Sitting of 5 May 1856

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Registration of Voters (Scotland); Industrial and Provident Societies; Transfer of Works (Ireland); Pawnbrokers.

LEGAL EDUCATION—QUESTION.
MR. NAPIERsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of state for the Home Department whether any steps had been taken by the Government to carry into effect the recommendations for the improvement of legal education which were contained in the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Inns of Court?
SIR GEORGE GREYsaid, he felt that the recommendations in question were entitled to very great weight: but at the same time he could not say that any step had yet been taken by Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of carrying them into effect.

POSTAL COMMUNICATION TO BANDON— QUESTION.
VISCOUNT BERNARDsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Treasury whether it was intended to make any alteration in the present mode of conducting the postal communication in the county of Cork, and to make use of the Cork and Bandon Railway for the conveyance of the mails?
MR. WILSONsaid, that, as he had already stated during the course of the last Session, the Cork and Bandon Railway Company demanded for the conveyance of the mails along their line a sum which was considered disproportioned to the service to be performed, and the line could not, therefore, be used for that purpose.

NIGHT COFFEE-SHOPS—QUESTION.
MR. BRADYsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he intended introducing any measure in accordance with the recommendation of that part of the Report of the Committee (which sat in 1853) "to examine into the system under which public-houses, hotels, &c., were regulated" which related to night coffee-shops, with the view to their being in future closed at proper and stated hours, many of which were now open through the night as harbours of refuge for abandoned characters of both sexes?
SIR GEORGE GREYsaid, that Report had referred to a variety of matters, among which was the subject mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. In order to carry out the recommendations contained in that Report, it would be necessary to obtain an Act of Parliament, and, as yet, no measure for the purpose had been prepared.

DOLLY-SHOPS AND LEAVING-HOUSES— QUESTION.
MR. BRADYsaid, he wished to know if the attention of the hon. Secretary to the Treasury had been called to a report of what had been stated by Sir Robert Carden in the Police Court over which he presided. The hon. Gentleman, had, on a previous occasion, denied that Sir Robert Carden had made a communication to the Government upon the subject of certain books which he had detained belonging to the keeper of one of those leaving-shops, and since that denial Sir Robert Garden had again reiterated his statement.
MR. WILSON,in reply said, his attention had been directed to the police reports on Saturday last by the hon. Gentleman, and it appeared from them that Sir Robert Carden did state that he had communicated with the Home Department with regard to this subject, but when he (Mr. Wilson) answered the hon. Gentleman's question the other evening, the only thing he knew was that the solicitor to the Board had not, up to within an hour of that time, received any communication from Sir Robert Carden. But that morning he had made inquiry, and found it was quite true what Sir Robert Carden had stated, that he had made a communication, but that fact was unknown both to that Gentleman and to himself. As to the second question put by the hon. Gentleman with regard to unlicensed pawnbrokers, he stated that he had already a Bill prepared on the subject.

RIOTS IN DEMERARA—QUESTION.
MR. MAGUIREsaid, he begged to ask whether it was true that, in consequence of fanatical harangues made in the streets of Georgetown, Demerara, by a stranger, named Orr, from another country, riots and disturbances had taken place, and the persons and properties of peaceable inhabitants had been injured; and if so, whether any steps had been taken to prevent a recurrence of such scenes?
MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, he was sorry to say that it was quite true that outrages of a serious and disgraceful nature had been perpetrated in that colony, on the part of the lower classes of the coloured population, directed against the persons and property of a very valuable class of the community, the Portuguese, who had lately emigrated in considerable numbers from Madeira. It was also true that those
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disturbances originated in harangues made by a person who had rendered himself notorious in other places against the Roman Catholic religion; but it was perfectly well known, that although those harangues were made the pretext for those disturbances they were not the real cause. The real cause, he had no doubt, was the jealousy entertained by the lower classes of the coloured population against the Portuguese emigrants, for their superior good conduct, which had thrown the retail trade of the colony almost entirely into their hands. The Governor, with the assistance of the Council, had taken the most prompt and effectual means to suppress those outrages and to punish the perpetrators, and in considering measures which he trusted would prevent their recurrence. The Government had to acknowledge the assistance rendered by a French and a Dutch vessel of war, which happened to be in those waters at the time and rendered very prompt and useful assistance in repressing those outrages.

CONVEYANCE OF TROOPS FROM THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.
CAPTAIN SCOBELLsaid, he wished to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if it had yet been determined whether some of Her Majesty's line-of-battle ships, frigates, or smaller vessels of war, now lying unemployed in the home ports or in those abroad, should assist in embarking and bringing away from the Crimea the troops, or cannon, munitions of war, and other stores, being public property?
SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, that two or three vessels of war had been ordered to the Crimea to bring home troops; but it was not intended that ships of war should be employed to any extent in that service.

SOLDIERS' KITS LOST IN THE CRIMEA— QUESTION.
CAPTAIN SCOBELLsaid, he would now bog to ask the hon. Under Secretary for War whether the soldiers who, without blame on their parts, lost their kits at the time of landing in the Crimea, or at any subsequent period, had been or would be allowed compensation for the same?
MR. FREDERICK PEELsaid, that the soldiers who had lost their kits in the Crimea, without any fault on their parts, would be entitled to compensation for that loss.

THE WHITSUNTIDE RECESS— QUESTION.
SIR JOHN TROLLOPEsaid, he wished to put a question to the noble Lord at the head of the Government with respect to the adjournment of the House for the Whitsuntide recess. He believed the House would receive with great satisfaction the announcement that the adjournment was to extend from Friday next to the Monday week following; and he wished to know whether the noble Lord would give his assent to such an arrangement?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he only proposed that the House should adjourn from Friday to Friday, and he thought it would be a pity that they should at that period of the Session lose a Friday evening. But, at the same time, if the House out-voted the Government upon the subject, the Government would be competent to submit to their decision.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES —QUESTION.
SIR BULWER LYTTONsaid, he had already given notice of a Motion with respect to the correspondence recently laid before the House connected with Central America. Before, however, he moved the Resolution on this subject which was at present on the paper, he would ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government, first, whether any answer had been received to the proposal of arbitration submitted to the Government of the United States; and, secondly, if that answer had not been received, whether the noble Lord was of opinion that the discussion of the question next Friday might be premature, or in any way prejudicial to the progress of negotiations? It would depend upon the answer of the noble Lord whether he would go on with his Motion on Friday or, in order to give greater time for the reply of the United States' Government, postpone the discussion until after Whitsuntide.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, Her Majesty's Government have not yet received any reply to the proposal made to the United States' Government, that the questions connected with Central America should be referred to arbitration, though I should hope that an answer will very shortly be received, either consenting or giving reasons for declining that proposal. Of course, it is not for me to presume to throw out any suggestions in order to influence
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hon. Members in the performance of their Parliamentary duty, but still, as the hon. Baronet has had the goodness to submit his views, I am bound to say that I think, with a view to national interests in a question pending between this country and the Government of another country, that while a proposition, such as that of referring the dispute to arbitration is yet unanswered, those national interests will be best consulted if this House abstains from entering into a discussion of a question of this delicate nature until the answer of the United States' Government, one way or the other, has been received. If, therefore, the hon. Baronet, in the exercise of his discretion, should postpone his Motion to a later period after the holidays, I confess I think he would be exercising a sound judgment in the matter.
SIR BULWER LYTTON: Sir, after the observations of the noble Lord, I shall postpone my Motion until after the Whitsuntide holidays, but I earnestly hope that no very great delay will take place in the discussion of the question.

THE TURKISH TARIFF—QUESTION.
MR. WISEsaid, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether there was any prospect of such a revision of the tariff, appended to the commercial treaty with Turkey of the 16th of August, 1838, as might lead to the abolition of the duty of twelve per cent on grain and pulse exported from Turkey to this country; and what was the existing position of the British merchants with reference to the exportation of grain from the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, there was concluded between this country and Turkey, in 1838, a convention regulating the duties of export and import in Turkey. With regard to export, the ancient duty of three per cent was confirmed and continued. Previously to that there had been a great number of fluctuating and oppressive internal duties levied upon Turkish produce, bought by British subjects for exportation—duties varying in amount and liable to arbitrary fluctuation. Those rates were commuted at that time for a fixed duty of nine per cent, which, added to the fixed duty of three per cent, made a total of twelve per cent; but instead of leaving that export duty of nine per cent to be levied ad valorem upon the fluctuating value of the commodity, either at the port of embarkation or the place of purchase, it was agreed

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that a fixed tariff should be established declaring for seven years the value of each commodity, upon which value the nine percent was to be levied. This tariff has been revised from time to time, and at the present moment the two Governments might, by the existing agreement, again revise it; but Her Majesty's Government has not thought it expedient to enter into that revision while prices were artificially raised by a state of war. The hon. Member is too well informed on these subjects to render it necessary for me to point out to him the circumstances which would not render that revision at the present moment particularly desirable. With regard to the Danubian provinces, I have to state that they regulate their own Customs' duties, and I believe at present there is no other duty levied upon the export of grain from those provinces except the duty of three per cent. The Turkish tariff does not apply to the Danubian provinces.
MR. ROEBUCKsaid, he was induced by certain reports, which had obtained circulation on the subject, to ask the noble Lord if the Turkish Government ever offered to Her Majesty's Government to do away with the internal duties upon the transport of goods?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I am not aware that any offer has been made by the Turkish Government on the subject, except one for the commutation established by the treaty I have just mentioned.

THE WHITSUNTIDE RECESS—QUESTION.
SIR JOHN TROLLOPEsaid, that seeing the course taken by the hon. Baronet near him (Sir B. Lytton) left Friday next in the hands of the Government, he would beg to ask the noble Lord for an explicit answer as to whether he would not accede to the adjournment of the House from Friday till Monday week?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONwas understood to say, that if hon. Members wished to adjourn until the Monday they must divide the House on the subject.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—QUESTION.
MR. HENLEYsaid, he would beg to ask what business the Government proposed to take on Friday next?
SIR GEORGE GREYsaid, they would go on with the Committee on the Police Bill.
MR. HENLEY: And if that should not occupy the whole night?
SIR G. GREY: In that case my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate
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will move the second reading of the Scotch Education Bill.
MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, that as Friday next had been restored to the Government, he thought it not improper upon his part to claim that day from them for the consideration of the Oath of Abjuration Bill. He had waited very patiently from time to time, for a day on which he could proceed with that measure, and as Friday seemed to be going a begging to some extent, he wished to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government whether he would place that day at his disposal?
SIR WILLIAM CLAYsaid, that before the noble Lord answered that question, he felt bound to put in his claim to that day for the consideration of the Church Rates Bill.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that Friday had been already engaged by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department for the Police Bill. He would endeavour to give his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) another day for the consideration of the Oath of Abjuration Bill. He thought that Bill, relating as it did to their own internal constitution, had a prior claim on their notice to the Church Rates measure.

DISBANDING OF THE ARMY AND MILITIA —QUESTION.
LORD ROBERT GROSVENORsaid, he would beg to inquire of the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government whether any plan was under consideration for the gradual disbanding of the army and militia, so as not to throw upon the country a great amount of unemployed labour at one period, as was done in 1814 and 1815, and thus to incur similar distress to that which was prevalent at that time?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that of course Her Majesty's Government would endeavour to arrange those matters in such a manner as would be least inconvenient to the community at large. His noble Friend must, however, remember that the militia could not be kept embodied for any very considerable time after the conclusion of peace. It was desirable also, with a view to agricultural employment, that the men forming the militia regiments should be disembodied at such a time as would enable them to fall back into the natural course of their industry in their respective counties about the time of harvest. With respect to the army, that portion which was abroad would not return for several months to

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come, and then would come to this country in successive detachments, so that no difficulty would arise from the reductions that it might be necessary to make in the respective regiments.

THE GENERAL THANKSGIVING DAY.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Mr. Speaker, I rise to make a proposal which I feel confident the House will agree to, namely, that the thanks of this House be given to the Rev. Thomas Garnier, who preached before us yesterday. I am sure that those who had the advantage of hearing that admirable discourse must have appreciated the sound judgment, good taste, and good feeling with which that sermon was delivered, and that the House will only be doing its duty in awarding a vote of thanks to their rev. chaplain for the same.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to the Reverend THOMAS GARNIER, Chaplain to this House, for the Sermon preached by him yesterday before this House at Saint Margaret's, Westminster, and that he be desired to print the same.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.
MR. EVELYN DENISONsaid, he rose to propose that the thanks of the House be returned to Her Majesty for Her gracious communication to the House upon the subject of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris on the 30th of March last. He craved the indulgence of the House, of which he had great need, for the performance of this task. He would promise to compress what he had to say into a narrow compass, and he would endeavour to avoid all topics calculated to excite unnecessary difference, being anxious to conciliate for his Motion the largest possible amount of general accord and support. It was but two short years, however replete those years may have been with great events and deep anxieties—it was but two years since a communication was made from the Throne to that House, calling upon the House for its support on the out-break of the war. At that time, how dark and uncertain did the future appear! He would ask hon. Gentlemen to go back to the time when the first detachment of Guards sailed for Malta. How various, then, were the speculations of men! Some said, "You are going to engage in a war, of which the youngest man now living will, perhaps, not see the conclusion:" others said, "Are you going to desert your native element, and to
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engage in a contest on land with a nation that possesses 1,200,000 trained soldiers?" Others, again, were satisfied, "That the extent of our operations would be the establishment of an entrenched camp for the defence of Constantinople at the last extremity." If, at that period, some one had appeared amongst us, possessing a power of penetrating the secrets of futurity, and if that person had said, "No, that is not the destiny of your army; that army is destined, in conjunction with the army of France, not to establish an entrenched camp at Constantinople, but to throw itself boldly on the enemy's shores, to engage the redoubtable army of Russia in its chosen position, to fight two great battles, to gain two great victories, to beleaguer the stronghold of Sebastopol, and then, when all question of surprise was at an end, to engage the enemy in a desperate and protracted struggle; your army shall endure great sufferings, which shall only serve to exhibit in stronger relief its heroic endurance, and after a dreadful conflict, and not on the first assault, the devoted fortress shall fall; you shall capture 3,800 pieces of cannon—that great fleet which has so long been the terror of the East shall sink beneath the waves; in the North, the strong fortress of the Aland Islands shall fall into your hands; you shall sweep the northern seas; you shall carry terror to the walls of St. Petersburg; and, at length, after two years, a peace shall be concluded at Paris, by which all the great objects of the war shall be accomplished and ample security be taken for the future"—had, he said, at that time such a prediction been made, who would have given it credence? Who would not have said, "May it indeed be so, and God's name be praised." And now, when that, and more than that, has been accomplished, shall we regard that, which in the prospect appeared so precious, with indifference? Shall we undervalue the great exploits of our army and navy? Shall we be slow in expressing our thanks to the great Disposer of events? When he said that this, and more than this, had been accomplished, he did not speak of the success of the British fleet in the Sea of Azoff and the capture of the forts, showing how long was the arm and how far the reach of the British navy. He spoke rather of the moral and political results which had been achieved. They had broken the great alliance of the North—that alliance which held, not only the words, but the very

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thoughts of men in subjection through great part of Europe down to the heel of Italy. In the North they had shaken the hand of Russia from off the throat of Sweden. If Russia had been allowed, not only to establish herself on the Aland Islands, but to accomplish her darling object of establishing a harbour and erecting a fortress in the North Sea, Sweden would have been fixed in a vice, of which Russia held the screw, and the independence of Sweden was gone. What use had Sweden made of her restored animation? She had entered into a treaty with France and England, which had given a most effectual security against the further progress of Russia in that quarter. Among all that had been accomplished, none, in his opinion, was of greater importance or of more precious significance than this alliance between Sweden and the Western Powers. The late Emperor of Russia, the aggressor in this war, sunk under the anxieties and labours which he had brought upon himself; they had heard these remarkable words from his successor—that the public opinion of Europe had pronounced against them, and it was time to withdraw from the contest. New words, these, to be heard in the Halls of Moscow. New, indeed, this recognition of public opinion, and this concession to its power. It required no small amount of moral courage in an Emperor of Russia to give them utterance. They gave indications of moderation and of wisdom, which were good auguries for the happiness of his own subjects, and, considering the leading part which he was destined to play on the theatre of the world, they were good auguries for the happiness of mankind. He had said that the great objects of the war had been accomplished. Now what, he would ask, was the great object of the war? It was to secure the independence of Turkey and to take a pledge for the peace of Europe for the future. What was the great danger which menaced Turkey? It was the strong fortress of Sebastopol and the overwhelming fleet of Russia in the Black Sea. Sebastopol has fallen, not to be restored; the fleet has sunk beneath the waves, not to emerge from them again. The Black Sea has been neutralised; Turkey has been received under the common law of Europe; and the independence of Turkey has been guaranteed by the great Powers. All this had been effected by the exertions of the Allies. But the Sultan
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himself, of his own motion, had done an important act towards invigorating the resources of his own empire. He had put an end to all degrading distinctions among his subjects; he had granted equal laws to all denominations of his people; he had raised the Christians to that just position which they ought to hold. Those were great, important, and generous reforms; and any hon. Gentleman who had applied himself to the papers which were before the House could not fail to see how large a part in effecting those great reforms was due to the well-established influence of our Ambassador at Constantinople. Severe things had been said lately of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, but the House was generous and just, and would not close its eyes to the important services which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had rendered to his country. There was another point of no small importance which it was necessary to refer to. It was contained in the twentieth Article of the treaty, and was called the rectification of the frontier between Turkey and Russia. He liked the word "rectification." It was not a very common word. It was a word which had the same signification in English and in French. It seemed to him to imply something more than to correct the line of demarcation, and to mark out a good road from one point to another. It appeared to him to contain in it something like an acknowledgment of redress—something like a moral and material compensation to Turkey. Such a word was rather a new word, employed in a treaty between Russia and Turkey, and, if it implied, what he was happy to acknowledge, wisdom and moderation on the part of the Emperor of Russia, it at the same time implied, in significant terms, what the strength had been, which had been engaged in this contest. These things had been accomplished by England and her Allies. First and foremost by France, next by Sardinia. Our alliance with France had been proved by severe trials, by some reverses and by great successes. He trusted that the close of the war had drawn the links of the alliance more closely and intimately between the two countries. France and England had at other times learnt each to know how great was the power of the other; they had learnt to respect each other. This was the first time in history that they had learnt to trust each other; and great results had flowed from this confidence—this confidence which was mainly due to the exact and scrupulous good faith

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with which the Emperor of the French had discharged every obligation which he had entered into with this country. He must be allowed to say one word with regard to Sardinia, a country not equal in extent of territory or in power of resources to either of those with which she was associated, but inferior to neither in heart or in spirit. She had shown herself worthy to stand by their side, both in the battle-field and at the council table. He congratulated the able statesman who presided over the affairs of Sardinia on the success of his policy. He rejoiced that the voice of Sardinia had been heard on the subject of Italy at the Conferences at Paris. They knew that Sardinia would countenance no excesses and no extravagance. Her voice would be for well-regulated liberty and constitutional government. If for a single moment he might venture, instead of speaking in his own humble name, to speak in the name of the House of Commons, he would say that England would never forget that it was at the moment of her sharpest trial, when other nations stood by and looked on, that Sardinia cast her lot into this struggle, and that Sardinia had earned for herself the firm good will and the lasting friendship of England. Speaking for himself, he could not hesitate to say that this peace was a good and an honourable peace. It was true it had not been received with any great exultation or enthusiasm by the country. The truth was that the country was so confident in her resources, that having made great exertions, and having brought her army and her navy to the point of perfection at which they now existed, and feeling herself more ready to carry on the war than at the moment when it commenced, the country was comparatively indifferent whether the war should be carried on or whether peace should be concluded. But if the noble Lord at the head of the Government rightly represented the feeling of the country last year, when he proposed to carry the war with vigour to a successful conclusion, he believed the noble Lord no less truly represented all that was rational and solid in the country in granting to it, at the earliest moment consistent with its honour, and the accomplishment of the objects in view, the inestimable blessing of peace. He believed the country would accept the peace with joy and satisfaction, and that that satisfaction would increase from day to day. He trusted the House would
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justly reflect the opinion of the country upon this point. He was very anxious to keep faith with the House, and he should be most unwilling to travel into collateral matters; but there was one point which he could not entirely pass over—he meant the point which referred to a question of what might be called arbitration, or the mediation of friendly Powers in cases of difference arising in future between nations. He regretted that one of the hon. Members for Manchester (Mr. Bright) and one of the hon. Members for the West Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Cobden) should not be present, and he still more deplored the causes of their absence. That particular clause of the treaty would, he was sure, receive their cordial approval and their warm support. It appeared to him, by giving time for angry passions to cool and for reflection to operate, to throw round peace an additional bulwark, and to set a new landmark in the progress of civilisation and humanity. Our thanks for this, as well as for many other objects accomplished by the treaty, were mainly due to the talents and perseverance of our chief Plenipotentiary, Lord Clarendon. Those qualities of the noble Lord had received a distinguished compliment before the assembled delegates of Europe in the Hall of the Tuileries, and he was sure that the House of Commons would not be slow to mark its sense of the services which Lord Clarendon had performed to his country. He would not enter upon other points connected with this treaty. He had already said he thought the peace a good and honourable peace. The noble Lord at the head of the Government, in carrying the war to a successful issue, had had his great reward. He believed that the people of England would receive from his hands with equal satisfaction the peace which was now offered to them, and in the confidence that the House would reflect the general sentiment, and cordially thanking them for the attention which they had bestowed upon him, he asked, not without confidence, their support to the Motion which he had the honour to propose.
MR. H. HERBERTsaid, that in seconding the Address which had just been so ably moved by the hon. Member for Malton, he could assure the House that he deeply felt the necessity of asking their indulgence, as the only claim which he could put forward, was not that he was able to say anything worthy of the occasion, but that he was not in the habit of

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trespassing upon their attention for any length of time, He would endeavour to compress his observations into as small a compass as was consistent with the duty which he had undertaken. His hon. Friend (Mr. E. Denison) had said, that the peace recently concluded at Paris had not been received by this country with the enthusiasm with which peace had been received on former similar occasions. He quite agreed with him in that remark; but he believed that the want of anxiety for peace and the absence of enthusiasm when it was attained, did not spring from any well-founded belief that the terms were unfavourable or not satisfactory; there were a variety of causes which produced those feelings. In the first place, there was a general conviction throughout the country that if the war had continued, our army, which was now in a most admirable state of order and discipline, would have added largely to the laurels which it had already so abundantly gained. The people of this country also believed that, being released from the arduous and terrible duties of the siege, our army would have been able at last to meet the enemy in the open field, and thereby give more distinguishing proofs of its powers than had hitherto been possible. They likewise believed, that at the commencement of the war, we were unprovided with the specific means of attack which the peculiar nature of the naval warfare required. They also believed, that if the war had continued, a very different result would have occurred in the ensuing campaign. Those were the main causes, in his opinion, of the want of enthusiasm, but he would submit to hon. Members that when such was the temper of the nation, it was the duty of the Government and all who regulated public affairs most scrupulously to ascertain how far the necessity still existed for continuing a war, upon which we had been forced to enter. He confessed, that when he read the accounts of the state of the army in the East, and when he saw on a recent occasion that magnificent armament which the energy and foresight of Her Majesty's Government had prepared to carry on the struggle, he could not get rid of a feeling of regret, that in a future campaign opportunity should not be afforded to show to the world what the fully developed resources and the fully aroused spirit of England could achieve. He, therefore, submitted, that that was exactly the frame of mind when the discipline of self-examination
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should be applied, and they should most seriously consider whether the objects of the war had been attained. At the moment when they were inclined to something like arrogant self-confidence, they should remember the chances of war, that "the race was not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," and beware lest, by continuing the strife when peace was possible, they might forfeit the support of that great Being by whom they had been enabled to bring the contest to a successful termination. To enable them to consider the subject, they must go back to the years which preceded the commencement of the war. Partly by treaties which gave rise to indefinite claims, partly by constant interference, Russia had obtained such an ascendancy over Turkey, that it became manifest that at some period or other the complicated web which was wound round Turkey must be cut by the swords of the Western Powers, unless they were prepared to see the Ottoman territory absorbed bit by bit by her gigantic neighbour, and that glorious capital, Constantinople, fall under a Power which would have given her a preponderance that would have rendered the independence of the west of Europe impossible. Things, however, were brought to a crisis by an aggression on the part of Russia. War ensued, which was commenced by the allied Governments, with a declaration that they sought no new territorial aggrandisement for themselves. The great object of the war was stated to be the defence of the integrity of Turkey. It was impossible for any man to say that that object, at all events, had not been attained. The events of the war had now become matter of history. It was stated on a recent occasion by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) that there were three modes in which Russia might attack Turkey, Upon all those points the enemy had been driven back. The heroic gallantry of the Turks, assisted by some of our own countrymen, at the siege of Silistria, drove the enemy back from the Danube. The gallantry of our army, with the assistance of our Allies, carried Sebastopol, and stayed Russian aggression in the Black Sea. And the gallantry of General Williams and our other fellow-countrymen at Kars had arrested the march of the Russian troops in Asia Minor, concerning which such great apprehensions had been entertained. He believed that those apprehensions were exaggerated, He did

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not think it to be so easy as some imagined for Russia to menace Constantinople from that quarter. No Russian General in his senses would advance by that line to Constantinople so long as an enemy had possession of the sea. But had it not been for the gallant defence of Kars by General Williams, Russia would have extended her conquests in Asia Minor, and would have been enabled to set up a claim in consequence for better terms at Paris. The gallantry and fortitude of General Williams had been alluded to the other night in the debate on the fall of Kars; but he thought hon. Members had underrated the enormous advantages derived from protracting the defence of that fortress, which rendered it impossible for the Russian armies to spread over a larger field in Asia Minor. Having provided for the present defence of Turkey, it became important that the system of aggression which had been pursued by Russia should no longer be allowed to exist. And on this part of the subject the Allies had been fully as successful as in the other. He did not propose to discuss what political objects in Europe might be necessary at the present time. He did not wish to allude to those political changes which many hon. Members might wish to see. He could not say that the political state of many countries in Europe was not exceedingly unsatisfactory, but the rectification of those evils did not form part of the object of the late war. It might be desirable, and he for one most heartily wished, that a different state of things should exist in Italy. It might also be desirable that the kingdom of Poland should again exist, and he for one should be glad to see that ancient kingdom restored. But he did not think that any hon. Gentleman had a fair ground for saying that a peace was not satisfactory because it did not provide for those changes, when the main design with which we had commenced the war and formed an alliance with other countries did not comprise these objects. Some might ask how the safety of Turkey was provided for by this treaty? Turkey was now admitted into the European system, and her integrity and her independence was guaranteed by the whole of Europe, as far as any political objects could be guaranteed or secured. It would now be just as impossible for Russia to interfere with or to attack Turkey, as for any powerful state of Europe to attack a weaker neighbour. That protectorate over the Christians
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in Turkey which had enabled Russia to interfere in the internal concerns of Turkey had ceased. The Black Sea was neutralized and that splendid fleet which had carried terror to Constantinople a few months ago was now beneath the waves, and the Emperor of Russia was bound never more to rebuild it. The arrangements relative to the Black Sea, which formed the subject of a convention between Russia and Turkey, were eminently satisfactory. It was impossible to say that for the suppression of piracy and the enforcement of Customs' regulations, Russia ought not to have some vessels of war in the Black Sea. But these vessels were to be limited to ten of a certain size, and Turkey was to have the same number, so that there would be an equality of force between the two Powers. Then, England, France, Austria, and Sardinia were empowered to station two small vessels of war at the mouth of the Danube, so that on any sudden emergency occurring there would be eighteen vessels of the allied Powers in the Black Sea for ten of Russia. Then, again, the Emperor of Russia had also agreed not to establish or maintain any military-maritime arsenals in the Black Sea, the principal of which we had destroyed. [Ironical cries of "Hear, hear!"] He did not say anything as to fortifications, but he referred only to naval and military arsenals. There was a declaration in one of the protocols with reference to one of these arsenals which did not lie in the Black Sea—he alluded to Nicholaieff, and which the relative position of the Allies and the enemy scarcely gave us, a claim to interfere with, without trying the result of another campaign. The Plenipotentiary of Russia remarked upon the maintenance of Nicholaieff:—
"The Emperor, his august master, on acceding with sincerity to the propositions of peace firmly resolved, strictly to carry out all the engagements resulting from them; but that Nicholaieff, being situated far from the shore of the Black Sea, respect for her dignity would not permit Russia to allow a principle solely applicable to the coast to be extended to the interior of the empire."
He thought that a very reasonable and unanswerable argument in the relative state of the armies of the belligerent Powers. But the Plenipotentiary of Russia added—
"The security of and watching over the coasts required, moreover, that Russia should have, as had been admitted, a certain number of light vessels in the Black Sea, and that if she consented to give up the ship-building yards of Nicholaieff, she would be compelled to establish others in some

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other point of her southern possessions; that, in order at once to provide for his engagements and for the requirements of the naval service, the Emperor intends only to authorise the construction at Nicholaieff of the vessels of war mentioned in the basis of the negotiation."
The First Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, and, after him, the other Plenipotentiaries, considered that declaration satisfactory. The Earl of Clarendon then inquired of the first Plenipotentiary of Russia whether he would agree to the insertion of this declaration in the protocol. After having replied in the affirmative, Count Orloff added,
"That, in order to prove the sincerity of his intentions the Emperor had entrusted him to demand a free passage through the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for the two ships of the line which alone are now at Nicholaieff, and which would have to proceed to the Baltic as soon as peace was concluded."
So far as a guarantee could be given, he thought we had security that for the future those engagements would be carried out. The freedom of the Danube was secured. An important point had been conceded by the rectification of the frontier at the mouth of the Danube. The House, however, would form a very inadequate idea of the importance of that concession if they measured it by the actual area of the territory which had been yielded. The line that had been drawn clearly excluded Russia, not only from all concern in the mouths of the Danube but also to a very considerable extent up the river Pruth; indeed, they were excluded from all that part which being accessible to gunboats, would have left the Russians a secure place of refuge for a force that had been used with great effect during the Danubian campaign. As a further proof of the importance of that cession he need only remind the House of the celebrated siege of Ismail, and of the words addressed by Prince Potemkin to General Suwaroff seventy years ago, "Vous prendrez Ismail; mais à quel prix?" A phrase which sufficiently showed the sense entertained by Russia of the importance of what was involved in the concession and which would be a strong barrier against future agression. The agreement which Russia had entered into with regard to Bomarsund it was unnecessary for him to dwell upon; but he ventured to submit that the agreements which had been come to and the guarantees which had been given had fully and fairly accomplished the objects of the war—that they secured, as far as treaties could secure, that those interferences
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on the part of Russia of which we had had so much reason to complain should not be repeated; and when he reflected upon the terms of peace which a short time ago many persons thought would have been admissible, and at the result which had now been obtained through the firmness and energy of the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown and his colleagues, he considered that the Government were entitled to the gratitude of the country. The noble Lord at the head of the Government might fairly claim the glory of having taken the helm at a time of enormous difficulties and discouragements, and of having brought the country through an arduous struggle to a satisfactory and triumphant issue. In conclusion, he would only glance for a moment at the attitude in which this country now stood. It might be true that the country accepted peace not with any great enthusiasm, and that she was as ready for war as for peace. She had, indeed, no occasion for enthusiasm, for she had not been relieved from any pressing danger near her own shores, but she had been engaged in a distant contest in which she had fully succeeded. She had carried that contest through—more especially the latter portion of it—with unexampled vigour, and she would be ready to continue that contest if it were necessary with increased strength and animation. Our alliance with France had been cemented; and England was now prepared to resume the pursuits of peace without any animosity to those who had been recently her antagonists. She could well afford to admire the bravery of those Russian soldiers who had opposed her with so much ability and courage, though they had never been able to defeat her in the open field. She could admire the courage and tenacity with which they had clung to that fortress the custody of which had been committed to their care; and she could admire not less the generosity than the determination of that man who had achieved an important triumph in Asia. He hoped that the House would be unanimous in agreeing to the Address which had been, proposed by his hon. Friend, and that they would more especially respond to the words in the concluding paragraph:—
"That the peace which has now been concluded may, under the favour of Divine Providence long continue to shed its blessings over Europe; and that harmony among Governments and friendly intercourse among nations may steadily promote the progress of civilisation and secure the welfare and happiness of mankind."

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Motion made, and Question proposed—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to return to Her Majesty the sincere acknowledgments and thanks of this House for the important communication which Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to make to this House of the General Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th day of March, between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, by which Peace has been established between Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, on the one hand, and the Emperor of Russia on the other.
"To assure Her Majesty, that, while we should have deemed it our duty cheerfully to afford Her Majesty our firm support if it had unfortunately been found necessary to continue the War, we have learned with joy and satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish Peace, on conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplished the great objects for which the War was undertaken.
"To express to Her Majesty the great satisfaction which we feel, at finding that while those Alliances which have so mainly contributed to the vigorous and successful prosecution of the War, have been equally effective in the consolidation of Peace, Powers which have not taken an active part in the War, have combined with the belligerents to give additional firmness to the arrangements by which the repose of Europe is in future to be protected from disturbance.
"To state to Her Majesty that we rejoice that, notwithstanding the great exertions which the late War has rendered necessary, the Resources of the Empire remain unimpaired.
"To express our hope that the Peace which has now been concluded, may, under the favour of Divine Providence, long continue to shed its blessings over Europe; and that harmony among Governments and friendly intercourse among Nations may steadily promote the progress of civilisation, and secure the welfare and happiness of mankind."
LORD JOHN MANNERS: Sir, I rise, not to oppose the reception of this Address, but to state some exceptions, and strong ones, to the terms contained in it. I must apologise for not having given notice of my intention to do so; but the Government, in their anxiety to get the Address agreed to as speedily as possible, allowed no opportunity to any independent Member of knowing its terms until Saturday, so that it was impossible to give any notice of objecting to it. Sir, I object to certain words in the second paragraph of the Address, in which we are asked to assure Her Majesty "that we have learned, with joy and satisfaction, that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish Peace on conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish the great objects for which the war was undertaken." Now, Sir, it strikes me that the hon. Gentleman
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opposite (Mr. E. Denison), who of course, I must assume, is responsible for the wording of the Address, must have fancied that he was sitting in the capital of our great and gallant Ally, and was deputed to draw up an Address which should faithfully represent the feelings of the French people, and would be gratifying to the distinguished man who now sits on the throne of France. Sir, I object to the words I have read, because I do not believe that they represent either the facts of the case or the sentiments of the English people on the conclusion of the war The mover and seconder of the Address have both very fairly stated the great object for which the war had been undertaken, and they have claimed credit for the Government upon the assumption that the peace accomplished the objects of the war. Now, those objects were the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire at present, and the security of that integrity and independence for the future. As to the first of those objects, I believe it has been obtained; and I should cordially join in the expression of the satisfaction of the House at that result. But with respect to the second, which was by far the most important of those objects, the security of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire for the future, I take leave to say that in one most important point the treaty does not accomplish that great and all-important object. And in discussing that point I shall have to consider the question whether the honour of the Crown has or has not been satisfied by this treaty. Sir, the question divides itself into two parts, the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire in Europe as well as in Asia. I ventured on the first night of the Session to express an opinion that when we came to consider any treaty that might be concluded, it was more than probable that we should find that the second part of the subject was not satisfactorily settled. And now I proceed to ask the House whether by this peace we have fully secured the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire in Asia? Be it never forgotten that (in the words of Mr. Oliphant) that integrity and independence have been as often and as dangerously imperilled on the Araxes as on the Danube. Let me now examine, then, what securities have been taken or attempted to be taken against the aggression of Russia on the Asiatic dominions of Turkey. It is remarkable that in the

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speeches of the mover and seconder of the Address—although they went through every point of the treaty which could at all bear speaking of, they sedulously abstained from mentioning Asia—if I except that passage in the speech of the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Motion in which he depreciated—unwisely and unjustly, as I think—the importance of the last Asiatic campaign. With that solitary exception no allusion was made to this most important part of the subject. Now, Sir, is the House prepared to say that in settling this great question no guarantees should have been taken with respect to the Asiatic provinces of the Turkish Empire? If it is maintained that our sole object was to raise up an effectual barrier in Europe against Russian aggression, I admit that object has been fully attained. But I believe that in Europe is not to be found the real danger to the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. Refer to history—of no remote date—not beyond the memory of many who are living. Let hon. Members recur to the state of affairs in 1828–29. With what force did Russia then commence her advance upon the banks of the Danube; and what was the condition of Turkey? The battle of Navarino had been fought. The Turkish navy was destroyed, and the finances of the country were seriously impaired by a protracted and an exhausting war with Greece. Russia seized that opportunity, and then Diebietsch commenced a campaign on the Pruth at the head of 158,000 men. Successes were of course obtained at first. But at the end of that campaign what was the condition of Russia? She found herself upon the banks of the Danube, and out of that vast armament not more than 80,000 men remained. She resumed the field in 1829, her army having been largely reinforced, and with 150,000 men they marched even to Adrianople. But what was the state of the Russian army at that time? It has been stated differently, some have put its force as low as 7,000 men. But no one can deny that at the moment of victory Diebietsch was only saved from certain destruction by the intervention of the great Powers of Europe. Is that doubted? Lord Ponsonby has said, in my hearing, that he had it from the chief of the staff of General Diebietsch, that the news of the acceptance of terms of peace found him praying to the Almighty for rescue from certain destruction. And from what quarter was it about to overtake the
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remnant of that mighty host? From an obscure Turkish Pasha, whose name no one then knew, and which no one has heard since, who came up at the head of 25,000 Turkish troops, ready to capture or destroy the remains of the Russian army. That was the end of the second campaign in the Principalities, undertaken under such circumstances and carried on with every advantage. Let us now look to the events which have recently occurred, and which show that the real danger to the integrity and independence of Turkey lies not in Europe, but, as I have previously asserted, in Asia. In 1854, before the tardy succours of the Allies arrived, the gallant Turkish army had repelled in more than one battle the whole available force of the Russian army; and for the first time in its annals there was a movement on the part of Austria. That significant motion told the astute and wily statesmen of Russia that they must not expect that Austria would permit Turkey to be invaded through her European frontier. Look at all these facts put together, that out of three campaigns undertaken by Russia, all were unsuccessful as to the object with which they were undertaken. Look at the position assumed by Austria—see the effective state into which the Turkish armies have been brought by the genius of one man whom it is the fashion of some hon. Gentlemen on the Ministerial benches to sneer at—I mean Omar Pasha; and tell me if, with this new element of successful resistance to Russian aggression in Europe, it is likely that her astute statesmen would again venture to attack Turkey on the side of her European frontier? But now for a moment let us reverse the picture. Let us look at the success with which Russia has invaded the Asiatic dominions of Turkey. In 1828 how many men were available for the invasion of Asia and the siege of Kars? Only 20,000 men, and of them Prince Paskiewitsch never could muster more than 12,000 or 14,000 round his standards; yet with that force in 1828 he reduced in less than a month that strong fortress of Kars, against which the great Persian conqueror had a century before directed his vast hosts in vain, and which from that time had been deemed throughout the East impregnable. With 12,000 men, however, in less than a month, Paskiewitsch captured Kars. Fortress after fortress fell before his arms, and so closed the campaign of 1823. In 1829 Prince Paskiewitsch advanced again in Asia.

