Sitting of 25 May 1855

MINUTES.
NEW WRIT, For Bath, v. Thomas Phinn, esq., Chiltern Hundreds.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Limited Liability; Partnership Amendment.
Reported—Court of Session (Scotland).
3° Personal Estates of Intestates; Militia (No. 2).

THE PARIS EXHIBITION—QUESTION.
MR. THOMSON HANKEYasked the Secretary of the Treasury whether any arrangements will be made for the purpose of facilitating the obtaining of passports to Paris during the Exhibition?
MR. WILSONsaid, the question of passports to Paris during the Exhibition, had been brought under the notice of the Treasury by the Foreign Office some few weeks ago, and an arrangement had been made whereby passports would be issued free to workmen and artisans of the United Kingdom, for the purpose of visiting Paris, and which would be good for one month from the time of their being issued. Arrangements had also been made for the purpose of enabling workmen to apply to the Foreign Office for their passports, and he believed they would require to have the recommendation of the mayors of the towns in which they lived, or, if they resided in London, the recommendation of the Lord Mayor or the Metropolitan Commissioner of Police. In country places, where there was no mayor, that authority would require to be given by the Superintendent Registrar of each district in England and Wales.

MR. PHINN'S APPOINTMENT AT THE ADMIRALTY.
SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEinquired whether it was true that Mr. Phinn, the Member for Bath, had been appointed to the office of Assistant Secretary to the Board of Admiralty?
MR. WILSONsaid, he believed so.
SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEthen moved, that a writ be issued for the election of a burgess to serve in Parliament for the City of Bath in the room of Mr. Phinn,
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who had accepted an office under the Crown.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, the office Mr. Phinn had accepted was not an office under the Crown, but under the Admiralty, and his acceptance did not, therefore, necessarily vacate his seat. He believed, however, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had already taken steps for that purpose.
SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEasked if the right hon. Gentleman meant to say that Mr. Phinn had applied for the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, Mr. Phinn had applied for the office in question, and a grant had been made, but he could not say whether it had gone through all the official forms. There could be no doubt, however, that the office would be conferred upon Mr. Phinn, in order to allow him to vacate his seat.
SIR CHARLES WOODstated that, in appointing Mr. Phinn to the office of Assistant Secretary to the Board of Admiralty, he told him that, as the person holding the post did not change with the Government, he must not again appear in his place in Parliament. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, therefore, need not be under any apprehension of Mr. Phinn recording his vote that evening.
SIR FREDERIC THESIGERbelieved that the hon. Baronet in making this Motion was actuated, not by a desire of preventing the hon. and learned Member for Bath attending in his place to-night and recording his vote, but because he believed that the hon. and learned Member had really vacated his seat. ["No."] He admitted that it was wrong to suppose that the acceptance of the office of Assistant Secretary to the Board of Admiralty necessarily implied that Mr. Phinn could no longer hold his seat; but they had now learned from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Mr. Phinn had accepted an office—the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds—for the express purpose of enabling him to vacate his seat, although the right hon. Gentleman was not certain whether the grant had been finally completed or not. Now, he apprehended that it was not the making out the grant, but the acceptance of the office, which vacated the seat; and that, therefore, the hon. Baronet the Member for Petersfield was perfectly in order in the Motion he had made.
SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, he had had some experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and would therefore state that the mode of dealing with the Chiltern Hundreds was this:—If a person wished to vacate his seat in Parliament, he applied to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, and it was in the discretion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give the office or not as he pleased. If the application was to be granted, the practice was for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to write a letter to the applicant, stating that he had conferred upon him the office in question—and it was the receipt of that letter that constituted the acceptance of the office. He could not say whether that form had been gone through in the present instance or not.
SIR FITZROY KELLYconsidered that it was entirely immaterial whether all the official forms had been gone through, or whether the patent or grant had been formally completed. According to law, and the invariable usage of that House, whenever an office was granted under the Crown, and the person had intimated his acceptance of it, from that moment his seat was vacant, and a writ was moved for as soon as possible. Such appeared to him to be the position of the present case.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid that having held the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, he might be allowed to make a few remarks upon the point before the House. There could be no doubt that if a man applied for an office, and the office was given to him, or if a man was offered an office, and he accepted it, it was not necessary that he should go through all the official forms in order to vacate his seat. But there must be two parties to every transaction of this kind; there must be an application on the one side, and a conferring of the office on the other; and it was no proof that Mr. Phinn had vacated his seat to say that he had applied for the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, and would probably get it. They must wait until they had evidence before them that the office had been conferred upon him, and that he had accepted it.
SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFE SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFE rose to explain. It was only within the last few minutes that he had learned that Mr. Phinn had accepted an office under the Board of Admiralty. When the fact was mentioned to him he thought it would be a pity to have the writ suspended over the holidays,
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and hence the motion he had submitted to the House. Seeing, then, that Mr. Phinn had applied for the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, he hoped there would be no objection to his proposition.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he would state exactly what had occurred. He received that morning an application from Mr. Phinn for the office of the Chiltern Hundreds in order to enable him to vacate his seat in consequence of his appointment as Assistant Secretary to the Board of Admiralty. The grant of an office under the Crown was brought to him for signature, and he signed it that morning; but he could not say whether the grant had already reached Mr. Phinn, and therefore could not answer to the House for its actual acceptance. He knew, however, that directions had been given for its transmission to Mr. Phinn, and he believed it was the intention of the Secretary to the Treasury to move a writ before the House rose.
MR. DISRAELIsaid, his experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer was not so long as he could have wished, but he had the opportunity upon several occasions of conferring offices under the Crown, and he thought it ought to be understood that when an application was made and granted the office had been accepted.
SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEsaid, he withdrew his motion, as his object would be attained by having the writ moved for before the holidays.

CADETSHIPS—QUESTION.
MR. H. A. BRUCEasked the Clerk of the Ordnance whether the cadetships to be granted in July were to be disposed of by nomination, or whether any system will be adopted by which they will be rendered attainable by young men of ability, unaided by interest?
MR. MONSELLsaid that the system which had prevailed for many years at Woolwich with regard to the appointment of cadets had been excusively that of nomination. Within the last few days, however, upon the reconsideration of the civil departments of the army, he directed the attention of the Secretary for War, in the first place, to the necessity of appointing a considerable number of additional cadets at Woolwich; and, in the next place, the expediency of altering the system by which they had hitherto been selected. It was utterly impossible, the want being so urgent, to make any permanent arrangement

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for the appointment of cadets, but a plan had been adopted which, at all events, was a considerable improvement on the old system. The Secretary for War was about to address a letter to the heads of all the chief educational establishments in England, Ireland, and Scotland, requesting them to nominate a certain number of young gentlemen who were anxious to enter the royal artillery or engineers, and willing to undergo an examination at Woolwich for that purpose. From the number thus nominated the Secretary for War would select from 100 to 120 of the best qualified, and these again would be reduced to thirty-five, by a public examination held at Woolwich. That examination would not be special or professional, but would be directed generally to ascertain the capacity and attainments of the young men; and he thought that in that way they would procure a large number of well educated and efficient officers for Her Majesty's service.

THE CRIMEAN MEDALS—QUESTION.
MR. A. STAFFORDasked what arrangements had been made for forwarding the Crimean medals to those wounded and invalided soldiers who were now at home with their friends on leave of absence?
MR. FREDERICK PEELsaid, that 2,000 medals were now in the hands of Messrs. Hunt and Roskell, to be delivered immediately to those soldiers at present in England on leave of absence from the Crimea, who had not been able to be present at the ceremony of the 18th instant. Those soldiers who had received medals on that day without clasps would immediately be furnished with certificates, by the production of which they would be able to obtain the clasps to which they were entitled. He might also take this opportunity of mentioning that arrangements had been made for forwarding to the Crimea 8,000 medals fortnightly for distribution there.
MR. A. STAFFORD: But how are the soldiers at present at home with their friends to get these medals?
MR. FREDERICK PEEL: Hunt and Roskell have received orders to forward them to their homes.

THE BURMESE MEDALS—QUESTION.
MR. ESMONDEasked whether the Burmese medals had yet been forwarded for distribution to the troops entitled to them?
MR. VERNON SMITHsaid, that 2,289
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of the Burmese medals had been sent to India on the 4th of April for distribution, and the rest were in a state of preparation.

THE GOVERNOR OF GIBRALTAR—QUES- TION.
MR. BRIGHT MR. BRIGHT rose to put a question to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, in the absence of the Secretary for the Colonies, with respect to the Governor of Gibraltar. During the last eighteen months he had had to present some half-dozen memorials to the successive Ministers for the Colonies, complaining of the conduct of the Governor of Gibraltar with regard to his interference with the trade of the port. The Duke of Newcastle, in an interview with a deputation which waited upon him from Gibraltar, gave them reason to expect that Sir R. Gardiner's term of office would then almost immediately expire, and his successors had intimated the same thing; but Sir R. Gardiner still remained there, and he (Mr. Bright) had received fresh memorials to present with regard to fresh grievances. He wished, therefore, to ask the noble Lord whether anything had been done to recall Sir R. Gardiner, and to appoint a rational man in his place?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONthought the language just made use of by the hon. Member was not quite the language to be applied to an old and deserving public servant. It might be all very well for hon. Members to use such epithets one to another in the course of debate, but he was sure the hon. Gentleman's good feeling must tell him that it was not the way in which to speak of an absent public servant. Sir R. Gardiner's period of service had expired, and he was only going on performing the duties of his office until his successor was appointed. The hon. Gentleman had no doubt referred to the complaints which were made of Sir R. Gardiner's refusal to permit the exportation of certain things which were considered to be articles of war, consisting of iron tubes, he believed, for the boilers of steam-vessels, and which had been imported into Gibraltar without his knowledge, contrary to a regulation which required that the permission of the Governor should be obtained in all such cases. The instructions which Sir R. Gardiner received from home were to grant permission for exportation in this instance, but for the future not to allow the standing regulations to be departed from.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, the case referred to was only one of many cases which he had had to represent to the Colonial Office. As the noble Lord had entered into the circumstances of this case, he thought, in fairness to the commercial house concerned, he had a right to state that, not only had the Governor done what the noble Lord stated, but he afterwards gave to another mercantile house that permission which he refused to the first.

CONFERENCES OF VIENNA—QUESTION.
MR. ROEBUCK: There is a report abroad of the Conferences of Vienna having been renewed. I wish to ask the noble Lord whether the Government have received any information about such renewal?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: There has been no conference held since the last recorded in the papers now before the House. Before any further conferences are held Her Majesty's Ministers at Vienna must receive authority from Her Majesty's Government to attend such conference.
MR. MILNER GIBSON: I wish to ask a question of Her Majesty's Government, for the noble Lord's answer to the question of the hon. Member for Sheffield is not quite understood. The noble Lord stated a few days since that the conferences were not finally concluded, but only suspended, and that Lord Westmorland retained full power to receive proposals. I wish, therefore, to know from the noble Lord whether those powers have been withdrawn, and, if so, at what period they were so withdrawn?
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: The powers have not been withdrawn; but it is one thing to possess powers and another to exercise them in cases not foreseen by Her Majesty's Government.

PROSECUTION OF THE WAR— ADJOURNED DEBATE (SECOND NIGHT).
Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to be made to Question [24th May]—
"That this House cannot adjourn for the Recess without expressing its dissatisfaction with the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the great question of Peace or War; and that, under these circumstances, this House feels it a duty to declare, that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the War, until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with Her Allies, obtain for this Country a safe and honourable Peace."
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And which Amendment was, to leave out from the first word "House" to the word "feels," in line 6, in order to insert the words, "having seen with regret that the Conferences of Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities," instead thereof.
Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
Debate resumed.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, that he rose to support the Resolution moved by his right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire. The best justification of the notice given by his right hon. Friend was afforded by the discussion which occurred last night. But for that notice they would never have heard the profound views of the noble Lord the Member for London, nor the able speech of the right hon. Member for the University, which would have resembled the celebrated oration for Milo that Cicero carefully elaborated, but never delivered. But for that notice the hon. Baronet the Member for Oxford University could not have expressed the hopes which he still cherished of the successful termination of negotiations which did not exist; neither would the hon. Member for Kidderminster have had the opportunity of framing his magnanimous Amendment, which it was to be hoped he would push to a magnanimous conclusion. Hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House were displeased with what took place on Monday night, and, if the First Minister of the Crown was a party to what then transpired, the House of Commons would fail in its duty to the public did it not unequivocally express its indignation at such a proceeding. When a Resolution of great importance—involving the momentous question of peace or war—was laid on the table, and hon. Gentlemen came down at considerable personal inconvenience to conduct its solemn discussion, that House would sink rapidly in the public estimation if it allowed such a matter to be got rid of on the flimsiest pretexts, and the country would justly consider that the House preferred a sham to a reality. They had had the advantage of listening to the noble Lord the Member for London, and the right hon. Member for the University—each of whom expounded his views with great ability, but with the most marked contrariety. Indeed, any impartial hearer of those two eminent men must have been struck with the proofs of inconsistency of opinion and uncertainty of conduct, not

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upon a minor subject, but upon the weightiest matters that could occupy the minds of statesmen, which were exhibited in their speeches. And one could not help asking himself, when he listened to the strange evidences of discrepancy between them, "Did these two Gentlemen sit so lately in the same Cabinet? Did they meet and deliberate together on the awful questions of peace and war, and on the negotiations which might affect the one or the other? Did they guide the destinies of the nation at a moment when it was above all things indispensable that a united and powerful combination of statesmen, acting on a common principle, should direct the energies of this country in a manner correspondent with its duties and obligations as a first-rate Power?" A Ministry whose individual opinions in such a crisis were diametrically opposed, contradictory, and discordant, could not fail to bring about the signal misfortunes which had recently befallen our country. Let the House not be fascinated by the eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman, or misled by the high authority of the noble Lord, but attentively examine the substance and tenour of their arguments. The noble Lord's views appeared to be bent on war, but the right hon. Gentleman's thoughts were turned on peace. The right hon. Gentleman said, the terms conceded by Russia would give us a safe and durable peace; while the noble Lord—the negotiator in person—maintained that those terms would give us a mockery. According to the right hon. Gentleman, a treaty with Russia might be sufficient; according to the noble Lord, we ought to have substantial guarantees. The revision of the treaty of 1841, said the right hon. Gentleman, would be of much value in the settlement of this vital question. That revision would amount to nothing, said the noble Lord, because (he added very truly) without any fresh treaty the Sultan might cry out for help when assailed. The right hon. Gentleman held that, should we accept the terms proposed, England would have been successful in the result of the struggle in which her blood had been profusely shed and her treasure lavished. The noble Lord, with a little more patriotism and truth, maintained that, if we acceded to those terms, we should be confessing in the eyes of the world that we and our chivalrous ally, France, had been defeated. The right hon. Gentleman said that by the adoption of the terms proposed the safety
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of Turkey would be secured, and the noble Lord that the danger to Turkey would be thereby increased. The right hon. Gentleman insisted that England and France would have gained their end, and established a European peace; the noble Lord insisted that the preponderance of Russia would be greatly augmented, not only over Turkey, but over Europe. Such were the discordant opinions, on a grave question, of two able and thoughtful men, who expected from the Parliament of England an unanimous conclusion upon their conjoint counsels. Thus, then, the argument, in its general bearings, stood between the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman. But in a more advanced portion of his speech the noble Lord let fall an important sentence; and when he expressed his belief as to a matter of fact, the noble Lord, from his position in this country, was entitled to implicit respect. The noble Lord said, "As to the negotiations with which I was charged at Vienna, let me say, in the first place, that, although I thought success in that negotiation came within the range of possibility, I felt at no time sanguine that it was probable." Consider for a moment that important avowal of the noble Lord in connection with all that had been heretofore absurdly stated as to the danger of disturbing pending negotiations—a point, however, which, thanks to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield's question, bad been set at rest that night. The chief negotiator, in fact, described himself as the leader of the forlorn hope in diplomacy; he went to Vienna, according to his own confession, dispirited, and returned from it defeated. He expected nothing, and the result exactly tallied with his anticipations. And yet some hon. Members of that House said they would not vote for this Motion, because it might interfere with the prospect of a happy issue to negotiations, which, according to the noble Lord's frank admission, never had a real beginning! Now, his right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) proposed that they should take the direct, the honest, and also the English course of asserting, that the language of the Ministry being equivocal and its conduct uncertain, they had no alternative but to address the Crown, stating that, because negotiations were impossible, or, if possible, were improbable, because they were futile and abortive, therefore nothing remained for the Members of that House, as men of honour and of spirit, but to declare their

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determination to carry on the war with energy and vigour, until it resulted in an honourable and lasting peace. But the noble Lord has destroyed politically his colleague beside him by the statement he made, that he never expected or believed that the negotiations would end in anything satisfactory or useful. The noble Lord had also returned to this country acting under that belief, for in a subsequent passage of his speech he said that he left Vienna more firmly convinced of the intention of Russia to assail Turkey than when he went there. He (Mr. Whiteside) could quite understand the noble Lord's entertaining that opinion; but if so, what did the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) mean by his answer to the question put by the right hon. Member for Wiltshire and the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire—what was the meaning of his answer? Did it not prove that his language was uncertain and his political conduct equivocal, when they had it from the lips of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), one who had never willingly erred in a matter of truth, that he believed the negotiations would be futile and abortive; and that though he went, as in duty bound to the Crown and to the Ministry to which he had given the weight of his name, influence, and authority, yet he did not believe that he would effect anything by those negotiations, and that he left Vienna neither surprised nor disappointed; and having communicated the result to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, he, when the House came to discuss the question raised by the right hon. Member for Manchester, made a statement that negotiations might be going on—that there was a chance, a possibility, of negotiations being successful? He (Mr. Whiteside) considered that there was no such possibility, and believed that they might freely and frankly discuss the question on the belief that there was not. With respect to the remarks made by the noble Lord on the Four Points, he must be permitted to observe that whenever any body of gentlemen attempted to come to a decision on the third point, the discussion of it was sure to create confusion; and he thought that those who sent the noble Lord to Vienna embarrassed with that third point were more to be censured than the noble Lord himself. He had made the best of a very bad case, but the noble Lord in the progress of the negotiations made an admission with respect to the necessity of
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preserving the honour of Russia which the crafty special pleader employed against him turned to his disadvantage at the very next meeting, for he told the noble Lord that he had made an admission previously which stopped him from making the demands which he subsequently put forward. What was the reason of his (Mr. Whiteside's) right hon. Friend saying what he had as to the propriety of the conference commencing with this third point? The right hon. Member for the University of Oxford had dwelt at great length on the vast concessions proposed to be made by Russia, but the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire had said that this was scarcely a question deserving of formal investigation, and that the conference might have begun with the third point. Why had he said this? Now came the authority of the Prime Minister, who about a year and a half ago, in answer to the hon. Member for Liverpool, gave an admirable exposition of the then existing treaties, by which Russia was bound to have the navigation of the Danube kept clear and open—a pleasanter speech the noble Lord had never made—and that was no inconsiderable commendation. He said that he had made many representations to Russia, and that it had never for a moment disputed its obligation to keep the navigation of the Danube free, and that he trusted that Russia would break through the trammels which had impeded its proper action; and he had also pleasantly insinuated that he did not believe in the value of the treaties, that Russia had always broken them, and would do so until the end of the chapter. But when they had been so assured that Russia was bound by friendly treaties to preserve the free navigation of the Danube, and that not to do so was an insult to the public law of Europe, was this proposed and pretended concession a point which required to be dwelt upon at any great length? There was an observation made by the noble Lord, in which he had fallen into a slight mistake. He insisted that the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, in reading an extract from a former despatch of the noble Lord with reference to the protectorate claimed by Russia, was not correct, because the noble Lord said that he only had referred to the protectorate over the Principalities, and that the right hon. Member had confounded with this the general protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. With

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deference to the noble Lord the Member for London, he (Mr. Whiteside) considered that the argument used by his right hon. Friend was clear and satisfactory, and was founded on treaties, on the language of the despatch of the noble Lord, and on the admitted facts of the case. The noble Lord then proceeded to a more important subject, and gave them a sketch—and a truthful one—of the encroaching and insatiable ambition of Russia, ending in her attainment of colossal power. He showed—as it seemed his object was boldly and manfully to prove—that Russia was as corrupt as she was ambitious, and that where she could not obtain territorial power, filch provinces, or plunder kingdoms, she corrupted officials, and endeavoured to stir up the feelings of subjects against their Sovereigns, and to establish an interest in every country which she might afterwards turn to her advantage. All this the noble Lord had boldly and frankly told them, and he (Mr. Whiteside) trusted that his description would be placed in the Chancellery of Russia, if they desired to lodge there a sketch of her policy, and he hoped that if Count Nesselrode wanted a text for another elaborate political essay he would take the noble Lord's sketch for his text, and answer it truthfully if he could. But when the noble Lord finished this remarkable description of Russia, he (Mr. Whiteside) asked himself: What is all this done for—what is its object? for he thought it the most terrible description of an existing European Power which had ever yet been given by any Member on either side of the House. If this Power was such as the noble Lord had described, would it be bound by any treaties? And if its object was to establish its supremacy by such means as the noble Lord had delineated, did they want any other argument in favour of the Motion of his right hon. Friend? Was not the bold statement made by the noble Lord the best corroboration of the argument that it was necessary that some Member should come forward with such a motion and declare their intention to carry on a just war against a Power so ambitious and so colossal? The noble Lord, having laid down his premises, drew his conclusion. A fearful Power in Europe, becoming greater and greater every day, was to be repressed, and what was the statesman's remedy for the prodigious evil to be dealt with? Why, it was best described by the mountain and the mouse. What was the remedy
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recommended by the political physician? Why, nothing in particular. He had listened to the noble Lord with attention, and when the noble Lord sat down he was as wise as when he commenced in reference to the policy of the Government with regard to Russia. He had been fired by the noble Lord's speech, which clearly proved the necessity of abating the monstrous evil he had described. But what measure did the noble Lord suggest for that purpose? All he could find out was that the noble Lord did say when he was in Vienna that something must be done—a very safe opinion to propound. What that something should be was the practical question; but the only suggestion he could find with respect to the abatement of Russian preponderance was this: The noble Lord said it was the opinion of some eminent men that the Emperors of Russia make a great mistake in attending to their marine; their ships will not fight, their naval power is next to nothing, and therefore, as the colossal power of Russia must be dealt with, reduce the number of their worthless ships. He found no other suggestion, and then the noble Lord told the Opposition they were inconsistent because they were in favour of reducing the power of Russia, and when he showed them how it might be diminished they would not agree with him. The political sagacity of the noble Lord and his colleagues was exhausted when they had framed the great project of reducing the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea. Could anything be more pigmy than the remedy which had been proposed for a colossal evil? The inconsistency charged against the Opposition was this. The noble Lord said, "Why do you not tell us what we are to do?" Well, they would do so if the Government would change places with them. The noble Lord said, "I have exhausted my stock; have you nothing to propose?" But was it ever the duty of an Opposition to do more than criticise the proceedings of the Government? It was certainly difficult to criticise the proceedings of diplomatists, but then they were not ordinary mortals. He wanted to know from the noble Lord, who was an adroit and expert party leader, when it had ever been the duty of an Opposition to perform the duties of Her Majesty's Administration. They might ask the noble Lord, as a Plenipotentiary, whether he had nothing more to say for himself. The noble Lord had never told them what was to be the

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policy of the Government. He forgot that cardinal point of the whole question, and he (Mr. Whiteside) appealed to the hon. Gentlemen opposite, who were going to vote against the Resolution of his right hon. Friend, to say whether the noble Lord, in his argument on behalf of this ricketty Administration, had satisfactorily explained to them what was the policy of which they were going to approve. The charge against the Ministry was that their conduct had been evasive and unsatisfactory, and their language equivocal. In answer to that accusation had the noble Lord satisfactorily explained what was the meaning of the noble Lord the Premier? He had not, for the best reason in the world—he did not know what the Premier meant; and he ventured to say that the Premier did not know himself what he meant, if he might judge from the little speech he had made the other night. The noble Lord at the head of the Government then said—
"Austria is charged by her own voluntary assumption, with the consent of course of the allies, with the task of endeavouring to discover the means of bringing about an accommodation between the contending parties."
Here we have a summons from the political Atlas of the day. He did not object merely to the wording of the speech, but to the fact that a Prime Minister had nothing more to say upon the great question of peace or war, than that a Power like Austria was charged with the task of endeavouring to find out some means of settling the contest which Her Majesty's Ministers had been unable to discover. Austria was to find out for them a means of solving this great difficulty. There was a statesman of this country still living who had written most ably upon the laws and constitutions of the European States, and these were the words which that statesman (Lord Brougham) had uttered fifteen or eighteen months ago with regard to Austria:—
"His apprehensions, he confessed, were for the period when he should hear that a movement had been made by the enemy for quitting the Principalities and to return to his own territory. He could not help fearing that there would arise embarrassments to us and to our ally, France; that great embarrassment of Russia having probably made some concession to Austria, and Austria then calling on us to enter into negotiations—of that he had more dread than of the war itself—because, if we were drawn into negotiations, the long series of diplomatic acts and protocols might be continued, with all the resources of Russian diplomacy, dragging us perhaps through the whole
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summer and autumn to the time when the Black Sea and the Baltic would be in very different circumstances from those in which they happily now were. He trusted that the opinion expressed the other night, and now repeated by the noble Earl, that the Western Powers were not committed by anything which had been done at Vienna or Berlin, would be shared by our great, magnanimous, and most honourable ally, France. He had no distrust of Austria—he should say nothing of Prussia; he had perfect confidence in the wisdom and sag councils of the advisers of the Emperor of Austria, and in the character of the young Emperor himself; but certainly a proposition was supposed to have been made by Austria to the Czar which, if it were to lead to negotiations, it would be for the Western Powers to say whether they should bear a part in them or not, and if they were to bear a part in them, he trusted that a certain time—and that not a very long time—would be fixed, within which those negotiations must terminate or cease, and then the war be prosecuted with energy as before."—[3 Hansard, cxxxiv. 670.]
It was thus pointed out by Lord Brougham, that one of the most unfortunate things a Minister could do was to embark in perilous diplomacy under Austrian influences, and yet this was what the Government had done. They had charged our ally "to a certain extent"—who agreed with us in "moral sentiment," which was certainly a most important consideration—with a task of finding out something they could not find out, and then the noble Lord coolly asked the House why it should venture to proceed to discuss questions touching the pending negotiations. Why, the House ought to have voted the noble Lord out of office after that speech. The noble Lord the Member for London said, the shipping of Russia was the thing to be cut down; but what was the answer of Russia to that proposition at the close of the conference? The argument of the Government was, that the preponderating power of Russia in the Black Sea was to be diminished by the reduction of her fleet, but if she said she would not reduce it they had nothing more to say. Prince Gortchakoff stated, that a security against Russian preponderance would be gained by the exercise of the power of the Sultan to call foreign fleets to his assistance, that this would be a solid guarantee for the independence of Turkey, and that the existence of a formidable Russian fleet in the Black Sea was a condition essential to the balance of power in Europe and to the independence of the Sultan and the Porte. This was the result of the negotiations. The Russian diplomatists said the whole matter had been mistaken, as their object was to maintain the independence of the Sultan.

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He would do the noble Lord the justice to say, that he thought he understood Prince Gortchakoff, although Prince Gortchakoff was too many for him. Russia was told, "If you reduce your fleet in the Black Sea, all will be well." The reply of Prince Gortchakoff was, "It is necessary to have a formidable fleet." Formidable to whom? Let the massacre of Sinope answer. Formidable to what? To the unfortunate Power they were pretending to protect. The Russian Ambassador said, "I will not give up the rights of sovereignty or the honour of my master; and what touches more nearly honour and sovereignty than the strength of an army or the number of ships in a fleet? You therefore ask me to consent that the Emperor of Russia shall make a bargain with you to reduce his fleet. My answer is, that Russia will keep a fleet and a formidable fleet." But there was balm in Gilead and hope for Turkey. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) had this peculiarity, that he saw what no other man could see, and that which might be visionary to common eyes in his assumed substance, shape, and form. There was the security of the electric telegraph, concerning which the Russian Plenipotentiary said, that if the Russian fleet did sail out upon Constantinople, Turkey had the wires, and before the Russians could despoil them, Turkey could inform her friends the Western Powers, and they would thus be enabled to bear down to the rescue. Well, if that did not satisfy the noble Lord, a more obstinate diplomatist never existed. The Russian Plenipotentiary seemed to have read our books of law, for he said on one occasion—"Oh! but you allowed that to Austria in a particular case, and reciprocity is equity." It must be admitted that more ability than that displayed by the Russian Plenipotentiary it was impossible to find, and he must do him the justice to say, that from beginning to end he offered nothing. Why did he offer nothing? He thought he found the reason yesterday in the instructive despatch of Count Nesselrode, and this seemed to him to be the solution of the Russian diplomacy:—
"Doubtless, according to the calculations of the Cabinets of London and Paris, the military operations in the Crimea, going hand in hand with diplomatic deliberations, were to influence the issue of the Vienna Conference. When they opened, the anticipation was not justified by events, and therefore the name of Sebastopol was never uttered. Russia is indebted for this silence to the heroic resistance of her brave generals,
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officers, sailors, and soldiers. Their noble devotion has been the most victorious means of negotiation."
If the English and French Plenipotentiaries could have used the same argument of military success, they might have better influenced the negotiation. The noble Lord at the conference instanced the cession of Dunkirk by Louis XIV. "Ah !" said the Russian Plenipotentiary, "but we have met with none of his disasters, and the case does not apply." If our arms had been conducted in a more efficient manner, the noble Lord might have been able to use the argument that victorious armies are the best negotiators. The debate of last night began in the hope of finding out something, but when the noble Lord sat down he had acquainted the House with nothing. Was there a hope of peace? The noble Lord did not know; and if he did not know how should the House know? It was impossible to find out what the Ministry meant. What, indeed, must be the unhappy condition of that Administration which, after due deliberation, after the expectation of a debate, with the protocols before them, had given to an expectant nation, listening through its representatives, no better account of its policy and no better idea of its plans than those given last night by the noble Lord, who, telling the House nothing which it required to know, yet called upon it to oppose the proposition of his right hon. Friend. The policy of the Government was so uncertain, and their conduct so ambiguous and equivocal, that the noble Lord could not venture to define, specify, and explain it; yet he called upon the House to proceed with them in the dark, and knowing not whither the Government might lead them. The right hon. Member (Mr. Gladstone) appeared to him to be now the chief of the Peace Party. He was at first, as might be expected, in some difficulty. It was a criticism of Lord Bacon on the speech of one of the ancients that it consisted from beginning to end of distinctions. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman seemed, in like manner, to him to be one of close and subtle distinctions; and what was he in such doubt and difficulty about? He said he could understand—and this was important testimony in its favour—the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) which others said was ambiguous, but he could not understand the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir F. Baring). The right hon.

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Gentleman said he could not quite comprehend the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster, but he was prepared to support the milk-and-water Amendment of his hon. colleague, and he cherished hopes of a successful result to negotiations which were begun to end in nothing, and did end in nothing. The right hon. Gentleman would vote for the peace Amendment of his colleague, because that was the widest of the mark of all the Motions before the House, and because there could be found the fewest people to believe in it in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Yet the right hon. Gentleman, with a political fidelity that did him honour, pinned his faith upon that Amendment and staked his character as a statesman on that all-important Amendment of his hon. colleague. The first part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a defence of the old Ministers, but their misconduct seemed to him to be not exactly the question before the House. The right hon. Gentleman was one of the few speakers of whom he could say that he always regretted when he sat down, but all that could be said of the first part of his speech last night was that he had made a dextrous and artful defence for that Ministry which the House had been obliged to condemn, but which it had not yet been able to punish. Common sense seemed to point out that those moderate terms which might have been considered sufficient before the event ought not be adopted after the war broke out. For himself, he avowed that he placed no dependence upon a treaty with Russia. He would very shortly say why, and the facts might be useful to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester. He placed no faith in Russian treaties because it was part of the history of Russia that she had never kept a treaty when it was her interest to break it. Russia had promised by treaty to respect the rights and feelings of the Tartar population, and had invoked God to aid her in the observance of the Crimean treaty. Allusion to the Divine power was always made by a tyrant, a hypocrite, or a bigot when about to lay the foundation for the commission of a great crime against his laws. He asked the right hon. Gentleman, did Russia keep that treaty? Did she falsely, perfidiously, and wickedly, when it suited her purpose, violate the treaty she had called Heaven to witness? Did she trample on the rights, and spoliate the territories of an unoffending people? She did. She
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committed that crime. What was the conduct of Russia afterwards? It was an instructive lesson which the hon. Member for Manchester had sadly misunderstood. Russia, in the reign of Catherine, made a favourable commercial treaty with England, and commercial men thought it would be beneficial to their pockets, and esteemed Russia accordingly. England got into trouble with her American colonies. Russia then formed a confederacy against England to reduce her maritime pretensions, to cut down the maritime law as practised and enforced by England, at the very moment when she believed England could not effectually resist. Russia encroached on Turkey, provoked Turkey to war in every way, combined with Austria, and formed a formidable confederacy to accomplish what was then her object. Russia was favoured by a section of the mercantile community in England, and he deeply regretted to say, for the sake of his fame, that party was headed by Charles James Fox and the Whigs. When Mr. Pitt wished to rescue Sweden from the Danish allies of Russia, and had laid the foundation of a powerful confederacy against Russia, Charles James Fox insisted, and it was a stain upon the political sagacity of that matchless orator and eminent man, that the maintenance of Turkey itself was of no use to Europe. Mr. Pitt said he would not condescend to argue with a man who thought it was of no consequence to England if Russia possessed Turkey; and Mr. Fox told Mr. Pitt he was insolent; they used plain speaking at that time to one another. Mr. Fox prevailed—clamour prevailed—the peace party prevailed; Mr. Pitt reasoned and argued that it was for the permanent advantage of England to maintain the confederacy he had formed for the purpose of controlling Russia and upholding the balance of power, but to no purpose; he was coerced to abandon that great object, the confederacy was broken up, and excellent reflections upon that unhappy event were made by Dr. Miller, who had published a book on the Philsosophy of History. What followed? The Empress Catherine received Mr. Adair, the friend of Charles James Fox, with unusual courtesy and kindness, thanked him for the services of his Whig patron, and placed the bust of that patron in her favourite retreat by the side of that of Voltaire. There might be a niche now vacant for the bust of a modern English statesman. Having done that the Empress Catherine,

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as the philosophical historian pointed out for our instruction, proceeded straightway to the partition of Poland. The second partition of Poland took place in 1793. The confederacy of the great Powers formed by Pitt against Russia was in 1791. That confederacy was broken up, and what said the writer to whom he had referred, and who was a very learned and accomplished man? He said:—"The late Lord Redesdale informed him that, when he called on Mr. Pitt a short time before his death, Mr. Pitt said there was one part of his political life which he lamented, and that was the having yielded to popular clamour and having given up the confederacy against Russia, which led to the perpetration of the blackest crime that stained the annals of Russia, namely, the partition of Poland." Such was the effect of a small party led by eminent men. And now they had as able, perhaps as influential a party, led by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford and the intellectual coterie to which he belonged, arguing that the alliance formed with chivalrous France should, perhaps, be put an end to, that Russia might recover her strength, recruit her armies, and finally accomplish that design, the partition of Turkey, which there was no doubt the Empress Catherine proposed to the Emperor Joseph of Germany. It should be remembered how that crime, the partition of Poland, was perpetrated. Russia saw Europe in confusion, and, having got rid of the confederacy formed by the wisdom of Mr. Pitt, there was no Power able to resist her. Perfidiously trampling on all treaties and all laws, she sent her emissaries to Poland to accomplish her object; they fomented disturbances, created confusion, seized on the country, and by that act of rapine and injustice sowed the seeds of confusion which had grown upon Europe from that hour to this. Such being the facts recorded upon the page of history, he placed no dependence in the faith of Russia, and Edmund Burke prophesied truly when he said, in allusion to the partition of Poland, "Europe will feel the effects of that dreadful crime for many, many years to come." They had had rebellions and revolutions; Vienna had been taken; Berlin had been taken; Russia had been invaded—he did not speak of this invasion, but of the former invasion—and all these things could be traced up to that Black crime, and were only fresh proofs of the moral
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government of God. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) confessed that, as regarded the present war, being then a Minister of the Crown, he felt himself coerced to go to war. Common sense pointed out that, if you ought to go to war, you ought not to have a peace unless you can prevent the necessity of going to war again. Otherwise the description given so powerfully of the horrors of war by the right hon. Gentleman told against himself, because the effect of an inglorious and insecure peace would be a repetition of those horrors. He wished to say a word with reference to the third of these Four Points. This was the hinge upon which the negotiation turned:—
"The revision of the treaty of July 13, 1841, must have for its object to connect the existence of the Ottoman empire more completely with the European equilibrium and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. As to the arrangements to be taken in this respect, they depend too directly on the events of the war for it to be possible at present to determine the basis; it is sufficient to point out the principle."
As well as he understood it, that amounted to saying they would negotiate on an arrangement which could not be pointed out by any of the parties, because it depended on the events of the war, and no one knew what those events would be; therefore they would begin a negotiation without being able to define any arrangement or to determine the basis of negotiation. After such an extraordinary diplomatic effort he congratulated the noble Lord upon having made so much of the negotiations as he did. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) separated the first part of that third point, and the second part, and a portion of another part, and said, everything was happily concluded save one small point, and that small point was only this,—how to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. He could not do justice to the classic language and the admirable delivery of the right hon. Gentleman, but after the vehement appeal of last night, what was the idea clearly left upon the mind but that everything was satisfactorily concluded save the only great question necessary to be determined? The right hon. Gentleman said it was a question of terms. The noble Lord, he said, "has his terms, and I too have mine." The noble Lord attempted to carry his and failed, his terms being to reduce the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea if

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we could only find the ships. He said we had tried to find them, but that many of them were sunk in the Black Sea, and the rest were worth nothing. The right hon. Gentleman told them that fleets could go to the Black Sea whenever they were sent for, and the noble Lord said it might happen that fleets would go there without being sent for. The right hon. Gentleman laboured to make the vision or phantom he had raised assume the appearance of reality. But what was that reality? It was a shadow that no man could grasp. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to argue that the Sultan, when attacked in his own territory by a hostile Power, could not, without an additional treaty, invite, by means of the electric telegraph, his friends the Western Powers to come to his assistance? The right hon. entleman's powers of imagination were far superior to his powers of argumentation. He spoke of something that would place matters in the East on a sound and stable basis; but what security did the right hon. Gentleman offer to the House for the realisation of his hopes? After listening to the right hon. Gentleman, he was reminded of a circumstance that not long ago occurred in Ireland. A gentleman, a friend of his, had been to a public meeting, where, he said, he heard a very fine speech. He asked him if he liked the speech? To which he replied in the negative. On his expressing some surprise at this, the gentleman rejoined, "Oh, it was a mouthful of moonshine after all." Where was the reality of the right hon. Gentleman's statements? He wanted to lay his hands on them, but could find nothing tangible. It will not do—continued the hon. and learned Gentleman—to make an able and sophistical speech, and tell us that the noble Lord is wrong. Why, we all agree in that. What we want to find out is how to be in the right. The right hon. Gentleman was lately a Minister of the Crown, and we want to learn from his lips what security he has to offer for the good working of his plan. If I can at all understand the right hon. Gentleman, his security is just this—that if ships are sent for by the Sultan they may come through the Straits, which, he says, they cannot do at present so conveniently as they will do when they have the united advantage of the electric telegraph and a treaty. "We will thus," says the right hon. Gentleman, "take care of the sick man." No doubt: and it will be, meanwhile, the care of Russia to secure his eternal repose. The
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right hon. Gentleman criticised with consummate ability the application of the third point. He pointed out the difficulties inherent in the composition, and criticised and commented on the language and conduct of the noble Lord in reference to that third point, and dwelt on these with inimitable power and effect; but I am nevertheless told that the right hon. Gentleman is himself the author of this third point. I understand that he—one of the great statesmen of the age—himself composed this third point, the application of which, he says, is so absurd, so imaginative, and which is practically so difficult of adjustment, and that having constructed this piece of statesmanship he now demolishes it with unsparing vigour. I do the right hon. Gentleman the justice to admit that he is convinced in his heart and soul that the application of this point is absurd, and that the application of it may be difficult if not impossible, and I only regret that he gave his own consent to it. He is in the same predicament as the noble Lord and his colleagues, and they are all alike responsible. They get the country into difficulties from which they want the virtue or the power to extricate it. They make war, and they cannot make war. They endeavour to make peace, and they cannot make peace. They draw up protocols which the very author of them cannot well understand, and to apply which, he says, is an impossibility. I confess I am not able to find anything more substantial in the course of the right hon. Gentleman's able speech than that appeal which he made when he counselled you on the grounds of Christianity, religion, and humanity, to terminate this war; but let me ask the right hon. Gentleman one question with reference to that eloquent appeal. He is a moralist and a philosopher—when did that new light break in upon his mind? When did the right hon. Gentleman feel the promptings of conscience so strongly as to be compelled to make that speech which left its sting so sharp behind it? Had he that speech in his mind on Monday evening last? If blood has been shed that should have been stayed, was it his duty to religion, to Christianity, and to God, to come forward on that occasion, and by an exhibition of his policy, and by his eloquent appeals to your feelings and understandings, to stop that discussion, which had for its object to stem the effusion of blood? Was it for him at such a time to stifle discussion, and prevent the

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free expression of opinion in this House, instead of giving utterance to those feelings and eloquent ideas to which he has now given birth, and which being then expressed by him, might have tended to stop the effusion of blood? The right hon. Gentleman has described to us, in fervid eloquence, the horrors of war, and he has expatiated, with no common power, on the blessings of peace. But, I ask, who advised the invasion of Russia? Who made war upon the territory of Russia? The right hon. Gentleman. Who advised the expedition to the Crimea and the attack on Sebastopol? The right hon. Gentleman. Who plunged this country into the horrors which he so pathetically described? The right hon. Gentleman. And if there has been an effusion of blood at which every humane man must shudder, that bloodshed was counselled and the invasion which led to it was undertaken on the advice tendered by the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues; and now we see that they are eager to denounce and lament the consequences of their fatal policy. The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues sent forth those gallant men who were now fighting our battles, and what was their conduct subsequent to that ill-fated expedition? Those brave men had nothing to sustain them but their bone and sinew—there was evinced for them no counsel, no foresight, no judgment, no adequate preparation. A large number of them fell not by the enemy, but were the victims of disgraceful and criminal neglect. The late Ministry exhibited in every department the most deplorable incompetence, and we, in this House, have had, as yet, no opportunity to express our sense of their awful mismanagement. Having done all this, what did the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues next do? When an indignant nation, through their representatives, demanded inquiry, up started the right hon. Gentleman, and told us that, on constitutional grounds, all inquiry ought to be stifled. That argument was disregarded, and 230 Gentlemen at this side of the House, true to their constituents and to their country, voted for inquiry into the horrors that had taken place, and are now ready to carry that inquiry to its legitimate consequences. I therefore deny the right of a Member of the late Ministry to argue as the right hon. Gentleman has done, and to make the appeal which he has addressed to us. The right hon. Gentleman, last night, quoted a passage from
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Virgil, but he did not venture to finish his quotation, an omission which I shall now take the liberty to correct—
"Cur indecores in limine primo Deficimus? cur ante tubam tremor occupat artus?"
Those inspiring words follow, happily, the lines he quoted. If they did not follow in his thoughts they now follow in my speech; and I add, moreover, that if it be even as he said, should that lessen the courage of our people? But the question we have now before us is, what are we fighting for? Is this a just war or is it not? If it is not a just war, let us end it quietly, and, on our bended knees, implore forgiveness from Russia even on any terms; but if it be a just war, what ought to be our language? Let me, in answering this, refer you to what passed one hundred years ago, when, in time of war, a Chancellor of the Exchequer came forward with a proposal to address the Crown. We were then fighting a great Power; the Exchequer was low, our people were divided, our King was brave, and there was a demand for a delusive, false, fraudulent peace. On that occasion the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed what I repeat, for the adoption of Parliament—
"This is the eighth year in which your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons in Parliament assembled, have assisted your Majesty with large supplies for carrying on a just and necessary war."
Afterwards, in this manner—
"To show to your Majesty and all Christendom that the Commons of England will not be amused or diverted from their firm resolutions of obtaining by war a safe and honourable peace, we do, in the name of those we represent, renew our assurances to support your Majesty and your Government against all your enemies at home and abroad; and that we will effectually assist you in carrying on the war against France."
How did the House of Lords speak? As follows—
"We assure your Majesty of our hearty and sincere assistance, not doubting but whenever your Majesty shall be obliged to be engaged for the defence of your allies and securing the liberty and quiet of Europe, Almighty God will protect your sacred person in so righteous a cause; and that the unanimity, wealth, and courage of your subjects will carry your Majesty with honour and success through all the difficulties of a just war."
Such is the language we ought to use now. There should be no ambiguous speeches and no delusive schemes of peace. If the management of the war had been in the hands of men capable

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of conducting it to the honour and advantage of this mighty nation, what might not have been the results. Behold the difference between the Ministry and the nation. On the one hand, timid negotiations, feeble policy, and divided councils. What a contrast with the energy, enterprise, courage, and enthusiasm of a gallant people! For what are we fighting? For the supremacy and greatness of England, a cause which cannot be deserted or betrayed. You are not fighting for the mere interests of commerce, though I wish not to be understood as undervaluing the advantages of commerce, for it spreads civilisation and gathers wealth, but you are fighting for something higher, nobler, grander—the greatness, the supremacy, and glory of the country—for something nobler than the interests of commerce, or the acquisition of territory. I believe that the object of this great contest is to establish the authority of eternal justice, to vindicate the outraged laws of nations, and to promote and advance, I ardently hope, the liberties of the world.
MR. LOWEsaid, the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down had quoted a most patriotic and soul-stirring passage, and said that was the language which ought to be used now. Then, why was it not used? Why did not his party use it? He heartily wished such language had been used; and it was because it had not been used, and because hon. Gentlemen opposite kept their patriotism for their speeches and put their party spirit into their Motions, that he had felt it his duty to place before the House and the country something which would really raise the question that the House had to address itself to, and to which the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman might properly have applied. It was his duty to recall the House, if in his power to do so, after the wonderful burst of eloquence they had just heard, to the question before it. He had given notice of an Amendment to the Motion of the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), and what he had to show the House was, that the Amendment was called for, true, and expedient; and with that view he would just recapitulate how the matter stood. The right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) gave notice the other night of a series of Resolutions relating to the proceedings of the Vienna Conferences; but when he was going to move them, a question was asked of the head of the Government
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as to what state the negotiations were in. The noble Lord made an answer calculated to deceive no one, being a true statement of the fact. The noble Lord said that the negotiations were suspended, but that Austria was looking about and waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up. Then the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gladstone) put it in his own peculiar forcible manner to-the right hon. Member for Manchester that it was impossible, under the circumstances, for him to go on with his Motion, the question of peace and war being undecided; and yet the right hon. Member for Oxford University had only last night gone fully into the circumstances connected with the Vienna Conferences. He (Mr. Lowe) felt dissatisfied with the proceeding to which he had alluded, thinking that the House would be disgraced in the eyes of Europe and the country if they abstained from pronouncing an opinion on the subject. Therefore he was pleased to hear the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) express sentiments on that point similar to his own, signifying an intention to lay on the table a Resolution which should fairly raise the question. He was, however, disappointed, when he found what was the tenour of the right hon. Gentleman's Resolution. What he had expected from the right hon. Gentleman, was an explicit opinion on the questions raised by the Conferences, and whether the negotiations should proceed or be stopped. Ho could not help thinking that, if the right hon. Gentleman had followed the inspiration of his own mind, and had not been obliged to conform to the opinions of others, the House would have had a Resolution, from him more in accordance with the sentiments he had expressed. As it was, however, he might ask—
———"Amphora cœpit
Institui; currente rotâ cur urceus exit?"
The right hon. Gentleman began in partriotism, but ended in party. The right hon. Gentleman, when he came forward to accuse the Government, should be in his language clear and definite; so that the House might distinctly understand on what it voted, and the Government might be sure against what it had to defend itself. When the right hon. Gentleman censured the ambiguity of the Government, he would have done well to avoid ambiguity himself. And vague and unmeaning as was the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, the debate which he raised upon it was

