Sitting of 12 December 1854

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS (during Recess).—For King's Lynn Borough, v. Robert Jocelyn, esq., commonly called Viscount Jocelyn, deceased; for Wigan Borough, v. Ralph Anthony Thicknesse, esq., deceased; for Forfar County, v. Lieutenant Colonel Lauderdale Maule, commonly called the Honourable Lauderdale Maule, deceased; for Frome Borough, v. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Edward Boyle, commonly called the Honourable Robert Edward Boyle, deceased; for Limerick City, v. Robert Potter, esq., deceased; for Coventry City, v. Charles Geach, esq., deceased; for Bedford Borough, v. Henry Stuart, esq., deceased; for Abingdon Borough, v. Montagu Bertie, esq., commonly called Lord Norreys, now Earl of Abingdon, called to the House of Peers.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Forfar County, Viscount Duncan; for Wigan, Joseph Acton, esq.; for Kingston upon Hull, William Henry Watson, esq.; for Canterbury, Right. Hon. Sir William Meredith Somerville, bt.; for Kingston upon Hull, William Digby Seymour, esq.; for Cambridge Borough, Francis Mowatt, esq.; for Marylebone, Right Hon. Sir Benjamin Hall, bt.; for Malden, John Bramley Moore, esq.; for Cambridge Borough, Robert Alexander Shafto Adair, esq.; for Bedford Borough, William Stuart, esq.; for King's Lynn, John Henry Gurney, esq.; for Frome, Viscount Dungarvan; for Limerick City, James O'Brien, esq.; for Coventry, Sir Joseph Paxton.
NEW WRITS (now Ordered).—For Marylebone, v. Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, deceased; for Limerick County, v. Wyndham Goold, esq., deceased; for Ayr County, v. James Hunter Blair, esq., deceased; for Antrim County, v. Edward Pakenham, esq., deceased; for Fermanagh County, v. Sir Arthur Brinsley Brooke, bt., deceased; for Gloucester County (Eastern Division) Sir Michael Hicks Hicks Beach, bt., deceased.
PUBLIC BILL.—1o Outlawries.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.
Message to attend HER MAJESTY: the House went; and being returned—
MR. SPEAKER reported, that the House had that day been to the House of Lords, when Her Majesty was pleased to make a most gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament; and that for the sake of greater accuracy, he had procured a copy thereof.
The right hon. Gentleman then read the Speech to the House.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH.
MR. H. HERBERT: Sir, in rising to move that a humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, in answer to Her Most Gracious Speech, I am unable to urge the appeal which is often put forward by Members standing in the position which I do,

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of having never addressed the House before, inasmuch as on several occasions I have had to acknowledge with gratitude the indulgence and forbearance of the House. But I trust I may be permitted to remind the House that on those occasions to which I refer, I have confined myself to those discussions which affected the social condition of that part of the United Kingdom with which I am more immediately connected, and with which, from previous habits, I might he supposed to be better acquainted; but I have left to others the discussion of those larger and more important questions to which I have felt they were more fitted to do justice. I trust, therefore, that the House will believe me when I say, with all sincerity, that I feel no one ever yet asked the indulgence of the House who had greater need of it than the individual who now addresses it. I am sure the House will have heard with pleasure at a period when we are engaged in a fearful contest with an adversary of tremendous power, that Her Majesty has been able to contract a treaty which will draw closer those bonds which unite us to our Transatlantic brethren. I am sure, also, the House will respond to the sentiment expressed, that when measures shall be introduced bearing on the social condition of this country, hon. Gentlemen will endeavour to abstract their minds from the all-engrossing topic which now occupies their whole attention, in order to give those measures full and fair consideration. Sir, there is one topic which is alluded to in Her Majesty's gracious speech—a topic which absorbs the mind of every man, woman, and child in these dominions. I allude, of course, to the war. In asking from the House permission to make a few remarks on this important subject, I feel that I labour under great and peculiar difficulties; inasmuch as, in order to arrive at a fair appreciation of the position in which we now stand, it will be absolutely necessary for me to take a short glance at some of the more prominent events of the war. I can appeal to the experience of every hon. Member how, in the intense anxiety with which we look forward to intelligence, and in our anxiety for the future—how little of interest are the details of the past. Yet it is absolutely necessary that I should ask your permission to refer to them. And in making a retrospect, I think I may say in the outset, that the country has ample cause to congratulate itself on the important results that have already been at-
