Sitting of 21 December 1854

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Common Law Procedure Act Amendment (Ireland).
Reported—Enlistment of Foreigners.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.
Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Question [20th December], "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"
Question again proposed.
Debate resumed.
MR. CONOLLYsaid, it was a significant fact, that of the Gentlemen who had addressed the House from among that section which generally supported the Government, but who at the same time vindicated fur themselves the right of freedom of thought and freedom of discussion, the most distinguished had united in denouncing this Bill as unworthy of the Government, unworthy of the object in view, and unworthy of the great country to which it was presented. He begged to offer his humble meted of approbation of the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), in which he so boldly and successfully attacked and destroyed the principle—if, indeed, there was a principle on which the Bill was founded. That Gentleman, with an eloquence worthy of the subject, went at once to the fountain head, and exposed the immorality, in a national point of view, of trying to filch and decoy subjects of neutral States to engage in a war in which their Governments had not declared themselves engaged. On principle, indeed, Her

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Majesty's Government had not a shred to stand by in the degrading proposition which they had made. Having admired the candid, straightforward, and truly English speech of the right hon. Member for Manchester, he felt himself bound also to pay a tribute to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who represented the West Riding of Yorkshire. That hon. Gentleman had come forward with true English spirit to say that this was not a Bill suited to the emergency, and that foreign mercenaries were not persons to be associated with the gallant army now engaged in the siege of Sebastopol. No one, indeed, would pretend to say that these mercenaries were men who would cheer the drooping spirits—if it was, indeed, possible that the spirits of such men could ever droop—of our soldiers either by their "lonely watchfires," their fatiguing marches, or amid the many hardships which they endured. In the words of the ancient poet—
"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis Tempus eget."
He rejoiced to hear sentiments like these coming from the other side of the House; and he asked, what must the Government think when they found the most eminent men, who generally supported their views, denouncing the measure which they now pressed upon the House and the country? It was evident that they had themselves no confidence in this measure. They had seen the noble Lord the President of the Council rise to defend it no less than three times, and to reiterate over and over again the arguments that had been so successfully refuted on all sides of the House. The Secretary at War had twice risen in defence of the measure, and a more feeble exhibition it never was his lot to witness than that made by the right hon. Gentleman in favour of this Bill. Indeed, the whole conduct of the Government was pitiable in the extreme. The noble Lord, when he found himself hard pressed by an argument, got up and complained of misrepresentation in a manner that was not very creditable to the Government. He heard the noble Lord with astonishment complain of misrepresentation on the part of the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), because he said the hon. Member had looked upon this as the only measure taken by Government for relieving the troops serving in the Crimea. The hon. Member had made no misrepresentations whatever, and he believed that if they knew the noble Lord's real view of
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this matter it would be found not to be far different from that of the hon. Member for the West Riding. He did not wish to take detailed exceptions to the conduct of the Government, but the day would come when the whole conduct of the Government with regard to the war must undergo the most searching investigation, and then hon. Members on that side of the House would go into all the details. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, instead of answering the other night the important charge brought forward by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington), had shielded himself under the mystification of a number of idle details. He stated that 56,000 had been sent from this country to the Crimea, just as if there was at any one time a force in the Crimea amounting to 56,000 men. That was a misrepresentation for which the people of England were not prepared, because it was well known that from 25,000 to 27,000 men only crossed to the Crimea, and that the miserable supplies sent from time to time had but barely filled up the losses they had incurred; but he would retain this and other charges against Ministers relating to the general conduct of the war for that full and ample discussion which the subject must at some future period receive. With regard to the Bill before the House, he drew the strongest arguments against it from the defence of the measure itself. He found in the weakness of the position taken by the Government—defended though it was by consummate debaters—in the miserable fallacies of the noble Lord the President of the Council, and in the plausible reasonings of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston)—in all these he found evidences of weakness which were conclusive in condemnation of the Bill. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton endeavoured to make it appear that the constitutional jealousy of foreign mercenaries entertained in this country was nothing more than a difficulty which presented itself to the House of Commons; but no one knew better than the noble Secretary of State for the Home Department that this was not merely a question of Parliamentary privilege, not merely jealousy of the Crown on the part of the House of Commons, but a question of time-hallowed and sacred privileges on which the people of England set the highest value. He had no hesitation in saying that, if there was one feeling more cherished by the people of England

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than another, it was the inviolability of this sacred island from the tread of foreigners, and particularly of foreign mercenaries. But when these foreigners were not merely armed troops, but men filched and stolen by the most discreditable devices from the most dishonest of Governments—for those Governments must be dishonest if they affected to be neutral and yet permitted their men to fight under our standard—if these Men were to be the scum, the vilest offscourings of all the petty States of Europe—which they must be if they were so wanting in character as to sell their nationality for gold—then nothing would exceed the disgust of the people of England. The noble Lord the President of the Council said there was no difference between such men and those who fought in the Peninsular war, mid who under the Duke of Wellington won some of the most glorious victories that are recorded in the annals of this country; but he indignantly denied that there was any resemblance between them and our gallant countrymen, who fought for all that could ennoble life and render death glorious. He regarded this, therefore, as a most miserable and disgraceful measure. After what had been said on all sides of the House regarding it, he felt assured that he did not overstep the limits of moderation when he said that it was both disgraceful and odious—disgracefulin the eyes of foreigners, in the eyes of our enemies, to whom, above all men, they were bound to show a hold front. Well had it been remarked by the hon. Member for the West Riding that it was a cry, as it were, of national bankruptcy; and how delightful such a cry must be, When proceeding from the Treasury benches, to the Emperor of Russia. It made them equally disgraceful in the eyes of their allies. What would that great nation—the French—and their noble Emperor, who was doing his part in this war so nobly, think of this pitiful and miserable device that had been resorted to by our Government? And was it likely that Austria and Prussia would be as willing as they otherwise might have been to act in concert with a country which had resorted to such modes of warfare? But the Government was not England. The Government might have no confidence in the power and resources of this country, but there were others who had, and who would have nothing to do with the miserable measure which they had submitted to Parliament. There were men on that (the
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Opposition) side of the House who had no sympathy with such a measure, and who proudly maintained that there was in England a power and a determination to carry on this war to a glorious and successful issue. He could not, indeed, understand what had led men in the position of Government to come forward with a Bill which had been indignantly scouted throughout the kingdom, and he was prepared to give it his most unqualified opposition.
MR. COLLIERsaid, that he was one of those Members who had not supported the present measure without reluctance, but he thought that the taunts thrown out against them of voting against their conscience were entirely misplaced. He was quite at a loss to see any inconsistency in reluctance to vote for a measure and a feeling of conviction at the same time as to its necessity. The question, and the only question, was, whether or not the measure was necessary. He, for one, would rather not adopt it, but would prefer that we should fight our own battles; but still the question was, whether or not it was necessary. Now, the Government. on the one side, asserted that it was necessary, and the Opposition, on the other, declared it was not; and he, as an independent Member, thought that the Government must be the best informed on the subject, though he could well understand that there might exist good reasons, independent of considerations of loss or retention of office, to induce the Government to withhold, at present, the information they possessed. The arguments against the measure had been accompanied with a great deal of eloquent declamation, wit, and powerful sarcasm, but he had not heard it proved—what, indeed, was a material point—that the country could do without the proposed assistance. He had listened to the Opposition with the view of learning what amount of disciplined and trained forces this country could bring into the field, and what number of troops would be opposed to them, but he had failed to hear any computation of our probable forces, or those of the enemy, by which it would appear that without the proposed aid we should be able to meet the forces of the Emperor of Russia. In support of the Government there was the opinion of the Commander in Chief—there was Lord Raglan writing home for succour of the kind now proposed, and there was our army in the Crimea, which would probably prefer the immediate succour of foreign troops to the promise of some aid of a different kind

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hereafter. Moreover, the Government, possessing, no doubt, full information, declared on their own responsibility that the proposed force was necessary for the conduct of the war, and, under all these circumstances, he felt he should incur a fearful responsibility if he refused that aid for the vigorous prosecution of the war which the Government stated was necessary. A great deal had been said about it being a reproach to this country that it was unable in itself to raise a sufficient force, but, for his part, he assuredly could not see that that was any matter of reproach. This country was in a transition state from being a peaceful to becoming a warlike nation. That state of transition must last some time, and it was no ground of reproach that in time of peace this country had not a large standing army, and that its Queen did not require the same military support as might be necessary to continental despots. In his mind, it was no cause of reproach that the weapon with which disturbances in this country were suppressed was the staff of the special constable, and not the bayonet of the soldier, and that, consequently, this country had not, like continental nations, a great standing army. However much, then, they might appreciate the conduct of the British soldiers—and he cordially admitted that they were the best soldiers in the world—still it was going beyond what they had any right to boast of to say that the English recruit of sixteen years of age was equal to the disciplined foreigner of twenty-six years of age, or that our ploughmen could suddenly be converted into soldiers equal to the continental veterans. If the Government declared that they wanted 20,000 men, and could not raise them here, what was the use of hon. Members boasting of resources which the country did not possess? Did they suppose they could conceal weakness by vain boasting? Which would damage the Emperor of Russia most—20,000 bayonets added to the allied force, or boasts of inexhaustible resources? He would not enter into the constitutional objections to the measure, which seemed one by one to have vanished, or into the distinction, which appeared more technical than substantial, between troops whose country was hostile to and those whose country was not hostile to Russia. He did not participate in the fear of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) that we might possibly embroil some of the continental Powers
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with Russia. He certainly should not feel much anxiety on that account. Every argument against the measure had been exhausted that could by fair criticism or perverse ingenuity be urged against it; and, not content with precedents in English history, hon. Members opposing the Bill had had recourse to the history of Greece. The House had had its attention directed to a despatch written by Nicias; but he thought there was a passage in the history of Greece far more applicable to the present case: when entering upon the war with Philip, Demosthenes urged the Athenians to prosecute the war with vigour, and rebuked them for substituting empty declamation for troops in the field. "Men of Athens," he said, "when will you do your duty? Will you wait for some catastrophe—will you wait for some necessity? But what greater necessity can there be than the reproach that your arms have hitherto failed?" That reproach now attached to this country; our arms had hitherto failed in taking Sebastopol, and it concerned our dignity and our honour, and it might concern our safety, that our arms should succeed. Those who had reproached the Government for being too late, now reproached it for being too early; and, like the procrastinating Athenians, would wait until some great catastrophe occurred. They would wait until the lives of all our gallant soldiers in the Crimea should be sacrificed; and then they would say was the time for the present measure. Heaven forbid that the fate of England should be like the sequel to that page in Athenian history, and that the English should be reduced to the condition to which the Athenians were brought! But if they did not take measures to avert such a catastrophe—if they did not render timely succour to the British troops in their present emergency in the Crimea, they would incur a heavy responsibility in which he was not ready to participate.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Collier) appeared to have some difficulty in reconciling his conscience to the vote he had given in favour of this measure. The hon. Gentleman had spoken much of the consequences that threatened if the Bill were rejected, and of the immediate results likely to flow from the employment of these foreign mercenaries. But where, he (Mr. Newdegate) would ask, were these 10,000 men in buckram,

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of whom so much was said? By the very Bill itself, it was made perfectly plain that these foreign recruits, instead of being ready for immediate service, were to remain some time in this country for the purpose of training, and the Government refused to tell even the nation from whence they were to be drawn, but talked of collecting stray emigrants from abroad and forming them into battalions. This must be a work of time, and precluded the idea of these foreigners being available for the immediate necessities of the war in the Crimea. Let Her Majesty's Ministers get up and say that they have 10,000 men ready to proceed to the Crimea. Such a statement might in some degree justify the demand made for the admission of these troops into England; but no such statement had been made. Let them state the nation whence they are to come. Let some assurance be given that these men would be found trustworthy on their junction with our glorious army in the Crimea. He could never believe that the House of Commons would be hood-winked into voting for the introduction of this force of tramping foreigners, by a declaration that the country was unprepared for the present emergency, without some assurance that these foreign troops were really available to meet the emergency. There could be no doubt that the passing of such a measure would do much to check the progress of enlistment throughout the country. The language which he heard on all sides from his fellow-subjects was—
"If the Government thinks that hired foreigners will fight the battles of England better than her own men, and the House of Commons sanctions such an opinion, why let them trust these foreigners—let them take these foreigners; we will wait till they are undeceived."
That, he could assure hon. Gentlemen, was but a common idea throughout the country. But there was another point which had scarcely received due consideration. Let the House consider the character of the enemy to whom they were opposed; of all the powers of Europe Russia best understood the means of corrupting her adversaries: no power had gained so much by the corrupt use of gold, and by flattering the feelings, the prejudices, the partialities, the ambition, the covetousness of those with whom she had to contend. There was no art of seduction, no course of intrigue, no species of falsehood, to which that Government did not feel justified in resorting. Now, of all troops in
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the world, mercenaries were the most liable to corruption; and yet they had not been told where these troops were to come from, and they were without any guarantee as to their character or good-will towards this country, although they were to be placed in the camp and in the line of battle of our gallant army in the Crimea, in close contact with the power most likely to corrupt them. The proposal of the Bill was simply this, that we should oppose to the most corrupting of all powers, of all forces the most corruptible. He did not think that the Government could fairly expect the House of Commons to incur such a danger. The House had heard him put a question to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London yesterday, relative to the transference of troops from India to the Crimea. Why, the Government spoke of the power or this empire as if it consisted only of the 27,000,000 population of the United Kingdom, and of the 120,000 men which composed our army. He was happy to say that there were men acknowledging Queen Victoria as their Sovereign in every clime. In India alone there was a population of 150,000,000 and a drilled force of 290,000 men, and he would remind the House, if the Government chose to adopt the means, that in less than four months they could place an armed disciplined force of British soldiers from India in the Crimea. Now, When they told him they would meet the emergency of the case by collecting an army of strangers from the Continent, and bringing them over here to drill them into battalions, he could turn on them and ask, had they taken any steps to avail themselves of the 290,000 men in India, part of which force might within four months be placed in the Crimea. Sonic of these were of the Queen's army, Europeans and Englishmen, and among the rest were reckoned as fine troops as need be led against the enemy—men with no Russian sympathies—with no doubtful allegiance—but men who had stood by the standard of England amidst all the vicissitudes of her long campaigns against their own neighbours and countrymen. There was another point scarcely yet noticed in the House. As the Bill was introduced into the House of Lords, it was distinctly specified that these foreign troops were to be quartered in this country, and were to be used in the country as well as without it, Their Lordships, however, objected, and very naturally objected, to that. They were not prepared to see this country

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under an Austrian or German occupation; and the provision was accordingly altered. Still, let them examine how the Bill remained. The House would find the tenor of the Bill in great measure unchanged. They were about to collect a foreign force to be drilled in this country, and yet the Secretary at War told the House he could not embody the militia, because there was not barrack room to house them as well as the regular army. So that they were actually going to barrack these mercenaries throughout the country, while they refused to embody the native militia for want of barrack room. He (Mr. Newdegate) wanted to know where these foreigners were to be placed—whether the Government were going to displace the garrisons of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, or Woolwich for the accommodation of these foreigners? Were they going to remove the troops from our arsenals to make room for these foreigners? Were they to occupy the Tower—the Trafalgar Square barracks—those of the Green Park? Were they about to add to the sense of safety, freedom, and security which Her Majesty enjoyed in the midst of Her own subjects, by placing a large body of these mercenaries at Windsor; merely, of course, for the purpose of drilling and training? It appeared to him that the whole framework of the Bill was consistent with its original intention—namely, that these troops were to be employed as home garrisons. The more he considered the Bill, the more he was surprised that the House of Commons should have placed such blind confidence in a Government who had made such an inadequate provision for carrying on the war, and now proposed such questionable measures. Although the expedition to the Crimea had proved hitherto unsuccessful—because it had been undertaken too late—becouse it had been left unsupported by any available reserve—because the Government had failed to secure a diversion by means of the Turkish army, and thus to prevent the concentration of the Russian troops in the Crimea—and because the Russian army were left in the undisturbed possession of the great resources of Odessa—although this expedition had hitherto proved unsuccessful through the rashness and incompetency of the Government, still he believed they were striking at Russia in the right place—that they would best curb her ambition by taking Sebastopol. He (Mr. Newdegate) sincerely desired the
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accomplishment of that great object. Nevertheless, he heartily and cordially voted against this Bill, as a measure which he had no reason to hope would meet the immediate necessity for the reinforcement of our army; as a measure dangerous in itself, as calculated to prevent the country putting forth its natural elements of strength; and, lastly, he would vote against it in order to force Her Majesty's Government to use the resources at their disposal by drawing British soldiers from India and elsewhere for service in the Crimea.
MR. FRESHFIELD: Sir, I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) that he has confined himself to points which had not been made by other speakers; on the contrary, I am aware only of one subject discussed by him which has not already been urged—almost the only suggestion of my hon. Friend which approximates to originality, although in principle it is not so, because it falls within that general class with which the House has been so largely supplied—namely, improved means of carrying on the war. My hon. Friend recommends that the British force in India should be transferred to the Crimea; but if I am permitted to travel in the same course—I mean that of volunteering warlike suggestions—I must differ from my hon. Friend. I consider this not a war to obtain this or that local object; it has become a war with Russia in which we must endeavour by all means to weaken her power and her influence, and even to give greater effect to our present operations by making diversions on every possible point. I should therefore prefer the plan of employing the British force in the East in the invasion of the more remote possessions of Russia. But in pursuing that suggestion, I should open a new subject for discussion and a further cause of delay, instead of prosecuting the object for which I rose, which was to urge the House to discourage further delay and to proceed with the Bill—feeling as I do, in common with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier), that every objection to the measure is exhausted. The two great speakers opposed to the Bill were heard on Tuesday night; it may be said that they have not been answered; but even their warmest admirers will not venture to say that their speeches were unanswerable—on the contrary, although the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire (Sir E. B. Lyt-

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ton) spoke with the advantage of great facility of composition and gracefulness of delivery, yet, in matters of fact, in constitutional principles, and in logical inference, he was conspicuously open to refutation, and in the excellent speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) there were obvious fallacies, I beg the excuse of my right hon. Friend for speaking of his speech as excellent—all his speeches are excellent—but to me his speech of Tuesday night was eminently so, because it was more condensed than his speeches usually are; but in that speech he relied much upon the fact, stated upon the authority of a foreign newspaper, that a foreigner had deserted from the allied army, and given information of the position of our force; and his inference was, that the enlistment of foreigners must therefore be unsafe, as it was proved that they could not be relied upon. I must own that I was surprised that a reasoner so acute could venture upon a proposition so unsafe as well as unsound; because my right hon. Friend could scarcely be uninformed of a fact established upon authority far less questionable, that three British soldiers had deserted from their respective regiments, and of course were able to convey important information to the enemy. But is my right hon. Friend prepared to conclude that every English soldier is a traitor, and ought not, therefore, to be trusted to fight the battles of his country? Sir, such speeches from those intrinsically of weight and influence have been answered, I may say, only departmentally or officially, with the disadvantage of judicious and necessary reserve, and not with the freedom of general debate; and even those Members who saw the insufficiency of the reasoning employed in opposing the Bill were nevertheless restrained by the understanding that it was for the convenience of the House that the division upon the question of the second reading should take place on Tuesday night. Well, Sir, we did divide, and the principle of the Bill was affirmed, and my right hon. Friend the leader of the Opposition in this House has declared that, technically, there is no objection to the Bill. If, therefore, the principle is adopted, and there is nothing technically wrong in it, what excuse have we for delaying to go into Committee? If there is anything wrong in language or the mode of carrying out the principle, that is the place in which to cure the de-
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fects; but to delay going into Committee is unreasonable and very objectionable. During the whole of yesterday's sitting we heard only of the faults of Ministers, their unsatisfactory mode of carrying on the war, the omission to do what the infallible self-created warriors of the House of Commons would have done; but no one reason was assigned to warrant our not going into Committee, except those reasons which had been unsuccessful when urged to prevent the principle of the Bill from being adopted. And, so far as I can perceive, the inclination of many hon. Members to day is to repeat the inconvenient and useless course of yesterday. In some places this would be called talking against time. I am not inclined to impute this as a motive; but it is obvious that time is sacrificed, that it is opposed to the useful employment of time, and that consequences are likely to follow which hon. Members would regret. It is now Thursday evening; we had reason to expect that the adjournment of the House would take place to-morrow; but it is more than probable that, if no disposition is shown to make progress, we shall be obliged to sit on Saturday; and it is equally probable, that, instead of adjourning for the holidays, we shall have an adjournment only over Christmas day, and may have to meet on Tuesday. Whether this would be for the reasonable convenience of Members it is scarcely necessary to say, but I may say that the necessity so created will be as wanton as it will be void of utility.
Some hon. Members justify delay, upon the ground of giving time to the country to understand the subject—or, more truly it should be said, to adopt the prejudices which some speeches are calculated to engender; but if the success of the measure is to depend upon their opinion in dealing with the false alarms raised by their opponents, there would, upon that ground alone, be little to fear. No, Sir, the British people are too generous, too humane, to adopt the theory of ingenious men, rather than the just and patriotic duty of helping by all the means in their power those who have bravely encountered the horrors of the battle-field, and the no less destructive consequences of disease, and who now stand exposed to increased danger from the ravages made in their ranks by death; and on behalf of my just and humane countrymen and countrywomen, I confidently claim that ready assent, which I assert for myself, to afford the most