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still more objectionable:—the right hon. Gentleman said little or nothing in favour of his Motion, and following his example, those who had spoken on the other side had said little against it. Then, again, he would not have anticipated that a speech on a Motion censuring the Government would have been so entirely taken up with invectives against the noble Lord the Member for London, for things not done by that noble Lord in his capacity as Secretary of State and Member of the Government, but in his diplomatic capacity as servant of the Crown—as representative not of any particular party in that House, but of the whole nation—in which capacity the noble Lord was entitled to that generous consideration which that House was in the habit of always extending to public servants who did their best to discharge any public duty. His (Mr. Lowe's) view of this matter was, that it was a great deal too serious to be made a party quarrel, and he thought that if the House only came to a vote affirming or negativing the right hon. Gentleman's mere party Motion, by which the right hon. Gentleman sought to displace the present occupiers of the Treasury bench and put himself and his friends in their position, without any pledge as to the line of policy he intended to pursue—if the House came to such a vote without having some assurance what line of policy was to be pursued, such a course would be discreditable to that assembly. But if it would be discreditable for the House to consent to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, it would be anything but creditable for it to agree to the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth. The House would remember that the question of the Conferences at Vienna was now distinctly before it, and, therefore, if they did consider that question at all, they ought to pronounce some decided and specific opinion upon them. Certainly, no course could be imagined more undesirable than that the House should pronounce an ambiguous verdict upon them—a verdict having three or four distinct meanings—and at the same time to leave the country in the dark as to which of those meanings it meant to adopt. That, however, was what the House would do if it adopted the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth. That Amendment began thus:—"This House sees with regret that the Conferences at Vienna have not led to the termination
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of hostilities." Now, in official language, the word "regret" was often used to express censure, and, therefore, in this place, it might either be meant in its abstract sense of expressing a simple sorrow that the war had not been brought to a close, or it might be taken to convey a censure on the Plenipotentiaries for not having brought the negotiations to a successful termination, or on the Government for having given the Plenipotentiaries such limited powers; or—as he hoped was the case—it might be meant as a censure on the Russian Government for having entered into the negotiations without any sincere desire to bring them to a successful end, but merely in order that she might secure the neutrality of the German States and obtain popularity with the Ottoman Christians. Before the House adopted the Amendment, it certainly ought to be made clearly to understand which of those four meanings was to be attached to the word "regret." Finding the question in this dilemma, it had occurred to him that what was wanted was to propose some Amendment on the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth, which would really raise the question which should have been raised on Monday night by the right hon. Member for Manchester—whether there was left, after the rejection by the Russian Plenipotentiaries of our proposition, anything which could be made a legitimate ground of negotiation for peace. That was his view in placing his Amendment on the paper, and that was the question which he intended it to raise, and upon which he desired to extract from the House a plain unmistakable opinion, without reference either to the objects of those gentlemen who wished to retain their offices or those who wished to turn them out and seat themselves in their places. If his Amendment were adopted it would have the effect of recording a clear, distinct opinion on the part of the House of Commons with reference to these negotiations, and it would also plainly point out that the word "regret" was intended to apply to the conduct of the Russian Government. Incorporating his Amendment with that of the right hon. Baronet, it would run thus:—"That this House, having seen with regret, 'owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea,' that the Conferences at Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities, feels it to be a duty to declare that 'the means of coming to an

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agreement on the third basis of negotiation being by that refusal exhausted,' it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her allies, obtain for this country a safe and honourable peace." In arguing in favour of this particular Amendment he was prepared to take his stand, not upon any of those grounds stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, but simply on the grounds which had been agreed to by Russia herself. He would not presume to say what ought to have been the basis of the negotiations. That, of course, had been settled in conjunction with our great ally, and no advantage to the common cause would be gained by canvassing it in the House of Commons; but at least he had a right to argue that England was entitled to as much as Russia herself had admitted she ought to have. Now, twice during the present year—once on the 7th of January, and again on the first day on which the Vienna Conferences were opened—Russia had admitted that we were entitled to stipulate that her preponderance in the Black Sea should be put an end to. That was the point, then, from which he started, and all he asked the House to declare was, that what Russia herself said was a reasonable condition of peace should be fully and carefully carried out, and that when the prospect of carrying that out fully and fairly had ceased, it was not for the dignity of the nation, for the interests of Europe, for the success of the war we were carrying on, and the security of Turkey that negotiations should any longer be continued. The question, therefore, was whether the terms proposed by the Western Powers to Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff at Vienna were or were not equivalent substantially to the third basis, as agreed to by Russia herself? Were these two positions—that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be put an end to, and that a limitation should be put on the Russian navy in the Black Sea—equivalent? He maintained that they were, and that any man who said that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea could be destroyed without limiting her fleet there, was guilty of as great a verbal absurdity as he who would say that Russia could put an end to her preponderance without limiting it, or destroy her fleet without diminishing its strength. There was no difference between the two propositions.
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If he were to argue the question on the ground of authority, he might first refer to the authority of Her Majesty's Government, who evidently were of that opinion, because the instruction they gave to their Plenipotentiaries at Vienna was to propose the limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as the means of putting an end to her preponderance there, and, when the Russian agent refused that proposition, left them nothing further to do but to declare their instructions exhausted. Then he might also bring Count Nesselrode into court in support of this opinion; for in the circular which had lately been published that astute diplomatist did not venture to say that Russia had agreed to such a modification of the treaty of 1841 as would put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. He suppressed that article altogether, because he knew that if he had stated it, and then had afterwards gone on to state that Russia had refused any limitation of her fleet there, it would have been a contradiction in terms; and the breach of good faith would have been apparent to all the world. He, therefore, suppressed the fact of that admission having been made by Russia, and merely spoke generally of the revision of the treaty of 1841. Russia, however, refused to go into the negotiation on these terms of limitation, and the ingenuity of the Conference was directed to frame a substitute. Russia herself proposed two substitutes, which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford said were Russian "methods" of applying the third point. He denied altogether that they were methods of carrying out the principle of the third point, for the mare apertum tended to increase, and the mare clausum to perpetuate, the predominance of Russia in the Black Sea. By opening the Black Sea to all nations Turkey gained nothing, because she had already the power of navigating the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; but Russia would gain immense facilities of developing her naval power, because she would then have the privilege of passing into the Mediterranean. Therefore, while no advantage whatever was to be given to the Power to be protected, and an immense increase of power would accrue to that Power whose predominance was to be curbed—this certainly could be no method of carrying out the principle of the third point. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford had laid great stress on

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the immense advantage which the Sultan would obtain by being able to call for the naval assistance of his allies even in time of peace, if the predominance of Russia should press too heavily on him. But he did not advert to what it is now competent for the Sultan to do without violating any treaty, and what he has done—namely, to call foreign ships to the very confines of the Dardanelles, so that in a few hours they might advance to Constantinople to his aid. Thus the point on which the right hon. Gentleman laid such stress turned out to be merely illusory. But the stipulation for putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea would not really put an end to it; it was, indeed, based on the assumption that that preponderance would continue, and would again become intolerable and insufferable, and when it became so it provided for the tardy assistance of the Western Powers being afforded to Turkey. Now, it might be right, when we had drawn the sword for the security of Turkey, and after we had spent millions of treasure, and sacrificed thousands of lives in a spirit of tardy humanity, to draw back from our proceedings, and leave Turkey to her fate; but, if so, let us at once boldly declare that there was an end altogether of the third point in the negotiation, instead of affecting nominally to reduce the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, and then assenting to that condition being made illusory by expedients, one of which would actually increase her preponderance, and the other admitted that it would continue to exist utterly undiminished. Therefore, it was pretty clear that there was no means of carrying out the third basis of negotiation, except by limiting the naval force of Russia in the Black Sea. Though Russia had been willing to sign the same form of words as the other Powers with regard to the other moiety of the third basis, and to say that she would respect the independence of Turkey, yet, when pressed upon the matter, her Plenipotentiaries stated that they did not mean by that to join in a territorial guarantee, as all the other Powers wished. So that, when Russia made a proposition that would increase her own naval preponderance, or, at least, make it permanent, and at the same time would give no guarantee to Turkey for the rights which she intended to invade, it was obvious that there only existed the worst possible basis for negotiation. This was no matter of arithmetical calculation as
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between the points that were conceded and those that were refused. The legal maxim applied in this case, "Sententiæ ponderantur, non numerantur;" they must look at the weight and importance of the points in dispute, and not merely at their number; and it might be that Russia might concede to us fifty-nine points out of sixty, and yet we might be justified in going on with the war, à l'outrance, for the sixtieth. Upon this point of destroying the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea depended all the others; and it would be most unwise if, with the experience that we had had of the dealings of Russia with the Porte, and with every one of her neighbours, we allowed her to retain all the power she possessed in war of menacing Turkey, and that, too, without obtaining from her a territorial guarantee for the dominions of the Sultan, which she refused on the flimsy pretext that she did not know the boundaries of the Turkish empire, the fact being that every such boundary that was likely to be attacked was a boundary which Russia herself had fixed by seizing some one Turkish provinces or another. As to Russia reserving to herself the right of judging when she should shed the blood of her own people, she was pouring forth that blood now like water in a much worse cause than in guaranteeing Turkey against attacks that might proceed from any other quarter. On these grounds, then, the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea was plainly equivalent to a refusal to put an end to her preponderance in that sea; and, if that were so, the conclusion was inevitable that negotiation on the third point was exhausted, and it would only be below the dignity of this country, and trifling with a great subject, to continue further negotiations on that subject. The right hon. Member for the University had stated that it was not true that the conference came to a termination owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea, and he quoted a highly diplomatic phrase of Prince Gortchakoff to the effect that he did not exclude everything that had a tendency towards such a limitation, though he reserved to himself the right of rejecting or negativing it altogether. God forbid that any man should snatch at a mere expression of this kind, apart from its real meaning; but this declaration was made on the 17th of April, and on the 21st, when Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff were

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making a substantive proposition to the conference, they employed this language—
"The propositions which have been made to them, namely, the limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, being, in their eyes, derogatory to the sovereign rights of the Emperor, their master, contrary to the European equilibrium, and dangerous to the independence of the Ottoman empire, they cannot but decline them."
From this statement the Russian Plenipotentiaries never wavered, and since it was made there had been no real negotiation, because the Plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers said that their instructions were entirely exhausted. Russia, therefore, having repudiated her own basis of negotiation, any man of plain commonsense must see that any further negotiation on this point would be futile and abortive; and, therefore, he was strictly and rigidly correct in saying that it was owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea that the Conferences at Vienna came to an end. To one who had a due sense of the responsibility attaching to every word used in that House, and who was endeavouring, as he was, to lift this matter out of the slough of party in which it had been wallowing, it was a grievous thing to be charged, even by implication, with a wish to perpetuate the misery of the human race—the frightful and terrible slaughter that was now going on—the devastation of provinces, the ruin of countries, and the retardation of civilisation. He admitted that these were things not lightly to be incurred; but, having entered into this struggle, having laid down bases of negotiation, having got great and powerful allies who concurred in these bases, we should be unworthy of our forefathers, unworthy of our country, unworthy of the name of Englishmen, if we were to retrograde before we were forced by overpowering necessity from the position which we had taken up, and to allow barbaric might and violence to trample upon rights which we had, in a spirit of honest and just indignation, taken upon ourselves to defend. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone) having read several of the terms proposed, and which had been acceded to, said that we had attained the objects of the war, and should, therefore, now make peace; but their end was to secure Turkey from the aggressive spirit of Russia. and unless they had accomplished that, they could not consistently or safely abandon the struggle. Were peace made upon the
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terms suggested by the right hon. Gentleman, what would become of Turkey? In her present state, deserted by her allies, diminished in her prestige and character, could she maintain her place as an independent Power for a single year in the face of Russia, whose prestige would be enormously increased by the result of the siege of Sebastopol? If we now retired from the contest, Turkey would, therefore, be delivered over to Russia, bound hand and foot; and the empire of that colossal Power would overshadow the Northern Powers; Germany would be at her feet, independent Tartary would be at her mercy, Persia would become a Russian province, and the Russian empire would extend itself until it brought within its gigantic span all the free nations which were conterminous to it. What was her dominion? Her dominion had worked out a principle which was the converse of the doctrine of Bentham—its aim and end were the greatest misery of the greatest number. Everybody in Russia was miserable—the serfs, the nobility, and every other class. Such was the uniform and melancholy testimony borne by every traveller. There was something plaintive even in the songs and dances of the peasants. The Emperor was miserable because he was overborne with toil and anxiety, and held his life by a tenure more precarious than did the meanest of his subjects. The nobility, amid all their pride and luxury, because they knew how slight a partition divided the pride and luxury from the horrors of the copper mines of Netkhin, from which no man who descended into them ever returned to the light of day, or the dreary miseries of Siberia. The peasant was miserable because his land was not his own, because his labour was not his own, because his family and blood were not his own, and because he knew not how long it might be before a ukase might be despatched from his tyrant to snatch him from his home and to condemn him to long military service and years of banishment from which none were hardly ever known to return. The country was miserable because there was no development for intellect, for art, or for science, because this degrading Power ground everything to powder under its iron heel, and comminuted all intellect, all manhood, to the same minute particles until every one was as good as, and no one better than, another. That was the state of Russia. That was the system, fruitful in misery and degradation,

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which was now maintained over sixty or seventy millions of people, and which, if this country faltered in its purpose and suffered itself to be tricked out of what it had demanded, must inevitably be extended to a still larger portion of the human race. The politics of Western Europe might appear to be distinct from these questions, but they would immediately be brought into contact with them. The frontiers of Russia would advance at a bound from the Vistula to the Rhine. In England and France you would have armies returning discontented, and recriminations as to the causes of these calamities. In England you would have discontent which might find vent in some organic change in our institutions. In France you would have discontent which would be not unlikely to find vent in a change of dynasty; and whether the new dynasty were Bourbon or Orleanist the sovereign must be one who owed obligations to this country which it would be impossible to forget or to forgive. With such a sovereign, and with the people discontented, and the army burning to vindicate its valour, you must expect things to tend to something very different from the cordial alliance now existing between the two countries. This was the time to say these things plainly, and not to wait until the calamities had arrived. He did not ask those gentlemen who made this great question of peace or war a mere party struggle to adopt his Amendment; but he did ask its adoption by those who thought it was time for the House of Commons to show that it went for something in the affairs of the country, that it had some duty to discharge, and some opinion to express—that it was sensible of the responsibility which rested upon it, and was good for something more than to vote million after million and address after address. He asked such gentlemen to join him in this attempt to defeat the measure by which an unmeaning Resolution was to be met by an unmeaning Amendment, and to lay down a principle by which the country might see that the House repudiated the system of keeping up these eternal negotiations, and admitting, as a mediator of a Power which ought to be our ally, and which only obtained the superiority of position because she dared not maintain that which, with us, she had avowed. He asked those who were weary of this half and hall system, who wanted to lay down clearly the terms on which we would or would not
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negotiate, who wished to throw into the hands of the Government the strength which was always given to it, when it was supported by the voice of a popular assembly—he asked such gentlemen to assist him in defeating both the Resolution and the Amendment of the right hon. Baronet.
MR. CAYLEYsaid, that the question before the House was one of such importance, that it was impossible to approach it without a sense of its magnitude; neither was it a party question, and he should not approach it in any such spirit. He thought that the House was much indebted to the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire for reintroducing this question. He was, however, bound to say that, although he had heard the speech of the right hon. Member with admiration, and agreed with many of the sentiments which had fallen from him, yet he did not think that the terms of the Motion were consistent with the terms in which the right hon. Gentleman had given notice of it, nor with the speech which he had delivered. His right hon. Friend had raised two issues—the late conferences, and whether the Government meant negotiation or war. For his (Mr. Cayley's) part, he would vote for whoever spoke out plainest. What the country desired was, to receive not only from the Ministry but from the House of Commons a declaration of opinion on this subject, and he trusted that to-night the House would make an explicit declaration of its opinion in order that the country, which was ready to do its part in this war, might know that in the House of Commons was a faithful representation of its feelings. He had looked for the declaration of the Ministers with great anxiety, and had determined not to come to a decision in his own mind until the noble Lord the Member for London had spoken. He had not heard the noble Lord's speech, but had possessed himself of its tenour through the usual channels of information; and, as it was one of the privileges of his high position that scarcely a word spoken by the noble Lord was lost, he (Mr. Cayley) had become fully acquainted with the noble Lord's sentiments. He had experienced a most painful sensation at the rumour that the noble Lord had turned from the sentiments he had formerly expressed some time since on this subject; but he was glad to find that the noble Lord had still penetration to see through the wiles of Russian diplomacy. He was glad to find that the noble Lord saw that

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it was impossible to come to a solution of this question without some material guarantee for the security of peace. Austria, in his (Mr. Cayley's) opinion, in spite of all that had been said of her, appeared to have acted with great loyalty at the conferences, and had, throughout all these transactions, acted with a wise prudence as to her own interest. He meant her mere self-interest. He had never expected more of her. Near a year ago he had written the same opinion to a friend in Vienna who had congratulated himself that Austria was won over to the Western Powers. His reply was, "her object is gained in the Principalities and on the Danube; in principle she may be with the Western Powers to a certain extent, but she will not engage in active operations against Russia. It will be sufficient for us, and all we can expect, to keep her strictly neutral, and it is from her self-interest alone—and that a limited view of it only—on which we can depend even for that." With regard to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, the opinion of Austria was clear; for, on two several occasions during the negotiations, so far as we know of them from the papers before us, Count Buol had declared that it was necessary that a limitation should be put to the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea. He thought that the House ought to support the French Plenipotentiary in the terms which he had proposed on this subject, and that nothing less could be accepted by England and France. He did not know that the treaty of Adrianople had ever received the sanction of this country, but the closing of the gates of the Black Sea was not derived originally from the Treaty of Adrianople, it was derived from the secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar 'Skelessi. Turkey was reduced in 1833 to ask for the assistance of Russia, and was obliged to make the humiliating concession of allowing her to have one of the keys of the gates of the Black Sea; but, as he understood international law, all these treaties were abrogated by the war, and the possessor of the Strait of the Bosphorus had the exclusive command of the entrance to and the exit from the Black Sea; and yet this was all that Russia virtually offered in the way of concession at Vienna. He was glad to find from the noble Lord's speech last night that he adhered to the sentiments he had expressed on the 21st of April, and he hoped those sentiments would be
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sanctioned by the First Lord of the Treasury. If these were the sentiments of the Government, it followed as a natural corollary that they must support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster, which was but a free translation of the declarations made by the noble Lord at Vienna and in his speech. Russia had even objected, in relation to the 2nd of the Four Points, to the proposition that Turkey, Austria, and Russia should each station a ship at the mouths of the Danube to insure the free navigation of the river, because she wished to have the exclusive monopoly of the Black Sea, which was one of the highways to Turkey. What was her motive for that wish? But that she secretly intended again to make an aggression upon Turkey, as she had so often done in former times. Russia had at the outset refused to limit her navy, and when she repeated that refusal, was not the noble Lord the Member for London justified in taking up his hat and returning home? No one wished for peace more than he did, but petty attempts at negotiations, when negotiations had proved to be utterly fruitless, would not tend to bring about a just and honourable peace. It had been negotiation too long protracted which betrayed us originally into the war, which had encouraged the Czar to hold language from which he could not subsequently withdraw. Had our language to Russia been as firm in January and March, 1853, as in January and March, 1854, the Pruth would never have been crossed. If it was the wish of the right hon. Gentleman, in moving this Resolution, to obtain an explicit declaration of the opinions of the Government, he hoped that if the noble Lord at the head of the Government spoke as plainly as the noble Lord the Colonial Secretary had spoken, and promised to vote for the Motion of the hon. Member for Kidderminster, the right hon. Gentleman would withdraw his Motion, in order that they might have a unanimous declaration of the House of Commons that they would support Her Majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the war. He believed that those who voted ostensibly in favour of peace at this moment were those who would do most to prolong war. A vacillating Ministry indeed brought on the war, but a vacillating House of Commons could never end it. The hon. Member (Mr. Cayley) then addressed himself to the speech of Mr. Gladstone of the previous evening. He had heard the right hon. Gentleman with

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admiration for his great power over the instrument by which men usually communicate their ideas to each other. What a glory and a credit to this assembly, he (Mr. Cayley) could not help saying to himself, was such a Member—but what a discredit and a shame to the country it might be to have such a Minister at a crisis like this. In that speech he (Mr. Cayley) found an explanation of the conduct of the Aberdeen Government in 1853. Hoodwinked in March, cajoled in April, they doubted in May, truckled in June, vacillated in July, and after a year of ambiguity finally floundered into this untoward war, taking few or no measures, all this while, to prepare for the dread alternative; and having by their want of preparation and their mismanagement produced the most disastrous results to our army, the Ministers of that Cabinet would now leave the country sprawling in the mire of an ignominious peace. The objects of the war, argued the right hon. Gentleman, are obtained, and more than obtained, if we remember what those objects were at the outset. Objects gained! What objects? The first and second points which have been yielded to by Russia were no concessions. First, they were no longer hers to yield, and secondly, if they were, and yielded, they are mere cessations of usurpation. The treaty of Kainardji never gave them the Protectorate, and the obstructions to the free navigation of the Danube were clear violations of the Treaty of Vienna. And he (Mr. Cayley) was not aware that the Treaty of Adrianople had ever been sanctioned by this country which gave the pretext for these obstructions. But how were the objects gained? The object was, at least certainly had become, to protect Turkey permanently from Russian aggression. Is there no road to Constantinople but by the Principalities? Is there no other road to Asia Minor? The Black Sea is the great highway by which the lurking ambition of Russia intends to gratify itself on the provinces of the Ottoman power. How did Marshal Diebitch obtain his supplies on his way to Adrianople in 1829? How did Prince Paskiewitch carry on his masterly campaign in Armenia in the same year, but by means of the Black Sea? Nothing would cripple the aggressive policy of Russia in the East so much as her preponderance in the Black Sea being annihilated. The Western Powers were now in possession, and ought to retain it till means were discovered for that subversion, and until
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Turkey possessed, in fact, what the law of nations gave her in right, namely, the exclusive key of the gates of the Euxine, to admit or deny entrance to any warlike flag she pleased; only material guarantees would secure this. The destruction of Sebastopol and its fleet were the necessary means to this end. He (Mr. Cayley) might not have counselled that expedition at the time it went, but, being there, Sebastopol could be ours, and by God's blessing, it would. It was to his mind an affair of time, and not of doubt—of fighting in the field, rather than of assault. When the plough had turned the furrow over the site of Sebastopol, and the western flags had floated in its harbour, the great material guarantee would have been obtained. He (Mr. Cayley) for one did not desire to retain possession of the Crimea, or to make aggression on Russia's European territory. His view from the outset had been, if we went to war, to establish a real check to Russian aggression in the East. He thought Ismail and Keni should both have been early dismantled to secure the free navigation of the Danube, and that some effective aid should have been given to the Turks to drive the Russian boundary back to the Kuban and the Terek. As matters stood, after Sebastopol is reduced, and the Danube really free, and a check put upon Russia in TransCaucasia, a small allied army of occupation in Bulgaria, and a few war steamers as inspectors of the Black Sea, and the war expedition of France and England might be greatly reduced, being then confined to blockading the White Sea, the Baltic, and the Euxine. Such a course, by crippling the commercial resources of Russia, would bring her to terms, at a cost cheap to us, but ruinous to her, and meanwhile destroy her prestige in the East. But he did not think it worthy of the European Powers, circumstanced as they now were, to overlook the case of Circassia. In one of his conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour in 1853, the Emperor Nicholas expressed strong sympathy for the way in which the people of Montenegro had preserved their independence against the Turks; and Europe, situated as it now was as regarded Russia, could scarcely do less for the noble people of Circassia, who had so long and against such gigantic odds struggled against the encroachments of their great northern neighbour. So much, then, for the limitation of the navy of the Russians in the

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Black Sea, for maintaining which at its present size she had no plea, as we had. Where were her colonies to defend? At the same time, although resolved to take every precaution in his power against the tortuous policy and diplomatic subterfuges of Russia, and to prevent, if it were in human power to prevent, her disturbance of the peace of Europe, he still sympathised strongly with his hon. Friend behind him (Sir W. Heathcote) in his desire for peace. He would not call his hon. Friend bloodthirsty, but he felt assured that those who now pressed upon Government the acceptance of Russian terms would in the end be the cause of an increased amount of bloodshed besides being responsible for the profuse and profligate waste of blood and treasure which had already taken place. We had indeed shillyshallied into war, but depend upon it we could never dilly-dally into peace—except a most disastrous one. No one could deprecate war in the abstract more than himself (Mr. Cayley)—its horrors, or the passions to which it gave rise,—and yet we must not forget that for some mysterious purpose war seemed in the councils of the Most High indispensable to His great plan. As in the outward world of nature storms and hurricanes seem required to purify the atmosphere; as in the inner life of the individual it is only through the tempests of the soul that even the good man is permitted to agonise his way to peace—so in the outer world of nations, from some inscrutable cause, it seems only from time to time by steering their bark through an ocean of blood that they may enter a haven of permanent rest. Inscrutable as such things may be to us (however visible to the eye of faith), the day will arrive when these ways of Providence will be surely vindicated, as emanations of completest wisdom and of purest love. Nevertheless, let us not conclude that this war, how grievous soever in many of its aspects, has been productive of evil alone. He under whose Government we live has even for the bitterest cup still in store some drops of merciful compensation. It is something that through its instrumentality this war has been the means of cementing a close alliance between two neighbouring nations, who stand in the vanguard of civilisation—of closing the wounds of a strife of centuries. Happy for us that in this Syracusan expedition Sparta is our ally—that Gylippus fights by our side. Happier still it would be did
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we remember that Athens, drained of her bravest for that distant expedition, became a prey to invaders at home. Is it nothing that this struggle has been the means of eliciting in our beloved Queen, not alone the graciousness of the Sovereign, but the yearning tenderness of her large mother's heart for the sufferings of her gallant troops? We daily pray that Heaven will preserve her in health and prosperity, and that she may be defended from all her enemies; let us pray that she may be preserved from what is worse than external enemies—from distracted councils and from incompetent administrations—that she may be protected against losses threefold greater than those in the field, occasioned by utter absence of preparation, management, and foresight. Oh! let us pray that that beloved lady may never again have to renew the reiterated wail of Augustus, "Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!" Now that every one who has studied the antecedents of Russia must see through her wiles—her wiles which are more dangerous than her arms—what language alone ought to be held by the Minister of this country—the valour of whose sons, never disputed, has again in this generation been proved before our eyes—a valour which mounts to heroism, and whose endurance and devotion rise to the spirit of martyrdom? What, I repeat, should be the language of the Minister of the Crown at a crisis like this? "Ours is a just and a righteous cause—with such an army, such a navy, such allies as ours, who can doubt of success? Those terms we have failed to obtain by the pen, we now will win by the sword." But human means will not suffice, as the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) truly remarked last night; we must still and always seek counsel and aid from Him whose fiat alone decrees the trumpet shout of victory or the bitter howl of defeat. Yet "let the nations rejoice and be glad, for he shall judge the folk righteously, and govern the nations upon earth."
MR. ROUNDELL PALMERsaid, in this debate, involving the most important subject ever discussed in our time, if there were no other point on which they were all agreed, he trusted and believed they were all agreed in a desire to preserve the honour, the glory, and the greatness of the country. There might be those out of doors who thought it a justifiable method of seeking to recommend their views, to cast unworthy aspersions on persons who differed from them, and to say they were

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the craven advocates of an ignominious peace; but there were none in that House who were the advocates of anything which would bring ignominy or disgrace upon the country which they loved and were bound to serve. Only two short years ago any one who had inquired what constituted the greatness and glory of England would have been referred to the deeds of philanthropic benevolence of which she was the instrument throughout the world—to her flag which carried Christianity, civilisation, and liberty over every sea, to the arts which flourished under her kindly culture, and to the glorious constitution under which her people lived; and, although all Englishmen felt proud of the great actions of their ancestors at Waterloo and Blenheim, they experienced a deeper satisfaction in thinking they had changed those days of blood-stained glory for the nobler and yet more renowned victories of peace. Many then believed the world had advanced so far in improved civilisation that wars had ceased, at least among nations bound together by the ties of religion and of treaties. It must, therefore, be a subject of deep regret to all, a portentous fact of disastrous significance, that the minds of most men were now so possessed with the passions to which the war had given rise, that they looked even with contempt on those who invited the Government to milder counsels and to act in a more moderate and more philanthropic spirit. Appeals were now made, in the spirit of the vehement and exciting declamation which they had just heard from the hon. Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside), to every consideration that could stimulate the pride, the passions, and the susceptibilities of the people, and lead them to forget the arguments of reason, to turn with impatience from the investigation of facts, in order that their eyes might be fixed upon those vainglorious and unreal notions of national honour which prompted them to persevere in enterprises of war, not for the sake of practical or definite ends, but for visionary objects, about which no two men could agree. He did not mean to say that they should never go to war, or that there never could be an occasion which would justify a nation great in the arts of peace, and devoted to the duties of humanity, in entering upon an enterprise of a martial character. He wished to separate himself from the assertion of such a doctrine, because he thought undoubtedly there might be cases of aggression when violence from without
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could only be met by measures of defence from within. Nor would he restrict the justification of war to an attack upon our own shores; but he took his stand upon this principle—that, in some genuine and honest sense, war must be defensive in order to be justifiable. The moment defence was turned into aggression, war was no longer honourable or justifiable; and upon that subject he must declare he had heard with great surprise some parts of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli), who seemed to censure the departure from a defensive, and the adoption of an aggressive policy, when the Crimea was invaded; and yet added, that we must accept the consequences of that fatal mistake, and must go on, because we had once entered upon a course which he himself considered erroneous. He did not think the right hon. Gentleman represented, in that respect, the general opinion of those who held that the war ought to be persevered in; he believed a majority of those persons thought the same principle of defence which originally justified the war might be pleaded as a justification for persevering in it now.
He (Mr. R. Palmer) did not propose to enter into the question, long since practically superseded by the course of events, whether the war was originally justifiable; but, beyond all doubt, it was represented, and was justified by those who entered into it, as a war which was necessary to repel an unjust aggression upon an ally whom we were bound to protect, and its objects were limited by the necessities considered to arise out of that occasion. What was the nature of those necessities and those objects? To state it shortly, the object was, if possible, to maintain the integrity of Turkey against the aggressions of Russia. That was an undertaking beyond all doubt impossible to be carried into effect, so far as the integrity of Turkey was concerned, unless we could secure such conditions and such arrangements as would give us some hope of restoring life and intrinsic energy to the Power whose independence we wished to maintain. There was only one possible way in which Turkey could be supported against aggression, whether it came from Russia or from any other quarter, and that was by the reconstitution of its internal institutions, and by insisting that justice should be done to the Christian portion of its population. We could not reanimate a corpse, but we could educate into powerful

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life a great people who had long been kept down by a degrading state of slavery. In that way alone could we accomplish the object. There was no doubt whatever that the Christian population of Turkey had no particular desire to fall under the dominion of Russia, and he believed they required nothing but such protection from us and the other Christian Powers as would relieve them from the necessity of looking to the protection of Russia. The work to be done was not merely the exclusion of Russia, but the raising up and civilisation of depressed races, and with them the Turkish Empire. Russia, if aggression was her purpose during the diplomatic contests which preceded the present war, had found the opportunity for that aggression in her peculiar relations to the Christian population of Turkey; the same relations led to the war of 1829, when she crossed the Balkan, and dictated terms of peace at Adrianople; the same relations led to the occupation of the Principalities in 1849, and to every other complication which, during the last half century, had kept alive the jealousy and alarm of the other European Powers. In Wallachia, Moldavia and Servia, by the express terms of the treatise of Kainardji and Adrianople, Russia enjoyed more than the powers of a protectorate over the Christian inhabitants of those provinces; she possessed a preponderating influence over their Government, notwithstanding the nominal supremacy of the Sultan; and, beyond the limits of those provinces, although the treaty engagements of the Porte did not exceed a vague and general promise to protect the Christian religion and its churches. Russia notoriously enjoyed in practice a virtual protectorate over all the Christians of the Greek rite, who naturally looked to her for that protection, in consequence of their community of religious feelings and interests with her Emperors and her people. The great object of our policy had been the exclusion of Russia from this Greek protectorate, and also from the Principalities; and we had now carried the war so far as to have secured that exclusion; but with this, it appeared, we were not to rest satisfied.
He (Mr. R. Palmer) wished, for a few moments, to point attention to some remarkable passages in the despatches of Lord Stratford and Lord Clarendon, tending, as they did, to show the greatness of the success we had already achieved, and the perils we should have to encounter if
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we were not satisfied with that success. In a letter written by Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon on the 4th of July, 1853—the letter, in fact, in which Lord Stratford first virtually recommended war to the Government. His Lordship said—
"If the ultimate exclusion of Russia, as well from the Greek protectorate as from the Principalities, be really that important object which has been hitherto presumed, success will never be obtained, according to every reasonable calculation, without a previous understanding between France and England to stop at no sacrifice which is to secure it."
His Lordship continued—
"Henceforward the extensive empire, of which Constantinople is the capital, must in all likelihood either take colour with Russia, or be assimilated to Europe. In the latter case, British influence and interests may be expected to find a widening field for their development; in the former they may be tolerated for a time, but they will probably decline by degrees, and be finally excluded. I can hardly doubt that the notion of Reschid Pasha and his friends, if fully supported from without, is, in failure of negotiation, to settle accounts with Russia once for all, and to carry out a system of internal improvements calculated to raise the condition of the Porte's Christian subjects and to place the Turkish Empire on a footing of close connection with the leading, and particularly with the Western Powers of Europe. The idea is no less brilliant than benevolent; but to realise it is difficult, though far from impossible."
Now, would not this idea, which Lord Stratford considered so brilliant but so difficult of realisation, would it not have been realised if we had made peace on the terms which we had rejected? Would not Turkey have settled accounts with Russia once for all, and have struck off the fetters of Kainardji and Adrianople? What was the answer which Lord Clarendon wrote to that letter on the 28th July? He said—
"It is from England and France alone that Turkey can look for sympathy and support; in the event of a struggle all other Powers would be found neutral, or would become hostile; and if England and France were now prepared to run the risks of a European war, and to disregard the commercial, the social, and the political disasters it would entail; if they were prepared, in short, as your Excellency says, to stop at no sacrifice for attaining the object they have in view, there is little doubt they would cripple the resources of Russia, and on the signature of peace it is more than probable that the exclusion of that Power from the Greek protectorate, and from the Principalities, would be secured. Russia would be effectually repelled; but Turkey would, in the meantime, be irretrievably ruined; and we might then find it impossible to restore her integrity or to maintain her independence."

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Such, in Lord Clarendon's judgment were the almost inevitable consequences of even a successful war, waged by Turkey against Russia, though with France and England for her allies; and yet, when we had now got the substantial objects within our grasp, without paying half the expected price for them. when we might have secured the exclusion of Russia from the Greek protectorate and from the Principalities, although Turkey had not yet been irretrievably ruined, we wished to prolong the duration and extend the circle of the war, as if on purpose that all those disasters which Lord Clarendon apprehended might fall upon Turkey, and the Power which we meant to protect might be effectually ruined. Again, after the war had actually broken out between Russia and Turkey, Lord Stratford wrote thus on the 24th November, 1853. After referring to the warlike spirit then evoked at Constantinople by the strength and unexpected successes of the Sultan's armies upon the frontier, and by the presence of England and France in the Bosphorus, and the moral support of the general feeling of Europe, he proceeded, in terms strikingly applicable to the present state of public feeling in this country—
"It may be alleged with truth, and I have striven to impress the truth in every form of language on their minds, that, however natural such sentiments may be, their indulgence on the present occasion is neither just, nor wise, nor humane; seeing that the original difference can now be settled on safe and honourable grounds—this was while the negotiations consequent upon the Vienna Note were in progress—with every moral and political advantage on the Sultan's side; while an unnecessary continuance of hostilities would involve the most perilous hazards, the most exhausting sacrifices, a vast effusion of blood, and, more than possibly, the horrors of a general war. Unfortunately, the motives to forbearance are thrown into the shade by the dazzling illusions of hope; and passion is in league with occasion to merge all fears of danger, and all considerations of prudence, in a wild, though attractive, speculation, difficult at best to realise, and of which even the accomplishment would not be unattended with formidable drawbacks."
Although at that time Turkey saw that the Western Powers must support her if she went to war, and that they had no alternative, yet, even for the sake of the object in view, Lord Stratford felt that if any peaceable means existed for attaining that object, those brilliant illusions ought then to have been foregone. We had, indeed, suffered much, but we had not yet arrived at the horrors of a general war. The war had hitherto been confined to one
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corner of Europe, and we had both the opportunity and the means of making peace without running the risk of spreading the flame throughout the world. Was not that an advantage greater than we ever anticipated?
It might be said—indeed, it had been said—that a treaty with Russia would be without value—that Russia was a perfidious power, which broke through all treaties. and could not be trusted to perform any engagement. But how was peace ever to be made, if we were never to make a treaty with Russia? Against such language, which had often before been directed, in time of war, against other nations as well as Russia, argument was useless; for his own part, he had no sympathy with those who heaped outrage and insult upon our foe. He admitted that it might not be enough to negotiate a peace upon honourable terms, unless those terms were also likely to be observed; that we ought to have something like security, "To be thus, is nothing; but to be safely thus." No doubt, what we wanted was a "safe" peace; but that word must be understood in a rational sense, as meaning such a peace as, upon a prudent calculation of the balance of good and evil, might be considered to afford reasonable guarantees for permanence. Now, what was the point upon which the Vienna negotiations broke off? It was the naval strength of Russia in the Black Sea. In the despatches of Lord Stratford, down to a late period, there was no allusion to that point at all. That was not surprising; for, though Russia had possessed Sebastopol and the greater part of the shores of the Black Sea, and the whole of those of the Sea of Azoff, for considerably more than fifty years, she had never yet made a sudden descent upon Constantinople. Whatever fraud and treachery we might lay to her charge, Russia had never yet, in the middle of peace, without regard to those principles which had always regulated the intercourse of nations, suddenly attempted to make a descent upon any portion of the Turkish Empire; and if we considered the consequences of such an action—the declaration of European outlawry which would instantly follow it—the total and perpetual forfeiture, not only of the position of Russia as a member of the European league, but of all credit and character even in the eyes of her own people—we must admit that the imputation of such a design to

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Russia, and the fear of its accomplishment, was one of the wildest chimeras which had ever entered into the brain of man. All the aggressions of Russia had been made on the Danube, or in Asia, by means of her military forces; but if she was as fraudulent and perfidious, and as determined to seize Constantinople as some imagined, and if it was so practicable for her to come down with her fleet suddenly from Sebastopol, he wanted to know when it was supposed that she first conceived the design, and why she did not do so during all those years, while we were still giving the Emperor Nicholas credit for being one of the wisest and most pacific sovereigns in Europe? Why did she not effect her purpose in the years 1848 and 1849? If Russia had the design now, she had it then. But her fleet did not sail from Sebastopol, and although she did occupy the Principalities in consequence of their then state of disturbance, yet most people gave her credit for conduct of a commendable nature upon that occasion. If ever there existed an opportunity for the purpose it was then. So, also, a favourable opportunity for accomplishing such a design existed in 1833, when Ibrahim Pasha invaded Turkey, and Russian troops came to Constantinople, not to attack the Sultan, but to assist him against his enemies. No doubt the Russians gained treaty advantages on that occasion; but that was a very different thing from coming down with her fleet without notice upon Constantinople. What did he infer? Either that she had not the power, or that she had not the will. He believed, for his own part, that she had not the power, and he cared not to inquire whether she had the will. The very idea was preposterous; but, even supposing that Russia had such a design—that she would like to use any opportunity of surprising Constantinople with her fleet—she must know that all the armies of Europe would march, as soon as possible, to the rescue of that city, and that her enterprise would prove as disastrous in its results as perfidious and treacherous in its conception. Hence it was never proposed to limit the power of Russia in the Black Sea until after the war began, and after the disaster at Sinope. The terms in which Lord Clarendon, in a letter addressed to Lord Westmorland, mentioned the proposition for the first time, pointed much more to such a solution as Russia had suggested than at the solution proposed by us by means of the
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limitation of the naval force of Russia in the Black Sea. His words were—
"The privileged frontier of Russia in the Black Sea has enabled her to establish a naval power which, in the absence of any counter-balancing force, is a standing menace to the Ottoman Empire."
And the same meaning attached to the language of the third point, which expressly referred to a modification of the treaty of 1841, for closing the straits. Neither the language employed by Lord Clarendon nor that of the third point implied a limitation of the number of Russian ships of war in the Black Sea; it merely required that the frontier of Russia should not be allowed to continue so privileged by the treaty of 1841 as that there should be no counterbalancing power to her naval force in the Black Sea. That was exactly the nature of the second proposition made by Russia herself—namely, that Turkey should have the power to admit into the Black Sea as many of the ships of her allies from the Mediterranean as she pleased, whenever she should consider her security menaced. It had been said that she could do so now, but that statement implied that the third point was nonsense, and that the treaty of 1841, which closed the Straits to ships of war, required no revision at all, inasmuch as it gave no privilege to Russia, or offered no obstacle to the introduction by the Porte of the fleets of her allies into the Black Sea. But all who had read the treaty were aware that it bound the Porte not to admit into the Straits any ships of war whatever, even though she might consider her security menaced, in the absence of anything which she and her allies could treat as an act of war; and, surely, it was no slight thing that Russia should say—
"Let the Straits remain closed against me; I give up all pretence of having a reciprocal right to go through them; and, at the same time, I am willing that the Porte should have the power, whenever she considers her security menaced, to admit as many ships of war as she pleases."
That, he believed, would be a sufficient and satisfactory security against the supposed naval danger from the port of Sebastopol, because any preparations at that place adequate for the seizure of Constantinople must necessarily be known at Constantinople, and to our consuls in the Black Sea and elsewhere, in time enough to enable the Porte to form an opinion as to whether her security was menaced or not; and the moment she heard that more ships were being built at Sebastopol, or that

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troops were under orders to assemble there in extraordinary numbers, she would at once admit the fleets of her allies, which were always close at hand in the Mediterranean, into the Black Sea. What, on the other hand, did we propose to do? We made a proposition which, under the pretence of limiting the naval force of Russia, created so extraordinary a preponderance against her that nothing but the salvation of the empire would bring her to think of accepting it. Russia was to have in the Black Sea only four ships of war; Turkey was to have as many; and any one of her allies might bring in as many more. Besides these, the fleet of Turkey within the Bosphorus, and the fleets of her allies in the Mediterranean, were to be without any limit of number. It was impossible not to see that if Sebastopol was a standing menace to Turkey, such a condition of things would be a standing menace to Russia. The real question for consideration was, of these propositions which would be the more likely to secure a safe and permanent peace? He apprehended that proposition of the two which, being as useful to us, would be less degrading to Russia. He was told that Russia was perfidious. Would she be more likely to adhere to an ignominious treaty? Would she not rather be always endeavouring, at Sebastopol or elsewhere, secretly to collect a navy of greater force than she was bound by treaty to keep, and plotting and contriving to sow dissension among the allies, in order that she might have an opportunity of striking off her fetters, in the very same spirit in which Turkey had striven to strike off the fetters of Kainardji and Adrianople? But Russia rejected our proposals as ignominious to herself; and were they not so? Should we, had we been in the position of Russia, have been ready to accept such terms? It was wise policy when we negotiated for peace with a powerful adversary to consider his honour as well as our own.
But he was told that we should compromise our honour if we left the Crimea without taking Sebastopol. That he believed to be an idea utterly without foundation in truth. Our troops had throughout the war sustained, and even increased, the military reputation of the British army. Though we had not yet taken Sebastopol, he was inclined to share the opinion of those who believed that we should if we persevered a little longer; and how then
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could there be loss of honour in withdrawing from an enterprise in which we were nearly certain to succeed if we persevered, simply because we had in another way accomplished, during its progress, the very political objects for the sake of which that enterprise was undertaken? An army which had won all the battles in which it had been engaged, and which had been reinforced as ours had been, could not with any truth be represented, either in the East or in the West, as a defeated army, or an army which had capitulated—for that phrase had, forsooth, been used—merely because it was withdrawn at the conclusion of a just and an honourable peace. Again, when hon. Gentlemen talked of our yielding to Russia and truckling to that Power, one would think that we had been making concessions, whereas all the concessions that had been made were made by Russia, instead of to her. A peace upon the terms now offered could not be otherwise regarded than as an admission on the part of Russia of her own inferiority and of our success in the prosecution of the war. But the alternative was, that we must take Sebastopol. Well, would that facilitate the negotiation of a peace? Would not such a defeat render it almost a political necessity for the rulers of Russia to endeavour to remove their disgrace; and, looking to our own side, would not those who were now clamorous for the prosecution of the war then reject with disdain the notion of concluding a peace on the basis of the Four Points? We should be told that the Crimea was once a dependency of our faithful ally, Turkey—that Russia took it from the Tartars—and that the diminution of the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea required that the Crimea should be either given back to the Porte or placed in safe custody. Who could tell what would come next? Inflated by success, the appetite for war would be likely to grow instead of diminishing, and the circle of objects to be sought for, and terms to be insisted upon, would be liable constantly to enlarge, under the guidance of those who aimed at nothing less than to strike a mortal blow at the life of the Russian Empire. Some very distinguished persons had already been heard to mention the name of Poland in ominous tones, and it was said that the
present constitution of that country was a standing menace to Germany; but surely it would be most unwise to plunge Europe in a war of which no man could foresee the

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end, for the sake of disturbing existing territorial arrangements in that quarter.
Again, we were told that our interests in India were involved, and that the progress of Russia in Asia was so formidable, that, in order to check it, we must carry on our military operations in that continent also. Depend upon it that if we once adopted the principle of changing what was originally intended as a defensive war into a war of aggression, we should be putting Russia in the right, and making the struggle she is now waging, a struggle pro aris et focis, which must be most protracted in its duration, and lead to countless disasters and misfortunes. We saw the beginning now; but no man could tell what might be the end. No man could tell how the British constitution itself might work under such a war; what a pressure might be laid by it upon our system of domestic government; what burdens and privations our happy and industrious people might have to endure. Such a contest might also produce the most deplorable effects on our foreign alliances; for, in our own times, we had seen those who had been our best friends become our bitter enemies, while those who had once been our foes had become our closest allies. We should therefore take warning from the past, and not adopt a course which might estrange those on whose support we now counted. If the cause were one of duty or necessity, all these risks ought to be patiently endured; but the objects we fought for in an aggressive war were purely imaginary, not real, and could never be reconciled with the interests or the true honour of a civilised and Christian nation.
LORD STANLEY: Sir, I know well the difficulty which any private and ordinary Member of this House has to face, when he attempts to occupy your attention, however briefly, after such displays of eloquence and debating power as those which on the present and preceding night have so well and worthily sustained the reputation of the English Parliament. At such a time, and on such a question, I speak only from a deep sense of responsibility and of duty: I do so because, long as this war and the negotiations precedent to it have lasted, the present is the first occasion on which it has been possible for this House to express, with any prospect of a practical result, its opinion on the course of policy to which we as a nation stand committed. I accept, therefore, the Motion of my right hon. Friend—a Motion which
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I mean to support—less on account of the censure which it carries against the Government, well deserved though I hold that censure to be—than because of the opportunity which it affords of ascertaining more clearly and distinctly, in terms more definite than have been hitherto employed, what are the real objects of the war, what the prospects, if any, and what the conditions of peace. I say that we are discussing these subjects for the first time. In 1853 Parliament separated, thinking war indeed probable but not certain; the recess was occupied in negotiations; those negotiations were secret (I do not complain that they were so, it is the practice, I am merely calling attention to the fact); they were necessarily left altogether in the hands of Government; they were unsuccessful, and at the commencement of 1854 Ministers came down to the House and told us, "All has been done that can be done: our efforts to prolong a state of peace have failed; diplomatic resources are exhausted, and war has become inevitable." They appealed to us for aid to carry on the war; we admitted it to be inevitable, we submitted to necessity, and we supplied, as we were bound to do, the means which Government declared to be necessary for the efficient carrying on of operations. But no opinion was then asked, none was expressed as to whether, by a better mode of conducting negotiations, war might not have been avoided. That was not, for the moment, a practical question. It would have been idle, at the very moment of commencing hostilities, to talk about terms of peace; for that it was necessary to wait until both sides were willing to negotiate; but the case is different now. A year has elapsed, a campaign has been gone through, great battles have been fought, negotiations are reopened, conferences have been held (whether now broken off or only suspended I know not), and surely now, if ever, the time has arrived when we ought to ascertain clearly and specifically what are the objects of the war. Those objects cannot be defined until we settle in our own minds what we believe to be the causes of the war. On that subject two different, and even opposite theories are entertained. There are some who think that—England and Russia standing forward as the types respectively of constitutional and despotic government—this contest, though by diplomatic skill it might have been for a while deferred, was yet in its nature inevitable,

