vigour and decision. Well, there certainly was another alternative, and I really only know of but one, which would have been if, feeling certain that Portugal was right (of which even at this moment we are not convinced), or not caring whether Portugal was right or wrong, we had said,—"We will stand by you according to the treaty of 1703, and if you will resist France we will support you." We might, indeed, have said this; but should we have been acting in accordance with a case very analogous which happened only last year—the case of the Cagliari? The French Government denied from the beginning the jurisdiction both of the first court in which the Charles et Georges was
  1438
  condemned, and of the Court of Appeal to which the case was afterwards carried. They denied the jurisdiction of Portugal just as Sardinia denied that of Naples in the case of the Cagliari, and just as we denied the competency of the Neapolitan tribunals to deal with Watt and Park, so the French Government would not recognize the right of the Portuguese tribunals to punish Captain Rouxel. But did we in that case carry things with a high hand? I know some persons were of opinion that we ought to have sent a fleet into the Bay of Naples; but I do not think the noble Earl opposite was one of those persons. How did we act? We appealed to the protocol of Paris to settle that question, and we recommended the same appeal and the same way of settling this matter between France and Portugal as in that case. Her Majesty's Government, then, were perfectly consistent in what they did in both those cases, and they could not, without the greatest inconsistency, to say nothing of the danger, have recommended Portugal to take violent measures. Another accusation has been made against us—that we had not fulfilled our treaties, but Portugal never in the most distant manner alluded to the treaties, and the Portuguese Minister himself stated that nothing but the good offices of England were needed. The treaty of 1703 ran, that whenever the King of Spain, or the King of France, together or separately, should make war, or should show an intention to make war on Portugal, the British Government shall "use their friendly offices to persuade them to observe terms of peace towards Portugal, and not to make war."
  LORD WODEHOUSE: Read on. It goes on to say, if our "good offices" fail, that we should go to war on behalf of Portugal.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: It says that if our good offices fail we are to send a force of 6,000 men for the defence of Portugal. Is that what the noble Earl recommends to the House? I have heard a great many suggestions as to what we ought to have done in this matter, but that is a perfectly new one. It is about as astonishing to me as the piece of poetry which the noble Lord quoted just now—of which nobody could Understand the point, and which had no possible reference to the question. Does the noble Lord mean that we were to send these 6,000 men over whether the Portuguese liked it or not? and I can assure the noble Lord that the

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  Portuguese Government showed no disposition for a second Peninsular war. If your Lordships wish to know what were the sentiments of the Portuguese Government on this point I can easily lay them before you. When the affair was all over, the Portuguese Opposition—no doubt conscientiously fulfilling their duty, like Her Majesty's Opposition at home—found fault with the Government for not having appealed to the treaty with England. In answer to this the Marquis de Loulé said:—
  "Some members of the Chamber are of opinion that the intervention of England should have been asked for, but it was not very clear that the casus fœderis had arisen. England is not bound to support us in every quarrel; and, besides, the circumstances were not of a nature to lead us to fear a war or to demand formally the assistance of England, for if she acceded to our request, a European war might be the result, which, on our part, as one of the members of the European family, and interested in the continuance of peace, we ought to avoid, and not to bring upon ourselves an affront and a difficulty; and it was requisite to weigh all the circumstances, not to look at things through the prism of our desires."
  Your Lordships would not have had us more Portuguese than the Portuguese themselves. I do not agree with the noble Lord that the good offices of England have failed. They obtained what they professed to obtain—mediation—that mediation which was cut in two by an untoward accident which it was impossible for any man to foresee, the restriction of its limits, which M. de Lisle, the French Minister at Lisbon, placed upon it. I am at a loss to know what more we could have done when, having asked our advice, whether they should accept the mediation as finally offered, the Portuguese Government refused to follow it, and took an independent line of their own. I say again, I am obliged to the noble Lord for having brought this matter forward. I do not regret having acted as I did, and I am perfectly certain that justice will be done to Her Majesty's Government by the people when they calmly consider the position in which we were placed. Any other line taken with France—any other language held with France—at that moment might have produced the most serious results. If we had gone beyond the line of good offices we should have entered on another chapter, and, bound as we were by treaty, it is impossible to say what consequences might have followed. I am inclined to think, my Lords, that if Her Majesty's Government had found themselves obliged in last No
  1440
  vember to call Parliament together unexpectedly, and announce to them that in consequence of some obscure quarrel which they could not settle or decide, the relations of France and of England were in a state of the greatest danger and uncertainty, I think I should not have been blamed for having either written too little or said too little, but for having written too much and said too much.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, the singularly lucid account of this affair which was given by the noble Lord who introduced this Motion renders it unnecessary for me to enter into the facts of the case, and it only remains for me to make some observations on the remarks which have just fallen from the noble Earl. As I understood him, his chief reason for not producing this telegram was that it was in cypher, and that to produce it might possibly furnish a key to the cypher. That reason would, no doubt, be stronger if so many telegrams had not been given in the papers.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: The words have been altered.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Then this message might have been subjected to the same operation. Certainly, the system of sending instructions by telegraph has been carried by the noble Earl to an unprecedented length. The noble Earl even resorted to this mode of sending instructions to Paris, which could only have anticipated a written despatch by about twelve hours. Noble Lords on this side of the House are placed at a great disadvantage by the date at which each despatch was received not being affixed to it.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: That is some carelessness in the office. I directed that the date of the receipt should be affixed to each despatch, and I do nut know how it was not done.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I accept the noble Earl's explanation; but the omission tends to a complication of the question as a matter of reference. The noble Earl tells us that he was for a long time left in ignorance of the circumstances of the case; but I think it appears from the papers that as early as the end of August Mr. Howard had reported to the noble Earl the serious view which the Marquis de Louié took of the affair. With reference to the defence which the noble Earl makes, of not having given written instructions on account of Lord Cowley's great knowledge in all these matters, I have the very great

  1441
  honour of having appointed Lord Cowley, and I should be the last man to think such instructions any proof of want of confidence in him, and I confess I should prefer leaving any negotiations in his hands rather than in the hands of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of this question I ventured to express a fear that the singularly inconsistent position which Her Majesty's Government had taken up towards the French Government would throw great difficulties in the way of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—that having placed themselves in a position of unexampled contradiction, they would be prevented using that conciliatory, but at the same time firm and frank, language without which no great States can continue on a really friendly footing, and which is the only way for a lengthened time to insure regard and mutual esteem. I must say that the subsequent reading of the papers now on the table of the House (together with all the language held by the noble Earl) fails to convince me that Her Majesty's Government have dealt fairly, not to say with Portugal, but with France, in not bringing before France all the facts and all the arguments which, as a friendly Power interested in this question, we were bound to observe. The noble Lord who opened this debate stated, and I entirely agree with him, that in questions of this sort it is not necessary that the House should enter into judgment on proceedings between two different countries where they do not interest this country or the acts of the Government. But at the same time it is not necessarily an unfriendly or hostile proceeding towards foreign Governments to criticize their conduct. I have no doubt that France was wrong, and I regret that the Emperor of the French did not give the whole matter full consideration at the outset, for if he had I think that the French Government would have found that the view taken of it on this side of the water was correct. I regret, also, the very imperious tone adopted by France towards Portugal—a tone which ought to be deprecated in the diplomatic relations of all foreign countries, but more especially when a most powerful country addresses one much inferior in force. I have less hesitation in saying this, because I know there is a temptation for every great country, not excepting ourselves, to adopt too high a tone towards inferior States. Another point in which I think the French Govern-
  1442
  ment was wrong was, before diplomatic relations were exhausted sending a large fleet to Lisbon under the specious pretence that it was merely going there for coaling purposes. I think the French Government were perfectly wrong in making the claim they did, and I believe they were wrong in their international law; but, no doubt, they had been much irritated. It must be very irritating whether to a small or great Power to have a delay of three months; and I believe there was a delay of three months on the part of the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs in answering three letters from the French Minister on the subject of the Charles et Georges. We are totally ignorant of the case laid before the French law officers, but if the French Government obtained a satisfactory answer from their law officers, and were also backed up by the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it seems to take away a great deal of the substance of the complaint against the French Government. The noble Earl asks what was he to do? and he reads the treaty engagements of this country to Portugal. The noble Earl, however, did not allude to one, in 1601, in which we are bound to act for Portugal as for ourselves. The noble Earl reads one clause in the treaty with Portugal in 1703, and when required by my noble Friend to read on, and show the House what are the real engagements of this country towards Portugal, and which he was bound to have in mind, the noble Earl, instead of reading on, gives a very slight portion about the number of troops, and says that was what the noble Lord recommended him to do, notwithstanding that my noble Friend carefully guarded himself against saying that a casus fœderis had arisen at all. I think it was of the greatest importance to keep these treaties in view, and what has fallen to-night from the noble Earl induces me to think he was as ignorant of the exact stipulations between this country and Portugal as Count Walewski in his last interview with Lord Cowley stated himself to have bee. Here is one of those points upon which detailed instructions to Lord Cowley, copies of which could have been forwarded to Mr. Howard, would have been of the greatest possible use. It was most important that when the noble Earl made up his mind to move in the matter he should have furnished Lord Cowley with instructions to lay before the French Government all the obligations under which Her Majesty's Government were placed