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ready assistance to our suffering heroes in the Crimea, whether English or French—to afford comfort and consolation to anxious fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, and other near relatives of those who have gone forth in the service of their country. It is said the additional force proposed is not necessary; but Ministers propose it upon the opposite ground. Who is prepared to solve the problem upon the mere assertion of the Opposition, who, at least, subject themselves to the unenviable charge of first endeavouring to deny to the Government the power of employing an additional force, and then, by loading that force with every form of opprobrium, to render them enemies rather than friends to those who profess to confide in their services? But Ministers seek the additional force upon their own responsibility; and, for one, I am not prepared to transfer the conduct of the war to other hands, notwithstanding the unexpected readiness shown in the course of this debate to criticise that conduct, and impliedly to offer superior management, and that even from quarters least likely to have studied the tactics of war. Sir, I am not insensible to the horrors of war. No one can feel more strongly the objection to any war not in itself just; but we are not now discussing the justice of the present war—even the party in opposition in this House is pledged to that justice—and it seems to me, as a national question, that it ought so to be carried on, and by such ample force, that, with the blessing of Providence upon our arms and the arms of our allies, we may be able to command an honourable, and a probably permanent peace—a peace which may not only establish the propriety of the war, but operate as a security against the recurrence of future wars.
With these considerations, and for the reasons I have adduced, I respectfully urge upon the House, that without further delay, we should adopt the Motion, that you, Sir, leave the Chair, and that the House proceed with the Bill in Committee.
MR. MURROUGH: Sir, I know not whether the hon. Gentleman the Member for Penrhyn considers that this subject has been exhausted in this House; but this I do know, that the people entertain grave doubts whether it has had sufficient consideration; and although it may not have sealed the fate of Her Majesty's Ministers within these wails, it has com-
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pleted their condemnation by the country. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London has again attempted to overawe the House by a threat of resignation in case we reject this measure, but the House will bear in mind that during the last two Sessions of Parliament threats of this description have been of weekly occurrence; and although the Government have sustained defeats on questions of great national importance, their threats still remain unexecuted, and the noble Lord is far too discreet in his attachment to office to go to the country with the cry, "Vote for the Whigs and ten thousand Hessians." Sir, I feel a strong conviction that the Peace party would have numbered many more adherents in this House, could it have been anticipated that Her Majesty's Government would have taken so early an opportunity of proclaiming the moral and physical weakness of England by the advocacy of the mercenary system, which has long been condemned by the policy of every enlightened State in Europe; even Switzerland, long the great mart for mercenaries and free lances, has passed an edict against it, and proceeded to denationalise and expatriate the Swiss guard now in the service of the King of Naples. In our own country the law has denounced heavy penalties against enlistment for alien service, and it is now only a few years since an English Baronet stood in the dock to take his trial for levying troops for the purpose of an expedition to Ecuador. The noble Lord has, indeed, quoted as an authority, the fact that a great part of that victorious army which served under Marlborough against France was composed of foreigners, but the example is inapposite; for the noble Lord must remember that the army which Marlborough led at Ramifies was formed in the preceding reign, when the Crown of England was upon the head of the Stadtholder, and the Dutch troops were not only the allies, but the fellow-subjects of the British. In the Peninsula and at Waterloo, the foreign troops were not mercenaries, but allies and subjects of sovereigns engaged in the same struggle as ourselves. But the noble Lord has put this question as one of necessity, and the hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War exclaims, England furnishes nothing but lads of eighteen, who are unfit to endure the hardships of a campaign, and, immediately on their arrival at the seat of war, are compelled to become the inmates of a hospital. If this

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be true, your remedy is plain; alter your military system, and assimilate it to that of France, and thousands of well-grown, well-conducted, well-educated young men will flock to your standard. In the French army the young peasant, from the moment of his conscription, feels the spirits of Ney, and Soult, and Bernadotte, hover around him, and proclaim in language deathless and unmistakable, that the space between the ranks, and batôns, and dukedoms, and thrones is not only traversable, but has been already traversed by men of antecedents as humble as his own; while your English soldier, from the time of his enlistment, feels his spirit shrouded beneath the shade of a upas-like aristocracy, and that though he way pour out his blood like water, and leave his widow desolate and his children in the destitution of orphanage, in the service of his country, it is but to swell the triumph of some Brudenell or Somerset, whilst his sole and only guerdon is au unknown grave and an unrecorded name. Amend then, I say, your military system, and there will be at once an end of your degrading dependence upon those fifth-rate German princes, whose ablest finance ministers are the croupiers of gaming tables, and whose military superiority is a fraud and an imposture.
MR. DISRAELI: I am not going to detain the House by offering any observations on the Bill, upon which I have already expressed my sentiments fully; but, with their permission, I will say a few words regarding the conduct of the debate, respecting which I do not wish any mistake to be prevalent. I believe the noble Lord the leader of the House, having already taken some part in the debate, has not the opportunity of expressing any wish on the pert of the Government that the House would proceed with the Committee; therefore, perhaps, he will excuse me if for a moment I should take his post out of his hands. I do not wish any hon. Gentleman for a moment to believe that there is any wish on this side of the House to throw any unfair obstacle in the way of the progress of public business, and if the noble Lord will reflect for a moment on the course of the discussion on this measure, he will see that there is not the slightest foundation for any such imputation in the present case. The Bill was read a first time on Monday, when the House remained sitting for a long time without business,
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but no Gentleman on this side took any advantage from that circumstance to propose any amendment. In a private conversation with the noble Lord, I expressed my wish to do everything I could to facilitate its being read a second time next day, and to have the division taken at an early hour. Every person must feel that any imputation upon this side of the House, of having thrown an obstacle in the way of public business, is quite unfounded. Considering that we entirely disapproved of this measure, it was quite impossible that we could have taken any other course than that which we have taken. With regard to the debate yesterday, we must all recollect that the noble Lord, the leader of this House, never rose and deprecated that debate. No doubt he was influenced by the feeling that, considering the suddenness with which the whole subject had been brought before Parliament, and the evident wish which had been shown on this side of the House to facilitate the legitimate progress of business, it was but fair that any Gentleman who desired to address the House on Wednesday morning should have an opportunity of expressing his opinion upon this subject. I do not suppose, in these circumstances, that the noble Lord thought that the discussion which took place yesterday was an unauthorised discussion. Well, we virtually have had bye days' debate upon the second reading of this important measure, and I do not think that, in the circumstances under which the House met, that was at all an unreasonable arrangement. I think it would have been disrespectful to our constituents if the debate had been hurried. With regard to myself, I came down to the House this evening prepared to go into Committee, and to offer no opposition to the Motion for that purpose. I am perfectly ready to come to a fair understanding with regard to the progress of this measure. I think we might go into Committee upon it to-day, and agree to take the third reading to-morrow. I think that is a fair arrangement. There will be then a subsequent occasion, upon which any Gentleman who feels a strong conviction of duty that he ought to address the House on this important measure may express his opinion, and at the same time we shall have fulfilled the pledge which we gave that we would offer an uncompromising opposition to the Bill, doing so, however, in a legitimate manner, and

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without, I conceive, laying ourselves open to the imputation of impeding public business.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I must say a few words after what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested to the House. It is quite true that I did not make any complaint yesterday of the debate being carried on during the whole of the sitting, because I thought that hon. Gentlemen who wished to take part in the debate—they not having proposed an adjournment on Tuesday night, nor interfered at all with the decision of the House upon the second reading of the Bill—were entitled to express their opinions upon the subject on the Motion for going into Committee. I entirely concur with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire that we, on the part of the Government, have no reason to complain of the course which has been taken by hon. Members on the other side. The matter has been fairly debated; but I think it would be for the convenience of all parties, and I am sure it would be for the public interest, if the House were to go into Committee to-night; and I should be glad if the hon. Member who has given notice of an Amendment on the first clause would not bring it under the notice of the House this evening, but would reserve it for the third reading of the Bill to-morrow.
MR. PACKSsaid, before the House went into Committee, he was anxious to ask the Government whether they were disposed to give them more definite information as to the duration of the Bill than was provided by the last clause. It was true that uo human being could prophesy when the war would terminate. The only limitation for the services of those foreign troops, as indicated by the Bill, was the duration of the war. Now he would venture to say that there never was a measure before the House of greater importance than the present, nor one more calculated to excite jealous feelings in the country. As yet no public opinion upon it had been expressed in the country. The only way in which they could judge of the character of public opinion was by the speeches of the representatives of such large and important constituencies as those of Manchester, Birmingham, Westminster, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and other places. Now, the representatives of all those constituencies stated that the measure was most
764
unpopular throughout the country, and yet there had been no test of public opinion upon the subject as yet. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War stated yesterday that he was perfectly willing to test public opinion upon the Bill. The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. H. Drummond) said, that meetings were now in progress throughout the country to discuss this matter. All, therefore, which he had to ask the Government was whether they were disposed to limit the duration of the Bill to some definite time, and not to leave it so vague as it was at present. The speeches made by the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Danby Seymour), and the hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich), though in support of the Government, gave a very reluctant assent to the Bill. He therefore considered that it was most desirable that some definite time should be fixed for the duration of the Bill, in order that the country might have at some future time an opportunity of reviewing its merits. He did not wish unnecessarily to interfere with the measure of the Government, but he did ask them to make some limitation as to the duration of the measure, in order that the opinion of the country might be tested as to the policy of renewing it, after those foreigners had been quartered upon the people of this country. Unless the Government were prepared to give some more definite time than that mentioned in the last clause—namely, the duration of the war, he would certainly move an Amendment on the subject.
MR. BRIGHT: Sir, I have a question to put to the noble Lord the President of the Council before the House go into Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding has given notice that at a certain stage of this Bill—upon the bringing up of the Report—he would take an opportunity to go into the general question of the war, which could not well be done while adhering closely to the contents of this measure. But if no alteration be made in the Bill in Committee this evening, there will be no fixed time for the bringing up of the Report, and so the discussion which my hon. Friend is anxious to raise may be pushed off by the arrangement which has just been made. In these circumstances, perhaps, the noble Lord and the House will not consider out of order any hon. Gentleman who may not to-morrow keep so close to the clauses of

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the Bill as hon. Members have done in the previous discussions. I merely state this in order that anybody who chooses to get up to-morrow night and say a few other things to the Government than what is contained in the clauses of this Bill may not be considered as out of order, or as talking wide of the subject before the House.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I will offer no objection to the course which he proposes to take to-morrow night.
Question put, and agreed to.
House in Committee; Mr. BOUVERIE in the Chair.
Clause 1,
MR. LOCKE KINGsaid, he would now beg to move the proviso of which he had given notice—
"That no contract with foreign soldiers shall be lawful, under the provisions of which this country shall be liable for any payments, except to officers disabled by wounds, to continue beyond the period of one year after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace."
Looking back to the years 1815 and 1816, he found the sums proposed in the Estimates to be paid on account of foreign charges amounted to about 300,000 l.; six years afterwards the sum was 140,000 l.; and at the present time we were paying some 36,000 l. a year in respect of disbanded foreign troops. What he should therefore propose would be, that we should at once come to an understanding with these foreign officers to pay them well while they were engaged, but that they should have no claim on us for half-pay after the conclusion of the war. As he understood the Bill, every foreign officer who came over here and trained one or two companies would be entitled to half-pay as soon as ever peace was concluded. This was increasing the dead weight of the country, and was scarcely fair to our own officers, for what was a miserable pittance in this country was a small fortune for a Mall living in a petty German State. There was always great difficulty, he believed, in ascertaining when these officers died; indeed, some persons asserted that they never did die. If the noble Lord would say that he would agree to the proviso on the third reading he would not press it now, but he thought it was highly desirable that some provision of the sort should be introduced into the Bill. The pay of the English army, although small,
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according to the scale of remuneration in this country, was yet considerable as compared With the pay of foreign armies; and it was desirable that foreigners entering our service should be considered to be remunerated by the current pay which they actually received while in our army, without reference to any advantages of a prospective nature.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, it was not the intention of the Government to give any pay to foreign officers after the termination of the war, nor did he think it would be desirable to do so. Of course he excepted pensions to officers disabled by wounds, and lie thought, also, that some pension should be given to the widows of those officers who might be killed in battle. He agreed with the hon. Member that any arrangement which might be made with foreign officers should be confined to the time they actually served, without any reference to prospective advantages. In the last war, when the German Legion was first raised, it was extremely unpopular in this country, and the consequence was that a clause was inserted in the Bill to the effect that no half-pay should be given; but when the Germans behaved with great gallantry, and became popular, not only with the army, but with the country at large, Parliament rescinded the prohibitory provision, and adopted a clause allowing half-pay. This only occurred, however, after a long period of service during which the legion had greatly distinguished itself. He agreed with his hon. Friend's observations as to the time during which the pay should be given. The officers of this corps would not be retained after the war was over, and, therefore, if they were to be put on half-pay, that would take place generally at an earlier period than could be the case with our own officers, who might still be wanted in the service in time of peace. He therefore concurred in his hon. Friend's principle, and his only question was whether it would be gracious to express that principle in words. however that might be, if the hon. Gentleman would not press his proposition that evening, so as to cause the Government to lose a stage, he (Mr. S. Herbert) would take an early opportunity of considering the point now raised, and then inform the House of his decision.
CAPTAIN KNOXsaid, he wished to know whether these foreign troops were to be commanded by English or by foreign

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officers, and whether the troops would be allowed to participate in the Patriotic Fund.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he did not know who the officers of this corps would be, but did not think there could be better officers than the English. As one of the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund, he had not the slightest doubt that that fund would be distributed among the widows and orphans of British soldiers only, and he believed that to apply it to the relief of any other persons would be a breach of faith towards the subscribers.
CAPTAIN KNOXsaid, the reason he had asked the question, where the officers were to come from, was because a noble Lord, a Member of the Cabinet, had facetiously said that they would be Irishmen, and, perhaps, that was the reason why so many Irish Members supported the Government the other night.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he wished the Government to direct its attention to the most efficient mode of arming our troops. New inventions were referred by them for examination to a committee of engineers, who were often backward in discovering their merits, when they were quickly discovered by other persons. New inventions in arms could be subjected to experiment at the cost of a few pounds, and they therefore ought to have a fair trial. He had heard of a gentleman who had an invention by which he undertook, in engagements like that at Inkerman, to do as much execution with one man as any eight men could do by means of existing appliances. Again, he had seen in the newspapers a letter, stating that when one of our posts was attacked our men were unable to maintain it because their percussion caps were wet and would not explode, and the position was only afterwards retaken with considerable loss. Now, a species of percussion cap had been invented which might be immersed in water for twenty-four hours, and yet when taken out would instantly explode. This and similar inventions ought to be put to the test by the committee of engineers to which he had referred, and he thought it would be better to appoint among the examiners some men who were free from the prejudices of old soldiers.
MR. F. SCOTTsaid, he wished to know if under this Bill the officers would be entitled to half-pay, as some misapprehension prevailed on his side of the House on that point?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTin reply, said, that they would certainly not. Half-pay could only be given under express Parliamentary sanction.
MR. HENLEYsaid, he wished to ask a question connected with this clause, in reference to a statement made by a Member of the Government the other night. If he understood the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War right, he said it was the custom in some of the German States to denaturalise their soldiers. He wished to ask what would be the condition of the wives and children of those men that would be enlisted by us, and what would be the position of the ratepayers in this country in respect to their maintenance? The emigrants from whom the right hon. Gentleman intimated that the Government might draw some, if not the whole, of the supply, were very often accompanied by their wives and children, who came over here, not as emigrants, but under letters of denaturalisation. It was not improbable that their wives and children would follow them here during the period of their training. As he (Mr. Henley) understood the law, if these men go abroad their families would be immediately chargeable on the parish of the port at which those soldiers had embarked. If those people be denaturalised, we could not send them back again to their own country. He consequently wished the right hon. Gentleman would give him an answer as to how they were to be maintained. Were they to be maintained out of the national fund, or as chance paupers at the places from which the regiment embarked? It would no doubt be a very heavy charge upon such parishes if they were to be maintained out of the parish funds.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he thought the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman a very important one. It should be understood that in any statement that he (Mr. S. Herbert) had made about the chances of obtaining these foreign soldiers, he necessarily spoke without book. Representations had been made to him that such and such a thing might be done, but whether it really could or not, remained of course to be proved. When the German corps was originally formed no inconvenience as regarded the wives and children of the men occurred, because they remained at their own homes. At present the stream of emigration which passed through England on its way to the Co-

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lonies entailed no evil on this country, because the emigrants took their families away with them; but, if he were right in thinking that the numbers of these persons who would offer to enlist would be great, of course the Government would select the men who had no wives or children, so that no difficulty on that score could arise. In other cases, where it might be thought that individual married men were so eligible for enlistment that it would be desirable to secure their services, their families might precede them in going to the Colonies to which the men had originally intended to emigrate. As to that, however, he could not positively speak; but, at all events, of course the Government would prefer enlisting single men.
MR. HENLEYsaid, he considered that the right hon. Gentleman had only met a small part of his question. No inconvenience might have occurred at the last embodiment of these troops, but with the present facilities for communication with the Continent the case was very different: for what was to hinder the wives and families of Germans who did not tell that they were married when they enlisted, from coming over to this country?—and being the families of denaturalised subjects of a foreign State, serving under licence in our Army, when once they arrived in England they could not be sent back. The question could not be so narrowed as that they had only to intercept from the stream of emigrants passing through this country, such men as they wished to enlist, and then forwarding their wives and families on to their original transatlantic destination, leaving it to the Americans to take care of these incumbrances. Perhaps the Americans would not be so civil as to perform that obliging office for us. But the Government must grapple with this matter, and explain how they meant to deal with it before the third reading of this Bill. If they were to enlist as many as 30,000 German emigrants of mature age, or between twenty-five and thirty, and who had passed through military service in their native country, they could not suppose that such a number of persons of their time of life would not have among them a considerable proportion with wives and children, or families of some kind or other, belonging to them; and no doubt these dependents of theirs would speedily find their way to this country, where they knew there was a maintenance for them, while they could have none at home. In
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that case, these families must be taken care of, and could not be allowed to starve or beg; the law of this country said, that no person should be left destitute; they must, therefore, go to the workhouse, and be supported by the ratepayers of England. About this there could be no manner of doubt, because, having letters of alienation, or denaturalisation, or whatever we pleased to call them, by which they ceased to be German subjects, we could not pass them over to the Consul of their own nation, and so shift the burden. It would, perhaps, be inconvenient for him to move an Amendment at the present stage of the measure, for possibly the matter could be better dealt with by the Government, who, he hoped, would take it into their consideration before the third reading to-morrow, and tell the House how they meant to provide for these people; because, if only 15,000 out of the 30,000 men proposed to be raised were married, the question what was to be clone with their wives and families was an important element in the discussion of this measure.
MR. R. PHILLIMOREsaid, he thought the principle of municipal law in this matter had been correctly stated by the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). When the right hon. Secretary at War stated that these troops were to be foreigners with letters of denaturalisation, he (Mr. Phillimore) regarded that assertion as a satisfactory answer to the powerful argument the other evening of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. T. M. Gibson). But then arose one or two questions of international law worthy of attention. A State, by granting its subject a letter of denaturalisation, no doubt parted with his allegiance; but if that subject entered into the military service of another country he was certainly bound by a temporary allegiance to such country, and he thought the obligation remained upon that foreign country to defend him in all his subsequent relations. If that were sound international law, the Government ought well to consider its bearing on this question. He believed his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War was right in stating that German States granted licences by which their own subjects became divested of their allegiance, and, therefore, there could be no subsequent collision of allegiance with regard to them. Our own laws enabled foreign sailors to become naturalised by serving in our Navy; and, speaking in the presence of the right hon. and learned

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Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier)—an eminent lawyer—who he thought would bear him out, he believed that a foreign soldier by enlisting and serving in the Army of this country had a clear right to the protection of this country so long as he remained in civil or military relations to it.
SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he wished for some explanations on an important point after what had fallen from the Secretary at War. He understood that right hon. Gentleman to have just stated that it was intended by the Government that the families of these foreign soldiers should in some instances precede their natural protectors by being sent to the colonies to which the latter also were ultimately to go. He did not understand the right hon. Gentleman on any former occasion to have said that it was designed to send these German soldiers to the colonies after the termination of their service, although he had certainly heard rumours out of doors to that effect. But if he (Sir J. Pakington) were correct in saying that this was the first reference that had been made to such a project, he thought he was certainly justified in asking the Government to explain what their intentions really were. He was the more entitled to make this inquiry, seeing that the Government contemplated raising from 30,000 to 40,000 of these men, and employing them in our service abroad at one time, and also recruiting to maintain that amount of force, and make up for the casualties occurring to them in the field, and were, therefore, likely to have a large number of them thrown upon their hands. There was reason to believe, from all that had passed during the discussions on this measure, that this species of force would not prove very popular to the people of this country, and it was a serious question whether our colonists would be willing, without their consent being asked, to permit so doubtful a class as these men would consist of to be discharged upon their shores. If such were the intentions of the Government, it was questionable whether they were at liberty to adopt any such plan without holding previous communication with the colonies to which it was proposed to send out these men. He wished, therefore, to ask whether the Government had any knowledge that the introduction of such a body of men would be acceptable to the people of our colonies?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he
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thought the right hon. Baronet had slightly misunderstood what he had stated when he said that it was the intention of the Government to send any large number of these persons to the colonies. He was informed that out of the whole number that we might be able to obtain, it would be possible to engage the services of a certain proportion of Germans who were in the habit of emigrating, some to the United States, some to Canada, and some to the Australian colonies. But he was not speaking of a gross number who are to be raised exclusively from this or from any other denomination of persons. It was true it might be possible for the Government to obtain the services of persons who came to England to go from thence to the British colonies, and in those cases, after their term of service had been completed, there of course could be no greater reason against their going to Australia, than if their services had never been asked for by the Government. So far, however, as concerned the colonies, he need not say that no Government would think of sending large bodies of men there against the will of the colonists. But the right hon. Baronet, from his acquaintance with colonial affairs, might know that there was a great anxiety felt in Australia to obtain German settlers, and that that Colony had even devoted a portion of its funds to procure their introduction, and especially the introduction of those who came from the banks of the Rhine, and were conversant with vine-dressing and wine-making. It was to this that he had alluded, but he did not venture to offer any exact information as to the probable number of persons whom they were likely to procure from among those who were proceeding to the colonies. He had merely wished to say that he thought we were likely to obtain a certain number of persons who, looking at the disposition they had evinced, and the destination they had shown their desire to reach, were likely to become British subjects by colonising portions of our empire, and that such persons it was desirable to secure.
MR. DRUMMOND: If there were one thing that was definite in the intentions of the right hon. Gentleman, it seemed to be this—that he was going to set "gins" in the "runs;" or, to use a somewhat more elegant phrase, in transitu, just exactly as they caught rabbits. Now, according as they set the gin, sometimes they got a pheasant, and sometimes a polecat; and so it might