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and must have come sooner or later. To those who hold that doctrine it is comparatively immaterial whether our diplomacy was well or ill conducted, since, in their view, its failure merely precipitated by a little an inevitable result; but my belief, and that of most impartial persons who have studied the evidence before them, is, that the war was not inevitable; that it was not a war deliberately foreseen, and entered upon by either country in consequence of a predetermined purpose; but that it was a war whose origin was most accurately described by the Foreign Secretary, when he said that we had "drifted" into it. Can it be said that Russia has forced it on? Look at the Memorandum of 1844; look at the secret correspondence of 1853; in both you find expressed the same desire—a desire the sincerity of which there is no reasonable cause to dispute—a desire to stand well with England, whatever might be the relations of Russia with other Powers. Why do I mention this? Because, in my judgment, at least, it affects the whole nature and character of the contest. If this war be, what many desire to make it, a war of principles; if the antagonism between the two countries be the necessary result of their political position, then, indeed, it is useless to negotiate, idle to talk of peace, and all we have to do is to reconcile ourselves as best we may to the situation of affairs, and carry on the struggle with all our energies, until one or other of the combatants shall be destroyed. But if, as I believe, the war was brought about merely by the accident of diplomatic mismanagement, then it assumes a very different character, and the question may reasonably be asked, "Are we fighting only to protect our ally, or with any ulterior object?" There are but two objects which it is possible to propose to yourselves; one is the protection of Turkey, the other the humiliation of Russia and the destruction of her power. If you aim at the latter, if you really seek to humble Russia, and to destroy her preponderance in the scale of nations, then, I say, the means you are employing are utterly, even ludicrously, inadequate. That object is not to be accomplished by a siege of Sebastopol, by a Crimean campaign, or a blockade of the Baltic and Black Sea: you must be prepared to expect from the nature of the people, and of the country with which you have to contend, an obstinate and long-protracted resistance. What is Russia? She is a Power weak for offence,
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strong for defence: her aggressive strength is not great, because her navy is worthless, and her armies, from want of an efficient Commissariat, suffer more than those of any other nation, when engaged in distant operations; but at home she is protected by her climate, by the immense space which an invading army must traverse, by the military spirit of the people, and by the low state of her civilisation, which war scarcely disturbs. In such a war—a defensive war, a national war, a war for her independence and for her very existence—she is powerful enough to occupy us for many years. Well, then, what are the means by which, and who are the allies by whose aid, we are to carry on such a struggle? It will not be argued that the Turkish armies can give us much help beyond the frontiers of their own country, nor yet that we can reckon on the co-operation of Austria and Prussia. Fortunate will it be if we can even reckon on their neutrality. We stand then alone, fighting by the side of France. Is it the interest of France—is it the interest of that dynasty which now fills the throne of France, to protract indefinitely a struggle of this kind, and to crush that Power which has always been held the firmest support of absolute government in Europe? For remember that in such a contest as you now propose, mere force of arms will not be sufficient. You may say now, and you may sincerely desire and intend it, that this shall be a war of Governments only; but ere long you will be driven to employ other means and to fight with other weapons. An internecine war with Russia must in its nature become a war of principle; you must raise against her Poland, Finland, Circassia, all the various countries on whose freedom she has from time to time trampled, and which she has incorporated with her empire; you will have to sow dissension and discord in the empire of Russia herself. But let the House recollect that if once they embark in a revolutionary war, that is an enterprise from which there is no possibility of receding with honour. Its influence will not be confined to those countries in which it originates. It is more than probable that Italy and Hungary will have something to say to such a quarrel. If they do, you have at once raised against you every despotic Government in Europe. There may, indeed, be some persons (I have not heard such language held in this House, but it is held frequently out of doors) who, foreseeing these results, and

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being prepared to face these risks, think that a war on this principle ought to be undertaken, and that it is the duty of England to stand forward and support the principle of nationalities. But is it in the power of England consistently and reasonably to do this? What does the principle of nationalities mean? If it has any meaning, it means this—that no State, however small its area, however numerically feeble its inhabitants, or however low their state of civilisation, shall be forcibly subjugated by any other and stronger race. I say, Sir, that against that principle the existence of the British Empire at the present day is a living and a standing protest. How can we, who maintain in India the most widespread military despotism that the world has ever seen—how can we, of whose colonial dominion one-half has been forcibly torn from other Powers, nay, who even here at home have united at least three distinct nationalities in one single empire—affirm that we are too free, too pure, too liberal, to tolerate the existence in any other part of the world of a despotism consolidated by conquest? Why, the assertion by us of such a principle will be received with ridicule throughout Europe. In nations, as well as individuals, the power of self-deception is immense: yet, allowing for its influence, other nations will find it hard to believe in our sincerity, and will regard us with a natural distrust. But I pass over that consideration; nor do I stop to compare (though it is a momentous question) the evils caused by despotism with those which a state of revolutionary anarchy may produce: but I ask of this House, responsible as it is for the interests of the empire—I ask of you, trustees not only for the present generation, but for posterity, whether you have a right, for the sake of any vague and remote results to be produced upon the future of the human race, to enter on a course which must inevitably be productive of great financial injury—perhaps of financial ruin—to this country? Setting aside, for argument's sake—though it is a consideration which you have no right to set aside—the claims of patriotism—I deny that the world at large, I deny that the human race, will be gainers. I believe that by crippling the resources and lessening the influence of this country, you will inflict upon the civilisation of mankind a deeper wound and a graver injury than can be compensated by the benefits, ten times
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told, of Polish nationality re-established, or Hungarian independence restored.
I may be asked, of what use is it to argue thus, when on all sides there exists a perfect agreement that we are fighting only for the protection of Turkey. That such an agreement of opinion exists in his House I allow, and I rejoice in the fact: but that is far from being the case out of doors. If the nation once thoroughly understood that the sole purpose of this war was the protection of our ally, and that no ulterior object was aimed at, I believe that the violence of popular feeling, the unreasoning desire to fight for mere fighting's sake, the unwillingness to listen to any moderate proposal of reconciliation, which now throws so many obstacles in the way of diplomatic proceedings, would be, if not at an end, at least greatly mitigated. There are not many persons who will come forward boldly, and say, "Your object in this war is to crush the power of Russia;" but there are many who, not taking the trouble exactly to understand their own meaning, but using a vague word which may mean anything, will tell you, "It is not necessary to crush Russia; but it is our business to humble her." Others contend only, that, having entered on the war, we are bound to proceed with it, until at least we secure some considerable military advantage. On that latter subject I shall say nothing: a right hon. Gentleman who spoke last night has sufficiently disposed of the theory of fighting, not for terms of peace, but for glory: but this I do affirm, that of all the impolitic ideas which ever entered the brain of man, none can equal in impolicy that of humbling an enemy whom you do not intend to crush. I do not speak the language of the Peace Society—I will give you the opinion of one who was no squeamish politician, no sentimental philanthropist, but one of the profoundest students of human nature and of political science that the world has yet produced. Macchiavelli, in his Prince, has said—
"We must never lose sight of this maxim—either make a man your friend, or put it out of his power to be your enemy. He may revenge a slight injury, but a great one deprives him of the power of revenge. Hence the injury should be so great, that we should have nothing to dread from his vengeance."
These are wise words; and they apply to nations as well as to individuals. They clearly indicate the only alternative which you have before you: either to settle this

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quarrel on fair and equal terms, respecting the honour of Russia as your own; or else to make up your minds to an internecine war. Between the two there is no middle course: if for the last alternative you are not prepared, you have no choice except to abide by the former. It is argued, "We must have Russia weak, not that we desire to injure her, but for the safety of Turkey." Sir, I doubt whether the state of the Turkish Empire can in any case be a state of safety. Her chief dangers are internal. A feeble Government, a corrupt system of administration, and a barbarous people, expose her to continual peril. But if it be meant that a security is required for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey against foreign aggression—in that theory I agree. But then the question arises, what is a security? The only point of difference between the terms offered on one side and those which will be accepted on the other—the only condition which the Allied Governments seek to impose, and which Russia refuses to concede—is the limitation of the Russian fleet.
Suppose that concession made, what then? No material guarantee for the security of Turkey will have been gained. The Russian armies in Georgia will remain still unreduced—there is no principle of limitation there applied—and what security have you if, while you guard Constantinople from the sea, a Russian army can at any moment sweep through Asia Minor, occupy the most fertile half of the empire, cut off the Persian trade, and encamp within fifty miles of the capital? That is of the two the more real and the more imminent danger. Russia is formidable, not as a great naval, but as a great military Power; yet, while you insist on the principle of limitation, you apply it only to her navy. I have shown that your third point contains no safeguard against an invasion of Turkey by land; but it does not even protect her against invasion by sea. The distance from Odessa or Sebastopol to the Turkish territory is short: a surprise is easy: there is no limitation of the number of transports which Russia may have in the Black Sea; nor can you prevent any number of troops being concentrated in those seaport towns. It is transports, not men of war, that are needed to carry over an invading force. Your security, therefore, even if you enforce it, secures nothing; but what guarantee have you for the observance of the terms imposed? You say,
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the limitation of the Russian fleet is a security for Turkey. Yes; but where is the security for the continued limitation of the fleet? No stipulation is so easily evaded as one which limits a naval force. To say nothing of ships which may be built ostensibly for trading purposes, and which will require only a little change to turn them into men of war, nor yet of the difficulty of ascertaining accurately what is passing in Russian dockyards, would England go to war because one ship had been added beyond the number agreed on? How easy the excuse, that that ship had been built to replace one which was decayed, and would be immediately withdrawn! When once peace has been made, when the military spirit has subsided, and when the nations are again disarmed, very large infringements of such a stipulation as the Government propose will be tolerated in preference to recommencing hostilities. What, then, is the use of this paper guarantee? You must rely, after all, on one of two things—either on the good faith of Russia, or on her fear of being involved in war by a breach of the treaty; but those same circumstances act already as securities for the integrity of Turkey. If Russia will not be bound either by good faith or by fear, the condition which you impose is useless; if either of those motives will influence her conduct, then that same condition becomes needless and superfluous. If Russia will abstain from increasing her fleet, lest by so doing she should provoke an European war, surely you have precisely the same reason to suppose—you have an equal moral security for it—that the same fear of war will restrain her from violating the independence of a European State. The condition, therefore, is valueless as a safeguard: it has no practical meaning, except as a defiance and an insult.
Precedents, no doubt, have been urged, and parallels cited, where terms limiting naval force have been submitted to by nations not less powerful than Russia. But it is easy to show that none of those precedents apply to the present case—that nowhere has the expedient answered its purpose, except in the single instance of the American lakes, where both England and the United States bound themselves to maintain no ships of war. But here the case was wholly different, because no ships except those of the two contracting Powers navigated, or could navigate, those lakes, so that danger from the interference of a third party could not exist. But with

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the Black Sea it is otherwise; there is there a free communication with the Mediterranean, and no material obstacle exists to the entrance of ships of all nations.
It is contended by many, and among them by persons well qualified to judge, were not their passions sometimes stronger than their reason, "We care little about terms of peace; only let us not make peace without taking Sebastopol, or achieving some decided military success." Is the House prepared to accept that theory? Is it prepared to affirm that peace shall never be made except after decisive victory? Because if so, understand it clearly, you are declaring that there shall be one law for England and another for all other Powers. If you allow that what is necessary for the honour of this country may be necessary also for that of Russia, if she too is to lay down the same principle and abide by it, then peace at any time becomes impossible, and the war is rendered interminable. But it is absurd that two great nations should continue to fight when little or no difference exists between them as regards terms of peace, merely because it is necessary that the honour of one or the other shall be satisfied by some signal success. Further, it is easy to say now that if you can only conquer in the field you will be content with moderate terms; but will it be so? Will not the expectations and demands of the country rise in proportion as the power of enforcing them increases? Will it not be argued plausibly, that those conditions of peace, with which, when victory seemed doubtful, we might have been well content, are below our acceptance now when our enemy lies prostrate at our feet? And will not the prospect of peace recede further and further, as every battle gained gives strength and encouragement to the party of war?
There is, I am aware, a feeling of disappointment in the public mind that more has not been effected by our armies; and there are those who think that England has not in this contest sustained her military reputation. But the best way to come to a fair conclusion on that point, is to reverse the relative positions of the two contending parties, and suppose the enemy's case our own. Suppose, then, that we had invaded a neighbouring State. Suppose that our invasion had been repelled with a vast loss of life—that our territory had been invaded in return—that our navy had been swept from the sea,
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shut up in our harbours, or sunk as a defence, that a strict blockade had been established along all our coasts, that in three pitched battles we had been defeated, should we, because the enemy had undertaken the siege of one place which he had not yet succeeded in capturing, contend that such a state of things redounded to our military honour? Compare, then, what we have done and suffered with what has been done and suffered by the enemy, and it will be plain that in the eyes of Europe we have lost nothing of our reputation. It may he asked, "If you are for peace, why not name your terms of peace?" To that question I answer, first, that to fix the precise conditions of a treaty belongs to the Executive; next, that in this struggle we do not stand alone. We are fighting by the side of an ally: it is not enough that the terms offered should satisfy us, they must satisfy him also; and all that Parliament can do is to mark generally its readiness to acquiesce in any honourable peace. But this at least is certain, that if we are to entertain any hope for the future, we must mark our sense of what is past. The Resolution of my right hon. Friend declares that the conduct of Government has been vacillating, and their language equivocal. I believe that to be the truth. If two years ago the language of Ministers had been plain and their conduct decided, I believe in my conscience that war would not have broken out. If you had told Russia that any aggression on Turkey would be held a casus belli, she would have taken the hint, and the Pruth would never have been passed; if, taking an opposite course, you had warned Turkey that it was not your intention to interfere in her behalf, she would have accepted the Russian interpretation of the Vienna Note, and peace might still have been preserved. But instead of taking either of these decided and intelligible lines of conduct, you lured on the Government of Russia by the ambiguity of your speech, and the vacillation of your purpose—you led them to believe that they had no opposition from you to expect—and then turned upon them at the moment when they had committed themselves to an aggressive policy, and when it was too late to recede with honour. That is the fault I find with the earlier stages of these proceedings; and as regards what has been done at Vienna, I find this grave fault—that the only point on which the British Government insisted was one which

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Russia could not be expected to concede, and which, if conceded, would have been utterly without value. Yet on that point the conferences were broken off, as if there were no other means of guarding Turkey against aggression, and of counterbalancing the power of Russia in the East, besides that one expedient of limiting her fleet. On these grounds I acquiesce in the Resolution of my right hon. Friend, regarding it as, and avowing it to be, a vote of censure. I do so in the interests of peace. I have little confidence in those Gentlemen, who, occupying the opposite bench, are by courtesy styled a Government. I can scarcely hope that the First Minister, whom I respect, but who in his half-century of public life has always seemed to aim at the show and semblance rather than at the reality of success, and who has never scrupled to court the popularity of the moment, will, in these his last days of administrative existence, pursue a more exalted object, and aspire to a more enduring fame. But I have confidence in the clear perception, the dispassionate judgment, and the resolute will of England's Imperial ally. I have confidence, too, in the people of England. They may be misled for a moment by passion, or duped by political intrigue; they may, and it is their greatest political failing, allow a small and clamorous minority to usurp their name and to misrepresent their wishes; but ere long the sound practical common sense of the nation reasserts itself, and I believe that a year will not pass before the country with one Voice will ask, "Tell us for what we are fighting—tell us, if we are victorious, what will be the results of victory—tell us what recompense we may expect, save only some barren wreaths of glory, for the sacrifice of uncounted treasure, and for mourning and misery entailed upon a hundred thousand English homes?"
MR. LAYARDtrusted the House would bear with him while he addressed them very shortly upon this important question. Before entering upon it he begged to thank the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) for the courteous notice he had taken of him and the kind advice which he had offered. The account which the right hon. Gentleman had given of what passed between them was strictly correct; for before entering the House he had no idea of the Resolution which the right hon. Gentleman was about to submit; but the moment he heard of the intention of the right
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hon. Gentleman to raise this discussion he at once ceded his right of preaudience. He had refused the request of hon. Friends on that side of the House to postpone his Motion, but he thought this question one of so much importance that everything else, however in itself important, should give way to it; he wished the House, however, distinctly to understand that his Motion was only withdrawn for a time, and that it was his intention to bring it forward upon the first Motion for going in to Supply after the Whitsuntide recess. He was also obliged to allude to what took place yesterday, lest he should be liable to some misrepresentation. He certainly did attend a meeting, called by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and had the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) invited him to a meeting he should probably have thought it his duty to attend to that also. He was no party man; he desired to hear what every one had to say; and when the noble Lord invited him, he went to hear what would be announced to his supporters on that occasion. As the hour was already late, he should endeavour to confine himself strictly to the subject before the House, and he ventured humbly to think he could throw some light upon it. He would recall attention to the origin of the war—for we were fast forgetting what we went to war about—and he thought he should demolish some of those splendid fallacies which had been advocated with so much eloquence by the right hon. Gentleman who sat behind him. What was the origin of the war? The Christians of Turkey were a population gradually increasing in wealth and prosperity; of their progress there was daily evidence; and the Sultan, a benign and beneficent ruler, was anxious to give protection to all his subjects. He did not mean to say that acts of oppression had not been perpetrated in the provinces; he had himself witnessed and protested against them; but those acts did not proceed from the central Government, and the central Government was no more responsible for them than was the Government of this country for any act of tyranny or outrage which occurred in a poor-house or other public establishment. He believed it was the main object of Russia in this war with Turkey to check that prosperity and put an end to that intelligence which was spreading among the Christians in Turkey. That it was so was no longer an opinion of his; it was an opinion which was warranted

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by the manifestoes of the late Emperor of Russia and the circulars of Count Nesselrode. The House would remember Prince Menchikoff's mission and its attendant circumstances. The mission ended with a Vote which, as an ultimatum, included all the demands which Prince Menchikoff made upon the Porte. That ultimatum stated that Russia desired to have those privileges granted to the Christian subjects of the Porte, professing the Greek religion, which were enjoyed by all members of foreign legations in Turkey. That was as much as if a foreign Power called upon this country to give to its Roman Catholic subjects all the privileges which were enjoyed by foreign missions in this country. After giving that ultimatum, Prince Menchikoff left Constantinople. The Sultan then issued a firman, which was communicated to the representatives of the Powers in Constantinople, and which guaranteed to the Christians all religious privileges and immunities, and confirmed any treaty in existence affecting them. Prince Menchikoff, when he heard of that firman, wrote a letter to the Grand Vizier, stating that he considered it an insult to the Emperor, his master, who did not want for the Christians religious but political privileges; so that that matter, he believed, was placed beyond all dispute. In consequence of the withdrawal of Prince Menchikoff, a conference was opened at Vienna, and that conference resulted in the celebrated Vienna Note. The modifications which the Turkish Government suggested in that Note were at first rejected both by England and France; but afterwards, when Count Nesselrode admitted that the interpretation which the Turkish Government had placed upon the Note was the interpretation Russia intended the Note should bear, there was not one Power in Europe, Prussia included, which did not declare that the Note could not be accepted by the Porte—that if the Porte accepted the Note with the interpretation placed upon it by Russia, she would forfeit her independence and place her Christian subjects at the mercy of Russia. It was upon the rejection of the Vienna Note that war broke out. He would not now stop to consider how far they were likely to obtain privileges for the Greeks, commensurate with the privileges which Russia insisted they should have, and how far the "Four Points" gave them those privileges. It had been said that, after all, there were no sufficient objects
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for this war; but would Russia, he asked, have gone to war if there had not been some great objects which she wished to attain? Surely, if the difference were so small and the modifications so trifling as was attempted to be proved, Russia would not have rejected the Vienna Note or gone to war, in order to insist upon the interpretation which she had placed upon it. He should always think, like the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), that if at that time we had held a dignified tone Russia would not have gone to war. He attributed this war to two things:—First, to the uncertain and ambiguous tone assumed by Her Majesty's then Government; and next, he regretted to say, to the tone adopted by the hon. Gentlemen behind him (Mr. M. Gibson and Mr. Bright). He did not mean to cast blame upon them, but unintentionally they were the main cause of the war. Having through ambiguity and uncertainty of conduct and language gone to war, we commenced with some capital mistakes. He thought the greatest of those mistakes was, the declaration that it was not intended to make any territorial changes in Russia, because such a declaration solemnly made was giving a premium to Russia to carry on the war, and preventing the Western Powers reaping any positive benefit from it. With respect to the conferences held at Vienna, to which the noble Lord was sent as negotiator, it was said by many Members that the first two points were insignificant, but that the third point was of great importance. He totally differed from hon. Members upon that subject, and he thought he should show that in the first and second points—in the first more particularly, but in the second also—we committed a most capital error. As usual, we went to Vienna and placed ourselves in the hands of Austria. The first proposal on the first point emanated from Austria. Austria proposed the mixing up of the three principalities, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia; she said that the decree to regulate the government of these provinces was to be referred to the European Powers, that no armed interference should take place on the part of the Porte without a corresponding interference on the part of the protecting Powers, and she finished by a declaration that it would be an act of criminality for the inhabitants to interfere in the management of their own affairs. Those terms were not accepted exactly, but with very slight modifications. Why were the affairs of the three Principalities,

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which were perfectly distinct, mixed up together? The treaties which affected Moldavia and Wallachia were perfectly distinct from those which affected Servia. But Austria wanted to have the right of interference in Servia, and that was her object in making it appear that those three Principalities stood upon the same footing. But Prince Gortchakoff, that able diplomatist, saw through the scheme of Austria, and he pointed out that Servia did not stand on the same ground as the other Principalities. He knew that Austria by establishing a protectorate there would have the power of exercising great influence over the Slavonic population of Turkey. Prince Gortchakoff knew—though our Plenipotentiaries, probably, scarcely knew anything of Servia, or whether it was inhabited by Slavonians or by any one else—he knew that Austria, if she once got a footing there, might so use her power as to overthrow Russian influence in Turkey in Europe. But the point was not settled, for he suggested, as he always did on any question of importance, that it should remain over till the treaty was signed. It would be found that, whenever a question of great importance was raised, Prince Gortchakoff always got quit of the difficulty by putting off the discussion of it till after the treaty was signed, knowing very well that rather than go to war again we should probably accede to his views on the subject. Much had been said as to attending to the wishes of the Principalities with reference to their government; but how, in present circumstances, was this possible? The Principalities were now under Austrian bayonets; and here he must say it appeared to him extraordinary that the noble Lord, our Plenipotentiary, the leader of the constitutional party in this country, should have put his name to the protocol determining the first point at the conference. What did that first point decide? The article stated that, in the event of the internal tranquillity of the Principalities being compromised, no armed interference should take place without being the subject of agreement between the high contracting parties; and it was stipulated at the close not to allow the inhabitants to meddle with matters dangerous to the tranquillity of their own country and of neighbouring States. What did that mean? It meant that no change whatever should take place in the Principalities; that, however liberal in feeling and however remarkable for intelligence
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the inhabitants might be, no change whatever should take place in their circumstances. It was astounding that the noble Lord, who was always the advocate if constitutional doctrines in this country, and the representative of the great constitutional party, should have affixed his name to a protocol which had in it such an article as this. If hon. Gentlemen knew the state of these provinces, they would see that this article extinguished every hope that might arise of a Christian nationality in Turkey, crushed every chance of liberal government in that country, and put an end to the progress of civilisation in those provinces. Did the House recollect the protest of the Servian Senate, which was laid on the table some time ago? That protest was drawn up with an energy, a dignity, and an independence that reflected the greatest credit on the Servian nation; it contained an indignant remonstrance against the interference of Austria, stating that, whatever Injuries they might have received from Russia, they feared Austria still more, and should be prepared to oppose her interference, if necessary, by force of arms. To Austria, however, by the concession of their first point, was given the right and power to interfere directly in the affairs of the Principalities. Let him next ask, had the Porte ever interfered with Wallachia and Moldavia? These were not provinces conquered by the Porte, and had never been treated as such. They became annexed to the Sultan's dominions by treaty, under which the Porte was bound to observe certain conditions, which she had invariably kept. It was Russia that had interfered in the affairs of the Principalities. From claiming the right to speak to the Porte, on behalf of her Christian subjects in Wallachia and Moldavia, Russia had gone on to assume the right of protection over them. When the revolution in Servia took place in 1853, and a new and a liberal Government was established, did the Porte interfere to put an end to it? No, it was Russia that interfered—the Porte it was that afforded an asylum to the Members of the new Government, and enabled them afterwards to return to their own country. It was the same in the other Principalities. In 1848 Russia interfered to drive out the liberal party from those Principalities, and the Porte afforded them an asylum and enabled them subsequently to return. But, if we sanctioned this proposed protectorate—if this protocol

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were to be carried into effect—we should sanction the interference of both Austria and Russia, and of them alone, for to talk of the interference of the other Powers was absurd, in all the internal affairs of those countries. England and France were too distant to take a practical interest in their concerns. He repeated that it was to him astounding that a man like the noble Lord should ever have put his name to such an article. The next point referred to the navigation of the Danube. Great credit was claimed for the concessions that had been obtained from Russia in this matter; but were they really concessions? By the Treaty of Vienna, Russia admitted the free navigation of the Danube; but we were told that she now consented to build no fortifications on the left bank of the Danube. This, however, she had agreed to in the Treaty of Adrianople; so that here Russia made no concession whatever. Well, but there was a concession in the stipulation that she was not to have a quarantine station there any longer. But what was the use of the quarantine? It was established in consequence of the prevalence of the plague; but there was no plague in the East now, consequently there was no longer any necessity for the quarantine. Could this then be regarded as any concession? But Lord Westmorland raised a question of great importance, which, however, appeared to have entirely escaped the notice of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell). This related to the boundary caused by the stream. Supposing the stream of the Danube should vary—as streams were ever ready to do when running over a marshy soil—and, instead of passing through the Sulina mouth, should pass through St. George's mouth, was the stream so changed to form the boundary? The question was important, because if the stream did vary, Russia might have the power to vary the boundary, and in the case supposed the whole mouths of the river would be in the hands of the Russians; yet this point seemed to have escaped the notice of the noble Lord. Then, by the treaty of Adrianople, the Turks were to withdraw to a certain distance from the Danube, and it became a question whether or not they should now be allowed to build establishments on the river's bank. To that proposal it appeared that Prince Gortchakoff replied that as the Turks were becoming more civilised than they were, there might be no objection to their doing so, but he added "we
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will reserve that point also until the treaty is signed." He asked what then had we gained by the second point? Russia had made concessions that were no concessions at all; she had merely conceded that which she was bound to by the double treaties of Vienna and Adrianople. The next point was the preponderance of Russia by sea. A great deal had been said of our courtesy in allowing Russia to take the initiative; but he would ask any one who had been attached to an embassy whether he could conceive it possible for a Power to make the first offer in such a case as this. A skilful diplomatist like Prince Gortchakoff would be careful not to make the first offer, and he accordingly said he would see what the other Powers would offer first. At this the diplomatists expressed their surprise, and then they made their offer. Count Buol made the first proposition, that the Turkish and Russian fleets should be limited; but his terms were so ambiguous that it did not plainly appear whether the fleet was only to be limited in the Black Sea, or limited altogether. There were two propositions—first, that of the allies, limiting the Turkish fleet; and, second, that of Russia, which in the first place opened the Dardanelles altogether, and in the second closed the Dardanelles, unless on extraordinary occasions, when the Porte might call for the fleets of its allies to come up. Now, with regard to the limitation of the fleet, he quite agreed with those who said that it was most difficult to have a limitation; it was a matter so difficult that it could never be carried out, for they certainly could not go to war if Russia should have one or two ships more than she was entitled to. How then could you enforce the stipulation? It would be impossible. There were a thousand different ways to escape from it. Therefore he put the limitation clause on one side.
The House would recollect that some time ago there was a considerable discussion in that House as to the meaning of certain words which fell from the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies; but that the noble Lord did say that Sebastopol and the Russian fleet should be destroyed was now pretty evident. In the evidence before the Sebastopol Committee there were produced two remarkable despatches from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, written about the time when the noble Lord made the declaration he now referred to in that House; and, if

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there was any ambiguity in the words of the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies, there certainly was none in these despatches. In the second despatch, the Duke of Newcastle directed Lord Raglan to make a careful inquiry into the amount and condition of the enemy's force in the Crimea; the difficulties of the siege, the despatch stated appeared to the Government more likely to increase than diminish by delay, and, as there was no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress of Sebastopol was reduced, and the Russian fleet taken or destroyed, nothing but insuperable impediments should prevent that being done. Therefore, whatever meaning the noble Lord might have wished to give to his words, the intentions of the Government were, at any rate, openly avowed in that despatch.
Now, with respect to the opening of the Dardanelles, would any one tell him that that was not a Turkish question altogether? By an article in the treaty of 1841, His Highness the Sultan declared that he was firmly resolved to maintain the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire, in virtue of which ships of war belonging to foreign Powers were at all times prohibited from entering the Straits in time of peace. That article had been very much misrepresented. Russia had insisted on that article as solely made in her favour; but the fact was, that it was made in favour not of Russia but of Turkey. If the Dardanelles had been opened, Russia would have brought her ships into the Bosphorus upon Constantinople in the recent dispute. But the Dardanelles being closed by treaty against her ships, Menchikoff would not risk a war by bringing down the Russian fleet to back his demands. He believed had the Dardanelles been open, Constantinople would have been in the hands of Russia at this moment. Well, as a great concession, Turkey was to be allowed to call in the fleets of her allies should she be in danger. The right hon. Member for Oxford University had said that if you brought your fleets to Beshika Bay you insulted Russia, and war was inevitable. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I never said that.] He thought it was said by the right hon. Gentleman, but at all events the argument had been used in the debate. But suppose Turkey had the right to call up the fleets of her allies to her aid considering herself in danger, would not Russia look upon that as a declaration of war on the part of those allies? On that
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point, therefore, he did not consider that my concession had been made; and if any, it was by Turkey and not by Russia. Now, let the House consider the fourth point, relating to the quintuple protectorate, and inquire whether Russia in reality conceded anything in reference to that. It was not a treaty which gave Russia a protectorate over persons of the Greek faith in Turkey. The article in the Treaty of Kainardji was the only pretence for that protectorate, though it merely declared that the Sublime Porte promised to protect the Christian religion and the Christian churches, and permitted the representative of the Imperial Court of Russia to make representations in favour of the new church at Constantinople and of those who ministered to it. That provision gave Russia no right to make representations in favour of the Christians generally; but, by a misrepresentation of the treaty, Russia had assumed the protection of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, though the Porte had never admitted the right of Russia in that respect. But now, by the fourth point, the allies were going to concede to Russia that power; and, though other nations were to share in the protectorate, Russia, by a community of religion, would have entire influence over the 12,000,000 of Christian subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion. If you gave the right to the other Powers the Christians of the Greek Church would still go to Russia. If anything in Bosnia happened they would appeal to Austria; and if anything in Syria, they would appeal to France. This united protection would ruin the Christians in the East. It would create constant dispute and constant interference. If complaint was made by the English consul and a pacha favourable to English views, the other Power would complain, and it would be the same if the interference were in favour of the views of the French, the Austrian, or the Prussian consul. There would always be four against one, and the poor Porte would not know what to do. It was this conflict of protectorates—this conflict of influence and interference that Russia wanted. She knew that the Greek Christians were the great majority of the Christian population of Turkey, and they would go to her—and she would use her influence, aided by them, to overturn every Minister who desired to improve the state of the country and of the people. Thus Russia would confirm her influence on Turkey, would undermine

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the Porte, and render the establishment of any independent Christian power in Turkey impossible. It had been said that he only advocated the cause of the Turks; but he told his hon. Friends behind him that the Christians in Turkey would be ruined if things there went on in the way they desired. They were told that it was a capital thing that the Christians in Turkey should be subject to conscription, as that would give them strength, and enable them to upset the Turks. Nothing, however, could be better contrived for the destruction of the Christians, for wherever there was a wealthy Christian, the conscription would always fall on him. During the last few years an immense change had taken place in Turkey. Leave the Christians alone, and the time might come when the Ottoman Christians would take that position in the East which every liberalminded man and every zealous Christian would desire to see them occupy; but he was convinced that injudicious interference would retard that consummation. But to return to the Four Points. He had drawn up a sort of balance-sheet, showing what each of the five Powers had gained and lost during these transactions, and he would read to the House how he made the accounts stand. First of all with Turkey—what had she gained? It was said that she would perhaps be able to advance to the right bank of the Danube, but that was hardly settled yet, and could not yet be called a concession; and she had also gained this, that Russia was no longer to have quarantine. But what did she lose? She lost all that he had just described by the establishment of a protectorate of five Powers, instead of one; she had lost already an immense portion of her army, and a large part of her fleet; she had greatly embarrassed her finances, and she had been obliged to have recourse to a loan; and she would lose in this, that we had confirmed, or were about to confirm, to Russia the possession of Circassia and of those provinces which, though actually already in her hands, had never yet, as was stated by the noble Lord in this House, been acknowledged to be hers; but which now, by the abolition of all former treaties and the admission of the status quo, would be conceded to her. Then, again, from the want of principle in conducting this war, another loss had been inflicted on Turkey by our refusal to support her in her demand for an indemnity from Greece for the invasion of
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Thessaly and Epirus, and the acts of brigandage which had been committed there by the Greek invaders. That was the loss of Turkey. And now for Russia. She had lost a vast number of men, and no doubt she had had to submit to great financial sacrifices; but what was the loss of men and money to a despot in comparison with the loss of prestige—and had she lost that? But what had been her gain? She had given up the sole acknowledged protectorate, in exchange for a conjoint protectorate, but one which she would exercise with our sanction; she gained the extension of her protectorate to Servia, and she gained also the acknowledged possession of Circassia and those other provinces which she had hitherto held, but her right to which had not been admitted. She gained, moreover, an enormous prestige in the East and in central Europe—a prestige which might be fatal to the liberty and civilisation of the world, and which might be a great step to the ruin of Turkey. What had France and England gained? England had gained a glorious battle, had made a glorious charge, and a glorious defence when attacked, and we had raised higher than ever the military reputation of our soldiers. France had made the same gain. But what had we lost? We had shown the world corruption and rottenness within; we had shown that our institutions were far from being as they should be; we had proved that we could mismanage a great war; and we had given the world to believe that, after all, constitutional Government might not be so good as it appeared to be. Thus we had gained nothing but the reputation of our soldiers. France had gained and lost pretty much as we had done. But what had Austria gained? And really, on looking back to the whole course of the transactions, it would appear that, after all, Austria was the only Power which really had gained; but turning to inquire what she had lost, on the contrary, the account was a beggarly row of zeros. She had gained through us the navigation of the Danube; she had gained a right to interfere in Servia and the Principalities—a right the significance and extent of which few hon. Gentlemen were acquainted with; she had strengthened her own position at home; and all this she had gained without the loss of a single man. She had strengthened her position at home; hers had been all gain and no loss. Yet she was still holding aloof, and allowing us to

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fight her battles. It was quite time that the House should know how soon this state of things was to end. He would like to know what was taking place now at Vienna in the conferences, and how long Austria was to keep out of the war? The difficulties of Austria had been explained by the noble Lord; but what he said was not new, and those difficulties had existed for the last two years, and when she signed the treaty of December. The main article of that treaty said that, on the re-establishment of peace on the terms indicated in Article No. 1, France and England could deliberate on the effectual means of obtaining an alliance with Austria, and that was meant to apply to last year. But it was well known that there was a secret article in that treaty. The time had been exhausted in which we were to have her active assistance, to which she was bound by the treaty. How long was that state of things to last? How long was Austria to play off her allies? The whole thing was preposterous. Look at all she had done against us by her occupation of the Principalities. She had enabled Russia to pour her troops into the Crimea. What had Austria done in the Principalities? He had seen a report in the newspapers, drawn up by Mr. Doria, of the Embassy at Constantinople, which showed what Austria had been doing in the Principalities, and how great was the hatred and horror of the inhabitants entertained of Austria. Martial law was proclaimed in the Principalities, villages plundered, the taxes raised 25 per cent, the Principalities were made to pay for the Austrian occupation; and yet we were to sanction and protect Austria in this occupation, Such was the result of the balance sheet.
He now wished to say a few words on the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University (Mr. Gladstone). The right hon. Gentleman had last night, with his unrivalled power of eloquence, built up a superstructure of magnificent and alluring proportions, but on a foundation of sand. The principal argument of the right hon. Gentleman was, that Russia has gradually made concessions until she came now to the minimum, and that it was unwise of us to press her any further, but that we ought to endeavour to meet her. Never was there such an enormous fallacy. What were the concessions that Russia had made? Russia had begun this war by making the most preposterous demands and now that she chose to recede from
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those demands, it was said that we ought to meet her half way; so that for the future, if any Power chose to go to war with another Power, it might make sure of gaining all that it wanted by commencing with the most preposterous demands, and then giving way gently and gently until it got down to its real objects, which then, by comparison, would only seem slight and easy to be granted. Thus it was, in this instance, that, according to the right hon. Gentleman's argument, we must give up something to which we had a perfect right, in exchange for demands for which there was not the slightest foundation. That was the sum total of the right hon. Gentleman's argument. The right hon. Gentleman had asked, what was prestige? Not long ago the noble Lord at the head of the Government was asking what was merit? Certainly there were things which could not be accurately defined, but still it was impossible that any statesman should not know what the prestige of Russia meant, and in what it consisted. But if it could not be defined, it could be felt. It had been admitted that Russia had gained ground by treachery and by fraud; that she had incorporated kingdoms and provinces without the shadow of a claim—and this showed more forcibly than anything else the fallacy of that doctrine which had been laid down in the course of the debate, that we were not to invade the territories of Russia. Russia incorporated a province to which she had no right; we did not admit her right to hold it, though we did not choose to go to war with her on account of it; but when a war did come that stolen province was called part of her territory, and it was said that we were not to invade it. But her prestige was no less an instrument for the extension of her power than fraud and violence. Suppose that England and France were to retire defeated from this contest, did any one doubt that Germany would not at once fall almost under the complete dominion of Russia? With what success had we been endeavouring to induce the minor States of Germany to join us; and why did they not come to our side? Because they feared Russia. Was there no prestige in the East? If we withdrew our troops from Sebastopol, it was all very well for hon. Gentlemen to say that the people of Europe would be able to judge whether we had succeeded in our object or not; but what would be the feeling of the people of the East, who were influenced by appearances, and who knew

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that we started with attempting to take Sebastopol, and that we would have taken it if we could? They, at least, could not be made to think that our troops sat down there to carry out a mere sham, and if they saw our army retire they would conclude that it had failed, and they would not stay to inquire the why or the wherefore. The prestige of England in that case would be ruined, and would no longer be felt in Asia Minor, in Persia, and even on the confines of India. It was asked, what is that prestige? It was that which enabled Englishmen and English merchants to travel in security in Central Asia, and pursue in safety the largest commercial avocations in all parts of the world. It was the name and honour of England which alone had secured these advantages. Let that prestige but vanish and England would sink like ruined Venice, like deserted Genoa, and the mercantile cities of the middle ages. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) said our original demands upon Russia were enough; that they were now for the most part conceded; and why, therefore, should we raise them? To that the answer was, that having already succeeded by our efforts in making Russia reduce her pretensions, we had only to proceed further with the contest to secure from her still better terms and conditions more commensurate with the requirements of Europe. But it was said, we must not seek to humble or humiliate Russia. Now, they need not desire to do that; but certainly great Powers of Europe had before this been deprived of territory which they once possessed. The dominions of France once extended to the Rhine, and included Savoy; and, at all events, when we embarked in a war for a great object we must carry it out, and not set out by declaring that we would make no territorial changes. The right hon. Gentleman finished his speech with one of the finest perorations he had ever heard in that House, in which he dwelt on the horrors of war. Really, to hear hon. Gentlemen behind him, one would fancy that those who advocated his (Mr. Layard's) views gloated in war, and wished to make war for its own sake. It was astonishing that right hon. Gentlemen who had lately seceded from the Cabinet should have been so contaminated after sitting a few nights near the representatives of the school in whose close neighbourhood they had taken their places. This unfortunate contamination had been ably pointed out in the very
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eloquent speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman who opened the discussion that night (Mr. Whiteside).
His (Mr. Layard's) own views on this question were, perhaps, more extensive than those entertained by many Members of that House. He did think that this war might have afforded this country a glorious opportunity of doing great good. England might have sustained the ancient reputation which made her great as she was. When Cromwell interposed in behalf of the oppressed Vaudois, he did not ask if our trade would be benefited by such an intervention. He said, "Here is a miserable people of the same religion as ourselves—they shall not be trampled upon, and taking her stand on principle, England will step forward and defend them,"—and they knew what was the result. [An hon. MEMBER here observed, that this was what Russia did in Turkey.] Now he (Mr. Layard) had had some little experience in Turkey, and begged to tell the hon. Gentleman that he had never yet known the Russians interfere to repress a real case of oppression, and he had seen a Greek bishop a suppliant at the British embassy; Russia only interfered when she thought the Greeks were becoming too intelligent and prosperous, and he challenged hon. Gentlemen acquainted with Turkey to contradict that statement if they could. Putting aside his individual views, the Government might have done more even acting upon its own. The protocols admitted that the declaration of war put an end to the pre-existing treaties. Then why revive those treaties? He would not now criticise the expedition to Sebastopol, though he thought it had been undertaken without the exercise of prudence or foresight. Still, the Government might have had information after all, warranting such an enterprise. But the treaties being at an end, why did we not stand on the defensive, and tell Russia that we would have no further protectorate? Neither Servia nor the Principalities required a protectorate. Their inhabitants, if examined at the bar of that House, would tell them that they dreaded Austria and Russia, but had no fear whatever of the Porte. The Sultan was far too humane, and had no disposition to interfere with the rights of his own Christian subjects; and, besides, public opinion was too strong to admit of his doing it even if he were so inclined. He (Mr. Layard) would answer for the disposition of the Porte, and he

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would assert that the Turkish Government would never oppress the Christians, and acts of that kind were never committed with its knowledge or authority. The whole of the protectorates might therefore have been safely abolished. But, if it were thought necessary still to maintain such a protectorate, let it be in the hands of a Sardinian mission or some agency of that kind, which should have authority to carry grievances when they occurred before the notice of the Turkish authorities, in which case they would be almost certain to be followed by redress. The next point to be considered was the proposal for a union of the Principalities. It must be remembered that the Moldavians and Wallachians were of different races, and almost of different religions; and that these provinces separated the two great Slavonian races of the world. It was said that we could not carry on a campaign in Bessarabia; and, of course, without medicine, transport, and other requisites of an army, we could not;—but had not the Russians carried on campaigns in Bessarabia; and could not we, with a properly equipped army, have done the same? The Wallachians, too, might have given us 60,000 effective troops, and afforded us important assistance, if the Austrians had not been allowed to enter the Principalities and prevent it. Russia might have been forced to maintain the defensive, and would not have dared to cross the frontier, while Turkey would have been enabled to husband her resources.
He had entered that House as an independent Member, and had laid on the table repeated Motions, the discussion of which had been stopped from circumstances which he could not control, and in spite of his own conviction of the immense importance of their being fully debated. He had thereby incurred much unmerited odium; but he had felt that a strong expression of opinion in that House might have prevented much of the complications that had arisen. But let him now refer for a few moments to the speech of the noble Lord last night. The noble Lord had said that the fortifications of Bomarsund threatened Sweden, Denmark, and the Northern Powers; and if all the noble Lord had said of Bomarsund was true, it would have deserved a war to destroy it. But, on looking at the protocols, no mention could be found of it. But were they to understand that the Four Points had been thrown to the winds? The noble Lord
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had, on a former occasion, said that they were not fighting for the Four Points, but for great principles. If this were so, he (Mr. Layard) would go with the noble Lord heart and soul, and vote for him night after night. He supposed that Bomarsund was not to be rebuilt, and he saw that the inhabitants of the Aland Islands were to be treated with consideration by Russia; but did any one suppose that these people would not be exterminated? The noble Lord had given them a picture of the corruption that was going on in the German Courts. But what were they going to do with reference to these courts? They were but going to strengthen the bands of their servitude, for there was no mention of them in the protocols. They had heard something of Polish nationality. Were they going to have a new Poland? If so, they ought to have spared the hon. and learned Member who had accepted some unknown office one more night at least to have witnessed his triumph. But, to finish all this, the noble Lord said that he would put himself at the head of administrative reform; but would the Secretary to the Admiralty get up and say that we were to have no more Bomarsunds, that we were to have Germany on our side, and Poland re-established, and have administrative reform also? If so, his (Mr. Layard's) vote was the Government's. But was this only the prelude to something like that which had happened before, when the Cabinet was not warlike enough for the noble Lord, and were they to find him some day again addressing the House from some remote corner of the benches? He wished for an explanation of the speech of the noble Lord. If those which he had expressed were the principles of the noble Lord, the whole country would be with him. Were they the principles of the Government. They had had from the noble Lord last year the same kind of speeches and statements, that the whole Government was with him; and yet, when there was a break up, it was found that half of them were for war, and half for peace. He (Mr. Layard) would say, let there be either peace or war. Where great principles were at stake, you could not go on with these half-and-half measures. If we were to have to war for a mere difference between what we proposed and what Russia proposed, then he said, with his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, that it would be a wicked War, and the man who carried it on incurred

