Sitting of 24 February 1854

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Bribery, &c.; Controverted Elections, &c.; Colonial Clergy Disabilities.
2° Towns Improvement (Ireland); Improvement of Towns (Ireland).

COPPER COINAGE FOR THE COLONIES.
MR. THORNELYsaid, the hon. Secretary to the Treasury having stated on a previous evening that a contract had been

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entered into with a house in Birmingham for the supply of coin for this country and Ireland, he (Mr. Thornely) wished to ask the hon. Secretary whether the Government had taken into consideration the necessity of supplying copper coin to the Colonies, and especially to the colony of Australia? He (Mr. Thornely) had that morning received information that so great was the scarcity of copper coin in Australia, and so little experienced were the people in preparing a supply of it, that they had to obtain supplies from the continent of Europe and from America. He wished to ask whether the Government had taken any measures to supply the Colonies of this country, and especially the colony of Australia, with copper coin?
MR. WILSONsaid, the contract to which the hon. Member alluded was entered into, not only for the purpose of meeting the requirements of Ireland, Scotland, and this country, but also of our Colonies, and more particularly North America and Australia. Of the 500 tons of copper coin only 19,000 l. had as yet been issued; but he had the pleasure to state that the daily delivery now amounted to 80,000 pieces, so that, the wants of Ireland having been relieved, he had no doubt that the Master of the Mint being aware of the pressure in Australia, to which the hon. Member had so properly called the attention of the House, would take measures to see it speedily relieved.

SEIZURE OF GUNPOWDER.
MR. OTWAYsaid, he wished to call the attention of the hon. Secretary to the Treasury to the following paragraph which appeared in that day's Times:—
"The public will rejoice to hear that, under the operation of the order which recently appeared, a quantity of gunpowder, intended for exportation and for delivery to the enemies of England, has been seized. Two large operations of this kind have been happily disconcerted, and it is hoped that many others will meet with the same fate. This result has been obtained by an anonymous communication made to the authorities, and, although we are no friends to anonymous communications in most instances, still, when the lives of our gallant soldiers and sailors are at stake, we cannot afford to be over sensitive."
He wished to know whether there would be any objection to state to the House the names of those traders whose gunpowder and munitions of war had been seized under the recent proclamation?
MR. J. WILSONsaid, in answer to the
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question, he must inform the hon. Gentleman that that was a matter which came entirely under the supervision of the Treasury; and he had to state to the House all that he knew of the steps which they had taken to carry out the present Order in Council. The fact was, that the day after the proclamation appeared the authorities at the Treasury had an intimation from certain persons that led them to suppose that a large quantity of gunpowder was about to be shipped to Syra, for the use of the Greek insurgents, and that a portion of it was intended for employment by Russia. The gunpowder was stopped, as well as other munitions which had also been prepared for the same market. He should not feel justified in stating the names of the persons who had been engaged in these transactions, because it did not at all follow that the persons who were engaged in shipping the gunpowder for Syra were informed of the quarter for which it was destined; and as the Treasury proceeded on information which was in a great measure confidential, he did not think he should be justified in stating more than the general circumstance. The authorities at the Treasury were quite aware of the great difficulty with which they were surrounded in attempting to stop this illicit trade. The means to which they had resorted, and which might prove of some importance, was, that they had caused an account to be made out of the quantity of gunpowder that each market had been usually supplied with, monthly, for the last two or three years; and whenever they now found that an unusual supply was about to be shipped to any country, they should probably feel themselves justified, unless the circumstance was fully and satisfactorily explained, in stopping the shipment of such unusual quantity. Of course, the authorities at the Treasury were very much in the hands of the public. They had received very considerable assistance by confidential communications made to the several departments, and they should be much obliged to any person who would aid them in carrying out the object they had in view.

TRANSPORT OF CAVALRY HORSES.
GENERAL WYNDHAMsaid, he wished to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty or the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, why the horses of the cavalry and horse artillery are to be embarked in sail-

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ing transports, at the risk of a protracted sea voyage, and whether any good and substantial reasons exist to prevent their accommodation on board of steam-vessels?
SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Sir, in answer to the question put by my hon. and gallant Friend, I shall be most happy to state, as shortly as I can, the reasons which decided the Government to employ sailing ships instead of steam-vessels for the conveyance of horses on this occasion. I am sure the experience of my hon. and gallant Friend will lead him to the conclusion that the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government is right. All the experience that we have hitherto had in removing forces by steam has been for short distances; and for short distances the horses may safely remain on deck without any danger. But on embarking for a distant part of the Levant, I think my hon. and gallant Friend will come to the same conclusion that I have—that it would be extremely detrimental, if not dangerous, to the horses if they should remain on deck during so long a voyage. If it were considered requisite to put them under hatches, it would be absolutely necessary to consider the immense amount of tonnage that would be required. You would require a space equal to ten tons; and I think, when the House considers the vast space occupied in the hull of each steam ship by the machinery, the quantity of coal which it would be necessary to carry for so long a voyage, and the quantity of water and of provender for each horse, the difficulty of the operation will be seen to be insuperable. For the conveyance of the troops, amounting to about 11,000, I think fourteen steamers will be provided; and the entire force will be removed in this way from hence to Malta in the course of the next fortnight. The consumption of coal for such an operation will be no less than 6,000 tons; and if, for 1,500 horses, you are to provide 15,000 tons of steam transport—each horse requiring, as I have said, ten tons—it would be necessary that we should have a collier in attendance on each steamer. Besides the tonnage for the provender of the horses, you would have to supply an extra tonnage for coals. I do speak of the expense, which would be enormous. My right hon. Friend at the head of the War Department has given the most careful attention to the subject which he could bestow; we were most desirous that the horses, as well as the infantry, should be conveyed by steamers;
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but, after having considered the subject, we came to the conclusion that the difficulties were so great that it would not be wise to incur them; and I think my hon. and gallant Friend will consider that that was the wisest decision we could come to.

SOLDIERS' WIVES AND CHILDREN.
MR. MACARTNEYsaid, he begged to ask the right hon. Secretary at War, whether it is intended to provide temporary accommodation and support for the wives and children of soldiers now proceeding to the seat of war, who have not been provided with a passage on board the transports; and, in case of their being unable to support themselves and families during the absence of their husbands, whether there is no other mode of proceeding than by being passed to their several parishes and becoming inmates of the workhouse?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, my attention has been called to this subject by several Gentlemen; and I should, in the first place, wish the House to understand the system upon which the removal of troops is usually conducted, and the arrangements that are made with regard to the wives of soldiers. Usually, when a regiment is ordered on foreign service, six women are allowed to go for every 100 men. Of course, this being the usual case, there would be no greater amount of separation between soldiers and their wives than is usual when a regiment goes, in ordinary times, to any of our Colonies. But it was thought necessary, as those troops were going on foreign service, to diminish to some extent the proportion of women and children who should accompany them. I believe that arrangement is a humane one, from what I understand from officers who have had great experience in foreign service; for when I asked one of them how the wives and children of soldiers on foreign service were provided for, he said the women usually followed the regiments on foot, and were occasionally given "a lift" on the carts or baggage waggons; but with respect to the children, he used this remarkable expression—"Before long they disappeared,"—meaning, without doubt, that the hardships to which they are exposed are such, that the children die. It clearly, therefore, is not a humane proceeding to encourage the number of children to be taken out with troops going on foreign service. Under these circumstances the Horse Guards decided that,

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instead of sending six women out for each 100 men, four only should be allowed to go. The difference, therefore, between the four and the six—that is, the two women that otherwise would have gone as a matter of course—are placed in a position of considerable hardship. I have written to the depots of all the regiments that are going abroad to inquire into the circumstances of each particular case, to know what is the best course to adopt with respect to them. At present, under the existing regulations, the wives of soldiers who do not accompany their husbands will be removed to their own homes at the public expense, where they will be taken care of by any friends they may have; or, in case they have no friends or relations, they will have recourse to parochial relief. But I would just make this observation, that if you encourage—by giving permanent provision to the wives of soldiers going abroad—the habit of marriage in the Army, you increase the evil to which you wish to put an end. I think, under these circumstances, the Government would not be justified in making any arrangement to give provision from the public purse to the wives of soldiers who are sent abroad. You will recollect that the non-permission to soldiers to marry above a certain proportion was a great hardship when soldiers were enlisted for life; but it is exceedingly diminished in cases where a man of only eighteen or nineteen enlists for the short term of ten years. I have, however, taken measures to ascertain what are the circumstances of the women that have been left behind. Those who under ordinary circumstances would naturally remain behind will be sent home in the usual manner to their friends, unless they have work or occupation in the places where they are located. With regard to those who had been originally intended to go abroad with their husbands, but who are now to remain behind in consequence of the new regulation, I think their eases are special; and I have for the present ordered that half-rations shall be supplied to them; and, in the meantime, I shall inquire into the circumstances, and deal with them in the best manner that I can.
COLONEL KNOXsaid, he would offer as a suggestion, that the barracks at St. John's Wood, now emptied by the troops lately quartered there going abroad, might be made a place of temporary accommodation for the wives and children of the soldiers ordered on foreign service.

REMOVAL OF IRISH PAUPERS.
On the question that the House go into Committee of Supply,
MR. MAGUIRErose, and begged to claim the attention of the House for a short time on a matter which he conceived to be really worthy of attention. The object he had in placing his notice on the paper was to draw the attention of the House to the harsh and unjust operation of the law for the removal of Irish poor from this country to Ireland. He was also anxious to place before the House some instances which would prove that a sufficiently harsh and stringent provision of the existing law was overstepped and exceeded by the interest or the zeal of those who were entrusted with the administration of the law in this country. He was most anxious to claim the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board to the statement he was about to make, because his (Mr. Maguire's) object was to place such a statement before the House as might induce the right hon. Gentleman to consider the case of Ireland seriously, and induce him and his colleagues to consider the necessity, on the occasion of the second reading of his Bill—of which he (Mr. Maguire) begged to say he warmly approved—of making a statement to the House to effect that Ireland should not be excluded from the humane and salutary provisions of the Bill. The main object of that Bill was to give the poor man the right to relief in whatever parish he might find himself destitute at the time of asking for that relief. That he should have a right to that relief, and have no fear, as at present, that on applying for relief he will be removed to whatever locality he may be considered chargeable upon. He (Mr. Maguire) regretted the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board did not take more into his consideration, and state more strongly, the case of Ireland. But, in the first place, how stood the law in the case of the Irish poor? By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 117, it was provided, that
—"If any person born in Ireland or Scotland, and not settled in England, became chargeable in England, by reason of relief given to him or her, or their children, such persons and such children were liable to be removed to their own country."
But that law was altered by the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 33, wherein it was provided, that
—"Any relieving officer, poor-law guardian, or parish overseer, might take before any two jus-

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tices, without warrant or summons, any person who became chargeable to the parish, or whom he believed was liable to be removed from this country."
Now see the operation of that. A poor man, who might have resided for twenty years in this country, and who had not established the necessary settlement, which would be a bar to his removal, would be liable, on obtaining parochial relief, to prompt removal as coming within the meshes of the law. He was removed; and though he might have spent all his life in this country, he was flung, notwithstanding, on the most convenient part of the Irish shore by the party who held the contract for his removal, with every prospect of being henceforth a helpless and destitute pauper. The law provided, that the poor to be removed were to be brought to the port nearest the locality of their birth. However, the ports of Wexford, Waterford, Cork, and Limerick, were the only ones named. Limerick, from its inconvenient situation, did not enjoy so many of the advantages resulting from that state of the law as the other ports; but even when landed at either of the other ports, it often happened that the unfortunate pauper was 100 or 150 miles from the locality of his birth, which distance he had to trudge with heart worn out by misery, and broken down by fatigue and privation. The moment the unfortunate pauper entered the workhouse of that distant locality, he left all hope behind him, and misery and despair might be said to be his portion for the remainder of his days. He could cite many instances of the hardships which the poor people of Ireland had suffered from this state of things. Some time since, in 1849, an inquiry was instituted by the Poor Law Commissioners, who sent an inspector to inquire into the case of a woman named Murray, whose husband had been a resident in this country thirty-nine years, and herself a resident twenty-one years, the last eight years of which she lived in the parish of St. Martin-in-the-Fields. The husband died, and left her with a child of about sixteen years of age, who was born in London. They got relief for about thirteen weeks, and were then shipped to Ireland against their will. Evidence in the case was taken upon oath, and he (Mr. Maguire) went to the establishment, a papier-maché warehouse near the Strand, where the husband had been employed, and found that he had been for fifteen years in the employment, and also that he was of unexceptionable character and conduct. The Cork Board
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of Guardians were enduring at this very moment, not 100 but over 200, cases of a similar nature, cases that they were not legally bound to administer relief in, and all because they had no idea of entering into a contest in the matter with the Poor Law Commissioners. He (Mr. Maguire) could tell those who were just now seeking the means to uphold the honour of England, that this was the time for them to soothe the feelings of the Irish people, and to prove to them that they recognised their equality, as well as solicited them to share in the toils and the chances of the approaching conflict. But he had several other cases to give to the House. On the 21st September, a woman named Condon went before the Cork bench. She had been fourteen years a resident in the parish of Marylebone. Her husband, who had always previously maintained the family, found it difficult to obtain work. He left his family to seek employment. The poor woman applied for, and obtained, parochial relief. But she was quickly shipped to Cork; and one of the constables of that city found the unfortunate woman and her four children wandering about the streets of Cork at night, having neither food nor shelter beneath which to rest their wearied limbs. The next case was one that came before him (Mr. Maguire) when he filled the office of mayor of Cork. A woman, who had resided sixteen years in Westminster, was deserted by her husband. She was advised by her friends to seek parish relief, in order to render her husband legally responsible. She did so, and was immediately shipped to Cork. The poor woman was most anxious to get back to Westminster; and he (Mr. Maguire) asked her it she had ever applied for relief before, to which she replied, "She never did, as she always worked hard for a livelihood." Now that certainly was doing more than putting the law in force; it was outraging the law, harsh and stringent as that law was of itself. A third case was that of a poor girl only sixteen years old, who, having lost half-a-crown, with which her sister had sent her out, she became afraid to go home, and applied for relief. She obtained it, and was shipped to Cork on the 6th of February. Now, hon. Gentlemen from Ireland knew the inconvenience and discomfort of crossing the sea to Holyhead—a matter of five or six hours; yet here was this wretched girl put on the deck of a steamer, against her will, clothed in a very light dress, with no head-covering what-

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ever. She implored to be permitted to go back to her sister, or to let her see her sister; but no, the officials knew their duty too well, and she was shipped to Cork, her sister being even ignorant of what had become of her. The next case was that of a woman who had been twenty years in England, and who was brought before the Cork bench on the 15th instant. She stated her husband had got out of employment for a short time, and she had been obliged to go into the workhouse to be confined. The workhouse authorities threatened to send her to Ireland. She supplicated them to leave her for a few days, at the end of which her husband, she said, would provide for her. But she, with her four children, all born in England, were sent to Ireland. The comment of the poor creature on the law was this:—
"I have lived the last ten years in Lambeth; all my children were born there; and it is a cruel thing to send a wife and children away from their provider, as it may be the means of parting us for ever."
The remark of the Cork magistrate was, "If this woman were English, and twenty years amongst us, we would have no power whatever to send her away." Now, he (Mr. Maguire) asserted it was unjust to have one law for a rich and powerful country, and another for a weak and poor one. The clerk of the poor-law guardians at Cork, writing to him the other day, informed him that an old woman born in Jersey, and who knew nothing about Ireland, was shipped to Cork, and was in the Cork workhouse at present, having strayed from Jersey into England. Then there was also a blind boy, who had been born in Jersey, and having strayed into Plymouth, was got rid of by the officials there, and was at present an inmate of the blind asylum at Cork. A woman named Ellen Connor, aged twenty-one and eight years a resident in London, went into St. Luke's Hospital. After three months she applied for her discharge, which was refused, and she was shipped for Cork, to the total ignorance of her husband. Then again there was the case of a child seven years of age, born in London, but being of Irish extraction, she was shipped to that country, though she knew no person there, nor had she a single friend. There was also the case of Catherine Hogan, of Whitechapel, aged seventeen, born in London. Her father was also born in London, and died in America. She became in and went to
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an hospital. After some time she applied for her discharge, was refused, was forcibly put into a van, and subsequently shipped for Ireland, because she was of Irish extraction. Bridget M'Carthy, who resided thirty-three years in London, and had four children born there;—she was kept four days in St. Clement's, and then forcibly sent to Cork in May last. Mary Mahoney, six years in London, three children born here, was sent over from Westminster without the knowledge of her husband. But the worst case was that of a family of the name of Cotter, the father aged sixty, the mother fifty, with two children, one of ten and the other of five years. Cotter lived in England forty-six years, the nine last of which he spent in Liverpool. They all became afflicted with fever, applied for parochial relief, and obtained it. They were kept in the workhouse until barely recovered, and were then shipped over to become an additional burden on the ratepayers of Cork. Anne Harriss, a resident of St. Pancras for seven years, applied for relief, her husband having gone into the Middlesex Hospital with a broken leg. She obtained it, but was refused a discharge, and sent to Cork against her will and without the knowledge of her husband. The clerk of the Cork guardians assured him (Mr. Maguire) that did time permit he could easily have sent twenty additional cases. He also said:—
"He did not know if Cork had been peculiarly unfortunate in receiving cases of this description, but he did know that the number of poor cast helpless and penniless on the quays of Cork was really frightful."
Now, hon. Gentlemen might ask, "Why don't the Commissioners of Poor Laws interfere?" The answer was this: Many cases of the kind had been from time to time stated to the Poor Law Commissioners, but no benefit ever arose from any such complaints, and, consequently, the guardians had long ceased to make representations on the subject. But the matter was now being taken up indignantly. The magistrates solicited the press to record the cases; and what, he begged to ask, did hon. Gentlemen think would be the result upon the sensitive and impulsive Irish people, whose assistance they were now anxious to secure in strengthening the power of their arms? His object was to point out this crying grievance; and it was the duty of the Government, if they intended to justify what they had stated, to grapple with the enormity of the evil im-

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mediately. The right hon. Secretary at War spoke, a few minutes since, of the disappearance of children during a military campaign. He (Mr. Maguire) could assure him that children also disappeared from the hardships and exposure of the unsheltered deck to which they were consigned in the depth of winter by some bloated official, some hard-hearted wretch, such as tied up the bell of the Whitechapel Workhouse, and denied the means of ingress to an unfortunate woman in the pangs of childbirth. The right hon. the President of the Poor-Law Board, had stated, in reply to a deputation which waited upon him a day or two since, in reference to the new Bill:—
"What he desired was to put an end to compulsory removal, which was unjust and oppressive to the poor man. The effect of the law, as it now stood, and which it was his (Mr. Baines's) wish to remedy, was, that if a man, through unforeseen circumstances, tell into distress, for instance, either in Marylebone or St. Pancras, instead of receiving relief from either of those parishes, the authorities had the power to send the poor man, and, perhaps, a wife and family, into Northumberland, or any other distant part, merely because his father some years before had a settlement there. Just in like manner might a poor man be sent up from Cornwall to one of the metropolitan parishes. The Act was unjust, impolitic, and cruel, and one which the Legislature was bound to put an end to. The present law of removal did not affect vagrants, but was calculated to oppress the industrious classes, who might fall into misfortune. Again, there could be no doubt that at present the grossest frauds were practised in some parishes by unscrupulous officers to get rid of the poor when the five years' residence was about to expire."
There could be no doubt whatever of the perfect accuracy of this description of the effects of the existing law. But if there were sufficient reasons for repealing the provisions of the existing law, which permitted an Englishman to be sent back to his own parish, there was ten times more justice and humanity in pressing for the repeal of a law which at this moment permitted bloated officials and unfeeling guardians in England to fling back upon his own country the poor used-up and unfortunate man who had been all his life toiling in the creation of wealth for this country. In many cases they might as well send these unfortunate people to the backwoods of Canada as to land them in the streets of Dublin, Belfast, or Cork. He had put forward the case of these unfortunate people now, in order that the right hon. Gentleman might have sufficient time to take that part of the case into his consideration. The law could not remain in its present state, because the feeling of the people of
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Ireland was thoroughly aroused against it. He was grateful for the measure so far as it went, but he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would not consider the case of the helpless Irish poor unworthy of his consideration.
MR. BAINESsaid, he regretted the hon. Gentleman should have supposed that he did not consider the question as one of great importance. He could assure the hon. Gentleman that he thought it of the utmost importance, and he was desirous that the house should have before it the fullest information in its power before it proceeded to legislate upon a question of so much magnitude and interest. On that account he was glad to find that an hon. Member had moved that all correspondence with the Poor Law Commissioners, both in reference to Scotland, England, and Ireland, should be laid upon the table before any legislative steps were taken. At present he felt that the House had not that information which would enable it to come to a satisfactory conclusion. He had already expressed his opinion that the law was in a most unsatisfactory state at present. In the case of Scotland and England there was now a power of removing all Irish paupers to Ireland, and the experience some years had given him of the working of the law satisfied him that it was a most injudicious arrangement, and entailed often very great hardship and injustice. At the some time, he could not help regretting that a subject like this should have been interposed by the hon. Member for Dungarvan at a time which was not well calculated to ensure it a fair amount of consideration from the House, and to which he admitted it was eminently entitled. The hon. Gentleman had brought the subject forward at a time when the House was anxious to go into Committee of Supply, and before it was in possession of sufficient information to enable it to form a satisfactory opinion upon the question. He must complain also that the hon. Gentleman had not given him any notice with regard to the nature of the statement he intended to make to the house, because if he had done so he (Mr. Baines) would have been able to meet him and state whether the information was accurate, or to show reasons for entertaining doubts of its entire accuracy. At all events, those unions and parishes to which he had referred had some reason to complain when they found the hon. Gentleman impugning the conduct of their officers

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without giving them intimation that such charges were to be made. Under these circumstances, the House must perceive that the only fair course would be to allow the matter to remain as it was, until the correspondence moved for by the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Bateson) should be laid on the table. If that correspondence should turn out not to be sufficient for the purpose in view, he should be willing to afford every facility for investigating further the operation of the existing law, and for putting the House in possession of such information as would enable them to decide whether, as he confessed was his own opinion, the law ought to be altered.
LORD CLAUD HAMILTONsaid, he must complain that the right hon. Gentleman, while laying down the proposed alterations in the law, had wholly omitted to notice the great injustice which was perpetrated towards the Irish paupers. The right hon. Gentleman's own statement that evening showed how well justified the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. Maguire) was in taking the course he had. He had himself admitted that there ought to be a change. He was aware that official Gentlemen were usually reluctant to depart from the ordinary routine of the House, but he begged to remind them that independent Members had, according to the rules of that House, very few opportunities of bringing forward cases of grievance, and the hon. Gentleman had taken the first legitimate opportunity that presented itself. However impatient the House might be to hear the statement of the right hon. Gentleman upon the Estimates, he must say the discussion had not been without its advantage, and he was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Baines) state that he intended turning his attention to these cases of hardship. He feared the correspondence to which he had referred would fall far short of supplying all the information that was required. Not one hundredth part of the cases of injustice in which the Unions found themselves fully justified in resisting the order sent them would be found in this correspondence. He could tell the right hon. Gentleman that one Union alone of the city of Dublin had been saddled with the expense of 539 paupers, who had been shipped from England during the preceding year, and he had no doubt there were many similar cases which called for serious investigation. He might instance the case
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of one poor person, who, after an industrial residence of forty years in London, was, at the age of eighty-two, sent back in the winter season to Ireland. These cases showed the greatest injustice and cruelty, and no temporary inconvenience should prevent any hon. Gentleman who was cognisant of similar ones bringing them at once before the House. In the district of Westminster, he could give him a case from St. Margaret's parish of one unfortunate woman, with five children, who had been thirty-two years resident there, and nine years consecutively in one house. Having received some temporary relief, she was sent by the magistrate's order, in the custody of the police, and shipped off to Ireland, without being allowed to sell her furniture or any little matters she had to dispose of. These examples might be quoted not only from London, but other towns, and in Liverpool he had heard of the case of an unfortunate man who had been twenty years residing there, and for the last ten years had resided in the same house without ever having been destitute, till by an accident he fell from the roof of a house, and applied for and obtained some temporary relief. The poor-law officials obtained an order to have him sent to the hospital, and the moment he was able to leave it, he was seized as if he had been a felon, and although 10 l. 14 s. was actually due to him, at the time, for wages, he was not allowed to get it, but was shipped off and landed in Ireland, at least 100 miles from his native place. Under these circumstances he did not think they ought to stand upon the question of whether this or that was the proper time to bring forward such cases of cruelty, and he was satisfied that such an appeal to the justice of the House would never be made in vain.
Subject dropped.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS—WAR WITH RUSSIA.
SIR JOHN WALSHsaid, that, in rising to call the attention of the House to the inadequacy of the military establishments of the country to meet the exigencies of the approaching war, he must say that although the state of our foreign relations had occupied a very considerable portion of the attention of the House during the last few days, yet, notwithstanding the magnitude of the subjects discussed, and the ability of the speakers on either side, a certain languor appeared to pervade the