  1443
  with regard to Portugal, and to press the French Government to act upon the Protocol. I admit that he could not go the length of obliging the French Government to act on the Protocol, but Lord Cowley might have been directed to appeal to France, as a friendly Government and a member of the Congress which signed the Protocol; but this was a case exactly in point, which the Protocol was intended to meet. I cannot help thinking that if such instructions had been given to Lord Cowley, and he had said that he had received instructions for a positive and definite object, it would have had a very great effect. With regard to the Portuguese Government, with the exception of that neglect to which I have alluded, in dealing with this question, it appears to me their conduct has been thoroughly what it ought to have been. It appears to me that the Governor General of Mozambique acted in a perfectly right and consistent manner upon the instructions which he received from his own Government, that those instructions were fully in accord with all the previous applications of Her Majesty's Government, and that in the subsequent steps which the Portuguese Government took they exhibited as strong a sense of their own honour and independence as the greatest nation which exists. With regard to our own conduct I hardly wish to go over the ground which the noble Lord who commenced the discussion has so ably trodden, but there is one point which the noble Earl has omitted to notice which I think is of very great importance. Having contented himself so long with bandying the despatches of Lord Cowley and Mr. Howard from one to the other; and, lastly, having given no instructions which could be acted upon, and only suggestions which were unavailable, I want to know on what pretext did he send two ships for protecting British interests and watching the French squadron? It seems like a little bark which could have no possible effect, and which only showed our comparative weakness and lukewarmness on the question. I cannot imagine one good point which could be attained by it, although it is not difficult to see that many ill effects might be produced by such a step. I have been struck with the rather ingenious course taken by the noble Earl in his conversation with the French Ambassador, after the whole thing was over. Your Lordships are aware of the very great difficulty which diplomatic agents have in
  1444
  conveying accurate reports of the long conversations they may have with those Ministers at whose Courts they have to do business. I was told by a gentleman who was an attaché under the Earl of Malmesbury, the noble Earl's grandfather, that the Earl was in the habit, immediately after a conversation of this kind, of calling one of his attachés, and repeating it to him with a view of imprinting it on his memory, and the young men were always struck with the ability with which the noble Earl's share of the conversation had been conducted, and how very much the best of it he always had with his opponent; and whenever the conversation came to be reduced to writing, the Duke de Bassano never appeared to have had the slightest chance in the dispute. The noble Earl, now Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in his Conferences with foreign Ministers, appeals to adopt the safe course of having the whole talk to himself. Mr. Dallas held some important conversations with the noble Earl, in which he appears to have had some difficulty in getting a fair share of the talk, but it might be supposed that, considering the vivacity of the French nation, the representative of that Power would have at least half the conversation with the noble Earl. Not a bit of it. The noble Earl spoke for a long time to the Duke of Malakhoff, the heroic soldier, and most honest and straightforward of diplomatists. The noble Earl appears to have spoken so well that I was reminded of the lines of the English poet—
  "'It grieves me much,' replied the Peer again, 'who speaks so well should ever speak in vain.'"
  But, after all, the noble Earl's remarks were, to use a French phrase, only "mustard after dinner." I think there can be no question that one doctrine laid down by the noble Earl to-night is open to very considerable doubt, and I hope that those who follow me in this debate will tell your Lordships in what part of the papers the French Government lay down the principle that the presence of a French delegate on board the ship gave an official character to the Charles et Georges. That principle the noble Earl very confidently stated. In what page is it to be found? The French vessel had been accused of an offence, which they say it was insulting to their honour to be accused of, although, by the admission of the French delegate, it unfortunately happened that it was an offence of which the ship and captain had been guilty. Nearly all the correspondence

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  between the great capitals and this country is conducted by boats conveying letters, and usually having on board an Admiralty or Post-office agent, who is a delegate of a character somewhat similar to that of the French delegate on board the Charles et Georges, and whose duty it is to see that the postal service of the packet steamer is efficiently performed. Now, I want to know whether, if on board a Calais or Lisbon boat so employed, a mate or captain were to be found guilty of smuggling in contravention of the regulations of the French Government, the fact of an Admiralty or Post-office agent being on board the ship chartered to carry our mails would free the vessel from the municipal law of France, Portugal, or any other country? One of the greatest authorities on international law, who is not a member of your Lordships' House, has declared that the principle of international law laid down by France cannot be sustained. I believe this matter to be one of very great importance. As far as our relations with France are concerned, they have been replaced upon a favourable footing by the letter of the Emperor of the French to Prince Napoleon, and the despatch regulating the particular employment of free labour, which we are so convinced would have led to the recommencement of the slave trade. But with regard to the position of the English Government towards Portugal, and its character in the world—with regard to those ties of honour by which we are bound—I am afraid that this transaction will leave a most unfavourable impression, not only on the people of this country, but on the whole of Europe and the civilized world. The noble Earl quotes the admissions of the Portuguese Government in his favour; but I never saw a despatch from a Foreign Secretary which betrayed so much of a sore conscience as that in which the noble Earl demanded to know why the King of Portugal had not thanked Her Majesty's Government for their good offices in the dispute with France. My noble Friend has shown that their good offices were exerted in no efficient sense; that they obtained nothing from France; and that, as to the advice they gave, the Portuguese Government will even be honoured for having totally disregarded it. The question was asked in the Chamber of Peers at Lisbon with much astonishment, whether those thanks had been given, and the Minister of Finance declared his ignorance of the matter. The discussion has shown that
  1446
  Her Majesty's Government have not, in the conduct of this transaction, shown either the activity or judgment requisite; and this opinion of your Lordships, fully shared by the great majority of the nation, will be conveyed to Portugal and the rest of Europe. I do not quite understand what the noble Earl proposes to do, but it is at any rate satisfactory that the subject has been fully discussed in your Lordships' House.
  LORD KINGSDOWNsaid, that his apology for troubling their Lordships must be that he intended to confine himself to that part of the subject which he was afraid would, in any hands, be found dull, and his doubly so—namely, the law applicable to this case. But it seemed to him that the legal question lay at the very root of the matter now under discussion; for although the noble Lord, who brought forward the subject, professed a desire to avoid any unnecessary discussion of the French rights, it was upon those rights, and the view which the House might form of those rights, that their opinion of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government must mainly depend. If the rights of Portugal were clear, it might be the duty of Her Majesty's Government at all hazards to support her in asserting them. But where the rights of Portugal were, to say the least, not indisputable—where the gravest doubts existed as to those rights, as in this case—the matter seemed to him to assume a very different aspect; and their Lordships must consider the course pursued by the noble Earl the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the position in which he was placed in relation to the question in dispute. The first point to be considered was as to the law applicable to the case, and on this there arose two questions—first, whether the vessel had been captured in the Portuguese waters; and, secondly, whether she was acting under the authority of the French Government. Whether the Charles et Georges was engaged in the practice of the slave trade, or was not engaged in the practice—though he thought from the papers it was evident that she was not—it was clear to every one acquainted with the international laws of civilized nations, that unless the capture was made in Portuguese waters, the Portuguese authorities had no right to make it. The case did not depend on whether the ship was engaged in the slave trade or not. Slave trade is not piracy by the law of nations,