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a guilt which few would be willing to incur. Last year there was no getting the peace party in the Cabinet to state their opinions in the House. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) never spoke on the subject, and those members of the Government most strictly guarded themselves in the matter; but they had now had a declaration from those members of the late Government who were suspected of being of the peace party. What else would the speeches of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) be, if they were not what had been called to-night mouthfuls of moonshine? It would be only deluding the country. What had been the result of such proceedings? Though he did not like to use the word, the result had been disgrace, and there was no use in disguising it. If we had had a united Cabinet should we have gone on as we had? Should we have seen preparations for war put off to the last moment, and a great expedition undertaken in the manner in which it was undertaken? No. We should not have seen such things. What course was the House to take? As an independent Member of the House, he knew not what way to turn. The country did not know whom to trust. When the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) said he would make a definite Motion, he (Mr. Layard) willingly gave way to him, and he regretted to say that he had been deceived in that Motion. It was, perhaps, not the fault of the right hon. Gentleman; perhaps the pressure on him was too great for him? But, under these circumstances, could he (Mr. Layard) trust the right hon. Gentleman and his friends? He was no party man. He would trust any one who could maintain the honour and dignity of the country. There was only one way to get out of the difficulty in which they were now placed. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had proposed an Amendment which appeared to him (Mr. Layard) to be consistent with the honour and dignity of the country. It was a test of the feelings of Gentlemen opposite, and, if they voted for it, and carried it, there would be some hope of them; but as to their own Motion, it was a mere nothing. There was a feeling of distrust gaining ground in the country, and you could not be playing more dextrously into the hands of the Gentlemen who sat behind him than you now were. Those Gentlemen knew that that feeling was to their advantage. He entreated Gentlemen on both sides of
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the House to express themselves definitely, and to let the country know what they really meant. All that the country wanted was the adoption of a definite principle. No minister that ever came into power in this country ever possessed such a prestige as the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston). He (Mr. Layard) did not wish to say much of that noble Lord, for he had not treated him with much courtesy; but there were greater considerations involved than mere personal considerations, and he would ask how had the noble Lord treated the country? Had the manner in which he had treated the country been creditable to that House or to the man who, placed at the head of a great country, might have led it on to glory and honour? He would not refer to scenes which had occurred in that House, for the recurrence to them was too painful. These were great times, and he called on the noble Lord to prove himself worthy of the position in which he was placed. The country was sick at heart, not sick of the war, for they would willingly go to a much greater extent than they had in its prosecution, for they believed it to be just, and that great things would yet come out of it; they were not sick of the war, but they were sick, heartily sick, of those who had the conduct of the war.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has truly said that this is a great country, that we are at present in a great emergency, and that the country will follow any leader who will lead it to honour and to glory. Sir, in spite of what has been said by the hon. Member, or by any hon. Member, on either side of the House, or by those out of it, who have found fault with the conduct of the Government, I venture to affirm that those now intrusted with the conduct of affairs will, as far as human powers will permit, lead the country through this struggle to honour and glory. I cannot say, I think that the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman on which we are now to decide is one befitting the greatness of this occasion or the magnitude of the subject. I could perfectly understand that a great party, which thought that power ought to be transferred to themselves, because those in whose hands it was placed were unequal to their task, should call on the House to pronounce a verdict of a transfer of power from those who hold it to those who wish to possess it; but, if that was the course

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that the party opposite were prepared to take, I must state that I think that this Motion is not suited to the object to which it is directed. I hardly like to descend to these verbal criticisms; but, if you wanted to find fault with the Government, you should have said what you disapproved of, and have called upon the House to express its dissatisfaction. You should have said, that you disapprove of certain conduct. But what is it, in regard to which the House is now called upon to express its dissatisfaction? Its dissatisfaction is invoked for the "ambiguous language and uncertain conduct" of the Government. Well, Sir, I deny that our language has been ambiguous—I deny that our conduct has been uncertain. I say, that if the party opposite are prepared to call down on us the censure of the House they ought to have had a better ground for doing so than that stated in the Resolution. However, I pass that by, and I accept their challenge. They call on the House to express dissatisfaction with our conduct; and, although they are not able to point out those courses to which dissatisfaction may apply, I care not for that, and I am willing to accept the challenge they have given us.
Sir, I heard the speech of my right hon. Friend who spoke last night (Mr. Gladstone) with admiration, no doubt, but also with considerable pain, because it appeared to me, taking the whole of the speech, especially the concluding part, that his opinions were adverse to the war, were adverse to the expedition to the Crimea, were adverse to the terms of peace on which we proposed to conclude the war; and yet my right hon. Friend was a party to all those courses; and I regret that any circumstances should have occurred since he quitted the Government to have so entirely altered his opinions. Now, it appears to me that among the supporters of the various Addresses and Amendments we have to discuss there are those who think, on the one hand, that we have not been sufficiently vigorous in the prosecution of the war, while there are those who wish, on the other hand, to drive the country to a peace upon terms which I think are not consistent with its honour, dignity, and interests. With regard to the origin of the war, it is, I think, unnecessary for me to go into any details or arguments as to its justice and necessity. That justice and that necessity have been admitted by all, except a small number of Members of
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this House. The necessity for the war arose not simply from the particular events which occasioned the rupture. For a long period of time it has been the standing policy of Russia to endeavour to weaken and crumble down, and ultimately to appropriate Turkey as her own possession. As has been openly avowed of late, this was the policy of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander, and of Nicholas; and it was this settled policy of Russia which, breaking out on a particular occasion in a manner which rendered further passiveness impossible, drove this country into a war for just and necessary results. I am not now required to stand up to defend the justice and policy of the war, for the nation is unanimous upon that subject; and I quite agree with the hon. Member who has just spoken that the nation feels, being engaged in the war in a cause which is adequate, and for motives and objects which are worthy the exertions of a great country, that we are bound to carry it on with energy and vigour, and to close it by a peace which will not only be honourable to the country, but which will accomplish the purposes for which it was undertaken. That purpose is the protection and defence of Turkey, not simply on account of any sympathy which we may feel for Turkey as an independent state, but because the balance of power in Europe—an expression which involves the greatest interests of the civilised world—is concerned in preventing the colossal power of Russia from extending over those wide and important territories.
Sir, we have been told that the war has been misconducted. We are ready to admit, that, beginning on a sudden, with a peace establishment, a war with a great antagonist, after a forty years' peace, it could not but be expected that there should be in the administration of the different departments connected with the war mischances and mistakes, which were the cause of great evils at the commencement of our operations. But it has been said that we made a great mistake in going to the Crimea. I contend that that was precisely the expedition we ought to have undertaken, if we meant to bring the war to a successful and speedy termination. It is said, you ought to have sent your armies to Bessarabia, to have given your hand to Austria, to have gone into the Principalities, and to have fought side by side with your Austrian allies. Why, if our armies had gone into Bessarabia, if they had entered

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the Principalities, if they had gone into the interior of Russia, they would have been fighting far away from their communications, they would have had no basis of operations, they would have been far from any supplies and reinforcements, and there was no point which, when achieved, would have produced any important result, or led to any decisive issue of the contest. We went to the Crimea to endeavour to take the fortress of Sebastopol and to capture the Russian fleet, because it was in the Black Sea that the danger to Turkey principally lay; because if we had succeeded in taking Sebastopol and capturing the fleet we should have given Turkey the greatest security from the greatest impending danger. That being our object, it was most important to aim a blow which, once struck, would best accomplish the purpose of the protection of Turkey on the one hand, and, on the other hand, would deprive the Russians of those means of aggression which were most to be apprehended; and, therefore, I say, the Crimea was the place to which our troops could most advantageously have been sent. Then it is said that we put ourselves too much in the hands of Austria, that we trusted to negotiations, and did not, therefore, prosecute the war with sufficient vigour. That statement is utterly unfounded. I think it was sound policy for this country to accept to the utmost the good offices of Austria; it was sound policy for us to endeavour as far as possible to get Austria on our side—in the field if we could—but if she were not prepared to take arms to fight with us, it was at all events of the utmost importance to have her friendly to us, and to obtain her concurrence in policy with England and France—that we have accomplished. It has not suited the policy of Austria to declare herself an active ally; but we have her good offices, we have secured her neutrality; nor let the House imagine that the neutrality of Austria, the armed position in which she has been standing, has not been a powerful military diversion in favour of the operations of England and France. If, instead of engaging by treaty with Turkey to defend the Principalities, she had stood by and allowed the Russian armies to advance towards Turkey in that direction, Turkey would have been obliged to keep a large army on her frontier in order to protect her capital, and we might have been obliged to afford her military assistance for the defence of the heart of her empire. The
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treaty of Austria with Turkey has shut the door to an invasion of Turkey, and has enabled Omer Pasha, with the whole of his valiant army, which prevented the Russian forces from crossing the Danube, to go to the Crimea and co-operate with the troops of England, France, and Sardinia, in whatever operation they may be called on to perform. But, more than that, the Russian Government have been obliged to place a considerable army on the frontier of Gallicia, in order to watch the proceedings of Austria, which army might otherwise have been directed against our operations. It is, therefore, untrue to say that the position of Austria, has been of no advantage to the allies. Then, with regard to the negotiations—would it have been politic or right for England and France to refuse the offers and good offices of Austria in order to obtain, if possible, the consent of Russia to those terms of peace which had been settled between the three Governments. I say that if we had so refused the good offices of Austria, I think we should have exposed ourselves to the severe censure of this House and the disapprobation of the country. We might, indeed, have been blamed if, trusting to the chances of negotiations, we had abstained from taking measures for the vigorous prosecution of the war. But that has not been the case—although we have been negotiating at Vienna, we have omitted nothing that could possibly advance the prosecution of the war, and have acted, in that respect, as if no negotiations had taken place. We have adopted every measure which was calculated, in our opinion, to place our army and navy in a fit state to commence operations in the campaign now about to open. And what has been the result? We have in the Baltic a fleet which is blockading the Russian fleet, and as soon as the ice disappears, and an opening is made for the Russian fleet to come out, the British fleet will prevent it from leaving its ports. We blockade this year as we did last year, the whole of the Russian fleet in its ports in the Baltic, and we have in the Black Sea a fleet fully equal to any services it may be called on to perform. It is quite true that that army during the winter, from various circumstances—from the climate it had to endure, from the labours it had to perform, from the difficulties that it had to contend with—it is quite true that that army was exposed to great and lamentable sufferings. But this is now over, and that army is now in

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a state of perfect efficiency. It is provided with everything that can render it effectual for service in the field; its health is good, its equipment is complete; it is furnished with all the materials of war; the Commissariat arrangements are good, the hospital arrangements are excellent, and nothing has been omitted to render that army fitted to render any service that it may have to perform. Our allies in the Crimea are strengthened. The French army has been reinforced, the Sardinian contingent is arriving, and there is now a large Turkish army in the Crimea. The allies, have, I take it, at the present moment, not less than 200,000 men in the Crimea, and I say, therefore, that so far from having relaxed in our preparations for war owing to our negotiations for peace, we have done everything that, humanly speaking, it has been possible to do to carry on the war, notwithstanding the negotiations in which we have been engaged.
And now, Sir, with regard to those negotiations, I deny that the language we have used has been ambiguous or uncertain. When we have been questioned in this House what we have stated has been exactly the truth—namely, that the conferences were suspended, but that the elements of the conferences have remained; the answers given were invariably in perfect consonance with the existing state of things at the time. Much criticism has been lavished on the conditions in regard to which we have been negotiating. I will not go into the first point or the second point; they relate to the arrangements for the Principalities and the mouths of the Danube. But proceeding to the third point, which is more material, I must remark upon the manner in which my right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone) has been pleased to put the question. He said we had come to an agreement, either actual or prospective, upon three out of the four points and the half of the third point; and that therefore we have got three and a-half out of the four, and were only disputing about half a point out of four points. Why, Sir, that may be a very convenient method of getting out of the difficulty. But suppose that the remaining half of the fourth point referred to the possession of St. Petersburg; suppose it referred to the separation of Poland; suppose it referred to a great diminution of Russian territory, it might then equally have been said, you have got three and a half points conceded out of four, and it is a shame to go on
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negotiating and haggling for the remaining half. Sir, it is not the arithmetical computation that determines the question, but the political value of that half-point. What is that half-point? The third point is divided into two portions, one being that there was to be a revision of the treaty of 1841 for two purposes, one of which was to attach more closely the Turkish empire to the balance of power in Europe. That, I admit, might have been treated with comparative lightness, because there is more of appearance than of comparative value in such a statement. The Turkish empire has in form by the preamble of the treaty of 1841, been recognised as a portion of the European family of nations, and as belonging to the balance of power in Europe. But do you preserve a country from aggression by saying that it forms part of the European system? That clause would not preserve it from conquest by any other Power of Europe, for there is no country in Europe which has been attacked by a stronger Power that has not at the time constituted a portion of the balance of power in Europe. It is, indeed, the admission of a principle, but the practical value of such an assertion affords very little security to Turkey against the aggression of Russia. But the second point is of real value; and to that the Russian Government agreed—namely, that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be made to cease. That preponderance, no doubt, was the source of great danger to Turkey, and its cessation would afford the greatest practicable security to Turkey against the aggression of Russia. So long as Russia had the great harbour of Sebastopol, from which a powerful fleet of eighteen or twenty ships were ready to sally forth at a moment's notice, and carrying a large army, which fleet was within forty-eight hours' distance from Constantinople, it is evident that Turkey is exposed, as my noble Friend (Lord John Russell) has said, to a standing danger, and the existence of that fortress and that fleet is a standing menace to Turkey. Then, Sir, it is obvious that, to give security to Turkey, there must be a reduction in the naval preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. But I understand my right hon. Friend to say, that to insist upon a dimunition of her naval preponderance in the Black Sea is such a humiliation to Russia that it is unwise and impolitic to propose it. But why should it be a humiliation to Russia? Any condition

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by which a Power binds itself not to do that which it has a right to do, and which it desires to do, may be called humiliation; but if Russia is sincere in declaring that she has no intention to invade Turkey or to possess herself of Turkish territory, or to make any attempt against the independence or integrity of Turkey—to say that it would be a humiliation to Russia to prove by her engagements and conduct that her professions were sincere, and that the intentions she has avowed are those she really entertains—is, I think, unwarranted by the facts. But then it is said there is danger to Russia from that proposal, and that Turkey not being limited in the number of her ships in the Black Sea, she might bring in a large fleet from the Bosphorus and the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, with which she might threaten the Russian ports in that sea. This is the first time I ever heard that any security was necessary to be taken from the lamb against the wolf. That Russia should require security against the probability of an attack from Turkey, I own, appears to me to be absurd, and nothing but the most exuberant fancy could induce any person to put that argument forward. But then, on the other hand, we are told that the best security to Turkey would be the opening of the Straits to the ships of all the Powers, and the ability of the Sultan to call in his allies to his aid if his territories were attacked. Why, if Turkey should open the Straits, if we expose the Sultan to have before the windows of his palace any amount of foreign force, we should expose him to the greatest possible danger, and no individual placed in his position would give his consent to such an arrangement, since it would be a source of perpetual danger to the Sultan. But, then, it is said that Russia made a very fair proposal, because, when she claimed the right of having any amount of force she pleased in the Black Sea—twenty sail of the line or any other number—her Plenipotentiaries said that the Sultan might call to his assistance the fleets of his allies. Why, "Thank you for nothing for that," might be the language of Turkey, for the right to appeal to his allies if his territory were attacked is a right inherent in the Sultan as an independent Sovereign. By the treaty of 1841 the Straits were declared to be closed while Turkey was at peace; but will any man tell me that it is not a mere mockery to say that if Russia threatened the territory of Turkey—if a
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Russian fleet were collected and an army were ready to embark to invade the Turkish territory, any treaty would deprive the Sultan of the power of calling to his aid the fleet of any nation that may be ready to assist him to ward off the danger that is impending over him? The Sultan, without any concessions on the part of Russia, would be at full liberty at any moment to call the fleets of England and of France to his aid, if they were near enough, and strong enough to render it. No doubt, with sufficient notice, and with our armaments on a war establishment, the fleets of the allied Powers are sufficient to cope with the Russian fleets either in the Baltic or in the Black Sea. But we are contemplating in this arrangement not a period like the present; the danger is that, on the contrary, at a period of peace, when we have peace establishments, but when Russia, pursuing a system of her own in time of peace, maintains a standing army and fleet of enormous proportions, that an advantage may be gained by Russia when the allied fleets may be weak and at home, far away from the danger that threatened the Sultan, when not a voice can be heard by his allies until the danger has burst over his head, and when their voice cannot be heard in his defence until the blow has been struck. This is the very state of things that we are guarding against. It is all very well for Russia to say that when the Sultan is in danger he may call on you, and you can come to his assistance. That argument, as it was pointed out by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, implies that there is to be aggression on the part of Russia, and that she contemplates it; whereas, says the Russian Plenipotentiary, it is essential to the balance of power that Russia should always have a very large and respectable force in the Black Sea. Yes, "respectable" is the word. Whereas she contemplates that she will keep a force of that amount constantly in the Black Sea, she contemplates also its becoming a hostile fleet; and in that case Turkey has no resource but in France and England to support her. I remember some years ago, when the armies of the Continent were swelled to an enormous amount, and all Europe felt that such large forces could not be maintained in presence of each other without danger of conflict, a proposal was made that France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia should disarm and reduce their armies to a peace establishment. That was agreed to by France,

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Austria, and Prussia, and proposed to Russia. What was the answer? She said, "We think the proposal excellent. France is maintaining an army much larger than is necessary for any defensive operations. Austria is crippling her finances by a ruinous expenditure. Prussia is withdrawing her population from the pursuits of industry by having too large a number of men serving in her ranks. We think a general reduction of force excellent; but it does not apply to Russia. We have only the 800,000 men, which is our regular peace establishment. We have nothing to do to carry the proposal into execution." So it is with her fleet. She has regularly 30 sail of the line in the Baltic; she has from 18 to 20 sail of the line in the Black Sea; and I ask any man what degree of security could Turkey feel she lived in, if, far away from England and France, with England and France reducing their navies to a peace establishment, there were almost within sight of her capital that large Russian force, ready at any given moment to repeat with much more effect, and in a much more skilful, manner, that which a year and a half ago Prince Menchikoff threatened and afterwards carried into effect. You may depend upon it Russia never will commit the mistake again of invading Turkey on the land side. Never again will she commit the mistake of going into the Principalities, exposing her armies to the losses by long marches and to the difficulties on the Danube. It is a much shorter cut from Sebastopol to Constantinople, and with a fleet of sufficient amount the operation is easy and the result does not admit of much doubt. That which appeared to France and to Austria the best security against that danger was to call upon Russia to renounce those local means of attack which predicated at all times danger to Turkey, with which she pretended she had no desire to interfere. For her own defence a fleet in the Black Sea is proved to be utterly unavailing. That which is now passing is a sufficient proof that for the defence of her coast and of her ports any amount of fleet which she can have must be unavailing, and must retire before the fleets of England and France. Against Turkey she needs no defence; against England and France the defence is unavailing. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no pretence on which Russia can refuse to give to Europe a pledge of the honesty of her intentions and her friendly disposition, by consenting
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to limit her naval forces in the Black Sea. I say the right hon. Gentleman has totally misrepresented the value of what he is pleased to call half of the third article, and instead of that being of little value, it contains the very substance of the provision for the security of Turkey.
The hon. Gentleman who spoke last, and others, have extended their views to a wider range. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) seems to imagine that any of those points falls short of what is required to reduce the preponderance of Russia. Nothing can be more unbecoming to a Government than to hold out expectations or boasting intentions beyond what they see their way to accomplish. We are engaged in a great operation in the Black Sea. We trust and hope that we shall be successful in that operation. We think success in that operation will lead to the obtaining those conditions which, in conjunction with France, we have thought, in the present state of the conflict, we have a right to demand. If, unfortunately, the war should take a wider range, and other Powers should take part in it, we have not tied our hands; on the contrary, we have recorded in the protocols our claim to make any additions to the proposals which the events of the war, or special reasons may render right and necessary for the general interests of Europe. Nothing can be more unworthy of a great country, when engaged in a war so important as this, than to hold out expectations which may mislead. I think our duty is to confine ourselves to that to which we see our way, and we do see our way to the success of the operations in which we are now engaged—in spite of all the difficulties which we have had to surmount, in spite of all the mischances which have happened, I think we have turned the point; and with respect to the Government with whom we are contending, I think that Russia, having refused those fair conditions which, in conjunction with France and the approbation of Austria, we have proposed, we are now in a position in which in full confidence we can carry on the operations of the war with a fair prospect of that success which England and France must, and are bound to obtain. I say "must, and are bound to obtain," because I say it is impossible for England and France, when engaged in a great contest, to fail in the accomplishment of that object. It will not be the simple disappointment; it will be the abdication of the proud position which those countries fill,

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and we shall sink into the condition of second-rate Powers. We have heard the right hon. Gentleman dwell upon the miseries and calamities of war. No man can be blind to those miseries. No man can be insensible to the calamities which war entails. But I say there are things worse than war. Dishonour to a country is worse than war. I do not mean worse only as respects reputation; but I say the physical evils which befall a country that descends to a lower rank, and permits herself to be worsted in a conflict, are far greater than the immediate results of war; and, therefore, I say that that party, be they who they may, that would induce this country to depart from the line of conduct which the general opinion of the public points out—the party who would induce the country to abandon the contest in which it is engaged, by making peace on insufficient grounds—grounds neither satisfactory to the country nor securing tranquillity for the future—that party, be they who they may, is one whose opinions, if they could prevail, would be most fatal to the best interests of this country.
I say, then, that this House is called upon to-night to pronounce an opinion upon two great and important questions. It is called upon, first of all, to pronounce an opinion upon the existence of a Ministry. If it turned upon a question of timber or sugar tax, the existence of the Ministry might be a matter of very slight importance, concerning which Parliament might decide simply on personal grounds, without much embarrassing itself as to the consequences. But there is a far greater question which this House has to determine this evening, and that is the policy of the country, the condition in which we are to stand among the nations of the world, our alliances with foreign Governments—I may also say the future reputation and honour, and the deepest interests of England. The obvious object of the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) is, that this House shall pronounce that the Government is incompetent, and, therefore, remove us from office. Well, then, Sir, who are to succeed us? We are told we have not shown administrative ability or united ranks. I deny both the one and the other. Is it in the opposite ranks that we are to look for that perfection and unanimity which is to insure a Government which would answer the wishes of the people? Is that a party which possesses those administrative abilities which you would substitute for the
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Government which sits here? Is that the party—[The noble Lord was here suddenly arrested by the call of "Black Rod," who appeared at the bar to summon the House to hear the Royal assent given to certain Bills. On the return of the House the noble Lord resumed.]—I think I have some reason to complain of the impatience of the other House in not waiting for the censure which the right hon. Gentleman opposite is desirous of inflicting, but in prematurely administering the Rod. I was proceeding to say that the question which the right hon. Gentleman opposite has called upon this House to determine is, that the present Government does not possess its confidence, and is unworthy of its support. The inference naturally to be drawn therefrom, is that some other party is entitled to the confidence of the House and of the country. One reproach made against those who now form the Government is a supposed want of unity of opinion and a supposed disinclination to administrative reform. I was proceeding to ask the House whether they saw on the benches opposite greater unanimity of opinion than they see on those which are occupied by my Friends? If one were to take, for instance, domestic affairs, I ask whether the opinions which would be followed on matters of the highest importance by Gentlemen on the other side of the House, namely, with regard to the education of the people, would be taken from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), or from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). If we are to judge them by our information of their foreign policy, I would ask whether the foreign policy that would be followed by them, especially with respect to the matters now under consideration, would be such as might be inferred from the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside), or from the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn (Lord Stanley)—whether it would be the policy of war with vigour, or of peace on any terms. Then, with regard to administrative reform. Let people be judged by themselves. It is but a very little while ago since the head of that party opposite had a commission to form an Administration. Well, the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), putting the good of his country above all questions of personal ambition or of individual feeling, to his own credit confessed that he had not in the party with

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which he is allied the elements from which he could form a Government suited to the exigencies of the times. That was but a short time ago; and what has happened since which enables those Gentlemen to present themselves with more confidence now, and induces them to declare their readiness to take charge of the great interests of the country? I will leave it to the House and the country to determine the question of preference between them and the present Government. This I will at least admit in their favour, that, judging from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who made this Motion, and also from the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen, and notwithstanding the very different opinion expressed by the noble Lord the Member for Lynn, still judging from the speeches to which I have referred, and from the Resolution now proposed, I am bound to say that, if this House and the country were to transfer the conduct of the Government from our hands to theirs, we have a pledge that to the best of their ability they would carry on the war with as much vigour and for the same objects as we are contending for. I see no difference in that respect. Therefore the appeal they make to the House to transfer power from us to them is not founded on any censure which they pass on the principles of this Government, but simply on the assertion they make that they think they have more capacity than we to carry on the same system of policy, which in fact they approve of, for their Resolution, setting aside some ambiguous and uncertain language, is a vote of approbation in favour of the Government—it being in the usual form in which Parliament affirms approbation of the Government. There are two alternatives for the House to choose. They may transfer by a majority to-night the Government from those who sit here (the Ministerial side) to those who sit opposite. There is another choice presented to them by the speech of the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gladstone), and by the sentiments of those who are going to vote for the Amendment of his hon. colleague. That is a party, who may repudiate the denomination of a party of peace at any price, but who would be ready to accept peace on conditions which I think and the country thinks dishonourable—dishonourable and dangerous to the future interests of this country and of Europe. Without meaning any disrespect to those hon. Gentlemen,
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some of whom I have good reason to hold in the highest regard, and whose talents are well known to the House, I will venture to say that, if a new Government were to be composed of them, it would be a very great chance if any of them were re-elected to sit in this House. The choice then really lies between the two sides of the House; and I contend that we have done nothing to forfeit the good opinion which the hon. Member for Aylesbury was pleased to say was formed of this Government when first constituted. We were supported by the good opinion of the country because the country thought we were going to prosecute with vigour the war which the country has unanimously determined to be necessary and just. I say we have been taking every possible measure to prosecute that war with vigour, and I confidently expect that the result will show we are not undeserving of the confidence with which the country hailed our advent, and that we shall be enabled to realise the just expectations which were formed of our policy. The fate of battles is in the hands of a higher Power. It is not in our power to command success, but it is enough for us to do all in our power to obtain it. That we have done. In a cause which we consider to be just, necessary, and honourable, we confidently place our trust in a higher Power. I say that, if we succeed, we shall have the satisfaction of reflecting that our success has been brought about by perseverance; and, without boasting—without proclaiming from day to day the different steps we have taken, we shall be justified in believing that that success is, humanly speaking, owing to our exertions to secure it. If, on the other hand, we fail—a contingency I will not permit myself to anticipate—we shall, at least, have the right to feel that the failure was not owing to any want of diligence or exertion on our part. I am persuaded that whatever may be the decision of the House this night as to the relative merits of parties here—whatever may be the decision of this House as to where the executive power of the Government shall reside—this country is in earnest in the war, and that the people of England will give their support to any Government which honestly and vigorously executes the will of the British nation. On the other hand, I am confident that they will never sanction any Government which, abandoning our allies, and deserting the policy which has been pursued up to this moment, not merely in deference to

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the principles of justice and a sense of national interest and national honour, but because it is in accordance with the will and feelings of the country. Therefore, so far as the interests of the country are concerned, I look with comparative indifference to the result of the present Motion. I feel that, in whatever hands the Government is placed, the will of the country must and will be obeyed. I know that that will is, that England, having engaged in a war necessary and just, in concert with our great ally and neighbour, France, must and shall succeed. I am confident that this nation will never permit any Government, composed of whomever it might be, to be false to the trust reposed in them; and, though it may be the duty of the Government to exhaust the means of negotiation as far as those means can be pursued with honour, the country would call to a strict account any Government which should, in expectation of the success of those negotiations, abandon the performance of its duty in preparing the means of war. We have not shrunk from that duty; and I defy any man to accuse us, with justice, of a dereliction of duty in that respect. I am persuaded that events, at no distant period, will show that in claiming a verdict of approbation for the manner in which we have performed our duty we have not overstepped the limits of justice, and that without reason we have been accused of shrinking from the exertions which the country expected at our hands.
MR. DISRAELI: Sir, if I felt any necessity of calling evidence to vindicate the propriety of the conduct which I have pursued, and the justice and policy of the course which I have taken, it would be the speech which I have just heard from the noble Lord, who has positively warned us, in the way of the fulfilment of his duty to carry on the war with effect, not to be influenced by any hope or prospect of any further negotiation for peace. Is this the Minister who only on Monday last evaded every inquiry? Is this the Minister who, to every question that was urged upon him—I will not say shuffled, for that would not be a Parliamentary word, and I certainly will not use it, although it rose to my lips in the heat of debate—but who certainly used every artifice to prevent the House of Commons from obtaining a single expression which would give an indication of the policy of the Government or of the resolution at which they had arrived on the great question of peace or war? Is this the
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Minister who only on Monday last would not sanction a motion that was to be brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester, (Mr. M. Gibson), and which would have given an opportunity to the House to express, after a proper discussion, an opinion on the practical result of the negotiations, an account of which had been placed on the table? Is this the Minister who has declined over and over again to move an address to his Sovereign—which it was his duty as First Minister of the Crown, and as one who pretends to lead the opinion of the country, to have done, but who has most seduously opposed all expression of opinion on the great question that now agitates the minds of the people? Is this the Minister who for the last—I will not say weeks, but months, has been the object of suspicion and distrust to the country, because no one could for a moment believe that there was any earnestness in the intention of Government to carry on the war; and who deprecated in this House in every instance that inquiry—even inquiries—should be made upon the subject, on the ground that even inquiries might interfere with the course of that delicate negotiation that was pending? Is this the Minister who, only on Monday last, prevented a discussion (one which he himself had fixed for that very day), on the ground that negotiations might possibly be taking place even at that moment, or might occur at any moment, and who this night has assured us that negotiations cannot take place, although his own colleague but a few days before told us that the Minister he left behind him at Vienna was thoroughly authorized to negotiate? I say, then, that from what has occurred in this debate, not merely on the part of the colleagues of the noble Lord, but by the speech of the noble Lord himself, the course which I have taken has been fully vindicated, and the Motion I have made has been justified in the eyes of the country. Only so late as Monday last there was to be no discussion in the House of Commons on this absorbing subject. I give this notice, and there is not a shade of opinion in the House that does not immediately, in the form of an Amendment, offer multiplied evidence that every person, of every section of opinion, wishes and feels it his duty to express that opinion on the momentous question before us. Those who believed that peace might have been obtained

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under the offers that have been made; those who believe that the war has not been prosecuted with sufficient energy; those who have, I was going to say, confidence in the Government, but there is no such section, but those who wish to have confidence in the Government—all these representatives of opinion in this House have proffered Amendments which are to be placed in the hands of the Speaker. Every Amendment, I say, that has been proposed only goes further to justify my Resolution. Whatever may be the fate of that Resolution it has at least elicited this good—that we have something definite at last from Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord for some time, in addressing the House on the subject of the war, has pursued his customary habit of making no allusion to the future, scrupulously shrinking from any expression of his own views, but carefully enumerating all the more the incidents of the past. "We have a fleet," says the noble Lord, "in the Baltic, we have a fleet in the Black Sea, we have a medical department, a commissariat staff, and many other establishments, of which we may be proud." The noble Lord reminds me always in this elaborate catalogue which he gives us so frequently, of the parvenu in one of Foote's farces, who used to recommend himself to his mistress's good graces by enumerating his possessions. "I have a house in the country, a house in town, a gallery of pictures, a fine cellar of wines," and so on. In that way the noble Lord for some time has been in the habit of informing us that he has a fleet in the Black Sea and a fleet in the Baltic, that he has a Sardinian contingent to assist his army in the Crimea; that he has a medical department established on the best footing—and those various other things which he has so often recounted—but at last he has felt that the time was come when this was no longer sufficient—when he must speak explicitly respecting the intentions of the Government on the question of peace or war. He remembered the engagement into which he entered at that meeting which had been referred to in this debate by one of his followers, and to which I am therefore justified in alluding, and he has at last made a declaration which he refused to make on every other occasion; he has made a declaration perfectly inconsistent with all the declarations which he has made on all previous days. The noble Lord now stands forward as a War Minister,
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who will be satisfied with nothing less than an achievement, the obtaining of which is perfectly inconsistent with the negotiations which he has been carrying on.
And then, Sir, I am told that ambiguity of language and uncertainty of conduct are expressions which it would be difficult for me to prove. Why, the whole course of this debate has entirely established the accuracy of those expressions; not a speech has been delivered by any Member who has risen all through this debate, whatever his views and whatever the policy which he recommends—whether united now in council with the noble Lord or severed from former connection—in which use has not been made of these very words—every remark and argument which have been elicited throughout this discussion, prove how accurately I selected the phrases which described the language of the Government as "ambiguous" and their conduct as "uncertain." I need not go further for evidence than to that which has recently passed before us, and to the declarations which are still ringing in our ears. What language can be more opposite to that which the noble Lord used only on Monday night than that which he has just now addressed to us? What line of conduct can be more contrasted to that which the noble Lord gave us reason to believe he was going to pursue only a week ago than that which he now tolls us is to be the future rule of his policy? "Ambiguity of language and uncertainty of conduct" not proved? Why, Sir, not a Gentleman has addressed you during this debate who has not used those phrases—they have already become household words. A year ago when discussions occurred on this subject—partial but always interesting—it was urged against the Government that their councils were divided on the question of peace or war. This was felt to be a great calamity at that difficult period. We all knew that we had men of great ability at the head of affairs; but there was more than a suspicion that their councils were not in unison upon a question of such vital importance. But how were we met then? We were told that these suspicions were without foundation—that these were imputations which the imagination of faction alone could suggest. But what has not occurred since to demonstrate their accuracy? What light has not even this debate thrown upon the distracted councils of twelve months ago.

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And who can refuse to ascribe to that want of union the feeble, uncertain, and ambiguous conduct of this war, and a great share of the calamities which have befallen us in consequence? It has been objected to the Motion that I have placed in your hand, that it is not in accordance with the speech I have made, and that it does not, in an unmistakeable manner, express the policy we propose to follow and are prepared to recommend. Having been some time in this House, and seen much of the conduct of its affairs, I have had some experience with respect to Motions that have been submitted to its consideration, and I can truly say that, although I have been called upon, as a Member of Parliament, to give my opinion upon Motions that have been drawn up by men of unrivalled sagacity and experience in Parliament, I never yet knew a Motion proposed which was not most critically received, and in which great errors were not discovered by those who had previously resolved to vote against it.
Sir, I am prepared to maintain, in every respect, the propriety of the Resolution I have laid upon the table. I am prepared to maintain not only its propriety, but its frankness and precision. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), following in this respect some hon. Gentlemen who have preceded him, intimated that it was my duty to have expressed clearly the terms upon which we thought peace ought to be obtained, or the objects for which the war ought to be prosecuted. There is, indeed, upon the paper, an Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster which, as coming from him, I have conned more than once, for he is a man who does not write without thought, and I am bound to say that I see, with respect to Amendments of that kind, very grave objections which I think upon reflection a Gentleman of the hon. Member's ingenuity will find not altogether unworthy of his attention. He must feel that of the last things the House of Commons should do, by any Motion proposed for its adoption, is to interfere with the terms upon which peace or war ought to be proclaimed. If I had brought forward a Motion stating what we considered the sine quâ non upon which peace was to be granted—if I had declared what were the precise objects for which the war ought to be waged—if, more particularly, I had pointed out the subjects to be attended to by Her Majesty's representative at a conference or a congress—I have no doubt
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the noble Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell), who has still some respect for the constitution of the country, and who is always a powerful defender of the just prerogatives of the Crown, would at once have risen, and by the exercise of his rhetoric and the expression of his constitutional convictions would have carried with him even the support of my hon. Friends on this side of the House. I deny that it was possible for me to have expressed in any other manner than I have done the feelings which influenced us on this side. We were dissatisfied with the language and the proceedings of the Government, especially with reference to recent negotiations and with the conduct of affairs as affecting the great question of peace or war. We were precluded from definitely expressing what we might consider the terms on which peace ought to be negotiated, or the objects for which the war ought to be pursued, and we wished to guard ourselves carefully from any interference with the exercise of the prerogative. Therefore all we could do was to ask the House, if we proved our case, to declare that there were ambiguous language and uncertain conduct on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers, not vaguely and abstractedly, but with reference to the great question of peace or war; and if the House were of that opinion—which it would be if it were to adopt the Resolution—we asked it also to show that there was no ambiguity in its language, no uncertainty in its conduct, but under these circumstances, in order to prevent any misconception on such a subject, to affirm that it was still determined to continue to support Her Majesty with all its means, in the same spirit as when it first addressed the Crown in answer to the gracious Message of the Sovereign announcing that war had been declared. Sir, I say again that the Resolution which I placed in your hands is one that is proper in its tone, loyal in its language, perfectly adapted to the contingency, and a Resolution which every Member of this House who wishes to terminate the unsatisfactory state of things which has too long prevailed, and which has produced a general feeling of distrust throughout the country, ought to support. But, if the noble Lord disapproves this Resolution, because it is a vote of want of confidence in the Government, why does he not simplify the question at issue, and allow one of his Friends to propose a vote of confidence in the Ministry?

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For what can be more inconvenient than the position in which the leader of this House has now placed, not only this assembly, but Her Majesty's Government themselves. You may negative this Motion; but will you find that any one of the Amendments that have been offered to your notice, if you choose to adopt it, is equivalent to an expression of confidence in the Ministry? If, then, this Motion is tantamount to a vote of want of confidence, I say the noble Lord must meet it with a direct negative, or he does not clear himself from what he represents as an attack upon his position. The noble Lord, placing this interpretation upon this vote, is bound to meet it with a vote expressing an exactly contrary opinion. Now, let me ask the House, fairly and candidly once more, whether what has occurred within the last two nights has not perfectly justified the course which we have taken? Have we not had an expression of feeling from the noble Lord which only a week ago no one could for a moment have anticipated from him? Were we not going to adjourn for the Whitsun holidays, and would not the whole country have been subject to the same suspicion and acted upon by the same distrust which prevailed until the last moment, had the noble Lord not felt it his duty to rise and make the declaration that he has made, a declaration utterly inconsistent with the entire conduct of the Government, because utterly inconsistent with the negotiations that have been proceeding? And here I may say that I have obtained the very object for which I was working. What did I venture to say yesterday was the great point to which we ought to address ourselves? It was to prevent the prosecution of war and the carrying on of negotiations simultaneously. The noble Lord has reiterated to-night the commonplace observation that, while he was carrying on his negotiations, he was also carrying on his war. But the noble Lord never answered the remarks which I made yesterday on that subject. I repeat that you cannot carry on negotiations permanently and conduct war at the same time effectively—that by attempting to do so you depress the spirit of your own people, and also damp the ardour of your allies. The noble Lord has to-night made a declaration of views and principles of conduct which, if they animated him only last Monday, did not justify him in the course he then took. He was not warranted in the observations that he then
1292
made, and by his conduct on that occasion he has, in my opinion, incurred a serious responsibility. The noble Lord has treated this as a vote of want of confidence, and has adverted to his possible successors if he be displaced from office. Now, I do not know what the right hon. Gentlemen who sit below the gangway, and who were recently colleagues of the noble Lord, may think of the noble Lord's estimate of their electioneering prospects. I perceive from the public prints, that some of those right hon. Gentlemen attended the meeting at the noble Lord's mansion or office, and they are paraded as the most distinguished followers of the noble Lord. Could they have been conscious, when he was addressing them in that animated harangue which at certain moments leaders of parties feel it necessary to address to the flagging courage of their supporters, that the noble Lord had calculated their career and the duration of their Parliamentary existence? Why, at the very time the right hon. Gentlemen were paraded as the principal ornaments of this assembly and the most distinguished adherents of this strong and united Government—all that time those useful but less celebrated Members who are supposed to be intimately acquainted with all the chances of political existence had, in fact, numbered these great lights of our assembly as dead men in their books.
The noble Lord did us the honour of assuming that we may be the coming men; but the noble Lord thinks that there is some difficulty in that arrangement, owing to our divided opinions. The noble Lord has particularly impressed upon the House the great inconvenience Her Majesty might experience if she were to find among Her intimate councillors my two right hon. Friends who differ on the subject of education. Well, Sir, I should have thought that even in the strife of party rhetoric no one would have thrown any discouragement on the efforts of any Member of this House, whatever may be his opinions or connections, with regard to that all-important subject. All I can say is, that, though I hope I may keep the privilege of taunting my political opponents on their divided opinions as freely as the noble Lord—that would be a subject upon which I should scarcely be tempted to indulge; for I should feel, as I am sure the majority of the House would feel, only too grateful to those who might attempt to

1293
solve a knot which has been hitherto indissoluble. But when I hear of the dangers of a coming Government with divided opinions, what am I to think of the right hon. Gentlemen and the noble Lords before me? The church-rate, I suppose, is a question on which the followers of the noble Lord, so distinguished for their numbers and influence, are united. On the ballot, of course, they are all agreed. The debate on the consular branch of the diplomatic service, the other night, showed what a powerful Government an united Government is. Some of their followers, particularly the Secretary of the Admiralty, of course, are bound to the Government by every tie, since the Cabinet have acceded to their all necessary views on army reform. To take them altogether, there never yet was a body of Gentlemen less remarkable for their union of opinion than the present Ministers; and all that is required to show how admirably they agree is that the noble Lord the Member for London, when he has recovered from the great exertions of his exhausted; instructions, should introduce a Reform Bill, or some small measure of that kind, to prove how compact is the alliance of these united colleagues.
The noble Lord has treated us with a stale taunt about the inability of Lord Derby to form a Government, and has said that Lord Derby was unable to form a Government because he had not political Friends competent to sustain a Ministry. If that were the case I should leave the observations of the noble Lord unnoticed; but, inasmuch as there is no man in this House who is more cognisant that the statement which he has made is, inadvertently of course, utterly erroneous, the noble Lord must permit me to say that he has not the slightest authority for that assertion. Lord Derby refused to form a Government, because it was his opinion, constitutionally expressed to his Royal Mistress, that England was in such a condition that the gratification of individual ambition was no longer to be thought of; but that the formation of a strong Government was a public necessity for which every sacrifice should be made. Lord Derby or his friends might have sat on that (the Ministerial) bench, or upon a similar bench in another place, if they had chosen to take the Government without being assured of that commanding majority which he believed was necessary to carry on affairs in the present state of the country. The noble Lord knows something
1294
about it, because he had some conversation with Lord Derby at that time. The noble Lord, however, has elected to carry on affairs with a very weak Government. By his meeting of yesterday, by his speech of this night—utterly inconsistent with his opinion as expressed last Monday—by suddenly adopting views and a policy utterly inconsistent with the instructions given to his own diplomatic administrators—by suddenly taking a course which we all know from his own expressions he could not a week ago have meditated; by the pledges he has given in this House to-night that he intends not only to prosecute the war, but to prosecute it for objects which only last Monday either he did not anticipate pursuing or which he veiled from this House, and the confession of which, therefore, this Motion has extorted from him—by such means as these the noble Lord may possibly defeat the Motion which I have submitted to the House. But that is only the first of many Motions which the noble Lord will have to meet, now that the policy of the Government has, by this discussion, become more precise. He may rest assured that though the month of May is far advanced, he is but at the beginning of his Parliamentary campaign. He will find that, from the very language he has used, and from the position which he has taken to-night, such consequences will ensue that it will become him to marshal his legions; and it will be well for him if he can give evidence to England that he has that strong Government which Lord Derby thought essential to the interests of the country.
Sir, I would sit down here, were it not that observations have been made in this debate which I must notice, not only because it is due to myself, but because it is due to others to do so. An hon. Gentleman has noticed the remarks which I made upon the conduct of the recent Plenipotentiary at Vienna. I think it was the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) who said that these observations were not fair, that they would not have been made had not the person employed been in this House and a Minister of the Crown, and that had Lord Westmorland, for example, committed all the mistakes which were laid to the door of the noble Lord the Colonial Secretary they would have passed unnoticed. Well, I make this admission to the hon. Gentleman, that it is always more agreeable for me to make remarks of that kind upon those who are present

1295
than upon those who are away. So far I agree with the hon. Member for Kidderminster. I would much sooner criticise the conduct of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) than that of Lord Westmorland, who is not in his place. But does the hon. Member for Kidderminster, or any one else, for a moment pretend to deny that if a Member of Parliament believes that a Plenipotentiary of the Queen, to whom has been intrusted an important and delicate duty, has ill-discharged that duty—that his conduct has been pernicious to the public welfare—that he has committed gross errors, leading to the abrupt termination of important negotiations—I say, in such a case, is the hon. Member for a moment prepared to deny, as I was astonished to hear that he did deny, that it is not merely the right, but the duty of a Member of Parliament to bring that conduct before the House and ask the opinion of the House upon it? Was I to be stopped because, in the language of the Member for Kidderminster, such a person was the servant of his Sovereign, and engaged on duties of the highest importance? I always thought that this House was the assembly which was to exercise a control over the highest servants of the Sovereign. If an Ambassador does take a course which is detrimental to the interests of his country, or has not the qualities necessary for a proper discharge of his duties, then I say it is incumbent on this House to bring his conduct under consideration, and to ask the opinion of the House upon the subject. If it be true that when the noble Lord was Secretary of State he did acknowledge that Russia had the right of protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte—(which she had not)—if it be true that in the principal act of the Conference the false interpretation of those treaties by the noble Lord has been alleged as the principal cause of this war, was it not my duty to bring this before the House, or am I to be stopped by such observations as have been made? The noble Lord knows that there are not two kinds of protectorates, and his objections to my observations were contradictory and inconsistent. He knows that he amply and completely acknowledged that Russia had a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I never used the word "protectorate" at all.
MR. DISRAELI: Well, the word I find is protection;—where is the difference?
1296
—and I say that in these treaties there is no such protection granted to Russia; and is the noble Lord, by this quibbling as to the difference between protectorate and protection to free himself from so grave a charge? I assert that the noble Lord's despatch to which I have alluded gave the form and colour to the fortunes of England with respect to this question. When Russia found that its protectorate was sanctioned by that despatch her course was clear. I say, this was a fatal admission made by the noble Lord as Secretary of State, and that, when he subsequently went to carry on negotiations, he made another admission equally detrimental to the interests of this country. I maintain that the noble Lord has not, in the slightest degree, invalidated the truth of any observations I have made on this part of the question. The noble Lord says, because I criticised his conduct as a Minister Plenipotentiary employed in the most awful service that a man could be engaged in, and in which he showed his utter incompetency, that I degraded this debate—degraded a debate on a question of peace or war, involving the lives of thousands, and the expenditure of millions of taxation. I will not quarrel with the noble Lord as to this; I will leave it for the country to decide whether, in exposing the conduct of the noble Lord—conduct on which further sacrifices of taxation and of the lives of other thousands of Her Majesty's subjects were dependent—I did my duty or not. The noble Lord says I degraded the debate; but, whatever I have done, I have done this—I have tried to prevent the noble Lord from degrading the country.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided:—Ayes 219; Noes 319: Majority 100.

List of the AYES.

Adderley, C. B.

Bennet, P.

Alexander, J.

Bentinck, G. W. P.

Annesley, Earl of

Beresford, rt. hon. W.

Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.

Bignold, Sir S.

Archdall, Capt. M.

Blackburn, P.

Arkwright, G.

Blake, M. J.

Bagge, W.

Boldero, Col.

Bailey, C.

Booth, Sir R. G.

Baillie, H. J.

Bowyer, G.

Baldock, E. H.

Bramley-Moore, J.

Bankes, rt. hon. G.

Bruce, C. L. C.

Barrington, Visct.

Buck, L. W.

Barrow, W. H.

Buck, G. S.

Bateson, T.

Buller, Sir J. Y.

Bective, Earl of

Bunbury, W. B. M'C.

1297

Burrell, Sir C. M.

Herbert, Sir T.

Burroughes, H. N.

Hill, Lord A.

Burrowes, R.

Horsfall, T. B.

Butt, G. M.

Hudson, G.

Butt, I.

Hume, W. F.

Cabbell, B. B.

Jones, Adm.

Cairns, H. M'C.

Kelly, Sir F.

Campbell, Sir A. I.

Kendall, N.

Chandos, Marq. of

Kennedy, T.

Chelsea, Visct.

Ker, D. S.

Child, S.

King, J. K.

Christopher, rt. hn. R. A.

Knatchbull, W. F.

Christie, S.

Knight, F. W.

Clinton, Lord C. P.

Knightley, R.

Clive, R.

Knox, Col.

Cobbold, J. C.

Knox, hon. W. S.

Cocks, T. S.

Lacon, Sir E.

Colvile, C. R.

Langton, W. G.

Conolly, T.

Lennox, Lord A. F.

Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

Lennox, Lord H. G.

Cotton, hon. W. H. S.

Leslie, C. P.

Davies, D. A. S.

Liddell, hon. H. G.

Davies, J. L.

Lindsay, hon. Col.

Dering, Sir E.

Lisburne, Earl of

Disraeli, rt. hon. B.

Lockhart, W.

Dod, J. W.

Lowther, hon. Col.

Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.

Lowther, Capt.

Duffy, C. G.

Lucas, F.

Duncombe, hon. A.

