Sitting of 31 March 1854

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Registration of Bills of Sale.
3° High Treason (Ireland).

DUNGARNAN ELECTION.
MR. NAPIERbrought up the Report of the Dungarvan Election Committee.
House informed, that the Committee had determined—
"That John Francis Maguire, Esq., is duly elected a Burgess to serve in this present Parliament for the said Borough of Dungarvan."
And the said determination was ordered to be entered in the Journals of this House.

WAR WITH RUSSIA—THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE.
MR. SPEAKERhaving read the Queen's Message [March 27th],
LORD JOHN RUSSELLrose and said: Sir, in rising to move an answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Message, I have a deep sense of the solemn, I may say the awful, importance of the Motion that I am about to propose. It is now more than half a century since a Message of a similar import was brought to this House. For the period of nearly forty years this country has been in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace, and those blessings have been never more widely nor more exten-

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sively valued. The privileges of the people have been increased, their burdens have been diminished, and, with an increasing and prosperous commerce, wealth has been diffused throughout the country. We have had lately an exhibition of the pride, pomp, and circumstance of war; but it is impossible to think of war without reflecting at the same time of the bloodshed that it occasions, of the prosperity that it interrupts, and of the misery that it inflicts. It is, therefore, Sir, only from a paramount sense of the necessity that we should engage in this war that I appear here to advise this House to reply in terms of assent and encouragement to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Message. In performing this task I will endeavour to avoid, as much as I am able, consistently with doing justice to the subject—I will endeavour to avoid those questions which we have already discussed on former nights of debate; I allude to questions with regard to the conduct of the Government, as to whether more or less of protracted negotiations should have been undertaken—as to whether the tone which was adopted by Her Majesty's Government at certain periods of that negotiation was the best fitted to secure that honourable peace at which we aimed. I shall endeavour rather to point to the course which Russia has pursued, and to show that, unless we are content to submit to the further aggrandisement of that Power, and, possibly, to the destruction of Turkey—whose integrity and independence have been so often declared essential to the stability of the system of Europe—we have no choice left us but to interpose by arms. Sir, in referring in the first place to the affairs of Turkey, I should beg the House to remark that a great change has taken place in the internal condition of that country during the last twenty or thirty years. We are all acquainted with the system of violence and misrule which used formerly to prevail, and those who have watched the conduct of Lord Stratford will be aware what has been the advice which he has given, and what the beneficial effects that have flowed from it. Long acquainted with the affairs of Turkey, having deeply at heart the maintenance of that empire, he has constantly said (not yesterday nor the day before, but during a long series of years)—"The independence of Turkey cannot be maintained without the assistance of the other Powers of Europe; that assistance cannot be afforded unless Turkey shall
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adopt with regard to her subjects in general, and with regard to her Christian subjects in particular, those general rules of justice and fair treatment which are established by the public opinion of Europe." That advice, though not immediately nor fully adopted, has yet been so far followed that there has been a great improvement in the treatment of the subjects of Turkey—that the Christian subjects of the Porte, in particular, have derived great advantages from these changes—that they have enjoyed the free exercise of their religion—that they have prospered in their trade—and that their welfare has greatly increased under the Government of the Sublime Porte. Sir, this is a very essential and important part of this question; because, if I am not mistaken—and it is no new opinion of mine, for I have held it at least from the commencement of the discussions of last year—it is not the prospect of the decay of Turkey, it is not the fear of her immediate dissolution, which has incited the Russian Government to demands inconsistent with her independence, and to aggrandisements subversive of her territorial limits; but it has been the fear that the old system of Russia, the system of making progress gradually, of depriving Turkey of her dominions one after another, of interfering more and more with her internal government, would not be successful—it has been the fear that the Ottoman Government, instead of declining, would exhibit to Europe a Government of internal concord within and of power and strength without—it has been this fear which has impelled Russia to what I believe will be found an unsuccessful, and what I believe Russia herself will consider a premature, attempt against the independence of the Ottoman empire. If, Sir, we look to Russia, we shall observe that while all the Powers of Europe have been, during this interval of peace, with more or less success, attempting to improve their internal organisation—while they have considered questions of commerce, questions of legislation, with a view to improvement, with a view to the promotion of the future welfare of their subjects, it has been almost the sole object of the Government of Russia to form and to maintain an overpowering army—to complete her military organisation and to be ready on any occasion to throw the sword into the balance in her transactions with the other Powers of Europe. We have, therefore, at the present moment, without even the immense

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effort which has been made during the past year—we have an immense military power, on the part of Russia, prepared, and, as we have heard within the last two days, already—commencing an attack upon the territories and upon the existence of Turkey. On the other side, Sir, if we have not at the present moment the material assistance, we have at least the moral approbation of all Europe, approving of the efforts which we have made to resist the aggressions of Russia. We have joined together to resist by arms those aggressions two Powers at the head of the civilised nations of Europe, who have tested by conflict in arms, and by rivalry in peace, the great qualities which each possesses, and who have learnt from that conflict and from that rivalry to esteem one another's courage and capacity.
Sir, I will now proceed to state, not in detail, because the House, having had the opportunity of studying the papers on the table, and having debated the greater part of them on past occasions, is fully informed with respect to those details—but I will now proceed to state the great outline of what has occurred with respect to the question now under the consideration of the House. I may as well, however, just say first, that in treating of this subject I shall keep wholly out of view the dispute which has furnished, not a cause but a pretext for the interference of the Emperor of Russia. I shall, therefore, keep out of view the question of the Holy Places. I will not touch upon the silver star, or the key of the great gate, or the key of the little gate, or any of those questions which were put forward as subjects of discussion, All these matters of dispute, whether they deserved the contention that took place about them or not, were settled by the agreement of all the Powers concerned. What I have to treat of are other questions and other demands. Now, Sir, in referring to the relations between Russia and Turkey, we must always keep in view that the Empress Catherine, after a successful war, obtained from the Sultan an article which I will read to the House with respect to the Christians generally residing in the Sultan's dominions. We must recollect, also, that some territory was given up to the Empress by that treaty of peace, and that she declared to her subjects that the peace was glorious and successful because she had obtained an assurance of protection for those who were members of the same religious community as the Russian em-
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pire. The seventh Article of the Treaty of Kainardji runs thus:—
"The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article XIV., as on behalf of its officiating ministers."
That is the whole of what is contained in the seventh article of the treaty of Kainardji. The House will perceive at once the promises that are made in the former part of this article—first, that there is an assurance that the Porte will protect the Christian religion of its subjects. And if there had been any persecution of that religion—if the Christians had been deprived of the power of resorting to their places of Divine worship, if they had been injured and slain because they held their religion, the Emperor of Russia might justly have complained of the infraction of the treaty. But there is another thing likewise very obvious—namely, that there is no especial detail with regard to any privileges or immunities which the Christians possessed—no interference stipulated for with the ordinary administration of the affairs of the Sultan in his own dominions. There is a protection stipulated for, but it is a protection of an exceptional kind, and not to be used without some special cause, some great neglect, or some maltreatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Now, Sir, coming to the events which took place last year, the House will have perceived that no sooner was the question of the Holy Places settled than further demands, which had already been put forward, were insisted upon by the Ambassador of Russia. In the first place, according to rumour, these demands had taken the shape of a treaty offensive and defensive. They afterwards took the shape of a convention. After this there was a formal document—a sened requiring the Sultan to give certain pledges to Russia. Again, a note was insisted upon, but a note which was to be an agreement with Russia, a stipulation with Russia that the privileges and immunities which the Christians held in the Turkish empire should be enjoyed for the future without molestation. The Sultan's Ministers had at first refrained from asking the opinion of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, and afterwards of Her Majesty's Ambassador, with respect to these proposals. They had naturally been alarmed at the manner in

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which the proposals were made, and the threats which were used in case the proposals were not adopted. And here, Sir, I cannot but refer to the statements that were made at a particular date by Count Nesselrode in a despatch written by him to Baron Brunnow, and which was communicated by the desire of the Russian Government to Her Majesty's Government. On the 7th of April, after enumerating various other demands which, according to rumour, had been made by Russia at Constantinople, all of which Count Nesselrode denies, he at length ends with saying:—
"That all the rumours relative to the hostile and threatening language held to the Porte by our Ambassador are not only exaggerated, but destitute of any kind of foundation."
On the 9th of April, two days after that date, Lord Stratford writes, saying, with respect to the Turkish Ministers:—
"This combination of alarm seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threatening language of Prince Menchikoff, and to the character of his proposals."
I cannot doubt that Lord Stratford's assertions were perfectly well founded—I cannot doubt that the language used to the Porte during the whole of that mission of Prince Menchikoff was of a threatening character—threatening, in the first place, in case the proposals should be divulged, with, at the same time, great and tempting offers of support—threatening, in a later period of the mission, that in case the proposals were refused, great calamities would ensue. Therefore, Sir, in stating to Lord Clarendon, on the part of the Russian Government, that the rumour of the use of hostile and threatening language was a report wholly destitute of any kind of foundation, Count Nesselrode did but pursue that system of deception and concealment which has unfortunately been the characteristic of Russia in these negotiations. But at the same time that these proposals had been made at Constantinople—proposals, as I have said, in the first instance of a tempting character, and offering the ships and the troops of Russia in aid of the Sultan, if the terms of Russia were accepted—the language held to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg was of a very different character. In speaking of the conduct of the Russian Government on a former occasion, I certainly used very strong language of reprobation. I do not now think, Sir, that that language was at all too strong. I cannot—although the
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words were uttered in debate—I cannot, upon reflection, say that the terms I then used at all exaggerated the character of the transactions I was then describing. But these terms appear to have excited great indignation at St. Petersburg, and the Emperor of Russia has done me the very great honour of ordering an article to be inserted in the Journal of St. Petersburg, in which reference was made, not very fairly, and certainty very unexpectedly by us, to the confidential communications which had taken place between the Emperor and the British Minister at his Court. Such was the nature of that article, that it gave an impression—an impression which was eagerly seized by the abettors of Russia in the different Courts of Europe—an impression that the English Government had been some party to or had listened favourably to proposals for the partition of the Turkish empire. It therefore became necessary that we should lay before Parliament and this country, what really had taken place, and to the divulging of that information which, out of regard for a foreign Sovereign, we had not before thought ourselves justified in producing. We have no reason, Sir, to regret the publication of that correspondence. From that correspondence, it appears that the Emperor of Russia, having, in the year 1844, declared that the time might come when the dissolution of the Turkish empire might take place, and that in that case he should be anxious to learn the desires and views of the English Government upon the subject, in 1853 insisted, and insisted against all reason, that the moment of the dissolution of the Turkish empire was at hand, and that it was necessary that the English Government should agree with him as to what was to he done in that case. The answer which I as Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave to that overture is before the world, and it is in substance that we could not be parties to any project of the kind. But at the time that that correspondence was taking place, I took occasion, in this House, because there were symptoms in this and in other countries that men's minds were all tending in that direction, that the dissolution and fall of Turkey was at hand, I took the occasion of declaring in this House, in answer to a noble friend near me (Lord Dudley Stuart), that to such a partition of Turkey as might be imagined by those who had taken part in other partitions, England would never be a party. So, too,

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my noble Friend (Lord Clarendon), who succeeded me in the office which he now fills with so much ability, replied to the same effect. In spite of what then looked like an offer of part of the Turkish territory for ourselves, he replied in terms as decided that our policy was to maintain the Turkish empire, to support her independence and her integrity, and that we had no wish to be sharers in her spoils. Now, Sir, it might be that the Emperor of Russia, from his observation of Turkey, had arrived at the opinion that the fall of Turkey could not really be prevented, and that it was advisable, in order to prevent war, that some arrangement should be entered into with the great Powers of Europe. That may have been his intention, but I think the natural impression was that which Sir Hamilton Seymour evidently derived from the conversations which he held with the Emperor of Russia—namely, that if the Emperor of Russia appeared to be so convinced that the fall of Turkey was at hand, he had it in contemplation that the fall of Turkey should take place. But be that as it may, whatever was the real meaning of the Emperor of Russia in these conversations and otherwise, Her Majesty's Government had hoped that when England entirely refused to be a party to any such project, it would have been relinquished by Russia, and that she would certainly calculate the consequences of having all Europe opposed to her in case she should proceed to an armed aggression.
I will now again refer to the mission of Prince Menchikoff. Prince Menchikoff ended with a demand for certain privileges and immunities for the Christians residing in Turkey. The Turkish Minister, being alarmed, had recourse to the Ministers of the four Powers at Constantinople, asking their advice and assistance. Lord Stratford was disposed to agree with the Turkish Government, that these demands of Russia were dangerous to the independence of Turkey. But the four representatives came to the decision that it was a question which so nearly touched the free action and dignity of the Porte that it was not proper for them in their then situations to offer any advice or instruction on the subject. When that decision was communicated to the Minister of the Sultan, he declared that the Porte had already come to a decision, and that that decision was adverse to the demands of Russia put forward by Prince Menchikoff. Prince Menchikoff
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having, as I said, pronounced threats of the calamities that would follow the rejection of his terms—threats, by the by, totally inconsistent with the language that he had before held to Her Majesty's Ambassador—Prince Menchikoff having pronounced these threats, proceeded with great state and ceremony to leave Constantinople, and returned to the Russian territory. Upon this intimation, Her Majesty's Government, thinking that the time had arrived when there was danger to the independence of the Porte, directed that Her Majesty's fleet, then at Malta, should proceed to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and Her Majesty's Ambassador was further directed, if it should be necessary, to bring the fleet up to Constantinople. Now, Sir, I think that step was an irrevocable proof of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to support and preserve the independence of the Sultan. If terms had been obtained which were honourable to the Sultan—which would have maintained the independence of his authority and the integrity of his dominions—the fleet would probably have returned to Malta; but whilst demands were insisted upon which could not be submitted to, while those demands were to be enforced by arms, still more was it impossible for Her Majesty and the Emperor of France, in concert with whom Her Majesty acted, to withdraw their forces from the support of the Sultan. I lay the more stress upon this circumstance, because it was at the time a matter of inquiry in this House. A fear was expressed—a fear in which I did not participate—that there would be a sudden invasion, on the part of Russia, directed immediately against Constantinople. Put this, at all events, was clear, that the House approved of the demonstration which was then made, and approved of the declaration which I made at that time—that it was a proof that Her Majesty was determined to support the Sultan against unjust aggression. Sir, when the intelligence arrived at St. Petersburg that the last demands of Prince Menchikoff had been refused, it was decided there that a message should be sent, conveying a letter of Count Nesselrode's, demanding, in the most peremptory terms, that Prince Menchikoff's note should be signed within eight days, and announcing that, in default of such signature, the Principalities, part of the Sultan's territories, would be occupied by Russian troops. It was quite impossible for the Sultan, with any regard to his honour, to assent to such

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terms; and the menaced invasion by Russian troops immediately took place.
The question then arose, what was the Sultan to do under these circumstances? Lord Stratford—as I have always said, the truest and best friend of the Porte—advised the Sultan not to exercise his right of making it a casus belli, but recommended him to renew negotiations, in the hope that honourable terms might be obtained, and in the meantime to strengthen those places by sea and land the defences of which during peace had been greatly neglected as well as greatly diminished. That advice was taken by the Porte, and it was in conformity with the opinion of all the four Powers, of England, of France, of Austria, and of Prussia. Fresh negotiation accordingly took place; the Sultan, offered, by the advice of his Ministers, fresh terms of peace. These terms arrived at a moment when a note had been agreed upon by the representatives of the four Powers at Vienna, and therefore the Sultan's terms were set aside, and the other proposals were transmitted to Constantinople. The Sultan agreed to those proposals, with some modifications. I am not going to enter into verbal niceties as to the question of the Vienna note. But what is perfectly plain—what any one who reads it will, I think, admit at once—is, that the Vienna note, as modified by the Porte, as altered in some respects by the Porte, conceded to the Emperor every security he could have wished as to the privileges and immunities of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Sultan said that he considered it due to his own honour to maintain unimpaired and unviolated the privileges and immunities of his Christian subjects. He was ready to make this declaration in a note to the Minister of the Emperor of Russia. Therefore the sole difference, and yet a difference upon which all these subsequent demands of Russia have been made—the difference was this, that, according to the proposal of the Sultan, the Christian subjects of the Porte would have enjoyed all their privileges and immunities—they would have had them under the sanction of solemn documents, confirmed by the Sultan, as their sovereign; they would have had them under the sanction of a declaration that it was due to his own honour to preserve them; they would have had them under the sanction of an assurance given to all the great Powers of Europe—to all the five Powers of Europe—to Russia also; to Russia no less, though no
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more, than to any other Power. The Russian proposal, on the contrary, was, not for increasing the immunities and privileges of the Christian subjects of the Porte—whose privileges and immunities, I may remark, had not been diminished, but increased, of late years—but that all those privileges and immunities should be confirmed by a special treaty with Russia, and thereby the Russian Minister would have had the power, on every question of spiritual, nay, on every question of civil privilege, of interfering between the Sultan and 12,000,000 of his subjects. Therefore the question was not, as the Russian Government has repeatedly put it, a question of a religious desire on the part of the Emperor to protect the Christians of his own community in the Sultan's dominions. That was not the question. That security was afforded—that security was amply afforded. But the question was, whether the sovereignty of these 12,000,000 of people should be transferred from their own sovereign, the Sultan, to a foreign sovereign who possessed an overwhelming force. Sir, the position which was taken by Her Majesty's Government at that time is stated so clearly in the circular of Lord Clarendon, dated the 13th of June, that it is one of those few documents which I shall take the liberty of reading to the House. My noble Friend says:—
"The repeated assurances of the Russian Government, given both to the Government of Her Majesty and to the French Government, that Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople had reference solely to the Holy Places, had led Her Majesty's Government confidently to hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pending question would have removed all grounds of difference between Russia and the Porte. But, under the plea of confirming ancient treaties, further demands were put forward by the Russian Ambassador, involving a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities of its members. Every concession which could be made was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for them to have complied with these last demands without derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman empire; and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte. In these views and opinions there is a complete agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and the English and French fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Dardanelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respective Ambassadors of the two countries, In taking this step Her

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Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to uphold the independence of the Turkish empire—an independence which the Great Powers are deeply interested in upholding, and which has been acknowledged by them as necessary to the balance of power in Europe." [No. 251.]
Such, Sir, was the position taken up by the English and French Governments. Now, when the Vienna note, modified in the manner I have stated, reached St. Petersburg, the Emperor, who had agreed to the original note, and who had agreed to it even as altered with a view to make the sense of it more clear to the Cabinet in London, refused to accede to that modified note. Not long afterwards there appeared that which the Russian Government had declared to be a confidential despatch, but which might not to have been confidential, because it showed the spirit in which the Russian Government were prepared to agree to the Vienna note. It showed that, while the Emperor accepted every word of that note, he did not affix to it the sense which was affixed to it by the four Powers, the sense which the English Government, in particular, had affixed to it, and, therefore, the intention of the Russian Emperor clearly was, according to his own expression, to accept the terms, according to one sense at Vienna, according to another sense in London and Paris, according to another at Berlin, and afterwards to enforce them in another sense at Constantinople. Why, Sir, I say, that, in agreeing to sign that note, if such was the intention of the Russian Government, they not only ought not to have made their explanation of it confidential, but they should have told the Powers with whom they were treating under whose sanction this note was to be signed, what interpretation they put upon it. And, therefore, the proposition to sign that note, knowing perfectly well, admitting themselves that they knew, what was the sense affixed to it by the four Powers, and especially by England and France, and affixing another sense to it themselves, which they meant to keep secret, but no doubt to make use of against the Turkish Government afterwards—I cannot call that proposition anything less than what I described it to be in the speech to which so much blame has been attached—a fraudulent interpretation. I should say that this interpretation was given in a note signed by Count Nesselrode. It is said to have been written by a subordinate in the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, but Count Nesselrode has assumed its responsibility. Sir, the modi-
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fied note having been thus rejected by Russia, the question arose whether any further effort at negotiation should be made. Even then the Sultan's Government were far from being adverse to a settlement of the question. But an event occurred of the utmost importance. A step was taken by Turkey from which she thought she could no longer refrain—I refer to the declaration of war by Turkey. Sir, it is always in the power of tyrannical Governments to endeavour to impose upon other Governments unjust terms; but that which is not in their power is that their attempts should not excite the indignation, should not provoke the anger, of those against whom they are directed. Such was the effect of the menaces of Russia against Turkey; such was the effect of the invasion of the Principalities, containing 4,000,000 of the subjects of the Sultan. The fanaticism, if you choose to call it so—the enthusiasm, as the Turks would call it, of their nation was roused; they hastened to the standard of the Sultan, and thousands of men appeared in arms on the banks of the Danube to resist the aggression of Russia. The Sultan had from the first moment of the entry of the Russians into the Principalities a just cause of war; encouraged and excited by his subjects, he thought he could no longer—after this last proposal of peace had been rejected, he thought he could no longer refrain from a declaration of war. Well, Sir, it is hardly for us to blame the conduct of the Sultan in that respect. The wrong was with Russia; the wrong arose from the conduct of the Russian Government. It might be imprudent in Turkey at any time to resist that force of Russia; but, Sir, it was an imprudence which we must all honour—it was an imprudence which arose from a just sense of independence, and natural resentment of the wrong which had been done.
Sir, when that war was declared, of course, the negotiations became more and more difficult; still terms of great moderation and great fairness, which were recommended by the four representatives at Constantinople, were adopted by the Porte and transmitted to Vienna as the basis of negotiations for a treaty. Upon considering these terms, the representatives of the four Powers at Vienna, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, were entirely agreed with respect to their moderation, and they were forwarded to St. Petersburg, with a recommendation from

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the Austrian Government, in the name of Austria, and in the name of the other Powers, her allies, requesting the assent of Russia to these fair terms of peace. The first impression at St. Petersburg was, that no answer should be given to this request. The step actually taken was little short of that determination. It was, setting aside all these proposals recommended by the four Powers, to propose other terms, those terms containing in substance the Menchikoff note which the Porte had originally rejected, and containing, besides, an article regarding refugees which had not hitherto been put forward by Russia. The Vienna Conference assembled, and they declared that these terms were inadmissible. Still Count Buol, anxious—and to his honour it should be said—anxious for the preservation of the peace of Europe, earnestly requested of Count Orloff, the Russian Minister, that other proposals might be made, that preliminaries of peace might be transmitted to Vienna, might be there considered, might be modified according to the views of the four Powers in conference with the Russian Minister, and might be transmitted to Constantinople for the assent of the Sultan. Well, this proposal was not assented to, but preliminaries were sent—pretended preliminaries of peace, preliminaries as inadmissible as the former, although the article referring to the refugees was not contained in them, and it was not insisted that the Turkish plenipotentiary should go to St. Petersburg or to the Russian headquarters, but in all other respects terms were submitted which could not have been assented to. Again the Conference rejected these terms as inadmissible, and declared that they could not transmit them to Constantinople. We have, then, the agreement, not of England and France, but of all the four great Powers of Europe, that with respect to this dispute between Russia and Turkey, Turkey has proposed and is ready to assent to fair and moderate terms of peace, and that the terms of peace proposed by Russia are unjust, intemperate, and inadmissible. I think, Sir, after this, considering how much connected Austria and Prussia have been with Russia now for many years, that the three northern Powers were connected on many occasions of European difficulty—I think that it will not be denied that in this contest Turkey must have been greatly in the right in order to have such an agreement of the four Powers. The moderate proposals of Turkey on the
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one side, and the inadmissible proposals of Russia on the other, seemed to preclude all hopes of an amicable termination of these negotiations. The remaining question was, therefore, whether or not we could any longer maintain the position which we had maintained—a position showing our interest in Turkey, and our sympathy with her in her struggle, but at the same time taking no active part in her support. Sir, it is obvious that, after the Emperor of Russia had rejected those terms, he must have intended to prosecute the war. The intelligence we have now received puts that intention beyond doubt; but there was moral evidence of it without such intelligence. We therefore considered with the Government of France what step remained for us to take. We came to the decision that we might propose to Russia to evacuate the Principalities within a certain number of days, at the same time informing her that her refusal to do so would be considered equivalent to a declaration of war. That step we have taken; but of course no one would expect that the Emperor of Russia, having refused reasonable terms, would yield to a summons so peremptory. He has declined to give any answer to that proposal, and it remained for Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French to consider if any other step, and what, remained. They considered that no other course but war did remain. They considered that, after having given, at all events an implied promise of assistance to the Sultan in his resistance to the unjust demands of Russia, they would be wanting in honour if they did not fulfil that implied promise of material aid. They considered that the safety of Europe depended upon the maintenance of the equilibrium of which the integrity and independence of Turkey form a part. They considered that it would be impossible to hope to maintain that integrity and independence if Russia was allowed unchecked and uninterrupted to impose her own terms upon Turkey. It was therefore decided by Her Majesty's Government at once to address this House—to advise Her Majesty to send down a message to the Houses of Parliament, and at the same time to issue a declaration of war. That declaration of war has been issued. We can none of us be insensible to the gravity and importance of such a declaration—we should all have been glad to have avoided it; but I hold that, consistently with our position—consistently with our duties to

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Europe—consistently even with the general interests of this country, we cannot permit the aggrandisement of Russia to take any shape that her arms might enable it to assume. Sir, there are, I imagine but few in this country who think that any other course was open to us. There are, I know, some who think that this country might remain altogether apart from the conflicts of other European nations; that we might be indifferent when the independence of a Power is assailed, when a country may be obliterated from the map of Europe, and some Power already great may obtain a fearful preponderence over the Powers of Europe. These persons, I say, indifferent to the triumph at one time of democracy, at another of despotism, at another time of republicanism, and to the aggressions that are made at different periods in the name of one or the other, may think it right to say, like the philosophic husbandman of Virgil—
"Illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum
Flexit, et infidos agitans discordia fratres;
Aut conjurato descendens Dacus ab Istro:
Non res Romanæ, perituraque regna."
But we, Sir, who are following the maxim which, since the time of William III. has governed and actuated the councils of this country—we, who have believed that we have a part in the great question of the liberties and independence of Europe—we who believe that preponderance cannot safely be allowed to any one Power—we who believe it is our duty to throw our weight into the scale in these conflicts—we who have seen our country rise to power, rise to reputation, rise, I may also say, in moral greatness, by the assertion and maintenance of these doctrines—we who have seen the country support burdens and incur great sacrifices in the maintenance of these maxims—maxims which I believe to be connected not only with your honour and your dignity, but with your very safety as a nation—we are not prepared to abandon our position in Europe, and we ask you, by agreeing to the address of to-night, to be firmly prepared to maintain it. Sir, I may be asked two questions, supposing that this House is prepared to assent to this Address—questions which I will not deny the privilege of any Member to ask—to which I should be glad if I could give full and satisfactory answers, but to which I can only give such answers as my duty will permit. I may be asked, in the first place, with what allies are we about to undertake this con-
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test. Now, Sir, in the first place, as I have repeatedly assured this House, we were acting in cordial concurrence throughout these negotiations, and we are acting in this last and final step, which ends negotiation and begins war, in cordial concurrence with France. I have not been able to lay upon the table of the House any formal agreement. We had proposed a formal agreement to France; in the then state of affairs, another form of agreement was thought by the French Government to be preferable; that was only a provisional agreement, and therefore I cannot lay anything in the shape of a convention before the House; but the two Governments are agreed that their concurrence should be put in the shape of a convention, and I hope before long to lay a formal instrument of that nature upon the table. But while I say this with respect to a formal document, the House may rest assured that with regard to the spirit of the agreement, with regard to friendly intercourse, with regard to frank communication, no two Governments were ever more closely allied than the Governments of England and France are at this moment. Then, Sir, we have to consider the position of those other two Powers with whom we have agreed in the negotiations—with whom we have agreed, not only in the protocols that have been signed, but so far that the Governments, both of Austria and Prussia, recommended to the Emperor of Russia to accede to the terms that were proposed, and to evacuate the Principalities at our demand. But, Sir, I must say that I can add but little to the statement I made on a former occasion, that while it is perfectly clear to us what the interests of these great German Powers demand, we have no document, no formal agreement that we can lay before the House, or even an assurance, that these two Powers will take part in the war against Russia. At the same time, the communications made by the Emperor of Austria and his Government have been most frank and most direct. They have expressed an entire agreement with us as to the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Turkey; but when we asked, as I think we were bound to ask, some short time ago, what, in case of a rupture, would be the conduct of Austria, the answer of Austria for the moment was of a satisfactory nature. It reserved, however, an application to the Government of Prussia, and my belief is, that if the Government

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of Prussia had acceded to that proposal, had acceded to the views of Austria, I should have been able now to make a most satisfactory communication to the House. But it did not appear to the Prussian Government that they could accede to our proposals. The Prussian Government has stated to the world its views upon this subject. I must say, those views at present seem to me to be too narrow. I had always thought that Prussia was a European Power—I had always considered her as one of the principal Powers of Europe; but in the document to which I refer, allusion is made only to German interests, and the duties of Prussia towards Germany, and there is no allusion whatever to her duties towards Europe. I trust, however, that a short time may bring us communications of another kind. I cannot but think that if Prussia means to maintain her position in Europe, distinguished as she has been, distinguished as she is, both in arts and in arms, she can hardly allow that the disturbance of the balance of power in Europe, and the immense aggrandisement of Russia which would ensue, can be matter of indifference to Germany, less than to Europe. Sir, I state the case to the House as it is—that negotiations are still going on, and that even the passage of the Danube by the Russian troops has not brought from Austria an immediate declaration that she will be in arms to oppose that aggression. I have stated that I think she would have been so prepared were it not for an apprehension that, Prussia not concurring in her course, danger might surround her if she proceeded to that step. But I repeat again that which I have always thought with respect to this subject—that it is impossible that this war should proceed, and that the great German Powers should not feel that it is their bounden duty—that it is their interest, fully as much as it is the interest of England, to assert their independence, and to check this unjust and unprincipled aggression. Such, Sir, is my belief—such is my hope on this subject.
The other question which may be asked of us is with regard to what we expect as the object and termination of the war. Now, Sir, I have said that I can state no more than that which I consider it my duty to state, and I consider that I should be departing from that duty—grossly departing from that duty—if I at all restricted the Government of England from at any time assenting to terms of peace which that
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Government thought honourable and just. For my part, I should not think any terms honourable and just that did not provide for the security of the Turkish empire; but with regard to the manner in which that security is to be provided, we all know what are the chances and contingencies of war—we all know how quickly the aspect of Europe may change from one month to another, and I think it would not be right, it would be a course not only wanting in prudence but in justice to the people of this country, if I were to specify the details of any terms that were to be procured as the terms upon which peace would be concluded. This House well knows that if terms were agreed to which it should think insecure and dishonourable, this House has it in its power to rebuke and to censure the Ministers who should make such a peace. This power has been exercised—whether wisely or not is not the question—but this power has been exercised, and the Ministers who signed a peace censured by this House were driven from office for agreeing to such terms of peace. I think the House may be satisfied to leave the question in this position—that, having taken up arms from necessity, for the sake of supporting an ally, our first object must be resistance to the aggressor and protection to our ally, and that we shall continue in arms so long as that ally is threatened by his formidable opponent. I know not, therefore, Sir, that I can add anything to the statement which I have made in regard to the course which these negotiations have taken with respect to the causes of the war and to its object. That object is plain and simple. An ally, one of the Powers whose integrity and independence are sanctioned by the public law of Europe, has had his provinces assailed and invaded, and is required to sign dishonourable terms of peace as the price of the evacuation of these provinces. He refuses to agree to these terms which he considers dishonourable; we go to his support in resisting that aggression. We have already agreed to a convention with Turkey, a convention which, not being ratified, I am sorry that I cannot lay before the House, but which provides that for the assistance which we shall give, Turkey shall not make peace without the concurrence and consent of England and France. The convention does not contain—I think it would have been very wrong if it had contained—any stipulations with regard to the internal government of Turkey. We have proposed no such con-

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vention to the Porte; we have proposed to her a convention, in the nature of a military convention, which, when it is laid upon the table of the House, will, I think, be sanctioned by the approval of the House as well as of the country. Well then, Sir, I leave the case as it at present stands in the hands of the House, fully convinced that the great majority of this House have at heart the honour and greatness of this country—that they will all lament, as I do, that the necessity of war should be brought to us—but that they will none of them be disposed to shrink from a contest which is honourable, and which I trust will end in securing the independence of our ally.
Motion made, and Question proposed—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to return Her Majesty the thanks of this House for Her Most Gracious Message, and for the Communication of the several Papers which have been laid before it in obedience to Her Majesty's Command:—To assure Her Majesty of the just sense we entertain of Her Majesty's anxious and uniform endeavours to preserve to Her people the blessings of peace, and of our perfect confidence in Her Majesty's disposition to terminate the calamities of war, whenever that object can be accomplished, consistently with the honour of Her Majesty's Crown, and the interests of Her people:—That we have observed with deep concern that Her Majesty's endeavours have been frustrated by the spirit of aggression displayed by the Emperor of Russia, in his invasion and continued occupation of the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia; in the rejection of equitable terms of peace proposed under the sanction of Four of the Principal Powers of Europe; and in the preparation of immense forces to support his unjust pretensions:—That these pretensions appear to us subversive of the independence of the Turkish Empire:—That we feel that the trust reposed in us demands on our part a firm determination to co-operate with Her Majesty in a vigorous resistance to the projects of a Sovereign whose further aggrandisement would be dangerous to the independence of Europe,"
MR. LAYARD: I can say, Sir, most unfeignedly, that no man in this House has listened to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London with more pleasure, with more satisfaction—indeed, I may add, with more enthusiasm than I have myself; and if the noble Lord would not think me presumptuous, I would say that on the three occasions on which he has addressed the House on this most momentous question, be has made speeches worthy of the subject, worthy of his own great reputation, and worthy of a Minister who ought at such a moment to have the affairs of the country under his direction. I have listened to his sentiments, so nobly expressed, upon all
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these occasions with a pleasure which would be unmixed, were there not at the same time other considerations forced upon me. I am bound to inquire whether these are the personal and individual sentiments of the noble Lord, or whether they are also the sentiments of the Ministers with whom he is acting? I am bound to ask whether at this moment, in another place, the noble Earl who is at the head of the Government is not expressing sentiments, if not diametrically opposed to, at least very strangely at variance with the sentiments which we have just heard? I am bound to ask whether there are not right hon. Gentlemen on the very bench occupied by the noble Lord who have not cheered him during his speech, and who do not participate in his sentiments? I regret to say that there are good grounds for my asking these questions. Were there not, I would not venture upon such an occasion as this to intrude myself upon the notice of the House. I feel at this moment in a very difficult position, and under a grave responsibility, but, at the same time, I feel that I have a duty to perform, and that from that duty it would be wrong in me to flinch. However little experience I may have had, I have found that a man almost always has cause to regret not having pursued the course which he was convinced was the right one; and I have the more reason for saying this now because under very nearly similar circumstances last year I yielded to the advice of those in whom I had great confidence, in refraining at the request of the Government from bringing before Parliament a discussion which would, I now solemnly believe, have evoked an expression of opinion in this House, and in the country, which might have gone far towards preventing the unfortunate results to which these negotiations on the Eastern question have led. At nearly the beginning of this Session it was my painful duty to have to review the past conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers. I totally disagreed with the policy which they had pursued, and I felt that, whether right or wrong, that policy had been carried out in a way which was not creditable either to the diplomacy or to the statesmen of this country; but in concluding my speech, I said that, if Her Majesty's Government would in future only pursue a course and adopt measures which were equal to the occasion and worthy of the circumstances in which we were placed, I would give them my most cordial though humble support. But, Sir, since that period an alteration has taken place in the