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turn out in this instance that the right hon. Gentleman's trap might catch Germans or anything else. But the question mooted by the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) was much more serious than this. In Bavaria there existed a most cruel and wicked law, which was adopted by all the petty States, and which prohibited marriage between any persons unless they could give the Government a security that they were able to support the children of the marriage. The consequence was, that, throughout the labouring population of those States, not one couple in eight were legitimately married. And to such an extent of severity did they carry this law, that parties were prohibited from going into a neighbouring State or into a canton of Switzerland to be married; and if they violated this prohibition they were punished on their return. What, then, would be the result on these persons reaching England? Why, that a great portion of them would not have been married at all when they left their own country, and if they had been we could not have proof of the fact. Not to allow these men to receive half-pay would, he thought, be exceedingly objectionable. They were a class of persons who had been truly described as a sort of national assassins. ["Oh!"] Yes they were. What was an assassin? You have a quarrel with a man for a good or a bad cause—no matter which. You will not wreak vengeance upon him yourself; but you go and hire another man to do it for you. You quarrel with a man; you hire another to go and shoot him and stab him. The man you hire is an assassin. Well, but it appeared these persons were not to have any retiring allowance. Was not that neither more nor less than an enormous premium for plunder? How were the men to provide the means of subsistence for themselves when peace should be restored? They must obtain it in some way or other. Did the Government contemplate giving them so much pay as that they should be able to save money, or insure their lives for the advantage of their families and friends? Clearly not. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that some provision should be made for them, and it was not just to place men in positions in which they could only by plunder obtain means for their future support. They ought to be treated like our own soldiers, and to receive half-pay.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that
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our own soldiers did not receive half-pay until they had served a certain number of years.
MR. BANKESsaid, he thought the question now raised by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Henley) an entirely new one, and one of great interest to the ratepayers of the country, yet he observed neither of the law-officers of the Crown present to whom they could apply for its solution. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War could not be expected to solve it, and must have perceived its importance, and also that the answer he had given was unsatisfactory and beside the question. They might endeavour to secure the services of unmarried men, but still, after what the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had stated, the Committee must be aware that there would be women and families attached to these men claiming to be married, and how could this be settled? In the case of the war being a short one, it had been said that these men would be transferred to the colonies, but at whose expense the Committee had not been informed. But in the case of the war not proving so short as they desired, then these women and children would remain in this country, unless the Government transferred them to the colonies at the public expense. And how were these women and children to live there, whose only means were the male emigrants, who were to be stopped in transitu? If transferred to the colonies, they would be transferred as paupers; and if they remained in this country, they would still be paupers, unless some mode were adopted by which a portion of the pay could be applied to their support. This question was an important one, and one which would not tend to increase the popularity of the measure. He regretted to be obliged to oppose the progress of the Bill through Committee, as he desired as much as possible to facilitate the business of the House, and to consult, as far as he fairly could, the convenience of the Government; but, as they had felt it their duty to summon Parliament before the Christmas recess, they should have done so earlier, and allowed time for discussion of a measure of which so little notice had been given, and which hail been introduced with so little preparation on the part of the Government.
MR. VERNON SMITHsaid, he also desired to caution the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War before he embarked on this question of emigration. It

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might be true that there was a desire on the part of the colonies for German emigrants; but this desire was for men with families, who would prove useful and profitable. He wished to say nothing against the class of persons who might enlist, but still, if their wives and children were transferred to the colonies without the heads of those families, they would be totally different from the class of emigrants the colonists had expressed a desire to receive. The question of expense was perhaps the least in connection with this matter, but still the expense would be enormous; and he considered, also, that before this course was decided on the colonists themselves ought to be consulted.
MR. BOOKERsaid, he wished to ask whether these men would be located in the manufacturing or rural districts? So jealous were our forefathers of the presence of foreigners in this country, that there was a provision that foreign troops in our service should not be allowed to go more than five miles from the coast. The German Legion was quartered at Eastbourne, Hastings, and St. Leonards, and there were in those places still visible traces of the visits of those men. He hoped that these troops would be kept together in masses, and he should like to know in what districts they would be quartered?
CAPTAIN KNOXsaid, he had heard it stated that these troops were to be sent out to the colonies, to serve in lieu of the regular British forces there, and he should be glad to know if that were so? He wished to know also, whether it was necessary that these troops should be commanded by foreigners?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he did not think any statement of that kind had been made from the Treasury bench; but certainly there was no such intention on the part of the Government. With respect to the second question, he found, upon inquiry, that the troops comprising the German Legion were commanded by Germans.
MR. OTWAYsaid, he would remind the Government that at this moment there was a large body of English officers living upon half-pay, many of whom were perfectly capable and willing again to accept active service. Now, could not these gentlemen be made available for the purpose of officering these foreign troops.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he felt bound to demand an explicit answer to the ques-
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tion of the hon. Member for Herefordshire (Mr. Booker). Were these troops to be stationed at Chatham, Portsmouth, London, or sent to Manchester, or quartered at Windsor? There was a strong wish in the country to know where this army was to be placed.
MR. GROGANsaid, that by some remarks made by the right hon. Secretary at War, the veil had been partly raised from the Government intentions, and it was evident that this German Legion was to be dealt liberally with at the Government expense. The great object of the Government was to get men of a mature age and constitution, capable of undergoing the fatigues of service in the Army; but had it ever occurred to them that if they held out the same inducements to their own subjects that they offered to these Germans they would then be enabled to obtain as many of their own countrymen as they liked of mature age and constitution, and men who would, in addition to this, be animated by the motive of fighting for their native land?
MR. F. SCOTTsaid, he had, during the last quarter of an hour, heard a number of questions asked, none of which had been answered. This might be a very simple mode of conducting a Bill through the House before the Christmas recess, and no doubt, by a compromise, it might be so passed if the Government would give no explanations. During the last ten minutes as many questions had been asked. Firstly, where were these troops to be located? Secondly, how were they to be officered? Thirdly, were they to be employed as a military force in the colonies? Fourthly, how did they propose to deal with the families of those persons who might be left in England? Fifthly, were the families of these mercenaries to be sent to the colonies? Sixthly, had any information been received from the colonies as to whether they would be acceptable? Seventhly, whether the men would be sent to the colonies; and eighthly, would the men so sent be sent at the expense of the colonies, or of the public of this country? He had arranged these questions categorically, in order that there might be no misunderstanding, and, although they had as yet listened patiently, their might not continue to do so unless these questions were answered.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, the questions came so quickly that he could not answer them at once. He was asked

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whether these troops were to be officered exclusively by Germans; there was no provision for that in the Bill, but he had already stated, as a precedent, that the German Legion was so officered, and he had no wish to put a restriction upon the military authorities now in that respect any more than prevailed formerly. With respect to the half-pay officers, it was true there was a great number of them, but from the augmentation of the regular army which had recently taken place it had been thought advisable to make inquiry into the condition of these, and now almost every man who was capable was in active service. Next, he was asked, where were these troops to be located? But that was a point which must be left entirely to the Executive, though he did not anticipate that any serious difficulty would arise out of it, because there were places in England where the troops could be located without injury or offence to anybody during the short time they would have to be here on the way to their ultimate destination. With regard to the question of emigration, the House has got into some confusion upon that point. No doubt it was one of considerable difficulty; perhaps the colonies might object to it if the means of transit were not found; while, on the other hand, there was the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire if the families were kept at home. All these questions were of great difficulty and importance; but there seemed to be an impression in the minds of the Committee that the Government had got some distinct plan of emigration in view which they were going to apply to these foreign troops. Now, all he had stated was simply that it had been suggested by competent persons that there was a good deal of German emigration going on which might be made available for the purposes of this Bill. He did not conceal from himself the difficulties which surrounded the question; but he had thought it right to mention the suggestion to the Committee as one well worthy of consideration.
MR. F. SCOTTsaid, he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would, between that time and to-morrow, take it into his consideration, and state distinctly to the House how they intended to provide for the wives and families of those whom they might enlist.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that if the families of these men came here, they must be supported. If the Government
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did that, they would be doing more for foreigners than for their own soldiers. When subscriptions were made for the Patriotic Fund, he always thought that our soldiers and their families ought to be provided for by their country. If the Government intended to support the wives and families of these mercenary foreigners, our own soldiers must consider themselves to be treated with great unfairness. Of course he took it for granted that the widows and children of those Germans who might fall in the war with Russia would not be left by the Government to starve. He wished to know what rank, whether of colonel or lieutenant-colonel, would be assigned to those who might have command of these foreigners? It would be most unjust to our own countrymen on half-pay, who would not be allowed to hold a higher post than that of lieutenant-colonel, if foreigners were to be appointed colonels of those regiments. He knew a great many of our own half-pay officers who had sought employment from the Government, but it was denied to them, and yet the Government now wished the House of Commons to consent to their going on a search for foreign officers.
MR. J. G. PHILLIMOREsaid, it was his intention to reserve for the third reading his Amendment, to the effect that a third of these troops should be commanded by English officers, and that the troops themselves should not be allowed to remain in this country for more than a year after the period of enlistment.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he understood one of the objections made to the Bill to be, that the Government had not proceeded with their plan before asking the assent of Parliament to it. After the Bill had passed they would endeavour to settle the details in the manner which they considered best calculated to obtain the service of these foreigners. The right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) had asked a very pertinent question with regard to the families of the soldiers who might enlist, and he believed the right hon. Gentleman had correctly stated the law, that they would be like poor without a settlement, and would, no doubt, have a claim upon the poor-rates. Whether any special provision should be made for those cases was a very fair question, and one which the Government would consider, but it was impossible to say exactly where these persons would be stationed, and to explain all the details of the measure. With reference to the Colonies and the

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question of emigration, give him leave to ask this question—suppose there should be a large German family come over here for the purpose of emigrating; suppose a father and family came with a married son, and the married son should enlist while here, and the father of the family should have sufficent funds to transport him and the rest of his family to Australia, surely there would be no objection to his spending his money in that way? No public money, however, would be applied to that purpose without the consent of Parliament having been obtained.
SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, the imaginary case put by the noble Lord was very different from the answer given by the Secretary at War. The noble Lord had said that several hon. Gentlemen complained that the Government had brought Parliament together without being able to answer questions of detail relating to the measures which were proposed. But that was not the ground of complaint against the Government. What was complained of was this—that the Government had summoned Parliament for the purpose of asking its assent to this extraordinary Bill; and that, when asked about nine questions of the greatest importance with respect to results that might flow from it when passed, the only answer which the Government made was, "We do not know." When his right hon. Friend (Mr. Henley) asked what was to be done with the wives and children of the foreigners whom it was intended to enlist, the Secretary at War said that their wives and children might precede them.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: I said it had been suggested that their wives and children might precede them, but I said, at the same time, that it would be prudent for the Government to enlist unmarried in preference to married men.
SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Just so; but it seemed that there was an intention to send the wives and children of the married foreigners to those colonies to which the latter might be sent on the termination of the war. When it was said by way of objection to that, that our colonies might not like emigrants of that kind, the Government said, "German emigrants are very acceptable in Australia." No doubt; but it did not follow that German mercenaries, with their wives and families, "who might precede them," would be equally acceptable with such a class of German emigrants as left this country for our colo-
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nies. Before such men, or their wives and families, were sent to our colonies, a communication should be made with the colonies on the subject. He was afraid that our own soldiers, whose wives and families had only the Patriotic Fund to look to, would feel very unfairly treated with reference to the apprehended proposition to send these foreigners, with their wives and families, to the colonies. Either the Government had not fully considered all the details of this measure, or they were afraid to speak candidly to Parliament upon the subject.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, that the German Legion raised during the last war were not only our allies, but our fellow-subjects. The King of England was King of Hanover. And he (Colonel North), having been a great deal in former years with those distinguished men, could take upon himself to say that the officers were composed of men who were connected with the first families in Hanover and Brunswick. If the Government would only state that we were to have a body of men like the old German Legion, commanded by officers like the officers of that legion, he was sure there would not be the slightest hesitation on that (the Opposition) side of the House in giving them its support. Those gallant men left a character in this country, not only for bravery, but for good conduct—the officers for gentlemanly conduct—and he was confident they would be received on this side of the water, not as mercenaries, but as friends and former fellow-subjects. Whom they were to have now, God only knew. But he should think that officers who were ready to take 5s. 6d. a day to cut Russian throats, if they could, and with the certainty of having their own throats cut should they once fall into the hands of the Czar, would not be the sort of men that English officers would be most proud to associate with. He hoped that, whatever took place, no English barracks would be given to these foreigners so long as there was an English regiment, militia or regular, to occupy it. He hoped more particularly that no barracks in the manufacturing districts would be allotted to them, as on the occasion of rows, which occasionally occur from want of employment, they would be brought into hostile collision with the working classes. Contitinental soldiers were never called out against the people except for immediate action; whereas he could speak from his own experience, the English soldiers have

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endured the pelting of their own fellow-countrymen for several hours without firing on them in return—a thing which foreign soldiers would never do.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, there was no intention to employ them in the manufacturing districts.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, he wished, then, to know who would preserve the peace in the manufacturing districts in case of riots after our regular troops and the militia had been sent abroad?
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, that foreigners would not be employed on such service at all.
LORD NAASsaid, he hoped that before the Bill passed through Committee some assurance might be given that the apparently ill-considered scheme of emigration connected with the measure would be given up, for nothing, he believed, was more calculated to create discontent, not only in this country but in our army abroad. The noble Lord seemed to throw out that those German emigrants' families might be allowed to proceed to the colonies at their own expense; but should we not be obliged at the end of the war to send out, at our expense, those members of their families who had been left behind? No boon could be more agreeable than that of giving at the close of the war a free passage to the colonies to those men who had not attained too great an age; but nothing would create more ill-feeling than the fact of the foreign troops obtaining at the end of the war a boon which was denied to our own troops, and of which many of our own men would be most glad to avail themselves, if it were offered them. He knew that of his countrymen in the Crimea almost all had relatives and friends in the colonies; and if any intimation were made that at the end of the war the German troops were to have free passages out, he hoped that a similar notice would be given to the British troops.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, that the noble Lord might rest satisfied that no advantage would be offered to foreign troops that would not also be offered to British. The noble Lord probably knew that great pains had already been taken to facilitate the settlement of soldiers in the colonies.
MR. HILDYARDsaid, he wished it to be distinctly understood that this House was not, on the part of the nation, undertaking any liability which was not borne upon the face of the Bill. If they did not choose to place upon the Bill the indul-
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gences, other than pay, that were to be accorded to the troops, he could only say that hereafter he should not feel himself restrained from refusing to saddle the country with any expense asked upon the plea that when we called these men into our service we virtually bound the nation to deal with them in the way that might then be proposed.
MR. F. SCOTTsaid, he could not consent to saddle any parish in England or Scotland with which he was connected with additional burdens, the extent of which was unknown. If the noble Lord would not give an assurance as to how the burdens were to be disposed of, he should be forced to divide the Committee, in order to record his protest against this blind bargain being carried out.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he was not prepared to see the arsenals of the country committed to men of whose character they knew nothing. London was not prepared, and it would be a degradation to see the care of the Queen and the Royal Palaces committed to troops of whom the description was not calculated to inspire confidence. Now that the Government had confessed their inability to give any information about those foreign troops, or as to what their character and conduct were likely to be, they could not expect that House to view their silence on this subject, as other than a grave addition to their already serious objections to the Bill. He was firmly persuaded there would be throughout the country a most justifiable jealousy, unless the House of Commons were informed where those troops were to be located, or whether they were to be kept in camps. Then there was the great question of the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) as to whether in-cumbrances in the shape of families following those troops were to be saddled upon those localities in which it might be decided to station them.
MR. WARNERsaid, he hoped that no barracks in this country would be given up to foreigners to the prejudice of the militia. There was throughout the country a great prejudice against the Bill, and nothing but the extreme urgency of the case would induce the Government to pass it; nor would anything increase that prejudice, and prevent the people's getting over it, so much as the giving up the barracks of manufacturing towns to foreigners. This was a question in which his constituents took a great interest.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, that the Committee had now heard one hon. Gentleman say, "Let foreigners by no means be placed in any of the arsenals of the country;" another exclaiming, "Let them not be placed in any barracks in the manufacturing districts!" and another, "For God's sake, don't let them come into the rural districts!" Now, it would be very difficult to say in what manner they were to be placed. His belief was that, although a prejudice had been raised, that prejudice would prove to be of a very temporary character. At first there existed a similar prejudice in 1804; but when it was seen, as it would be, that these troops were fighting bravely for us, a respect would be excited for them, and the people of England would be sorry to have entertained those prejudices.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, he hoped that a provision would be introduced into the Bill to the effect that these foreign troops should not be allowed to advance into the country more than five miles from the coast. A similar limitation had existed in 1804, such was the constitutional jealousy of the period; but, as the noble Lord had said, the progress of enlightenment and the increase of education ought to dispose the people of England to dispense with such a provision. If the noble Lord could have given any information at all about the character of the people he proposed to employ, he might with fairness have expected such a result. If those troops were to go to Ireland, he (Mr. Whiteside) would propose that they should be located in the poor houses nearest the coast, for, happily, those establishments were destitute of other tenants.
MR. WILKINSONsaid, it was assumed that these recruits were to be the scum of the earth, and they were called cutthroats and assassins; but it seemed also to be admitted that, if they behaved as well as the German troops in our pay in the last war, then they were to be considered as respectable men.
MR. BANKESsaid, he wished to know if the Secretary at War meant to ask for power to billet these foreigners on the public?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he really must ask the Committee to be reasonable. There were in all Bills certain details which only an executive could decide upon. Most of the questions that had been asked were questions that the military authorities could decide much better than
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anybody else; and it was to the Executive that must be left all those questions as to barracks, rank of officers, &c. As to that constitutional jealousy of which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) spoke, which ordered in 1804 that foreigners should be quartered not more than five miles from the coast, that order was entirely disregarded, and such a provision at the present day might force the Executive to station troops in places where it would be most imprudent to have them. It would be the interest of whatever Government had the Bill to work to place the troops where the least prejudice would be excited by their presence, and he hoped the Committee would not persist in confining the Government to expressions of opinion upon all those minute details. It was quite true that the Government did not pretend to give any accurate and definite description, or any minute detail, as to the forces for which they had only now obtained the consent of Parliament. There must be a preliminary to every step that was taken. Having got that preliminary, they would take their steps in accordance with the will of Parliament. When the Estimates came before the House, an account would have to be given of every step that had been taken, and the House would then have a full opportunity of criticising their conduct.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he thought that the whole details of the Bill should have been matured before it was brought into Parliament. Of all classes in the country, the military class was the most opposed to the Bill. He wanted to know how they were to be placed relatively to those foreign soldiers—whether they were to have equal rank, or if they were to be commanded by them?
MR. BENTINCKsaid, he should have been entirely of the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, that details should be let alone for the present, if they had received any information as to what the men were to be, or as to their character or conduct, and where they were to be brought from; but when they were refused all information, when they did not know whether these men were to be the most respectable people in Europe or the scum of the earth as some hon. Gentleman had termed them, he thought they should be wanting in duty to the country if they did not insist upon some clear statement, or if they did not resist the quartering of the men in places where

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their presence might be extremely objectionable, he was therefore quite disposed to divide the Committee on the question.
MR. BANKESsaid, he thought that that question was not a trivial one which related to whether his fellow-subjects were to have foreigners billeted upon them against their will. With regard to our own army, those matters of detail were left to the Executive, but were annually brought before the House when the Mutiny Bill was considered. He could hardly think the Government were perfectly sincere in thinking they should carry the measure when he saw the manner in which it was drawn.
MR. GROGANsaid, he would suggest that the precedent of the former Act should be adopted, and that then it should be repealed, as formerly, when these troops had shown, by their good conduct, that they deserved the favourable consideration of the House.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, that no restriction of the kind spoken of had been inserted in the Act of 1804. It was very well for hon. Gentlemen to speak of the German legion as not a foreign legion. At the time that legion was instituted it was looked upon quite in the same way as the foreign legion now proposed, and the terms scum of the earth, mercenaries, hired assassins, &c., were applied to them then as they now were. The measure was then a very unpopular measure; and yet there was no restriction imposed of the nature stated.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, the right hon. Gentleman had not answered the question as to the billeting of foreigners in this country.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERTsaid, he could only state the feelings of the Government; and what earthly use could there be in billeting upon the country troops that were to be here only for a few weeks for the purpose of being drilled?
MR. F. SCOTTsaid, that on a former occasion the foreign troops remained under canvass, and suffered there from hunger and exposure till the transports were ready to take them back to Hanover. In the following year Lord Chatham was prevailed upon by the German influence, which was paramount at the Court of George III. to pass a Bill enabling and enforcing the billeting of foreign troops on English families. In the year 1804 the legion was composed, not of foreigners brought here for the purpose, but, as stated in the preamble
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of the Bill, of foreigners actually in the country at the time.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he must complain of this attempt to delay the passage of the Bill. He had understood the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire to admit that it was desirable for the public convenience that the Bill should go through Committee that night, and that the discussion on the third reading should be taken to-morrow. If the Bill were to be rejected, it ought to be immediately rejected; but, if on the contrary, it were to become law, it was of the highest importance in the estimation of the Government that it should become so at once. What the object of this delay, therefore, could be he was at a loss to imagine. It bad been asked whether these foreign troops were to consist of respectable persons, or of the scum of the earth, but to that he could only reply that it would, of course, be the object of the Government to secure as far as possible the services of respectable persons; but it could scarcely be expected that they could bring men before that House with certificates of character in their hands. It was, in fact, a question which the House of Commons could not regulate, but which must be left to the discretion of the Executive. He hoped that the Committee would not sanction this measure of delay, or decide in favour of a postponement.
MR. DISRAELIsaid, he did not think the noble Lord had drawn a correct inference from what he said. He had never consented that a Bill should go through Committee without discussion, or use his influence towards such a result. And in agreeing that the Bill should go into Committee, he never had any intention at all of controlling the debate, or preventing hon. Gentlemen taking, upon subjects of great importance, such views as they might think it their duty to do. In the present case a very important question had been mooted; and he should be sorry if Her Majesty's Ministers were not able to give a satisfactory answer to the Committee; but he could not attempt to control the conduct of Gentlemen sitting on that side of the House, or prevent them expressing and acting upon their opinions. He had done what he could in order that the House might go into Committee, trusting that, in Committee, the Government would be able to support their Bill.
MR. SPOONERsaid, he thought the noble Lord should not have said that hon.

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Gentlemen were bringing on this subject merely to create delay. The question was should these foreigners be billeted in the houses of our countrymen? A right to billet would exist unless it were restricted, for that right was in the Mutiny Act, under the clauses of which those persons would be brought. He could not give his consent to any measure which did not restrict that right in the case of these foreigners.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, it had been already stated more than once that there was not the slightest occasion for asking such a question. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bankes) would give notice of an Amendment containing his views for the third reading.
MR. BANKESsaid, he should prefer that the Government would write their own Bill.
Clause agreed to; as were the remaining Clauses, House resumed, Bill reported without Amendment.