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  and no nation had a right, unless warranted to do so by treaty, to interfere with the vessels of another nation, because such vessels were carrying on a trade in slaves. On the other hand, nobody disputed that every Power had a right, within its own dominions, to make what provision it liked for the regulation of its commerce, and persons who thought fit to engage in that commerce, took on themselves the responsibility of knowing what those laws were, and must submit to the penalties imposed for their infraction. But that depended entirely on those acts being done within the territory of the State which passed those laws; if they were so done, it was within the power of the municipal authorities to deal with the case. There was, however, this important exception—that every ship which belonged to a Sovereign State, and acted under the authority of that State, was exempt from the municipal law. It might commit any wrong in a foreign port, and would not be responsible for that wrong to the municipal authorities. A wrong so done was not to be brought before any judicature; it was a matter for diplomatic negotiation and arrangement between the two States concerned. That principle of exemption was laid down in the ordinary case of ships of war belonging to foreign States. But did it depend on their being ships of war? Would Her Majesty's yacht be liable to seizure, or would any vessel acting under the authority of a Government, be subject to seizure, because she was not armed? Certainly not. A ship belonging to a foreign State was not exempt from the municipal laws because she was armed, but because she was a public ship; because she was acting on behalf of a State, under the authority of that State, and involved the State in the consequences of her acts. It was for that reason that a vessel so acting under the public authority was exempt from the municipal laws, and was subject only to those laws which prevailed between Sovereign States. He would call their Lordships' attention for a moment to a case which excited great attention not many years ago, and on which the law on this subject, on the part of Great Britain was carried, he would not say beyond, but to its extreme limits. Captain Denman was employed on the coast of Africa, in the command of one of Her Majesty's ships. He was instructed by the Government to land on the coast of Africa, and to demand of one of the chiefs the restoration of two British subjects. He did so,
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  and he obtained their restoration. On returning to his ship he found a baracoon full of slaves belonging to a Spanish subject, and he liberated them. He was not then acting in the command of his ship, or under the direction and authority of Her Majesty, but he was an agent of the British Government, who subsequently ratified his act. An action was brought against him for the recovery of the value of those slaves, and what was the opinion of the Court on the subject? It was a trial at bar, attended with the greatest solemnities which obtained in British Courts of Justice, and the law laid down on that occasion was, that the subsequent ratification of Captain Denman's act was, equivalent to an authority for it, and that, therefore, the act was one which, however wrong, was free from municipal authority, because it was the act of a State, and was, therefore, the subject of representation between the two States concerned in it. If those were unquestionable principles of law, the question that arose in the next place was, whether this ship at the time of the seizure was in Portuguese waters or not? If she was not in Portuguese waters, there was an end to all controversy; but if she was in Portuguese waters, then the question arose, what was the character of that ship at the time of the seizure? Was she, or was she not, at that time, acting under the authority of the French Government, and therefore, involving the French Government in responsibility for her acts? If she was acting under the authority of the French Government he defied any one to contend that she was subject to municipal law. Count Walewski gave this account of her, "that she was a French ship freighted for Government purposes, with a Government agent on board," and he assumed the accuracy of this statement as the basis of any opinion which he might express. It was known to all of their Lordships that, rightly or wrongly, the French Government had at that time adopted the plan of importing negroes from the coast of Africa into the Isle of Bourbon on the terms of what was called free immigration. In all those cases there was a Government delegate on board the vessel by whom the contracts for those negroes were to be entered into, and who in that capacity acted under the authority and in the behalf of the French Government. Was that unknown to the Portuguese Government at the time when this act of seizure was committed? In the very first paper of the collection before the

  1449
  House it appeared that distinct notice was given by the British Admiral on the station to the Governor of Mozambique that the latter had not the least authority to interfere with the exportation of negroes under the directions of the French Government. The Portuguese Government had no doubt a perfect right if they thought fit, to forbid the exportation of negroes or the exportation of anything else from their territories and to impose any reasonable penalty on the violation of that prohibition. They had, in fact, issued such a prohibition, but the Governors had been in the habit of granting licences for such exportation and thereby superseding the local law, just as during the great war with France licences were constantly granted by the British Government for trade in violation of the Orders in Council. In fact, the Portuguese Government being urged to a stricter enforcement of their laws, had, just before the transaction in question took place, appointed a new Governor, and recalled the old one on the ground of the extent to which he had granted these licences. The new Governor had under his consideration the course which was to be pursued towards ships acting under the authority of the French Government who might be found engaging negroes within the Portuguese territory, and he accordingly on the 20th of November issued a circular prescribing the course to be taken in cases where a French delegate might be found on board, directing that his instructions should be examined, and the prohibition to export slaves communicated to him. This circular showed that the Portuguese authorities had full knowledge that it was the custom for these ships to have a delegate on board, and it was not denied that the Charles et Georges had a French delegate on board. The circular having been issued on the 20th an armed vessel was sent out, which, after chasing the French ship, eventually captured her in the port of Conducia on the 27th, on the pretence that she was engaged in the slave trade? What possible right had the Portuguese authorities to chase the ship? He (Lord Kingsdown) had seen too much of the proceedings of prize courts in Africa to attach much value to the evidence given, or the sentence passed. But what was the account given by the captor immediately after the occurrence—on the 30th of November? "The captain stated his name to be Charles Rouxel—the name of the ship the
  1450
  Charles et Georges, of 372 tons, with fifteen persons on board, including a delegate of the French Government." Thus it was admitted the captors were aware of the presence of a delegate from the French Government. Then it was said, "the captain stated that he had come there to receive colonists, that he had come to trade; he had sent money and had received colonists, as he was authorized by the Government." To which the captor replied "he did not doubt it;" that is to say, he did not doubt that instead of being engaged in the slave trade the ship was employed under the authority of the French Government in the importation of negroes as colonists. The captor then demanded the authorization of the Portuguese Government, which he says could not be produced. Now, it was quite true that there was a regulation by which the French delegate was to receive the sanction of the Portuguese authorities in the place from which he proposed to ship the negroes before he took them away. But the ship had come there armed with the authority of the French Government, and there being no Portuguese authority at the place where she was, the negroes were shipped without the authorization of any Portuguese official person, although there was the licence of an Arab sheik acting as it appears under a licence from the Portuguese Government, and it was really for this violation of the municipal regulations of the Portuguese colony, and not for being engaged in the slave trade, that the ship was seized. Was not this a case, if ever there was one, in which the country as well as the orders of the Portuguese Government of the 20th of November required that the greatest caution should be observed. But what was done? Instead of conforming to those laws which were laid down for regulating the intercourse of States, the Portuguese authorities seized the ship, carried off the captain and the delegate acting under the authority of the French Government, took down the French flag and hoisted the Portuguese, and then proceeded to convict the French ship, or in other words the French Government, of having been engaged in the slave trade. He would ask what would England have said if their Government had been accused of slave dealing and their flag treated with such indignity, as had been the case with that of France? Such being the state of facts and the law, what was the position of Her Majesty's Government? Remarks