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Erzeroum surrendered; Batoum soon fell; and in a few months a force of 15,000 men had effected what ten times that number had essayed in vain upon the banks of the Danube. Now the importance of the Asiatic dominions of Turkey, I maintain, is altogether overlooked in the treaty. Sir, can this House be asked to affirm that the objects of the war have been fully achieved when only one poor pitiable attempt was made at the Conference to procure some guarantee and raise up some barrier against Russian aggression in Asia. A most unaccountable delusion appears to have prevailed upon this subject, which I will endeavour to dissipate. I repeat that the only allusion at the Conferences in Paris to the Asiatic dominions of Turkey, is to be found in the poor and miserable attempt of Lord Clarendon to prevent the re-erection of the Russian forts upon the Eastern coast of the Black Sea. We are now assured, however, by the noble Lord, that Russia is at perfect liberty to re-erect these forts. And with what object, I ask the House, would she re-erect them? Why, for the purpose of conquering, and perhaps exterminating, the gallant Circassians and the other tribes who inhabit the mountains of the Caucasus. Who are these people, and what have been the relations of England with respect to them? They are a people who, in the language of my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Whiteside), in his magnificent oration a few nights since did that in 1854, which you (the Government) failed digracefully to do for yourselves in 1855.They raised the siege of Kars in 1854; they are the people whom you took every pains to excite to hostility against Russia, and, having succeeded in so doing, basely abandoned. Gracious Heaven! if these things can be done in the hour of victory, what baseness would not have marked your conduct in a moment of disaster? When the war broke out we entered into friendly relations with the Circassian chiefs. We induced them, in order to satisfy our most proper and laudable prejudices, to a band on a traffic hateful and horrible to ourselves, but lucrative to them. We then sent an accredited diplomatic agent, Mr. Longworth, to them, to arrange a plan of campaign, and, of course, we proposed to protect them. Were these people to be told that they could rely on the honour and might of England, but at last to be sacrificed at the shrine of expediency by Her Majesty's Ministers? and who was Mr. Longworth?
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He was, by his past history and by his zealous efforts in her favour, to Circassia what the late Lord Dudley Stuart was to Poland. He was sent on his delicate errand with all the pomp and ceremony calculated to impress on the minds of the Circassian chiefs the importance of his mission. He went out in a man of war, commanded, if I mistake not, by Sir Edmund Lyons; was accompanied by a suite of attachés, and he remained at his post during the whole of the war. Sir, Her Majesty's Government could afford to do for the Circassians that which they declined to do for our fellow-countrymen shut up in the beleagured city of Kars. Arms, money, and ammunition were sent to the Circassians, But when all this had been done, and the faith of England pledged, what effort has been made to save this unfortunate but gallant people in the Conferences at Paris? The Government may set up two lines of defence, and only two. The noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) may either say that the Government when the war broke out regarded the Circassians as independent of Russia, or that he regarded them as dependent, and therefore as insurgents against the rule of their lawful Sovereign. But, Sir, what do we find as one of the earliest consequences of the past conduct on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers? Why, on the 30th of April, from Vienna, was despatched the following announcement:—
"Advices from Constantinople of the 24th of April have been received here. A deputation had arrived there from Cireassia, to request the recognition and the guarantee of the independence of that country by the Porte, England, and France."
Now, what answer had Her Majesty's Government given, or what answer were they prepared to give to this demand on the part of the Circassians? The only answer contained in the protocols is, that Russia shall be at liberty to rebuild the fortresses on the Circassian coast, and exterminate the people, if she be so minded. Sir, my position is that, up to the present moment, neither England nor Europe has ever recognised by any State paper the right of Russia to Circassia. But one of the first proofs that we have of the satisfactory and honourable conclusion of this most "successful war" is to give the sanction of European law to Russia for the acquisition of all these important territories. I am willing to make this admission to the noble Lord at the head of the Government,

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that by the Treaty of Adrianople Russia undoubtedly set up her claim, not only to Circassia, but to a great many other countries; to more indeed than she very wisely chose to specify. The fourth article of that treaty was in the following terms—
"Georgia, Imeritia, Mingrelia, Gouriel, and many other provinces of the Caucasus, being united for many years and for ever to the empire of Russia, and that empire having, further by the treaty concluded with Persia at Tourkmantchai, on the 10th of February, 1828, acquired the Khanats of Erivan and of Naktchivan, the two high contracting Powers have recognised the necessity of establishing between their respective States, along the whole of that line, a frontier well determined, and likely to prevent all future discussion."
That was a treaty which affected Turkey and Russia alone, but neither England nor any other European Power sanctioned this vast and indeterminate power on the part of Russia with regard to these provinces. [Mr. LAYARD: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Aylesbury cheers, and fortifies me in that opinion. In 1839 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, speaking on the subject of this treaty, said—
"Mutual explanations took place, and he believed he was justified in saying that any candid mind brought to the consideration of the case must come to the conclusion that, in point of honour, Russia was restrained from availing herself of her successes over the Turkish empire to increase her territory to the smallest extent; but when the acquisition extended to not less than 250 miles of a line of coast, with an average depth of 100 miles, including not only Circassia, but the whole of the mountainous range of the Caucasus, it was impossible not be astonished at the claims which were now advanced."
Advanced, but not conceded then. It remained for the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) in this magnificent treaty of peace, to make the concession to Russia of these all-important territories for the future vindication of the future integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. But, Sir, I ask the noble Lord whether he regards Circassia independent of Russia or not? It is said that there is a map in existence marked by the noble Lord, on which many of these places are marked as independent. At all events we have the authority of the late Sir Robert Peel, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and the Earl of Derby for saying that these territories were independent. Now, Sir, I ask are we in the very first moment of success to make them dependent? If we are to make them dependent, I cannot find words to express my sense of
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the baseness of England under such a contingency. You supplied the Circassians with arms; you arranged the campaign in concert with them; you spared neither arms nor ammunition in order that they might act vigorously against the common foe; and after so treating them—after they had saved for you a fortress which you could not save for yourselves—you throw them away like the sucked orange for which you have no further use, and allow Russia to proceed with her schemes of final conquest in Asia. To put a parallel case, what would have been said if we had so worked on the feelings of the Poles? Supposing that when the war broke out, we had received adeputation of Poles from Warsaw, arranged a plan of action for them, that we had sent out the late Lord Dudley Stuart as our representative in Poland, and that at the end of the war, after having destroyed the Russian fortresses on the Polish frontier, of which we used to hear so much from the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell)—all we should attempt to do for the Poles, after rousing them to successful rebellion, should be to make a feeble and, as I believe, an unreal attempt to prevent the reconstruction of those fortresses—what, I ask, would then be thought of us? But, if such is the case in point of honour, what is it in point of policy? Is it, as stated by the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address, that the Asiatic question and Asiatic campaign were of secondary importance? That I believe is not the opinion of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), who the other night laid great stress upon the silence of the noble Lord at the head of the Government upon that point. Without relying too much upon the opinions of others, I must say I have considerable support for my views in the statements of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, and some wise, and, no doubt, discreet observations made by hon. Gentlemen who either sit on or immediately behind the Treasury benches. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, on a previous evening, that the fall of Kars had nothing to do with the terms of peace, that it was an insignificant affair, and that everything had been agreed upon at Vienna before the fall of Kars was made known. I should like to know if the right hon. Gentleman has ever studied a valuable book written by one of his colleagues, the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. D. Seymour). In his work

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on the Black Sea that hon. Gentleman said—
"When peace shall be made, it will be most fortuate should we be able to secure the freedom of the eastern coast of the Black Sea by treaty, for the independence of that country would form one of the best securities against Russian aggression. At the Caucasus, Russia may be said to end, and a new class of nationalities to begin."
Hon. Gentlemen who have so long sympathised with oppressed nationalities, might surely find some enthusiasm in favour of the oppressed nationality of Circassia:—
"And she can only desire to possess that mountain range with the intention of extending her conquests beyond it. The Caucasus—that is, the mountain range itself and the countries that lie at the foot of them, to the north and south—are the most convenient entrance to the heart of the great tableland of Asia, which, when once thoroughly subdued, might constitute an impregnable citadel whence Russia would be enabled to extend her influence and dominion in every direction. The Caucasus is the real citadel of Russian power in the south and east, although as yet beleaguered by the nations from which it has been partially wrested. Russia has surrounded it by an army of 170,000 men, and carefully keeps its inhabitants from communication with civilised Europe. We have never acknowledged the sovereignty of the Russians over this territory.—[Can we say so after this debate?]—nor over the Christian provinces to the south of the Caucasus. If her blockade were permanently removed from the eastern coast of the Black Sea and the brave inhabitants of the mountains allowed to carry on a liberal commerce with Europe, their energies would be quickly turned from war to peaceful arts."
The hon. Gentleman subsequently went on to say—
"The coast of Circassia is now free, and all that is required is, that it should be kept so without being again subjected to a barbarous blockade. If a consul were placed there and merchants encouraged to frequent it, its gallant inhabitants would soon yield to the civilising influences of Europe and engage themselves in developing its boundless resources. We may rest satisfied that the freedom of the Caucasus will form an important element towards the diminution of Russian influence in the East."
These were wise and weighty words, coming as they did from a subordinate Member of the Government, and I think it would have been well if we had seen some of that wisdom and foresight manifested in the conduct or even in the language of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in Paris. But if Lord Clarendon and the noble Lord at the head of the Government failed to uphold the language, or were disinclined to adopt the enlightened views of one of their subordinates, I find support in another quarter, which I am given to understand
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is not entirely unconnected with the Treasury bench. In one of the organs of public opinion, I find an article upon the terms upon which peace might have been made, and of which I will read a paragraph, and then ask whether hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury bench have ever heard of it before:—
"An agreement on the part of Russia to keep no more ships in the Black Sea, to abstain from any future interference with Turkey, and to open the navigation of the Danube, would not be worth a single sixpence or a single life. It is precisely on this account that we insist upon the capture of Sebastopol, the retention of the Crimea, the recovery and restitution of the mouths of the great Great German river, and the expulsion of the Russians from their possessions south of Caucasus; for these would not be parchment promises, but 'great facts'—not engagements which Russia might violate at pleasure, but actual losses which would tie her hands and paralyse her power of mischief."
Sir, that paragraph is from an article in the Economist newspaper. I did hope that the writer of that article, fully impressed with the importance of the subject which he had taken in hand would follow it up. I was not deceived; another article appeared on January 26th even more forcible, if possible, on the point. The writer said:—
"But the fact still remains, notwithstanding these natural reflections, that the retention of those provinces by Russia is incompatible with any feeling of security or permanence. From these she at once overawes Persia and menaces Turkey. From the fastnesses, natural and artificial, with which they abound, her armies can at any moment issue forth to ravage Asia Minor and assault Constantinople. The capital of Turkey can be as speedily and probably more easily reached from Tiflis and Gumri than from the frontiers of Moldavia or Bessarabia. … Russia needs and desires the Transcaucasian provinces solely for purposes of encroachment and extension, and as long as she retains them the temptation to use them will be irresistible."
Such, Sir, is the opinion of the gentleman, be he who he may, who aspired to be the guide of public opinion in that valuable organ on this subject. It was clear, too, from the statement of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, that he was not one who attached any small importance to the handing over of the Transcaucasian provinces to Russia, for having shown in a late memorable debate that Ministers were mainly responsible for the loss of Kars, he pardoned that error in consideration of their having secured the non re-erection of the Russian forts on the Black Sea. No Member of the Government had given any explicit statement

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on the subject until Friday night, when the noble Lord at the head of the Government spoke, and stated that Russia was at liberty under this famous treaty, which is to secure the independence of Turkish power, to re-erect every one of those fortresses. Well, but what do we see in another most influential organ of public opinion of this morning, after the declaration of the noble Lord, that those forts might be rebuilt? What is the language of that organ of public opinion which at present, at any rate, undertakes to defend the policy of Her Majesty's Government? I find in an article in which the writer sums up the results of this treaty, of which the country, it is said, ought to be so proud, but concerning which, according to the mover and seconder of this Address, they take very good care to hide their enthusiasm. I find it stated in this summary—
"The fortifications on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, constructed with so much labour and expense, are to remain dismantled; and even Kars, bought at the price of so much blood and so much suffering—the solitary trophy which Russia can show, is given back to Turkey."
[Viscount PALMERSTON: So it is.] Let us be thankful, then, for even the smallest favours. What I have read, Sir, is the language of the apologist of the noble Lord as to the rendering back of the fortress of Kars. This morning organ, which it is vain to deny is the mainstay of Her Majesty's Government, comes to this conclusion, which is important to a clear understanding of the case. It says:—
"Less would not have satisfied our honour; more might have endangered the permanance, stability, and tranquillity of Europe."
But the country has less; and therefore, according to the panegyrist of the noble Lord, the honour of England is not satisfied. Now, Sir, I ask the noble Lord are the Circassian fortresses to be dismantled or not? Is the whole Transcaucasian coast to be placed under a powerful and ruthless invader or not? It has been stated that great gains have been obtained by this treaty; but in my mind there has been no gain, but on the contrary a loss, and if so, even according to The Times, the country ought not to be satisfied. I cannot, therefore, consent to the terms of the Address, in assuring the Crown that by this treaty this country has accomplished all the great objects of the war. Can any one doubt that these forts in the provinces of the Caucasus will be rebuilt?
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Is it not plain that the sole object of Russia is the subjugation of those provinces—provinces extending along 250 miles of coast, and reaching 150 miles inland; inhabited by a gallant and loyal people, rich in internal resources, and which are of the greatest importance to the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire? Why, Sir, before the ink has dried with which this belauded treaty was signed we find statements as to the new footing upon which the Transcaucasian army is to be put. At St. Petersburg they are already beginning to talk of warlike expeditions. The Times correspondent at Berlin, under the date of April 28, writes thus:—
"In St. Petersburg they are already beginning to talk of warlike expeditions to be undertaken in the summer; a portion of the Caucasian army, under the command of General Khruleff, is to operate towards the Tschetsehnaia, while other troops that will by that time have been set free from the Crimea are to act against the Abchasen(?). It appears that, carefully as all news of the facts have been Kept from the knowledge of the Western press, these mountain tribes had availed themselves of the Russians being perfectly occupied with their more imposing foes to harass them in a variety of ways, and to encounter them in a variety of skirmishes, not always without success. The first use their implacable neighbour the Muscovite intends to make of the leisure the present peace has procured him is to subdue and subjugate these tribes, and then to rebuild the frontier fortresses for the purpose of perpetuating that subjugation. The supplies that are to be contracted for to be delivered this year sound enormous: the infantry require 2,223,000 pairs of boots; 168,000 ells of regimental cloth are to be forwarded from Tamboff to Astrachan by water; 200,000 ells from Tamboff to Moscow; 590,000 ells from Simbirsk to St. Petersburg; 415,000 ells from Kasan to St. Petersburg; and 300,000 ells from Kasan to Moscow. The new organisation of the military force is going on rapidly; the Caucasian army has been strengthened by two fresh regiments of infantry, to be called 'Crimea' and 'Sebastopol;' and two regiments of Dragoons, 'Seversk' and 'Péréiaslaff." The Guards have got an addition of two new battalions of Rifles."
Now, Sir, all this takes place before the treaty is discussed—all this is announced as taking place in St. Petersburg, and we are now informed by the noble Lord that Europe consents to the re-erection of these fortresses in the Black Sea. Sir, I have shown you how intimately the honour of the Crown of England and of this country is impugned by these disgraceful terms of capitulation. I have endeavoured to show you the gross impolicy of handing over these Provinces to Russia. Already by our unwise conduct of the war in Asia, we have raised the military supremacy of

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Russia from the Caucasus to the Hindoo Koosh. And now we are about to tell the tribes of Circassia that they are to have no faith in the honour of England, and that, unable to strengthen the hands or animate the hearts of our Plenipotentiaries, tribes whom we have excited to action in time of war we are prepared to abandon in a time of peace. I will turn at once to the sole paragraph in the protocols that bears any reference to the question, and I will entreat the attention of the House to the remarkable, though brief, discussion that is there reported. But first let me express my regret that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not present to hear the allusions which I am forced to make in reference to the right hon. Gentleman's observations as to the fall of Kars. Well, at the sitting of March the 1st,—
"Count Walewski states that, as the second separate condition, the Allied Powers require that the state of the territories situated to the east of the Black Sea should be specially inquired into.
"Baron Brunow explains the diplomatic transactions which have placed Russia in possession of those territories, and their present situation."
Now, of course, they could not know what was the explanation given of these diplomatic transactions, but I am curious to know whether the representative of Her Majesty assented to the whole of the explanation given by Baron Brunow. I very much wish to know if Russia based her explanations upon the treaty of 1843 or the treaty of 1829, and maintained that the whole of those provinces belonged of right to Russia. Upon this point there is no reply whatever from Lord Clarendon. After, however, a little further amiable discussion, Count Walewski goes on to observe that Russia has erected forts on the eastern coasts of the Black Sea, which she had herself in part blown up.
"Count Walewski observes that Russia had erected forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which she had herself in part blown up, and that it will be necessary to come to an understanding in this respect."
Then came the solitary observation of the Earl of Clarendon, the only proof throughout the whole of the protocols that Asia was ever present to his mind, or that the gallant people whom the Government of which he was a Member had incited to war against their powerful and implacable neighbour were not altogether overlooked by this great statesman.
"The Earl of Clarendon, relying, specifically, on the principle of the neutralisation of the Black
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Sea, proceeds to show that these forts could not be rebuilt.
"The Russian Plenipotentiaries, setting up the distinction which, according to them, exists between these forts and military-maritime arsenals, maintain the contrary opinion."
Of course, the Russian Plenipotentiaries maintained the contrary opinion, and they maintained it with great skill, with great courtesy, and, as the event proved, with remarkable success. But what was the result? Why, that the consideration of the point was adjourned. Until when? Until the Ides of March—until the Greek kalends! And the noble Lord the representative of England, who could state that the terms of this treaty would not permit Russia to re-erect these forts, when his position was controverted had not the heart to resume a discussion in which the honour and interests of England were preeminently concerned. Why did the noble Lord shrink from the rediscussion of the question, and why, I ask, did he consent to terms so dishonourable to the Crown of England? The answer is obvious and patent. Here I will beg to request the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what I am about to read, as I should like to know whether the right hon. Gentleman will adhere to his opinion, that the fall of Kars had no influence upon the conduct of the negotiations at Paris. Well, Kars was the next point touched upon.
"Count Walewski lays down that the town of Kars, and the Ottoman territory at present in the occupation of the Russian army, shall be restored to Turkey.
"The Earl of Clarendon supports and enlarges on this opinion.
"The Russian Plenipotentiaries admit the principles of this restitution; but, as it cannot be finally decided on till the end of the negotiation, they express a hope that, in the course of the negotiation, credit will be given to them for the concessions which they make in consideration of the separate conditions proposed in addition to the bases already agreed upon."
Well, now, what other meaning can you attach to this, but that in consideration of the restitution of Kars the Transcaucasian provinces, the Circassian coast, and the right to re-establish the forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, should be conceded to Russia?
"Count Walewski, while taking note of the adhesion of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, bears witness to the conciliatory disposition which they have evinced during the sitting, as well in regard to Kars as in regard to the Aland Islands."
Were they to be told, in spite of the statements of Count Walewski and the Russian

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Plenipotentiaries, that the Aland Islands were the compensation for Kars, and that the fall of Kars did not in any way affect the question of the Transcaucasian provinces and the re-erection of the forts on the eastern shores of the Black Sea? I understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that the fall of Kars had no influence on the discussions at Paris or the terms of the treaty, inasmuch as it was not known at Vienna until after the bases of the treaty had been agreed upon. Now, did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that what we were determined to ask at Vienna we asked bonâ fide, and with the intention of obtaining it in the Conferences at Paris? Two points which we had agreed to ask at Vienna were the non-reerection of the fortifications on the Aland Islands, and the non-reerection of the forts on the Circassian coast. Well, now, coming to the actual treaty of peace, we find that the non-reconstruction of the fortifications on the Aland Islands conceded, while the non-reerection of the forts upon the Circassian coast was resisted, and successfully resisted, by Russia. Was it alleged that, we had not agreed at Vienna to demand the non-reerection of the forts on the Circassian coast—that the point was left perfectly open, in order to take advantage of what in the interim might be the state of the war? I think that any Gentleman who has read the protocols must come to the inevitable conclusion that at Vienna it was our intention to secure, by prohibiting the re-erection of these forts, the independence of that gallant people, and, with their independence, the future independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire. If such was the intention at Vienna, how came it to miscarry at Paris? Kars had fallen. The fall of Kars was brought prominently before the Conferences by the French and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and its restitution was quoted by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer as proof of the conciliatory disposition of Russia. Russia was complimented upon her conciliatory disposition, and the Circassians were handed over, without pity or remorse, to their implacable and inveterate foe. Sir, I really cannot believe that the hon. Gentleman who moved the Address to-night could really be of opinion that the honour of the Crown had been sustained, or that the great objects of the war had been secured by this treaty, or that the future integrity
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of the dominions of Turkey in Asia Minor were not implicated in the Conferences of Paris. I must say that I rose from the perusal of the protocols which recounted the Conferences at Paris with feelings very far from those of satisfaction and pride. As an Englishman, I could not but feel that the representatives of halting, hesitating Prussia, and even the representatives of Sardinia, occupied far higher ground in those negotiations than did the representatives of the Queen of Great Britain. Their opinions were at least always clearly stated and manfully sustained, but when. Lord Clarendon stated some opinion of paramount importance it seemed to be hinted at only to be withdrawn. If those to whom liberty in every shape was dear, and who looked upon the liberty of the press as the palladium of English liberty, would read the laboured speech of Lord Clarendon at the conclusion of the Conferences, they would think they had good reason to complain of the terms in which Lord Clarendon expressed himself upon the proposal of Count Walewski. Now, what was that proposal, expressed, no doubt, in courteous and diplomatic language? It was, that if the laws and constitution of Belgium were found not strong enough to put that amount of repression upon the press of Belgium which Count Walewski thought proper, an armed intervention would take place. What, Sir, was the reply of the representative of England to those observations?
"As regards the observations offered by Count Walewski on the excesses of the Belgian press, and the dangers which result therefrom for the adjoining countries, the Plenipotentiaries of England admit their importance; but, as the representatives of a country in which a free and independent press is, so to say, one of the fundamental institutions, they cannot associate themselves to measures of coercion against the press of another State."
["Hear, hear!" from the Treasury bench.] Hon. Gentlemen upon the Treasury bench seemed quite astounded at the boldness with which Lord Clarendon "declined to associate himself to the measures of coercion, against the liberty of the press." It certainly was satisfactory to find that at the end of the negotiations the representative of England "screwed up his courage to the sticking point," and that he gave the Plenipotentiaries no reason to expect that in the event of an armed intervention by France, the fleet reviewed the other day at Spithead would be sent to its assistance. Let us, however, as I said

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before, be grateful for small mercies. But was that the language in which the representative of a Liberal Government might be expected by hon. Gentlemen opposite to express an opinion on a proposal to gag and fetter the press of one of the only free countries now left upon the Continent? The protocol went on to say—
"The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, while deploring the violence in which certain organs of the Belgian press indulge, does not hesitate to declare that the authors of the execrable doctrines to which Count Walewski alludes, the men who preach assassination as the means of attaining a political object, are undeserving of the protection which guarantees to the press, its liberty, and its independence."
This moral truth who could doubt? Practically, however, what would happen if it were carried into effect? The liberty of the press would be gagged and put an end to in the endeavour to prevent these incitements to assassination. Does the noble Lord opposite, who took a share in constituting Belgium as an independent kingdom, believe that the laws and constitution of Belgium were impotent to restrain these excesses, and that they were so much less powerful than our own that an armed intervention was required, and would be justified on this account? It seems to me, however, that the language of Lord Clarendon, in "declining to associate himself" to those reactionary and restrictive measures, would give far more countenance and encouragement to the future intentions of the French Government than it would reassure the Belgium Government that the support and countenance of the English Government would be afforded to them in resisting such a project. I wonder Lord Clarendon, from his own experience, did not recommend a more gentle and efficacious way of silencing an obnoxious press. Did Lord Clarendon proceed to Paris to sign a treaty of peace, however poor, pitiful, and dishonourable its conditions might be? I believe that Lord Clarendon went to Paris to bring back a treaty of peace, and in that object he unquestionably succeeded. But it was a treaty that established the political and military supremacy of Russia throughout the whole of Asia; that rendered Persia a satrap of Russia; that permitted that very fleet, which we so foolishly boasted we had for ever destroyed, to anchor in the Golden Horn, on its way to be refitted, perhaps, at Portsmouth, before it finally took up its position before the fortifications of Cronstadt, which we had failed to endamage.
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It was a treaty that placed Circassia at the feet of her implacable foe, and in so doing violated the honour of the Crown, and failed to accomplish one of the great objects of the war. As by military mismanagement we had rendered the idea of Russian military supremacy paramount in the East, so we had now fatally impressed upon the mind of every Eastern ruler that as we were unable to baffle the armies of Russia in war, so we were unable to cope with her diplomacy in peace. I must apologise to the House for trespassing upon its indulgence at such length, but I felt bound to raise my voice and protest against the exaggerated and untrue description of the peace contained in the second paragraph of the Address; and I will submit to the noble Lord, if he is anxious that the Address should pass unanimously, the necessity of modifying the terms of this paragraph, so that the House may agree to a unanimous expression of satisfaction at the conclusion of peace, the terms of which they were not prepared too minutely and too curiously to scrutinise.
MR. MONCKTON MILNESsaid, he could not think—apathetic as the people of England no doubt were with regard to the peace—that the noble Lord who had just sat down would find many persons to agree with him in the exaggerations into which he had allowed himself to be drawn, that the peace which had been ratified contained in it anything that was either dishonourable or degrading to England. It was, however, a different question whether the peace actually accomplished all that the people of England desired—whether it realised all that the ardent hopes of the people had anticipate—whether it really secured that permanence of peace which it professed to do, and which every one hoped that it might accomplish. He contended that there was nothing to be ashamed of in the present attitude of the people of England on this subject, for he thought that they now looked upon peace without joy, as they had looked upon war without fear. When he considered the circumstances in which the war had originated, he thought that no one could have calculated that it would ever be brought to a conclusion which would at any time be grateful to the feelings of the people of this country. The real cause of this probably was, that the war had been regarded in a somewhat different spirit by the Government to that in which it had been viewed by the people. By the British

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Government and by our Imperial Ally it had been regarded solely as political, bearing upon certain distinct political objects, and tending to certain distinct political ends. By the people of this country, on the other hand, it had been associated with far other hopes, far other desires, far other expectations; and the accomplishment of one of those results did not in any degree carry with it the accomplishment of the other. He thought, however, that when the terms of the treaty came to be carefully considered the people of England would find in them certain results to which they would be able to look back with at least a moderate degree of satisfaction. The people of England had been mainly actuated, in the enthusiasm and generosity with which they had supported the war, by the conviction that the power of Russia was likely to extend to a degree which would disturb the peace of Europe, and that that power was essentially an immoral power—the result of brute force. He thought that we might now encourage a hope that the aggressive and encroaching spirit of Russia had been to a considerable degree checked and curbed by the occurrences of the late war. He did not say how much this had depended upon the providential event of the removal of that Emperor who had been the cause of the war; but he had no reason to doubt that, from the very moment the present Emperor determined that peace should be made, that determination had been carried out in a spirit of perfect sincerity. There had been no reticences on the part of the Russian Government which should lead us to doubt their good faith; and, as the present Emperor of Russia appeared prepared to devote his energies to the internal improvement of the people, so the Russian people might suspend those extravagant notions of aggrandisement which had so long disturbed the real and material progress of that vast empire. He thought, too, that the people of England would find some gratification in the conviction that the integrity of Turkey had now received a guarantee such as could hardly have been hoped for under present circumstances. As regarded the Circassian people, the noble Lord (Lord J. Manners) had, in his opinion, enormously exaggerated the amount of independence which that people bad asserted and enjoyed, as well as the claim which they were supposed to have upon England. There was scarcely any incident of the war which had
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more disappointed the advocates of freedom than the small amount of interest and sympathy which the Circassian people had taken in the great contest in which we had been engaged. He believed the fact to be that very intimate relations existed between the Russian Government and the leaders of the principal Circassian tribes; and that all the noble Lord's fears of any vengeance being wreaked upon the Circassians by their "implacable foes," as the noble Lord termed them, in consequence of anything that they might have done during the late war, were entirely visionary and groundless. He wished that he could feel as certain with regard to others who had indeed felt a deep sympathy with the war, and whose relations with Russia ought to have attracted some attention—he, of course, alluded to the Poles. He knew that there were few things more distasteful to that House than the mention of the name of Poland, but he thought that at least some consideration should have been shown for the future safeguard of those Poles who had taken part in the war, and that the fullest security should have been taken for their lives and fortunes, for he feared that the vengeance of Russia might be felt elsewhere than in Circassia. The noble Lord, towards the end of his speech, had alluded to a subject which he (Mr. Milnes) should be glad to see frequently brought under the notice of the House before the close of the debate. He alluded to the speech of Count Walewski at the Conference, in reference to the Belgian press. It was his firm belief that it would have been impossible to have chosen a topic less germane to the business of the Conference than that which formed the subject of Count Walewski's alarm. There was one country in Europe which was prevented, by the circumstances of its political existence, from joining in the war, which, by the guarantee under which it enjoyed its political existence, was almost out of the region of political conflict, and its affairs formed a subject with which the Conference had no business one way or the other. That country was Belgium. He (Mr. M. Milnes) knew his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) was very proud of what was called his little political experiment, with which he had often been twitted, but with which he had every reason to be proud; but he assuredly did not think his noble Friend had equal reason to be proud of the language of Lord Clarendon, when the free press of Belgium was so gratuitously

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attacked. If it had been the business of the Congress to discuss all the questions that disturbed the peace of Europe, surely there were others which would have come before them more naturally than this, and when Count Walewski made his complaint against the press of Belgium, he, and the Government he represented, should have remembered that there was no person present who could have answered the imputation, or who could have defended the character and cause of that country. The imputations were grave, and required defence, and if there had been any person present authorised to enter into that defence, or if Lord Clarendon had been sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances to do so, as perhaps from the connexion between Belgium and this country he might have been expected to do, he (Mr. M. Milnes) did not think that the subject could have been allowed to remain in its present state. If his Lordship had stated, in answer to the accusation of Count Walewski, that Belgium was so impressed with the responsibility arising from its vicinage to France, that in the year 1852 the Belgian Parliament had enacted a law declaring that all offences against the person or character of any Sovereign, or any person connected with the Sovereign of another country, either by printing, writing, or misrepresentation, should be severely punished by the Belgian law, on the demand of the representative of the offended Sovereign; if he had also informed Count Walewski that on the representation of the French Government in 1854, the Belgian Parliament prolonged their Alien Act until 1858, for the sole purpose of holding a strong authority over any French refugees that might he in that country; and if Lord Clarendon had also maintained, as he might have done, that in the month of March last, at Windsor itself, the King of the Belgians gave his consent to a law, the object of which was to declare that any persons, whatever their nation might be, who were suspected of encouraging projects of assassination against any Sovereign should not receive any cloak of defence as political refugees; if it had been strongly declared what great marks of deference the Belgian Government had shown to the political exigency of France, he (Mr. M. Milnes) thought that such statements would have been more becoming an English representative than, words that bore the colour, in his opinion, of vindicating the attack of the
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French Government. Of course he could not suppose that Lord Clarendon intended to convey to the Conference the idea that, under any circumstances, this or any other free Government could associate themselves with the French for the purpose of repressing the free institutions of Belgium; for he must have known that if one French soldier crossed the Belgian frontier, the general guarantee would have been violated, and that the integrity of the Belgian territory must be defended by force of arms. That being the case, Count Walewski's words could have conveyed nothing more than an empty menace. That it was a menace no one could deny. It would be taken as a menace by the Belgian Legislature, which would meet in a few days to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Belgian independence; and, therefore, he trusted that both from the Treasury bench and the House, they would have a declaration of what was certainly the sense of the people of England, namely, that that passage, from the proceedings of the Conference, had been read in this country with the greatest pain, and that the effect would tell most injuriously on the reception of the peace, if it could be inferred for one moment that an English representative had given any countenance whatever to so unjust an accusation. The principle had been asserted that we should be content with this peace, because it accomplished all the objects for which the war had been declared. He, for one, should be sorry if such a doctrine were accepted. It was a new principle in international law, and he believed that if the war had continued this country would have been justified in demanding far other terms and conditions than had now been obtained. He wished to place the peace on its true grounds, and he had no hesitation in stating that he was satisfied with its terms, not because the object for which the war was undertaken had been attained, but because, having reference to all the circumstances of Europe, and more especially the peculiar condition of our ally, he considered the peace to be as good a peace as any reasonable man could hope to obtain. The people of England, no doubt, had thought that the effect of a peace might be to remove existing difficulties in Southern and Eastern Europe by are arrangement of territory, by a readjustment of freedom, by some liberty extended; and no such result had been obtained. Italy, in all her