WOODEN HUTS AND CLOTHING FOR THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.
SIR GILBERT HEATHCOTEsaid, he begged to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War when the wooden houses for the troops in the Crimea might be expected to arrive, and whether any progress had been made in providing huts or shelter from any sources derived from the country itself? He also begged to ask when it was expected that the winter clothing for the troops would arrive in the Crimea?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: In replying to the questions of my hon. Friend, I will answer him in the order they stand upon the paper. With respect to the wooden houses, we gave orders to have them constructed as soon as we received information from Lord Raglan that they would be required. A portion of them is at sea, and as far as I am able to form a guess that portion is at this moment at the Bosphorus. Day by day they are going out, but the numbers sent are not sufficient to hut the whole army. We have sent word by telegraph to Constantinople to Lord Stratford to procure as much materials as possible there for constructing huts and to send them to Balaklava; and Lord Raglan has sent to Sinope to purchase timber there. We have sent by telegraph to Lord Westmoreland to have huts constructed in Austria; and by the mail before last we learned that an Austrian Lloyd steamer had left Trieste with some of
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those huts on board. I do not know the exact extent of the aid we have received in Austria; but, from what we can gather by surmise from the amount of the Bill, I trust the operation has been a very considerable one. With respect to the warm clothing, a considerable portion of it has arrived—a great portion is on sea—and a portion has not yet gone. The last letter I received from Lord Raglan stated that the warm clothing which had come by the ships was in process of distribution, and he hoped the result would be that the troops would be much more comfortable.
SIR GILBERT HEATHCOTEsaid, he would also beg to ask whether any steps had been taken to do away with the difference between the dress of the officers and privates, both in reference to their ordinary clothing, and that specially ordered for winter use in the Crimea? He asked the question in consequence of the great and disproportionate loss of officers in the late battles.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: With regard to the clothing ordered for winter use we gave instructions to Lord Raglan—as many officers would be unable from the want of facilities for transport to obtain clothing—that he should have the power to issue clothing to the officers as well as to the men from the stock sent out, and so far as that is done they will be similar in appearance. With reference to the new pattern uniform, which is that by which the clothing of the regiments in the East will be made up next issue, the distinction between officers and men has been greatly minished. There will be no epaulette on the officer's coat, and that which is now the most distinctive mark between the officer and private has been done away with. It has been stated by an officer who came from Balaklava that a misapprehension exists as to the officers having been picked off on account of their uniform. The fact is, that officers from the nature of their duty, are much more exposed than any other persons, especially mounted officers, who are more likely to catch the eye of marksmen, and who are more exposed than others.
SIR GILBERT HEATHCOTE: Will there be an undress uniform?
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: I think there is to be no undress uniform.
The House adjourned at half after eight o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat first in Parliament.—The Lord Denman, after the Death of his Father.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Militia.
Reported—Militia.

BLOCKADE OF RUSSIAN PORTS— QUESTION.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYrose to put a question to the noble Duke the Minister of War with reference to the blockade of Russian ports. The noble Marquess was understood to complain that the measures of the Government respecting the blockade, both in the Black Sea and the Baltic, had been so ineffectual that they had only tended to enhance the price of imports to the British merchant without inflicting any injury on the trade of Russia. In some commodities 25 per cent had been added to the value, the whole of which went to the advantage of Russia. It appeared to him that, although at the commencement of the war some semi-official notice had been put out warning persons not to enter into commercial relations with Russia, up to the present no steps had been taken which were at all effectual in embarrassing its trade. He begged to ask if the Government would state whether the measures they had adopted to blockade the Russian ports had been carried into effect, and what had been the consequence of such measures?
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, he need scarcely appeal to their Lordships whether the course adopted by the noble Marquess was, under the present circumstances, one according to the practice of the House or the convenience of the public service? There were a certain class of questions relating to the administration of the various departments of the Government in which the Ministers were always prepared to answer any questions that might be put to them; though it was the custom to give either private or public intimation of their intention to put such questions; and in that case no Minister would have any right to complain of want of courtesy if merely a simple question were asked. But the

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noble Marquess had come down to the House and made a somewhat elaborate statement with reference to the blockade of the Baltic, and another statement of the consequences of the blockade in the Black Sea—and the whole of that without any notice whatever. It was a matter of the most delicate nature, in which the Government of this country was not morely concerned, but also with that country with which we were in alliance. In the course of last Session, a noble Lord, whom he did not then see in the House (the Marquess of Clanricarde), more than once referred to the question of the blockade of the White Sea more especially; but invariably before doing so, he gave notice of his intention to put a question, and moreover admitted at once, when he (the Duke of Newcastle) replied to him that negotiations were going on with France on the subject, that it was not a question which ought to be discussed then in the House. Now, if he (the Duke of Newcastle) did not answer the question of the noble Marquess, he readily admitted it was on the principle that he must positively decline, on behalf of himself and colleagues, to answer questions of this nature, put in that House, in which France was concerned as well as ourselves. He thought this was a fair distinction, and one to which they had a right to adhere; and that the Government were not to be called upon to give an answer there on a question like that, in which France was equally concerned with ourselves, without first having an opportunity of conferring with the Government of France, or at least with the Ambassador of France residing here. He entirely demurred to the statement which the noble Marquess had made as to the effect on the trade of Russia of the blockade in the Baltic. If the noble Marquess chose to give notice of his intention to bring the subject under the notice of the House, he would find that either himself or one of his colleagues would be prepared to go into it with him; but it was one of too serious a nature to the trade of the country, in alliance as it was with France, to be entered upon, as he might say, in the haphazard way which was proposed by the noble Marquess. As to the course which it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take with reference to the blockade of the Black Sea, he must decline to answer the question of the noble Marquess, but would be prepared to go into the subject if he gave notice of his intention to bring it before the House.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHbelieved that the rule of the House was to consider all questions irregular, and that they were only admitted by way of preventing a Motion. Of course, therefore, the Government would assume that when a question was put which they thought inexpedient to answer, the noble Lord who put the question would bring his Motion for the purpose of getting an answer.
THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that although he concurred with the noble Earl in his interpretation of the rule of the House, he did not think the noble Marquess who put the question was open to the accusation of having made an elaborate statement, seeing he had only spoken altogether for three or four minutes. He was surprised to hear the noble Duke state that the question which had been put with reference to the blockade was one which he was not called upon to answer. for he (the Earl of Derby) had thought that the noble Duke had been appointed especially as Minister of War to preside over a War Department and all the operations of the war, and that a blockade was an operation of the war; therefore, if there was one Minister who should be prepared without notice to state whether or not the Government had practically enforced the blockade, that one was the Minister of War. It seemed, however, that he (the Earl of Derby) had been under a delusion all this time. The noble Duke said it was a delicate question. If it had reference entirely to the enforcement of a blockade prospectively, nothing could be more reasonable than that he should have declined to answer it without previous communication with other parties. But this was no prospective question. It had been announced over and over again on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that orders had been sent out to enforce the rigour of the blockade in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the White Sea, and if there had been any Minister who had been more conspicuous than another in making those declarations, it was the Minister on whom such a duty would more naturally fall. The First Lord of the Admiralty had, in the last Session of Parliament, repeatedly declared that the most stringent orders had been issued to enforce a strict blockade of the Russian ports, not only in the Baltic, but the White Sea and the Black Sea, and it was by no means unreasonable now that Ministers should be asked whether their orders had been practically carried out, and what had

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been their effect. It did appear to him that his noble Friend ought not to be exposed to censure for having asked the question, more especially when it was materially a question of fact. They might have enforced the blockade in the Baltic without being able altogether to put a stop to Russian trade, because some portion of it might be carried on, though with considerable loss, through the neutral ports of Prussia. Yet that was the very trade which they had first attempted to put a stop to, and the trade of Archangel was not put a stop to till August. At the present moment the trade of Odessa was for all practical purposes uninterrupted, and Russian commerce went on as though no war was pending. Of course every blockade and impediment to trade were injurious to the commerce of our own country as well as to that of our enemy. There would never have been an Alma or an Inkerman if we had argued that, though in battle we might kill a good many Russians, yet we must also lose a great many Englishmen. Whether war operations caused an impediment to trade or not, they must consider whether the injury inflicted on the enemy did not counterbalance the injury we ourselves sustained.
EARL GRANVILLErose to order. The noble Duke had objected to answer the question of the noble Marquess, not because he was unprepared to do so, but because it was of the highest importance that information upon so grave a subject should not be given off-hand by a Minister trusting entirely to memory, having received no previous notice of the question. This was a very important question, and could hardly have entered into the noble Marquess's mind since five o'clock, and therefore he might have given the Government a previous notice of his intention; but, having put his question without notice, the noble Duke declined to answer it, whereupon the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had risen, and was entering into all the facts and merits of the question in a manner which was not exactly regular.

MILITIA BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, although in the course of the discussions which have taken place upon the Bill now before the other House of Parliament (the Foreign Enlistment Bill), this Bill, the second reading of which I now
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propose, has been not only repeatedly referred to, but discussed at some length, your Lordships will, nevertheless, perhaps expect a few observations from me in explanation of its object. During this short sitting of Parliament, both sides of the House have frequently concurred in the necessity of establishing a reserve for the support of the army under Lord Raglan at some point or points nearer than the shores of this country, so distant from the seat of war—in which respect this war differs from any former war which we have ever carried on against any European Power. I apprehend your Lordships will admit that it is not only desirable that we should have a reserve of men, such as we are about to establish at Malta by an addition of four companies to each of the regiments now serving in the Crimea, but that it is also important, if possible, that a further reserve should be created in the shape of entire battalions not now employed in the service. Your Lordships are aware that, although the army of this country consists of 100 regiments, yet a great proportion are employed in the Colonies and in India; and although the numbers employed in the colonial service are now greatly reduced, the numbers serving in India, embracing a considerable proportion of the entire army, remain at their former amount. Under these circumstances, nearly the whole of the regiments available having been sent out of the country, the Government regard it as very important, with a view of conducting our operations in the spring, that we should be enabled to scud forward to the seat of war those regiments which now constitute the important garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. It is for this purpose that the present Bill is introduced; for, although it is worded generally so as to enable the Government to employ these troops in other parts than the Mediterranean stations, yet, as has been stated before in this House, the immediate object of the Bill is as I have represented. The accommodation in barracks and other buildings at Malta, will, I apprehend, be occupied by the reserve to which I have previously adverted—the depôts of regiments serving in the Crimea—and therefore, so far as Malta is concerned, it is not probable that, beyond, perhaps, a single regiment, the services of the militia will at present be required in that garrison. Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands are in a different position; but, in these places,—without the aid

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of this Bill, it would be impossible, with a due regard to the public safety, to reduce these important garrisons below their usual standard, by sending away the regiments now stationed there. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH inquired the strength of these garrisons?] The regular garrison of Malta has been set down at five regiments. The same number of regiments has also been deemed a proper garrison for Gibraltar, and the same for the Ionian Islands. At the present time the garrison of Malta does not amount to so much, because we have somewhat anticipated the sanction of Parliament to this measure, and we have despatched troops thence to the Crimea without waiting for authority to employ the militia in their places. My Lords, the Bill appears to have been somewhat misunderstood when it was discussed, not quite regularly, on the question of the Foreign Enlistment Bill; but your Lordships' minds must now be quite disabused of the idea that there is any compulsion in the principle or details of the Bill. Before I proceed to that part of the question, I ought to answer another objection which seems to have been entertained by some—that, even if the Bill were passed, there would be some difficulty in getting militia regiments to undertake foreign service. So far from that being the case, I can assure your Lordships that the greatest readiness exists on the part of the militia generally to come forward in any way that their services may be required for the public safety. I believe I may say that the voluntary offers of embodiment—without which, under the Act of this year, militia regiments could not be embodied—have been so general, that I think I can say they have been made by all the regiments, almost without exception—in fact I know of no exception; and I may add that the voluntary offers for foreign service were more numerous than the necessities of the time required. When I say foreign service, I do not mean merely service in the Colonies, to which this Bill is intended to be limited, but offers were made for service in the field of war. We have not thought it desirable to ask the sanction of Parliament to any measure to enable us to accept these offers for foreign service. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH was understood to say, that the Bill did give such powers.] If my noble Friend will be so kind as to state by and by his objections to the Bill, I shall be happy to reply to them. I can only say, the Bill
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was not drawn with any intention to send militia to the actual seat of war, and I do not believe it will bear such a construction. I doubt whether, if the Government were to attempt to employ this measure for such a purpose, the noble Earl would not be the first to rise and complain that we were greatly straining the Act, if we were not guilty of a violation of it. I was proceeding to observe, that when we declined these offers for foreign service, and stated that we did not propose to ask the sanction of Parliament to enable us to accept them, we have always been met by a counterproposal to undertake service in any of the Colonies, in order to facilitate the removal of the regular troops now engaged there. I may, perhaps, anticipate an objection of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), and would draw his attention to the fact that there is a distinction between the wording of this Bill and the 54 Geo. III. c. 1, which had for its object the transfer of the militia from home to foreign service. He will see that the objects are quite different, and that the powers conferred by that measure were far more extensive than any we now ask you to sanction. I said just now that the principle of the Bill was purely voluntary. Not only is it voluntary as regards the officers—not only does it require a colonel to propose the services of the body he commands—but it absolutely requires the consent of each individual man in the regiment to be obtained before we can avail ourselves of his services. But the principle goes still further. It is not proposed that the regiment should volunteer for service in the Colonies generally, but for a specific particular place. Thus, for instance, if a militiaman volunteered for service at Malta, we should not have power under this Bill to send him to the Ionian Islands, unless, on our refusal to send him to Malta, he should volunteer for the other garrison. The noble Earl raised an objection on the second reading of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, to which I admit that this Bill as originally drawn was open, although I do not believe the operation of the Bill would have been as he supposed. The noble Earl said, we should have power by this Bill to send the whole of the militia abroad, without leaving anybody in reserve at home to serve as depôts for the army on active service. As the Bill was drawn undoubtedly it might have been open to that construction, although it would have been necessary, in any case, that depôts should be maintained. But as

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the Bill now stands, never more than three-fourths of any regiment can be accepted for foreign service, the other fourth being required to remain here as a depôt. Another alteration, and, I think, a manifest improvement, has been made in the other House. Considering the probable duration of the war, it was, perhaps, not wise to ask the militia to volunteer for foreign service "during the war," and the Bill now limits to five years the period for which the services of the militia were required on volunteering—the period for which they originally enlisted. Observations have been made as to the non-necessity of this Bill or the Foreign Enlistment Bill at the beginning of the war. I am unwilling to reiterate the arguments your Lordships have already heard upon that point; but I cannot forbear repeating that it is at the beginning, and not at the close, of a war that these additional powers and exertions are required and should be exercised. More than one noble Lord has made a statement of the force which this country had in arms in 1813 and other years. They have pointed out that we had then an enormous army serving abroad, an efficient militia, and a local militia. If you compare our present means with the condition of our forces at the commencement of former wars, and compare the forces which we have now sent to the East with any army we were enabled to send out on any former occasion, I think the comparison will be found greatly in favour of the present time. It is not fair to compare 1813 with the present time. You should go back to the commencement of the war in 1793. if you want a fair and just comparison, to see what the country can do, has done, and is doing, you ought to go back to 1793 to make such a comparison. The provisions of the Bill arc so few and simple that I believe I have now described them. I have stated the object to be to enable the Government to have at their command additional reserves, in addition to that of the new battalion to be added to each regiment.
My Lords, a noble Friend (Earl Grey) the other evening expressed an opinion that I should, on moving the second reading of this Bill, give some information to show how far the powers given last year for recruiting and reinforcing the army have been effectual. I will therefore state what has been done to accelerate recruiting both the militia and the regular army. Under the provisions of the Militia Act, on the original enrolment of the militia, an enrolment
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fee of 10 s. was paid to each recruit, and a further sum of 8s. 6d. for expenses. If a militiaman had enlisted for five years, and wished to be discharged, whether for the purpose of joining the regular army or any other reason, he was only permitted to leave the militia on repayment of the 18 s. 6d., and providing a sufficient substitute to fill his place in the regiment he sought to quit. The first step taken by the Government to encourage recruiting from the militia into the army was taken on the 3rd of March, by the repayment of the enrolment fee being remitted to the men seeking their discharges for the purpose of joining the regular forces. This first step was taken about three weeks before the declaration of war, and, on the 5th of April, shortly after the declaration of war, another relaxation of the restrictions upon recruiting from the militia took place. The payment was not only remitted to the man who sought to be discharged for the purpose of enlisting into the army before the time of the annual training of the regiment to which he belonged, but at the same time a further sum of 10 s. was given to him to compensate any pecuniary loss to which he might be exposed by such a step. On the 27th of May, a further relaxation took place in the removal of all restrictions on the transfer of men from the militia to the army. In May, June, and July, eighteen regiments of militia were embodied, as your Lordships, no doubt, are aware. The removal of the impediments of recruiting from the militia for the army had been followed by a great increase in the number of recruits; but during the earlier part of the autumn recruiting from the militia dwindled to a very small amount, and in November a circular was issued to all the eighteen regiments which were embodied, calling upon them to contribute towards the regular army 25 per cent of the numbers comprised in their respective regiments, and, in order to encourage this enlistment into the line, an additional bounty of 1l. was granted to each recruit, and an ensigncy in the army was offered to every officer of militia who should bring seventy-five men to join. Since the 25th of November forty-five additional regiments have been embodied—thirty-six in England, and nine in Ireland. These last nine Irish regiments having been embodied before being enrolled, it is for the present impossible to look to them as an immediate source of recruiting; but, from the thirty-six additional regiments

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ordered to be embodied, and which I hope will be embodied in the course of the next fortnight, we expect to derive the same advantage of 25 per cent which we have already obtained from the other eighteen regiments previously embodied. Some observations have been made upon the number of recruits offering from the militia; but the number was not so great as was supposed until the plan was adopted of calling on the militia to furnish 25 per cent of their numbers to the line. I do not think the number who entered direct from the militia before that time exceeded 5,000, and those who were recruited by other means from the same source would swell that number, perhaps, by 2,000. I should add that, with the view of restoring the militia regiments, thus weakened by the withdrawal of 25 per cent of the men, to their proper numbers, encouragements have been held out in the shape of increased bounties, or rather in a redistribution of the bounty, by which the recruit receives the larger portion at the commencement, instead of the latter period, of the five years for which he enlists. Noble Lords will perceive from my statement that a very large proportion of the militia in England is ordered to be embodied. I can only add that the same system will be pursued with regard to the remaining regiments in a fit state, and that the whole of the militia which may be ripe for embodiment will be called out without material delay. With regard to recruiting for the army from other sources than the militia, the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) the other night said, the only thing necessary to be done was to lower the standard and raise the bounty. If that be all that he required, I can assure the noble Earl that before he made that observation both these measures had been adopted by the Government in concurrence with my noble Friend the Commander in Chief. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I said a further reduction.] The reduction, which was made long before the noble Earl offered any suggestion on the subject, was from 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 4½ inches. I had not apprehended any contradiction, or I would have been prepared with the date of the reduction; but to the best of my recollection it has been in operation for something like four or five weeks. I dare say, however, that my noble Friend the General Commanding in Chief recollects the date of that reduction. I know not what the date of the subsequent re-
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duction may have been, but this I do know, that at the time when the reduction of 1½ in. was made, the General Commanding in Chief did not think that it was desirable at once to reduce the standard to that which existed during the whole Peninsular war, namely, 5 feet 4 inches, because he was anxious, in the first instance, to see what would be the effect of the reduction of 1½ inch, and his determination to reduce the standard another half-inch, with the entire approval of the Government, had no reference whatever to the debate which took place in this House. That reduction was, indeed, determined upon before anything was said on the subject in this House. It may be that, technically, the order may bear date the 19th of December; but many noble Lords conversant with such matters are aware that these orders frequently bear a date some days subsequent to that on which the measures to which they relate are determined upon. The standard was reduced a week or ten days ago to that at which it now stands—namely, 5 feet 4 inches—that having been the standard which existed during the whole of the Peninsular war; and I have the authority of the Commander in Chief for saying that, unless it should be absolutely requisite, he would strongly deprecate, upon sound military grounds, any further reduction. I must say, therefore, with regard to these measures, that they have been adopted without any pressure from the Opposition. With respect to the bounty, it was increased at the time that the first reduction of the standard took place, in different proportions to the three branches of the service—the cavalry, the infantry, and the artillery. At the same time that these two measures were adopted, a third, which was not suggested by the noble Earl, was also adopted—namely, that of extending the age up to which recruits would be accepted, from twenty-five to thirty years. This alteration took place at least four or five weeks ago; and at the same time another extension was made—namely, that soldiers who have obtained their discharge by purchase, may re-enter the service up to the age of thirty-five, the age of thirty having heretofore been the limit. [Earl GREY asked, what effect had been produced by these alterations?] It is, of course, not very easy to indicate the exact effect produced by each of these different causes. We have every reason to believe that the most material cause of the increased enlistment has been the em-

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bodiment of the militia, and the calling upon each militia regiment to furnish recruits to the line equal to 25 per cent of its numbers. Mark, I do not think it is owing to the embodiment of the militia alone, because practically that was found nearly inoperative; for, although some regiments were embodied in May, June, and July, yet from that time up to the period when the circular was issued calling for recruits in the proportion of 25 per cent from each militia regiment, the recruiting from the militia, so far from increasing, had been gradually dwindling away. The call of 25 per cent from each militia regiment most undoubtedly produced a great increase in the enlistments for the regular army. Of course the reduction of the standard applies to recruiting from the militia equally with recruiting from the general population. I cannot state what effect the increased bounty has had up to the present time; but at its first adoption, which took place a week before the issue of the circular to which I have referred, it undoubtedly had some considerable effect. The source whence we have derived the most material increase to the regular army has certainly been the militia regiments, from which 25 per cent of their numbers have been obtained. [Earl GREY asked whether the army had been brought up to the full establishment?] No, the army is not yet brought up to the full establishment fixed by the Votes of last year. My noble Friend will, of course, recollect that two separate grants for the increase of the army were made by the House of Commons in the course of the present year, the increase amounting altogether to 40,000 men. Now, though, upon the whole, the enlistments in the course of 1854 have been more considerable, I believe, than in any one year upon record, my noble Friend will at once see that an addition of far more than 40,000 men would be necessary to increase the strength of the army to that extent, after replacing even the ordinary casualties of such a force. The ordinary casualties of such an army are reckoned at 1,000 a month, or 12,000 a year, but it must be remembered that numerous additional casualties have taken place consequent upon the actions in which the troops have been engaged—so that the number of recruits necessary to bring the army up to its complete establishment would be something like 60,000 men. I am sorry to say that we have not yet arrived at that
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point. What effect may be produced by recruiting from the militia it is impossible to conjecture. I can only say that the recruiting from that source, at the present moment, would not in itself be adequate. When all the militia regiments are assembled, 25 per cent from every regiment in the kingdom would not be sufficient for the purposes of the army, and I sincerely hope that not merely noble Lords, but the public at large, so far from throwing any impediment in the way of recruiting generally from the population, will give it all the encouragement in their power. I have no hesitation in saying, that no measures which Her Majesty's Government may propose—whether Foreign Enlistment Bills, such Bills as that now before your Lordships, or any others—can form anything like a substitute for enlistments from the population of this country; and whatever efforts may be made, in connection with the militia or otherwise, we must look to a large recruiting from the general population of the country, without which our army cannot be maintained in such a state as will enable us to cope with the gigantic forces with which we have to contend. One mode of increasing the means at the disposal of the Government for the prosecution of the war will be the adoption of the present measure, which I believe to be as right in principle as I am certain it will be effectual in practice, at least to the extent to which it goes; and I trust your Lordships will give it your assent, if not unanimously, at any rate without a division.
Moved, That the Bill be read 2a.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I think it right to say that I do not concur as fully in the policy and expediency of this measure as I do in the avowed object with which it is brought forward, that object being numerically and otherwise to increase, as far as possible, and as rapidly as possible, the strength and efficiency of our regular forces. I confess it was with deep concern that I heard the announcement of the noble Duke, that, notwithstanding all the efforts which have been made in the course of the present year, it has not been found possible to meet the wishes and views and to second the endeavours of Parliament, by raising the regular forces up to the number which Parliament sanctioned during the last Session—that is to say, that the addition of 40,000 men, sanctioned by Parliament, plus the casualties and deficiencies in our regular forces,