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whole debate, in consequence, as he believed, of its referring for the most part to past events and bygone transactions. He now took the liberty of inviting the House to consider this great question from another point of view; to cast their eyes forward, and to consider what policy they ought to pursue in the future; to endeavour to measure the proportions of the contest into which they were about to enter, to estimate the means which they intended to employ in order to procure a successful result. He regretted being the cause of interposing any delay in going into the Committee of Supply, but he felt that the considerations he was anxious to offer to the House were of so general a character as to be more fitted for discussion in the whole House than in any particular vote in Committee. He deeply lamented the necessity of war; even that champion of peace, the Member for the West Riding, could not regret it more; but when we had actually entered into treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with France and Turkey, he conceived that it was out of the power even of the hon. Member for the West Riding himself to point out to us a means of honourably avoiding war. He hoped the House would not commit the error of underrating the importance of the approaching struggle. He had heard hon. Gentlemen say, both in and out of that House, that the power of Russia had been greatly exaggerated—that her armies existed only upon paper—that the mismanaged state of her commissariat neutralised the strength of her forces—that all her classes were demoralised and corrupted—and that, in short, her power was a mere bugbear, and she herself an ideal adversary. That was not the opinion of one whose judgment on military matters, and on national questions such as the present, was entitled to the highest consideration. The Emperor Napoleon represented the forces of Russia to be of the very first order, and said that Russia was the only country in Europe whose population were raised in the social scale by becoming soldiers. It must be recollected likewise, that, although Russia was governed by an absolute monarch, a very intense national spirit pervaded it—that the patriotism of the Russians was of a very warm character, and that in the present contest the religious feelings of the people were enlisted. Nor should it be forgotten that what the sea was to England, her steppes, her immense tracts of country, her
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ice-bound shores, and her rigorous climate were to Russia, and that, in fact, she was a fortress and a citadel in herself, waging war upon her opponents, assured of the comparative safety of her own interior dominions, and perfectly safe from foreign invasion. The greatest empire this world ever saw was shipwrecked and disorganised in a vain attempt to cope with her. Moreover, when once war was proclaimed in Europe—when once the peace of forty years was broken—we could not estimate what extension the war would have, or what direction it would take. Even within the last few days the theatre of the war had been extended. A war of a most embarrassing character, which might wholly change, if it proceeded, the complexion of the entire contest, had supervened, as it were, upon the original war. An insurrection had taken place among the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Porte. How far that insurrection might extend, or what direction it might finally take, was certainly, at present, a question involved in obscurity; but there were the elements of extension in it, for not only were the Greek population of European Turkey in a state of violent agitation, but there was a very considerable Christian population in Syria, which had often been disaffected, which was always turbulent, and which was warlike and capable of causing additional embarrassment. He must, therefore, confess that he viewed this part of the contest with considerable anxiety, for, whatever might be our opinion as to the justice and expediency of the cause of Turkey as against Russia, the question would certainly become very much changed if it should assume the character of a struggle between Christianity and Islamism within the territory of the Porte. But there was another point to which he would venture to call the attention of the house. Two systems of neutrality had now been declared in Europe: one, the system of neutrality declared by the northern maritime nations; the other, the system of neutrality declared by the great Germanic Powers. Now, he saw round him, perhaps, very few hon. Gentlemen who, any more than himself, had much experience of military matters, but he presumed he saw a great many who had had considerable experience of electioneering contests—those little mimic wars which bore some degree of similarity to great struggles between nations—and he would appeal to them whether, in electioneering contests, they could

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ever place the slightest reliance upon declarations of neutrality. Such declarations had often been made in elections in which he himself was engaged, but he never knew of one, where the contest became keen and the passions were aroused, in which these declarations were not merged in the heat and excitement of the contest; and he was quite sure that in this respect the politics upon the great stage of Europe would not differ essentially from those of a county or a borough. There was still another point to which be wished to call the attention of the House. The peace of Europe, which had now lasted for nearly forty years, was based upon the treaty of 1815–16; but shortly subsequent to the great compact a very important treaty was entered into by the Northern Powers, which had a great effect upon the politics of Europe. He alluded to that famous treaty which had been so often denounced in that House—the Holy Alliance. There were two main principles upon which that treaty was founded. First, it was a union of three great Powers against the principles of revolution and progress; but, in order to give effect to that principle, there was another necessarily superadded—that of a disclaimer on the part of these three Powers of all and every intention of territorial aggrandisement, or personal or national ambitious views, by those nations towards each other. Now the latter, at any rate, whatever might have been the disadvantages or the faults in other respects of the Holy Alliance, was a principle which in itself worked for good. The Holy Alliance was originated by the Emperor Alexander, and that disclaimer and relinquishment of all views of territorial aggrandisement had been one of the many causes which, for nearly forty years, had preserved the peace of Europe. It was now quite evident, however, that Russia had abandoned that policy—that all those obstacles which the three allied Powers opposed in Europe to the progress of national ambition and the desire of territorial aggrandisement, which in former times had been the cause of half the wars of the world, had been swept away—and that all the horrors of confusion and anarchy had been again let loose upon mankind. We had now, consequently, to deal with an altered state of things, and would necessarily be obliged to make a corresponding change in our policy. During the last forty years we had dealt with a state of
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peace; we had now to deal with a state of war, the extent and direction of which we had at present no means of measuring. The policy of England during the continuance of peace had been a policy based upon the assumption that war would never again exist in the world, but would be superseded by the enlightenment and progress of the age. We had now arrived at a state of things in which war was not only certain, but in which it was extremely likely that war would be for some time to come the normal condition of Europe. What, then, was the course which England should take under such circumstances—what the provision she should make to preserve her character and position as one of the first-class Powers of the world? England had never been an aggressive country—the whole of her history showed that she had nothing to gain and everything to lose from war; but still, if war did come, it was their duty to see that England should be maintained in her position as one of the greatest nations in the world. Now, it might be said that any war in which England ought to engage should be a naval war; but he thought, in answer to that, it would be sufficient to point to the fact, that before we were actually at war—when we were only drifting towards war—we found it necessary to send 25,000 men to the other extremity of Europe. If there was to be an European war, and if England was to be engaged in it, she must of necessity be both a great naval and a great military Power. And England had every possible requisite for becoming both. Napoleon had said, "With your 40,000 troops you will never become a great military Power." But why should England have an army only of 40,000 men available for foreign service? Why, he would ask, with 27,000,000 of inhabitants, with the richest country on the face of the globe, and with soldiers who had never been surpassed by any troops in the world, should we not be a military nation if an European war should occur? Not only had we the materials for making the best soldiers in the world, but we possessed the command of the seas, and that great facility of transport by steam which had infinitely augmented our power, and we enjoyed advantages in other respects which might enable us to become a powerful military nation, with a comparatively smaller number of troops than any other great country in Europe. Supposing a state of war pervaded Europe, England, as he had

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shown, had every means to become a great military Power. National feeling, he was sure, would respond to every demand properly made on the patriotism of the people; and he wished to know on what grounds it could be urged that we should be satisfied with assuming a second position, when we had a right to assume the first position, among the nations of the world. The English army at present was about equal in number to the army of Belgium—a second-rate State; but the English army was dispersed over all the quarters of the world, and for years past we had barely had a peace establishment. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War was now about to propose an augmentation of about 10,000 men upon the Army Estimates for last year—but would our army be then upon any other footing than that of a liberal peace establishment? In 1848–49, when we had no subject of quarrel or controversy with any other State—though certainly there were disturbances on the Continent which rendered precautionary measures prudent—our army consisted of 113,847 men. The number of men now about to be proposed for the army was rather less than 113,000 men, so that, while we were sending 25,000 men to tight the Russians in Turkey, the number of men in the army would be actually less than it was in 1848–49. In the year 1846 our army consisted of 108,600 men, and in 1847 of 108,400 men, and therefore our army this year, with the proposed augmentation, would little exceed in number the armies of 1846 and 1847, when a state of peace existed. He would ask whether this was an adequate provision for a great emergency—for a struggle with a first-rate Power of Europe? It appeared to him either that Her Majesty's Government were extravagant then, or that they were parsimonious now. It was actually proposed to diminish, though not to any great degree, the number of the cavalry—a most important arm of the service, and one that it required a very considerable time to form. He thought it was evident, then, that though Her Majesty's Government had taken advantage of the present warlike movement to get the army up again from the low numbers to which it had been screwed down by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) and his friends to the peace establishment, which was maintained four or five years ago, they were not putting the army upon the footing of a war establishment. He did not bring forward the ques-
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tion with any party views, or in any spirit of hostility to Her Majesty's Ministers; indeed, he thought Her Majesty's Ministers ought to feel obliged to him for throwing out these suggestions. If it were intended to be a party or hostile move, it was certainly the choosiest ever man conceived, because the Secretary at War would most probably use his (Sir J. Walsh's) speech as an answer to that of the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Sir D. L. Evans), who had a notice on the paper to call attention to the number of troops in the Colonies which had been found necessary to protect our garrisons during forty years of peace, but were to be withdrawn during the very first year of war. He would leave the Secretary at War to answer that proposition, but he ventured to predict that the right hon. Gentleman would tell the House there was one hon. Member calling out for greater armaments and another for the withdrawal of those already existing, whilst the Government, taking the happy medium, only asked for such a force as was indispensable. He brought forward this subject, however, with no hostility, as he had already said, to the Government, but simply as an independent country gentleman, deeply sensible of the importance of the present crisis, and anxious to impress what he considered truths of a most important character upon the attention of the House and of the country. In doing so, he was supported by the opinion of that great man to whose valour we owed the blessings of the long peace which we had enjoyed. In almost the last speech which the late Duke of Wellington delivered in the House of Lords he made use of a few epigrammatic sentences, which were so germane to the subject that he could not forbear quoting them, believing also that the voice, as of one beyond the grave, would possess a weight and consideration which the words of no living man could obtain. On the 15th of June, 1852, the Duke of Wellington said:—
"As to the regular army, my Lords, I tell you that for the last ten years you have never had in your army more men than enough to relieve the sentries on duty at your stations in the different parts of the world; such is the state of your peace establishment at the present time; such has been the state of your peace establishment for the last ten years. You have been carrying on war in all parts of the globe, in the different stations, by means of this peace establishment; you have now a war at the Cape, on the very frontier of Her Majesty's dominions, still continuing which you carry on with your peace establishment; yet on that peace establishment I tell you you have not more men than are enough to relieve the sentries

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at the different stations in all parts of the world, and to relieve the different regiments in the tropics and elsewhere, after services there—of how long do you suppose?—of, in some cases, twenty- five years, in none less than ten years, and after which you give them five years at home, nominally—for it is only nominally in a great many cases.… My Lords, I tell you you have never had a proper peace establishment all this time."—[3 Hansard, cxxii. 729.]
Those were the words of the Duke of Wellington; and if he used those words when the country was at peace, or engaged only in little wars with distant and barbarous nations, what would he have said had he been spared to the present crisis, and seen England, with only a peace establishment, entering upon a war with the greatest and most powerful nation in Europe?
MR. ALCOCKsaid, he wished to be allowed to say a few words upon this subject, as he had, twenty-five years ago, travelled through those countries which were now the scenes of war, and had formed opinions which, whatever might be their merit, were founded upon the most honest conviction. He would not refer to any of the diplomatic negotiations which had been in progress for some time, but would come at once to the question of war with Russia. Upon that subject he only wished to refer to one particular point—namely, the question of the command of the Black Sea. In his opinion, if this country determined to have the ascendancy in that sea, there would be no difficulty whatever in compelling Russia to come to terms. He was fortified in this belief by the opinions of the English Ambassador at Paris, of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of the Emperor Napoleon, of Lord Clarendon, and of others who were admitted to be the highest authorities upon this subject. In a letter from Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon, dated the 16th of December, Lord Cowley said that he had had a very long interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys; that they had discussed the affair of Sinope, and the question of sending the fleets into the Black Sea; that they had come to the conclusion that, unfortunately, they had not the power to compel the suspension of hostilities by acting on the Danube or in Asia Minor, but that they had it in their power to compel the suspension of hostilities by obtaining the superiority in the Black Sea, and by sweeping that sea of the Russian flag. In another part of the same letter, Lord Cowley spoke of Russia as being paramount in the Black Sea, and observed that that sea could be considered
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little else than a Russian lake. The question had already been asked, but he thought it had not been very satisfactorily answered—why, attaching so much importance to these facts, the French and English Governments did not send their fleets into the Black Sea before the affair of Sinope? But, if there was any difficulty in explaining why the fleets did not enter the Black Sea before the affair of Sinope, why, he asked, did not they enter that sea immediately after the destruction of the Turkish ships at Sinope? He did not attach any blame to Her Majesty's Government with reference to that matter; on the contrary, he considered that Lord Clarendon had behaved very nobly on the subject, and he (Mr. Alcock) had not a word to say except in praise of Her Majesty's Government. But there was a vast difference between the conduct of the Government in this country and the conduct of the British Ambassador at Constantinople. He (Mr. Alcock) might refer, on this point, to two letters in the published correspondence—one addressed by Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford on the 17th of December, and the other addressed by Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon on the same day. Lord Clarendon, in his letter, alluding to the affair of Sinope, said:—
"Your Excellency, no doubt, will have already sent the fleets into the Black Sea. No particular instructions, it seems to us, are necessary; we have engaged to support Turkey against the hostile aggressions of Russia, and we are bound to stand by that engagement."
Of a very different spirit and character was the letter of Lord Stratford. Having stated that he was about to send the combined fleets into the Black Sea, he went on to say, in effect:—
"But your Lordship may be disposed to ask why I have not done this sooner—why I have not sent the combined fleets to avenge themselves for the dreadful attack on Sinope—why I have waited until this time?"
And what did the House think were Lord Stratford's reasons? Lord Stratford assigned five reasons for the delay—three principal and two inferior reasons. His first reason was, want of information as to the movements of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. But the best way of discovering the movements of the Russian fleet would have been by sending out the combined fleets to confront it. In the very same letter of the 17th of December, however, Lord Stratford showed that he was acquainted with the movements of the

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Russian fleet, for he mentioned that on the 8th of December that fleet, consisting of twelve sail of the line, had been seen on the cost of the Crimea. Lord Stratford's second reason was an unwillingness to incur the risk of a collision by premature provocation; but, when the diplomatic negotiations between this country and Russia had been going on for so long a time, and when the barbarous massacre of Sinope had taken place, he (Mr. Alcock) thought it was absurd to talk of premature provocation. Lord Stratford's third reason was that he thought it better to wait for an invitation from the Turkish Government; but it would be found from the published despatches that such an invitation had been given on the 4th of December, when Reshid Pasha requested that the combined fleets might enter the Black Sea. The two inferior reasons assigned by Lord Stratford were, that the north-west winds prevailed and had delayed the arrival of the English fleet from Besika Bay, and that about the time in question a change of the French Ambassadors at Constantinople took place. He (Mr. Alcock) must say that, under the circumstances, it was a matter of surprise to hint that immediately after the affair of Sinope the Russians did not avail themselves of the apathy of Lord Stratford and at once take Trebizond. He had been induced to make these remarks against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he need not say, from no personal motives, but because blame must be laid somewhere, and it appeared to him that this was the quarter in which it ought to be laid. Why had the British navy been tied down in the Bosphorus, contrary to their natural feelings, for they must have been burning to sail into the Black Sea? The result of keeping them back was that opportunities had been lost which we should scarcely ever have again, The Government had now to despatch troops to Constantinople, but the war would have been put an end to at the time he referred to if the fleets had been sent into the Black Sea with full power to act against the Russians. He believed there was yet time to repair the mistake which had been made. Let the combined fleets sweep the Black Sea of the Russian flag, and the war would soon be at an end. The possession of the Black Sea was not only important from the material power it gave, but from the moral power it also conferred. In the first place, if the English and French fleets held possession of that sea, the Russian
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fleet could no longer assail that of Turkey, nor could it co-operate as in 1828–29 with land forces from Odessa or Sebastopol, below the line of the Balkan. That was most important, because it was only from that co-operation on the part of their fleet that the Russians got to Adrianople in their last campaign against the Turks. Then, again, by holding the Black Sea, we should at once put an end to the possibility of reinforcements being conveyed to the Russian troops in Georgia, and other parts north and south of the Caucasus, and the consequence would be, that all the fortresses, extending for 300 miles on the coast, and including Anapa, SudjoukKale-Julendjik and Poti, would easily fall, the existence of which alone prevented the Turks co-operating with the Circassians. The House would recollect that the people of the Caucasus, who had for so many years defended themselves single-handed against the whole power of Russia, occupied a country as large as the whole of England and Wales, composed of a succession of fastnesses and natural fortresses, and it was not an unreasonable expectation that, if that indomitable people were properly assisted, they would soon take advantage of their opportunity, and Georgia (one of the richest provinces of Russia) would be wrested from the dominion of the Czar. These were some of the material advantages; and then, looking at the moral effect, what would the people of Bessarabia and the Crimea, and all the discontented nations under Russian rule, do if they once knew that the ascendancy of Russia in the Black Sea was at an end, and that the British navy was paramount there? Why, it would be nothing less than a deathblow to Russia, and it would then rest with the allies to make their own terms. In conclusion, he would reiterate his opinion that great blame attached to our Ambassador at Constantinople for his want of decision and straightforward conduct in not taking that course with regard to the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea which was marked out for him by his own Government, and still more by the Government of our ally.
SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he had a notice on the paper to call the attention of the House to the large number of troops employed in the Colonies. He had on a former occasion attempted to advocate a reduction of the military force in the Colonies, and he thought it was more opportune at the present moment than at any

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other period—not, as the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Walsh) supposed, because he wished to diminish the military force of the country, but because his object was to place an additional force at the disposal of the Government. During the last two or three years several hon. Gentlemen, besides himself, had adverted to the great number of troops in the Colonies, and the propriety of their being diminished, considering that, as free trade had been established and free institutions had been conceded to the majority of them, the time had arrived to oblige the Colonies, if they wanted troops, to maintain them at their own expense, and not to have the British army disseminated over those Colonies in small detachments at a great additional expense and without any advantage to the Imperial Crown. He found, from the observations of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), that he readily complied with those suggestions, and promised that several regiments should be withdrawn from the Colonies; but he was very sorry to find, by a return laid on the table of the House within the last few days, that, instead of diminishing the force in the Colonies, they had been increased, and had now reached the enormous number of 47,000 men of all arms. Considering that the whole force disposable for war and the defence of our home territories was only 64,000 men, he thought 47,000 a very large and unnecessary force to be retained in the Colonies. He did not propose to touch the garrisons, as the hon. Baronet seemed to fear. He was aware that the garrisons must be kept up in the fortresses, and he should not say a word on that subject. He would, however, advert to two or three principal items. He found that Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and our other North American Colonies had 6,400 men; the West Indies, 5,300; the Cape of Good Hope, he lamented to see, 8,000, besides irregular troops, which were very expensive; Ceylon, 3.000; and the Australian Colonies, 3,400. He understood that one of the Australian Colonies had consented to charge itself with a battalion. That was a beginning, though a very small one, but he trusted this example would be generally followed. He contended that the whole of the British troops in the Colonies ought to be maintained at the expense of the colonists. He would not go into detail, except with regard to our Canadian Colonies. That splendid colony had now an independent Govern-
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ment of its own. He found the revenue for the last year was 723,000 l., and the expenses, including interest on debt and sinking fund, was 535,000 l., leaving a surplus of 188,000 l.; and, with this surplus of 188,000 l., the mother-country was still left to defray the charges of the military forces of that colony. There were the fortresses of Quebec and Montreal, in which garrisons should be kept; but the noble Earl who was then at the head of the colony had advised, two or three years back, that the number of troops should be reduced to 1,500 or 2,000 men. He considered that that advice ought to have been followed, and that 1,500 or 2,000 men would be quite sufficient to garrison the fortresses to which he had alluded. In that case there would be 3,400 men disposable for the service for which they were now likely to be required. He was especially at a loss to understand why so many as 1,000 men of the Artillery and Sappers and Miners should be kept in the Canadas alone. There was another colony which was in so flourishing a state that last year its revenue had nearly doubled—he alluded to the colony of Nova Scotia; and yet this country was required to pay a military force for its defence, although there was no external danger whatever to be apprehended. In point of fact, with respect to these colonies the troops there were doing little more than police duties. He had no wish to detain the House from going into the Estimates, but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War would take the subject into his consideration and give a satisfactory answer. He knew that there was a constant pressure on the Government on the part of the Colonies against the withdrawal of the troops; but it could not be expected that, whatever the colonists might wish, that House would permit the continuance of this unnecessary expense. There was another topic with respect to which his name appeared upon the paper, upon which he proposed to make a very few remarks. Great complaints had been made in the public prints with respect to the advanced age of the general officers of the Army. It was for the Government and not for him to say whether those complaints were well founded or not. He was afraid it was so to a very considerable extent, and he thought it was not to be wondered at. The notice which he had given suggested either that the intervals between the military brevets should be shortened, or that

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seniority should no longer be the sole ground of making promotions to the rank of general officers; or that the selection should be made upon the ground of merit, or of fitness for command, which he thought would be the best rule of all. If seniority was to be perpetually the rule, and five or six years to continue to be the interval, it must of necessity happen that the higher ranks would be constantly filled by old men. If they compared the Army with the Navy, they would find that, although the former was, in point of fact, threefold more numerous than the latter, the Navy had a greater number of admirals than the Army had of generals. To improve the efficiency of the flag list, an arrangement had been made some little time ago by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), then at the head of the Admiralty, for limiting the list of effective flag officers to 100, and for placing the remainder on the non-effective or retired list. What was called the effective list contained 100 admirals, and the non-effective list 199; but, owing to the extraordinary ingenuity of the right hon. Baronet, he believed that a great number even of the former were troubled with gout and other little matters which would be likely materially to impair their fitness for active service. He did not, therefore, ask that the rule which prevailed in the Navy might be extended to the Army, but certainly some remedy for the existing state of things was imperatively called for. It was, moreover, quite unfair to send out, as they were doing, a number of officers of the rank of colonel to take the command of brigades, because they had not officers enough of the higher grade to undertake that duty. In the present state of the service there was, probably, no option. But was it fair to call upon these officers to undertake the duties and responsibilities of a rank higher than their own, without giving them, at the same time, the rank and pay? Would the same kind of rule be considered just if it were applied to the civil service—if, instead of promoting persons from subordinate positions to fill the vacancies occasioned by the retirement or incapacity of their superiors, they compelled them to do the duty for half pay, giving them only a kind of local or temporary rank? He thought that where the duty was thrown, the rank and pay ought to follow; and he hoped the subject would engage the serious attention of the Government, as in the present circumstances
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of the country, it unquestionably ought, and that there was no truth in the report that it was intended to be referred to a Commission, because questions which were so dealt with were almost invariably shelved.
MR. F. FRENCHwas disposed to doubt whether the power of Russia was so formidable as it had been considered to be. In the campaign of 1828 and 1829, although the Danube and Balkan were undefended, and there was but a very little fighting at Shumla, Varna, and Silistria, it still took the Russians two years to get to Adrianople; and he had it on the authority of Lord Ponsonby that, at the moment when peace was signed, Russia had only 7,000 available bayonets, and that out of the immense force, 120,000 men and 300 guns, which crossed the Pruth two years before, only 15,000 returned to their own country. Turkey at the present moment stood in a very different position from that in which she was then placed. She now had a large army in first-rate order, her artillery was second to none in the world, and she had proved that her own troops alone were competent to her defence; but, if even they were beaten at Kalafat, and the Balkan was turned by Sophia, the contingent of France and England would meet the Russians successfully when they emerged upon the plains of Adrianople. He could not agree with the hon. Member for East Surrey (Mr. Alcock), that any blame was to be attached to our Ambassador at Constantinople, nor, on the other hand, could he concur in the praise which had been bestowed on the Government for the line of policy they had pursued. The Government had been guilty of grave errors, both of omission and commission, in this matter. The first error to which he would advert was non-compliance with the request sent by Colonel Rose that the fleet should proceed to Constantinople. He knew it was said that Colonel Rose had afterwards expressed his satisfaction that this request had not been complied with, but it was worthy of notice that from the time that Colonel Rose sent for the fleet an altered tone was observable in the negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had approved of the refusal of Admiral Dundas to leave Malta—so did the Emperor of Russia, as shown by the complimentary message conveyed from him to Lord Aberdeen in Count Nesselrode's despatch. How strange it was that all Sovereigns entertaining hos-

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tile feelings towards England, as Louis Philippe at the time of the Spanish marriages—Nicholas on the question of the Greek and Latin Churches—are gratified at, and grateful for the beau rôle played by this noble Lord. He (Mr. French) doubted that the approval of these Sovereigns would enhance his merits, whatever they might be, in the eyes of the British public. The next point was the non-interference of the British fleet after it did go up to Constantinople. Admiral Dundas had a force quite sufficient to fulfil the engagements into which we bad entered to give assistance to the Turks, but at Constantinople it was a matter of doubt whether the fleet had been sent to assist the Turks against Russia, or to coerce the subjects of the Porte. Had the fleet gone as directed by the Ambassador to the Black Sea one week before the disaster at Sinope, that unfortunate event would not have occurred, and he believed that not only had we been the cause of that disaster, by our fleet not going into the Black Sea, but that it was through the interference of British agency the Turks had not been allowed to protect themselves. There were letters from Admiral Slade in this country to the effect that he was perfectly competent to deal with the Russian fleet with the ships under his command; but Lord Stratford interfered, and they found him writing to Lord Clarendon that he had succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships into the Black Sea. Indeed, the friends of Admiral Slade expected to hear of a victory over the Russian fleet, when the news came of the destruction of the Turkish flotilla at Sinope. On the 5th of November Lord Stratford writes to M. Pisani:—
"I have just heard that orders are come up for sending four line-of-battle ships and ten sailing frigates into the Black Sea-to-morrow. In consequence of this I shall not order up the remainder of the squadron until the intended enterprise is abandoned."
This squadron was destined for Sinope. The threat was effectual, and the expedition was given up. The same day the Ambassador writes to Lord Clarendon:—
"I have succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and frigates into the Black Sea at this moment."
We neither protected the Turks nor allowed them to defend themselves. Then, when our fleet did go into the Black Sea, what did they do? We sent war steamers
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to Batoum, within twenty-seven miles of St. Nicholas, which place was bombarded after our entry into the Black Sea, and no explanation of this circumstance had yet been given, nor of the cause of their return. It was said they were induced to do so from stress of weather, but the Turks declared that they never had better weather than at this time. The steamers returned, too, in opposition to the orders of the Ambassador. The noble Lord had approved the course taken by the Admiral. No sooner had they returned than the Russian fleet came out, threatening the whole coast of Circassia, and the British merchants at Trebizond were compelled to solicit protection. Under these circumstances, it was not wonderful that questions were raised as to the conduct of the British Government. What was Lord Stratford's opinion of the course that was taken may be judged from his letters. On the 17th of December he writes to Lord Clarendon:—
"I cannot conceal from myself that the late destruction of the many Turkish ships at Sinope would not have taken place had the fleets been sent up the Black Sea at an earlier period. Forgive me, my Lord, if, in the combination of circumstances, all tending to the same conclusion, I cannot lose sight of public opinion, or that matured judgment which later times will pronounce on our conduct."
The Vienna correspondent of the Times says that Count Buol was so afraid that the Western Powers, after Sinope, would assume the offensive, that an uninterrupted telegraphic communication was kept up with Paris and London, till his apprehensions were relieved by an assurance, "that no step would be taken that could interrupt negotiations." In whom was the command of the fleet vested? Foreign Secretary, Ambassador, or Admiral? Lord Clarendon says, that Lord Stratford was allowed to have the disposal of the fleet, if he considered the assistance of a British force absolutely essential to the safety of the Turkish empire; that Her Majesty's Government, however, were desirous that his Excellency should understand they by no means intend to depart from the moderation and conciliatory course, which they had always adopted; and concluded by informing him that force should only be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the protection of Turkey from an unprovoked attack. For what was the fleet sent to Constantinople? Lord Clarendon declared to Baron Brunnow that it was merely to protect British