  1451
  had been made on the uncertainty which had prevailed in the councils of the Cabinet; but the noble Lord who made the criticism did not remember the position of the Cabinet at that time. They were receiving each day most contradictory statements from all quarters, and might well be uncertain as to the real facts. It had been said that the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) had recommended as an excuse, not founded on fact, to be put forward as a ground on which Portugal might shuffle out of the difficulty in which she had involved herself and had suggested that the Arab sheik, under whose authority the French captain had acted, should be treated as an independent chief, whereas he was under the control of the Portuguese Government. But the authority so given was not in the least degree affected by that circumstance, for the sheik had acted under a licence granted for that purpose by the Portuguese Governor, and therefore his act was just as valid as if it had been done, as the noble Earl supposed, in the character of an independent chief. In this state of circumstances what course could the British Government adopt? Could they urge Portugal to resistance, to war, and to ruin, on a case in which, if she was not clearly in the wrong, it was in the highest degree doubtful at least whether she was in the right. Above all, could this be done after the course pursued by this country in the case of the Cagliari? He was for many reasons unwilling to speak of what had been done in that case as any authority. But precedents were good against those who made them. No one could doubt that the Governor upon the spot had power to relax any regulation made by the Portuguese Government, and though the acts of the Portuguese Governor as between himself and his Government might not be binding on them, yet all the acts done by him in respect of foreigners were binding on them. Now, what he would ask, was the course which any Government of ordinary prudence ought to have pursued under those circumstances? What was the course which the comity of nations called upon them to adopt? For his own part, he should contend that unless we were animated by a greediness for war—which he could not attribute to a sane people—it was our duty to represent to the Portuguese Government that if the French agent had acted without authorization, or in violation of treaty engagements, it was to his employers he was respon-
  1452
  sible for his acts. Precedents were good by way of argument against those who set them, and those, he ventured to say, who would look into the papers which had been laid before Parliament in reference to the case of the Cagliari, would find that a course which had been pursued in the one instance had been followed with little or no difference in the other. The French Government had a far better right to insist on the surrender of their vessel than the British Government to insist on the surrender of the Englishmen found on the Cagliari. It had been contended that his noble Friend might have written in a more spirited tone; but he could not help thinking that we had too recent experience of the effect of peremptory language used by one State towards another, to render us ambitious of imitating their example. He was afraid that we were too much accustomed, while indulging our own feelings without restraint, to forget that other nations had feelings as well as ourselves. Were we, who had rejected a measure which was just and right in itself, because we deemed its enactment to have been demanded at our hands by a foreign Power in an improper tone, to turn round and adopt towards France that very attitude of which we so much complained? But, be that as it might, he felt quite assured that if his noble Friend had, instead of acting in a conciliatory manner, used peremptory language the result in the present instance would have been very different from that which had been brought about. The Portuguese Government had, in his opinion, owing to the rashness of its proceedings, involved itself in a position of extreme peril. From that position his noble Friend had by the exercise of prudence and forbearance contributed to extricate it with infinitely less damage than might have been anticipated, and in doing so had maintained the peace of Europe and had secured one of the most important triumphs for humanity in procuring the abandonment of the French plan for the exportation of negroes, by which the efforts of this country for the abolition of the slave trade had been so greatly impeded.
  EARL GREY: Before I proceed to address myself to the subject immediately under discussion, I would beg to be permitted to congratulate your Lordships on the great accession to the debates in this House which we have received in the person of the noble and learned Lord who had just spoken. And although I may be un-

  1453
  equal to cope with the noble and learned Lord in dealing with a question which turns to a groat extent upon the interpretation of international law, yet so great is the confidence which I feel in the strength of the case which I have to lay before you that I can entertain no fear as to the opinion at which you will arrive. I must, in the first place, endeavour to recal to your attention that which is the real point at issue. For a number of years—it does not appear from those papers how many—it has been the policy of Portugal to prevent the exportation of negroes from her dominions. This policy had been adopted (owing, partly at least, to the urgent representations of this country) prior to 1854, for in that year the ex-governor of the Island of Réunion applied to the Portuguese Minister at Paris for permission to transport negroes from the African possessions of Portugal to that island. That application was referred to the Government at Lisbon, but, after full consideration, was not granted. In reply to a subsequent request of the same nature, a note was presented by the Portuguese Minister at Paris to the French Government, in which it was expressly stated that the traffic in negroes was prohibited, and the French Government was called upon to convey the decision of Portugal to the Governor of Réunion, in order that the laws upon the point might not be contravened. It is true that these orders were not always enforced by the local authorities; but the Portuguese Government, when it learned that fact, recalled the Governor who had acted in contravention of them, and this fact was officially communicated to the French Government in January, 1857, when a long correspondence took place between the French Minister at Lisbon and the Portuguese Government upon the subject. The Marquis de Lisle wrote to the Viscount Sa da Banderia, requesting that the prohibition against the exportation of Africans to the French Colonies should be withdrawn. To this application the Viscount replied, pointing out the objections to the system, and the abuses to which it gave rise. The Marquis de Lisle was not satisfied, and again returned to the charge, sending a letter from the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs, saying how much importance the French Government attached to the application, and begging the Portuguese Government to reconsider its decision. To this, again, at the end of January, Viscount Sa da Banderia replied, stating that it was
  1454
  impossible to comply with the request, pointing out that though it was true that the colonists when landed at Bourbon were not regarded as slaves, yet up to the moment of landing they were so treated, and that in procuring them all the abuses of the slave trade necessarily arose. He also forwarded extracts from letters from the Mozambique, stating that there were French ships collecting these emigrants, as they were called, but that these negro "workmen" had irons on their necks. He showed that the French speculators had carried on a traffic in slaves, their operations had necessarily led to wars in the interior, to the system of kidnapping, and all those evils connected with the slave trade which were formerly in existence, the ultimate emancipation of the negroes so procured when they reached the French colonies making no difference in the effects produced in Africa, which were precisely the same as if the so-called emigrants were consigned to slavery in Cuba. He said the Portuguese Government were convinced that the great obstacle to the progress of their African Colonies was the manner in which this trade was carried on; that they were determined to make every effort to suppress it; and that as the late Governor of Mozambique had not performed his duty in this respect, he had been recalled; that another Governor, who, it was hoped, would act with more energy, had been sent to take his place; and he ended the correspondence by asking the French Government to make known in Réunion that this was the law of Portugal, and to give directions against the introduction of any negroes from the Portuguese dominions. That was in January, 1857. So much, therefore, for the want of notice to France of the determination of Portugal of which the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) complained. The Portuguese Government thought France was going to act upon this request, because in July, 1857, several months before the affair of the Charles et Georges, the Governor of Mozambique reported to his Government that the commander of the French naval force there, Captain Mécquet, told him that no more French ships should come to Mozambique in search of negroes, and that if they had done so heretofore it was under a mistaken impression that the traffic was not prohibited. Such was the course of events when French ships were detected carrying on the trade. My noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) told you that the first two