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has been obtained. The noble Duke has not told us how far the number of men obtained falls short of the number required, nor do I think it necessary to call upon him for any information on that point. I have said, my Lords, that I do not concur as fully in the policy and expediency of the mode of action proposed by Her Majesty's Government as I do with the objects they have in view; and my objections to this Bill are founded upon the conviction, which I entertain in common with many noble Lords, and I believe with a large portion of the people, that the measure, so far from promoting, will rather tend to impede those objects, and that it will be accompanied with other inconveniences, not the least of which will be a total and entire change in the character of the militia service of this country. The militia force of this country I apprehend to be strictly for the maintenance of domestic tranquillity and the preservation of the country from the danger of foreign invasion, and, as supplementary to those objects, to enable us, when circumstances require its services elsewhere, to dispense within the United Kingdom of the services of nearly the whole of our small standing army. I say our small standing army, because at all times the Parliament and the people of this country have looked with suspicion upon a large standing army. My opinion is that that jealousy has of late years been pushed to an unreasonable extent, and that it will be found that the Parliamentary economy which has enforced reductions of our standing army in time of peace has proved a false economy, and has led us into the difficulties in which we are now involved with respect to raising sufficient forces for the war. The standing army of this country, from whatever cause, has been practically reduced to such an amount as may have been sufficient for more attendance upon the Crown, with regard to the Household troops; and, in the case of the regiments of the line, for providing a force barely sufficient to reinforce and relieve from time to time that large portion of our army which is habitually employed in service abroad to a much greater extent than any other army in Europe. The object and use of the militia force, then, are the home service, and the home service alone, and to supply the place of that small portion of the regular army which, being habitually kept at home, it may, upon, extraordinary occasions, be necessary to send abroad in the
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service of the country. Remember, that your militia force now—which was not the case in the last war—is essentially a voluntary force; and, as the population have shown the greatest readiness to volunteer for service in that militia force, it is upon a strict adherence to those terms and conditions which have been made with the various regiments that you must mainly rely for the existence of your militia, and for maintaining this perpetual nursery and seed-bed, as it were, from which to supply your troops. I will endeavour to consider the operation of this Bill, first of all as bearing upon the manner in which it contributes to the relief and reinforcement of our regular army, and, next, with regard to the effect it will have upon the future enlistment of the militia. With regard to the reinforcement of the regular army, the noble Duke was incorrect—though, no doubt, he correctly expressed the intentions of the Government—in stating the terms and conditions of the measure, that it does not enable Her Majesty to employ any regiment of militia upon foreign service otherwise than within our Mediterranean colonies. The noble Duke has called our attention to the variation between the terms of this Bill and those of the Act of 1814. There is a variation—but that variation, so far from being what the noble Duke represents, is one which gives far more extended powers to the Crown for the employment of the militia than were given to the Crown for the employment of that force by the Act of 1814. By that Act the Crown was restricted to the employment of these forces in Europe. By the present Bill there is no limitation whatever as to the quarter of the world to which the militia may be sent. The consent of the militia regiments is required before they can be sent to Malta, and precisely the same consent—neither more nor less—is required to send them to the Crimea or anywhere else. By the Act of 1814 the King was enabled to employ a definite portion of the militia in any part of Europe he might think fit; but this Bill enables Her Majesty to accept the services of the militia and to employ them in any parts or places out of the United Kingdom. The noble Duke is, therefore, quite incorrect in his statement, whatever the intentions of the Government may have been—and I have not the least doubt he has correctly stated their intentions; but the wording of the Bill gives the Government the power to send the militia, with their

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own consent, just as much to the Crimea as to Malta, Gibraltar, or the Ionian Islands.
My Lords, it is said that the intention of the Bill is to provide for the sending militia regiments to Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands. Now, is this the best and most efficient mode of providing for the reinforcement of the army in the Crimea, under present circumstances? I think the noble Duke will hardly deny—I am sure, if he does, there is scarcely an individual in the kingdom who will concur with him—that the great error which has been made by the Government in the course of their preparations for this war, and in carrying it on, is that of not having provided an efficient reserve. They have sent 30,000 40,000, or 50,000 men to the Crimea, and they have no reserve at hand to support them. The noble Duke has stated that, at this moment, the garrison of Malta is reduced very much below its ordinary strength. I believe that garrison was so reduced; and if I am not mistaken, the garrison of the Ionian Islands also, by the acts of the officers commanding in those islands, upon their own responsibility; and, if they did so act upon their own responsibility, I conceive that they did themselves very great credit, looking to the circumstances in which our army in the East was placed. It is admitted by Her Majesty's Government that a great fault has been committed in not having in the Mediterranean a reserve immediately available for reinforcing the army in the Crimea; and with reference to that omission, I ventured, on the first night of the Session, to express my strong approval of the proposition—which I apprehend came rather from the old superseded department of the Horse Guards than from the modern lately-introduced department of the Secretary for War—namely, the proposition for forming a second battalion for all regiments, and for increasing the number of companies of all regiments, serving in the Crimea, and also for placing one-half of each of these second battalions as what may be called an advanced reserve in the Mediterranean, leaving the other half of such second battalions in this country, to form the nucleus for obtaining reinforcements for the army. Of that provision I entirely approve, because it appears to me to be the proper course to raise your raw recruits in this country, to send them forward, when they have received some training, to an advanced post near the scene of action, and then, as they become more
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perfectly trained and disciplined, to transport them to the seat of war. But, if the object of the Government is to have in the Mediterranean garrisons a large reserve force immediately available, why do you send to the Ionian Islands and to Malta, not regiments which can be sent to the seat of war, but regiments which, from the terms of their enlistment, are only available for service in the particular garrisons to which they are sent? Your object appears to be, not only to garrison Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, but to have at each of those points the greatest available reserve for the army in the Crimea; but your proposition will have the effect of displacing a considerable number of regular troops in those garrisons, and of filling them with regiments which, according to the intentions of this Bill, cannot be forwarded as reinforcements to the Crimea. I consider that, for the purpose of reinforcing the army, it would have been infinitely better to have maintained as large a number of regular troops as possible in the garrisons of the Mediterranean, and to have used every exertion in your power, by bounties, by lowering the standard, or by other means, to encourage the militia of this country, not to embark ill bodies as militia regiments for foreign service, but to volunteer into the line, and thus to keep perpetually feeding your army with well-trained men. This Bill, however, so far from encouraging that object, tends to oppose and defeat it, inasmuch as you send out militia regiments to places where their services can be of comparatively little value, and thereby diminish the means of reinforcing and recruiting your army.
I am not going to quarrel with the noble Duke, nor to discuss with him at what time it was determined by the Government to increase the bounty or lower the standard, but I am ready to give entire credit to his assertion as to the period at which those measures were determined upon, and I am not in the least disposed to claim, on the part of those who are opposed to Her Majesty's Government, the slightest credit for having suggested such measures. I at once say that they are measures in the propriety and necessity of which I entirely and cordially concur. They are steps which the Government were bound to take, and which they have very properly taken; but I say that the effect of the present Bill will be, to a great extent, to neutralise all the beneficial results which

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might have been expected from the adoption of such a course; and that the better plan would be to afford encouragement to the militia regiments to supply recruits to the line. The noble Duke laid considerable stress upon the doctrine that this is a purely voluntary service, and, undoubtedly, to some extent it is so; though, when he claims credit for the large number of recruits who have been derived from the militia, he at the same time lets out what is hardly consistent with the purely voluntary principle—namely, that every regiment of militia was called upon and required by the Government to send 25 per cent of its numbers as recruits to the regular army; that every means were used by the Government to obtain that reinforcement; and that it is only since that requisition on the part of the Government for 25 per cent of the strength of the militia, that any very large number of recruits have been obtained for the army. Now, let me ask this question—and perhaps the noble Duke will not refuse to answer it, though he does not appear disposed to afford much information in that manner—let me ask whether encouragement will be given to the regiments of militia sent to the Mediterranean garrisons to furnish recruits to the line, or whether they will be prohibited from doing so? There appears to me to be this double difficulty and dilemma in the course you are taking. If these militia regiments are sent out without any permission or encouragement to volunteer into the line, then the maintenance of this large force in the Mediterranean will be utterly useless for warlike purposes; but supposing it is intended to encourage them to volunteer into the line, you run the risk of having these militia regiments which may be imperfectly drilled and trained when they are sent out, and which are to hold important garrisons, unduly weakened by this system of recruiting. From one of these two alternatives I do not see how the Government can escape. The noble Duke laid great stress upon the entirely voluntary character of this proceeding, and he says that, so far from there being the slightest difficulty in obtaining militia regiments for foreign service, a larger number of regiments than are required have volunteered for that service. I do not in the slightest degree doubt that fact. I do not doubt that, in the first excitement of active service, men who have already been embodied, and who have acquired a taste for
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military life, will be perfectly ready to volunteer in a body for foreign service. But I believe that almost an equal proportion of men would be quite as likely to volunteer out of militia regiments into the line, after they have acquired these military tastes, and thus I think we should obtain much more serviceable reinforcements. But what I am looking at is not the immediate pressure, nor the existing willingness of the militia to volunteer—I think it is a question, if you thus alter the character of the militia service, how far you are likely to obtain from the non-military portion of the population recruits for a service which may be converted into a totally different service from that for which they enter. When you first enlisted your militia regiments, certain conditions were laid down under which they were to be embodied—such, for instance, as the invasion of the country. Those conditions were extended to circumstances of war, and, even with regard to their foreign service under such circumstances, you thought it necessary to ask the special assent, not only of every regiment, but of every individual in each regiment. I think in that respect you did rightly, because nothing could be more dangerous than the slightest suspicion of breach of faith with these men, who were enlisted upon certain conditions. You then went further, and asked them to volunteer for five years. You ask them now to volunteer for active service abroad, and no doubt many of these regiments would be quite as ready to volunteer for active service in the Crimea as at Malta and Gibraltar. But that is not the question. At present the militia are chiefly connected with the rural and agricultural districts, and they do not object to the lowering of their earnings for two or three months, or even to being embodied; but they are a class upon whom all the pressure of friends and relations will hereafter be put in force when they find that, instead of the ordinary militia service for which they enlisted, the service is to become something like the regular service in the army. Do not tell me that this volunteering for foreign service is, with respect to individuals, purely voluntary. I have no doubt that, though many men have entered the militia who would be unwilling now to quit the country for active service, there would be, in the present excited state of public feeling, very great reluctance upon the part of any man to plead his own personal circumstances and his own pri-

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vate inconvenience as reasons for not going abroad when he found his comrades had volunteered for foreign service. He would be reluctant to escape from that which would be put before him for a duty, although it was a duty which he never contemplated when he entered the militia. Well, he would go—the man now in the militia would go;—but they would find country gentlemen, and persons employed in trade, would hereafter hesitate much to enter the militia, if they were to have that moral screw placed upon them in the shape of an invitation to volunteer into the regular service. A noble Friend behind me asks what is to become of the man with a family, who, possessing but small means, has insured his life? Such a man may have entered the militia without conceiving that he was entering upon any very sanguinary business, or that he would be exposed to any great risk. His life, however, will be risked by going to an unhealthy climate; he will be compelled to forfeit the insurance which he has effected as a provision for his family at his death; and all this will be done by requiring him to enter into an engagement which he never contemplated when he joined the militia. I conceive that this is pushing the voluntary principle to the furthest extremity. The noble Duke will perhaps remind me that a very considerable alteration has been made in this Bill by an Amendment moved in the other House of Parliament by a right hon. Friend of mine (Sir J. Pakington), and assented to on the part of Her Majesty's Government, whereby a limitation has been fixed to the proportion of any militia regiment to go abroad; and it may be said, on behalf of the officers of the various regiments to whom it would be inconvenient to go abroad, that they may be left at home with the companies remaining as depôts, in which case they would be still performing all the duties they contemplated when they entered the force. Now, I think the limitation which has been put to the number of each regiment to be sent abroad is very important in this respect, and it is also most important in another respect—in keeping up that which ought never to be broken—namely, the connection between the militia regiments and the country—as well as the various counties in which they are raised. If you were to send the whole of a militia regiment abroad—the Royal Bucks, or the Royal Lancashire, or the Royal Stafford—you
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would at once break up the connection of the regiment with the county—you would convert those regiments into more regiments of the line, bearing the names of the counties in which they were raised, but being otherwise wholly unconnected with those counties. Depend upon it, my Lords, that with regard to the militia force —its peculiar constitution, its peculiar character, and its peculiar duties — it is of primary importance that you should connect it, not only with the country, but, locally, with the county to which it belongs, and with all denominations of men within that county, from the highest to the lowest rank. If you were to send the whole of a regiment abroad for the period of the war, or for five years—the limit which you have fixed—you would leave it no root in that county—no nucleus or means of recruiting its strength—you break up altogether its connection with its county, and so alter the character of the whole militia force. It has been admitted by the Government that the Amendment to limit the proportion of each regiment sent abroad hit a blot in the original draft of the Bill, but that it never was intended to take the whole of these regiments out of the country. Now, this Bill professes to be founded on the 54 Geo. III., c. 1; now, in that Act there is a clause precisely to the effect of the proviso which, on the Motion of my right hon. Friend in the other House, was inserted in the Bill, and inserted for the reasons I have mentioned—a proviso prohibiting more than three-fourths of any militia regiment being sent out at the same time. I say, then, if this was a blot, it was an intentional one on the part of the Government, and that the omission was studiously made. When the proviso to which I refer was inserted in the other House, another point was noticed which I think a very important one—namely, that in the former Bill there was a proviso not only limiting the proportion of each regiment to be sent out, but the total number of the militia to be sent out from this country as well. In this Bill there was no such provisio; and, in noticing the matter in the other House, the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who has had great experience of military and militia affairs, objected to any limitation in this respect, not upon the principle itself, because he thought no man would ever think of sending out the whole militia force, but because in the Act 54 Geo. III. there was no such proviso. This, how-

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ever, is not the fact; for in the Act of Geo. III. I find a proviso that no more than 30,000 shall be sent out at any one time. Thus, then, there are two provisions of the Bill of Geo. III, which have been studiously departed from in this Bill, one of which the noble Duke says was a blot, while the other is not admitted to be a blot, but is said to be a limitation for which there is no precedent. It was with great reluctance, my Lords, that I found myself compelled, in a matter of principle in which, I believe, the great bulk of the country concurred with me and with those who have acted with me—it was with great reluctance that I found myself compelled to object to the Foreign Enlistment Bill, and to call upon your Lordships to reject that Bill; but in a matter of less vital importance than the principle which was embodied in that Bill, I think the greatest latitude should be afforded to Government in the means they may adopt for reinforcing the army at this crisis. I do not intend, therefore, to offer any opposition to the Bill now before your Lordships, or to move any Amendment upon it; but I must say, with regard to the point to which I have already adverted, that, considering the objects for which the militia were raised, and the importance of keeping up that force, it was not unreasonable to expect that, whereas in 1814 a limit of 30,000 was put to the whole number to be sent out of the country, in this case some limit should also have been fixed—a limit, perhaps, of something like 15,000 men, considering that the numerical force of the militia at present is so much less than what it was in 1814. My objections to this Bill are founded, first of all, upon the belief that you are not taking the most efficient or advantageous mode of recruiting the strength of the army—that you would reinforce it much better by embodying the whole of the militia, and giving every inducement to the men to enter the line, than by sending militia regiments and portions of militia regiments abroad; and secondly, because, while I admit that the alterations which have been made in the Bill, make a material difference in the measure, still I cannot help thinking that, altered as it is, you are still exposed to a serious risk—not now, in the present year, and under the present excitement, but hereafter—as to how far you will be able in future years to keep up a permanent supply to the militia of the country. I think, moreover, that Her Majesty's Government
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will experience considerable difficulties when they come to deal with the bounties which are to be given for re-enlistment and for entering into foreign service. Great difficulty will be felt, I believe, in adjusting the bounties awarded to militiamen volunteering for foreign service, and to militiamen volunteering to take part in the war. That, however, is a question which may remain altogether in the hands of the Government.
My Lords, there is one peculiarity with regard to the militia to which I am now particularly desirous of calling attention—namely, the inconvenient position in which this Bill places the medical officers of the various regiments. The proposition of my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Pakington) in another place was that not more than three-fourths of the strength of any militia regiment should ever be sent abroad at any one time; and I am told that considerable amusement was excited by an hon. and gallant Member, when on the question being asked how many were to remain at home, the answer given was one-fourth. It would be very well if that were the case; but as the Bill is worded it would appear that not more than three fourths of the "establishment" of a militia regiment are to be permitted to serve out of the United Kingdom at one time. Conceiving the "establishment" of a regiment to be 1,200 men, if three-fourths of that regiment volunteered abroad, that would make 900 men so volunteering; but if a regiment in the whole amounted to 900, seeing that that number would not be sufficient to constitute its "establishment," I see nothing in the Bill to prevent the whole 900 leaving the kingdom; and, therefore, in such a case, one-fourth would not be left at home. If that is their intention, I must say the Government have acceded to the words of the Amendment, but have not adopted its spirit, namely, that there shall be always left in this country at least one-fourth of the strength of every militia regiment. I trust that we may hear from the noble Duke that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government, whether three-fourths of the establishment of a regiment go abroad or not, to keep in this country at least one-fourth as a nucleus for reinforcing and recruiting the regiment. And now with regard to the medical officers. You place your militia in a certain locality, and you form the force out of persons more or less in that locality. You then embody them, and, to a certain extent, you subject them

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to inconvenience; but they are embodied only for a short time, and they hope soon to return to their regular avocations. The next step you take is to send them out for five years to a foreign country; and, in that case, in what situation do you place the medical officer? He enters the regiment and is content with the poor pay he receives, because he has an independent practice in the locality which he is desirous of retaining, and, if possible, of augmenting; but when you despatch the regiment to Malta or Gibraltar, he will either not go and you will have to send out an inferior man, or, if he does go, it will be to the ruin of his private practice, which it is impossible to suppose he can regain when his period of service has terminated. He is entitled to no half-pay when he comes back again; and you, therefore, claim from that man the sacrifice of his connection, his practice, his profession, and his means of livelihood; you send him abroad for five years, and, at the expiration of that period, you turn him loose upon the country to make his way as he can. Surely you cannot expect that a medical man, a gentleman well informed and well educated, will consent to forego all the advantages of private practice to form part of a militia regiment on this footing, though he would be proud and happy to form a portion of the corps if the objects for which the force was originally raised were adhered to.
My Lords, before I sit down, I hope I shall be permitted, as we are now considering the most effectual mode of carrying on the war and of reinforcing Her Majesty's troops—I hope I shall be permitted to say a few words upon a subject respecting which, on a point of form, I was properly interrupted a short time ago. I wish to call attention to that portion of Her Majesty's forces which has been employed in blockading' hostile ports. In the other House of Parliament we have had the assurance of the First Lord of the Admiralty—or, if not, by other Members of the Government in that House, on several distinct occasions, that the strictest orders had been given to blockade the Russian ports in the White Sea, as well as in the Baltic; and in the Black Sea, as well as in the White Sea. An effectual blockade of the Baltic has taken place from an early period—I think from the beginning of last June. It was undertaken later in beginning case of Archangel, where also it was certain to be effectual; but up to this moment the
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ports of Taganrog and Odessa are just as much open to Russian commerce as if no blockade had ever been threatened. Russian commerce passes from these ports without let or hindrance, as if no word had been ever said about the blockade, and to the greatest injury of British commerce. A blockade of the ports of the Black Sea must naturally be felt to be a great loss to the commerce of this country; but, having declared that there should be a blockade, you have sent British industry to every part of the globe in order to provide substitutes for the produce which ordinarily came through those ports; and the importations of palm oil and other commodities from the West Indies and the coast of Africa have prodigiously increased in consequence of the announcement made by Her Majesty's Government that it was intended to maintain an effectual blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. And now what has happened? Why, our enterprising merchants, acting on that declaration, are bringing home their goods from India and other parts of the world, and on entering the English market are met by the astounding fact, that notwithstanding the announcement of the blockade of the Russian ports the trade with Russia in the Black Sea is not only as brisk as ever, but that British merchants have this additional hardship placed upon them, that they are excluded, not only from the Black Sea, but from the Baltic and Archangel as well. And who is it that is carrying on the trade of the Black Sea? Why, it is notoriously the Greek houses. The British merchant is suffering all the inconvenience and hardship of a blockade, inasmuch as he abstains from carrying on the trade in the Black Sea, which goes to other quarters, and in particular our very cordial friends and well wishers, the Greek merchants, enjoy the advantages of an unrestricted commerce. Now, my Lords, I think this is a subject upon which we ought to have information. I think we have a right to ask if orders have been issued to blockade the ports of the Black Sea, and if Government have ascertained whether that blockade has been strictly maintained. I presume, however, that it has, or if it has not, then it must be in consequence of orders issued from the Government, because they have lately signified their approval of the conduct of the Admiral in command of the fleet in the Black Sea by giving the Thanks of Parliament to Admiral Dundas and the men under his com-