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state of matters. We were then arguing on very insufficient grounds. Other documents, of a very important nature, which have thrown an entirely new light upon these transactions, have now been published. Things have occurred which have snore than confirmed the opinions which I even then formed of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, and I feel bound to recur to the subject. When I discussed the policy of the Government I was taunted because I did not bring some definite question before the House, in order to test its feelings with regard to the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers. I may be again taunted on the same grounds, and I will, therefore, state distinctly to the House what it is my intention to do. Upon such an occasion as this, I would be the last man to propose an Amendment to the Address, or to take any step which might interfere with the general expression of loyalty towards Her Most Gracious Majesty, or have a tendency to show that the country was not united as one man in supporting the Crown in this great struggle; but if it is the feeling of this House, after what I shall state to it, that the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers ought to form the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry or a division in this House, I, humble as I am, shall be the first to ask Her Majesty's Ministers to name an early day upon which I can bring this question formally before the House.
The noble Lord in his speech said that the papers upon the table had been so often discussed that it was scarcely of any use to revert to them. It is true that the papers which were at first laid upon the table have been discussed, but as yet nothing whatever has been said with regard to those most important documents which on a subsequent occasion have been submitted to Parliament. I have hitherto purposely avoided referring to them, because I have been told that I might impede the action of Her Majesty's Government; but I think the time has now come, especially as these papers go far to prove the opinions which I shall lay before the House, when some discussion should be raised upon them. Sir, in the year 1829, when the noble Earl now at the head of the Government was Minister for Foreign Affairs, Russia was engaged, as at this moment, in a war with Turkey. Her troops crossed the Balkan, and though her army was in a very critical condition, the Porte was compelled to conclude a disastrous treaty with
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General Diebitsch. The noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) has more than once and within the last few days claimed the honour of having framed that treaty, upon which were mainly based the claims which Russia now puts forward for the protection of the Greek Christians of Turkey. In 1842, the same noble Earl being at the head of the Foreign Office, a revolution took place in Servia. The Prince of that province was expelled by a popular movement, the Porte confirmed the nomination of a new Prince, and took other steps, which, by its treaty connection with Servia, it had a perfect right to take. But the Russian Government opposed that order of things, insisting that the Porte should cancel its acts, and that there should be a new election, and, though France was at that time willing to go with us, the noble Lord now at the head of Her Majesty's Government approved and abetted Russia in all the acts which she then undertook, and made that most extraordinary statement to which I have before alluded, "that Russia had a right to put her own construction upon her own treaties"—an assertion which, if there be anything in it, would completely justify every step that Russia has taken which has led to the present war. Can we be surprised, then, that in the year 1844, when the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) was again at the Foreign Office, the Emperor of Russia should have visited this country, and have taken the opportunity of proposing to Her Majesty's Government a scheme which was part of the hereditary policy of his family, and which was almost the political testament by which he came to the empire? That visit of the Emperor ended in a certain agreement between him and certain of Her Majesty's Ministers, which has been laid upon the table. I am not now about to discuss it, although I will say that it contains two propositions which appear to me exceedingly dangerous as involving a principle for which Russia has always been contending. They state, that although the policy of Russia and England will be to maintain the present political combination—that is to say, the existence of Turkey—as long as possible, yet if they foresee that it must fall to pieces, they will enter into previous concert in relation to the establishment of the new order of things to succeed it; thus leaving it in the power of Russia to interpret such signs as she thought fit, at any period most convenient to her, into proofs of the approaching dissolution of the Otto-

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man empire. I know not what documents may have passed between the persons who were the parties to that memorandum, or whether that memorandum was accepted by some of Her Majesty's Ministers as a correct record of that which had passed between them and the Emperor of Russia, and as setting forth the principles that had been agreed to as a basis of action by both parties in case of the event happening which was predicted by the Emperor of Russia. But, Sir, it is not surprising that when in the beginning of last year a change took place in the Government of this country, and the noble Earl found himself at the head of the Government, the Emperor of Russia, on the moment of receiving intelligence of the new Administration, renewed the proposals that had been accepted on his former visit to this country by Lord Aberdeen.
I must now entreat the attention of the House for a few moments to these important secret documents last laid on the table, more because I wish to show the extraordinary divergence of opinion which existed then, and exists at this moment, between the different Members of the Government than to offer any detailed criticism upon them. The first proposal was made on the 11th of January, 1853. After congratulating Sir Hamilton Seymour on the return to office, and the accession to the head of the Government, of the nobleman with whom he had had an intimate acquaintance, and expressing his great regard that he had entertained for Lord Aberdeen for almost forty years, in the very next breath the Emperor of Russia refers to the proposal for the partition of Turkey. That proposal was, however, not renewed very distinctly on that occasion; but a few days after it was again brought under the notice of Sir Hamilton Seymour, and in very distinct and positive terms. Sir Hamilton Seymour lost no time in communicating these extraordinary conversations to Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time he called the attention of the Government, very ably, I believe, to the dilemma in which we should be placed, either if we received these propositions, or if we took no notice of them—in the one case that we should be called to take part in carrying them out, having sanctioned them; in the other, we should have allowed the Czar to make proposals, and, not giving an answer to them, we should have tacitly sanctioned the policy
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that he had told us he would adopt. This despatch was received in England on the 6th of February. On the 9th of the same month—and the dates were important—the noble Lord who has just spoken, and who was then at the Foreign Office, returned an answer to Sir Hamilton Seymour. I do not wish to criticise the noble Lord's despatch, but I should say that it was hardly suitable to the occasion; it contained a very good account of the general principles involved in the partition of falling empires, and expressed a disinclination to enter further upon the subject; but I humbly submit that a more direct and decided answer ought to have been returned, and that the Government should have at once declared that no proposal such as the Emperor had made could ever be entertained for one moment by a British statesman, and that any attempt to carry it out would at once lead to war. I may be told that this was a secret despatch, and that the Government could not honourably make use of it; but I very much doubt whether any such obligation exists. If a man comes to me and says, "I have an intention of murdering your friend, but I tell it you in the strictest confidence—you must not make a disclosure of it to any human being," I say that the greatest casuist that could be found would not hold that I was bound by any such implied pledge of confidence. Now, in this despatch I find a passage in which the noble Lord admits that the Emperor of Russia has a right by treaty to interfere in behalf of the Christian subjects of the Turkish Government. The time is gone by for dwelling on this extraordinary admission, which, however, the Emperor of Russia might surely quote as justifying all his subsequent proceedings. I will admit that the answer of the noble Lord, however, was quite sufficient for the Emperor to believe that the English Government would not entertain his proposal; and the next despatch of Sir Hamilton Seymour, acknowledging the receipt of the noble Lord's answer, tells us that the Emperor of Russia was very sorry to hear that the British' Government would not listen to his proposal. Shortly afterwards Sir Hamilton Seymour was called upon to be present at what he is justified in terming the most important and most interesting interview in which a diplomatist was ever engaged. On that occasion the Emperor took an opportunity of laying before our Ambassador very fully his views on

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the Eastern question; and that, there might be no mistake whatever, the Emperor lays down the principles on which he would carry out the partition, and makes a proposition of territorial concession to England which he thought might induce this country to join in his nefarious project. Sir Hamilton Seymour lost no time in sending home a despatch containing an account of this conversation to the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) now at the head of the Foreign Office. But what do I find? That although the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) then at the head of the Foreign Office had answered the first despatch within three days—and I entreat the House to notice the dates, because this is a momentous consideration—no answer was returned to that despatch by the noble Earl who had succeeded him at the Foreign Office, I think, for seventeen days, nor was it submitted to the Cabinet Council till the 13th of March, being seven days after its receipt. I beg the House to consider the commencement of the noble Earl's reply. Instead of rejecting the proposal of the Czar as my noble Friend (Lord John Russell) had done, he begins to throw somewhat of a doubt upon the policy of the noble Lord who had preceded him in the Foreign Office. He says:—
"I need not assure you that I think the opinions and proposals of the Emperor of Russia ought to receive that consideration which their importance demands."
And mark these further words:—
"Although Her Majesty's Government feels compelled to adhere to the principles laid down in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish, that the subject should be further and frankly discussed."
And this was written in direct opposition to Sir H. Seymour's urgent entreaties, that he should be directed to put an end to these dangerous conversations:—
"You are handling hot coal, for God's sake give me instructions to discontinue these discussions; do not let us prolong them a moment longer than is absolutely necessary."
And yet, in spite of his repeated remonstrances, after a delay of seventeen days, on the 23rd of March, he is told to inform the Emperor that we are ready to take these proposals frankly into further consideration. And what does the Emperor of Russia say, after he receives this communication from Sir Hamilton Seymour? In his despatch of the 20th of April, Sir Hamilton Seymour says:—
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"His Majesty then said that he wished to state to me the real and sincere satisfaction which he received from your Lordship's despatch (Lord Clarendon's), marked secret and confidential, of the 23rd ultimo."
No wonder that he received it with satisfaction, although he had not received the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell's) reply with satisfaction; and the result was that the memorandum, which was drawn up, I conceive does contain some very damaging admissions. But I principally wish to draw attention to this despatch in order to show its bearings on some other circumstances connected with this case. In referring to these despatches I wish to say very little on what occurred last year, and if I do allude to it, I trust the House will believe that it is from no wish to make any vain boasting upon what I stated then. But I ask the House if these despatches do not, word for word, confirm almost every syllable I uttered last year. I then said that this great Eastern question was one of independent nationalities, and the Emperor of Russia has said the very same words. He has said:—
"I will not allow England or France permanently to occupy Constantinople, nor shall I permit any attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or at the enlargement of the kingdom of Greece, so that it may become a powerful State."
And, again, he added:—
"If you like, I will consent to Servia and Bulgaria being placed upon the same footing as the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia."
But what was the position of these Principalities, but that of mere creatures and dependents of Russia? But the speech of the noble Lord to-night is the best justification of what I said last year; and, I ask, could anything have been more favourable to my case? I heard on one occasion a right hon. Gentleman in this House talk of connivance or credulity as connected with the conduct of the Government in these transactions. As an Englishman I revolted at the bare idea of such a thing as connivance in such a matter; but I must now confess that there are circumstances connected with this case of so extraordinary a nature that, without saying that I believe there was connivance, I must say that there was something that I cannot explain, and that I cannot understand. Is it that, as there were two parties in the Cabinet at the time, there was connivance and credulity among the different Members of the Government, and that out of this unhappy and unnatural

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union was begotten that monstrous policy which has brought us into all this difficulty, and has involved us in a war?
Now, Sir, I am about to refer for a few moments to some opinions of the Times newspaper. I cannot quote to the House all its opinions, because I might in that case quote from hour to hour opinions upon all sides of any question. But if I prove to the House that the opinions of the Times which I will read are the opinions of any of Her Majesty's Government, then I think there is an importance which attaches to them that cannot be denied. This, Sir, is a most momentous question, and I entreat the attention of the House to it. I do not at all exaggerate—I will prove to the House that every one of those secret and confidential despatches were communicated, if not on the very day, at least one or two days after their arrival, and furnished the materials for the leading articles of the Times: and that there are men, and not clerks in the Foreign Office, because the contents of these despatches could not have got beyond one or two Members of the Cabinet—men who have been endeavouring to bring the country to approve of the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia and to give their consent to the nefarious transactions to which he had alluded. Perhaps some Members of this House may remember that in February and March last year there appeared a very extraordinary series of articles in the Times, saying that the time had come for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and even that it would be necessary that we should take into consideration whether we could not agree to some partition of that country. I was myself particularly struck with those articles, which came out for no possible purpose that I could then understand. But the other day, when these secret papers were brought to light, I thought that I recognised expressions in them which I had noticed in these leading articles of the Times. I happened at the time to be with a Gentleman, a Member of this House—a dispassionate and calm-judging man—not agreeing with me in sentiments; and I said to him—" Let us go and look at the Times, and see if there is any coincidence between the articles in that journal and the secret correspondence." Well, to my astonishment, of course, but also to his, we found in an article in the Times published at the beginning of last year, the very same words used as those that appeared
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in the despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, and that subsequently articles followed other despatches, frequently the very day after their arrival, sometimes containing almost the very same words. ["Hear, hear!"] Do not believe that I wish to exaggerate anything; but I say this is a question of the utmost importance—the significance of which cannot, indeed, be exaggerated, and one in which the interests of this very empire are at stake. If the secrets of the Cabinet are not to be divulged to the House of Commons, and yet are to be made use of in this manner to frustrate the endeavours of those in the Cabinet who are attempting to carry out the true policy of this country, such men as are struggling to maintain those interests, and to maintain its honour, will feel that no emphasis that I can lay on such a proceeding, and no time that I can take up in disclosing it to the House, can be ill employed. Now, Sir, the first despatch, the House will remember, was received in this country on the 23rd of January, 1853. Well, on the 26th of January came out the first of the series of articles in the Times newspaper, to which I refer. I entreat hon. Members who may doubt my statement to turn to these articles for themselves, and not to take it simply on my assertion. The next despatch was received on the 6th of February. Now, on the 11th of February we have this extraordinary article published in the Times, four days after the receipt of the despatch. It states:—
"We do not suppose that it is the intention or the policy of Russia to accelerate a catastrophe in the East, and the good offices of this country will again be employed to lessen the perils of a situation which is becoming critical. We cannot, however, forget that the attempt to prolong the brutal and decrepit authority of the Turks in Europe is purchased by the surrender of fine provinces and a large Christian population to barbarous misgovernment; and we shall rejoice when civilisation and Christianity are able to repair the injuries of the Ottoman conquest."
Again it was stated in the Times on the 23rd of February, 1853, after various comments on the exhausted state of Turkey:—
"With the utmost political caducity, with a total want of ability and integrity in the men who arc still its rulers, with a declining Mussulman population, and an exhausted treasury, the Porte unites, as if by way of derisory contrast, a dominion over some of the most fertile regions, the finest ports, and the most enterprising and ingenious people of southern Europe.…. It is hard to comprehend how so great a positive evil can have been so long defended by politicians

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as a relative good; and though we are not insensible to the difficulties attending any change in the territories of so huge an empire, we are disposed to view with satisfaction rather than with alarm the approach of a period"—
How did the Times know the period was approaching?—
"when it will be impossible to prolong the domination of such a Government as that of the Porte, over such a country as that which is now subject to its authority."
In the next sentence (and, remember, this was written two or three days after the arrival of the despatch), it says:—
"Perhaps that period is less distant than is commonly supposed; and it may be the part of wise statesmen to provide against such a conjuncture, which it is beyond their power indefinitely to postpone. We do not believe, and we do not mean to imply, that any combination of Austria and Russia, hostile to the territorial claims of the Ottoman empire, is now in existence, or is likely to be formed without the knowledge of the other European Powers. We have strong grounds to believe"—
When the Times says that, we know what it means—
"that Prince Menchikoff is sent from St. Petersburg to Constantinople upon a special embassy for the express purpose of declaring, in the name of the Emperor Nicholas, that, as head of the Greek Church, he cannot submit, or allow the Eastern Church to submit, to the conditions of the firman recently obtained by the French Ambassador with reference to the holy shrines in the Holy Land."
Now, the first intimation of Prince Menchikoff's mission was contained in Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatches, received February 14 and February 21, two days before this article appeared. Now, on the 6th of March came that most important despatch which gave the whole plan of the partition. I said before, that no answer was returned till the 23rd, and that no Cabinet Council was held upon this despatch till the 13th, seven days being allowed to elapse by those Members of the Cabinet who had it in their possession before they submitted it to their Colleagues. But it was submitted to the Times, because on the 7th of March, the very following morning, when it was impossible that the despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour could have gone beyond one or two Members of the Cabinet, and when no clerk in the Foreign Office could have known its contents, almost the very words of the despatch are given in a leading article. The Times says:—
"The state of the Turkish empire and the relations of the European Powers to the East are
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subjects on which it may be useful for reflecting politicians and the independent press to form and express opinions, though the consummation to which these opinions point be still unwelcome and remote. Statesmen bound to transact the business of the day, and to recognise at every turn the obligations of what is called State necessity, are restrained within narrower limits, and would probably be unable to give effect to any novel or original conception, if it had not previously been entertained by the mind and reason of the public."
The meaning of this is evident. It is a feeler to see how far a plan for the partition of Turkey would be accepted by the public in this country. It was an endeavour to ascertain whether the Emperor's proposal could be entertained by a Minister without incurring the danger of any public remonstrance. I have told the House that the Earl of Clarendon in his despatch said that he did not agree with the policy of his predecessor in the Foreign Office (Lord J. Russell); and now mark how the Times article goes on:—
"We are, therefore, by no means surprised that, in adverting to the differences which have recently taken place in Turkey, and especially on its European frontiers, Lord John Russell should have expressed his dissent from the opinions which have been recently put forward on this subject, and should have repeated in his place in Parliament, speaking under the weight of official responsibility, the old story of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. We ourselves, however, are not affected by similar considerations."
Well, but how did the Times know that the noble Lord dissented? The article continued:—
"We do not, therefore, concur in the opinion of Lord John Russell, that no greater calamity could occur to Europe at the present time than the necessity of considering what ought to be done in such a case as the dismemberment of that empire. It would, we think, be a far greater calamity"
mark these words, because, if not actually the very same, they convey precisely the same meaning as those used in the Emperor's communication—
"that the dismemberment commenced before any such consideration took place."
Why, this remark about the dismemberment having commenced was what the Emperor told us himself. The article went on to say:—
"And here we must be allowed to express our surprise that any statement should, for an instant, confound the policy which it might be proper to pursue in the event of a dissolution of the Turkish empire with that which led to the partition of Poland."
Thus attempting to justify the proposed

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scheme, which, in order to keep out of sight its nefarious character, was carefully distinguished from the great political crime already committed by Russia. On the 10th of March an article appeared in the Times commencing with these words:—
"Prince Menchikoff arrives in a more strictly diplomatic capacity, and we have reason to believe"—
the House knows what that means—
"we have reason to believe that his instructions are more conciliatory than those of Count Leiningen."
Now I find that on February 21, in the despatch of Sir Hamilton Seymour, sent to the Earl of Clarendon, it is said:—
"His Excellency (Count Nesselrode) wished to assure me that the instructions with which Prince Menchikoff would be provided were of a conciliatory nature."
No Cabinet Council was held till the 19th of March, when the despatch received on the 6th was discussed and an answer returned on the 23rd of March. That answer commenced with the following words:—
"Although Her Majesty's Government feel compelled to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further and frankly discussed."
On the same day an article appeared in the Times, which commenced thus:—
"The opinions we have expressed on the present condition and future prospects of the Ottoman empire do not coincide with the views entertained by Lord John Russell, and communicated by him to the House of Commons; they differ from the course of policy which this country has pursued in former times and on several occasions; and they are entirely at variance with the system which a large numerical proportion of the London press is attempting, not very brilliantly or successfully, to defend."
Honour to the British press, that, though wanting the brilliant epigrammatic pen which had shaken a Colonial Minister and almost upset a Cabinet, it rejected with indignation the nefarious and unprincipled scheme to which the Times had endeavoured to reconcile the country! The Times added, near the end of its article,—
"He (the Emperor) has said that it is an object of his ambition to stand well with this country, and to deserve its confidence. His proceedings on this occasion will bring that assurance to the test, and he can give us no greater proof of moderation and good faith towards Turkey and the rest of Europe than a willingness to co-operate on these subjects, as he has before done, with the British Government."
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On the same day on which the Times announced that its endeavours to reconcile the British public to the partition of Turkey had failed, the answer to the despatch which had been delayed for sixteen days was sent to St. Petersburg. I need not trouble the House with further extracts from the Times. [Ironical Cries of "Hear, hear!"] If noble Lords and right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury bench desire it, I will read every one of the articles I have by me, for the more I read the more I shall strengthen my case. [An expression of dissent.] Good gracious! [A laugh.] But surely, no man in this House will tell me, after what I have read, that the person who wrote those articles was not acquainted with these despatches, or had not received direct communication from those who were. Well, putting aside the charge against the person who made these communications to the newspapers, I ask what must have been the effect of these articles in Russia, where the greatest care is taken to examine every shade of opinion in this and other countries? When the Russian Government saw the substance of despatches, sent from St. Petersburg appearing in the Times almost on the very day after that on which they were received, what could it think but that the articles must have been written by some person in communication with the Ministry? Again, do you think that Baron Brunnow was not aware of these conversations between Sir Hamilton Seymour and the Emperor of Russia, and of what passed at St. Petersburg; and what must have been his surprise to find almost every day after the receipt of these despatches that the information and opinions contained in them were re-echoed by the Times newspaper? Baron Brunnow well knew too, what, at that time, was a matter of public notoriety, that the Times represented the opinions, and was the official organ of at least a section of the Ministry, and that those who were directly connected with that newspaper had been privy to most of the proceedings of Lord Aberdeen on the formation of the new Government, some of the Members of which were actually supposed to have received their offices through its influence. It might be said that, after all, the evidence, from identity of sentiments, was only circumstantial, and that the circumstance might be accounted for by a strange coincidence; but that the writer in the Times was acquainted with the contents of the despatches, I confess, Sir,

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that no doubt whatever remains upon my, mind. Mark, I am now endeavouring to show that there were two parties then in the Cabinet, and that there are two parties now, and that these discordant elements have been striving to counteract the influence of each other, and that one of these parties wishes to pursue a policy which I, and I believe the country, most completely concur in. Let me now recur to a speech of the Earl of Clarendon, on the 25th of April last, in the House of Lords, when the Marquess of Clanricarde asked a question with reference to the alarm that had been excited at Constantinople by the demands of Prince Menchikoff. The noble Earl, although he had received all the secret despatches and many others now published, made use of the following words:—
"It was not for hint to say that the Emperor of Russia was to be blamed for not making his intentions publicly known, or for not keeping the public informed in regard to his Envoy's proceedings. There were, certainly, considerable military and naval preparations concurrent with the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople, but the extent of those, he considered, had been greatly exaggerated. There had been no disguise whatever on the part of the Emperor of Russia as to his intentions in sending his Ambassador, and he showed no hesitation in answering any question the Government of this country thought proper to put to him. He (the Earl of Clarendon) could only say that Her Majesty's Government felt precisely the same confidence as his noble Friend in the honour and integrity of the Emperor of Russia."—[3 Hansard, cxxvi. 378.]
Let the House bear in mind that this was said after all the secret communications had been received. The noble Earl added—
"Some exaggerated reports of recent events had been circulated within the last four days which were calculated to excite alarm; but their Lordships would be pleased to hear that Her Majesty's Government had recently received a despatch from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated the day after his arrival at Constantinople, in which he gave them every reason to think that the views entertained by all parties upon the question were such as to ensure a satisfactory result."—[3 Hansard, cxxvi. 379.]
There appears to be some extraordinary mistake here. Either the date of the receipt of the despatch alluded to by Lord Clarendon has been changed in the blue book, or the noble Earl has misquoted the despatch. There is only one despatch written by Lord Stratford, the day after his arrival, and that was received on the 26th of April, the day after Lord Clarendon's speech. Unless, therefore, the date has been for some purpose changed, he
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could not have quoted this despatch—which, moreover, so far from corroborating his assertions, states exactly the contrary. I am willing to accept the only explanation—that Lord Clarendon meant to quote the despatch written by Lord Stratford on the day of his arrival at Constantinople. But did that document authorise Lord Clarendon to assert, in the most solemn manner, that all parties believed that the disputes between Russia and Turkey would be brought to a satisfactory result? Most certainly not. It contained only a few lines, and was written before Lord Stratford had had any opportunity of ascertaining the real state of affairs. After announcing his arrival that day, he says:—
"I have only to add that, while the Turkish Ministers intimate a strong sense of anxiety and alarm as to the eventual intentions of Russia, the impressions of the Austrian Legation, founded on the language of the Russian Ambassador, are favourable to the existence of moderate views on the part of that Power, and to a friendly solution of the pending question."
Let it be observed from whom this opinion, unsatisfactory as it was, was received—from the Austrian Minister! Did not Lord Clarendon thus wilfully deceive the country? I ask, what must Russia have thought? what must Baton Brunnow have thought? Why, that there was a party in the Cabinet who were screening him and his Government, a party keeping the country in the dark. Again, notwithstanding what had passed between the Government and the Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding the proofs of double dealing we had received, on the 22nd of March, Lord Clarendon, writing to Lord Cowley at Paris, expresses his regret, and actually condemns the French Government for sending their fleet to the Greek waters, and he said, in reference to a conversation he had held with Count Walewski:—
"Her Majesty's Government, I added, were disposed to place reliance on the Emperor of Russia, from whom they had often received the most solemn assurances that it was both his interest and his intention to uphold the Turkish empire, and that if any change in this policy were contemplated by His Imperial Majesty, the intention should be communicated without hesitation or reserve. No such communication having been made, Her Majesty's Government were bound to believe, until they had proofs to the contrary, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey."
On the 23rd of March Lord Clarendon wrote to Sir Hamilton Seymour a despatch in which, after expressing entire approval of Admiral Dundas for having refused to

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obey the summons of Colonel Rose, and alluding to the dismissal of Fund Effendi and the advance of the Russian forces, he said:—
"Her Majesty's Government have felt no alarm, and have not shared the apprehensions which the facts above alluded to (the reports current about Prince Menchikoff's &c.) might appear to justify, for on more than one occasion they have received personal assurances from the Emperor of Russia that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish empire," &c.
Thus justifying the whole proceedings of Russia, and screening her. I may be told that, although the despatches just published show grounds for distrust of Russia, yet that the assurances in the secret despatches given by the Emperor, on the word of a "gentleman," were such as to remove all apprehensions. But I find in the secret despatches, as well as in the public, that Sir Hamilton Seymour repeatedly warns the Government of the double-dealing of Russia—warns them that she is preparing the dissolution of Turkey. The following passages showed clearly that Sir Hamilton Seymour took an accurate view of the matter:—
"The Emperor must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution must be at hand. The Emperor's words and manner, although still very kind, showed that His Majesty had no intention of speaking to me of the demonstration which he is about to make in the south. … Would the understanding be acted upon? That, indeed, may well be doubted, and the rather as the Emperor's assurances are a little contradicted by the measures to which it has been my duty to call your Lordship's attention."
The word "fraudulent" has been used with regard to the conduct of the Emperor of Russia; and if I had not seen these secret despatches, I should equally have said his conduct was fraudulent. But I do not wish to screen the Czar, and I say that be has been guilty of gross fraud. But then that is the policy of his House, and a policy that has been pursued by Russia for years, and almost for centuries, as everybody who knows anything of the history of Russia must be well aware. But if the Emperor of Russia's policy was fraudulent, what I complain of is, this misleading of the public in a solemn manner before the most august assembly in the world, and the putting forward of opinions directly contrary to the facts. I will not press the same argument as to differences of opinion in the Cabinet from the conduct of the Government during the re-
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cess, when greater latitude is perhaps used, and things said that a Minister would not always like afterwards to be bound by. But I remember reading the speeches delivered by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) in Scotland, and by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Manchester, on the Eastern question. The noble Lord's speech led everybody to believe that the integrity and independence of Turkey could be maintained, but the right hon. Gentleman expressed a diametrically opposite opinion; and there consequently was the greatest difficulty in collecting what was the policy of the Government. Here, then, were two eminent Members of the Government giving opinions of a diametrically opposite nature on a question of the most momentous importance. I happened at that time to be on the Continent, and I was frequently asked what I believed to be the true policy of the Government? I could return no answer. It is not difficult to understand the evil effects which such contradictions had upon foreign Governments. I might continue this line of observation up to the present moment. Her Majesty's speech at the, beginning of the Session was a document almost unworthy of the occasion. It spoke of the quarrel as if it involved no great principle; but the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), in the debate upon the Address, made a speech to which I listened with intense pleasure; and I thought, after all it was, perhaps, better not to place in the mouth of the Sovereign any strong expressions, and that the noble Lord's speech was to be taken as indicating what the Royal speech meant. Therefore, I did not rise to move any Amendment or make any remarks on the Address. But my astonishment was unbounded when I found that the noble Earl at the head of the Government, in another place, held quite different language—his talk was still of peace—that he hoped to maintain peace, and that peace was the policy of the Government—and that he desired to be left to his prayers and his hopes for peace. Was this suitable language to be held at such a time as this? To declare that we could not go to war could only be an encouragement to Russia. The true policy of a great country was neither peace nor war, but upon the maintenance of its honour and its interests. Similar declarations were made by the Premier at the Mansion House and elsewhere about a

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policy of peace. And even now the question was almost, are we at war? If one noble Lord says we are at war, and another noble Lord says we are at peace, whom are we to believe? The proclamation and other public documents that have been issued are of the same vacillating, undignified character. I do not want to hear any inflated proclamations; but let the people of England be told plainly that they have great interests at stake, and tell them what we are going to war for. Let them know that this is a question not only affecting the general civilisation and freedom of Europe, but our own material interests; and that if it is not taken up now, it will have to be taken up by and by, and that in the meantime it may lead to disasters which nothing that we can do will be able to repair. Early in the Session, when I expressed my opinion of the mismanagement of this great question by Her Majesty's Government, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham) got up, and admitted all that I had said; but, said he, "It is very true we may have been vacillating; but see what we have gained? Why, we have got Austria and Prussia with us." That was announced as the triumphant result of all their temporising. But where are Austria and Prussia now? What has the noble Lord told us to-night? No man can count upon more than the armed neutrality of Austria, which means nothing at all. But were we ever justified in believing that Austria would act with us? In the memorandum of 1844, before Austria was under her present obligations to Russia, the Emperor of Russia said that between him and Austria there existed already an understanding and an entire conformity of principle with regard to the affairs of Turkey. This is repeated distinctly in two, or three, or four secret despatches of Sir Hamilton Seymour's, in all of which he tells us that he suspects that there exists a distinct understanding between Russia and the Austrian Government. I believe such an understanding existed as early as 1842, between Austria and Russia, with regard to the manner in which they would jointly deal with the Turkish empire. Let me ask, after all these negotiations with Austria to which the Government refer with so much satisfaction, what kind of a promise have we received from that Power? what policy is she prepared to adopt? In one of the last despatches from Lord Clarendon to Lord Westmoreland that have been
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placed on the table, a very important document in many respects, I find a most extraordinary paragraph. It is to this effect:—
"This measure, on the subject of which tranquillising assurances have been given to the Porte, is not to be considered of a hostile nature towards either of the belligerents; its object is solely to preserve the Austrian frontiers from insult, and, if necessary, from the contagion of insurrection in the adjoining Turkish provinces; and even if an armed intervention on the part of Austria should become indispensable, it would be with the firm intention of preserving intact in all respects the status quo established by treaties—an intention which Count Buol is confident will be shared by the other Powers who are represented at the Conference of Vienna."
I ask the Government, have they agreed to any such proposal? Are we, I ask, to go to war to restore old treaties and the status quo? Is that the understanding we have entered into with Austria? But observe the dangers into which this divergence of opinion in the Government has led us. If it were merely confined to debates in the Cabinet, it would be had enough; but look to the state it has brought us to with regard to our preparations for war. In making these remarks, I make them with a deep sense of the responsibility that I incur; but I can state, from information I have received within the last few hours, that in Constantinople nor any part of Turkey have adequate preparations been made, either for the proper provisionment or transport of any troops we may now be sending there. Not a sack of corn has been got, not a horse has been got to assist in the transport of the baggage or of the troops. And at Malta we are told that the troops are living fourteen together, in small and miserable tents, not fit for the accommodation of one or two men. Why, I ask, should they expose fine men, with prospects no way brilliant, to the damp and dew, while a number of spacious public buildings might have been appropriated to their use? Then an account is given of the rain falling upon the Highlanders, and how they are suffering; and it is asked if there be no ordnance or hospital board to see how these men are lodged. Then look to the fleet. Every day I see in the papers that the fleet is at Beicos. What, I ask, is the fleet doing at Beicos? Are we to have another Sinope, whilst we are continuing in utter inactivity in the Bosphorus? We hear of the Russian fleet going out to sea, and landing troops on the

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Turkish coast. The Sampson has just reported that a detachment of the Russian fleet had appeared off the coast of Circassia, had very wisely embarked the garrisons from the detached forts, which would have fallen an easy prey to an enemy, and had landed troops and stores for those places which must be defended—and all this while our fleet is at Beicos Bay. Then I am told that our fleet have no coals. Why, they have been lying there these two months doing nothing, and why should they remain for two months without coals? I said, on a former occasion, that we ought to have some explanation about Sinope, and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty on that occasion contradicted me when I said that under the instructions of the 8th of October the fleet could have acted in the Black Sea, in case of a Russian fleet having left Sebastopol with hostile intentions. I say now they could have acted under these instructions; and if they could not have acted under them, I ask the Government to explain why they could not? I see there is a despatch which contains a communication that was made by the British Minister at Constantinople to the Ottoman Secretary of State, to whom he puts categorical questions respecting the state of the fortifications at Sinope, and the sending of the fleet there. It is rather curious language to use to a Prime Minister. He asks the Prime Minister of Turkey for information on these subjects—he asks to be fully informed on these points; and begs if Reshid Pasha cannot give him the required information at once, that he will take steps to get it. I want to know where, after that communication, is the independence of Turkey? He asks who is to blame for sending the fleets there; but did that justify our fleet remaining in the Bosphorus while the Turkish fleet was destroyed? He asks who sent the Turkish fleet to Sinope, but that is not what we want to know; we want to know why our fleet did not prevent the massacre at Sinope? But what has been the consequence of all this delay? The Russians are crossing the Danube. The importance of the position at Kalafat is misunderstood—it is of political as well as of military importance. It is important to prevent them from getting at Servia, for if they get to Servia they may raise an insurrection which may extend to other provinces. The Turks are therefore bound to keep a very considerable portion of their army at Kalafat, but
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they have thereby greatly weakened Omar Pasha; and should the Russians, by concentrating a large force and crossing the Danube which they will easily be able to do, defeat the Turkish commander-in-chief, Constantinople may be in their hands in three months. It is stated that we are going to make an entrenched camp at Gallipoli to save the capital; but when all Turkey is in the hands of the Russians, where is the use of saving the capital? In this most critical state of things, it is said that Lord Stratford has been hammering out of the unfortunate Turks concessions in favour of the Christians; but is that generous? Is it fair, for the assistance we give them, to get out of them concessions in favour of the Christians? Is it politic, I ask? You have got at the head of the Turkish Government the most enlightened of Turkish Ministers. He is a man who will make all possible concessions; but give him time; otherwise you will undermine his authority and strengthen the fanatical party in Turkey, and the result may be that you will have a rebellion in Turkey. I read a letter from Constantinople in which it is stated that some delay has occurred in the signing of the convention between England, France, and Turkey—on account of some demands in favour of the Christians, and that the Turks openly declare that they had better give way to the Russians at once, for then they would only have one master instead of four with which they are now threatened; the writer adds—that no doubt it would be mortifying to them, but that submit they must. I ask, is that politic? I say you are doing all you can to prevent these Christians having these privileges. You are asking the Turkish Government to put the Christians into the army, and to submit them to conscription. If you desired to check the progress making by the Christians, and to render them miserable, you could not devise a better plan than that. What will be the result? You may not take advantage of these conventions and articles, but the French and the Austrians will do so, and you will find those persons who may be taken for the army, under some plea of exemption, going to the French and Austrian Ambassadors, and seeking their intervention; and we shall have no end of interventions every day. Then, it is said they must abolish the capitation tax; but recollect at the same time the great mass of revenue you call upon the Turkish Government to abolish at once and at a most

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critical period. I cannot better illustrate the mode in which the Porte views these demands than by relating an anecdote. I think it was in the year 1844 that the dragoman of the British Embassy, after having had a long discusssion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the abolition of some imposition of which the Christians complained, and which the Porte agreed to do away with, was rising to depart, when the Pasha stopped him, and said:—
"We have a favour to ask of your Government, which, of course, will be conceded as readily as that we have just granted to you. The Sultan has received a petition praying him to intercede with Her Majesty the Queen on behalf of the poor people of England, who it appears cannot eat their bread without paying a tax for it."
The document to which the Pasha referred was signed by various persons, and amongst thorn by the hon. Member for the West Riding, and it asked for the intercession of the Sultan on behalf of the people of this country, requesting of him to use his influence with Her Majesty's Government to abolish the tax upon bread. I ask all those who have the interests of the Christians in Turkey at heart not to embarrass the Turkish Government at present, and they will get these concessions in good time. But do not, while you talk of defending Turkey and are making arrangements to defend her territory, be persecuting Reshid Pasha until you drive him to tears, in order to extort from him, almost at the peril of his life, measures which are in direct violation of the civil and religious law of Turkey. Is it, I ask again, generous or politic to do so?
I think we have been greatly misled as to the intentions of Austria. She never can embark in any policy which would really lead to the ends most essential to the interests of this country and of Europe. Her interests are substantially the same as Russian interests. Like Russia, she can never tolerate a strong or a liberal State in Turkey—she must have there a weak Government and divided populations, amongst whom she can intrigue. She may assist in getting back the status quo ante bellum, but she will go no further. I cannot refer, with respect to Austria, to a higher authority than the noble Viscount before me (Visct. Palmerston), and I will read what that noble Lord said with respect to her in 1849: in a well-known speech, he laid down, in terms equally forcible and just, our true policy in regard to that country,
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and pointed out the mistakes we were in danger of committing. The noble Viscount said:—
"It is not as the ancient ally of England during war—it is not as the means of resistance in the centre of Europe to any general disturbance of the balance of power—it is as the former (though I trust it is no longer so)—the former symbol of resistance to improvement, political and social—it is in that capacity that Austria has won the affections of some men in the conduct of public affairs. There are persons who see in the relations of countries nothing but the intercourse of Cabinets—who value a country not for its political weight, but for its political opinions—and who consider that the relations between countries are sufficiently intimate when the personal intercourse of their Governments is placed on a complimentary footing. Sir, there are men who, having passed their whole lives in adoring the Government of Austria, because they deemed it the great symbol of the opinions they entertained, at last became fickle in their attachment, and transferred their allegiance to the Government of France, because they thought that in that Government they saw an almost equal degree of leaning to the arbitrary principle, and because they, forsooth, suspected that Government of designs hostile to the interests of freedom. We have heard of persons of that sort making use of the expression old women.' Public men ought not to deal in egotism, and I will not apply to them the expression that has fallen from their own mouths. I will only say that the conduct of such men is an example of antiquated imbeeility."—[2 Hansard, cvii. 809.]
If the description which the noble Lord gave of it was given merely in reference to its juvenile days, or its days of indiscretion, we might hope that during the few years which have since elapsed it might have been improved; but I fear antiquated imbecility is a hopeless and incurable malady, which can only increase as time moves on. I could also quote the speech of the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord John Russell) on the same subject, when he told us of the noble Viscount being an English Minister, and not being a French Minister, an Austrian Minister, or a Russian Minister, applying those terms by inference to the present head of the Government. We have now entered upon a most vital question, which demands the whole of our energy, and which must be met with a conviction that a great cause is at stake of the deepest interest to the country. If any Member of the Government—if any right hon. Gentleman on the Treasury benches—doubt that we are going to war to maintain great principles, if he have scruples about fighting for Mussulmans against Christians, if he have misgivings as to the justice and necessity of this war—let that man, I say, retire at once—for if he