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interests—to Mons. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it was to assist Turkey. How can you accuse the Emperor of Russia of want of straightforward dealing, when such is the course taken by a British Minister? He gave Ministers credit for their desire to preserve peace, though the means they took to bring it about would have, if successful, left matters in a far worse state than they found them, and forced all Europe into war to resettle the balance of power on a safer basis. Their negotiations were described by Lord Ponsonby as "based on fear of Russia." He writes, "The present pusillanimity is the promoter of danger, it is the fosterer of shame, it is the offspring of ignorance, it has disgraced the country in the eyes of other nations." Such was the deliberate opinion of a Minister of the highest intellect and greatest experience in Europe. The Emperor of Russia had reason to complain of the treatment he had received. His demands in relation to the Holy Places were approved of here by Lord Aberdeen, before they were presented to the Sultan by Prince Menchikoff, and were supported by England at Constantinople. The intended occupation of the Danubian provinces was known and not objected to here. So early as the 7th January the Government had ample information that Russia was prepaying military forces to carry out her objects, whatever those objects might be. They had similar advices in March, and again in April. It was true that Count Nesselrode's answers to representations on this subject were evasive; but there were the like accounts from our own consuls and agents in or near the countries where the forces were being collected. How was this information received by the Government? Merely by sanguine hopes that the Emperor of Russia would refrain from further increasing his forces or abstain from using them. Was there any language of remonstrance heard from the British Government? Was there any attempt to point out the gross injustice which Russia was about to commit, to throw the responsibility upon the Emperor of measures which would inevitably throw Europe into collision, and to point out to him that, if he drew the sword and took possession of territory which did not belong to him, he would be responsible for all the fatal consequences that might ensue? Not a bit of it. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the 8th of June, wrote a despatch to the British Minister at St. Petersburg, in which he said:—
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"The Emperor cannot doubt the warm feelings of friendship towards himself entertained by our Gracious Sovereign, and his Imperial Majesty must be also aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the most cordial relations with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing, as they do, with alarm and abhorrence, whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace. Her Majesty's Government do not believe that Europe can be in danger of the terrible calamity of war from a question such as that which is now pending at Constantinople: they do not believe that the door will be finally closed against an arrangement which to them appears to be still practicable; and they venture, therefore, to hope that the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation of existing treaties and their due fulfilment, but without seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte that Russia must always and necessarily exercise."
It was upon language such as this that the Emperor of Russia must have founded the conviction that he expressed, that Great Britain would never go to war upon a question like the present. He admitted Lord Clarendon to be both an able and a ready writer, as well as a skilful diplomatist, but they had yet to learn that he was a statesman. He (Mr. French) feared he was of too flexible material not to bend under the weight of a heavy superior. He ventured to assert that had the noble Lord the Member for London, or the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department, been at the head of the Government, the disaster of Sinope would not have taken place, nor would a single soldier have crossed the Pruth. To the well-known political predilections, supposed infirmity of purpose, and temporising policy of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, was owing the position in which the country was now placed. He believed that the antecedents of the noble Lord at the head of the Government had encouraged the demands of Russia, and paralysed the exertions of the fleet, and that if he remained at the head of the Government, no arrangement satisfactory to Europe was likely to take place. The Russian Emperor speculated on the weakness, and acted on the indecision, of the Prime Minister, but he believed it would have been different if the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), or the noble Lord now at the Home Office, had been charged with the management of our foreign affairs, and the maintenance of the honour of England. If such was, as he believed it was, the opinion of the House, then he thought it would be the duty of the House to declare so. There was always a considera-

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tion of personal feelings in matters of this kind, but he believed it was of the last importance that we should at the present moment have for the conduct of our foreign affairs men who possessed the entire confidence of the country.
MR. HADFIELDsaid, he must express his strong dissent from the sentiments of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, for he highly approved of the conduct of the Government in making war their dernier ressort. So far from having suffered by delay, he thought we had obtained vast and almost incalculable advantages by it. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had declared to the world that the policy of this country was peace; and the desire we had shown to avoid war must have convinced the world at large that the sentiment which the noble Lord had uttered was not a mere profession. Thrice armed was he whose quarrel was right, and since we had not willingly entered into this struggle, but had been driven to it, Europe would find the wrath of the peaceful man more effectual than the fury of the enraged Emperor.
Lord JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he must object to the course which the discussion was now taking, as contrary to all precedent. There had been a lengthened debate upon this subject, and the House had expressed its opinion that supplies should be granted for the purpose of carrying on the war, if the country should be involved in war. The Government had not shrunk from debate, and he thought the House would now be acting only in conformity with its expressed opinion by allowing them to go into Committee.
House in Committee; Mr. BOUVERIE in the chair.

SUPPLY—THE ARMY ESTIMATES.
(1.) 112,977 Laud Forces, number of men.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Mr. Bouverie, I am sure the hon. and gallant Officer who addressed the House a short time ago, making some observations on the distribution of troops, and the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Walsh) who objected to the amount of force proposed in the present estimate will not think me guilty of any disrespect towards them in having waited until the House had gone into Committee before noticing the observations which they had made. Before I do so I will state—and I will endeavour to do it as shortly as I can—the changes which are embraced in the present estimate, stating at the outset
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that the present estimate must not be looked to as the final estimate or the year. The Government thought it more consonant with their duty to allow the House to discuss their policy, being a policy on which any large increase of estimate would be necessarily founded, before laying any such large increase before the House. This, therefore, must be looked on as an estimate formed in time of peace, but in anticipation of events which might follow. Now, it will be seen that the proposed increase of men amounts, speaking in round numbers, to 10,600; but the increase really is rather larger than that, owing to the reductions which have taken place in some of the colonial corps, and particularly in the Ceylon corps, in which a large reduction has been effected, because it was found that in the course of years the recruiting ground of the Ceylon rifles did not afford a sufficiently large population to recruit the regiment up to the requirements of the establishment. Allowing for these reductions, we may consider that the increase of British troops—Guards and infantry of the line—amounts in round numbers to 11,000 men, and that the increase of cost will be 300,000 l. The increase in the whole estimate, however, will be balanced by very considerable reductions in the non-effective departments of the service. There are some items of increase over which I can have no control, as in the case of the Military Asylum, the Hibernian School, and the hospitals at Chelsea and Kilmainham, where the increase in the price of provisions has of course had considerable effect. By the constant application and vigilance of the military authorities, there is a reduction of something like 33,000 l. The attention of the Government has for some time past been systematically turned to the staff, and the reductions in consequence have been considerable; but in spite of that, there has again this year been a reduction at Canada, the Cape, Hong Kong, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies, amounting to about 5,000 l.
Before I state the degree to which the concentration and withdrawal of troops from foreign stations has increased the effective power of the army, I should like to mention what changes have been made during the year in its interior organisation. Upon the subject of education in the army, very considerable changes have been made this year. In the first place, the pay of the schoolmasters is about to be put on an entirely different footing from that on which it was heretofore. Hitherto the

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schoolmasters have been paid a very small fixed stipend, and have had to trust for the rest of their receipts to what they could get by fees from the men, their scholars. It was thought, as it turned out erroneously, that the effect of that system would be, that, their pay depending on their activity and their exertions, they would, from motives of interest, keep up the numbers of their scholars. But it was found on experience, that this was not so. It was found that the popularity of the school, and the number of men attending it, depended far more on the interest taken in it by the officers than on the degree of efficiency in the schoolmaster; for of his efficiency the great majority of the men were not able to judge, whilst if they found the officers of their regiment taking an interest in the school, they were immediately stimulated into attendance. The result was, that we had some of the very best schoolmasters which Chelsea had produced, receiving the lowest rates of remuneration, and, on the other hand, some of the worst receiving the highest; and there were constant complaints from those who considered themselves in off, and requests from them to be removed to what they considered better regiments, that is, to regiments where the attendance was better. Under these circumstances I proposed to Lord Hardinge that the system, not answering, should be changed, and that, instead of the faulty mode of payment then existing, there should be three fixed rates of pay, into which the fees should be merged applicable to three classes of schoolmasters. I suggested this change, and, at the same time, proposed that promotion from one class to another should be by merit, and by merit alone. I had no doubt that the hope of appreciation and reward would be in this, as in other professions, the very best stimulus to exertion. This system, I believe, will tend to promote zeal among the schoolmasters, and will induce them to use every exertion to keep the schools in a high state of efficiency. I hope that it will also improve the somewhat anomalous position of the regimental schoolmaster, who is at present considered neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. I need not say that the result of this school system has as yet been extremely good, and that the army has derived great advantage from its introduction.
The Committee will perhaps recollect—in reference to the education of officers, to which I propose now to advert—that some
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few years ago the late Duke of Wellington issued an order that no candidate for a commission in the army should receive one, unless he had passed a certain standard examination. The Duke of Wellington also stated that it was his wish that no officer of the army should be promoted from a subaltern rank to a company, unless he had passed an examination proving him fit for the transition. The Duke of Wellington then said, that in the first examination all you need wish to obtain was the knowledge that the young man had had the education of a gentleman, and that he possessed the abilities to take full advantage of that education. But of the second examination his Grace spoke differently; and he said that it should show not merely that the candidate had had a liberal education, but that he had applied it by turning Iris mind to military studies, and to an acquaintance with the theory of his profession. The present examination for the first commission is conducted at Sandhurst; and about it I do not wish to enter into details; but my impression is, that the education there is too limited, and within its limits too severe. It is too limited, because certain text books only are required to be studied, and the young man who has not even the best memory, but the quickest memory, is most successful. My own impression is, that that is not a fair or a desirable system, and that it might be thus improved:—By allowing a young man who had had a fair liberal education to be examined in what it is stated that he had learned, by making that the test of his fitness as regarded sufficiency of instruction, and by only considering further his ability to take advantage of the education, the liberal education, which he had received. That is all you want in the first examination. In the second it is different. You then want a professional examination; you want to know that, in addition to a fair gentlemanly education, your officer has applied his mind to mathematical and strategetical studies, to such studies as will render him efficient as an officer. I know there is an objection, which I consider fallacious, to this examination, that, by it, you will get men who are book-worms instead of getting the active spirits you require. There is this answer to that, that if the officer who has studied his profession is the worse for his studies, then you must admit that the whole body of the Artillery and Engineers, who are all men of reading and great scientific knowledge, are unfit for

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their profession; and that I am sure you will not do. There remains, however, this difficulty—a more reasonable one, to my mind—that the means of study given to different officers would not be the same, and that they would, on the contrary, vary extremely with the localities in which they were quartered. For instance, the officer quartered in England has access to all the best and newest books, whilst he who is quartered in the backwoods of Canada or elsewhere, is, of course, isolated from all access of the kind. It is proposed, by way of removing this difference of opportunities, to establish at the head quarters of certain districts an officer, whom you may call "Captain of Instruction," or what you please, who will be known as professor of military studies in that district; and on whom it will be arranged that every subaltern officer shall get leave to attend. Thus every such officer would be able to go through a course of instruction before he became a lieutenant, and through another course of instruction before he became a captain. It is intended that there shall be an examination on both these occasions; but, of course, great care must be taken, and will be taken, at first, not to make the standard of these examinations too high, but to arrange it so as to give those who had to go through it every encouragement to qualify themselves. With regard to the instruction and education of the men, I need only say that one proof of the degree to which that instruction is popular among them is shown in the increasing number of volumes which they use, and of the number of persons subscribing to the military libraries. They were instituted in 1840; each man paid a penny per month, and the officers one day's pay in the year. The number of books when the libraries were first established was 5,000, and it is now 118,000, and the number of men subscribing is between 15,000 and 16,000.
It was suggested by the hon. and gallant Officer (Sir De L. Evans), that there is not at present any sufficient means of education for the post of army surgeon. With especial reference to this question, I have made inquiries both at Paris and Vienna as to the training provided for those who are candidates for employment in their armies as medical officers. At Paris I find they have gone into an extreme which works very ill. They take medical students and educate them exclusively for military surgeons, entirely for-
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getting that in nine cases out of ten a military surgeon's duties differed in no way from those of an ordinary surgeon. On the other hand here, except at Edinburgh, it is impossible to get instruction of the peculiar character necessary to make a complete military surgeon. Now, what we propose is, not to diminish by any means the general studies of young men wishing to become military surgeons, but to super-add to those general studies a course of lectures on military surgery; these to be given in Edinburgh, Dublin, and London. The House must be aware that no army in the world requires this course of study so much as our own. Last year, for instance, in Barbadoes, a colony which had hitherto been considered as comparatively healthy and the freest from that terrible scourge of all the West India Islands, the yellow fever broke out, and, notwithstanding all that the doctors there could do, it did not abate. To fill vacancies only too frequent we were obliged to send out medical men from England; but what were they? Men who had studied every disease but this, which they had had no means of studying in England. It is most necessary that before young men become army surgeons they should have the opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the diseases of tropical climates, as well as the peculiar diseases incident to the soldier's life. Under these circumstances, we are going to extend to London and Dublin the advantages of the establishment which already exists at Edinburgh, and we hope to make arrangements for a course of lectures there by next autumn. These lectures, I believe, will be attended with a double advantage. Not only will they be of the greatest value to students, but a great number of army surgeons also will gladly have recourse to them for the purpose of adding to the stock of knowledge they already possess.
Now, Sir, let me say, in passing from this subject of the education of the soldiers, that there has been a very remarkable improvement in their conduct. It was the custom for many years to govern in the army almost entirely by the fear of punishment; it has been the custom now, for some years, to govern it by the hope of reward. The difference, I rejoice to say, has been very remarkable. Under the former system the man entered for life, at least for twenty-one years, during all which time the best he could hope was not to be flogged, not to be imprisoned, and so on.

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Under the present system he has not this only motive of the dread of punishment—he has the immediate hope of reward, by the increase of his pay, and he has the assurance that ultimately, in the case of long service, he will obtain an increase of his pension, supposing his merits to entitle him to it. Lately, too, we have made a difference with regard to men who have given twenty-one years of good service. The practice was to give them a medal after their discharge; but that, however gratifying to them, had, for the purposes of example, but little effect. We have changed that practice, and now we give this medal after eighteen years, and he who has earned it wears it from that time till the time of his discharge. We have likewise made changes with regard to the accommodation of troops on board ship; and more especially with contract packets. The effect of all these changes has been most marked in the conduct of the men, the excellence of which increases every year. This year I may mention, if anything were wanting to prove the greater than ordinary frugality of the men, that there has been an augmentation in the amount they have invested in the savings banks. In 1844 the number of depositors was 1,890, the amount deposited 14,849 l.; in 1853 the number of depositors was 10,723, the amount deposited 124,000 l. As to of-fences, the number of persons in military prisons is diminishing; but on this point I will read an extract from the governor of the prison in Limerick:—
"From a force comprising so many men as that which sends its delinquents to this prison, only 172 have been received during the last year, a fact which, it is my privilege to say, exhibits a decrease in the percentage admitted in former years. That this gratifying result is to be attributed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the dread of military prisons, would not, I think, be a correct conclusion. Mere punishment, however rigorous and severe, will not deter the soldier from offending. I cannot, therefore, but regard the decrease of military offences as, in a great measure, the happy consequence of that system of education and reward which is now so beneficially operating upon the soldier, and teaching him to realise the importance and advantage of respectability and faithfulness. The excellent conduct of the troops serving in this district is additionally gratifying and observable, since during the past year drunkenness has, I regret to say, very lamentably increased among the lower orders in this part of the United Kingdom."
Now, Sir, having gone through these heads, let me say that the military authorities, while paying this attention to the individual comforts of our soldiers, and to
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the means by which the character of the men could be formed, have not neglected to take measures for securing the general efficiency of the forces. Last year I took from the estimates a sum for the purpose of completing an establishment at Hythe, where we could obtain—what in this country it is now very difficult to obtain—a sufficiently long range for practice in shooting. Before the completion of that establishment the practice of the musket had been extremely neglected, and in some regiments there was scarcely any ball-cartridge used in the course of the year. That state of things is now remedied. To that establishment a certain number of privates and non-commissioned officers go from each regiment in their turn; there they obtain practice and instruction; and then they go back to their regiments, able to instruct those whom they left behind them. The consequence is that there is hardly a regiment which will not soon be thoroughly masters of what lately was so generally neglected. A gentleman, a competent judge, came to me the other day, having spent a day at Hythe, where, he told me, he had seen almost more than he could believe. He saw the men at practice with the Minié rifle, and out of 100 shots seventy-seven were put into a target eight feet high, representing cavalry, at 800 yards distance. He had also seen the men skirmishing—shooting without any measured distance, and obliged to guess at it—which, as any one accustomed to rifle shooting knew, was a great disadvantage, and yet out of fifty shots forty were put into the target.
And now, Sir, I come to the point which was mentioned by the hon. and gallant Officer (Sir De L. Evans), who asked what are the Government's intentions—first, with regard to the troops to be allotted to the Colonies; and secondly, with regard to promotions in the army. I agree entirely with what he said as to the distribution of troops in the Colonies, but I must call his attention to the fact that the return he has quoted is a misleading return. The return of the 1st of April, 1853, really gives the force existing in 1852. The next return which appears will give the hon. and gallant Officer the right figures for 1853, and by it he will find that the number of troops in the Colonies has been very considerably diminished since the present Government came into office. Five thousand men, I think, have been withdrawn in that time from the Cape, North America, and the

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West Indies. But you have to put against these the augmentation that has been made in the garrisons of the Mediterranean. During the last year, whilst reductions have been taking place in Canada, the West Indies, and the Cape, an addition has been made of upwards of 1,800 men at Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands; and it is obvious that at the present moment these three garrisons form the basis of our operations in the East. I agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the Government were right in withdrawing troops from the West Indies. There have been complaints of that, though; but there always are complaints if you remove troops from any colony. Since the gold discoveries, Australia has maintained a regiment from its our resources. A regiment is given on the condition that they pay all the expenses except arms and clothing; and if they want any further troops they will be sent to them on the same terms, and on the same terms only. In short, the Government have made considerable reductions so far as regards the hon. and gallant Officer's first inquiry. With regard to the hon. and gallant Member's other question, the attention of the Government has also been drawn to that subject. It is certainly true that there have been appointments of colonels and lieutenant-colonels to act as brigadiers in consequence of the advanced age of general officers; but the hon. and gallant Member will be gratified to learn that the Government have decided to issue a Commission to inquire into the mode of appointments and retirements in the army, with a view to see what means can be adopted to bring up men more rapidly in promotion, and at a period of greater vigour. The names of the Commissioners are such as to inspire confidence on all sides. First, there are the two eminent military authorities, Lord Hardine and Lord Raglan; two general officers, Lord Cathcart and Lord Seaton; two colonels, Colonel Buller and Colonel Knowles; two ex-Secretaries of State, Earl Grey and Sir John Pakington; two ex-Secretaries at War, Lord Panmure and Mr. Ellice; and myself. With regard to the observations which have fallen from the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir J. Walsh), I certainly think the hon. Baronet has underrated the military power of this country, and when he quoted the dictum of Napoleon that this country never could be a military Power because it could not raise more than 40,000 men, he forgot one impor-
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tant point, that if actually raised 140,000. The hon. Baronet omitted, too, the great augmentation that has been made in the Artillery, which has been increased from 14,000 to 19,000 men. I must remind those who think the present estimate is not large enough, that I do not propose this as a war estimate to the Committee. The Government wished to have their policy discussed before making any great augmentation. It may not be so satisfactory to the Committee as to the hon. Baronet, but I have to state that I must before long bring before you a supplementary estimate. At present I will not delay the Committee any further, but only move that the number of land forces, officers and men, for the ensuing year, be 1,12,977.
MR. HUMEsaid, he cordially congratulated the Government on the great success which had attended the amended system of rewards and punishments. He hoped they would persevere in the system, which was one that he had advocated for many years past. He was also gratified to find so large an increase of depositors in the military savings banks. He was also glad to hear that it was in contemplation to establish medical schools for the Army. With respect to the Colonies, anxious as he generally was to reduce the military force in them, he thought there was great cause why they should not withdraw troops from these Colonies which had been almost ruined by legislation in this country, and which were hardly in a condition at present to maintain even their own police. He thought it likely disorders might arise in the troops were withdrawn thence. But as regarded the whole of the North American colonies, he was of opinion the troops might be withdrawn from then to strengthen our military establishment here. He should be very glad to hear from Her Majesty's Government that they intended to pay some regard to the unfortunate Colonies which had a mixed population and were altogether dissimilar to the Australian or North American possessions. He could not help thinking that too expensive a staff had been retained, and although he admitted that much had been done to reduce the non-effective portion of the Army, yet they still found nearly 2,000,000 l. of money paid for non-effective services, while the effective services only required 4,000,000 l. This went far to prove that the complaints repeatedly made last year were well-founded. On the whole, however, placing confidence in the improved

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management, he had no hesitation in saying that no department of the public service had undergone so much improvement as the Army. The results which had been stated with respect to education, the attention to schools, supply of books, and other matters, were highly satisfactory, and taking what they had done as an earnest, of their future intentions, he was not disposed to find fault with the Government with respect to trivial matters. He must say, on going over the list, that they had added 11,000 men to the Army at the least possible cost, and he would admit that it was possible to double or treble the number, if necessary, at a comparatively moderate expense. Before he sat down, he was very anxious to refer to what had fallen from an hon. Member with respect to Lord Aberdeen. The hon. Member for Roscommon (Mr. F. French) took on himself to say, that those around him concurred entirely in the reference he made to that nobleman. That might sound very well out of doors, but hon. Members would recollect that there was not a single Member on the bench with the hon. Member for Roscommon at the time he was speaking. He considered that there had been a settled attack upon the Government, and that gross injustice had been done to them in reference to their reluctance to go to war. He would, as a friend of peace, repeat his opinion, that their conduct in the matter deserved great praise, and he therefore protested against the speech of the hon. Member for Roscommon being supposed to carry with it the assent of the House of Commons, he being entirely destitute of supporters, though he appealed to those around him, as though many were sitting near. In conclusion, he congratulated the country on having an improved Army and better hopes of prospective improvement than on any former occasion.
LORD LOVAINEsaid, he wished to inquire whether it was not the intention of the right hon. Secretary at War to add at least one subaltern to a company. He would remind the House that we were about to enter into a war under peculiar circumstances, to be carried on in an unhealthy climate and under uncertain auspices, and therefore it was our duty to provide for the effective officering of the troops. In this particular the French excelled us, their men being much better officered than ours. He should be glad to know the intentions of the Government on this matter.
MR. JOHN MACGREGORsaid, he fully agreed with the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) in thinking that the Government had acted wisely, and with extraordinary prudence, from the first moment of the occurrence of those lamentable disputes in the East. He also considered that the Estimates had been framed with a wise regard to economy and efficiency. He hoped that the Government would take measures to assimilate the law of England and Scotland in respect to the billeting of soldiers. As regarded Scotland, the state of the law upon the subject was most vexatious. He was not going to get up a Scotch grievance, but the billeting of troops on private houses was unknown in England, though it was unfortunately the practice in Scotland.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished, before proceeding to make any remarks upon the Estimates, to call the attention of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) to the great inconvenience which arose from the number of Motions that were brought on upon different subjects on Supply nights previously to going into Committee. It was impossible for the House to do its duty, and go through the Estimate with that care and deliberation which their importance deserved, when they were brought on at so late an hour—the previous portion of the evening being occupied with the discussion of four Motrons, at which not forty Members were present. A few days ago two or three of the most important votes in the Naval Estimates were taken at two o'clock in the morning. He did not wish to stop hon. Gentleman from bringing forward their Motions, but he thought they ought not to bring them forward on Supply nights, but on Wednesday, when but little business was brought on. He did not rise for the purpose of offering any opposition to the effective portion of the vote. He would concede all the men and money that were required, though he must say he heard with some regret the observation thrown out by the right hon. Secretary at War, that if was not unlikely he would come before Parliament again during the present Session with fresh Estimates. He had risen for the purpose of suggesting that if ever there was a time when no unnecessary expenditure should take place, it was now. His hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) had last year called attention to the increase of pay to the colonels of the Foot Guards, as compared with those