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mand, for the manner in which they have discharged their duty in the Black Sea. In proposing that Vote, the Government asserted that Admiral Dundas had obeyed their orders strictly and effectually, and, therefore, one of two things must have occurred—Her Majesty's Government, having made a declaration to Parliament that they had issued orders to enforce a strict blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea, have either never issued those orders, or they have issued counter-orders since. It may be said that this is a delicate subject, and that we are acting in conjunction with another Power whom it is our duty to consult. It might certainly be a delicate subject were I to ask Her Majesty's Government if it was their intention to direct a blockade of some port against which no blockade had yet been maintained—but this is no matter of delicacy at all. Parliament have a perfect right to know whether Her Majesty's Government, having said one thing to Parliament, have practitically done another—whether, having announced to British merchants that there would be a blockade, they have since suffered unfriendly merchants to enjoy the whole of the commerce of the Black Sea, by taking advantage of the practical absence of a blockade. In my opinion, the Government ought and are bound to give an explanation on the matter. There is also another point upon which I wish for information. I may be quite wrong in the information I have received, but it is currently reported—and, if erroneously, it should be contradicted by Her Majesty's Government—that not only goods and merchandise have left the port of Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea, but military stores, ammunition, and supplies have also at various times left the stores of Odessa for the Crimea. It is likewise reported that two Russian Princes the other day quitted Odessa by sea, and I ask the Government if they have reason to believe that such was the case? I have no reason to believe either in the truth or untruth of these statements; but I think it important that full information should be given upon the matter. With regard, however, to the existence of a blockade, I can speak with more confidence; and I am surprised that the rigid and rigorous blockade announced by the Government has not been adhered to. Perhaps I ought now to apologise for deviating from the subject more particularly before your Lordships—the Militia
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Bill—into that which appears to me to be a material portion of the general scheme for carrying on the war. I certainly do not approve that Bill; I do not think it likely to bestow any great advantage upon the army. I think it calculated to create great inconvenience, and to cause great discouragement to the militia; and it is only because I am desirous of not interposing the slightest obstacle to Her Majesty's Government in carrying on the contest in which they are engaged that I abstain from moving any Amendment upon it.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I think the noble Earl has somewhat misunderstood my motives for interrupting him upon a point of order when I rose very shortly to answer a question put by him. The noble Earl seems to think that Her Majesty's Government are either anxious to conceal from the House a fact which they knew, or that my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle), being War Minister, was ignorant of matters taking place in the conduct of the war. Now, with regard to the ignorance of my noble Friend, it so happens that the fact of the blockade was the subject of conversation between my noble Friend and the First Lord of the Admiralty this very afternoon, which shows to a certain extent that he had not acted from ignorance, but because he was anxious to keep up a most essential principle, which, so far as I am concerned, I shall always observe—namely, that no one of Her Majesty's Ministers should be required to jump up in his place and give an off-hand answer to any question of importance, which, even with a very good memory, might be very incorrect, and would place him, the next time the question was put, in the awkward position of appearing to be ignorant of the business of his department. The noble Duke never meant to say that the Government refused to give any information upon these points; but it is quite obvious that, in the matter of a blockade, involving in the greatest possible degree the interests of trade, and in which the interests of the French Government are combined with our own, it would be most rash not to take care of the strict and perfect accuracy of every part of the answer given to any question respecting it, and it was the delicacy of the matter which induced my noble Friend not to give any off-hand answer which might possibly be inaccurate. The noble Earl has stated very accurately the fact of the blockade as regards the Baltic. Until lately the block-

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ade of some of the Baltic ports has not been enforced, and this has taken place almost exclusively on one ground—namely, that in certain ports there, particularly in Archangel, almost all the goods about to be exported were the property of British or of French merchants. It was, therefore, very desirable that some little latitude should be given in such a case; and I hope this explanation will satisfy your Lordships that no blame rests with the Government, with the department more particularly concerned, or with the officers upon whom it would have devolved to carry out the blockade. An explanation equally satisfactory can be given with regard to the blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. Instructions were originally sent out for the strictest blockade of those ports. Those orders were received by both the British and the French Admirals; but difculties both practical and theoretical arose as to their execution. At last plans were agreed to by the Admirals for blockading the Russian ports by watching the entrance to the Bosphorus. When this came to the knowledge of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, it appeared to him that such a course was contrary to the principles of international law. He therefore referred the case home to the British Government; communications were at once opened with the French Government upon the subject; and it was found that Lord Stratford was perfectly right, and that the Admirals could not, with regard to the blockade, take the course they proposed. Upon this, fresh communications were immediately entered into between the two Governments, and entered into, as regards the French Government, with the cordiality which has always marked their bearing towards the Ministers of this country. New arrangements were made, and fresh orders were sent out for the complete blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. All this, however, occupied a considerable time, and entailed great delay; and then came that most enormous enterprise, the carrying over of the allied troops from Varna to the shores of the Crimea. During that time the material means were wholly wanting to the Admirals to enforce the blockade. Since then, however, fresh arrangements have been made, and the strictest orders given to our naval officers not only to enforce the blockade, but to harass the enemy in every possible way. I have no doubt that order is being efficiently carried out, as far as our commanders can possibly
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do so. [The Earl of DERBY: When were those last orders sent out?] Two months ago. The noble Earl put to the Government another question which, from its nature, I cannot answer with perfect assurance—I mean respecting an enormous quantity of ammunition said to be sent from Odessa, and as to the two Russian Princes having gone from that port by sea to the Crimea. The only answer it is in my power to give to that report is, that I four or five ships from the allied fleets have been constantly cruising in front of Odessa; that reports have been constantly sent to Her Majesty's Government from the commanders of those vessels; and it certainly appears perfectly impossible that such ammunition should have been sent, or that the Russian Princes should have been able to sail from Odessa to the Crimea in the way described by the noble Earl. Further than that, however, I cannot answer as to the truth or falsehood of these reports. With regard to this Bill, the noble Earl has certainly made an ingenious statement of his objections to it. The plan proposed by the noble Earl is, indeed, a most excellent one. I do not imagine there is one noble Lord on this side of the House who does not think that the best plan of proceeding would be, while we are making war in the Crimea, to have in the Mediterranean a large reserve of perfectly well-trained troops, able at once, in case of necessity, to replace those of our forces actually engaged against the enemy, and thus enabling us to keep our militia at home, where their services would be of the most value. But, unfortunately, we have to do, not what would be most desirable, but what is practicable and possible. We are blamed, forsooth, for that, having sent out some 50,000 men to the Crimea, we have not an equal reserve to support them. Now, a reserve would have been most desirable, but I hardly think, supposing in that case we could have gone to Sebastopol at all, that to have sent 25,000 men to the Crimea and to have retained a reserve of 25,000 men behind in the Mediterranean, would have been the best way of securing success there. When, therefore, the noble Earl says there ought to have been a reserve, I think he ought to have reflected where any reserve over and above these 50,000 men was possible. I remember, during the Administration of the noble Earl, that it was said it was absolutely impossible to scrape together in one spot in England 25,000 men, and even then, you

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would be taking every man from sentry duty and from the manufacturing districts. I mention this to show the difficulties, as regards the number of our forces, which existed during the Administration of the noble Earl, and which were duly appreciated by him then, because a Bill at that time was proposed by the Government of the noble Earl to increase by 5,000 the number of our troops. Now, however, when during the present war you have sent some thousands of miles 54,000 men—absolutely double the number which, so short a time before, it was suggested that our peace establishment could provide—after having done this, it is made a strong point of attack upon the Government that we have not an equal reserve of perfectly trained men at our disposal! With regard to our garrisons in the Mediterranean, it would no doubt be better to have them occupied by well-trained men. But that, unfortunately, is not the alternative presented to us. The additional companies which are to be raised and added to the line regiments will consist of perfectly raw recruits, and it is not desirable to intrust the whole garrisoning of our Mediterranean possessions to perfectly raw troops such as I have described. The noble Earl's plan of recruiting from the militia into the line regiments so sent out is not a bad one; but the fact is that there is not that immense readiness on the part of men to volunteer from the militia into the like which is supposed to exist. It has been declared that in many cases the appeal to the militia regiments was not followed by a voluntary recruitment. How that statement can be supported I really do not know. You wanted recruits for the line, so you sent to the militia to offer each man a bounty if he would enlist, and give an ensigncy to officers to induce them to use their influence. Now, I confess I cannot understand how the noble Earl can represent that as drawing a contingent of one-fourth from each regiment of militia. The fact is, that in some of those very regiments which have been most anxious to volunteer for foreign service as proposed, you have not been able to get this proportion of one-fourth when they were required to volunteer individually. I really must request your Lordships to look at this measure candidly, and I cannot help thinking that, when such measures are brought forward at a great crisis like the present, the ordinary Parliamentary system of examining into every little detail with great
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minuteness is hardly applicable, when you want really to strengthen the hands of your Government at home. This remark, I think, applies particularly to what has been advanced by the noble Earl about the medical men who are to accompany these militia regiments, The practical answer to his complaint on this subject clearly is this—the old-established, well-to-do medical men will not go out with the regiments, while you will get very able, energetic young men, who are delighted at the opportunity of going out, and under whose care I have no doubt the health of the troops will be looked to as well as by any possible arrangement which could be entered into. I will not occupy your Lordships' time longer, but, having answered, as far as it was possible to do so, the questions of the noble Earl, I trust that the second reading of this Bill will not be further delayed.
EARL GREY: My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble Earl who has just sat down that this Bill presents only petty details, which are not worthy the attention of Parliament, nor of discussion by noble Lords who arc sincerely desirous of aiding the Government in carrying on the war. I do not think we need a very microscopic eye to discover flaws enough to give us great objections to this Bill. For my own part I object to this Bill, because I believe it to be wrong in principle, and a departure from the whole design of that Militia Bill which three years ago Parliament was induced to sanction. The object of that Bill was to create a defensive force for the safety of the country—a defensive force to consist of persons who, not adopting a military service for their profession, and not intending to give up the ordinary pursuits of civil life, were yet willing to devote a certain portion of their time to an annual training, in order to acquire a fitness to defend the country in case of actual danger or emergency. The Militia Act of 1852 differed considerably from our former Militia Bills. It contained the special provision—that even in time of war the militia was not to be embodied except in case of actual invasion, or imminent danger of invasion, or in case of rebellion or insurrection. It was not intended that even during war the militia should be constantly and permanently embodied like the militia raised during the last war. This is obvious from the terms of the Act of Parliament itself. Acting, then, on the faith of the principle so laid down, men went into the militia, both as

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officers and privates, who would not have entered into it if it had been thought that they would hereafter have been drawn wholly from their usual civil pursuits. Country gentlemen, professional men who could not without the greatest inconvenience, or even without actual ruin, give up their whole time to the militia service, yet, believing they were called up upon by their duty to their country, came willingly forward and entered into a force which they believed would only call for a sacrifice of a portion of their time which they could spare. At the same time many of the privates were married men, men with large families, men with various occupations which they could leave for a time without much inconvenience, but which they never thought of leaving permanently. Having laid down these conditions, I say, a very considerable number both of privates and officers joined the various regiments of militia. I for one confessed that I did not approve the measure which was then brought before Parliament, because I believed that with less cost to the country a reserve force of a much more efficient character might have been formed; at all events, however, the measure introduced by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) did proceed upon a plan and upon a principle perfectly consistent with itself. That principle was to form, as I said, a force of that particular class of persons who could not be expected to enter into the army, and who, upon entering into the militia, would not interfere with the army. One of the great objects in view was, that this militia force should as little as possible interfere with the regular army, and, by having both privates and officers of the character I have mentioned, you did not, in fact, withdraw from your regular service persons who would probably have entered into it. Now, is it consistent with this principle that your militia regiments should be allowed to go abroad? Under the present Bill a militia regiment, if sent abroad, will probably not remain there for a period of less than two or three years. That being the case, your Lordships must perceive that the service which will be required of these militia regiments is a service altogether similar to that of the regular army during peace, and both officers and privates are as completely withdrawn from their avocations as if they had entered into the regular army; after such an interval they cannot resume their places in the ordinary society of the country; they will certainly find them occupied by other
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persons; their previous employment will be closed against them; and they will be debarred to a great extent from resuming their former career. Is it fair or just to ask the militia to enter into a bargain so obviously disadvantageous to themselves? Your Lordships will remember that, with regard to the line, when men enter into that service they do so as a profession, of which the mere pay is a part, and not the largest part, of the inducements. The officers look forward to rising to the honours and emoluments of their profession. The privates know they shall have increased pay for good conduct after a certain period of service, and ultimately a pension at the age of 39—supposing them to have enlisted at the ordinary period of life—when they are able, if they choose, to retire with a very comfortable provision for the future. But none of these advantages are in store for the militiamen. Officers in that force can rise to no higher rank than this grade of lieutenant colonel; no half-pay is provided for them; and, at the same time, as far as I am aware, no pension whatever is provided for the privates—nay, the Bill, as introduced into the House of Commons, contained a clause by which, if wounded in action, a militiaman would have a right to a pension; but in the progress of that Bill through the other House that clause was struck out. This shows clearly the course contemplated with regard to this force. Now, I repeat, is it right to ask men to enter into an arrangement so disadvantageous to themselves? If you do, it is quite clear to me that much discontent will hereafter arise. The noble Earl opposite Said, very truly, that this volunteering for foreign service would not be really voluntary in all cases; that there would be a moral compulsion upon individuals, both officers and men, which would compel them to go abroad with their regiments. Look at what you have already done. I have pointed out that the Act of 1S52 contained a clause which distinctly provided that regiments should only he embodied in case of actual or of apprehended invasion. The men enrolled themselves on the faith of this provision; they accepted a bounty calculated upon the supposition that the demand for their services would be limited to one month in the year daring the five years of their service. Well, last year, without their consent, you passed an Act arbitrarily altering the terms of the contract into which these people had mitered, and giving the Government power to call upon

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them to serve for the whole year instead of for a part of it. Now, the injustice of that arrangement, I recollect, was to a great extent obviated by a declaration of the noble Duke the Secretary for the War Department, who told us that no militiaman who objected to be permanently embodied would be required to serve for the year; that, notwithstanding the regiment generally might express a readiness to serve, still, if any individual felt it to be a hardship upon him, he would receive leave of absence if he thought fit to ask for it, or would be allowed his discharge. That declaration met the requirements of the case, and I trust it will be adhered to now, because I know that in the North of England, wages being very high, and men, having in many instances, made a great sacrifice in accepting 1s. 1d. per day for militia service when they are earning elsewhere 2s. 6d, or even 5s., great discontent and great dissatisfaction will otherwise be created. But, leaving this point, I say that I object entirely to the policy of employing the militia in discharging the duty of regular toops, because, in the first place, you will necessarily alter the whole character of the employment. Your country gentlemen have important duties to perform at home, which cannot be left undone without great disadvantage to the country. In the same manner with regard to professional men, of whom I know there are many in regiments of militia, it would be absolute ruin to them to go even for one or two years from home. To a certain extent, this result is produced even by the permanent embodiment of the militia contrary to the original intention of the Act. I have already received two resignations from officers of the Northumberland militia expressing great regret that their avocations will not allow them to retain their commissions under these circumstances. To that embodiment there might not, however, be much complaint, because all classes were prepared to undergo a good deal of inconvenience to enable the Government to overcome the first difficulties of the war; but I repeat. that if you carry out the proposals contained in this Bill you will destroy the last vestiges of the old character of the militia—henceforth it will cease to be a corps of men not following the military life as a profession. You will drive all such men out of the force. This will be a great injury and disadvantage, because, amid many defects which I think were contained in the measure of the
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noble Earl opposite, it had the great advantage that it did bring together all classes of the inhabitants of our counties in a manner attended with great social advantages, as well as the benefit expected to result as regards the defence of the country. What will happen if this measure be adopted? No man will enter the militia unless he wishes to devote himself entirely to a military life; all the best men of that kind will, of course, go into the regular army; and thus, while spoiling your militia, while discouraging men from entering into it for the future, and the entrance of gentlemen into it, you will be simply making an addition to your regular army—a force precisely as costly as your regular army, at the same time that it is not disposable for every kind of service like the regular army, and is officered in an inferior manner. Men now in the militia will, many of them, volunteer for foreign service, trusting at a future time to extort some compensation from Government; and no doubt, if the war goes on, and these regiments serve for three or five years, it will be quite impossible for you to turn them adrift without some compensation to both officers and privates, and you will find in that way that this measure will be very onerous to the country. This measure will, moreover, discourage enlistment in the militia by giving effect to the representation of intending recruits, and of such placards as were issued by the Peace Society in 1852, assuring them that, in spite of what was promised by the Government, the men would be drawn into the regular army; and you now seem to be fulfilling to a great extent that prediction. I want to know what necessity there is for having recourse to such a measure, and I did expect to hear some explanation from Her Majesty's Government on that subject; but, after having given my best attention to what has fallen from the noble Duke, I am still at this moment completely in the dark. The noble Duke stated that the object of this Bill is to establish a large reserve force in the Mediterranean garrisons; but does the noble Duke think that that is the most convenient reserve force which cannot be sent forward? The noble Duke has said that four companies of each regiment are to be employed in the Mediterranean station as a sort of advanced reserve to complete the regiments hereafter. That, no doubt, is a most admirable plan; but, in my opinion, a reserve force could be established in the Mediterranean in a dif-

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ferent and less objectionable manner. Why could you not get militiamen to volunteer into these companies, and complete them at once? I believe that there would be no difficulty in doing so, and, indeed, that militiamen would be More ready to volunteer for the Crimea itself than for Malta or Gibraltar. What has been the course already adopted? You have allowed 25 per cent of every militia regiment to volunteer, and have given ensigncies to those regiments for every seventy-five men. Well, the principle is, I believe, a good one, and, if acted upon to a still greater extent, there would be, I think, no difficulty in completing the companies you want to form as an advance reserve. There is, however, one thing that strikes me still more, and that is, that this measure would not have been necessary, and the reserve companies of those regiments of the line on active service would have been quite sufficient for the duty required to be performed, if the Government had been more prompt in encouraging recruiting. The noble Duke has stated that the army is actually short of the number of men voted during the last Session of Parliament, and, if I have rightly understood, a Member of the Government is reported to have said, in the other House of Parliament, that it fell short by nearly 20,000 men. [The Duke of NEWCASTLE: About that number.] Well, that being the case, the Army never having been brought up to its establishment, I have heard with astonishment the noble Duke, in vindicating the measure of lowering the standard for recruits, tell us that the order for reducing the standard was issued only four or five weeks ago. I wonder that the order was not issued five or six months ago. Every one knew that we were engaged in war, and the most prompt exertions should have been made for the augmentation of the Army. Why was not the standard lowered on the very day upon which the House of Commons voted the increase to the Army, or even in anticipation of that vote? The same argument also applied to raising the bounty. It may be said that it is too late to look back; and we are now asked to repair the error of that delay—which, to me, was unaccountable, and which was matter for regret—to adopt the plan of allowing militia regiments to volunteer for service in the Colonies, and so to enable us to increase our effective forces by withdrawing the regular troops from those Colonies, I believe that the
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principle is a very erroneous one and a very impolitic one, and that we shall probably be spoiling our militia by the adoption of a measure which will have less effect in accomplishing an immediate increase of the Army than other methods which might be employed. At the same time I agree with the noble Earl opposite, that at this crisis it would not be expedient that your Lordships should reject this Bill: and, by stating my objections, I do not propose to offer any opposition to the second reading, but rather to check, for the future, the adoption of similar principles. I hope that the result of this discussion will be to bring the Government to adopt a different line of policy, but I do not wish to refuse them the means they now ask for to increase the effective forces of the country, and the same principle actuated me in voting in favour of another Bill, which I do not consider to be free from grave objections.
LORD DENMANsaid, he believed, notwithstanding what had been said by the noble Earl who had just spoken, and by the noble Earl opposite, that the patriotism of the country would induce the people to volunteer for this service as well as for the regular service of the Army. The objections urged by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) would probably induce certain classes, especially professional men, to weigh well the advantages of the one service against the other before they determined upon their course of proceeding; but whether or not, he believed that in the present emergency all classes would unite in showing to the world the example of a united nation. The great difficulty under which we, as a people, laboured—that of not befit, properly trained to military duties—had been well pointed out. That was the difficulty, and for the future we must endeavour to repair it. He hoped orders would be issued to lower the standard still further, if necessary, and to raise the force required by the most ready means. In the late war the regular army was recruited to a considerable extent from the volunteer regiments, and persons were induced, by the promise of commissions, to use their influence to raise volunteers for the regular army. He thought the same course might be adopted now with advantage. He knew instances in which as many as twenty-four volunteers had been enlisted in one parish by one individual. If this country should be invaded we had no Sebastopol to stay the invader; and it was the duty of the Government to make

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every provision for increasing the military resources of the country.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLentirely agreed with an opinion uttered by the noble Earl, that every discussion on the subject which had taken place in their Lordships' House bad been attended with advantage to the Government and to the country, and he believed that such would always be the case when they were conducted in the spirit and temper which usually characterised discussions in that House. Every one entered that House under the full conviction that, whatever might have been necessary if certain steps had been taken, under existing circumstances the present measure was one of convenience, if not of necessity. He would admit that if we had had a large standing army the Government would not have asked the militia to volunteer even for garrison duty; but not having a large standing army, or a numerous army of reserve, they had to remove our troops from the garrisons, and were, in consequence, obliged to ask militia regiments to perform that duty. He did not deny that there were some objections to the measure, but there must always be objections to any measure which placed it in the power of the militia to leave the confines of the kingdom, and he agreed generally with the principle that they should be kept for the defence of the shores of England. All the objections, however, which had been taken to this measure were, he thought, exaggerated in the course of the discussion, and the measure itself was not without a precedent. The noble Earl opposite had drawn the distinction between the Act passed during the last war and the present Bill, that the men forming the militia under the former Act were drawn by ballot, and were not volunteers; but that distinction appeared to him not to tell against the present Bill, but to be rather in its favour. If men were compelled to enter the militia, it was a greater hardship to press them to go upon foreign service than when the militia service was itself entirely voluntary; and, indeed, he did not see any hardship at all in giving to the militia the option of performing these duties. The noble Earl said that a system by which the militia were sent out of this country to do garrison duty would strike at the very root of recruiting in this country. He had understood the noble Earl to say that if that system were adopted the relations of young men would dissuade them from joining the
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militia for fear of being made complete soldiers of, and being draughted into the regular army; but it appeared to him that that objection held equally against the system advocated by the noble Earl of allowing individuals from the militia to volunteer into the line. A very considerable number of recruits in the regular army had been derived from militia regiments, and he could not conceive why that state of things should not continue. It was most important, he thought, to preserve a portion of militia regiments in this country to maintain their local connection with the various districts of the country; and if this were done, and the services of the militia regiments were confined to the immediate objects of the Bill, he held that this measure would increase the military spirit of the people, and enable us to take more effectual measures for the creation of an army of reserve for the regular army.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, the noble Duke would have been more correct if he had stated, not that noble Lords were in favour of this Bill, but that they were in favour of the second reading of the Bill; for in what has fallen from him, he appeared to me to assume that all, or nearly all, the Members of your Lordships' House were in favour of this Bill in all its details, and there, I apprehend, the noble Duke is in error. As I understand it, my Lords, the necessity fur this Bill arises out of an immediate and pressing demand for ten or eleven regiments now in the garrisons in the Mediterranean, to enable as many regiments to be made disposable for service in the Crimea. Now, I acquiesce in the second reading of the Bill, because I am ready to give power to the Government to that extent; but at the same time I must say that it is not consistent with Parliamentary usage to give to any Government powers beyond the necessity of the case; and least of all is it consistent with Parliamentary usage to pass a Bill subject to an explanation the Government may give as to the mode in which they mean to act upon its provisions;—and yet that is what we are now asked to do. This is a new system, which has been introduced of late, and I protest against a course so inconsistent with usage and with public policy. What the Government want is a Bill to enable them to garrison certain places in the Mediterranean. They want ten or eleven regiments, regiments of the line, and they ask for the whole militia;—there is no-