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do not, he is betraying his country. This is not a moment for half-convictions and shams. If men enter into a war of this magnitude, they must do it heart and soul. The vessel of the State is in danger, it is tossed to and fro by the waves, and if there be an unsteady hand at the helm, or some person who has mistaken his mission, or who is treacherous to the cause—I say, throw your "Jonah" overboard. If you do not, your vessel will be wrecked. Let us know what you are going to do. I do not ask you to let me know what your plans of operations are. If you wished to answer me you could not, for I conscientiously believe you have no plans at all. I do not think any man should ask to have the plan of operations disclosed to the enemy, or that we should tell them what we are about to do. I do not want to know what boundaries you are going to make, or what treaties you are going to sign; the result of a war like this must be in the hands of God, and God alone can determine what the result will be. But what I want the Government to say is, that by the help of God, and relying on the stout hearts and strong arms of England, we shall do our utmost to carry this war to such an issue as will prevent Russia hereafter from returning to her aggressions, and from threatening the independence, freedom, and civilisation of Europe—that we shall take care to reduce her within limits beyond which she will not hereafter be able to go. I think we are fairly entitled to say to the Government, that if they go to war merely to defend the territory of the Ottoman empire, and to restore old treaties and the status quo, we are entering into an unnecessary war, which will involve us in vast expense, and may entail upon us great bloodshed, without accomplishing the ends we have in view, or protecting us from a recurrence of those very evils we are now about to make these enormous sacrifices to avoid. Now that we have entered upon this war, there can be but one end to it—the placing of Russia in such a position as will prevent her again threatening the liberties and civilisation of Europe, and aiming at such acquisition of territory as would render her dangerous to the very existence of this country. This is not a little war. It might have been made a short war if it had been taken up last year. If, after that affair of Sinope you had sent your fleet into the Black Sea, and destroyed the Russian fleet, as you might have done,
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you might have made a peace at once. But now you have got into a great war—a war of which no one can foretell the end. It is not easy to meet the Russians in Turkey. You do not know what Turkey is, or what are the resources of the country for the maintenance of an army. The troops may become infected with the worst of fevers, and you do not know how many of those men who are now going to that country will return, unless you make some preparations more worthy of the occasion than you appear to have done. I am told that this is not a period to bring on a discussion of this nature—not a moment to embarrass the Government by such discussions. I am not insensible of the responsibility I have taken upon myself. I have thought night and day upon the course I ought to pursue; but I have now made up my mind that I have a duty to perform, and I will not flinch from it, at whatever risk to myself. I have asked myself, is it better for us now to suffer a temporary inconvenience, and if possible place the affairs of this country in the hands of a strong and united Government, who will carry on this great war in a manner worthy of England? or, in order to avoid that inconvenience, should we allow the present state of things to go on until, from divergence of opinion, vacillation, and doubt, we shall he involved in disasters from which it may cost us incalculable sacrifices of blood and treasure to extricate ourselves? I have been told, too, that thus to expose the past policy of the Government, is to shake the confidence of France and of Germany in the straightforwardness of British Ministers, and in our sincerity in entering upon the war. It appears to me that what I have attempted to show will have precisely the contrary effect. It will prove to the world that, however much inclined any Minister, or any Government, in this country might be to compromise its dignity and interests, by listening to such proposals as those made by Russia, or by sanctioning her ambitious policy, yet that there has been but one feeling in England, and that Ministers have been compelled to adopt, however tardily, the only policy worthy of the nation. No Minister could oppose the popular feeling on the subject, and, with the exception of a small section in this House, we have one united feeling on the subject. If compromises should be proposed that would be unworthy of the dignity and character of the country, there is public opinion, and

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there are statesmen that are able to resist all those attempts, and to carry the country triumphantly to the position in which it should be placed. I know I may weaken my own position by intruding myself upon the House at such a moment; yet, however inexperienced I may be in this House, I feel convinced that in thus having undertaken the discharge of what I consider to be a sacred duty, I shall at least be acquitted of being influenced by any personal or party motives, or by any wish to oppose that which may be for the true interests of the country; and if I should fail in the object which I have had in view, or should have had the misfortune of incurring the displeasure of the Members of the House, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, poor as that satisfaction may be, that I have, on two occasions, warned the country against the calamities which may be impending over it.
MR. BRIGHT:* Mr. Speaker, there are two reasons which may induce a Member of this House to address it—he may hope to convince some of those to whom he speaks, or he may wish to clear himself from any participation in a course which he believes to be evil. I presume I am one of that small section of the House to whom the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. Layard) has referred, when he alluded to the small party who objected to the policy by which this country has arrived at the "triumphant position which it now occupies." In coming forward to speak on this occasion, I may be told that I am like a physician proposing to prescribe to-day for a man who died yesterday, and that it is of no use to insist upon views which the Government and the House have already determined to reject. I feel, however, that we are entering upon a policy which may affect the fortunes of this country for a long time to come, and I am unwilling to lose this opportunity of explaining wherein I differ from the course which the Government has pursued, and of clearing myself from any portion of the responsibility which attaches to those who support the policy which the Government has adopted. We are asked to give our confidence to the Administration in voting the Address to the Crown, which has been moved by the noble Lord the Member for London, and to pledge our support to them in the war in which the country is now to engage. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Dis-
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raeli) on a recent occasion, made use of a term which differed considerably from what he said in a former debate; he spoke of this war as a "just and unnecessary war." I shall not discuss the justice of the war. It may be difficult to decide a point like this, seeing that every war undertaken since the days of Nimrod has been declared to be just by those in favour of it; but I may at least question whether any war that is unnecessary can be deemed to be just. I shall not discuss this question on the abstract principle of peace at all price, as it is termed, which is held by a small minority of persons in this country, founded on religious opinions which are not generally received, but I shall discuss it entirely on principles which are held unanimously by all the Members of this House. I shall maintain that when we are deliberating on the question of war, and endeavouring to prove its justice or necessity, it becomes us to show that the interests of time country are clearly involved; that the objects for which the war is undertaken are probable, or, at least, possible of attainment; and, further, that the end proposed to be accomplished is worth time cost and the sacrifices which we are about to incur. I think these are fair principles on which to discuss this question, and I hope that when the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Lord Palmerston) rises during this debate, he will not assume that I have dealt with it on any other principles than these. The House should bear in mind, that at this moment we are in intimate alliance with a neighbouring Government, which was, at a recent period, the originator of the troubles which have arisen at Constantinople. I do not wish to blame the French Government, because nothing could have been more proper than the manner in which it had retired from the difficulty it had created; but it is nevertheless quite true that France, haying made certain demands upon Turkey with regard to concessions to the Latin Church, backed by a threat of the appearance of a French fleet in the Dardanelles, which demands Turkey had wholly or partially complied with; Russia, the powerful neighbour of Turkey, being on the watch, made certain other demands, having reference to the Greek Church; and Russia at the same time required, and this I understand to be the real ground of the quarrel, that Turkey should define by treaty, or convention, or by a simple note, or memorandum, what was conceded, and what were the

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rights of Russia, in order that the Government of Russia might not suffer in future from the varying policy and the vacillation of the Ottoman Government.
Now, it seems to me quite impossible to discuss this question without considering the actual condition of Turkey. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) assumes that they who do not agree in the policy he advocates are necessarily hostile to the Turks, and have no sympathy for Turkey. I repudiate such an assumption altogether. I can feel for a country like that, if it be insulted or oppressed by a powerful neighbour; but all that sympathy may exist without my being able to convince myself that it is the duty of this country to enter into the serious obligation of a war in defence of the rights of that country. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is one of the very few men in this House, or out of it, who are bold enough to insist upon it that there is a growing strength in the Turkish empire. There was a Gentleman in this House, sixty years ago, who, in the debates in 1791, expressed the singular opinion which the noble Lord now bolds. There was a Mr. Stanley in the House at that period, who insisted on the growing power of Turkey, and asserted that the Turks of that day "were more and more imitating our manners, and emerging from their inactivity and indolence; that improvements of every kind were being introduced among them, and that even printing-presses had been lately established in their capital." That was the opinion of a Gentleman anxious to defend Turkey, and speaking in this House more than sixty years ago; we are now living sixty years later, and no one now, but the noble Lord, seems to insist upon the fact of the great and growing power of the Turkish empire. If any one thing is more apparent than another, on the face of all the documents furnished to the House by the Government, of which the noble Lord is a Member, it is this, that the Turkish empire is falling, or has fallen, into a state of decay, and into anarchy so permanent as to have assumed a chronic character. The noble Lord surely has not forgotten that Turkey has lost the Crimea and Bessarabia, and its control over the Danubian Principalities; that the kingdom of Greece has been carved out of it; that it has lost its authority over Algiers, and has run great risk of being conquered by its own vassal the Pasha of Egypt; and from this he
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might have drawn the conclusion that that empire was gradually falling into decay, and that to pledge ourselves to effect its recovery and sustentation, is to undertake what no human power will be able to accomplish. I only ask the House to turn to the statements which will be found nearly at the end of the first of the blue books recently placed on the table of the House, and they will find that there is scarcely any calamity which can be described as afflicting any country, which is not there proved to be present, and actively at work, in almost every province of the Turkish empire. And the House should bear in mind, when reading these despatches from the English Consuls in Turkey to the English Ambassador at Constantinople, that they give a very faint picture of what really exists, because what are submitted to us are but extracts of more extended and important communications. It may fairly be assumed that the parts which are not published are those which described the state of things to be so bad, that the Government has been unwilling to lay before the House, and the country, and the world, that which would be so offensive and so injurious to its ally the Sultan of Turkey. But, if other evidence be wanting, is it not a fact, that Constantinople is the seat of intrigues and factions to a degree not known in any other country or capital in the world? France demands one thing, Russia another, England a third, and Austria something else. For many years past our Ambassador at Constantinople has been partly carrying on the Government of that country, and influencing its policy, and it is the city in which are fought the diplomatic contests of the great Powers of Europe. And if I have accurately described the state of Turkey, what is the position of Russia? It is a powerful country, under a strong Executive Government; it is adjacent to a weak and falling people; it has in its history the evidences of a succession of triumphs over Turkey; it has religious affinities with a majority of the population of European Turkey which make it absolutely impossible that its Government should not, more or less, interfere, or have a strong interest, in the internal policy of the Ottoman empire. Now, if we were Russian—and I put the case to the Members of this House—is it not likely, according to all the theories I have heard explained when we have been concerned in similar cases,

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that a large majority of the House and the country would be strongly in favour of such intervention as Russia had attempted? and if I opposed it, as I certainly should oppose it, I should be in a minority on that question inure insignificant than that in which I have now the misfortune to find myself with regard to the policy of the Government on the grave question now before us.
The noble Lord the Member for London has made a statement of the case of the Government, and in favour of this Address to the Crown; but I thought it was a statement remarkably feeble in fact and in argument, if intended as a justification of the course he and his Colleagues have taken. For the purposes of the noble Lord's defence, the Russian demand upon Turkey is assumed to be something of far greater importance than I have been able to discover it to be from a careful examination of the terms in which it was couched. The noble Lord himself, in one of his despatches, admits that Russia had reason to complain, that she has certain rights and duties by treaty, and by tradition, with regard to the protection of the Christians in Turkey. Russia asserted these rights, and wished to have them defined in a particular form; and it was on the question of the form of the demand, and the manner in which it should be conceded, that the whole of this unfortunate difference has arisen. Now, if Russia made certain demands on Turkey, this country insisted that Turkey should not consent to them; for although the noble Lord had attempted to show that Turkey herself, acting for herself, had resolved to resist, I defy any one to read the despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe without coming to the conclusion that, from the beginning to the end of the negotiations, the English Ambassador had insisted, in the strongest manner, that Turkey should refuse to make the slightest concession on the real point at issue in the demands of the Russian Government. As a proof of that statement, I may refer to the account given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his despatch of the 5th of May, 1853, of the private interview he had with the Sultan, the Minister of the Sultan having left him at the door, that the interview might be strictly private. In describing that interview, Lord Stratford says, "I then endeavoured to give him a just idea of the degree of danger to which his empire was exposed." The Sultan was not suffi-
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ciently aware of his danger, and the English Ambassador "endeavoured to give him a just idea of it;" and it was by means such as this that he urged upon the Turkish Government the necessity of resistance to any of the demands of Russia, promising the armed assistance of England, whatever consequences might ensue. From the moment that promise was made, or from the moment it was sanctioned by the Cabinet at home, war was all but inevitable; they had entered into a partnership with the Turkish Government (which, indeed, could scarcely be called a Government at all), to assist it by military force; and Turkey, having old quarrels to settle with Russia, and old wrongs to avenge, was not slow to plunge into the war, having secured the co-operation of two powerful nations, England and France, in her quarrel. Now, I, have no special sympathy with Russia, and I refuse to discuss or to decide this question on grounds of sympathy with Russia or with Turkey; I consider it simply as it affects the duties and the interests of my own country. I find that after the first proposition for a treaty had been made by Prince Menchikoff, that envoy made some concession, and asked only for a Sened, or Convention; and when that was disapproved of, he offered to accept a note, or memorandum merely, that should specify what should be agreed upon. But the Turk was advised to resist, first the treaty, then the convention, and then the note or memorandum; and an armed force was promised on behalf of this country; at the same time he knew that he would incur the high displeasure of England and France, and especially of England, if he made the slightest concession to Russia. It was about the middle of May that Prince Menchikoff left Constantinople, not having succeeded in obtaining any concession from the Porte; and it was on the 3rd of July that the Russian forces crossed the Pruth; thinking, I believe, by making a dash at the Principalities, to coerce Turkey, and deter her allies from rendering her the promised support. It has been assumed by some that if England had declared war last year, Russia would have been deterred from any further step, and that the whole matter would have been settled at once. I, however, have no belief that Russia on the one hand, or England and France on the other, would have been bullied into any change of policy by means of that kind.

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I come now to the celebrated "Vienna note." I am bound here to say, that nobody has yet been able clearly to explain the difference between the various notes Turkey has been advised to reject, and this and other notes she has been urged to accept. With respect to this particular note, nobody seems to have understood it. There were four Ambassadors at Vienna, representing England, France, Austria, and Prussia; and these four gentlemen drew up the Vienna note, and recommended it to the Porte as one which she might accept without injury to her independence or her honour. Louis Napoleon is a man knowing the use of language, and able to comprehend the meaning of a document of this nature, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs is a man of eminent ability; and Louis Napoleon and his Minister agreed with the Ambassadors at Vienna as to the character of the Vienna note. We have a Cabinet composed of men of great individual capacity; a Cabinet, too, including no less than five Gentlemen who have filled the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and who may, therefore, be presumed to understand even the sometimes concealed meaning of diplomatic phraseology. These five Foreign Secretaries, backed by the whole Cabinet, concurred with the Ambassadors of Vienna, and with the Emperor of the French and his Foreign Secretary, in recommending the Vienna note to the Sultan as a document which be might accept consistently with his honour, and with that integrity and that independence which our Government is so anxious to secure for him. What was done with this note? Passing by the marvellous stupidity, or something worse, which caused that note not to be submitted to Turkey before it was sent to St. Petersburg, he would merely state that it was sent to St. Petersburg, and was accepted in its integrity by the Emperor of Russia in the most frank and unreserved manner. We were then told—I was told by Members of the Government—that the moment the note was accepted by Russia we might consider the affair to be settled, and that the dispute would never be heard of again. When, however, the note was sent to Constantinople, after its acceptance by Russia, Turkey discovered, or thought, or said she discovered, that it was as bad as the original or modified proposition of Prince Menchikoff, and she refused the note as it was, and proposed
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certain modifications. And what are we to think of these arbitrators or mediators—the four Ambassadors at Vienna, and the Governments of France and England—who, after discussing the matter in three different cities, and at three distinct and different periods, and after agreeing that the proposition was one which Turkey could assent to without detriment to her honour and independence, immediately afterwards turned round, and declared that the note was one which Turkey could not be asked to accede to, and repudiated in the most formal and express manner that which they themselves had drawn up, and which, only a few days before, they had approved of as a combination of wisdom and diplomatic dexterity which had never been excelled? But it was said that the interpretation which Count Nesselrode placed upon this note made it impossible for Turkey to accede to it. I very much doubt whether Count Nesselrode placed ally meaning upon it which it did not fairly warrant, and it is impossible to say whether he really differed at all from the actual intentions of the four Ambassadors at Vienna. But I can easily understand the course taken by the Russian Minister. It was this:—seeing the note was rejected by the Turk, and considering that its previous acceptance by Russia was some concession from the original demand, he issued a circular, giving such an explanation or interpretation of the Vienna note as might enable him to get back to his original position, and might save Russia from being committed and damaged by the concession, which, for the sake of peace, she had made. This circular, however, could make no real difference in the note itself; and notwithstanding this circular, whatever the note really meant, it would have been just as binding upon Russia as any other note will be that may be drawn up and agreed to at the end of the war. Although, however, this note was considered inadmissible, negotiations were continued; and at the Conference at Olmutz, at which the Earl of Westmoreland was present, the Emperor of Russia himself expressed his willingness to accept the Vienna note—not in the sense that Count Nesselrode had placed upon it, but in that which the Ambassadors at Vienna declared to be its real meaning, and with such a clause as they should attach to it, defining its real meaning. It is impossible from this fairly to doubt the sincerity of the desire

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for peace manifested by the Emperor of Russia. He would accept the note prepared by the Conference at Vienna, sanctioned by the Cabinets in London and Paris, and according to the interpretation put upon it by those by whom it had been prepared,—such interpretation to be defined in a clause, to be by them attached to the original note. But in the precise week in which these negotiations were proceeding apparently to a favourable conclusion, the Turkish Council, consisting of a large number of dignitaries of the Turkish empire—not one of whom, however, represented the Christian majority of the population of Turkey, but inspired by the fanaticism and desperation of the old Mahomedan party—assembled; and, fearful that peace would be established, and that they would lose the great opportunity of dragging England and France into a war with their ancient enemy, the Emperor of Russia, they came to a sudden resolution in favour of war; and in the very week in which Russia agreed to the Vienna note in the sense of the Vienna Conference, the Turks declared war against Russia,—the Turkish forces crossed the Danube, and began the war, involving England in an inglorious and costly struggle, from which this Government and a succeeding Government may fail to extricate us. I differ very much from those Gentlemen who condemn the Government for the tardy nature of their proceedings. I never said or thought that the Government was not honestly anxious for peace; but I believe, and indeed I know, that at an early period they committed themselves and the country to a policy, which left the issue of peace or war in other hands than their own—namely, in the hands of the Turks, the very last hands in which I am willing to trust the interests and the future of this country. In my opinion, the original blunder was committed when the Turks were advised to resist and not to concede; and the second blunder was made when the Turks were supported in their rejection of the Vienna note; for the moment the four Powers admitted that their recommendation was not necessarily to be accepted by the Porte, they put themselves entirely into the hands of the Turk, and might be dragged into any depth of confusion and war in which that respectable individual might wish to involve them.
The course taken by Turkey in beginning the war was against the strong ad-
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vice of her allies; but notwithstanding this, the moment the step was taken, they turned round again, as in the case of the Vienna note, and justified and defended her in the course she had adopted, in defiance of the remonstrances they had urged against it. In his speech to-night, the noble Lord. (Lord J. Russell) has occupied some time in showing that Turkey was fully justified in declaring war. I should say nothing against that view, if Turkey were fighting on her own resources; but I maintain that, if she is in alliance with England and France, the opinions of those Powers should at least have been heard, and that, in case of her refusal to listen to their counsel, they would have been justified in saying to her, "If you persist in taking your own course, we cannot be involved in the difficulties to which it may give rise, but must leave you to take the consequences of your own acts." But this was not said, and the result is, that we are dragged into a war by the madness of the Turk, which, but for the fatal blunders we have committed, we might have avoided.
There have been three plans for dealing with this Turkish question, advocated by as many parties in this country. The first finds favour with two or three Gentlemen who usually sit on the bench below me—with a considerable number out of doors—and with a portion of the public press. These persons were anxious to have gone to war during last summer. They seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to Russia, and without considering the calamities in which they might involve this country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, as they imagined, on behalf of European freedom, and in order to cripple the resources of Russia. I need hardly say that I have not a particle of sympathy with that party, or with that policy. I think nothing can be more unwise than that party, and nothing more atrocious than their policy. But there was another course recommended, and which the Government has followed. War delayed, but still certain—arrangements made which placed the issue of war in other hands than in those of the Government of this country—that is the policy which the Government has pursued, and in my opinion it is fatal to Turkey, and disastrous to England. There is a third course, and which I should have, and indeed have all along recommended—that war should have been avoided by the acceptance on the part of Turkey either of the last note of Prince Menchi-

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koff, or of the Vienna note; or, if Turkey would not consent to either, that then she should have been allowed to enter into the war alone, and England and France—supposing they had taken, and continued to take, the same view of the interests of Western Europe which they have hitherto taken—might have stood aloof until the time when there appeared some evident danger of the war being settled on terms destructive of the balance of power; and then they might have come in, and have insisted on a different settlement. I would either have allowed or compelled Turkey to yield, or would have insisted on her carrying on the war alone. The question is, whether the advantages both to Turkey and England of avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which are likely to arise from the policy which the Government has pursued? Now, if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is right in saying that Turkey is a growing Power, and that she has elements of strength which unlearned persons like myself know nothing about, surely no immediate, or sensible, or permanent mischief could have arisen to her from the acceptance of the Vienna note, which all the distinguished persons who agreed to it have declared to be perfectly consistent with her honour and independence. If she has been growing stronger and stronger of late years, surely she would have grown still stronger in the future, and there might have been a reasonable expectation that, whatever disadvantages she might have suffered for a time from that note, her growing strength would have enabled her to overcome, and the peace of Europe might have been preserved. But suppose that Turkey is not a growing Power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to its fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled them more rapidly to grow in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to supplant the Mahomedan rule, and to establish themselves in Constantinople as a Christian State, which, I think every man who hears me will admit is infinitely more to be desired than that the Mahomedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of France and the fleets of England. Europe would thus have been
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at peace; for I do not think even the most bitter enemies of Russia believe that the Emperor of Russia intended last year, if the Vienna note or Prince Menchikoff's last and most moderate proposition had been accepted, to have marched on Constantinople. Indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to withdraw his troops at once from the Principalities, if the Vienna note were accepted; and therefore in that case Turkey would have been delivered from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time have been secured to Europe; and the whole matter would have drifted on to its natural sohttion—which is, that the Mahomedan power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of the Christian population of the Turkish territories. The noble Lord the Member for London, and his Colleague the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, when they speak of the aggrandisement of Russia relatively to the rest of Europe, always speak of the "balance of power," a term which it is not easy to define. It is a hackneyed term—a phrase to which it is difficult to attach any definite meaning. I wish the noble Lord would explain what is meant by the balance of power. In 1791, the whole Whig party repudiated the proposition that Turkey had anything to do with the balance of power. Mr. Burke, in 1791, when speaking on that subject, used the following language:—
"He had never heard it said before, that the Turkish empire was ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. They had nothing to do with European policy; they considered themselves as wholly Asiatic. What had these worse than savages to do with the Powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction, and pestilence among them? The Ministry and the policy which would give these people any weight in Europe, would deserve all the bans and curses of posterity. All that was holy in religion, all that was moral and humane, demanded an abhorrence of everything which tended to extend the power of that cruel and wasteful empire. Any Christian Power was to be preferred to these destructive savages.
Mr. Whitbread, on the same occasion, said:—
"Suppose the Empress at Constantinople, and the Turks expelled from the European provinces, would any unprejudiced man contend that by such an event mankind would not be largely benefited? Would any man contend that the expulsion of a race of beings whose abominable tyranny proscribed the arts, and literature, and everything that was good, and great, and amiable, would not conduce to the prosperity and happiness of the world? He was convinced it would. This was an event with which the paltry consideration of the

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nice adjustment of the balance in Europe was not to be put in competition, although he was a friend to that balance on broad and liberal principles. He abhorred the wretched policy which could entertain a wish that the most luxuriant part of the earth should remain desolate and miserable, that a particular system might be maintained."
And Mr. Fox, when speaking of Mr. Pitt's system, said,—and be it remembered that nobody is so great an authority with the noble Lord the Member for London as Mr. Fox, whose words I am now about to quote:—
"His (Mr. Pitt's) defensive system was wicked and absurd—that every country which appeared, from whatever cause, to be growing great, should be attacked; that all the Powers of Europe should be confined to the same precise situation in which this defensive system found them." "Her (Russia's) extent of territory, scanty revenue, and thin population, made her power by no means formidable to us—a Power whom we could neither attack nor be attacked by; and this was the Power against which we were going to war. Overturning the Ottoman empire he conceived to be an argument of no weight. The event was not probable; and if it should happen, it was more likely to be of advantage than injurious to us."
It will probably be said, that these were opinions held by Gentlemen who sat on that side of the House, and who were ready to advocate any course that might serve to damage the Ministers of the day. I should be sorry to think so, especially of a man whose public character is so much to be admired as is that of Mr. Fox; but I will come to a much later period, and produce authority of a very similar kind. Many hon. Members now in the House recollect the late Lord Holland, and they all know his sagacity and what his authority was with the party with which he was connected. What did he say? Why, so late as the year 1828, when this question was mooted in the House of Lords, he said:—
"No, my Lords, I hope I shall never see—God forbid I ever should see—for the proposition would be scouted from one end of England to another—any preparations or any attempt to defend this our 'ancient ally' from the attacks of its enemies. There was no arrangement made in that treaty for preserving the crumbling and hateful, or, as Mr. Burke called it, that wasteful and disgusting empire of the Turks, from dismemberment and destruction; and none of the Powers who were parties to that treaty will ever, I hope, save the falling empire of Turkey from ruin."
I hope it will not be supposed that I am animated by any hostility to Turkey, in quoting sentiments and language such as this, for I have as much sympathy with what is just towards that country as any other man can have; but the question is,
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not what is just to Turkey, but what is just to this country, and what this House, as the depositary of the power of this country, has a right to do with regard to this most dangerous question. I am, therefore, at liberty to quote from the statesmen of 1791 and 1828, the political fathers and authorities of the noble Lord the Member for London, and to say, that if I hold opinions different from those held by the Government, I am, at least, not singular in those opinions, for I can quote great names and high authorities in support of the course I am taking. This "balance of power" is in reality the hinge on which the whole question turns. But if that is so important as to be worth a sanguinary war, why did you not go to war with France when she seized upon Algiers? That was a portion of Turkey not quite so distinct, it is true, as are the Danubian Principalities; but still Turkey had sovereign rights over Algiers. When, therefore, France seized on a large portion of the northern coast of Africa, might it not have been said that such an act tended to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake,—that Algiers lay next to Tunis, and that, having conquered Tunis, there would remain only Tripoli between France and Alexandria, and that the "balance of power" was being destroyed by the aggrandisement of France? All this might have been said, and the Government might easily have plunged the country into war on that question. But happily the Government of that day had the good sense not to resist, and the result had not been disadvantageous to Europe; this country had not suffered from the seizure of Algiers, and England and France had continued at peace. Take another case—the case of the United States. The United States waged war with Mexico—a war with a weaker State—in my opinion an unjust and unnecessary war. If I had been a citizen of the American Republic, I should have condemned that war; but might it not have been as justly argued that, if we allowed the aggressive attacks of the United States upon Mexico, her insatiable appetite would soon be turned towards the north—towards the dependencies of this empire—and that the magnificent colonies of the Canadas would soon fall a prey to the assaults of their rapacious neighbour? But such arguments were not used, and it was not thought necessary to involve this country in a war for the support of Mexico, although the

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Power that was attacking that country lay adjacent to our own dominions. If this phrase of the "balance of power" is to be always an argument for war, the pretence for war will never be wanting, and peace can never be secure. Let any one compare the power of this country with that of Austria now, and forty years ago. Will any one say that England, compared with Austria, is not now three times as powerful as she was thirty or forty years ago? Austria has a divided people, bankrupt finances, and her credit is so low, that she cannot borrow a shilling out of her own territories; England has a united people, national wealth rapidly increasing, and a mechanical and productive power to which that of Austria is as nothing. Might not Austria complain that we have disturbed the "balance of power" because we are growing so much stronger from better government, from the greater union of our people, from the wealth that is created by the hard labour and skill of our population, and from the wonderful development of the mechanical resources of the kingdom, which is seen on every side? If this phrase of the "balance of power," the meaning of which nobody can exactly make out, is to be brought in on every occasion, to stimulate this country to war, there is an end to all hope of permanent peace. There is, indeed, a question of a "balance of power" which this country might regard, if our statesmen had a little less of those narrow views which they sometimes arrogantly impute to me, and to those who think with me. If they could get beyond those old notions which belong to the traditions of Europe, and cast their eyes as far westward as they are now looking eastward, they might there see a power growing up in its gigantic proportions, which will teach us before very long where the true "balance of power" is to be found. This struggle may indeed begin with Russia, but it may end with half the States of Europe; for Austria and Prussia are just as likely to join with Russia as with England and France, and probably much more so; and we know not how long alliances which now appear very secure, may remain so; for the circumstances in which the Government has involved us are of the most critical character, and we stand upon a mine which may explode any day. Give us seven years of this infatuated struggle upon which we are now entering, and let the United States remain at peace during that period, and who shall say what will then
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be the relative positions of the two nations? Have you read the Reports of your own Commissioners to the New York Exhibition? Do you comprehend what is the progress of that country, as exhibited in its tonnage, and exports, and imports, and manufactures, and in the development of all its resources, and the means of transit? There has been nothing like it hitherto under the sun. The United States may profit to a large extent by the calamities which will befall us; whilst we, under the miserable and lunatic idea that we are about to set the worn-out Turkish empire on its legs, and permanently to sustain it against the aggressions of Russia, are entangled in a war. Our trade will decay and diminish—our people, suffering and discontented, as in all former periods of war, will emigrate in increasing numbers to a country whose wise policy it is to keep itself free from the entanglement of European politics—to a country with whom rests the great question, whether England shall, for any long time, retain that which she professes to value so highly—her great superiority in industry and at sea. This whole notion of "the balance of power" is a mischievous delusion which has come down to us from past times; we ought to drive it from our minds, and to consider the solemn question of peace or war on more clear, more definite, and on far higher principles than any that are involved in the phrase, "the balance of power." What is it the Government propose to do? Let us examine their policy as described in the message from the Crown, and in the Address which has been moved to-night. As I understand it, we are asked to go to war to maintain the "integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire"—to curb the aggressive power of Russia—and to defend the interests of this country. These are the three great objects to which the efforts and resources of this country are to be directed. The noble Lord the Member of London is, I think, the author of the phrase, "the integrity and independence" of Turkey. If 1 am not mistaken, he pledged himself to this more than a year ago, when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to somebody at Newcastle-on-Tyne, in answer to an Address from certain enthusiasts in that town, who exhorted the Government to step in for the support of the Ottoman empire. But what is the condition of that empire at this moment? I have already described to the House what it would have been if my policy had

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been adopted—if the thrice-modified note of Prince Menchikoff had been accepted, or if the Vienna note had been assented to by the Porte. But what is it now under the protection of the noble Lord and his Colleagues? At the present moment there are no less than three foreign armies on Turkish soil: there are 100,000 Russian troops in Bulgaria; there are armies from England and France approaching the Dardanelles, to entrench themselves on Turkish territory, and to return nobody knows when. All this can hardly contribute to the "independence" of any country. But more than this; there are insurrections springing up in almost every Turkish province, and insurrections which must, from the nature of the Turkish Government, widely extend; and it is impossible to describe the anarchy which must prevail, inasmuch as the control heretofore exercised by the Government to keep the peace is now gone, by the withdrawal of its troops to the banks of the Danube; and the licence and demoralisation engendered by ages of bad government will be altogether unchecked. In addition to these complicated horrors, there are 200,000 men under arms; the state of their finances is already past recovery; and the allies of Turkey are making demands upon her far beyond anything that was required by Russia herself. Can anything be more destructive of the "integrity and independence" of Turkey than the policy of the noble Lord? I have seen only this day a letter in the Times from its correspondent at Constantinople, which states that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and one of the Pashas of the Porte had spent a whole night in the attempt to arrange concessions which her allies had required on behalf of the Christian population of Turkey. The Christians are to be allowed to hold landed property; the capitation tax is to be abolished—for they are actually contending for the abolition of that which the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) says is a positive benefit to those upon whom it is imposed; and the evidence of Christians is to be admitted into courts of justice. But the Times' correspondent asks, what is the use of a decree at Constantinople, which will have no effect in the provinces?—for the judges are Turks of the old school, and they will have little sympathy with a change under which a Christian in a court of justice is made equal with his master the Turk. This correspondent describes what Turkey really wants—not three fo-
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reign armies on her soil, nor any other thing which our Government is about to give her, but "a pure executive, a better financial administration, and sensible laws;" and it must be admitted that the true wants of the country are not likely soon to be supplied. Now, so far as regards Turkey herself, and the "integrity and independence" of that empire, I put it seriously to the House—do you believe, if the Government and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had advised Turkey to accept the last note of Prince Menchikoff, a note so little different from the others, offered before and since, that it was impossible to discover in what the distinction consisted; or if the Government had insisted on Turkey accepting, as the condition of their co-operation, the Vienna note, either as at first proposed by the Conference, or with the explanatory definitions with which the Emperor of Russia at Olmutz offered to accept it, that they would have injured the "integrity and independence" of Turkey? Nay, I will not insult you by asking whether, under such circumstances, that "integrity and independence" would not have been a thousand times more secure than it is at this hour? If that be true, then the "balance of power" theory has been entirely overthrown by the policy of the Government, for no one will argue that Turkey will come out of her present difficulties more able to cope with the power of Russia than she was before. With her finances hopelessly exhausted, will she ever again be able to raise an army of 200,000 men? But there are men, and I suspect there are statesmen, in this country, and men in office, too, who believe that Turkey will not be Turkey at the end of this war—that she cannot come out of it an Ottoman Power—that such a convulsion has been created, that while we are ready to contend with half the world to support the "integrity and independence" of the Ottoman empire, there will shortly be no Ottoman empire to take the benefit of the enormous sacrifices we are about to make.
But we are undertaking to repress and to curb Russian aggression. These are catching words; they have been amplified in newspapers, and have passed from mouth to mouth, and have served to blind the eyes of multitudes wholly ignorant of the details of this question. If Turkey has been in danger from the side of Russia heretofore, will she not be in far greater danger when the war is over? Russia is always there. You do not pro-