Lushington, C. M.

Duncombe, hon. O.

Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B.

Duncombe, hon. W. E.

Macartney, G.

Dundas, G.

MacGregor, Jas.

Dunne, Col.

MacGregor, John

Du Pre, C. G.

M'Mahon, P.

Egerton, W. T.

Maddock, Sir H.

Egerton, E. C.

Maguire, J. F.

Elmley, Visct.

Malins, R.

Farnham, E. B.

Mandeville, Visct.

Farrer, J.

March, Earl of

Fellowes, E.

Maunsell, T. P.

Fergusson, Sir J.

Maxwell, hon. J. P.

Filmer, Sir E.

Meux, Sir H.

Fitzgerald, W. R. S.

Miles, W.

Follett, B. S.

Michell, W.

Forester, rt. hon. Col.

Mitchell, T. A.

Forster, Sir G.

Morgan, O.

Franklyn, G.

Mowbray, J. R.

French, F.

Mullings, J. R.

Freshfield, J. W.

Mundy, W.

Frewen, C. H.

Naas, Lord

Fuller, A. E.

Napier, rt. hon. J.

Gallwey, Sir W. P.

Neeld, John

Galway, Visct.

Neeld, Joseph

Gaskell, J. M.

Newark, Visct.

George, J.

Newport, Visct.

Gilpin, Col.

Noel, hon. G. J.

Gladstone, Capt.

North, Col.

Goddard, A. L.

Northcote, Sir S. H.

Gooch, Sir E. S.

Oakes, J. H. P.

Graham, Lord M. W.

Ossulston, Lord

Greaves, E.

Packe, C. W.

Greenall, G.

Pakenham, T. H.

Grogan, E.

Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J

Guernsey, Lord

Palk, L.

Guinness, R. S.

Palmer, R.

Gwyn, H.

Parker, R.

Hale, R. B.

Peacocke, G. M. W.

Halford, Sir H.

Peel, Gen.

Hall, Gen.

Percy, hon. J. W.

Hamilton, Lord C.

Portal, M.

Hanbury, hon. C. S. B.

Repton, G. W. J.

Hayes, Sir E.

Robertson, P. F.

Henley, rt. hon. J. W.

Rushout, G.

1298

Scott, hon. F.

Vernon, L. V.

Seymer, H. K.

Vivian, J. E.

Shirley, E. P.

Vyvyan, Sir R. R.

Smith, W. M.

Vyse, Col.

Smith, A.

Waddington, D.

Sotheron, T. H. S.

Waddington, H. S.

Spooner, R.

Walcott, Adm.

Stafford, A.

Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.

Stanhope, J. B.

Welby, Sir G. E.

Stanley, Lord

Whiteside, J.

Stirling, W.

Whitmore, H.

Stuart, W.

Wigram, L. T.

Sturt, H. G.

Williams, T. P.

Swift, R.

Woodd, B. T.

Thesiger, Sir F.

Wyndham, Gen.

Tollemache, J.

Wyndham, H.

Trollope, rt. hon. Sir J.

Wynn, Lt.-Col.

Tudway, R. C.

Wynn, Sir W. W.

Tyler, Sir G.

Wynne, W. W. E.

Tyrell, Sir J. T.

Yorke, hon. E. T.

Vance, J.

TELLERS.

Vansittart, G. H.

Taylor, Col.

Verner, Sir W.

Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.

List of the NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Cayley, E. S.

Acton, J.

Challis, Mr. A.

Adair, H. E.

Chambers, M.

Adair, R. A. S.

Chambers, T.

Alcock, T.

Chaplin, W. J.

Anderson, Sir J.

Cheetham, J.

Antrobus, E.

Clay, Sir W.

Atherton, W.

Clifford, H. M.

Baines, rt. hon. M. T.

Clinton, Lord R.

Ball, J.

Cobbett, J. M.

Baring, H. B.

Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.

Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T.

Coffin, W.

Baring, T.

Cogan, W. H. F.

Barnes, T.

Collier, R. P.

Bass, M. T.

Coote, Sir C. H.

Baxter, W. E.

Cowan, C.

Beaumont, W. B.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Beckett, W.

Craufurd, E. H. J.

Bell, J.

Crook, J.

Bellew, T. A.

Crossley, F.

Berkeley, A.

Currie, R.

Berkeley, hon. H. F.

Dalkeith, Earl of

Berkeley, C. L. G.

Dalrymple, Visct.

Bethell, Sir R.

Dashwood, Sir G. H.

Biddulph, R. M.

Davie, Sir H. R. F.

Biggs, W.

Deedes, W.

Bland, L. H.

Denison, E.

Bonham-Carter, J.

Denison, J. E.

Bouverie, rt. hon. E. P.

Dent, J. D.

Bramston, T. W.

De Vere, S. E.

Brand, hon. H.

Dillwyn, L. L.

Brocklehurst, J.

Divett, E.

Brockman, E. D.

Drumlanrig, Visct.

Brotherton, J.

Drummond, H.

Brown, H.

Duff, G. S.

Brown, W.

Duff, J.

Bruce, Lord E.

Duke, Sir J.

Bruce, H. A.

Duncan, Visct.

Bulkeley, Sir R. B. W.

Duncan, G.

Burke, Sir T. J.

Duncombe, T.

Butler, C. S.

Dundas, F.

Byng, hon. G. H. C.

Dungarvan, Visct.

Cardwell, rt. hon. E.

East, Sir J. B.

Castlerosse, Visct.

Ebrington, Visct.

Caulfield, Col. J. M.

Egerton, Sir P.

Cavendish, hon. C. C.

Elcho, Lord

Cavendish, hon. G.

Ellice, rt. hon. E.

1299

Ellice, E.

Keating, R.

Elliot, hon. J. E.

Keating, H. S.

Emlyn, Visct.

Keogh, rt. hon. W.

Esmonde, J.

Kershaw, J.

Evelyn, W. J.

King, hon. P. J. L.

Ewart, W.

Kinnaird, hon. A. F.

Ewart, J. C.

Kirk, W.

Feilden, M. J.

Labouchere, rt. hon. H.

Fenwick, H.

Laing, S.

Fergus, J.

Langston, J. H.

Ferguson, Sir R.

Langton, H. G.

Ferguson, J.

Layard, A. H.

FitzGerald, Sir J.

Lee, W.

FitzGerald, J. D.

Lemon, Sir C.

FitzRoy, rt. hon. H.

Lewis, rt. hon. Sir G. C.

Fitzwilliam. hn. C. W. W.

Lindsay, W. S.

Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W.

Littleton, hon. E. R.

Foley, J. H. H.

Lockhart, A. E.

Forster, C.

Lowe, R.

Forster, J.

Luce, T.

Fortescue, C. S.

Mackie, J.

Fox, W. J.

Mackinnon, W. A.

Freestun, Col.

M'Cann, J.

Gardner, R.

M'Taggart, Sir J.

Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.

Mangles, R. D.

Gladstone, rt. hon. W.

Marjoribanks, D. C.

Glyn, G. C.

Marshall, W.

Goderich, Visct.

Martin, J.

Goodman, Sir G.

Massey, W. N.

Gordon, hon. A.

Matheson, A.

Gower, hon. F. L.

Matheson, Sir J.

Grace, O. D. J.

Miall, E.

Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.

Mills, T.

Greene, J.

Milner, Sir W. M. E.

Greene, T.

Milnes, R. E.

Gregson, S.

Milton, Visct.

Grenfell, C. W.

Moffatt, G.

Greville, Col. F.

Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.

Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

Monck, Visct.

Grey, R. W.

Moncrieff, J.

Grosvenor, Lord R.

Monsell, W.

Grosvenor, Earl

Morris, D.

Gurney, J. H.

Mostyn, hon. T. E. L. M.

Hadfield, G.

Mowatt, F.

Hall, Sir B.

Muntz, G. F.

Hankey, T.

Murrough, J. P.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Norreys, Sir D. J.

Harcourt, G. G.

North, F.

Harcourt, Col.

O'Brien, P.

Hardinge, hon. C. S.

O'Brien, C.

Hastie, Alexander

O'Brien, J.

Hastie, Archibald

O'Connell, D.

Headlam, T. E.

O'Flaherty, A.

Heard, J. I.

Oliveira, B.

Heathcote, Sir G. J.

Osborne, R.

Heathcote, G. H.

Otway, A. J.

Heathcote, Sir W.

Owen, Sir J.

Heneage, G. F.

Paget, Lord A.

Herbert, H. A.

Palmer, R.

Herbert, rt. hon. S.

Palmerston, Visct.

Hervey, Lord A.

Patten, J. W.

Heywood, J.

Paxton, Sir J.

Higgins, G. G. O.

Pechell, Sir G. B.

Hindley, C.

Peel, Sir R.

Hogg, Sir J. W.

Peel, F.

Horsman, rt. hon. E.

Pellatt, A.

Howard, hon. C. W. G.

Perry, Sir T. E.

Howard, Lord E.

Phillips, J. H.

Hutt, W.

Phillimore, R. J.

Ingham, R.

Pilkington, J.

Jackson, W.

Pollard-Urquhart, W.

Jermyn, Earl

Portman, hon. W. H. B.

Johnstone, Sir J.

Powlett, Lord W.

1300

Price, Sir R.

Steel, J.

Price, W. P.

Stephenson, R.

Pritchard, J.

Strickland, Sir G.

Ramsden, Sir J. W.

Strutt, rt. hon. E.

Reed, J. H.

Stewart, Sir M. R. S.

Ricardo, J. L.

Sutton, J. H. M.

Ricardo, O.

Talbot, C. R. M.

Ricardo, S.

Tancred, H. W.

Rice, E. R.

Thompson, G.

Rich, H.

Thornely, T.

Robartes, T. J. A.

Thornhill, W. P.

Roebuck, J. A.

Tomline, G.

Rumbold, C. E.

Townshend, Capt.

Russell, Lord J.

Traill, G.

Russell, F. C. H.

Tynte, Col. C. J. K.

Russell, F. W.

Uxbridge, Earl of

Sadleir, James

Vane, Lord H.

Sadleir, John

Vernon, G. E. H.

Sawle, C. B. G.

Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.

Scholefield, W.

Vivian, H. H.

Scobell, Capt.

Walmsley, Sir J.

Scrope, G. P.

Walter, J.

Scully, F.

Warner, E.

Scully, V.

Waterpark, Lord

Seymour, Lord

Watkins, Col. L.

Seymour, H. D.

Watson, W. H.

Seymour, W. D.

Wells, W.

Shafto, R. D.

Whatman, J.

Shee, W.

Whitbread, S.

Shelburne, Earl of

Wickham, H. W.

Shelley, Sir J. V.

Wilkinson, W. A.

Sheridan, R. B.

Williams, W.

Smith, J. A.

Wilson, J.

Smith, J. B.

Wise, A.

Smith, M. T.

Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

Smith, rt. hon. R. V.

Wortley, rt. hon. J. S.

Smyth, J. G.

Wyndham, W.

Somerville, rt. hon. Sir W.

Wyvill, M.

Stafford, Marq. of

TELLERS.

Stanley, hon. W. O.

Hayter, W. G.

Starkie, Le G. N.

Mulgrave, Earl of

Question proposed, "That the word "having seen with regret that the Conferences of Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities,' be inserted, instead thereof."
MR. LOWE,amidst general cries of "adjourn" and "divide" proposed his Amendment—
Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment, by inserting after the words "regret that," the words "owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea."
Question proposed, "That those word be there inserted."
MR. MILNER GIBSON: Sir, I move that the further consideration of this question be adjourned until Monday week—[Loud calls for a division on the Opposition benches.]
VISCOUNT GODERICHprotested against the adjournment of the discussion. I was highly objectionable that the House should separate for so unusually long a period at that season, for their private

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purposes and amusement, in the midst of a great debate like that. For himself, he would say that had he any idea that the decision of the whole question would be attempted to be postponed he should certainly have opposed the adjournment for the holidays. To adjourn without coming to a decision would be to lay themselves open to great public censure.
MR. J. G. PHILLIMOREexpressed his entire concurrence in the views of the noble Lord.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I think, considering the importance of the subject which has been brought under our notice, and considering, moreover, the ground upon which the present debate is raised, namely, that the House ought not to separate for the Whitsuntide holidays without expressing its opinion relative to the position of affairs—I think the House, although the hour certainly is very late, might proceed to dispose of the Amendments. For my part, I have no objection to accepting the first section of my hon. Friend's (Mr. Lowe) Amendment, as it merely recites a fact which cannot be denied; but to the second, I am decidedly opposed, for the same reason that I have opposed that of the right hon. Member for Bucks, namely, because it contains a principle of interference with the prerogative of the Crown. While, as regards the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, I am also opposed to it.
SIR JAMES GRAHAM: I voted against the Resolution which was proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bucks, because it appeared to me that it would not raise the question of peace or war, but more directly raised the question of confidence in Her Majesty's Government; and I thought that at this moment a change in the Ministry was not advisable, and would not be conducive to the welfare of the State. That was a question implying censure on the Government, and it seemed to me that, although the debate, from the House having determined to adjourn over the holidays from this morning, was necessarily comprised within the compass of a few hours, quite inadequate to the ample discussion of the entire subject—it seemed to me, on the whole, only fair that the decision of the House should be taken to-night on the question whether a change in the Administration should take place. The House by a decisive majority, has pronounced its decision that that change at
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this moment is inexpedient; but the great question raised by the hon. Member for Kidderminster, namely, whether the Conferences of Vienna having now ceased on the ground that the limitation of the Russian force in the Black Sea cannot be accepted by Russia, other means cannot be found which would be acceptable—that question, I say, is not yet fully debated. The noble Lord the First Minister has threatened me—though I have not yet had an opportunity of expressing my opinion on the subject—and the Gentlemen who sit near me with the censure of our constituents. I think it right that we should have the opportunity of stating what is the opinion we entertain, and what are the reasons by which we sustain that opinion. That opportunity has not been afforded us, and I think it only conducive to the public good that the adjournment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester should be agreed to. The question now is fairly before us, frankly put by the hon. Member for Kidderminster in the most convenient shape. If we go to a division I shall certainly vote for the adjournment. I know not what may be the decision of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but the course of the debate has entirely changed the circumstances under which it commenced. As I understand the speech of the noble Lord at the head of the Government all negotiations are at an end. I have heard that statement for the first time; and I must say that the speech of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London delivered last night does place the state of our relations with Russia on a footing which would appear to me to lead to an interminable war—at least to the commencement of a war of thirty years' duration—and although I am not satisfied with the declaration of Gentlemen opposite as to the policy they would recommend, and making every allowance for their position in opposition, as not imposing on them the necessity of declaring such a policy, yet I am bound to say that the speech delivered by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire in the opening of this discussion, did lay down principles, with reference to the war in which we are engaged, which appeared to me to afford a prospect of a fairer settlement than that announced by the Government. The right hon. Gentleman declared that, in his opinion, there were only two modes in which the war could be conducted against Russia. One of them was the revision of the territorial

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arrangements of Europe—an attack upon the extended frontier of Russia throughout its enormous extent—in point of fact, that a war of nationalities should be raised; and he expressed an opinion, in which I concur, that a war of that description would be interminable, if not hopeless. He then proceeded to point out the second mode of giving effect to the objects avowed by this country—namely, that the war should be conducted upon the principle of protection to Turkey, so that her independence and integrity should be preserved, and that that operation should be effected without the invasion of the territory of Russia. It would be superfluous for me at this moment to enter on the question of why was not adherence given to that principle, and why was the Crimea attacked. I am ready, on a fitting occasion, to defend the steps which were taken by the Government of which I was Member in attacking the Crimea; but I repeat that, with respect to the future policy of this country, I am convinced that the view taken by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire is a view which, if steadily pursued, does not exclude the hope of peace; whereas the doctrine laid down by Her Majesty's Government—that negotiation or the principles on which it has hitherto been conducted being abandoned, and the ground of the war being changed, it is no longer a question of terms; but that terms being abandoned the question becomes reduced to a war of nationalities—I say that a more serious question was never raised in the British Parliament, and I feel that an opportunity must be given for the discussion of the question.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: No doubt a very important question has been raised by the right hon. Baronet; but in the first place I must, before saying anything on the question immediately before the House, utterly and entirely deny the meaning which he has in some manner or other extracted from my words and the words of my noble Friend. I said the object of the war should be beyond the immediate defence of Turkey from the aggression which was committed by Russia—security for Turkey for the future. I said we should endeavour to obtain that security. I have never gone beyond that declaration. I said nothing of nationalities. I said that we were precluded at Vienna from entering into the question of diminishing the territory of Russia; and neither with regard to territory nor with regard to nationalities
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did I give expression to any opinion whatever. I conceive that when security for Turkey is obtained—that when we are able to say, if we make peace on these terms, Turkey will not be attacked in the course of the next six months nor in the course of the next eighteen months by Russia, and on more unfavourable terms to Turkey than those on which she was attacked lately—that when you can obtain terms of that kind, which will give security to Turkey, you ought not to hesitate to make peace. With regard to what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) has said, that we cannot at the same time carry on negotiations and conduct the war—I say it is for him to choose which of these two things he would do, and he declared that negotiations ought to be broken off, and that war should continue. That was the decision to which he came. How out of that state of things he was to evolve a state of peace hereafter, I know not. But, with regard to the question immediately before the House, I beg to observe that there are four declarations by hon. Members entertaining different opinions, all agreeing that the House will give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, until Her Majesty shall be able to obtain a safe and honourable peace. I do think that before we adjourn for the holidays we ought to agree to some declaration—to some terms which shall contain these words—a declaration in which all parties are agreed—a declaration of great importance both in this country and in Europe. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) thinks it strange that my noble Friend's language to-night does not agree with what was said by him on Monday evening. But the fact is, that from day to day and from hour to hour changes take place. I should say if the House would agree to words containing the declaration to which I have alluded, it would be far better for the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) to bring on a discussion on the views which he entertains on the earliest day after the recess, and we shall then be able to give a complete and definite answer as to the result of the conference, and we shall now be in a condition to carry the declaration which has been proposed.
MR. DISRAELI: I congratulate the supporters of the noble Lord upon his present tone. The majority is obtained, and the noble Lord has risen to recant the speech which most legitimately called for

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the observations of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle. It was only yesterday that we had a picture drawn, not of the power only, but of the policy of Russia, which rivalled the spirit and pencil of a Dante. The House was terrified at a description, which following up the views of the noble Lord, proved that this kingdom was in danger from the aggressive policy, increasing power, and systematic aggrandisement of Russia. It was received with cheers—it was received with enthusiasm by those peculiar benches which particularly represent the war feeling of the country; and no sooner is the majority obtained—a majority, allow me to say, which has expressed no confidence in the Government—than the noble Lord, when his attention is called to his remarkable statement by a Member of this House who is not apt to make mistakes, rises and, in fact, recants his views—withdraws from our discussion that powerful picture which influenced the debate, and which is at this moment influencing the people of England. It is a second edition of the Sebastopol speech. It is the very same circumstance. There is no difference, except that in the case of the Sebastopol speech the noble Lord recanted it the same night on which it was delivered. And yet I am told this is a Government whose language is not ambiguous! I congratulate the triumphant majority who represent a policy so lucid and politic, and which must end in consequences so succesful and triumphant for the country. And now the noble Lord tries to do something still more remarkable than the recantation of his own speech. Last Monday night the First Minister declined the necessity of expressing any opinion on the subject. What do the Government want to do now? They want to pass without discussion a vote of this House—an unanimous vote of this House—that we are determined to support Her Majesty in carrying on the war. Who is the leader of this House? Is the First Minister the leader of this House? Or is the noble Lord the leader of this House? When on a point no less important than a Resolution of the House of Commons to support Her Majesty in carrying on the war, the Ministry hold two opinions on the subject? One night they tell us it is not necessary, or not expedient; and then suddenly finding out that three or four Members are of a different opinion, these profound statesmen immediately feel
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that it is the duty of the House of Commons not only to do it, but to do it without discussion. I told the First Minister, before the division, not to plume himself on the vote, which I knew must be in his favour. I told him he was but at the beginning; of prolonged and protracted discussions, which would end probably in consequences different from what he anticipates. I say now it would be most indecent and impolitic to hurry on a vote of this description. I am against further discussion at this moment. You have come to a conclusion upon the Resolution which I myself proposed. I knew when I introduced it that there was not sufficient time to give it as much discussion as it required; but we did everything we could to facilitate that discussion. But as to approaching a subject so important as that which the noble Lord proposes to settle, I am sure it is the feeling of the House that no further debate shall at present take place. They had now to come to a decision of ten thousand times more importance than anything that had been decided by the vote which had just been given. They had a question to decide not between parties in that House, but one which affected the whole of Europe. He for one was not prepared precipitately, and without discussion, to come to a decision upon a subject of the most vital importance that has ever been submitted to Parliament since he had the honour of a seat in the House. He appealed to the Government and to the House not to allow their own convenience, or a desire to go for a few days' holidays into the country, to interfere with the due discussion of this question, when the civilized nations of Europe were looking for the grounds upon which they were entering on this new war. They could not arrive at that decision until they knew what were or what were not the opinions of the Government. The question was now raised for the first time, and he hoped the House would insist upon debating it before they pretended to arrive at a decision upon it.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTthought the House had been perfectly right in deciding at once upon the Resolution, which was one of great importance to be settled, and declaring the opinion of the House as to whose hands the Government should be intrusted. But now that it had decided a great question as between parties, it was called upon to decide upon a question affecting the country—to dispose of, without

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discussing, two Motions on which the meaning of words required to be minutely weighed. He was not now prepared to come to a decision upon those Resolutions which related to a subject the most important which had occurred since he had had the honour of a seat in that House. It would be indecent and destructive to their character to allow such questions to be treated as mere postscripts to a party debate. The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) had complained of having been misrepresented by his right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham), and surely the accuracy of that complaint was a matter of importance. Now that the country was called upon to enter upon a new Russian war, when the prospect of other interference was held out, he (Mr. Herbert) called upon the House to vindicate its privileges, and not to allow the convenience of a few days' holidays to interfere with their duties at this important moment. He for one would not consent to dispose of the matter until he knew the opinions of the Government upon this new Russian war.
MR. ROEBUCKthought the House must be conscious that they had acted injudiciously in consenting to adjourn for the holidays, and he appealed to the House to get itself out of the difficulty. Could the Speaker inform them whether it would not be competent to adjourn for a shorter period than ten days?
MR. SPEAKERsaid, that it was not competent for the House to rescind a Resolution which it had come to the same night.
MR. BARROWthought a fair opportunity ought to be afforded for discussing the Amendment, although he had already made up his mind on it.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that at this hour, and in the present state of the House, he could not resist the proposal to adjourn the debate.
Debate adjourned till Monday 4th June.
The House adjourned at a quarter after Three o'clock till Monday 4th June.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Roman Catholic Charities; Royal London Militia; Education of Poor Children; Brighton Incorporation.
3a Registration of Births, &c. (Scotland).
ROYAL ASSENT.—Income Tax; Customs Duties; Spirit, &c. Duties (Excise); Militia (Ireland); Intestacy (Scotland); Affirmations (Scotland); Alterations in Pleadings; Parliamentary Representation (Scotland) Act Amendment.

THE CHURCH IN CANADA.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORD THE BISHOP OF OXFORD moved—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for Copy of an Address presented to Her Majesty by the House of Assembly and Legislative Council of Canada, praying for the Removal of Disadvantages to which the Church in Canada is subject, and to enable it to elect its own Bishops; and for any Answer which may have been given thereto."
The right rev. Prelate said, that an Act had passed the Canadian Legislature, and had been accepted by the Parliament of this country, one clause of which would effect an entire separation between the Established Church and the State in Canada, and it was in consequence of the adoption of that Act that the Address for which he moved was agreed to by the two Chambers of the Canadian Legislature. The Address prayed that, inasmuch as the connection between Church and State had thus been declared to be dissolved, those accidents which had hitherto followed that connection might also be removed. If any answer had been returned to that Address he hoped it would be also communicated to their Lordships. He would only say, in moving for the Address, that he thought this was not an uninstruetive movement to the people of this country also. Many people were apt to forget that the union between Church and State implied co-relatives to either—certain support from the State, and a certain renunciation by the Church, of what would properly be the natural liberties of the Church. He, for
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one, believed that the Church and State greatly profited by the relations existing between them, and he believed that the Church was kept, in many instances, from sectional feeling and sectional action by its connection with the State, and that the supremacy of the Crown exercised influences highly beneficial to the Church of the land as well as to the State of the land. Believing this himself, and yet seeing that the daily current of legislation tended to remove from the Church the support in every respect which it had hitherto received from the State, he thought it might not be uninstructive to consider that these two things were co-relative, and that if the State gave up all assistance and support to the Church it was not to be contended that the State could exercise the same authority as when supported by the Church.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, there was no objection whatever on the part of the Government to produce the papers moved for by the right rev. Prelate. No answer had yet been sent—only a mere acknowledgment.
THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he had listened with great satisfaction to the remarks of the right rev. Prelate, and he fully concurred with him in all he said as to the advantage of the connection of the Church with the State, as well as in the deduction that this Address would prove not uninstructive on that subject to people in this country. But he could not forget that it was to a measure to which that right rev. Prelate gave his most cordial support—the Clergy Reserves Bill—that the present desire to separate Church and State in Canada was owing; that measure having given the Colonial Legislature full power and freedom to dissever the endowments of the Church in Canada. He (the Earl of Derby) was happy to feel himself free from all responsibility of the sanction of that measure, which was the first step in bringing about the separation between Church and State.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORDsaid, that any future notice he might take of the subject would, of course, depend upon the answer that might be returned to the Address. In reply to the courteous remark of the noble Earl, whose agreement with him (the Bishop of Oxford) on this occasion was to him a matter of great satisfaction, he would point out to the House where, in his judgment, the noble Earl had misconceived what he (the Bishop of

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Oxford) had agreed to, and what he had not agreed to, on the occasion to which reference had been made. What he had agreed to, and what he was still prepared to agree to, was this, that Canada and this country should keep their terms, and that this country should not make engagements with its Colonies and then break them. He had not given any assent, direct or indirect, to the clergy reserves being taken from the Church. On the contrary, he had stated in his place in Parliament that he conceived that such a spoliation of the Church, if it was ever effected by the Canadian Legislature, would not only be unlawful for them to effect, but would be an act of the grossest folly. As this country had intrusted to the Colony the power of legislating for themselves, he had thought that the power and its responsibilities ought to be wholly left in their hands.
THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, there was an inaccuracy in the statement of the right rev. Prelate. It was true that we had committed ourselves by giving the Colony the power of legislating for itself; but that power was subject to certain reservations, which bore directly on claims preferred by the body of which the right rev. Prelate was a member. The Act to which the right rev. Prelate referred broke down those reservations, and enabled the Legislature of Canada to deal with the endowments of the Church.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORDremarked that the whole question turned upon whether this was a reserved point or not. His belief was, that it was a point concluded already by Parliament.
THE EARL OF DERBY: If there were no reserves, where was the necessity of an Act of Parliament.
Motion agreed to.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA.
EARL GREY:* My Lords, I must solicit from your Lordships this evening a more than usual share of your indulgence, for I can very unaffectedly assure you that I feel oppressed, not only by the magnitude, but also by the painful nature of the task I have undertaken, in giving notice of the Motion I am about to make. It is a painful task, because I am aware that I can look for the support and sympathy of very few of your Lordships in submitting to you this Motion, and that I shall incur the condemnation of many both within and without these walls, for whose judgment I have great respect, and whose good opinion
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I highly value; and it is painful to me also to ask this House to concur in a vote, which involves censure upon a Government, among the Members of which there are many for whom I entertain a sincere regard, and more than one of my best and oldest friends. From these considerations I would gladly have abstained from bringing this question before you, but motives still more powerful impel me to proceed.
I cannot, my Lords, look upon the calamities of the war in which Europe is now involved without a feeling of horror it is impossible for me to describe. My noble Friend on the bench above (Lord Lansdowne) informed the House only a few evenings ago, that it appeared from information which had reached the Government, and in the accuracy of which they had reason to trust, that nearly 250,000 Russian soldiers had perished by the sword, or by disease, since the war began. I lately saw in the newspapers a calculation which seemed to be founded on sufficient data, that the loss of the Turkish armies, from the same causes, had not been less than 120,000men. We know that the losses of our own and of the French armies have also been very heavy, and if to the losses of all these armies we add the number of inhabitants of the provinces which have been the seat of war, who have fallen victims to want, disease, or violence, in consequence of the war, we can hardly reckon the total number of lives it has already cost at less than 500,000, though we are but in its second year. 500,000 human beings in that short space of time already sacrificed to the grim idol of war! Think of the amount of suffering which these figures represent. Not the sufferings of the victims only—though it is frightful to contemplate, what they have too often had to endure from wounds and sickness before they found rest in death—but the pain and misery of the multitudes of sick and wounded who still survive, and the grief and anxiety of the friends and relations of the fallen. Recollect that of the 500,000 who have perished, whether our fellow-subjects or those of other nations, there are few who have not left some near and dear to them to deplore their loss.
Nor is this all, in estimating the baneful effects of the war upon the happiness of mankind, I doubt whether the waste of life is what is worst. You have to consider the provinces which have been devastated and thrown back for years in civilisation and improvement—the progress of

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industry and commerce throughout the world arrested or retarded (since there is not a nation, however distant, that does not feel more or less the effects of this calamitous struggle) above all, you must remember the moral evils occasioned by war, which proverbially rouses into activity all the worst passions of human nature. How many in all the contending armies must have been demoralised and unfitted for the pursuits of peace, by the fierce contest in which they are engaged, and what a fruitful source of misery to themselves and to the world will this become when peace shall be restored. Nor can even the mere expenditure of money in the war be regarded as a slight evil. Our own share of that expenditure before the close of the second year of the war, will certainly not fall short of 50,000,000 l. How enormous is this sum, and how many objects of the highest importance to the welfare of the people have been postponed for years and years for one-tenth or one-twentieth part of the amount! Consider what good might have been done with this sum, if, instead of being applied to purposes of destruction, it had been used for the permanent advantage of the country. This great city might have been relieved from the disgrace and danger of its present sanitary condition, and the crying evil of the want of means of education for the poorer classes might have been remedied by a splendid permanent endowment, and a large sum would still have remained for other purposes of the same kind. When I reflected, my Lords, on the magnitude of the evils which have been brought upon our own country, upon Europe, and upon the world, by the war in which we are involved, and when I satisfied myself on carefully studying the papers relating to the recent Conferences at Vienna, which Her Majesty has ordered to be laid before us, that an opportunity has been thrown away, which, if judiciously improved, would have afforded a fair prospect of averting these calamities, I could not reconcile it to my conscience, to abstain from raising my voice, feeble as it may be, in protest against the course which has been followed by Her Majesty's Government, and which has deprived us of the hope of terminating the war.
I have by no means, my Lords, changed the opinion which I have more than once expressed to your Lordships against the policy of the war—on the contrary, the progress of events, and the additional information
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I have obtained, have only tended to confirm that opinion; but for the present I waive this question, and I will assume, for the sake of argument, that the policy which has been followed was right; that we were called upon to support Turkey in her quarrel with Russia, and I am prepared to contend, that even on this assumption, Her Majesty's Government were wrong in rejecting, or rather, I ought to say, in refusing to entertain, the proposals made by Russia in the recent negotiations. I do not contend—it is quite unnecessary for me to do so—that these proposals ought to have been accepted precisely in the form in which they were made, I only maintain, with the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, that they afforded fair ground for discussion, a sketch—this was the expression made use of—which might have been worked out into a satisfactory settlement of the questions at issue. This is the opinion I ask you to express to Her Majesty by an humble Adress, and I apprehend, that if I could convince you that the opinion itself is sound, it would clearly be not only the right, but the bounden duty of your Lordships, to inform the Crown of the conclusion to which you had come, and respectfully to submit to Her Majesty, that, in your judgment, she was ill-advised by her confidential servants, when it was resolved to reject the overtures made by Russia, in so peremptory a manner. I do not propose to go further in the Address that I shall move, than to express the opinion of the House, that an error has been committed in breaking off the negotiations on the grounds set forth by the British Plenipotentiaries. I do not presume to suggest what steps ought now to be taken to repair the effects of that mistake. I know that, after the conferences have been closed, or, what is much the same, adjourned sine die, to reopen the negotiation is a matter of much delicacy. I am aware that we have allies whom we must consult, and with whom we are bound to act; but if anything so improbable should happen, as that Her Majesty's Government should be induced by your Lordships' advice, to adopt the conclusion that it is desirable to renew the negotiations on the basis of the Russian offers, I cannot doubt that they would know well in what manner to proceed with that view, nor do I think that they would encounter any great difficulties on the part of our allies. Unless the public are greatly misinformed, and unless the appearances

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from which we may form a judgment on this point are very deceptive, it was the opinion of Her Majesty's Government against entertaining the Russian proposals, which mainly contributed to turn the counsels of France in the same direction, and if the views of Her Majesty's Ministers were to become more pacific, it is in the highest degree improbable that their efforts to recommend a corresponding policy to the French Government would fail.
Having thus explained the object of my Motion, it is fit that before I go further, I should add a few words to the reply which I gave on Tuesday to the question put to me by the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Lyndhurst), as to whether I should postpone my Motion in consequence of what had taken place the previous evening in the House of Commons. I said, in answer to this question, that I saw no grounds for my altering the course I had determined to take, but that if any reason for my doing so could be adduced, I was ready to consider it. I meant by this, as your Lordships must, doubtless, have understood, that if Her Majesty's Ministers were prepared to state, on their responsibility, that they apprehended injury to the public service from the discussion which I meant to bring on, I was ready to listen to such a suggestion, and I should certainly at once have postponed my Motion had they asked me to do so on that ground. But, as they have not taken this step—as my own opinion is that it is most desirable that a discussion should take place without delay—and as I can see no possible injury that it can do, when we gather from the replies of Her Majesty's Ministers to the questions that have been addressed to them, that there are no negotiations now in progress which afford any rational ground for hoping that they may lead to peace, I have thought it right to persevere in the course which I had previously determined to take. I am the; more encouraged to believe that no injury; can arise from my proceeding with this Motion, because I intend, in submitting it to you, carefully to abstain from giving any opinion or making any remarks on the future; I shall confine myself to the past, and I hope other noble Lords will observe the same reserve. The views of Her Majesty's Government, as to the offers made by Russia, in the late negotiations are fully explained in the papers on our table, I cannot therefore see what inconvenience
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can arise from their being called upon to defend the decision they have already adopted; if, however, there are any points on which I may touch, on which my noble Friend the Secretary of State may think that he cannot follow me without inconvenience, I can only say that, so far as I am concerned, I shall be perfectly satisfied with his simple statement to that effect.
But to return from this digression: I am sure your Lordships must all remember that, when we were entering upon the war, all views of selfish advantage and of aggrandizement on the part of the allies were most earnestly disclaimed. We were assured that it was a strictly defensive war; we were told that Russia, in requiring from the Sultan a formal promise to protect his subjects of the Greek Church, made a demand inconsistent with the independence of Turkey, and that in attempting to enforce this demand by the occupation of the Principalities, she committed an act of aggression which it was our duty and interest to assist the Turks in repelling. This was the language held by Her Majesty's Government at the beginning of the war in both Houses of Parliament, and the same views were still more formally recorded almost immediately afterwards in the protocol of the conference, held at Vienna on the 9th of April, 1854 [Eastern Papers, Part viii., p. 2], which referred to the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, and the abandonment of her claim to the exclusive protection of the Greek Christians in the Turkish Empire, as the objects to be obtained from Russia, without mentioning any other concessions to be required from her. Such having been the avowed objects of the war, I would ask your Lordships whether they have not long since been obtained, and far more than obtained. Russia has, many months ago, been compelled to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, she has long since withdrawn her demand that the Porte should recognise her right to protect the Greek Christians in the Turkish dominions, and is willing that the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of Turkey should be left to the safeguard of the European powers. All offensive military operations of Russia against Turkey have also been long discontinued, and the war is, on her part, become purely defensive, and she is now engaged in a manful and resolute defence of an important

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part of her own territories from invasion by the combined armies of England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey.
The original dispute which led to the war, has therefore been decided entirely in your favour, but you declared, as you were entitled to do, that having been compelled to engage in war, you would no longer be satisfied with the terms which you would have been content to accept before the commencement of hostilities, and would endeavour to obtain security for the future by requiring additional concessions. Accordingly the Powers deliberated together, and agreed upon certain arrangements to be proposed to Russia as the groundwork of negotiations for peace. In the first instance, Russia rejected the proposal thus made to her, but ultimately agreed to accept it, and the recent Conferences at Vienna were held for the purpose of ascertaining whether Russia and the allied Powers could agree on the means of carrying into effect the four heads of an arrangement—known as the "Four Points"—which had been communicated to the former on the 28th of December last. When the conferences opened, the first two heads of the Proposed arrangement were easily settled. Russia consented to abandon the claim she had under former treaties to protect the Danubian Principalities, and that they should in future continue subject to the Porte, but enjoy an independent and national administration under the guarantee of the European Powers. This was a concession of no trifling importance on the part of Russia, which you did not think of asking at the beginning of the war, but which I willingly admit to have been now very properly demanded, as tending materially to diminish the danger of future wars. Russia, upon this point, seems to have met the allies as fairly as possible, and to have agreed to an arrangement with which no fault can be found. The same may be said of the second point by which the freedom of the navigation of the Danube was satisfactorily provided for.
The third head of the proposal was that which it was always felt would lead to the greatest difficulty. The memorandum delivered to Prince Gortchakoff on the 28th of Dec. 1854, stated, as the third point insisted upon by the allies, that—
"The revision of the treaty of July 13, 1841, must have for its object to connect the existence of the Ottoman Empire more completely with the
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European equilibrium, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea."— [Eastern Papers, Part xiii. p. 2.]
This was a demand of which nothing was heard until some months after the declaration of war. The first allusion I can trace to the necessity of obtaining anything of the kind, is in certain speeches delivered in the House of Commons on the occasion of a vote of credit being asked for the war, on the 24th of July last. Upon the first part of this point no serious difficulty arose, and an article was agreed upon declaring that the high contracting parties—
"Engage themselves severally to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, guarantee together the strict observance of this engagement, and will in consequence consider every act or event which should be of a nature to infringe on it as a question of European interest." [Eastern Papers, Part xiii. p. 64.
To which a second article was added, providing—
"That if a misunderstanding should arise between the Porte and one of the contracting parties, these two States before having recourse to the employment of force, should place the other Powers in a position to anticipate this extreme course by pacific means."
On these two articles which were intended to carry into effect the first part of the third point, no difficulty whatever arose, except with regard to a reservation made by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, that they were not to be considered, by agreeing to them, as engaging their Government to take up arms for Turkey, whenever she might be attacked in any part of her dominions. The other Powers recorded their regret at this reserve, but I must say I think without sufficient reason.
Russia did not object to bind herself in the strictest manner to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey, and also to abstain from using force in any misunderstanding she may hereafter have with the Porte, without giving to the other Powers of Europe a previous opportunity of endeavouring to settle the dispute by pacific means; nor did she object to the other parties, binding themselves to defend Turkey by arms from any attack, if they thought proper to do so; she only declined to contract a similar engagement herself, saying with unanswerable force, that the blood of Russia belongs to Russia, and ought to be shed only for

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Russian interests. The Russian Plenipotentiaries, in my opinion, exercised in this a wise discretion, which I wish that our own had imitated. Unlimited engagements to defend other countries by arms in all cases that may arise, and, therefore in circumstances which cannot be foreseen, are, in my opinion, always imprudent and dangerous. But it is more especially so to enter into such an engagement, in behalf of the Turkish Empire, composed as it is of such ill-joined materials, and menaced by such dangers from without and from within, that its ultimate dissolution is a matter of certainty, and a question only of time. Hence I consider the qualification attached by the Russian plenipotentiaries to their guarantee of the Ottoman Empire to have been, not only reasonable, but called for by the most ordinary prudence; it is, I hope, most improbable, but it is certainly possible, that at some future time the English Government may direct an attack from India on the remote eastern extremity of the Ottoman Empire, and it is quite as possible, that France may invade Tunis from Algeria—Russia most justly objected to being bound in such a case to make war with either of these powerful nations; and I own, it gives me far more confidence in the sincerity of her Plenipotentiaries, to find them thus guarding their assent to what was proposed to them, than if they had agreed, with what would have been a suspicious readiness to all that was suggested.
Still the assent of Russia to what was proposed on the first part of the third point was accepted in the form in which it was offered, though the other Powers recorded their regret that it should have been thus qualified. Unfortunately the attempts to come to an understanding on the second part of this head of the arrangement, relating to what is called the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, were not equally successful. I will not trouble your Lordships by following the discussion upon this point through its various stages, it is sufficient to mention that it was brought at last to the following result. England and France, on the one side, would be content with nothing but a limitation of the naval; force, which Russia should be allowed to keep up in the Black Sea, while Russia, on the other hand, though she refused to agree to this limitation, was ready to listen to any other proposal which might be made, and in the mean time suggested that the object in view would be gained
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if, in addition to the articles already agreed to, the treaty of 1841 were altered, by providing that, while the general rule established by that treaty of closing the Straits leading to the Black Sea against the ships of war of all nations, should be adhered to, the Sultan should, in future, be at liberty to admit the ships of any of his allies to these waters, whenever he may consider himself to be menaced, instead of being required as formerly to wait until an actual declaration had taken place —Austria was of opinion that this proposal of Russia offered fair grounds for discussion, and might have led to some settlement of the question.
I believe, my Lords, I have stated correctly the manner in which, as we learn from the papers laid upon our table, the attempt to negotiate a peace has failed. I have now to call your attention to the reasons on which I found my opinion, that the Austrian view of the Russian proposals was correct, and that Her Majesty's Government have grievously erred in giving up the prospect of putting an end to the war, which their adopting that view would have afforded. When, in the language of diplomacy—unfortunately little like the language of common life, and common sense—it was required that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be put an end to, I presume what was meant was, that some arrangement should be made to prevent the Russian naval force from affording just grounds of apprehension to Turkey. So understood the demand was a fair one, which in any other sense it certainly would not have been. We have therefore to consider whether, on a fair comparison of the two plans for effecting this object, that suggested by the allies was so superior to what was proposed by Russia, and at the same time so free from just objection, that it was right inflexibly to adhere to it, and to treat its rejection as a sufficient ground for shutting the door against any further negotiation.
I have no hesitation in declaring that I think no sufficient answer was brought forward to the arguments urged by Prince Gortchakoff. When Russia consented to bind herself by a solemn engagement, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, and not to use force in any quarrel she might have with the Porte, without first allowing the other Powers an opportunity of endeavouring to arrange the difference, so that the

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breach of this engagement would have given these Powers a just cause of war against her; and when she would further have agreed that the Straits being closed as a rule, the Sultan would have the power of calling in the fleets of his allies, whenever he might think himself threatened, it seems to me that even without anything more, (and Russia declared her willingness to consider any further precautions that could be suggested) much would thus have been done to prevent the Russian fleet from becoming the source of any real danger to Turkey. The importance of the alteration proposed in the treaty of 1841, when taken in connection with the two articles previously agreed upon, does not seem to me to have been duly appreciated. It is quite true as Prince Gortchakoff remarked, that the transport by sea of an army, capable of striking a sudden and fatal blow at the seat of Turkish power, would be no such easy affair. Considering the facilities that exist for fortifying the narrow passage of the Bosphorus, and defending the points where a landing could be effected to threaten Constantinople, considering the extent and population of the Ottoman Empire, and the great resources it possesses if properly made use of, yon must have very little faith in all that has been so confidently asserted as to the improvement going on in the Turkish Government, and you must regard it as in a state of even more hopeless weakness than even I believe it to be, if you suppose that the Turks could not easily provide such means of defence as to make it impossible for Russia to venture an attack upon their capital without being obliged to employ in the enterprise a powerful fleet of transports capable of carrying a land army of not less than from 40,000 to 50,000 men, with an adequate proportion of artillery. But our recent experience sufficiently proves, that even with all the advantages of our large commercial marine, and our magnificent steamers, to collect the means of transport for such an army would be a work of much time and labour, a work which it would be utterly impossible to carry on in secret, and which would afford more than ample time for the allies of Turkey to come to her assistance. If you reflect upon the difficulties and dangers of such an enterprise, you can hardly doubt that it is one which Russia will never attempt, so long as she believes that the other Powers will abide by the treaty by which it is proposed that Turkey should
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be placed under the general guarantee of Europe. If, indeed, this treaty should ail, if from quarrels with each other, or from any other cause, the great Powers of Europe should decline to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire, or if one of them should join with Russia in any iniquitous scheme of spoliation, then, indeed, I grant that Turkey might well view the Russian fleet with alarm. But in that case do your Lordships consider that the limitation you proposed to place upon the amount of the Russian fleet in the Euxine would be of much service in preserving the Turkish Empire from danger? Can you really believe that if it should ever happen that Russia should be seriously bent on attempting the destruction of that Empire, at a moment when the state of Europe may be such as to prevent the Western Powers from coming to the rescue, the proposed limitation of the Russian naval force would have the slightest effect in preventing the subjugation of the Turks?
But there is another consideration not to be lost sight of, in judging of the value of that stipulation on the part of Russia, which you insisted upon, and for the sake of which alone we are now, as it appears, to continue to endure and to inflict upon our enemy all the calamities of war. Having obtained from Russia a promise not to appeal to arms in any future quarrel with the Porte, without a previous reference to the other Powers, having also obtained from her a solemn engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, it is obvious that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea can be a source of danger to Turkey, and that a limitation of that fleet can be required, only on the supposition that Russia is so regardless of the obligation of treaties, that it is necessary to take some security against aggression on her part, which does not depend upon the good faith with which she observes her engagements. But if this is the ground upon which Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it right to
insist upon obtaining this stipulation, if they have demanded it as a security against the dishonesty of Russia, and her disposition to break her engagements, I wonder that it should not have occurred to them that with this view, what they asked would have been utterly worthless. Suppose that a treaty had been concluded in the very words proposed by the Allies, binding Russia only to keep up in the Black Sea four line of battle ships and four frigates,

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with a proportionate number of lighter vessels and transports, is it possible to conceive any treaty which a dishonest Power would have less difficulty in evading? Of course, if Russia were to be at liberty to have four line of battle ships in the Euxine, this must be understood as meaning four ships fit to go to sea, those no longer seaworthy, and those building to replace the ships afloat as they were worn out, should not be reckoned. Would it then be difficult for a Power you assume to be dishonest, to have ships nominally dismantled as no longer fit for service, and ostensibly converted into hulks for convicts or stores, but really in a state of perfect efficiency, with all their rigging and equipments in a complete state of preparation and ready to be put on board at a moment's notice? Would it be difficult to have other ships in an equal state; of readiness, but unlaunched, professing to be destined to replace the vessels afloat! and might not two or three crews be attached to each ship in commission, to be practised in succession, and to be placed on board the ships ready to receive them, whenever occasion for it should arise? The treaty, therefore, would have been very ineffective even as regards ships of the line. I would ask my noble and gallant Friend opposite (the Earl of Hard-wicke), whether it is not true that, since the invention of steam, and the great improvement of naval gunnery, perhaps the most formidable of all descriptions of naval force (especially for the purpose you attribute to Russia of being in constant readiness to make a sudden descent on Constantinople), would consist of fast steam gunboats, each capable of carrying one or two heavy guns, and of embarking for a voyage of a couple of days 200 or 300 soldiers. A numerous flotilla of vessels of this description, which could take sailing transports in tow, and approach close to the shore to land their troops under the protection of their guns, would be by far the most dangerous force to Turkey that the Russians could possibly possess. But if the article drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and insisted upon by the allies, had been assented to by Russia, it would not have presented the slightest obstacle to her multiplying vessels of this sort, to the utmost extent that her resources would permit. You cannot, of course, object to any possible extension of the Russian commercial marine; but, under the name of vessels for commercial purposes—as
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tugs, passage boats, or coasters, nominally the property of private merchants, but really belonging to the Russian Government—any number of steamers of this sort might have been built at Odessa, Taganrog, and the various other ports of the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff, to be brought whenever they were wanted to Sebastopol, and their guns and crews put on board. The facilities for evading such a treaty are obvious, and, from the nature of the Government, would be far greater for Russia than any other Power, since she possesses peculiar facilities for concealing her measures. It is true you proposed to stipulate also for the power of appointing consuls at the Russian ports in the Black Sea, but might not these consuls have been so surrounded by police as to be completely cut off from all means of obtaining information of what was going on in the very ports whore they were stationed? Even if you succeeded in obtaining information convincing to your own mind, that Russia was violating the stipulations you had imposed upon her, how could you obtain proof of the fact which would enable you to obtain redress? Treaties, you must remember, can only be enforced by arms; and you can hardly doubt that Russia might violate such a promise as this, and that you might have the clearest moral certainty that she was doing so, without your being able to establish the fact in such a manner, as to enable you to make out a casus belli which would satisfy the world. My Lords, it appears to me that the precedent, not very happily quoted by the British Plenipotentiary, of the article of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which France was obliged to destroy the port and fortifications of Dunkirk, is a remarkable example of the inutility of imposing obligations of this kind upon a powerful nation. I am indebted to the historical knowledge of my noble Friend on the cross bench (Earl Stanhope) for the fact of which he has reminded me, that, in spite of the agreement that it should be destroyed, Dunkirk was in a state which allowed an expedition against this country to be fitted out there in the year 1744, and, in the appendix to the last volume of his History, he has published a curious letter, showing that this article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the presence of a British commissary at Dunkirk to watch over its fulfilment, was a constant source of irritation to France. Nor was it fulfilled in spite of the presence of a commissary.