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tained, as well as the splendid success of our arms. In making that assertion I hope I may not be misunderstood—I hope I may not be understood to undervalue the great sacrifices that have been made—I hope I may not be understood not to lament the loss of those brave soldiers who have fallen so gallantly in battle—I hope I may not be understood not to appreciate the loss of those sailors who have recently found a grave in the stormy waters of the Euxine—I hope I may not be understood not to sympathise deeply with those who are now lamenting the decease of those who were near and dear to them. I believe that we are able to offer to these last this—the greatest worldly consolation—that their country not only appreciates their bravery and devotion, but can say that the sacrifices that have been made have not been made in vain. It was on the 27th of last March that Her Majesty informed us of the failure of her constant and patriotic endeavours to secure to Her subjects and to Europe the blessings of peace. It is not my intention to make any allusion to what preceded that period—there were ample discussions upon it in this House and out of it, and I feel, therefore, that it would be impossible for me to enlist the attention of the House, even if it were necessary—which I do not consider it is—to enter into any detail of the negotiations which preceded the war. But what was the position of affairs when Her Majesty made the announcement to Parliament to which I have referred? War had commenced. The winter had been passed in a series of skirmishes between the Russians and the Turks. It was perfectly true that the Turks had shown a degree of energy for which we were little prepared; it was perfectly true that Oltenitza and Citate could bear witness that, if properly led, and under circumstances suited to their military character, they had in no way degenerated from the valour of their ancestors; but, Sir, I believe that there were few who were sanguine enough to think that those efforts could be protracted for any lengthened period. I believe there were few who would have ventured to assert, notwithstanding the successes of the Turks, that they would be able to meet their gigantic antagonist in the open field, and that the result of a regular campaign would not be most disastrous to their arms. In the month of February previous, Sir John Burgoyne had been sent to Constantinople. I believe I speak the sentiment of the House when I say, that an abler officer,

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and a man more capable of forming a sound opinion on the actual state of affairs, does not exist than Sir John Burgoyne. He went in conjunction with a distinguished French officer of engineers, and he had there the benefit of constant communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a man probably more able to form a just estimate of those matters than any man alive. He had also the benefit of the assistance of Mr. Colquhoun, our Consul at Bucharest, who was then getting the best possible information with regard to the resources of the enemy, and the forces he was likely to bring into the war. Well, this was the result bring into the war. Well, this was the result that Sir John Burgoyne came to—not that we should be in a position to make an offensive movement upon the Danube, but that our first and principal effort must be to defend the Dardanelles and Constantinople. It was supposed that the Russians were advancing with at least 200,000 men, and he came to the conclusion, that the first move that we might expect would be the advance of the Russians over the Balkan, and their reappearance at Adrianople. The Russians passed the Danube on the 27th of March. Our troops were in the meantime sent out. They first went, as the House is well aware, to Gallipoli, where energetic preparations were made to resist the enemy if he should arrive so far. Silistria was besieged; and who, at that time, could have predicted that a third-rate fortress could have resisted successfully the armies of Russia? But, Sir, the gallantry of an Englishman, the gallantry of the brave Butler, now, unhappily, no more—added to the warlike character of the Turks, which some had been accustomed to decry, commanded, as it were, by him, although not officially, was able to stop the whole of the Russian army. In the meantime our forces were ready to advance, and although the enemy retreated without our being able to strike a blow, yet who can doubt that the moral effect was produced? Who can doubt that the presence of the Anglo-French army at Varna had a moral effect on the resistance of the Turks at Silistria? Well, about the time that our army was preparing to march, the Russians retreated. And I think it fortunate that the advice of some who advocated the immediate advance of our troops into the Dobrudscha was not complied with. When I recollect the great mortality at Varna in consequence of the mysterious dispensation of Providence, our troops being attacked by a frightful disease,
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I cannot help thinking that we have reason to be thankful that the fell disease attacked them when it did, instead of when they were engaged in the pestilential marshes of the Dobrudscha. Well, Sir, threatened on the one hand by Austria, and on the other by the Anglo-French army, the Russians retreated. The campaign, which had been ostentatiously begun by the declaration of the Emperor of Russia, that he was marching in defence of the orthodox faith—which could mean nothing else than that he was going to Constantinople—the campaign, which began by crossing the Danube, ended with the Russians retreating across that river, and behind the Pruth. And thus, without a blow being struck, without a man being lost in actual combat with the enemy—although we deplore the loss of a great many from the attacks of a more terrible enemy—yet without a blow by the enemy, the first and immediate object of the campaign was attained. The Emperor of Russia was forced by the pressure of circumstances to do that which he had refused