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pose to dismember Russia, or to blot out her name from the map, and her history from the records of Europe. Russia will be always there—always powerful, always watchful, and actuated by the same motives of ambition, either of influence or of territory, which are supposed to have moved her in past times. What, then, do you propose to do? and how is Turkey to be secured? Will you make a treaty with Russia, and force conditions upon her? But if so, what security have you that one treaty will be more binding than another? It is easy to find or make a reason for breaking a treaty, when it is the interest of a country to break it. I recollect reading a statement made by the illustrious Washington, when it was proposed to land a French army in North America, to assist the colonies in overthrowing the yoke of this country. Washington was afraid of them—he did not know whether these allies once landed might not be as difficult to get rid of as the English troops he was endeavouring to expel; for, said he, "whatever may be the convention entered into, my experience teaches me that nations and Governments rarely abide by conventions or treaties longer than it is their interest to do so." So you may make a treaty with Russia; but if Russia is still powerful and ambitious—as she certainly will be—and, if Turkey is exhausted, and enfeebled by the war—as she certainly will be—then I want to know what guarantee you have, the moment the resources of Russia have recovered from the utmost degree of humiliation and exhaustion to which you may succeed in reducing her, that she will not again insist on terms with Turkey infinitely more perilous than those you have now ruined Turkey by urging her to refuse? It is a delusion to suppose you can dismember Russia—that you can blot her from the map of Europe—that you can take guarantees from her, as some seem to imagine, as easily as you take bail from an offender, who would otherwise go to prison for three months. England and France cannot do this with a stroke of the pen, and the sword will equally fail if the attempt be made.
But I come now to another point. How are the interests of England involved in this question? This is, after all, the great matter which we, the representatives of the people of England, have to consider. It is not a question of sympathy with any other State. I have sympathy with Turkey; I have sympathy with the serfs of
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Russia; I have sympathy with the people of Hungary, whose envoy the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton refused to see, and the overthrow of whose struggle for freedom by the armies of Russia he needlessly justified in this House; I have sympathy with the Italians, subjects of Austria, Naples, and the Pope; I have sympathy with the three millions of slaves in the United States; but it is not on a question of sympathy that I dare involve this country, or any country, in a war which must cost an incalculable amount of treasure and of blood. It is not my duty to make this country the knight-errant of the human race, and to take upon herself the protection of the thousand million of bunion beings who have been permitted by the Creator of all things to people this planet. I hope no one will assume that I would invite—that is the phrase which has been used—the aggressions of Russia. If I were a Russian, speaking in a Russian Parliament, I should denounce any aggression upon Turkey, as I now blame the policy of our own Government; and I greatly fear I should find myself in a minority, as I now find myself in a minority on this question. But it has never yet been explained how the interests of this country are involved in the present dispute. We are not going to fight for tariffs, or for markets for our exports. In 1791, Mr. Grey argued that, as our imports from Russia exceeded 1,000,000 l. sterling, it was not desirable that we should go to war with a country trading with us to that amount. In 1853, Russia exported to this country at least 14,000,000 l. sterling, and that fact affords no proof of the increasing barbarism of Russia, or of any disregard of her own interests as respects the development of her resources. What has passed in this House since the opening of the present Session? We had a large surplus revenue, and our Chancellor of the Exchequer is an ambitious Chancellor. I have no hope in any statesman who has no ambition; he can have no great object before him, and his career will be unmarked by any distinguished services to his country. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer entered office, doubtless be hoped, by great services to his country, to build up a reputation such as a man may labour for and live for. Every man in this House, even those most opposed to him, acknowledged the remarkable capacity which he displayed during the last Session, and the country has set its seal to this—that his financial measures, in the remission and

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readjustment of taxation, were worthy of the approbation of the great body of the people. The right hon. Gentleman has been blamed for his speech at Manchester, not for making the speech, but because it differed from the tone of the speech made by the noble Lord, his Colleague in office, at Greenock. I observed that difference. There can be no doubt that there has been, and that there is now, a great difference of opinion in the Cabinet on this Eastern question. It could not be otherwise; and Government has gone on from one step to another; they have drifted—to use the happy expression of Lord Clarendon to describe what is so truly unhappy—they have drifted from a state of peace to a state of war; and to no Member of the Government could this state of things be more distressing than to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for it dashed from him the hopes he entertained that Session after Session, as trade extended and the public revenue increased, he would find himself the beneficent dispenser of blessings to the poor, and indeed to all classes of the people of this kingdom. Where is the surplus now? No man dare even ask for it, or for any portion of it. Here is my right hon. Friend and Colleague, who is resolved on the abolition of the newspaper stamp. I can hardly imagine a more important subject than that, if it be desirable for the people to be instructed in their social and political obligations; and yet my right hon. Friend has scarcely the courage to ask for the abolition of that odious tax. I believe, indeed, that my right hon. Friend has a plan to submit to the Chancellor by which the abolition of the stamp may be accomplished without sacrifice to the Exchequer, but that I will not go into at present. But this year's surplus is gone-and next year's surplus is gone with it; and you have already passed a Bill to double the income tax. And it is a mistake to suppose that you will obtain double the sum by simply doubling the tax. Many persons make an average of their incomes, and make a return accordingly. The average will not be sustained at the bidding of Parliament; and profits that were considerable last year, will henceforth show a great diminution, or will have vanished altogether. I mention this for the benefit of the country Gentlemen, because it is plain that real property, lands and houses, must bear the burden of this war; for I will undertake to say, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will prefer to leave that
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bench, and will take his seat in some other quarter of the House rather than retrace the steps which Sir Robert Peel took in 1842. He is not the promoter of this war; his speeches have shown that be is anxious for peace, and that he hoped to be a Minister who would dispense fiscal blessings to the people; and I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman will consent to be made the instrument to reimpose upon the country the Excise duties which have been repealed, or the import duties which, in past times, inflicted such enormous injury upon trade. The property tax is the lever, or the weapon, with which the proprietors of lands and houses in this kingdom will have to support the "integrity and independence" of the Ottoman empire. Gentlemen, I congratulate you, that every man of you has a Turk upon his shoulders. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) spoke of our "triumphant position"—the position in which the Government has placed us by pledging this country to support the Turks. I see nothing like a triumph in the fact, that in addition to our many duties to our own country, we have accepted the defence of twenty millions or more of the people of Turkey, on whose behalf, but, I believe, not for their benefit, we are about to sacrifice the blood and treasure of England. But there are other penalties and other considerations. I will say little about the Reform Bill, because, as the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) is aware, I do not regard it as an unmixed blessing. But I think even hon. Gentlemen opposite will admit that it would be well if the representation of the people in this House were in a more satisfactory state, and that it is unfortunate that we are not permitted, calmly and with mutual good feeling, to consider the question, undisturbed by the thunder of artillery, and undismayed by the disasters which are inseparable from a state of war. With regard to trade, I can speak with some authority as to the state of things in Lancashire. The Russian trade is not only at an end, but it is made an offence against the law to deal with any of our customers in Russia. The German trade is most injuriously affected by the uncertainty which prevails on the continent of Europe. The Levant trade, a very important branch, is almost extinguished in the present state of affairs in Greece, Turkey in Europe, and Syria. All property in trade is diminishing in value, whilst its burdens are increasing.

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The funds have fallen in value to the amount of about 120,000,000 l. sterling, and railway property is quoted at about 80,000,000 l. less than was the case a year ago. I do not pretend to ask the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) to put these losses, these great destructions of property, against the satisfaction he feels at the "triumphant position" at which we have arrived. He may content himself with the dream that we are supporting the "integrity and independence" of Turkey, though I doubt whether bringing three foreign armies on her soil, raising insurrections in her provinces, and hopelessly exhausting her finances, is a rational mode of maintaining her as an independent Power. But we are sending out 30,000 troops to Turkey, and in that number are not included the men serving on board the fleets. Here are 30,000 lives! There is a thrill of horror sometimes when a single life is lost, and we sigh at the loss of a friend—or of a casual acquaintance! But here we are in danger of losing, and I give the opinions of military men and not my own merely—10,000, or it may be 20,000 lives, that may be sacrificed in this struggle. I have never pretended to any sympathy for the military profession—but I have sympathy for my fellow-men and fellow-countrymen, wherever they may be. I have heard very melancholy accounts of the scenes which have been witnessed in the separations from families occasioned by this expedition to the East. But, it will be said, and probably the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton will say, that it is a just war, a glorious war, and that I am full of morbid sentimentality, and have introduced topics not worthy to be mentioned in Parliament. But these are matters affecting the happiness of the homes of England, and we, who are the representatives and guardians of those homes, when the grand question of war is before us, should know at least that we have a case—that success is probable—and that an object is attainable commensurate with the cost of war. There is another point which gives me some anxiety. You are boasting of an alliance with France. Alliances are dangerous things. It is an alliance with Turkey that has drawn us into this war. I would not advise alliances with any nation, but I would cultivate unity with all nations. I would have no alliance that might drag us into measures, which is neither our duty nor our interest to undertake. By our present alliance with Turkey, Turkey can-
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not make peace without the consent of England and France; and, by this boasted alliance with France we may find ourselves involved in great difficulties at some future period of these transactions. Sir, I have endeavoured to look at the whole of this question, and I declare, after studying the correspondence which has been laid on the table—knowing what I know of Russia and of Turkey—seeing what I see of Austria and of Prussia—feeling the enormous perils to which this country is now exposed, I am amazed at the course which the Government have pursued, and I am horrified at the results to which their policy must inevitably tend. I do not say this in any spirit of hostility to the Government. I have never been hostile to them. I have once or twice felt it my duty to speak, with seine degree of sharpness, of particular Members of the Administration, but I suspect that in private they would admit that my censure was merited. But I have never entertained a party hostility to the Government. I know something of the difficulties they have had to encounter, and I have no doubt that, in taking office, they acted in as patriotic a spirit as is generally expected from Members of this House. So long as their course was one which I could support, or even excuse, they have had my support. But this is not an ordinary question; it is not a question of reforming the University of Oxford, or of abolishing "ministers' money" in Leland; the matter now before us affects the character, the policy, and the vital interests of the empire; and when I think the Government have committed a grievous—it may be a fatal error—I am bound to tell them so. I am told indeed that the war is popular, and that it is foolish and eccentric to oppose it. I doubt if the war is very popular in this House. But as to what is, or has been popular, I may ask, what was more popular than the American war? There were persons lately living in Manchester who had seen the recruiting party going through the principal streets of that city, accompanied by the parochial clergy in full canonicals, exhorting the people to enlist to put down the rebels in the American colonies. Where is now the popularity of that disastrous and disgraceful war, and who is the man to defend it? But if hon. Members will turn to the correspondence between George III. and Lord North, on the subject of that war, they will find that the King's chief argument for continuing the war was, that it would be dishonourable in him to

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make peace so long as the war was popular with the people. Again, what war could be more popular than the French war? Has not the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) said, not long ago, in this House, that peace was rendered difficult if not impossible by the conduct of the English press in 1803? For myself I do not trouble myself whether my conduct in Parliament is popular or not. I care only that it shall be wise and just as regards the permanent interests of my country, and I despise from the bottom of my heart the man who speaks a word in favour of this war, or of any war which he believes might have been avoided, merely because the press and a portion of the people urge the Government to carry it on. I recollect a passage of a distinguished French writer and statesman which bears strongly upon our present position; he says:—
"The country which can comprehend and act upon the lessons which God has given it in the past events of its history, is secure in the most imminent crises of its fate."
The past events of our history have taught me that the intervention of this country in European wars is not only unnecessary, but calamitous; that we have rarely come out of such intervention having succeeded in the objects we fought for: that a debt of 800,000,000 l. sterling has been incurred by the policy which the noble Lord approves, apparently for no other reason than that it dates from the time of William III.; and that, not debt alone has been incurred, but that we have left Europe at least as much in chains as before a single effort was made by us to rescue her from tyranny. I believe if this country, seventy years ago, had adopted the principle of nonintervention in every case where her interests were not directly and obviously assailed, she would have been saved from much of the pauperism and brutal crimes by which our Government and people have alike been disgraced. This country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated. We should indeed have had less of military glory. We might have had neither Trafalgar nor Waterloo; but we should have set a high example of a Christian nation, free in its institutions, courteous and just in its conduct towards all foreign States, and resting its policy on the unchangeable foundation of Christian morality.
MR. J. BALLsaid, perhaps it would
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not be improper that a few observations should be made by the representative of a country none of whose Members had yet taken part in these debates. He agreed with the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) that none of the reasons for war to which he had referred were just or satisfactory to the House. He agreed with him that the maintenance of the balance of power was not a sufficient justification for war; but yet he was prepared to support the war. He agreed with the hon. Member that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Turkey was not a sufficient justification for war, but yet he was prepared to support the war. He agreed with him that the support of the commerce and trade of England was not a sufficient justification for war, but yet he was prepared to support the war. He believed that the real justification was larger, vaster, higher, and nobler than any of these—it was the maintenance in civilised society of the principles of right and justice. That, he thought, was the real ground on which the war was to be justified. What was it among individuals that cemented them into cities and States but the maintenance of law? and if the day should come, as the hon. Member for Manchester thought, when war would be impossible, and peace be a necessity, he believed that could only happen in one way—not from any idea of self-interest as a nation, but from a recognition of the principles of justice in relation to nations as well as to individuals. The hon. Member for Manchester had quoted, and had seemed to approve, the idea that nations must and would trick throughout all treaties and engagements whenever it suited their convenience so to do. Against that doctrine he protested. He believed there was in the minds of men, and in the heart of nations, something higher than self-interest—conscience—and that conscience might supply motives more powerful, as well as more worthy, than mere considerations of self. The hon. Member for Manchester had spoken of Turkey's declaring war; but he had said nothing of the unjustifiable invasion of the territory of the Sultan which led to that declaration; no doubt if there were not that unprovoked invasion our conduct would be most erroneous. The hon. Member had asked, why not force Turkey to adopt the Menchikoff note? Because to have done so would have been as great an invasion of her rights as the occupation of the Principalities. The people

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of this country would approve the war if it was clearly stated that the cause of resistance to Russia was the cause of resistance to wrong, and if there was no attempt made by our Government unduly to interfere with that of Turkey. He would beg to conclude by expressing his dissent from the view taken by the hon. Member, that the correspondence published argued a want of unanimity in the Cabinet.
THE MARQUESS OF GRANBYsaid, it had been a matter of deep regret to him to hear the tone and language which had been used that night by hon. Members on the other side of the House, in speaking of the conduct of the Emperor of Russia in the recent transactions in the East. That aggression might be real and might be most dangerous to the interests of this country, but he thought it would be more becoming this great and powerful nation to enter into the discussion of the question in the spirit of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), than in the language which he had heard used in the House that night. He had observed that tone with regret, for it was a tone and manner which the Emperor of Russia had not stooped to employ. The Emperor of Russia had given the Government of this country full credit for their efforts to maintain the peace of Europe—a credit which they had utterly denied to him. No matter what the Emperor of Russia might say or do, or what Her Majesty's Government might say or do, in his opinion there was still the same danger. Let them examine coolly into the case which had been set forth by the hon. Member for Manchester. He (the Marquess of Granby) knew that many hon. Gentlemen believed, that no matter what the Emperor of Russia might say or do, there was always some underhand dealing in his conduct; and if they entered on a discussion of these blue books and secret correspondence, actuated by such views, it was hardly possible that the House could arrive at a true or impartial conclusion. He would ask the House to remember, as it was stated by the hon. Member for Manchester, that France was in this case the first aggressor, though she had certainly made the amende honorable. Then it was said that the Emperor of Russia had acted fraudulently to this country, though he thought that when the House came to consider the whole question, the hon. Member who had made use of such an expression would see cause to regret it. Were not the demands which
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Prince Menchikoff had made in direct consequence of the demands which the French Government had put forward? Prince Menchikoff had stated in the first instance that the only two objects which the Imperial Government had in view were to obtain recompenses to the Greek Church for injuries done them through the concessions granted to the Latins, and to have some guarantee that such a state of things should not occur again. Prince Menchikoff had never required territorial aggrandisements; on the contrary, he only required that the subjection in which Turkey was held should be put a stop to. Prince Menchikoff's note, however, was rejected. Then came the Vienna note, which was drawn up by the French Government, and adopted by the Ambassadors of the four Powers—adopted after anxious and mature deliberation. The Emperor of Russia accepted that note. To that note of the four Powers the Emperor of Russia expressed his willingness to accede; and yet Her Majesty's Government stigmatised him as the disturber of the peace of Europe. Now, as far as he (the Marquess of Granby) understood the question, all that Russia asked was a kind of protectorate over the members of the Greek Church. Was there anything in that demand of which the British Government had reason to be afraid? Was there anything in that which would lead them to say the Emperor only wanted Constantinople? That was the secret of the whole case. The noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) had expressed himself to that effect, when he wrote to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 9th of February, 1853, saying that the more impartially Turkey was ruled, the less opportunity would it afford for the interference of the Court of Russia. What was it that the Emperor of Russia had done in all this which justified the abuse which had been levelled at him in the course of the present debate? While on the subject, he might say that he entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend below him (Mr. Disraeli), that if Her Majesty's Government had been more of one mind, or if Lord Aberdeen had had more command over the Cabinet, they would not now have been going to war with Russia. He also agreed with his right hon. Friend, that if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Lord Palmerston) had been at the head of the Government, there would have been no war; and he (the Marquess of Granby) believed that if the press of this country

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had possessed the power which was so often spoken of, there would likewise have been no war; though, above all, if the civil war which had been raging in the Cabinet had been put an end to, there would have been no war also. Reviewing all the circumstances of the case, he felt that the war into which the country was now plunged was mainly due to the vacillation and indecision exhibited by the Members composing Her Majesty's Government.
LORD DUDLEY STUARTsaid, he should be sorry that anything should fall from him calculated to disturb the unanimity in which, in his opinion, it became them to reply to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Message. At the same time he wished that they could have had from Her Majesty's Ministers some declaration of the views and objects they proposed to themselves in entering on this war. They knew that one of the objects was the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, but they required to be informed, now that Russia had wantonly forced on a war, whether increased taxation, the loss of trade and commerce, and probably a great loss of life, were to be submitted to without our experiencing a return equivalent to the sacrifices we made. They ought to be distinctly informed whether it was intended by means of this war to place Europe in a position to afford security for the future preservation of the peace. He was afraid, unless the war was undertaken with greater vigour than appeared to characterise the negotiations which preceded it, that this country and the whole of Europe would be forced into a state which lie could only describe as that of chronic war. It had been stated in the progress of the debate by an hon. Friend near him (Mr. Layard) that one portion of the Government was imbued with an anxiety—with a monomania for peace, while another part of it was sensible of the necessity of carrying on the war with vigour. That, perhaps, might account for the fact; but whatever was the reason of it, he must say that hitherto they had not seen that vigour in council which was necessary to carry every enterprise, whether of peace or of war, to a satisfactory and salutary conclusion. But he must impress upon the House the necessity, even the duty, of Ministers giving some information with regard to the proceedings of our fleet in the Black Sea. He hoped they would not shirk that question, and
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that they would tell the country what it had been doing, and what it was now doing. With every desire to give credit to the gallant Admirals, both of England and France, with one of whom he had the honour to be personally acquainted, and towards whom he entertained a feeling of friendship and respect, he must be permitted to say that affairs there wore a very ugly aspect. It had been said that the fleets were ordered to go into the Black Sea, and sweep the Russians out of it as early as the 8th of October; certainly, however, they were ordered to go there in January, and with most distinct injunctions not to allow any Russian ship they met with to hold the sea, but to call upon it to return to harbour, and, in case of resistance, to capture it, and bring it back to the Bosphorus. But how was it possible that such orders could be executed if the ships remained at Beicos Bay, where they had laid snugly at anchor ever since? Under these circumstances it was no wonder they did not fall in with the Russian fleet. Yet it was now stated that that fleet had come out from Sebastopol, had proceeded to the coast of Circassia, and had transported from thence a number of troops back to Russia, troops which might have been captured in security; and would it not be thought that on the first news of such an event reaching the Admirals that they would have been eager to make prizes of this audacious Russian fleet, which had thus come forth to beard the navies of England and France? No such thing—they only sent out two steamers to see what had happened! Now, such a course did not appear to him to prelude any great results. On the other hand, he was confident in the assertion that, if this war were properly carried on, it would be the most beneficial war that the country had ever undertaken. He believed that now we were at war, a great deal too much was said of peace. Peace was, no doubt, a thing to be desired by every humane and Christian person; the object, however, could alone be to obtain a peace of lasting duration, for the country would not be satisfied with a peace upon any other terms, and if Her Majesty's Ministers accepted any other, they would be unfit to direct the councils of a great nation like England. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester was one of those who thought that peace was to be desired before all other things—at all hazards and every cost. Why, no one could be for war in itself;

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this was only a state of transition. He looked upon war as upon a surgical operation, which was painful, dreadful, and only to be resorted to in cases of extreme necessity. And he did think that war would have the effect of placing Europe in a better condition than it was or had been in for a great number of years. Russia had now afforded the opportunity of placing it in such a position; and it was our part, our duty, to seize that opportunity, and if they did not, posterity would not pardon them. In days now passed a great crime had been perpetrated in -allowing the partition of Poland. At that moment they were expiating the pusillanimity which their forefathers had been guilty of. But let them take warning, and not suffer the present crisis to pass without taking such measures as shall for ever put a curb in the mouth of the haughty Muscovite. He had heard with very great satisfaction the speech made by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell); but more particularly was he satisfied with his declaration that no convention bad been entered into with regard to the internal affairs of Turkey. It was not that he disregarded the condition of the Christian inhabitants of that country, far from it. But if they once interfered by treaty, and made stipulations as to the internal affairs of any other country, they not only sinned against that great principle of non-intervention which had been proclaimed, and for many years acted on in this country, but they perpetrated the very wrong which they were taking up arms to prevent, and while they were sending fleets and armies to contend against Russia for interfering with the independence of Turkey, they would be committing acts inconsistent with that independence. It was not his intention to say one word to prevent the unanimity with which the Address was about to be accepted; but he hoped an answer would be given to the question he had put about the fleet. And he must say he did think the House of Commons and the country ought to have an assurance that the war would not be concluded without in some way or other clipping the claws of Russia, so that she might be rendered unable for the future to inflict upon this country and upon Europe the evils which at that moment they were suffering at her hands.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, I might, indeed, have wished, upon an occasion of such importance as the present, when Her Majesty has applied to Her Par-
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liament for support in a great contest, the magnitude and the importance of which it is impossible to deny, that questions arising out of detail, matters connected with the conduct of negotiations, might have been postponed to another and a more appropriate occasion, and that the House might have looked simply at the appeal which the Sovereign has made to it, and have responded unanimously, as I am sure it will; but not only unanimously, but without mixing up in its assurances of loyalty and devotion to the Crown any topics of a minor and subordinate character. At the same time, I know full well it is a privilege of this House, when questions are brought under its consideration by the Government, to discuss freely and minutely any topics which they may think properly connected with the subject under debate. I shall, however, be excused, I trust, if, not following the example of some of those who have gone before me, I do not pursue the steps of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) in all the detailed examinations on which he has thought it right to enter, of the conduct of the Government in the course of the long negotiations which have ended in the unhappy rupture now announced. There is, however, one topic to which my hon. Friend has alluded, and which I cannot allow to be passed over in silence. My hon. Friend has quoted divers passages from the Times newspaper. Taking it as the unquestionable organ of the British Government, and contrasting the opinions expressed in certain leading articles in the Times, he has opposed to those opinions the deliberate course, and the general principles, which Her Majesty's Government have followed and adopted. Now, Sir, I do not presume to inquire from what sources the newspapers of this country may take their inspirations, but if any inference is to be drawn from the identity of opinion expressed in those articles, and the opinions expressed by the Government of Russia, I should be disposed to draw a very different inference from that which the hon. Member has felt disposed to draw. And, if I were to search out the origin of the inspiration which dictated those articles, it is not to the English Government certainly that I should go, but I should be disposed rather to go to that of Russia.
Sir, I say that the question which tonight is submitted to the House is, whether Her Majesty shall receive that support of Parliament in the contest in which this country is about to be involved. Now, it

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is known, I think, to those who have given their attention to the affairs of Europe for a considerable time that the views of Russia upon Turkey are not of yesterday or even of this century. It is well known that for a great length of time it has been the standing and established policy of Russia to endeavour to obtain possession of at least the European part of Turkey, and subsequently of the Asiatic part. That policy has been pursued with undeviating and systematic efforts. It has been ever kept in view, and when opportunities have offered steps in advance have been made. When checks have been experienced those steps have been withdrawn, but only for the purpose of taking advantage of the next opportunity which offers. Delay has been no element in mitigating or inducing Russia to abandon its schemes. Its policy has been to keep one object in view—not to hide or to lose that object—but, perpetually grasping at its possession, to watch the course of the other Governments of Europe, and to take advantage of every opportunity that might present itself, by which it might get even the slightest advance towards the ultimate objects of its ambition. Nor, Sir, do I blame the Russian Government for entertaining such a policy. A policy of aggrandisement, pursued by legitimate means, is a policy which you may condemn as dangerous to yourselves, and oppose as destructive to the liberties and independence of other States, but it is without reproach to the Government that pursues it, provided it is pursued by open, undisguised, and avowed means, without concealment, without subterfuge, and without fraud. The course, I am sorry to say, which the Russian Government has pursued, at least in these recent transactions, has not been that open and straightforward course which would justify it in avowing and in boldly declaring its policy. But was it from ignorance that that policy was pursued? Did the Russian Government entertain any doubt whether aggrandisement in the direction of Turkey would or would not peril its relations with other countries? Why, Sir, no such inferences were ever excited. I had frequent occasions, when I held the seals of the Foreign Office, to communicate with an eminent Russian diplomatist upon the relations between the two countries, and his language to me was always this: he said:—"Russia and England entertain different views of constitutional principles. You think constitutional government the best, we think arbitrary government pre-
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ferable; you endeavour to propagate your notions, we naturally endeavour to support our own; but we have great European interests in common, and so long as we do not come into contact upon the affairs of Turkey—so long as England and Russia have no differences upon those important affairs—so long, I tell my Government, there is nothing in our opposite principles of government which will prevent England and Russia from acting amicably together in matters on which they have great and common interests." Then, what was it that made the Russian Government think that the recent occasion seized upon by it was favourable to the advancement of these long-cherished designs and wishes? Why, no doubt, Russia speculated upon differences—irreconcilable, as it thought—between England and France. It never imagined that there could be a cordial union between these two Powers. It speculated, too, upon the differences between England and Austria. It thought that the differences of opinion which had prevailed between the two Governments, and, to a certain degree, between the two nations, would prevent cordial action between them; and thinking, therefore, that there was disunion, and an impossibility of combination, among the great Powers of Europe, Russia thought that was a favourable moment for making another great step in the progress of aggrandisement towards Turkey. And that step was made with all the ability, with all the sagacity, which has ever characterised the policy of that able and ambitious Government. It sought no acquisition of territory, no rearrangement of the map of Europe—it sought that which was more useful to its views than the acquisition of any portion of the Turkish empire—it sought but the concession from the Sultan to the Emperor of the real sovereignty over the whole Christian population of Turkey. The hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) said he could not see what harm would have arisen from the Sultan accepting either the Menchikoff note or the Vienna note. Why, Sir, it is impossible for any man not to see that if, by a concession from the Sultan, the Emperor of Russia had been made the arbiter of all the concerns, religious, civil, and political, of the whole Christian population of the Turkish empire, the sovereignty of the Sultan would have been held simply at the will and discretion of the Emperor. And that is his object, and this is the greatest move that has for a length of time been

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made towards the extinction and partition of the Turkish empire. Sir, the Russian Government pursued that course with a secrecy and a concealment which showed the certainty of its convictions that that which it demanded was a thing which could not and ought not to be granted. The Turkish Government, acting with a just sense of that which was due to its own interests, consulted its allies. In the last memorandum of the secret correspondence, what is the language which the Russian Government uses in regard to its policy towards Turkey, and with regard to the manner in which the European Governments should also behave towards Turkey? Why, throughout, the Emperor of Russia professes an anxious desire to maintain Turkey as it is; apprehensions are expressed that that will not long be possible; but, he says, the mode of preventing it will be by the Powers of Europe abstaining from pressing imperious demands on Turkey, supported by menace. And that opinion is recorded at the very moment when Prince Menchikoff was doing at Constantinople the very thing which the Russian Government said the Governments of Europe ought to abstain from doing, if they wished to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey. I say, then, Sir, it is impossible for any man who has eyes in his head, or is capable of drawing a conclusion, to doubt there is a settled intention on the part of Russia to overrun and overthrow the Turkish empire for the purpose of establishing in the territory of Turkey the ascendancy and domination of Russia.
It may be said, "What of that?" "Is it possible," it is asked, "for us to maintain things as they are?" "The Turkish empire," the hon. Member for Manchester says, "is in a state of rapid and progressive decay," and that I am the only man in the world who is blind to that fact. I think the contrary is the truth. Why, I will appeal to the events of the last eight months in proof of the truth and the correctness of my opinion. Compare the resistance which Turkey has made within the last eight months to the arms of Russia with the military events of former years, and let any man say whether Turkey has not shown proofs of vitality and energy which few people imagined it could display under circumstances so embarrassing as those in which the country has been placed. And, Sir, among the reasons which, I have no doubt in my own mind—and, indeed, it is avowed in the correspondence—urged
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Russia to strike the blow at the present time was this, that the Russian Government was aware of the progressive improvement in Turkey tending yearly to strengthen the Turkish Government, and aware also that by this improvement, and by the progress in welfare and comfort of the whole of the Christian and Greek population, they were gradually withdrawing their eyes from Russia for support, and looking for their well-being and improvement to other sources than the Emperor of Russia. The Russian Government saw that the Christian population was slipping out of its hands, and that the Turkish Government was gradually getting too strong to be easily overthrown; and, therefore, it was thought no longer convenient to delay striking the blow.
But then some hon. Gentlemen say, "You are supporting Mahomedanism against Christianity." Why, Sir, that has nothing to do with the great question in which Europe is now about to engage. In the first place, I contend—as, indeed, the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) stated upon a former occasion—that, however much you may wish that those vast and fertile regions, the most favoured portions, almost, of the earth, should be ruled by a Christian Government and cultivated by a Christian population, the truth is, in the present state of those countries, the Mahomedan race is the only one that can keep the country together as an empire, and govern it as such. The Christian population, as every one who understands the subject is well aware, is divided into so many religious sects, into so many national divisions, into such minute fragments, that there is no one of them sufficiently powerful to rule over the whole, and no one of them that would probably submit with tranquillity to the domination of any other. The Turkish Government, therefore, affords the only method by which these great countries could be kept in a state of independence. But the real question is, not what you would wish to see established in the Turkish empire, but that which you are determined shall not be established—it is not what might be, but what for the interests of all Europe ought not to be. And that which ought not to be, and that which I trust Europe will take care shall not be, is the transfer of those countries to the sceptre of the Emperor of Russia. That is the object which, I trust, the Powers of Europe—I speak in the plural, because I trust the plural, and not the

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dual, will be the proper expression with regard to those Powers—have determined shall never take place.
The hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) asks, "What is our interest in this war?" and he also asked me to explain the meaning of the expression "the balance of power." Now, the hon. Member for Manchester and I differ so much upon almost every question involving great principles that I am afraid I shall be unable to gratify him by complying with his request to explain the meaning of the expression "the balance of power." I think, however, that a man of his unquestioned ability, of his extensive knowledge, who has arrived at the age which he has attained, and who has not by his intuitive perception acquired a knowledge of the meaning of the words "balance of power," is not likely to be greatly enlightened by any humble effort of mine. Why, Sir. call it what you like—"balance of power," or any other expression—it is one which has been familiar to the minds of all mankind from the earliest ages in all parts of the globe. "Balance of power" means only this—that a number of weaker States may unite to prevent a stronger one from acquiring a power which should be dangerous to them, and which should overthrow their independence, their liberty, and their freedom of action. It is the doctrine of self-preservation. It is the doctrine of self-defence, with the simple qualification that it is combined with sagacity and with forethought, and an endeavour to prevent imminent danger before it comes thundering at your doors. Now, Sir, I know that the hon. Member for Manchester is so attached to his principles—very properly and very sincerely so—that he thinks that peace is, of all things, the best, and that war is, of all things, the worst. Now, Sir, I happen to be of opinion that there are things for which peace may be advantageously sacrificed, and that there are calamities which a nation may endure which are far worse than war. This has been the opinion of men in all ages whose conduct has been admired by their contemporaries, and has obtained for them the approbation of posterity. The hon. Member, however, reduces everything to the question of pounds, shillings, and pence, and I verily believe that if this country were threatened with an immediate invasion likely to end in its conquest, the hon. Member would sit down, take a piece of paper, and would put on one side of the account the contribu-
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tions which his Government would require from him for the defence of the liberty and independence of the country, and be would put on the other the probable contributions which the general of the invading army might levy upon Manchester, and if he found that, on balancing the account, it would be cheaper to be conquered than to be laid under contribution for defence, he would give his vote against going to war for the liberties and independence of the country, rather than bear his share in the expenditure which it would entail. The hon. Member has a perfect right to entertain these opinions, and to avow them in this way; but I do not think that that is the general feeling of the country, and, therefore, I look with as much confidence for the vote of the House, and for the support of the country, in carrying out the policy which, by necessity, the Government have been compelled to adopt, as if the very eloquent—eloquent it certainly was—but somewhat hypothetical argument of the hon. Member had not been urged, to induce the House to take a different view of the matter. The real question which we have to consider is, not whether the Mussulman is better or worse than a Christian—whether it is desirable to hasten, more or less, those internal reforms which must sooner or later take place in the Turkish empire—not that we have proposed to Turkey a convention containing exactly the same declaration which we have urged Turkey to resist in the face of Russia—for nothing of the sort has been done—but I say the question is not, whether sooner or later, those reforms and that equality of religion and races shall take place in Turkey, which sooner or later must inevitably take place. The question we have to consider is this, whether Turkey is to lie prostrate at the feet of one great overwhelming Power—whether one Power is to bestride the globe from the north to the south, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, to dictate to Germany, to domineer in the Mediterranean, to have the whole of the rest of Europe at its mercy to deal with as it pleases—or whether that Power shall be taught that there are limits even to the ambition of a Czar—that there are limits even to the conquest of a military empire, of which one may say that the whole territory is one great camp, and the population one recruiting depôt—and that in spite of the power which a Sovereign may be able to sway—in spite of the military resources which he is able to command—that there

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does exist in the Powers of Europe a respect for the principles of national independence—that there does exist in the Powers of Europe a determination to resist the overwhelming encroachments of any Power, be that Power what it may—and that we are able, as we are willing, since resort to arms has become necessary, to maintain in arms, by sea and by land, the liberties of Europe and the independence of nations.
MR. DISRAELI: Sir, having had, on a previous occasion, the opportunity of making some remarks upon the papers on the table, I should not have presumed now to address you, but for two reasons; and the principal one is, that this being a Motion for an Address to the Crown in answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Message, I thought it hardly consistent with my duty to the Gentlemen with whom I have the honour of sitting, if I allowed it to pass entirely unnoticed on their part. I rise, sir, to support the Address which the noble Lord has moved. I rise to support it in the same spirit in which I endeavoured to express my opinions upon the first night that we met. Sir, the power of declaring war is the prerogative of the Crown. I look upon that prerogative as a real prerogative; and if Her Majesty sends a Message to Parliament, and informs us that She has found it necessary to engage in war, I hold that is not an occasion when we are to enter into the policy or impolicy of the advice by which Her Majesty has been guided. It is our duty, under such circumstances, to rally round the Throne, and to take subsequent and constitutional occasions to question the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers if it be not a proper one. Sir, I know that the expression of these opinions has subjected myself and others who sit on this side of the House to imputations which I think unjust; and, to my great surprise, those imputations have come from the Treasury bench. We have been told that it was not open to us to support Her Majesty under the circumstances to which we refer, and at the same time to reserve to ourselves the right of questioning the policy which has recommended Her Majesty to have recourse to such an extreme measure as war. But I must, on this occcasion, however, as I have done on previous occasions, vindicate the right of the Opposition not only to support the Government under the circumstances in which we feel it our duty to support the present Govern-
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ment, but at the same time to question the prudence of the counsels which has rendered it necessary that all parties in the nation should surround the Crown with their unanimous support. Sir, this question has before been argued in this House. I have met with a passage only this evening, which I will quote, because it not only is brief, but is part of a speech made by one who was a great favourite of the House, and whose words can never be quoted here without some effect. Mr. Canning was once taunted in the same spirit in which hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House have been taunted, because they support a Government carrying on a war, of which Government they, at the same time, disapprove. How did Mr. Canning meet this taunt? In answer to Mr. Sheridan, he said:—
"Mr. Sheridan has stated it as a matter of grave imputation against those who, like myself, are ready to vote for every measure of defence and preparation that the Minister may think proper to propose, that while we concur in such measures, we do not withhold expressions of distrust and disapprobation of the general conduct and system of the policy of those who propose them. It is urged as if there were something uncandid in not giving confidence to a Government at the moment the subject of debate is one on which you agree. Now, Sir, I am, on the contrary, of opinion that it would be much more uncandid and unfair to conceal our general sentiments at the moment of our expressing our approbation."
And he adds,—
"We are not ready, whatever we may think of the counsels by which we have been brought into our present danger—whatever we may think of the chance of being extricated from it by the same counsels; we are, therefore, not ready to obstruct those counsels in anything confessedly directed to that end—we are, therefore, not ready to deliver our common country defenceless into the possession of the enemy."
I think, Sir, that a complete vindication, and the best authority for the course that we have thought proper to adopt; and on this, and on all similar occasions, we shall feel it our duty to support Her Majesty in vindicating the honour of the country, and in defending the best interests of the empire.
Sir, there is another reason why I have ventured this night to rise. Since I expressed my opinion upon the documents—the weighty documents—which detail the conduct of the Government in the negotiations, and which were placed on the table at the meeting of Parliament, other documents have been added for our consideration, and, remembering the opinions which I have expressed, I cannot allow these