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When objections were made in this House in the year 1783, to the peace then concluded, for not renewing this article of the peace of Utrecht, Lord Shelburne replied, that if he had been wrong in giving up this article, all preceding ministers had been wrong in neglecting to enforce it. My Lords, had the stipulation asked for by the allies been agreed to, would have proved, like that relating to Dunkirk, a source of irritation to the State on which it was imposed, and useless to those that insisted upon it.
But while it would have been useless to the allies, it was open to just objection on the part of Russia. In the first place, she said that it was an insult to an independent nation, to be required thus to bind her hands with respect to the measures she might think fit to take in her own dominions. It appears to me that this is reasonable objection, and I can call your Lordships' attention to high authority in favour of this opinion. In the year 1813, when the Emperor Napoleon was driven almost to extremity, (after his disastrous retreat from Moscow and loss of the battle of Leipsic, nearly the whole of Europe being united against him in arms,) and was treating for peace, the negotiation was conducted on the part of this country by my noble Friend (Lord Aberdeen), whose absence, as well as the indisposition by which it is occasioned, I greatly regret. At this time, though the difficulties of the French Emperor were so great, it was still proposed that he should retain what were called the natural limits of his empire. This raised the question, whether Antwerp should be included in his dominions; and upon this question, there is a remarkable letter to my noble Friend in the correspondence of Lord Castlereagh which has been lately published. In this letter, which is dated November 13, 1813, Lord Castlereagh, speaking of Antwerp, says, that—
"To leave it in the hands of France is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment."
And returning to the subject in a postcript to the same letter, he adds—
"The line of the Waal would reduce Holland to nothing, strip it of all its best defences, and leave Antwerp in the enemy's hands. You must, my dear Aberdeen, use all your influence with Metternich, to deliver us from this annoyance. We do not wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon France, which, limiting the number of her ships would be, but she must not be left in possession of this point."
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Thus, your Lordships will perceive that Lord Castlereagh (no mean judge) was of opinion, that to ask a Sovereign State to limit by treaty the amount of naval force she should be at liberty to keep up, would be to require from her what was so dishonourable, that it it was easier to demand from France the surrender of Antwerp, after all the vast sums that had been expended on its dockyards and arsenal, than to call upon her to limit the number of her ships of war. I think that the fact of such an opinion having been expressed by so high an authority as Lord Castlereagh, forty years before the present question arose, is a clear proof that it is not unnatural for Russia to regard the stipulation required from her, as one to which it would be a degradation to submit; and the more so, because it is obvious, as I have already shown, that there can be no reason whatever for demanding it, except your belief, that Russia's good faith is not to be relied upon, and that she will not observe the solemn engagements she has agreed to make. Therefore, in asking Russia to consent to a treaty containing this provision, you asked her to direct her Ambassador to sign an acknowledgment of her own want of faith.
Russia also said, and I think, with truth, that her naval force may, at some future period, be required for defence, and even for the defence of Turkey against one of her present allies. When this is treated as an idle pretence, I cannot forget that the differences which led to this unhappy war began with threats of the employment of a French fleet to coerce Turkey into making concessions which could not justly be required of her; and that to encourage Turkey to resist these threats was the first object of the warlike preparations of Russia. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that while the demand made upon Russia professed to follow the precedent of the treaty between this country and the United States, respecting the maintenance of a naval force on the great American lakes, and to impose a similar limitation of force on Turkey to that to which Russia was called upon to agree, the proposed arrangement was in reality altogether unlike the precedent quoted for it, and would have been very unequal in its operation on the two empires. The arrangement between this country and the United States, for limiting the amount of naval force which either nation should be at liberty to maintain on the great American lakes, was not imposed

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by one of these nations on the other as a condition of peace. It did not even form part of the treaty of peace, but was adopted for mutual convenience, by a separate treaty in April, 1817, more than two years after peace had been concluded. It contained also a provision, that either party should at any time be at liberty to put an end to the agreement on giving six months notice to the other, and, above all, it bore equally on both parties, since it was impossible for this country to bring up ships of war through the St. Lawrence into the lakes, and it could only increase its naval force there by building them on the spot. In all these respects, the arrangement you sought to impose upon Russia was as unlike as possible to the precedent quoted for it, and especially so as regards the inequality of its operation. Turkey, it is true, was to be nominally bound to keep her naval force in the Black Sea within the same limits as Russia, but I cannot find that any restriction whatever was to be placed on her force in the Archipelago, or even in the Sea of Marmora, so that she might have as many ships as she pleased in a place from whence they might at any time be brought in a few hours into the Black Sea, which, with the assent of Turkey, would have been equally accessible to the fleets of the allies. There was, therefore, no real reciprocity in the proposal, but a demand was made upon Russia, without any corresponding concession being offered to her.
There would be no difficulty in pointing out other objections to the stipulations required from Russia; but I abstain from taking up your Lordships' time by doing so, it is sufficient to have shown that she had grounds which were by no means unreasonable for her refusal, while there would have been no real advantage to the allies in obtaining what they asked. This I would submit to your Lordships that I have established, and if so, it surely follows that Her Majesty's Ministers have grievously erred, in throwing away the prospect of putting an end to the calamities of war, for the sake of a demand of such a character; they are, I think, the more to blame for having obstinately insisted upon it, and for having thereby, as it appears, closed the door for the present, to any further negotiations, because, unless the public are greatly misinformed, still larger concessions might have been obtained from Russia than those which are described as having been offered by her in the papers laid before us. Though
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these papers contain no account of any proceedings subsequent to the conferences of the 20th of April, it has been stated by Her Majesty's Ministers, that some further proposals have been made (verbally at least, if not formally and in writing) by Austria, to which there is reason to believe that the assent of Russia would not have been refused, if that of the allies had been given. Now, my Lords, with regard to this plan of accommodation, whatever it may have been, some remarkable facts have been made known, by two articles which have appeared in the Independence Belge. From these articles we learn that this plan of accommodation was considered so reasonable by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that rather than be a party to rejecting it he resigned the high office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he held under the Emperor of the French. When I remember that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was not satisfied with what the Russian Plenipotentiaries offered in the conferences, and how little real difference there was in the terms proposed by the two parties even then, it appears to me quite impossible that a new offer going further than Russia had previously done in concession—which so distinguished a statesman as M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought ought to have been accepted—I cannot, I say, believe that an offer of this sort ought to have been peremptorily refused at the cost of continuing all the horrors of war. But there is something still more important; in the newspaper I have already mentioned, the Independence Belge, there is a letter from Paris in which the writer, after stating that the Emperor of the French had differed from M, Drouyn de Lhuys as to the proposal in question, proceeds to say—
"I have not yet received any information to make me sufficiently acquainted with the conditions and terms of the Austrian proposition; but it is certain the English Government decided on rejecting it. The Emperor therefore had the same motives for refusing it—that is to say that it did not offer such a peace as would give sufficient guarantees to the Powers which had made so many sacrifices to defend and secure European right. His Majesty had, moreover, a desire to maintain in all its integrity and force the alliance with England, and the feeling of that Government on the question being already known had beyond any doubt a certain weight with him."
My Lords, this is a remarkable statement, but it derives its chief importance from the fact, that the letter containing it, was copied without comment or contradiction into the Moniteur. The insertion of

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such an article without contradiction in the Moniteur, though only in the non-official part of it—is to me a proof, only less conclusive than an official declaration to the same effect, that the Emperor of the French would not unwillingly have consented to the proposal, whatever it may have been, had the views of the British Government been equally pacific, so that the real responsibility for the continuance of the war rests upon Her Majesty's Ministers.
My Lords, I have endeavoured to show you that the point they insisted upon was one of too little real value to the allies, and that the difference between their demands and the concessions offered by Russia was much too slight to justify the course taken by the Government in breaking off the negotiations; but I am aware that it may be the opinion of some of your Lordships, that even if I should have succeeded in establishing this conclusion, it would not follow that I had made out the principal part of the proposition I intended to submit to you. There are, I fear, some who think that it is true, indeed, that the proposed limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea would have been worth little or nothing, but that it is not thence to be inferred that peace might have been made, because Her Majesty's Government had already gone much too far in offering such terms as they did, to the acceptance of Russia. These terms have been condemned in unmeasured language, as humiliating and disgraceful to the country, and it has been loudly asserted, that we ought not to lay down oar arms without having obtained complete security for the future, and without having effectually guarded against the resumption of Russian schemes of aggression against Turkey. This language has been held by many persons out of doors, but I should hope it will not be adopted by any of your Lordships, though I confess I have been a little alarmed by some things I have heard even within these walls. My Lords, it seems to me that those who entertain such views ought to descend from the region of vague generalties, and explain what they really mean. What is it we are to contend for, and what is the security we are to obtain from Russia, before we consent to relieve the world from all the evils of war? I have in vain endeavoured to obtain any clear answer to these questions. The only approach I can find to an explanation of what is meant by the language I have adverted to, is the
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declaration, that since it is unsafe to rely upon England and France being always able to act as cordially together as they do now in defence of Turkey, some means ought to be found for guarding her against the danger to which she would be exposed if deprived of such powerful protection. But if this is the security that is desired, I would ask how it is to be obtained by continuing the war? You have already rescued Turkey from all external dangers; those by which she is now threatened, and which no doubt will prove fatal to her before very many years pass away, arise only from her false religion, the barbarism of her people, and the inveterate corruption of her government. To prolong the war, far from diminishing these her real dangers, will only tend to aggravate them; already it has greatly hastened that rapid decline with which she is afflicted, and consumed no small part of her remaining resources.
Are we then, because Turkey is hopelessly weak, to continue the war until we have reduced Russia to a similar state of weakness? Are we to make the breaking up of the Russian empire the object of our efforts, and are we to endeavour to accomplish it, by undertaking the cause of what are called, in the jargon of the day, "the oppressed nationalities?" If this is to be the future object of the war, with what allies is it to be carried on? From Austria, the mistress of Italy (I might, I believe, add Hungary and more than one of her other provinces) over which her dominion certainly does not rest upon the affections of her subjects, you certainly cannot look for assistance—nay, you can hardly, in such a contest, expect even neutrality, either from her, or from Prussia, and I know not where in Europe you are to expect to find allies, except in the revolutionists of 1848. I Will you, with that party for allies, enter upon a war in favour of the "oppressed nationalities," and at the same time on behalf of Turkey? Turkey, the ruthless oppressor of a large Christian population; Turkey, under whose barbarous and ignorant despotism, commerce and industry languish, and poverty and wretchedness cover the most fruitful region of the East. Turkey, under whose grinding tyranny millions of our fellow-Christians are groaning and writhing, with such impatience that even the sight of the overwhelming power of England and of France arrayed in support of their oppressors, has not been able to restrain them since this war began, from

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frantic and convulsive efforts to throw off the yoke, and can at this moment scarcely prevent the renewal of their struggle for freedom? Can any man seriously wish that in a war undertaken in defence of Turkey, you should appeal to the "oppressed nationalities," and take the revolutionists of Europe for your allies? My Lords, I entertain the most perfect confidence that there is no one of your Lordships who would be prepared to enter into a war, so insane in its character, and of which the consequences must be so frightful. Such a war, once begun, would kindle a flame, that would in all probability extend from end to end of Europe, and like the war of the French revolution, might again, for a quarter of a century, cover the continent with blood and ashes.
But I am aware, my Lords, that there are some persons, and I greatly fear some of your Lordships, who, though they would shrink from such a war as I have attempted to describe, yet contend that we ought not to lay down our arms till we have effected a great reduction of the power of Russia. But how is this to be accomplished? I do not know of any other mode by which you can reduce the power of a great empire, except by imposing upon her a considerable sacrifice of territory. But if this is to be our object, the character of the war will be entirely altered; we were assured at its commencement that it was strictly defensive; it will become one of simple aggression, the moment you determine that it is to be continued, until you can wrest from Russia such a portion of her present dominions, as seriously to diminish her power. I say, it will become a war of simple aggression, for though you may attempt to throw over it the thin disguise of being intended to protect you from future danger, this will not alter its real nature. To justify war, the dangers which it is meant to avert must be immediate and apparent, not re-remote and doubtful; but it is idle to talk of our being threatened by any immediate and apparent danger, unless we can reduce the power of Russia; and to represent a war for the diminution of her territories as a defensive war, would be merely to use one of those flimsy pretences, for which ambition and the love of war are never at a loss to cover the iniquitous acts they suggest.
Remember also, that if the war is to be carried on with this object, its termination must be almost indefinitely remote, neither
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the Government nor the people of Russia would submit till the last extremity, to a peace imposing such conditions, as we are told by some persons that we ought to insist upon. Even if we should ultimately succeed in compelling her to accept a peace of that sort, we may find ourselves greatly mistaken, as to the advantage that will result from it. You could hardly expect it to be durable, since Russia would be little likely to submit to conditions she felt to be unjust and degrading to her, any longer than till she found a fitting opportunity of getting rid of them. It is also not a little doubtful whether the balance of power would be improved by reducing Russia to a state of weakness, and whether it would be for the real interest of either France or England, that she should cease to be one of the great Powers of the world. My Lords, if we are to continue the war, when we have actually gained all the points in dispute when it broke out, and when we have, within our reach, those farther objects which, in August and December last, we agreed with France and Austria that we ought to obtain—we are bound, at least, to come to a clear understanding as to the ends to which our efforts are now to be directed. But, instead of endeavouring to arrive at such an understanding—instead of laying before us a calm and reasoned explanation of the objects for which we are now to contend, and of the grounds upon which our seeking to obtain these objects by arms is justified, the partisans of the war content themselves with vague declamations, addressed to the passions of the people, and inflammatory appeals to their feelings.
I fear, my Lords, that these appeals have been too successful in rousing in the country an eager desire to persevere in the war, not from a sober conviction that it is necessary for the true interests of the nation, and that it may still be carried on without transgressing the limits of justice, but from a spirit of passionate and unreasoning animosity against Russia. The unmeasured imputations, and the virulent attacks on the conduct and character of the Russian Government and people, and on the late Emperor, which have been poured forth by the press day after day, and week after week, have roused this spirit among our countrymen, and I have observed with deep concern that it has been encouraged by what I am compelled to call the unjustifiable language which has been used by Members of Her Majesty's

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Government, and especially by two noble Lords in the other House of Parliament, one of whom is now at the head of the Administration. Lord Palmerston declared that—
"The Russian Government, by its various agents and by itself, exhausted every modification of untruth, beginning with concealment and equivocation, and ending with assertions of positive falsehood."—[3 Hansard, cxxx. 1033.]
Lord John Russell, in speaking of the Government, said—
"That to its unprincipled and unjust aggression it added what he could not designate as otherwise than fraudulent in the manner in which it pursued its policy.—[3 Hansard, cxxx. 177.]
["Hear, hear!" from the Treasury bench.] I regret to perceive that the language I have quoted of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, is endorsed by Members of Her Majesty's Government in this House also. Believing, as I do, that these statements as to the conduct of Russia are coloured and exaggerated, and that they have mainly contributed to raise that feeling in the minds of the people which is at this moment, I am convinced, the principal obstacle to the conclusion of peace, I think it my duty to endeavour to prove to your Lordships that the language I have referred to is not justified by the facts of the case.
I apprehend, my Lords, that when "unprincipled and unjust aggression" is attributed to Russia, this is meant to apply to her demand that Turkey should enter into an engagement to respect the religious rights of those of its subjects who belong to the Greek Church, and should recognise the right of the Emperor of Russia, under the treaty of Kainardji, to watch over the manner in which this engagement was performed. It has been represented that in making this demand Russia endeavoured to usurp an authority over some millions of the subjects of the Sultan, which would virtually supersede his legitimate authority, and be fatal to the independence of the Ottoman Empire. The charge of fraud which is urged against Russia is founded on her supposed concealment of the extent of this claim, till a late period of the negotiations which preceded her rupture with Turkey. Such are the charges against Russia, which I trust my noble Friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, will acknowledge that I have stated correctly; it seems to me that nothing is required to prove their injustice
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except a reference to a few acknowledged facts in the history of the quarrel. In making this reference I will endeavour to save your Lordships' time by touching only on the most important points, and by abstaining as much as possible from quotations from the voluminous papers on the table; but I hold in my hand extracts from those papers by which I shall be prepared to support, if necessary, every statement I shall make.
Your Lordships are aware that the disputes of the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches, with respect to what are called the Holy Places at Jerusalem, furnished the original cause of the quarrel between the Governments of Turkey and of Russia, which, at last, ended in the war in which we are involved. It is fortunately unnecessary that I should trouble your Lordships with any account of the miserable and paltry subjects of these disputes, which have led to such calamitous results; nothing can be more lamentable than to think that these wretched questions about a silver star, and the key of a church door should have been allowed to become the means of arraying Christian nations against each other for mutual slaughter. But it is most important to remember, that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government has been distinctly recorded, that in these disputes, wretched as they were, Russia and the Greek Church were clearly in the right, since the Sultan, through fear of France, and under the coercion of the French Ambassador, had infringed upon the just claims of the Greek Church, and in doing so, had violated his engagements to the Emperor of Russia, in a manner to which the latter could not be expected to submit, since he could not, as was acknowledged by my noble Friend, the Secretary of State—
"Without a loss of moral influence throughout his own dominions, yield any of the privileges of the Greek Church to that of the Roman Catholics, of which the Emperor of the French claimed to be the protector."—[Eastern Papers, Part V. p. 23.]
It is also acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government, in all the earlier part of the correspondence, that, for a long time, the Emperor of Russia acted with great moderation and forbearance in the dispute thus forced upon him. But having failed to obtain the redress to which he considered himself entitled, he, at length, in the beginning of March, 1853, sent Prince Menchikoff as extraordinary Ambassador

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to Constantinople to demand it, in a manner which would make it unlikely that it should be refused. This embassy was supported by the assembling of troops on the Turkish frontier, which was announced to the British Government, with a distinct declaration that this display of force was intended to encourage the Turks not to allow themselves to be overawed by France on the question of the Holy Places, and to show them that the Emperor was determined to enforce a compliance with his just demands. We find this fact recorded in Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatches of the 8th and 13th of January, 1853, and in one from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow communicated to Lord John Russell on the 24th of the same month.
Sir Hamilton Seymour to Lord John Russell.
Extract.
"St. Petersburgh, January 8, 1853.
"As regards the present crisis, his Excellency expressed the hope and the belief that it would be brought to a conclusion by negotiation, but observed that it was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported (appuyé) by a demonstration of force. It would be required that the Porte should strictly fulfil its engagements towards the Greek Church and the Emperor; it would further be exacted that a corresponding compensation should be made to the Greek for any new concession made (I believe his Excellency said at the expense of the Emperor's coreligionists) to the Latin Church."—Eastern Papers, Part i. p. 57.
Sir G. Hamilton Seymour to Lord John Russell.
Extract.
"St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1853."
Nevertheless that His Imperial Majesty's rights, secured to him and to the Greek Church, could not be withheld with impunity; but that he was prepared to seek satisfaction through diplomatic means."—P. 59.
Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow.
Translated Extract.
"St. Petersburgh, January 14, 1853.
"The match is too unequal between us and the French Government, if, while the latter moves its squadrons about without opposition in all parts of the Mediterranean, and presents its least demand at the cannon's mouth, we allow the notion of our inability to defend them, and likewise to protect our own interests, indefinitely to take root in the minds of the Turks. The Emperor has, therefore, considered it necessary to adopt in the outset some precautionary measures, in order to support our negotiations, to neutralise the effect of M. Lava-lette's threats, and to guard himself in any contingency which may arise against the attempts of a Government accustomed to act by surprises."— P. 63.
Later, on the 20th of April, 1853, we find it stated, that the Emperor himself informed Sir Hamilton Seymour that "he had no intention of being trifled with, and that if the Turks did not yield to reason, they
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would have to give way to the approach of danger."
Sir Hamilton Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.
Extract.
"St. Petersburgh, April 20, 1853.
"His Majesty, after observing that according to the accounts just received (those of the 29th ultimo) little or no progress had been made towards an adjustment of difficulties at Constantinople, said, that as yet he had not moved a ship or a battalion; that he had not done so from motives of consideration for the Sultan, and from economical motives; but that he would repeat that he had no intention of being trifled with, and that if the Turks did not yield to reason, they would have to give way to an approach of danger."—Eastern Papers, Part v. p. 24.
In this conversation the Emperor referred to general ill-treatment of Christians in all parts of Turkey, as requiring his interference, and this is also very distinctly implied in a memorandum of Count Nes-selrode's enclosed in it.
From the first, it was announced [see the despatches already quoted of Sir H. Seymour, of January 8th and 13th, 1853, and of Count Nesselrode of January, 24rth] that Prince Menchikoff's mission had two objects in view—first, to require the Sultan strictly to fulfil his engagements to the Greek Church and to the Emperor; and, secondly, to obtain preparation for the offence of which the Porte had been guilty, together with security for the future.
The immediate question of the Holy Places was amicably arranged, as the French Government, in a spirit of moderation and fairness for which it is entitled to great praise, retreated from the ground unadvisedly taken by its diplomatic agents in the first instance, and consented to an equitable adjustment of the claims of the two churches. But, unhappily, this did not avert the mischief which arose from the original error. The Emperor of Russia's claim for reparation for the flagrant offence he had received, in a form to give security for the future against the repetition of any similar offence, still remained to be settled. In order to meet this object, Prince Menchikoff, in the first instance, proposed that the Porte should enter into a treaty with the Emperor, but, finding that this was resisted, after modifying his original demand more than once in order to obviate the objections that were raised, he at length, on the 20th of May, 1853, required, as the least concession he would accept, that the Turkish Minister should sign a note, of which a draft was transmitted to him, and by which he would have

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promised to the Greek Church and clergy, in the name of the Sultan, protection and the full enjoyment of all the rights and privileges to which they were entitled ab antiquo, together with an equal participation in the privileges granted to other Christians. The note further contained a promise that no change should be made in the arrangements relating to the Holy Places.
The Porte, acting under the advice and influence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, refused to sign this note. I say, my Lords, acting under the advice and influence of Lord Stratford, for this is a point of great importance, to which I shall have occasion hereafter to return. Upon the refusal of the Porte to comply with his final demand, Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople, which led, by a short and easy succession of events, to the occupation of the Principalities and ultimately to the war. My Lords, I am the last man to defend the occupation of the Principalities by Russia. I consider it to have been an act of unjustifiable aggression, by which she put herself in the wrong, having been up to that time, if not entirely in the right in the dispute which had arisen, yet, at all events, very much more so than her adversary.
It is the conduct of Russia, up to the time of Prince Menchikoff's withdrawing from Constantinople, which has been so greatly misrepresented; it is painted in colours as inaccurate as they are odious, when Prince Menchikoff's demand is represented as one put forward without any reasonable grounds, and supported only by an overbearing display of force and by fraud. My Lords, it could only have been regarded in this light from losing sight of some of the most important facts in these transactions. In the first place, it is most material to bear in mind, that the question of the Holy Places derived its whole importance from its connection with that rivalry between the Greek and Roman Catholic churches which has existed for a long series of years. No man can suppose that the French Emperor or the Emperor of Russia, would either of them have taken the slightest interest in the questions of the star, and the key, and the right of performing service at certain altars, except from their exciting so strongly the feelings of the members of these churches both in Turkey and elsewhere, in consequence of their ancient and bitter rivalry. France, and the other Catholic powers, supported the claims of the Roman Catholics,
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because their own subjects took an interest on this ground in the questions in dispute, and in like manner my noble Friend has acknowledged, in his despatch to which I have already referred, that the Emperor of Russia would have lost moral influence in his own dominions, had he failed to support the Greek Church. From the very first we find it stated, by the Emperor of Russia, that his motive for interfering was to protect the Greek Christians from the encroachments of the Roman Catholics. In Count Nesselrode's despatch of January 14th, [Eastern Papers, Part I. p. 63] he gives as the reason of the indignation of the Greek population at the making over the key of the church at Bethlehem, to the Latins, that this demonstrated their religious supremacy in the East; the very first note presented by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, [Eastern Papers, Part I. p. 149] also stated in the clearest manner that the object of the Emperor was to protect the members of his own Church from the aggression which the Roman Catholics were constantly making, with the support of the European powers of their own com. munion. The same thing is mentioned in Lord Stratford's [p. 150] despatch of the 16th of April, 1853, as having been again repeated to him by the Russian Ambassador. An equally distinct explanation of the Emperor's intentions was conveyed by his letter [p. 191] sent to the Sultan by Prince Menchikoff which was communicated to the British Government.
As it thus clearly appears that the Emperor of Russia claimed the right of protecting the Greek Church, for the purpose of guarding its members from injustice committed by the Latins, under the protection of the Catholic Powers, and especially of France, it becomes necessary in order to judge how far he meant to push this claim, and what reason he had for doing so, to ascertain what was the extent of protection which France claimed in behalf of the Roman Catholics in Turkey and in what manner this claim affected the Greeks. Now, my Lords, although since these differences have led to such serious results, France has partially withdrawn her former claims, there can be no doubt that up to a very recent period, France insisted upon being recognised as the official protector of the Sultan's Roman Catholic subjects, and what is more, her right to do so, has been admitted by other Powers in a formal diplomatic document. Your Lordships will find in the Russian

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memorandum transmitted to Sir H. Seymour, in his despatch of the 17th of June, 1853, a quotation from the protocol of a conference on the affairs of Greece, held on the 3rd of February, 1830, in which it is recorded that the French Plenipotentiary represented to the conference that—
" France has for many years been entitled to exercise in favour of the Catholics subject to the Sultan an especial protection."
He is then represented as having proceeded to say, that France will give up this claim, so far as relates to those of the Sultan's former subjects, who were now to become subjects of the new Christian State, in consideration of certain guarantees which Greece should be required to give, and the protocol upon this records, that—
"The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Russia appreciated the justice of this demand, and it was decided that the Catholic religion shall enjoy in the new State the free and public exercise of its worship." [P. 296.]
The claim thus formally asserted and recognized has been moreover continually exercised, and exercised, it is most material to remark, to the prejudice of the Greek Church. This has happened repeatedly, but I will quote only a single example, which I select both because it rests on very high authority, and because it illustrates in a striking manner, how it is, that the necessity for Russian interference has arisen out of that of France. My Lords, I hold in my hand a pamphlet which I wish that all your Lordships had read, from its great importance upon this subject. Its title is The war, its Origin and its Consequences. It is written by the Right Rev. Dr. Southgate, a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, who for fourteen years resided in the Turkish dominions as a missionary. In this pamphlet I find Dr. Southgate states that in the year 1841, he was the guest for a few weeks of the Syrian Patriarch in his monastery on the confines of Mesopotamia. The Patriarch informed Dr. Southgate that a large amount of valuable church property had been seized j by certain seceders from his own church, who had joined the Romish communion. The property was an endowment of the Syrian Church, and the titles by which it was held were as clear and strong as any titles to property can be imagined to be. Dr. Southgate undertook upon his return to Constantinople to assist the Syrian bishop, who represented the Patriarch, in urging the claims of the Syrian Church
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before the Porte, and what occurred is thus related by Dr. Southgate:—
"The documents laid before it (the Porte) were too clear to admit a reasonable doubt, but still it hesitated to accord justice. We were convinced that some hostile influence was in operation. Upon inquiry, it wag found that the French Ambassador was opposed to a settlement, and was using his influence at the Porte to prevent it. I advised the Bishop to protest against this interference of a foreign power in a question which concerned only two parties of the Sultan's subjects. He did so, and the reply was, that France was the acknowledged protector of the Eastern Christians, who owned spiritual allegiance to the Pope, or as the French Ambassador was pleased to express it, 'The Hereditary Protector of the Oriental Catholics.' In this character he had interfered in behalf of the Papal seceders from the Syrian Church. In this character, he was acknowledged by the Porte, through the whole of a controversy which lasted nearly two years: and in this character he finally succeeded, against the plainest dictates of justice and equity, in intimidating the Porte, so far as to prevent it from restoring the property."
It was then the encroachments of the Roman Catholics, which led to the claim put forward by Russia to protect the Greek Christians, and among all the extraordinary circumstances of this lamentable war, there is none to my mind more astonishing than that this country, which, only four years ago, was driven almost to frenzy by a very trumpery "Papal aggression," should be now carrying on a bloody war against a nation whose quarrel with Turkey arose from her resistance to a Papal aggression far more serious in its character than that of which we ourselves complained, so that it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that at this moment we are fighting in the cause of his holiness the Pope.
Under these circumstances, my Lords, I own I cannot see anything unreasonable in the conduct of Russia, when she asked —not to be placed on an equality with France—not to be recognised as the official protector of the Greek Christians, but simply that the Sultan should promise the Emperor of Russia to treat this class of his subjects with justice, and to respect their rights, so that if this promise were violated, the Emperor would be entitled to remonstrate. It appears to me, that it is contrary to every notion of what is just and reasonable to contend, that while France shall be at liberty to claim a right of protecting the Sultan's subjects of her own religion, and to exercise this right in a manner to work great injustice to the Greek Christians, the Russian Emperor shall not be permitted to claim, in a less

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objectionable form, and in a minor degree, a similar right in favour of the latter, who are of the same communion with himself, and with the bulk of his own subjects, who take a deep interest in their welfare. The only difference which has been alleged to exist between the two cases is, that France only interferes in behalf of thousands, while Russia would do so in favour of millions. Surely this is a circumstance that can make no difference in the principle, on which the right of protection is claimed, or in the justice of the demand.
The great argument that is relied upon in opposition to the Russian demand, is that the exercise by a foreign power of such a right of interfering between the Sultan and his subjects would be inconsistent with the due maintenance of his authority in his own dominions, and dangerous to his independence. I have no wish to deny that there is considerable force in this argument; I readily admit that no European Government would, for a moment, submit to such an interference between itself and its subjects, as that which Russia wished to exercise in Turkey. But while I make this admission, allow me, at the same time, to remind you, that the Government of Turkey is so detestable, especially to its Christian subjects, that without the interference of the Christian nations to check its tyranny, it would become too great a nuisance to be endured by the civilised world. For this reason, the various European powers—and not the Europeans only, but even so distant a nation as the United States of America— have been compelled, from time to time, to interfere in Turkey, in matters which in any civilised country would be considered questions of purely internal administration, in which no foreign nation would be permitted to meddle.
By no country has this interference with the internal administration of Turkey, been carried to the same extent has by England, and I must entreat you to consider what has been your own conduct, before you raise this cry of unprincipled and unprovoked aggression against Russia, because she claimed a right to interfere in favour of the Sultan's subjects of her own religion. My Lords, the British Government has interfered in the internal administration of Turkey, not merely in behalf of those of the Sultan's subjects for whom we might be supposed to have a feeling of sympathy on the score of community of religion, but in matters affecting both Mahometans and
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Christians. Your interference has been the chief means (I am not sure France did not assist you) of extorting from the Sultan the promulgation of the famous Tanzimat—a law, which I may observe in passing, I believe to have been most injudiciously forced upon the Turkish Government, as being utterly unsuitable to the state of society prevailing in that empire, so that it has naturally become a dead letter, except in those places where the Turkish authorities are under the immediate eye of some European diplomatist or consul. But this is by no means all; you have actually compelled the Sultan to promulgate laws in direct opposition to the laws of the religion of which he is the chief, and on which his power mainly rests. He has been compelled to enact that Christian evidence shall be received on a footing of equality with that of Moslems; but I believe where there is a considerable Mahomedan population, he has been utterly unable to enforce this law, and I am told that recently at Damascus the attempt to carry it into execution has entirely failed, the Cadi having declared, after great discontent and excitement had been shown by the population, that although he had the Sultan's firman before him, directing him to receive the evidence of Christians and of true believers on the same terms, he had the Koran before him also, which was of still higher authority, and from this he learnt, that in criminal cases the evidence of a Christian could not be received against a Mahomedan at all, and that in civil cases two Christian witnesses were only to be regarded as of equal authority with a single Moslem. The Sultan has also been compelled to repeal the law (which is also a law of his religion) that a Mahomedan convert to Christianity is to be punished with death, though in spite of this repeal, I believe the life of a man brought up as a Mahomedan, who avowed his conversion, when out of the reach of European protection, would be a very short one.
But, my Lords, what is most remarkable of all, is the mode which has been adopted of endeavouring to enforce obedience to those firmans for the alteration of the ancient laws of the Ottoman Empire, which have been extorted from the Turkish Government, by what is called (I suppose in irony) the "moral influence" of the European Powers. My Lords, I hold in my hand a circular, addressed by the British Ambassador, on the 20th of

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November last, to Her Majesty's Consuls in Turkey, which has lately been laid upon your table, in answer to an Address moved by myself. I hope your Lordships have read this most remarkable document. It contains instructions to the British Consuls, more utterly inconsistent with the maintenance of the independent authority of the Sultan over his own subjects, than I could have believed it possible could have been issued by any Ambassador. After describing the various laws of what is called internal reform, which have within the last few months "emanated from the Turkish Government," the Ambassador informs the Consuls that—
"As Her Majesty's Government have taken a deep interest in the adoption of these measures, they cannot but feel an earnest desire to have them carried seriously and permanently into effect."
The Ambassador then tells the Consuls that to this end their "watchful attention," and "the exercise of their unbiassed influence may be essentially conducive;" and in order that they may fully understand the extent of the interference expected from them, he proceeds to explain that—
"The Turkish provincial authorities, on whom, in the first instance, devolves the faithful enforcement of the measures in question, have some traditional prejudices to overcome"—
Such, for instance, I suppose, as a respect for the authority of the Koran—
"And many adverse interests to withstand in the execution of their duty. At a distance from the seat of Government, they naturally stand in need of support, admonition, and encouragement; nor in the present most intimate and cordial state of our relations with Turkey, can aids of this kind descend to them from a better source than from you and your colleagues elsewhere, animated, as no doubt you are, by the spirit of that alliance, which holds the two countries together in close co-operative union. I ought, however, to remind you that the most friendly interference in those matters which immediately concern the internal affairs of the empire"—
So your Lordships perceive that there is no disguise as to the Consuls being directed to interfere in the whole internal administration of the Turkish provinces—
"Requires to be conducted with prudence, and a just respect for rights of sovereign or of local jurisdiction. Your vigilance may be exercised, your advice may be given, the language of remonstrance even may be used, without transgressing the limits of propriety, and in case of failure your representations to the Government at home, and also to the Embassy here, will afford that prospect of redress which, though more distant, may not on that account be of less certain effect."
Now, my Lords, I would ask you to consider what will be the situation of the Turkish Pachas if these instructions to the Consuls are carried into effect, and what real authority or moral influence will be left to them? Every Turkish subject who has a grievance against the local authorities, every man who may be punished for his crimes, however deservedly, but who can make out some plausible tale to prove himself to be the victim of oppression, will appeal to the British Consuls, and these functionaries—not invariably men of the best judgment, and thoroughly conversant with the laws, the character, and the language of the people over whom they are to exercise so much authority—will then proceed to review all the acts of the Sultan's officers in the administration of the provinces committed to their charge, and woe to the Pacha who fails to receive with becoming deference the decisions of the Consul. He will soon find that despatches, describing him as unfit for his office, to the all-powerful Ambassador have led to his recal. Under such a system the respect and obedience of the people will not long be yielded to the servant of their own sovereign, but it will be discovered that real power— unaccompanied by proper responsibility—belongs to the foreign Consul and to the Ambassador under whose authority he acts.
My Lords, I am persuaded that it is so impossible that any country should be well governed in this manner, and by such conflicting authorities, that I say deliberately, if you came to the conclusion that the oppression and corruption of the Turkish Government, if unchecked by European interference, would be so intolerable that you could not let the evil take its course, but were obliged to endeavour to arrest it, even by such means as I have described, then it would have been much better that you should have gone a little further, and should have avowedly deposed that Government you could no longer trust with; the internal administration of its own dominions, and should have shared these dominions among the Christian Powers, or made such other provision as might have been found most advisable for their future government.
I say this would have been a better and a more honest course than that which you have taken; but, at all events, you must admit that your own measures involve a complete recognition of what I believe to

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be the indisputable fact, of the intolerable character of the internal administration of the Turkish provinces, and the oppression of the Christian subjects of the Porte, where they are left without the protection of some foreign power. And, in the face of this recognition, with what decency can you complain of Russia as guilty of a gross abuse of power towards a weaker neighbour, because she insists upon being allowed to exercise in favour of a class of the Sultan's subjects, in whom she takes a legitimate interest, an interference infinitely less violent, infinitely less inconsistent with the independent authority of the Porte, than that which you have yourselves assumed.
My Lords, I maintain, on these grounds, that the conduct of Russia, in making her original demand upon Turkey, does not deserve to be described as "an unprincipled and unjust aggression," still less can it be said that in doing so she was guilty of fraud. It is alleged that in announcing the mission of Prince Menchikoff, the Russian Government repeatedly assured the British Minister at St. Petersburg that it related only to the Holy Places, and that the intention of claiming a general right to protect the Sultan's subjects of the Greek Church was concealed. My Lords, I have already endeavoured to show you, that the question of the Holy Places itself was only considered of importance by Russia, as forming part of a more general question respecting the rights of the Greek Church, and the encroachments of the Roman Catholics; and that from the very first, the Russian Government used language which clearly showed, that in dealing with the minor question that of which it was a part was not to be lost sight of. I will not trouble you by again referring to despatches I have already quoted, but if your Lordships will examine them, you will perceive that the language of the Russian Government was such as I describe, and that not one word was ever used by it which can fairly be understood as limiting to Jerusalem the interference in behalf of the Greek Christians which it announced. But more than this; so far is it from being true that Russia concealed, in the first instance, the claim she put forward under the Treaty of Kainardji, to protect the Greek Church, that I find that so long ago as the 5th of December, 1852, Colonel Rose, then Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, reported to the noble Earl
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opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), who at that time held the office of Secretary of State, that the Russian Minister in Turkey had formally made this very claim. Very soon afterwards Sir Hamilton Seymour, in his secret despatch of the 22nd of January, gave an account to Lord John Russell of an important conversation he had had with the Emperor himself, whom he describes as having, in the course of it, used this remarkable language—
"Well, in that Empire (Turkey), there are several millions of Christians, whose interests I am called upon to watch over, while the right of doing so is secured to me by treaty."
Your Lordships will perceive that the Emperor speaks of several millions of Christians, obviously including all the Sultan's subjects of his own religion. But bow did Lord J. Russell answer this despatch, having at the time before him Colonel Rose's despatch, received only a few weeks before, which reports the formal assertion of the very claim of Russia to exercise this protection of the Greek Church by virtue of the Treaty of Kainardji, which became afterwards the subject of the dispute that led to the war? My Lords, in his answer to Sir H. Seymour, Lord J. Russell, after saying that Her Majesty's Government thought it essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects with equity, adds these most remarkable words—
"The more the Turkish Government adopts the rule of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which His Imperial Majesty has found so burthen-some and inconvenient, though, no doubt, prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."
The despatch containing this passage Sir H. Seymour was instructed to place in the Emperor's hands; and how, after this, it is possible to contend that Russia fraudulently concealed the extent of the claim, I am unable to conjecture. Surely she might, with far more reason, assert that we not only knew, but recognised the validity of that claim, which we afterwards supported Turkey in resisting, even at the cost of war. There was, I believe, no intentional deception on either side, but a misunderstanding between the two Governments as to their mutual intentions, for which the blame, as it seems to me, rests at least as much with this country as with Russia.
But the chief ground on which the charge of fraud against the Russian Government

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has been supported, is the alleged endeavour of Prince Menchikoff to conceal the nature of the demands he was pressing upon the Turkish Government from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. It has been asserted that while Prince Menchikoff was pressing these demands in the most urgent manner upon the Turkish Ministers, he at the same time required from them strict secrecy upon the subject (more especially from the British Embassy), and enforced this injunction by menaces. Reports to this effect were no doubt transmitted to my noble Friend the Secretary of State from the British Embassy at Constantinople, but upon a careful examination of these papers, I think your Lordships will be satisfied that the story is to be traced entirely to that unfortunate spirit of credulity and suspicion, which seems to be infectious among the diplomatists of all nations in Pera, and to make them ever ready to swallow the absurd tales which are continually current in that focus of political gossip and intrigue.
My Lords, at first my noble Friend the Secretary of State justly appreciated the value of the alarming reports transmitted to him from Constantinople; in an admirable despatch which he addressed to Lord Cowley on the 22nd of March, 1853, he gives an account of a conversation he had had with the French Ambassador, on the subject of the panic produced in the French and English embassies at Constantinople, by the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, and the demand which, under the influence of that panic, had been made for the support of the fleets of the two countries. In that conversation my noble Friend says—
"I told his Excellency (Count Walewski) that when the intelligence from Constantinople was analysed, and divested of the colouring imparted to it by local excitement, there was but one fact to deal with, namely, that General Menchikoff, in pursuance of the orders of the Emperor of Russia, announced nearly two months ago, had declined to hold official intercourse with Fuad Effendi, because that Minister, in the opinion of His Imperial Majesty, had acted with bad faith to Russia. Fuad Effendi had accordingly resigned; but Prince Menchikoff had not required this, and he had declared that no disrespect was intended to the Sultan by the omission of the customary visit to his Minister."……
…"I ventured to remark to his Excellency, that a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe, and often led to hasty determinations."
My Lords, if my noble Friend had continued to discriminate with the same sound judgment between what was ally true in
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the accounts transmitted to him from Constantinople, and what was due to "the colouring imparted by local excitement;" —had he scrutinised the despatches of the Ambassador, with the same acumen he applied to those of the Chargé d'Affaires—and had he continued to be on his guard against being led into "a policy of suspicion," which he truly said, is "neither wise nor safe," we should have had no war with Russia, and we never should have been told that Prince Menchikoff had endeavoured to conceal the object of his mission, by threats directed against the Turkish Ministers if they revealed his demands. The only authority for this story is to be found in the untrustworthy, because utterly inconsistent and improbable statements, made by the Turkish ministers to the British diplomatists, and the manner in which it has been allowed to gain credit is so instructive with respect to the spirit in which our diplomacy at Constantinople, has been conducted, that I must venture to trouble your Lordships with some details regarding it. In doing so, let me acknowledge the obligation I owe to a very elaborate analysis of the contents of the voluminous papers on this subject, which has been published by Mr. Macqueen. I take shame to myself, for having failed to detect last year some of the remarkable, facts to be deduced from the despatches to which my attention has been directed by the book of Mr. Macqueen.
The first despatch bearing upon the subject which I find, is one from Colonel Rose (who was still acting as the representative of this country in the absence of Lord Stratford), dated the 24th of March, 1853. In this despatch Colonel Rose gives an account of an interview he had with Rifaat Pacha, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he had learned that the Turkish Minister had received his first visit from Prince Menchikoff on the 17th, when the Prince was described as having "confined himself to stating, in general terms, that his object was to settle not to embarrass matters." Rifaat Pacha is reported to have denied, on this occasion, that any "note verbale" had been delivered to him by the Russian Ambassador. In this despatch there is enclosed a report from M. Pisani of conversations with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pacha, in which they seem to have made much mystery as to the Russian proposals, speaking of them in vague, but, at the same time, alarming language. M. Pisani informs Colonel