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of the other regiments of the line. Now, no man would object to the increased pay of the Duke of Wellington as long as that illustrious soldier lived, but that was no reason why Prince Albert should enjoy such high emolument as Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, in direct violation of the recommendations which a Committee of that House had laid down upon the subject. Now, his Royal Highness Prince Albert, although holding a high rank in the army, was not a soldier, and did not profess to be, and in his (Mr. Williams's) opinion, the giving of that regiment to his Royal Highness was a violation of the principle on which the increase was granted, namely, that it should be conferred on officers as a reward for distinguished services. By the provision of 1833, adopted at the recommendation of the Committee, the pay to the colonel of the Grenadier Guards was fixed at 1,200 l. a year; allowance for clothing the regiment, 8,949 l. 13 s. 6⅝d., making together 10,149 l. 13 s. 6⅝d.; and assuming cost of clothing to be 7,109,l. 11 s., it left an absolute remuneration to the colonel of 3,040 l.2s. 6⅝d. The colonel of the Fusilier Guards was the Duke of Cambridge, a very gallant soldier, no doubt, but he was not a soldier who had rendered distinguished services to the country, that he ought to receive increased pay, when they saw veteran officers who had served all through the Peninsular war and at Waterloo, whose only reward was their medals—some with nine or ten clasps—and their simple good service pension of 150 l. or 200 l. a year. Nobody would object to such a man as Lord Strafford, the colonel of the Coldstream Guards, or to the Marquis of Anglesey, receiving the highest pay and the highest honours, but it was on such men alone both ought to be conferred. The pay of the Duke of Cambridge as colonel of the Fusilier Guards was 1,000 l. a year; allowance for clothing, 5,010 l.; making together 6,010 l.—the net income of the colonel being 2,135 l. The pay of the colonel of the 2nd Regiment of Foot was 500 l. a year; clothing, 2,186 l.; net income, 1,080 l. Men of high rank, whosoever they were, however exalted, ought not in the British army or navy to be permitted to elbow out the veterans who had fought and bled for their country. He looked upon it as a positive degradation that a colonel should be also the tailor of his regiment. The colonels ought to have a fixed allowance, and ought not to be allowed any tailoring
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perquisites. It was humiliating to see so exalted a personage as the husband of the Sovereign making a profit of 1,800 l. a year out of the clothes of the soldiers; it was inconsistent with the character of a soldier, and degrading to the position of a prince. Colonels of artillery received a salary of 1,000 l. a year, without tailoring perquisites, and it was found that the clothing of the men of the artillery was obtained 16 per cent cheaper than that of the infantry and cavalry, and that the clothing was of a better description. He was happy to learn that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War bore such honourable testimony to the good conduct of the British army as evidence of the increase in "the good service pay," and the great diminution in the number of punishments. The "good service pay" commenced in 1837, and during the first year the number entitled to it was 1,944 soldiers, who received a sum of 3,600 l. It had been gradually increasing ever since, and in the present year the number of soldiers who received good service pay was 30,900, the amount of money 63,900 l. This was a large sum of money, no doubt, but still he did not grudge it, since it improved the social condition of the soldier, and kept away the lash. He wished to ask the right hon. Secretary at War bow it was that there was a charge of 12,500 l. for encampment expenses? Was that a remnant of the Chobham expenditure? He thought there ought not to be such a charge, since the Government, in reply to a question last year, declared the vote then given was sufficient. He also wanted to know what saving had been effected in the army expenditure in consequence of the number of men on the 1st of January being 12,000 less than the number voted last year?
MR. LAINGsaid, that without wishing to revive the discussion of the Eastern question, it was impossible not to perceive that the present Vote, involving, as it did, the number of men to be added to the army, related to the conduct of that war, and whether it was to be conducted with the energy and decision necessary to bring it to a speedy issue. Conceiving the number of 11,000 to be added to the army, and 260,000 l. in the Estimates, by no means sufficient to effect that purpose, it was with satisfaction he heard the statement by the right hon. Gentleman with reference to a supplemental estimate by which the number might be increased. In making that statement the right hon. Gen-

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tleman seemed to entertain some misgiving as to the manner in which it might be received by some parties in that House, but his (Mr. Laing's) object in rising was to show the Government, that many hon. Members, who under ordinary circumstances would scrutinize these votes with rigour, and object, with a view to economy, to any increase of the Estimates, thought, under the present circumstances, that the true economy would be to ask for such supplies as to enable Government to prosecute the war with the greatest vigour. Certain parties in that House were of opinion the war ought never to be undertaken; others thought that in its conduct the operations ought to be confined to our Navy; while a third party, and he thought by far the largest majority, were of opinion that, being once forced into a war, the proper course would be to proceed with all our energy, so as to bring it as soon as possible to a conclusion. The amount of injury which the country had already sustained by the mere apprehension of war was far greater than would have been supposed. That floating mass of property which was contained in the funds, railway securities, and such like, and which was generally estimated at 1,000,000,000 l. sterling, had suffered a depreciation of not less than 10 per cent, being a total loss of 100,000,000 l. He wished, instead of the criticism that had taken place on the past conduct of the Government, some substantial Motion had been proposed, on which the House might have expressed its opinion by a vote. They would thus have shown to foreign countries the unanimity of their feelings on this question; and the Government would have been able with more freedom, and with a more undivided responsibility, to take such steps as they thought necessary for bringing this war to a speedy and a successful termination.
COLONEL BLAIRsaid, that, in reference to the statement made with respect to the pay of colonels of the Guards, the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) could not have chosen a worse time to make such a statement than the present juncture. The colonel of the Fusilier Guards was no drawing-room soldier, but was about to proceed on foreign service. He could not sit by and hear him called a regimental tailor, and he considered it was speaking in a very derogatory manner of a Royal Prince. It was said that his Royal Highness Prince Albert was not a soldier; he (Col. Blair) had an op-
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portunity of observing the internal economy of the regiment under the command of his Royal Highness, and no general officer could command it better. He understood the hon. Member to say that the Duke of Cambridge ought not to have a regiment because older officers were unemployed. He could only say, that no blame ought to be imputed to his Royal Highness, for the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had proved by the Estimates that it was the wish of Government to advance junior officers in the service.
MR. W. WILLIAMSwished to explain that he did not mention the word "tailors" to impute the least disrespect. He merely described the position, and condemned the practice of placing such distinguished men in it.
MR. J. HEATHCOATsaid, he wished to draw the attention of the right hon. Secretary at War to the distinction in the dress worn by the officers and privates, and he would suggest the expediency of not unnecessarily exposing our officers, through this means, to be picked off by the able marksmen of the enemy. He believed the Emperor of Russia had recently made some alteration in the dress of his officers, assimilating them to that of the troops. It was highly inexpedient that the officers should come into the field in blue, and the men in red coats. He thought they would all agree with him that everything should be done to preserve the brave men who were going abroad to lead the British army, and who left so many near and dear to them behind.
SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had made reference to a Commission for the purpose of making promotions. He (Sir De L. Evans) thought such Commissions often led to shelving questions, and he could not conceive why the great officers of State should not take on themselves the responsibility of these promotions as heretofore. These Commissions were only devices to remove the responsibility from the shoulders of those who ought to bear it. With regard to the clothing of the troops, he thought it would be very desirable that distinctions of dress, which were a relic of antiquity, should be removed when danger might result from their continuance. The Government were sending troops to the East to serve with the French, who were much more rationally clothed. He wished the Secretary at War would take the

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clothing of the troops into his own hands; it was only a question of money. He knew that the Commander-in-Chief had desired very much to make alterations in clothing, and to give frock-coats to officers who wore jackets; but one of the principal causes why nothing had been done was, because it would interfere with the arrangements between the colonels and the contractors, and diminish the profits of the colonels. If the war were to last, was it to save trouble to contractors and to save clothing, that our troops were to present such a contrast to those of our allies?
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he wished to call the attention of the Secretary at War to the women and children of the troops who had embarked for the East. Every one who had witnessed the embarkation of troops for foreign service must be aware of the misery that was always presented to view upon the beach. Only four, or, at the most, six women were allowed to go with a company, and, from the facility with which commanding officers of regiments consented to marriages, which was, in reality, only a cruelty to the men, there were always accumulated a great number of women and children who could not accompany a regiment. They had no means of support, except what they derived from the subscriptions of the officers, by means of which they were sent to their different localities, where they usually fell upon the poor rates. Sometimes the women, for want of the means of subsistence, contracted vicious habits, and the children were almost invariably deprived of all means of education. This subject ought to engage the attention of Parliament, for the army would never be properly organised, and the men would never go out to fight with proper feelings, so long as they knew that their wives and children were thrown upon the world for charity during their absence. The question of the staff was also deserving the attention of the Secretary at War. Of all the armies of Europe ours had the worst staff in the field, and the reason was, because our officers bad so little experience of staff duties. One of the greatest uses of the camp at Chobham was to teach our officers the nature of staff duties. In the French army, before an officer could serve upon the état major, he must serve by turns in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and then, having served in each arm of the service, and gained a knowledge of its peculiarities, he was appointed to the état major. But,
1300
except about fourteen officers who went to study at Sandhurst, but who were not appointed to staff duties any the more because they went there, we had no school of staff officers. There would be a great difficulty in any one Board at present in existence supplying clothing for the whole of the army. The general officers in command of regiments, if they were sufficiently paid, would be satisfied to give up the privilege of clothing their regiments.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he wished to state, in reply to the noble Lord (Lord Lovaine), that the question of appointing additional subaltern officers must stand over for consideration and decision. The attention of the Government had been drawn to the necessity of altering the dress of the officers, so that the officers and men might fight in coats of the same colour, and last year, when the Guards were at Chobham, the officers received instructions to be dressed in a similar manner to the men. With respect to the complaint of the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams), as to the appointments to the household regiments, he had on a previous occasion stated that the Committee had reported that the three household regiments of cavalry should be reserved for veteran officers of distinction; but they did not recommend that such an arrangement should be insisted on with respect to the Foot Guards, the appointments to which rested with the Sovereign for the members of her family. In the case of the household cavalry regiments the recommendation of the Committee had been scrupulously followed. But with respect to the household infantry, Lord Strafford had been appointed to one of them, in consideration of his long and brilliant services. With respect to the suggestion for an equalisation of the allowances, he must observe that the three regiments did not stand on the same footing as to numerical force; and he thought the vested interests involved in the question should be respected. He thought it was due to His Royal Highness Prince Albert, to observe that he (Mr. Sidney Herbert) had occasion to make a proposal to him with respect to his regiment. It had been a matter of complaint in that House for a long time that there were a great number of supernumerary officers in the Guards, and he (Mr. Sidney Herbert) made a proposal with respect to those supernumerary officers which involved a sacrifice on the part of the colonels of the

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Guards of their patronage. That proposal he submitted to His Royal Highness, who at once consented to relinquish his patronage. He thought it only due to His Royal Highness to state that circumstance.
SIR JOHN FITZGERALDsaid, he wished that it could be referred to a commission to inquire, among other matters, into the propriety of doing away with the rank of colonel, which was only a useless rank, and prevented an officer from arriving at the rank of general when his health and strength allowed him to serve with the greatest efficiency. He was nine years a colonel without employment, and that time was altogether lost to him. He was then made major-general. Now, would it not be much better that an officer should be promoted at once from the grade of a lieutenant-colonel to that of a major-general? They would thus have general officers in the enjoyment of all their energies. He fully agreed with those hon. Members who thought that the clothing of the army was not a proper subject of emolument to the colonels. Improvements were from time to time required in the clothing of the army, which the authorities now hesitated to make. It would be much better if it were left to the Commander-in-Chief to alter the clothing, without having to meet the views of the general officers who had regiments. He very much desired to see the cavalry regiments completed to 800 men, for it was much better to have one regiment of 800 men acting together than to have that number made up of detachments from other regiments.
VISCOUNT GODERICHsaid, he wished to call the attention of the Committee to the mode of education now adopted with respect to the private soldier, under which he was required to attend school only during the time when he was undergoing the preliminary drill, the consequence being, of necessity almost, that he acquired a dislike for the instruction he received there. He suggested that the soldier should not be required to attend school until after he had undergone that preliminary drill, and then that he should do little or nothing else for three or four months, an arrangement which he (Lord Goderich) thought would tend to make him appreciate the education the more at the time it was imparted, and to use it afterwards as a means of relieving the tedium of garrison duty during his subsequent service.
MR. J. G. PHILLIMOREsaid, in order to guard against his vote in support of the
1302
Estimates being misconstrued, he felt it necessary to remark at that point of the discussion that, had we adopted a firm and manly tone at a much earlier period of the negotiations on the Eastern question, the same result would have happened which followed the negotiations in 1851, when our remonstrances were backed by a fleet, and the Emperor of Russia withdrew his claims.
Vote agreed to.
(2.) 3,923,288 l., Charge of Land Forces.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished to move that the emoluments of the colonels of the Grenadier Foot Guards be reduced by 2,000 l., and those of the colonels of the Fusileer Guards by 1,000 l.
COLONEL LINDSAYsaid, the effect of the reduction proposed by the hon. Member for Lambeth would be that his Royal Highness Prince Albert, who had nearly 3,000 men under his command, would have to conduct his regiment for the same sum that would be allowed to a colonel of a regiment of the line for a single battalion.
MR. W. WILLIAMS, in reply, said, that the colonel of a regiment, whether his regiment consisted of one, two, or three battalions, performed no duty; that his office was, in fact, a sinecure, and considered as the reward for distinguished services.
Amendment negatived.
Vote agreed to, as were also,

(3.) 151,382 l., General Staff Officers.

(4.) 105,093 l., Public Departments.

(5.) 17,401 l., Royal Military College.

COLONEL NORTHsaid, he must complain of the change which had been effected of late years in the rules of this institution, by which the object of its founder was entirely defeated. The college was established by the late Duke of York for the education of the orphans of officers, but now these orphans were compelled to pay the sum of 40 l. per annum before they could participate in the advantages of the institution. It must be obvious, when the widow of an ensign received a pension of only 36 l. a year, and the widow of a lieutenant only 40 l. a year, that the college was now virtually closed to that class of cadets for whose advantage the institution was specially designed by the Duke of York. He did not wish to throw the slightest blame upon the present Secretary at War, for the existing regulations were in force when that right hon. Gentleman succeeded to office. He (Colonel North) hoped, however, some mea-

1303
sures would be adopted for enabling that class of young men for whose benefit the establishment was originally intended to receive education without any expense to their friends. A large surplus, of variable amount, bad lately been derived from the college, but he was confident that, even if the arrangement he suggested caused any deficiency in the funds of the institution, such deficiency would be cheerfully supplied by that House.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that while he felt the utmost respect for the opinions of the hon. and gallant Officer, and for the feelings which dictated his suggestion, he entertained great doubt as to the propriety of providing an eleemosynary education for such a profession as the Army. He had frequent applications from the widows of officers on this subject, but he did not think a greater disservice could be done to persons in such a position than by inducing them to bring up their sons to so expensive a profession as the Army. He considered that if a person who had no private income entered the Army, he embraced a profession which was not likely to conduce to his comfort in life.
COLONEL NORTHcould only say, that many of the cadets of the orphan class who were at Sandhurst at the same time with himself were at this moment among the most respectable officers in the service. He only regretted that the service should be so expensive that the orphans of our gallant soldiers were precluded from entering it.
MR. HUMEsaid that this was, he believed, the only country where the military service was so expensive that the general community were unable to enter it with a fair chance. He thought that the Government ought to adopt means to reduce the extravagance in dress and other matters which rendered the military service so expensive. He considered that the pay of officers of the Army ought to be sufficient to maintain them, and that was the principle adopted in every other country in the world. The present state of things had arisen because the Army had heretofore been a service for men of fortune. Young men had been put into the Army who never meant to derive their livelihood from the service. It suited them very well during their younger years, and in time of peace; but when war occurred, they sold out and left the service. [Cries of "No, no!"] Well, some of them did. ["No, no!"] He hoped those hon. Gentlemen who said
1304
"No," would not differ from him on this point—that the Army was made a convenience, and that the men who actually performed the duties of professional soldiers were deprived of their fair share of emoluments and rank.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid, he would recommend the Government to economise the expenses of the establishment at Sandhurst, which might be done without interfering with the efficiency of the institution, as by this means funds might be provided for educating the sons of such subaltern officers as died in the service of the country and left no provision for their families. There was a governor and lieutenant-governor, who were both general officers, keeping their four or five horses, at the college, and there were chaplains, sergeants, schoolmasters, riding masters, surgeons, assistant-surgeons, and other officials, all to look after about 150 boys. In fact there were about as many officers as there were boys in the institution.
MR. OTWAYsaid, that the Sandhurst College was not originally intended for civilians, but was designed for the education of the sons of officers. He considered it very desirable that an ensign's wife should have the satisfaction of knowing that, in case her husband died in battle, her son would be educated at the public expense. Some twelve or fifteen years ago, when he was at Sandhurst, the number of cadets of the orphan class was from thirty to forty, while it was stated that there were now only ten or twelve of that class in the college; he thought it was most desirable that some means should be adopted for extending the advantages of the institution to the orphans of officers.
MR. HUMEsaid, he thought that the expenses of the establishment might be very considerably reduced. He found that the governor received 1,000 l. a year, the lieutenant-governor 383 l., and a major-superintendent 300 l., for the management of a few boys.
MR. M. CHAMBERSsaid, he had had the happiness of being educated at Sandhurst, and he knew many distinguished officers who had been educated as orphans at that institution. He would suggest to the right hon. Secretary at War, however, that 40 l. a year was a larger sum than the orphans of some officers were able to pay. He had been sorry to hear the Secretary at War express an opinion that Gentlemen in that position ought not to enter Her Majesty's Army. He (Mr. Chambers)

1305
thought, on the contrary, that they were the very persons who ought to have the opportunity of entering the Army. He conceived that no class of young men were more entitled to the consideration of the State than those whose fathers had died in its service, and who were left in a position which precluded them from paying a large sum of money for their education. Sandhurst College was founded by the late Duke of York, who thought it the duty of the country to provide for the education of the orphan children of officers, and who proposed that some orphans should be educated entirely at the public expense, while others should pay a small sum for their education. He (Mr. Chambers) considered that, as the country was now on the point of war, the present was a very proper time for bringing this subject under the notice of the Committee, because it would be an inducement to persons to serve the country well and faithfully if they knew that, should they perish in the public service, the State would provide for the education of their children, who would hereafter have an opportunity of entering that service in which their fathers had gained distinguished fame. The Secretary at War had stated, however, that he did not think the army was a service which it was desirable for the orphans of officers to enter. He knew the right hon. Gentleman meant that the Army was too expensive a service for young men who had no private income. That was deeply to be regretted; but he (Mr. Chambers) was old enough to recollect the late war, and he knew many officers who had obtained their commissions in consequence of passing an examination at the Military College at Sandhurst, and he knew also that some of those officers had paid 10 l. or 20 l. a year, according to the rank of their fathers, while others had paid nothing, but that they had worked their own way to rank and distinction. He would suggest that, as the college was now a profitable establishment, the amounts paid by the cadets should be reduced, and regulated according to the military rank held by their fathers.
Vote agreed to.
The two following Votes were also agreed to:—

(6.) 20,756 l., for Royal Military Asylum, &c.

(7.) 88,000 l., for Volunteer Corps.

(8.) 20,500 l., Rewards for Distinguished Services.

MR. HUMEsaid that, in the Committee
1306
which had sat upstairs, the abolition of all sinecures in connection with garrison appointments had been recommended. The garrison of the Tower of London was the only one which had not been the subject of inquiry; but it was understood that, on the death of the Duke of Wellington, a complete change would take place. He wished to know why the recommendation of the Committee had not been carried out in that case?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that when he came into office he found Lord Combermere filling the position in the Tower which had been occupied by the Duke of Wellington. Since then a warrant had been signed for reducing the Tower establishment for the future, and as the places became vacant the money saved would be divided as rewards for distinguished services.
Vote agreed to.
(9.) 46,000 l., Pay of General Officers.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished to call attention to the immense number of general officers as compared with the number of regiments. He found from the last Army List that there were 324 general officers to 128 regiments, so that there were more than two generals and a-half to each regiment in the services.
COLONEL LINDSAYsaid, the hon. Member for Lambeth, in looking over the Army List, had taken all the general officers mentioned there, but there were many whose names were in italics, who were retired officers, and received no army pay. The number of general officers would not be more than 243 or 244, which did not, however, include those belonging to the ordnance, artillery, engineers, and marines.
MR. HUMEsaid, the Government ought to maintain no more officers than were required for the service. The recommendations of the Committee on this point had led to no result whatever. While the Duke of Wellington was alive every alteration was met with the cry of "Oh, you must put it off, the Duke is against you;" but he recommended the Government now to look to the advice of the Committee, and bring down the officers to the number required.
Vote agreed to.
(10.) 49,600 l., Full Pay for Retired Officers.
COLONEL LINDSAYsaid, he would suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should remove the grievance which was

1307
complained of by officers retiring on full pay, namely, that their promotion ceased as soon as they had retired. As the number of these officers was but small, and as the average number of years' service of the retired lieutenant-colonels was about thirty-eight, and of majors thirty-six, it was clear that much addition to the higher ranks could not be made by allowing promotion to go on. He hoped this subject would receive the attention of the Commission to which the right hon. Gentleman had alluded.
Vote agreed to; As was also

(11) 356,000 l., Half-pay and Military Allowances.

(12.) 33,671 l., Foreign Half-pay.

MR. HUMEsaid, he could not avoid expressing a fear that great abuses existed in this item. One case he had heard of, in which an officer in receipt of a pension signed thirteen or fourteen half-yearly receipts, which his widow regularly handed in after his death and received the money. Personal appearance ought, he thought, to be necessary for receipt of a pension.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that great care was taken to prevent imposition, and of late years personal appearance had been insisted on.
Vote agreed to; as were also the two following Votes:—

(13.) 115,889 l., Widows' Pensions.

(14) 75,500 l., Compassionate List.

(15.) 30,694 l., In-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals.

MR. I. BUTTsaid, he begged to ask the right hon. Gentleman what steps had been taken in consequence of the Address to Her Majesty last Session relating to Kilmainham Hospital?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid that, in consequence of that Vote, he had thought it his duty to act upon the decision of the House, and a Royal warrant in reference to Kilmainham was being prepared. He had made several alterations in the staff there, the effect of which was, in many instances, a reduction of expense, and, in all, an increase of efficiency. The number of pensioners admitted this year had been somewhat larger than last year, and the number would be permanently kept up to 140.
MR. I. BUTTsaid, this management did not comply with the spirit of the Address of last Session. In 1845 the number of pensioners was fixed by Royal warrant at 200, and the discussion last Session turned upon the point whether the number
1308
was to remain at that fixed upon by that warrant. Now, the right hon. Gentleman, however, had reduced the number from 200 to 140. The Vote of last year had carried with it a very beneficial influence in Ireland, as showing that the Government were not determined to cut down institutions of benevolence merely because they were Irish, but he must say that a great deal of that influence would be done away with when the reduction proposed by the right hon. Gentleman came to be made known, particularly when the Estimate for Chelsea Hospital was increased at the very moment when that for Kilmainham was diminished.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he considered the decision of the Secretary of War was most unsatisfactory, and would have an ill effect on the recruiting in Ireland. As an income tax had been placed upon Irishmen, he thought they had at least a right to have their establishments kept up.
MR. HUMEsaid, he would like to see both Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals abolished, and he believed that the pensioners would prefer having the liberty to live where they pleased. Kilmainham kept up a large staff at a most expensive rate.
MR. VANCEsaid, he had come to a very different conclusion. There were in Kilmainham 140 inmates, and there was a department for out-pensioners, who had their arms and accoutrements there. There was full accommodation for 250 pensioners in the establishment. He believed the hospital had a very advantageous influence in Ireland in favour of the service, and the proportion of in-door pensioners was increasing, having been only kept down by the apprehension of being turned adrift.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that it was stated that there were 144 pensioners in the establishment, but there were only ninety-eight old soldiers, and there were forty-six persons to look after them. There was a matron and nine nurses, an infirmary sergeant, two cooks, two assistant-cooks, two barbers, two lodge-keepers, and so on. It was all very well for Gentlemen from Ireland to wish to keep up an establishment of such importance for ninety-eight old men, when there were 63,000 out-pensioners, of whom at least 25,000 were Irishmen, living more comfortably with their families.
MR. P, O'BRIENsaid, that the staff of officers to which the hon. Member for Lambeth had alluded was composed of old sol-

1309
diers and officers who had served, and deserved well of, their country. There was a great disposition to enter this hospital on the part of men who, having served twenty or twenty-five years abroad, had lost sight of their family connections, and were therefore glad to go where they might meet with their old comrades, who were now their only friends. He hoped that they would not, just on the eve of a war, by any utilitarian proceedings in that House, repress the strong feeling which always animated Irishmen to come forward in defence of their country.
MR. HUMEsaid, he would point out that all the officers at Kilmainham could not have served their country, because their occupations showed that they had not been soldiers; besides, some of them—the nurses, for example—were women.
MR. I. BUTTsaid, that there were few persons in the hospital who had not served their country well. The very nurses were widows of old soldiers who had been killed in the service. But the question was not at present as to the maintenance of the hospital. That question had been decided by that House last Session, and the decision would, doubtless, be confirmed if the question were raised again. Those who complained that there was a large staff and a small number of pensioners, made the very complaint which he did. At an expense of 500 l. the hospital could be made capable of receiving twice the present number of pensioners, and that, would tend to keep up the national spirit in Ireland [Mr. W. WILLIAMS: Hear, hear!] Oh, no doubt the hon. Member for Lambeth was a better judge of those matters than the gallant commander of the forces in Ireland, or the Marquess of Anglesey. But the opinion of the people of Ireland was strongly in favour of keeping up this ancient establishment on a proper scale.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, among the differences on both sides of the House, the hon. Members for Lambeth and Youghal were agreed on one point, and on that one point they were both wrong. The number was not 144, but 140; and the staff, so far from remaining the same as it was, had been gradually diminished, and was still in the process of reduction, until it was more suited to the number of the pensioners. The staff was admitted on the very same principle as the pensioners. On visiting Kilmainham last year, he found 127 or 130 men in the hospital; he had altered it to 140, but that was not reduction. It was indeed a reduction from the number
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on the warrant which was made some six years ago. He had made that alteration after full consultation with the most likely authorities on the spot, and he was not disposed to reconsider it.
Vote agreed to, as were also the two following votes:—

(16.) 1,215,712 l., Out-Pensioners.