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confusion, remained the same, the various portions of the Austrian empire were no better amalgamated than before; in other parts of Europe causes of disturbance still remained, which it would require all the efforts of statesmen to remove, but he trusted that the spirit in which the terms of peace had been accepted afforded some good reason for hope for the future. Another great advantage of the war was the fact that the French alliance remained unbroken, and, considering all the circumstances of the case, although he did not look upon the peace which had just been concluded as containing such elements of security as would allow us to throw aside all just means of precaution for the future, yet, nevertheless, it afforded reasonable ground for trusting that, by adhering to a wise course of policy, this country might, by the blessings of Providence, he spared for a long time to come from the horrors of war.
MR. LAYARDsaid, the Address which had been moved that evening was so worded that to a large portion of it he could quite agree, though he must confess, as regarded all the great objects of the war, he did not think that they had been accomplished. He was, however, willing to accept the terms of the Address to this extent—that, so far as the intentions of Her Majesty's Government went when they entered into the war, the chief objects of the war had been attained. He was not going to criticise vexatiously the peace which was now about to be celebrated; but he thought it was due to himself, considering the interest he had taken in this subject from its commencement, to claim for a short time the indulgence of the House, while he entered—not more fully than the subject deserved—into the several articles contained in the treaty. It appeared to him that they were too much in the habit of coming to a decision upon generalities when discussing these subjects. With the exception of the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Colchester (Lord J. Manners), with great part of which he was certainly compelled to agree, the House had heard no actual criticism upon the peace itself. Now, it was, he thought, a reasonable wish that the opinion which one had formed might be placed on record, and, as he should not probably trouble the House again on this point, he would venture now, for the last time, to lay before them his opinion as to the chief subjects settled by the treaty of
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peace. The differences which had existed between himself and many others in that House on the subject of the war arose upon questions of principle at its very commencement. He had always maintained that we were led into error by the line taken by Lord Aberdeen's Government. He, and those who thought with him, believed that this war, entered into upon sound principles, and in a proper spirit, might have led to very great results; that an opportunity offered of doing much for the cause of civilisation and of liberty in Europe; that the war might have taken a very large area; and that there were other questions to settle besides what was commonly called the independence and integrity of Turkey. Lord Aberdeen's Government, however, thought differently. They believed that much might he done without extending the war beyond the immediate limits of Turkey. That, he would admit, was a fair question for discussion—he thought, however, that they had lost a golden opportunity—but still there might be arguments in favour of the more restricted course pursued. Under the circumstances, as it was useless now to point out what might have been done, he should confine himself to a discussion of the peace, on the supposition that the late and the present Government were right in the principles upon which they had acted. Discussing the peace in that spirit, the House would remember that they had been contending for "four points;" a fifth was added during the progress of the Conferences at Paris, but that was, and remained, very ambiguous to his mind. The four points were clearly laid down, namely, the emancipation of the Christians in Turkey, the condition of the Principalities, the navigation of the Danube, and the Russian naval force in the Black Sea. In discussing those points he wished to be perfectly fair and impartial. He thought it was hardly fair of the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Manners) to pick out a particular part of the treaty or of the protocols and criticise that portion, without relation to its other conditions, and leaving out of view altogether the general character of the peace. He knew all the difficulties to which the Government had been exposed, and was quite willing to make every allowance for those difficulties. The French alliance, for example, had proved a source of great embarrassment. Now, he was one of those

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who would make every sacrifice for a French alliance, except a sacrifice of the national honour and national independence. He must confess, however, that to his mind, from the very commencement, our position with regard to France had been a most anomalous one. For this the present Government were not so much to blame as those who originated and took the first steps in the war, for the war once commenced, it was too late to change the relative position of the two countries. From the beginning he had been deeply impressed with the equivocal position we had held with regard to France, and he thought no one could read these protocols and those of the Vienna Conferences, or could have followed the events of the war, without being persuaded that we assumed a false position as respected France, that we had placed ourselves unnecessarily in her power, and had taken a course which could never be consistent with the true interests and honour of this country. Having once embarked on this course, however, we could not recede, and, therefore, bearing in mind that Lord Aberdeen's Government had entered upon the war, he was therefore willing to make every allowance for Her Majesty's Government in considering these protocols, and to examine the treaty with all fairness and impartiality. The country expected from that House that an inquiry should be made, and they also expected that an impartial verdict should be returned. The first and most important point was that regarding the Christians in the Turkish empire, and he must own that on this subject much more had been done than he could possibly have expected when the war was commenced. The question was a most difficult one. The Christians were at once both the strength and the weakness of the Ottoman empire. They represented its strength, because they stood first in intelligence, in wealth, and in activity, the Turks themselves not possessing these qualities. They represented its weakness, because the natural result was, when the intelligent and wealthy classes exceeded in number the dominant class there was a continual fear of such popular movements as might overthrow the Government and produce confusion in the State. They had, therefore, to deal with those very discordant elements. A firman had been granted by the Sultan to the Christians, but he thought Lord Clarendon acted most wisely, fairly, and honourably—and he hoped his Lordship's conduct would be appreciated at Constantinople—when he supported the Plenipotentiary,
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Aali Pasha, in his objection to the embodiment of that firman in the treaty. The firman in question was prepared at Constantinople under the auspices of Austria, France, and England, and no document could be more liberal in its tone, and if the noble Lord at the head of the Government could promise them some equally liberal measure in England he thought the people ought to be very well satisfied; the Administrative Reformers themselves could not have asked for more. Christians were, under this firman, to be admitted to the highest places in the Government; they were placed on a perfect equality with Mussulmans; and in theory nothing was withheld from them. Of course such a firman as that could not be fully carried out, but to have those principles admitted was an immense gain. He had said it was wise on the part of Lord Clarendon to support Aali Pasha in his objection to see that firman form part of the treaty. The war with Russia had been chiefly entered into to endeavour to prevent her from interfering with the internal affairs of Turkey, and if that firman had formed part of the treaty it would have certainly given all the countries who were parties to the treaty the right to interfere, but that power of interference would have been exercised almost exclusively by Russia. By one of the articles of the treaty it was expressly stated that the communication of this firman gave to the contracting Powers no "right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire." The Sultan's Government deserved all praise for their liberality, and he had therefore been much grieved to hear the language which had been used in that House respecting them. Hon. Members might, perhaps, have looked through some papers laid on the table containing the correspondence and communications which had taken place between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Government, and the Porte on the subject of concessions to the Christians. Those papers were of peculiar interest. The hon. and learned Member for Dungarvan (Mr. Maguire), who enjoyed to a great extent the vituperative talents peculiar to that part of the world which gave him birth, had spoken strongly on the subject of the Porte and of Lord Stratford. Now, he (Mr. Layard) thought it most unwise that that language should be used; it was most unjust and unfair towards the Porte; and how could we expect Turkey

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would go with us and accede to our demands when such language was employed towards her? Among the papers to which he was referring was one signed by many missionaries and clergymen—English and American—of his acquaintance, expressive of their satisfaction with the hatti-sheriff and of their gratitude and obligations to Lord Stratford for his efforts on behalf of the Christians in Turkey—efforts which they believed by this act had been crowned with success. Even in this country we had some relics of barbarism—a band playing in Hyde Park on Sunday, or a grant to Maynooth excited the opposition of educated and worthy gentlemen. It could well be imagined, then, that it would not be wise to ask the Turks in one day to alter all their laws and religion—to forego every form which they had inherited from their forefathers. It would be most unwise and imprudent to compel the Porte to make concessions which would only exasperate its subjects and have the certain effect of preventing, or, at least, retarding the accomplishment of those ends which all had in view. Immense changes had lately taken place in Turkey; every day fresh progress was made, and as intercourse with Europe increased that progress would also increase. There was, however, one point upon which he was not so well satisfied. He was of opinion that the extension of the conscription to the Christian subjects of the Porte was unwise; that it would expose them to hardships which hitherto had been reserved exclusively to Mussulmans, and the exemption from which had been one of the causes of the great prosperity of the Christians in Turkey. There were one or two points which he was glad to find, although not included in the treaty, were noticed in the protocols, which pledged those who were parties to it. He was glad to find that both points had been originated by Lord Clarendon—one of them referring to our commercial system as far as Turkey was concerned, and the other relating to the abolition of the capitulations. He (Mr. Layard) was not desirous of remodelling the treaty to which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had referred in an earlier period of the evening, but he was anxious to see the duty upon grain and other articles of export abolished or much reduced; such a step would be, he believed, the best means of destroying Russian influence in Turkey, and nothing would tend so much to the strength and prosperity of that empire as an unrestricted trade in corn. At
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present the export duty upon all Turkish produce was 12 per cent, while the import duty on foreign articles was only 5 per cent. With respect to the capitulations, he was glad to find there were to be deliberations upon that subject. These capitulations belonged to a past age, when groups of Christians were allowed to settle in various parts of Turkey without being subject to Turkish law, but under the control and protection of the Missions of their respective countries. It would not be right, when asking Turkey to make concessions, to allow those to whom those concessions were made to defy the laws of the Porte at their pleasure, and he hoped the result of the deliberations would be to release Turkey from that annoyance. He wished to call the attention of the House to the fact that the only Power which objected to that alteration, as it had likewise done to every proposition to improve every country besides Turkey, was Austria. The condition of the Christians was, as he had shown, greatly improved; they could hold land, and had other rights conferred upon them, and he had no doubt that in a few years that firman would be regarded as the basis of the strength of the Turkish empire. How different was now the state of Turkey compared with that of Austrian Italy, with her desecrated public monuments, her teeming prisons, and swarming police. Compare Turkey with Norway, where, he believed, Jews were not permitted to reside. In Belgium, even, he had been informed that Protestants were almost entirely excluded from all public employment and dignity, and attempts had been made to remove the bodies of deceased Protestants from burial-grounds upon the plea that the ground was consecrated. Therefore upon the whole he considered the position of the Christians in Turkey was one which entitled the Turkish Government to much credit for its efforts on their behalf. That deeds of violence did occasionally occur he did not in the least mean to deny; hundreds of times he had had occasion himself to interfere to obtain justice for Christians, but the Turkish Government had never been the cause; and he thought that the firman had now placed them in a very satisfactory position. The next point was as to the Principalities—Moldavia and Wallachia. He was willing to admit that with regard to them more had been done than he had expected, but there were still many points which required explanation. It was known that the Principalities

2077
had submitted voluntarily to the Porte. Moldavia and Wallachia were inhabited by the same race, speaking the same language and professing the same religion. Russia, however, obtained a right of interference, which she exercised to effect any change she desired in the local government, or to annoy the Porte. That right of interference was now, he was glad to find, abolished, and the Principalities were placed under the guarantee of the contracting Powers, in the same manner as Belgium, but of course still subject to the suzerainté of the Porte. With regard to them it appeared that Lord Clarendon bad proposed a liberal duty—to unite the two provinces—in which proposition he was supported by France and Russia. That union was, however, opposed by Austria, who succeeded in inducing the Porte to join with her in opposing and rejecting it. Austria, without doubt, feared that union, because by it the Principalities would become strong, and consequently become an example and an encouragement to the adjoining Austrian provinces inhabited by the same races, who sympathised with the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia. It appeared that a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the feelings and opinions of the Principalities, and new forms of government were to be framed for both. Divans ad hoc were to be assembled to ascertain the sentiments of the people, but it should be remembered that the provinces had been for some length of time ruled by Austrian bayonets, and were now occupied by Austrian soldiers. Any assemblage at present under such auspices could not be regarded as a true expression of the wishes of the inhabitants; therefore, he trusted that before any sitting took place, the Austrians would be cleared out of the Principalities. He was glad to find that one of the Commissioners to investigate the condition of those provinces was a gentleman of great experience connected with the embassy at Constantinople—Mr. Alison, than whom no one was better qualified for the task, for few understood so well the wants and requirements of the Principalities. If we should succeed in forming those provinces united into a strong government even under the sovereignty of the Porte, which he thought it would be for the best at present to retain, they would prove a formidable barrier against Russia. That was much better than anything which had been proposed at the Vienna Conference, where we had been
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on the point of admitting that when anything occurred in the Principalities which Russia and Austria considered not to agree with the quiet of the country, those Powers were to have a right to march in and occupy them. Another point which he considered most valuable was, that the Principalities were to be empowered to raise their own troops for their own internal defence and police. He hoped that those gentlemen who were expelled from Moldavia and Wallachia in 1848, would be allowed to return and take a part in the administration of their country. Many of them were men of high character, and well worthy of being entrusted with that duty. With regard to Servia, it was, in the first instance, agreed that a new form of government should be introduced into that country; but that intention had been changed, and he was glad to find that Servia was to be allowed to administer her own affairs. He had no doubt Servia would one day play a distinguished part in the East. With regard to Montenegro, that territory was still in an unsatisfactory state in respect to the sovereignty claimed over it; and it was, he regretted to find, to be allowed to remain in a state of uncertainty. He then came to the Black Sea, and he would here call attention to the circumstance that the Vienna Conferences had been broken off because Russia would not agree to the limitation then proposed. He would admit, that something had now been gained in regard to the forces to be maintained in the Black Sea by Turkey and Russia—gained so far as the treaty was concerned; that was to say, as long as the parties with whom the treaty was made were willing to abide by it. There was a limitation clause in the treaty, which stipulated that Russia should only have in the Black Sea vessels of a certain size. If Russia adhered to that stipulation, there would be no fear of the result of the treaty. But, in reality, this clause of the treaty was of very little importance, because there were a thousand ways in which Russia might evade the terms of the treaty. Large ships had been proved in the late war to be of very little advantage. Now, there was nothing in the treaty to prevent Russia from having a swarm of gun-boats in the Black Sea, only they must not be called gun-boats. They need not be armed, but they could keep the guns ready, and in case of a war the boats would be armed in a few days. Russia would have a right to introduce as

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many vessels of commerce as she thought fit into the Black Sea. Most of the steamers of war belonging to Russia during the late war he had himself seen pass through the Dardanelles as merchant vessels before the war; but when the war broke out they were used at once as vessels of war. He agreed with the noble Lord (Lord J. Manners) in strongly condemning the course which had been taken as regards Circassia. The very name of "Circassia" did not once occur in the protocols. He wished to know whether the blockade formerly established on the Circassian coast was to be continued? That was a question seriously affecting our commerce. We had hitherto been excluded from any commercial intercourse with Circassia; and that intercourse would be the best means of civilising the Circassians and bringing them into communication with Europe. There was no document or protocol existing, emanating from any European Power, which recognised the right of Russia to Circassia. On the contrary, we had always considered that Circassia was wrongly and unlawfully occupied by Russia. But this treaty contained a tacit recognition that Russia was in possession, and had a legal right to Circassia. The very fact of the Plenipotentiaries entering into discussion as to the power of Russia to rebuild the forts on the Circassian coast, admitted the right of Russia to that coast. He was willing to admit the distinction between a fort and a military arsenal. Russia ought to have the power of defending her coasts; but that was not the question; that was a right which might fairly be conceded to Russia. They could not prevent a nation from defending its own coasts, supposing that those fortifications were erected strictly for that purpose; but what he contended was, that the coast of Circassia was not the Russian coast. To raise the question whether Russia could or could not rebuild those forts was at once to admit that she had a positive right to the coast. It was certainly a hard thing to be compelled to give up the rights of an independent people, which undoubtedly were capable of being enforced as regarded Circassia, simply on account of our relations with France or Austria. He wanted to know how far this distinction between forts and ports would apply to our consuls. A consul was an officer entrusted with the supervision of trade; the Government had no right to demand an exequatur for a consul in a fort. Now, he wanted to know whether Sebastopol and Nicholaielf remained
2080
forts, or were merely ports. If they were forts, the Russian Government might refuse to admit a consul within them; and we should then be excluded from any means of information as to what was going on at Sebastopol or Nicholaieff. With reference to that question, the Government had made a most important and a very dangerous admission. Within the last few days, they had asked leave of the Russian Government to send ships into Sebastopol harbour for the purpose of removing the materials of war. The Russian commander said, the question must be referred to St. Petersburg, in order to obtain permission. Now, he wished to know whether Sebastopol harbour was to be closed for ever, and whether British ships were to be excluded from entering it. If so, that would be continuing a state of things which, among others, he had always understood the war was intended to put an end to. With regard to Nicholaieff, we had no consul there, and if it was regarded as a fort and not a port, what would be our protection? England could not go to war with Russia for building a vessel to-day or to-morrow, and we could not keep up a police to look into every corner of the Russian empire. So far, therefore, as that part of the treaty was concerned, he saw very little advantage in it, though, if Russia would adhere to the stipulation, he would confess there would be something gained. He was glad to find that the treaty recognised the old right of Turkey to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. He thought it would be a most dangerous thing to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous to foreign fleets. If that had been done before the late war, the probability was, that Prince Menchikoff would have been in possession of Constantinople. With regard to the navigation of the Danube, he considered the provisions of the treaty excellent; and it was a wise course to have the Principalities represented in the Commission that was to regulate that navigation. The fifth article of the treaty contained an amnesty to those subjects of Russia who had been engaged in the war. He wished that something had been said about the inhabitants of the Crimea. Those poor people had been exposed to horrible tyranny. It was well known that the policy of Russia, for years, had been to exterminate the Tartar race. They were prevented from leaving the country; they could not make their pilgrimages to Mecca; everything was done to

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exterminate them. He wished, therefore, that something had been done by the Conference to guarantee their liberties. The seventh and eighth articles of the treaty were very important; they guaranteed the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and placed it on a footing much more advantageous than it had before occupied. Such were the principal points of the treaty; and, taking them all in all, he thought Her Majesty's Government deserved great credit for it. When he saw the preliminaries he certainly was not prepared for so good a treaty. He confessed that the terms far exceeded any reasonable expectation which he had formed; and, in all fairness, he was bound to congratulate the Government on the treaty they had made, and on the principles which it embodied. He would not say that much more might not have been gained; but, assuming the principle laid down by Lord Clarendon, more had been gained by the treaty than he could possibly have hoped for. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said that the fall of Kars had no influence on the terms of peace. He differed from that; the protocols showed that it had had an influence. If we had been successful in that quarter a most important rectification of the frontier might have been made, by restoring to Turkey two provinces of which she was deprived in the last war, and which would have been most important to her in another war. There was much in the protocols that was equally binding and important with the treaty, and did equal honour to Lord Clarendon. As to Italy, the language held by the noble Lord at Paris was worthy of this country. It was impossible to exaggerate the present state of Italy, or the degradation into which it had fallen. Unfortunately, it was the policy of Austria to make the opinion predominate in Europe that Italians were not practical, and not able to govern themselves; and, to further that policy, Austria had fomented the state of disunion which had led to such misery in Italy. He repudiated the idea, and would point to Sardinia as a proof of how successful the Italians were in governing themselves. What a contrast between the condition of Sardinia and the condition of the Roman States. In the Roman States few offices were held by laymen, and even when held by laymen they were entitled to all the privileges of ecclesiastics. The privilegio di foro exempted all priests and all parties
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bearing an ecclesiastical character from the control of any courts of law, except Ecclesiastical Courts, and that was carried to such an extent, that if one person in a suit was entitled to the privilege, though there were forty or fifty who were not, the suit must be adjudicated by the Ecclesiastical Court. No cardinal was subject to the law at all—he could not be summoned to the Ecclesiastical Courts without his own consent. If the canon and the common law clashed, the canon law was preferred, even in the common law Courts. The priests paid no taxes and therefore there was an immense idle population supported by the really industrious portion of the community. The inhabitants in the Papal States were disarmed, and the country was overrun by banditti. The roads were unsafe, and no one could go to a place, even in the immediate vicinity of Rome, without imminent risk of being plundered. Austria, having insisted on the people being disarmed, turned round now and used the argument of the insecurity thereby produced to induce Europe to tolerate her retaining possession of the Roman States. In 1850 there were 10,436 persons in the Roman prisons, and in 1854 the number had increased to 13,006. The existing state of things was intolerable. There was no law. The bishops had a right to imprison. The inquisition, the political governors of towns, and the police had a right to imprison. No man's house was safe for an hour; nobody knew what the law was; and he (Mr. Layard) had been told many times by Italians that they would rather live under the Austrian law, terrible and oppressive as that law was, than under the system which existed in the Roman States. The Austrians had, in addition, compelled the inhabitants to pay for their troops. The French, he was happy to say, had not done so. Suggestions which were made to the Pope for the improvement of the Government were despised, and up to the present day no change for the better had been effected. He left the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) to deal with Naples. But with regard to Sicily, it was almost impossible to conceive the state of that island. The best men were banished. There was some slight riot in the streets, got up by a few boys, without any political object whatever, and humane as the Governor was, he was compelled by the authorities, against his will, to do acts

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of great cruelty. In consequence of the riot, which was soon quelled, orders were issued to seize the first six men coming into the town and to shoot them in the public square. A party of men returning from enjoying themselves in the country were seized. One of them died of the shock when told the purpose for which they were seized; his body was dragged to the place of execution, and there his five companions underwent the terrible sentence, which he, by his death, escaped. By a most wicked and atrocious Government, Sicily had been changed from a fertile island into a desert. In Tuscany things were very little better. The Grand Duke was brought back by his own troops, and the first thing he did was to call in the Austrians. Although the troops, he believed, were withdrawn, the Austrian Generals still retained their command in the town. They had all heard of those persecutions for reading the Bible that were discreditable to any Government. Talk of Turkey! Why, there was infinitely more freedom of conscience in Turkey than in any part of Italy except Sardinia. Then look at the confiscations of property in Lombardy. Let his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Bowyer) cross over into Sardinia and see the contrast which that country presented to any other part of Italy. The same state of things which existed in Sardinia would prevail elsewhere if they gave the people of Italy a fair chance of governing themselves, for some most practical men were to be found in all parts of Italy. It was impossible for Piedmont fully to develope its resources while the Austrian occupation continued, for the King of Sardinia was obliged to keep up an army in consequence, and every petty prince in Italy considered himself safe in persecuting his subjects because he knew he could fall back upon Austria. He was glad to see by the protocols that France I had expressed a readiness to withdraw her troops from Italy, and he was sure that, if the Government thought it desirable to represent the necessity of a change of policy in Italy, they would be supported both in that House and out of it. He should be the last to interfere in the concerns of other nations. All that he wished was, that other Powers should not be allowed to interfere. He thought the proposal of Lord Clarendon wise and prudent, and he should be glad to sec the Roman legations placed under a lay Government, with the French code of laws, and under
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the suzerainté of the Pope. It would be a step also in the right direction if the Austrian army were withdrawn from the Legations. He could not think that the language of Lord Clarendon with regard to the Belgian press was open to the remarks of the noble Lord (Lord John Manners); but he considered that Count Walewski's resumé of the result of the five points he had submitted to the Plenipotentiaries was not borne out by the facts. Count Walewski stated that the Plenipotentiaries had agreed to the following proposition:—
"That all the Plenipotentiaries, and even those who considered themselves bound to reserve the principle of the liberty of the press, have not hesitated loudly to condemn the excesses in which the Belgian newspapers indulge with impunity, by recognising the necessity of remedying the inconvenience, which is so greatly abused in Belgium."
[Mr. DISRAELI: That is signed.] He did not think this statement was justified by what Lord Clarendon had said, for the words "uncontrolled licence" in the protocol might mean any thing. He certainly was astonished that Lord Clarendon had signed this protocol, and he trusted that they would have some explanation upon it from the noble Viscount at the head of Her Majesty's Government. With regard to the agreement of the Conference concerning privateering, he did not see any objection to this great advance in the practice of civilized States. In conclusion, he thought they had gained much by the I treaty. The condition of the Christians; in Turkey had been improved, they had been released from the Russian protectorate. The principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea had been admitted, and Turkey had been placed in the European family. Those were great gains, and, in consideration of them, he was inclined to look over much in the treaty that he should otherwise have objected to He agreed, for instance, with those who thought Circassia a great omission in the treaty. It was impossible to aver that the peace had been received with enthusiasm, and why was it that the country was not satisfied with the peace? Because the people of this country did not believe that Russia was sincere, or that this would be a lasting and durable peace, or that Russia, after a war of a couple of years, would change the policy of two centuries. He was astonished to hear hon. Members upon the Ministerial bench now praising Russia who two years ago believed her capable of committing

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any atrocity; but he believed that any man acquainted with history would not suppose that Russia, after two years' losses, which were not irremediable, would renounce the policy that formed the very essence of her Government. What was her policy at the present moment. She was now about to form railways and to unite the most distant parts of her empire, and she would no doubt continue to intrigue in Central Asia. The people were not satisfied, too, that the position of this country was at this moment what it was when this war broke out. The war had also shown the necessity of a change in our administrative system, and if this had been one of its results it would not have failed in its effect. He could not sit down without bearing testimony to the very able manner in which the negotiations had been conducted by Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley. Looking at the services of the whole diplomatic body of this country, there was no one who, in his opinion, was more deserving of public gratitude than Lord Cowley. He had represented and maintained the honour of England with an ability that had never been surpassed, and he had shown a knowledge of his subject and an amount of independence which did him honour. The noble Lord had been many years at Constantinople, and he had brought to bear upon the consideration of this subject an amount of local knowledge which had been of the greatest assistance to Lord Clarendon. As that was probably the last occasion on which he (Mr. Layard) should address the House upon the subject of this war, he must therefore briefly notice the taunt which had been thrown out against the occupants of the bench where he sat, that they had done nothing. He thought that the occupants of that bench could look back with some satisfaction and pride at their efforts for the last two years. Who was it that had drawn attention to the state of the troops in the Crimea? Who was it that had brought forward the Motion which was intended to rescue those brave men from the "horrible and heartrending" condition in which they were stated to have been, but his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck)? Almost every Motion to obtain some change in that administrative system which had plunged us into disgrace had emanated from one or two Gentlemen on that bench, and he should, as long as he lived, look back without regret at the course which they had taken during the war. They might
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have been often wrong, but they had never brought forward a Motion for mere factious purposes, and their only object had been to do their duty conscientiously both to the House and to those who had sent them there.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, the noble Lord opposite, the Member for Colchester, has very much blamed a particular part of this treaty, and has more than once applied the word "base" to the conduct of the Government; yet, as he had neither proposed any Amendment nor raised any opposition to the Address to the Crown, the debate must lose much of the interest and excitement that might otherwise belong to it. Still, as the subject is one of great moment, and as we have now to consider the settlement of a question which for half a century at least has occupied the minds of men, and which I am afraid may occupy them again at a future time, it is, I think, of such importance to consider the terms of the peace that we have made that I cannot refrain from offering to the House some observations upon it. I will say at once that I entirely differ from the noble Lord (Lord J. Manners) and that I believe that the conditions of peace are honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and that they fully accomplish the great objects for which the war was undertaken. That is my persuasion with respect to this peace, and I think, if the House agree in that belief, that no lower or more feeble terms should be used in order to express that sentiment. The Ministers who, after the peace of Amiens, brought forward an Address to the Crown, did not insert in that Address the term "honourable" peace; and I think it was almost condemnatory of their own work that they did not so characterise the peace which they had themselves concluded. Now, with respect to the Motion before the House, I will take first the Articles in the order in which they have been placed over and over again, as they were sent from Vienna to St. Petersburg more than once, and as they have been finally adopted as the preliminaries of peace. The first of those articles respects the condition of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; and there can hardly be a question of greater gravity than that. We must recollect that, in 1774, by the treaty of Kainardji, special powers were given to Russia to interfere in certain respects with the condition of those Principalities; that the treaties to that effect were not only renewed

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from time to time, but strengthened; that the bonds were drawn closer and closer; that the supremacy of Russia over the nominal sovereigns of those provinces was more and more asserted; and that when at one time the alliance between Napoleon and Alexander the Emperor of Russia seemed to divide the world between them under their undisputed sway, the great object of Alexander in those negotiations was to obtain complete sovereignty and rule over the Principalities. With regard to that first object, it must be observed that, not to day, or at Paris, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) has observed, for some time before the Conferences of Vienna, Russia declared her willingness to give up those treaties, to renounce all the advantages which she had acquired by them, and to consent that there should be no particular and exclusive protection of the Christians of these Principalities on the part of herself or of any other power. The conditions by which that arrangement is carried into effect seem to me to be very efficient for their objects. The Porte declares that the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia shall continue to enjoy all the privileges and immunities of which they are at present in possession. These privileges have long been a subject of dispute, and were so as late as the time of the mission of Prince Menchik off to Constantinople. The Sultan has always declared that the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the inhabitants of those Principalities had been granted by the grace and favour of his ancestors, while, on the other hand, the Emperor of Russia had always endeavoured to induce them to believe that they have derived those privileges through his efforts, and that it is to him that they must look for the retention or extension of them. Now, Sir, in the 23rd Article of the present treaty, the Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation; and those words are almost identical with the words used in the preliminaries to the Conference at Vienna, and Russia now does not recede from the professions she then made. The hon. Member for Aylesbury, however, says—and not for the first time—that there is a great difference between this Article and the Article agreed upon at Vienna, and that by the Articles agreed to at Vienna, Russia and Austria had at any time the power of coming into
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the Principalities and destroying the constitution conferred upon them. Now, Sir, I cannot think that any interpretation of the Article in the treaty proposed at Vienna could have justified that opinion of my hon. Friend, There was, it is true, an article in which it was stated that if any armed interference should take place in the Principalities, that armed interference should, either previously to its taking place or afterwards, be made the subject of European deliberation, and in the protocol referring to that Article there was a mistranslation which has doubtless led to some amount of misconception. The simple fact, however, is this, that as the Sultan could not in an ordinary state of affairs send his troops into the Principalities, although they acknowledged him as their suzerain, it appeared necessary that the Powers who were neighbours to those provinces, Russia and Austria, should take some precaution in order to prevent those Principalities becoming scenes of anarchy and a cause of alarm to their neighbours. By the present treaty I find that full precaution is taken to avoid such a state of things. The 27th Article provides that if the internal tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding with the other contracting Powers in regard to the measures to be taken for the maintenance or restoration of order therein. No armed intervention can take place without previous arrangement or agreement between those Powers. Now, there is, I admit, a difference between this article and the one proposed at Vienna. The article proposed at Vienna did not allow the Sublime Porte, although the suzerain of the Principalities, without concert with the other Powers, to enter them with her troops, and put down any insurrection which might take place, while the present Article provides that no armed intervention shall take place without previous agreement between the Porte and the other contracting Powers. But, while I admit the difference, I still say that both Articles provided for the continuance of those privileges to the inhabitants of the Principalities which were guaranteed to them by England and France, and at the same time they provided that Wallachia and Moldavia should not become the arena of disorder and confusion, or that if they did the suzerain of those provinces should have the means of restoring order. I come next to the question of the navigation

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of the Danube. With respect to that point, it appears to me that our successes at Sebastopol have been taken advantage of to obtain much greater security for the future for the free navigation of that river than it was possible to ask for, while our troops were still lying before that town. The Articles in this respect differ a little from the preliminaries. Russia has agreed that a line to mark her new frontier shall be drawn from the Pruth to the Black Sea, not a longitudinal line, but a line across the country by which the forts of Ismail and Novokilia will be placed within the territory of Moldavia, and Russia will be excluded from any power of interference with the navigation of the Danube—an interference which has hitherto been found so mischievous and injurious. It was said by Russia that that control which she exercised was exerted to improve the navigation of the Danube; but, in point of fact, there can be no doubt that it tended very much to impede the navigation of that river. I believe, Sir, that the whole of Europe, and this country no less than any other, will derive the greatest benefit from the improvement of the navigation of the Danube, and that Moldavia and Wallachia, and also Hungary and some of the other Austrian provinces at present little known, will acquire the means of developing their natural resources and their industry, which cannot but materially tend to their future prosperity; and at the same time to the general advantage of Europe. The provisions of the treaty are applicable to the whole course of the Danube, and I fully concur in the appointment of a French and English temporary Commission to clear the obstacles which at present impede the course of that river. I now, Sir, come to the third point, the point which proved a stumbling-block at Vienna, and which prevented any agreement between the belligerents. I mean, of course, the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. Now, Sir, as regards either limitation, counterpoise, or neutralisation, I do not think it possible that any treaty introducing either of those principles could be so framed that it would not be possible to pick a hole in it. Or one which Russia, if inclined to violate the faith of the treaty, might not find some excuse for breaking. We are often told, and I must say that I consider the assertion a foolish one, that Russia is not a Power to be dealt with like other Powers; that we cannot trust to her keeping the engagement into which
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she enters, and that as soon as she signs a treaty she will find some means of violating it. It appears to me that we must deal with Russia as we would with any other Power. Russia, no doubt, has ambition, but other Powers have ambition also, and if Russia agrees to a treaty which it is to her interest to preserve, and which is agreeable to the general tranquillity of Europe, we have, I think, no reason to believe that she will immediately violate it. If a treaty be found to be injurious to the interests of a country, and some means of violating it are obvious, I do not know of what country in Europe we could predicate a strict observance of that treaty. The objections to a system of counterpoise are obvious, and no doubt there are many objections to a system of limitation, and some can be urged against the system of neutralisation. No doubt Russia can have a number of gunboats unarmed, or even steamers, which, although built for commercial purposes, might readily be adapted for purposes of war. I can only say that I think that as much security has been taken for the future as it was possible to take, and that you could hardly tell Russia more than what Lord Clarendon told Count Orloff at Paris—that the stipulations of the treaty would be nugatory if a great fleet were to be prepared at Nicholaieff, and if the maritime resources of that place should be used for that purpose. It is hardly possible to believe that the Russians would ever have consented to destroy Nicholaieff; and as to the forts on the coast of Circassia, they are not arsenals, arid cannot, therefore, be said to have anything to do with the neutralisation of the Black Sea. The proposal of neutralisation was, I believe, originated by a statesman, for whom I have the greatest respect, and from whom I have always experienced the greatest cordiality—I mean M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and I believe it affords as good a solution of the problem as could have been, discovered. I come now to the fourth point, upon which the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury are so well worth the attention of the House that I hardly like to add anything to them. I believe, with him, that it was wise not to insist either upon inserting the hattisheriff as an article of the treaty, or upon annexing it to the treaty. The document is referred to in this solemn treaty; it is declared a law of the Turkish Empire, and we must expect that the Sultan will use all the means he can in order to carry it into

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effect. With regard to the actual Government of the Turkish Empire, I have hardly that respect for it which my hon. Friend entertains, because, whatever may be intended by the Sultan's Government, we all know that when you go 300 miles off in the heart of Asia, or the mountains of Thessaly, the Pashas and their officers may say, "What is this firman to us? We must not regard it. Let the irregular troops be sent out to collect the tribute from the villages; "and these irregular troops, as we know, kill many of the men, and carry the women into slavery, in spite of all the laws which the Sultan has enacted. It is therefore desirable, and I trust we shall see the day when the Sultan may be able, not only to enact just laws at Constantinople, but when, by reforming the corruption which debases and degrades his empire, he may appoint persons in whom he can trust to hold the subordinate offices in the provinces; and, where it is necessary to use force, in order to maintain obedience, we may, I hope, see employed a regular and disciplined soldiery, and not an irregular force, whose pillage and whose lawless violence have been so disgraceful and injurious to the Turkish Empire, and so degrading and ruinous even to the Sultan himself. I say, "ruinous to the Sultan," because it is the outrages and invasions of those irregular troops which lead the Christian subjects of the Porte, who have every reason to be satisfied with his toleration and satisfied with the absence of religious persecution, to dread the Government of the Sultan as a Government which affords no protection to the honour of their wives or the safety and sanctity of their homes. With regard, Sir, to this war, I may say in general—and I think every Member of Lord Aberdeen's Government who began the war must have felt the same—that if we had begun that war for the protection of Turkey against Russia, having no other prospect but that of seeing continued the abuses and misgovernment which caused and accompanied the decay of the Sultan's power in Europe, we should not have been justified in entering upon it. But it was our hope—a hope confirmed by this treaty of peace—that while we prevented an ambitions neighbour from planting himself in fair territories to which he had no claim or title whatever, we might at the same time open to the 10.000,000 or 11,000,000 inhabitants of these countries the prospect of better government, of security in their homes, and an acknowledgment of all those
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rights which in civilised parts of Europe contribute so much to the happiness and welfare of the people. I have said already I do not think that any Articles of any treaty, however framed (and these Articles appear to me to be drawn up with very great precision and skill), would give you security against aggression on the part of Russia. It has been a project long meditated; the present Emperor may refrain from carrying it into effect; we may have security during his life that he will not resume these ambitious projects; but taking that at the best, we cannot say that in the Articles of the treaty we possess perfect security that no attempt will ever be made at some future time to realise those projects on the part of Russia. I remember at the commencement of these disputes being very much struck by a political prediction made by a man perhaps as well entitled to deal in these predictions—always very hazardous—as any one—I mean the Emperor Napoleon. Napoleon said, when at the island of St. Helena, that the next war in Europe might very probably be owing to an attempt by Russia to get possession of Constantinople; that, according to his opinion, it was the only thing which could cordially unite England and France in one object; that such an attempt would cordially unite those two Powers; and he thought it likely that Prussia would join them under those circumstances. But he said—and this is a very remarkable part of the prediction.—that Austria would take part with Russia; she would share in the spoils of the declining empire of Turkey; and therefore the efforts of France, Great Britain, and Prussia, would fail in preventing the march of the Russians to Constantinople. He added that this might not happen now; but it might happen in the day of one of the youngest among us, perhaps thirty-five years hence, and I believe the period mentioned in this prediction expired in 1852. There was something very remarkable here; but one point contained in the prediction could hardly fail to be particularly striking—namely, the confidence with which at that time the Emperor Napoleon spoke of the accession of Austria to the projects of Russia against Turkey. Now, in the beginning of 1853–4, the Emperor Nicholas spoke with a similar confidence of the agreement of Austria in any plan he might propose for the dissolution of Turkey. Well, but did not this furnish a suggestion well worthy of consideration by any Power which wished to