to moderate remonstrances, namely, to give up those provinces that he had so unjustly seized; and the Anglo-French army was sent forth to prosecute the second and not less important portion of its destiny, namely, to obtain—and we may thank the enemy for the phrase—a material guarantee against these aggressions of Russia being renewed. I may now be permitted to glance very shortly at our naval operations. I am very well aware that there are some who perhaps in some degree are disappointed that the countrymen of Nelson, and of those heroes whose exploits adorn our naval annals, have fought no great battle, that the recital of no brilliant results have been added to the already brilliant chronicle. But, Sir, we must remember that on former occasions when those great battles were fought, we had an enemy to deal with who did not skulk behind impregnable fortresses—who never refused to meet us in the field, with whom it was an honour to be allowed to cross arms—who, in many a well-fought engagement, gave us proofs of his valour, devotion, and skill. We are apt to forget, in the remembrance of those brilliant victories, of which we are all so justly proud, the long period of time that intervened between them, the long period over which they were extended—we are apt to forget the blockades and the hardships that were endured before any of those great results were accomplished. And we are also apt, I am sorry to say, to underrate the services

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that have been performed. I may fairly ask, is it nothing for our sailors to have navigated with success in dangerous seas—is it nothing to have swept the flag of our enemy from the seas, and to have offered him combat in those waters which he was accustomed to call Russian lakes? Is that service nothing which has enabled our commerce to continue undisturbed—which has enabled Her Majesty this day to inform us that she views with satisfaction the general prosperity of the country? Is it nothing that our flag should be as safe now with a war raging as it has been in time of profound peace? Is it nothing that an unarmed pleasure yacht should be enabled to navigate the waters almost within range of the guns of Cronstadt, and that another should depart with perfect safety, laden with necessaries for our troops in the Crimea, and land them within a few miles of the great fortress of Sebastopol? Nor can I quit this subject without congratulating the House upon the attitude which has been assumed by our sailors during this war. Almost as far back as I can remember prophecies have boon made with regard to the impossibility of manning our fleets. It was prophesied that whenever a war should break out, it would be found necessary to resort to the press-gang. But what has really been the case? In time of peace our sailors may have been unwilling to join the fleet, and there may, perhaps, have been some difficulty in manning the ships; but the instant danger menaced their country, there they were as ready as of old to maintain the honour of their native land. But to return to Varna, where I left our troops. We know that the greatest possible difficulties were experienced, and that much time was necessarily spent in making those gigantic preparations essential for the expedition in which we were about to engage; but at last everything was ready for the expedition to the Crimea: in the midst of disease, and under the greatest possible difficulties, the army was got into a state of preparation for that memorable expedition. On the 3rd of September the allied forces left Varna, and in eleven days they landed at Old Fort. Not having myself any military experience or knowledge, it would be presumptuous in me to criticise the instructions which Lord Raglan issued to the forces on their embarkation; but I think that the most ignorant amongst us could hardly read those instructions without being convinced that in Lord Raglan
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we had a commander in whom the country might repose every confidence—a commander who both inherited the hereditary gallantry of his race, and who was gifted with a prudence, a discretion, and a foresight, which would command success, if success were possible, and which were worthy of that great school in which he had been trained to arms. On the 20th of September was fought the memorable battle of the Alma—a battle memorable, not only for the valour displayed by the allied forces, but for the fact that it was the first occasion in modern history on which French and English soldiers had fought together. In many a painful field had they learned to respect each other's valour, but never before, in modern times, had they fought side by side; and I trust that that battle set a seal upon that alliance which, if it shall continue, as I trust in God it may, will be the best guarantee for the peace of Europe, and against the aggressions of any one Power upon the people of another country. I will pass over shortly, because I feel it impossible to do them justice, the details of the famous flank movement of the Allies after the battle of the Alma, and I will remind you that great difficulties were experienced in getting up the guns necessary for the siege of Sebastopol; but on the 17th of October the first shot was fired; and it soon became evident that the difficulties which the allied forces would have to encounter had hardly been foreseen by the commanders. On the 25th of October occurred the battle of Balaklava. I shall not enter into the details of that day. It is a mournful subject for us to consider. It was a mournful day for England—that day on which the gallant light cavalry brigade rode to their death. But if a mournful day, it is also a day to which we may look with pride—for I believe there is not an Englishman who would not feel proud of being the countryman of but one of those heroes. I believe there is not a parent who mourns the loss of a son on that ensanguined field, who, when time shall have dulled the first poignancy of his grief, will not, as he wipes away a tear and checks the rising sob, say with feelings of pride, "My boy was one of those 600 brave men who rode to death that day." Well, Sir, the siege progressed. On the 5th of November was fought the memorable battle of Inkerman. On that occasion 8,000 of our countrymen, who were alone engaged, well and bravely sustained