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documents to pass without some brief notice on my part. Those documents have been referred to in the course of the debate. They have been referred to by the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), in a speech of eminent ability, which I thought might have attracted more attention and a completer answer than it has yet received from Her Majesty's Ministers; and no doubt there is in these documents, and in the observations of the hon. Member for Aylesbury, much which I think cannot ultimately be passed by unnoticed by Her Majesty's Government. Sir, the hon. Gentleman who addressed the House after the noble Lord, referred, without circumlocution, to the fact that there was a discordance of opinion in the present Cabinet on the important policy which now occupies our consideration, and which has led to such vast results. I am the last person, I am sure, who would in this House fancifully assume any variance of opinion in a Cabinet. I think there is no weapon of opposition more illegitimate—I would say more unconstitutional, or, if I might use the language of the Emperor of Russia, more ungentlemanlike. I remember, some few years ago, when the present First Minister of the Crown, with the "aid," as we were informed by the present Leader of the House of Commons, "of some foreign conspirators"—and I am sure the noble Lord is a gentleman who would never make such a statement without due authority—I say that I remember, a few years ago, when the First Minister of the Crown, by the aid of foreign conspirators, prevailed upon the First Lord of the Admiralty, sitting opposite me, to impeach, as it were, a Secretary of State, who is also sitting opposite to me—I remember that I had occasion, both publicly and privately, to protest against a course of Parliamentary persecution which I thought so unjustified and unprecedented. It was my opinion, that as not the slightest evidence existed which could in any way make a difference, so far as the opinion of the Cabinet was concerned, between the noble Lord and his Colleagues, that nothing could be more unjust, nothing more unfair and unparliamentary, than to bring an attack against the noble Lord then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as distinct and isolated from his Colleagues. No circumstances had ever transpired which for a moment justified the belief that the foreign policy of the Cabinet of the noble Lord
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the Member for the City of London was not supported by the whole of his Colleagues; and in this House, although I highly disapproved of that foreign policy, and especially of the insurrectionary mission into Italy, I took the opportunity, when I presumed to address the House, of stating in the most distinct manner, so far as I was concerned, that my disapprobation was a disapprobation of the policy of the Cabinet, anti not of the policy of the individual.
Sir, I say that on that occasion not a circumstance had transpired which could authorise the belief that the Members of the Cabinet of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London had any difference of opinion upon foreign affairs, nor have I any reason to believe that they had. But is that the case at the present moment? The hon. Member for Aylesbury has called your attention to the strange contradiction in expression, in sentiment, and in conduct, that prevails upon this subject in the present Administration. On a previous occasion I have myself also alluded to it. Sir, we have Members of this present Cabinet who tell us that the integrity and independence of Turkey are facts, and facts of the utmost importance. We have Members of the present Cabinet who tell us that the integrity and independence of Turkey are not facts, but are phantoms and phrases. We have a Secretary of State in the other House of Parliament, and a Secretary in a most important department, so far as foreign policy is concerned, telling us that it is the interest and intention of England to secure for the Christian subjects of the Porte equal privileges with the Mussulman subjects of the Porte; and we have the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) to-night informing the House most positively, that the present Administration have no intention whatever of insisting upon such a policy. We have the war in this House called a blessing, and in another place we have it denounced as a curse; and, above all, about to embark in a war to uphold the independence of the Porte, we have the Foreign Minister of England, in a despatch which is read in the Senate of his country, announcing that, although we may succeed in crippling Russia in the coming struggle, the irretrievable destruction of Turkey is the most probable of events. I say then, Sir, that it is a fact that there is a difference of opinion in the present Cabinet—that there has been a difference of opinion in the pre-

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sent Cabinet on the policy which we ought to pursue between Russia and Turkey. Nor is it wonderful that that difference of opinion should exist. There have always been two theories upon that important subject which, in common phrase, is called "the Eastern question." Two theories have always existed, and each has been maintained by statesmen of eminence. There are statesmen who are of opinion that there is vitality in Turkey—that, far from being exhausted, it is a country full of resources, and of resources hitherto only imperfectly developed. There are statesmen, and the noble Lord opposite (Visct. Palmerston) is one of them, who believe that Turkey is a country not only qualified for independence, but absolutely capable of progress. Statesmen of this school, upholding these opinions, have been of opinion that, with wisdom and with firmness, Turkey might form a substantial and a real barrier against Russia. Then there is the other school, which believes that there is no vitality in Turkey—that it is decaying and decrepit—that its resources, always imperfectly developed, perhaps, are now virtually exhausted, and that it is totally impossible that it can long exist as an independent or quasi-independent community; and these statesmen, not wishing to hand over this rich prey to its powerful neighbour, have been of opinion that by encouraging the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and by advancing the civilisation and increasing the right of those classes, you might in time prepare a population for Turkey which would prevent that intermediate state of anarchy which otherwise would happen between the fall of a great empire and the rise of a new Power.
These, Sir, are opinions that may be entertained, and conscientiously entertained, by men of great abilities, however various the conclusions at which they arrive, and however opposite the results which they ultimately adopt. But it is a notorious fact that the present First Minister of the country has never concealed that he was a disciple, or rather a professor and votary, of the second class of opinions. He never has believed in the vitality of Turkey—he has never professed to believe in the vitality of Turkey—he has never professed that he believed it could be an independent State, and of course he could not believe it was a progressive one. He has been called upon in the course of his career to act on different occasions, when this great "Eastern question" has
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been placed before him for its solution or its management. The hon. Member fur Aylesbury has referred to several of those occasions. The year 1829 will not be easily forgotten. We have it upon record, that Lord Aberdeen, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the Duke of Wellington, agreed with the Russian Government that the Turkish ports in the Mediterranean should be blockaded, and if that blockade had been established Turkey could not perhaps have held out its first campaign—certainly could not have maintained itself during a second. I mention this because it is convenient at the present time, when the Duke of Wellington is no longer with us, to tell the world that the Duke of Wellington was Prime Minister and responsible for all that then occurred. But it is a well-known fact, and upon record, that the Duke of Wellington repudiated the agreement of Lord Aberdeen, as the Secretary of State who assented to the blockade, and it was owing to the Duke of Wellington that it was abrogated. We have it upon record—I heard it myself from the most illustrious of modern statesmen, and I do not doubt that there are some Gentlemen in the House who have heard it also—that Prince Metternich never would have encouraged Turkey to make a second campaign in 1829, had he not had a moral conviction that the British fleet would have entered the Black Sea; and we know that Lord Aberdeen prevented it. I do not say that he did not act from what he considered to be a sense of duty—that he thought, on the whole, it was much better that he should temporise and patch up the existence of a State which he believed to be in a condition, not only of rapid decay, but of impending dissolution—but if Lord Aberdeen on that occasion committed a great mistake, it should be remembered that he is the statesman who is called, at the present moment, to preside over the destinies of this country, at a time of a still more trying and stirring exigency, when the same materials are in action and the same questions are at issue.
Sir, I must now call the attention of the House to that mysterious document, the memorandum of 1844—a document which hardly anybody has referred to—to which the Member for Aylesbury has only slightly alluded, which has received but little attention from the press, and which certainly, from the way in which it has been placed before the House, without note or comment,

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I should not be much surprised if those who have been little accustomed to papers of this description were to pass by as a document little worth notice. But I hope to show to the House that this is one of the most important public documents which has ever been submitted to Parliament. I venture to say that nothing but the unprecedented circumstances which have occurred—circumstances unforeseen and unexpected, which must have confounded any Cabinet when they became known—could ever have brought that document under the consideration of the House of Commons. It is called the Memorandum of Count Nesselrode of June, 1844; but it is a document which, from the whole tenor of its expressions, from one end of it to the other, must be called and treated as an agreement, for it says, "to secure these objects of common interest, the Emperor agreed with Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers," and it goes on further to say that "this notion was, in principle, agreed on during the Emperor's last residence in England." In fact, this document, which is not very long, is drawn up and composed in a form which assumes that there is an agreement, and its object is to embody the spirit of that agreement which had been entered into between the then Government of England and the Emperor of Russia personally, during the visit of the Emperor to this country. Now, then, what are the points upon which the agreement takes place? The first point is nothing more nor less than a proposition for the partition of Turkey, made by the Emperor of Russia to the English Government. That is the first point in the document. The English Government is not asked to enter upon that partition to-day or to-morrow; but the very fact that such a suggestion was made, and that the subject was dwelt upon, shows that the time was not considered far distant. The first point, then, of the agreement is that there shall be a partition, when it becomes necessary, of the Turkish empire. And how is that partition to be effected? It is to be effected by the agency of Great Britain, and Russia, and Austria alone, with the studied omission of France—with the express, the intentionally express, omission of France. And the noble Lord who has just addressed us, speaking on a subject of which he is a master like a master, giving to the House all the reasons for the lamentable condition of affairs at present, tells the House he had no doubt that the catastrophe was precipitated, because when the present Govern-
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ment came into office, the Emperor of Russia had an idea that there was no good feeling between England and France. Why, Sir, there was no good feeling between Great Britain and France when the Minister of England, in the year 1844, agreed to the ultimate partition of the Turkish empire by England and Russia and Austria alone without French interference or intervention. Observe now that you have in this document the prospective partition of Turkey, you have the marked exclusion of France, and you have something else which is exceedingly connected with the subject of our discussion to-night. What does the Emperor say, and what does Lord Aberdeen agree with the Emperor in 1844? Although they were not then ready for the partition of Turkey, the Emperor says that the Turkish Government have a very awkward habit of freeing themselves, or endeavouring to free themselves, from engagements to which they are bound by treaty; and that, if they do that, and the parties with whom they are under treaty endeavour to enforce a fulfilment of their engagement, it is apt to create a jealousy among the other Powers. When a case of that kind occurs, and the Porte fails in its obligations towards one of the great Powers, it is suggested, and apparently agreed, that no other great Power shall interfere to countenance or support her.
But is there nothing else? Yes; the Emperor of Russia says that it is of great importance to vindicate the rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and the Emperor quits England in the belief that he has made this agreement—that he has made an agreement with the present Prime Minister of England, who was then Secretary of State: first, that when the time shall arrive there shall be a partition of Turkey, and that that partition shall be effected by Russia, Austria, and England alone, without the interference of France: secondly, that, in the meantime, he is to interfere in the government of Turkey upon pretence of treaties and treaty rights, which no other great Power is to question; and upon the pretence also of vindicating the rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte. But then, Sir, we are told that this was not an agreement—that it was only a memorandum of Count Nesselrode, found in our Foreign Office, and never heard of until it had been noticed in the St. Petersburg Gazette. What evidence of concord, it may be asked, is there?

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There is no signature of Lord Aberdeen. It is not a convention—it is not a protocol—it is only an understanding between two gentlemen, and two gentlemen who were old friends. But let me ask this of any one who has the courage to say that this was not an agreement between those two gentlemen—What was the answer which was sent to this document when it was forwarded from St. Petersburg? The English Minister is waited upon by the Russian Ambassador here, who gives him, with great form and ceremony, to hold as a sacred deposit, what affects to be the substance of an agreement entered into between the Emperor of Russia and the Ministers of Her Britannic Majesty. We have been told the result. The Minister received the document—locked it up in the Foreign Office—handed it over to his successor—invested it, in fact, with every accident and circumstance which could impart to it the character of a great State secret, but did not consider himself bound by it. Did he consider himself bound to give any answer to Count Nesselrode? Did he say, "I have received this which affects to be an agreement between the Emperor of Russia and the Government of Great Britain, but the notion of such an agreement is a complete dream—no such conferences ever took place; no such agreement was ever entered into; there ought to be no mistake on so grave and important a subject as the partition of an empire; and, in order to prevent misconception, I too send a memorandum." If he did that, where is the memorandum? Where is the answer to Count Nesselrode? I am bound to believe, in the absence of that document, that no answer was ever sent; I am bound to believe, therefore, that this document was received by Lord Aberdeen in the same spirit in which it was drawn up, and I am bound to look upon it as an agreement between Lord Aberdeen and the Emperor of Russia—in the first place as to the partition of Turkey, and, in the next place, as to the unquestioned and unchallenged interference of the Emperor of Russia in the government of Turkey, first, upon the ground of treaty rights, and secondly, as the champion and the vindicator of the Christian subjects of the Porte.
Well, then, Sir, let us see whether the document of the Czar is not materially affecting our position at the present day—whether it has not materially contributed to bring us into the position which we now occupy. And here, Sir, I am bound to
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say that I think the observations of the noble Lord were very fairly put, so far as they related to the ultimate intentions of the Emperor of Russia, or to the policy of his country. I think that upon this point considerable misconception prevails, and that nothing could be more inexpedient than that England should go to war because it thinks that any foreign potentate has not behaved with sufficient candour, or that the policy of a foreign Power has been dictated by an undue spirit of aggression. These are not causes which would warrant us in hazarding so great a stake of life and treasure. With respect to the first point—the personal conduct of the Emperor of Russia—I am bound to say that, having read this "secret and confidential" correspondence, I entirely acquit him of any duplicity. He informed us not only of his future plans, but of his present intentions; and I should say that a frankness, which is very remarkable, characterises that correspondence. As for saying that when secret and confidential letters are published in this way there may not be traits and details which may create an impression unfavourable to the individual, all I would observe on it is, that I should think hardly any Gentleman in this House would like his secret and confidential correspondence to be suddenly published to the world, and the whole of his character and conduct to be suddenly and severely guaged and ascertained by what might appear upon the face of that correspondence—a correspondence, in this instance by the way, which was not written or conducted by the principal. But if you come to the spirit of aggrandisement on the part of Russia, I am bound to say also that I think the noble Lord made a very just observation, that we should not be in too great a hurry to believe that Russia is animated by any extraordinarily immoral propensity to increase her territory. I do not think it becomes any of the great Powers of Europe to urge that topic. I do not understand how France—our faithful ally at this moment—can come into court with clean hands and urge as a complaint against the Emperor of Russia the fact of the occupation of the Principalities, while she herself is in possession of one of the most considerable of the Principalities of Turkey—namely, the province of Algiers. I do not think it becomes England to do so with her Indian wars, and her recent proceedings in Burmah. Nor do I think it becomes that country to which the hon.

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Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) has referred as one that had redressed the political equilibrium—I mean the United States, which has recently absorbed Texas—to come forward at this moment and dilate on the immoral tendencies and the immoral policy of Russia. We oppose the policy of Russia, because, if she succeeds in getting possession of Constantinople, we believe she will exercise such a preponderating influence in European politics as would be fatal to the civilisation of Europe, and injurious to the best interests of England,
Well, Sir, the class of politicians represented by the noble Lord in his speech tonight—who believe there is vitality in Turkey—who believe there are the elements of continued independence in Turkey—who believe that she may be maintained in that independence and in her territorial integrity—that class of politicians may fairly call upon us to support her in this emergency. But as to that other class of politicians to whom the hon. Member for Aylesbury referred, and whose position is illustrated by the memorandum of 1844, I confess I cannot understand how they can call upon us to support the integrity and independence of a country which they believe to be utterly incapable of either quality. I say, then, you have been brought into the position you now occupy by a divided Cabinet, representing discordant opinions. We know the opinions of that portion of the Cabinet which the First Minister of the Crown represents. We have those opinions illustrated by the policy of 1829 and the policy of 1844. After the fall of Sir Robert Peel, and while the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) was First Minister of the Crown, and the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston) was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, we were not troubled with any schemes of partition. And again when Lord Derby succeeded to office, no plans of partition were suggested to us; so notorious was the determination of the late Government, and of the Government of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, to maintain a good understanding with France. These partition schemes were considered to be so far settled in the year 1844, that when the Emperor of Russia returned to St. Petersburg he believed that the policy of Catherine had been virtually fulfilled; but the Ministry of that day, of which Lord Aberdeen was a
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Member, was much briefer than at the time was anticipated. During the whole period that the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) was Prime Minister, and during the time the Earl of Derby was Prime Minister, those plans were suffered to sleep. Yet, almost within forty-eight hours of the arrival of the news at St. Petersburg, that Lord Aberdeen had unexpectedly become Prime Minister, we find the Emperor, with feverish haste and undignified restlessness, sending for the British Ambassador and proposing to revert to the agreement of 1844.
Well, Sir, the circumstances under which Lord Aberdeen acceded to office were very remarkable. There was a patriotic determination on the part of various sections of this House who had little sympathy with each other in party or political feeling, to secure peace and Parliamentary reform. Sir, no time was to be lost in the attainment of those objects, and it was perfectly clear that, by turning us out, and making Lord Aberdeen Prime Minister, a large measure of reform could alone be obtained and peace preserved. We had then the Emperor of Russia instantly reverting to this policy. You say that the Emperor of Russia has been guilty of duplicity. The noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), who really understands the question, talks of the deception with respect to the mission of Prince Menchikoff. Why, what do we find in the "secret and confidential" despatches, which range only over the first two months, barely three months, of the year? What are the great features? The features are these—a proposition for the partition of Turkey in the spirit of the memorandum of 1844; and shortly after, when this is discovered not to be quite ripe, as much in the opinion, as it appears to me, of the Emperor of Russia as of the English Ministers, either at St. Petersburg or at St. James's—what next? A frank piece of information that Prince Menchikoff is at Constantinople with certain objects which they care not to explain, and which you do not even ask them to explain. The Emperor says, "I shall be above board—I tell you fairly Menchikoff is at Constantinople; if the Porte will not consent to his demands, I will not be trifled with; I will use force." That is in the month of February. In that month the Emperor tells Sir Hamilton Seymour that he will not be trifled with, and that if Menchikoff cannot obtain his objects, he will have recourse to force. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard)

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has given us a rapid but accurate narrative of these strange events, so that I need only allude to them to complete my argument. Sir Hamilton Seymour, who was not in the secret, much agitated, communicates with the Secretary of State, who then happened to be the noble Lord the Member for the City of London—a Member, I believe, of that school of politics who have faith in the vitality of Turkey, who believe that that country has great resources undeveloped, and that it may be both independent and progressive, a professor of what I will call, to make things simple, British politics on the subject, not Russian ones. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), who, I believe, took the seals of the Foreign Office with no serious intention of fulfilling the duties of that position, otherwise he would not have remained in it for so brief a time—indeed, we were informed, from the first formation of the Ministry, that another individual was to occupy that position—the noble Lord is called upon to answer this strange communication, and he does so in a despatch which I am as little inclined as the hon. Member for Aylesbury to criticise, in which I think there is much to praise; but still, one ought to be impartial, and as one is criticising his Colleagues, I am bound to say that there are some portions of this despatch to which I should have thought the noble Lord might have referred in his opening address, for they appear to me to need some explanation. This is what you call an historical despatch, and I think the occasion justified it. The noble Lord refers to the Succession war, and to the demise of the dynasty of the Medici. I doubt not the Emperor of Russia had heard the Succession war, the last of the Medici perhaps was more familiar to the poetic historians, amongst whom the noble Lord once figured. But when the noble Lord referred to the Succession war—to which he often refers, and always with vigour and accuracy—when he adorned the pages of his despatch with that felicitous recollection of the last of the Medici, I could not help wondering why the noble Lord, as he is apt to be historical, and wished to make an impression, a friendly impression, upon the Emperor of Russia, had not in this despatch referred to an instance and an illustration which I think would have been far more apposite and instructive. Why did not the noble Lord take a case more in point? Because neither of the instances to which he refers has really any analogy with the partition of Turkey.
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Both are cases in which possibly a dismemberment and certain appropriation of territories was to be occasioned at the extinction of a dynasty. That is not the case with Turkey. The Sultan is alive; he is a young man, with a great many wives and a great many children. Suppose the noble Lord had said, "Sir, the only instance which I can recall to instruct us at this perplexing moment, is one with which your Majesty must be acquainted, and of more recent occurrence. It is not a political dilemma that occurred from the extinction of a dynasty, but rather from the partition of a kingdom. Sir, if we look to what occurred at the partition of Poland, I think that England, that Europe, and that even Russia, may have cause to hesitate before they again embark in such a venture, which has led to consequences so perilous even to your Majesty." But no; not a word about Poland. There is, however, something else in this despatch which I confess I read with the utmost astonishment. The tone in general is good, except that the noble Lord says that he thinks that at present there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the Sultan cannot govern his dominions; and his successor soon took especial care that the Sultan should not be able to govern his dominions, so far as the instructions from the Secretary of State to our Ambassador could bring about that. The noble Lord says that, as we cannot consent to the partition—the noble Lord certainly did not consent to the partition; but the noble Lord says:—"Your Majesty may find something to occupy you. There are means by which you may advance your hereditary policy. The memorandum of 1844, so far as the partition is concerned, is, in my opinion, impracticable; but the schemes of 1844, which are to prepare for the partition—viz. the protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Sultan—surely this is an office the exercise of which may well occupy your Majesty, and which may, in the meantime, effect all that a reasonable man may desire." What does the noble Lord say? He reminds His Majesty of that protection which the Emperor has already said he had found so burdensome and inconvenient. He tell us that it is "no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty." Now, mind, these are remarkable words. This is not merely a right, it is a duty. A man may possess a right, and it may be an inchoate right; he may not choose to exercise it; he is master of himself, and

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though he has it may come to the conclusion not to exercise it. Some men have a right of free warren; but a wise man would not exercise such a right in the present day. It is not merely a right the Emperor may decline to exercise; but it is also a duty which it is prescribed to him to fulfil. I think that is a remarkable admission. I want to know where are the treaties which sanction this right and which prescribe this duty? I think the noble Lord who was then Secretary of State, though for too short a time (Lord J. Russell), ought to condescend to inform the House where these treaties are to be found. The noble Lord is a very dexterous hand at a schedule—I do not know any statesman who has placed more schedules on the table of the House of Commons. Now if the noble Lord will place upon the table a schedule of the treaties which prescribe it as a duty to the Emperor, and sanction it as a right, that he should protect the Christian subjects of the Grand Seignior, I think that would be one of the most instructive diplomatic documents that could possibly be offered now to our consideration. But I am told, at least I read it to-day in one of those organs that sometimes injure statesmen by defending their conduct and vindicating their character—I am told that this is a malignant misrepresentation, and that the protectorate referred to—the protectorate under the treaty—was that of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. But, unfortunately, this is an answer of the Secretary of State—it is an answer to a passage which, I think, is about as clear and as complete as any passage that ever I read. What says the Emperor, as reported by Sir Hamilton Seymour? This is the passage to which the then Secretary of State replies. The Emperor says:—
"In that empire"—of course the Ottoman empire—"there are several millions of Christians whose interests I am called upon to watch over, while the right of doing so is secured to me by treaty."
He adds that he makes a moderate and sparing use of the right. Thereupon we have the answer of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell). He agrees to it, and says:—
"It is no doubt prescribed as a duty, as well as sanctioned by treaty, that you should guard over the interests of the several millions of Christians in the Ottoman empire."
But what are we going to war about? I thought we were going to war to prevent the Emperor of all the Russias from protecting the Christian subjects of the Sultan
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of Turkey. That is really the question we are going to war about. We are not going to war to ensure the evacuation of the Principalities, although that may be the formal pretext of the declaration, because, the Emperor has twenty times offered to evacuate the Principalities if you will give him this protection over the Christian population of the Porte—a protection which, according to the Secretary of State who commences these important papers, will involve us in a European and enduring war—a protection sanctioned by treaty, and "no doubt prescribed by duty." It is not a casual admission—it is made doubly impressive. First it is a right, secondly a duty, and then it is a doubtless duty. I am not mentioning this to blame the noble Lord, at least not much, but when we hear Potentates and Ministers in other countries called fraudulent, when we are told that every modification of falsehood has been by them exhausted, when the passions of the country are excited to involve them in scenes of warfare, the cause of which is still obscure and the end of which is darker still, I must ask myself whether there is any foundation for these statements, what this fraudulence is about, what these modifications of falsehood apply to. What is the fraud? Is it the pretence, the plea, the pretext of the Emperor of Russia, that he should be the protector of the Christian population of the Porte? Now, my opinion is, that there is no plea whatever for the Emperor to assume that protection. I have shown the House on a former occasion, in a brief but accurate analysis of the treaty of Kainardji, the slight fabric upon which that monstrous claim was built up. But what does the Emperor of Russia care for my opinion? He cares for the opinions of Secretaries of State, responsible Ministers of the Crown, men with whom he holds "secret and confidential" correspondence, men upon whose advice and counsel the Queen of England is to declare war against him and his subjects and all his Russias. When, then, I say, when he has a secret despatch in which it is said, in answer to his own expressions, that the protectorate over millions of the Christian population of Turkey is doubtless his right, is even his duty to fulfil, then I say no wonder that the Emperor of Russia was a little nettled when he found that the Minister who had made this frank and complete admission was the first person who in the British Parliament should denounce that claim of

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his as fraudulent. Notwithstanding that unfortunate paragraph about the treaties, I still could have wished that the noble Lord had remained Secretary of State, for I agree with the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), who has touched upon that point so fully that it is unnecessary for me to refer to it, that there is a marvellous contrast in the tone, manner, and inclination between the despatches of the noble Lord and those of his successor. I say that it is this conflict in the Cabinet between British principles and Russian principles, British sentiments and Russian sentiments, upon this question that has ultimately brought us to the position in which we now find ourselves. I say that the partition of Turkey was by the Emperor himself, early in the course of these despatches, entirely set aside. It was not Lord Clarendon who closed that subject; it was the Emperor himself, who, speaking to Sir Hamilton Seymour early in the year, said, "The business of Montenegro has blown over; the time has not arrived to touch on that subject;" "therefore," virtually, he said, "I shall resort to other means by which I may obtain that supremacy in Turkey which must be a compensation and a substitute for the absolute and material appropriation of the States of Turkey; therefore I have sent Prince Menchikoff to Turkey, and my instructions to him are, if he cannot obtain his purpose, he is to use menaces, for I am not to be trifled with." I have thus traced the progress of the secret agreement of 1844. I have shown how the Emperor, systematically, candidly, with almost fatal frankness, required that agreement to be fulfilled, and endeavoured to work it out in all its provisions. And I ask you how you would have acted under those circumstances? I ask the House to consider how the present Government acted, with this full and complete knowledge of the views and policy of the Emperor? Now, mind you. I entirely acquit the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) from being a supporter of Russian politics in the Cabinet. I believe from first to last he has always maintained British principles, and was disposed to act on a British policy. He was at the head of foreign affairs only for a moment. He was called on to decide a difficult question, with no anterior experience of it, and he left office before it was well entered into. There was a different tone in the language of his successor, different conduct, and, as the hon. Member for
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Aylesbury has shown you in clear detail, a totally different policy. What should have been the conduct of the Ministry? I ask the House to decide by their moral vote, for we shall not come to a formal vote, to say whether this war might not have been prevented?
Let me recapitulate before I sit down that I may not be misinterpreted, because these are questions on which there should be no misconception. I say that there are two systems of policy to apply to the management of what is commonly called the Eastern question, but which resolves itself into the geographical question, namely, the possession of that site which commands the empire of the world—the city of Constantinople. There is that school of opinions which I call British opinions, advocated by the noble Lord the Leader of this House (Lord J. Russell) and the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston), who believe in the vitality of Turkey, that it may remain an independent and even a progressive country, and form a powerful and sufficient barrier against the encroachment of Russia. There is the other school, which I call the school of Russian polities, that believes that Turkey is exhausted; that all we can do is, by gradually enfranchising the Christian population, to prevent, when its fall takes place, perfect anarchy, and contemplates the possibility of Russia occupying the Bosphorus. I say that the First Minister of this country has, during a long and consistent career, maintained on this subject Russian politics—that at every period of his career he has maintained a policy opposite to that supported by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London. I say that in 1829 he did it, and that in 1844 he entered into a virtual agreement with the Emperor to carry out the policy of ultimate partition and intermediate interference. I say that during the Ministry of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) and the Ministry of Lord Derby the Emperor of Russia never presumed for a moment to attempt to act on that agreement. I say that, from the moment Lord Aberdeen was the First Minister of this country, the Emperor of Russia never lost a moment in attempting to carry out his policy. I believe that the noble Lord opposite, in his brief interposition in the business, intended to assert British policy. I believe that sincerely; but the management of the business fell out of his hands into those of a noble Lord under the immediate,

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and naturally immediate, influence of Lord Aberdeen, and for a considerable time the Government attempted to fulfil the policy of the memorandum of 1844, but at last, and by the efforts of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) and the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department, a contrary policy was adopted, which has terminated, and I shall shortly show the reason, in a state of warfare.
I ask, what is the course the Government ought to have adopted when they found so undisguisedly what was the purpose of Russia, and what was the secret agreement which Russia deemed probable of fulfilment? Mark one important fact. The Emperor of Russia, when he came to this country in 1844 personally to enter into this secret agreement, based the whole of his future operations upon an estrangement between England and France—the partition was to take place without the interference or interposition of France. Now, in 1844 there was a cordial understanding between England and France generally throughout the Government of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), and entirely through the Government of Lord Derby. But was there a cordial understanding between England and France when Lord Aberdeen acceded to power? Had the Emperor of Russia any reason to believe that there was any change in the feelings of this country towards France? A storm of invective against the Emperor of France was raised by the Colleagues of the noble Earl. No wonder the Emperor of Russia was in such extreme haste. No wonder he was so sanguine and so precipitate. No wonder he sent to Sir Hamilton Seymour immediately there was at the head of the Government of this country the individual who had agreed to the ultimate dismemberment of Turkey, who had agreed before the partition that Russia should indirectly govern Turkey, and who was surrounded apparently by Colleagues preventing a good understanding with France as much as possible. And then we are told by one of the Ministers that the Emperor made a mistake in supposing there was any change of feeling between the two countries. Why, was there not a change of feeling between the two countries? Is it not a fact that there was a considerable change, and have we not since found there was a most fatal alteration in the feelings of the two countries? No one can at this moment calculate the evil, the injury, which the conduct of the Colleagues of Lord Aberdeen
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and himself occasioned with reference to that point?
Well, then, I say, what ought the Government to have done when these communications were made? Suppose you had said, as the Emperor of Russia said with regard to Prince Menchikoff's mission, "We are not to be trifled with. This is no trifling matter. We know the plans have been long matured, devised with great judgment, and ripened with great vigilance. We know the Emperor of Russia is not acting from caprice, but upon a supposed agreement with this country of ten years old. He is counting upon an estrangement between England and France, for, in conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, he reverts to the point that this is to be carried into effect without the interference or interposition of France. We must lose no time in letting the Emperor of Russia know that he is labouring under most serious and awful misconception. We must tell him great changes have taken place since 1844—that no Cabinet is bound by what can be considered only as an agreement between gentlemen; and, however favourably that may have been received at the moment, great changes have since occurred in the position of Turkey, in the progressive improvement of Turkey, and in the opinions of the people of this country with respect to Turkey. We must tell him it is totally impossible to sanction these plans and prospects of his—that we look upon Turkey as capable of forming an independent barrier to any aggressive Power; and though we are anxious to maintain with him a cordial friendship, he must dismiss from his mind for ever those plots and plans which he has nursed with so much sedulousness and so much secrecy." Was anything of this kind said? Ought not the Government to have said more? "Sir, we find you are labouring under a great mistake. You are misconceiving the relations which subsist between England and France. The relations are not dynastic relations. They do not depend in any degree on the families which occupy thrones; they have been formed by the development of the material interests of the two countries and the intimate alliance which those interests suggest. We cannot consent to the partition of Turkey. That is out of the question; but if it were absolutely necessary and inevitable to consider the state of that Power, the first counsellor we should call in would be France. You are labouring under a great

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mistake, and you must relieve your mind from all this misintelligence." And do you believe, I ask, that if the Emperor of Russia—a prince of great sagacity, shrewdness, and ability—had been met in that way—if you had told him that partition was out of the question—that Turkey was not only to be maintained, but to be permitted to enter into the community of European nations—that France was the cordial friend of England, as you wished Russia also to be—do you believe that we should be at this moment discussing this question, or even in the possession of this painful "secret and confidential" correspondence? No, Sir, the war has been produced by one man. It has been produced by that individual who occupies the most eminent post in this country. And certain I am that, as time elapses, and not ere long, that will be the general conviction of all England.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I hope, Sir, I shall not have to occupy the House for any long time, while I reply to some at least of the observations which have been made in the course of this debate by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House. I own I was a good deal surprised by the speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard). That speech was no doubt a very able speech, but what was still more remarkable than its ability was the bitterness with which it was distinguished. I own I cannot imagine how it is that the hon. Gentleman, who, we have been accustomed to believe, takes more interest in the welfare of Turkey, and is more desirous to prevent that Power being overthrown by Russia, than any other Member—that he upon this occasion, when the House is asked whether or no it will support Turkey in an active, earnest, and effectual manner against Russia, should have filled three-fourths, or even more, of his speech with personal attacks upon Members of the Administration. How flimsy, too, are the materials on which these attacks are based! The hon. Gentleman is famous for excavations, and he seems to have been excavating the columns of the Times newspaper for the past year. He has produced extracts from the Times to show that the opinions of the writers in the Times agreed very much with the opinions of Russia. If he had shown that they agreed with the opinions of the English Government it might be some matter of charge that the English Government and the editors of the Times were in communication with respect
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to the Eastern question; but when he shows that the opinions entertained by the Times were the opinions which the hon. Member does me the credit of saying I was rebutting in this House, and declaring to be contrary to the policy of the Government, I really cannot see what purpose the hon. Gentleman hoped to attain, when he brought out the grave charge—almost a charge of impeachment—that he found the despatches received at the Foreign Office agreed in sentiment with the opinions given by the editors of the Times, and upon those premises he arrives at the somewhat illogical conclusion that the Times and the Government were leagued and agreed together. Unless the hon. Gentleman means to proceed generally with regard to papers, and to extend those inquiries which we have lately had some knowledge of, and to ask the editors of all the newspapers how they form their opinions, and who are the writers of particular articles—unless he goes to that length, I really do not see how he can make anything out of the charges he has made against the Government. With regard to the statement, that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs differed from me in respect to the communications made to the Emperor of Russia, I cannot but think that, though the expressions may be different, the sentiments are the same. The resolution not to agree in any previous arrangement with regard to Turkey was exactly the same, and as firmly declared by my noble Friend as it was previously declared by me. I need not, I think, refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright). The opinions of the hon. Member, no doubt, are sincerely entertained by him. My noble Friend near me (Viscount Palmerston) has expressed his entire difference from those opinions, and I think he has sufficiently treated of that subject to render it unnecessary in me to say a word upon it.
But then comes the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), and he is very much impressed with the notions of the Emperor of Russia, and says that there are certain things that are gentlemanlike, and others that are not. He says that he believes allusions to the differences between Members of the Government are not gentlemanlike; and believing these allusions to be ungentlemanlike and unconstitutional, what does he do? Why, he proceeded with painful detail and

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at very considerable length, to point out the differences which he says existed in the Administration of 1829 between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, and he points out differences of a similar kind which he believes to exist between Members of the present Government; and he charges against one Member of the present Government and its head the faults for which his Colleagues must be responsible as well as the Earl of Aberdeen. That is the course the right hon. Gentleman adopts, and his theory of what is gentlemanlike very widely differs from his practice. But the right hon. Gentleman has criticised the memorandum of 1844, and the secret correspondence lately laid on the table; and in doing so he took not only parts of sentences totally separate from other parts, but mis-states the whole foundation of the memorandum and the correspondence, because the proposal of the Emperor of Russia is not to this effect, that "Turkey is a weak Power—she cannot maintain herself—let us ask her to give up her provinces—I will insist on having Bulgaria—do you insist on having Egypt, and we shall share the territory between us." That was the nature of the partition of Poland. The first, second, and last partition of Poland, all went on the strength of the combined Powers, and all consisted in making demands upon Poland, which bit by bit destroyed her territory and subverted her independence. Now the proposal of the Emperor of Russia was not of that kind, and therefore any reference on my part to the partition of Poland would have been a gratuitous impertinence, and would have been considered by the Emperor of Russia and his Government as having no application whatever to the proposal that he had made. Now, I think it is fair to suppose that the Emperor of Russia may well have imagined, as many persons, not in Russia alone, but in various other countries of Europe have imagined, that Turkey is a Power that cannot long maintain herself, and that the hour of her dissolution may be near at hand. Likewise, we may suppose that the Emperor may think that it would be very injurious to his empire and very injurious to his policy that, whilst he is respecting the integrity and independence of Turkey, England and France should agree upon what is to be the ultimate fate of territories that now form parts of Turkey. Well, if we take this supposition—a supposition I think natural enough—we arrive easily
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enough at the first sentence of the memorandum of 1844. The right hon. Gentleman says it is a memorandum the sole object of which is the partition of Turkey, and which shows that that was the ruling idea in the Emperor of Russia's mind, and that in fact it contained a plan for that partition. Now, what is the first sentence of the memorandum:—
"Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitutes that empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace."
The right hon. Gentleman, then, conveyed to the House a false notion of the contents of the memorandum. The memorandum goes on to state that it would be very unfortunate if the dissolution of the Turkish empire should come about suddenly, and that there should be no previous agreement on the subject; and the Emperor proposes that England and Russia should so far understand each other as, in the face of the dissolution of Turkey, to devise measures as to what should have to be done. Sir, in accepting that memorandum, I believe Lord Aberdeen lost no time in communicating its substance to the Government of France; and so far from being on bad terms with France, it was the Government of Sir Robert Peel at that period which first gave rise to the phrase of the entente cordiale, which then subsisted between England and the Government of Louis Philippe. So far, then, has the right hon. Gentleman mistaken the facts of the case, or allowed himself to ramble. Well, the right hon. Gentleman treats of the despatch which I had the honour to write, and says it was evidently my object that, not agreeing to the partition, I should give to the Emperor of Russia an occupation, and point out to him an employment in which he could spend his time in future, and that that employment should be the protection of the Greek subjects of the Porte. Now, the right hon. Gentleman made that representation by dint of leaving out part of a sentence; because the sentence I used, after saying that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects with equity and religious freedom, went on to say:—
"The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection

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which His Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."
My object was not to point out that he should interfere more, but that, as the Government of the Sultan improved, he would find less occasion to interfere. Well, the right hon. Gentleman finds fault with the end of the sentence, "Though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty." Well, I should have supposed that the treaty of Kainardji imposed certain obligations upon Turkey, and reciprocal obligations on the Emperor of Russia, else why does the hon. Member for Aylesbury and others wish to get rid of the obligations of that treaty? Is it not that in that treaty there is an engagement taken on the part of the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia that protection shall be given to the Christian religion and its churches? Can anybody believe that it would be consistent with any duty which the Emperor of Russia has, that treaty having been signed, to hear of villages being destroyed, and the irregular troops of the Sultan, being authorised by the Sultan himself to kill men, and lead women and children away into slavery. I say the Emperor of Russia could not hear of those circumstances and not feel himself bound to remonstrate with respect to such outrages. Therefore, Sir, I was saying no more than what was generally acknowledged ever since the signature of the treaty of Kainardji, when I said that, in exceptional cases the Emperor could give protection to the Christians. The right hon. Gentleman knows that, although this appears at the end of the despatch, the whole purport of the document is to reject the proposal of the Emperor, that before the fall of Turkey we should make some arrangement as to the future division of its territory.
With respect to the general observations of the right hon. Gentleman, in which he divided the Cabinet into those who he says pursue a British policy, and those who pursue a Russian policy, I believe, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Turkish institutions and Turkish rule, and the administration of the law in that country, that with respect to Russia there is no difference whatever in the Cabinet, and that we are all determined not to allow any weakness on the part of Turkey to contribute to the aggrandisement of Russia. That is, in fact, the essential part of this question. Those who are most con-
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vinced of the weakness of Turkey, were naturally the most apprehensive of a war with Russia; not that they wished to favour the projects of Russia, but because they were afraid that, in the event of a war taking place, the position of Russia would become formidable in the balance of power. The right hon. Gentleman appears to find fault with the progress of the negotiations. Far be it from me to deny him the right which he or any other Member of this House possesses, of blaming the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in these negotiations. I believe, however, that the country in general would have blamed us if we had on the commencement of these transactions declared that there was no resource but war. If, under the delusive hope which the hon. Member for Aylesbury entertains, that if the war had been entered into earlier it would have been a short war, we had entered upon that war before we had exhausted the means of negotiation, the people of England would have blamed us for such conduct. I said last year that we ought not to make war till we had exhausted every resource for effecting a pacific termination of the disputes. The only way by which you would obtain the hearty assent of the people of this country to any war would be by showing them that you have made long-continued—and protracted, if you will—efforts to effect a pacific solution of the question. The Government are ready; they may meet with the criticisms of the right hon. Gentleman, and with the censure of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, but they believe that if either the right hon. Gentleman or my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury will produce a Resolution stating that we did not go to war sufficiently early, that we did not use that language to the Emperor of Russia which the right hon. Gentleman would have put into our mouths, I believe the country would disapprove of any such Resolution. I am quite sure that the language that the right hon. Gentleman would have had us use to the Emperor of Russia would have been totally unsuited to the occasion. If we had said to the Emperor, "You have proposed to us a partition of Turkey; no such proposition shall be allowed," the Emperor of Russia would have said, "I proposed no partition; what I asked you to do was to make an arrangement against the fall of Turkey happening without preparation." This answer we could not have met, because it would

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have been precisely within the terms of his proposal. I, therefore, submit to the House that we ask them to agree to a vote, not upon the ground that we have taken the first opportunity of making war, but that we have exhausted every endeavour to avoid war. And we even come before this House with every wish to restore peace as soon as it can be done consistently with the honour and interests of this country—that we know and have weighed the great power of Russia in any contest in which she may engage—that it has been with reluctance that we embark in this contest—but that, having entered upon it, we feel ourselves bound to give to Turkey every assistance in our power, and we rely upon the support of the nation in the struggle in which we are engaged.
COLONEL SIBTHORPsaid, he had no confidence in France, and he did not think the explanations of the Government had been sufficiently satisfactory. There had been, in his opinion, great neglect and great delay, and he must complain of the vacillation that had characterised the councils of the Government. He believed, nevertheless, the country would be ready to assert the national honour and dignity. He did not like the sudden changes that were constantly taking place in the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) had hit them hard, and very hard, and they would go home and feel it. Poor creatures, he pitied them. He believed the war might have been avoided if proper steps had been taken at an earlier period, and for his part his humble services were at the disposal of his country.
Question put and agreed to.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I have to ask your advice, Sir, as to the next question. I wish to move that this Address be carried up to Her Majesty by the whole House. It is usual, I believe, to appoint a Committee in such cases to prepare the Address, but I believe that course will not be absolutely necessary, and if we could depart from it I would at once move that the Address be presented to Her Majesty by the whole House.
MR. SPEAKER: The noble Lord has correctly stated the practice of the House. Whenever an Address has been agreed to by the House in answer to a Message from the Crown, it has been usual to appoint a Committee to draw up an Address in con-
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formity with the Resolution of the House, but when an Address from the House to the Crown has been taken up by a Privy Councillor it has not been usual to appoint a Committee to draw it up, though the Address presented by a Privy Councillor would be in the same form as an Address presented by the whole House. The form of the Address, however, can as well be drawn up by the whole House as by a Committee, and if the noble Lord will move that the Address be presented to Her Majesty by the whole House, I am not aware of any objection to that course.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Then, Sir, I will now move that the Address be presented to Her Majesty by the whole House.
MR. DISRAELI: I beg, Sir, to second that Motion.
Ordered—
"That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the whole House."
Ordered—
"That such Members of this House as are of Her Majesty's Most honourable Privy Council do humbly know Her Majesty's pleasure when She will be attended by this House with the said Address."
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I hope, Sir, the House will agree to meet on Monday at half-past two, when I am led to believe I shall be in a position to convey
House the command of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to receive the Address of this House shortly after that hour—namely, about three o'clock.
The House adjourned at One o'clock till Monday next.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL.—la Income Tax.

THE WAR—DAY OF HUMILIATION AND PRAYER.
THE EARL OF RODEN: My Lords, I wish to put a question to the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government, to which I have previously adverted, and which I trust he will be kind enough to answer. I trust he will not consider that in putting that question I am acting from any political or party motive, but from a sense of duty connected very nearly with the subject about to be entered upon by your Lordships. My Lords, I think there can be no doubt that the time is past when there was any doubt whether we had entered upon a war. The noble Earl himself for a long time held out a hope that war might be averted, and yet, unhappily, that is not the case. I, therefore, think it is the duty of every person who desires to see

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peace restored, and the honour of the country vindicated, to suggest to the Government any means which they may think have not yet been taken to secure that great end which every Englishman must have sincerely at heart. I am willing to give the noble Earl and the Government full credit for the means they have employed with respect to the army and the fleet; but I think there is one measure which they have omitted, and which I trust they may even now have recourse to. It is one which I believe to be consistent with the character of this great Christian country, which would be received with satisfaction by thousands of Her Majesty's loyal subjects, and one which, I am sure, will be most gladly received by many of those noble and brave individuals who form our army and our fleet, and who have left the shores of this country. I mean that a day should be set apart on which the voices of the assembled nation might ascend in common prayer to Almighty God to grant his protection and his blessing on the exertions they are making for the benefit of mankind, and to give success to Her Majesty's armies by sea and land in the awful struggle in which they are now about to be engaged. I believe that such a course would be most acceptable to the country, and I trust the noble Earl will be able to give a satisfactory answer to my question, whether it is the intention of the Government to advise Her Majesty to institute such a step. I, therefore, beg to ask the noble Earl whether the Government are prepared to advise Her Majesty to command a day to be set apart for national humiliation and prayer to Almighty God for his protection and his blessing, and to give success to Her Majesty's armies by sea and land in the brave struggle on which they are entering; and also that He would give his Wisdom to Her Majesty's councils to guide them in the difficult enterprise in which they are engaged?
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: In answer to the question of the noble Earl, I beg to state that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to advise Her Majesty to direct that a day of humiliation and prayer shall be set apart for the purpose mentioned by the noble Earl.
THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I am anxious to express, on my own behalf, and I am sure on behalf of a large portion of Her Majesty's subjects, the satisfaction I feel at the declaration we have just heard from the noble Earl. It
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has always been usual upon every occasion in which this country has been involved in war, to have recourse to the means which are now proposed, and which I am glad to see the Government are about to advise Her Majesty to adopt. There never was an occasion when we could more justly and with a safer conscience invoke the blessing of God upon Her Majesty's arms than in a war which has not been provoked by any aggression or ambition on our part, but which has been undertaken solely for the purpose of protecting those interests of justice that ought not to be laid aside; and in which, I trust, we shall receive a blessing from Him whom we desire to honour.

WAR WITH RUSSIA—HER MAJESTY'S MESSAGE.
Order of the Day for considering Her Majesty's most Gracious Message of Monday last read.
The Message having been read by the Reading Clerk,
THE EARL OF CLARENDONrose, and said: My Lords, in rising to move your Lordships to agree to the Address which I shall have the honour to propose in answer to the Gracious Message of Her Majesty which has just been read, I trust that it will not be necessary for me to detain the House at any great length on a subject with which your Lordships are already so well acquainted, both from the papers which have been laid before Parliament, and from the discussions which have already taken place in this House. But, my Lords, upon an occasion like the present—upon an occasion of such solemn and grave importance—when the hopes and anticipations of the last few months have been dispelled—when the peace which we have so long laboured to main-tam has been terminated—when war, which we have thought for years past to be impossible to be renewed, is about to be commenced—and when your Lordships are now called upon to reply to the appeal which Her Majesty has made to your loyal devotion and zeal in the struggle which she is about to wage in defence of an injured ally—I admit that I cannot approach the subject, familiar as it is, without feelings of the greatest anxiety. My Lords, I do not shrink from the expression of this opinion, because I believe it is a feeling in which your Lordships will entirely participate; because it is not inconsistent with our national honour; it is not inconsistent

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with that courage which characterises our countrymen; it is not inconsistent with that firm determination and stedfastness of purpose which in past times has borne us safely through difficulties and dangers—calmly to contemplate the wide field of calamity that war opens before us, and to reflect upon the various and vast interests that will be endangered, upon the social progress which will be interrupted, upon the burdens which will be increased upon the people, and the plans of improvement which will be set aside, by this war. But, my Lords, these considerations—presenting themselves, and weighing heavily, as they must do, on every reflecting mind—have not proved sufficient either to abate the determination or to damp the ardour—I would rather say the enthusiasm—with which this country has risen as one man at the sacred call of duty to defend the national honour, in a holy, just, and righteous cause. My Lords, I trust that nothing will fall from me this evening to mar those unanimous feelings with which on every account it is so important that our proceedings should be characterised, or that I should impair the great and good effect which I know has been produced throughout the whole of Europe by the unanimity of the people of this country and by the imposing attitude which in conquence England has assumed since war has appeared to be imminent. But, my Lords, in saying this, I am far from intending, as my noble Friend opposite thought on a former and less important occasion, to deprecate discussion or avert inquiry in any and every stage of these proceedings; still less have I any intention to complain of the spirit in which these inquiries and that criticism have hitherto been conducted. Some of your Lordships may have thought that we did not speak out sufficiently strong and in sufficiently good time; others have thought that we should have acted more vigorously, and rendered war inevitable in order to avoid war; others have thought that we have displayed a foolish confidence in the assurances we have received; while others, like my noble Friend below me (Earl Grey), have, by powerful arguments, endeavoured to establish that we should not have interfered at all. But, my Lords, as far as I have been able to ascertain the real state of public opinion, I believe that the verdict of the country has been given in our favour, and I believe it is because our persevering efforts to maintain peace
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have been exhausted, that the unanimous support of this powerful nation is now so cordially to be given to us.
My Lords, it has been, on several occasions, my duty to explain and defend the policy of the Government; and I shall not, therefore, on the present occasion, occupy your Lordships' time, or weary you, by going over the same ground and repeating the same facts and arguments. But, my Lords, with reference to that undue confidence which we have been accused of exhibiting in the Emperor of Russia, I do desire to say a few words, and they will be with reference to that correspondence which has just been laid on your Lordships' table. My Lords, it is unnecessary for me to say that that correspondence would have remained buried in the archives of the Foreign Office, if we had not been challenged, and consequently compelled, by the Emperor of Russia to produce it. We neither desired nor sought these communications; but, having received them as confidential, we have behaved with scrupulous honour to the Emperor of Russia, and I can give your Lordships no better proof of this than this fact—that in a despatch that I wrote at the end of April, in which I recapitulated the various assurances given us by the Emperor, I inserted one short extract, not from the despatch sent by Sir Hamilton Seymour containing an account of his conversations with the Emperor, but from the memorandum presented by Count Nesselrode at the Emperor's request, and which the Emperor had caused to be drawn up. Count Nesselrode, observing this extract, protested against this as a breach of confidence, and requested that it might not be inserted in that despatch when it was laid before Parliament. We replied, that all communications of this kind were exceedingly inconvenient to a constitutional Government; but that if the Emperor thought he had just cause to complain, we would promise him that that passage should be withdrawn from the despatch when it was laid before Parliament. And I can with confidence appeal to your Lordships whether, in the course of the various discussions which have taken place upon this subject, there has been any, the slightest allusion, on the part of the Government to these communications made by the Emperor of Russia. But, my Lords, as that correspondence has been produced, I can only express my satisfaction that it has seen the light; because I think I may say,

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without presumption, that it proves that we have been honest to the Sultan, honest to our allies, and honest to the Emperor himself. It was the Emperor who voluntarily developed his ideas, or rather expressed his convictions that the dissolution of the Ottoman empire was inevitable. And, my Lords, we must remember that this was no singular idea on the part of the Emperor—that he had no monopoly of it—and that it was shared by thousands of persons in this country, who, at this time last year, had no idea of the vital energy and national spirit which the Turks have since exhibited. It was proved in books, in pamphlets, in newspapers, and by a variety of statistical data, that the Ottoman empire could not last. The Emperor of Russia desired to discuss this matter with us, and to arrange with us what would be suitable, or rather what would not be suitable, to the interests of the two countries in the event of these prophecies being realised. My Lords, I say there was in this nothing more to excite suspicion or create alarm in the year 1853 than there had been in the year 1844, or in 1829, when these ideas were first broached. But, my Lords, if this country had participated in these ideas of the Emperor—if we had shown that we believed that the dissolution of the Turkish empire was at hand—if we had been ready to admit its dismemberment, or shown a readiness to accept Egypt or Candia, as was proposed to us—then, my Lords, I think, the Emperor might have looked to the realisation of his prophecy. But it was because we wished to avert that danger, and to bring the Emperor to our view of the question, that we did not shrink from his wish that we should discuss the whole question with him. We frankly discussed his arguments; we gave him our reasons for thinking that the dissolution of the Ottoman empire was not at hand; we declared that we would not be a party to any underhand dealings, and that we would have no secrets from our allies; we dismissed with something like silent contempt the offer of a territorial bribe; and we pointed out to the Emperor the course which he himself ought to pursue. Well, my Lords, the Emperor in return said that Russia was too great in territorial extent already; that he desired no increase of territory; he agreed with us that the maintenance of the Ottoman empire was a European necessity, and that its downfall would be a European calamity; and,
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though he said he should insist upon justice being done him by the Sultan upon the question of the Holy Places, yet he positively asserted that he had not, moved a man or a ship at that time towards Turkey. And, my Lords, these assurances were given to us, not only upon the word of the Emperor, but on the word of a "gentleman"—His Imperial Majesty seems to draw some distinction between the two—and these assurances were addressed, not merely to Her Majesty's Government, but to the Queen herself. And then, my Lords, in a memorandum drawn up by the Emperor's desire, and perhaps by his own pen, we received these assurances:—
"The Emperor has, with lively satisfaction, made himself acquainted with Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 23rd of March. His Majesty congratulates himself on perceiving that his views and those of the English Cabinet entirely coincide on the subject of the political combinations which it would be chiefly necessary to avoid in the extreme case of the contingency occurring in the East which Russia and England have equally at heart to prevent, or, at all events, to delay as long as possible. Sharing generally the opinions expressed by Lord Clarendon on the necessity of the prolonged maintenance of the existing state a things in Turkey, the Emperor, nevertheless, cannot abstain from adverting to a special point which leads him to suppose that the information received by the British Government is not altogether in accordance with ours. It refers to the humanity and the toleration to be shown by Turkey in her manner of treating her Christian subjects. Putting aside many other examples to the contrary of an old date, it is, for all that, notorious that recently the cruelties committed by the Turks in Bosnia forced hundreds of Christian families to seek refuge in Austria. In other respects, without wishing on this occasion to enter upon a discussion as to the symptoms of decay, more or less evident, presented by the Ottoman Power, or the greater or less degree of vitality which its internal constitution may retain, the Emperor will readily agree that the best means of upholding the duration of the Turkish Government is not to harass it by overbearing demands, supported in a manner humiliating to its independence and its dignity. his Majesty is disposed, as he has ever been, to act upon this system, with the clear understanding, however, that the same rule of conduct shall be observed, without distinction and unanimously, by each of the great Powers, and that none of them shall take advantage of the weakness of the Porte to obtain from it concessions which might turn to the prejudice of the others. This principle being laid down, the Emperor declares that he is ready to labour, in concert with England, at the common work of prolonging the existence of the Turkish empire, setting aside all cause of alarm on the subject of its dissolution. He readily accepts the evidence offered by the British Cabinet of entire confidence in the uprightness of his sentiments, and the hope that, on this basis, his alliance with England cannot fail to become stronger."

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Now, my Lords, this was on the 15th of April, and as the result and conclusion of a correspondence begun, apparently, with very different feelings on the part of the Emperor of Russia from those which he now entertains, I think it was all we could expect and all we could desire; unless, indeed, we are to proceed upon a general system of disbelief and suspicion in the honour and rectitude of persons in high quarters, where they might most naturally be expected to be found. Well, my Lords, if you can divest your minds of all that has passed since the month of May, and realise the impression which would have been made upon you, if, at the end of April last, and before the real nature of Prince Menchikoff's mission was known, I had been able to lay this memorandum on your Lordships' table, I think your Lordships would have felt, as Her Majesty's Government felt at that time, that Turkey was safe from the dangers in which she was soon after involved. And, my Lords, the dangers were and are of a very clear and substantial nature. The Emperor of Russia has endeavoured by a treaty, or by an engagement which should have the force of treaty, to obtain that right of interference between the Sultan and many millions of his subjects which would have extended not only to a virtual protectorate, but have conferred actual government upon him. Had the Sultan entered into the engagements which were required from him, the Greek Christians, who are the subjects of the Porte, would have been placed in the same position as the subjects of the Emperor of Russia. No question, however small and however trifling, connected with the control of the affairs of the Greek subjects of the Sultan could have arisen which would not have had to be determined by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. We should then have seen the enlightenment, the intelligence, and the progress of the Greek subjects of Turkey, as well as the free exercise of their religion, brought down to the same low level as those of the subjects of the Emperor of Russia; and any demur upon the part of the Sultan to submit to the government of the Russian Ambassador would have been an infraction of treaty and a legitimate cause of quarrel. Under these circumstances, my Lords, Russia would have been enabled at any moment, and upon any pretext, with her powerful fleet in the Black Sea, to render herself mistress of Constantinople. I need not waste your
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Lordships' time by any comments upon the effect of such an event as that occurring. We should have found in such a case, to our cost and to our disgrace, that the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, which is a matter of European necessity, as its downfall would be an European calamity, was nothing more than a vague and unmeaning term. And I must say, my Lords, that I think it was unworthy of the dignity of the Emperor of Russia perseveringly to attribute the failure of his scheme, not to the nature of the scheme itself, but to the perseverance and malignity of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The Sultan was perfectly alive to his own interests, and, under any circumstances, would have refused the terms sought to be imposed upon him by the Emperor of Russia. True it is that Lord Stratford, on being consulted, did not advise the Porte to commit political suicide; but it is also true that the same advice was given at the same time by the French Ambassador, the Austrian Inter-nuncio, and the Prussian Minister. When the outrage of occupying the Principalities was committed, it was committed as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of a treaty which had not been violated. And, my Lords, although this part of the subject has been more than once alluded to before, your Lordships must bear in mind that the whole question, as regards the Emperor of Russia, turns upon the interpretation of the seventh article of the treaty of Kainardji, by which the Porte engaged to protect the Christian religion and all its churches thoughout the Ottoman dominions; but so carefully did the Porte guard itself against any right of interference on the part of Russia that, by a subsequent portion of the article, that interference was expressly limited to the right of making representations with respect to a church at that time building at Constantinople, and. to an engagement on the part of the Porte to take those representations into consideration. But, my Lords, it is this unlimited interpretation of the treaty which has been throughout insisted upon by Russia, and for which she is now prepared to enter into war. And, my Lords, if a mission like that of Prince Menchikoff could be resorted to to enforce rights which she was not entitled to demand, I leave your Lordships to judge what would have been the effect as regards Russia if this scheme had succeeded, and if the Emperor had been entitled to demand all that was conceded to him, with

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the additional interpretation put upon this treaty. We have a treaty with the King of Naples. Suppose we had suddenly chosen to give an interpretation to that treaty that it was an undertaking to admit British commodities free of duty, for the purpose of rendering them cheaper to His Majesty's subjects; and suppose the King of Naples, as he was justly entitled, had resisted this, and we had seized on Sicily as a material pledge—not for anything we had a right to claim, but for a compliance with demands resting merely on our own interpretation of the treaty—in that case, I ask whether the indignation of Europe would not have been aroused, and whether the King of Naples would not have been warranted in calling in his allies to assist him in repelling the aggression, if England could even have attempted it? Yet such an assumption of power would not have been one whit more unwarranted or unjustifiable than has been the conduct of the Emperor of Russia towards the Porte. But, notwithstanding all that had occurred, the mediation of Austria for the settlement of the differences between Russia and the Porte was called in, and Austria invited the aid of the other three Powers in this work. Though the four Powers felt that the Emperor of Russia had committed a great wrong, they thought it advisable to find for him a means of retreat without loss of dignity, and if the Emperor had accepted the modified Vienna Note he would have lost nothing of dignity, but in reality would have gained in other respects. However, he rejected the terms proposed, and Count Nesselrode then, in a note, avowed what it was that Russia really would insist on. Still, however, the Emperor of Russia having said, after the Conferences at Olmutz, that if any fresh terms were proposed to him he desired that they should be first settled with the Porte, the four Powers again renewed their endeavours, and their representatives at Constantinople obtained from the Porte fresh terms, giving the Emperor much more than he had a right to demand. And it deserves to be recorded to the honour of the Porte, that it was after the Sultan had been compelled, in his own defence, to declare war, and after the massacre at Sinope, which aroused national indignation, that this fresh negotiation was begun. My Lords, the terms of ads negotiation were sent to Vienna, and unanimously approved by the representatives of the four Powers, who declared them to be just and
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honourable, and such as the Emperor might accept without any loss of that honour and dignity which it was thought so desirable to maintain. And, my Lords, how were those negotiations received? The Emperor of Russia did not even notice them. He ignored the terms offered him by the Porte. He disregarded the advice and recommendation of the four Powers, and he disregarded the highest and greatest interests of Europe and the universal expression of public opinion. He, however, subsequently sent proposals of his own, in which his original demands, so far from being abated, were increased, and put in a form to render them more injurious and offensive to the Porte. Could we, under such circumstances—could France and England—allow the virtual supremacy over millions of the subjects of the Sultan to be handed over to the Emperor of Russia? Could France and England submit to the degradation of allowing Russia to take up a position as regards Turkey which would be the means of inflicting death upon that country, either by slow poison or by sudden death? for that is the alternative which Russia offers. There could be but one answer to that question, and that answer has already been given by the generous and high-minded people of this country, who detest aggression, whatever form it may assume, and who are always ready to protect the weak against the strong. And, my Lords, it was a sense of national honour, a sense of duty, and a desire that this country should continue to be respected among the nations of the earth, that made Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the Government of the Emperor of the French, feel it their bounden duty to bring this question to a final decision, and require within a given period an understanding from the Emperor of Russia that he would evacuate the Principalities, giving him notice at the same time that his refusal to comply with the terms proposed, or a refusal to reply, would be considered as equivalent to a declaration of war. Late on Saturday evening last a messenger arrived from St. Petersburg with the information that the Emperor did not consider it consistent with his dignity to give any answer to the communication of the Allied Powers, and on Monday Her Majesty's Royal Message was read in this House. My Lords, I think your Lordships will admit that we have been actuated by no selfish considerations, that we have sought for no territorial ag-

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grandisement, and no extension of political influence. We want nothing for our trade, and we fear nothing for our Indian possessions. For none of these would we make the sacrifices we are now about to make; but for the preservation of our honour and our self-respect we are prepared to make any sacrifice, and it is to maintain our honour and our self-respect that Her Majesty appeals to the loyal devotion of your Lordships.
On Monday evening, a noble Earl Opposite (the Earl of Derby) expressed a wish that the agreements between England and France, and England, France, and Turkey, should be laid upon the table. Certain papers have already been delivered, but at the present moment we are not able to lay our agreement with France on the table. At present it consists simply of an exchange of notes, containing arrangements with respect to military operations, and which have been drawn up for the purpose of facilitating arrangements elsewhere, which, I hope, may have been concluded before now. If those arrangements are not concluded at Vienna, the notes between France and England will take a more decisive and definite form, and will then of course be laid upon your Lordships' table. With respect to the convention entered into with Turkey, I explained to my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), last night, that, in consequence of a misunderstanding at the French Foreign Office, the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French at Constantinople had not yet received his full powers, and, consequently, the treaty had only been provisionally signed. It cannot, therefore, at present be laid upon the table. But I may at once reply to the inquiries made by my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby), the other evening, with respect to some fears he expressed with regard to certain rumours which had reached him, that the convention contains no stipulations of any kind with respect to the Christian subjects of the Porte. A question has been asked by my noble Friend opposite (Earl Grey) as to the object of the war, or, in other words, what are the terms on which peace would be concluded? But I think my noble Friend will not press that question, when he must be aware that the answer must depend upon a vast variety of circumstances which it is impossible for any one to foresee. We enter on the war for a definite object; it is to check and repel the unjust aggression of Russia. In what manner that will be carried out, and to what consequences it may lead, must depend entirely upon the
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proverbial chances of war, upon the success that may attend our arms, and upon the activity of our allies; and I certainly, therefore, can give no answer to that inquiry, seeing how unfounded any assurances I can give may ultimately prove to be. When the British army went to Spain we went to assist the people of that country to defend themselves from aggression; but in 1808, or 1809, or 1810, or 1811, we could not say we would make no peace except upon the territorial arrangements which were ultimately fixed at Vienna. In entering on war now, we do so to repel aggression and to secure a peace honourable to Turkey. I believe there is not a man in the dominions of the Czar who does not expect that Constantinople will ultimately belong to Russia. It will be our duty, as far as we possibly can, to prevent the realisation of that expectation, and to take care that a Russian occupation may never begin there. Were it to succeed, and were Russia to be in possession of Constantinople, commanding, as she would do then, the Black Sea and its shores, being enabled, as she would, to occupy Circassia and Georgia, and convert the population of those frontier countries into one mighty army, having access to the Mediterranean and a vast naval fleet in the Baltic, and determined, as she now is, to increase her naval power by all those facilities which steam and modern invention have afforded for the transport of troops—with all these advantages, were Russia in possession of Constantinople, it would not be too much to anticipate that more than one Western Power would have to undergo the fate of Poland. The wealth, and the intelligence, and the civilisation of Europe would be no more a barrier against encroachments upon the part of Russia than were the intelligence and civilisation of ancient Rome against the encroachments of the Huns and Vandals. And, my Lords, the more we examine this question, the more gigantic is the aspect it assumes. It is not merely the protection of Turkey against the aggressions of Russia that is concerned in the Eastern question, as it is commonly called, but it is the battle of civilisation against barbarism, for the maintenance of the independence of Europe. Already, even without territorial aggrandisement, the policy pursued by Russia has, in a great measure, placed the nations of Germany in a state of dependence. Several foreign Governments, but more particularly those of Germany, have been acted

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upon by Russia with a strength and influence which have been and always will be exercised to check education, the free expression of opinion, and that progress which is essential to civilisation. The object of the Emperor of Russia has been to render other countries dependent upon him. From the papers which have already been laid upon the table of the House, your Lordships must have seen at once that the submission of Austria to the designs of the Emperor of Russia upon Turkey was taken for granted, and that, with respect to Prussia, she was not thought worthy of mention at all. And even after all that had passed, even in the course of this very year, after Austria and Prussia had signed the protocols condemning the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor of Russia sent a tripartite convention for the German Powers to sign for his advantage, and did not authorise his agent to give an answer to the Emperor of Austria himself, when he asked what the policy of the Emperor of Russia would be in the event of his signing that convention. Nor would the Emperor of Russia even say whether his forces would cross the Danube or not. But the conventions and propositions of the Emperor of Russia were rejected in a manner well calculated to maintain the dignity and independence of Austria and Prussia. And here, my Lords, let me repeat what I have said before, that this country has every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Austria. She has behaved in an honourable and straightforward manner throughout the negotiations with Russia, and she has done, in her own way, and at her own time, everything that she could for the preservation of peace, and to maintain the integrity of Turkey. I believe she has now placed her army upon a war footing, and only this evening I received a communication stating the position of her different forces, which now amount to 130,000 men, independently of her troops upon the frontier, and I think we have no right to be dissatisfied with that disposition. There is, however, unfortunately, a difference in the mode of action between Austria and Prussia. The latter Power is desirous of exercising a perfect neutrality; but I must say that, with such a war as is now about to be waged upon the frontiers of both countries, it will be impossible for either Power to preserve a neutrality. At all events, nothing could be more exhausting, nothing more disastrous, nothing more fatal, to the
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best interests of both these countries than a protracted war, and nothing could be better for them than a short and decisive contest. But if the two great German Powers be divided, the result will inevitably be in favour of revolution; and therefore favourable to the present interests of Russia. If these Powers, however, proceed in accordance with popular opinion, which is every day more and more against Russia, it cannot be for one moment doubted that the ultimate result will be favourable to German independence. That Power which lends itself to the designs of Russia will transfer all the popular sympathy of Germany to the Power that refuses to do so, and into the hands of that Power will be committed the future destinies of the German nation. Under these circumstances, I do sincerely hope that these two great Powers—taking an accurate estimate both of their own interests and the interests of Europe—may become not only united in their policy with the Western Powers, but that they will undertake united action with them. I trust they will take the parts which befit them in this great struggle, of which not only the immediate, but the ultimate result concerns them even more than it does Western Europe. I trust that, at the close of this struggle, we shall find them by our side, re-establishing peace upon a solid and secure foundation; but that peace, my Lords, will be neither solid nor secure sinless the territorial extension and the immoderate influence of Russia be repressed and for ever limited. That peace will not be a glorious peace, my Lords, if we do not secure equal rights and immunities for the Christian subjects of the Porte—not securing them by treaties nor by a protectorate, nor by acquiring rights fatal to the very independence of the Power which we intend to uphold; but securing them as the spontaneous act of the Sultan—and not less binding on him on that account—by which he will best consult his own interests, and by which he will entitle himself to the gratitude of Europe, and afford to France and England the only return they desire for the exertions which they are now making on his behalf. With these objects in view—and if the Crown meets, as I trust it will, with the unanimous support of the Parliament and people of this country—we may humbly hope that the protection of Heaven may be vouchsafed to a cause which we believe to be a righteous and just one, and we may look forward boldly and fearlessly to the

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result of the struggle in which we have now embarked. The noble Earl concluded by moving—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to return Her Majesty the thanks of this House for Her most gracious Message, and for the communication of the several papers which have been laid before it in obedience to Her Majesty's command. To assure Her Majesty of the just sense we entertain of Her Majesty's anxious and uniform endeavours to preserve to Her people the blessings of peace, and of our perfect confidence in Her Majesty's disposition to terminate the calamities of war, whenever that object can be accomplished consistently with the honour of Her Majesty's Crown and the interests of Her people. That we have observed with deep concern that Her Majesty's endeavours have been frustrated by the spirit of aggression displayed by the Emperor of Russia in his invasion and continued occupation of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, in the rejection of equitable terms of peace proposed under the sanction of four of the principal Powers of Europe, and in the preparation of immense threes to support his unjust pretensions. That these pretensions appear to us subversive of the independence of the Turkish empire. That we feel that the trust reposed in us demands on our part a firm determination to co-operate with Her Majesty in a vigorous resistance to the projects of a Sovereign whose further aggrandisement would be dangerous to the independence of Europe."
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I rise, not for the purpose of offering any opposition to the adoption by your Lordships of the Address which has been moved by the noble Earl opposite, because I concur with him in thinking that, whatever may be our differences of opinion as to the manner in which the negotiations which have preceded this war have been conducted, this is a moment and an occasion on which it is of importance—of the utmost and most vital importance—that there should be no difference in the expression by this or the other House of Parliament of an opinion which I believe, with the noble Earl, to be the general and almost universal feeling and opinion of the country, with regard to the necessity of giving an active support to Her Majesty's Government in the prosecution of that war which, however lamentable and however much to be deprecated—as all war must be—is, in my belief, and in the belief of the country, a just war, and which, in the present state of things, however different it may have been originally, is also a necessary war. And I am only apprehensive, my Lords, that, as Her Majesty's Government have, up to the latest moment, continued to hope against hope—that as, up to the last moment, they have spoken of peace when all around them breathed war
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—so that even now they imperfectly appreciate, or, to use an American expression, they fail to "realise" the magnitude, the importance, and the probable duration of that arduous struggle upon which we are now about to enter. I fear, too, that the country has set its hopes and expectations too high with regard to the immediate and direct success of our interference. I fear that they underrate the resources, more especially great for purposes of defensive warfare, of the great antagonist whom we have to meet. I fear they underrate the difficulties which must be thrown in the way of the best combined operations, of the most gallant armies, and of the most powerful fleets, from circumstances against which neither bravery nor conduct can secure those fleets or those armies. And if I venture, my Lords, at this moment, when we are entering upon a great war, to call your attention and the attention of the country to its importance and magnitude, and to its possible duration, I do it, not with a view of discouraging that enthusiasm which the noble Earl describes to be felt by the nation in this struggle—I do it with no wish to damp the ardour and eagerness of the people of this country at any sacrifice to support a cause which they believe to he a just and sacred cause—but I do it, well knowing the character and nature of my countrymen, and believing that those energies, that eagerness, and that enthusiasm will be rather kindled and excited than diminished by having placed before them, plainly and distinctly, the magnitude of the struggle and the greatness of the sacrifices for which they must be prepared. And I think nothing would be so unfortunate as that we should enter on this great struggle with an idea entertained by a great portion of the community, still less with an idea entertained or encouraged on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that this war will be a light affair or one of a trifling nature. I cannot conceive a greater mortification—1 cannot conceive a greater discouragement, that the country should feel, after two or three campaigns, that they had made but little progress towards the attainment of the object which they were led to believe would be of instantaneous execution; and I think it infinitely better they should know beforehand the magnitude of the cause they are about to undertake, than that they should lightly contract hopes and expectations which may for a considerable time be baffled and deluded. But it