721
thing in this Bill to prevent the whole militia being sent to any part of the world. There is a very material difference between this Bill and the Act of 1813. That Act was passed at the very end of the war, when the Allies were making a rush upon Paris to put an end to the war, and the militia regiments, when sent out, arrived at Bordeaux too late, and there they remained in garrison until the conclusion of peace. It was not any part of the policy of the successive Governments that existed in this country from 1793 to 1813 to alter the character of the militia, and the Act of 1813 was only passed at the last moment of a war, and that exceptional measure was agreed to under particular circumstances. Considering the number of regular troops there were in the kingdom at that time, I think that that measure must have been adopted more on account of certain colonels of militia and certain regiments which were desirous of distinguishing themselves, than to perform any public service. I know no worse policy, either with regard to our military or our naval service. than at the beginning of a war to draw upon our last reserves. If a general does so at the commencement of a battle, he almost invariably loses it; and the same principle applies to the commencement of a war; and the fact of the Government already drawing upon their last reserves shows that they have provided very inadequately for the necessities of the circumstances under which they are placed. Under the Bill of 1813, the number that might be sent out of the kingdom was three-fourths of those on actual service, which was then not much below three-fourths of the establishment. At the present time three-fourths of the establishment amount to the whole of those actually serving, and in some cases even to more. At all events, the number remaining at home in 1813 was, in all cases, something that might be called a regiment; but now the establishment of a regiment may be 1,000 amen, but there may be only 800 actually serving; and then if three-fourths of the establishment should be sent abroad, there would only be fifty men of the regiment remaining in this country. In the Act of 1813 there was a limit to the number that might be sent abroad. The limitation was not three-fourths of the establishment, but three-fourths of those actually serving. In 1813, too, the whole number of men to be sent abroad was limited to 30,000. At
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present the militia establishment is 80,000, and therefore three-fourths of the establishment is 60,000; but the number of effective men is only about 50,000, so that by this Bill the Government acquire the power of sending abroad more actually than all the effective men. But, again, one-quarter of the men in the militia regiments are called upon to volunteer into the line under a certain degree of moral pressure not agreeable to withstand; three-fourths are liable. by this Bill, to be sent abroad. Now, I pretend to no great mathematical education, but I remember enough to satisfy me that, if yon take one-fourth for one force, and three-fourths for another, nothing remains. It seems to me, therefore, that there will be no militia left. Now, noble Lords on this side the House are desirous that something should be left; they do not wish totally to destroy the militia. The effect of this measure will be to establish at the commencement of the war two different armies, raised in a different manner, one of which will be officered in an inferior manner, and will be a local army of a limited size. I apprehend, that nothing can be more inconvenient than the establishment of local corps, and in Committee I intend to propose an Amendment to prevent regiments volunteering for particular garrisons, and to give Government the power of transferring these men from one garrison to another. There ought to be some limitation, say 15,000 men, to the number of men to be sent out; and I think that to pass the Bill without such a limitation would be inconsistent with Parliamentary convenience, and, however unfashionable it may be at time present day, I still look with reverence to the constitutional practice of Parliament. With regard to this Bill, to employ an expression perhaps not quite consistent with the dignity of Parliamentary language, the effect of it will be to kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs, and to impair a militia that all parties have combined to render efficient. I believe, if the same spirit animate all neighbourhoods as has been evinced in some with which I am acquainted, 160,000 men might be brought to the public service. Those men were obtained by placing before them the circumstances of the militia as they stood then, and have always stood up to this time. Upon those occasions we have had invariably in our favour the exertions of the families of the men enlisted, because

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they saw in the bounty which they received, and in their pay, and in the certainty of their return at a fixed period, considerable advantages. Will you have the exertions of the family in your favour now when the men will be induced to go abroad, and in all probability not for a short time? I am certain that you will not. The women of the family especially will always entertain apprehensions that the men will be sent abroad; and I am satisfied that you will be cutting at the very root of a most valuable force—which produced most of your recruits in the last war, and which will produce them in this war if you only use proper care. As it is, you are asking more than you have a right to ask. All that you have a right to ask I will willingly grant. Take your eleven regiments, and I have no objection; but to give a general power to take practically the whole militia of the country for service in any part of the world appears to me to be destroying your future means of recruiting. I cannot assent to such a course, and I shall therefore propose Amendments in Committee which will tend to remove these objections.
THE EARL OF GLENGALLsaid, there was one point to which he wished to call the attention of the House, and that was the question of pensioning those soldiers serving in the militia who might be wounded while engaged abroad. He had scarcely any doubt that pensions would in such instances be granted; but the subject, nevertheless, was one with reference to which he should wish to receive some assurance from the Government. He thought there was a good deal of force in some of the objections which had been urged by the noble Earl; but he (the Earl of Glengall) looked at the subject in another light. We were now engaged in a very formidable contest—a contest of which it was extremely difficult to foretell what the duration might be. The more we attacked the dominions of the Emperor of Russia, the longer would the war last; if we took our stand in the Crimea and attempted to hold that position on the Emperor's own soil, he believed that every Russian would do as they did in 1812; for, while our soldiers continued upon the soil of Russia, neither the Czar nor any of his subjects would consent to treat with us otherwise than as enemies, and that was the course he should recommend to every nation that should be invaded. It was important, bearing that statement in mind, to consider
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what was the position of our army in the East. He believed that that army had suffered from disease and other causes so much, that it became absolutely necessary that an immense number of troops should be sent out to its relief, and that immense reserves should everywhere be kept up. It was, as a consequence of that necessity and the expediency of having the soldiers who might be sent to the Crimea as well adapted as possible to cope with the hardship of the war, that he was desirous the Government should have recourse to the services of the militia, who were, upon enlistment, accurately examined by a medical officer, and found to be sound in wind and limb, instead of depending upon Germans—who might be well-dressed, indeed, but who would be found devoid of that bodily vigour which, in order to encounter successfully the hardship of a winter in the Crimea, it was indispensable to possess.
Resolved in the Affirmative.
Bill read 2a accordingly.
Standing Orders Nos. 37 and 38 considered (according to Order) and dispensed with: Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House instanter: house in Committee accordingly.
On Clause 1,
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHproposed an Amendment, the effect of which would be, he said, to make the Bill exactly analogous to that of 1813, and to confine the number of men to be taken under the Bill to three-fourths of the number actually serving. He had already given his reasons for this proposition, and therefore would not trouble the House again.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEregretted that he must oppose the Amendment. He readily admitted that such extreme cases might occur as the noble Earl had referred to in his former speech, but he thought that there was a considerable advantage in having a fixed rather than a fluctuating number. He would mention a circumstance which would show what he believed would be the practical working of the measure:—the greater part of the regiments which had been first embodied had volunteered, and their numbers were now again very nearly completed. The practical working of the measure would be very different from that suggested by the noble Earl; and, so far from the prospect of serving abroad operating injuriously on the zeal and spirit of these regiments of militia, as the noble Earl had inferred, such

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was the zeal and spirit of the country, that it had operated up to this time in precisely a contrary direction. The first regiment which had volunteered for foreign service had now given its quota of 25 per cent to the regiments of the line, and he believed that their original number had again been nearly, if not quite, completed. He adhered, therefore, to his opinion, that the rule adopted by the present Bill would he found to operate more satisfactorily in all respects than the plan proposed by the noble Earl, and he could not agree to the Amendment.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHwas exceedingly glad to hear what had fallen from the noble Duke. It appeared from statements which he had before made, that after the battles of Alma and Inkerman there had been displayed on the part of the people of this country a stronger military disposition than had existed previous to those victories; but their Lordships must recollect that they were legislating for the whole war, and that we could not rely altogether upon the continuance, under adverse circumstances, of those feelings which had been created on the sudden by two great military successes. He thought, however, that it was highly desirable that, under all circumstances, Parliament should take care that there remained in this country a sufficient nucleus, as it were, around which all new recruits should rally. Before he sat down, he wished to put a question to the noble Lord the Commander in Chief. A good deal had been said upon the new establishment of the several regiments in the army, which consisted at the beginning of the war of eight companies, were then raised to twelve, and now were to consist of sixteen companies. What he wished to know was this:—when we had in this manner doubled the number of captains and lieutenants, and, he presumed also, of ensigns, was it proposed to add two additional majors and one additional lieutenant colonel? Because, if it were not so, it must be distinctly understood that the prospects of promotion to the higher ranks would be exactly twice as bad as before the alteration? That, in fact, was his great objection to the plan. He thought it would be much better to follow the old system, and have another battalion. There would then be two majors and one lieutenant colonel in the additional eight companies, and the same chance of promotion as hitherto. But now, when they were sending out
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officers to encounter great perils, they deprived them of one-half the prospect of promotion they had before.
VISCOUNT HARDINGEbegged to state, in reply to the question put by the noble Earl, that there would at once be an additional major, and eventually, as soon as the numbers reached anything like what they were fully expected to reach, there would be a second lieutenant colonel.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYcould not help thinking that, in another place, the idea just broached had not been that which was there understood. He knew that a great many persons who heard the Amendment — and, indeed, many noble Lords in that House—understood differently to what was now the impression. If, however, the noble Duke agreed that depôts should be left in this country, why did he scruple to have it made a law that only three-fourths of a regiment should be sent out of the country at once. The noble Duke seemed to fancy that all the eighteen regiments to which he alluded had been recruited to their effective strength; but that was not the case. Two regiments that lie knew were 400 or 500 short of their full strength, in consequence of the number of men that had been drafted into the line. It was, therefore, impossible to have this first clause in the Bill, and carry it out as it should be carried out. But, as the Government appeared to him to share with his side of the House as far as the principle of the matter was concerned, he should have liked to know what reason or argument they had for refusing to alter the clause so as to carry out the principle in which they said they were agreed?
LORD DYNEVORentreated the Government to consider the practical working of this measure. The noble Duke said the regiments of militia which underwent training last summer were all very nearly up to their number. That might be the fact, yet their effective strength might be considerably less than the number. If he were correctly informed, in those cases in which militia regiments had been embodied —embodiment being a voluntary act—the effect had been that a considerable number of the men had not been embodied. He knew a regiment which in time of training, when it was stated it was perfectly ready to be embodied, consisted of 900 men, nearly up to the establishment. Within a week the order came down for that regiment to be embodied, and 600 was the whole number which at that time came

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forward to go into barracks. Of the remainder, some, from the nature of their occupations, were not disposed to quit home; others were married men, and it was conceded on all hands that they ought to be allowed to remain. He believed that in all the eighteen regiments the same result had attended their being embodied, and that, in no case, even when the establishment had been complete in training, was it complete on being embodied. He thought all the necessities of the case would be met by adopting the suggestion of the noble Earl. They would not get, perhaps, so many men to garrison the Mediterranean ports as under other circumstances; at the same time, they would leave that which the noble Duke admitted to be necessary, a nucleus round which volunteers would gather, and from those depôts drafts might be sent out to supply the places of such men as volunteered for service in the Crimea.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, there was no noble Lord to whose opinion he should be more inclined to defer than to that of his noble Friend who had just spoken, because he knew the great attention he had paid to the subject of the militia; hut the noble Lord had certainly supplied the Government with the very strongest argument in favour of the clause remaining as it stood. He had cited a regiment 900 strong, which, when embodied, only went out to the number of 600. The noble Lord, of course, did not mean that the 300 had ceased to belong to the regiment; but that, acting on the provision of the Act of Parliament, they had not come forward to be embodied. Then, did the noble Lord mean that it would be right to leave at home one-fourth of 600 as well as the 300? He was convinced, the more he examined into this question the more difficult would it appear to his noble Friend to take any other standard than the establishment. He readily admitted that Parliament would and must leave to the Executive Government considerable responsibility as to the regiments to be taken and the mode in which they would carry out the Act; but he was satisfied, looking at the present state of the militia, that any departure from that standard would create inextricable difficulties. As to the last proposal of the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough), it was very much more stringent than his Amendment, and, of the two, the Amendment was much nearer the proposal of the Government. With regard
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to any supposed misunderstanding on the subject of this Amendment, he thought it impossible, because his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department readily admitted the principle of an Amendment proposed by a right hon. Gentleman in the other House (Sir J. Pakington), but objected to the mode of carrying it out, and words now standing in the Bill were adopted instead, with the consent of the right hon. Gentleman.
THE EARL OF DERBYobserved that, as to what had occurred in the other House, he rather thought the Secretary of State for the Home Department, from his long Parliamentary experience and practice in debate, had managed apparently to adhere to the Amendment while making a mere verbal alteration, very much to the gratification of the Mover, though completely defeating the object he had in view, When the noble Duke said there could be no error, he wished to know how that was reconcilable with the jocular allusion of the Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert), who, being asked if three-fourths went abroad, how many would remain at home, answered, "of course, one-fourth?" He thought the noble Duke would see that the error arose from the difference between the actual strength of the regiments when embodied and their actual strength at the present moment. The noble Duke would find a practical illustration of his error if the regiment alluded to was the regiment he supposed it to be. He believed the establishment of that regiment was 1,200, and that its present number was 920 after all the recruits had been added since its quota had been contributed to the line. That regiment stood first of those which had volunteered for foreign service; and he believed that other regiments that had volunteered stood in the same condition. The noble Duke, having the papers in his hand, would, perhaps, tell them whether the establishment strength did not greatly exceed the effective strength, and whether, in many instances, the taking three-fourths of the establishment would not be taking the whole effective strength of the embodied regiments?
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHthought the noble Duke hardly understood what he had suggested. If one quarter of each regiment was to be left at home it would amount to the same thing as taking three-quarters for foreign service, provided the establishment and the effective strength were equal. If the regiments were below

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their establishments, the number serving abroad would be smaller. But if they were very much below, such as 1,000 amounting to only 750, under the noble Duke's proposition the whole regiment might go abroad and leave none at home.
EARL FITZWILLIAMconsidered it important there should be no doubt as to a nucleus from each regiment remaining at home. He very much objected to the measure in the form in which it was proposed. He had no objection to individuals volunteering for the line—he had not the slightest objection whether they were privates, or subalterns, or officers who joined the regular army, provided their doing so was purely voluntary. He would ask any noble Lord who had read the first, clause, whether the terms in the second part of that clause were consistent with a real voluntary engagement? The first part, he admitted, was perfectly voluntary; but then it went on to say—
"And it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, by any order signed by one of Her principal Secretaries of State, or by the Lord Lieutenant or other chief governor or governors of Ireland, or by his or their chief secretary, directed to the commanding officer of any regiment, battalion, or corps of such militia, to propose to such regiment, battalion, or corps, or any part or parts thereof, to extend their services to any parts or places out of the United Kingdom to be specified in such order, under such rules and regulations as Her Majesty may think fit to appoint."
He put it to their Lordships, as Gentlemen who knew how to weigh words, whether they would venture to resist that proposal if it were made to them? It would be difficult, in his opinion, even for privates, but for those in the condition of gentlemen it would be impossible to resist such a proposition, however distasteful it might be, however disagreeable in its consequences, however injurious to their fortune and property. It was a proposition which no Government ought to make. Let the volunteering be a true volunteering—that was to say, let the idea of volunteering arise in the mind of the man who volunteered, not in the mind of somebody who suggested it to him. He concurred in thinking the Amendment of the noble Earl would remove a great objection, but not the objection he entertained—that, under the specious garb of being an entirely voluntary proceeding, something was proposed and almost enforced on these regiments by the Queen's order.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, he trusted that he should be understood when he said that Government would not make
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any offer to any militia regiment, but would wait until it volunteered its services. They would not force any man who had been embodied under the old system to be embodied again under the new one.
In answer to a question by the Earl of DERBY,
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHbefore the Amendment was put to their Lordships, wished to propose another, limiting the places to which the militia regiments could be sent to the Mediterranean garrisons and the Channel Islands.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEconsidered the restriction unwise.
LORD COLCHESTERhad heard that in another place Canada had been mentioned as one of the places to which the militia were likely to be sent. Was that so?
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEanswered in the negative.
THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, it would be exceedingly desirable that their Lordships should know the actual state of the militia regiments. He perceived the noble Duke was perusing a document. Perhaps that document would enable the noble Duke to inform the House upon a point so material in considering this Bill?
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: The paper to which the noble Earl referred had been put in his hands since he entered that House. There was no date to it, only merely 1854, and he did not even know who sent it.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: The noble Duke obstinately refused to furnish information to their Lordships as to how the militia regiments now actually stand; and yet the whole question actually depended on that knowledge. He believed the truth was, that the noble Duke was ignorant of the fact.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, the noble Earl had resorted to his accustomed practice of lecturing the Government upon every possible occasion, and using terms, if not very applicable, certainly very discourteous. The noble Earl—he would not use that, favourite term of his, "misrepresented," but he would say "misunderstood" every word he (the Duke of Newcastle) had uttered. He had never stated he was ignorant of the state of the militia, and the noble Earl was not entitled to assume that as a fact. He had stated the precise reverse. What he said, and what he now repeated was, that the great majority of the regiments embodied had very nearly their full establishment.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: Perhaps the noble Duke would gratify the House with a return, showing the number of regiments embodied which had their full establishment on that very day. Would the noble Duke give that to the House?
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: If the noble Earl made such a motion to-morrow he would consider it. He must say he thought further reference as to the state of the regiments was not desirable. [The Earl of DERBY: Hear, hear!] Yes, he understood the cheer of the noble Earl, but he (the Duke of Newcastle) felt sure that the people out of doors would be of opinion that he had already gone to the verge of prudence—he hoped he had not overstepped those bounds, and given information to the enemy which he ought not to give, in the statements he had made on that night. He had no wish to keep anything back which it was for the interest of the public service to furnish. He would not attempt to deceive the House, but he was not, without some consideration, prepared to agree to the request made by the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF DERBYwould be the last man in that House to ask for information which it was not for the interest of the public service to be afforded, but, at the same time would remind the noble Duke that the return sought for was the very key to the question they were considering. As for what the noble Duke said about his noble Friend making a motion to-morrow, of course if the information were not furnished at once they could not have it until after the recess, when the Bill would have been passed, and when the return would be comparatively valueless.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLErepeated his conviction that by far the greater number of regiments which had been embodied had their full complement—had completed their entire establishment. He begged to remind the noble Earl that a return of the militia force on that very day would represent almost the lowest figure at which it would stand, in consequence of those who had volunteered into the line, but in a fortnight the case would be very different. There would be some trouble and delay in obtaining the return, which must be obtained from each of the colonels of eighteen regiments; still if it were meant to test his veracity, it would be produced.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYdid not doubt the noble Duke's veracity—it was his information he doubted. He believed the noble Duke was totally misinformed as to the real strength of the militia regiments. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) himself knew five regiments which had not yet got half their establishment. The noble Duke ought to have at his fingers' ends the information for which he had asked.
THE EARL OF DESARTwas understood to support the Amendment.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHwould submit to the noble Duke that it would be very desirable he should be furnished with a return each week, showing the number that had volunteered into and quitted each militia regiment.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEfelt obliged to the noble Earl for the suggestion, which would not be lost sight of.
Amendment negatived; clause agreed to.
Clauses 2 and 3 agreed to.
On clause 4 being proposed,
THE EARL OF GLENGALLasked who it was that really had the control over the militia now—the Secretary at War, the Secretary for War, or the Home Secretary?
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: The recent appointment of a new Secretary for War had not made any difference in the control of the militia. So long as they were not embodied, the force was under the control of the Home Office, but when embodied, the control of the Home Office ceased, and the force came under the control of the Secretary for War.
Clause agreed to.
On Clause 5,
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHproposed that the volunteer force sent abroad be limited to 15,000 men, which was 4,000 more than the Government itself proposed. In 1813 the militia force sent abroad was limited to 30,000. He also proposed that not more than three-fourths of the actual strength of each regiment be sent abroad, and not three-fourths of the nominal establishment. His object was always to keep a nucleus at home for the due recruiting of the force.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEobjected to the restriction as impolitic and unnecessary.
Amendment negatived; Clause agreed to; remaining Clauses agreed to. Bill reported without amendment, and to be read 3a To-morrow.