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the honour of old England. Well and bravely did they maintain the reputation of that Army that never knows when it is beaten. Since that time it must be allowed that we have been unable to prosecute the siege operations with the same vigour as before. The Russian flag, according to the latest advices, still floats over Sebastopol; and it may be frankly admitted—though I make the avowal without any official authority—that both the Government at home and the allied commanders abroad underrated the difficulties they had to encounter, and were not sufficiently aware of the great resources which our enemy would have at his command. I will not ask if that is any reason why we should relax in our endeavours, or why the House should refuse to the Government those supplies which are necessary to carry on the campaign with vigour. I will not do so, first, because I think it is a question unworthy to be put to a British House of Commons; and, secondly, because it is a question which has already been loudly and distinctly answered by the unanimous voice of the British people. Never, Sir, in our history, has there been such unanimity displayed; never has the spirit of our people been so roused. Does a want occur, instantly a subscription is made to supply it. Are our soldiers supposed to suffer privations, either in the hospitals or in the field, instantly a thousand hands are stretched out to supply that need. I am sure—I most firmly believe—that on no occasion has there been such unanimity. As an Irish Member, I may be permitted to congratulate the House on the state of Ireland at this particular moment. Sir, it was no novelty that Ireland should fill your ranks with soldiers who, to use the words of a leading journal, "Never in the hour of danger were craven or untrue." It was nothing new that the shout of the Connaught Rangers should mingle with the cry of the Cameronians; or that the Enniskilleners should charge side by side with the Scots Greys. But, Sir, there have been periods in our history when an English Minister would have hesitated to withdraw troops from Ireland—there have been times when it would not have been safe to have done so. Those times, I hope, are passed for ever away. I have recently come over from Ireland, and I can bear my testimony to the patriotic spirit which animates every class of my countrymen. I have seen persons of different creeds and of different
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parties vieing with each other in patriotic efforts to respond to the appeal which has been made to them by Her Majesty. I believe, Sir, that your hopes are our hopes—your sympathies our sympathies—and I trust I may soon add, your triumphs our triumphs. If such, then, is the state of things at home, what is the state of things abroad? We are in alliance with the bravest and most powerful nation in Europe. In conjunction with our gallant Ally, we have established a position which I believe to be impregnable, and from which, indeed, it would be an insult to our troops, who have held it against such odds, to fear that, with the reinforcements they are receiving, they will not be able further to maintain it until the great object of our hopes and desires shall have been attained. We have obtained a position, moreover, into which we shall be able to throw any quantity of ammunition, or of such supplies as may be necessary to mitigate the calamities of war. Her Majesty has informed us that she has concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria, and that that treaty will shortly be laid upon the table. Until the details of that treaty shall have been laid before us, it would be quite presumptuous in me to attempt to discuss them; but I may say this—that if we had learned that Austria had concluded a treaty with our enemy, we should, no doubt, have considered it as a fearful disadvantage, and it would have been received by us as a severe blow. I think, therefore, that I am not asserting too much, even without knowing anything of the details of the treaty, when I say, that we may consider we have gained a very considerable advantage. But, Sir, what is now the condition of our enemy? He is left with the unanimous public opinion of Europe against him; his flag has been swept from those seas which he has been accustomed to call Russian lakes, and even in Asia he has been unable to resume the offensive, for after gaining a victory he was so weak that he has been obliged to continue on the defensive. Still it is necessary that we should not underrate our antagonist. That great and ponderous machine may be slow in its movements and not easy to move; but we do not know how severe a blow it may be able to give. It, therefore, behoves us to take every measure and to strain every nerve to forward the great object we have in view. I would appeal to the House whether this is a period for any man, however much he may differ from the Government upon the