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resist these projects—namely, that it was desirable to obtain the assent and assistance of Austria in resisting, instead of aiding in these projects? Now, that was the course which has been taken by Lord Clarendon during the time he has held the seals of the Foreign Office—with much discouragement, with many reasons to complain of the backwardness of Austria, with many reasons to say that this was a question which interested her more than any other Power, and yet she was the last who would give her blood and her money for this purpose. With many discouragements of this kind, the plan has nevertheless been persevered in, and the result is the treaty of peace now under consideration. Because we must recollect that, although Austria had, as appeared to me, two objects in view—the one not to enter into the war at all, and the other to favour the Western Powers in their resistance to Russia; yet the first object was so much in her mind, and evidently so much at her heart—owing, perhaps, to particular circumstances—that it was very difficult to get the effective aid of Austria. Now, however, a treaty has been signed, entered into by Austria, in common with Great Britain and France, by which the independence and integrity of Turkey are guaranteed, and by which any attempt to violate that independence and integrity is made a casus belli. Now, Sir, I believe, so long as these Powers can keep together—so long as these Powers will resist these ambitious projects, that whatever changes may take place in the Government of Russia, even if you had a very ambitious prince instead of one who, to his honour, is so much disposed to pacific councils—I believe this Treaty would prevent Russia from carrying out her projects, and that thereby you have a security against the renewal of the war. Of course, if England and France were at war, and Russia had to deal with Austria alone, and obtained military successes over her, the treaty would fail of effect; but so would any treaty you could possibly frame. As far as words and as human wisdom can do so, the present treaty, I firmly believe, secures the integrity of Turkey; you cannot pretend to that perfect security which no human calculation and foresight can possibly hope to obtain. Such, then, being the case—such being the arrangements made with regard to the future, I think this House has every reason to be satisfied with what
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has been done; and if I am told that many people are dissatisfied, and if I believe, as I do believe, that my noble Friend was quite right when he said it was probable, if we went on with the war, that we should gain success in the campaign of 1856, and that at the end of the year we might obtain greater advantages than we now have, I only give the more honour to the Government; for, having it in their power, as I believe they had, to induce the nation to continue the war, yet, being satisfied in their own minds that the objects of the war had been fully accomplished, they have preferred peace to further bloodshed and to further warfare. Such, Sir, therefore, are my opinions as to the Treaty of Peace. There are, however, some things upon which, if I ventured upon criticisms, I should ask some explanations. I think, for instance, that, as regards that declaration of Count Orloff as to Nicholaieff, it would have been better to have had it formally delivered as an agreement between the belligerents than to have merely mentioned it in the protocols, subject, on a future occasion, to be disputed or explained away, I think, with regard to the Circassian forts—although I do not know that Circassia has, during the war, even shown that energy we might have expected, or even that inclination to fight for her independence, which might have induced us to bind ourselves to them—yet I do consider that the power which Russia has of restoring those forts is a great means of confirming her power in the Black Sea. My hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) and the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Manners) have argued that Russia has no rights over Circassia. I believe her rights are confined to what were formerly the rights of Turkey. That Power had certain forts which she occupied by her garrisons; she had no sovereignty over the main land, her rights being confined to those forts. By the Treaty of Adrianople those forts were surrendered to Russia, who succeeded to the rights of Turkey, but to no more, and not one inch of ground beyond that which was occupied by the forts could she claim upon that account. Those forts, however, gave Russia the means of sending troops from Odessa and Sebastopol to the Asiatic coast. If I am told that no advantages could be obtained beyond those we have obtained, I confess, I would rather have beard that Russia had stipulated not again

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to occupy those forts than to have stipulated about the fortifications of the Aland Isles. I am aware that these stipulations were entered into with a view to the important interests of Sweden, but I would rather have given them up if I could have obtained the consent of Russia to abandon these Circassian forts, which had been already abandoned and destroyed during the war. Having made those criticisms, I will just remark upon one or two points brought under consideration by the protocols. Towards the end of the negotiations it appears that the French. Minister brought under consideration the state of the Belgian press, and objected to what, no doubt, are great excesses and a lamentable abuse of the freedom of the press, but which, as far as my experience goes, belongs to that very freedom, and is inseparable from it. Lord Chatham said that, like air, the press was a "chartered libertine;" and I am not aware that since his time the press has become less "libertine" or less "chartered." The freedom of the Belgian press is secured by the constitution, and the offences of the press arc punished by trial by jury; and, I think that no Ministry which the wise and constitutional Sovereign who presides over that country has ever had has ever proposed any alteration of the constitution upon the subject of the press, or has proposed to submit the press to a censorship, or to any more summary interference. I cannot but think, therefore, that, while we are all ready to say the Emperor of the French in his own dominions may regulate the press as he likes, if it be necessary for the peace and tranquillity of the country, without our having the least right of interference, yet, I think he should respect similar rights in others, and not call upon the Minister of England to do what must be most abhorrent to the feelings of the English nation—to interfere with the press of a foreign country. But there were other and far graver questions discussed in that Conference. The state of Greece—unfortunately a melancholy state—but one which, if examined, will show, not only much disorder, many outrages, great licence and corruption on the part of the Government, but also some of those proofs which any species of freedom and independence must produce in whatever part of the world it may be established. There is another subject, Sir, still more melancholy—the state of Italy. The state of Italy is what the hon. Gentleman who spoke last described
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it to be. I called the attention of my noble Friend at the head of the Government to that subject last Session, feeling confident that he would show, by his answer, how much he sympathised with the misfortunes of that misgoverned and much oppressed people. I was not disappointed. I heard the noble Lord enunciate sentiments perfectly satisfactory to me, and which showed that, if at any time he had the means, he would use his best endeavours to relieve them from the tyranny under which they suffered. Since then I have received from some persons protests and complaints as to my having spoken against the Italian Governments. I made further inquiries—looked into details, and the result has been I am more than confirmed in my original impression. I found the condition of the people in the Roman Legations was such as I could hardly have conceived. For instance, the police, having a suspicion of any man, however respectable, or of whatever rank, seize him, place him in a filthy dungeon, where they keep him for months, and, when asked, they refuse to grant him a fair trial; but at last tell him they are convinced there is nothing against him, and therefore they let him go. They let him out of prison in a place where he has no home and no means of following his profession, where he is subjected to a variety of restrictions, such as not being out after eight o'clock, and of not speaking to any suspected person. When he asks who are the suspected persons, he is told, "You know better than we who are suspected, but you must not speak to them." This is not only a tyranny over those unfortunate persons, but it is an oppressive atmosphere for all whom it encompasses. It must destroy the whole enjoyment of life, especially to men who, like the Italians, are quick in idea, sensitive in feeling, endowed with great imaginations, and aspiring to live under good government; to such a people a tyranny of this kind must be quite intolerable. Now, Sir, how is this state of things maintained? Why, by foreign intervention. We all know that there have been many foreign interventions since 1815, but such intervention has always been on account of the momentary overthrow of authority and of order to the momentary supremacy of some demagogical party; and when, after a short time, authority has exercised its legitimate sway, the foreign intervention has ceased. That has been the history of most foreign interventions

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since 1815. When we interfered in Portugal a few months saw our intervention at an end. But here is an intervention which has lasted for seven years. The time has surely come when we may ask, "Do you mean your occupation to be perpetual, or at what period do you propose to withdraw?" If the occupation be perpetual, it is the same as a Power seizing a territory which does not belong to it; it is an overthrow of the balance of power so far as that State is concerned. We should ask, too, "If you do not mean to occupy in perpetuity, what are the measures by which the authority of the legitimate Sovereign will be strengthened and be enabled to restore order?" That question might, I think, be answered; but it would be by the sacrifice of a good deal of the priestly power which has been the source of so much misgovernment in that unhappy country. It might also be answered by the sacrifice of the Austrian protectorate over Italy. I am very much in favour of the legitimate dominion of Austria, where she has a legitimate dominion. I think her position in the centre of Europe eminently useful to Europe, and that her influence and authority have often been used to withstand Powers more ambitious than herself. But she has no claim to the protectorate of Italy beyond what is given to her by the treaty of peace at Vienna in 1815; therefore, I trust that the words used by Lord Clarendon at the Conferences, and which I am assured by one who could not be mistaken, were stronger than those put in the protocol, will not be allowed to fall to the ground. Because, if you make a protest against the present state of Italy—if it is taken up by Austria with a refusal to discuss the question at all—you leave Italy in a worse state than you found it, and you will not be justified in what you have done. I have stated this strongly, but I have no intention of saying that Her Majesty's Government will not do all that it is possible to do on this subject. On the contrary, knowing that they will have the support of this House, and feeling, themselves, warmly on the subject, I believe they will take the measures that are necessary. I believe that those measures ought not to be hasty or abrupt. They should be conducted, in the first place, by counsel with the Emperor of the French, who found his troops in possession of Rome protecting the person of the Sovereign; and that in concert
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with the Emperor of the French we should speak the language of firmness and of reason to Austria. What should be the particular proposition, Government of course are to determine. It should be left to them to conduct the business. I think there should be no Resolution, no Address proposed on the subject, but that we should leave it entirely in the hands of the Government, evidently knowing, as I am sure they must know, that there is but one almost universal feeling in the country on this subject. But when speaking of the occupation of Italy by Austria, we must not forget that the people of the kingdoms of Naples and of Sicily are subjected to even a still more harsh and iniquitous rule than Italy. There is but one subject more that I shall touch upon, and that is, as to what the hon. Member for Aylesbury has said respecting the Motions which have been made in this House. I trust that with regard to the army the Government will take such measures, not with respect to regimental regulations, but with regard to the general staff of the army, as will make them more fit on a future occasion to meet the sudden requirements of a warlike state of things. But while I trust this will be their course, I hope they will not be led, I feel sure they will not be led, into the false notion that this country ought to be a great military Power. Although I believe that we are essentially a military people, and that in no long time we should be able to produce an army that would be able to cope with any other army in Europe, yet I trust that while we keep up, not only a respectable, but a considerable naval force, we shall not extend the expenses or the scale to our army. If we have an army well constituted and well commanded, with a better knowledge of the usages of war, there is no need whatever that that army should be of considerable extent. These are things which I think the Government ought to have full time to consider. It is a passage from war to peace. It is not a thing to be dealt with at once. A peace establishment requires great consideration, mature reflection, and a proceeding step by step before it is finally accomplished. But I do trust that such an establishment will be accomplished; and that former errors will not be allowed to be passed over because we are now at peace, but that every part of our establishments will be fully considered, and that without any pretence of our being a great military Power, we

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may do justice to our military spirit, and preserve our station in Europe as we deserve to maintain it, bright and unimpaired.
LORD CLAUD HAMILTONsaid, it was his intention to submit to the House a considerable modification of the second paragraph of the Address which had been moved. In that second paragraph it was stated that the House had learnt with "joy and satisfaction that Her Majesty had been enabled to establish peace." Now, he had listened to every speech which had been uttered that night, but had failed to perceive any indications of such joy having been expressed by those who had supported the Address. No one had ventured to say that the people out of doors hailed the treaty with either joy or satisfaction. The seconder of the Address was a Gentleman who usually spoke with considerable vivacity, but in the performance of his present task he had altered his tone considerably. The noble Lord who had just sat down had manifested neither joy nor satisfaction. On the contrary, he had stated his objections to several provisions of the treaty. The treaty did not touch on the subject of Italy, to which the noble Lord had so largely adverted, and he (Lord C. Hamilton), therefore, deprecated the introduction of it. He was not about to touch upon the general policy of the war or the terms of the peace, but to confine himself to its bearings on the gallant inhabitants of Circassia, and to endeavour to prove to the House that it was impossible for Russia to set up any just claim in Circassia founded on any cession of territory by Turkey. The power of rebuilding forts on the Circassian coast would confer great advantage on Russia. In order to show how impossible it was for Russia to found a claim, more especially a right, to the coast of Circassia, he would go back to the case of the Vixen, which was first brought forward by the present Lord Stratford de Redcliffe when he had a seat in the House of Commons. The owners of that vessel attempted to open a trade with Circassia, but before leaving this country to do so, they applied at the Foreign Office to know if any treaty or arrangement existed to interfere with their trading with that coast. They received an evasive reply, stating that it was not the duty of the Foreign Office to give advice on such matters, and referring the owners to Lloyd's. They then applied to Lloyd's, and were informed that no
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blockade existed to prevent their going there. The vessel arrived at Constantinople, and there again the owners made inquiries at the British Embassy, and were informed that no official notification of any blockade had been received. The vessel had landed some small portion of her cargo at Soujouk-Kaleh, when a small Russian vessel of war made her a prize, for breach of fiscal and quarantine regulations. The ship was taken into Sebastopol, and claimed as a prize. The owners applied to the British Consul at Odessa, and were informed that no notice of any blockade had been received there. So long as the right of capture was defended on the plea of a breach of Custom House and quarantine regulations it seemed probable that the Russian Government would restore the vessel, as it was perfectly clear that no such regulations had ever been notified to the British Consuls either at Odessa or Constantinople; but the case having gone to St. Petersburg, Count Nesselrode represented to the British Ambassador that there was an actual military occupation of the spot where the goods were landed and de facto a blockade of the coast. That was a complete deception. Mr. Longworth, who visited the spot shortly after the affair of the Vixen, states his readiness to give evidence on oath of the complete want of truth in that assertion of the Russian Government; and the present Government should respect his evidence, as he was the person employed by them to carry on negotiations with the Circassian tribes during the recent war. Mr. Longworth states that the only fort or place that has any military occupation in that vicinity is Alexandrinsky, a small fort of the name of Doba having been enlarged by the Russians and so named by them. This fort is quite out of sight of the spot in the Bay of Semez where the Vixen was captured, being separated by a headland that projects into the sea. There is no road from it to the bay in question. The garrison were completely hemmed in by the Circassians, and their riflemen would have destroyed any force that attempted to penetrate through the woods that lay between the fort and the bay. In short, the Circassians in that locality would as soon expect an invasion from Constantinople as from that fortress. But the Circassians had no means of making the truth known. Our Ambassador was deceived and silenced, and the

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rights of the Circassians were sacrificed. The fort of Soujouk-Kaleh was originally a small factory, raised by the Circassians themselves. It became the residence of a Turkish Commissioner, and was ceded to the Turks. In 1783, in a formal treaty, Russia acknowledged the right of Turkey to Soujouk-Kaleh and two other forts, named Anapa and Pote, and upon that old treaty was based the claim of Russia to the whole territory of Circassia, The Russian Government maps, however, distinctly laid down the whole territory as belonging to free and independent tribes; and although Russia, by treaty, ceded these three forts to Turkey, they were never claimed by Turkey. The Turks were anxious to keep up relations of amity with the Circassians, for the sake of their own social and domestic comfort, and maintained constant commercial intercourse, but they never claimed the territory. They did not even maintain these forts for purposes of any military occupation, but merely as places for commercial intercourse, where Turkish Commissioners resided, and there never was the slightest attempt to raise revenue or soldiers in that country, or to claim the inhabitants as subjects. The matter came to a point in 1829, when the Treaty of Adrianople was signed. The Russians claimed of the Divan the cession of the whole territory. The answer of the Divan was straightforward enough—that they could not cede what had never been theirs. Russia insisted, however, upon what she called a trifling cession, but which was, nevertheless, the cession not only of the trifling rights that Turkey really possessed, but of the whole extensive and valuable territory peopled by the different tribes of Circassia, to which the Sultan had never at any time laid claim; and in the Treaty of Adrianople the whole of that territory was ceded to Russia by Turkey under protest. He denied that Russia ever had any right to that territory, and it was the more incumbent upon that House to interpose because England had unfortunately acquiesced in the claim of Russia. As the representatives, therefore, of a free people, he called upon them to insist upon an undertaking from the Government that the Circassians would not be handed over entirely to the power of Russia. The very termination of the war had placed the Circassians in a much worse position than they were before it broke out, owing to the immense augmentation of the forces and
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military material collected in the vicinity of their territory, and to the fact that by the terms of this treaty England and France acquiesced for the first time in the claims of Russia to the possession of that territory. Hitherto it has never been acknowledged to belong to Russia either by right of treaty or conquest. But the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell) had declared he was not aware that the people of Circassia deserved very much of this country; indeed, it could not be denied that the feeling was pretty general that they seemed to regard the cause of the Allies with apathy. He would, however, beg the House to hesitate before it hastily joined in that condemnation of the Circassians—for there were many reasons to account for their not taking a more active part in the contest. In the first place their chiefs had been misled in the expectations which they had been induced to entertain that the seat of war would necessarily be in Asia. Having been summoned to Constantinople to concert measures against the common enemy, they left Turkey with the impression that they were to be aided by a large body of European troops, who were to serve as the nucleus of the army that was to oppose the Russians in Circassia. Now, he (Lord C. Hamilton) was quite sure that no absolute promise to that effect had ever been given, nevertheless encouragement had been held out justifying the expectation; and, therefore, when it was found that the allied generals had sailed for the Crimea, a feeling of disappointment and discouragement spread far and wide throughout Circassia, to dispel which nothing whatever was ever done. The House must bear in mind that these were a primitive people, who knew little of European politics, and whose whole feelings and interests were bound up in the gallant struggle they had so long maintained against the enormous power of Russia. They naturally looked to their own country as of the greatest importance. They wished to aid the Allies; but they having no regular army, no supplies, no commissariat, could not co-operate with regular troops in campaigns distant from their own homes. Their system of warfare resembles the ancient forays between Highland chieftains. Their ideas were, therefore, limited to operations near their own country, and they earnestly entreated a small body of regular troops with whom they could act—they at last reduced their requests

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to the presence of a single battalion—but the exigences of the Allies prevented even that small aid, so that they felt they were wholly neglected. Again, they must recollect, in estimating the claims of the Circassians upon them, how great had been the result of the attack which they made upon Tiflis, which compelled the Russian general to detach a corps d'armée to maintain that fortress. Another cause of the Circassians holding back was the unhappy differences with Mr. Longworth, the Commissioner—differences which undoubtedly were deeply to be regretted. Now, suppose the Circassians had said—"This is our time; Russia is in great straits, and we can make terms." Would any one be entitled to blame the Circassians if they had done so? Why, an assurance of their neutrality would have been, under the circumstances, an immense boon to Russia. But, no, the gallant people refused all the offers that were made to them, and they declined to take advantage of the excellent opportunity thus offered to them for the first time within five-and-twenty years. To leave the gallant people, therefore, as they were was certainly not the treatment which they deserved. For we had sent them a Commissioner—we had sent them arms as well as money, and had, in every way, placed them in direct hostility to the Russians. He must say, therefore, that a peace concluded as this one was, was not an honourable one. He would maintain also that the securities held forth in the treaty would prove wholly inefficacious. In the protocols, as well as in the treaty, there was an allegation of the neutrality of the Black Sea. What was the meaning of the term neutrality? They were told that the Black Sea was to be thrown open to the mercantile marine of the world. But how did that apply to the 250 miles of the Circassian coast; or what was meant by the declaration that it was to be open to them, "subject only to the regulations now in force." Why, the regulations on the Circassian frontier, for the last five-and-twenty years, had been a rigid blockade. What, then, was the meaning of the term "regulations now in force?" Even the noble Lord opposite did not quite approve of the power which had been given to rebuild the forts; but now, let him ask, what became of the neutrality if the forts were to be rebuilt? And let the House remark this power to rebuild was not confined to Anapa, Pole, and Soujouk-Kaleh,
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the three forts that did once belong to Turkey and might lawfully be ceded by her—but to all the forts constructed by Russia since the Treaty of Adrianople, whereby she endeavoured to maintain military sway over those gallant tribes. By this treaty we now for the first time formally recognise the unjust claim of Russia to the territory of that brave and free people. Again, at page 36, it was specified that the Black Sea was to be open to transports, which might be of any size. Why, they might include a vessel of the size of a 130-gun ship. Count Orloff contended that aboard these transports there should be a suitable armament, which was ultimately conceded by Lord Clarendon. Now, what was the meaning of a suitable armament? Who was to be the judge of what it was? The reply to that important question was adjourned at Paris. He hoped the Government would not upon this occasion follow the practice that had been pursued at the Conferences and adjourn the answer to all inconvenient questions, for adjournment seemed to him to mean an unconditional surrender to Russia. Again, the treaty of peace made mention of a full and complete amnesty to be granted by each of the contending Powers to such of its subjects as might have taken a part in the war antagonistic to it. Well, turning to another article, which bears upon and explains this amnesty, he would ask, what protection would it afford to the Circassians? He denied that the Circassians were the subjects of Russia, and therefore they were wholly excluded from the conditions of the amnesty. As a free and independent people they could not claim rights as subjects, and would therefore be exposed to the unmitigated vengeance of Russia. Unless, then, Her Majesty's Government could show that by the terms of the fifth article protection was secured to the Circassians, he should certainly press forward the Amendment which he had already sketched out. He would ask any man possessed of British feeling, whether it was consistent with the national spirit to approve of that article unless it secured protection for the Circassians. Nor were they without a precedent to guide them in obtaining for a people not directly concerned with a treaty of peace terms of security for the future against those with whom they might be at war. After the close of the last war, the inhabitants of Parga, a town in Albania,

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finding that they could no longer resist the attack of Ali Pasha, petitioned the British Government for relief, and begged to be placed under the same protection as the Ionian Islands. He (Lord C. Hamilton) was happy to say the appeal was responded to, and in the noblest manner, and the inhabitants were at once told they would not be left to the vengeance of the Turk. They were not only protected, but removed to a place of safety, and the sum of £150,000 was voted by Parliament to indemnify them for their losses consequent on leaving their former home. Upon the occasion of the discussion in that House, the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, then at the commencement of his distinguished career, advocating with great zeal the claims of that gallant people, said—
"Would to God I could enter into the question of the cession of Parga with such effect as to be able to induce the House to commiserate the late and relieve the situation of a wronged and gallant people."
After alluding to some anonymous writer who endeavoured to defend the transaction, the noble Lord proceeded—
"He thought the general opinion of mankind would be that this was a case of as notorious treachery and as grievous injury as any that had ever yet occurred in the world. And what had been the consequence as regarded our own reputation? Our enemies always alluded with extreme anxiety to the case of Parga as an instance of our acquiescence in oppression and our desertion of the cause of freemen, and they reproached us with this fatal inconsistency, that we, who for ages and throughout protracted wars had stood forward as the champions of the rights of nations, were content when the enemies of the Parguinotes required their submission and the surrender of their rights, to act in a very different character, and upon principles contrary to those on which we had hitherto unsheathed our swords." [2 Hansard, ij. 106.
Now, he thought the case of the Circassians as well deserved the application of such eloquent language as those on whose behalf the noble Lord had spoken; and, he hoped the public spirit of this country had not degenerated, but that it would prove itself still ready to defend those gallant men who had so long defended their liberties against overpowering forces. Believing that, unless due security was given, these gallant people would not be protected from the vengeance of Russia, he should move the Amendment of which he had given notice.
Amendment proposed, in paragraph 2, line 3, to leave out the words "joy and
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
SIR CHARLES WOOD: Sir, as during this discussion, many hon. Gentlemen have called for explanations upon various points from the Government, it is but due to them that those explanations should be given. I have listened with great pleasure to the speeches of my noble Friend the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard). No one can be better acquainted than the noble Lord with all that took place at Vienna, or than the hon. Member for Aylesbury with the state and condition of the Sultan's dominions; and, consequently, no Member of this House can be better qualified than they are to express an opinion upon the general provisions of the treaty. I was, therefore, much gratified to hear from them an unqualified approbation of the general terms of the treaty. I do not know even that we have much reason to complain of the observations of the noble Lord the Member for Colchester (Lord J. Manners), because, although he seems to be of opinion that it was impossible for us to make other than an ignominious peace, I think that even he has fully admitted that the treaty does accomplish all the objects for which the war was originally commenced. We have not, then, I think, much reason to complain of the noble Lord, who confined his objections to one point, omitted, as he said, from the treaty, but which appears to me never to have been contemplated as one of the objects of the war. The noble Lord has admitted the position maintained in the able speeches of the mover and seconder of the Address—namely, that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire has been secured. He has admitted that, as regards the present, the integrity of that empire, both in Europe and Asia, is fully secured, and the only point upon which, in his opinion, the security of the Ottoman Empire is not attained for the future was, as regarded the state of those provinces lying between Russia proper and Turkey in Asia, and that opinion has been repeated by the noble Lord who has just sat down. The noble Lord who has just sat down has narrated various transactions which have taken place with regard to those provinces, of which I can only say, that I have never before heard of them. He has talked about our handing over to

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the dominion of Russia certain independent provinces, and has accused us of betraying those who were nobly struggling for liberty. Now, I can assure the noble Lord, that all nations gallantly struggling for freedom, will always command the sympathy of this House and of Her Majesty's Government; but, at the same time, I must ask him to explain what he means by our handing over provinces to the dominion of Russia, and also what are the provinces which we have so handed over? With regard to the Christian provinces, Georgia, Mingrelia, and Imeritia, the feelings of the population of those provinces were in favour of Russia rather than of the Allies, and certainly they took no active part against Russia in the prosecution of the war. Neither did they seek independence at our hands from the dominion of Russia, by whom they seemed to think they were well treated. The inhabitants of Daghestan, led by their gallant chief Schamyl, certainly were at war with Russia, but their territory is not on the Black Sea, but on the shores of the Caspian, and they have never co-operated with us. Nothing that the Government could do—except offering arms, which Schamyl declined—could possibly assist him in his operations. That chief did precisely what he pleased, and if report speaks the truth, very soon after the commencement of the war, there was a treaty made between him and Russia. Surely, then, the Government cannot be accused of handing Schamyl over to the Russians. The only people to whom such a charge might be supposed to apply, were those occupying that portion of the country in the neighbourhood of Anapa, with whom the Government were certainly in communication. But Her Majesty's Ministers never held out any expectation to them that they would land an army in Asia, with whom they might co-operate. The only occasion upon which, so far as I am aware, there was any question of co-operation between the Circassian or Abasian tribes and ourselves was, that in which an attack was made by our vessels on Soujouk-Kaleh. On that occasion the neighbouring tribes promised that they would operate on the land side, if we undertook to attack upon the sea side. Well, we did so; the Russians were driven out by the shells from our vessels, but the tribes did not appear at all, and the Russians retired unmolested, when they might all have been cut off. The accounts received so
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late as November last from the neighbourhood of Anapa, informed us that the people there were not disposed in the slightest degree to co-operate with us—that, on the contrary, they looked upon us almost in the light of enemies, because we endeavoured to interfere upon a point involving what the noble Lord (Lord C. Hamilton) so delicately calls their arrangements for the social and domestic comforts of the inhabitants of Constantinople, or, in other words, with selling their children as slaves. What, then, does the noble Lord mean, by saying that we handed over provinces to Russia? By the treaty of Adrianople, Turkey ceded to Russia the forts on the coast of Circassia, but it did not cede the territory of Circassia, because it did not belong to Turkey to cede; and that district is now, as regards its internal position, in precisely the same condition as it was before the war began. As to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, the treaty expressly stipulates that the territories of Russia and Turkey in Asia shall be as they were before the war. As to the apprehension of the noble Lord that those districts will be subject to blockade, the treaty expressly states that—
"Free from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs, and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions."
And that is the treaty to which Russia has pledged herself. As regards the districts to which the noble Lord refers, I must inform him that they are districts over which there is no fixed Government, and that consequently there is great difficulty in treating with them. Each chief is something like a Highland laird of the olden time, and in his own territory is independent of all control and acknowledges no superior; so that in order to treat with them, the first thing to be done must be to establish a Government, guarantee its continuance, and then secure some kind of alliance with that Government. I can only repeat that the condition of those provinces now is exactly the same as it was before the war began. I do not mean to say that if the war had continued the establishment of some sort of independence of Circassia might not have been attempted. I do not mean to say that if an independent country could have been set up between Russia on the one hand and Persia on the other hand, great benefits might not have been gained. But that assuredly was not

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the object for which the war was undertaken, and the question therefore resolves itself into this—should we have been justified in continuing the war on that ground, when the objects of the war, namely, the independence and integrity of Turkey, had been attained? The hon. Member for Aylesbury spoke of the "larger area" over which the contest must have spread if other objects had been attempted; and the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Monckton Milnes) has lamented that the independence of Poland is not secured, and that the condition of Italy remains as it was. I regret the state both of Italy and of Poland; but, if the Government is to be blamed for not having secured the independence of Poland and the freedom of Italy, I believe that is a censure in which the great body of this House will not join. The forts along the Circassian coast were in the possession of Russia before the war begun, and there is no more reason why we should stipulate that those forts should not be rebuilt than there is for stipulating that the Turks should destroy their forts at Varna or at any other point on the coast of the Euxine. But in forming our judgment on these various questions, I agree with the hon. Member (Mr. Layard) in thinking that the treaty should be examined generally, and not with reference only to one single point. What is done for the security of Turkey? That object is effectually provided for by taking away from Russia the power of attacking Turkey suddenly and with an overpowering force by sea; it is provided for by the fact that Russia binds herself, in common with the other Powers represented in the late Conferences at Paris, to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and it is further secured by a treaty which has been laid on the table this day, and has been concluded between Austria, France, and England, guaranteeing the independence of the Porte. We have no right to treat Russia as a Power so faithless that she will break treaties as soon as they are made; and so far as can be done by treaty obligations, I assert that the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire are fully secured by the treaty now under consideration. As to the other points embraced in it, the hon. Member for Aylesbury, well acquainted as he is with the condition of Turkey, has stated that with respect to the articles relating to the condition of the Christians, we have got more
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than he thought we could possibly have obtained. I was glad to hear the opinion expressed by him, that the firman securing to the Christians equal rights and privileges ought not to have been included in the treaty; our desire was to treat Turkey as an independent nation, and by doing so less opportunity is afforded to any Power at any future time to interfere in her internal arrangements. With respect to the Principalities, an hon. Member inquired whether the divan is to be elected during the occupation of the Austrian troops? The hon. Gentleman will find in one of the protocols that Count Buol declares that immediate measures will be taken for the evacuation of the Principalities by the troops of his Imperial master; and it is clearly understood that the Principalities are to be free from Austrian interference previously to any step which they may take for the future settlement of their affairs. With regard to the arrangements for the improvement of the navigation of the Danube, I have heard no dissatifaction expressed by any person as to the provisions introduced into the treaty on that subject. Those provisions are a great improvement upon what was contemplated at Vienna. The Russians are removed altogether from the banks of the Danube, and they have no power therefore to interfere with the navigation. I cannot help thinking that, seeing how the obligations which devolved upon Russia with respect to the navigation of this river have been hitherto neglected, there would have been but little security for the future freedom of the Danube if she had been left in possession of either bank. The next point to which some objection appears to be taken is the arrangement with regard to the neutrality of the Black Sea. At Vienna the proposal was to limit the Russian force, allowing her to retain a certain number of vessels of large size. Now, I cannot help thinking the present arrangement of neutralisation is a very much better one. The number of ships which Russia is allowed to retain in the Black Sea is reduced to ten light vessels of about the size of our second class gunboats. It has been objected by hon. Members that this provision of the treaty may easily be evaded. Now, it is difficult to provide a form of words which cannot be evaded by persons desirous of doing so, in the same way that it is said that there is no Act of Parliament through, which a coach and six may not be driven.

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So far, however, as words go, I think we have a security that the naval force I have mentioned will not be exceeded by Russia. No doubt it is true that gunboats may be built by her in some part of the rivers which run into the Black Sea, and guns may be provided for their equipment. But, could we decently impose on Russia the obligation that she should not build, at any distance from the Black Sea, in any of the rivers which run into that sea, vessels which upon occasion might not be converted into gunboats? Why, barges and lighters might upon an emergency be converted into gunboats, and to provide that no such vessels should be built would be carrying jealousy and prohibition somewhat too far. An hon. Member also said that merchantmen may be brought into the Black Sea, which may be subsequently armed. No doubt they may; but are we therefore to prohibit commerce in the Black Sea, and to say that Russia shall have no trading vessels there because they may hereafter be improperly used? To carry out our jealousy of Russia to such an extent would be entirely to defeat the object we had in view, which was to convert the Black Sea into a sea of commerce. We have no reason to suppose that Russia will not abide by her treaties, but, taking matters at the worst, this point at least has been gained—Russia cannot create in a moment a large naval force for purposes of aggression; and long before such a force could be called into existence, the British or French fleet would pass the Bosphorus and would sweep the waters of the Euxine as they have swept it before. Therefore, supposing—which I cannot believe to be possible—that Russia should attempt to break the treaty, ample time is given to us to guard against the effect of such a breach of faith. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) has expressed a fear that the people of the Crimea may not be treated well by the Russians. I am not aware that many of those people have at all subjected themselves to any hostility on the part of the Russian Government, but such as have will be protected by the amnesty contained in the fifth article of the treaty, than which nothing can be more complete and explicit. The stipulations in regard to the Aland Islands are of great importance. Those islands hung over Stockholm as much as Sebastopol hung over Constantinople, and, I think, that beyond those objects for
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which the war was undertaken, we have attained a great advantage in securing to a great extent the independence of Sweden both as regards the Aland Islands, and the districts in Finmark from the aggression of Russia. These are the principal stipulations of the treaty, and to me they seem to be stipulations which we ought to receive with joy and satisfaction. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Layard) thinks that the country is disappointed because the character of England has, during the progress of the late war, fallen in the estimation of Europe. I do not believe that such has been the case. I admit that at one time the complaints and misrepresentations of persons in this country, who did all they could to destroy its character, produced some effect on the minds of foreigners who made no allowance for our constitutional privilege and habit of grumbling, but I believe that all such feelings have been entirely removed by the events of the last year, and by the present condition of the British army in the Crimea. I have been informed by an eyewitness that the other day nearly 40,000 British troops were reviewed on the heights before Sebastopol, and that they turned out, to the admiration of the French, and to the astonishment of the Russian army, in such order that, were they being reviewed in Hyde Park, they could not have been in better health or more perfect condition. I agree with my noble Friend the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) that it would be most unwise, impolitic, and wrong to attempt to maintain a large standing army in this country, but I do hope that we shall from this war learn the important lesson that nothing can be such bad economy or so cruel to our troops as to deprive ourselves in time of peace of the means of sending out properly equipped, with the necessary auxiliary means, any force which it may in future be found indispensable to send from our shores. I do not think that any one can doubt our ability to send out a powerful fleet. Circumstances have prevented the navy from signalising itself so much as might have been desired during the late war; but all that was in its power it accomplished in a manner which was worthy of its former credit. I believe that if there is any want of enthusiasm in favour of the peace it is due in a great measure to the disappointment felt by the country that we cannot employ those magnificent forces which the liberality of Parliament has enabled the

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Government to provide for carrying on the war. That feeling, I am convinced, will be but a transient one, and I am certain that the more the country looks into the treaty the more it will feel that the ends of the war have been attained, the better satisfied it will be both with the conduct of the war and with its termination, and the more disposed to hail the peace, in the words of the Address, with joy and satisfaction. Having attained the objects for which the war was undertaken, having provided for the safety of the Ottoman Empire, by depriving Russia of her ready means of assaulting it and by admitting that empire into the family of European nations, I do not think that we should have been justified in continuing the war, or that, had we continued it, we should have had a right to expect that Divine blessing which has hitherto crowned our exertions with success. I agree with my noble Friend the Member for London, that the alliances which we have formed, and the admission of Turkey into the system of European politics are additional securities for the maintenance of peace. I hope that the pacification which has just been concluded will be an enduring one; and, notwithstanding the opinions which have been expressed against it, I think that we are justified in saying that it is one which is honourable to the country, which has attained the object for which the war was undertaken. I therefore hope the House will reject the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Tyrone, and carry the Address by a large majority.
MR. LINDSAY MR. LINDSAY moved the adjournment of the debate to to-morrow.
MR. WALPOLEsaid, that he had precedence to-morrow for a Motion on the subject of education. He felt that it would be unbecoming in him to prevent the continuance of a debate on an Address to the Crown on such an important question; but, as he had last year postponed the same Motion in order to afford time for the discussion of a question of peace or war, he thought he had a claim upon the Government for a day. Friday had been given up by the hon. Baronet the Member
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for Hertfordshire (Sir B. Lytton), and he hoped that that day would therefore be granted to him (Mr. Walpole).
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he should feel very happy to comply with the right hon. Gentleman's request, for the very courteous manner in which the right hon. Gentleman discharged his duties in that House must make every one anxious to defer to him as much as possible. He regretted, however, that in the present instance it was not in his power to concur in the arrangement which the right hon. Gentleman had suggested. He quite agreed with him that, as the debate was founded on a message from the Crown, it was fitting that it should be continued without interruption. If they had arrived at the end of the Session when, in the ordinary course of affairs, there would be no probability of the right hon. Gentleman being able to bring on his Motion until many hon. Members had left town, the right hon. Gentleman would, no doubt, have a strong claim upon the Government to appoint some day for his Motion, but at the present period of the Session the appeal, he thought, was somewhat premature. An arrangement had been made by which the Police Bill was to be brought forward on Friday, which could not be disturbed. Although the hon. Baronet whose Motion had been fixed for Friday had postponed it, it was only a postponement, and the hon. Baronet no doubt believed himself to be entitled to the reversion of another day, in substitution for Friday, whenever he should think the proper time for bringing on his Motion had arrived.
MR. WALPOLEsaid, he must acknowledge the importance of losing no opportunity of proceeding with so important a Bill as the Police Bill, and would, therefore, be content to waive his claim on Friday. He would try the ballot once more; but so strong was his sense of the importance of the subject that, if he failed, he should feel justified in bringing his measure forward some day on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply.
Debate adjourned.
The House adjourned at Two o'clock.