(17.) 38,000 l., Superannuation Allowances.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Sir, I shall now proceed, if the Committee pleases, with the Navy Estimates, and shall state very shortly what is the result of our calculations for the year. On a former evening the Committee consented to vote the first three items, which are the largest in point of amount. The increase in the Navy Estimates generally may be stated at 1,200,000 l., the increase upon the three first votes which have been already passed being 711,000 l. It will be satisfactory to the Committee to hear that the entire sum voted for the Navy Estimates this year is by no means the largest sum which has been voted within the last ten years. I think in the year 1848–49, the entire sum voted for the Navy Estimates amounted to nearly 8,000,000 l.; this year it is under 7,500,000 l. At the same time, you will bear in mind that the number of men for whom provision is made in the votes which have been already passed amounts to 58,500, whereas in 1848–49, when a larger sum of money was voted than in the resent year, the number of men was only 42,500, so that, this year, a less sum of money was required, and a larger number of men is provided for. The increase in the remaining votes is under 500,000 l. Last year the Committee somewhat objected to the diminution effected in the scientific branch of the service, namely, the fifth vote, and, notwithstanding the large expenditure which it will be necessary to make with reference to the anticipation of warlike operations, I thought I should best consult the wishes of the Committee by not continuing the reduction upon the scientific branch, and this year the Committee will observe there is a very considerable increase made in the amount of the vote. I will now state the particular services in which that increase arises. In the first place, as I have already announced, in answer to a question put to me the other night by an hon. Friend of mine with reference to meteorological observations, we propose a vote of 1,000 l. in con-

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sequence of the conference which took place at Brussels. Observations have likewise been directed to be made and recorded daily in Her Majesty's ships of war; and, in concert with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, I have arranged for the taking of similar observations in the mercantile marine. These records will be carefully kept, the statistical information will be properly digested, and I have no doubt the advantage to science will be considerable. In the second place, my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has thought it necessary to send an expedition to Central Africa for the purpose of making a survey of the river Tchadda, with the view of opening up the interior of that vast continent to our commerce, and the cost of that expedition will be 5,000 l. It is also necessary to provide for sending a supply of provisions to the Arctic regions, both to Behring's Straits and the extremity of Wellington Sound. The Committee will probably be aware of the announcement which the Admiralty has thought it necessary to make, that, considering the little prospect there now is of the return of Sir John Franklyn and his gallant comrades, it is not intended, after the present year, to send any further expeditions upon that hopeless search; but for the present it will be necessary to make provision for the ships already employed in that distant and hazardous service. The next vote to which I will refer shows an increase of 200,000 l. as compared with the estimates of last year. That increase is owing to the high price of provisions, and to the increased duties to be performed in the dockyards within the shortest possible time. The artificers employed in those establishments are now working extra hours, and their pay has consequently to be increased, in addition to the expense attending the employment of a larger number of additional labourers. The next increase is upon the naval stores; it amounts to 119,721 l., and arises chiefly from the high price paid for articles principally consumed in the dockyards, such as coal and other commodities, the consumption of which is very large. The next item to which I shall refer is an increase of 115,000 l. upon new works. This increase principally arises from the expenditure at Keyham, in the immediate neighbourhood of the arsenal at Devonport, where a considerable sum will require to be expended in the present year. It is proposed to give a sum of 60,000 l. to complete the two docks and basin; 45,000 l.
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will be requisite for the commencement of the works for the repair of steamships of war, and 10,000 l. will be expended upon the tunnel between Devonport Dockyard and Keyham. The only remaining sum to which I shall allude is Vote 17, in which the increase is 72,000 l., which is connected with the Army and Ordnance, and which is the sum taken for the conveyance of troops within the year. I may state to the Committee that, upon the whole, my confident expectation is, that the entire sum which I now propose to be voted will cover the expenses of the present amount of the forces, with the exception, perhaps, of two particulars. I am not quite sure that another vote may not be necessary, under the head of No. 2—for provisions—the price of which keeps perpetually rising. I am inclined to think, also, with respect to the expenditure under Vote 17, for the conveyance of troops, that a larger sum will be necessary at a subsequent period of the Session. Now, Sir, I know not that it is necessary for me, before going into the discussion of the votes separately, to address any further observations to the Committee. I certainly do not think it expedient to make any vainglorious boast in regard to the state of preparation in which we now find ourselves; but, in justice to my predecessors, you must allow me to state that I found the affairs of the department in admirable order, all the branches in good working condition, and all the servants zealous and efficient. One great change is in progress—I mean the change caused by the application of screw power as an auxiliary to sailing power. I think it just to my predecessors to state, that the first application of this new power took place under the administration of Lord Haddington, whose secretary I see opposite. This great auxiliary principle was applied to ships of war in the face of great opposition. The principle was carried out under the authority of the Admiralty, which proceeded slowly and prudently as experiments led the way; but the officer, who is now the Surveyor of the Navy, deserves the greatest credit for the efforts he made and the timely advice which he gave, for, being confident of the excellence of the principle, he persevered till he succeeded in overcoming every opposition. My right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) is also deserving of the thanks of the country for the efforts he made while at the head of the Admiralty, to increase the efficiency of our naval forces; and I should be guilty of great injustice to the

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administration of the Duke of Northumberland, if I did not say that to his Grace, acting upon the advice of Sir Baldwin Walker, we owe the application of the screw principle to a large number of ships of war. Whatever may be said, therefore, of the state of preparation in which our naval forces now are, the praise is to be distributed among my predecessors, who have introduced great and decided improvements into all the branches of that department of the public service. The result is, Sir, that without over-confidence I may assure the Committee, that I believe the British Navy will be found more efficient than ever it was before, and ready and prepared to maintain the honour and independence of the country. I now beg to move a vote of 138,467 l. for the Admiralty Office.
CAPTAIN SCOBELLsaid, he thought there was no one in the nation who would be more worthy to be a permanent First Lord of the Admiralty than the right hon. Gentleman who now filled the office; but it would be well if they could divest the office of all Parliamentary influence, and apply to it the principle which was laid down in the paragraph used with respect to the dockyards—that merit, and merit only, should be the ground for advancement. He was glad to find that this rule was about to be introduced into the Civil Service, and he hoped the same alteration would soon be made with regard to the Army and Navy, for then the best talent in each of those professions would be brought forward certainly in a greater degree than it had been for the last thirty or forty years. They had 7,000 officers of all descriptions belonging to the Navy, there was about 250 or 260 admirals, and about 400 post-captains. There was no way, in his opinion, to bring the Navy into an efficient state, even in war time, but by at least reducing their active list one-half. In consequence of having so large a list, the officers were four or five years on shore for every one they were at sea; and some of the admirals, when they hoisted their flags, had been a quarter of a century on shore, and when that is the case, however able they may be, they get out of order and rusty. There were 3,000 officers on the retired list, and 1,690 admirals, captains, and lieutenants, of whom a great many would never go afloat again; and the navy list was kept crowded without any good to it whatever. He would glance at an ar-
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rangement that was made some years ago, but in which it would be now necessary to make some alteration. It was now required that every post-captain should serve a certain number of years after he was posted, or otherwise, when he came to the head of the list, he would be put on the retired list, and would not be employed in active service. Now he thought that the whole of an officer's service should be taken into consideration. Some of those who were set aside had served much longer than the required time as midshipmen, two or three times the required period as lieutenants, and three or four times the period as commanders; but because they had not served six years as post-captains, they were not considered fit to be made admirals. Such men might have been twenty years afloat, when those who were made admirals because they had served the six years might not have been more than thirteen or fourteen years afloat. With regard to the reduction of the active list, he would remind the Committee that the French navy had only two admirals, five or six vice-admirals, and eight or ten rear-admirals, all of whom must have seen service, and must be really good officers. In the American navy there was not a single admiral, and there were very few commodores. He wished to see the Navy more efficient than it had hitherto been; but no systematic improvements could be effected when so many changes took place in the Board of Admiralty. There had been seven First Lords since 1840. He would call the attention of the Committee to another important point. They had voted that night something more than 5l. per man for raising 18,900 soldiers, and it was not fair or equitable not to offer an equal bounty to seamen as they did to the soldiers, and to the marines, who served with the seamen. They wanted 7,000 men for the Navy, and they should offer 5l. per head to come to them. The nature of the sailors was this—they were generally in want of cash, and if they told them there was ready money for them, which would enable them to put on a new suit of clothes, they were likely to accept of it. He must protest against their entering more landsmen than were necessary, for it was very seldom that a grown man could ever be made a good seaman, and they were liable to all sorts of accidents on board ship. He hoped, also, that the landsmen who were entered would not be required to be five feet six inches in height, as by taking a lower standard, they would

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obtain men who did not come up to the military height, besides which it was well known that a tall man on board ship always found his head in his way. They were told they were on the verge of a war, and he dare say they were. He trusted and believed the Navy would do their duty. They never had such powerful ships, and he only hoped they would have such good crews as they had during the last war. It should be, however, observed, that the best crews did not shake into their places for some months, and they could not expect that ships would all at once be as effective as if they had been in commission for six or eight months. It required time to enable the officers to judge of them, and to put them in their places. Some remarks had been made, reflecting on the conduct of the Ambassador at Constantinople (he would leave him to take care of himself), and also on the conduct of the Admirals in command of the Black Sea fleet. Comments had been made as to why they went here and there; but they should recollect the dangers that must occur in an unknown sea of narrow dimensions, where the fleets of two nations were cruising together; and the best thing to do during the dark nights and bad weather was to do what had been done—to keep up a chain of steamers between themselves and Sebastopol, let the Russians go to sea, and then get between them and Sebastopol and stop them. Some of the Gentlemen who commented upon those matters had never seen a gale of wind. With respect to the Baltic, he had served there three years, and had been at the blockade of Cronstadt. At that time they were at war with Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. The enemy managed to get in, and all they could do was to blockade them. Whether their screws would do more he could not say, but at all events they kept the enemy in, and they never attempted to get out. He hoped for more decided results, however, both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic.
SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he wished to address the Committee in reference to the affair at Sinope.
The CHAIRMANsaid, that it would be irregular to submit a Motion of that subject on the question of a Vote for the expenses of the Admiralty Office.
Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, that in that case he would bring the subject forward on the Motion for going into Committee on a future occasion. His object in wishing to discuss that subject now was
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that he wished to avoid a general discussion of their Eastern policy.
MR. HUMEsaid, this was a question of great importance, because it was just possible that there might be a difficulty for the future in obtaining seamen. Good seamen were scarce, and he hoped Government would not hesitate, if it should be found necessary, to increase the pay of the sailor, who was required for the service of his country. Whilst every class of labourers and artisans were receiving an advance in their wages, it was only right the Navy should participate in the rise; and he trusted there would be some attention paid to this point by the department whose especial duty it should be to look after it. True, a great improvement had taken place in the quantity and quality of the accommodation provided for men who entered the Navy, and he had no doubt that if the same spirit of liberality were extended to the pay, but little difficulty would be found in securing an ample and efficient number of volunteers for the future requirements of the Navy.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, that some short time back the House had consented to a considerable increase in the pay of the sailor, and also that the Board of Amiralty had reconsidered the question of secondary punishments, and the result had been that they had thought it desirable to mitigate their severity, and he was glad to be able to state that crime was on the decrease. The result of the endeavour to raise additional seamen had been most satisfactory. Notwithstanding the general rise in seamen's wages, and the emigration from all parts of the United Kingdom, the royal service had become so popular that since November, 1852, 7,000 additional seamen and 1,800 marines had been entered, showing that there was no necessity at the present time for any bounty. The hon. and gallant Member (Captain Scobell) was in error in supposing a bounty of 5l. would only involve the sum of 85,000 l. for the 7,000 fresh volunteers. By a just law the Admiralty would be bound to give the same bounty to the seamen already entered, and that would amount to at least 200,000 l. The spirit of the seafaring population was above all praise, and, as a proof of the alacrity with which the men came forward, he was happy to say they had in the month of February entered no less than 900 men by voluntary enlistment alone, and volunteers were still coming in as quickly as they could desire.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid he fully

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agreed with the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Graham) that there was no fear of any want of seamen, neither did there appear any necessity for giving a bounty to induce seamen to enter. They had waited to see if the Emperor of Russia was really in earnest, and now that they saw a good chance of active service, they had come forward. He was glad that the experiment of calling the coast guard men into service had been successful, and he thought that that circumstance might lead to defects being pointed out which ought not to exist. It was intended when the coastguard service was established that it should consist of sailors who received good characters from ships just paid off; but he feared that there were at present men in that force who did not even know how to sling their hammocks. He had the strongest hope, and, indeed, he firmly believed, that in the impending struggle the ships and seamen of this country would do their duty, for there was no period in the former history of the country at which its Navy was in such an efficient condition. With regard to the injustice of placing post-captains who had not been six years at sea, when they came to the head of their list, on what was called the reserved list, and not upon the list for active service as admirals, the subject had been fully discussed in the other House of Parliament, though he had not observed it stated that sometimes the captains got better situations, and did not apply for any appointment to ships in commission. It was a great advantage to the service that such strenuous attempts had been made to abolish corporal punishment, and, indeed, at the present day, any officer whose books showed that a very great amount of punishment had been inflicted on board his ship would suffer in his future career. The First Lord of the Admiralty had given them reason to believe all the ships would be required to perform services in the Baltic and Black Sea, but he hoped some attention would be paid to the suppression of the slave trade, which could only be done effectually by a blockade of the coast of Cuba. He hoped the Admiralty had taken such precautions as to leave a sufficient number of ships for the purpose, for be observed the present captain general of Cuba was determined to prevent the importation of slaves—
LORD JOHN MANNERSrose to order. The Chairman had prevented the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughby)
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discussing the affair at Sinope. Surely the slave trade of Cuba was quite as irregular.
The CHAIRMANsaid, the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton was connecting it with the administration of the Admiralty.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid, he considered the interruption of the noble Lord very unnecessary, and really thought the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) might have discussed the dreadful catastrophe at Sinope, as the Admiralty had sent a fleet to the neighbourhood, without appealing to the Chairman at all on the matter. Perhaps some discussion of that subject would have been of advantage in preventing the recurrence of so great a calamity. It was satisfactory to find that the screw propeller was now to be applied to all the vessels of the Royal Navy. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Graham) would not forget the subject of the freight-money receivable by officers in the Navy. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether that valuable article, marine glue, so useful in the construction of the masts of line-of-battle ships and of the larger class of vessels generally, was still made use of in the Navy? This glue also enabled them to get rid of the process of caulking, and the use of pitch on board of our vessels, which, in tropical climates, was a very offensive nuisance.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, he would begin first with the glue. He had the greatest pleasure in telling the hon. and gallant Member that, so far from the use of that article being discontinued in the Navy, it still proved a very efficacious and excellent material, which was used very largely, and effected a great saving to the public. The practice with regard to freight-money, to which the hon. and gallant Member referred, had been superseded in a great degree by the course of events; and he was not aware that any instance of it had occurred for a considerable period. There was another observation of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, which he could not allow to pass unnoticed. It would be very undesirable that it should be supposed in Africa and Cuba that, on account of the naval exertions this country was called on to make, we had the least intention of relaxing our efforts in suppressing the slave trade. He (Sir J. Graham) had great pleasure in informing the Committee that he had not withdrawn from the African station a single ship, and he had no intention to do so. The flagship would be replaced by a most efficient screw steamer; and the

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directions of the Admiral were to keep a close watch, the earnest resolution of the Government being, that the efforts and vigilance of the squadron in suppressing the slave trade should not undergo any diminution.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he gave the right hon. Baronet credit for not having increased the number of clerks in the dockyards, notwithstanding the great increase of labour which had taken place in those yards, but he could not help calling the attention of the Committee to the fact that there were no less than 243 clerks employed in the Admiralty, and sixty-seven messengers, being one messenger for every four clerks. That was monstrous.
LORD DUDLEY STUARTsaid, he must express his regret that the Chairman had decided against hearing the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughby) on the subject of Sinope. He thought the hon. Baronet was in order in referring to that disastrous affair, especially as they were about to vote money to pay the salaries of the servants of the Board of Admiralty; but he bowed to the decision of the Chair. He did not think there would have been any objection to such a discussion after the patriotic speech of the noble Lord, which was worthy of a Minister of that great country, and of the leader of that House—not shrinking from stigmatising the Emperor of Russia in terms that were deserved—and followed as he was, in the same spirit, by his noble Friend the Secretary for the Home Department. After hearing these speeches with reference to the prosecution of the war, in a manly, vigorous style, worthy of the country, he was willing to give the Government his most earnest, cheerful, and decided support. While he was on his legs, he would like to put it to the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it would not be desirable, in order to make the naval service more popular, to abolish the practice of impressment.
MR. LAINGsaid, he wished to know from the right hon. Baronet whether there was any truth in he rumour that our sailors were to be armed with Colt's revolvers? Having seen it stated that the Russian sailors on board the fleet in the Black Sea were armed with these weapons, he believed it would be very satisfactory to the country to feel that our sailors were no less efficiently equipped.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, that there was no intention on the part of the Ad-
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miralty to supply Her Majesty's ships with Colt's revolvers, neither did he think that British sailors would require them.
Vote agreed to.
House resumed.

COLONIAL CLERGY DISABILITIES BILL.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to relieve the colonial clergy from certain disabilities, said, he should confine himself at that late hour to a very brief statement of the object of the measure, of the way in which it was proposed to attain it, and of the reasons which made it necessary that some such measure should be passed. There was at present a great deal of doubt as to the legality of the colonial clergy meeting together for the purpose of agreeing, either among themselves or in conjunction with the lay members of the Church, upon any regulations or arrangements which might be necessary for the conduct of their ecclesiastical affairs. Hon. Members who were present at the discussion of the questions that took place in the preceding Parliament would remember that disability arose—or was supposed, and he thought justly, to arise—out of a Statute passed in the reign of King Henry VIII., and which prohibited the clergy from meeting together for the purpose of making any order, canon, or constitution, without being summoned for that purpose by the King. That Statute had become part of the supremacy of the Crown, and as the supremacy was held to extend over the whole country as well as to any foreign possession, there was very good reason, he thought, for the apprehension that the colonial clergy—carrying with them, as they did, the obligation of obedience to that Statute—would be acting in violation of the law if they attempted any meeting, either by themselves or jointly with the laity, for the purpose of making any ecclesiastical regulation or arrangement. The effect of this disability was to press very hardly on the clergy, and to place the Church of England in the Colonies in a position very far inferior to the freedom possessed by religious bodies of every other denomination. It became abundantly necessary, therefore, that some step should be taken, not for making any Church establishment in the Colonies, but for giving to the Church of England there the same freedom which was enjoyed by other communions. It was unfair to place the clergy in a position of inferiority to other religious bodies in countries where

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they had not the same tribunals to appeal to which were available to their brethren in this country; and it was necessary that the disability should be removed, because in the present state of things it was impossible to have the mutual relations between the clergy and their bishops defined and carried out. The result was, that the bishop exercised despotic power; and he might deprive a clergyman of his licence, and, with his licence, of the stipend which he received from the Colonial Legislature—taking away from him his whole ecclesiastical and clerical status, and, in fact, depriving him altogether of his privileges, without his having any opportunity of appeal. The bishops were reluctant to exercise this power; the clergy felt themselves oppressed by the existence of a power which was not regulated by a legal check; and it had been very generally felt, on a variety of occasions, that some legislation on this particular subject was necessary. The difficulty in legislating appeared to be to confine the Bill to the mere object of removing the disability, without proceeding by implication to do what he believed would be very generally deprecated, giving the clergy and laity the power, when assembled, to make laws; or imparting to any regulations on which they might agree the force of an Imperial enactment. In the Bill which he had prepared he had endeavoured to collect what he believed to be the prevailing sentiment on both sides of the House; for he had found, on both sides, a concurrent expression of opinion that it was absolutely necessary that there should be legislative interference, but that it should be expressly confined to conferring upon the Church a liberty correspondent with that enjoyed by other religious sects. To that purpose it was strictly limited; and, therefore, while it took away from the clergy, while in the Colonies and doing spiritual duty there, the disability to meet, either by themselves or with their lay brethren, for the purpose of dealing with their ecclesiastical affairs, it was careful to provide that no authority should be conferred, or derived by implication from the Statute which could give to any regulations made at any of these meetings any binding force, unless, indeed, they were confirmed by an Act of the Colonial Legislature. These were the general features of the Bill, which he hoped would meet with the assent of both sides of the House.
MR. HENLEYsaid, that he would not
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oppose the introduction of the Bill, but he must reserve to himself the right of judging of the measure when the Bill was printed. He was afraid that it might be open to the objection that it did little else than relieve the clergy in the Colonies from the supremacy of the Crown.
MR. J. G. PHILLIMOREsaid, that the measure would not abolish the supremacy of the Crown, but would merely place the Church of England in the Colonies in the same position as other religious bodies. It was a melancholy thing that this boon should have come so late, but he thanked the Government for having taken up a question with which all previous Governments had been unable or unwilling to grapple.
THE SOLICITOR GENERALsaid, that there was no more reason to fear that by this measure the clergy would be relieved from the supremacy of the Crown than from their obedience to the laws of England.
Leave given.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Solicitor General, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Peel.
Bill read 1°.
The House adjourned at a quarter after One o'clock till Monday next.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Inspectors of Nuisances; Compensations for Tenants Improvements (Ireland).

RUSSIA AND THE PORTE.—RESOLUTIONS RESPECTING TEE OBJECTS OF THE WAR.
LORD BEAUMONTrose to move the Resolutions of which he had given notice:—
"That it appears from the Documents which Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to communicate to this House that the Efforts of Her Majesty and of Her Majesty's Allies to establish, without Recourse to Arms, amicable Relations between the Sublime Porte and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia have been unremitting.
"That it appears also that those Efforts have failed to produce the desired Effect, and that The Emperor of Russia continues to hold by three of Arms Two important Provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
"That it is, therefore, the Opinion of this House that the Honour and best Interests of this Country require that immediate and effectual Means be taken to repel the unjustifiable Aggression of Russia on the Territory of the Sultan; and that the Power and Influence of this Country should be exerted to place the Relations of the Sublime Porte with the rest of Europe on such Foundations as shall appear best calculated to secure a durable Peace, and afford the Ottoman Empire a fair Opportunity for developing its natural Resources, and of proceeding with its administrative Reforms."
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The noble Lord proceeded to say, that it was not his intention on the present occasion to resume the thread of the discussion that took place in their Lordship's House a short time since on the Motion of his noble Friend (the Marquess of Clanricarde); for, however anxious he might have been on that occasion to go into a minute analysis of the papers that had been laid upon the table, and to point out those passages which he thought reflected on the conduct of the Government, as well as those which he thought a justification of a portion of their conduct, still he believed that to pursue such a course at the present moment would neither tend to promote the object he had then in view, nor to explain the grounds upon which he made the present Motion. There could be no doubt that the analysis which his noble Friend on that occasion made of the papers was most ably executed; and although he must allow that much had been afterwards said to explain away many of the charges brought against the Government, and although he thought that on many points a better defence might be offered for the Government than they had yet made for themselves, vet he must still maintain that one or two charges with respect to the past conduct of the Government still remained unanswered. He would not then enter into any details with regard to those papers, and would only refer to them in such a general manner as was absolutely necessary by way of explanation and to carry the history of events up to the present period. As to the charges that in his opinion remained unanswered, he must say, with all due submission to his noble Friends on the Treasury bench, that the charge of credulity being carried to the point of weakness remained wholly uncontradicted. It appeared to him that it was utterly impossible to justify the conduct of the Government in placing confidence in the professed intentions of the Emperor of Russia when they had such positive evidence in contradiction, as appeared, not only in the papers laid before the House, but in the past conduct of the Emperor in regard to this subject. He admitted that the difficulties that surrounded the Government were extreme; he admitted that the most distinct professions were made by the Emperor; and he believed that, in addition to what appeared in the papers, much stronger verbal declarations had been made, and which, being delivered by the Russian Ambassador here, must have been supposed to be the echo of the Emperor's

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instructions: no doubt, therefore, the Government were in this difficult position—that they must either at once have positively charged the Emperor of Russia with direct falsehood, or must have given some weight to the positive assurances that were made on his behalf. This certainly was an excuse. But still when, time after time, information of an opposite character reached them from every quarter of Europe; when everybody, not only in Turkey, but in Russia, understood the designs of the Emperor, when facts came positively contradicting the assurances given, why, then, even that respect which should always be shown to the word of a crowned head should have had its limits. It must have been known to the Government that the demands of Russia with respect to European Turkey were of a systematic character, and formed part of an enormous plan long since framed, which had never been departed from, which from its commencement had been pursued with unflinching perseverance, and with great ability. There were documents to which not only noble Lords on the Treasury bench, but all their Lordships, might have access, and in these documents were distinctly stated the intentions and policy of the Russian Government on the highest authority; and although their date was no doubt rather distant, they distinctly anticipated as a portion of their policy the manner in which it was intended to meet such events as had since taken place. These papers showed with what skill they had laid their net to entrap the greater part of Europe. It was remarkable how, throughout all their proceedings for the last twenty years, they had carefully connected that which belonged to the religious with that which belonged to the political part of the question; and, in fact, they had done so so systematically that at last, when they talked about the religious question, they implied a claim to a control over all the inhabitants of Turkey who professed the Greek faith. One of the documents to which he referred, though written a long time ago, had only been given to the public some short time since; and their Lordships were aware that certain State papers belonging to Russia had, at various times, been betrayed by the officials employed in their public offices, or copies of them had, as in the present case, been discovered and given to the world in the course of some revolution. Now, in one of the papers, which he held in his hand, he found a scheme drawn out at the suggestion of the
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Emperor of Russia with regard to the very state of circumstances now occurring. No doubt some of those papers combined with that a reference to the existing state of things at the time they were drawn up—to the treaty of July, and to the position of France, England, and Austria, at that particular moment: but the general broad scheme of the perpetual and standing policy of Russia was nevertheless there given; and the same scheme was repeated at a later period, the papers containing it being on both occasions drawn up at the request of the Emperor. The Emperor, desiring to have the opinions of the leading men of his country on this subject, asked the views of Pozzo di Borgo, Prince Lieven, and Count Nesselrode, and of many other persons whose abilities rendered them capable of drawing up a plan for the aggrandisement of the position of Russia in the East, and by which he might eventually be able to obtain a control over the Ottoman empire. One of these was so strong that he could not help quoting two or three passages as to the scheme it was thought ought to be pursued. Pozzo di Borgo, in the paper which he submitted to the Emperor, said:—
"On the side of Turkey it is necessary to have everything ready to penetrate to the capital of that country. It is also necessary to turn the Servians to our advantage, and also all other Christians who are willing to join us. As soon as the Principalities are occupied by us, there is no reason why we should not establish relations with the Greeks in the Turkish empire. In stating this, I do not intend to suggest any step which would imply recognition of that people. It would be sufficient to make them feel by means of agents, whom we need not avow, that their safety depended on the resolutions taken by his Imperial Majesty, and that they should always be ready to follow his direction. It would also be useful to associate Persia with us in our designs, and to try what could be done in that quarter in case of a war with Turkey."
Then he went on to show the great change which he believed to have taken place in the policy of England from the accession of Mr. Canning to power; to state how hostile he felt that Minister to be to the Russian plan of aggrandisement, and how much was to be feared from the principles he had introduced. He next calculates carefully the power and the position of England, and considers how she would be circumstanced were she to declare war against Russia on the Turkish question. He says no doubt she might have successes by sea, and might blockade the ports of Russia, and it would be prudent to prepare for these events; but hostili-