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details of the war, or with regard to some of the objects that might have been gained, and that have not been gained—whether this is a period at which to indulge in any party attacks, or whether all these minor differences of opinion ought not rather to be merged in a desire to support the Government in those great operations which we are carrying on? Sir, I hope that this appeal may be responded to; and that on this occasion all may show our enemy that he has made war not upon this Government or upon this party of Englishmen, but upon the whole English people. Let us show our foe that, regardless of danger and expense, we will prosecute the great enterprise in which we are engaged. Let us show him that we will send any number of men that may be necessary—men such as scaled the heights of the Alma, dashed through his ranks at Balaklava, and defeated his battalions against such fearful odds at Inkerman. I hope the House, by its unanimity, will be worthy of the people of England. The pride of all England is in arms. The people of England, humbly founding their trust in the Great Disposer of Events, have accepted the challenge so haughtily thrown down before them by the Emperor of Russia, and have chosen the fairest spot in his own dominions as the arena in which the great quarrel may be brought to an issue. The hon. Member concluded by moving—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to convey to Her Majesty the Thanks of this House for Her Majesty's Most gracious Speech from the Throne:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that Her Majesty has called us together at this unusual period of the year, in order that by our assistance Her Majesty may take such measures as will enable Her to prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost vigour and effect:
"To assure Her Majesty that this assistance will be readily given, and that we fully agree with Her Majesty in the necessity of sparing no effort to augment Her Majesty's Forces now engaged in the Crimea; while we rejoice to learn that the exertions they have made, and the victories they have obtained, which are not exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, have filled Her Majesty with admiration and gratitude:
"We participate in the conviction expressed by Her Majesty, that the hearty and efficient cooperation of the brave Troops of Her Ally the Emperor of the French, and the glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more
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closely the union which happily subsists between the two Nations:
"That we learn with satisfaction that, together with the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty has concluded a Treaty of Alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which Her Majesty anticipates important advantages to the common cause:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that Her Majesty has also concluded a Treaty with the United States of America, by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted:
"To thank Her Majesty for the announcement that these Treaties will be laid before us:
"Humbly to concur in the hope expressed by Her Majesty, that, although the prosecution of the War will naturally engage our chief attention, yet that other matters of great interest and importance to The general welfare will not be neglected:
"That we rejoice to learn that the general prosperity of Her Majesty's subjects remains uninterrupted, and that the state of the Revenue affords Her Majesty entire satisfaction; while we humbly beg to assure Her Majesty of our desire to continue to promote the progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures:
"To thank Her Majesty for expressing the hope that, in the Estimates which will be laid before us, we shall find that ample provision has been made for the exigencies of the Public Service:
"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for the confidence with which Her Majesty relies on our patriotism and public spirit, and for the conviction expressed by Her Majesty that, in the momentous contest in which we are engaged, we shall exhibit to the world the example of a united people; that we share Her Majesty's opinion, that we shall thus obtain the respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful termination."
MR. LEVESON GOWER: Sir, in rising to second the Address, I feel great diffidence in attempting the performance of the task allotted to me, although the able speech of my hon. Friend has greatly diminished the difficulty of that task. I do not consider that I have ability sufficient to do anything like justice to the subjects suggested by Her Majesty's Speech. I am sure that every one present must feel the deepest regret that he has lived to see the day when he has heard from Her Majesty's Throne a Speech delivered in which allusion is made to one topic only, and that one war. Still, Sir, under the circum stances of the time, and considering how the whole mind of the country is engrossed with that one topic, I think Her Majesty's