MINUTE.
PUBLIC BILL.—1a Joint Stock Companies Winding-up Acts Amendment.
GENERAL THANKSGIVING DAY.
Ordered, That the Thanks of this House be given to The Lord Bishop of BATH and WELLS for the excellent Sermon by him preached Yesterday in the Abbey Church, Westminster, being the Day appointed by Her Majesty's Royal Proclamation for a General Thanksgiving for the Restoration of Peace, and that he be desired to cause the same to be forthwith printed and published.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.
Order of the Day for the Consideration of the General Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, for the Re-establishment of Peace, read.
THE EARL OF ELLESMERE: My Lord, I rise for the purpose of inviting your Lordships' assent to an Address of congratulation to Her Majesty in reply to Her Majesty's notification of the peace which has been concluded between this country and our Allies on the one hand, and the Emperor of Russia on the other. My Lords, before I touch on any of the topics to which I may be tempted briefly to advert, in recommending this Motion to what I hope and trust will prove your Lordships' unanimous acceptance, I would ask permission to address myself for a moment to that considerable majority of your Lordships who, like myself, are not old enough to have a Parliamentary recollection of the similar occasions which have occurred within the present century. Fortunately such occasions do not occur every day, and I hope that as great or a greater period may again intervene before any one of your Lordships may have, like me, to
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advert to topics of congratulation, indeed, but which involve the sacrifices, the sufferings, and the exhaustion of antecedent war. Your Lordships would find on inquiry that the duty I now undertake has usually been allotted, as it is now, not to one of your Lordships, who, from connection with office or from their active participation in public business, are in the habit of speaking with authority in these walls, but rather to one who, having nothing but independence of position to recommend him, must look to your Lordships' indulgence for attention rather than to that deference which is earned here and in the other House of Parliament only by exertions to which I am not equal and talents which I do not possess. I owe it, I think, to Her Majesty's Government, which has invited my services, to state a circumstance which may acquit them, if not of defective judgment, at least of departure from prescription; and I owe it to myself to avoid the possible charge of presumption in accepting a duty which, though I undertake it not without satisfaction, but for that excuse of practice and prescription I should have gladly left to abler and worthier hands.
My Lords, my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has closed his labours, and returning "fraught in either hand with palm and olive, victory and peace," has laid his work on your Lordships' table for better criticism than mine. For my own part, whether I look to the terms of the treaty from which the veil of diplomatic secrecy has lately been lifted, to the protocols which throw much, and, so far as they go, doubtless, faithful, light on the manner in which it has been arrived at; or whether I look to both with some reference to former settlements and to the circumstances in which my predecessors in the discharge of my present function have stood, I own that I should have to look very curiously and very fastidiously for any drawback or mitigation of any moment to the satisfaction of which I have spoken, and which I would fain hope to find largely shared by your Lordships. My Lords, I am not here to exaggerate my own feelings, or to misrepresent those of the public in this matter. My own satisfaction I do not intend to describe as that which springs from victories without a check, from successes without sacrifices, or such as might attend one of those great consummations which leave the vanquished enemy at the mercy,

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at the pleasure, at the discretion of his victorious antagonist. Satisfaction such as France might have felt with the bulletins of Ulm, or Austerlitz, or Jena, is not what I claim from your Lordships, nor is it what I ever expected to gain, nor, I must own, what I am reluctant to forego. I must, my Lords, however, still contend that our reward for great exertions and great sacrifices, though less dazzling in the mode of its attainment and less astounding in its immediate incidents than was the case in 1814 and 1815—though it involve no subversion of dynasties, no sweeping redistribution, still less acquisition of territory—though it leave on the map of Europe little trace beyond one beneficent and not unimportant change—has come up to the mark which we prescribed to ourselves at the outset; is in the main all to which reasonable men looked forward, and more than even sanguine men expected to gain within the time, or anything like the time, in which the issue has been attained. My Lords, I trust, that in expressing these opinions, I am not provoking any desire to pronounce a different decision on the part of any one of your Lordships, and I will not risk doing so by indulging in any strange eulogium or exaggerated statement. Eyes more practised, if not more impartial, than mine will scan the provisions of this settlement; it is fit they should:—for my own part, looking back to the origin of the struggle—to its past vicissitudes and chances to come—I know of no rational expectation, no fair demand, no purpose at once achievable and considerable, which has not been met by one or other of its provisions. I speak for myself, but I am sanguine, that however modified may be the assent, or even however pronounced the dissent, of some of your Lordships to this general view of the subject, I shall not be considered by those who hear me here as having vitiated the moderate and, as I conceive, scarcely exceptionable terms of the Address by the language of intemperate advocacy. Beyond these walls, I am well aware that with a considerable portion of the public considerations have exercised, and may probably continue to exercise, an influence averse to the conclusions I have stated. There is no doubt that England has warmed to a contest which she did not provoke; that difficulty and sacrifice, instead of depressing, have but roused her energies; and that the consciousness of developed strength and unexhausted resources has made her of all the
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parties to the strife the least disposed to shrink from a further trial of arms. I am, however, convinced that the issue at which, by less violent means, by honest concurrence with a faithful ally, by the demonstration without the actual use of preparation for war, by firmness without menace, and conciliation without weakness, we have arrived is one which, on calm consideration, will bear even the jealous scrutiny which men in the frame of mind I have mentioned are naturally disposed to apply to its conditions, and that it will obtain the approval of the future and unbiassed Hallam or Macaulay.
My Lords, if I look back to the circumstances under which my noble Friend left England for Paris, I might advert to some which materially enhanced the inherent difficulties of the trust which he undertook, and which ought to enhance our appreciation of the success with which he has overcome them. In Count Orloff and Baron Brunow he certainly had a singular advantage of meeting with two distinguished men, both of whom knew him, and the latter of whom knew this country well. They were, therefore, incapable of individually doubting the honesty and good faith which he brought to his task, and that circumstance, no doubt, prevented the negotiations from being impeded by any suspicion of insincerity either on the one side or the other. In other quarters, however—I mean as regarded public opinion on the Continent, and especially in Paris—I believe my noble Friend embarked under a cloud of misconception respecting the mind and policy of England, well calculated to add to the difficulties which he has overcome, and the anxieties from which he is now released. It was very generally imagined—at least it was very industriously circulated—that England, in pursuit of some interest, real or fancied, of her own, was willing or resolved to ignore the substantial offers of Russia; that it was part of the instructions of my noble Friend, by all the subtle devices attributed to that bugbear of continental coffee-houses, "perfidious Albion," to make it impossible for other Powers to accept conditions with which they were satisfied, and to close a strife with which they were comparatively wearied. Your Lordships have not to learn from me that these suspicions were utterly unfounded. Still, there was much to account for and excuse them. The recognition by Russia—which I shall always think a frank and manly one—of

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a state of circumstances which forbade her to persevere in armed opposition to the remonstrances of her truest friends and the accumulating power of her antagonists had come, not as such recognitions often come, late, and on sheer compulsion, but had anticipated the expectations of Europe at large, and still more of England. It certainly ran before my own. Here and elsewhere, but here especially, men were slow to perceive and to admit that the untarnished honour of her arms had enabled wisdom and moderation to predominate in her councils. It was the duty of Government, while a prospect remained of a recurrence and continuance of the contest, to take no step and to use no language which should relax our material preparations for the worst, or damp the spirit of the country. It was an inevitable consequence that while, on the one hand, some here misconstrued the conduct of Russia, others should draw false conclusions from the somewhat grim and determined attitude of England. It was hard to believe that a country which had accumulated, not in unapproachable nooks and corners, but in the face of day and the blaze of notoriety, materials for war such as the world had never witnessed, could be sincere in its acceptance of the preliminaries of a peaceful solution. I advert to this, because I am well convinced that my noble Friend had uphill work to encounter at the outset, before he could carry conviction to the minds of all concerned that he was as incapable of accepting the task of acting on dishonest instructions as any English Government, let the party in power be what it may, is of giving them to its representative. Your Lordships now know in what manner and with what amount of success my noble Friend encountered and overcame these and all other difficulties of his arduous task. His success has, at least, been such as leads me to entertain much distrust of a theory very prevalent in this country. It is somewhat remarkable that, while by the continental press England is very usually represented as the type of selfishness and perfidy—as always aiming at and often succeeding in overreaching the innocent diplomatists of other countries—all this time she is as constantly represented by writers of her own soil as the ready dupe and victim of the superior diplomatic capacity of continental statesmen. I know, and your Lordships know, that the first of these theories is erroneous. I think the recent conduct of my noble Friend and his
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coadjutor (Lord Cowley) throws much doubt on the second. I see no evidence in the documents before me that the innocence of my noble Friend has been practised upon. But, my Lords, I am equally bound to say that I see no proof that the attempt was made. I have no doubt that Count Orloff contended well and manfully for his master's interests; but neither in the documents before us nor from common fame have I gathered reason to believe that he was more capable than my noble Friend of descending to those low and insincere devices which diplomatists are supposed to permit themselves. Those who had personal knowledge of men and things at St. Petersburg, as I have heard, drew favourable auguries from the selection of Count Orloff for his mission. It was, as I believe, justly thought that the choice spoke well for the character and intentions of that young Sovereign for whom, from no fault of his own, the dawn of his reign arose
"Not in the sunshine and the smile of heaven, But wrapt in whirlwinds and begirt with woes."
I hail in that Sovereign the indications of strong will and sound decision which have contributed essentially to the pacification of Europe, and give fair promise of the continuance of tranquillity. I hope that Russia may henceforth present a spectacle which the rest of Europe may contemplate not only without jealousy or mistrust, but with sympathy and satisfaction—the spectacle of a great empire, under the guidance of a strong and able hand, repairing the ravages of war by the arts of peace. It is perfectly true—it is a truism—that the real sinews of war are wealth, science, and civilisation; but it is as true that the cultivation of all or any of these interests has pacific and corrective tendencies, and if we are to act, either as individuals or as nations, on the moral view that every depository of power is to make the worst possible use of it, the world will be less fit to live in than it now is with all its imperfections. I have argued elsewhere, and I continue to hold the opinion, that a single well-directed line of rails would have made Russia more formidable for defence to her antagonists than all the guns, ships, and stores she had accumulated for years together in the Crimea. It requires no great wisdom to know and to feel this; but I am content to take my chance of any misuse which future Czars may make of those additions to her

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power which accrue, not from without—in the shape of acquisitions by force and fraud—but from within—by good government and industry. I have no right and no wish to act otherwise. The time has been when all nations, without exception—England being, I am afraid, no more an exception than the rest—entertained a contrary principle, and acted on it when they could—I mean the principle that the wealth and gains of one nation are the poverty of another, and the power and strength of one, however legitimate, the weakness of another. My Lords, I think these principles as detestable as they are unsound; and I am happy to think that the whole tenour of the recent legislation of England has been such as to enable me to disclaim and repudiate them. I say, I shall look without jealousy or alarm at the legitimate advancement of which I see promise in the present condition of Russia. Least of all am I jealous on the score of India. Of all the causes of jealousy which have been imputed to us, the apprehensions we are supposed to feel on account of our Indian Empire are said to hold the foremost place. But if there is one thing upon which Englishmen have been more misrepresented than another it is with regard to this imaginary fear far our Indian possessions. I have heard it stated in all parts of the world to which I have travelled that this was the foundation and the real origin of the hostile spirit of this country with respect to Russia. My Lords, on this subject it is not necessary for me to speak, after the language which has been held elsewhere, and which, I think, was worthy both of an Englishman and of the Prime Minister of England. No doubt India has its own difficulties and its own dangers. I do not wish to speak in any arrogant or boasting tone, still less with any insolent assumption of military superiority to our late antagonists.
"Stetimus tela aspera contra Contulimusque manus."
India, I repeat, may have its own difficulties and its own dangers. It is our business to rear new Clives, and Wellesleys, and Goughs, and Ellenboroughs, and Dalhousies to meet them, if need be, in council and in field. But among those dangers a Russian invasion—one, at least, worthy of the name—may be treated as holding no place. I am assuming no innate military superiority—we know the qualities both of the Russian officers and the Russian troops; but we know, also,
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the vast distance against which any operations against India would have to be conducted. But, supposing such operations possible, and supposing some modern Alexander, emulating his Macedonian namesake, could overcome the difficulties of the journey, I hope and believe he would find on the banks of the Sutlej and in the district of the Five Powers something very different from Porus and his zoological collection. Be this as it may, nothing can, to my knowledge, be more unfounded than the notion that India had anything to do with that strong national feeling which, when the time came, made England ready to draw the sword, and, scorning alike disaster and success, made her unwilling to sheathe it.
My Lords, I have consulted my own feelings in endeavouring to express what I think is justly due to my noble Friend. It is possible that in the course of free discussion he may have to encounter less friendly criticism; but in what I have to say with regard to others I have little apprehension of securing the accordance of your Lordships. In a lapse of time, short, thank God, in comparison with the duration of former wars, but if time could be measured, not by the revolution of the heavenly bodies, but by action and emotion, almost a lifetime, this country has accumulated a debt of gratitude to those who have devoted themselves to its service which I have no words to acknowledge, and the fountain of honour has scarcely rewards to satisfy. I know by report the number of hours which have been elsewhere devoted to the discussion of a single episode of the great struggle from which we are now taking breath. I accept that warning, and your Lordships need not fear from me the infliction of a review, however summary, of the events of the war, nor any attempt at a catalogue of the names which would rise to the recollection of your Lordships. Of those who did their duty, and did it well, in the normal discharge of their profession it is scarcely for me to speak. Of some who did more than their duty—who found or made occasion for the display of their high qualities—such men as Williams and his associates, Nasmyth, the lamented Butler, and Dr. Thompson can derive no lustre from mention or praise of mine. There is, however, one other name among those who have distinguished themselves in the performance of their professional duties which I will take the liberty of mentioning, because it so happened that I

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came in contact with that gallant officer and was enabled to judge personally of his merits. I will mention it because the gallant officer who bore it no longer survives, but has died in the execution of his duty, when premature clouds of malignity had darkened his latter days. I do not think the exertions of Admiral Boxer can be overrated. Were he now living I would not have ventured to bring him thus specially under your Lordships' notice. There are other reasons why I should repress, though I do it with difficulty, some expressions of opinion and some statements of what I believe to be fact. There are subjects connected with the vicissitudes of the late struggle of which I know too little, and, pardon my presumption if I add, I also know too much to bring them now under discussion. Among those on which I scarcely trust myself to speak are Lord Raglan's services and Lord Raglan's loss. I am the less disposed to regret any restraint I put on myself in this matter because I know that accident has elsewhere afforded occasion to more than one friend and associate of Lord Raglan to do justice, as far as for the moment is possible, necessarily incomplete, but substantial and solid, to his glorious and lamented memory. Among those witnesses to character—those conservators of that sacred trust, a comrade's fame—was one who, I say it advisedly, next to Lord Raglan, contributed more than any man living in Her Majesty's service to the success of the allied arms and the peace in which we rejoice: I mean Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons. I well know that if he were standing, as I wish he were, in my place here, he would tell your Lordships that through that awful winter of complicated trials, such as no army I ever heard or read of endured and survived, there was one spell which stood between that host and its destruction. That spell was confidence in its leader. From that humble abode—the head-quarters of Lord Raglan—there radiated a moral force, a serene and unquenchable spirit of faith, and trust, and duty, which did resist, and which alone could have resisted, the combined influences of weather, privation, and fatigue, superadded to the constant changes of a defective military position, threatened in front, flank, and rear by a brave, an able, and outnumbering enemy. The spell prevailed; not even discomfiture, far less disgrace—for discomfiture and even destruction under such circumstances might have come without
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disgrace—fell on the banners of England. My Lords, the agony of that time has become matter of history. The vegetation of two successive springs has obscured the vestiges of Balaklava and Inkerman. Strong voices now answer to the roll-call, and sturdy forms now muster round the colours. The ranks are full, the hospitals are empty. The Angel of Mercy still lingers to the last on the scene of her labours; but her mission is all but accomplished. Those long arcades of Scutari, in which dying men sat up to catch the sound of her footstep or the flutter of her dress, and fell back on the pillow content to have seen her shadow as it passed, are now comparatively deserted. She may probably be thinking how to escape, as best she may, on her return, the demonstrations of a nation's appreciation of the deeds and motives of Florence Nightingale. I am sure that, while, from Balaklava and Kadikoi to the ravine of the Tchernaya and the heights of Inkerman, England's renovated battalions are shaking the earth with their tramp, and extorting alike from constant Allies and former foes that ungrudging admiration which true soldiers love to feel even for "foemen worthy of their steel"—amid that pomp and circumstance of war's display without its terrors, and the interchange of hospitalities between reconciled antagonists, surget amari aliquid. There will be a bunch of myrrh in the festival goblet when the cup is fullest and the revel is at its height, which will make the draught bitter but wholesome. There will be a thought and a sigh for one who should have been there. They will miss among the crowds of officers of many nations the armless sleeve, the noble form which in the hour of battle they had never far to seek—that countenance which by its winning expression was in itself a passport to the soldier's heart. Yes, there will be a thought and a sigh for him who first planted our banner in the Crimea, and whose undaunted courage, whose military skill sustained untarnished the military honour of England, and but for whom, as I devoutly believe, the graves on Cathcart's Hill would have been now, like the tumuli which record in that country the reign of extinct dynasties and forgotten sovereigns, the sole memorial of the early successes and the disastrous catastrophe of an English army. The noble Earl concluded by moving—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to return to Her Majesty the sincere

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Acknowledgments and Thanks of this House for the important Communication, which Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to make to this House, of the General Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, between Her Majesty, The Emperor of Austria, The Emperor of the French, The King of Prussia, The Emperor of Russia, The King of Sardinia, and The Sultan, by which Peace has been re-established between Her Majesty, The Emperor of the French, The King of Sardinia, and The Sultan, on the one hand, and The Emperor of Russia on the other:
"To assure Her Majesty, that while we should have deemed it our Duty cheerfully to afford Her Majesty our firm Support, if it had unfortunately been found necessary to continue the War, we have learnt with Joy and Satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish Peace on Conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish the great Objects for which the War was undertaken:
"To express to Her Majesty the great Satisfaction which we feel at finding that, while those Alliances which have so mainly contributed to the vigorous and successful Prosecution of the War have been equally effective in the Consolidation of Peace, Powers which have not taken an active Part in the War have combined with the Belligerents to give additional Firmness to the Arrangements by which the Repose of Europe is in future to be protected from Disturbance:
"To state to Her Majesty, that we rejoice that not with standing the great Exertions which the late War has rendered necessary, the Resources of the Empire remain unimpaired:
"To express our Hope, that the Peace which has now been concluded may, under the Favour of Divine Providence, long continue to shed its Blessings over Europe, and that Harmony among Governments and friendly Intercourse among Nations may steadily promote the Progress of Civilisation and secure the Welfare and Happiness of Mankind."
LORD GLENELG: My Lords, in rising to second the Motion, I feel that I address you at no inconsiderable disadvantage after the eloquent speech, full of pathos and of sound principles of political science, which we have just heard from my noble Friend; but I trust that you will accord to me the indulgence of which I stand in need. I join with my noble Friend in expressing my delight that the period has arrived when we can thank Her Majesty for the communication of this treaty. I was one of those who, two years ago, approved the reluctance with which the Government of that day entered upon this war. Convinced as I was of the justice of the war, I was yet glad that they were slow to enter upon it; and I rejoice now to be among the first to welcome the conclusion of hostilities and the return of peace. When we consider what war is and what peace is, it requires some coolness of judgment to contemplate calmly the absence of war and the revival of peace. It is not,
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however, by our feelings alone that we are to be guided on such occasions as this. Great as are the evils of war, there are evils still greater; great as are the blessings of peace, there are blessings for which these ought to be willingly sacrificed.
My Lords, the question before us, as my noble Friend has said, is, whether, speaking generally, the objects of the war have been attained—whether its conditions have been fulfilled by this peace? I need not dwell on the general reasons which justified the war; but I may say that, if we consider the state of Europe as it was two years ago and as it is at the present moment, we shall find sufficient cause to congratulate Her Majesty on this great truth, that all the conditions of the war have been satisfied, fully and honourably, yet without insolent exultation, and without contempt of the rights and feelings of other nations. The real test is, what were the evils we meant to redress, what the evils we meant to avert, and what has been the result? Look at the state of Europe two years ago. Russia was then in possession, either personally, if I may so apply the expression, or virtually, of the greater portion of Germany. Russia with all her native grandeur, exaggerated by the imaginations of men, and surrounded with all the prestige which diplomatic skill, talent, and great wealth could throw around her—Russia at that time exercised over the greater part of continental Europe a mesmeric influence, which extended into Asia, and overshadowed even our Indian Empire. What was then the condition of the several countries of Europe? All Germany overawed or paralysed by the supremacy of Russia; Sweden gradually entangled in her meshes; the Principalities in her grasp; the waters of the Danube under her seal; the Black Sea hedged round by her fortresses and loaded with her navies; Turkey at her feet—not yet, indeed, reduced to the last gasp, but already condemned by the sentence of mortal disease which her powerful neighbour had pronounced. What do you see now? The spell broken. Germany awaking from that trance and beginning at last to show some symptoms of conscious existence. Sweden released, the Principalities rescued; the Danube free, the Euxine free, the Ottoman Empire free. The spell is broken. But, my Lords, there is more reason for congratulation even than this. The conspicuous characteristic of the treaty which has been concluded is the

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moderation which has been displayed by the belligerents. The two belligerents who commenced the war have, as to that treaty, been swayed by no sordid or personal desires of aggrandisement, by no vulgar ambition. Throughout its stipulations there is not one which can be called of a private character—they are all national, all European, all public, all belong to the world. We remember, my Lords, that when France and England entered on this war they announced to the world that it should not be followed by any personal aggrandisement. Some persons very naturally were disposed to regard that declaration with suspicion. Such announcements from kings and statesmen have too frequently been the preludes to acts of rapacity and spoliation. On this occasion, however, that pledge has been honestly redeemed, and I say that its redemption is the most satisfactory characteristic of the treaty.
There, is, however, yet another subject of congratulation—not, indeed, in the articles of the treaty, because it relates to the internal affairs of Turkey, but in that instrument which is in a manner incorporated with the treaty and is surrounded by its sanctions—a document which interests all Christendom—I mean that by which the Sultan has accorded civil and religious equality to all his subjects, Christian and Mahomedan. That alone would almost have justified what we have done, and it imparts a species of sacredness to the conditions of the treaty. For the first time the Sultan has recognised the rights of conscience and the rights of man. All honour and praise are due to that monarch for having crowned a long series of beneficent acts with this great charter of the liberty of his Christian subjects. Praise be to him, and honour to all those who have in any way contributed to this good work; honour especially to that eminent man by whose wisdom, and unwearied efforts, and distinguished talents, this triumph has been accomplished—I mean our Minister at Constantinople. My Lords, it is impossible to express any hope for Turkey without mentioning the name of Lord Stratford. It is to his efforts, his zeal, and his high principles, that we owe it, that we can number this among the results of the war; and warmly have the exertions of Lord Stratford been, appreciated by those best able to judge. There is among the papers on your Lordships' table, an address from the missionaries of various religious
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societies of England and America stationed at Constantinople. It is one of the ablest and most eloquent documents that was ever penned, evidently proceeding from the hearts of the writers. After describing by what able means Lord Stratford has obtained the great object of the emancipation of the Christians in Turkey, they offer up their prayers that he may for many years be spared to that country, because, as they assert, all the wisest measures which have, during the last thirty years, been adopted by the Porte have been the results of his personal influence and advice. All praise is also due to those Sovereigns of Europe who have cordially ratified this treaty, thus giving their assent to the principles and the policy on which it is founded, and, having thus introduced Turkey into the European system, have cast round its stipulations every guardianship which the policy and the good faith of Europe can supply. We have fenced them round with the vigilance and watchfulness of European statesmen, with the might of European armies, and with the sanctity of religious obligations. I venture to say that this is a treaty which, looking at it generally, must command the approbation of your Lordships and of the country. But, my Lords, I should be unjust indeed if, in alluding to the treaty, I did not add my humble tribute to the praise which my noble Friend has so eloquently bestowed upon the Government of this country. In the presence of my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) I must, I know, restrain in some degree the feelings which I wish to express; but, in justice to my own position, I am bound not altogether to abstain from their expression. I say, then, that great credit is due to the Ministry of this country, and especially to those Members of it who have been by their position most concerned in the negotiations and the treaty—to the Prime Minister who, called to his high office under peculiar circumstances by the unanimous voice of the people, has gloriously answered to that call—and to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I am persuaded that we owe this treaty—the advantageous conditions which it contains, and the whole spirit which runs through it, in no small degree to the personal character, to the manners and general bearing of my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon). Before he took his departure for Paris, my noble Friend told us, in this House, that he would endeavour to make

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a peace which should be honourable to all and humiliating to none, and well as he carried out that declaration. That speech resounded throughout Europe, and I believe that the impression which it made contributed mainly to the successful termination of his labours.
My Lords, I agree most cordially in the observations of my noble Friend who has just sat down (the Earl of Ellesmere) respecting the conduct of the people of this country during the war. From the treaty itself we are naturally led to consider those who have contributed to its conclusion not by negotiation in the Cabinet, but by gallantry in the field, and by patience and liberality at home. I cannot but express my admiration of the noble attitude which the people of this country have presented during the two years of war. When the war commenced it was supposed that we were so enfeebled by luxury, so devoted to the acquisition of wealth, as to be unable ever again to recall our ancient valour or to rival the former glories of England. It might have been true that we had to a great degree given ourselves up to the arts of peace, but it was not true that these had in any degree affected our national character; on the contrary, there never was a period in the history of this country so full of great exertions, of self-denial, of the pursuit of great objects at great sacrifices, of the development of every art relating to social life, as the thirty years which had elapsed since the termination of the last war. Under the appearance—perhaps the partial reality—of luxury, there were as high principles of duty at work as ever animated the hearts of Englishmen. Those sterling virtues which during that period were silently engaged in strengthening the hearts of the people, in teaching them sound principles, in elevating their character, and in enlightening their minds—all those efforts of great and good men in every rank, many of whom have now passed away—were deeply planting the materials from which have ultimately sprung those mighty results which have been seen by all Europe with admiration, and which are now crowned by the conclusion of an honourable and satisfactory peace. The people of this country, devoted indeed to the arts of peace, were yet deeply alive to the call of justice and humanity, and from one end of the country to the other the demand of justice and humanity was answered by one universal voice. This war was peculiarly the war of the people; they threw themselves
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into the lists regardless of consequences, and, joined to noble Allies, resolved never to cease from the war until its objects were obtained. If that period excite admiration, what must be our admiration at the subsequent attitude of the country? No eulogy can be too great for the qualities which were exhibited during the summer and winter which followed the commencement of the war. The winter of 1854–55 is one of the most glorious periods recorded in the annals of England. The most powerful demands were made upon the greatest virtues which belong to man's character. In the field, in the hospital, in the trenches, gallantry, self-devotion, noble heroism—
—"the better fortitude Of patience and heroic martyrdom,"
were all gathered together and exhibited to the world in the ranks of the British army. At home the nation was not idle or indifferent. We all know how the springs of sympathy were unlocked, how every heart and every head was at work to furnish supplies of every kind to our soldiers in the Crimea. We know how all ranks, from the throne to the cottage, vied in efforts to minister to the wants of our fellow-countrymen, and how from the lap of luxury, from the retreats of unpretending virtue, from the bosom of domestic happiness, the fair, the young, the tender, the refined, hastened to the seat of war itself to carry consolation to the sick, the wounded, and the dying. But this was not all. In the spring of last year negotiations for peace failed, and it seemed as if the war was to be protracted for a long period. New burdens were to be imposed, new sacrifices to be required, new miseries to be endured. Then it was that strong nerves began to tremble and stout hearts to falter; but did the people of England waver? Never. They had nailed their colours to the mast, they had chosen their lot, and they were determined to carry the contest to an honourable issue. Nothing can excel the solemn but noble attitude of the people of England at that moment. There was no noisy invective, no factitious excitement, but a determined resolution arising from a consciousness of right and of power—a resolution that they never would be baffled. Neither have they been baffled. It was impossible to mark the conduct of the people at that period and not to see that the fate of Sebastopol was sealed.

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At that juncture Sardinia joined the Allies. Let that never be forgotten. In extent and in resources Sardinia is not among the first Powers of Europe, but she did not hesitate to enter into the lists with us, though greater Powers shrank from our side. With her admirable army, with her people faithful to their Sovereign because he was faithful to them, with the single free constitution in Italy, she did not scruple to enter into those bloody lists, though she was fully aware of the desperate nature of the contest, and had seen that the task was one which had put to the stretch the energies even of this great country. At that time unexampled calls were made upon the resources of this country. Let it never be said that a constitutional Government is unequal to the hard exigencies of war, or that it is deficient in energy and rapidity of action. However our military system may have been relaxed during the time of peace, when the call was made there perhaps never was before seen such a rapid creation of great forces, so wonderful an application of the multiplied powers of science to the purposes of war as between Christmas, 1854, and Christmas, 1855. New power seemed to be given to this country, and new armies and navies seemed to spring up as if by magic.
But, my Lords, it is not alone to our own army and to those of our Allies that praise must be rendered. When history tells of the famous leaguer of Sebastopol, she will tell not merely of the armies of France, Sardinia, and England, but of those who were within the walls of Sebastopol. She will tell of the matchless intrepidity of the Russians, of their unfaltering courage, of their patient endurance, of the science of their engineers, and of the bravery and consummate skill of their generals. It is pleasing thus to be able to speak of those who have been our enemies, and I know the people of this country would have been willing to pay them this tribute had they still remained our enemies. But they are no longer our enemies. With the exception, perhaps, of one or two instances, the Russian soldiers of all ranks, particularly those of the superior ranks, and indeed all Russians of the higher ranks, have displayed a gallant courtesy and a generous feeling for their enemies which entitle them to the highest applause. It will be long remembered—that beautiful example of generous sympathy shown at the commencement of the
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war by an illustrious lady, the lady of General Osten Sacken, to the mother of the young midshipman who died of his wounds when the Tiger went ashore near Odessa and was captured. From that act down to the closing scene of the war—the interview between General Mouravieff and General Williams—the same generous feelings softened the horrors of war; and in that interview, how admirable was the chivalrous conduct of the Russian commander!
But, my Lords, when we speak of chivalry, I am naturally led to that great nation which has been our companion of the war, and whose armies have in all ages been eminent for that noble quality. With that great nation we have, unfortunately, been too frequently in a state of hostility, but henceforward, I trust we shall enjoy perpetual friendship. Nothing can be more noble than the manner in which France and England joined together to resist an attempted aggression—their past animosities vanished in a moment—they became brothers in arms, brothers in sufferings, brothers in military labours and in the victories of war, and I trust that they may now continue brothers in the more glorious victories of peace.
The confederacy between France and England will be memorable in history. Confederacies are proverbially frail. They carry within themselves the seeds of their dissolution. It is true that when one mighty Power coalesces with an inferior Power, the undisputed supremacy of the greater Power may preclude the evils and dangers of divided command; but even here there are risks of disagreement and disunion. But in cases of coalition between equal Powers, those risks become more numerous and far greater, and rarely do such coalitions hold long together. There is, indeed, a splendid instance of a confederacy between two great and equal Powers which worked as harmoniously as if it had been under the guidance of a single mind—that under Marlborough and Eugene—but there the genius of two great men mastered the evils inherent in a coalition. When one mighty Power coalesces with an inferior Power, there is then the acknowledged supremacy of the former, which precludes the evils of divided command; but it has its peculiar risks of disagreement. Even when the confederate Powers are of more equal rank, though such an alliance, as in the case of Marlborough and Eugene, may be successful, it is usually sustained by

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the genius of the great men who command. In the present instance, France and England, two nations equal in power and renown, and European position, combined in a course of united action, for a great purpose. Great armies and great fleets were to be put in motion, but the generals and admirals were to be separate, and yet these forces thus combined and thus separate, were to stand "front to front, against one will supreme, independent, irresponsible, and that the will of a mind of vast capacity and gigantic aspirations, and the absolute master of millions of brave, intelligent, and disciplined, soldiers." Such were the odds against which this confederacy had to contend, and under unexpected difficulties, too, because unforeseen delays occurred, severe sufferings were endured, disappointments took place, all calculated to multiply the embarrassments and bring forth the weaknesses of a confederate action. And yet success was the result. What was the secret of that success? First and foremost, the purity of your motives so disinterested as to elevate the alliance above the range of petty discords and vulgar animosities. The next cause of our success was the loyalty and good faith, at home and abroad, of those by whom affairs were conducted. But something more was wanted to effect what purity of motive and loyalty and mutual confidence could not by themselves effect, and that was a wise and well-judging mind to direct the policy of the war. You must select one great paramount object; the importance of which should be such, that its acquisition should at once decide the final issue of the whole contest. And that was the principle on which you proceeded. Thus, and thus only, could the combination of the two nations in one common bond be assured. You bound together the different wills of the two nations to one common end and one common endeavour, and entwined all their hopes and councils and interests with one enterprise; you thus gave compactness to their alliance, and thus gave it the power which enabled it to cope with the supreme and single will of your antagonist. I say it to the honour of my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Aberdeen) who then was at the head of the Administration, that the paramount object was selected wisely and well. But it was not enough to select wisely—you were also to adhere to it firmly. In spite of difficulties and dangers, the fixed object,
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the fall of Sebastopol, must be followed up with pertinacious fidelity. You could not, indeed, have unity of command, but thus you had unity of purpose, and no collateral enterprise of the moment, however interesting, no temptations or inducements, no prophecies or menaces must be allowed to divert your mind from that object. All praise is due to those military and naval officers who, on the 14th of last June, were assembled in General Simpson's tent to decide upon a plausible proposition made by an eminent general, for the despatch of some troops to a different destination. They felt that the success of the cause they were engaged in was centred in the fall of Sebastopol, and they refused to yield to any arguments for the diminution of the force before that stronghold. They knew that the crisis of Sebastopol was approaching; Pelissier, in persisting in that refusal, even after the fall of Sebastopol, proved how well he had studied his profession, and the opinions and the conduct of great commanders, both ancient and modern; he showed how well he had profited by being trained in that great school of war bequeathed to France by the great Napoleon—or, I should rather say, by the first Napoleon, for the epithet is now no longer distinctive as applied to that name. He knew that for an army there is no moment more critical, perhaps, than the moment of success, when exultation and self-confidence are likely to lead to a relaxation of vigilance. History abounds with instances where victory has been from this over-security torn from the conqueror at the very moment of conquest. I must also add, in reference to this part of the subject, I honour the French Emperor for the course he pursued. He did well in referring that question to the Marshal, and well did the Marshal justify the confidence of his Sovereign.
My Lords, one very satisfactory part of this treaty and the papers connected with it is, that, besides the advantages which the stipulations and engagements entered into by the contracting parties confer at present, they contain the promise of much future good, the development of which must be productive of important results. Look, for instance, at the well-earned and honourable place which Sardinia now occupies among the nations of Europe. Look at the admission of Turkey into the pale of European States, and the incalculable consequences of such a measure. Above