1205
ties with England would not impede the progress of the Russian arms, and would cause her no serious evil, especially if not supported by continental co-operation. "Besides," he says, "she will always be desirous to arrange matters, even if a rupture with us were to take place." He next goes on to suppose that Austria co-operated with England, and says, "Great Britain is not formidable without allies;" and then adds:—
She will, however, be weaker still when she has compromised Austria, for then she will have exposed part of her system to destruction. Our policy, therefore, requires us to present ourselves under an aspect terrible to Austria, so as to persuade her that if she moves or takes a step against us, she will encounter one of the most terrible storms she has ever witnessed.… In consequence of that, she will either tell the Turks to listen to our proposals, or she will herself fall on the provinces of the Turkish empire. In the first case, we shall perfectly agree with her; in the second, we shall come to an agreement."
Now, these were only specimens of the schemes and plans of the Russian statesmen; and knowing these, he certainly was surprised at the confidence which the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) and some other Members of the Government seemed to have reposed in the assurances which they received from the Emperor. It was the more surprising, when they recollected the conduct of Russia in the Greek war, in the war with Turkey in 1828 and 1829, and in the treaty forced upon the Porte at the peace of Adrianople, which was a complete violation of all her previous engagements and agreements, that the Government should not have been more upon their guard against the professions of that country. After this very treaty of Adrianople, Count Nesselrode, by command of his master, wrote a State paper containing an account of the position of Turkey and Russia, and drew up a plan of the course of policy which the latter should adopt with respect to her neighbour. He there says:—
"In the opinion of the Emperor the continuance of the Ottoman empire, if reduced to exist only under the protection of Russia, and obliged to listen in future to all the wishes of Russia, would suit our political and commercial interests better than any new combinations which would necessitate the extension of our dominions by conquest or by the substitution of other States in the place of the Ottoman empire, which might become our rivals. It is on this principle we should deal with the Divan. We do not wish the ruin of the Turkish empire; we seek to sustain it in the state it now is, as this Government can only he faithful to us by its deference towards us."
With all these, and a hundred other in-
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stances before us, though the Russian assurances were very strong, and although no doubt Baron Brunnow and Count Nesselrode, and the Emperor himself, were all "honourable men," yet still he thought that, with all this before them, the Government might well have felt and expressed some doubt as to the bonâ fide intentions of the Emperor, or as to the positive true and literal meaning of the assurances which he gave as to his intentions. On that point, therefore, he could not think that the Government were entirely blameless. He thought they had carried credulity to weakness; but still he perceived the enormous difficulties which surrounded them, and was willing to admit that the results of their policy had not turned out to be very disastrous. It had its good as well as its bad side. The delay which had taken place had no doubt been of great use to Turkey, the party most interested; and it was now, no doubt, of great use to the Government, albeit through circumstances over which they had no control, by enabling them to lay before the public, a better case, by allowing the people to become acquainted with the subject, by giving time for public feeling to rise into enthusiasm, and by placing it in the power of Government to say, "We are rather urged on by the voice of the people than conducting the people towards war."
He must own, too, that there appeared to him another defect in the past conduct of the Government that he could not pass over. He thought they had not sufficiently availed themselves of the many opportunities they had had to inform themselves thoroughly of the position of the Turkish empire. They were not well aware of the character of the Ottoman empire and its resources, or of the nature and conduct of its Government, or they would not have spoken of that empire or acted towards it in the manner they had. Had they been aware, as they must now be, that that country was still great, powerful, and independent—that its councils were directed with extreme wisdom—that its troops were prepared to fight with courage—that the people were ready to show their patriotism and to respond to the call of their sovereign, they would have, no doubt, taken a different tone both towards Russia and Turkey—they would have been less humble and subservient in their addresses to Russia, and more firm in their appeals to the Emperor, and they would never have ventured, without calling for the advice of

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the Turkish Minister, to have drawn up a note which was to arrange and settle definitively the relations between the Ottoman empire and Russia. He believed that had they regarded this question as one relating to two great and powerful countries—though, no doubt, one was more powerful than the other—they would have acted in such a manner that the proceedings at Vienna might have had a successful and honourable result. Unfortunately, however, instead of taking that view, some portion of the Cabinet, and particularly that section of it which was more directly represented in that House in consequence of the head of the Government having a seat there, had used language towards Turkey at the commencement of these proceedings, which was calculated to run down and depreciate that country. And though he would never charge Ministers with any direct communication with the public press, he must say that one at least of the journals which was supposed to represent the opinions of the Government, and particularly of the Prime Minister, took a line at the commencement of these proceedings—it had taken a much wiser course since—which tended in every way to encourage Russia by running down Turkey. We were told that to fight for the independence of Turkey was to fight for a shadow; for that her integrity and her independence were alike impossible. The whole tone assumed by some of the members of the Government, as well as by their supposed organs, bad a very injurious effect; and during the four or five months that he (Lord Beaumont) was on the Continent, he never heard a person whose opinion was worth having, who did not say that it was his firm conviction that the English Cabinet were rather inclined to favour Russia, that they had a bias for Russia, and that they had no intention of going to war with that country to support the integrity and independence of Turkey. It was the general opinion on the Continent, that they looked on her independence as a shadow and an impossibility; that they knew that Russia must prevail; that all they wanted was to avoid a general continental war, and that they would do this by framing any bridge to enable Russia to retreat. Although, as he had said before, he (Lord Beaumont) never would accuse any Minister of descending to work on the public mind in an underhand way, through the press, when he had an opportunity of declaring his opinions in Parlia-
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ment, yet, still, knowing that it was generally understood who the writers of these articles were, and that it was whispered that some of them came from persons holding some inferior offices not far from Downing Street, and who might, therefore, have opportunities of learning what were the sentiments of the Government, he thought that these articles must pass as semi-official communications of the opinions and policy of the Government. There had been a wide difference between the language that had been used on this subject by the members of the Government in that House and the members of the Government in the House of Commons; and no contrast could be more complete than the contrast between the speeches which he had lately read in the newspapers, stated to have been delivered by Lord Palmerston, and by Lord John Russell in another place, and the speeches which he had listened to in that House, and which had been delivered by the noble Earl at the head of the Government. He read that the two noble Lords to whom he alluded had made speeches in the other House, so worthy of the dignity of the country, so firm in purpose, so decided with regard to the proceedings of the Government, so positive in their declarations with regard to hostile measures, so condemnatory in every way of the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, so approving, applauding, and asserting the progress of Turkey, stating that they were not fighting for a shadow when they were fighting for the independence of a great progressive power, and stating so distinctly that, under the circumstances in which they were placed, they should go right forward in the course which they had professed to take, namely, to act as the firm and faithful ally of the Porte—that the deduction to be drawn from those speeches was, that no peace would be entered into which did not afford a proper security for the independence of Turkey, and a firm guarantee also for the general peace of Europe. That warlike tone—those spirited phrases—that appeal to the people—that urging on of great armies to proceed—that calling upon the patriotism of the people to support them, contrasted strongly with the speeches they had heard in that House, where a tone bad been assumed which would have been perfectly appropriate in the mouths of Mr. Pease and Mr. Sturge. He found in the speech of the noble Earl a sentence which was not only a contrast, to the speeches of his Colleagues in an-

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other place, but which had the effect of making the present state of affairs so gross an anomaly, that he felt the necessity of adopting some vote like that which he proposed. The noble Earl at the head of the Government, in answer to the noble Earl at the head of the Opposition, observed that, when that noble Earl said he was more of a war Minister than he had intended, he had put forth more truth than he perhaps contemplated; for, said the noble Earl, "I can assure him in good truth that if I have any misgiving, it certainly is not that we have been too pacific." Was not that a direct contradiction to the whole statement made in the other House? Did the noble Earl say he was forced to go on against his opinion? Did he still say he had a misgiving whether they were right in going to war? Did he persist in saying, that while his colleagues were blowing the blast of war, he was still hanging on to some hopes of peace? He (Lord Beaumont) could not imagine anything more puzzling or more strange. But the noble Earl said more than that; he said, "the feeling is a generous one, to resist aggression and injustice; but it is not for us to encourage that feeling." He (Lord Beaumont) differed widely from the morality of the noble Earl, who proceeded to add, "On the contrary, it is the duty of the Government as much as possible to resist such feelings, however natural and generous they may be, and to direct them in the course of a more pacific policy." He (Lord Beaumont) differed totally from the noble Earl, and asserted that it was not the duty of the Government, nor of any man, to try to suppress feelings that were honourable in themselves, or to encourage the people to adopt pacific views—that is to say, peace at all price—when war should be the honourable choice. Why should they attempt to crush everything that was patriotic, noble, and generous in the hearts of the people, and to instil into them those ridiculous and absurd doctrines that were preached by that absurd society called the Peace Society? They might smile at the mention of that Society; but it was no smiling matter, when the same doctrines were preached by the head of the Government that were held up by that little club of ridiculous people.
He should now proceed to refer to the conduct of the Government since the meeting of Parliament; and it was upon their proceedings since the meeting of Parlia-
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ment that he justified his present Motion. At the meeting of Parliament Her Majesty stated that documents would be laid upon the table relative to the war in the East, and they were informed that, though efforts to obtain peace had been unremitting, they had been unsuccessful; but that, nevertheless, they would be proceeded with, and that it would be necessary to support those efforts by an increase in the naval and military forces. Now, he (Lord Beaumont) presumed those documents were laid there to be read and studied; and he could not understand the allegation that it was useless "to potter" over those papers. They were informed of the position of affairs at the meeting of Parliament, and, though the information given them by the Government was not very precise, it was sufficient for the purpose, and as much as he thought ought at that period to have been given. At that time the note founded on the protocol of Vienna was still before the Emperor of Russia, no positive answer had been received from him, and the Porte, from whom the note was supposed to have proceeded, with the approval of the Conference, had allowed forty days for the Emperor to answer it. He understood that note to be the ultimatum of the whole of the Powers that were represented at the Conference, and that if in forty days no answer was given, or if the note were rejected, there was nothing left then but the last thing they could appeal to—namely, war. Since that, he believed positive information had been received that the Emperor of Russia declined to accept the terms; and after that it was naturally expected that the next step would have been a declaration of war, or, at any rate, that a Message would have come down to Parliament announcing the position in which they then were, and that the last appeal by negotiation was totally at an end. Instead of that, what took place? There had been no information from the Government, there had been no Message from the Crown; on the contrary, whenever an attempt was made to obtain any information from the Government, the members of the Government in that House answered in a manner the most puzzling that was possible. The answer of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was indeed not only ingenious, for it left them more in the dark than before, but it also, he believed, truly represented the exact position of the Government. Their Lordships would well remember the comments that had been

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made on the noble Earl's answer, in a most facetious tone, by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby). The noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) stated that they were not at peace—that they were not at war—that they were not neutral; but that they were drifting towards war. Now, drifting meant this—and he believed it to be the true position of the Government at the time—drifting was applied to a ship that was going with every wind and tide, and would not obey the helm, and he believed that was the true position of the Government at the time, and he was afraid it was the position of the Government at present. He believed that they were then catching at straws—hoping against hope—thinking that something would happen—that perhaps Austria would come forward and make some convenient bridge for the Emperor to get off—that Count Orloff might propose some more pacific measure—that it was possible that at Berlin something might occur—that something would occur, perhaps, in the Principalities—that the Emperor might win some battle—whereas, on the contrary, he had lost a battle, on the Danube—that his pride would then be satisfied, and that he would come to an arrangement. But everything had turned out contrary to what they expected—all these sources had failed them. Count Orloff's message was more hostile and warlike than any answer that had been received before—the proposal from Vienna had been rejected with scorn—nothing had taken place in Berlin of which he was aware—and instead of the Emperor of Russia winning a battle, he had suffered a defeat. Under these circumstances, he thought that they would have bad, at any rate, a Message from the Crown, or some information from the Minister, to show that, instead of drifting towards war, the ship obeyed her helm, that she had luffed up, and that they were really going to take some decided course. Nothing of the sort; and it appeared to him most extraordinary that, Parliament being sitting, there was no Message from the Crown or statement from the Minister, and that all they could know of the state they were in was to be obtained from the public newspapers, and not from the Minister in Parliament. To his astonishment, he found by the public papers, that a proclamation had been issued which would interrupt the trade of the country—which set aside an Act of Parliament—which prevented men from carrying on their trade—a pro-
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clamation which would be justifiable in the case of a war, when the safety of the country required it—which was requisite for the public security, under the circumstances of their going to war with Russia, but which could hardly be reconciled with the assurances of the noble Premier, and the hopes he held out that no hostile measures would be necessary. That proclamation had appeared in the public papers, and yet not only had there been no declaration of war, but they had had no Message from the Crown, or statement from the Government. All they could gather from the speech of the noble Earl at the head of the Government was, that they were still at peace, and likely so to remain; it is true the speeches of the noble Lords in the other House of Parliament indicated something like war, and the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that they were drifting towards war. Surely under these circumstances, as Parliament was sitting, some communication ought now to be made, which, if not equivalent to a declaration of war, would let us know what we were about, and which, going forth to the world, would let it know in what position our fleets were placed. They should consider the dangers to which our merchantmen might be exposed. We might hear some day of some accident having happened. He understood there were now Russian vessels in the Adriatic, and it was possible that some of our ships might fall in with them. If such a thing happened, what was to be done? Would they salute each other? or would our ships seize upon the Russian ships? Or, suppose that the Russian ships should be found acting in cooperation on the coasts with the Palicari, or with Albanian or Greek robbers, who had got possession of some of the mountain passes of Albania, and were trying to raise a rebellion there, until there was a declaration of war, how could the British men-of-war interfere with them? They should have a declaration of some kind; that declaration, indeed, he thought should be a declaration of war, as that would be the natural result of the Emperor of Russia's refusal to accept the ultimatum at the expiry of forty days; but whatever that declaration might be, it should be one which would put an end to the contradictions which now characterised the speeches of Ministers. These circumstances justified him in bringing the subject before their. Lordships; such a state of ignorance ought

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not to continue; they ought to be enlightened with regard to the intentions of Government; they should know the position they were placed in. He understood, also, that in the China seas there was a large—certainly a Russian—force. In addition to that, he was afraid of something which was still more serious—and he would be candid on that point, for it was the great object he had in view in waking the present Motion. He was afraid the Government considered that the note which resulted from the protocol of Vienna was still under the consideration of the Emperor of Russia; and he was afraid, that if the Emperor of Russia now accepted that note, the Government would feel themselves justified in coming to an arrangement. Now, he (Lord Beaumont) protested against that—he protested against the possibility of such an act altering the situation of affairs. If they made peace in that way—if they allowed the Emperor of Russia, after he had put them to the expense of fitting out 10,000 or 20,000 men—sending their fleets into the Black Sea and preparing for war—after he had insulted this country in the manner he had done—after he had warred against the opinion of Europe and attempted to trample down the people of Turkey—after he had laid desolate two provinces on the banks of the Danube and destroyed the trade there, blockaded its mouth, and injured the best interests not only of Turkey, but of the whole of Europe—if, after he had done all that—after they had condescendingly and generously given him twenty bridges to retreat over without loss of honour, and he had obstinately refused to avail himself of them—they offered him terms almost equivalent to the terms he originally asked—if they offered now again to sacrifice Turkey, which they would have done if the Czar had accepted any of those offers—if, after he had done all that, they had agreed not only to put him in as good, but in fact in a better position than he stood in before he undertook this unlawful and Unmoral war, he (Lord Beaumont) protested against their purchasing peace at such a price. But he feared that a portion of the Government would eagerly seize upon that straw. He had no fear that the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department would accept such terms. His language was the language he wished to hear in that House, and that noble Lord's tone, the tone which he wished Ministers would assume there. He had no fear that
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the leader of the House of Commons, who had made a most eloquent speech, and had spoken out like a man on the subject, to use a vulgar phrase, would submit to such terms; but from all he could collect from the members of the Government in this House, particularly from the noble Earl at the head of it, such terms as these might be acceptable to them. He protested against anything of that sort; but he found, on comparing the expressed opinions of the Prime Minister with all that had fallen on a previous occasion from his noble Friend below him (Earl Grey), except his depreciation of Russia, there was a nearer approach between his noble Friend and the noble Earl at the head of the Government, than between the noble Premier and either of the noble Lords to whose speeches elsewhere he had alluded. If the noble Earl really agreed with his noble Friend below him; if he really thought that the independence of Turkey was a shadow, and that in fighting for Turkey they were fighting for a mere name, he did not think the noble Earl was justified in going to war. If he held those opinions he should recommend them at once to accept any peace they could get, to agree to the Menchikoff note, and to bully the Porte into accepting it. The noble Earl below him (Earl Grey) had said that Turkey was not an independent Power; but he (Lord Beaumont) would undertake to prove that Turkey was as independent a Power as any other Power in continental Europe. It was said that Turkey must either rely upon some of the Western Powers or upon Russia; but admitting the truth of that statement, was there, he asked, a Power is Europe that must not rely upon some of its neighbours, or upon some great Power in Europe, if there should be a combination of other great Powers against it? Was Austria independent? Why, at one period Austria could not have existed for an hour without the support of Russia; and if Russia were to attack her she could not exist an hour if Turkey were not to defend her southern frontier. Could Austria exist if the other Powers in Germany rose in rebellion against her, except she was protected by Russia? He would remind their Lordships of what had taken place in 1850, when the course taken by Prussia would have been fatal to Austria had not the Emperor of Russia interposed in a manner even more violent than he had done towards Turkey: for he drew up a plan for the settlement of the disputes be-

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tween Austria and Prussia, and said, "Accept this, or I will march upon you." He treated them both as dependent Powers, and dependent Powers they were. The consequence was, that Prussia was obliged to succumb and obey the mandate of the Czar; she did so, she eat dirt; and the Emperor of Russia told the Emperor of Austria that he could not defend himself against one of his own revolted provinces; but that he, as his protector, would come to his assistance, and that the Emperor of Austria should pay him for it by putting himself entirely at his disposal. For the time, Prussia, Austria, and the other States of Germany were the vassals and slaves of Russia; and that vassalage and slavery existed till the tie was broken not by the manly conduct of Austria or Prussia, but was broken by the cannon of Omar Pasha at Oltenitza. Luckily there was now an opportunity afforded to them of assuming their former position, and he trusted they would, by ranging themselves on the side of national independence and of Turkey, throw off the incubus of Russian influence. What other States were completely independent of all aid in Europe? Was Spain or Portugal? Certainly not. The United States of America are, and perhaps this country and France are, independent Powers; but could even France or England be considered perfectly secure without allies? France and England had wisely sought an alliance with each other; but one of them opposed to the rest of the world would fight an unequal battle, and this is exactly the case with the Ottoman empire—namely, that Turkey, by herself, would also fight an unequal battle. She must seek alliances somewhere to defend herself against the aggression of a foreign Power, as every other Power in Europe under similar circumstances would be obliged to do, and this fact showed the wisdom of General Marmont's observation, that she must seek an alliance either with the Western Powers or with Russia. She preferred the alliance of the Western Powers; but unless they treated her cordially and as an independent State she would be driven into an alliance with Russia, and such an alliance was one of the great objects of Russian statesmen, He believed Russia, when she professed that she did not want to take territory from Turkey, or to take a portion of it herself and give a portion of it to another State; but she desired that Turkey should be united to her in such a manner that she would possess not a province here or a province there, but that she would
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be able to exercise a moral influence throughout the whole of Turkey. She might wish to acquire Constantinople, but he believed she would never attempt to hold Constantinople, as she knew the race of men who now possessed it, and she knew that the Sea of Marmora would be one pool of blood, and that no mosque or minaret would be left standing before the Osmanli would permit the Muscovite to possess those territories. She therefore thought it would be better for her own interests to spread a Russian protectorate, which would act like a subtle poison over all the institutions of Turkey, so as to keep her in a state of subjection and enable the Czar to exercise a kind of sneaking control over her. They had now an opportunity of thwarting this long-cherished design, and of driving Russia back from the Principalities over which she had exercised a protectorate, and they should not let slip by that opportunity, but put an end to that protectorate, not only as regarded Wallachia and Moldavia, but as regarded Servia, which had been exercised so much to the detriment of the Ottoman empire. It was their duty to be prepared to do something which might confer a lasting benefit on Europe now that they were preparing to expend their money and their blood and to involve themselves in war. He believed this country would never be satisfied if the war they were about to commence did not lead to some better result than the protocol of Vienna—if it did not, above all, secure the real independence of the Ottoman empire. They should also throw back the Russians from that ground which was called the quarantine ground, at the mouth of the Danube, where, under the name of a quarantine station, she had forts to control the commerce there. The mouth of the Danube should be cleared, and they should establish on it, like all other great European rivers, a highway for all nations and for all flags. This country had now gone too far to go back, and they must for ever shut the books on the table, and no more look to the miserable Vienna note, or equally paltry protocol of the Conference; but they must look forward to making Turkey and Russia distinct countries, without any of those treaties between them which encourage mutual aggression and interference. He was sorry to find that some persons mixed up with the question of the freedom of the Danube the question of the freedom of the Black Sea, and spoke against the treaty of 1841,

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which closed the Dardanelles' against foreign vessels. But he (Lord Beaumont) would stand by that treaty. It was a wise and safe treaty for Turkey, and a still wiser and safer treaty for England and France. That treaty, in time of peace, shut the Dardanelles against them, but it also shut the Bosphorus against Russia. Let them consider what was the effect of that treaty, Although Russia could build any amount of ships she liked in the Black Sea, and could also man them and exercise them, as she possessed some of the finest harbours in the world there, she could not, while the treaty of 1841 was in existence, take them into the Mediterranean, If she were not at war with the Porte, her fleet would be perfectly useless to her, because it would be shut up in the Black Sea. All that Russia would be able to do, in the event of a war with England, would be to put a stop to that portion of our trade which was carried on between Constantinople and the ports in the Black Sea; whereas, if the treaty were not in existence, she would be able to come suddenly down into the Mediterranean, and thus keep as large a fleet there as she now kept in the Black Sea. This would oblige us also to increase our fleet in the Mediterranean, and would add both to our danger and to our expense. The treaty of 1841, therefore, guarded this country against surprise by shutting up the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Certainly, if it were not for that treaty, they could go into the Black Sea; but where would be the use of their going into the Black Sea, unless they went in there with a larger fleet than was possessed by Russia? When we wanted to go into the Black Sea it was generally in consequence of some aggression on the Turkish territory, and when that took place the treaty fell to the ground. Surely a treaty could not be made upon a safer footing. He wished to see that treaty reenacted, and its preamble freed from ambiguity. He said this on account of the interpretation which the noble Earl (Earl of Aberdeen) had put upon this instrument; otherwise he (Lord Beaumont) would be perfectly satisfied with the treaty as it stood. The noble Earl said that the treaty shut the Dardanelles, but contained nothing binding us to uphold the integrity or independence of Turkey. Now, taking the words literally, that might be so; but by the spirit of the treaty we were so bound, and it was unworthy of nations to act upon quibbles of this kind. What was the intention of France in joining in the treaty? In a
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despatch of the French Government which was not in the blue book, but which appeared in the Moniteur—and therefore he presumed he might quote it—it was stated that Turkey claimed, under the treaty of 1841, and now had a right to share in the solidarity which now unites all the European States, and in the security which those States now derived from it. He (Lord Beaumont) thought that Turkey was justified in making this demand; because M. Guizot, alluding to this treaty, called it an official act which introduced the Porte into the public right of Europe, and which declared the common intention of the great Powers to respect the inviolability of the Sultan's rights, and to consolidate the repose of his empire. There could, therefore, be no doubt that this treaty admitted the Porte into the comity of European nations, so that the Porte had as good a right to demand protection against the infraction of its integrity as any Power included in the treaty of the Congress of Vienna had a right to demand assistance should their territory be endangered. He (Lord Beaumont) hoped, therefore, that in future they would hear no more about its being advisable that the Black Sea should no longer be a mare clausum. When this question was last before the House his noble Friend below him (Earl Grey) made a speech containing many passages which, if they had fallen from many persons, he should have deemed too absurd for notice, but which, proceeding from an individual who displayed immense ability and judgment in most cases, he felt bound to make some observations upon. He hoped his noble Friend would acquit him of anything ungracious or disrespectful when he declared that he never heard a speech containing so many statements, both of fact and opinion, from which he so completely differed. The general principles which his noble Friend laid down were totally destructive of all society, because, by rendering treaties entirely useless, they would reduce the whole world to a jumble of anarchy and confusion, and leave nations to make what they could for themselves in a universal scramble, instead of appealing to the justice of the common law of Europe, as they now did in all questions of right. He also differed from the noble Earl's alleged facts, although the noble Earl had with great ingenuity strung together, in a very plausible and eloquent speech, isolated circumstances relating at one time to Albania, and at another time to some other equally

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obscure territory. The noble Earl's sketch of the Turkish empire was about as true as that wonderful narrative, so agreeable to youth, "Jack the Giant Killer." In the first place the noble Earl stated that Turkey was the most intolerant country, and that no Christian was allowed any degree of freedom there. Now he (Lord Beaumont) ventured to say, from fourteen months' personal experience of Turkey, as well as from the assertions of other persons of the highest authority who had resided there, that there was no portion of Europe, not excepting England itself, where such complete religious toleration for different sects and different opinions prevailed as was the case in Turkey. Indeed, so great was that toleration, that—though the opinion might startle some persons—he could wish it were in some degree curtailed, because it at present enabled the clergy to oppress the laity of the different communions. The toleration of Christians in Turkey went to this extent, that there existed no Ecclesiastical Titles Bill there—the titles of Christian bishops of all denominations were acknowledged. Every man might go freely with book and candle to church; and in fact every religious privilege that could possibly exist was enjoyed by different communities in Turkey. The bishops, priests, and other members of the hierarchy were judges in various cases, and they had the power, in certain instances, of putting in force sentences of excommunication. Quarrels, it was true, sometimes happened between tribes of Mahomedans on the one side and Christians on the other, because the Mahomedans had certain privileges which the Christians had not; but be (Lord Beaumont) scarcely recollected a single instance in which any such quarrel had originated on any question of a purely religious character. The case, indeed, was different between the Christians of different sects. To speak from his own experience—in an island in the Archipelago, where Latin and Greek Christians resided, the enmity between the two sects was so great, that when a Roman Catholic sailor was dying, and wished the viaticum, the Catholic priest came out with the consecrated host, and was proceeding to the death-bed, when the Greek Christians collected a mob, blew out his torches and candles, insulted him in every way, and prevented him from fulfilling the last rite of his church to the living. Catholic processions with the consecrated Host were frequently seen in the
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streets walking under the protection of the Mahomedan soldiery; and, on the other hand, the processions of the Greek clergy had to be protected from the Latin Christians in the same manner. In Turkey there were innumerable sects of Christians, and they were all hostile to each other. There was no intolerance displayed on the part of the Turks; in fact, there was not one sect of Christians who were not more intolerant towards their fellow Christians than the Mahomedans; and the Turkish Government invariably took the side of order, and did its utmost to maintain it. The powers of the Christian clergy relating to excommunication and some other matters ought to be regulated or withdrawn. During the last fifteen or twenty years Turkey had made vast progress in social improvement, and in the development of administrative reforms. In a great portion of the empire the wise and excellent provisions of the famous proclamation of Gulhané had been in operation, and tribunals of commerce and courts of criminal jurisdiction had been established, and were working admirably, giving protection to life and property, and affording perfect satisfaction to the community. A code had also been published, and was now in operation; the army had been reorganised, and a perfect system of police instituted; financial reforms had been commenced, and it was not the fault of the Turkish Government that the Christian population did not serve and receive promotion in the army in the same way as the Mahomedans. An able Turkish diplomatist had informed him that the Government were fully aware that the system of conscription, by being confined to the Mahomedans, checked the increase of the Mussulman population, whilst it gave undue advantage to the Christian population. His informant also told him that the Government had been most anxious to induce the Christians to serve in the army, because by this extension of the conscription over the whole population of the country, it would fall much lighter upon the Mussulmans, and enable them to follow agricultural and other industrial pursuits, from which they were to a great extent precluded by the existing system. The Government had, therefore, offered to abolish the capitation tax levied upon the Christians on condition that they would accept service in the army, but the Christians of various denominations had refused to render military service, and preferred, and indeed