  1455
  ships found were both discharged upon a simple undertaking that they would not attempt to take negroes from the Portuguese dominions. The were found with complete slave fittings, but no slaves were on board, and they were therefore treated with forbearance. But then came the case of the Charles et Georges, and it certainly is a curious circumstance that the capture of that vessel took place at the instigation of the British Consul, Mr. M'Leod. He reported to the Governor of Mozambique that there was a bark lying in the harbour of Conducia under suspicious circumstances, which he believed to be a slaver. Now, looking at the past correspondence which had taken place, was not the Governor warranted in supposing that, unless he acted vigorously, serious difficulties would arise with this country? The late Foreign Secretary (the Earl of Clarendon) had addressed to the Portuguese Government, up to the very time of leaving office, the strongest remonstrances for not taking sufficiently active measures to compel the local authorities to enforce their orders, particularly against the trade carried on by these French ships. The Governor knew, therefore, that if he did not act upon this warning from the British Consul he would probably be liable to a very severe censure from his own Government. The Charles et Georges was accordingly seized in the manner related, and on board were found several Portuguese subjects, some of them freshly kidnapped at Mozambique—men who had landed on an island to get water, and who had been then kidnapped and sold to the French captain. You will find a list of these persons in the papers. No doubt others were sold by their own masters; but I was really surprised to hear the noble and learned Lord (Lord Kingsdown) allege, as a palliation of the offence, that these were not freemen reduced to slavery and then purchased, but were negroes who, being slaves, were then purchased by the French captain. Why, that is the very gist of the complaint which is made. The Portuguese Government wish to free their dominions from the abominable scourge of the traffic in slaves, and these men were either bought from their masters, or from those who had wrongfully reduced them to slavery, contrary to the known wish of the Portuguese Government, to be exported to Bourbon. Of course if traders are allowed to come into Portuguese ports And buy without inquiry all slaves offered to them for emigrants, all the old and
  1456
  detestable means of procuring slaves for these customers will continue to be resorted to. Then, the ship being so found, a Commission is first appointed to report on the circumstances, and see if there is a case for further proceedings. That Commission makes inquiry accordingly, and the Portuguese authorities consider the facts quite sufficient to bring the ship before a proper tribunal, by which she is regularly condemned. The captain next appeals against the decision to a superior court. Well, I am told that this was a wrongful proceeding on the part of the Portuguese Government. In the first place, the noble and learned Lord says it is doubtful whether she was in Portuguese waters. That may be so; but certainly if you will read the papers you will find that at the beginning of the correspondence no doubt whatever was expressed on the point. The captain himself never once questioned it. The plea was not raised until long afterwards, and, as far as I can judge, it appears to have been tacitly abandoned by the French Government in the latter stage of the correspondence. But the noble and learned Lord relied mainly upon the principle that a ship acting under the authority of the Government of a State is not subject to the municipal law of a foreign country. We all admit this: I have never heard it questioned; but can a single despatch be found in these papers in which the French Government distinctly put forward the claim that the Charles et Georges was a vessel of that kind, and therefore, exempted from the municipal law of Portugal. I find, indeed, the French Government asserting that the presence of a French agent on board the Charles et Georges ought to have exempted her from all suspicion of being engaged in the slave trade; but nowhere is there a distinct claim of her exemption from the authority of the State in whose waters she was found. The noble and learned Lord spoke of the ship as being chartered by the French Government; but there was no evidence to show that she had any claim to a public character. She was navigated by a private individual for his own benefit. The captain found the money, and the agent on board had nothing to do but to verify by a certain seal the indenture by which the kidnapped blacks were bound to serve for a certain term of years. The captain finds the money and buys the slaves, whom he converts into what he calls "free labourers," and when he gets to Bourbon he sells the indentures, the

  1457
  difference between what he gets for them, and the price he has paid for the blacks being his profit. It is impossible, therefore to compare a ship of this kind with a ship acting under the authority of a Government. Under these circumstances there is every reason to believe that the Portuguese claim was right, and that they had acted under an authority which they really possessed. But granting it were doubtful, can a case be conceived which much more required to be referred to the arbitration of a friendly power? [The Earl of MALMESBURY: Hear, hear!] By that cheer 1 suppose the noble Earl means to assert that this claim for reference was efficiently supported. But is there anything in the papers to show that our Ambassador at Paris was ever instructed to urge this reference as a matter of right? It was a mere suggestion on our part which the French Government might or might not adopt as it deemed expedient. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs contends that he did all for the Portuguese Government which they had a right to expect, and that we are not to judge of him by what we know now, but by what we knew at the time. It would certainly be in the highest degree unfair to the noble Earl to assume that he knew as much as we know at the present moment; but at a very early period of the dispute he seems to have had very full information on the subject. On the 7th of September Mr. Howard wrote a despatch to the noble Earl, which contained all the real facts of the case, and soon after that he wrote another which contained all the documents, and which really left no doubt as to the merits of the case. The noble Earl asked whether we would have him menace France and involve Europe in war on this matter? I am sure no one who has spoken on this side of the House would give him such unwise advice; but surely this was a case in which it was possible for him to have caused a formal note to be presented to the French Government expressing the deep interest which England took in the matter, and setting forth the serious grounds there were for thinking that France was not altogether in the right. The Portuguese Ambassador presented a memorandum on the 4th of October which argued the case of the Portuguese Government very ably, and Lord Cowley ought to have been instructed to support that memorandum. Some such remonstrance as this I am sure would have been sufficient. The noble Earl, though
  1458
  he did not say so in so many words, implied that he had not taken that course for fear of war. No man views the calamities of war with greater horror than I do, but I am persuaded that to desert a faithful Ally in difficulties which she has incurred through following our advice, from a mere fear that we may possibly be involved in war, is not the way in the long run to secure the enjoyment of peace. If you are willing to submit to insults and aggression in your intercourse with foreign nations you will have to submit to them until they reach a point which you can no longer bear, and you will then be dragged into war. But in this case there was no cause whatever for apprehension. I have never expressed that violent admiration of the Emperor of the French which the noble Earl and some other noble Lords have often declared in a manner which has seemed to me to savour of adulation, but at all events I do not think so ill of him as to suppose that a remonstrance, conciliatory in form yet firm in substance, would have led to any danger of war. The force of truth and justice is so great in these days, that the Emperor of the French, so urged, must have given way; and I am confirmed in that opinion, because I find that, when lie was truly informed of the real nature of the case, he made a substantial concession in putting an end to the traffic and to all future difficulties. I am persuaded that if the case had been properly brought before the Emperor at an earlier period he would have seen that, instead of his honour being involved in maintaining the acts of the French captain, his honour was concerned on the other side. It is not denied by any one that this French captain had improperly bought negroes in the Portuguese dominions. We know from the deposition of the French agent on board that he was satisfied the captain had acted improperly, and that it was his intention, on the ship's return to Bordeaux, to have reported those improper acts. When the captain and ship were seized for these infractions of the law, if the Emperor had said the French Government never intended to support the captain, his honour would not have been touched; and I am confirmed in the opinion that the Emperor, had he known the whole of the facts, would have taken that course, because it is evident, from reading these papers, that the French Government were exceedingly ill-informed upon the subject. There can be no stronger proof of this than the fact that Count Walewski re-