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all, look at the union between France and England, and, knowing the misery which war brings and how the advance of arts, science, and civilisation is retarded by it, tell me, if you can, what may be the possible consequences of this union, which I trust will continue unbroken. If it does so continue, it will not be stationary. It will from day to day acquire new strength, and produce ever increasing accessions to the cause of civilisation and happiness. I believe that this treaty will be beneficial to all the parties concerned, and I am glad to think that it will also be beneficial, and not least beneficial, to Russia herself. We have no hostility to Russia now, and we remember our former friendship with that country. We lament the interruption of that friendship, and delight in binding up the wounds which war has inflicted. I hope and believe that Russia, remaining a great Power, will enhance her greatness and fill the position to which, she is entitled. The present Emperor of Russia has already won the esteem and regard of Europe. He has shown, as had been already noticed in this House, by his recent conduct, great moral courage, humanity, and a just estimate of the interests of his people. A magnificent career of usefulness is before him, and I trust he will steadily pursue that course which he seems determined to take, and, if so, I am sure he will obtain a glorious reward in the improvement and happiness of his country, and in the love and admiration of all Europe. With these sentiments I most cordially support the Address to the Crown.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships must begin to wish to hear something about the treaty we have been invited to discuss by the noble Lords; for, although it was impossible for us to have heard more eloquent speeches than those which have just been delivered by those noble Lords, I doubt—without any discourtesy to them—whether one of your Lordships now knows anything more about the treaty than he did when he entered the House. Upon an important occasion like this I should be very unwilling to raise any small objections, but I cannot help observing that Her Majesty's Government would have acted more fairly, and more in accordance with the custom of Parliament, if, at the time or immediately after they placed the treaty on your Lordships' table, they had also laid before your Lordships the Address which they
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intended to move. It was not until Friday evening that we received copies of the Address, so that if we had wished to move any Amendment upon it, in which we had desired to have the support of the whole body of our party, it would have been impossible for us to obtain it. It might have so happened that the reason for this delay was, that the Address would be framed in a perfectly unexceptionable manner; that it would be what my old friend Baron Brunow used to call une addresse inodorée—an Address perfectly devoid of salt or savour—that might have been presented from any quarter. But, far from proposing an Address of that kind, I am sorry to say that Her Majesty's Ministers, carried away, perhaps, by the feeling of the moment, have made use of language so exaggerated that I, for one, cannot concur in it.
Her Majesty's Ministers have instructed the noble Lords who began this conversation to recommend your Lordships to assure Her Majesty that—
"While we should have deemed it our duty cheerfully to afford Her Majesty our firm support if it had unfortunately been found necessary to continue the war, we have learnt with joy and satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish peace on conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish the great objects for which the war was undertaken."
I cannot concur in this strong language. I may observe, in passing, that if the noble Earl who moved the Address, and who is so well known as an elegant writer, had drawn up this article, he would not probably have called upon your Lordships to express your "joy and satisfaction" on the re-establishment of peace, but would have made the "joy" the climax to the "satisfaction," instead of making "joy" merge into "satisfaction." But, waiving such criticisms, I cannot follow the noble Earl in recommending your Lordships to make use of these words at all;—I do not think that the treaty warrants us in expressing our joy, or even our satisfaction. Further, so far as I understand what were the objects of the war—and I confess I do not clearly understand them, inasmuch as they have never been clearly explained by Her Majesty's Ministers—I deny that they have been fully accomplished by this treaty; and I should, therefore, respectfully advise your Lordships to leave out from this article the words "joy and satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish

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peace on conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish," in order to insert the words, "satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish peace upon conditions which have appeared to Her Majesty and her Allies adequately to effect the great objects of the war." Whether or not I shall press this Amendment to a division depends upon the feeling that may be manifested by your Lordships during the debate. I have no wish to divide upon any Motion hostile to the Government, but I have a strong desire to record my decided opinion with respect to the treaty. We are not now met to discuss a question the decision of which must depend upon our votes; we are invited by the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to consider a treaty which we cannot alter, but which Her Majesty, in accordance with her undoubted prerogative, has entered into with other European Powers.
My Lords, before I refer to the treaty for the purpose of pointing out the parts which do not fulfil the objects of the war, it will be necessary to tell your Lordships what those objects were; and the best, in fact the only, authority on that point is the authority of Her Majesty's Ministers. I hope your Lordships will therefore pardon me if I quote a few passages from the debates of this and of the other House, in order to give you some information as to the opinions of Her Majesty's Ministers with respect to the objects of the war. On the 24th of February, 1854, the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs said:—
"It might be very desirable or very just to take from Russia and to restore to the countries from which they had been taken various territories which Russia had taken from other countries; it may be very just and desirable to make Russia pay the cost of the war; but, my Lords, it is impossible that we should take any resolution upon any of these subjects without knowing with what skill and with what success the war will be conducted, or what will be the position and circumstances of the Emperor of Russia at its conclusion,"—[3 Hansard, cxxx. 1230.]
This was a complete truism. Events have succeeded my noble Friend's speech, and this treaty has been framed entirely in consequence of these events, which have, to say the least of them, been very unfavourable to our Allies and to ourselves. My noble Friend continues—
"But, my Lords, as we are about to undertake it, and as we have been forced into it against our wish, I say that it ought to be settled, and firmly
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settled, once for all. I can assure your Lordships that it is the purpose of every man who directly or indirectly will take part in this war, and that it is the purpose of Her Majesty's Government, so far as the course of events will permit, to do that which is necessary for the future security and tranquillity of Europe to check the aggressive and ambitious power of Russia; I say it will be necessary to take solid guarantees that Europe shall not be again deprived of the great blessings of peace."—[Ibid. 1231.]
It will be my duty to show, if I am able, that solid guarantees have not been obtained by the documents now presented to the House. On the 31st of March, 1854, my noble Friend said—
"I trust that at the close of this struggle we shall find them—Austria and Russia—by our side re-establishing peace upon a solid and secure foundation; but that peace, my Lords, will be neither solid nor secure unless the territorial extension and the immoderate influence of Russia be repressed and for ever limited."—[3 Hansard, cxxxii. 152.]
I shall endeavour to show that the territorial extension of Russia has not been much repressed, and that her immoderate influence, if she chooses it to be immoderate, has not been removed. On the 12th of December, 1854, Lord John Russell said—
"I believe no peace will be safe for Turkey—I believe no peace will be honourable to this country, which left Sebastopol in the same menacing position in which it had been of late years before the war."—[3 Hansard, cxxxvi. 219.]
[Cheers from the Ministerial Benches.] I understand the meaning of those cheers; but I think I shall show that if Sebastopol is not literally in the same position—if the same stones do not still stand upon others in the same manner as formerly—it is, politically speaking, very nearly in the same position as before the war. On the 19th of December, 1854, Lord Palmerston said—
"We have engaged in a great war against a great Power, with great exertions, and for great objects; and it does not become this country—it is not either to the interest of this country or the honour of this country—that we should end that war by small and ineffectual results; we ought to have a result adequate to the sacrifices we have made, and in conformity with the interest and dignity of this country."—[3 Hansard, cxxxvi. 589.]
Let us now proceed to examine the treaty, and to inquire whether the hopes expressed by the Government with regard to the results of the war have been fulfilled. The first two Articles appear to be merely preamble, but in the third occur the words "the town and citadel of Kars."

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I am anxious at this point to give your Lordships an explanation. I have been taunted in another place by no less a person than the Prime Minister with having shrunk from my pledge to this House, and with not having brought forward a Motion of which I had given notice on this subject, because I was afraid of being defeated. Those who know the customs of this House will, I hope, do me the justice to say that, if I consulted your Lordships' convenience and the propriety of debate always studied here, it was necessary that I should withdraw my Motion on Friday last. On Tuesday week the noble Earl appeared here for the first time after his return from Paris. It is the custom of the House never to give less than a week's notice of a Motion upon an important subject, and I was not able to give any notice until Thursday. I should then have brought forward the Motion upon the following Thursday, but that, unfortunately, was Ascension-day, and the House did not sit. By that time the noble Earl had placed the treaty upon the table, and it would; have been impossible for me to thoroughly discuss the circumstances of the war in Asia Minor without referring to that important Article of the treaty in which Kars was mentioned. I hold that it is the duty of every Member of Parliament, if he thinks the Government in the wrong, to point out the faults they have committed, without the slightest reference to divisions. That is especially the duty of the Opposition; besides, looking at it as a mere question of tactics, it is a great advantage to them to discuss questions upon which they are convinced that the Government are in the wrong, in order to inform the country of their opinions, by which means they may possibly convert a majority of the country to those opinions.
The Articles of the treaty to which I shall first refer are the 3rd and 4th:—
"Art. 3. His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias engages to restore to His Majesty the Sultan the town and citadel of Kars, as well as the other parts of the Ottoman territory of which the Russian troops are in possession."
"Art. 4. Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan engage to restore to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias the towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaklava, Kamiesch, Eupatoria, Kertch, Yenikale, Kinburn, as well as all other territories occupied by the allied troops."
Is there anybody in this country who has the common knowledge that would enable
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him to change a gold sovereign into twenty shillings, or conduct any simple negotiation of that kind, who will say that the town and citadel of Kars are an equivalent for all those forts and fortresses restored to Russia? Take the first. Sebastopol, the scene of all our disasters and of all our glories—the scene of all our hopes and disappointments, our misfortunes and victories—the goal for which we contended for nearly two years—is restored to Russia in exchange for the town and citadel of Kars. Will anybody say after that that the loss of Kars has had no influence on the negotiations at Paris or on the conditions of peace? Why, the mere juxtaposition of the two Articles proves that such was the case, and so completely did at least one of our Plenipotentiaries feel the objection which I now state that, as I read in the protocols, Lord Cowley protested against the conjunction of the two Articles on the ground that it would appear as if the belligerent Powers were making an exchange, whereas in exchange for the forts and territories occupied by the allied armies Russia had consented to the rectification of her frontier with European Turkey. But Lord Cowley was immediately repressed and suppressed, for the matter was not afterwards referred to in the Conferences; the Articles appear following one another in the treaty, and therefore I think we are entitled to assume that there has been an exchange of all the fortresses I have mentioned for the town and citadel of Kars. The treaty goes on to declare that neither Russia nor Turkey shall establish or maintain any military-maritime arsenal on the shores of the Black Sea. There is no exact definition of what that term means, and I should be glad to hear from the noble Lord opposite an explanation of its true import. But I conclude it means that there are to be no docks in which men-of-war may be built and armed. Sebastopol, then, will have no war-docks; its docks will not be restored, and no men-of-war will be built there. But here is nothing in the treaty to prevent the northern forts of Sebastopol being maintained in their present impregnable strength—nothing to prevent the Russians again fortifying their hills and raising another Malakhoff with even greater power than before—nothing to prevent them constructing immense stone fortresses heavily armed on the shores of the Black Sea, facing the Turkish Empire, and certainly finding no rival on the; opposite side. When once such a fortification

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is rebuilt—sayat Sebastopol—the treaty may be observed within it or it may not, but that fortress will remain impregnable for ever, and we must all know that, whatever circumstances may happen, it can never again be wrested from the hands of the Russians. I assume that these fortresses may be rebuilt; else let the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary say that they may not. But Sebastopol is not all that we give in exchange for Kars. We give Balaklava, an excellent harbour, which the Russians from past experience will not allow to fall into our hands a second time; we give Kamiesch, which has been admirably
fortified by the French; we give Eupatoria, which has been strengthened by ourselves; we give Kertch, in the same position; Yenikale—I do not know whether it is to be rebuilt or not; and Kin-burn, a place of considerable strength. All these are given in exchange for the town and citadel of Kars, with the province in which Kars is situated, and the only portion of the Ottoman territory occupied by the Russians. But our liberality, or weakness, does not stop here; for what becomes of those many forts along the Circassian coast which the Russians were obliged to abandon, and the abandonment of which at last gave peace and liberty to that noble people, the Circassians? It has been stated by the Prime Minister in another place that the Russians are to resume possession, and if they please rebuild and garrison them. In plain English, my Lords, we have deserted the Circassians; we have left them to a dreadful and a certain fate, after having begged for their assistance and, let me add, benefited by it to a very great extent. [An ironical cheer from Lord PANMURE.] Notwithstanding the cheer of the noble Lord the Secretary for War—who, let me say in passing, is not the first authority I should take upon hostilities in Asia Minor—I repeat that we have benefited by the assistance of the Circassians, because, in 1854, when the Russian general had gained two victories over the Turkish army, and was entering Anatolia, it was the inroad of Schamyl upon Tiflis that compelled him to retreat, and prevented him from following up his advantages during the whole of that spring and summer. But no wonder that the noble Lord and his colleagues have deserted the Circassians, when they have already forgotten their obligations to them. Even, however, if the Circassians had been unable or
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unwilling to assist us as we wished, what were the causes of that backwardness on their part, or how were we to be excused for abandoning their interests in the treaty after having excited them to aid us in the war? On the 26th of June, 1855, Lord Palmerston stated in the other House that there were no relations subsisting between Her Majesty's Government and the Circassian chiefs until those arising out of their co-operation in the attack upon Anapa. Mr. Baillie immediately got up and inquired, if the statement of the noble Viscount were correct, in what capacity Colonel Lloyd was sent to Circassia in the previous year, at a salary of £ 2,000 per annum? The noble Lord replied that Colonel Lloyd had gone to Circassia to open a communication with the people and ascertain to what extent and upon what terms their co-operation with us could be obtained. Is not that inciting them to assist the Allies and direct their arms against Russia? If afterwards their support did not come up to what was expected, it arose very much from the mistakes and blunders of our own Government in conveying arms to that country; and because they did not assist us as much as we wished they are forgotten entirely—they are not noticed in the treaty—only one observation, which had no effect, is made on their behalf by the first British Plenipotentiary, when he protests against the restoration of those forts, and the word "Circassia" is not found in the protocols. I am afraid that the noble Earl opposite will stand in history in the same category with those politicans who, many years ago, deserted the liberties of other free countries when they had an opportunity of saving them. I cannot believe, knowing as I do the generous spirit of the noble Earl, but that he did strongly desire to save the Circassians from perdition, and that he was restrained by circumstances which we do not know and which, perhaps, he dare not tell.
Well, great stress will, of course, be laid upon the neutralisation of the Black Sea, and I confess—as I said when the Vienna Conferences were going on—that of all the modes of settling that question, the neutralisation of the Euxine—the making it a purely commercial sea—is, in my judgment, the best. But are we quite safe in the arrangement which we have made? Was there no arrière pensée in the minds of those who took part in the negotiations at Paris? I am not entirely satisfied with the answers given to the

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first British Plenipotentiary upon this point. It is clear that Russia and Turkey are respectively to maintain only six ships of war of a certain size in the Black Sea. The Russian Plenipotentiaries claimed great credit for making what they called such a concession; but it is not a concession on their side only. Turkey, who had the right of navigating the Black Sea, makes a similar concession, and, therefore, the Russian Plenipotentiaries had no right to claim any praise upon that score. But I observe from the protocols that the suspicions of our first Plenipotentiaries were roused, for I find him asking with evident anxiety whether the transport vessels which, it appears, the Russians may build ad libitum would he armed? I do not wonder at the jealousy of the noble Earl; but I should like to know how that question was finally settled, because, in answer to the noble Earl's observation, Count Orloff replied that, like all the transports employed by the Powers in other seas, the transports of Russia in the Black Sea would be furnished with an exclusively defensive armament, suitable to the nature of the service for which they were required. The noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon), said the protocol, not considering that he would be justified in admitting this explanation, the consideration of the question was adjourned; but it seems to have been adjourned sine die, for the subject does not appear to have been alluded to again in the protocols. I should like to know from my noble Friend how the matter ended. The suitable armament for these transports may be only one gun, but that may be a very large one, and the transports may be ships of 1,000 tons or of 3,000 tons; they may lie in the impregnable harbour of Sebastopol, whence they may hereafter issue, when they please, to make a descent upon any part of the Turkish coast. It is our duty to consider all possible contingencies, and that is not a very remote one. I think, then, it cannot be said that the objects of the war are fully accomplished if Sebastopol may be rebuilt more strongly than before, and if its harbour may be filled with transports sufficiently armed to defend the troops on board and to convey them to any part of the Black Sea. Unless we can believe that this question of transports was settled in accordance with the views of the Foreign Secretary, it is impossible to say that the objects of the war have in this respect been fully accomplished.
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There is another question, also, with regard to which the Russian Plenipotentiaries seem to have acted with great expertness. My noble Friend opposite asked some awkward questions about Nicholaieff, and he was told that as that port was not on the Black Sea, but a considerable distance up a Russian river, the maritime-military arsenals there might be continued; but Count Orloff added, as a great favour to my noble Friend, that he had no objection to promise that no larger ships than those described in the treaty should be built at Nicholaieff, and that he was also ready to consent that two line-of-battle ships now at that port should be sent round by the Bosphorus to the Baltic. The noble Earl asked for the only security for the fulfilment of this promise that he probably thought he could obtain—namely, that it should be entered upon the protocols. I have no doubt that Count Orloff is a man of the highest honour, and meant what he said, and that both he and the Emperor of Russia mean to fulfil this promise; but I think it is no insult, even to an Emperor, when we are making important agreements upon which the fate of nations depends, to ask for some more binding guarantee. We do not regard a bridegroom as a rascal because we ask him to make a settlement upon his wife; and why should we not insist upon binding articles with reference to agreements which concern the honour and the faith of nations? I do not like to rake up old grievances; and at this moment, when we have just signed a peace with Russia, I should be sorry to say a word that could lead a Russian of any class to believe that I do not sincerely rejoice at the conclusion of that peace; but political events have occurred in former times between Russia and ourselves which ought to act as warnings, and which ought, I think, to have led my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) to get some more solid guarantee on the subject to which I have referred than a mere phrase in a protocol which will be worth nothing after Count Orloff and his master—who are mortal—are no more. [The noble Earl read an extract from Sir J. M'Neill's Progress of Russia in the East, detailing negotiations which took place in 1814 between Russia, Persia, and the Porte, with reference to the cession of territory held by Persia in the Caucasus. The Russian Governor General in Georgia then solemnly pledged himself that a certain portion of this territory should be

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ceded to the Porte, and the British Ambassador, whose intervention had been employed, satisfied of the sincerity of this promise, felt himself justified in confirming it; but the Emperor of Russia could never be induced to relinquish a foot of the ground in question.] I have not the least doubt of the good faith of Count Orloff and the Emperor of Russia; but when they have passed away from this earthly scene, you will not have a line in your treaty which will prevent Russia from building what ships she pleases in Nicholaieff, so long as she does not bring them down into the Black Sea until a favourable moment arrives for doing so. If, therefore, the object of the war was to prevent any future aggression on the part of Russia, similar to that of which she has been guilty, certainly the maintenance of the maritime-military arsenal of Nicholaieff should have been forbidden, and the fortifications at Sebastopol should have been razed, as other fortresses almost as important have been razed under the conditions of former treaties.
There is one important part of the treaty, with reference to which I fear that I shall have some difficulty in explaining my meaning without a map. One of the cessions made by Russia—and a very important one—is a part of Bessarabia. Your Lordships may remember that, when Austria proposed the preliminary basis of negotiation, a line was drawn by her which divided Bessarabia into two parts, proceeding from Kichenau in
the north-west to the Sasyk Lake on the borders of the Black Sea. The whole length of the district was about 250 miles, and the line drawn as nearly as possible bisected Bessarabia. When this question came to be discussed at the Conference I find that the Russian Plenipotentiaries made a suggestion, to which my noble Friend could not listen—namely, that something like a quarter of the province which they had promised Austria to give back to Turkey should be retained by Russia. This proposition was, of course, at once stifled; but to cut the matter short, Count Walewski said, that, although he could not consent to the sacrifice on the part of the Allies involved in the proposition of Baron Brunow, there was such a thing as a principle of compensation, and that, if Russia would give some other part of Bessarabia in lieu of that which she wished to keep back, such a proposition might be considered. But what do your Lordships suppose
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was the extent of territory proposed to be given up by Russia according to Count Walewski's principle of compensation? Looking at the map, it bears about the same proportion to the territory retained as my thumb-nail bears to my arm. It has been agreed to give to Russia a portion of territory extending 200 miles, and from thirty to forty miles in width, and it is of most essential importance. The line drawn by the Austrian officers would have given Turkey both banks of the Pruth and both banks of the Danube, and would have given to Bessarabia, belonging to Turkey, an exit into Austria, and it passed by the Russian magazines at Kichenau, which were driven back on the Dniester. But the plan adopted leaves 120 miles of the Pruth, belonging half to Russia, and half to Turkey. There must have been some strong reason for such a change in the distribution of territory as this. When you had relinquished Sebastopol and the other points I have mentioned, together with the whole of the Circassian fortresses, and when you had accepted the tortuous promises of Count Orloff relative to Nicholaieff, why was this important boundary and barrier against Russian aggression thus given up? Rumour was rife—although the protocols make no very distinct allusion to it—that the Russian Plenipotentiaries alleged that their Government was not in the same position as when it agreed to the Austrian proposition; that it had since then taken Kars, the key of Anatolia, and had one foot established in Asia Minor; and that, as it was, therefore, in a more advantageous attitude, it had a corresponding right to a more advantageous treaty. Indeed, the protocols even hint that the restoration of Kars and its province must be taken into account by the negotiators when the question of rectifying the frontier in Bessarabia was under discussion. It appears that my noble Friend gave way, and has obtained exactly one-half of what he was promised when the Austrian and French Governments first submitted their proposals to the English Cabinet. Why, then, should I be asked to join in an Address of joy and exultation to the Queen, declaring that such a result fulfils all the objects of the war? I am afraid, my Lords, that not the objects of the war, but the objects of the peace, were the matters chiefly considered at Paris. I am afraid my noble Friend forgot that one principal aim of the war, four months before, was to secure half Bessarabia from

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Russia. Be this, however, as it may, the only reason for yielding on this point could have been the conquest of Kars. In plain English, the first Article, as entered into by Russia, means this:—"Here is Kars, we have got it, and what will you give us for it?" It has been the fashion of late for the Government and their supporters to depreciate Kars, and assert that it was of very little consequence in relation either to the war or to the Conferences; but a perusal of the protocols cannot fail to induce the suspicion that some pressure, some force majeure, must have been at work to compel my noble Friend and the other Plenipotentiaries of the Allies to recede from the points previously intended to be maintained; and, without adverting to common gossip which has been circulated in this country on the matter, I cannot help concluding that the real cause of this retrograde step from the frontier of Bessarabia was the advantage given to Russia by the surrender of Kars. I am not going into the whole question of the campaign of Kars, but I confine myself to the loss of that city; and that disaster I directly impute to the neglect of our Government; and on the same shoulders the responsibility for our not obtaining such a treaty as we could wish, and as my noble Friend himself would, I am sure, have desired, must consequently rest.
The history of the events ending in the loss of this important Asiatic fortress may be divided into two epochs; and the first of them comprises the period—about ten months—between the date when General Williams was first sent out as the Queen's Commissioner and left Erzeroum to defend Kars, and the time of Kars being finally invested. At any part of that period Kars might have been saved—I do not mean by the aid of an army, for that was not necessary, nor by sending any English or Turkish Contingents, that is not the real point; but by your sending provisions and ammunition to its garrison. This view is borne out by General Williams himself, who says as much, and is confirmed by Dr. Sandwith, who is now in England, and who says as much in his book. Your Lordships must not perplex yourselves with the second epoch when—Kars being invested and in imminent danger—it was necessary to relieve it by an army; but simply confine your attention to the antecedent period, when all that the place wanted was, not men, but a supply of provisions and ammunition, there being excellent
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troops within its walls, with an extraordinary soldier to command them. When England was "drifting into the war," I asked myself the question—put simultaneously to themselves, no doubt, by thousands of my countrymen—Who is to conduct the great and distant contest now impending? The great man who used to occupy that chair (the late Duke of Wellington) was no more; and he had left no equal behind him. It has not pleased Providence to raise up a general or a statesman fitted to supply the void occasioned by his removal. The Ministers to whose hands the Government of the country was committed in such an emergency did not take that comprehensive survey of the theatre of the conflict which a far-reaching sagacity would have dictated. From the first Asia Minor was neglected, and our efforts were entirely directed to other points. I do not say this was wrong—I am no soldier, and will not venture an opinion upon strategy; but still I think the Government held Asia Minor too cheap. Defensive operations in that quarter, if planned in time, might have easily been combined with the offensive in the Crimea, and if that had been done in time, Kars would have been saved. The Government cannot complain of the want of warning. The war of 1829 and the Treaty of Adrianople ought to have told them the importance of Asiatic Turkey, for it was far more the victories of Paskiewitsch in Asia Minor than those of Diebitsch in European Turkey, that gave Russia the advantages she then obtained. On the 6th of February, 1854, an eminent Member of this House (the Earl of Ellen-borough) raised his voice to enforce the same lesson of history, and to urge the necessity of a campaign in Asia. The total defeat of the Turkish commander in this region followed in the next campaign, and yet it was not until the month of August that my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) sent out an agent, who was certainly well chosen—General Williams—as British Commissioner to the Turkish army. General Williams's story is soon told. Having communicated with Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan, that officer at once went to Erzeroum. Having reviewed the Turkish army, and given the best advice he could to its generals, he thence proceeded to Kars; and, having put also that town in a still better state of defence than General Guyon and other distinguished officers who fortified it in the previous

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spring had left it, he returned to Erzeroum, there to prepare an account of what he had witnessed for his own Government and for the British Ambassador at Constantinople, with whom he had been duly authorised to correspond. General Williams's account of the condition of the Turkish army was deplorable. The soldiers had not been paid for eighteen months; the officers, from the colonel down to the lowest subaltern, had been robbing them of provisions and money, and many of the generals were worse, if possible, than the subalterns. In a word, more harrowing descriptions of cowardice, debauchery, and corruption than those contained in the Blue-book which had been laid on their Lordships' table were never perused. General Williams represented all these things to the Ambassador at Constantinople and to my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, and what he most earnestly requested was, that he might be recognised by the Turkish officers as the accredited agent from England, and armed with such extensive powers as would be respected by the Turkish generals. He distinctly asserts that if he had possessed such powers, and had been acknowledged as possessing them, he could have done anything—corrected any abuse and redressed any wrong. Yet some of the powers he thus asked for he did not obtain until he had been contending for many months with the corrupt officials around him, and others, as, for instance, those of director general of supplies, he never received at all. Who is responsible for this neglect? I should be sorry to lay upon your Lordships' table a bill of indictment against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of whose former services to his country I am fully cognisant. I have had personal experience of his great talents, and never having had a dispute with him, but, on the contrary, having been always on the best terms with him during the existence of our official relations, I have no reason to make observations respecting him which might be imputed to any other motive than that suggested by a sense of public duty. But this Blue-book—the correspondence relating to the fall of Kars—has been placed in my hands, and no honest man can peruse it without perceiving that it is a bill of indictment against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe for not having invested General Williams with that authority which would have been the great key to his operations at Erzeroum and Kars, and which
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would have enabled him to procure for the army those supplies which the Turkish Government either would not or could not furnish. If General Williams had had that authority he would have revictualled Kars—not for four months, but for any length of time—and that fortress would hare survived not only the taking of Sebastopol, but the negotiations for peace. On the 2nd of August, 1854, my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) directed Lord Stratford to send General Williams to the Turkish army as the Queen's Commissioner. Lord Stratford answered, on the 15th, that he saw no difficulty in making the necessary arrangements for sending General Williams properly authorised; yet, on the 23rd of October, six weeks afterwards, he wrote to say that Reschid Pasha required to be informed officially of the name of the Commissioner. So that, six weeks after the Ambassador had promised to make the necessary arrangements, the Prime Minister of the Sultan did not know even the name of the Queen's Commissioner. In the meantime General Williams had gone to Erzeroum, where his scarlet uniform insured him a good reception; but when he began to meddle with the affairs of the Turkish, army, he was asked to show his credentials and he was obliged to confess his inability to do so, and what was still more extraordinary was, that on the 3rd of December—four months later—he was still disavowed, and Shukri Pasha did not hesitate to speak of him as one who had no higher power or position than that of a simple colonel. Thus four months were lost, during which General Williams might, if he had been invested with proper authority, have supplied Kars and Anatolia with victuals and ammunition. On the 22nd of September the Foreign Secretary wrote to Lord Stratford to say that it would be well to obtain for General Williams a high rank in the Turkish army; but the latter did not make the necessary application until the 15th of November, or seven weeks after the date of Lord Clarendon's letter. Delays continued. Mr. Pisani, that constant and useless go-between between the British Ambassador and the Porte, repeatedly communicated with the Turkish Government, and always came back with the same answer—namely, that what was necessary would be done without delay; next he was told that it had been sent; but, not with standing the frequent and indignant remonstrances of General Williams,

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it was not done until the 23rd of January, 1855.The third authority which General Williams solicited was that of director general of supplies—a position of the highest importance, as the preservation of Kars depended on the possibility of procuring provisions. He applied to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the 29th of January to obtain it for him; Lord Stratford did not do so, but lost four or five weeks by referring the application to the Foreign Office. Of course, by return of post, the noble Earl told him that he was to get the office for General Williams if he could. By the time that letter was received, the 20th of March had arrived, and then General Williams bitterly complained that he had not got the authority in question, and that he might do anything if he had it. But the delay did not rest there, for from that day to this General Williams has never received the appointment of director-general of supplies—he was left entirely to his own energy and resources. On the 10th of May there was only one week's or at most a fortnight's provisions at Kars. The English and Turkish officers wrote to General Williams, then at Erzeroum, entreating him to send them some supplies. The Russians were then within a month's march of Kars—for it was on the 9th of June that the place was invested. General Williams was still at Erzeroum, and not having received the necessary authority, could send no provisions; but seeing that the Russians were advancing upon Kars, he left Erzeroum and in what he describes as
"an isolated position," took matters into his own hands, and by wonderful energy and ingenuity contrived to throw four months' provisions into Kars, thereby saving not only that fortress, but Erzeroum, and, probably Asia Minor; for, if the Russians had attacked Kars only a week sooner it must have fallen, and they would have had the whole summer to march upon the Bosphorus. These are not my statements; they are supported by the authority of Dr. Sand-with, who distinctly declares that had not General Williams taken the Commissariat under his own management, Kars must have fallen at once; and that had he been invested with adequate powers from the first that fortress would have been saved. Upon that narration I need not enter. The town was not surrendered until mothers brought their children to the doors of the general, and entreated him to save their lives—until every atom of eatable food was gone—until
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the soldiers were spectres—until the officers were in a state of actual starvation, and were induced to eat the dogs which fed upon the carcasses of the dead. There is no other man who has come out of this war with such a reputation as General Williams. I am not eloquent enough to do justice to his merits, but his name is engraved in the history of his country. When I make such an accusation as I am compelled to make against the noble Lord opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) and his Ambassador, your Lordships will expect that I should support it by some extracts from the correspondence. The first letter which I will quote is one of accusation from General Williams. Three months after his departure from Constantinople—namely, on the 8th of December, the Commissioner wrote to Lord Stratford:—
"Since I fulfilled the duties confided to me as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the head quarters of the army of Kars, I have had the honour of addressing to your Excellency fifty-four despatches, identical with those forwarded simultaneously to the Earl of Clarendon and General Lord Raglan. Each packet has been accompanied by a private letter containing details and suggestions which, had they found place in my public communications, would have inconveniently lengthened those documents. On the 23rd of September I was honoured by a private letter from your Lordship, appealing to my 'spirit and humanity,' relative to the captivity of those unfortunate Russian ladies who had then recently been seized and carried into the mountains by Sheik Schamyl, the Circassian chieftain. Since the above date I have not been favoured with a line by your Excellency, even with an acknowledgment of the reception of my public or private communications. To one who has served your Lordship for so many years such an avowal on my part can only be recorded with feelings of deep disappointment and mortification—feelings which I have studiously endeavoured to conceal, even from my aide-de-camp and secretaries, because each successive post was anxiously looked for, in the hope of receiving answers from your Lordship on the pressing and important affairs connected with my mission to the head quarters of the army of Kars."—inclosure, No. 66.
It is impossible for any man accustomed to the amenities of civilised life to understand the reason of this extraordinary conduct on the part of the Ambassador. It can only be known to two persons in the world—Lord Stratford himself and my noble Friend opposite. The noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) must have asked the reason, and I hope he knows it. I will make no guesses at it, but will only say that such a solecism as the neglect to reply to fifty-four despatches from a servant of the Crown is unintelligible to the

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House of Lords, and I will leave if to the noble Earl himself to explain it. If this had ended in a fault of manners it would not have been a subject for your Lordships' interference; but when want of politeness, or rudeness, is detrimental to the public service, it is then manifestly our duty to reprove it, and to reprove it strongly and publicly. This neglect of General Williams was most detrimental to that service, because it deprived him of the little personal authority which he possessed among the Turks. As soon as the knowledge of this unaccountable conduct reached my noble Friend, he wrote a despatch in which he severely reprimands the Ambassador for his neglect. No one who has read that despatch can fail to approve it, because every one must feel that the conduct of the Ambassador to General Williams cannot be palliated. It is but fair to Lord Stratford to give his reasons for not answering the despatches and for failing to give proper assistance to the Commissioner. In a letter to General Williams he says:—
"I have received your several despatches numbered to 61 inclusive. I have also received from you a number of private letters, to which you appear to have given an ostensible character. The public interests with which you are more immediately connected have not, as you suppose, been neglected by Her Majesty's Embassy. In due season I hope to afford you ample proof of my correctness in making this assertion. For the present I can only assure you that I have not time to write more fully. I received information ten minutes ago that the steamer was to start for Trebizond in an hour, and other more urgent matters are pressing upon my attention."
Other more urgent matters! What matters could be more urgent than the welfare of Asia Minor and the preservation of Kars? Will the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) tell us what they were? If the noble Viscount (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) alludes to Sebastopol, he was not there. He was at Constantinople, with a very large staff of some of the ablest men in the diplomatic line. Could none of these have been trusted to answer General Williams's despatches? Could none of them have given to him one of those stereotyped acknowledgments of their reception, while the Ambassador was attending to the more important affairs to which he alludes? Equally trifling is the statement about the steamer to Trebizond. I had no idea that our Ambassador was treated so cavalierly as to be informed only ten minutes before of the
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departure of that steamer. It used certainly to be the case formerly that they were more likely to wait ten hours to suit his convenience than to depart ten minutes after they had told him they were about to go. Lord Stratford, however, afterwards enters into a much more elaborate defence, which amounts to this—that he cannot get the Turkish Government to move or to take any steps to procure the supplies which are required by the Commissioner. In my opinion he never frees himself from blame for not having obtained for General Williams the authority which would have enabled that officer to get the things which the Ambassador could not himself procure. That despatch is not the only one (besides the other which I have read) in which the noble Earl opposite positively disapproves Lord Stratford's conduct in not having supported General Williams as he ought to have done. General Williams afterwards maintains that he could have done anything had he been properly supported—that is, he could have victualled Kars and have held it until peace was made, and the Russian negotiators would not then have had the opportunity of entering the Congress Chamber with a bargain in their hands, or with anything at all to offer in exchange for the places and territory which we have restored to them. Having arrived at that point, I certainly did believe that Lord Stratford was greatly to blame, and, as it is my constitutional opinion that the Ambassador is solely responsible to the Foreign Minister and not to Parliament, and that the noble Earl alone is responsible to Parliament, it follows that I think the noble Earl is responsible to Parliament for not having either recalled Lord Stratford or sent another agent with advice and money for General Williams. If you had sent General Williams money, Kars would have been saved. But there is another mystery in the subject. The whole Cabinet must have concurred in the reprimands which were addressed by the noble Earl to Lord Stratford; certainly the Prime Minister, in the discharge of his duty, must have read and approved the despatches; but yet, no longer ago than the 1st of May, I find Lord Palmerston speaking in the other House as follows:—
"I am perfectly ready to take my share of any responsibility that may devolve upon those who did not think it right to recall Lord Stratford. No doubt, we lamented that from the pressure of business, or any other cause whatever, Lord Stratford