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Rose, that "His Highness [the Grand Vizier] requested me to say that so long as he continues to be at the head of the Ministry, you can reckon upon the non-accomplishment of the wishes of Russia; but, if he is dismissed from office, of course he does not know what line of policy might be adopted by his successor." In these words, my Lords, we have a clue to the whole affair. At that moment it suited the Turkish Ministers, in order to maintain their position amidst the intrigues of the Seraglio, to make the British Minister believe that the interests of his country were menaced by some dark designs of Russia, which could only be defeated by their own continuance in office. My Lords, I fear it is not quite peculiar to Turkey, that a Ministry, threatened by formidable rivals, should endeavour to create a belief in the representatives of foreign Powers, that their own retirement from office would be attended with danger.
On the 25th of March (the day after that on which his previous despatch was dated), Colonel Rose writes again, and encloses a memorandum from M. Pisani, giving an account of further conversations which Colonel Rose had held in his presence with the Turkish Ministers. In this memorandum, M. Pisani states that both Rifaat Pacha and the Grand Vizier had now informed Colonel Rose, that Prince Menchikoff had, on the 17th, delivered in a "note verbale," of which they gave the British Minister what purported to be a full summary, though being now in possession of the document itself, we can see that their account of its contents was very far from accurate, but was coloured in a manner to create the alarm which it was successful in exciting. Why the document itself was not shown, or even, as it appears, asked for by the British Minister is not explained, Colonel Rose, indeed, says in his despatch transmitting the above memorandum—
"Your Lordship will see that, in spite of Prince Menchikoff's denunciations against the Turkish authorities, should they reveal his secret demands, they, in consideration of the danger which would ensue from a compliance with them, determined to make them known to Her Majesty's Government."
But, my Lords, notwithstanding this statement, it is perfectly clear that the Russian ambassador had no motive whatever for this concealment, since when the "note verbale" reached St. Petersburg, it was shown by Count Nesselrode to Sir H. Seymour, who said, no exception could be
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taken to the language of the document, and he only remarked on some ambiguity in one of the concluding paragraphs. It was subsequently communicated to my noble Friend himself, by Baron Brunow. My Lords, when you couple the fact that it thus clearly appears, that Prince Menchikoff could have no motive whatever for concealing this note, while the Turkish Ministers, in abstaining from showing the; document itself, and stating that threats had been used to prevent their disclosing it, gave a coloured and distorted version of its contents, you can hardly doubt, that in this story about threats they were playing on the credulity of the British Minister, and that their true motive for not showing the paper itself was, that they were aware that had they done so, the alarm they were labouring so successfully to create with respect to it, would have been at once; dispelled, and Colonel Rose would have perceived, like Sir H. Seymour, that this "note verbale," of which they made such a bugbear, was a very innocent document.
But something much more remarkable remains to be mentioned with respect to this "note verbale." After it had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government, and I suppose when it was felt that something like ridicule attached to the British Embassy at Constantinople, for having raised such an edifice of alarming reports on so slight a foundation Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in a despatch, dated the 27th of May, from which only a very short extract is given in the papers, says—
"I think it my duty to record, that the 'note verbale,' presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the 4/16 of March, and enclosed with Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunow on the 9/21 ultimo, was never communicated to this embassy. I have questioned M. Pisani on the subject, and he assures me, that Rifaat Pacha would never be brought to admit its existence. That Minister was probably restrained from disclosing it by the Russian ambassador's threatening language."
Observe, my Lords, M. Pisani is here said by Lord Stratford, on the 27th of May, to have assured him, that Rifaat Pacha could never be brought to admit the existence of the note in question, yet just two months before, on the 25th of March, Colonel Rose had transmitted a memorandum, bearing the signature of M. Pisani himself, in which it is stated that Rifaat Pacha had not only admitted the existence of that note, but had given a full summary of its contents, which M. Pisani reports from the lips of the Turkish Minister.
My Lords, you must at once perceive that, if M. Pisani gave the assurance which Lord Stratford reports, and which, of course, I do not for a moment doubt that he did, it involves a contradiction of his previous written statement, which most seriously affects the character of an important member of the British legation at Constantinople. It is not a case which can possibly be explained by a fault of memory; the circumstance was one of too much importance to have been forgotten, nor would forgetfulness be any excuse for a mistake of so grave a kind. But the blame goes far higher than M. Pisani. How can Lord Stratford be justified for having made a deliberate statement to Her Majesty's Government, that Rifaat Pacha had concealed the existence of an important state paper, drawing there from the inference, that he had probably been deterred from disclosing it by the threats of the Russian ambassador, not merely without one tittle of evidence to show that any threats had been used, but without having taken the slightest pains to ascertain that; the Turkish had ever made any secret at all (at least for more than a single day) of his having received the note in question?
I should have thought, my Lords, that when Lord Stratford resumed his post as Ambassador at Constantinople in the beginning of April 1853, considering the extreme gravity of the circumstances which he found there, his very first duty would, have been to make himself thoroughly; acquainted with what had taken place in his absence, by carefully reading the correspondence of the gentleman, who during that time had acted as Chargé d' Affaires. Had he done so, he would not have failed to remember the important despatch of (Colonel Rose, enclosing the memorandum of M. Pisani, giving an account of the note delivered by the Russian Ambassador to the Turkish Government. But even if Lord Stratford had neglected this essential part of his duty, and was not aware of the existence of that despatch, still I say that he was not entitled to throw out so grave a charge against a Power at that time friendly to us, and with which it was of the highest importance that we should remain on friendly terms, without having first satisfied himself that the concealment he sought to account for by a supposition so injurious to Russia, had really taken place. Had he attempted to do this, and had he looked for five minutes into the archives of his office to see what had
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occurred with reference to this well known note of the 16th of March, he would have found M. Pisani's own report to Colonel Rose of Rifaat Pacha's conversation, giving an account of the delivery of this note and of its contents.
My Lords, when I find that in one instance a person filling the high and responsible situation of Lord Stratford, has brought forward a grave charge against a friendly power, so lightly (to use the mildest word), I am entitled to receive with the greatest caution, every other statement of the same kind which he makes;—I am entitled to consider him as one of those persons whose reports of the events passing before him are peculiarly liable to be tinged by that "colouring imparted to them by local excitement," against which my noble Friend the Secretary of State was in one instance (but unhappily not in this) so judiciously on his guard. But far from there being any corroborative evidence to support the statement, that threats were used to induce the Turkish Ministers to conceal the demands addressed to them by Prince Menchikoff, we find on the contrary that every circumstance combines to disprove it. The story rests entirely on accounts given by these Ministers of what had passed between themselves and the Ambassador, which, as I have already remarked, are obviously untrustworthy, and it is also utterly irreconcilable with facts as we learn from Lord Stratford's own despatches. From these it appears that immediately after his arrival at Constantinople, he was in possession of the details of the Russian demands, that within a fortnight he was in confidential communication with respect to them with Prince Menchikoff himself, and that the Prince actually read over to him the amended draft of the convention he was then proposing to Turkey.
With these facts before us it is impossible to give credit to the alleged attempt to conceal the proceedings of the Russian Ambassador by threats addressed to the Turkish Ministers; and, therefore, my Lords, I feel myself compelled, with great regret, to say that I think a heavy responsibility rests upon her Majesty's Ministers, for the statement to that effect which they introduced into a document of such solemn and awful importance as Her Majesty's declaration of war against Russia. I say a statement to this effect was introduced into the declaration of war; but as I should be sorry to run the slightest risk of

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being guilty of any misrepresentation, I had better read the very words to which I allude. The following, my Lords, is the passage I mean from the declaration of war, which the servants of the Grown advised Her Majesty to make, and which was published in the Gazette:—
"But while the Russian Government repeatedly assured the Government of Her Majesty, that the mission of Prince Menchjkoff to Constantinople was exclusively directed to the settlement of the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff himself pressed upon the Porte other demands of a far more serious and important character, the nature of which he, in the first instance, endeavoured, as far as possible, to conceal from Her Majesty's Ambassador. And these demands, thus studiously concealed, affected not the privileges of the Greek Church at Jerusalem, but the position of many millions of Turkish subjects in their relations to their Sovereign the Sultan."
My Lords, I cannot find that what is here asserted is supported by one particle of trustworthy evidence; and I therefore deeply regret that such a statement should have been put forth to the country on such high authority; I cannot doubt that nothing has more contributed to excite that feeling against Russia, which is now the great obstacle to the conclusion of peace, than that the people should have thus been taught to believe that Russia, in these transactions, had acted with deep and premeditated falsehood. I utterly deny that there is any sufficient ground for this imputation. I am persuaded that the war has been produced, not by a want of good faith on the part of Russia, but, as I have already endeavoured to show you, by a misunderstanding between the two Governments, for which that of England was certainly not the least to blame, and still more, perhaps, by the manner in which the diplomacy of this country has been conducted at Constantinople. I do not see how any man can carefully read the papers, which have been laid before us, without coming to the conclusion, that if at any time between Lord Stratford's arrival at Constantinople and the departure of Prince Menchikoff—a period of four or five weeks—Lord Stratford had, either on his own responsibility, or in consequence of instructions which there was ample time for him to have received from England, stated plainly what was to be the conduct of the British Government on this subject; if there had only been a plain, an unambiguous declaration of the real intentions of Her Majesty's Government to the Russian Ambassador on the one side, and to the
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Porte on the other, all danger of war would have been averted.
Whether it had been determined to support Turkey in resisting the demands of Russia, or the reverse, mattered comparatively little, provided only you had decided in time on the one course or on the other, and had made your decision known to those whom it concerned. Had you determined not to support Turkey, and had you told her in plain language, that if she thought fit to reject the demands of Russia, she must do so at her own risk, and must not look to you for aid, it is clear that she would have given way at once, and the dispute would have been settled by her concession. If, on the other hand, you had resolved upon the opposite policy, and had made this known to Russia in proper time, that course would equally have prevented a rupture. It is certain that Russia was no less anxious to keep out of a war with England, than Turkey was to avoid entering into one single-handed with Russia. Nothing could more vitally affect the interests of Russia than a war with England, and it is impossible to read the papers with ordinary attention, and resist the conviction that the late Emperor entertained a most sincere and earnest desire to remain on good terms with us, and that he never would have pressed his demands on Turkey (by which in truth he would have gained very little that he did not already in fact possess, if be had had the least suspicion that by doing so he would become involved in a quarrel with this country. If, therefore, you had come to the conclusion that Russia asked more than Turkey could safely grant, and that it would be your duty to support the latter in her resistance, Lord Stratford should in the very beginning have informed Prince Menchikoff, in language which need not have been the less firm for being perfectly friendly in its tone, "Do not press those general claims of the protectorate of Russia over the Greek subjects of the Porte, because if you do, we shall be compelled to support the Sultan in his resistance, and we shall thus become involved in a quarrel with you, which we are most anxious to avoid."
My Lords, if this line had been taken, I am persuaded that Prince Menchikoff would not have pressed his demands in the manner he did. But instead of following this plain and straightforward course, Lord Stratford's whole language and conduct were such as to encourage Prince

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Menchikoff in the belief that the British Government would not take up the cause of Turkey if she refused what was required from her. In one despatch we find Lord Stratford saying that in a conversation he had with Prince Menchikoff on his demands, they "both avoided entering into a discussion that might be irritating;" in another he says—
"I did not conceal from him (Prince Menchikoff) my knowledge of his ulterior propositions, and my conviction that they would meet with serious opposition from the Porte, and be regarded with little favour by Powers even the most friendly to Russia."
And to the very eve of the Prince's departure from Constantinople not one word seems to have been said by the British Ambassador, which could be construed into a warning of any probability of England's seriously supporting Turkey in her resistance. I must say that this language and conduct on the part of the British Ambassador, coupled with the fact, which must have been known to Prince Menchikoff, that the Secretary of State in a despatch which he had himself ordered to be communicated to the Emperor, had distinctly recognised the Emperor's possession of a right, secured to him by treaty, to protect the Sultan's subjects belonging to the Greek Church, might well create a strong conviction, both on the part of Prince Menchikoff and of his master, that England had no intention of coining forward to support Turkey by arms, in refusing a formal acknowledgment of that right, which the British Government had distinctly admitted Russia to possess. This was the conclusion the Russian Ambassador as well as his Government could hardly avoid being led to by the course which was pursued, and the unhappy consequence; was, that he committed himself more and more deeply to insist upon the claim he had made, till at last he found himself in a position, from which it appeared both to him and to his Imperial master, that he could not recede without sacrificing the dignity of Russia.
But while Russia was thus encouraged to persevere in her demands, by being led to believe that we should not aid Turkey if she refused to comply with them, Turkey was at the very same time encouraged and advised to persist in her denial. My Lords, I say Turkey was encouraged and advised to withhold what was asked from her, for though a formal memorandum, declining to advise the Sultan, was agreed to by the
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representatives of the Four Powers, and though there was a pretence of leaving the Porte to act upon its own unbiassed judgment, it was a pretence too shallow to impose upon a child. How was it possible that Turkey could decide according to her own judgment, when Lord Stratford himself has informed us that if Turkey were to be left to herself she would have no choice but to submit? Turkey being thus incapable of resistance, and fully conscious of her weakness, the whole responsibility for her decision rests with those who held out to her the prospect of support if she refused what was asked—that is, mainly with Lord Stratford, for the French Ambassador throughout played only a subordinate part. Lord Stratford's own despatches afford the most conclusive evidence how entirely the decision of the Turkish Government was prompted and encouraged by himself. On the 9th of May he reported that he had had an interview—it does not clearly appear on what day, but as far as I can gather it must have been on the 7th—with three of the Turkish Ministers, on which occasion we learn that Lord Stratford could not "in conscience" advise the acceptance of the Russian demands; that, as he was coming away, the Grand Vizier asked, "whether any reliance could be placed on the eventual approach of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, to which a somewhat vague answer was returned, and probably, in consequence of this answer, Lord Stratford adds, that—
"On comparing notes the next day with M. de la Cour, I found him under an impression that the Turkish Ministers were disposed to shrink from encountering the consequences of Prince Menchikoff's retirement in displeasure."
It appears, my Lords, that the manifestation of such a feeling alarmed Lord Stratford, for he immediately took the most effectual steps to counteract it. If my calculation is right it must have been on the 8th of May that he became acquainted with this opinion of M. de la Cour, as to the "disposition to shrink" of the Turkish Ministers, and we learn from his despatch of the 10th, that he had a private interview with the Sultan on the 9th, of which a most remarkable account is given. Lord Stratford tells us, he "endeavoured to give the Sultan a just idea of the degree of danger to which his empire was exposed," which from the context of the despatch clearly means the danger of acceding to the demands of Russia. Having

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thus succeeded in producing a proper effect on the mind of the poor Sultan, so far as alarming him with respect to the consequences of concession, it was necessary to encourage him not to yield to the more immediate terrors of Russian resentment—accordingly this encouragement was given in the manner thus described by the Ambassador—
"I concluded," he says, "by apprising His Majesty of what I had reserved for his private ear, in order that his Ministers might take their decision without any bias from without—namely, that in the event of imminent danger, I was instructed to request the commander of Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness."
Now, my Lords, is it not rather too great an experiment on the gravity of those whom he addressed—would it not be inexpressibly ludicrous, if it had not led to such tragical results, for Lord Stratford after this to talk of leaving the Turkish Ministers to "take their decision without any bias from without?" What does such language mean when he has himself told us of the utter helplessness of Turkey if left to herself, and of the "disposition of the Ministers to shrink" from encountering the consequences of Prince Menchikoff's displeasure, which no mere hints that the British fleet would come to their assistance could remove, so that he was at last obliged, in order to screw the courage of the Turks to the sticking place, to tell the Sultan in plain language that he had authority to summon the squadron for his protection, while he explained to him the dangers of the Russian proposals?
But, my Lords, I ask you, if the decision of the Turks was to be really prompted and encouraged by the British Ambassador, would it not have been more fitting the character of a great nation like this, to have openly assumed that responsibility which could not in fact be declined? If we had avowedly taken the responsibility for the Turkish decision, we should have been entitled to exercise an authority as to what that decision was to be, which would in all human probability have averted the war. We should have had a right to say to the Turks—"We know you cannot resist Russia by yourselves, but we will only give you our aid on condition that you will abide by our advice as to the concessions to which you will agree in order to avert a rupture." We should also have been enabled to go to Russia, and in the same spirit of straightforward and open
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dealing to have said to her—"You ask for more than we think Turkey can grant, and if you press these demands we shall find it necessary to support her in resisting them; but we are ready to enter fairly with you into an examination of how far Turkey ought to go in meeting your wishes, and if we can come to an understanding with you on the subject, we will then tell her plainly, that she must accept the terms so arranged, or resist them at her own peril." I am very far, my Lords, from imputing to Lord Stratford a desire to bring about the war; it would be difficult for me to believe any man capable of such wickedness; I have not the slightest doubt of the very earnest desire of Her Majesty's then Government to avert this great calamity, and yet I say that if the object in view had been to render war inevitable, it would have been impossible for human ingenuity to have devised a line of conduct better fitted to accomplish this purpose than that which was actually pursued. The adoption of so mistaken and so fatal a course may, I think, be accounted for, partly by that fear of responsibility which too often exercises a prejudicial influence on public affairs, and which seems in this case to have prevented Her Majesty's Ministers from adopting and steadily pursuing a sufficiently decided policy either of one kind or another; partly to that "local excitement" which appears to have blinded our Ambassador at Constantinople. Unfortunately, the Government at home either failed to detect this in his case, with the same wise discrimination they had shown in that of the gentleman who discharged his duties during his temporary absence, or if they did detect it, they wanted firmness to apply the proper remedy to the evil, by recalling him from his post.
My Lords, I have trespassed on your time far longer than I could have wished, but I have thought it necessary to enter into an examination of the transactions to which I have referred, and into details which I am aware must have been tedious, because although it is too late to correct the fatal error committed in the early stages of these proceedings, it is not too late, for your Lordships, and for the nation, seriously to consider the circumstances in which the war originated, in order to remove the undue prejudice which has been created against our enemy, and to moderate the passions which have been improperly excited against him by misrepresentation.

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I wish the country to see that it is by no means true that we have been so clearly and entirely in the right in this unhappy quarrel, or Russia so completely in the wrong as we have been in the habit of confidently (may I not say presumptuously?) assuming.
My Lords, it becomes nations not less than individuals, to show a spirit of fairness and moderation in the controversies in which they may be engaged, to be ready to believe that their adversaries are not always necessarily to blame, but that it is possible they may themselves sometimes be mistaken. In private life, wise men distrust their own judgment in quarrels in which they are themselves concerned—they know how difficult it is to prevent it from being warped by passion, and they endeavour to correct that tendency, by inquiring what is the opinion formed by judicious and impartial men on their own conduct, and that of their opponents. My Lords, it is not less the wisdom and the duty of nations to pursue a similar course; and I would earnestly entreat my countrymen, who have allowed themselves to be worked up into such a heat of passion against Russia, to inquire in what light this unhappy war, and the disputes which led to it, are viewed by disinterested spectators! If they will do so, they will not find that we are so uniformly considered to have been in the right as they suppose. I have already, my Lords, quoted a pamphlet on the origin of the war by Bishop Southgate, a prelate, whose judgment is entitled to the greatest weight, as well from his high character, and the position he occupies in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, as from his intimate knowledge of Turkey, and of the religious questions which brought on the quarrel, in consequence of his long experience as a missionary. My Lords, Bishop Southgate, writing just before the war began, and while there was still a possibility that it might be averted, gives it as his deliberate opinion, that this country had been greatly misled, and that the demands of Russia upon Turkey were reasonable and just. This opinion ought to make the more impression upon us, because, far from being delivered in a spirit of hostility to this country, it is written in a tone of even affectionate anxiety, that we should not put ourselves in the wrong, and that the banner of England should not be displayed in support of an unjust cause.
Bishop Southgate thinks that Russia was in the right in the whole controversy, even to the breaking out of the war. In this opinion, though I receive it with the most respectful attention, I cannot agree—perhaps I may be biassed by my desire to think my own country in the right, (for though, perhaps, your Lordships may not believe it, this is a desire I very strongly feel)—but I so far concur with him, as to think, that up to the time of Prince Menchikoff's departure from Constantinople, Russia was in the right, and England greatly to blame for the course she pursued; from that time I think Russia put herself in the wrong, and that the occupation of the Principalities was an act of violence and injustice. But admitting Russia to have been then in the wrong, surely the fact that such a man as Bishop Southgate is of a different opinion, must be taken as proving, that she may not have been so wilfully and palpably in the wrong, as we have been in the habit of assuming, and that some allowance ought to be made for her conduct. There have been too many gross faults in our own conduct to give us a right to be very severe in criticising that of Russia. Was it unnatural that errors, and very serious errors, should be committed in the circumstances in which he was placed by such a man as the late Emperor Nicholas, and does he deserve for these errors the unmeasured vituperation of which he has been the object?
For my own part, I will not shrink from saying of him, that, with all his faults (and they were many), he was still a great man in whose character there was much to admire. I am persuaded that he was sincere and earnest in his devotion to the welfare of his people. No doubt he was often mistaken as to the means of promoting it, I but he acted to the best of his judgment; the good of his subjects as he understood it, not his selfish gratification, nor any low or mean interest of his own, was the end to which all his exertions were directed, and for which he displayed such untiring energy, and underwent such unremitting labour, in governing the vast empire which Providence had placed under his rule. When I read the touching accounts which have been published of the last illness of the Emperor Nicholas—when I contemplate the spirit of Christian resignation with which he met approaching death, the calm and unaffected fortitude he displayed in that awful season, his thoughtfulness for his people, his family, and his attached

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followers, I cannot, I say, consider these things, without utterly disbelieving that a man, capable of so passing through the great and final trial of human nature, could be one whose character deserved to be described in the odious terms which have been applied to the Emperor Nicholas. Whatever were his faults, fraud and falsehood were not among them. He was, I think, overbearing, arbitrary, violent when his will was resisted; and is it wonderful that the man should have become so, who for near thirty years had ruled with unlimited power and almost unchecked success the vast dominions of Russia? Would he not have been something more than human if he had remained entirely proof against the trials and temptations of such a position? But I repeat, that his faults were those of a high and noble, not of a low and mean nature, like falsehood and fraud.
My Lords, I have thought it my duty to submit to you these views, as to the origin of the war and the conduct and character of our enemy, because, if they could gain acceptance with your Lordships and with the public, they could not fail to have some influence in mitigating that bitter spirit of hostility against Russia which has been manifested by our countrymen, and which, as I have already said, now forms, in my opinion, the chief obstacle to the conclusion of peace. Would, my Lords, that my feeble efforts could contribute, even in the slightest degree, to remove that obstacle and to promote the restoration of peace. To wage an unnecessary war, or to continue a war that may have been just because necessary at the outset, for one hour after it has ceased to be so, is the greatest sin which a nation can commit, and every individual member of the community, from the highest to the lowest, shares in that sin and partakes its fearful responsibility, if he fails to exert whatever influence he may possess in order to check, so far as in him lies, the violation of the laws of God, which, to persevere in such a war, involves. It is this feeling which induces me, my Lords, now to move—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty,
"To thank Her Majesty for having ordered the Protocols of the recent Negotiations at Vienna, to be laid before us:
"To inform Her Majesty that this House deeply deplores the Failure of the Attempt to put an End by these Negotiations to the Calamities of the War in which the Country is now engaged: And,
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"To express our Opinion that the Proposals of Russia were such as to afford a fair Prospect of concluding a Peace by which all the original Objects of the War might have been gained, and by which Her Majesty and Her Allies might have obtained all the Advantages which can reasonably be demanded from Russia:"
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have listened to my noble Friend with all the respect and attention which his knowledge and ability on this subject demand. His very long and able speech this evening has been characterised with his usual skill and earnestness of manner, and if my noble Friend should have failed in convincing your Lordships of the correctness of his views and the soundness of his reasoning, it will certainly not be on account of any want of conviction on his own part. I think, my Lords, that my noble Friend had no reason, because there was no necessity, to account for his motives for having addressed your Lordships on this subject. None of your Lordships will, I am sure, be disposed to dispute that they were honest and straightforward. I have no doubt that my noble Friend thought that he had a public service to perform; and he has accordingly this night performed that service. But, on the other hand, I may be permitted to say that his motion appears to me to be one the proposal of which cannot be viewed but as a matter of deep regret, and that it is my firm conviction that, neither in its form nor its substance, is it one that ought to be adopted, and that if agreed to by your Lordships, it will be productive of most serious mischiefs. My noble Friend has not succeeded in proving that which he has all along been endeavouring to prove—namely, that the present war is neither a just nor a necessary war. True it is, he has condemned the policy of the war, he has condemned the manner in which the war has been conducted, and he has condemned the negotiations and the manner in which they have been carried on. He has thrown great blame on the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers, he has applauded the moderation of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, and has affirmed that the offer which was made by them ought to have been accepted. For three hours and a half my noble Friend proceeded in one unbroken strain of admiration of the spotless policy and the admirable course which had been pursued by the Emperor of Russia; but not a word did he say in favour of Her Majesty's Government. But it should be remembered

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that all that the noble Earl has said in regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government applied with equal force to the policy of the Government of France. Nothing has been done or undertaken, I may almost say, nor said nor written, since the commencement of the war, or even before its commencement, by the English Government which has not been in entire concurrence with the Government of France. The speech of my noble Friend, with all the authority of the name which he bears and with all the weight of his own character and position in this country, will be read with delight by all the partisans of Russia throughout Europe; and at the same time, not without regret by those who are allied with us in opposing that Power. I say that my noble Friend has, as far as in him lies, this night rendered signal service to the Emperor of Russia in aiding him in his war with the allies. He has done his utmost to encourage the Emperor of Russia to resist a compliance with those demands which England, France, and Austria consider just, and which it would have been honourable for him to accept; and, as far as in him lies, he would represent us to the world as being in a state of division and of weakness. But, I think, my noble Friend will be disappointed, and all those possible mischiefs which his speech might otherwise have done will be avoided by the result of this night's debate; for I trust your Lordships will this evening show by a large majority that you agree with me in that negative with which I propose to meet the Motion of my noble Friend, and that you will thereby prove to Russia that the opinions you have so often expressed in this House on the justice of the war have undergone no change and are not now wavering.
I will not cavil with my noble Friend as to the somewhat inopportune moment at which he has thought proper to bring on his motion. Not that I object to discussion on the subject of the war. On the contrary, I think it most safe and right that your Lordships should have the earliest opportunity, consistent with the public convenience, of expressing your opinions upon what has taken place. It is not that I expect any particular advantage to arise from those proposals that are at this moment under consideration, and which I have not considered of sufficient importance to ask my noble Friend to postpone his Motion; but it is for those objects
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which Her Majesty's Government have quite as much at heart as my noble Friend himself; it is for the interest of peace itself that I deprecate entering into a premature discussion. If we are to be called upon to enter into all the details of negotiations that are pending, to defend all our proceedings as we advance step by step, and to be required to state what are the grounds upon which alone we think peace should be made, I say that your Lordships may find yourselves, and the country may become pledged in a manner which may render all future negotiations still more difficult to be conducted to a satisfactory conclusion; and, as negotiations must necessarily precede peace, you may ultimately find that even peace itself may be rendered more difficult of attainment from such discussions. I think, therefore, it will be satisfactory to your Lordships if I now state that I intend to avail myself of the privilege which the noble Earl in the beginning of his speech conceded to me, and which was not to answer any part of my noble Friend's speech having reference to the Blue-book of last year. My noble Friend has, from all appearance, been studying that Blue-book. He has that advantage over me; for I am not sufficiently accurate in my recollection of its contents even to speak to some of the passages which were brought forward by my noble Friend, although they at the time appeared to me to admit of some explanation. But what I will enter into, and what I think of much more importance to the country, are the deductions which my noble Friend has made from that Blue-book, and by which he has attempted to prove that we are engaged in an unjust and an unnecessary war. To a question of war, as to all questions, there are two sides. The noble Earl has left us to infer that, as we in this war are entirely wrong, so Russia is entirely right. He has defended the demands of Prince Menchikoff, and has even defended Russia in her occupation of the Principalities, although he thought she acted rightly when she left them. Well, my Lords, my noble Friend drew a very affecting picture of the calamities of war, and he subsequently said that war was only to be justified in the very last extremity. I think it may be satisfactory to my noble Friend, and not altogether uninteresting to your Lordships, if I quote an authority, with a view to show that the war in which we are engaged is in strict conformity with the law of

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nations. I will quote a passage from one of the clearest writers and ablest expounders of the law of nations—Vattel:—
"By the law of nations it is laid down as a principle that war is just and lawful which is to avenge or prevent injury."—"When once a State has given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or any imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her. They may come upon her when she is at the moment of acquiring a formidable accession of power—may demand securities, and if she hesitates to give them, may prevent her designs by force of arms. Must we delay to avert our ruin until it becomes inevitable? If the appearances are so easily credited, it is the fault of that neighbour who has betrayed his ambition by several indications. Should that formidable Power betray an unjust and ambitious disposition by doing the least injustice to another, all nations may avail themselves of the occasion, and, by joining the injured party, thus form a coalition of strength, in order to humble that ambitious potentate, and disable him from so easily oppressing his neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear—for an injury gives us a right to provide for our future safety by depriving the unjust oppressor of the means of injuring us; and it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to assist those who are oppressed or unjustly attacked. When a neighbour in midst of a profound peace erects fortresses on our frontiers, equips a fleet, augments his troops, assembles a powerful army, fills his magazines—in a word, when he makes preparations for war, are we allowed to attack him with a view to prevent the danger with which we think ourselves threatened? The answer greatly depends on the manner and character of that neighbour. We must inquire into the reasons of those preparations, and bring him to an explanation. Such is the mode of proceeding in Europe, and if his sincerity be justly suspected, securities may be demanded of him; his refusal in that case would furnish ample indication of sinister designs, and a sufficient reason to justify us in anticipating them."
My Lords, I think that those words of Vattel are as applicable to the war we are now waging against Russia as if they had been written last week. But my noble Friend, in his eulogies upon Russia, and upon the forbearance which Russia has shown towards Turkey, has entirely omitted to refer to what has been the constant course of aggressive policy pursued by Russia towards Turkey. I will ask your Lordships' attention to a statement of the acquisitions of territory which Russia has wrung from Turkey since 1774:—
"In 1774 the fortresses of Kertch and Yenicale, with their districts in the Crimea, Kinburn and its district, the desert between the Bug and the Dnieper, the town and district of Azoff, and the two Kabadins in Circassia, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1783, the Crimea, the Island of Taman, and Cuban Tartary were annexed to the Russian Empire by a manifesto of the Empress
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Catherine. In 1784 Turkey acknowledged, by treaty, the River Cuban as the boundary of Russia. In 1792 the Fortress of Oczakow and the country between the Bug and the Dniester were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1812 a part of Moldavia; the fortresses of Chotchim and Benber, Bessarabia, with Ismail and Kilia; and the left bank of the Pruth, from its entrance into Moldavia, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1829 a part of the pashalic of Akhalt-zick, and all the littoral of the Black Sea, from the month of the Cuban to Port St. Nicholas, and the islands at the mouths of the Danube, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1834 the Russian territories, from the port of St. Nicholas to the province of Georgia, were extended by treaty with Turkey."
This, then, is the Power which my noble Friend represents as having acted with so much forbearance towards Turkey. We all know, from the papers which have been laid before Paliament, what was the opinion of the late Emperor Nicholas with respect to the state of Turkey. We know that he considered nothing could save the "sick man;" and we also know that Prince Menchikoff's mission was to give the coup de grace to the "sick man," not by violence, as my noble Friend seems to suppose, but by slow poison. There can be no doubt the object of that mission was, by a misinterpretation of the Treaty of Kainardji, to secure another treaty, or an instrument of equally binding force, by which a right of interference between the Sultan and his Christian subjects would be secured to Russia; whereby the Emperor of Russia would obtain virtual sovereignty over 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of the most enterprising, active, and industrious inhabitants of the Turkish dominions. Then came the seizure of the Principalities, the only step on the part of Russia to which my noble Friend saw reason to object; but since that time we have learnt a great deal of the intentions of Russia, and the means she possessed of giving effect to those intentions. We now know what were the vast military resources of Russia, how stealthily they had been accumulated, and how readily they could be made available. We now know something of the almost incredible amount of warlike stores which had been accumulated in Sebastopol, where Russia had no commerce to protect, and we are also aware of the gigantic fortifications which were contemplated at Bomar-sund. Why, Europe was really standing upon a mine without being aware of it, while the influence of Russia was so skilfully exercised as to paralyze both Governments and people, to render them unconscious

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of the danger to which they were exposed, and to diminish their ability to meet that danger. For this state of things every Government in Europe has been partly to blame; for, during the last thirty-five years, an amount of deference has been paid to Russia to which she has no claim, and she has been allowed to interfere, to meddle, and to bribe, in different countries, without check. The encroachments of Russia were unheeded, although her designs had been suspected and denounced; but it was nobody's business to interfere effectually, and no one wished to disturb the general peace until the mine which had been silently and slowly prepared was exploded by the rashness of Prince Menchi koff. Long before this war began, the Russian Government ordered a large increase of their steam fleet, to the number of sixteen or seventeen ships of the largest size. Orders had been given for converting all the Russian men-of-war and ships of the line into screw steamers, and the Russian Government were also actively employed, and had been for a considerablee time before the commencement of the war, in completing a system of railways. It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that the army of Russia—be it 800,000 men or upwards—would thus have been doubled in respect of efficiency by the rapidity with which it could have been removed to any point within or without the Russian territory, and with Constantinople and the Bosphorus in the hands of Russia, what would have been the fate of Europe—to say nothing of the countries bordering on the Black Sea, whether in Asia Minor or Europe, which, with the European provinces of Turkey, must have become as much dependencies of Russia as the Crimea itself? What, I say, would have been the fate of Europe when the Russian fleet was no longer locked up in the Black Sea—when Russia was in full possession of the Sound, and her northern fleets were no longer icebound for six months of the year? Why, all Europe would have fallen into the arms of this colossus. I may remind your Lordships that the very first act of the present Emperor of Russia was to declare his determination to raise Russia to the highest pinnacle of glory and power, and fully to carry out all the plans of Paul, of Catharine, and of Nicholas; and it is no very agreeable reflection that we were nearly on the point of seeing this scheme of universal dominion realised. The policy of Russia has undergone no change. It is now precisely
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what it was twenty-five years ago, when it was most eloquently described by a noble Member of your Lordships' House, the father of the noble Earl who has brought forward this Motion, in these words:—
"Let it be remembered, that the Emperor of Russia only the other day proposed to place him-himself at the head of 800,000 men to give peace to Europe. Peace! What peace? The peace of the grave—the silence of death."
That was the language of the late Earl Grey; and I think, if he could this night have heard the speech of my noble Friend, it would have caused him deep and sincere pain. Looking, then, at what were the projects of Russia, I think, if ever there was a war which was just and necessary and unavoidable, it is that in which England and France have now deliberately engaged, and it is all the more just and necessary, because every effort has been made by negotiation to preserve peace and to avoid having recourse to hostilities. Your Lordships will remember that my noble Friend at the head of the late Government, with the full concurrence of his colleagues, was determined to exhaust every effort to secure pence; and I believe it is because such efforts were made that, on the declaration of war Her Majesty's Government received the unanimous support of the country. The country knew that every facility had been afforded to Russia for retracing her steps, and that every means had been adopted to induce her to abandon a policy which was fatal to Turkey and dangerous to Europe. The declared intention of Russia to occupy the Principalities until every demand she had made upon Turkey was satisfied, and the fact was humbly announced by a special ambassador from Constantinople to St. Petersburg, was not merely the only reply England and France could obtain, but was the only answer given to the entreaties and remonstrances of Austria and Prussia. I say, then, that the unbending pride of Russia was the real cause of the war. It was that which made war inevitable, and I say that the people of this country have not repented the course they took. I believe the people of England are as fully sensible of the inestimable blessings of peace, and as anxious to be restored to the enjoyment of those blessings, as my noble Friend who brought forward this subject. I believe there is no man in this country who would advocate war for mere aggrandisement or for military glory for

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its own sake; but if there is one thing which more than another characterises the English people, it is a keen sense of national honour, and a stern determination not to submit to anything that can be regarded in the light of national disgrace. I say that the people of England do not repent of this war, and would not tolerate a hollow peace. Nor do I think that there is among the people of this country that want of information with reference to the war which my noble Friend supposes to exist. The papers laid upon the tables of both Houses of Parliament, the debates that have frequently taken place in both Houses, the documents that have been published by foreign Governments, and the very able and persevering manner in which the subject, in all its phases, has been treated by the press, really leave no excuse to any reflecting man not to have formed an opinion upon the causes and objects of the war. To those objects we have steadily adhered. To those objects we mean to adhere. We entertain no intention of reviving extinct nationalities, or of resorting to the measures my noble Friend has shadowed forth. The object of the war was to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey, and that not alone for the protection of Turkey, but in order to guard Europe against the dangers by which she was threatened by the ambitious designs of Russia. We thought, and we continue to think, that these objects would be secured by annulling all those treaties which have been so often the pretext for new encroachments on the part of Russia; by causing the protectorate of Russia over the Principalities to cease; by removing all the impediments and obstacles which have obstructed the free navigation of the Danube; by connecting Turkey with the system of European equilibrium; by causing the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease; and by preventing Russia from possessing an exclusive right of interference between the Turkish Government and its subjects. I believe, if these bases of negotiation had been honestly accepted and acted upon, they would, as far as possible, have secured the objects we had in view in entering upon this great struggle. My noble Friend dwelt upon their being humiliating to Russia; but, my Lords, Russia accepted them in principle, and they were recommended by the Austrian Plenipotentiary as well as by those of England and France. To my mind, there was
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nothing in the principle contrary to the honour of Russia, and nothing in the application of that principle contrary to the dignity of Russia. My noble Friend says, and says truly, that the attainment of all this would offer no security to Turkey. The value of a treaty must always depend upon the spirit in which it is agreed to and the good faith with which it is entered into. No treaty can make a weak Power like Turkey perfectly safe against a powerful neighbour immediately in contact with her, if that neighbour is determined to act the aggressive towards her. That, however, is no reason why you should not make the securities you accept as effectual as possible. My Lords, I will take the defence of Sebastopol, which, I am willing to admit, reflects high honour on the arms of Russia. The stores accumulated there could only have been accumulated for purposes of aggression; and the manner in which Russia, without being enabled to bring a single man or a single gun by sea, has relied solely on the defences of the place to defend Sebastopol for many months, shows the danger to which Turkey was exposed, and the menacing position which Russia had taken up. Everywhere throughout Russia, from Archangel to Sebastopol, from Bomarsund to Petropaulovski, in Kamtschatka, there were the same means of defence, the same proof that Russia was aware that by the line of policy she was pursuing, she would sooner or later excite the arms and the united efforts of all Europe against her. Therefore, my Lords, we were justified in seeking to limit the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. All we desired was to make such a limitation of the forces of Russia as would be consistent with the safety of Turkey, and afford no danger to the liberties of Europe. We meant nothing more; and I must say, when my noble Friend criticises the comparison made by my noble Friend Lord John Russell with respect to Dunkirk, and admires the answer given by Prince Gort-chakoff, that that was at the end of a disastrous campaign, which is not the case in the present instance—that my noble Friend ought to bear in mind that the preponderance which we wish to limit effectually does not really exist in the Black Sea at the present moment. In that sea, where, two years ago, Russia told us it would be a casus belli if a French or English ship entered it, the flag of Russia has entirely disappeared, and has been swept from those waters. Surely, then, before England

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and France consent to withdraw their fleets from the Black Sea they ought to require some guarantee from Russia, not humiliating or degrading, but simply to secure the independence of Turkey. But, my Lords, Russia says she will not submit to this; that she will not permit any interference between what she considers her own Sovereignty and her own dominions; and she defends her right to accumulate, and even to develope, every means of aggression. Now, that is a principle quite untenable, because it would be no degradation to a Power to reduce her armaments if she were desirous of restoring confidence and not of justifying suspicion. My noble Friend alludes to the difficulties that the Russian fleet would have—adopting Prince Gortchakoff's words—in taking Constantinople. Prince Gortchakoff says it would take a fortnight to transport 16,000 men from Sebastopol to Constantinople; but if these 16,000 men, or a larger number, were embarked on board the Russian fleet secretly within the walls of Sebastopol in comparatively a few hours, they might be conveyed to Constantinople, and a fatal blow might be given to the existence of the Ottoman Empire. The arrival suddenly of such a force without any declaration of war would produce disastrous effects, even upon a well-organised community—but, in Turkey, by appealing at the same time to the religious sympathies of the most disaffected portion of her subjects, a blow would be inflicted upon the Ottoman Empire from which it never could recover. It is said that Russia requires her fleet in the Black Sea for her own protection. Now, Russia can never seriously pretend that any danger can threaten her in a sea which the maritime Powers would have no object in entering, from which they would be excluded by; treaty, and where, if they had any motive in entering it, events have shown that the Russian fleet would be powerless to protect the commerce of those waters. But Russia proposes that the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be opened indiscriminately to all Powers, and that her fleet should have the means of entering the Mediterranean and of disturbing the Greek inhabitants of the Turkish islands. She further proposes—and this is what my noble Friend considers an ample safeguard for Turkey—that the Porte should relieve itself from the obligation of the treaty of 1841, and be enabled to call the Allies into the Black Sea whenever
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her security may be in danger. But, my Lords, the security of Turkey would always be in danger from such a fleet as Russia proposes to keep up in the Black Sea, and the Allies would never be able to say that the apprehensions of the Porte, when they were called upon, were groundless, or that the call for assistance should be listened to: and the result would be that, in return for all the costly sacrifices which they have made in the war, England and France would indirectly bind themselves by treaty to maintain a large force in the Mediterranean, to be always ready at the call of the Sultan; and they would thus enter themselves into securities for Russia keeping the peace, while Russia would enter into no corresponding securities. England and France would, in fact, constitute themselves the watchmen of Europe, and be required perpetually to keep their fleets upon a war footing. But, supposing it did not suit the Western Powers to have a large fleet in the Mediterranean, in four or five years our fleet would be placed upon a peace establishment, and would not be able to go to the assistance of Turkey; besides which, Russia would be mistress of her own policy, as she would be of her own time, and probably she would not undertake any attack upon Constantinople until she had largely increased her Baltic fleet, and then we should find the necessity of retaining our fleet at home, in order not to expose our own shores to insult. We should never be able, at any rate, to arrive in time to protect Constantinople from a well-organised and preconceived attack. All we should have done by adopting the course so strongly recommended by my noble Friend would have been to impose upon ourselves, at a great cost, the duty and obligation of watching Russia, and we should have entered into a hollow armistice that would not be effectual for any purpose we had in view, instead of having secured peace between the two countries. But Russia still claims her right to be a standing menace to the Porte; she has refused to join the other Powers in guaranteeing the independent existence of Turkey; she will not relieve the apprehensions of Europe with regard to the existence of the Ottoman Empire; and she has no right to say that she has made great and important concessions, when the concessions which she has made have been merely to conciliate Austria and Germany with respect to the Danubian provinces,

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and have in no respect fulfilled those duties in regard to European interests which have led to the just and necessary war in which we are now engaged. Russia knows very well that her fleet is useless to her in the Black Sea, except as a menace to Turkey, though to gain her own ends upon the Ottoman Empire that fleet is invaluable. Upon that account it is to the interest of England and France to limit the power of Russia; and if Russia does not intend to act in good faith, she has no right to complain that the maritime Powers have refused to enter into terms for the cessation of hostilities. I have not entered into any pledges, but I have endeavoured to state what are the views of Her Majesty's Government, and to point out what are the objects which they desired to accomplish throughout the negotiations which have taken place. I can only add, that if it be our good fortune to restore to this country the blessings of peace, I trust it will be only such a peace as will meet with the approbation of your Lordships and of the country at large.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, that although he need not tell their Lordships that it was not his mission to appear before them as a defender of the acts and policy of Her Majesty's Government, he considered this question as one so far removed from the region of party politics that he should have come at almost any inconvenience, and from almost any distance, to record his vote against the Address moved by the noble Earl. The noble Earl declared in this Address that the proposals of Russia afforded a fair prospect of concluding a peace "by which all the original objects of the war might have been gained." Now he (the Earl of Malmesbury) did not at all agree with that proposition, for he was of opinion that the original objects of the war were not sufficiently touched upon in the course of the negotiations which had taken place at Vienna. He was sorry to be obliged to oppose the noble Earl, because no man doubted that noble Earl's complete sincerity, and because he (the Earl of Malmesbury) respected the noble Earl's great consistency on this question, inasmuch as for the last year the noble Earl had been earnestly endeavouring to persuade the House not to be alarmed, and not to enter into a war with Russia. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) therefore respected the noble Earl's opinions; but, on the other hand, he was also bound to say that he felt glad
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that those opinions were shared by so few of their Lordships, and he hoped that no attempt would be made to force the Motion to a division. The speech of the noble Earl, however, was none the less mischievous because of the sincerity of the noble Earl's convictions; in fact all those qualities for which the noble Earl was justly entitled to credit rendered it but the more dangerous. But it was not the speeches and sentiments of the noble Earl only that were replete with danger to the country, but also the speeches and sentiments of other persons. It was not, he (the Earl of Malmesbury) was aware, decorous to allude to the proceedings of the other House; but he was bound to take notice that he heard no later than the night preceding the same sentiments expressed in another place by a man who was equally looked up to as the noble Earl for his talents—he (the Earl of Malmesbury) would not say equally for his consistency and the sincerity of his convictions—but equally looked up to, and, indeed far surpassing the noble Earl in the accomplishments of eloquence and oratory. If he (the Earl of Malmesbury) might be permitted to speak of the right hon. Gentleman as an abstraction, he would say that no longer ago than the preceding night he dreamt he heard a man, whom all his admirers said was the greatest orator of the day, address an august assembly in a tone and manner, with a force of words, with a colouring of expression, and he might add, with a distortion of facts which were worthy of any Russian Minister, and which would have gained such Minister every cross of St. Andrew that the Russian Government had to bestow. When he (the Earl of Malmesbury) awoke in the morning after this dream, he felt so humiliated, as an Englishman, that he would not believe what he had heard, until he read it in print in the morning newspapers. There he saw word for word the same things he had dreamed—the same distortion of facts—the same anti-English and entirely Russian sentiments; and he thought within himself, as he read those sentiments, which emanated from the breast of a man who, not three months since, had sat in the same Cabinet with his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), that they were well calculated to leave an impression on the mind of any one that the secession of this gentleman from the Cabinet was a great escape for this country. His noble Friend who had just sat down had spoken of Europe

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being at this moment, as it were, on a mine. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) certainly thought that England was on a mine not three months ago, when the Government included three such men who now sat in the House of Commons as ex-Ministers, and who represented such sentiments as those which had been expressed by the right hon. Member for the University (Mr. Gladstone) last night. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) thought it most important that the sentiments entertained by these men, who had been all their lives in office, should be known; and he would call the attention of the House to these sentiments, especially those of the right hon. Gentleman in question. What did that right hon. Gentleman say, when he alluded to what he supposed—erroneously supposed—was the feeling of a large proportion of the people of this country. He said that they desired the war to continue merely for the sake of military honour. The right hon. Gentleman pretended to believe that this was the feeling of the people of England, and speaking on that assumption—an assumption which his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) had justly stated to be entirely erroneous—he affected to speak with deep indignation. He said, don't dismember Russia; don't involve yourselves in territorial enterprise; don't attempt to pick that great empire to pieces, because you can't do it. Don't, on the other hand, trust it—don't rely on treaty stipulations—but do what? Insult her. Offer her indignities; strike her in the face; and having done so, then leave her with all her strength unimpaired to meditate and to watch for an opportunity of revenge. That is the policy of those who say, We don't want to rely upon a question of the terms given and refused; for the difference between them is scarcely perceptible; but what we do want is a military success. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) retorted on the right hon. Gentleman that in that sense Englishmen did not want military success; and he was certain that there was no man in the country so barbarous, so uncivilised, and so unchristian as to require war for such a purpose. Military success was unquestionably wanted by the nation; and military success it should have to teach that barbarous Power its duties to humanity, and her proper place in the European family, before negotiations could be entered on with one of the most obstinate Sovereigns in the world; but he (the Earl of Malmesbury) protested
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with all his might against the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the only object of the war was military success, and he believed that there was not a single individual in England who wished war solely for that purpose. The right hon. Gentleman afterwards proceeded to defend—who did their Lordships think, and what?—the first steps taken by the late Emperor of Russia, when that potentate made the Treaty of Kainardji an excuse for the invasion of Turkey by the occupation of the Principalities; and though that right hon. Gentleman was a Minister at the time of this transaction, and sat in the same Cabinet with the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon), this was his language not quite three months after he had ceased to form part of that Cabinet—
"It appears to me that he has been very unjustly blamed on that score. It is not to be denied, in my opinion—if plain words can convey a plain meaning—that, however justly you may say that the Treaty of Kainardji is dangerous, there can be no doubt that it really imports what my noble Friend admitted. When two Powers enter into engagements together, and one of them promises by treaty to protect the Christian religion and Christian Churches within its boundaries, it is liable to the other Power for the fulfilment of the engagement."
The right hon. Gentleman then went on to say—and he (the Earl of Malmesbury) begged the attention of their Lordships to the fact—
"It is quite clear that the Treaty of Kainardji is a most dangerous treaty in this particular; for the Emperor of Russia was placed by it in a condition, with some colour, and, perhaps, more than colour, of right, to build on it a claim to intervention in the internal concerns of the Turkish empire."—[3 Hansard, cxxxviii. 1047.]
What, however, was the state of the facts with respect to the Treaty of Kainardji? The Treaty of Kainardji was signed in 1774, and all the Empress of Russia obtained from it was the right of intercession for the Greek Christians under Turkish rule. In 1796, twenty-two years after, the Treaty of Akermann gave the Emperor a right of representation under the same circumstances; and by a subsequent treaty the Emperor of Russia asked for a protectorate. The right hon. Gentleman, like the noble Earl (Earl Grey), objected to the negotiation of the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon), especially as to the demand of that noble Earl for the limitation of Russian naval power in the Euxine. The right hon. Gentleman was a Member of Her Majesty's Government during the