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advisers will be supposed to have done wisely in confining themselves to that single question. Every Englishman will read with gratification the terms—worthy of the occasion—in which Her Majesty has expressed Her approbation of the services of Her troops in the Crimea. The speech of my hon. Friend has relieved me from the necessity of alluding to the events of that campaign, and I feel that I cannot embody in words my admiration of the services of that noble set of men. In whatever light we view their conduct—whether we view their gallantry in action, their humanity in the hour of victory, or their cheerful endurance under sickness and privation—we must consider it in every light worthy of our approbation. I am told that in the hospitals at Scutari, their beds extended miles in length—all filled with the sick and wounded—and yet was not heard one word of murmur or complaint from the lips of those men, who are comforted by the reflection that they have fought and suffered in the service of their country. We must all have been glad to hear the tribute which Her Gracious Majesty has paid to the bravery of the French troops. That the armies of England and France, who, for centuries, whenever they have met in battle, have been opposed to each other, should, now that they fight together, be moved by a spirit of emulation to outdo all their former deeds, need be a matter of no surprise; but that in that spirit of emulation there should be mixed not a particle of jealousy—such a spirit as was displayed in the impetuous rush of the French in our support at Balaklave and Inkerman—I confess exceeds my expectations. Sir, the fact of my seconding the Address implies that I have confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers, and I hope I shall not be deemed presumptuous if I state why I consider they have deserved that confidence. In the first place, by maintaining as long as possible the policy of peace, they have not only united all classes in this country in support of the war, but they have turned the whole opinion of Europe in their favour. Then, by revising the practice of the laws which regulate belligerents and neutrals, they have obtained the goodwill of neutral Powers. By a straightforward policy, coupled with continued good faith, they have preserved the most complete agreement with the French nation during all the negotiations which have taken place with respect to this contest. In Germany what have they done? I
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believe that by the assistance of their unacknowledged allies, the German people, they have gradually drawn the German Governments towards the Western Powers; and we have heard, with great gratification, that a treaty has been signed with Austria—a treaty which, we are told, promises advantage to the common cause, and which has caused the greatest irritation to Russia and to her partisans throughout Europe. At all events, it is a treaty on the right side of neutrality. In Greece the firm attitude assumed by the Allies has put down an insurrection which presented a most anxious question, and on which the Emperor of Russia placed the greatest reliance. As far as I am able to judge as a civilian, I think the conduct of the Government in respect to its military operations has, in many of its features, been bold and energetic. I think that if, at the beginning of the year, the Government had come forward and stated that they intended to make themselves masters of the Baltic, to keep the fleets of Russia shut up in their ports, to fetter the commerce of Russia in every part of the world, and to take possession of and destroy the important fortress of Aland—I think that such a programme would have fully satisfied the expectations of the country. If Government had come forward with the promise that during the year they would send an expedition of 55,000 men, well disciplined and well equipped to the Crimea, I think their ability to do so would have been little credited. If a year ago we had been told that we should be in possession of Balaklava, and in a position from which we cannot be driven out, and from which, as I have been told, we certainly shall be in possession of Sebastopol, the last thing any one would have urged against Government would have been want of vigour. If, Sir, they had been accused of anything in that respect, it would not have been want of energy, but rashness. What does rashness mean? Engaging in any enterprise without taking precautions to ensure success. Now I believe there has been no want of energy on the part of the Government to ensure our getting possession of Sebastopol, and if you do that you destroy the power of the Emperor of Russia to put into execution those schemes of mad ambition which have caused the present war. I am sure the House of Commons will be united on this occasion; and though some may differ from the views I have enunciated, I venture to say to the dissentients that, unless

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they are prepared to put another and a better set of men in their place, they ought to support the present Government. I venture also to remind those dissentients, that every word that shall be spoken in this debate will be read with the greatest avidity not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Europe; and that every symptom of division or petty criticism among us will serve to encourage the enemy, and will have a most injurious effect on neutral and wavering States. Therefore, considering the sacrifices this country is ready to submit to for the purpose of bringing this war to the hoped-for conclusion, and considering that we have soldiers in the East cheerfully laying down their lives day after day for their country, I think it is not too much to ask that the House of Commons should unite themselves as one man in support of whatever Government has the war in charge, and by that means carry them through the deplorable and inevitable but triumphant struggle in which they are engaged to a successful issue.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That," &c. [See p. 101.]