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begged and intreated, to be allowed to pay the capitation tax instead. The provision of the hatti sheriff of Gulhané in this respect, although it was now the law of the land, and had been so for some years, had not been able to be carried into effect. In fact, then, Turkey had been making rapid strides in social improvement of late years; and—as the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the home Department had stated elsewhere—she had made more internal progress during the last fifteen years than Russia had done in 150 years. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) must therefore have been reading some antiquated books when he came to the conclusion that the independence of Turkey was a shadow, and that she was the most intolerant and the most stationary country on the earth.
He (Lord Beaumont) would now briefly refer to the position in which England stood at the present moment, before he sat down. As he had said before, all negotiations had terminated on the 9th of this month. Since then we had been drifting about, as the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs said, and now it was time that we should know whether we were likely to take some certain course, and also towards what point the Government intended to steer. If the Government meant now to go to war with a great object in view—namely, to complete such a peace as was likely to be permanent—never could a Government go to war under better auspices. We were closely bound and allied to the great and powerful nation of France by the ties of common interests and common objects, and in vain would any attempt be made to separate the two countries. We had likewise the prospect of having Austria and Prussia with us, to the statesmen of which countries it must be clear and evident, as it was to the world, that the chance of maintaining the independence of these two German Powers rested upon their joint action with England and France. The geographical position of Austria indicated the necessity of such a combination, and the honour of Prussia urged her in the same direction. Had we not, therefore, the certainty of the joint action of these three great Powers in the course we were about to pursue? Further than that, had we not also an ally in the Power on whose land we were going to fight the battle of civilisation against barbarism, of independence against aggression, and right against wrong? Had we not also already witnessed the bravery and the success of the
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arms of Turkey, and the people of that country rallying round their Sovereign eager to defend his rights?—had we not also observed the judgment, the intelligence, the honour, and the honesty of the Turkish Government? The ability, and firmness, and good sense displayed by Reshid Pasha and the other Turkish Ministers, was some guarantee that that Government was not likely to be led away by any vain hopes, or to be induced to act without the fullest confidence in the friendship and support of her allies. Nor was this all. Far beyond all these elements of strength, our Government had with them at this moment the people of England, whose patriotic enthusiasm had been fully aroused. Never was a more interesting spectacle witnessed than that presented by the departure of the Guards the other day, cheered as they went by crowds of their fellow-countrymen, and showing by the words which fell from them that their hearts were enlisted in the cause in which they were about to serve. Backed by this immense moral and physical support, it was the duty of the Government to obtain something far more advantageous than a counterpart of the protocol of Vienna—something that should secure a firm and lasting peace. With this view he had brought the subject under the consideration of the House. Let the people of this country be assured that the Government was not engaging in a war in order to patch up worthless treaties—for shadows or phantoms, but for great European objects—for objects worthy of our arms, and for the real and earnest support of an ally and a nation essential to our existence, and who he believed was now fighting our battle as well as its own on the banks of the Danube. Turkey had long been the means of saving Europe from the invasion of northern barbarism, and now we must not repeat our former blunders by leaving her to fight it alone, but identify her cause with our own, and endeavour to draw from our expenditure a permanent good for her and for Europe at large. Well, with all this in our favour, what was there arrayed against us? He could not agree with his noble Friend (Earl Grey) in his estimate of the power of Russia, which seemed to be on a par with that once entertained by a Gentleman who talked of "crumpling it up." Russia was an immense Power, and in a just cause would not easily be beaten. She was a great military Power, and possessed great moral power over a large por-

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tion of Europe, which a short time ago would have given her immense influence over the destinies of both Prussia and Austria. Let them not, then, despise Russia; but still it was true she now stood single-handed against the combination of all the Punters of Europe. By whom was she supported? Nut by the public opinion of Europe—not by the Christian population of Turkey, though great efforts had been made to create a Russian cause among them. He knew that there had been some outbreaks in Albania and other places, but be was able, by previous experience, to put a proper estimate on those outbreaks. He knew that the Emperor of Russia bad plied the trade of Mazzini in Turkey without either the excuse or the ability of the Italian agitator. Russia's policy was always first to excite disaffection in the countries which she wished to subdue; and she had sought to spread anarchy in the Turkish States by means of agents whom she could afterwards disavow. But she had failed. The Bulgarian population of Russia had evinced a desire to emigrate to Turkey, in order to enjoy the blessings of a milder government. Even the Christian population of Turkey so much dreaded the nominal protection of Russia that they had spontaneously declared that they would sooner live under the rule of the Porte. In Moldavia and Wallachia, and particularly in the latter province, the whole of the liberal party had loudly proclaimed in 1848, and since that date, their wish to be under the simple suzerainty of the Sultan, with the liberties which he had offered them, and to be released from the incubus of the guarantee and protection of Russia. Russia, then, in the present case, stood alone on the one side, and all Europe on the other. Whatever might be the difficulties, therefore, which they might have to overcome, he never could believe that, in a state of circumstances such as that, this country and its allies would not in a very short time have its enemy in such a position as to be able to dictate whatever terms it pleased. This was in truth the real object of his Motion. He had no wish to force on the Emperor of Russia any unjust or exaggerated demands, but he should not have any confidence in the Government unless they demanded of Russia something more than a mere protocol embodying the substance of the Vienna note, and unless they insisted upon some clear and definite measure from Russia which would hereafter ensure the peace of Europe
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and vindicate the common law of nations. Be should feel little confidence in the Government if he thought, as appeared to be indicated by the speeches of two noble Lords in the other House of Parliament, that the Government merely contemplated the reinstatement of the protocol of Vienna. But if Her Majesty's Ministers were willing to announce that the objects they had in view were such as were worthy of the country, then he would give them his humble support, and he hoped and believed they would receive the support of the United Kingdom. The noble Lord having apologised to their Lordships for having so long trespassed on their attention, concluded by moving his Resolutions.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have listened with great attention to the long, able, and discursive speech of my noble Friend who has just sat down; but I have listened in vain for any arguments in support of the Resolutions with which he has concluded his speech. My Lords, I think that there are parts of those Resolutions which are certainly unobjectionable; but, at the same time, I consider that it is perfectly useless for your Lordships to affirm by a positive Resolution a notorious fact, which was stated in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne, and that it is also perfectly useless to affirm other statements which have been made in both Houses of Parliament. I think it also highly objectionable that your Lordships should tie your hands with reference to the results of a war which is not yet commenced, in order to give scope to speculative or administrative reforms in Turkey. But I hope that my noble Friend, now having had that opportunity, which he says he did not have the other night, of making his speech, will not press the Resolutions which he has now laid on the table. And, my Lords, I am certainly not about to follow—even if I were able to do so—my noble Friend through the various topics to which he has at different times returned and returned again in the course of his speech. I shall not follow him through his details, neither shall I refer to the despatch of M. Pozzo di Borgo, nor to the details in the Times newspaper, nor to the Russian iniquities which he has recounted, nor to the Turkish statistics into which he so fully entered: nor, since it has been my duty to trespass on your Lordships' attention at some length on a very recent occasion, should I have troubled you at all this evening, had it not been that

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my noble Friend has joined in much of that uncandid opposition to which Her Majesty's Government has been subjected; had he not accused us, as others have done, of that which I know is not the fact; and had he not said, in reference to the past, that we have exhibited an easy credulity and behaved without sufficient decision during the negotiations on this question. I will only detain your Lordships a very few minutes by offering a remark on that part of my noble Friend's speech which refers to past events: and, indeed, if I feel boned to offer any explanation to your Lordships and to the country—and, in fact, the only matter concerning which any explanation either to your Lordships or to the country is at all necessary—it is in respect to that part of my noble Friend's speech which refers, not to past events, but to the position in which we now stand, and the objects which we have in view. However, my Lords, with reference to the past, I will say a very few words in reply to my noble Friend. My noble Friend has referred to our really credence of what was stated to us by Russia. I say that, up to the beginning of May, when we knew that Prince Menchikoff had other designs than those which we were led to believe—I say it would have been impossible not to have given credit to those frequent, those solemn, and, in many instances, unsolicited assurances which we received from Russia; and I am perfectly certain that my noble Friend himself, if he had been in our place, would have done the same. As soon, however, as we found—which was within less than two months after these negotiations commenced—as soon as we found what was the course of policy being pursued by Russia—as soon as we found that it was not what we had been led to expect it to be, there was never for one moment any hesitation in our opinion as to the course we should adopt. We declared our determination to uphold the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire; we advised the Sultan not to assent to anything contrary to his dignity or independence; and we assured him, and we told him that if the terms which he proposed and which were consistent with his dignity, were refused by Russia, he might then securely count upon our active support. But, at the same time, my Lords, we strenuously and sincerely laboured in the cause of peace; and if my noble Friend had had the candour to put himself in our place seven or eight months ago, he would, I
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am sure, admit that it was for our interest, and for the interest of our ally; but, above all, for the interest of Turkey, which is mainly in view, that we should not have rushed into war. The state of things, at that time, was this—that Turkey was wholly unprepared for war, that she could have offered no resistance, that there was no Baltic fleet, and that, at this very time, our own fleet, except that portion of it which was at Besika Bay, and also the fleet of France, were scattered over the world; while Austria and Prussia, condemning alike with ourselves the occupation of the Principalities, were entreating us not to resort to warlike measures until remonstrances and representations had been made to Russia, but assuring us that if those representations were not effectual, they would act in concert with us. And your Lordships must bear this other fact in mind, that no sooner had a Russian force entered the Principalities, than the Emperor of Russia asked for the mediation of Austria, whose principal object was to get him out of the Principalities. So far from there being at that time any desire for war, or that enthusiasm which my noble Friend has said exists at this moment, no one would listen to war, or believe in its possibility. But my noble Friend and others say that we did not use strong language, which would have controlled the Emperor of Russia, and prevented war. My Lords, strong language means menace, and menace means war; for I suppose my noble Friend does not mean that we should menace the Emperor of Russia unless we were prepared to support the menace; and I say you have no right—that my noble Friend has no right—to say that the Emperor of Russia more than any other man would have bent to menace. In speaking of Russia, let it be remembered that we are speaking of, and dealing with, a very great nation, and also with a single man, a man holding despotic power and irresponsible for the exercise of it; accustomed to the predominance of his will, and possess: big great resources. I should like to know why the Emperor of Russia should have bent to menace, and why he should have evacuated the Principalities upon the English and French fleets occupying the Black Sea? If we had then gene to war—gone to war, mind you, as my noble Friend says, on account of the great military preparations that Russia had made—on account of the vast armaments and corps d' armée that were collected on the Turkish frontier—

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what would have been the sentiments of the people of England? If Russia was then prepared, as my noble Friend thinks she was, and we had gone to war, there was nothing to have prevented the Russian army from crossing the Danube and proceeding towards Constantinople. Now, I believe that Russia could not have crossed the Danube, and I believe that, as my noble Friend (Lord Beaumont) says, territorial aggrandisement is not what Russia wants; but what would have been the consequence of that if it had taken place—the Turks being unarmed, unprepared, and unable to resist? Why, the consequence would have been that the Russians would have exacted, from the fears and weakness of Turkey, what terms they had desired; while Austria and Prussia might fairly have said to us, "You have disregarded our interests, you have disregarded our entreaties; you have not allowed us to use the means at our disposal; you must not, therefore, be surprised, nor quarrel with us, if you find that our alliance with Russia is cemented." The people of this country would have been justly indignant if no measures had been taken, if no attempts had been made to save the vast foreign interests of this country from the calamities of war. But, my Lords, we acted otherwise—we acted as our accusers would have acted, or as any men of sense and alive to the consequences and responsibilities of their own acts, would have acted; and what have been the consequences? Why, as even my noble Friend admits, a powerful army has been raised in Turkey with an alacrity that is perfectly wonderful; that that army has already done great and good service; and that a national spirit, wholly apart from a fanatical spirit, has been raised in Turkey, which inspires the utmost confidence in the vigour and vitality of that country; while Austria and Prussia, grateful for the deference that we have shown to their opinions, and as fully alive as we are to the aggressive and mischievous policy of Russia, are now with us. We no longer hear any talk about neutrality. It was only this day that I heard by telegraph that 25,000 fresh troops had been ordered by Austria to the frontier. We ourselves shall shortly have in the Downs as effective and powerful a fleet as ever left the shores of England to sustain her glory; the French Government are precisely in the same position; while the conviction existing in England that war is inevitable, because every means of main-
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taining peace have been exhausted, will be a very important source of success. I say, then, my Lords, that we have brought to bear against Russia an amount of moral and material power such as no nation on earth ever before had to encounter; and that this is the result of six months forbearance and moderation. And now, my Lords, that the facts are before the people of England, who in their judgments are always just and reasonable, to judgment and sense of justice we appeal. They admit that these things are so; and as to the charges brought against us of credulity and connivance to the dishonouring of England, there is no echo of these accusations from the people of this country.
My Lords, I now come to the part of my noble Friend's speech in which he asked, what is our present position—whether we are at war? and very justly deduced that we are not at war, because no declaration to that effect has been made by the Government in either House of Parliament. My noble Friend seemed to show a most feverish and nervous anxiety lest the deferring of the declaration of war should indicate a settled determination on the part of the Government to maintain peace. I can to a certain extent relieve the mind of my noble Friend on that subject; because, although I certainly am just as desirous for peace as ever, and should be just as happy as ever if I could inform your Lordships that peace was now attainable upon just and honest grounds, yet I must say that I see no prospect of such a thing. Just and honourable terms have been in the hands of the Emperor of Russia. He might, with honour to himself, have relieved Europe from the state of suspense and anxiety in which it now is, and have saved it from the calamities of the war in which we may now be about to plunge; but he has rejected all overtures of a pacific nature, and has added to his original unreasonable demands requisitions that cannot for a moment be entertained. He has made representations and addressed remonstrances to his nearest allies; and by a requisitition to them to connect themselves with his policy, it is not too much to say that he has hurled defiance at Europe. My noble Friend need not be under any apprehension that that challenge will not be taken up. But your Lordships must be well aware that we are not acting alone; it is not a quarrel between England and Russia alone;—we are acting with allies

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and for allies, and it would be the height of imprudence were we not to take all the precautions which the circumstances of the case render necessary; or if we were to be induced by any sneers or reproaches to declare or to announce anything which we do not consider the actual state of things to require. I am quite sure that your Lordships will not require that we should do so. Your Lordships never do require that any statement should be made by a Government which they believe would be prejudicial to the public service; and your Lordships will readily understand that, as Austria and Prussia have fully entitled themselves to our confidence, it is our duty to defer to a certain extent to their wishes, as well as our interest to know what, under certain contingencies, will be their policy. We are also bound to consult, not alone the wishes, but also the dignity of the Sultan, and to inform him of the measures we are about to take in order to guard the integrity and independence of his empire. We have consequently proposed to the Sultan a convention, and until his assent to that is given, it would be to consult neither his dignity nor his independence to land an English and French army upon his territory. My noble Friend need therefore be under no alarm in consequence of the declaration of war not having yet been communicated to the Houses of Parliament, because he must be aware that no time is lost and no injury caused by the delay; that during this time our preparations are being carried on with all necessary vigour and energy; and that the fleets and armies of England and France will be in a state to carry out effectively the great purpose of any war—the prompt restoration of peace.
My noble Friend has said much about what the objects of that peace should be, and has required your Lordships to bind yourselves to what shall be the ultimate object in view. I think, however, that your Lordships will be of opinion that it would be a most imprudent course—nay, it would be an impossible course—for you to pledge yourselves as to the results of a war which has not yet commenced, and upon the contingencies, upon the proverbial chances and uncertainties of which they must depend. There are many things which may be just and desirable to be attained, but which at the present moment it is totally impossible for us to say can be attained. Many of the things my noble Friend has alluded to may be just and de-
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sirable—it may be desirable that none of the treaties now existing between Russia and Turkey should continue in force. But, by the way, there is a great misapprehension about those treaties. I will take, for instance, the treaty of Kainardji. Why does the Emperor of Russia quarrel with that treaty? Because he says it does not give him what he wants, and that it is ineffectual for its purpose. He wants to interpret it in a manner in which Europe will not permit him to interpret it, in order that he may get a power and influence which he can get in no other way. It is the 7th article of that treaty on which he rests his claim. What is that 7th article? He says that the Sultan promises, by that article, to protect the Greek religion and all its churches throughout the Ottoman empire. I must say that this is a very proper pledge for a Mahomedan Power to give to a Christian one; but it is limited to, or rather it extends no further than, the general protection; and the only intervention permitted to Russia with respect to the Greek Church is with respect to a church at that time building in Constantinople. It, therefore, proves that the Emperor has no right to protect the Greek Church, which does not equally apply to other denominations. So much with respect to the treaty of Kainardji. I say the same with regard to the treaty of Balta Liman in respect to the provinces. The Emperor of Russia is not in possession of the Principalities by virtue of that treaty, but in violation of it. If that treaty had never existed, his troops might, and probably would, have been there. He is there by the right, or rather by an abuse of the right, of vicinage. The Emperor of Russia has an army on the frontier, and whenever he wants to coerce Turkey he marches into her neighbouring territory; that is all that it has to do with the existence of a treaty. I was going to say, however, that it might be just and desirable to effect some of the things alluded to by my noble Friend. It might be desirable not to retain these treaties; it might be very desirable or very just to take from Russia, and to restore to the countries from which they had been taken, various territories which Russia had taken from other countries; it may be very just and desirable to make Russia pay the cost of the war; but, my Lords, it is impossible that we should take any resolution upon any of these subjects without knowing with what skill and with what success the war will be con-

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ducted, or what will be the position and circumstances of the Emperor of Russia at its conclusion. The predilection of Mr. Pitt for the French Royal Family, for the Bourbons, was certainly very strong. No one could desire more than he did, as the result of the war, that they should be restored to the throne of their ancestors; yet throughout the war, notwithstanding that he was constantly pressed to do so, Mr. Pitt never would say that the restoration of the Bourbons was the object of the war, or should be the ground on which peace should be concluded. In the same way, my Lords, I affirm that we cannot now come to any resolution as to how a peace shall be made durable, or how Turkey shall so become a portion of the great European family as shall tend to make peace durable. My Lords, for my own part, I think that we are now on the threshold of very momentous and important events; and I think that it would in become the gravity of the moment and the circumstances of the case to come to any resolution such as is suggested by the noble Lord. We are now approaching—or rather, I may say, we are already embarked in—that great question which has long been foreseen, and which has long been postponed, by all the ablest and clearest-sighted statesmen in Europe, on account of its magnitude—of the universal political embarrassment and commercial dislocation which it would cause; but, my Lords, as we are about to undertake it, and as we have been forced into it against our wish, I say that it ought to be settled, and firmly settled, once for all. I again repeat, my Lords, that it is impossible for us at this moment to tell what the result will be; but I can assure your Lordships that it is the purpose of every man who directly or indirectly will take part in this war, and that it is the purpose of Her Majesty's Government, so far as the course of events will permit, to do that which is necessary for, the future security and tranquillity of Europe—to check the aggressive and ambitious power of Russia;—I say that it will be necessary to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire; I say it will be necessary to take solid guarantees that Europe shall not be again deprived of the great blessings of peace; but I say also that neither this country nor the other Christian Powers would fulfil the great duty that has devolved upon them, nor, indeed, would they consult the best interests of the Sultan himself, if they did
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not take this opportunity to secure equal rights and equal justice to the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to pave the way for that progress and prosperity which Christian civilisation would bring about in that empire.
THE EARL OF MORNINGTONwas understood to blame the Government for having, at one stage of the transactions, placed too great confidence in the assurances of peace made by Russia, while that Power was actively arming for war. He thought that, in the face of certain notorious facts, they ought to have required from that Power more distinct and positive explanations. It was necessary, in his opinion, in order to maintain the just balance of power in Europe, to deprive Russia of that power which she exercised, under the pretext of religious treaties, against the independence of the Sultan. The Russo-Greek communion and the Greek Church were as different as Protestantism and Romanism; and, therefore, the Emperor of Russia had no justification for putting forward the claims be had made to the protectorate of that Church. He had a great respect for the Turkish character, and very little for the position of the Greek and Christian population generally in the Turkish dominions; but the way to prove that population and to render them more moral was to let them see that all Christian nations collectively in Europe were ready, should they be oppressed by the Turks, to interest themselves in their behalf for the sake of Christianity, but not for the purpose of supporting one sect against the other as had hitherto been the case.
LORD LYTTELTON: My Lords, on this question I will not say that it is my misfortune to agree with the noble Earl (Earl Grey): I do not put it in that way, for I am very glad to agree with that noble Earl whenever I can. But I have the misfortune to hold to some extent, in common with him, views in which I fear very few of your Lordships, very few people of this country, concur. That being so, I have, indeed, no sort of satisfaction in giving expression to these views in this place. A noble and learned Lord (Lord Lyndhurst) once quoted here a saying of a learned man in old times—Nunquan libentius loquor, quam cum quod dico auditoribus displicet. The noble Lord said he did not share in that feeling—neither do I. But I do feel unwilling that the noble Earl should be alone in this House in giving

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expression to those opinions; and I hope I may ask the indulgence of the House if I now act on that feeling. I do not profess adhesion to all the views stated by the noble Earl. Concerning the condition of the Russian and Turkish empires—concerning the old question of the balance of European power—I will only say, that what the noble Earl said seems to me deserving of serious consideration. I propose to take a much narrower ground—to confine myself to the demand of Russia—for what I presume was the most important point in the recent negotiations, the power of interference, control—what you will—over the affairs of the Greek Church in Turkey, and, with reference to that, to the period of Prince Menchikoff's mission. Since, or nearly since that time, I much agree with the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), that, mainly, I suppose, by the indecision and embarrassment of the Austrian Government, the negotiations became such as it is very difficult to understand, to follow, or to recollect. I trust that no apology is required—an apology is due at any time from so insignificant a Member of the House as myself, for troubling the House—but I trust no apology is required for adverting to these early negotiations. At least, I do not think there has been any general response to the opinion expressed in some quarters, that it is a waste of time to speak of these early transactions. I apprehend it has always been the custom, the right, and the duty of Parliament, closely to scrutinise the origin of wars; that it is important for various reasons, and especially with respect to the guidance of our future policy. Now I by no means deny that, preceding and accompanying Prince Menchikoff's mission, there was much in the conduct of Russia to excite suspicion and disapproval—in her vast armaments, in the imperious tone, and in the demand for secrecy, which he was instructed to make use of. But that is not the exact question. I wish to look at the actual demands made by Russia, and at what our negotiators were prepared to concede; and I desire to ask attention, with perhaps rather more precision than has yet been done, to the words of some of the inure important documents of that time. It seems that there were four important papers issued by Prince Menchikoff; and what I would urge is, that as that series of proposals was a series of concessions on the part of Russia, so the difference of the parties, which began by
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being one of substance, became one of form, and in the end even that difference of form was obliterated. The first paper was a project of secret treaty; the second, a letter proposing a different sort of convetion; the third, the actual draft of convention founded on that letter; the fourth, the well-known note or ultimatum. I must ask leave of the House to read the particular clauses in these papers which bear on my point. The first is this:—
"The Greek religion shall always be protected in all the churches; the representatives of the imperial Court shall have the right to give orders to the churches in Constantinople and in other places, as well as to the ecclesiastics; and as these recommendations proceed from a friendly and neighbouring Government, they shall be welt received."
No one can doubt that this is an objectionable proposal. Considering the relation of the parties, of course these "orders" would be peremptory ones; and their being "well received" means, of course, the absolute submission of Turkey. In the very next paper these grounds of objection have disappeared. It is there merely said that "a sened or convention shall be made for the guarantee of the strict status quo of the privileges of the Catholic Greco Russian rite of the Eastern Church, and of its sanctuaries." The third paper puts this in a definite form, namely, the article—
"No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed ab antiquo by, the orthodox churches, pious institutions, and clergy in the dominion of the Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the status quo now existing."
The fourth is substantially the same as the third, but the form is varied from a convention to an official note. Now this question is one partly of substance, partly of form—partly the form of the question is itself its substance; and I would first ask the attention of the House to an important despatch of Lord Stratford, inclosing (under date 15th May) a proposal which he then thought, between the time of the third and fourth proposals of Prince Menchikoff, might be accepted by the Porte. In that despatch he states—"Your Lordship will perceive that it gives everything required by Russia, except the form of guarantee." Now it is true that these words are not literally correct. The clause referred to does concede all that Russia asks, but that the limiting words are added, "as regards spiritual matters." And I am aware that in some parts of these