THE EXCHANGE OF VESSELS WITH THE PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: I have given notice, my Lords, that I intend to put two questions to Her Majesty's Government to-night, and I assure the House I will be as brief as I can; but you will allow me to say that I do so, not so much for the purpose of getting an answer for myself as to bring before your Lordships' notice a case which bears on the subject of the war in which we are engaged. The first question which I wish to put to the Government has reference to an exchange which is stated to be about to be made between this country and Prussia, which seems to be considered a small matter by the answer which has been elicited from the First Lord of the Admiralty. The other day I was at Chatham, and I saw in one of the docks Her Majesty's ship Thetis, and on noticing that vessel, I was told by the officer who had charge of the yard that she was about to be exchanged for two gunboats belonging to the King of Prussia. I must confess I was extremely surprised at such an exchange, more particularly as the ship itself happened to be well known to me. I had been on an experimental cruise in that identical vessel, and I was very much struck with the circumstance of the contemplated exchange, knowing as I did that the Thetis was constructed by a superior class of British shipwrights as one of the trial ships of that day which was to exemplify the best possible form of a floating body. I knew her to be one of the best of her class, and, in fact, to be a model of perfection. I should not have referred to the matter after the answer of the First Lord of the Admiralty, if I had not seen and been informed that he, in another place, in a conversation on the subject of the exchange, stated that the agreement had been first for two corvettes and afterwards for an old frigate, and that the matter was, in short, of no sort of importance—of very little consequence. Now, there is no man living on the face of the earth who knows the force of language more than the First Lord of the Admiralty; and when he says in his place in Parliament, that the exchange was to be for "an old ship," I will ask anybody in this House, or out of doors, whether connected with the service or not, would not that convey to the mind, that it was a ship past ordinary service and of not much value? But, my Lords, this ship was built in 1846, and I took great interest
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in her, because she was built by a body of men in whom I felt interested; she turned out to be an extremely fine ship, and, indeed, one of the best ever constructed both in form and strength. She was nearly 1,600 tons burden, and could not have cost this country less than 40,000 l. or 50,000 l., and when I saw her the other day she had been completely refitted with new rigging. Now, my Lords, even as a matter of trade, as a mercantile transaction, this matter is one of very great importance. What may have been in the breast of the Government at the time they made that exchange I cannot say; but when I consider that the cost of this vessel was what I have stated, and that the cost of the gunboats for which she was to be exchanged could not exceed 6,000 l. apiece, such a transaction will be well worthy the attention of the House of Commons when the Estimates are brought before them; and if ever there was a case in which the First Lord of the Admiralty ought to be made to pay the difference, this appears to me to have been one of all others in which it would have been right to visit that great functionary with such a penalty. I can make no comment on this; it is a matter of fact; it is a matter of bargain and sale. He has certainly not gone to the cheapest market, but he appears to me, contrary to his own principles, to have paid the largest amount of money for these gunboats. One great peculiarity with regard to these boats is, that they were built by a gentleman of this country, Mr. Scott Russell, who, I understand, possesses models of them; and yet he was sent to Prussia to see whether they were fit to exchange and to be used in Her Majesty's service. He comes back and says they are peculiarly fit for the Baltic. Now, my Lords, I very strongly suspect that they are not fit for the Baltic; for I do not think that the Prussian Government would have been very anxious to exchange these very fine gunboats, as such vessels, particularly to a maritime nation, are of the greatest value. I have, therefore, taken the liberty of bringing this subject before your Lordships, in order that you and the public may know the value of this exchange, which I consider to be very detrimental to this country. I also think that the answer which I hope to get from the Government will be directly opposite from that which has been given in another place by the First Lord of the Admiralty, because he stated that the bargain was not completed.

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Why, my Lords, these vessels have just arrived; the bargain is completed, and this country has given one of its finest ships, valued at 40,000 l., for two vessels not worth 10,000 l. or 12,000 l. It only remains for me now to inquire of Her Majesty's Government what were the circumstances under which the exchange was effected?
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I hope if the First Lord of the Admiralty is to pay the difference of a bad bargain out of his own pocket, he is to be allowed to pocket the advantages of a good one. The transaction to which my noble Friend alludes having passed through the Foreign Office, I suppose that I am the person who is expected to answer the noble Earl's question. I propose in that answer to give him all the information I can; but not being exactly aware of what my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty did say, I am not sure I shall give the same answer. All I can undertake to do is to state the facts, and I have not the least doubt that they will turn out to be precisely what were stated in the other House. The proposal in question came from the Prussian Government, who stated that they wished to increase their marine force, and would be very glad, as they understood Her Majesty's Government were about to construct gunboats, to exchange the two gunboats in question for what they termed "donkey frigates." That was their proposition; but the answer of Her Majesty's Government was that they had no "donkeys" to dispose of, but that there were two corvettes which might be given in exchange, if, on a survey, the gunboats in question appeared to be valuable. This survey of the gunboats was made. I am not sure that it was made by Mr. Scott Russell, but I believe he made a report as to how they were constructed, and what they were peculiarly adapted for. I am sure they must have cost considerably more than my noble Friend says—5,000 l. or 6,000 l.—for I believe they were built to carry two or three mortars, and it was considered that they would be very desirable boats—in fact, just such as Her Majesty's Government wished to obtain in the middle of June. A noble Friend near me says that, with their armaments, they are now worth 40,000 l. Some delay, however, took place on the part of the Prussian Government, and the negotiations were only renewed in the month of September, when my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said it was no longer an
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object with Her Majesty's Government to obtain such gunboats, and objected to the completion of the exchange, upon which the Prussian Government answered, "Oh, but we have obtained your word—your word has been given," and it was under those circumstances that the exchange was consented to. With respect to the Thetis herself, I understand that she requires an expenditure of nearly 8,000 l. before she can be put in a proper state, and that she will be handed over to the Prussian Government without any armament whatever. I hope this answer will be satisfactory to my noble Friend.

STATE OF BALARLAVA HARBOUR— QUESTION.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: My Lords, the second question I wish to put to Her Majesty's Government is, as to who is the responsible Naval Officer in the Harbour and Roadstead of Balaklava? The town and harbour of Balaklava is one of the most important positions our army could possibly hold; and it is important that our army in the Crimea, whose safety depends upon the state and condition of another department of the service (the Commissariat), should be placed, as regards that other department, in such a position as to be able to meet any difficulties which may arise. I have been induced to-day to take notice of the state and condition of the port of Balaklava, in consequence of the afflicting circumstances which followed the gale of the 14th of November. It is unnecessary for me to describe to your Lordships the state of things which then existed, and which, I believe, has been, generally speaking, faithfully reported. The whole of the circumstances attending that tremendous storm, which inflicted such severe loss upon our shipping and that of our allies, have been before your Lordships. Among these losses was one, the circumstances attending which were of a very peculiar character, in, consequence of that ship having gone out from England to Balaklava with almost every necessary for the relief and sustenance of our army—our seamen as well as our soldiers. In addition to her cargo, I understand she contained ammunition to a large amount, and it is well known that that ship perished in the gale. Now, my Lords, it is a bold thing for any one to assert, who was not on the spot, that that ship might have been saved; but I think I am justified in asserting my firm conviction,

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that if the regulations of the port of Balaklava had been such as they ought to have been, that ship would have been saved. Now, what were the circumstances under which this ship was lost? It has been spoken of in Parliament, and my noble Friend opposite has said, that he had himself sent out for the purpose of making an inquiry into its loss. I believe that I can pretty nearly tell the answer which will be made to the question. It has been stated that that ship was not commanded in the manner that she ought to have been; and I believe also, from statements made to me, and from assurances from my own acquaintance, that the Government were advised as to the want of ability on the part of the officer who commanded that vessel. But the point I wish particularly to allude to is an evidence of the truth of that statement, which also bears much on the condition of the harbour of Balaklava. When she arrived at the port of Balaklava, it is perfectly clear and well understood, that in entering she was taken in with such velocity and in such an unseamanlike manner, that in bringing up she lost her bower anchors. Whether the cables were what, in technical terms, is called "clinched" (or secured to the mast), or not, is a matter of some dispute; but, at all events, she ran her cables out in consequence of the inability of the officer to bring her properly into the port. But what was done by the officer who had charge of Balaklava? She was forced to leave that port and anchor outside with such anchors as she had left, which at the utmost could only have been one sheet-anchor, the others being only such as were used in warping. It is not stated precisely whether she had any of those anchors or none at all; but how is it that, with men-of-war lying there, a ship of such value was not supplied with an anchor, or was not directed to make an offing and lie to till such time as the necessary preparations were made to receive her? The whole transaction is one that shows, first of all, the greatest want of seamanship on the part of the commanding officer; and, secondly, great neglect on the part of the officer at Balaklava. Now, my Lords, I am going to make use of a statement inserted in a newspaper in this country which is acknowledged as an authority in all cases, and the reports of which have been given with such perfect accuracy that I do not think Her Majesty's Government
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will be able to "pooh, pooh" it. I will read a statement made in a report of the transactions which have taken place in the Crimea and the Black Sea; and I do not think that Her Majesty's Government will be able to say that it is a mere newspaper report, and not to be relied upon, as being without authority. But, even if they do say so, my object will be equally gained. I shall be glad to find, in putting the question with which I shall conclude, that the officer who is charged with the management at Balaklava Harbour is not liable to the charges made here. I shall take the liberty of very shortly reading one or two extracts from a report in the Times newspaper of the 18th of this month. I am not going to read the whole story; the reporter says:—
"Will it be credited that, with all our naval officers in Balaklava with nothing else to do—with our embarras des richesses of captains, commanders, and lieutenants—there is no more care taken for the vessels in Balaklava than if they were colliers in a gale off Newcastle? Ships come in and anchor where they like, do what they like, go out when they like, and are permitted to perform whatever vagaries they like, in accordance with the old rule of 'higgledy piggledy, rough and tumble,' combined with 'happy-go-lucky.'"
And in another place he adds—
"It is now more than two months since British vessels have crowded into this port, and yet there is not the slightest sign of anything like system in the mooring of the vessels. Without any regard to whether a vessel will stay a long or short time—whether it is a man-of-war or transport—whether it carries ammunition or grain—they are lying pêle-mêle. The consequence is, that the entrance or departure of every single vessel deranges the whole squadron. This circumstance may be attended with considerable danger, particularly if, as was the case yesterday, a strong breeze is blowing into the harbour. The Cleopatra screw steamer, with troops, the Belgravia, 105 transport, with stores, and three other smaller transports, came in the one after the other in close succession, running, of course, foul, now of a bowsprit, now of a yard, and causing a great deal of trouble and some damage, which, with a little care, should be all avoided. But most of the vessels come in without knowing anything of the port, and are obliged to anchor as best they can."
So much for the state of the port. Now, what I have to say is, that nothing could be more easy than for the officer having authority, and understanding his business, to have arranged the details and to have put things into proper order in his own mind first of all, and then to have used sufficient energy and activity in carrying out his own views. I ask, why it is that there is not this description of officer in the port of Balaklava? Who is the responsi-

739
ble officer there? and why is it that Her Majesty's officers placed in that quarter are not capable of conducting the affairs of the harbour in a proper manner? I do not mean to say that the Government of this country are answerable for the small details of everything that takes place in arrangements of that kind, but I will say they are entirely answerable for the officers placed there, and they should take care that they are officers of such ability as to be able to conduct the affairs of the country in that respect in a proper manner, There is no doubt the officer in question would have had no difficulty in finding men and officers for the purpose of carrying out any such arrangements, so as to secure order and regularity when ships are coming in or going out—to establish, in point of fact, a sort of police, to give their directions as to the course any particular vessel was to pursue—where she should be made to anchor, and all necessary warping arrangements. All these arrangements should be entirely finished and completed, and a certain fixed plan laid down in order to carry them into effect. Now, look at what the French have done. It really appears to me that the French are our betters in matters of detail, and more capable of carrying out minor arrangements. I must trouble your Lordships with another extract, for it does appear to me that the management with regard to the ships evinces such a state of absence of mind and carelessness on the part of those who have duties to perform as is absolutely surprising. Is it not astonishing that after they had such terrible disasters, that when a calm succeeded the storm, no opportunity should have been taken to collect the débris of every sort which floated upon the shore? Now, this reporter goes on to state—
"Indeed, our cavalry is at present employed in feeding itself. It is all they have to do. The men are sent down with their horses from the camp to the waterside every day, and carry back their fodder and rations. It is perfectly disgraceful to the authorities, whoever they may be, to see on this, the twelfth day after the gale, trusses of compressed hay floating about and rotting in every direction in the harbour, while our horses are dying of sheer inanition. Scandalous neglect and indifference to the interests of the public service arc chargeable somewhere or another in this matter. The compressed hay would have kept sweet for many days had it been fished out even within the week after it floated out of the wrecks, and the slight impregnation of the outer portion by salt water would not have rendered it at all distasteful to the horses. But, no: we are all 'Jolly Miller wights' out here, and care for nobody or nothing,
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and so the fodder floated and bobbed about, stranded on the fringe of unutterable abominations and corruptions by the beach, floated off again, and rotted and stank, and stinks and rots, while the animals are half starving. In the same way the immense amount of timber which washed about the harbour and on the coast outside, and which would have answered for hutting all the army, and for fuel, was permitted to drift out again the other day when the freshet set in to the head of the habour after the rains, and when the wind blew off the shore, and very little of it was saved, though woe betide the luckless wretch who may be found by the provost marshal walking off with a piece of wood for his hut without an order."
Upon the face of that statement alone the state of things appears to be of a serious character. I am confident, I may say, that the Government of this country and my noble Friends opposite, will take every means in their power to put the regulations with respect to the harbour and roadstead of Balaklava on a better footing. I have no sort of fear whatever for the ships in the port or roadstead, if they be properly handled. Some time ago I was told that nobody could go into the Black Sea in winter; but I expressed my conviction that the blockade in the Black Sea could be supported in winter if proper precautions were taken. I have no desire to reflect on the conduct of officers of my own profession; I know them too well to do that; but I trust for the future, if any circumstances should arise of a character to give warning of a gale, that the ships, instead of being "caught" on a lee-shore—which is a state in such circumstances to be of all things avoided, according to naval maxims—should be out twenty miles in the offing. This would give them the means of escape; for such is the formation of the land of the Crimea, that they could run where they liked, and have the opportunity of getting under some part of the land, where they might lie to in smooth water. The dangerous gale is that which blows from the south-west, and if the commanders of vessels take warning in time, and get to sea, there can be no question at all that steamships—and, I should say, sailing vessels too—would be safe if properly- handled. I have made these remarks from a regard for the state and condition of our forces in the Crimea. I consider the port of Balaklava is the present basis of our operations, and upon its state and the condition of the roadstead depend, will not say our success, but the means of properly supporting our troops; for it is the place where they look to receive all their sustenance, and to which, in time of

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real difficulty, they must also look for aid and assistance.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I certainly am extremely glad that this question has been mooted in Parliament, and especially that the noble Earl, a member of the naval profession, has been the individual to attract public attention to a question of such paramount—I might almost say of such vital—interest. I cannot admit that all that has been said and written is absolutely to the letter correct; nevertheless, there have evidently been cases of neglect and want of foresight and attention to matters of real importance to the welfare of the army and the fleet, which I think may be corrected by the pressure now administered by Parliament, coming in aid of the remonstrances made by myself and others. Before I proceed to answer the question, the noble Earl will forgive me if I express some regret that he should have brought forward what he has called the disqualifications of the captain of the Prince steamer. I can assure my noble Friend that this is by no means an established fact; and considering that the individual—whether qualified or disqualified—has perished with the ship, I do regret that anything should be said in reference to him—at any rate until the question has been thoroughly investigated. The noble Earl should have remembered that I told the House on a former occasion, I thought it fair to wait the result of an inquiry, which, I stated, was to be originated. My noble Friend should also recollect, when he complains of other ships, which were wrecked and damaged in the storm to which he alludes, that it was not a storm of the ordinary character prevailing in that sea, or affording sufficient warning to get out of the way of danger. My noble Friend ought to bear in mind that this was a storm which came on without any warning, and was, in fact, a hurricane of the most violent description. I do not mean to say that greater care might not have been taken, but, at the same time, much allowance ought to be made for such accidents. My noble Friend says, with great fairness, that he does net charge against the Government any neglect in respect to minor details; but he says that the Government is responsible for the appointment of fit and able officers. I readily agree in that proposition; and if every noble Lord, and every hon. and right hon. Gentleman, and every one in and out of the two Houses of Parliament,
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would deal with the Government in the same spirit of candour, I certainly should have no cause of complaint. Undoubtedly it is our bounden duty to see our orders carried out by proper instruments, and the details must be left to them; but to say that the fact of some officers in the Crimea not having a change of linen is the fault of the Secretary for War, that is carrying the responsibility of Government into minutiæ which I am afraid it would be perfectly impossible for any Minister to attend to. I repeat that it is the bounden duty of the Government to appoint fitting instruments and to remove those that are not fit. I think I can satisfy my noble Friend that, as regards the Prince, there is no case of neglect on the part of the Government. I am asked by my noble Friend who is the responsible officer in the port and roadstead of Balaklava? In the first place, front the period of the flank march to Balaklava to the 17th of October, Sir Edmund Lyons was the responsible officer, and the noble Earl will admit that one more experienced and able is not to be found in Her Majesty's service. On the 17th of October he left for the purpose of attacking Fort Constantine. Since then he has been otherwise engaged in the public service, and has not resumed his position at Balaklava; but a captain in Her Majesty's Service—I will not say equal, but little inferior to Sir E. Lyons—was the person who succeeded to him, Captain Dacres, of the Sanspareil. He, therefore, was the responsible officer until he was invalided, shortly after the storm of the 14th of November—viz. somewhere about the 16th or 17th of November. I am not absolutely certain who succeeded him, but I have reason to believe it was Captain Drummond, of the Retribution, a very able and efficient officer. In addition to these officers, the commander of the Vesuvius has held the appointment of beach-master. Admiral Boxer, who had the command of the transport service between the Bosphorus and Balaklava, has been ordered out to Balaklava to undertake duties there, and Admiral Stopford will succeed him in his former office. I have now given an answer to my noble Friend's question as to who were the responsible parties in the port of Balaklava at the respective periods named, and if he thinks we have not appointed efficient officers, it will be, of course, his duty to comment on the conduct of the Government. I can only re-

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gret that there appears, according to the statement which my noble Friend has quoted—assuming it not to be exaggerated—a want of organisation in the port of Balaklava, and I have felt it my duty to call on Lord Raglan to make immediate inquiry into this alleged gross neglect, and report upon it to the proper department. I shall also give him similar directions to inquire as to the loss of the Prince, and orders will also be sent out by the Admiralty to the naval authorities to ascertain where the culpability, if any, exists, and to prevent, if possible, such disasters from occurring in future.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he did not rise to offer any observations on the points particularly touched upon by his noble and gallant Friend, but to call their Lordships' attention to what had been stated in reference to the steam-ship the Prince. It had been represented that the whole of the warm clothing and medical stores were conveyed in that vessel, but that the medical stores were placed in the bottom of the hold with all the other stores above them, so that the medical stores being wanted at Scutari they could not be got at for landing without first removing the heavy articles, and, this being found impossible, it was necessary to take them on to Balaklava. Now that of itself showed great mismanagement on the part of the persons charged with the stowing of that vessel, and he thought it would be well that there should be some persons appointed who should be particularly responsible for the stowage of all vessels in the public service. But what he particularly wanted to suggest to the noble Duke was this, that every cargo sent out to the Crimea should be an assorted cargo, and that in no case should there be put on board of one vessel the whole of the stores of the same description; because, in the event of the vessel being lost, the whole bulk of the stores of one description would be lost likewise, and the army be left utterly destitute of that particular kind of stores. I think it essential that it should be adopted as an uniform principle, that every cargo should be perfect in itself, and should be an assorted cargo, containing a portion of each class of articles, however small; and then, if you lost one ship, you would suffer comparatively little, because the several ships, in a manner, insured each other, making up each others' deficiencies.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEsaid, he
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had not seen the statement to which the noble Earl referred, and certainly was not aware that any newspaper or individual had ever stated that the whole of the medical stores and warm clothing were on board the steamer Prince. But this be could assure the noble Earl, that if any such statement had been made, no statement more incorrect was ever put forth, because every ship or transport conveying stores, with the exception of those that carried the battering train, had invariably carried out an assorted cargo. Thus, for example, in the case of the very vessel whose unfortunate loss they had had so much reason to deplore: the Prince carried out a regiment of soldiers; it carried out besides a considerable quantity of ammunition; it carried out also a large amount of medical stores and warm clothing. So far from all the medical stores, however, having been placed on board that vessel, it was in fact the fifth or sixth consignment of such stores which had been sent out, and it certainly was not the last. Again, so far from all the warm clothing for the troops having been placed in that one ship, he rejoiced to say that nothing could be further from the fact. The Prince carried out a considerable quantity of warm clothing, which was lost; but since then various ships had arrived out with warm clothing, and a considerable number of the troops had obtained this comfort. The Jura arrived almost immediately after the loss of the Prince, with a considerable quantity of warm clothing on board, and he believed there was hardly a ship which had left this country for the Crimea during some time past which had not carried out warm clothing of some description or another; and especial care had been taken never to send out in the same ship the whole of the articles of one description, so as to avoid the risk of losing the entire stock. Thus houses for covering the troops and stores also had been sent out on board several different ships. This principle of assorted cargoes led to difficulty in the case of those enormous ships to which the noble Earl has referred. He says, the medical stores were placed at the bottom of the Prince. I believe that that, unfortunately, is too true; because if these enormous ships do not happen to load at one port, there is great difficulty in arranging the cargo, and the Prince after taking in these stores went to Woolwich and Portsmouth to embark other stores. He did not mean to say that they could

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not, perhaps, make a different arrangement by providing that the whole of the stores should be taken in at one port of embarkation—such Portsmouth; and that, at whatever expense or inconvenience, the medical stores sent should be placed at the top, rather than at the bottom of the cargo. He did not say that these things might not be done; but great allowance ought to be made on account of the difficulty attending these arrangements, considering the immense quantity—thousands and thousands of tons—of every article necessary to be sent out. He believed the statement was correct with regard to the Prince, that the medical stores were at the bottom of the cargo; but the other statement with respect to the Prince was incorrect, for she carried stores of all kinds.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEobserved, that merchants loaded their ships at the port where the cargo was ready, and stowed it away according to the different places at which it was to be delivered. He believed that in the Thames and at other ports great confusion had arisen in loading the Government vessels, from different portions of the cargo being sent, and the persons in charge thereof each insisting on that portion under his care being stowed away immediately. All that would be remedied if, at the ports where Government ships were likely to be laden, there were placed trustworthy officers under the orders of the Government, to whom notice was given, when the cargo was about to arrive, of what it would consist, and where it was going—such officers being responsible for the stowage of the ship.
LORD ABINGERsuggested whether it would not be possible to establish at Balaklava some corps for the delivery of goods, as he knew that officers had great difficulty in getting at the articles which were sent out? He believed the baggage of the army had arrived at the Crimea, but up to the present moment had not been distributed, being somewhere in a ship in the harbour, nobody knew where. It was obviously important that there should be some organisation for the reception and delivery of the baggage, and that baggage waggons should be ready to take it away to the different regiments, so as to have it distributed without delay.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLEwished to say that he had already made an arrangement of the nature and for the end suggested, though whether it had been successful or not he was unable to state.
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About four or five months ago, finding that the Commissariat would not be able to manage this department satisfactorily, he applied to his right hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Fremantle), the Chairman of the Board of Customs, to select sixteen or eighteen landing waiters, who should undertake the conduct of this duty. They had been accordingly appointed and sent out, being made a branch of the Commissariat, in the hope that, by their aid, confusion and inaccuracies in the baggage department might be obviated. How far the arrangement had effected this object he could not undertake to say, but he should not omit to make inquiry on this head also.
House adjourned till To-morrow.