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is not because I think the war will be of long duration and of serious importance—it is not because I fear we do not enter into it in so full a state of preparation as, perhaps, we might have done—it is not because I feel that for defensive purposes the resources of the Emperor of Russia, even if he receive no co-operation or neutrality from other Powers, are formidable—that I deprecate underrating a conflict, which, however fatal and lamentable, however easily it might have been avoided in its origin, has now, I think, become necessary for the protection and maintenance of the liberties of Europe. I concur fully with the noble Earl opposite that the possession of Constantinople would in point of fact give to Russia a preponderating and overwhelming power, which would render her the mistress and arbiter of Europe and a great part of Asia. I concur also with him in thinking—for although I think he did not express the opinion, it is one which he must entertain—that the assumption of that amount of influence that the protectorate which Russia claims over Turkey would virtually, if assented to and allowed by Europe, give to Russia, would give her the same power, and place her in the same position in regard to Europe, as if by her armies she occupied that country. It is, then, of importance that we should understand what it is for which we are about to contend, and what position that is which is demanded by Russia. I concur with my noble Friend in thinking that, from the very first moment the pretensions of Russia to this protectorate for which she has throughout uniformly contended, were pretensions which it was impossible to admit, and pretensions which, if admitted, would give to Russia an absolute sovereignty over Turkey. Therefore, it is not merely for the expulsion of the Russian forces from the provinces, it is not merely for the purpose of preventing the realisation of the future dreams of Russian ambition and Russian greatness that we are contending—it is for placing the relations between Russia and Turkey, by the act of universal Europe, upon a footing which shall be that of two independent States—not that of one nominally independent, but smothered and strangled under the protectorate of the other. I concur, then, with the noble Earl, that this is a just war, that it is a necessary war, and I that it has for a long time been an inevitable war. But I am afraid, in accepting the invitation given by the noble Earl to
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enter upon a discussion of those revelations which have been made by the secret papers lately produced, and laid upon your Lordships' table, I am not altogether prepared to go along with him in the view which he takes as to the deception which he thinks was practised on this country by Russia, or the conviction he still entertains, that, with the information which they had in their hands, Her Majesty's Government were justified in supposing that there was no danger to the peace of Europe arising from the pretensions made by Russia. I must go further—I say it without meaning any personal disrespect—but I must say I believe this war never would have taken place, these pretensions never would have been put forward, if, at the particular time of these particular differences arising, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen) had not been the Minister at the head of the Government. It is impossible to enter on the consideration of these papers, and the consideration of that question, without referring, in the first instance, to that secret memorandum which has been produced and laid on the table by the noble Earl—I mean the memorandum which I, erroneously, had always supposed to have been prepared by Baron Brunnow, but which is now stated to have been prepared by Count Nesselrode. The endorsement on this memorandum is of rather a peculiar character. It is stated to be a memorandum founded upon communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to England in 1844. Now I dare say the memorandum was framed subsequent to His Imperial Majesty's visit; but I do not understand that the communications were made by the Russian Emperor to Count Nesselrode subsequent to His Imperial Majesty's visit. That can hardly be the meaning of the noble Earl, or else there must have been communications to Her Majesty's Government subsequently. But if there has been diplomatic correspondence, there must be despatches to be produced, and those despatches have not been produced. But, if I am not misinformed, this memorandum, whatever the time when it was framed, was framed in consequence of communications which took place at the period of the Emperor's visit to this country in 1844—personal, not official, communications with two or three Ministers of whom the noble Earl is the only survivor, and especially personal com-

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munications with the noble Earl himself, who at that time filled the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This document is one of a very remarkable character. It is not an official document—it is not a document, I think I can venture to say, which was brought under the cognisance or consideration of the Cabinet of which the noble Earl and myself were, at the time, both Members. It was not an official document at all. It was a personal document, binding on the noble Earl himself, but not binding in the slightest degree any subsequent Government. It remained, not with the ordinary papers of the Foreign Office; it remained in the custody of each successive Secretary of State, with no copy in the Foreign Office. I am in a position to know the great importance which Russia attached to this document, because I had not occupied the situation which, in 1852, I had the honour of holding, many days when, both to me and the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Malmesbury), Baron Brunnow expressed an anxious desire that we should see and make ourselves acquainted with this particular document. At that time I could answer with perfect sincerity, "of that document 1 knew nothing," and (luring the whole period—not a very long one certainly—I held office, no reference or communication was made by Baron Brunnow to me with regard to this document, which, if it had been held binding on the British Government, would infallibly have been the case. But when the noble Earl succeeded to the head of the Government, then immediately the correspondence or memorandum, which the Emperor, to use his own expression, held to be binding upon himself as a "gentleman," and which, in his judgment, was also binding on the noble Earl as a gentleman—not as a British Minister, but as the individual to whom he had confidentially communicated the whole of his scheme in 1844, and who then, as he conceived, gave him encouragement in it, was brought forward; and the then position of Europe giving encouragement, the Emperor was led, and most naturally, to believe that the time had arrived to carry into operation the understanding entered into in 1844. What was that understanding—what was that undertaking—what was that which (if this memorandum be correct, and I presume it is, for it has never been contradicted) was agreed upon
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personally by the noble Earl during the Emperor's residence in Her Britannic Majesty's dominions? The result was "the eventual engagement that, if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common." It seemed as if England and Russia went hand in hand, according to the Emperor's views, as developed in that memorandum; and it was assumed that if Austria followed in the train of Russia, as from the period of 1844 up to the present moment Russia has always assumed she would, France would be obliged to act in conformity with the course which might be agreed on between the Courts of St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. The object was that in the event of unforeseen events in Turkey, England, Russia, and Austria—Austria following in the train of Russia—should enter into a combination which would compel France to accept any terms they might think desirable. When that agreement was entered into, the noble Earl now at the head of the Government was Foreign Secretary; when he acceded to power again, it was supposed that there was no very cordial understanding between the incoming Ministers and France. At that moment there were serious differences between France and Russia, arising out of the question of the Holy Places—or, rather, the question of the disputed protectorate—and it was supposed, rightly or wrongly I do not say; but whether rightly or wrongly then, the reverse is happily the case now—that between the incoming Ministers and the French Government there was no very cordial understanding. And it was thought that if Russia could succeed in binding the Prime Minister of 1853 to the obligations into which he entered in 1844, France would be isolated, England, Russia, and Austria would make arrangements among themselves for the settlement of the Turkish difficulty, and the arrangements they made would be assented to by the rest of Europe, leaving only the question how the spoils were to be divided between Austria, Russia, and England. That such was the state of things no one can doubt. That such was the design these papers are the evidence, and not only so, for in the most open and most unblushing manner that design was developed to the British Government; and I do not understand what the noble Earl means when he says that there was no greater

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danger in 1853 than there was in 1844, when the original undertaking was entered into. It seems to me there was much greater danger. There was this great difference—that the agreement of 1844 was a theoretical arrangement providing generally as to what should be the course in case of unforeseen events at some distant period, which might never occur; while in 1853 the state of things was such that it was intimated that the dissolution of Turkey might occur at any moment, and the danger to Europe, therefore, in 1853 must be considered imminent and inevitable. The one was a theoretical agreement which might take effect on some future occasion. The other was a proposition to be carried into effect immediately, and without delay, and in the then state of Europe. I think the language of these despatches very strongly bears out the view I have ventured to lay before your Lordships. The very first paragraph contains the report of a declaration made by the Emperor, of the extreme pleasure with which he had heard of the formation of Her Majesty's present Government; adding that he trusted it would be of long duration; and he desired that assurance might be conveyed to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom he said he had been acquainted for nearly forty years, and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. He then in the very same conversation, on that very same morning—it vas either on that or the following day, certainly at no more distant period—he referred at once to the conversation which he had in England in 1844, in a manner which evidently shows that he thought the time had arrived when the understanding then entered into might be acted upon. And here I must say that, on looking at these papers, whatever now may be the faults we have to find with the Emperor of Russia—and I am not standing here as the apologist of his course of policy—I do not think we have any right to say that he has wilfully deceived this country. On the contrary, as between the two parties, I think the Emperor of Russia has much more reason to say he has been misled by the conduct pursued by the British Government, not only by the antecedents—not only by the individual who found himself at the head of the British Government at that moment—but by the correspondence now laid on the table for the purpose of proving that, in the estimation of Her Majesty's Government, on
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the 25th of April last there was not the slightest reason to apprehend any danger to the peace of Europe from any undue aggression by Russia. The question still remains, what are we going to war about? The noble Earl concurs with me in saying—to put down and destroy this assumption of the protectorate of Russia over Turkey. Now, my Lords, has Russia upon any occasion concealed her determination to claim that protectorate? Has she ever varied in the interpretation site seeks to put on the treaty of Kainardji? Has she ever gone from the determination to obtain that interpretation, by negotiation if possible, but if not by negotiation then by menaces, and if not by menaces, then by force? The claim to a protectorate is put very broadly forward by Russia in a conversation detailed in a secret and confidential despatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour to Lord John Russell, received 6th February, 1853. In that communication Sir Hamilton Seymour reports the Emperor of Russia to have said to him in conversation:—
"In the Turkish empire there are several millions of Christians, whose interests I am called upon to watch over, while the right of doing so is secured to me by treaty. I may truly say that I make a moderate and sparing use of my right, and I will freely confess that it is one which is attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient; but I cannot recede from the discharge of a distinct duty. Our religion, as established in this country, came to us from the East, and there are feelings, as well as obligations which never must be lost sight of."
Now, my Lords, observe, this right, which the Emperor states is secured to him by treaty—the right of protectorate over many millions of the subjects of the Sultan—is the very right which we are now going to war for the purpose of repelling. What was the answer of the British Minister to that declaration? But first, my Lords, I may say that the correspondence to which I refer makes perfectly clear what were the intentions and the hopes of Russia. The Emperor again and again refers to the arrangement of 1844—namely, the union of England, Russia, and Austria, in dealing with the affairs of Turkey. He declared that he does not desire any extension of territory, but at the same time he insists upon the maintenance of his protectorate, which is equivalent to territory, in its full power and to its full extent; and he subsequently does not disclaim the occupation by himself provi-

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sionally even of Constantinople itself—not for the purpose of securing a permanent footing there, but as a means of obtaining the recognition of the protectorate which he demands. He says:—
"Maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre et moi, pour le reste peu m'importe; il m'est indifférent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas. Je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement; de mon côtê, je suis également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y établir, en propriétaire il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hazard."
He speaks of occupying Constantinople provisionally; not only to invade Turkey—not only to take possession of the Principalities—but provisionally to occupy Constantinople itself, for the purpose of obtaining the recognition of his claim to the protectorate. What is the answer of the British Government to the declaration? My Lords, I do full justice to the language and to the principles and sentiments expressed by the noble Lord who at that time held the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The answer of Lord John Russell was the only answer which a British Minister could give, or which any man of honour could give, to such a proposition—namely, that they could not enter into any engagement which was to be kept secret from the other Powers of Europe; that, were such concealment possible, it would not be consistent with the end of preventing an European war; and that, moreover, such an agreement would only tend to accelerate the contingency for which it was intended to provide. But while I do justice to the manner in which the proposition of the Emperor was received by the British Minister and the British Government, I must call the attention of your Lordships to a most serious error which it appears to me was committed by the noble Lord, who, in his answer to the despatch from Sir H. Seymour, distinctly recognised the whole principle which we are now about to go to war for the purpose of repelling and repudiating. While he denies any—I had almost said complicity—but any concurrence in the views set forth by the Emperor of Russia for the ultimate partition of Turkey, he says:—
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"The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and so inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."
Now, my Lords, we are going to war to prevent the Emperor of Russia exercising a protectorate over a portion of the subjects of the Sultan, and in the first phase of these transactions, in almost the first page of that correspondence in which the Emperor of Russia is charged by the Government with having concealed his intentions, and with having misled them, the Emperor declares that he shall have recourse to negotiations, next to the use of menaces, and then, if menaces failed, to the use of force, for the purpose of establishing the Russian interpretation of the treaty of Kainardji and his protectorate over several millions of Turkish subjects; and the noble Lord then describes that protectorate as being "prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty." Well, my Lords, with that letter in his hands, in what possible way could the Emperor of Russia understand the course intended by the British Government except this—that they would enter into no engagement at that moment for the ultimate destination of the spoils of Turkey, but that they recognised his right to a protectorate, and that, recognising his right to a protectorate which was guaranteed to him by treaty, they of course extended to him the right conceded to every independent Sovereign and every independent nation, namely, the right of vindicating by force of arms that which is already secured to them by treaty. It appears to me that this letter of the noble Lord gives up the whole of the case for which Europe is at the present moment about to be involved in war. But, my Lords, the correspondence continues; and throughout the whole the Emperor declares his intentions with the utmost candour; and I am satisfied, that at this moment the Emperor of Russia is convinced in his own mind that throughout all these negotiations he has been perfectly frank, open, and unreserved with the British Government in regard to his intentions. Her Majesty's Government appear to me never to have separated in their own minds two questions which are essentially distinct and separate, and which have all along been distinct and separate in the judgment of the Emperor, namely, the reparation which he demanded for an in-

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jury which he asserted had been done to him in consequence of the interpretation put by Turkey upon the treaty of Kainardji, mid that other, and widely different question, what should be the ulterior disposition of the various members of the Turkish empire when that empire should finally fall to pieces. With regard to the second of these questions, the Emperor expressed himself anxious and ready to communicate, and, in point of fact, he did communicate, most frankly and unreservedly, with the British Government. With regard to the first, there is no proof whatever that he recognised the right of the British Government in any way to interfere. He claimed the liberty of asserting for himself rights which he declared—and he British Government assented to the declaration—were secured to him and sanctioned by treaty. My Lords, I say nothing of the manner in which the Emperor of Russia thought fit to treat his other ally, Austria, with whom the tripartite engagement was to have been entered into by England and Russia; but I must say that, as an example of supreme contempt, as an example of utter indifference to the feelings and honour of one nation or one person on the part of another, l know no parallel to it since the days of the Roman Triumvirate, except in the language put by Shakspeare into the mouth of Antony, when expressing to Octavius the estimation in which he holds Lepidus. Octavius says that Lepidus is a "tried and valiant soldier;" to which Antony replies:—
"So is my horse, Octavius; and, for that,
I do appoint him store of provender.
It is a creature that I teach to fight,
To wind, to stop, to run directly on;
His corporal motion governed by my spirit.
Do not talk of him,
But as a property."
Now, my Lords, since that celebrated conversation, in which two of a party frankly intimated their opinion of the merits and importance of the third—having in view especially the ultimate consequence of the conference to the absent Lepidus—I know no parallel to it, except that of the Imperial Antony unbosoming himself to Sir Octavius Seymour with regard to Austria. But, my Lords, the Emperor of Russia, whatever may be said of his conduct to Austria, has, at all events, been candid, frank, and open to the British Government; for, after the last of the communications from Lord John Russell to which I have referred, he proceeds to expound and de-
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velope his scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, assuring the British Minister that, if he imagined there was any vitality in Turkey, his accounts had miserably deceived that the moment of the dissolution of Turkey was at hand, and that it was essential to come to an immediate determination as to what ought to be done; and then went on to explain not only what he would not do, and what he would not permit, but also what he should consider as a reasonable mode of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the Turkish question. He said:—
"I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. Haying said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful State. Still less will permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics."
Having said what he would not do, he proceeds to what he will do. I quote from a despatch from Sir H. Seymour:—
"He thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. The Principalities are, he said, in fact, an independent State under my protection; this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria. There seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the full of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia. That island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession."
Again:—
"In dismissing me, His Imperial Majesty said, 'Well, induce your Government to write again upon these subjects—to write more fully, and to do so without hesitation. I have confidence in the English Government. Ce n'est point un engagement, une convention, que je leur demande; c'est un libre échange d'idées, et au besoin une parole de gentleman; entre nous cola suffit;
Now, my Lords, how was that proposition received by the British Government? No doubt they repudiated the idea of any territorial aggrandisement—no doubt they repudiated the idea of keeping up an understanding with Russia which was not to be known by the other Powers—but with regard to the negative propositions of the Emperor, the British Minister entirely concurred in the whole of them. Lord John Russell, the predecessor of the noble Earl opposite, had declared his opinion that—to use a common expression now—the ven-

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tilation of this question had a material tendency to accelerate the fall of Turkey, and that, consequently, it would be better to avoid discussions and negotiations on the subject. The noble Earl opposite, I presume, entertained a different opinion, because, though he adhered to the policy laid down in the despatches of Lord John Russell, yet he gladly complied with the request of the Emperor, that the subject should be further and frankly discussed; and, having complied with that request, he went on to say:—
"Her Majesty's Government entirely share the opinion of the Emperor, that the occupation of Constantinople by either of the great Powers would be incompatible with the present balance of power and the maintenance of peace in Europe, and must at once be regarded as impossible; that there are no elements for the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire; that the systematic misgovernment of Greece offers no encouragement to extend its territorial dominion; and that as there are no materials for provincial or communal government, anarchy would be the result of leaving the provinces of Turkey to themselves, or permitting them to form separate republics."
Well, now, there are only a certain number of ways of dealing with the partition of Turkey. The Emperor of Russia declares that he would never permit England to occupy Constantinople—that he will not permanently occupy it himself—that he will not allow the establishment of a Byzantine empire; but he tells you what he thinks would be a very easy and agreeable arrangement. In your answer you say nothing about the easy and agreeable arrangement which he proposes; you merely say that you cannot enter into any engagement without consulting the other Powers; but, with regard to all those suppositions which he excluded, you exclude them also; and, after you have done so, and after you have thus assumed the impossibility of the independence and integrity of Turkey, I want to know what more the Emperor could desire, fully satisfied as he must have been that you concurred with him in the necessity of a protectorate, by himself over a portion, and by yourselves over another portion, of the Turkish empire. My Lords, it appears to me that the Emperor has some reason to conclude, as he does conclude, from the despatches of the noble Earl opposite, that, with regard to the ultimate arrangement of the affairs of Turkey, he and Her Majesty's Government were perfectly agreed, and were acting entirely in concert. But with respect to the other question, which Her Majesty's Government seem to have per-
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petually misunderstood—namely, his vindication of his own right to his own- protectorate, and the subsequent mission of Prince Menchikoff for the purpose of enforcing that claim—there is not a single passage to be found in the whole correspondence by which it can be shown, or attempted to be shown, that the Emperor ever abandoned his interpretation of the treaty of Kainardji, or ever departed from his right of enforcing that treaty by force of arms, if necessary. Now, my Lords, I will not say—I am far from saying—that the interpretation which the Emperor of Russia puts upon the treaty of Kainardji is an interpretation which can be borne out by facts. I concur entirely with the declaration made by the noble Earl opposite when, referring to the seventh and eighth articles of the treaty, he showed that while the seventh provided for the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte by the Porte itself, the eighth specially limited the right of interference on the part of Russia to one particular case, which it was attempted by the Emperor to expand into a general protectorate over the whole Christian population of the Turkish empire. I say the argument of Russia is untenable and indefensible, and that its adoption and execution would be dangerous, if not fatal, to the interests of Europe. It would be the destruction of Turkey; and I say that the British Government had a clear and perfect right to advise the Sultan—while the Sultan in turn had an equally clear and undoubted right to anticipate that advice—never to accept the Russian interpretation of the treaty. But as the Emperor never acknowledged your right to interfere in the matter—as he always, on the contrary, treated the question as one which concerned himself only—as he never concealed his views on the subject or denied that he was determined to enforce those views—there is not the slightest ground for Her Majesty's Government to complain that they have been misled or deceived. That, however, with all these declarations and propositions which emanated from the Emperor, and which we now find embodied in public documents—with all the warnings which the Government received from their Ministers at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Constantinople—the noble Earl at the head of the Government should declare on the 25th of April that he entertained no apprehension of a disturbance of the peace of Europe, arising out of the affairs of Turkey, and that he

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had received the most solemn assurances from the Emperor of Russia of his desire to act entirely with the British Government, appears to me an example of political blindness not very complimentary to the sagacity of the noble Earl. Yet from that imputation of political blindness the noble Earl opposite cannot escape except by subjecting himself to a charge, which I certainly am not disposed to advance—namely, that of political connivance. I say at once that I acquit the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon), as well as the noble Earl at the head of the Government, of having at that time any desire to favour the ulterior views of Russia.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: At what time?
THE EARL OF DERBY: The 25th of April.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: What did we connive at?
THE EARL OF DERBY: The noble Earl knows that better than I do. It certainly is not for me to pry into the secret recesses of the imperturbable mind of the noble Earl opposite, who certainly contrives to keep his own counsel, both here and elsewhere, by dint of a solemn and persevering silence such as I have seen in no other Minister. Well, my Lords, I say again that as far as this country is concerned it has no cause to complain of having been misled by the Emperor of Russia with regard to his ulterior intentions. I say that those intentions are of a character most dangerous and most formidable to the peace of Europe. I say they are intentions which it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government or for this country not to resist by every means in their power; but I again repeat that which I have urged upon your Lordships before, that, supposing the view which is taken of the intentions of the Emperor of Russia to be correct, if at that moment, when the Russian forces crossed the Pruth, and took possession of the Principalities, the noble Earl opposite had then pointed out to the Czar that he was following a course, not only inconsistent with the ordinary rights of nations, and the ordinary course of political proceedings, but wholly inconsistent also with those engagements into which he had entered with the British Government themselves, then, if the Emperor did not recede from his unjust demands, we should, at all events, have known what to do, and we should no longer have blinded ourselves to the consequences which would inevitably come. I say, my
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Lords, from that period when, disregarding the ordinary course of nations in dealing with each other—disregarding even the solemn engagements entered into with the British Government, who thereby acquired a right to interfere—the Russian forces crossed the Pruth, in my conviction and belief either absolute submission to Russia or war with Russia was irresistible.
My Lords, I will not go through the whole mass of diplomacy, of negotiations, of protocols, and of notes which followed that event; but I would remark to the noble Earl opposite that the Vienna note, of which he speaks as having been rejected by the Emperor of Russia, and rejected apparently to his extreme surprise, after having been amended on the part of Turkey, was refused to be listened to by the Emperor of Russia, for precisely the same reason which induced him in the first instance to accept the unmodified note, and for the same reason likewise which induced Turkey to insist upon its modification, namely, that in its original shape the Vienna note, adopting the spirit, if not the language, of a previous despatch from Lord John Russell, granted to the Emperor of Russia that protectorate which every one admits to be dangerous to the peace of Europe. The British Government were compelled to confess that Turkey had reasons, on the one hand, for rejecting, and that Russia had reasons, on the other, for accepting that note.
My Lords, it is not without considerable uneasiness that I find this country embarked in a most formidable and what I fear will be a protracted war. I have the fullest confidence in the good understanding which has been established between this country and France. I think we have had upon the part of France, from the moment of the memorable declaration, "L'Empire c'est la paix!" down to the equally remarkable declaration, "Le temps des conquétes est passé sans rétour!" abundant evidence to convince even the most sceptical of the entire good faith and loyauté of the Emperor of the French. My Lords, it may be that at a time not very far distant, when it was found necessary in this country—and I rejoice that it was found necessary, for if they had not been made then those preparations would have to be made now—to increase our military and naval forces, there might be many who doubted, not, perhaps, the intentions of that extraordinary man who had raised France from anarchy and confusion, and placed her in the foremost rank of the

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nations of Europe, but the unsettled state of the country itself, and the confusion and tumult of parties into which it was divided, and whether it would be in the power of any single mind, however great, and of any intellect, however commanding, to reunite and bring under control all those parties, and, above all, to extinguish, and boldly to proclaim his determination to extinguish, that which in the mind of Frenchmen is the strongest of all passions—the thirst for military glory and the ambition of military power. At that time, some alarm was created by the seeming impossibility I have mentioned; but now,
"Via prima salutis,
"Quod minimé reris, Graiâ pandetur ab urbe."
But, my Lords, we cannot forget that the quarter from which we are now threatened with a disturbance of the peace of Europe and with an unprovoked aggression upon the territories of an independent power, is the very quarter which at that time was most anxious to instill suspicions against the good intentions of France, to warn us of the territorial aggressions which were said to be meditated by France, and to insist strongly upon the maintenance of the treaties and of the territorial status quo of Europe.
My Lords, I say that I look with anxiety to the commencement of this great struggle, not that I doubt of the continuance on the part of my countrymen of the patient endurance of such sacrifices as they may be called upon to make—not that I think they are merely actuated by a blind and momentary enthusiasm in what they believe to be a just cause, and in the expectation that the object of it will be obtained at a slight sacrifice; but because I foresee that the war in all probability will be a long and arduous one, and because I cannot but feel that our recent financial arrangements have been made in accordance with an unwise policy, and not been such as could place this country in an advantageous position for entering upon a war. I cannot forget that last year, after the danger of war had become imminent, in spite of all that could be said both in and out of Parliament by persons of the highest authority in such matters, a financial scheme was brought forward and was applauded to the echo, more especially by the noble Earl opposite, as a very model of financial science and an example to all future Chancellors of the Exchequer, but which nevertheless proved completely abortive, as had been foreseen; and I cannot
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forget, also, that, in spite of the remonstrances of a noble Earl whom I see near me, there was, with a war impending over us, a gratuitous and unnecessary sacrifice of revenue to the amount of about 1,000,000 l. annually. It is true that my noble Friend warned Ministers against that sacrifice, at a time when they were proposing to continue the income tax; but it was continued with a declaration that its continuance was to be limited to a very short period, and that at the expiration of that period it should finally cease. What is the case now? We find ourselves in the position of having lost the greater portion of our balances in the Exchequer; we find ourselves in the position of having lost the revenue derived from soap and other articles; we find ourselves under the necessity, in order to provide for the emergencies of war and for meeting our deficiency bills out—in consequence of the course pursued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we find ourselves compelled to double the income tax, and to do that, moreover, under the plea of taking the double income tax for the first half-year only, in order to meet a temporary deficiency. Now, I want to know in what position we are likely to be at the expiration of the first half-year? No human being imagines that this war can be brought to anything like a close within the period of six months. No human being believes that the estimates which have been submitted to the House of Commons will be sufficient to meet even one-tenth part of the expenses which the Government are bringing on the country. No human being, I think, will contend, or can believe, that direct taxation, by means of the income tax, will defray the current expenses of the war. I say, then, that if, at the moment when you are entering into that which must, I am afraid, be called a protracted war, you have deprived yourselves of the means which were formerly at your disposal—if you have cut off a large source of revenue which was at your command—if you have anticipated your future outlay—if you have been obliged to disregard the pledge which you gave last year, that you would put an end to the income tax in the course of seven years—and if you have declared it to be the intention of the Government not to anticipate the revenue of the country, but to make the present generation pay, year by year, for the whole expense of the war—I tell you you will find that line of policy simply impracticable. My Lords, it is absolutely

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impossible, especially if you intend to limit the incidence of taxation, and to make that taxation bear directly on property by means of the income tax—I think it possible in no case, but especially not in such a case as this, that the current expenses of the war can be borne by the current revenue of the country. At all events, if they are to be so borne, it must be by the destruction of your whole system of currency as it at present exists—it must be by recurring to a depreciated currency and an unlimited issue of inconvertible paper money. In that way you may, if you think fit, defray the current expenses of the war; but if you maintain your present metallic currency, and the stringent law of 1844, it will be utterly impossible year by year to pay the expenses of the war out of the ordinary revenue of the country. Now, my Lords, I think it is right that we should look to these circumstances and to these dangers, ay, even to the sustaining national failures and national disgraces in the first instance. We must look at the state of our preparations, and be careful that we are in a state of continued and progressive preparation for a continued and formidable struggle. Our present means as regards men, we are exhausting by an effort, mighty indeed, for the preparation of a great military demonstration—for it can hardly be more than a military demonstration, whatever may be the magnitude of the preparations of your fleet; but you are taking almost every man whose service at the present moment you can dispense with. But, my Lords, you must be preparing your resources—you must not raise the whole of our forces—pensioners, coast-guardsmen, and all—in the first instance. If you do that, you put the honour of England, the security of the country, and the liberties of Europe upon the hazard of one fearful throw, and you will expose yourselves to dangers and disasters such as this country never witnessed heretofore. My Lords, you are now embarking in an arduous war. I give the noble Earl opposite and the Government credit for everything they have done in the interest of peace, and to postpone—if possible, to prevent—the horrors of war. I do not think that their measures have been either skilfully combined or judiciously adopted; but I give them full credit for a desire to avert war if possible; and I give them equal credit now that they have entered into war, for a desire to carry it on in a manner befitting the dignity and honour of this country. But
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that being so, there must now be no hesitation, no tampering, no pottering with the question of a few hundred thousand pounds, more or less, in the expenditure of the year. What the Government should say is, "We have a great object before us, and that object we will and must attain, at whatever cost and whatever inconvenience. We appeal not to the enthusiasm, but to the perseverance of the country. We appeal to the patriotism of our opponents—we appeal to all classes who are interested in the honour of their common country." If they do make that appeal, believing the war to be in itself a just and righteous war, I am confident it will not be made in vain, either in this House or in the country at large.
Now, my Lords, one word more in reference to some of the points touched upon by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The noble Earl has explained to us the reason which renders it impossible for him, technically speaking, to lay on the table of the House the convention entered into with France. He says, notwithstanding, that that engagement is as clearly binding upon both Governments as if it were embodied in the more regular form of a treaty.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I said there was an honourable understanding.
THE EARL OF DERBY: There is an honourable understanding; but we are called upon to go to war on the faith of that honourable understanding, and I do think it is right that the Parliament of England, at the moment when war is at our doors—when we are entering into a struggle, the issue of which no man can foresee—should know at least to what it is we have pledged ourselves and our allies. I agree with the noble Earl that it is quite impossible we could now declare what are the terms upon which, and upon which alone, peace may be restored to Europe; but I presume there is something in the shape of a sine quâ non about which we are going to fight. We are not fighting for the mere evacuation of the Principalities, or for the mere restoration of the original state as between Russia and Turkey. We are not about to enter into a war in which the Russians will be permitted to retire whenever they please, on terms under which their claims may be revived and repeated. I confess, my Lords, there is one—but only one—passage in the Address of which I do not entirely approve. I am not disposed to move any Amend-

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ment to the Address. But I confess I should be glad to see, in addition to the announcement, that there is to be a "vigorous resistance to the projects of a Sovereign, whose further aggrandisement would be dangerous to the independence of Europe;" that some security is to be taken, that the unjust pretensions of the Emperor shall not again and again be brought forward; but that, having been once repelled, measures should be taken in order to prevent their repetition. Now, my Lords, the treaties between Russia and Turkey are at an end in consequence of this war; and I say, and I hope to hear the Government say also, that there can be no safe or satisfactory termination of this war, unless, in any treaty which may be adopted for regulating the future relations between Russia and Turkey, there is an absolute negative placed upon the interpretation which the Emperor of Russia has attempted to put upon the treaty of Kainardji, and unless there is some guarantee afforded for the observance of that understanding and for the maintenance of that treaty. I do not ask anything further, but I do ask the Government to explain a little more distinctly than has been done by the noble Earl opposite, what are the engagements into which we are entering, or have entered. My Lords, I rejoice to hear that there is no stipulation with regard to any protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan, such as would have placed us in a position as false as that of Russia; but I do think it not unreasonable, when we are about to go into a war, to ask what are the engagements to which Her Majesty's Government have pledged us, and for the maintenance of which we are about to shed the best blood and a large portion of the treasures of the country? It is reasonable also to ask, what are the objects for which this war is to be undertaken, and what are the ends to be accomplished before it can be brought to a successful termination? For my own part, I intend to offer no opposition, no amendment, no qualification to the terms of the Address. I cordially join with Her Majesty's Government in the tone, the language, and the spirit of that Address. As I believe that this war is a just and necessary war—a war undertaken in a righteous cause—and as I think it is a war necessary for the preservation of the liberties of Europe and the repression of the encroachments of Russia; so I feel, with my noble Friend, that we may look with
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more confidence and hope, and less in a spirit of blasphemy than characterised Russia on a recent occasion, that we may look with humble confidence, having done all in our power to avert the horrors of this war, having failed in these endeavours in consequence of unjustifiable pretensions on the part of Russia—having endeavoured, not with any motives of self-aggrandisement, or with any designs of ambition, but for the purpose of defending the weak and succouring the oppressed, to resist the pretensions of Russia—we may look with humble confidence to the protection of that Great Power in whose hands are the hearts of kings and the destinies of nations; and, as the armies of England will never be employed in a more honourable cause, so I trust they will bring the war in which they are engaged to a conclusion, than which none has ever been more honourable or more glorious.
THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, your Lordships have now an opportunity of remarking the nature of that support which the noble Earl, in a spirit of patriotism, has thought proper to offer Her Majesty's Government. I presume we must be grateful for what we have received; but I confess that I trust we shall receive from your Lordships and from the country a very (Efferent support. My Lords, the noble Earl has confined a large portion of his speech to what may be called a personal attack upon myself, and the trans. actions in which I have been concerned. Now, before I take notice of that attack, I will admit with the noble Earl, that I am one of those who have, as he says, "hoped against hope," and to the last, moment I have preserved the opinion that that greatest of blessings which a country can enjoy would still be preserved to us. I think, my Lords, I could give your Lordships good reasons for the hopes which I entertained; but that subject has been so much discussed, and these topics have been so much exhausted, that 1 should unnecessarily weary your Lordships by explaining the grounds and the motives which induced me to entertain that belief; and especially is it unnecessary for me to do so because, unfortunately, those hopes have been fallacious. The noble Earl first stated that he was persuaded that this war, much as he lamented it, would never have taken place had I not had the misfortune to be at the head of the Government of this country. He referred to the remarks made by the Emperor of Russia to Her

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Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg, in which His Majesty was pleased to express an opinion favourable to myself personally, and to allude to the long acquaintance which he was pleased to recollect he had had with me. Now, on that I will say, that I, of course, cannot but feel flattered by the good opinion of any Sovereign in alliance with our own Queen—and that was the condition in which the Emperor of Russia stood at that time; and I confess I see nothing to be ashamed of in the good opinion expressed of an humble individual like myself, by a Monarch in alliance with Her Majesty. But the noble Earl is not without his compliments also. At the instant the noble Earl assumed the head of affairs in this country what happened? Why, the Austrian Government wrote to congratulate him; and the noble Earl who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Malmesbury) returned a despatch full of gratitude to the Emperor for that congratulation. And this congratulation was offered by the only Minister whom I ever recollect in Austria as the bitter enemy of the English nation. That was the great distinction of Prince Schwarzenberg beyond that of any other Austrian Minister. Now, my Lords, I have had no congratulation from Austria, notwithstanding I have been longer formally in connection with that Government than even the noble Earl opposite, and, indeed, have been even branded in this and other countries as "the pupil of the detested Metternich," but no congratulations have reached me from that quarter. And I am ashamed to say that even the congratulations of His Imperial Majesty, through Sir Hamilton Seymour, were received by me without any notice, and with. out that profound sense of gratitude expressed by the noble Earl opposite in the case of Austria. The noble Earl next proceeded to deal with this "memorandum" prepared in 1844, upon which he has dwelt a great deal, and out of which he fancies he has made a great discovery, and turns to great account. He even thinks that there is a correspondence connected with it, and that there must be something more yet to be produced. How it is that he has formed that opinion I am unable to state; but I can only say that everything which exists in connection with the subject is on your Lordships' table. With respect to the memorandum itself, its history is briefly this:—When the Emperor of Russia was in this country, in
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some conversations which he had with the Duke of Wellington, with Sir Robert Peel, and with myself, he repeated the apprehensions which he entertained of the probable dissolution of the Turkish empire, and expressed his anxiety as to the consequences which must necessarily ensue from such a European calamity. The whole drift, and the only particular effect, of this memorandum is simply this—to request us to do nothing, or, at all events, to do nothing without an understanding and previous concert with Russia—but not at all to the exclusion of other Powers—not in the least. It is quite true that the Emperor, as your Lordships well know, treated in the same cavalier manner the Ministry of the dynasty which then ruled in France as he has treated the present Government of that country, and therefore he put out of the view any concert with the French Government; but he never insinuated in the slightest degree that we were precluded from communicating with the French Government on this subject; and, further than this, the fact is, that I myself personally communicated to the French Ambassador the substance of the conversations which had taken place. There was not, therefore, the slightest uneasiness on the part of France on that subject—not the least in the world; for, as I stated before, this memorandum has no other practical effect in the world than that there should be no separate action, in the event of that calamity taking place which the Emperor of Russia anticipated would happen to Turkey. This memorandum, after an interval of ten years, I see again; and I look upon it, on the whole, with great satisfaction. I see nothing to find fault with in it. It seems to me, always supposing the Emperor to have been well founded in his apprehensions of the dissolution of the Turkish empire—and of his sincerity I cannot doubt, whether he were well or ill founded in his apprehensions—but, acting upon that belief, I see nothing but that which is wise, and moderate, and judicious, in this memorandum. There are some portions of it particularly to be admired, and particularly such as your Lordships would do well to ponder and act upon in case of necessity. For instance, all relating to the interference with the Christian subjects of the Porte; and, in fact, I see nothing whatever to object to; and I should be perfectly ready again to subscribe to the opinions which it embodies, under the