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first year of the war; and he (the Earl of Malmesbury) would, therefore, ask permission to refer to the interpretation which his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) put on the third point on the 22nd of July, 1854. These were his words—
"Her Majesty's Government have no hesitation in stating the guarantees which, in their opinion, and in that of the French Government, are essential to secure the tranquillity of Europe from future disturbances. These guarantees are naturally suggested by the dangers to guard against which they are required. Thus, Russia has taken advantage of the exclusive right which she had acquired, by treaty, to watch over the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with the suzerain Power, to enter those provinces as if they were part of her own territory. Again, the privileged frontier of Russia in the Black Sea has enabled her to establish in those waters a naval power which, in the absence of any counterbalancing force, is a standing menace to the Ottoman Empire. The uncontrolled possession by Russia of the principal mouth of the Danube has created obstacles to the navigation of that great river which seriously affect the general commerce of Europe. Finally, the stipulations of the treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji relative to the protection of the Christians have become, by a wrongful interpretation, the principal cause of the present struggle. Upon all these points the status quo ante bellum must undergo important modifications."—[Eastern Papers.]
Was the right hon. Gentleman absent from London like so many of his colleagues, in the month of September, when the siege of Sebastopol was undertaken? Was he ignorant of the views of the Cabinet? and if he knew them, entertaining as he did, the opinions he expressed, how came it that he continued to retain his seat in the Cabinet? The right hon. Gentleman subsequently said—
"The more I have considered the plan of limitation, the more I feel the enormous difficulties of carrying it into anything like real or full effect, the more I despair of the ends at which limitation aims being gained by forcing it upon Russia, and the more I feel the extreme indignity which, if so forced, it inflicts upon her; and there is no policy, I think, which is so false and dangerous as to inflict upon Russia indignity without taking away strength. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that we had obtained limitation, although at this time appearances here and elsewhere are such as to make it very questionable whether it will be attained; but, if it were, what, what good or what evil should we have accomplished? We should, in the first place, have recorded against the Russian Government, in the face of the Russian people, a standing insult to that Government—a standing deprivation of its own natural powers of defence—the first and most essential powers which belong to a Government as such."—[3 Hansard,cxxxviii. 1060.]
LORD LYTTELTONobjected to the noble Earl's referring to a speech made in
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the other House of Parliament as contrary to the usage of their Lordships' House.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he was entirely in the hands of the House, and put his trust in their Lordships' indulgence. He had wished to show, with respect to the limitation, what difference existed between the right hon. Gentleman's opinions now and his acts when in office, and to show how, as Ministers and as statesmen, what an escape the country had had in the secession of the right hon. Gentleman and some of his colleagues from power. With respect to the limitation being a humiliation of Russia, the noble Earl (Earl Grey) who began the debate repeated it. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) did not, however, agree with him. The noble Earl seemed to have forgotten that the limitation was proposed to be reciprocal, and that Turkey, as well as the other Powers, agreed to it. If he read the proposition aright it was, that Turkey and Russia should be limited each to four ships of the line and four frigates in the Euxine; and that the other Powers, parties to the treaties, should be limited to two ships of the line and two frigates each in these waters. In reading that proposition the only objection made by Russia was, that the other Powers would pass the quantity of ships assigned to them. Turkey could not be placed in the same category, however, with Russia; though it was true that the present allies of Turkey, in combination with that Power, would, under such an arrangement, have twenty ships of war in the Black Sea, and in making such a proposal it might, perhaps, have been expected that the Government would have given it a semblance of fairness in order to induce Russia to accept it. The Russian Plenipotentiary, however, said he had not sufficient power to accept that treaty. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) did not for a moment regret the non-acceptance of that proposition, and the speech of his noble Friend confirmed him in his views; for, however convinced he was of Russian ambition and of her determination to extend her territory as far as possible, it required the official knowledge and the assurance of his noble Friend, to be able to state, and to prove, that she had a matured plan to enslave a great part of the civilised globe. The noble Earl read a quotation from Vattel, but that quotation went against himself, or, rather, against the course of negotiation that had been adopted; for it said securities should be demanded, and none had

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been asked from Russia. It appeared to him (the Earl of Malmesbury), however, that the only plan which would afford security for the future was to make the Black Sea analogous to the American lakes. It was no use closing the Straits, and the only way of coining to a satisfactory solution of the question was by being enabled by a military success to draw the teeth of the combatants, and, either by force or by persuasion, to induce Russia and Turkey to give up all ships of war except a few small ones which might be necessary for purposes of police, while we bound ourselves by treaty not to send any ships of war into the Black Sea, except on conditions to be defined in the treaty. From adopting such a course there would be no humiliation to Russia—no more, indeed, than there would be to France and England if they, being allies, agreed, for political or economical purposes between themselves, to reduce their naval establishments in the Mediterranean. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) could not agree with the noble Earl in his eulogy upon the late Emperor of Russia. That he was a great roan he (the Earl of Malmesbury) did not deny; but that he was also ready to sacrifice any number of human beings to his ambition there could be no doubt. As to the sincerity of the Russian Government, so much eulogised by the noble Earl, it did not appear to him to be a proof of its existence that the Russian representatives at Vienna had no proposal to make with regard to the settlement of the third point. They asked for eighteen days to ascertain what answer they should give. Did that look like sincerity or a desire to bring negotiations to a speedy termination? When a question was put to his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) upon the subject of these negotiations, he understood his noble Friend to reply that he might as well at once avow that they were broken off; whilst, in the other House, on the very next day, the Prime Minister stated that negotiations were still going on. It was, therefore, scarcely possible to ascertain whether negotiations for peace were still going on or not. However that might be, certain it was, that the main propositions of the allies were refused by the Russian Plenipotentiary, and Lord John Russell withdrew from Vienna. He did not think that much interest was felt on that (the Opposition) side of the House as to whether the noble Lord remained or not. Indeed, he thought that it would
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I have been a graceful end to that noble Lord's eminent but rather fitful career, if he had spent the last days of his political existence as Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. In that case both the noble Lord himself and Her Majesty's Government would have been infinitely more comfortable than they were likely to be in England, and the Cabinet would, no doubt, not have greatly regretted his absence. If he (the Earl of Malmesbury) were a party man, he did not know that he should regret the noble Lord's return home, because he had always looked upon him as one of those elements which occasioned the spontaneous combustion that ended in the destruction of Governments. It was not for him, therefore, to regret the noble Lord's return and his renouncement of a diplomatic career; but certainly his return was, in the eyes of the whole world, a matter of decided and significant character, and he trusted that the Government were determined to make no propositions that were not at least fully as strong as, if not stronger than, those which the noble Lord proposed, and which were rejected by Russia. No one could feel more than he (the Earl of Malmesbury) did the losses which the army had sustained in the Crimea; but he thought the horrors that had been suffered had been greatly exaggerated by the noble Earl. Now, it was not necessary to represent war as more horrible than it really was; it was stated that 240,000 Russians had been slain in the course of the present conflict. What did that imply with regard to the strength of the Russian army? If 240,000 were dead, there must at least be an equal number hors de combat. In that case there were 500,000 Russians hors de combat; so that the army which was still able to keep the field could not have amounted originally to less than 700,000 or 800,000 men ! For his part, he deprecated all such exaggerated statements. We had entered upon the war after much deliberation, convinced that we were I engaged in a just cause; and it was useless, worse than useless, either to magnify the losses we had sustained, or to represent the enemy as in a worse position than he really was. He was satisfied that we could trust the spirit of the people of this country, which was unchanged, and which was represented most faithfully by their Lordships House. He was satisfied, too, that we could trust our officers and soldiers, whose bravery had never been surpassed since England was England. We

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only wanted determination, unity, and vigour on the part of the Government. We wanted men in the Government the very reverse of those who were banished from its ranks three months ago. We wanted men who could answer such speeches as those which had been delivered in the House of Commons last night. [The Marquess of LANSDOWNE made a remark.] He was glad to hear the noble Marquess say that those speeches had been answered to-night, because the country looked with the greatest anxiety to the language which was held by Ministers upon this question, But would Ministers act up to the language; they held to-night for the next six months? He for one had never despaired of the cause in which the country had engaged, whatever he might think of the strategical movements of the campaign. He did not say that mistakes might or might not have been committed. He was not a soldier; but he was an Englishman, and he felt certain that the spirit of our officers and soldiers would be given with unabated ardour to the service of the Crown. He hoped and intreated that their Lordships, if they did divide on this question, would do so with all their strength, because they might depend upon it that if they thus showed their opinion of that party of which, the noble Earl might be the ornament, but which he could never render a strong party, the effect upon Europe would be most important. The manner in which the question had been brought before the House of Commons was so puzzling to persons who were not acquainted with the technicalities and jargon of Parliament that it would be almost impossible, owing to the complicated nature of the divisions, to comprehend what the sense of the House really was; but, he trusted, that it would be understood that if the noble Earl did not divide the House, he refrained from doing so only because he knew that he would stand almost a solitary individual against the whole of their Lordships' House. That was the fact, and he trusted that it would be so understood both by this country and by foreigners. If England were to follow the noble Earl's, advice, and could believe it possible that Russia were right and England wrong, what a position would be ours at this moment ! Why, if we could credit what the noble Earl said, and were now to make a peace upon such terms as Russia had offered, it would give us no security for the future, and in contradiction to that noble Spanish proverb engraved upon Toledo
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blades—we should have drawn the sword of England without a cause, and have sheathed it without honour.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, the argument of his noble Friend (Earl Grey) appeared to be intended to convince this country and Europe that after the war was commenced they had been adding constantly to their demands; that while Russia had been exhibiting a conciliatory and candid spirit, they had been exhibiting an arrogant and exacting one. He could conceive no argument more erroneous or more unjust. He did not know whether his noble Friend really meant to convey that impression? [Earl GREY: Certainly not.] He was glad to have elicited that answer; but his noble Friend's speech would convey that impression, and wherever that speech was translated for circulation that impression would be urged by Russia. With regard to the disposition Russia had shown to accept reasonable terms from the allies, he exceedingly regretted the tone of his noble Friend's speech, which was an out-and-out defence of Russian moderation, and as such would have an exceedingly bad effect. Now, he wished to correct some errors of fact into which his noble Friend had fallen. The first document to which the noble Earl referred was the first Vienna protocol, dated the 9th of April. The noble Earl said that the original protocol did not contain any reference to the revision of the treaties of 1841. It was true that there was no specific mention made of the point; but the expressions used respecting the maintenance of the Turkish empire in its integrity and making it a part of the general European balance of power directly pointed to the revision of the treaties. The protocol of the 9th of April contained the foundation of the future proceedings, and the note agreed to on the 8th of August, at Vienna, laid down in distinct terms what were afterwards termed "the Four Points," which, with the interpretation placed upon them, formed the subject of the papers placed upon the table. He much regretted the tone of the noble Earl's speech in reference to the disposition of Russia, and her good faith, in reference to her readiness to accept reasonable propositions. He did not think such a speech would serve the cause of peace; it would only serve the cause of war. Such an out-and-out defence of Russia must produce a bad effect. After war had been declared terms were again offered by Turkey,

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through the intervention of the Western Powers, which, if accepted by Russia, would have put an end to the war. Looking back to the transactions the only doubt on his mind was whether, considering the great interests at stake, the allies were justified in advising Turkey to offer such terms. She demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, but she offered to renew the former treaties, and, by a formal declaration to which all the Powers would be parties, to regulate the condition of her Christian subjects. Such an offer was most generous and liberal, and he was surprised that, while the noble Earl could dwell so much upon the mistakes of the English and French Governments, he had not a word of reprehension for the insolent conduct of Russia in reference to this proposal, which placed upon her the whole responsibility of the calamities of war. No written answer was vochsafed, but Count Orloff was sent to Vienna. He declared that the quarrel between Russia and Turkey was one which must be settled between themselves, and that Russia would not submit to any interference of the Western Powers; if Turkey sent a diplomatist to the head-quarters of their army, or to St. Petersburg, they would give her what terms they pleased; and it was generously added that if the Plenipotentiary went to the capital, the representatives of the Western Powers might give him what advice they thought fit. The principle laid down in the imperious message of Count Orloff was one they were bound to resist if they thought they were entitled to interfere at all in the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and prevent Russia from taking advantage of her superior power. The answer of the Powers was that Count Orloff's proposition was inadmissible, and could not be listened to. Russia took no notice of the protocol of the 9th of April till after the failure of the siege of Silistria. She then sent a message to the effect that she was ready to assent to the protocol—not from any conciliatory spirit, but because of a great military disaster; but even then her agreement was not bonâ fide; she omitted all mention of the most essential article—the revision of the treaties of 1841, with a view to the attaching Turkey more closely to the system of European equilibrium. At the moment Austria was about to join more closely with the Western Powers to compel the evacuation of the Principalities, Russia immediately informed her that she was about to do so, but solely from strategic reasons;
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and it was only just to Austria to say that she did not allow that event to influence her conduct towards the allies. After the note of the 8th of August, Count Nessel-rode wrote a scolding note to her for having signed it. It was only after the battle of Inkerman that Russia intimated her acceptance not alone of the protocol of the 9th of April, but of the "Four Points" contained in the note of the 8th of August. In every step Russia had been driven by hard necessity. She made every concession, not from any conciliatory spirit, but from the pressure arising from the hard necessity of war. He reminded the House of these facts, because it was most important to remove the impression that England had advanced her terms. Long before the declaration of war the allies were in possession of the Black Sea, and they, therefore, had a right to lay down conditions in reference to those waters. Since then they had not advanced one step in the conditions they had originally thought necessary for the peace of Europe. It was important that the country should know that by the force of their arms and the effects of their combination, they had extorted very great concessions. The question, however, was whether the concessions made up to the present moment were sufficient, and it should be clearly understood that these concessions were not the result of any conciliatory spirit. A great deal had been said of the principle of limitation; that principle was opposed by three parties; first, Her Majesty's Opposition, who of course opposed anything proposed by Government; next, by the extreme war party, who looked for great changes and a war of nationalities; and, lastly, by the small party that considered any such limitation unjust to Russia. The noble Earl told them that it was an insult to Russia; but they did not propose to limit the whole naval power of Russia. They saw the Euxine was a sea of such a peculiar character that Russia might fairly be asked to give up a fleet which could be of no use for the purposes of defence, and the very existence of which implied purposes of aggression against Turkey. He thought that the practical effects of limitation had been somewhat underrated. Although a large body of troops could be moved by merchant ships and thrown upon the coast of Turkey, an armed force was necessary for their protection, and the knowledge that a strong naval force would speedily be at hand to oppose them would be a great impediment to any such movement.

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It had been argued that the limitation which was required implied a distrust in the good faith of Russia; but the advantage of limiting her power in the Black Sea was that in case of future aggressive designs on her part she would have to start from a lower point of preparation, and consequently would give a longer intimation of her intentions. He was himself an earnest supporter of the cause of peace when peace could be obtained not only with honour, but when we had gained the objects for which war was commenced; but he could not agree with the noble Earl that the present offers of Russia held out to France and England those sufficient guarantees which we had a right to expect.
LORD LYTTELTONentertained opinions generally in accordance with those of the noble Earl (Earl Grey), but he felt they were the opinions of a minority in that House, and were unpopular out of doors. Those circumstances, however, rendered it incumbent on those who did agree with the terms of the noble Earl's Motion to give him their support. He did agree with the terms of the Motion, but it was not necessary to agree in all the views expressed by the noble Earl that evening. He did not think it quite fair in the noble Earl the Secretary of State to blame his noble Friend for bringing forward this Motion while the war was pending; for, if that objection were to prevail, it would prevent the discussion of all questions relating to the war so long as it lasted. Those who thought the invasion of the Principalities was a gross infraction of the public law of Europe, and as such justified the commencement of the war, had no such pretext now, as Russia had retired to her own territories, and he thought the present war, besides securing the great objects for which we had commenced it, had given a most valuable lesson to other nations, that the power of a nation for defence was infinitely greater than its power for aggression. After the campain on the Danube he could not imagine any danger to Constantinople. With respect to the chief point in dispute, he considered that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea had been given up by that Power. He could not say that the propositions of Russia were wholly satisfactory, because he thought it utterly impossible to expect satisfactory relations between Turkey and Russia. It was the old story of the iron pot and the earthen one—the weaker vessel must be crushed by the stronger; the
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energetic and powerful nation must assert an ascendancy over one that was feeble, decayed, and corrupt. We had here a strong nation by the side of a weak one, between whom perfectly satisfactory relations could not be expected to exist. But the question was the most practicable solution to be found for the difficulty. Agreeing, as he did, with the terms of the Resolution, he should vote with the noble Earl if he divided the House, which, however, he trusted the noble Earl would not do, considering the position in which the tellers would probably be placed.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORDsaid, he held it to be the duty of every man, in whatever station he might be placed, to use all the talents and opportunities God had given him to promote peace upon earth, and more especially were the Members of their Lordships' House bound to use the power given to them in that direction. He felt, also, that the appeal which had been made by the noble Earl ought to meet with some answer from those benches to which he himself belonged before their Lordships proceeded to a division. He could not, for one, vote for the Address which the noble Earl proposed. He could not vote for it, because he did not believe that the adoption of the Address by that House would tend to the promotion of that object which he knew to be so dear to the heart of the noble Earl. If the Address had been of a different character—if, while expressing his regret at the apparently unfavourable termination of the recent conferences, the noble Earl had expressed to Her Majesty his belief that from those conferences there might even yet be drawn that great blessing, peace to the world—he would have felt it his duty to support it. But the Address proposed went much beyond that, and the speech of the noble Earl, in which he appeared to throw the whole blame on England and her ally, and not upon Russia, went still further than the Address. He believed, as doubtless all their Lordships believed, that war was, under certain circumstances, not only absolutely justifiable, but a duty on the part of a nation; or, as it had been expressed by an eminent authority, war was an appeal to the tribunal of God in those cases where there was no superior power on earth which could give a decision thereon. But when a nation was about to enter into a war, it should stop and carefully examine whether the war into which it was entering was for a cause which could be made the subject of an appeal to the tribunal

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of God for that decision which no other tribunal could give. He believed that for a war to be justifiable in its origin and in its conduct it must be capable of being resolved into a war of self-defence. It might be that a nation seeing an attack coming upon it forestalled that attack, in order to prevent the evil that otherwise might come. But when a war which had been rightly begun was long continued, another point arose which every Christian nation should carefully examine. They should ask themselves whether they had been led on by the progress of the war to change their views on any essential point which concerned its original justification? Believing that this war in its origin had been just—that it had been undertaken to defend the liberties of Europe against the tyranny of a domineering potentate—believing that it had been undertaken by our Government with a righteous purpose, and most reluctantly, and that the Government had even, through their unwillingness to plunge the nation into the horrors of war, encountered much obloquy, he thought the practical question was, whether we had now reached such a point in the war that we might hope to close it in the spirit of justice and rectitude, as well as with due regard to our national dignity. Agreeing, as he did in much that had been said to night by Members of Her Majesty's Government, he was bound to say that, after the best study he had been able to give to the papers and protocols, he did think that there was an unnecessary strain placed upon the acceptance by Russia of the third of the propositions under discussion, and he did believe that they were in danger of being led on from a just and a righteous into an unrighteous and unjustifiable war. We seemed now to be continuing the war with no precise or settled purpose, but with the notion of obtaining some great and striking military success, such as would draw, as it had been expressed, the teeth of Russia. He thought it desirable that the people of England should fully understand how great had been the success of our arms during the campaign, and how material had been the concessions made by Russia. He believed that from the first Her Majesty's Government had been really anxious to preserve the peace of Europe by any means compatible with the national honour. In February, 1854, Russia demanded that any negotiation for peace should take place, not at Vienna, but at some neutral point—which, with considerable naïveté, was afterwards explained
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to be St. Petersburg, or the head-quarters of the Russian army; and, further, that such negotiation should be between Russia and Turkey alone. These points had, however, already been conceded by Russia. The Russian Government further demanded a confirmation of all the old treaties—but they were now content that those treaties should be swept away; and whereas at the commencement of the war Russia required that the protectorate of the Christians in the Turkish empire should be committed to her alone, she was now willing that it should be committed to the great Powers of Europe. He contended, then, that all the main objects for which this country had engaged in war had already been gained. The Principalities had been evacuated; arrangements had been made for a European guarantee to secure their future immunity from Russian invasion; and it was agreed that those treaties should be swept away which had afforded a continual excuse to Russia to interfere in Turkish affairs, and by degrees to annex great Turkish provinces to her own dominions. The question upon which our negotiations had failed was that of limitation, and he thought the noble Earl (Earl Grey) had made a very strong point in quoting a high authority to show that to require any Sovereign State to limit the number of its ships of war was an indignity to which it could not be expected to submit. He (the Bishop of Oxford) thought such a limitation would afford but slight protection to Turkey, because it might very easily be evaded. They all knew that in the great shipbuilding yards of Russia many large vessels might be kept on the stocks in readiness to be launched at any moment. He should regret that any language should be used in that House which would make it difficult for Ministers to carry on these conferences and communications, so that they might endeavour to vary the terms of their requirements to meet the only remaining point, and thus give peace again to Europe. No peace could be lasting or secure with a great nation, which inflicted upon it, even though its humiliation for a time should be ever so complete, terms which it felt to be unworthy of its inherent greatness. It might be said that that was holding Russian language, but it was the language that was held by no less a man than the Duke of Wellington himself at the termination of the last French war. When the question was discussed of obtaining a security for Europe against

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the awakening and insatiable ambition of France, he observed that if large cessions were required the operations of war might be considered as only deferred until France should find a suitable opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she had lost. He (the Bishop of Oxford) was far from wishing to see the British nation quit any war in a dishonourable manner, or without the successes merited by its arms; and therefore he regretted the depreciating language which had sometimes been used with regard to the results of the campaign, because it tended to render the attainment of peace more difficult, consistently with the honour of England. There was danger in a great country like England making peace under equivocal circumstances. Much of the power of England, throughout the Continent and in the East, depended upon the prestige of her name, and undoubtedly, as an Englishman, he could not desire to see her quit the war in a manner that would lead to any abatement of her power; but he thought, after the substantial gain which had resulted from the campaign, and after the courage which the British armies had displayed, they might make peace now with perfect safety, if proper guards could be provided against a renewal of the ambitious aggressions of Russia. The courage exhibited by our troops at the Alma and at Inkerman had raised rather than lessened the character of England with respect to the strength of her military array and the might of her soldiery; and he need scarcely remind their Lordships that the Russian navy had been swept from the sea, and if it had not been defeated it was only because it had shrunk from encountering the fleets of the allies. He therefore felt deep regret that language should have been used by any one which might throw difficulties in the way of those who were intrusted with the conduct of delicate negotiations, and might prevent a safe and honourable peace from being secured to Europe. He would remind their Lordships that, great as was our power as a nation, brave as were our soldiers, unequalled as were our fleets, it was only for Him who was higher than the highest to breathe upon us, and our power would fade away beneath that blast. He entertained not the slightest doubt that France and England, so far as mere human might was concerned, could utterly overcome those who were set against them; but, although he entertained such confidence, he knew that there was One who disposed the events of nations as well as the affairs of men;
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and he prayed their Lordships to allow no language to pass unrebuked within their walls which would make a just and honourable peace more difficult of England's attainment.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, I should not have risen to address your Lordships at all this evening if I thought it likely that it would be left to your Lordships to signify your opinions by your votes; but I rather apprehend that the appeal made to my noble Friend not to divide the House is about to be attended to, and I am, therefore, desirous of stating the views which I entertain upon the Resolutions which have been brought before the House. I must say, my Lords, that I have listened to much of what has passed this evening with very sincere pain. When I saw the notice given by the noble Earl some ten days ago I apprehended that some little mischief might arise from the discussion of the questions which the noble Earl was about to raise; but I must say that those anticipations of evil have been considerably augmented by the speech which has fallen from my noble Friend this evening. Throughout that speech my noble Friend so greatly extenuated—I may say defended—every act of our enemy, and pressed so heavily upon every act of ourselves, that I am afraid the result cannot be otherwise than to a great extent to irritate the people of this country, and to lower us in the estimation both of our allies and of our enemy. In expressing these opinions with reference to the speech of my noble Friend, I beg to assure him that I am addressing the House most seriously in the interests of peace, and in my conscience I believe that the speech addressed to your Lordships by my noble Friend is far better calculated to postpone the conclusion of peace, which all so heartily desire, than any of the declamations of the most violent friends of war. I cannot but apprehend that the speech of my noble Friend, followed by such Resolutions as those which he has proposed, must, in the first place, have the effect of encouraging Russia to persevere in all her efforts and demands, and it may also even induce her to withdraw the concessions she has already expressed her entire willingness to make. And if this is likely to be the effect on our enemy, what is likely to be the effect on our friends? What is the present condition of Germany? Germany is divided upon the question, but we have nevertheless many friends of our cause in the States of Germany. Then, is not a

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debate like this, and such sentiments as those which have been expressed, not by an inexperienced Peer, but by one who has occupied a high position in administering the affairs of the country, and one who bears a great and historic name, calculated to paralyze Germany, to turn those friendly to us against us, and to induce those unfriendly to us to persevere in their hostility? Is it not highly probable that many of the people of France may look with alarm at the discussions which have taken place? Is it not likely that the people of France may say, "If we are to be pushed forward in this alliance, what security have we, with a free constitutional Government in England, that she may not desert us in a short time?" And are not the people of France likely to be deterred by that consideration from a continuance in that firm and fixed alliance which has been so cordial hitherto? My noble Friend has spoken of a war-cry having been instigated in this country; but I must say that if you put forward language so friendly to the actions and conduct of our enemy as that held by my noble Friend, you are much more likely to instigate a war-cry than by any course you could possibly take, and you are likely to raise a feeling in the country which may prevent any Government—even a Government as friendly to peace as the present Government must be, unless they have departed from the sentiments which I always heard them express when I had the honour of a seat with them—from concluding peace. I do not think, however, that there has been a war-cry in the spirit in which my noble Friend has stated. There has been no vain love of military glory—no desire on the part of the people of this country to see a sanguinary conflict for the mere sake of hearing the firing of cannon and the proclaiming of a great victory in the park; but, on the contrary, I am convinced that the spirit of the country goes only to the belief that we have not yet attained those great objects for which alone we entered upon the contest. My Lords, if I listened with pain to the speech of my noble Friend, I must say that I also viewed with regret the Resolutions which my noble Friend calls upon this House to affirm. He calls upon us to say that the proposals made by Russia were such as ought to have been accepted. [Earl GREY made an observation.] Perhaps I had better read the Resolution. It calls upon us to "express an opinion that the proposals of Russia were such as to
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afford a fair prospect of concluding a peace, by which all the original objects of the war might have been gained, and by which Her Majesty and Her allies might have obtained all the advantages which can reasonably be demanded from Russia." Now, it is impossible for us to take into account the rumours which we have heard of Russia having been disposed to concede something more. I confess that I, for one, cannot agree that the proposal made by Russia—the counter-proposition made upon the third point—gives us any such assurance. We have heard a great deal of discussion with regard to the limitation of the power of Russia in the Black Sea. I confess that I cannot see that that limitation would be any such great indignity that it would be inconsistent with her honour to accept it. In fact, we are not obliged to look upon the proposition in any such point of view; for the limitation of the power of Russia in the Black Sea was one of the Four Points accepted and adopted in principle by Russia herself; and it was simply the mode of carrying out that principle which she refused to adopt. It has been said that the counter-proposition of Russia would have given us the object we have at heart; but I frankly confess that I cannot for the life of me see either that it would be an equivalent, or that it would offer any security at all for the independence of Turkey. It appears to me that the counter-proposition of Russia is really one entirely for her own advantage. Putting on one side the question of limitation, what is it she proposes? It is simply this—that, as regards the whole question of the Black Sea, we are to return to the status quo ante bellum, with this simple exception, that Turkey is not to wait for a declaration of war, but is to be at liberty at any time she pleases to call in the assistance of the Western Powers, and, in point of fact, to open the Straits. But Turkey might some day "call those spirits from the vasty deep" when there would be no one to answer her. My noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has already observed that if the proposition of Russia were agreed to it would impose upon the Western Powers the necessity of maintaining a very large fleet in the Mediterranean for the purpose of watching the safety of Turkey. You would be in a perpetual state of semi-war, and I appeal to any noble Earl whether the experience of the last half-century does not tell us that if this state of semi-war

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were for one moment departed from the inevitable consequence would be that we should have to incur again the heavy expenses to which we have been put in the prosecution of the present war. Directly peace was concluded the House of Commons and the people of the country would call for a diminution in the expenditure; in a short time we should only have three or four vessels of war in the Mediterranean; those vessels would probably be locked up for months in the harbour of Valetta, and then where would be the security of Turkey? My Lords, I think when this nation is embarked in war, it is your bounden duty to yourselves, to your country, but, above all, to posterity, not to allow that war to close in such a manner as that you will be exposed at an early day to its renewal, at a time, too, when you may not be able so well to thwart these endeavours, as I sincerely hope you may now be enabled to do. As I before said, I never addressed this House with more pain than I have done upon this occasion; and, if even there is not a division, I must still say emphatically "No" to the Resolution.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, little as I wished to intrude upon your Lordships any observations of mine upon this occasion, my disinclination to do so has been materially increased, and the inutility of doing so is more plainly demonstrated, after the speech of the noble Duke, in which there is not one single syllable from which I can dissent, or which does not entirely express the views and opinions with which I regard the unfortunate Motion of the noble Earl opposite. I call it by this term, because I think it is most unfortunate that a proposition like that which is now before us and accompanied by a speech involving such principles, made with such ability, and exhibiting, upon the part of a noble Lord of such influence and such station, opinions so unfavourable to his own country, so encouraging to the aspirations of Russia, should have been brought forward in this House, more especially as this speech, while it is utterly at variance with the opinions of the people of this country, no doubt, will go forth to Europe and to the world; and more especially, too, as it appears to have been supported, at all events by one noble Lord in this House, and that it will not be known to Europe and to the world that in all probability, that noble Lord would have been the one, if not the
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only one, by whom the Motion would have received support upon a division. Though not desiring to fetter the judgment of the noble Earl, and thinking that, considering what his own views are, he probably exercises a sound discretion in abstaining from a division, I must say I think that if he wished to place his own opinions and the opinions of the Peers of England fully and fairly before the country and before the world, he either ought not not to have brought forward a Motion of this kind, at this time, or he ought not to have made that Motion nugatory by resolving to withdraw it. Without wishing to imply anything disrespectful to the noble Earl, I would say that, if we have the poison of his arguments we ought, at all events, to have the comfort of the antidote which a division would have afforded. I desire that there should be no mistake as regards the opinion of this House. If the noble Earl disputes the fact I challenge him to disprove it; but I venture to say that, if the Peers of England divide on this question there will not be a dozen—I will even say there will not be half-a-dozen—out of the 450 Members of your Lordships' House who would not give a negative to the proposition now before us. Then, again, I confess I regret the manner in which this discussion has been brought on. I could have desired that Her Majesty's Ministers had taken a course more in accordance with usual practice, and that the negotiations having closed, and my noble Friend having admitted to us that for all substantive purposes they were closed, and that that was the vindication of the Government for laying upon the table the result of these negotiations—I say, that being the case, I cannot but lament that Her Majesty's Ministers did not express to the House, as they might have done, their regret that these negotiations had not led to a favourable issue, and invite Parliament to give an assurance—which I am certain they would have been ready to give—of their cordial and continued support in the vigorous prosecution of the war. The right rev. Prelate, who does not, indeed, altogether concur with the noble Earl in all he has put forward, stated that, had the noble Earl proposed a different kind of Resolution, he would have supported it. My Lords, so should I; but that depends upon what difference was made in it. Though I come nearer to the right rev. Prelate than to the noble Earl, I certainly could not support a Resolution which should bear upon the face of it an

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opinion that further conferences at Vienna, in the present state of matters, would lead to peace. I own that I have no such hope, and desiring, as I do, a just and honourable peace as much as any man can do, and agreeing with the noble Duke in his statement as to what the feelings of the country are on this point, and that there exists an anxious and earnest desire to obtain, if it can be obtained, an honourable peace, yet that the country is sternly resolved to carry on the war with vigour until that kind of peace is obtained—I say my regret rather is, that the propositions made were such as, even if accepted by Russia, would not have given us all the security which we ought to have. It is idle, I think, to look back, as the noble Earl did, into what might have been done and what was done two years ago, and how far we might have averted the war at the period of Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople; although I must be permitted to say, en passant, that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, giving, as he did, a very admirable answer to the noble Earl, appears to me to furnish the strongest case I have ever heard against the Government of which he was then a Member, for not having taken at that time a more decided and more strenuous course in resisting the aggressive attitude assumed by Russia. I think the whole tendency of his arguments showed that a more decisive position than was then taken up by Her Majesty's Government, and the placing before Russia the inevitable consequence of persistance in the line of conduct she was pursuing would have afforded a much better chance of preserving peace than the reluctance displayed by the English Ministry to enter upon the war. I agree with the noble Earl who opened this discussion, that Russia did not desire war; that Russia was bent upon attaining her objects at all costs, but if possible without war; and the more she could gain by a stealthy march upon the integrity and independence of Turkey, the better she felt she would be prepared for war when it came, and the better placed she would be. Such a feeling as that, however, was to be met by a firm and uncompromising declaration on our part that we understood the projects of Russia, and that if she persevered in them she must do so with the certainty of having united against her the determined hostility of the two great nations of the West. I am persuaded that such a tone taken at that time would have
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checked the aggressions of Russia, and have placed us in a much more favourable position than we are now in. My noble Friend talks about Russia not having unveiled her designs, and of having given no outward signs of that violent ambition by which she is devoured. But the fact is, that at that time the British Government knew perfectly well what the designs of Russia were. Russia wished, indeed, to be on friendly terms with England, and with that view put forward certain discreditable proposals; but the Government knew perfectly well what the ulterior objects of Russia were, and from that moment it became the duty of the Government to have taken up a firm stand, and to have shown, by unequivocal language and conduct, that the objects contemplated by Russia could not, at all events, be attained with the sanction of England. But it is useless now to refer to the past. The question at present is, what course ought England now to take to bring this war to a speedy, but above all, to an honourable and a satisfactory termination? I do not undervalue the concessions which Russia has been compelled to make by the progress of our arms, and by the pressure upon her resources. I do not undervalue her withdrawal—if she has indeed withdrawn from them—from those claims she originally made as to a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Porte, her assent to the
independence of the Governments of the Moldavian and Wallachian Principalities; nor do I undervalue her admission of the necessity of securing the free navigation of the Danube—though with regard to the latter point we must not talk as though it were a new concession, because, although in practice Russia did not concede it, yet, as far as treaty obligations go, as far as the bounden duty of Russia, pledged in the face of the rest of the world went, the freedom of the Danube was just as much secured by treaty as it will be when secured by any new treaty, if entered into. I say, my Lords, I neither undervalue those objects, nor do I pretend to say that they are incomplete in themselves;—but the main object for which we entered into this war was to take a sufficient guarantee for the permanent independence and integrity of Turkey against the open aggression or the secret wiles of Russia. My complaint with regard to the third point is, not that we asked too much, but that we asked too little. My Lords, in the course and progress of this war a material

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change has taken place in the demands which were originally made, but that change has been rendered necessary by the alteration of the circumstances under which we are now placed. Terms and restrictions which we were willing to accept to avert war are quite insufficient now that we have once drawn the sword. When, as the noble Earl has told us, we have lavished no less than 50,000,000 l. of treasure, and when the lives of 20,000 of our fellow-countrymen have been sacrificed, it would be vain to expect us to accept those terms which we would have been willing to accept before the war broke out. But, my Lords, a material alteration has taken place in the character of the war in which we are engaged since the original demands were made. It was entered into as a purely defensive war, but by the expedition to the Crimea it has assumed an aggressive character. I have not to reproach myself with having taken any part in that change in the character and circumstances of the war. The war commenced as a purely defensive war, having for its object the defence of the independence and integrity of Turkey, and the setting free of the Danube, and this country might have been satisfied with accomplishing those objects if the war had retained that character; but as the character of the war has changed, conditions which we might at first have accepted cannot now be agreed to with honour, or even with safety. From the moment that you commenced an aggressive war—from the moment you gave effect to the declaration of the Government, and we became bound to put a stop to the preponderance of Russia, and to weaken and impair the power of that great country—from that time it was very useless to talk about our propositions being humiliating or inconsistent with the dignity of Russia. You have entered upon the task of materially diminishing the power of Russia, and any condition which tends to that result must be humiliating, and may be insulting, to her dignity. You pledged yourselves when you entered the Crimea and sat down before Sebastopol, that yon would destroy what the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs called a standing menace to Turkey, and of which he said that as long as it remained it was a mockery to talk of a safe and honourable peace; after that challenge, and after the armies of two great nations have been occupied seven months, notwithstanding the most heroic exertions
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and unparalled efforts of privates and officers in the siege of that fortress, and as yet without success—after that declaration on the part of the Government to which I have referred, and to which the country is committed—I say that to withdraw from before that fortress baffled and defeated, and to leave that standing menace to the independence and integrity of Turkey undiminished in power, would be a humiliation to England and to her ally. Anxious, therefore, as I am for peace, and unwilling as I am to say a single word which may interfere with any attempt to secure that inestimable blessing, I say that I do not believe that any engagement which we could have entered into at the Conferences at Vienna, and which could have been accepted by Russia as being consistent with her dignity, would have afforded sufficient guarantees for the future, now that we have entered upon an aggressive war. We are not responsible for the aggressive character of the war, nor are we responsible for the conduct of it, or for the strategy which has been displayed; but we are responsible for this—that we have committed to a particular Ministry the power of exercising the functions of State, and we are responsible to the Sovereign and to the country that their efforts shall not be disgraced by an unworthy peace, whether we approve or disapprove the conduct of the war. I concur with the noble Earl that the proposal to limit the number of Russian ships of war in the Black Sea contains nothing dishonourable to Russia, because it is founded upon the principle of a reciprocal limitation on the part of Turkey. The right rev. Prelate has slightly misunderstood what fell from my noble Friend on this subject. What my noble Friend said was, that it would have been no more humiliating to Russia to consent to a condition to reduce her naval power in the way proposed than it would be for England and France to enter into an arrangement to reduce their naval establishments in the Mediterranean. The acceptance of such a proposal would not have been more humiliating to Russia than the arrangement entered into by England at the close of the war with the United States, that not more than a certain number of vessels should be kept on those lakes which lie between the territory of the two nations. I quite agree that any condition as to the limitation of the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea might easily be avoided. I think it very

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possible that vessels might be kept upon the stocks in various stages of preparation, that ships might be built as merchantmen which would be ready at any moment to take guns on board, and that the provision might be easily evaded; and, therefore, I say that any such provision does not appear to me to afford that security for the future which I think we ought to demand. The question, however, for your Lordships to consider is, not whether the proposals made to Russia were satisfactory, but whether the Russian counter-proposals afforded a fair expectation of our obtaining from Russia the original objects of the war, and of obtaining all the advantages which we have a reasonable right to expect from her. Now, my Lords, what were the advantages which we were to obtain from the counter proposition of Russia? Russia proposed that her fleet should not be limited either in extent or number, but that she should have power to increase it to any conceivable limit; but she was willing that Turkey should have the power to do away with the principle of the mare clausum, and, in case of danger or menace, that she might open the Straits, and summon the fleets of her allies to her assistance. Now, my Lords, observe that the Dardanelles are, by every principle of national law, the absolute property of the Ottoman Porte, and that Turkey has the abstract right of opening or closing those Straits as she pleases. It is true that, as regards other countries, Turkey is bound by treaty to close the Straits, but quoad Russia there exists no such obligation, because all treaties between Russia and Turkey are dissolved by the war; so that all Russia is willing to concede is that Turkey shall exercise a right which belongs to her on every principle of international law. If there could be a proposition more calculated than another to embroil Russia and Turkey, to keep up a constant fear of insecurity, to impose on the guaranteeing powers the necessity of keeping up forces without the hope of effecting the object for which the forces were maintained—if there could be a proposition having for its object these results, that was the proposition made by Russia, and which the noble Earl calls on your Lordships to affirm. The noble Earl seems to think that Austria views these proposals with satisfaction, but I do not think that any such inference can be drawn from the written expression of the opinion of Count Buol. I do not yield to the right rev. Prelate or to the noble Earl in the
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sense which I entertain of the horrors and calamities of war; but it is of no use now to moralise as to those horrors and calamities. We are entered into war, and the question is, how shall we withdraw from that war, not only without discredit to our army, not only without dissatisfaction to our allies, not only without alienating from us those who have been hitherto with us, but how we shall withdraw from it with the security of a reasonable prospect that we shall not within six months plunge into another war more angry in its character and more intense in its hostility than the present, from our having shown too great an eagerness to arrive at a hasty peace? I say, therefore, in the interest of peace, that this is no time for commenting upon how the war might have been avoided; our question is, in the interest of our common country, to determine what is to be done to obtain the great object of the war. In that sense I can hardly say that I regret that the negotiations at Vienna have failed, because I was convinced that they must fail from the commencement. I believe that if we are to have a secure and honourable peace we must conquer that peace; and, if we are to conquer that peace, it must be by showing, in the teeth of such resolutions as those of the noble Earl, or in the teeth of any resolutions calculated to quench the energy and to damp the courage of this country, that it is our fixed determination to go through that which we have entered upon, and not to depart from it until we have arrived at an honourable and satisfactory conclusion.
EARL GRANVILLE EARL GRANVILLE rose to state a matter of fact, and not to prolong the debate, which the remarkable unanimity that had characterised the discussion rendered altogether unnecessary. Every Peer who had addressed the House had condemned the course which his noble Friend had suggested; and he must be allowed to congratulate the House that, although the speech of his noble Friend who had introduced the Motion appeared to be of a singularly irritating character, and singularly calculated to lead those who differed from him to indulge in some exaggerations upon the other side, yet that, while the tone had been firm, he had scarcely remembered one sentence which had been uttered which could fairly be charged with intemperance or irritability. The matter of fact which he wished to state was, that, whereas the noble Earl had supposed that the Conferences at Vienna were closed for

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any practical purpose, not only was that not the case, but at this very moment proposals had been received from Austria, accompanied with subsequent modifications, which were at present under the consideration of the two Governments of France and England. There was very little chance—indeed he might say there was no chance—of a favourable conclusion. He thanked the noble Earl opposite for the really useful speech—useful to the national cause—which he had just made, and he trusted that his noble Friend (Earl Grey) would yield to his appeal to divide upon the present question.
EARL GREY,in reply: *—My Lords: I can assure your Lordships that I am not going to commit what I am sensible would at this hour be the great impropriety, of availing myself of my right of reply, in order to answer the various objections which have been made to the Address I have moved, and to the arguments by which I supported it; but some imputations have been cast upon me of so serious a character that I cannot pass them by without notice. These imputations were made in the first instance by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, and were repeated by the noble Duke below me (the Duke of Newcastle), and by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby). My noble Friend accused me of having served the cause of Russia by my speech; of being the eulogist of the late Emperor; of having praised the moderation and forbearance of Russia; and of having gone so far as to say, that the Four Points presented to her as the basis on which the allies were prepared to treat for peace, were humiliating to her, and ought not to have been required from her. Now, my Lords, all these statements as to what I said in submitting my Motion to yon are entirely erroneous. I will take the last first. So far from having objected to the "Four Points," as they are called, I said expressly, that although all the matters in dispute before the breaking out of the war had been long ago decided in your favour, yet I was aware that you had declared, as you were entitled to do, that after the war had begun, you would no longer be content with the same terms with which you would have been satisfied before hostilities had been commenced. My argument was not that the "Four Points" were objectionable (for I think that they afford a fair basis for peace) but that Russia had fairly met you in the endeavour to
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carry these heads of agreement into effect. I contended that on the two first heads Russia had acceded to all you had asked, that on the first part of the third head she had also come to an understanding with you, and that on the second part of this head, what she proposed was better for your own purpose than that for which you asked, and that the condition on which you insisted, and the refusal of which you made the ground for breaking off the negotiation, was one which would have been perfectly worthless if you had obtained it, while it was justly regarded as objectionable by Russia.
Then, with regard to my alleged praise of Russia for moderation and forbearance, I beg to remind my noble Friend that I never used the words at all except when I recalled to your Lordships' recollection the fact, that in the original dispute with respect to the Holy Places, it stands recorded in the papers on our table, as my noble Friend's own opinion, that Russia was in the right and France and Turkey in the wrong, and that for some time Russia had acted with moderation and forbearance. I quoted this as the opinion, which it undoubtedly was, of my noble Friend and of the Government.
It is equally incorrect to represent me as the unqualified eulogist of the late Emperor Nicholas, and as having asserted that Russia had been in the right throughout. What I did say was that the late Emperor, though he had great faults, had also some great qualities; that his faults were not the faults of fraud and falsehood, and that he did not deserve the unmeasured vituperation of which he has been the object. I said that the original cause of the war between this country and Russia arose from a misunderstanding between the two Governments as to their mutual intentions, for which our own Government was at least as much to blame as that of Russia: but so far was I from asserting that Russia had been in the right throughout, that I expressly said, in speaking of the occupation of the Principalities, that it was an act of aggression which it was impossible to defend, by which Russia put herself entirely in the wrong, though up to that time she had been, if not altogether in the right, at all events, much more so than her antagonist. My argument did not lead me to refer to what took place afterwards, but I have no hesitation in avowing my opinion, that in the various transactions that intervened

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between the occupation of the Principalities and our declaration of war, Russia was for the most part greatly to blame, and especially so in her rejection of the terms proposed in December, 1853, to which my noble Friend the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) has referred. The view which I took of the case was, that owing to the undecided line of policy pursued by our Government, the Emperor Nicholas was drawn on to commit himself to enforce a demand, which was not originally an unreasonable one, by means of a very objectionable kind, so that before he was aware that we should support Turkey in her refusal, he had gone too far to retreat without what he considered a sacrifice of dignity, to which, with his proud nature, and in the position he held, it was not wonderful that he could not make up his mind to submit. Hence I intended to argue, that although the aggression committed upon Turkey by the occupation of the Principalities was one which she was entitled to resist; still, when the circumstances which led to this step were considered, the conduct of Russia did not deserve to be described in the exaggerated language that has been applied to it, and that has created the spirit of animosity against her now generally displayed.
As to the service which it is said that my speech will do to the cause of Russia, I would remind your Lordships that this is merely what has been said of every man who has at any time ventured to lift up his voice against a popular war. It was said of the opponents of the American war; and, again, of the opponents of the revolutionary war with France. It may be admitted that some inconvenience does arise when the country is engaged in war, from the arguments of those who oppose it, but far more inconvenience—or rather a most formidable evil—would arise in a free country, from attempting to restrain those who disapprove of war, from expressing their opinion. Your Lordships cannot fail to perceive that it is possible, at least, that a war, though popular, may yet be unjust or impolitic; but there would be no means of preventing or putting a stop to such a war if those who condemn it are to be silenced on the ground that their arguments may help the enemy. If this principle were to be established it would be better, as regards its foreign relations, for a nation to be under a despotism than under a free government. A despot, before he plunges into war, or rejects overtures for peace,
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will generally listen to what his counsellors may have to say in favour of peace, and will not, therefore, decide for war without knowing the arguments against it. But, in a free country, public opinion is the ultimate governing power which decides, in the last resort, the great question of peace or war; and how is the public to have the means of forming a sound opinion, and of coming to a just decision on this most momentous question, if you are to silence all those who would endeavour to show by argument the injustice or impolicy of engaging or persevering in war, while free conrse is given to those who flatter the passions of the people, and court their favour, by defaming and vilifying any nation with which we may have a controversy? The noble Duke below me (the Duke of Newcastle), while he joined my noble Friend the Secretary of State, in condemning the course I have taken, on the ground of its being serviceable to Russia, added, as an additional objection to it, that he feared it would irritate the people of this country and thus make them still more averse to peace. My Lords, I do not think so meanly of my countrymen, as it would appear that the noble Duke does from his expressing this opinion. I have no doubt that the speech I have made this evening will give great offence. Neither individuals nor nations, in general, like to be told that they have been in the wrong; but I have such confidence in the right-mindedness of the people of England, that I do not doubt that in spite of the offence I may have given, they will allow their due weight in the end, to whatever truth and justice there may be in the arguments I have used.
My Lords, I have only further to say, in answer to the advice of the noble Earl opposite, that I should call for a division, that I shall act upon the old maxim that it is dangerous to take advice from an enemy, and that I much prefer following the advice not to ask your Lordships to divide, which was given to me by my noble Friend (Lord Lyttelton), who must, I fear, be considered as the only one of your Lordships who has supported me in this debate, since, if I rightly understood my right rev. Friend who spoke a short time ago (the Bishop of Oxford), he does not intend to give me his vote, though all his arguments seemed to me to be in favour of my Motion. I am the less inclined to put your Lordships to the trouble of a division, because I know that more than one of the

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very limited number of those who are inclined to vote with me are unavoidably absent.
On Question, Resolved in the Negative.
House adjourned to Monday, the 4th of June next.