SIR J. PAKINGTONsaid, that if he was desirous of availing himself of an early opportunity of taking a part in the debate on the Motion which had now been submitted to the House, he did so because he had a strong impression that in the present state of public affairs it was the duty of men of all parties in that House frankly to state their sentiments, and not because he entertained the slightest desire to criticise, and especially in any hostile spirit, the speeches which had been delivered by the two hon. Gentlemen opposite, the Mover and Seconder of the Address. On the contrary, he recognised readily the fairness of the tone in which those hon. Gentlemen had spoken. He took no exception to the spirit in which they had addressed the House, and he would readily admit the ability with which they had discharged the duty intrusted to them. He confessed, also, that it was to him a source of the greatest possible satisfaction on that occasion that he found himself unable to take any serious exception to the Address to Her Majesty which had been moved and seconded by the two hon. Gentlemen opposite in answer to the gracious Speech which Her Majesty had delivered from the Throne. In contemplating the first paragraph of that Speech and of the Address, namely, the paragraph in which Her Majesty had appealed to Parliament for support in the great war in which She
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was now embarked, he entertained the sanguine hope that among every party in that House there would prevail a degree of cordial unanimity, such as was never exceeded in any popular assembly. He was sure he might say, in the name of the great Conservative party, both in that House and in the country, that they did not yield to the Gentlemen who had framed that Address, or to any body of men in that House or in the country, in the firm resolve to extend to Her Majesty that support which She desired. The next portion of the Speech appealed to the House to sanction an augmentation of the Army. He felt himself equally unable to take the slightest exception to this demand on the part of Her Majesty's Government. On the contrary, he believed the feeling of those Friends with whom he had the honour of acting was not that they should now hesitate in acceding to the desire of the Government for increasing the Army, but that they should rather be disposed to find fault with the Government for having so long delayed that increase. The question had not been, "Why do you increase the Army now?" but rather, "Why have you not sooner adopted that measure?—why have you not sooner taken precautions to show that you were aware of the magnitude of the struggle in which the country is now unhappily engaged?" He feared the only construction that could be put on the policy adopted by the Government, and on the course which they had taken, was, that until lately—until the last month, when they appeared to have awakened as from a dream—they had been entirely unconscious of the magnitude, the difficulties, and the perils of the struggle with Russia in which they were embarked. There had been no fault on the part of that House. In the last Session of Parliament, whatever demands the Government made were freely and liberally granted; and the noble Lord opposite (Lord John Russell), on more than one occasion, frankly admitted the spirit in which they were met. It was, therefore, not from any want of support from that House that the Army was not sooner augmented. But he believed be might trace what he called the crippled state of our military armaments mainly to the financial arrangements of the Government during the past Session, and to that attempt announced on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—to the principle of which he and his Friends took no exception, but of the impossibility of which they warned

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him—that in so great a struggle they were to pay all the expenses of the war entirely from the revenue of the year. To this part of the speech then, he was sure no one on that side of the House would be disposed to take any exception. He now approached two passages of the Speech from the Throne to which he could not but advert—he alluded to the paragraph in which reference was made to the conduct of our army in the East, and to that which referred to the conduct of our noble Allies, the French. He approached this portion of the Speech with a feeling—which he thought every man must entertain who touched upon it—of the difficulty of expressing his opinion as he could desire. No language could exceed the debt of gratitude which we owed to the British army. Well did the language of Her Majesty's Speech say, that "the exertions they have made and the victories they have obtained are not exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, and have filled me with admiration and gratitude." Not only did he hold this language to be just—not only did he think the page of history recorded no parallel to the gallantry shown by our army in the field—but fiction had hardly imagined, we had not read in fable or in song, anything equal to the gallantry of that noble army. And brought, as he was, by this paragraph of the Speech to a consideration of the deeds of the army, he was naturally led to think of those who had bled and suffered in the sanguinary struggles in which our army had been engaged. He hoped that in that assembly and at that moment it would not be considered inappropriate or improper if he paused for a moment to pay a tribute of respect and deep regret for the memory of the gallant Colonel Blair. They all valued and esteemed him as a friend—he said this because he was sure no party feeling could mix on such a subject as this—he was esteemed by all; and he was sure that all must feel deep and heartfelt regret that one so full of promise, and with regard to whom there was so much reason to hope that a career of distinction and usefulness awaited him, had been so soon and so prematurely carried off. There was another name connected with that House—a gentleman long familiar with them all, of whom he could not refrain from making one passing remark. Colonel Blair was no more; but he did hope they would again see amour, them in renewed health and vigour the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans). In