  1459
  presented to Lord Cowley that the difficulty arose from Portugal prohibiting the trade after having permitted it, when in truth, the Portuguese Government always had prohibited it, and had formally written to the French Government declining to withdraw that prohibition upon request made to do so in notes bearing the signature of Count Walewski. It is impossible to suppose that Count Walewski intentionally made a false statement to the British ambassador; we have a right therefore to conclude that the French Government were ill-informed, and would have acted differently if the Secretary of State of England had taken care to put the facts fairly before it, instead of deserting a faithful Ally and leaving Portugal to make what terms she could with France. Under those circumstances, the conduct of Portugal was in the highest degree dignified and honourable. She yielded, but she said she yielded only to superior force. What a contrast between her conduct and that if our own Government. Instead of using the language which became a British Ambassador in maintaining the rights of an ally who had brought upon herself an unjust demand by following our advice. Lord Cowley, under the instructions of the noble Earl in his communications with the French Minister, adopted the tone of one who can only
  "Bend low, and in a bondman's key
  With bated breath and whispering humbleness,"
  try to deprecate the anger of a master. And this was followed by something almost worse. When the French squadron was sent to Lisbon the noble Earl sent two British ships, and their instructions were to protect the persons and property of British subjects. I suppose the noble Earl thought that France would proceed to extremities, that France would use her naval force, and by actual hostilities compel Portugal to submit, and, therefore, he sent two British ships to be mere spectators of those hostilities, perhaps of the burning of Lisbon. After all that occurred, the noble Earl extorted from the Portuguese Government the admission that the good offices of Her Majesty's Government had not been without result. It is, no doubt, as represented by my noble Friend, a certificate of character, but as to what is the opinion of Portugal you will form a very bad judgment if you look merely to that official estimate. I am informed that in the debate in the Portuguese Cortes, the manner in which England was spoken of was most painful
  1460
  to those who value the character and reputation of this country. I am told that all political parties concurred in saying, "We complain less of France than we do of England, because on France we had no peculiar claim, but on England we had, and England has deserted us." I hear from authorities, which I cannot doubt, that the impression which those unfortunate transactions have produced throughout the continent of Europe is of the very worst description. I hear that in all foreign Courts, and especially in the Courts of the smaller Powers which have hitherto been accustomed to look up to England as a Power that could be safely relied on to assert the claims of right and justice when wrong and violence threatened, it is deemed a confession of weakness and an abandonment of that duty which this country hitherto has always felt bound to discharge. I am extremely glad that my noble Friend has brought the subject under the notice of your Lordships, and although he has not thought it right to propose a Motion which would test the opinion of the House—and I concur with him in that view—I ant glad to have had this opportunity of expressing my own opinion upon the question.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I am also very much obliged to the noble Lord who has brought this question forward, and I concur with the noble Earl who has just spoken in commending the judgment of the noble Lord in framing the Motion in such a manner as renders it impossible for the House to come to any conclusion on the merits of the question involved in it. I think the noble Lord has shown excellent judgment in so framing the Motion; but certainly if he had entertained the view which the noble Earl seems to entertain, that the course which the British Government has pursued has reflected discredit on this country, and lowered our character in Portugal and throughout Europe, I should have thought it his duty not to have contented himself with moving for a paper to which there is not the slightest objection, except what has been stated by my noble Friend, and which, in point of fact, is absolutely immaterial, but to have called on Parliament to pronounce a verdict against a Government which had so grossly neglected its duty. I listened with attention and some interest to the speech of the noble Lord (Lord Wodehouse), although that interest was somewhat diminished by the fact that on Satur-

  1461
  day last the greater portion of the noble Lord's speech might be read in a publication of a laudatory character with regard to everything and everybody, and singularly discriminating and candid in everything relating to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. After the speeches of my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) and my noble and learned Friend (Lord Kingsdown), who has for the first time addressed your Lordships, and who reminded me to-night of the triumphs which he achieved while he and I were Members of the other House, I confess I should have been perfectly satisfied to have left the question to those two speeches if it lied not been for some remarks which have fallen from the noble Earl who lies just sat down. My Lords, those who debate this question on the part of the Government labour under very considerable difficulties, because with the question of the conduct of the Government, which is alone properly under your Lordships' consideration, various other questions are complicated in regard to the conduct of the French and Portuguese Governments to each other, and the merits of the transactions out of which the immediate interventions of Her Majesty's Government arose. All the sympathies of Parliament and of the country are in favour of what is supposed to be the ease of Portugal. Here you have Portugal incited by England to take an active part in the suppression of the slave trade, exerting herself for that suppression, in doing so incurring the hostility of a powerful neighbour, and then deserted by the friend and ally whose instigation had caused the active part she had taken. That is a very plausible way of putting the question, and it enlists all the sympathies of Parliament and the country in favour of the State that so laudably exerts itself for the suppression of the slave trade and was so unfairly deserted by her ally. But, my Lords, that is not the case we have to argue. The question on which the decision of Parliament is to be taken is not whether the proceedings of France in regard to Portugal are such as to be altogether defended or supported—not whether the system of French emigration from the coast of Africa is or is not necessarily connected with the slave trade—but whether, under the circumstances in which Her Majesty's Government were placed, they did their duty between the two parties, and whether they took the course consistent with the honour
  1462
  and interests of this country. The difficulty of the position in which they were placed was increased by the fact that we have all along said and contended—and none more vehemently and successfully than the noble Lord—that the system of free emigration, as it was carried on with the best intentions by France, was inseparably and indissolubly connected with the revival of the slave trade. Nevertheless, we were compelled to admit the perfect right of France to carry on that traffic if she thought fit. We have no treaty with France against such a traffic; it is not in itself contrary to international law, or illegal; and, although we never ceased to contend that there was no distinction between this system of so-called free emigration and a bonâ fide slave trade—that is the purchase of persons formerly slaves, and carried off against their will—yet we could not but confess that we had no power or justification to interfere to prevent that traffic by France. We represented to the Government of the Emperor the cases that had arisen and the consequences likely to follow from that traffic, and I rejoice to say, that, partly owing to the prudent and conciliatory course taken by my noble Friend, the French Government were led to a conviction that we were right, and under that conviction the Emperor of the French took a course which must be gratifying to this country and favourable to the interests of humanity; and, my Lords, it is my confident belief that, if we had taken a different course—if we had taken the course pointed out by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), we should have interposed the greatest difficulty in the way of the conclusion to which time French Government came, and should have placed serious obstacles in the way of the abandonment of the traffic complained of. The question is, has England faithfully and duly performed her duty to her Ally—Portugal? I think that the noble Lord who commenced the debate began by admitting that no violation of our treaties with Portugal had occurred. [Lord WODEHOUSE: I admitted that a casus fœderis had not arisen.] That is to say, that Portugal had not, under her treaties with this country, the right to ask for the good offices of Her Majesty's Government under the circumstances that had arisen, much less to claim our armed intervention in her behalf. It would be under the treaty that Portugal would have claimed our good offices if the necessity had arisen, and under the same treaty that she would have claimed our