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omitted to answer those letters, and to give to General Williams that comfort and encouragement which would naturally have been derived from letters received from the Ambassador at Constantinople; but Lord Stratford did at Constantinople that which General Williams urged him to do; and no man who reads the papers with an impartial mind can fail to arrive at the conclusion that Lord Stratford did everything which it was in the power of an Ambassador to do for the purpose of obtaining for General Williams the supplies and reinforcements which he wanted."—[Page 1887.]
I ask any one of your Lordships who has read those papers to listen to this speech of Lord Palmerston, and tell me whether the conduct of the Ministry is not as inexplicable as the conduct of Lord Stratford. I withdrew my Motion the other evening, and it is not now, of course, the time to renew a similar one; but my former impression remains—is, if anything, stronger than before—that the Government are most blameable for not having duly attended at first to the position of Asia Minor, and, when they did turn their attention to that country, for not having properly supported the agent whom they sent there. They showed vacillation from the beginning in prosecuting the war in that quarter. I think I may say that they have crowned their former conduct by still further vacillation, when we see the Foreign Minister in one House writing a despatch strongly condemnatory of the Ambassador, and the Prime Minister in the other House completely exonerating him.
I have nothing further to say than to congratulate your Lordships on the position in which this country stands at the end of the war. While all the other belligerents are breathless and exhausted after the deadly struggle, this country alone appears to remain unwearied, and stronger even than when that struggle commenced. Yet had the war continued, I am not sure that we should have gained greater advantages than we have gained, and I cannot say that I regret that peace has been concluded. I am willing to join in an Address to the Crown in the terms which I have proposed, but the terms which have been submitted to your Lordships are exaggerated, and are not such as we can, in justice to ourselves, consent to use. If the objects of the war were such a reduction of the power of Russia as would make it impossible for her ever again to attack Turkey, they have not been attained, neither have we obtained that cession of territory which we might have obtained, and the omission to obtain which it remains for
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the noble Earl to explain. Having said this, as it seems to be the wish of the House to accept it, I shall not oppose the Address which has been proposed from the other side, but shall remain content with recording the opinions which I entertain upon the subject.
Amendment moved in the Second Paragraph to leave out ("Joy and Satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to reestablish Peace on Conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish") and insert ("Satisfaction that Her Majesty has been enabled to re-establish Peace on Conditions which have appeared to Her Majesty and Her Allies adequately to effect").
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, before I proceed to offer some observations upon the long and unmitigated censure pronounced by the noble Earl opposite, in the course of a speech which, he says, he has found it his duty to deliver, in order to bring back to the knowledge of the country that which they might well have already known, I shall take the liberty of expressing my satisfaction and gratitude at the able and eloquent speeches of my noble Friends who moved and seconded the Address. It is most satisfactory to me to find that my noble Friends, who, from the beginning, were of opinion that the war in which we were engaged was a just and righteous war—who have been second to none in advocating the vigorous prosecution of the war with the view of arriving at an honourable peace, and who did not think that any peace would be honourable which did not attain the objects for which the war was commenced—it is most satisfactory to me that these noble Lords should call upon your Lordships to agree to an Address of approval of the treaty of Paris, thereby implying their opinion that the peace has been concluded upon safe and honourable terms. My Lords, I am most grateful to my two noble Friends for the opinion—far too favourable to myself—which they were pleased to express of the manner in which I had discharged the duties confided to me by Her Majesty of conducting the negotiations as one of the Plenipotentiaries on behalf of this country. But I would wish to take this opportunity of saying that any commendation which may be awarded to me for my part in the negotiations applies equally to my noble Friend and colleague. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. The noble Earl says that the name of Lord Cowley is not seen

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in the protocols, and that I had, indeed, completely superseded him.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: I said my noble Friend's name was immediately superseded after he made the excellent observation as to the juxta-position of the two articles. No one knows better how to appreciate my noble Friend's (Lord Cow-ley's) diplomatic services than I do, and I hope always, both in public and in private, to bear testimony to their value.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I am glad I have given occasion to this explanation. It is certainly true that my noble Friend's name appeared much less oftener than mine in the protocols; but I should be pained, indeed, if any inference prejudicial to my noble Friend should be drawn from that circumstance. In my official capacity I naturally took the precedence of my noble Friend, and I consequently spoke more often in the Conferences, but I did so in his as well as in my own name, and always after previous consultation with him; I likewise received from him all the sound advice and able support which it was possible for me to derive from his experience. I am also anxious to take the earliest opportunity of removing the apprehension of the noble Earl opposite as to the prejudicial influence which he thinks the fall, of Kars exercised on the negotiations and upon the terms of peace which were ultimately concluded. That apprehension, or, as I will take the liberty of calling it, misapprehension, appeared to be so strong on the mind of the noble Earl, that not with standing the secrecy maintained at the Congress, he did not hesitate to record it, before the treaty of peace was laid before Parliament, in a notice of Motion which he placed upon the paper of your Lordship's House, but which, in consequence of what took place elsewhere, he afterwards prudently withdrew. It is perfectly true that the fall of Kars was alluded to by the Russian Plenipotentiaries at the Conferences as an important event, which had taken place since the preliminaries of peace had been agreed to at Vienna, and which gave them some title to advantage, or at least favourable consideration, in the negotiations; but they at the same time said that the conditions having been accepted by the Emperor of Russia—and Count Orloff told me the same thing privately, the day after his arrival at Paris—they should be faithfully and honourably carried out in the negotiations. The Russian Plenipotentiaries
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were told that the fall of Kars was known at St. Petersburg at the time the conditions were accepted there, and that no notice was taken of the event; and that as the restoration of territory between the belligerents was a matter of course, and as, in the present case, it was a sine quâ non condition, we could not even admit that it formed matter of discussion. I will not enter into details of the discussions which took place on that subject, because a certain proposal was agreed to at our first meeting, and the complaint of the noble Earl that the first protocols are meagre and unsatisfactory, shows how well that agreement has been adhered to. We determined, in the first instance, that these protocols should merely contain decisions and such opinions as tended to elucidate those decisions, but that all desultory remarks and observations should be excluded, and, above all, anything that might wound national susceptibilities, and leave cause for irritation, in the event of our labours fortunately concluding in peace, should be excluded. However, if the noble Earl will have the goodness to look at the conditions of Vienna, and compare them with the treaty of peace now signed, he will discover that the fall of Kars has not exercised any injurious influence. Those conditions did not originate with us. They were proposed to us, but were made clear and precise by us. We were determined not to accept less, but we could not in honour demand more. I fearlessly appeal to your Lordships and the country, and ask whether those conditions have not been developed and carried out to their legitimate conclusions, and whether they are not stated in clear and unambiguous language? Such being the case, I regret that the noble Earl should have thought it necessary to bring forward the subject of Kars at such length—though I, perhaps, should be the last to complain, because I am the cause, as he told your Lordships, of his having carried his speech about with him so long. I appointed Colonel Williams to his post in the East with the entire approval of my noble Friend at the head of the Government, who first brought him forward and employed him. Colonel Williams was sent as Commissioner to the army at Erzeroum, and if Colonel Williams had been an ordinary man he would have confined himself strictly to his instructions, and reported only the occurrences which took place. The instructions to a Commissioner

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sent by the Foreign Office without military command or any military duty are to report to the Foreign Office, or to the Foreign Ambassador, the events and political occurrences which pass under his observation. If Colonel Williams had been an ordinary man, he would have confined himself to those instructions; but he was not an ordinary man. He exceeded his instructions, and determined himself to carry out the reforms which were indispensable to the existence of the Turkish army. His conduct was approved, and he was encouraged to proceed in the same course. It was quite true, that in the early part of his proceedings he did not receive from Lord Stratford that assistance he was entitled to expect; and no one regrets more than Lord Stratford that he left for so long a period the despatches of Colonel Williams unanswered. Even if Lord Stratford had employed himself in obtaining, and had been successful in obtaining, all that Colonel Williams desired, still it was a great error to leave a man like him, situated at a distance, in a position which might add to his difficulties and tend to dishearten him. I admit this—and Lord Stratford would also admit it—but it would be unjust to assume that because Lord Stratford did not write, therefore he did nothing else, or to suppose that in a city like Constantinople things were as well organised as at Paris, or that procrastination was not the rule there and the performance of duty the exception. What Blue-books might have been made out of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, and out of all the disappointments and delays he experienced, not from the ill-will of the Spanish Government, but from their slow habits of business, the want of means and of organisation, and from the dislike of foreign interference which was to be found in all nations, and in none more than in Turkey. The Turkish Ministers are at all times opposed to compliance with foreign representations; and at the moment when Colonel Williams's demands reached Lord Stratford, that noble Lord had actually several important matters on hand. He had to demand the cession of the Heraclean coal mines, to obtain a place for barracking the British troops, he was forming the Turkish Contingent, providing baggage animals throughout the provinces of Turkey, and more especially he was attending to the pacification of the Turko-Greek frontier. I do not wish to defend Lord Stratford on any point on which he
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may be rightly censured; but if your Lordships would consider that he had all this business on hand, with political intrigues without end going on, you will have some idea of the difficulties he had to contend with, and will rather think that he deserves credit for having done so much, rather than condemnation for not having done everything. The noble Earl opposite said that Lord Stratford is responsible to the Foreign Minister, and that the Foreign Minister is responsible to Parliament, and he implies that what should have been done was to recall Lord Stratford. Now, I think we should have acted most imprudently if we had at that crisis recalled Lord Stratford and sent out a new Ambassador to represent British interests at Constantinople, who would have taken weeks to get there, weeks more in learning their peculiar ways of conducting business, and still further weeks in learning the proper way of dealing with them. We certainly should not by that have saved Kars, and we should have been deprived of the public services of an eminent man at a critical moment. I say, then, that Her Majesty's Government, under these circumstances, took the only course which they could have taken. They expressed strongly to Lord Stratford disapproval of such of his proceedings as were to be disapproved; they insisted that he should communicate with the Porte, and obtain from it a recognition of Colonel Williams's rank, which would give him authority with the army at Kars, and that his demands should be complied with; and this course was successful, for the Blue-book shows that when Lord Stratford received these despatches he did make exertions and was successful in supplying the wants of Colonel Williams. My Lords, I know very well that Lord Stratford has his defects—who has not?—but his failings are those which arise from the indomitable energy of his character. No man who does not feel strongly can act vigorously; but the worst enemies of Lord Stratford admit that he has always used his experience of the country, and the influence he has gained during his long and honourable career in the East, exclusively for the good of Turkey. It is not too much to say, that it is to Lord Stratford's knowledge, experience, and influence with the Porte, that Europe is indebted for that hattisheriff which is the Magna Charta of the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, which has established equal justice

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in the place of religious domination, and which will, as far as a decree can, unite all ranks and classes of the empire, and achieve one of the great objects of the war by bringing Turkey into fuller intercourse with the Christian Powers of Europe. Whatever Lord Stratford's failings may be, they are certainly not new; such as he is, he has been all his life; and yet it is to my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby) that he is indebted for a seat in this House. Only a short time ago my noble Friend took credit, most properly, for having only recommended to Her Majesty three Peers, and of these Lord Stratford was one. I have been reminded, too, since I came down to this House, that there was at one time a rumour that Lord Stratford had considerable reason to complain of my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury), because he was entitled to expect that he would be appointed Ambassador at Paris. It was said that my noble Friend was not indisposed to recall Lord Cowley and send thither Lord Stratford, whose defects have to-night been so vividly described by him, in order, no doubt, to cement and promote the harmony of that alliance of which my noble Friend flatters himself that he is the author.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: I never heard of such a rumour in my life until just now from your lips.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I do not propose to follow the noble Earl into everything he said with respect to Kars; but I would ask your Lordships whether, stripped of all party colouring, any charge can be brought against the Government with respect to Kars that does not apply equally to the French Government—unless, indeed, you are prepared to say that we had an interest, exclusively English, in Asia Minor? When I had the honour to attend Her Majesty to Paris, I discussed the whole subject of Kars and Asia Minor with the French Government. I pointed out the dangers that might result to Turkey from that quarter, that both Powers were equally pledged to defend her from those dangers, and that it was imperatively necessary for that purpose to take measures for the relief of Kars. I found the French Government just as much alive to the dangers which threatened Kars and as desirous to send relief as we could be; but it was always urged upon us by various persons with whom we discussed the subject, that Sebastopol was our chief object, that to
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Sebastopol all our attention should be directed, that if Sebastopol fell other things would follow as a matter of course, and that in all military affairs of consequence nothing was so unwise, so likely to produce failure, as divided operations. The generals, too, were consulted, and all of them—General Pelissier, General Simpson, General Delia Marmora—were unanimous in the opinion that not a man should leave the Crimea. And what, I ask, what would I have been the feeling of indignation raised throughout the country if the Government had taken on themselves—at a distance of 3,000 miles, and setting aside the wishes of the Turkish Government and the recommendations of the Generals—to send into Asia an army able to compete with that of General Monravieff, which General Williams described as the most efficient he had ever seen, which might have given a lesson on parade to the best European armies, and which, besides being large enough to blockade the whole circuit of Kars, included a large force of cavalry? My Lords, the fall of Kars was a great disaster—a deplorable incident in the war. What its consequences would have been if the war had gone on I will not now pretend to say; but I do declare that that disaster had no prejudicial effect upon the negotiations of peace.
My Lords, I will now offer a few observations upon my noble Friend's criticisms upon the treaty. In the first place, he called your Lordships' attention to the juxtaposition of the 3rd and 4th Articles, referring to what was given up on both sides. But, my Lords, the juxtaposition to which he attaches so much importance, has a cause which he evidently does not understand. The whole of these first Articles relate to the belligerents, they are kept distinct from those which follow, and which relate also to the Powers which had nothing to do with the war. The 6th, the last of the war Articles, which provides for the restoration of prisoners, is generally the last clause in a treaty. Having in the 3rd and 4th Articles provided for the territorial arrangements necessary to complete the peace, the 20th Article, in conformity with the conditions of the Treaty of Vienna, states that—
"In exchange for the towns, ports, and territories enumerated in Article 4 of the present treaty, and in order more fully to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias consents to the rectification of his frontier in Bessarabia."

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The next point taken by my noble Friend refers to the Russian transports, and he asks for an explanation of Count Orloff's statement upon that point. In a conversation that occurred upon the subject of transports, Count Orloff stated that it would be necessary to have them of a considerable size for the conveyance of the troops, and to give them a certain amount of armament; but it was ultimately arranged that the conveyance of the troops might be secured by ships of war, and that six small vessels of about 200 tons each would be sufficient. With respect to Nicholaieff, I must observe that Nicholaielf is not in the same condition with respect to the question of military and naval arsenals as Sebastopol. The Russian Plenipotentiaries did not attach much importance to it; but Count Orloff pointed out that the same principle by which we required the destruction of the works of Nicbolaieff would apply equally to any place situated upon the internal waters and rivers of Russia flowing into the Black Sea, from whatever distance, and that some shipbuilding place was absolutely necessary for Russia in that part of her dominions for the purpose of building and repairing the vessels which she would be entitled by her engagements with Turkey and the other European Powers, to maintain in the Black Sea. What Count Orloff said was very true. He said it was not the existence of an arsenal, but the use to which it was put, that was of importance; and he solemnly declared, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, that neither at Nicholaieff, at Kherson, nor at any port in the Sea of Azoff, nor in any tributary to that sea, would there ever be constructed or maintained any vessel exceeding in number or size those which Russia would be entitled by the treaty to maintain in the Black Sea. My noble Friend complains that this declaration is not included in the treaty; but I do not see that Russia was bound to make any engagement with respect to her inland waters. We had no right to propose that degree of humiliation, and she would not have agreed to it. But the declaration made by the Russian Plenipotentiaries in the name of their Sovereign, and recorded in a protocol which is signed by them, although it may not have all the binding force of a treaty, carries with it a moral obligation which appears to me satisfactory; and I have no hesitation in saying that if one of those protocols were ever violated it might be appealed to successfully
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by all the contracting parties, as a binding document.
My Lords, another point to which the noble Earl alluded was the rectification of the Bessarabian frontier; and here also he attributed the arrangement that has been made to some mysterious influence—some spell which he supposes to have been exercised upon my noble Friend and myself, which fettered our independent action; and induced us to make a great concession to Russia. Now, it is quite true that the Russian Plenipotentiaries did bring forward a project to a great extent at variance with the conditions agreed to at Vienna; but that project was unhesitatingly rejected. It did appear, however, that the line of frontier proposed in the Austrian conditions was by no means the best. There was very great doubt as to the existence of what was called "a chain, of mountains." Some maps omitted them altogether; others had them; and there appeared to be no doubt that they were little more than rising grounds—mere watersheds, in short—just a line that would have made a bad frontier and led to great confusion. It appeared, moreover, that it would intersect some Bulgarian colonies in which the Russian Government take great interest, and those colonies, from information I have since received from one of Her Majesty's Consuls, seem to be in a most prosperous condition; the inhabitants are free from the conscription, they are free from taxes, they pay only a small amount of rent, they have a local government, and they can leave Bessarabia when they please. We felt that to insist upon a line of frontier which would, not be a good one, simply in order to keep Russia to the letter of our bond, would be mere chicanery, and we therefore agreed, upon a line which was so clear that it could lead to no doubt or dispute whatever; which gave both sides of the Danube to Turkey, and restored to her all the fortresses upon that river; which gave to Moldavia 200 miles on the Pruth from the point at which it joins the Danube; and which removed all the apprehensions that had been entertained as to the possibility of Russia collecting large flotillas there. Towards the east the frontier line is extended from the Lake Bourna Sola—one side only of which belonged to Moldavia—to the sea, and the Danube will henceforth be free from all obstacles. The removal of the impediments will be entrusted in the first instance to a European Commission,

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and the maintenance of perfect freedom of navigation will be confided afterwards to a Riverain Commission, acting on the same principles as those which regulate the management of the Rhine. Your Lordships will see, therefore, that that great European object—the freedom of the Danube—has been successfully accomplished.
I will next refer to the forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Not having obtained any military successes in that quarter—not having, indeed, carried the war into Asia Minor—we were certainly not in a condition to impose terms upon Russia with respect to Mingrelia, Imeritia, and the other countries in that region. It would be extremely difficult, indeed, to know what conditions to have imposed upon Russia. Only two courses were possible—you must either have restored those countries to Turkey, or have rendered them independent. Now, none of those countries would have submitted to be restored to Turkey; and to have declared their independence in the neighbourhood of Georgia, and of a Power like Russia, would have been a mere mockery, particularly as the sympathies of most of the chiefs are with the Russians, who have behaved to them with great kindness and consideration. Among those chiefs, notwithstanding the remarks of the noble Earl opposite, I must include Schamyl, for it is remarkable that the only period during which there have been no military movements whatever against the Russians, on the part of Schamyl and the Circassians, has been the two years of war. They have never shown the slightest sympathy with us, or the least wish to assist our arms. On one occasion, indeed, a chief did engage with the captain of one of Her Majesty's ships to produce 10,000 men at a particular place, on a particular day; but when the officer went to receive them, he could not find a single man. The only evidence we had of their feeling was the declaration of some of their chiefs to obstruct our progress along the east coast of the Sea of Azoff. There can be no better authority as to the disposition of the Circassians than General Williams, who, in a letter to myself, dated the 13th of April, 1855, informed me that Schamyl was only to be found when the invading army arrived near Tiflis, and that it was a notorious fact that this too-much vaunted chieftain did not even succeed last campaign in pillaging that town. In another letter, of so late a date as the 21st of
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August, 1855, General Williams states that at that time nothing was known of Schamyl's movements, and that the restitution of his son, together with large sums of money in the form of ransoms, might account for this inaction on the part of the Circassian chief. That does not show any very great activity on the part of the Circassians or their chief in support of the Allies, and does not constitute any great claim upon us in negotiating the treaty of peace. I say, therefore, that, not having been in a position to alter the territorial limits arranged by the Treaty of Adrianople, we confined ourselves to that which was a real grievance to Turkey, and which, by giving rise to encroachments upon the frontier line, has been a constant cause of quarrel for twenty-seven years between the Porte and Russia. We have appointed a mixed Commission, upon which there will be one English and one French officer, for the complete rectification of the Asiatic frontier; but, not having been able to annul the Treaty of Adrianople, we could not require Russia to demolish the forts on her own territory. Count Orloff said, that the forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea had been built at great expense in most unhealthy localities; that their occupation had been attended with great loss of life; that they were now destroyed, but that he could not engage that nothing of the kind should be built, because some troops must go there, and they must have shelter and be protected against the brigands who infested the whole of that quarter. Moreover, these forts are not forts for purposes of aggression; they were intended for internal objects; in fact, for defending commerce—for assisting the blockade which has been so many years established in these countries; but Count Orloff stated, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, that he hoped the character of the people would be improved by the civilising influence of commerce, that the blockade and other restrictions would be removed, and that all the ports of Russia in that quarter—seven or eight in number—would be opened to foreign trade and would receive foreign consuls.
My Lords, I believe I have now answered most of the objections that were taken to the treaty by the noble Earl opposite, and I shall, if necessary, be prepared to give any further explanation that may be required. But I should ill fulfil the obligations imposed upon me by justice and

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gratitude if I did not bear my humble testimony to the honourable conduct, the perfect good faith, and the straightforward proceedings of the Emperor of the French. My Lords, the Emperor occupies a great position, which he has made for himself, and which he deserves, because it is founded upon entire confidence in his honour and fidelity. That confidence will continue to increase, for the great position which he occupies, the great power which he wields, has neither disturbed his calm judgment nor kindled in his breast the flame of ambition. His policy had its reward when, on the 30th of March last, the anniversary of the battle of Paris, the representatives of the same Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris went in a body to the Tuileries, to announce to the Emperor Napoleon that they had just signed with France, and not against France, another and a very different Treaty of Paris, restoring peace to Europe. My Lords, my noble Friend who moved the Address has alluded to the difficulties of my position, arising out of a general belief in the insincerity of England, founded on the vast preparations which she was making, as it was supposed, for the sake of military glory, and on the warlike spirit which was manifested by the Parliament and by the press of this country. I must acknowledge, my Lords, that when I arrived in Paris I became painfully sensible of the existence of a feeling there that we did not intend to make peace, but to drag France on in a war with us, even after she believed that the objects for which the war was undertaken had been accomplished. But I must say, my Lords, that the Emperor did not share that feeling. The Emperor knew that what we had undertaken to do we should perform. He believed in the honour of England, and he believed that no British Minister and no British representative would have undertaken negotiations for the purpose of securing any selfish objects. But, on the other hand, the Emperor well knew that, faithful as we should be to our own engagements, we should, at whatever risk or hazard, insist that engagements should be kept with us. Now, I believe one of the chief reasons which rendered the notion of a Congress and the negotiations at Paris unpopular in this country, was the impression that Russia was insincere, and that the Conferences of Paris would be put an end to, as those at Vienna were terminated, by Russia. I am, therefore, the more desirous
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of saying, that throughout the negotiations, the conduct of the Russian Plenipotentiaries was honourable and straightforward. They certainly did, in a manner of which no one could complain, in a reasonable tone and with great moderation, endeavour to alter some of the conditions which were submitted to the Congress; but they uniformly declared, that if those conditions were insisted upon, they should be faithfully observed, and on no occasion did they pertinaciously insist upon any deviation from those terms to which the other Plenipotentiaries declared their determination to adhere. I must also say, that on more than one occasion, proposals were made to Count Orloff, which were at variance with his instructions, sometimes exceeding them, but which he accepted, and upon which he was obliged to ask for orders from St. Petersburg; and in no one instance did the Emperor of Russia fail to approve, by the telegraph, the conditional acceptance given by his Plenipotentiary. On all occasions, indeed, Count Orloff manifested a desire not only to prove that he acted in good faith, but to meet every wish of the other Plenipotentiaries. I trust—although my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) thinks that Lord Cowley and I have been somewhat too "soft" in this matter—that your Lordships will agree that, if, without abating one atom of the substance of our conditions, we could, in matters of form, consult the dignity of a Sovereign between whose subjects and those of Her Majesty there existed important relations which could not but be promoted by the restoration of cordiality between the respective Governments, we were right in doing so. I think if your Lordships will reflect upon the state of things which existed two years ago—if you remember the onerous treaties by which Turkey was bound, and which were so interpreted as to give Russia powers of interference in the Ottoman Empire—if you remember that Russia claimed a protectorate over the civil and religious immunities and privileges of many of the Sultan's subjects—that Sebastopol, protecting a powerful Russian fleet, was a standing menace to Turkey—that Russia claimed a protectorate over the Principalities, and claimed and constantly exercised a power of armed intervention—that she was able to obstruct the free navigation of the Danube—that she was meditating the establishment of another Sebastopol in the Aland Islands—that she was aiming at

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an occupation of Norway, which would have given her complete command of the Northern seas—if you remember that Russia had created and justified the greatest alarm throughout Europe—and if you reflect that now all the treaties between Russia and Turkey are annulled—that the Sultan has granted reforms, privileges, and immunities to his Christian subjects—that Sebastopol and the Russian fleet are no longer a menace to Turkey—that the seas which were before closed, are now open to free and unrestricted commerce—that the Principalities will no longer suffer from Russian protection, or have cause to fear Russian intervention, but that the institutions which, in fact, they will give themselves, will be placed under the guarantee of Europe—that a treaty has been signed, which is annexed to the general treaty, and therefore part of the national law of Europe, which guarantees the possessions of Sweden and Norway from aggression on the part of Russia—that Austria is now more closely bound to the Western Powers by the treaties into which she has entered—that Sardinia has gained great influence and prestige by the position which has been assigned to her in the Congress of the great Powers of Europe—that the alliance between England and France has been strengthened by the war—and that the common sacrifices and hardships which they have borne have cemented the ties of friendship, good-will, and cordiality, between the two nations—I think, my Lords, you will have no reason to be dissatisfied. I think it will be admitted that the objects of the war have been accomplished, and I trust that a treaty which secures those objects may not be thought unworthy of your Lordships' approval. I trust, also, that the people of this great country—knowing, as they do, that their resources are unexhausted, that their energies are unimpaired, that they never were, at any moment of their history, better prepared for war than at the present time—will be content to sheathe the sword with honour, and remember the calamities of war only the better to appreciate the blessings of peace.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I am very far from denying to the noble Earl that, comparing the condition of this country and its foreign relations at the present moment with what they were two years ago, the war has not been unaccompanied by circumstances which afford reason for satisfaction and congratulation;
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but the question between us is, whether all that might have been attained has been effected—whether we have made the full use we might have done of the powers we possessed—and whether by this treaty we have, according to the statement of the Address, "fully accomplished the great objects for which the war was undertaken." I can assure Her Majesty's Ministers that nothing would have given me greater satisfaction than to have been enabled to join in an unanimous Address to Her Majesty upon the Royal Message which has been sent down, announcing the conclusion of peace; and I certainly hoped that the noble Earl, having so long delayed laying before your Lordships the words of the Address, would have taken care—and I think I ventured to make the suggestion to him—that it should be framed in such terms that no possible difference of opinion could have occurred; but, with my conscientious views of the results of the war and the terms of the peace, I cannot consent to adopt that language of high-flown eulogy which Her Majesty's Ministers have thought fit to apply to themselves, and declare that I regard the peace "with joy and satisfaction," and as having been concluded "on conditions honourable to Her Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish the great objects for which the war was undertaken," I accept this peace—and I accept, as I believe the country accepts it—without enthusiasm, but without opposition. I believe the country looks upon it as a peace which might have been worse, but which might have been far better—a peace with which they are willing to put up, but not a peace which they think compensates for the sacrifices, the sufferings, the labours, and the expenses of the war. I can only hope that this peace may be permanent. I hope it may have a better fate than that peace to which, unless he was misrepresented, a right hon. Colleague of the noble Earl opposite compared it—the Peace of Amiens,—a peace which that right hon. Gentleman declared was one at which all men rejoiced, but of which all men were ashamed. This is a peace at which all men may rejoice, inasmuch as it must be a matter of general rejoicing that this and other countries are freed from the calamities of war, and enabled to enjoy the blessings of peace; but I say, also, that it is a peace the terms of which afford little, if any, reason for national rejoicing.

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My Lords, I cannot complain that my noble Friend who has just sat down has referred to the siege and abandonment of Kars; but I must be forgiven for saying that I do not think his explanation was entirely satisfactory, either with regard to the conduct of the Ambassador or of Her Majesty's Government. I entertain high admiration of the talents and ability of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. It is quite true, as my noble Friend opposite has stated, that I felt it my duty to advise Her Majesty, in reward for Lord Stratford's long labours and able services, to confer upon him a seat in this House, which he had richly earned by his devotion to the public service; but it is not the fact, as my noble Friend has been led to suppose, that I at any time suggested the removal of my noble Friend, who was then Ambassador at Paris, in order to substitute Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and I think my noble Friend the Ambassador at Paris will recollect the particular circumstances under which he was retained at his post in that capital. Whatever gratitude, however, the country may owe to Lord Stratford for his many and important services—and for none of greater value than those rendered in the position which he has so long filled at Constantinople—Parliament must not omit to censure a neglect which appears to have been prejudicial to the public interest, merely out of consideration for those services. In dealing with Lord Stratford, my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and the noble Viscount at the head of the Government seem to be under some strange misconception. My noble Friend dwelt apologetically upon the vast demands there were upon the time of the Ambassador at Constantinople, and he said that at the time when Lord Stratford de Redcliffe neglected to write to General Williams, he had six matters, all more important than the relief of Kars, pressing upon him coincidently; and, allowing for a little exaggeration in the estimate here given of the relative weight of the rival subjects claiming his attention, I have no doubt that his time was amply occupied. But, if that be so, what is the meaning of the stern and severe rebuke administered to the Ambassador by my noble Friend for not doing that which, according to this statement, it was absolutely impossible for him, overwhelmed as he was with his multifarious other avocations, to perform? Then my noble Friend says that Lord Stratford
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deeply regrets and deplores his neglect of the British Commissioner at Kars, and penitently wishes that he could recall it; but that in the latter period of the siege of that fortress, when it was unfortunately too late to do anything effectual in behalf of its brave garrison, no man could have devoted himself to the business with more zeal and ability than our Ambassador. Yet he sincerely repents of his shortcomings, for which, in no over lenient terms, my noble Friend reprimanded him; and, therefore, what becomes of the assertion of the noble Viscount the First Minister, that Lord Stratford did everything within his power?
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: The noble Earl must pardon me for interrupting him, but I should like to know when, the statement was made which he ascribes to Lord Palmerston?
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: On the 1st of May.
THE EARL OF DERBY: The authority on which I spoke is not such as I would always trust, yet it is fully as authentic as many of the public documents laid on your Lordships' table. But, whatever may have been the conduct of Lord Stratford on this point, he was, in the first place, the agent of Her Majesty's Government, and, in the next, whatever blame attaches to him is of small importance as regards the fate of Kars when compared with the omissions directly and immediately attributable to the Ministry. In the eulogium passed by my noble Friend on General Williams, there is not a man who would not cordially and entirely concur, and—as it turns out—no selection for his office could have been better or more fortunate for the public service. But what was his position? He was a Commissioner attached to the Turkish army, precisely, as the noble Earl says, on the same footing as Sir Hugh Rose stood in connection with the French army. He had no power—no authority—no rank. True, being no ordinary man, he took upon himself an authority far beyond any with which he was invested, but there is no denying the fact that if—when it became evident that Colonel Williams must either be practically supreme or fail in his object—Her Majesty's Government at home and the Ambassador at Constantinople had interposed to support him, Kars would have been provisioned, and that fortress would have remained at this moment in the hands of Turkey. That fortress fell from famine and not from force; and if Colonel Williams had been

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properly furnished with the authority or money to procure supplies of provisions—as he might easily have been to any amount—the place would never have been captured; for it had fallen from famine and not from war. I say, then, it is indisputable that not our Ambassador, but primarily and mainly Her Majesty's Government, were the cause of that disaster, having left Colonel Williams without the means of laying in those stores which would have enabled him, with the military assistance of his friends, to make Kars absolutely impregnable. It is vain, therefore, for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to ride off upon the second epoch of this unhappy business, and to tell us that troops could not be spared from before Sebastopol to save this Asiatic stronghold. My Lords, I have thought it my duty to follow my noble Friend through his statement with regard to Kars, and I would not have done so if the question had not borne directly upon the terms of the treaty. I listened with great admiration to the eloquence of the noble Earl who introduced this Motion, and to the speech of the noble Baron who followed, yet, I trust, it will not be deemed disrespectful if I observe that neither of them in the slightest degree touched on the merits of the question before us, or at all attempted to discuss the advantages or the defects of the treaty of peace. The speeches of these noble Lords were excellent addresses in praise of everybody and everything—the gallantry of our troops and of the distinguished men, many of whom are unhappily lost to their country—the bravery of the Turkish forces, as well as of our own army and navy—the foresight and ability displayed by Her Majesty's Government—and last, but not least, the unparalleled efforts made with unparalleled constancy and unanimity by the people of this country for the promotion of the great objects of the war. But, as to the results of those exertions and sacrifices, and their ultimate effect in achieving the great ends which they contemplated, not a single syllable fell from either of the first two speakers. The noble Baron (Lord Glenelg) did, indeed, advert to one point in the treaty, and assured us that the hatti-sheriff granted by the Sultan in favour of his Christian subjects reflects infinite credit on Her Majesty's Government; but allow me to remind him that that document is a condition obtained from our friends and not from our enemies—I can assure the noble Baron that the hatti-sheriff was granted not by Russia, but by Turkey,
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Perhaps, also, the noble Baron will allow me to inform him, if he does not know it already, that the hatti-sheriff does not form one of the Articles of the treaty. [Lord GLENELG: I said it did not.] "If," said the noble Lord, "you have got nothing else, you have got that which is worth all the war has cost. It is not a part of the treaty; but we have extorted"—such was the noble Baron's phrase—"extorted the ungrudging consent of Turkey to it."
LORD GLENELG: I never used such a phrase.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I beg the noble Lord's pardon—it was the noble Earl who talked about "extorting an ungrudging consent."
THE EARL OF ELLESMERE: The noble Earl probably alludes to an expression which fell from me in the course of my speech. But what I said, and what I now repeat, was, that the British army had "extorted the ungrudging admiration" of their former enemies.
THE EARL OF DERBY: Well, I do not exactly understand how a thing can be "extorted" when it is "ungrudged;" but that is a point of rhetorical taste upon which it would be useless to dwell. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the fall of Kars made no difference to the terms of the treaty. I am not going to dwell on the conjunction or the juxta-position of the Articles in the treaty, on the subject of which my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury) made a remark which the noble Earl opposite said was made in ignorance—wherever the Article to which I am about to allude is placed, one thing seems clear—namely, that when the basis of the pacification was originally signed, no provision was made for the restitution of territory by Russia, for the simple reason that she had taken none. The original terms were that, in exchange for the fortified positions and territory occupied by the Allies, Russia consented to the rectification of her frontier in Europe. In the meantime circumstances had changed. Russia had become possessed of the fortress of Kars and of a considerable portion of Anatolia; and, consequently, when at one of the Conferences the restitution of Kars was brought upon the tapis, the Russian Plenipotentiaries, admitting the principle of that restitution, yet expressed a hope that the question would be reserved for discussion till the close of their proceedings, and that in the meantime credit would be given to him for having assented to the concessions already

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agreed to. In the first instance, it was one of the preliminary conditions on which we consented to enter into negotiations for peace, that in exchange for Sebastopol, Kertch, Kinburn, Eupatoria, Balaklava, and other places, we should obtain from Russia the very rectification of the territory of Bessarabia that had been arranged at Vienna; but when the Plenipotentiaries came subsequently to discuss the terms of the treaty, the Russian Minister claimed that as a counterpoise for the restoration of Kars, most important alterations should be made in that rectification, and those alterations were made accordingly. Yet the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has the courage to stand up and assure your Lordships that the fall of Kars had no influence one way or the other on the terms of peace, and that Turkey is secure from future danger. And what is this rectification of which the noble Earl makes so light? Here was a district of 300 miles in length and thirty or forty miles in breadth. The Russians gave up both banks of the Danube and of the Pruth, with thirty or forty miles of territory to the east of the latter. But the noble Earl now says that that was an inconvenient line—that it was marked out not by mountains, but by a mere elevation of land. But what is a more convenient or a more usual boundary, not only of territories but of properties, than one which shall include the whole watershed and the sources of the river, whether such watershed be determined by a chain of mountains, or by a mere elevation of land? What, in fact, the noble Earl has given up is150 miles of territory, thirty or forty miles broad; he has brought the Russians back upon the Pruth, and has given them a divided command of that river. But again, where is now Jassy, the capital of Moldavia? Under the original scheme there would have been forty or fifty miles between it and the Russian territory; now, the Russians have been allowed to approach the stream, over which there is a good bridge. The difference between the plan of rectification originally proposed and that to which, owing to the surrender of Kars, we were compelled to accede, may be illustrated by a familiar simile. In the first case, there was a locked door, both keys of which were in the keeping of Turkey; in the second, there was the same locked door, but the parties on each side of it had each a key: and which Power is the more dangerous to be put in possession of such an instrument—Moldavia
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or Russia—I will leave to your Lordships to determine. I do not hesitate to assert that, as regards this matter of the rectification of territory, there is a manifest defect in the treaty, and that this defect has been occasioned by the fall of Kars. With respect to the Black Sea, the original proposition was that it should be completely neutralised. It was to be open to the commerce of all nations, but no military arsenals of any description whatsoever were to be erected on its coasts. Your Lordships have the treaty before you, and you can ascertain for yourselves how far that promise has been realised. There is a question to which the treaty makes no allusion, but which, nevertheless, is one of no trivial importance—What is to become of the fortresses of Ismail and Kilia-nova? Are they to be razed? Is there any understanding on the subject? Perhaps the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will have the kindness to inform us?
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: There is no understanding; they are in the territory which will be restored to Turkey.
THE EARL OF DERBY: That will form part of Moldavia.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: Well, that is Turkish territory.
THE EARL OF DERBY: Yes; but I am not sure whether it is not Turkish territory that cannot be occupied by Turkish troops; and unless these fortresses be occupied by Turkish troops, they can constitute no security for Turkey. And what about Nicholaieff—the great maritime arsenal at which most of the Russian ships designed for the Black Sea are constructed? Is Nicholaieff to be dismantled or destroyed? The Government may find it convenient now to argue that we had no right to demand that Nicholaieff should be dismantled or destroyed. The Government may find it convenient now to argue that we had no right to demand that Nicholaieff should be dismantled; but such was not the opinion of the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) at the Conferences of Paris. A change in our fortunes, however, necessitated a change in our policy. At the request of the Russian Plenipotentiary, the question was adjourned, which is tantamount to a Motion in this House to postpone the reading of a Bill for six months. The matter dropped; and it is admitted by the Government themselves that Nicholaieff is to be left untouched. We are told, indeed, that the Emperor of Russia will not permit any ships to be built there except such as are expressly mentioned in