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papers, stress is laid on this circumstance. But I apprehend nothing can, in fact, be built upon it. For whatever Lord Stratford may have thought about it, it is clear that the Porte itself was prepared to go beyond those words. This appears in many places, but especially in a firman which the Porte issued, or was to issue, at a subsequent period, and which appears in p. 271. There the Sultan says:—
"I propose that the special privileges concerning spiritual matters which my ancestors have granted to the clergy of the Greek religion, my faithful subjects—that the immunities and privileges granted to its churches" (additional) "with the lands and real property dependent thereon—and that the immunities and rights which peculiarly appertain to the Greek clergy—shall be for ever maintained."
And again, in the protest against the occupation of the Principalities, the Porte "does not hesitate to give sufficient assurances respecting the rights, spiritual privileges, and other immunities attaching to the Greek churches." I conceive, therefore, that Lord Stratford's words are substantially correct, and that the difference was only one of form. Well, then the form was given up! In the elaborate language sometimes used in these despatches, all that was "bilateral and synallagmatic" in the form was given up, and an official note was substituted. It is true that in one place Lord Stratford says that the note would have the force of a treaty. But how could that be? If the force, why not the form? I must repeat that the stress was laid on the mere form, and that that form was given up. And, accordingly, on the note being submitted by them to the Porte, and their advice asked, our negotiators, rather like people unexpectedly taken at their word, refused to say anything. I must say this seems rather a poor-spirited and improper thing to do. I conceive that it was their duty throughout these transactions to have advised the Porte. But, in fact, though nominally they did not advise, it cannot be doubted that their opinion was well known at Constantinople. In the very despatch sending home the note, Lord Stratford says:—
"The Pasha declared his opinion that the altered form of the Russian demands left them as objectionable as ever, and I found that my colleagues agreed with me in adopting an opinion essentially identical with that of the Turkish Minister."
Now it is true that this confinement of the question to the point of form was not resorted to by our Government at home as it
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was at Constantinople. The noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) always insisted much on the substance of the demand. That substance may be found most conveniently stated in the third of Prince Menchikoff's papers, as follows:—
"No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed ab antiquo by, the orthodox clergy, &c., in the dominions of the Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the status quo now existing."
One objection was taken by the Secretary of State to a part of this clause, which hardly seems to have much weight—namely, founded on the words ab antiquo, as possibly admitting a number of indefinite and obsolete claims on the part of Russia, to the danger of the Turkish empire. Now this is answered in several parts of the Russian papers, but it was really superfluous to do so, for the clause itself says that what is claimed is the status quo now existing. I desire, then, to know what is the objection to the substance of this demand? I do not mean to say its effect on the actual state of things—the actual condition of the people in the Turkish empire. If that were the question, there is much curious evidence upon it that may be inferred from the despatches of that able negotiator, Sir Hamilton Seymour. It will be found that in several places, when pressed by Count Nesselrode to say what would be the harm of this—what would be the real change—he evades, in a remarkable way, giving any argument in reply. He says:—"After a little discussion on this, we passed on;" or, "I said it was of no use to advert to that; that the mind of my Government was made up upon it, and there was nothing more to be said." But there is one much more significant passage. In a report (p. 242) of a conversation which he had with Count Nesselrode, Sir H. Seymour says he observed—"this was a question of granting to the Emperor a right of protection over 10,000,000 of Greeks, which would make them all look up to a foreign sovereign, and not to their own master." "Have they looked," Count Nesselrode replied, "for the last 100 years in any other direction?" Sir H. Seymour, of course, denies this in a general sort of way, but he does not controvert it; and his concluding sentence seems to me still more significant. He says:—
"It may, indeed, be argued that this influence is already possessed by Russia, and that, although

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the right to interfere generally on behalf of the Greek subjects of the Porte is not yet secured to her, the practice of so interfering has long prevailed, All this may be true."
And then he adds words which, I must say, coming from so clear a writer as Sir H. Seymour, seem to me, from their feebleness and indistinctness, to furnish strong proof that he himself felt very little force in what he was saying. He says:—
"All this may be true, but it is no less certain that a long-cherished object is seen to have been sought by a tortuous path, and that if words be not intended to disguise intentions, Her Majesty's Government have good right to look with suspicion upon their demands."
But what I am to look at is the condition of the existing treaties. I desire to know in what respect this demand departs from the substance of the treaty of Kainardji? No doubt the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) and others have put their finger on these very treaties, and have said, "The mischief lies here, and these treaties must be reconstructed." That may be or may not; I am not concerned to argue it. Very likely it is so, and that reconstruction may be an incidental advantage of the present war; but of course there was no such question as that in the negotiation, and the argument tells the other way. No one can doubt that, if Russia could have established that her demands did not vary from the treaties, her case would have been made out. Well, the words in the treaty of Kainardji are no doubt very few, very simple, very general:—"The Porte promises to protect the Christian religion and its churches." And the only argument in these papers against the Russian allegation that its present demand, though more explicit and detailed, is substantially identical with the terms of the treaty is—first, that the treaty is general, while the demand is precise; and, secondly, that whereas the treaty mentions the Christian religion, the demand relates to the Greek Church. But the more general words are, the more space they may cover in a question; and, with regard to the first and to the second point, with every desire to find a satisfactory answer, and, though it is what one does not like to do—at such a moment it may sound unnational—to adopt the enemy's words, I cannot resist the force of a few sentences, which I will read, of Count Nesselrode, in a sort of semi-official letter which he wrote to Sir H. Seymour (p. 328):—
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"As regards the treaty of Kainardji, it is very true that, if taken literally, the rights and privileges of the Greek religion are not mentioned therein in express terms; but protection granted to religion and its churches clearly implies, in the estimation of every sensible and honest man, that of the rights and privileges of the said churches. From the moment that the Sultan pledged himself to us to protect them, he by that very act conferred upon us the right of watching over the manner in which he fulfilled that engagement. And, as regards the term 'Christian religion,' employed in the article of the treaty, we will not do the English Cabinet the injustice to suppose that it is desirous of quibbling (subtiliser) on that term. It is very evident that, in stipulating for religion and churches in Turkey, the Catholic rite being already placed there under another protection than than own, there could only be a question of the religion and the churches to which we and the subjects of the Sultan our co-religionists belong."
I, therefore, cannot resist the conclusion, that the Porte ought to have been advised to accept this ultimatum; and that, if so, the war would have been averted or postponed. Perhaps, indeed, that is not denied. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) seemed to think it enough to say that it would only have been so for a time. I reply, that a mere postponement of a war is a clear gain and a great advantage. It is so even in the nation implicated, unless it can be shown that, after postponement, it would enter on the war at an increased disadvantage. And how can that be maintained of Turkey? Is it not the fact that, since the last war, or the last danger of war, that empire has greatly increased in military power and ability? Are we not loudly told by the friends of Turkey, that that improvement is rapidly going on? And still more, might it not have been hoped, though I at least could not confidently expect it, that had peace been preserved, Turkey might have well spent the years that are coming in the conciliation and consolidation of the affections of her own people, especially of her Christian population? I must say, notwithstanding what has been said by my noble Friend (Lord Beaumont), that some credit must be given to what we see in these blue books; and that nothing can be more I eminently unsatisfactory than the reports there furnished by Lord Stratford of the state of that Christian population. And I should conjecture that, if at this moment there is one subject which more than and other weighs upon the minds of Her Majesty's Ministers, it is the accounts which reach us day by day of the Greek insurrection in the Turkish provinces. Moreover,

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the question whether war was or was not, sooner or later, inevitable, does not make insignificant the question, whether it was just in its origin at the time it was entered upon. I am one of those who consider that the war of 1793 was not, at the time and on the grounds on which we engaged in it, a justifiable one. I have no idea that it could have been long deferred; but still the question, whether it was then a right one, has always been held an important one in history. Having ventured to express these opinions, I am anxious to add some words, to some extent, in qualification of them. First, it would be very presumptuous and unbecoming in me to cast any strong or sweeping censure either on the Government, or on the able man who has conducted these negotiations at Constantinople. I cannot, indeed, resist the opinion, that at an important moment errors of judgment were committed, but no one can feel more strongly that both here and there they were actuated by the most sincere love of justice and the most anxious desire of peace. My noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) has often told us that he feels, as every man ought to feel, the contest pain at the thought of this country being involved in war from any cause whatever. I also wish distinctly to avow, that these opinions have no practical bearing on the present or immediate future conduct of this country. Not only now, but for many months past, I believe that war has been inevitable; and an inevitable war is a just war. For many months past, I conceive that Russia, almost by her every step, has been putting herself more and more in the wrong, and so has altered the whole aspect of the question. Still more, after the approval, the support, the encouragement, the promises which we have given to Turkey, it would be impossible to desert her now in her hour of extreme peril and need. Parliament, indeed, is not responsible for this war. By the necessities of our foreign system—almost entirely even while Parliament is sitting, quite so when it is not—the responsibility of a war lies upon the executive Government. But Parliament is responsible for the execution of the promises of the Government, and, therefore, would be so for so flagrant a breach of faith as the desertion of Turkey now would be. War, therefore, must be; and must be carried on in the most humane, that is, the most vigorous manner. And, no doubt, it is well in many, perhaps in most, points of view, that in such a war we should have
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the strong popular feeling which now exists on our side. But I hope that no one is relying too much on the continuance of that popular feeling. No one can tell me of any war that was not popular at its outset with the people of this country, and the more so now because it is so entire a novelty to the present generation. No wonder, then, magnificent preparations for war delight them. But that same novelty and inexperience will very soon have a powerful opposite effect, when the people begin to feel the burdens of war, of which they now know nothing. I believe, and sincerely hope, that the Government intend to make the country pay for this war year by year, without running into debt. That is the only right way; but its effect on the popular feeling may easily be anticipated. But, as to the people's approval of this war, what do the bulk of the people know about the origin of this war? What can they know about it? What they know and see is, that there is a big fellow bullying a little one, and that the little one is making a brave fight of it—and they are all for the little one. And that is very good and right; but it has nothing to do with the question of the justice of the origin of this war. I can only hope that the result may be a peace more stable and durable than we have lately had—the production of some good that may more than counterbalance the certain interruption of good, and creation of evil, that any war whatever must occasion.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, he would not trespass long upon their Lordships' time, but he rose to express the satisfaction with which be had listened to the able and eloquent speech of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, because, whatever might be their Lordships' opinions with regard to the origin of the dispute and the manner in which the negotiations had been conducted, they were all agreed with the noble Lord (Lord Lyttelton), that the prosecution of the war in a vigorous manner was the best, the safest, and the most humane policy. The speech of the noble Earl held out hopes to the country that Her Majesty's Government were fully alive to that consideration, and were amply doing their duty. But he (the Marquess of Clanricarde) wished to call the attention of their Lordships to the fact, that there never before had been an occasion when the country sent out an armed expedition and organised great fleets without a communication upon the subject, or the ob-

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ject, being made direct from the Crown to the two Houses of Parliament. And such a message from the Crown might have been made on the present occasion, and yet need not have communicated one quarter as much in the way of revealing in a direct form the plans of the Government as was contained in the speech of his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), The noble Earl had referred to the authority of Mr. Pitt as a precedent. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) would also refer to the authority of Mr. Pitt, and of those who were his contemporaries; and he found that when Mr. Pitt went to war, and when Mr. Addington, his successor, went to war, they came down to the Houses of Parliament and not only made a communication, but moved an Address, by which the sense of Parliament was expressed on the expediency of the war. The Address moved in the year 1803 might be adopted almost verbatim at the present crisis, merely changing the word "France" to "Russia;" it expressed a determination to resist the spirit of encroachment, of ambition and aggression, which then actuated the Government of France. He was highly gratified at the result of the present debate, on account of the speech it had drawn forth from the Treasury bench; though, undoubtedly, it would have been still more gratifying if they had had that speech from the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury—because it was impossible not to have noticed the discrepancy of tone which had been evident in the speeches of different members of the Government at different times on this important subject. Having said this much, he would not go back to the blue books, or again repeat his opinion further than to declare that nothing had been advanced in these discussions which proved that this war might not have been avoided. A new question had now sprung up of a very embarrassing nature, which reminded him of the manner in which the pretensions of Russia were checked on former occasions by the firm and decided attitude that had been then taken; he alluded to time claims of Russia upon Turkey in reference to political refugees. This had been a question in the Cabinet of Russia for many years, and he remembered that, in a debate which took place in their Lordships' House in 1850, the noble Earl now the First Lord of the Treasury sneered at the appearance of the British fleet at that time in the Levant, in consequence of this very ques-
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tion of the political refugees having been mooted by Russia. The agents of Russia knew well that the great Western Powers, France and England, would not stand idly by and permit the encroachment upon the independence, of the Sultan, which, in respect of that very point, Russia was attempting to make. True, our naval forces did not then arrive in Turkish waters until after that question was settled; but that was a case almost exactly similar to the present, and there would have been no occasion for a ship of war to approach the Turkish coast now if it had been clearly understood from the outset that, now as then, the Governments of France and England were prepared to act in concert to resist the aggressions of Russia. He would repeat that he had heard with pleasure the speech of his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) that night, because he hoped it would do much to counteract the bad effects which it was impossible to conceal from themselves had been produced in the East by the extraordinary position in which the combined fleets were placed. We read that the fleets were in the Bosphorus. But why? Because they were waiting for an explanation of their instructions. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) had no right to ask what those instructions had been, or what they were to be. But he held that it was a most unfortunate thing that the Admirals should have been instructed to put forth a threat which they could not fulfil, and which turned out to be a mere idle boastful menace. Captain Drummond was sent in the frigate Retribution to Sebastopol, and well had he executed his commission. Would that courage and determination similar to that of Captain Drummond had been exhibited in the counsels of the allies of the Sultan a year ago. Captain Drummond was sent to Sebastopol to intimate that the combined fleets would not allow the Russian fleet any longer to assail the Turkish coasts or interfere with Turkish vessels in the Black Sea. Had we carried that threat into execution? He might be told that professional reasons had prevented its being done. No doubt they had; but it was a most unfortunate thing, indeed, that we should have held out that threat, and that the nations of the East, susceptible as they were known to be, should see our fleet retire, and the Russian ships come out from Sebastopol, and, at no great distance from the fleet, bombard the fort of Shefkatil, on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. He

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hoped, therefore, that the speech of his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary would go forth to the East without delay, for every minute lost was of the greatest importance there. He believed that prompt action on the part of the combined squadrons would be worth more than an army of 20,000 men on the shores of the Caucasus for if once the fleet showed that England and France were really opposed to the pretensions of Russia, the whole population of that and the adjacent countries would join the standard of the Sultan. He would appeal to the noble Lord (Lord Beaumont) not to press his Resolutions to a division, on the ground that such a proceeding would be unusual and unwise after the satisfactory declarations of his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that no apology was necessary on the part of the noble Lord (Lord Beaumont) for having again brought forward the present question; for his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon) had a few nights ago expressed a strong wish, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that the discussion upon this subject should be of the most ample kind; and he thought his noble Friend had had that wish granted, and that, by the granting of that wish, it was shown that the more the blue books had been "pottered over" and the question discussed, either in that or the other House of Parliament, the stronger and the more general had the opinion become of the wisdom, and sagacity, and ability with which his noble Friend had conducted these most difficult negotiations. The question had resolved itself into two accusations against the Government—the first, made with singular ability by a noble Earl (Lord Grey) was, that they had been too inclined to go to war, and that the reasons they had adopted for going to war were not good reasons. He need not argue now whether this opinion was well or in founded, for the utterance of this opinion had not met with any response either in the country or in their Lordships' House. As to the other charge, it was satisfactory to know that it was the very identical charge which every Opposition in almost every country in Europe concerned in this great question had made on their Governments—namely, that they had shown weakness and vacillation. Every post confirmed the unpopularity of Count Nesselrode for the course be had pursued towards England and
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France. In Turkey, the population of the capital actually broke into open insurrection, from discontent with their Government not taking a sufficiently energetic tone. The same accusations were made against the Government of France as against that of England; that Government being accused of being dragged in the wake of England for a cause which did not interest France; while in this country it was said that our only acts of vigour were the consequence of the spirited action of the French; so that they had the Oppositions bringing against two Governments, which, he believed, had in an unexampled manner acted together in perfect confidence for a disinterested object, the same accusations—accusations so incompatible that they could be mathematically shown to be impossible. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) had stated his case as if the Government were going to war without making any communication to Parliament upon the subject. But that was not the fact, and he held that it was a matter entirely for Government to decide when it was proper to make a declaration of war.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEhad said nothing about a declaration of war. He had spoken merely of the expedition which had just been sent out.
EARL GRANVILLEwas not aware that it was customary for communications to be made to Parliament every time that troops were sent to the colonies, and the troops which had recently embarked had gone to Malta. As to the reflections which had to-night been made upon the combined squadrons employed in the Bosphorus, he was sure the noble Marquess would, upon consideration, perceive that he was not justified in the statement he had put forth. There had been no squabble respecting the Admirals refusing to do a service they were called upon to perform. No want of spirit had been displayed on their part. They were perfectly prepared to do what they were required to do; but, influenced by nautical considerations (and all professional authorities in the country agreed with them), they thought it better to take possession of the Black Sea, by moving war steamers from place to place, than by exposing the men-of-war to be knocked about, or keeping them in the very position where, to use the expression of one of the gallant officers employed, Russia most wished them to be for the next two or three months. With regard to the Motion before the House, he (Earl Granville) did not know what was

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meant by it. It was either a vote of want of confidence (and after the declarations that had been made by his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary the House would unanimously reject it), or else it was a vote of confidence; but the Government did not want a vote of confidence. He considered the course pursued to be very remarkable. If a vote of want of confidence had been carried, or nearly carried, against the Government, the necessity for such a Motion as the present might, perhaps, have then arisen; but the contrary was the case, for it was a most remarkable fact, that in neither House of Parliament had the slightest attempt been made to convey at real censure on the Government. And even if the noble Lord had meant it in a favourable sense, and the Government had accepted it, he was sure the effect would be bad, not only in this country, but throughout all Europe. There was one other point to which he wished to advert. His noble Friend who had introduced the discussion had talked of a discrepancy between the language which had been held by members of the Government in that House, who had strongly expressed their opinions as to the desirability of peace and the horrors of war, and the language which had been held by other members of the Government in the other House, who had made a patriotic appeal to the country to carry on hostilities in the spirit which became Englishmen. He (Earl Granville) as a very humble member of the Government, protested against such being the case. Even at the present time be felt no enthusiasm at the approach of war. He had remarked that the noble Marquess himself had carefully guarded himself against the possibility of its being supposed that he was anxious for hostilities, although his noble Friend, with whom the discussion had originated, had hardly spoken in so temperate a tone. But he (Earl Granville) believed that there was not one Member of that House who would not be prepared to express his conviction that war was a frightful calamity, that it was pregnant with evil and destructive of much good; but was it to be asserted on that account that the war, when once it was undertaken, ought not to be carried on with becoming vigour and energy. His noble Friend had quoted from a despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo. He also (Earl Granville) had read that paper, and, speaking from memory, it seemed to him that that despatch only served to prove the wisdom of the course
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which had been pursued by Her Majesty's Government. But he remembered another despatch written by Count Pozzo di Borgo six months later, and to which he would for a moment direct their Lordships' attention. In that latter document the writer stated his reasons why England could not, in his opinion, go to war on the Eastern question. He said that England could never succeed in combining with her the other European Powers—that her internal state was such as would prevent her from going to war—that her commerce was in a most desperate condition—that a Roman Catholic insurrection was on the point of breaking out in Ireland—that the revenue of this country was diminishing from year to year—that we were suffering from a scarcity of food—that the people were clamorous for a repeal of the corn laws, which the aristocracy would not grant. Now these statements were, to a great extent, true in the year 1826, when they were made. But what was the state of England at present? In consequence of the legislative measures which had been passed of late years, and which had been supported by every member of Her Majesty's Government, and which were approved of by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde), though not, he believed, by the noble Lord the Mover of the Resolutions (Lord Beaumont), the greatest prosperity, both as regards trade and commerce, was enjoyed by this country. Her commerce and her manufactures were flourishing; her revenue, instead of declining from quarter to quarter, was increasing from quarter to quarter, and the increase in the last quarter had amounted to 3,000,000 l.; and instead of the people of Ireland being in a state of insurrection, the most gratifying accounts were received of their hurrying to the British standard in a manner most creditable to that brave nation. He agreed with the noble Lord near him (Lord Lyttelton) that for the sake of a permanent peace, and of a satisfactory settlement, not only of this, but of other questions, it was necessary that the whole force of this country should be put forward the moment it engaged in war. He hoped that policy would be pursued, and he, for one, could not have the slightest doubt of its success. There had been idle discussions carried on for the purpose of deciding whether the progress of science, as applied to war of late years, had been as great as the progress of science in the arts of peace. Whatever might be the judgment at which people might arrive

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upon that point, it was quite clear that nearly all those modern inventions which had been so useful in peace could be applied to the purposes of war; and he could not believe that this country, which possessed within itself so vast a quantity of the raw material which supplied the moving power of steam, which was almost unknown in the rest of Europe, and which had been so extensively employed in our navigation, in our inland locomotion, and in every species of machinery—he could not believe that this country could fail in the most effective and formidable application of modern scientific discoveries to the operations of war. He felt persuaded that the freedom of our commerce, and the great extension of our trade, in recent times had not unnerved the people of the United Kingdom. He believed, on the contrary, that the expansion of our commercial enterprise, and that perfect freedom of thought and action which we enjoyed, would indefinitely extend our material resources. All that Her Majesty's Government asked at present from their Lordships was, a continuance of that confidence which had been placed in them on a preceding evening. They felt that they had undertaken a great responsibility; but it was a responsibility from which they would not retreat. He thought he could answer for the noble Earl at the head of the Government, that supported as he would be by his colleagues, he would do his duty, while he took as his guiding rule of conduct that principle which has been laid down as the only proper basis of English policy by the illustrious Canning and by Sir James Macintosh—the principle of respect for the faith of treaties—respect for the independence of nations—respect for that territorial arrangement of Europe which was known as the balance of power—and though last, not least, respect for the honour and interest of England.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEexplained that he did not mean to cast the slightest imputation on the gallant officers commanding the fleets in the Black Sea; he had merely said they were detained in the Bosphorus for explanation of their instructions. He knew, if they were told to go out and fight the Russians, they would make short work of them.
EARL GRANVILLEwould not argue the point. The Queen's Speech had informed the House that warlike preparations were being made, the present destination of the troops was known, and when the
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proper time arrived further information would be given.
EARL FITZWILLIAMsaid, he believed that was the first time in the history of this country in which some communication had not been made to Parliament by the Ministry of such portentous proceedings as those in which Her Majesty's present Government had become engaged. He would, however, assure his noble Friend that he was not one who blamed the Government for their endeavours to procure peace, but rather because their endeavours to obtain it had, judging from the result, been unsuccessful and misdirected. He could not help thinking that if they had pursued a more vigorous policy at the commencement of these proceedings a different result might have been arrived at. Without entering into any examination of the blue books, he would remind their Lordships that some sort of insinuation had been now and then thrown out, either in that or the other House of Parliament, that at the commencement, when the Russian Ambassador appeared at Constantinople, there was not quite a sufficient degree of prudence exercised by the gentleman who filled the office of Chargé d'Affaires of this country at Constantinople. Prince Menchikoff arrived at Constantinople about the 7th of March. In consequence of his arrival, and, at the instance of the Grand Vizier, Colonel Rose sent to the fleets to go to Vourla Bay. The result of that being known at the Russian Legation produced a total change in the character and conduct of Prince Menchikoff, who before that had behaved in a most insulting manner to the Porte; but the change on the part of the Russian Legation was so marked as to produce an impression upon some of the Ministers of the Sultan that it was not their intention to act in any other than a friendly manner. What happened, however, when it became known that the order to the fleet had been countermanded? Then came back the insulting tone, the menace, and the frown. The charge to which he thought the Government was obnoxious was, that they had failed in energy, not at the termination, but at the commencement of the negotiations. With respect to the particular Motion before the House, he confessed that he entertained, to a certain degree, the objection which had been offered to it by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and upon that account he proposed to move an Amendment to the latter part of the Resolution. He agreed

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with the Government that it would not be expedient to point in detail to the particulars at which they might think it desirable to arrive; but he did not admit that they should conceal from Parliament what were the objects which they proposed to themselves in allowing the country to be drawn into a war. He wanted to know what we were going to war for, and he wished to warn the Government against their suffering to be infused into the minds of foreign nations suspicions of what the objects of England were. He was far more afraid of the wiles of Russia than of her power; and he wished it to be stated as the opinion of one individual member of their Lordships' House what the object ought to be for which we were going to war. The common law of Europe declared that no State should be allowed to encroach upon the territories of a neighbour. It was that common law which protected the weak from the strong; it was that common law which had been invaded by the Emperor of Russia, and it was that invasion of the common law of Europe which he thought it desirable that that House should mark with its reprobation. When they were about to engage in war, they should declare what was the cause which justified that war, and he should propose to substitute for the end of the Resolution words in which it would be impossible to suggest even the trace of any selfish motive upon the part of England. The Amendment which he proposed was as follows:—
"That it is, therefore, the opinion of the House that the time has arrived when immediate and effectual steps ought to be taken to vindicate the public law of Europe by repelling the unprovoked aggression of Russia upon the territory of the Sultan, and to obtain a durable and secure peace."
The duty of England was a great one. He hoped that, single-handed, England could contend with all the nations of the earth. Her Navy ought to be able to cope with all the navies of the world, and, combined with France, she ought to be able to crush them all. But, when he saw that the other Powers were combined with England, and were acting with her with a cordiality which, perhaps, was not to have been expected, he could entertain no doubt about the conclusion of the war. It must be conducted, however, upon a great scale; they must make no little war; they must task the energies of this country to the utmost. It was the duty of the Government to make the people understand what was the character and what might be
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the duration of the war, and to teach them that they must not repine at the sacrifice of pleasure or of life, but that the greater the early sacrifice, the more sure would be the speedy and successful termination to the war.
LORD BEAUMONT, in reply, said, that the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had, on this occasion, made a speech of quite an unusual character. Presuming him to speak the sentiments of the Cabinet, he (Lord Beaumont) had obtained from that Cabinet an assurance equivalent entirely to that which was proposed to be obtained by the Motion; for if he understood the noble Earl at all, he agreed that effectual means must be taken to repel the aggression of Russia—that the power of this country should be exerted to place the relations of the Sublime Porte and the rest of Europe on a foundation calculated to secure a durable peace. The noble Earl stated more. He stated that affairs were really advancing to that end, and that an agreement was now being entered into with the Porte and France which had for its object the supporting of the dignity and integrity of the Ottoman empire. He could not in such circumstances press his Motion, and he, therefore, begged leave to withdraw it.
EARL FITZWILLIAMobjected to the withdrawal of the Motion, as he wished his Amendment to be put.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, the Motion could not be withdrawn, if any one of their Lordships objected to the withdrawal.
After a short discussion,
EARL FITZWILLIAMsaid, he would not press his Amendment.
Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.
House adjourned to Monday next.