  1463
  armed intervention. The authority of the Prime Minister of Portugal himself has been quoted upon this point, and he distinctly stated in the Cortes, when he was charged with not applying to England, that he had not done so because in his judgment the casus fœderis had not arisen. We may, then, set aside every question in regard to any treaty obligation existing between us and Portugal. The question was one between Portugal and France, both of whom were on terms of amity and friendship with this country, and to both of whom in any difficulty that might arise Her Majesty's Government would be willing and ready to tender their good offices. But Portugal was not entitled to demand either our good offices or intervention, These transactions commenced in December, 1857, and from that time to the month of August, 1858, although much correspondence took place between Portugal and France, no single reference was made to this country by either Portugal or France with reference to any part of these transactions. Some noble Lords. have asked in the course of this debate why we did not take part in the negotiations at an earlier period? In the first place, the matter in dispute did not touch this country, because it was a difference between two independent countries, and neither of them asked for our interference; and in the next place, because, even if we were inclined to interfere, we had not been furnished with the information and evidence, without which we could not form a judgment. Nay, more, I assert that up to this moment we have not the means of forming a correct judgment on the whole of this transaction. We have not the French statement, or the results of the inquiry instituted by the Comié des Contentieux, to whom the case was referred, and which had pronounced an opinion seriatim on the points referred to it. If we had been called upon to act as arbitrators or mediators, there would have been much conflicting evidence on points essential to a just decision in the case, for it was admitted that if the French vessel at the time of the seizure was beyond the Portuguese waters cadit quæstio, and the Portuguese Government were guilty of a wrong. There was much contradictory evidence on other points, and that point with regard to the position of the vessel was not brought forward until a late period. Up to September no communication was made to us. The noble Earl says that this French vessel was not of a character
  1464
  to claim the privileges of a ship of war. But that point is at all events very questionable. The French Government assert that she was a French vessel—that she was, in fact, freighted by the French Government—that she had a French delegate on board, who was responsible for the conduct of the persons who carried on the traffic. Those were the statements of the French Government, and they were not denied. I say, then, that even if the vessel were within the limits of Portuguese waters, I would not go so far as to say that she was withdrawn from all interference of municipal law; but, admitting that she was within the Portuguese waters, it was only the municipal law she was violating, and not any treaty between Portugal and France. The comity of nations required not that she should be dealt with as a slaver, but that she should be given over to the French Government, and the matter made the subject of diplomatic negotiations. But supposing she had been carrying on this trade not under the sanction of the French Government, and supposing she had been in Portuguese waters, the Portuguese tribunals, by their own confession, did not take the course which they were bound to take. If she was not a slaver, they had no right to deal with her in the manner they did. If she was a slaver, they were bound to adjudicate on the case, not at Mozambique, but in the Prize Court at Loando. The course taken was utterly irreconcilable, under any circumstances, with the comity of nations, and absolutely contrary to international law. This case having occurred, and a long correspondence having taken place upon it, towards the latter end of August the French Government were found to be taking a decisive and energetic part in it, and the matter began to be serious. On the 18th of September, I think, Mr. Howard writes to us from Lisbon:—
  "The Marquis de Loulé begged me to point out more particularly to your Lordship that this was shown to be a case not of the engagement of free labourers, but of the actual purchase of slaves. His Excellency did not make any application to me for your Lordship's valuable assistance, but I feel persuaded that he would be very grateful should your Lordship be able to afford the Portuguese Government any aid in the treatment of the question with the French Government."
  By return of post, on the 25th of the same month, my noble Friend wrote back saying he should be happy, although not requested by the Portuguese Government, to offer the good offices of Her Majesty's

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  Government in the settlement of the matter in issue; and it was not till three or four days after he had done so that an application was made by the Portuguese Government for the employment of those good offices which he had already tendered. The noble Earl who has spoken last (Earl Grey) says, in dealing with the French Government we ought to have remonstrated with them, that we ought to have urged all the arguments that could be urged, to show the French Government that they were entirely in the wrong, and that Portugal was in the right. But, in order to show them that we ought to have been quite satisfied ourselves of it in the first instance. I do not think any person would be very likely to be accepted as a mediator between two contending parties, if he said to one of them, "You are entirely in the wrong, and the other party is entirely in the right, and, therefore, I write you to accept my good offices for the purpose of settling the dispute;" and if a course could have been devised so entirely calculated altogether to defeat the possibility of coming to a satisfactory conclusion, and to prevent the French Government listening to what we might have to say, it was that recommended by the wisdom and judgment of the noble Earl. But what did we do? We offered our good offices for the purpose of mediation. We have been told that a long despatch ought to have been addressed to Lard Cowley as to how he was to act. I think, knowing the character of Lord Cowley, my noble Friend acted much more wisely by informing him that we had offered our good offices in the matter, and leaving it to him, with the influence which he deservedly possesses at the French Court, to do what appeared to him right under the circumstances. It is assumed that Lord Cowley did nothing in the matter, except make a single representation to Count Walewski, the result of which was unsatisfactory. But during the whole time that Count Lavradio was in Paris he was engaged with Baron Paiva in negotiating with Count Walewski, and constantly in the presence and with the assistance of Lord Cowley, with the view to their arriving at a common understanding. And they undoubtedly came to a common understanding. They came to an agreement with regard to a mediation which, if it had been carried into effect, as has been admitted by the noble Lord who has brought this question under your Lordships' consideration, would have been a wise, ho-
  1466
  nourable, and satisfactory solution of the question. I thank him for that admission. But it is said the French Minister at Lisbon, either not having sufficient instructions or misconceiving his instructions, declared he could only deal with the question as to the amount of the indemnity to be offered, and not as to the legality of the seizure. All I can say is, that Count Walewski and Lord Cowley are at one on the Marquis de Lisle having mistaken his instructions. What did Mr. Howard do? When he was informed, on the part of the Portuguese Government, that the Marquis de Lisle had stated lie could only deal with the question of the indemnity, and not with that of the legality of the seizure, Mr. Howard said, very judiciously and wisely, that he had no instructions to enable him to meet that state of things; that that was not the way in which the case had been represented to him; but that, as the question had been put in that way, he—speaking for himself alone, and not for the Government he represented—would recommend an endeavour to be made with the view to an arrangement of the dispute. I think that under that state of circumstances no charge can be made against my noble Friend for not giving instructions in a case that could not be foreseen. I have always been of opinion, that when one party places his honour in the hands of another he is bound to place himself in the hands of that other person unrestrictedly and unreservedly. In the present case there was no treaty obligation in question, but from ancient friendship Portugal asked us what was best to be done. We advised them to accept the mediation that was offered, because it involved all that it was desirable to obtain; and Portugal not having asked our advice for four months, and then having refused to follow it, I say that as against England she has no real cause of complaint. The noble Earl who spoke last said something about England having had to submit to an insult, and of having lowered herself in the eyes of other countries. I know nothing of any insult to which England has been subjected in this matter. It was no question of hers; it was no question between her and France. What she did was, to give this disinterested advice to an ally as to the mode of extricating that ally from a difficulty; and if Portugal had taken that advice, the negotiation would have been conducted in a manner which Would have been satisfactory to all parties. Here is a case

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  presented of a vote of censure against the Government, though it has wisely not been put forward exactly in that form. The whole object in raising this discussion is to show that we have neglected our duty and lowered this country in the estimation of the world. My Lords, I say on the contrary that we had arrived at a point, late as it was before our intervention was sought, at which the matter was likely to have been brought to an honourable solution. It was only by an incomprehensible accident that that solution was interfered with, and that solution would still have been arrived at if Portugal had not repudiated our advice. I say more. I say that considering the difficult course which Her Majesty's Government had to pursue, I believe we adopted the course most consistent with prudence, most consistent with honour; we avoided entangling ourselves in a hostile controversy between Portugal and France,—a course of moderation and firmness by which we were enabled to hold the position we were bound to hold as the friend of both parties, and our moderation has had the effect not only of convincing France of the soundness of our arguments against her system of so-called free immigration, but has disposed her to allow fair play to her own reason, and to have yielded to argument and by the force of her own conviction that which she would never have yielded to unfriendly remonstrances pressed on her in a hostile spirit. Out of that difficulty, serious as it was, I believe we have come with honour to ourselves and advantage to the general peace of Europe; and until our conduct has been condemned by a vote of Parliament, which the noble Lord evidently does not think it desirable to ask at present, I shall be satisfied with the course we have pursued, and, if again placed in the same circumstances, I could rejoice to follow the same course, and to have it attended by the same results.
  LORD CRANWORTHsaid, that the noble Earl had stated that the main object of this Motion was to induce the House to express an opinion on the conduct of the Government; but he was apprehensive lest the result of the discussion should be that the House should seem to lay down general principles as to the law of Europe, which might seriously embarrass them on a future occasion. His noble and learned Friend (Lord Kingsdown) had said that there were two questions of international law material to be considered—one, whether the ship was taken in Portuguese waters;
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  and secondly, if in Portuguese waters, whether it was taken under circumstances which gave her an exemption from the fiscal or municipal laws of Portugal. But as to the first question, it appeared from all the inquiries on the spot, from the statement of the Portuguese authorities, and from the minute signed by the captain and French delegate themselves, that the vessel was at anchor within cannon range of the island; indeed, that point had not latterly been seriously brought forward. The second question was the real one, and he must extremely deprecate a silent acquiescence in such a doctrine of international law as the French authorities had laid down. He knew there were eminent jurists in France, and no doubt, before the French Government acted as it had done, it consulted the learned civilians of the Comité des Contentieux, and acted upon their advice. But it would be unreasonable that we should be bound by the unknown reports of foreign jurists. He could not even form an estimate of the value of their opinion without knowing the facts that were submitted to them. Here was a trading vessel—mark, not a Government vessel—from the Isle of Réunion, coming to get labourers from the African coast. By the French law no ship was to come from Bourbon or Réunion without complying with the regulations of the French Government, and in order to see that those regulations were observed, a French delegate was put on board. The ship then came within the waters of Portugal and violated its law. Was it protected from the jurisdiction of Portugal by having a French delegate on board? He protested that this doctrine was inconsistent with principle and not to be found in any work of international law. The consequences of such a law would be monstrous. The case of Captain Denman, which had been alluded to, was totally different; he was a Queen's officer, commanding a Queen's ship, and doing something which might be admitted, for the sake of argument, was unwarrantable, but which the Government adopted afterwards. It was therefore the same thing as though the Government hail previously authorized the act. Let them consider to what a preposterous length the matter would go if the principle contended for were admitted. Suppose we had a law here that iron should not be sold in this country except under certain restrictions, and a foreign