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the treaty as being intended for the service of the Black Sea. But no such obligation is imposed on him by the treaty. It is simply recorded in the protocol that it is the intention of the Emperor not to permit other ships to be constructed there.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: It is stated in the protocol that the Emperor is under an engagement in that respect.
THE EARL OF DERBY: The noble Earl will pardon me for assuring him that on this point he is quite in error. The protocol has not one word about "engagement." Instead of a condition that Nicholaieff shall not be used as a naval arsenal for building vessels of war, you are content with the simple declaration that the Emperor has no intention to use it for such purposes. This may be true enough of the present Emperor, but you cannot have any means of ascertaining what may be the intentions in this particular of any future Sovereign of Russia. There is nothing in the treaty to prevent the building of any number of ships at Nicholaieff; and as for Sebastopol, I can see no reason why it should not be rendered impregnable. For commercial purposes the docks may be restored to their original dimensions; and, limiting my observations to the mere provisions of the treaty, I can see no reason why vessels of war may not be floated down from Nicholaieff to the Black Sea, and placed behind the impregnable forts of Sebastopol. Perhaps it may be said that we shall have Consuls at Sebastopol and all other ports in the Black Sea, and that from them we shall be sure to obtain information early enough to render remonstrance effective. Yes, upon the coasts of the Black Sea; but you have agreed that Nicholaieff is not upon that sea, neither is the Sea of Azoff to be considered any portion of it; therefore we have no right to have Consuls at either of those important places. And, after this, you tell mo that you have taken treaty security for the neutralisation of the Black Sea. With regard to the forts on the east coast of the Euxine, my noble Friend says that we had no such success in that quarter as would justify us in demanding the abrogation of the Treaty of Adrianople. I thought that that, like every other treaty between Russia and Turkey, had been abrogated by the war. My noble Friend says that we could not call upon the Russian Government to demolish these forts. I do not know whether, upon the part of the country, he had a right to do so; but I know that the British Plenipotentiary
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did ask for the destruction of these forts, and his request was, to use a mild diplomatic term, "adjourned." And now he tells us that we had no right to ask anything of the sort, and he could not expect Russia to grant it. As to military success, I do not know what view the noble Earl takes of the subject. Perhaps he is so intoxicated with greater military successes, not unmingled with some disasters and some imperfections, even in the achievement of the greatest operations, as to think that the naval operations upon the eastern coast of the Black Sea by which these forts were destroyed, and which caused their abandonment by the Russians, were not such as called upon us to maintain the status quo, and to procure that those forts so abandoned and destroyed should not, by these same Russians, be rebuilt and reoccupied. I will not enter into the question of what degree of support or co-operation we may have received from the Circassians, from Schamyl or any other of their chiefs, nor into the question why we did not receive such support; but I ask, not as a question of gratitude or good feeling towards them, but as a question of policy, and of carrying out that which the noble Earl himself declared to be among the principal objects of the war—the limiting of the territory and the repression of the aggrandisement of Russia—whether he can justify having inserted no conditions in this treaty by which these tribes should be maintained in that degree of independence of Russia which has formed, and might continue to form, an important barrier against the aggressions of that Power in the quarter in which they are most dangerous to Turkey? Your object was to repress the aggressions of Russia and to secure the integrity of Turkey; and you neglect to make provision against the expansion of territory and the continuance of aggression precisely on the side on which Russia can at any time best carry out her views of aggrandisement against that Turkey the integrity of which it is your object to secure. I say that that is a signal defect in the treaty. You may say what you like about the indifference to your assistance manifested by those tribes—an indifference occasioned, perhaps, by your injurious interference with their domestic concerns, or by their inability to hold their own; but I say, that in providing for the neutralisation of the Black Sea, for the repression of Russian aggression, and for the integrity of Turkey,

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these Circassian provinces were, of all others, those to which you ought primarily to have directed your attention; and this you have wholly and indisputably neglected.
My Lords, there is one point in the treaty which was not touched upon by my noble Friend (the Earl of Malmesbury), and therefore has not been replied to by the noble Earl opposite—I mean the position in which you have left the affairs of the Principalities. Now, if there was one point which it was important to settle, or for the settlement of which to lay down a basis, it was the precise constitution of those Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. They form a barrier between Russia and Turkey, and their neutrality and their virtual independence under the suzerainty of the Porte are of primary importance. How have you left the subject of their constitution? You have left it in this way: The Sultan engages to summon divans, ad hoc, for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the people. When he has ascertained those wishes, is he to act upon them? Not at all. The contracting Powers are to appoint another Commission, the composition of which is left to future settlement, which is to make its inquiries and to report to a fresh Congress. Having received that report, and that of the divans summoned by the Sultan, you are to have a fresh Congress for the purpose of settling the constitution of the Principalities. Therefore, the constitution of these Principalities, which is essential to the fulfilment of the objects of the war, and to the maintenance of the intergrity and independence of Turkey, is to be left to two separate bodies responsible to two different authorities; one of which is to be constituted by the Sultan, the other to be constituted I know not by whom, and to be organised you know not how. When these bodies have come to a final conclusion you will enter upon the question, of how Moldavia and Wallachia are to be governed. I say this is not the way to conclude a treaty. This concludes only a truce. It leaves open endless causes of dispute and difference, and does not do that which you might have done, namely, bring to a satisfactory conclusion the questions involved in these subjects.
My Lords, there is another point too important to be dealt with incidentally in a debate upon a treaty, of which it does not form a part, but which I cannot pass over without entering my solemn protest against
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the act, and still more against the manner in which that act has been accomplished. I mean that declaration of the maritime Powers which has introduced an entirely new rule in the maritime code of England, which has gone counter to the declaration of every statesman in every period of our history, and which abrogates the principle for the maintenance of which we have withstood foreign combinations and resisted foreign invitations to the conclusion of treaties, and which we have held by as the sheet anchor of our naval power. [A noble LORD: The Corn Laws.] Did we repeal the Corn Laws by the unauthorised act of a Plenipotentiary? The Corn Laws were repealed after full discussion, with the knowledge and sanction of both Houses of Parliament. But our maritime supremacy has been surrendered, to use the mildest word—has been given away—has been yielded to I know not what. There is no protocol which tells us what were the arguments in its favour. There is no discussion as to the objects to be gained by it. There is no statement whether it was volunteered by the British Minister. But this I know, that, right or wrong, volunteered by the British Minister, or surrendered by him to the feeling, prejudices, and desires of other countries, it was done in the dark, without the knowledge of Parliament; and that the Minister, sent and trusted by the country to conduct negotiations for restoring peace on certain bases known to the country, took advantage of his position to make an important alteration in the maritime law of England, without the knowledge of Parliament, and without our having the least idea that such our birthright was being given away. This question is too large to be argued now; but I should have thought myself unworthy of a seat in your Lordships' House if, while we are discussing the terms of this treaty, I did not protest against the contents of the paper which I have seen with astonishment and indignation forms an adjunct to the treaty, of which it is undoubtedly no part. For the treaty itself, my Lords, I accept it, as I believe the country will accept it, with some degree of reluctance. I do not regret—God forbid that I should—I cordially rejoice that we are delivered from the horrors and calamities inseparable from war. I hope, far more than I believe, that the peace you have concluded may be enduring. I do not regret that we have shown moderation in our success. I do

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not regret that the great efforts which the country has made will end in the exhibition of a mighty naval armament the like of which no country ever saw, and of an army in a condition which nothing can surpass, and that the actions of which that army and navy might have been capable are no longer required. I am willing to believe that the exhibition of that power, that unbroken power, on the part of England, has had some influence in facilitating the conclusion of peace, and I willingly consent that that great naval armament, as it has been the greatest, so it shall be for the present war the last exhibition of the greatness of the nation, and of the incapacity of the Administration which governs it. I say I do not regret that more blood was not shed; I do not regret that we have come to terms of peace. I accept this peace, even such as it is; but if you call upon me, in my place as a Peer of Parliament, to say that in my judgment this peace is honourable to Her Majesty's Crown and completely attains all the objects for which we went to war, I cannot, with all my desire that we should come to an unanimous vote, assert that which I do not believe, and must give my assent to the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend. I do not mean to trouble your Lordships by taking a division upon the question, but I wish to record my opinion together with his that the words of this Address are not justified by the facts, and that, although the nation assents to peace and gladly reposes from war, this is a peace which they do not hail with enthusiasm, but which they accept with reluctance, and which in the opinion of the country and in mine reflects no honour upon the Ministers by whom it was negotiated.
EARL GRANVILLE: I do not rise, my Lords, to answer at length the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, but simply to make a few observations on certain points on which he has touched; and I can assure your Lordships that I am too well satisfied with the speeches which have been delivered on this side of the House, and, I may say, on the other side of the House too, to break though that resolution. The first point touched on by the noble Earl was the conduct of Lord Stratford. There was a great difference between the two noble Earls who have addressed the House from the Opposition benches in this respect. The noble Earl who commenced this discussion (the Earl of Malmesbury) spoke in a tone of great vituperation;
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but the noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Derby) merely contrasted the reprimand addressed by the Secretary of State to Lord Stratford, and the unwillingness of the Government to recall him. Surely, every man of common sense must see that Lord Stratford, having done wrong on one point, and the Secretary of State having reprimanded him for it, it was the duty of the Government, if they should be of opinion that it would, on the whole, be more for the advantage of the Government that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe should remain at Constantinople, not to recall him, and it is clear that, except upon this point, both the noble Earls are of opinion that the noble Lord is the proper person to represent Her Majesty at Constantinople. The noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) attributes the fall of Kars not so much to the Ambassador as to Her Majesty's Government at home. He says that if General Williams had been supplied with money, provisions, ammunition, and authority, Kars would not have fallen. As to authority, it was clearly out of the power of Her Majesty's Government to invest General Williams with the authority which he desired over an army not their own—the Turkish Government alone could do that—and if Her Majesty's Government had sent a Commissioner into Asia, insisting, before his abilities and energy were known, that he should at once take the command of the Turkish, army, it would have given rise to no small complaint. As to money, General Williams never, except upon one occasion, made application for money; and as to provisions and ammunition, they were in Asia even at the early period which has been alluded to, and it was owing to the gross negligence of a Turkish official that they were not stored in safety in Kars long before its investment. Not with standing the very clear and explicit declaration of my noble Friend as to what passed at the Conference in consequence of the possession of Kars by the Russians, to the effect that it was stated most clearly to Count Orloff that, inasmuch as the fall of Kars was known to the Russian Government when they accepted the proposals from Vienna, the demand made by the Russian Government could not be submitted to; yet the noble Earl misstated the facts to the House, and referred to a passage of Count Orloff's observations inserted in the protocol; but your Lordships will see that that passage does not say that this question

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will be considered while treating upon the points already settled at Vienna, but upon the consideration of the additional Articles, which had nothing whatever to do with it. With regard to the other stipulations of the treaty, the noble Earl appears to me to undervalue their importance; because, by the communications of the Turkish Government, it was ascertained that the principal things they wished for were the rectification of the boundary in Bessarabia and the opening up to commerce of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, both of which have been secured by the treaty. The noble Earl made another objection, which I thought was not consistent with the facts of the case, as to the effect of the razing of the forts of Ismail and Kilianova. If there was one thing more than another which surprised me in this treaty, it was that the Russians had consented to give up the fortress of Ismail, which is connected with one of their greatest military achievements; but when your Lordships remember that the whole of the Powers have guaranteed the integrity of the frontier as newly laid down, and that three of the Powers have declared it to be a casus belli if the provisions of the treaty are infringed, it was, you will allow, something very like special pleading for the noble Lord to argue that Ismail was not really restored to Turkey. The noble Earl has expressed his regret that Nicholaieff was not included in the treaty, instead of being made merely the subject of a declaration in the protocols; and he stated that Sebastopol was still a standing menace to Turkey, as there was nothing to prevent Russia, reconstructing the docks, fortifying them, and building any description of vessels she pleased. But I put it to your Lordships whether there is not that moral obligation imposed by a declaration made so solemnly in the face of all Europe by the Plenipotentiary acting on behalf of his Sovereign, which Sovereign has afterwards ratified the treaty, which would give us a right to protest, and even to proceed to further extremities, should any breach of it be attempted. If we are not to place confidence in this sort of expressions, the value of the treaty itself must be very much weakened. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) repeated the objection of the noble Earl near him with regard to Sebastopol. He said it would not be a difficult thing to build a new town, to fortify it, and to construct commercial docks. I speak certainly with very great deference
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in the presence of those who are so much better acquainted with these things than I am; but, I ask you, would it not be a direct infraction of the treaty if Russia were to rebuild her docks, calling them commercial docks, and then to fortify them, as the noble Earl suggests? Would not the treaty be clearly broken by such a perfidious proceeding? When the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) talked of the Circassians, he moderated his tone a little from that adopted by the noble Earl near him, in consequence of the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs having pointed out how little the acts of the Circassians really put us in a position to justify us in urging a point not easy to be obtained in their favour. The noble Earl said that we compromised the Circassians, and asked what Colonel Loyd was about? I regret to say that he died immediately after the battle of the Alma, and never reached Circassia; and Mr. Longworth, another agent, did not succeed in making any arrangement with the Circassians. Perhaps the noble Lord will say that this was owing to not employing able agents; but exactly the same ill success attended the efforts of the French Commissioner. I must say, however, that when the noble Earl complains of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary for not carrying out all his views on this question, he speaks as if Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary had been sitting in his own room and dictating despatches to some subordinate, bound to execute his intentions. But there were other Plenipotentiaries concerned—those of our Allies as well as of the belligerents to whom we were opposed; and I ask your Lordships whether you think it would have been possible to prolong the war because these arrangements were not made for the Circassians, in insisting on which, I venture to say, my noble Friend would not have been supported by any other nation represented at the Co0ngress? The noble Earl made one observation which I am willing to attribute to a slip of the tongue. It was surprising that one who has had no small share in persuading this nation to make one of the noblest sacrifices ever witnessed for the abolition of slavery in our own colonies should have said that Her Majesty's Government had pursued an ill-judged policy in endeavouring to put an end to the slave trade in Circassia. With regard to the Principalities, the noble Earl said that the arrangement with respect to those provinces was one of the principal points

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on which he found fault with the Government, and he thought that nothing would have been so easy as for the Plenipotentiaries at Paris to settle the question off hand and to have done with it. Now, I think, we are acquainted sufficiently with the consequences of Congresses proceeding on the assumption that they know better than the people of the country they are dealing with what is best for their welfare. I venture to say that there was not sufficient knowledge on the part of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris to enable them to come to a satisfactory arrangement on the subject of the Principalities, or one pleasing to the inhabitants. The noble Earl said that a Divan was to be called to express the wishes of the inhabitants, then a Commission was subsequently to be formed, and that references were to take place from one to the other; which would lead to endless confusion. This is not a correct statement. The Commission is not to be subsequently appointed, but is to be ready to confer with the Divan representing the wishes of the people. The noble Earl said that he would reserve his animadversion on another part of the proceedings, and then went on in every possible way to discredit what had been done by Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, in regard to the maritime law. Whenever that question may come on for discussion we shall be able to show the noble Earl, who is such a stickler for precedent, that the Government strictly followed the precedent invariably set with respect to treaties or conventions with foreign nations, and would show, moreover, most triumphantly, that what was thus settled would not only be an immense advantage to mankind, but would be most especially beneficial to the interests of this country. It was said by the noble Earl that nothing could show more the greatness of the nation and the incapacity of the Administration than the events of the late war. Now, as to the former, I freely admit that the steadiness and determination of this nation during the war, and its calmness and good sense now that we are in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace, have been beyond all praise; but with regard to the incapacity of the Government, I must say it was most extraordinary that, to prove the incapacity of the Administration, the noble Earl should have taken as his illustration one of the greatest armaments which this country was ever able to produce. The noble Earl concluded by stating that he
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could not regard the treaty with feelings of joy or satisfaction, and I am grateful to the noble Earl that, while entertaining that opinion, he shrinks from taking a division on the Address. I conclude that the noble Earl had some fear that he should not have many noble Lords on his side if he were to divide the House; he had probably assumed that the contrary would be the case, as he had in the case of "the fall of Kars," and had in vivid recollection what took place elsewhere in that matter, and feared the same result in this House. In conclusion, I congratulate my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary on what has taken place this evening. Considering all the difficulties of his position, to have restored the inestimable blessings of peace to Europe, and to have fully and amply, at the same time, carried out all the objects of this great war, without leaving any embittered feeling on the part of any of the nations of Europe, is a triumph he may well be proud of, and it is one which will not in the slightest degree be affected by any of those little objections to details which have been urged this evening.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, it is not my wish or intention to enter into any details of the treaty; but I wish to say that, as no man ever more earnestly desired than myself to prevent the calamities of war, none can now more cordially rejoice in the restoration of peace. I rejoice that the warlike reputation of my noble Friend now at the head of the Government has rendered it possible to make a peace wise and honourable in itself, but which, if it had been made under my auspices, might, perhaps, have produced discontent and excited serious reprehension. I think the peace wise and honourable to Her Majesty's Crown. It is not, indeed, of the triumphant character of that treaty which it was my good fortune to sign in the same capital some forty years ago; that was a moment of unexampled glory and success, but the present treaty is one which amply fulfils the objects for which the war was undertaken, and such therefore as ought to be satisfactory to every reasonable man. I entertain no doubt that, whatever may be the criticisms which we hear now on the terms of pacification, this treaty will meet with the approbation of the country; for it is a remarkable circumstance in the history of the last century, that all our treaties of peace, however unpopular and objected to at the time they were made, have always, ultimately, been sanctioned by the

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deliberate opinion of posterity. There could not be a stronger instance of this than the declaration of Mr. Pitt, which I very well remember to have heard him make, that he thought the treaty of Utrecht a very good one, but it had been much disfigured and misrepresented for party purposes. My noble Friend on the cross benches (Earl Stanhope), who has done so much for the history of his country, has described wisely and justly the treaty of 1763, looking at it from this distance of time; but if he had lived in those days, he would, very probably, have entertained the same opinions as his illustrious relative, Lord Chatham, who described it as a treacherous, insecure, and disgraceful capitulation. But not only have all treaties of peace during the last century, however much objected to at the time, been acquiesced in, but they have been ultimately approved by posterity. I will go further and say, that with regard to wars, the operation which has taken place has always been the converse. Wars which have been extremely popular when they were undertaken have, by the verdict of posterity, been less favourably judged. The most popular war in which the country was ever engaged—truly a war of the people, as the late war has sometimes been called—was that one into which Sir Robert Walpole was reluctantly dragged. I believe there is no one who will now hesitate to declare, that it was one of the most unjust and unnecessary wars this country ever engaged in. It is but natural, that when the passions of men are excited, they should not be able to judge of events as coolly as after those events have passed away—and, consequently, wars which have been popular when entered upon, have been looked upon with different conclusions when the passions have passed away. I will not undertake to say, that the war in which we have recently been engaged, will have the same fate as its predecessors. I never felt the slightest doubt respecting its justice; and, although the policy of a war must always be more or less a subject of debate, we have every reason to believe that the universal judgment of the country upon it was clearly pronounced. At the same time, I will not undertake to say, that our posterity may not come to a different conclusion, both as to its necessity and its justice. [Earl GREY: Hear, hear!] Some noble Lords have, I know, anticipated the verdict of posterity. But, however reluctant I was, and no one could be more reluctant,
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to engage in the war, I cannot deny that it was justified by the great interests of the country. My noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) has fully carried out a declaration which I had great satisfaction in hearing him make shortly before his departure for Paris. My noble Friend said that the peace, in order to be durable, must be honourable to all the parties concerned in it; and I think that the present treaty answers that description, that it is honourable, not only to the Allies, but also to the Power with whom they were at war. I will not trouble your Lordships by referring to it in detail, but there are one or two Articles, with respect to which I wish to obtain some explanation. In the first place, I do not perfectly understand what will be the operation of the Article with respect to what is called the neutralisation of the Black Sea. Russia and Persia might easily enter into an agreement with respect to a sea situated like the Caspian, or we may agree with the United States to regulate the military force in the American Lakes, but the Black Sea is open to all the world. The neutralisation clause sounds well, and consecrates what appears to be a good principle; I should like to see the Mediterranean also neutralised, but that would be impossible, and I am afraid it will be found practically impossible to neutralise the Black Sea. The clause must either give enormous advantages to Russia, or it must be inapplicable. The Turkish fleet can enter the Black Sea when it pleases, it will be prevented from doing so merely by the obligation of the treaty; but if Russia ever had reason to apprehend an attack by the Turkish fleet, and applied to you, what are you to do? You must either guarantee her from any such attack, or you must allow her to make preparations for her own defence. Either, you guarantee Russia from an attack by the Turks, or your neutralisation conies to nothing. You say it is not probable that Turkey will attack Russia. Perhaps not, under ordinary circumstances; but we cannot tell what combinations may hereafter take place, which may give Turkey the means and the inclination to attack Russia. My noble Friend at the head of the Government has, over and over again, stated that the war ending in the Treaty of Adrianople was provoked by the Turks, and that they were entirely to blame. I do not say that this opinion was correct, but at least such a contingency is not impossible.

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I also wish for some explanation with respect to the Article which refers to the act of the Sultan conferring rights and privileges upon his Christian subjects. No one can rejoice at that act more than I do, or can give more credit to Lord Stratford for the great ability he displayed in obtaining it. It leaves nothing to be desired. I find that the hatti-sheriff is communicated by the Sultan to the Conference at Paris; but that body, while not undervaluing the importance of the document, declares it to be clearly understood that it does not give to the European Powers a right to interfere, either individually or collectively, in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal government of his dominions. That makes the hatti-sheriff of less value than it might be, because it precludes the contracting Powers from interfering in its execution, and that prohibition is included in the treaty of peace itself. Now, I know enough of Turkey to be aware that, without the constant superintendence of the other Powers to secure its execution, the hatti-sheriff will not be worth the paper on which it is written; and if they be prohibited by treaty from interfering, the Christians will be worse off than before. I may appeal to my own experience. Ten or twelve years ago, when I was at the Foreign Office, a Christian turned Mahomedan, but repented shortly after, and resumed his former religion. They put him to death. The same thing was done more than once. Upon that I insisted that the law should be abolished. They said they would be ready to abolish any human law, but this was a Divine law, and they could not meddle with it. However, I persevered, and at last, by means of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, obtained the abolition of the law. But, like all other Turkish engagements, it was not adhered to, for I believe that several persons have been murdered since for the same offence. Although I had no hatti-sheriff, I did not hesitate from interfering authoritatively to put a stop to such an abominable practice. I believe this treaty would have prevented me from doing so, and it will prevent my noble Friend, whatever his own wishes may be, from interfering to put an end to abominations that still exist in Turkey. No man could value more than I do the provisions of the hatti-sheriff, but it appears to me that its efficacy is completely destroyed by that passage in the treaty
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which declares that the contracting Powers should not be entitled to interfere with its execution or with any of the internal affairs of the Sultan. Perhaps the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, will be able to give some explanation of this. I have no doubt that should Lord Stratford remain at Constantinople, he will take care to have the hatti-sheriff put in execution; but, suppose Turkey were to call in the aid of Russia to prevent your interference in its internal government, would Russia not have a right to oppose your proceedings as contrary to the engagements of the treaty of peace? I trust some explanation will be given to us upon the point to which I have thus briefly referred. Upon the whole, however, I think the treaty is all we could expect—honourable to Her Majesty's arms, and creditable to the noble Earl, whose wise and conciliatory conduct of the negotiations helped to secure it.
LORD COWLEY: My Lords, it is with extreme diffidence that I present myself before your Lordships. Personally unknown to the great majority of you, and speaking for the first time in public, nothing but a sense of duty could have induced me to rise on the present occasion; but, having been engaged in the negotiations at Paris, and having put my name to the treaty now under consideration, I think I should be almost wanting in respect to your Lordships if I did not trouble you with a few observations. I shall confine myself to the two questions asked by the noble Earl who spoke last. First, with regard to the neutralisation of the Black Sea; the noble Earl inquires whether, in the event of Turkey making an aggression upon Russia, the Allies would go to the assistance of the latter. That point was discussed in the Conferences, and it was laid down as a general rule that if either party violated the conditions of the treaty, the Allies would go to the assistance of whatever party required their help. But if the noble Earl will read the treaty, he will find that the case he puts can hardly arise, because the parties to the treaty bind themselves not to commit any act of aggression without giving the other Powers an opportunity of meeting the difficulty. With regard to the second question—the execution of the hatti-sheriff—it was not the intention of the Congress to limit the power of diplomatic interference—that is expressly stated—but to prevent the Government of the Sultan being constantly harassed by applications from foreign

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Powers with regard to the internal affairs of the empire. The noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) may have an opportunity of making any inquiries on this point from the Grand Vizier, who will shortly be in England, and who will, I am sure, be ready to give him every information. I have only to remark upon the general question that I think the treaty has been discussed this evening too much as if England had been the only party on one side, and Russia on the other. It should be remembered that other Powers were engaged in this transaction—that we were not alone—and that, in fact, from the day on which we entered into the alliance with France we practically gave up our right to independent action, both in reference to the operations of war and to the negotiations for peace. With regard to the operations of war, I think that if we had been able to have an undivided command in the field we might have stood in a much better position than at present. That, also, is more or less true with regard to the negotiations for peace:—We were obliged to take into consideration the wishes and ideas of the other Powers that went along with us in the negotiations, and could not act entirely on our own. Nevertheless, I believe the treaty is a good and honourable one, worthy the acceptance and approval of your Lordships, and the approbation of the country at large.
EARL GREY: My Lords, though I did not intend to take any part in this debate, I cannot allow it to close without expressing my entire dissent from the observations of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) with regard to that modification of the maritime law which our Government have so wisely accepted. So far from agreeing with the noble Earl upon that subject, I feel deeply grateful to the Government and to the Plenipotentiaries of the various Powers represented at Paris for having adopted what I believe to be one of the greatest advances made for a long course of years in the progress of civilisation and humanity. I am persuaded that we have acted rightly in giving up the powers which we formerly exercised against neutrals at sea in no very gentle or creditable manner. Does any man believe, looking at the present state of the world, that those odious and intolerable powers, pressing so unjustly upon neutrals and innocent persons, could be now exercised by any of the great Powers without involving ourselves in hostilities
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with all the maritime nations of the world? We have, therefore, great reason to rejoice that now, when it can be done without any suspicion of our being overawed by other nations, we are enabled to give up voluntarily powers which we could not put in execution without the extremity of danger. I say, moreover, that England, the greatest commercial country in the world, will gain more than any other from this new principle of maritime law. I confess I heard with extreme astonishment from the noble Earl that he objected to the manner in which this alteration has been made. If there is one principle of the constitution more clearly recognized than another, it is that the Crown acts on behalf of the nation in its relations with all foreign countries; that it is for the Crown to contract such engagements as it thinks fit, and that Parliament has the right to censure the servants of the Crown for any improper advice which they may give. Our constitution does not resemble that of the United States, where treaties entered into by the Executive must be ratified by the Senate; but in this country treaties entered into by the Crown, and ratified by the Crown, are binding upon the country, whatever may be the opinion of Parliament. This country has, at various times, by treaties with Sweden, Holland, and other States, consented to a temporary or permanent modification of the rights it possessed by maritime law; and these objects were effected, not by the authority of Parliament, but simply by treaties ratified by the Crown. The noble Earl below me (the Earl of Aberdeen) has referred to the hatti-sheriff, as it is called, which the Porte has granted to its subjects. My noble Friend went into the general question of the policy we are pursuing towards Turkey; and I think from the answers which were given to his inquiries by the noble Lord who followed him (Lord Cowley) that we have reason to form very alarming anticipations with regard to the future. Now, what are the facts with regard to this hatti-sheriff? I find it stated in the treaty that the contracting Powers recognize the value of the firman, but state that it cannot give them the right to interfere, in any case, in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects. When I read that article, I thought, like my noble Friend, that it would place Turkey in a position very different from that which she has hitherto occupied. I know that the

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Governments of this country have, for many years, been in the habit of interfering with respect to the treatment of the Christian subjects of Turkey; I know that this very hatti-sheriff was not the voluntary act of the Sultan, and it is a farce to speak of it as if it were so. It was, in fact, a measure extorted by the Ambassadors of England and France, in consequence of the weakness and inability of the Sultan to resist demands so pressed upon him; but when I saw the statement in the treaty that the firman gave the contracting Powers no right of interference on matters concerning the internal Government of the Sultan, I thought that Turkey had made a great step in advance, and had obtained an independence which she never before possessed. The explanation which has been given, however, completely destroys that idea, for we are told it is distinctly understood that the Article does not limit the right of diplomatic interference, and what other interference could there be? We are, then, in this situation:—Turkey has passed certain laws with regard to her Christian subjects, and if any abuse of these laws takes place we are to bring diplomatic pressure to bear upon the Sultan. Now, what will be the consequence? The hatti-sheriff has been panegyrized in very glowing terms, and noble Lords on both sides of the House have expressed a high opinion of its extreme importance; but if the enforcement of the firman is left to Turkey, it is not worth the paper upon which it is written. The regulations of the hatti-sheriff are directly opposed to the religion of the Koran, and in such cities as Bagdad or Damascus, where there is a bigoted and numerous Mussulman population and a small Christian population, do you think it is possible that the Pashas or Turkish authorities can attempt to place Christians upon an equal footing with Mussulmans? I have been told, indeed, that when the hatti-sheriff arrived at Bagdad the Pasha took to his bed in sheer despair at the impossibility of carrying out a law which he had no means of enforcing. The Christians themselves are alarmed at any attempt to enforce such laws, because they know that if a Government so weak as that of Turkey endeavoured to put laws of this description in force in distant provinces, the passions of the bigoted Mussulman population would be so strongly excited against the Christians, that they would probably suffer far more from direct
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violence than they had done from the operation of the old Turkish laws. I am persuaded that the whole system of hatti-sheriffs is an attempt to accomplish an impracticable object, for you cannot make people like the Christian and Mahomedan subjects of Turkey live together amicably by such means. It is admitted, I believe, that this law will be entirely nugatory unless it is supported by diplomatic interference. The result will be, then, that every Pasha will find, in carrying on the ordinary government of his province, that the consuls of European nations are viceroys over him. Every act of the Pashas will be reported to the Ambassadors at Constantinople, and they will be in constant dread of being recalled. Every man who has, or fancies he has, a grievance, and every personal enemy of a Pasha, will apply to the consuls. The English and French consuls may probably take different views of the same case, and the result will be to produce throughout the provinces of Turkey a state of absolute anarchy. I know that it is very shocking to contemplate the misery and evils that would prevail in Turkey without European interference; but, with the full knowledge of those abuses, I say deliberately that I am persuaded you do more harm than good by these attempts at interference. Anarchy is worse than tyranny, and nothing but anarchy can result from an attempt to divide authority between the diplomatic agents of foreign Powers and the native officials. I think the importance of this subject is not duly appreciated. We call upon Turkey to admit her Christian subjects to an equality of rights and privileges with her Mahomedan subjects. Now, is it possible for any Government to rule with mildness and equality subjects whose affections it does not possess, who regard it with feelings of bitter hostility, and who look forward with anxiety to the time when they may be able to contribute to its overthrow? Are not these the feelings of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and were they not manifested during the late war? Was it not solely by the intervention of the British and the French that an insurrection in the European dominions of Turkey was prevented from becoming general, and probably successful? It is impossible, after 400 years of the most galling tyranny, that any other than the most hostile feeling towards their oppressors can exist in the minds of the Christian population of Turkey; and therefore,

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I say, that to ask the Government of the Porto to admit this portion of its subjects to an equality of rights and privileges with the Mahomedans is to make a demand upon it which it is not in its power effectually to concede; and it is vain to imagine that the system you seek to establish can ever practically work. This was one of my main objections to the original policy of the war—objections only the more confirmed by all that has since occurred. The contest, undertaken ostensibly to uphold the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, has, in my opinion, tended greatly to accelerate that inevitable and rapidly approaching issue—the dismemberment and dissolution of Turkey as a Mahomedan State. Entertaining that conviction, I extremely regret the Additional Treaty laid on the table on Friday last, the assent to which is an act of the greatest imprudence, binding this country, as it does, without any limitation of time or restriction as to circumstances, to prop up and sustain a crumbling and doomed empire, a burden which no strength can bear. In conclusion, I cordially concur in thanking the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) for the manner in which he has fulfilled the pledge that he gave to this House before he undertook his mission to Paris; for I believe that we owe him a debt of gratitude for having powerfully contributed to the termination of the calamities of war.
The DUKE OF ARGYLLadmitted that the clause of the treaty relating to the hatti-sheriff promulgated by the Porte by no means solved the difficulties inseparable from the rule of a Mahomedan Government over a Christian population; but wholly dissented from the opinion of the noble Earl who preceded him, that that stipulation added to the dangers inherent to such a state of affairs. On the contrary, he thought it would diminish them. The hatti-sheriff of the Sultan contained a detailed enumeration of the various rights and privileges to be enjoyed by his Christian subjects, guaranteeing their continuance for the future; but it as distinctly declared that the issue of that instrument did not authorise any other Power to interfere with the internal administration of his dominions. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) forgot the danger against which we were guarding. We never objected to the bonâ fide interposition of Russia to protect the Greek Christian in the interest of religious toleration, but we conceived that that plea had been used by Russia as a pretext for
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usurping a practical right of interference with the internal government of the Ottoman Porte. He was glad to have the approval of the noble Earl to the resolution come to by Her Majesty's Government to give up the maritime doctrine so long maintained by this country, and to sanction the principle that henceforth all property, save contraband of war, should be protected by neutral bottoms. The Government were not fairly open to the censure of having taken this step in an illegitimate or unconstitutional manner.
LORD CAMPBELLsaid he could not forbear to express his deliberate opinion that the new convention respecting maritime rights had been agreed to in a strictly constitutional form. There could be no doubt that the prerogative of the Crown extended to the adoption of such a stipulation without the previous consent of Parliament. Such had hitherto been the practice of the constitution, and such he hoped it would ever remain. Unquestionably it was the law of nations that neutral bottoms did not make neutral goods, and that belligerents had the right of seizure; but this was a right which could not now be enforced, and he exceedingly rejoiced at the change that had taken place, which would confer an inestimable blessing on the civilized world.
On Question, that the Words proposed to be left out stand Part of the Motion, it was Resolved in the Affirmative: Then the said Address was agreed to; and a Committee was appointed to prepare the Address: The Committee withdrew; and, after some Time, Report was made of an Address drawn by them, which, being read, was agreed to; and Ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,
"WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to return Your Majesty our sincere Acknowledgments and Thanks for the important Communication which Your Majesty has been graciously pleased to make to this House, of the General Treaty concluded at Paris on the Thirtieth of March, between Your Majesty, The Emperor of Austria, The Emperor of the French, The King of Prussia, The Emperor of Russia The King of Sardinia, and The Sultan,

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by which Peace has been re-established between Your Majesty, The Emperor of the French, The King of Sardinia, and The Sultan, on the one hand, and The Emperor of Russia on the other.
"WE humbly assure Your Majesty, that, while we should have deemed it our Duty cheerfully to afford Your Majesty our firm Support if it had unfortunately been found necessary to continue the War, we have learnt with Joy and Satisfaction that Your Majesty has been enabled to re-establish Peace on Conditions honourable to Your Majesty's Crown, and which fully accomplish the great Objects for which the War was undertaken.
"WE beg leave to express to Your Majesty the great Satisfaction which we feel at finding, that while those Alliances which have so mainly contributed to the vigorous and successful Prosecution of the War have been equally effective in the Consolidation of Peace, Powers which have not taken an active part in the War have combined with the Belligerents to give additional Firmness to the Arrangements by which the Repose of Europe is in future to be protected from Disturbance.
"WE beg leave to state to Your Majesty that we rejoice, that, notwithstanding the great Exertions which the late War has rendered necessary, the Resources of the Empire remain unimpaired.
"WE humbly express our Hope, that the Peace which has now been concluded may, under the Favour of Divine Providence, long continue to shed its Blessings over Europe, and that Harmony among Governments, and friendly Intercourse among Nations, may steadily promote the progress of Civilisation, and secure the Welfare and Happiness of Mankind."
House adjourned till To-morrow.