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same circumstances as those in which this paper was drawn up. It is a very common notion—one which the noble Earl was not the first to give currency to—that this is part of a deep-laid plan of the Emperor of Russia, and that this apprehension of the speedy dissolution of the Turkish empire was but a pretext put forward as a means of engaging this country in his scheme of that partition of the Turkish dominions which was to be brought about under the specious pretext of that dissolution. I think the noble Earl near me (the Earl of Clarendon) has already said that he had no monopoly of those apprehensions. I confess that, on the part of myself, that apprehension is not of recent date, nor even of the date of 1844, but it was shared in by myself so far back as 1829. And I will give your Lordships the proof that I had these apprehensions. Your Lordships are aware that by what is called "the Treaty of London" it was the intention of Mr. Canning to erect Greece into a State under the suzerainty of the Porte, and not to make it an independent State. After the Peace of Adrianople, my opinion of the state of Turkey was such that I proposed to my noble Friend, then at the head of Government, to endeavour to change the intention of Mr. Canning, and to constitute Greece, if possible, into an independent State, as being more consistent with the interests of Europe, and as affording a better chance of Greece being independent of Russia, than if it continued to be connected with the Porte by the suzerainty intended by Mr. Canning. My noble Friend agreed with that view, and the other Powers assented to our proposition, and this in consequence of that very apprehension of the speedy dissolution of the Turkish empire which we entertained after the Peace of Adrianople. The independence of Greece was thus established upon a general concurrence in this opinion. Your Lordships will see that here was a practical proof of the apprehension which the noble Earl has treated as a mere pretext. The noble Earl, in the course of his remarks upon this memorandum, made some which I have had the benefit of hearing and reading before—nay, which I should not be very much surprised if, at the same time, they were being made in another place. But I have seen them before—I allude to a publication which is supposed to enjoy great authority, but, at all events, judging from its
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malignity and misrepresentations, the origin of it is not, perhaps, very difficult to imagine. Seeing, therefore, that it possesses some weight—even greater, perhaps, than the Times—I will venture to make an observation upon the contents of the last number of this publication, the Press—which I have just received—with respect to the memorandum, which is the grand cheval de bataille of the noble Earl, but which appears to me to be what is vulgarly called "a mare's nest." This article begins with a falsehood, but that was nothing more than might be expected. It states:—
"In the year 1844 the Emperor of Russia visited our country. An estrangement having then taken place between England and France, His Majesty deemed the season appropriate for the advancement of a long-cherished project, and he seized the opportunity of personally accomplishing it, with the co-operation of an English Minister, between whom and the Count of St. Petersburg there had existed for thirty years relations of extreme confidence. That Minister was Lord Aberdeen, then Secretary of State in the Government of Sir Robert Peel."
Now, the falsehood to which I refer is, that there was the slightest misunderstanding between this country and France at that time. I know what is intended; it is intended to allude to the celebrated Tahiti affair, which did occur in 1844, which, though greatly exaggerated at best, and entirely owing its importance to the patriotic efforts of individuals and a part of the press in this country and in France, still had somewhat of a serious character. Undoubtedly, however, the Emperor of Russia visited this country in the first week of June in that year, and with respect to the Tahiti affair, the first intelligence of it was not received until early in August. Therefore that misunderstanding could not have invited the Emperor to indulge any hopes such as those set forth in the paper. The article also states:—
"On his return to St. Petersburg, the Emperor instructed Count Nesselrode to draw up a memorandum embodying the understanding arrived at during his recent visit, and forward it to Baron Brunnow, accompanied by a private letter from the Emperor to Lord Aberdeen, in which he begged that if any inaccuracy were found in the document it might be corrected; but that, if approved, the memorandum should be accepted and preserved as 'the key of the relations between Russia and England.'"
Now, my Lords, I can only say that I know of no such letter. I think my Imperial and Royal correspondence is not quite so extensive as to prevent me from recollecting such a letter as this, and I

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can only say that I have not the slightest recollection of ever having received such a letter from His Imperial Majesty of Russia. The article next goes on to say:—
"The Emperor succeeded in his first object. By the advice of Lord Aberdeen, he addressed himself to Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington. The Duke was always favourable to the Russian alliance."
Yes, his Grace was always favourable to the Russian alliance. And why was he so? His Grace was always favourable to it for the same reason for which he taught me to be favourable to it, because he thought it favourable to the interests of England. And I regret—deeply regret—although forced into a war which I believe to be just and indispensable—I deeply regret the rupture of our friendly relations with Russia. And therefore, not only was his Grace favourable to the Russian alliance, but I should hope that every man who values the interests of England is also favourable to the Russian alliance. It would not do to criticism his Grace, so the criticism was reserved for me. But the article goes on to say:—
"Sir Robert Peel, full of tariffs, was entirely governed with respect to external politics by Lord Aberdeen. It was definitively settled in 1844, between the Emperor of Russia and the English Government, that the partition of Turkey, when it became necessary, should be transacted by Great Britain and the two Imperial Courts, without France."
Yes. The writer of this well knew, when he talked of Sir Robert Peel as thinking of nothing but tariffs, that the opinion of the Duke of Wellington was shared by that statesman, and I humbly endeavoured to act with them; and to this hour it is my endeavour to profit by their precept and example. I wish to be led by their light, and by their wisdom and guidance. I confess that, for myself, I have no intention whatever—indeed, I never think of contending for a moment with the noble Earl who has now left the House (the Earl of Derby)—but your Lordships will permit me to say that, with those two names, and acting with them, and with this memorandum approved and sanctioned by them, I care little indeed for whatever may have fallen from, or whatever may be the opinion, of the noble Earl. My Lords, I believe I have stated sufficient on this personal part of the subject. I have merely to add these few words—that, being now engaged in this war, I trust that, although to the last deprecating and resisting it to the utmost of my power, as far as I thought it
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my duty to the country to do so, I do say that I do trust I shall not now be found deficient in carrying it on in such a manner as may lead to the only legitimate end of all war, that is, a lasting and enduring peace, upon terms consistent with the honour and dignity of the country. My Lords, I do not feel that, even if at this moment I make peace my first object and my first vow, if it is never absent from my thoughts, I am acting in a manner at all inconsistent with carrying on the war with vigour and energy. Your Lordships will recollect that the most virtuous character in our civil war, and the man most devoted to the cause in which he was engaged, even when arming himself for the combat, still murmured "Peace! Peace!" That is the feeling which is still uppermost in my heart; and while I trust that the war will be carried on with all the spirit and energy which becomes this nation, I still hope that its termination will be an enduring peace; and this feeling is one which I trust is shared by your Lordships.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, there is no one of your Lordships who is more anxious than myself that we should all with the greatest unanimity concur in the Address to be presented to Her Most Gracious Majesty. I have already addressed your Lordships several times on this subject, and I regret that I should again have to trespass on your time; but I cannot refrain from expressing my extreme surprise that at a moment of such solemn import as the present, when your Lordships' minds, like that of the whole country, must be occupied with the perilous situation in which this country stands, that the noble Earl at the head of the Government should have made a speech like that which your Lordships have just heard. During the greatest part of that speech it is not too much to say that your Lordships have been convulsed with laughter. Instead of taking a statesmanlike view of the subject, and reassuring the country with respect to the dangers to which it is exposed, and the resources on which it has to rely—instead of showing how greatly superior at this moment is its position to that in which it stood fifty years ago, when about to enter upon a war—or going deeply into the question to prove the necessity of the war, and assisting the enthusiasm and spirit of the country by stimulating its hopes—the Prime Minister of England, at this important moment, should take up a weekly, and what he calls a

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scurrilous paper, and should lay it upon the table of your Lordships' House, and for nearly half an hour occupy your attention by reading some absurd extracts from this public print. The Prime Minister did not answer a single argument of my noble Friend, and did not think your Lordships worthy of hearing any reply to that eloquent and stirring address of my noble Friend; but merely read—what those of your noble Lordships who had nothing better to do might have read for yourselves—certain extracts from a weekly publication. Had the noble Earl been paid by the editor of the Press to puff his journal, I could have understood his object in reading what he himself describes as scurrilous nonsense to the House; but I think the Prime Minister on such an occasion should have occupied your Lordships' time with matters of a higher tone and a deeper consideration. The noble Earl, however, for a short time, made some remarks which seemed something like a reply to the speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) in reference to the congratulations the noble Earl had received from the Emperor of Russia on his accession to office, and he appeared to consider it as a very natural expression of feeling towards him. The noble Earl is accustomed to Royal compliments. He has been called by successive Sovereigns, "the dear," "the good," and "the excellent," and at this moment the usual manner in which the Pope speaks of him is "that estimable heretic." The noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) takes exceptions to the remarks that have been made on the congratulations of the Emperor of Russia—for what reason I cannot see—for upon this occasion the expressions go a little further than mere empty compliment. The Emperor, while speaking to Sir Hamilton Seymour with such interest of the "dying man" whom he so often mentions, said, "We must come to some understanding and we should, I am convinced, if I could only hold out about ten minutes' conversation with your Ministers;" and then, perhaps not quite so sure of that, he says, "with Aberdeen for instance, who knows me so well, and who has as full confidence in me as I have in him." This was not simply that natural respect which we all feel for the noble Earl to which reference was made, but the compliment was paid because upon this particular question the Emperor knew well the sympathy between the noble Earl and himself. With respect
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to this memorandum, if my memory does not betray me, there has been an alteration or mistake in the endorsement. If I recollect rightly, the original was endorsed in this way, "Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications received from the Emperor of Russia during his Imperial visit to England in June, 1844." As now endorsed it runs, "Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to his Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June, 1844." The internal evidence of the document shows, and the noble Earl himself admits it, that this communication was made during the visit of His Majesty. The identity of the noble Earl with this document was distinguished from that of a mere Minister with an official document; and that this was the case is proved by another paper that has not been laid before your Lordships. This document has always been considered of the greatest possible importance, and one which was not to be communicated to the other Powers, although the noble Earl has stated that he did think it his duty to communicate the substance of it to the French Ambassador, but I should like to know whether he ever informed Count Nesselrode that he had made this confession to France. When I came into office I received the document from the noble Earl who preceded me in the office (Earl Granville); it was not kept in the archives of the office, but was delivered to each successive Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. With it I received a note stating that it was a memorandum drawn up by Baron Brunnow as the result of the conferences between the Emperor of Russia, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen—the name of the Duke of Wellington was not mentioned. It is of little consequence whether this document was drawn up by Baron Brunnow or Count Nesselrode;—it was, if I understand it rightly, intended as a provisional, conditional, and secret arrangement between Russia, Austria, and England, to do certain things with respect to Turkey, and to that arrangement France—without any consent of her own—was to be obliged to concur. If any doubt exists upon that point, the single paragraph referring to that point will remove it. The document states—
"For the purpose thus stated, the policy of

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Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime Power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna."
Now, I should like to know if the Emperor of Russia was aware of the noble Earl having communicated the contents of this document to the French Ambassador? Because, mark the progress of events! I had not been in office forty-eight hours before Baron Brunnow came to ask me if I had read the memorandum. I had not, then, however, received it from my predecessor. Baron Brunnow urged and pressed upon me the necessity of reading the document, and stated to me that he conceived it to be the key of our whole policy with Russia. From that moment, although I saw Baron Brunnow almost every day during the ten months I held office, it was never afterwards mentioned to me. Baron Brunnow must either have judged for himself that it was not likely that the Government of my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) would concur in the policy marked out, or he was instructed from St. Petersburg to say nothing further to me on the subject. On the 8th of December, 1852, the Government of my noble Friend resigned; and immediately it was known at St. Petersburg who was the new Prime Minister, on the 11th of January, the Emperor of Russia opened up the subject to Sir Hamilton Seymour. Now I think that is evidence, considering that Lord Palmerston had been in office for a great many years, and might have been naturally supposed not to have concurred with that view—considering that during the whole of the time in which the Government of my noble Friend was in office not one word was said upon the subject, and that within five or six days after the intelligence of the accession to office of the noble Earl opposite the Emperor took up the thread of the propositions as broken off since 1844—that is, I think, sufficient evidence to convince almost any mind that the Emperor considered the noble Earl as ready to act upon the policy embodied in the memorandum. I should not have risen to snake the statements I have, had not the reply of the noble Earl to my noble Friend appeared to call for them. In conclusion, I can only say, without expressing either approbation of the manner in which the negotiations have been carried on, or confidence in the probable vigour and judgment
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of Her Majesty's Ministers in carrying on this war—I give no opinion on these subjects—I think it my duty as a loyal subject, and as an Englishman anxious for the success of my country's arms, to support the Address which Her Majesty's Government has proposed for the adoption of the House.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he did not think it necessary that he should then enter into a discussion of the general question which had been brought under the consideration of their Lordships. But there were a few points in the speeches of the noble Earl who had preceded him which he did not wish to leave altogether unnoticed. The noble Earl who had just sat down was perfectly correct in stating that he (Earl Granville) had handed to him the memorandum in that box, as Lord Palmerston had handed them to him. Baron Brunnow had requested him to do so; but he owned that on reading it he had been rather surprised to find that there had not been more in so mysterious a document. The noble Earl had told them that, immediately after his appointment to the Foreign Office, Baron Brunnow had directed his attention to the memorandum of the Russian Government, drawn up in the year 1844; and the noble Earl had referred to that circumstance for the purpose of proving what he considered the extreme importance which the representative of Russia in this country attached to that document. But it seemed to him (Earl Granville) that that step on the part of Baron Brunnow might fairly be attributed to the interest which his Government began at that time to feel in the question of the Holy Places. With respect to the speech of the noble Earl who had spoken second in that debate (the Earl of Derby), he could not help observing that one portion of that speech seemed singularly inappropriate, after the explanations which had been given by his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs with respect to the objects of the war; and in fact it would appear as if that portion of the noble Earl's speech must have been prepared before the discussion of that evening had commenced. When the noble Earl who had spoken last expressed his opinion that the noble Earl at the head of the Government had not entered into the subject of the war in a statesman-like manner and had hardly acted in a manner worthy of his position when he had referred upon so grave an occasion as that to an article in a weekly newspaper, it seemed to him

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(Earl Granville) that that article derived an importance which it would not otherwise possess from the fact that it had been introduced into the speech of so distinguished a Member of that House as the noble Earl who was at the head of the late Government. The noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) seemed to labour under an impression that the Emperor of Russia had been induced to attempt to carry into effect his ambitious designs in consequence of the retirement of the late Government from office. But whatever respect he had for the two noble Earls opposite, as the present Administration comprised men so distinguished in European diplomacy as the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office, the noble Lord the Leader of the House of Commons (Lord T. Russell), and the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston), he (Earl Granville) could not but think that the noble Earl assumed too much credit to himself and his Colleagues when he supposed that the Emperor of Russia had thought that the last change effected in the councils of the British Crown offered a favourable opportunity for the prosecution of his projects.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he could not help taking that opportunity of expressing his satisfaction that one noble Earl had taken occasion to state, what he thought it was most essential to have stated—that this contest in which we were now most unhappily, though most unavoidably, engaged, was not likely to be an easy contest—one unaccompanied with heavy sacrifices to this country—and, he must add, he feared it might not prove a very short one. It was most necessary that those things should he stated, in order to prevent any popular delusion as to the extent of the sacrifices which, he greatly feared, the country might be called on to make; and it was the more necessary, when their Lordships remembered that the Government, having most wisely and most consistently shown the utmost possible reluctance to enter into this struggle, had been anticipated by the popular voice expressing the popular feeling, which had been much more general and much more vehement in favour of hostilities than the desire of the Government, as appeared by the recent negotiations. That reluctance, he felt confident, would have been heartily shared by the great man whose name had been mentioned in the course of the debate, if he had been happily preserved to us. The Duke of
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Wellington, of all men, would have been most reluctant to have seen that peace which he conquered interrupted. But as we had been reluctant in beginning the war, in the same proportion, he (Lord Brougham) felt assured, would be found our vigour in carrying it on. We had on this occasion, happily, what we had not in former wars, not only a perfectly just cause, but a perfectly unanimous Parliament, and a united and zealous people engaged in supporting it; and we had also the inestimable advantage of an alliance with France, the Government of which had shown a wisdom, a firmness, and a good faith, throughout the whole of those transactions and negotiations, which it would be wholly impossible to praise too highly. But he wished he could say—with all his hopes of the success of our arms, and feeling nothing like alarm in reference to the impending struggle—he wished he could say he felt no anxiety regarding the possible result, not to the two allies, England and France, but to the rest of Europe. For as regarded the southern and central parts of Europe he owned he felt considerable anxiety. Nothing was more to be dreaded for the safety of the Continent than a war of what was commonly called "propagandism," and nothing was more to be deprecated than any appeal to insurrectionary movements—nothing more perilous to all our European neighbours. Nor can you wrap yourselves up as standing aloof, and indulge in the sordid reflection quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est; for though secure in your insular position, and feeling no alarm from any risk your internal tranquillity may run, you are not without your part of the peril. Their Lordships might believe him that our prosperity is so bound up with that of the rest of Europe that nothing could happen, he would not say to carry disaster and desolation, but to extend discord and disturbance over the southern and central parts of the Continent, which must not put our own interests in jeopardy. Towards avoiding that great calamity, he looked to the wisdom and the firmness of certain of the German Potentates. With respect to Austria he had no fear; and if all the rest of the Germanic Powers took the same view with the Emperor and his sage advisers, he believed the Continent would be safe from those insurrectionary movements to which he had alluded. None had so great an interest as they in preventing the extension and limiting the duration

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of the contest which had unhappily begun. As to the Power against whom that war was to be waged, he would merely say it was a common remark, sometimes applied wickedly as well as foolishly to the transactions of individuals in private life, that "You should always live with your friend as if he might one day be your enemy." But to the transactions of States this maxim was well and wisely applied; and there was another, alike applicable to States and to individuals, that "You should deal with your adversary as if he might one day be again your friend." Acting upon this sound maxim, he would fain shut his eyes to some passages in the correspondence now laid before Parliament, in which the conduct of our adversary is displayed in such colours as we naturally shrink from contemplating. Acting upon the same maxim, he would, if he could, forget scenes lately enacted in Asia—forget, if he could, scenes which it seemed beyond the power, the unlimited power, of their actor to exhibit—scenes which he should have thought exceeded the power of autocracy itself, eclipsing the atrocities of Ismail, and casting even the combined horrors and blasphemies of praga into the shade.
EARL GREYsaid, he certainly did not rise with the intention of following any of the noble Lords who had preceded him into an examination of the events of the past, nor did he mean to make any objection to the Address which had been moved by his noble Friend. But he must confess that he was disappointed with the terms in which the Address had been drawn up. He had hoped that it would have been so framed that even he, much as he differed in opinion from many of their Lordships, should have been able to give his cordial assent to it without any reserve whatever. It was impossible, however, that he could do so, consistently with the opinions he formerly expressed in their Lordships' House in regard to this war. Those opinions were not changed. On the contrary, all that had happened since their last discussion of the subject, and all the additional information which had been laid before their Lordships, had only tended to confirm the opinions he then expressed. But having stated then very fully why he disapproved of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and why he believed that this war might have been and ought to have been avoided, he would not do that which would be most irksome to their Lordships and himself, and again go over that ground. He was therefore pre-
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pared to look, not to the past, but to the future; and notwithstanding the terms in which it was expressed, he was ready to accept the Address as one not expressing or implying any opinion as to the past, or as to the conduct of either party in those transactions, but as simply pledging the House to support Her Majesty in that struggle which had now, unhappily, become inevitable. In that sense he concurred in the Address; and he was content merely to disclaim any participation in any further meaning that might be extracted from it. As the struggle was now unavoidable, he might be permitted to say there was no one of their Lordships and no one person in the country more anxious than he was for the successful termination of that struggle, and for the honour of the British arms. From the greater part of what had fallen from the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) he widely differed; but he concurred in one point of the noble Earl's speech—he meant in what the noble Earl said with reference to the financial condition of the country at the commencement of the war. He (Earl Grey) believed that that condition was one which was likely to lead to very serious embarrassment; and he could not help concurring with the noble Earl in thinking that, with the knowledge of the difficulties then impending, the measures adopted last year under these circumstances, and persevered in too long, were inconsistent with real prudence, and had placed Her Majesty's Government and the country in a situation of very great embarrassment. He also believed that the provision that had been made for the expenses of the war was, as the noble Earl had stated, altogether inadequate to that object, and inadequate for it even if we could hope—which he (Earl Grey) could not do—that hostilities were likely to be concluded in a few months. He would, likewise, venture to allude to a subject to which he had adverted on the first night of the Session. He meant the inadequacy of the existing arrangements of the public departments connected with the administration of the Army for carrying on that most important branch of the public service during a state of war. But that was a subject which he considered of such urgent importance that he would take another opportunity of offering to their Lordships some remarks in reference to it; and he would, therefore, next week move their Lordships to call for the production of certain papers, which would show whether the

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Government had taken any steps on the subject, and, if so, what those steps were; and in making that Motion he should venture to lay before their Lordships the arguments which led him to believe that a much more extensive change than that which he understood was at present contemplated was absolutely and pressingly required in the existing circumstances of the country. Before he sat down he must express the very great pain, and the anxiety, and solicitude for the future, with which he joined their Lordships in taking this last formal step for placing the country in a state of war. He could not concur in the vote which was to be the inauguration of a great war without saying how deeply he deplored the necessity which was now thrown upon us, and how entirely he concurred in those sentiments which, much to his honour, had been expressed on this point by his noble Friend at the head of the Government. When be remembered during that long European peace of which we were now witnessing the termination—when he remembered how much had been done for the moral and physical improvement of the inhabitants of this island—how much had been done for the general benefit of the whole human race by the freer intercourse of nations, by the diffusion of knowledge both moral and religious, and by the blessings of commerce and civilisation throughout the globe—when he remembered also bow great as was the improvement that had been effected, small in proportion as it appeared to what was still required—when he also recollected that this peaceful progress which was going on year by year with accelerated steps was now to be cut short—that nations were now no longer to vie with one another in cultivating the arts of peace, and in increasing and extending the enjoyment of that commercial intercourse by which they were bound together, but that, instead of that, the energies of nations were to be arrayed against nations for their mutual destruction—when he reflected on the extent of human suffering that might be in prospect—the misery, privation, and famine resulting from the loss of friends near and dear, not only to our fellow-countrymen, but to our allies and also to our enemies—and when he thought of the victims which were to be offered up on the altar of war, he could not but deplore the commencement of a contest which would carry so many fatal consequences in its train. It was impossible not to feel respect for that
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great Russian nation, for their devotion to their Emperor and their country, which they believed to be a duty. He thought the Russian people was one which, under better guidance and better circumstances, had within it all the elements of a great and enlightened nation. He believed if peace had been continued, that by degrees light and knowledge, in spite of every effort to exclude them, would have penetrated even to the masses of Russia, and that by such means, in not many years, we should have obtained a more certain security against the designs of their despotic master than we should now do by the most successful war; for he (Earl Grey) was convinced that as that population became enlightened and civilised, and knew the real interests of their country, they would have ceased to be mere passive instruments for fulfilling the will of any one man, and to pursue a line of conduct opposed to their own interests. He could not, also, help referring with regret to the spirit with which he feared this war was pursued. He apprehended there was too much truth in what fell from his noble Friend at the head of the Government on the first night of the Session, when he said there were many persons in this country to whom the avoidance of war, and a reconciliation with Russia, would rather be a matter of disappointment than otherwise—that they would miss a subject of excitement; and that, instead of rejoicing, as they might to do, in the restoration of tranquillity, they would rather regard it as a misfortune. He feared there was too much of a feeling prevalent that was unsuited to a solemn sense of our responsibility which would befit us on such an occasion—that there was a presumptuous confidence in our position, an eager, if not a fierce, desire to engage in mortal conflict with our enemy, and an unreasoning feeling of animosity, not only against the Emperor of Russia, but against his people, whom we ought not to regard with any such feelings. He was, however, happy to acknowledge that those feelings had received no encouragement from either side of their Lordships' House that night; that, on the contrary, nothing could have been more becoming than the tone and temper with which the prospects of war had been referred to on both sides of the House. But, although that had been the case here, he was afraid he was not mistaken in regard to the feeling that prevailed out of doors. He could not help

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reminding those who might be encouraging the feelings to which he had alluded, that they ought to remember that that was not the spirit in which a Christian nation ought to enter on a war; that those were not the feelings and dispositions which they were taught to believe were likely to bring down blessings on our arms; and that it became them at this solemn moment to bear in mind that "the race was not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong."
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, that he rose for the purpose of performing what he considered to be a duty which he owed to his country and to his brother officers of the profession to which he belonged, and on which we mainly depended for the success of our present operations. He had no hesitation in saying, that, in his opinion, our force in the Baltic was not sufficiently strong. He believed that we ought not to have a less force at starting there than twenty sail of the line, fully manned by well-disciplined crews, in order to be successful in what we undertook. He felt persuaded that a niggardly use of the public money in the manning of our fleet would be productive of the most pernicious results. He would call upon their Lordships, and upon his fellow-countrymen generally, to be forbearing in the judgment they would form of the conduct of the gallant men who were prepared to shed their blood in the public cause, if those men should undertake no decisive operations until they should find that their crews had become thoroughly disciplined and effective. The strength of a ship depended entirely on the discipline of its crew. The seamen who were serving in the Baltic fleet were, for the most part, newly-raised levies; and though they might be gallant and active men, they must become disciplined in order to be effective. All mobs were useless; but of all mobs on the face of the earth, the most useless and the worst was a mob on board a line-of-battle ship engaged with the enemy. It should not be supposed that because our vessels were propelled by steam they were to be brought immediately into action, and were to conquer by the mere flash of their guns. Under these circumstances, he appealed to their Lordships, and to the people generally of this country, to exercise some patience in judging of the mode in which the commanders of our ships might be pleased to act, for it should be remembered that they ought not to act until they
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could calculate on meeting with success. Again, he should observe, that anything like a niggardly manner of dealing with our seamen would be productive of the very worst results. The seaman was a man of very peculiar character. Although he was prodigal of his money and of his food, when he received them, yet he calculated with the greatest nicety the amount of either which he might obtain. During the war with America, the American Government had been enabled to get British seamen to man their ships and to fight against their own country, loyal though those men usually were. And how had that been done? It had been done by means of the high wages paid in the American navy. It was only by pursuing a similar course that the Government of this country could get their fleets sufficiently manned at the present time, and the more especially as they seemed disposed not to have recourse to the system of empressment. He believed that we ought to have a reserve of twenty sail of the line, in addition to twenty sail of the line in the Baltic; and if we could obtain those ships and crews to man them, there could be no doubt that we should easily find plenty of gallant officers to command such a force.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSD OWNE: Although not at all disposed in the present stage of the debate, and after this question has engaged our attention some few hours, to ask your Lordships to prolong that debate, I cannot allow myself on an occasion like the present to acquiesce in perfect silence to this Address, little as has been the opposition which has been exhibited to it. Notwithstanding the observations, many of them severe and many of them uncalled for, of the noble Earl opposite relating to the conduct of the negotiations, I am happy to say that to the Address itself, and to the spirit in which it is framed, no opposition has been offered, save that which my noble Friend (Earl Grey) has offered to one sentence of it only, acting undoubtedly in perfect consistency with those opinions to which he has already lent the authority of his name. My Lords, I will not now go into the question at length connected with the general policy of Europe, which has formed the foundation of these objections on the part of my noble Friend; but I am most desirous, and that alone would have been a motive for me to rise, in the strongest terms to deny that which I will not say the noble Earl opposite has brought

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forward as a charge, but that which he certainly appeared to impute to the Government and its supporters—namely, that they have shown in the progress of these negotiations a want of appreciation of the difficulties of the contest in which we are about to engage, or a want of sense of the means with which it is necessary to carry on that contest. On the part of my noble Friend near me, and on my own part, so far as I have had the honour of sharing in the advice of these transactions, I do most distinctly deny that there has been at any time wanting the strongest sense of the difficulties of the contest we were about to engage in, of the magnitude of the means we were called on to employ, or of the greatness of the sacrifices on the part of the country, by which alone that contest could be maintained. But, my Lords, if we felt all this, were we not bound to feel something more? Were we not bound to feel that before we engaged the country in such a contest, we were bound to exhaust every means which negotiation and conciliation could suggest for the purpose of avoiding that contest and preventing its consequences? And that, my Lords, is the answer, and which I humbly think is a sufficient answer, to all those accusations which have been made, in and out of this House, against the Government of this country, of having placed too firm a reliance on the continuance of peace and of not having at once taken steps, the inevitable tendency of which would have been to produce and hasten that very war which it was their duty, as far as possible, to prevent. I must say, that throughout the whole observations and strictures made in this and the other House of Parliament, and by a portion of the press of this country, against the mode in which these negotiations have been carried on by the Government, and for its not having hastily plunged the country in a war by a more direct hostility against Russia at an earlier period, I have never up to this moment heard the particular period of the negotiation mentioned, at which we were bound at once to renounce all hope, to declare our want of faith in the Sovereign with whom we were negotiating, and to plunge the country into a war which would have brought with it a reaction in the public opinion of Europe against this country, this being a war in which it is of the greatest importance that we should carry with us the general sentiments and the public opinion of Europe. The noble Lord
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may say, that we ought to have been suspicious at one period, another noble Lord may point to another moment of these transactions—nay, everybody who considers the papers and the transactions to which they relate, has, I venture to say, in the infallibility of his own judgment, ascertained the precise point at which we ought to have detected the bad faith of the Emperor of Russia; and I have no doubt that, if the Government, like the painter who asked his friends to scratch out those parts of his picture which they did not like, asked every noble Lord to strike out the particular passages to which lie objects, every line of ours in the blue books would he scratched out. We all know that in public transactions it is necessary to trust to the faith of Sovereigns, as in private life an individual will put his trust in the friend of many years, or an employer have confidence in one who has served him long; and when a friend betrays his trust, and employers are deceived by those whom they employ, it is by a long train of small circumstances that the violation of friendship is evinced, and then when utter want of confidence comes to be felt, then "trifles light as air" come to be" confirmation strong as Holy Writ." If the matter is to be examined in this House as in a court of law, to determine at what particular moment we ought to have changed a course which was suggested by a disposition to believe that a Sovereign whom not only all parties in this country, but in all countries of Europe, so much respected, was a man of honour and of character, whose word would not be forfeited, one whose declaration might be believed, I am convinced we shall stand blameless; and until some more specific charge shall have been brought forward, it cannot be said that we have failed in our duty to the country by abstaining, while there was any hope that action would not be required, from endeavouring to excite general suspicion in order to procure a joint action on the part of those whose united action would give us strength. If your Lordships look to the papers before the House, you will see that during the whole time, from the first moment that there was any reasonable ground for suspecting the projects of the Emperor of Russia, from the moment that there appeared any danger of the great calamity of war, no exertions have been spared to lead the other Powers to the same conviction as ourselves—Austria and Prussia, and all those countries which were

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more or less affected by doubts which the Government did not partake, and he must add by timidity in which he hoped it did not share;—and to induce those Powers to co-operate in that course of action which it was his firm belief, if it had been adopted at an earlier period, might have secured to us the blessings of peace. But it was not the fault of the Government, if other Powers did not at once see with the same eyes as we, or were not prepared to meet the danger with the same courage and vigour which this country has displayed. My Lords, the noble Earl who sits on the bench below me (Earl Grey) has said that he cannot go the length of approving of one paragraph in the Address which pledges us to resist any further aggrandisement of the Emperor of Russia. As to that point, without venturing to offer any opinion as to the precise terms or conditions on which we ought to be prepared to conclude peace, or what securities we ought to require for the future, I must say that I entertain a strong opinion, not only that the further aggrandisement of Russia ought to be resisted, but that, looking to the extent to which that aggrandisement has been already carried, and the uses to which her great power has been applied, the peace, and the security, and the happiness of Europe require that bounds should be set to it. To effect our object in this struggle, we must trust to Providence and to our exertions. I do not mean to say that those exertions must not be great; on the contrary, I believe that the country will be called on to make the sacrifices which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), not with a view to alarm, but to prepare the country, has depicted. The calamities of war are great; it is attended with a loss of life which no man who is not inhuman can contemplate without seriousness and regret. Yet even in these sacrifices, even in this state of war, there are symptoms from whence we may derive consolation and satisfaction. The noble Earl has stated that the war is to be waged against a mighty Power—that, from the localities in which it is to be carried on, it will be a long and a difficult one; but at least we have this satisfaction, that it is not a dynastic war, a war most difficult to end—nor is it a religious war, a war which is never brought to an end without leaving lasting traces of the strife and hostility. I cannot but express my disgust at the hypocrisy which puts on the mask of religion, which seeks to make this a war of
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religion on the part of Russia—a war in which no religious principles are involved, and with which Christianity has nothing to do. But there is one thing connected with this war for which I think we owe a debt of gratitude to the Emperor of Russia. For many years there has been a growing disposition to amity, a tendency to good fellowship, between this country and France, which I have no doubt would have ultimately produced a conviction of the mutual advantages to be derived from a perfect understanding and confidence between them; but the Emperor of Russia has cemented these bonds, and has brought home to the feelings, not only of the Governments of the two countries, but of every individual in England and France, the advantages to be derived from the perfect confidence and friendship that have existed during the course of these negotiations. The Governments of the two countries have laid the foundations of a system of action of which I hope that the ultimate if not immediate success will remain on record, as a monument of the advantages to the two countries, and to the world, arising from their perfect amity and cooperation for the interest of both. I may take this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction at the system of action laid down in reference to neutrals and commerce, which must do honour to France and England in the eyes of the world, and which will have a beneficial action on the law of nations as applied to war. If we strike strongly, I have no doubt as to our success, whatever be the duration of the war. Before I sit down, I wish, without questioning the statements made by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Hardwicke) as to the profession to which he was so long an honour, to unite with him in imploring of the House and country not to expect too much from the gallant men who have gone forth so nobly at the first call in the cause of their country. Whatever defects may exist in our preparations, I must say that no blame can attach to the Government—no blame to any of the establishments. All that man could do has been done by every individual in the Horse Guards and Admiralty, and in every department, and nothing has tended so much to excite the universal admiration of Europe as the manner in which that splendid fleet has been equipped, which I trust will soon vindicate the honour of this country against her enemies. However, my Lords, we have acted in the whole

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course of the negotiations which have been so ably conducted and so ably explained to-night by my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), I am ready to take my share of the responsibility of everything that has been done, and of everything that has not been done—of everything that has been omitted, not from negligence, but from a deliberate anxiety to preserve peace if possible, and when that could not be done, to gain the assent of Europe to our line of conduct, and by commanding public confidence, gain the best auxiliary for success in war and the attainment of peace. On these grounds I hope the House will agree to the Address.
Motion agreed to, Nemine Dissentiente; and a Committee was appointed to prepare the Address. The Committee withdrew; and, after some time, Report was made of an Address drawn by them, which, being read, as follows:—
"MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,
"We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to return Your Majesty our humble Thanks for Your Majesty's Most Gracious Message, and for the Communication of the several Papers which have been laid before Us in obedience to Your Majesty's Command.
"We beg leave to assure Your Majesty of the just Sense we entertain of Your Majesty's anxious and uniform Endeavours to preserve to Your People the Blessings of Peace, and of our perfect Confidence in Your Majesty's Disposition to terminate the Calamities of War, whenever that Object can be accomplished consistently with the Honour of Your Majesty's Crown and the Interests of Your People.
"We have observed with deep Concern that Your Majesty's Endeavours have been frustrated by the Spirit of Aggression displayed by The Emperor of Russia in his Invasion and continued Occupation of the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, in the Rejection of equitable Terms of Peace proposed under the Sanction of Four of the principal Powers of Europe, and in the Preparation of immense Forces to support His unjust Pretensions.
"These Pretensions appear to Us subversive of the Independence of the Turkish Empire.
"We feel that the Trust reposed in Us demands on our Part a Firm Determination to co-operate with Your Majesty in a vigorous Resistance to the Projects of a Sovereign whose further Aggrandisement would be dangerous to the Independence of Europe."
The Address was agreed to; and Ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Whole House: And the Lords with White Staves were Ordered to wait on Her Majesty, to know when She will please to appoint to be attended therewith.
Afterwards—The Lord Chamberlain reported, That Her Majesty had appointed Monday next, at Three O'Clock, to receive the Address of this House, at Buckingham Palace.
House adjourned to Monday next.