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  vessel came here to purchase iron; no doubt if our law were contravened we might confiscate the ship; but suppose there were an agent of a foreign Government on board, not in order to purchase the iron, but to take care that the captain of the ship should not violate certain other regulations of his own Government, would that prevent the ship being amenable to our law? As he had not seen the Report of the Comité des Contentieux, he could not positively say there might not be some principle suggested in it which had escaped his research; but he had not been able to discover, in any writer on international law, one opinion or instance to show that the presence of a Government delegate was a good reason for any exemption of this kind.
  LORD WENSLEYDALEsaid, that upon some parts of the case, as it appeared upon the documents laid before the Douse, different opinions might be entertained; but upon one there could be no possible difference, and that is, that the Government ought not to have taken up the cause of Portugal against France, and supported it to such an extent as to lead to war with that Power, unless there was a case on the part of our Ally which was clear beyond all possible doubt. Now, he had taken great care to look over all the documents, and he had attended to all the arguments on either side, and had looked into the authorities of international law, and after a good deal of reflection, he certainly could not see his way to the conclusion that the Portuguese Government had a clear case against the French Government. It appeared to him to be a very doubtful question. Supposing the Portuguese tribunal had jurisdiction over that vessel, he thought no fault could be found with its decision. There was evidence from which they might reasonably conclude that the captain of the ship was engaged in what might properly be called the slave trade. That word might be understood in different senses. The trade might be carried on with very different degrees of moral guilt. Slaves might be bought with a view of being carried away from their country, and kept in slavery—a hateful crime—they might be bought with a view of their being employed with their own consent or without it, as hired labourers, for a limited time. They might be bought by a benevolent person, with the view of immediate emancipation, and even this sort of purchase is within the words, but nut the spirit of the Act, imposing such
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  severe punishments on persons engaged in the slave trade; but every species of the purchase of slaves on the coast of Africa ought to be put a stop to, because it tends to encourage the practice of kidnapping and dealing in slaves in the interior, which impedes every other species of commerce and prevents the social improvement of that extensive country. The Court, he thought, might fairly decide upon the evidence, that the French captain meant to purchase slaves from the native chiefs, and so to carry on the slave trade in the less odious sense of that word, and which the Portuguese Government justly sought to repress. But the question was, not whether the Court decided properly or improperly, for that would be the subject of appeal to a higher Pourtuguese Court, but whether it had jurisdiction to decide with respect to this vessel at all. If the ship was seized out of the waters of the Portuguese settlement, that is beyond the range of cannon shot from the shore, the seizure was illegal, and the Court acted without jurisdiction altogether, and could not give itself jurisdiction, by finding that the seizure took place within these limits. That question would have to be settled, as all disputed questions are between Sovereign Powers, not by any tribunal of justice. This was the first objection raised by Count Walewski; but what he principally insisted upon was, "that the vessel was sent by the Government," and exempt from local jurisdiction on that ground. Ships of war are undoubtedly privileged by the tacit consent of all civilized nations. The noble Lord who commenced that debate had referred to Wheaton's work, as establishing that exemption, but confining it to ships of war. If he looked farther alto its pages, he would find that the reference there was not to ships of war alone, but to public ships. If a public ship, not armed, but under the command of an officer of the Crown, were sent to a country for the purpose of obtaining provisions to supply an army, and the municipal law of that country forbade the export of provisions under the penalty of forfeiture, would that ship be liable to be seized and forfeited under the local jurisdiction of the country? He apprehended it would require a great deal of authority to show that it could. It would, he conceived, be protected as a public vessel; and it seemed, also, that if the ship was sent, and notice given that it was sent by a special order from the Sovereign for any particular purpose, it was not in

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  the power of the municipal tribunal to deal with it. He had been struck by the argument used in an able article in the Law Magazine, written upon the present question, that if a Sovereign gave a positive order for a particular thing to be done, the person executing that order in a foreign country was not responsible to any tribunal for so doing, and the authority of a decision of Mr. Justice Story in the American Court was cited. He could not positively say, but he bad thought much on the subject, and he was not at all satisfied that this was not a vessel acting under the orders of the French Government. He was much disposed to agree with his noble and learned Friend (Lord Kingsdown); but, at all events, the question, at the least, was involved in considerable doubt, and he must say, that in his opinion it would have been very impolitic to make it a ground for interference on our part, which might end in plunging the country into a war.
  THE EARL OF ST. GERMANSconcurred in the opinion respecting this case which had been expressed in the course of the correspondence by Lord Cowley—namely, that it would have been more in accordance with international polity that the Charles et Georges should have been allowed to go free, and that the question should afterwards have been treated diplomatically. He was not prepared to impute blame to the Government for the course they had taken in this matter. The original transaction was involved in so much doubt and obscurity that it was difficult indeed to judge of the merits. Thus, for example, the vessel appeared to have been chased into the bay of Conducia by a Portuguese sloop-of-war, and it was by no means an admitted fact, even then, that she was seized in Portuguese waters. Considering all the doubts which existed in reference to the legality of the capture, he thought that any strong language by Her Majesty's Government towards France, in support of the view taken by the Portuguese Government, would have been quite out of place. It was, perhaps to be regretted that after the mistake committed by the Marquis de Lisle the noble Earl did not urge upon the French Government the propriety of acting upon their original convictions, and of accepting mediation with regard to the question both of right and of indemnity; and he thought the French Government would have taken a more generous course if they had accepted the mediation of a
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  friendly Power. At the same time, he could not but congratulate the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) on the great result which had been accomplished, since the attention of the Emperor was no sooner called to the subject than, feeling the danger of encouraging this system of negro immigration, he spontaneously resolved to put an end to it. Such being the case, causes of dispute like those which had just been discussed could not again arise between the French and Portuguese Governments.
  LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he should not press his Motion, being satisfied with the discussion which had taken place on the subject. The noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) and the noble Earl at the head of the Government had spoken of him as though he had recommended the use of petulant language and angry remonstrances towards France. He assured their Lordships that he should have thought such language as much out of place in this as in every case submitted to diplomatic arrangement. Then the noble Earl the Secretary of State said he had treated the principle of arbitration very cavalierly. On the contrary, he thought this principle of the utmost value, and one ground of his complaint was that the Government had not insisted to a greater extent upon its adoption.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
  House adjourned at a quarter-past Ten o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.