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naming these names, no man, he trusted, would feel that he was making invidious distinctions. Where all had earned honour, to them honour was due—but he was now referring to Members of that House—men with whom they had all daily mixed—to men whom they all knew well—and he thought that every one who heard him would agree with him, that among the noble deeds that had distinguished the gallantry of the British army in the Crimea, there had been nothing more gallant, nothing more heroic, than the manner in which that gallant veteran left his bed of sickness on the day of Inkerman to share in the dangers of that terrible contest—an act of gallantry exceeded only by the generosity he showed when he refused to resume the command of the division which, unhappily, he had been obliged to resign into other hands. He hoped the House would pardon him for having stepped aside for a moment from the strict business before them, and expressing the hope that they would soon see the hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom he had made reference once more restored to his place among them. On this passage of the Speech too much could not be said; but so much was felt in the breast of every Englishman with respect to the noble deeds of the army that to dwell on them would be superfluous. Honour to all! They had saved the honour of their country by their gallantry, and deeply were they indebted to them for their heroic achievements. In the same spirit might he speak of the conduct of our Allies, the French; and he was glad to hear the language used by the hon. Gentlemen opposite—especially by the Seconder of the Address—on this subject. The hon. Member referred in terms most just and proper to that noble emulation and total freedom from anything like jealousy, and that unparalleled gallantry with which the French army had borne their share of glorious deeds in the Crimea. And here he would mention, in passing—for he could not refrain from doing so—the superfluous, the unnecessary gallantry, as some might think, and the noble spirit, with which General Canrobert rode side by side with Lord Raglan during the early portion of the day of Inkerman, and the ready gallantry with which General Bosquet—whose division was so placed as to be most at hand to aid the British troops when necessary—had ever shown himself willing to render assistance. He had heard with unqualified satisfaction the reference made in the Speech to the conduct of our Allies, and

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he hoped it would be known, not only to the French nation, but to the French army, that the Parliament of England acknowledged and appreciated their conduct. The next paragraph in the Speech to which he felt bound to refer, and on which he found himself unable to speak in the unqualified terms he had hitherto had the pleasure of doing, was undoubtedly one of the greatest importance—he meant that which referred to the treaty of alliance with Austria. The House must bear in mind that they were at present in ignorance of the nature and purport of that treaty. The noble Lord, he thought, had intimated that that treaty would be laid on the table forthwith; but the bearing of that treaty on the present state of affairs in the East, and on the future prospects of the war, was so important that he could not help hoping Her Majesty's Government would think it not inconsistent with their duty to give, as soon as they could, some statement of what the real scope and nature of that treaty is. Public feeling on this question, with respect to Austria, was very strong: it had been greatly excited with regard to the conduct and the intentions of Austria; and her conduct and intentions had been watched with an anxiety proportioned to their importance. An impression prevailed that we were very little informed as to what the real position of Austria in the East has been, and that we were very little informed as to the nature of the treaty concluded between Austria and the Porte; and impressions also prevailed, that Austrian influence had prevented Omar Pacha from keeping in check the Russian forces in Bessarabia, and so left free the division of General Osten-Sacken and the forces under Prince Gortschakoff to swell the Russian force in the Crimea, and to increase the risks and dangers of the British army at Inkerman. Now, these were serious matters. They could not fail to recollect what was said upon this subject at the commencement of last Session of Parliament by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the discussion which then took place on the negotiations that had been pending. The right hon. Baronet, if he remembered right, claimed as one advantage which had resulted from the conduct of the Government and from the delay that had occurred, that we had secured the co-operation of the German Powers. How had that been carried out? Where had been the co-
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operation of the German Powers from the time when the right hon. Gentleman spoke up to the present moment? This country had viewed—and naturally viewed—with suspicion the conduct of the Austrian Government—conduct which, he believed, had been marked by great ability as regarded the objects of that Power, but which had not been considered as equally conducive to the objects which the Western Powers had in view. Under these circumstances, the treaty which they now heard had been entered into with Austria was regarded in this country as a matter of no common interest, and, therefore, he hoped the noble Lord would think it consistent with his duty to inform the House as soon as possible of its contents. In the meantime, he trusted that it would be distinctly understood—and he confessed he had watched with some degree of anxiety the wording of this part of the Address—that the Address to which they were now asked to agree did not pledge the House to any expression of opinion as to the treaty, which had not been laid before them. There was one other paragraph in the Royal Speech which he must notice—a very mysterious paragraph, which referred to measures which they were told would promote the welfare and interests of the country. These measures were not specified in the Address; but he would only express the hope that a Reform Bill did not form part of the programme. They could not forget that the noble Lord told them last year that the moment of a great war with Russia was precisely that in which they should promote a Reform Bill, as it would afford the noble spectacle of a country which was not only in a position to make war with Russia, but to reform its institutions at the same time. He hoped the noble Lord had changed his mind on that point, and that a Reform Bill, at least, was not one of the measures included in this mysterious paragraph. With that proviso, he might say that he agreed to that paragraph of the Address; for, notwithstanding the duties devolving on the British Parliament at this most important crisis of European affairs, and the anxious considerations connected with the war to which they must attend, he could not think it creditable to that House to be unable at the same time to devote attention to matters of domestic importance. Having thus stated that he had no fault to find with the language which the Government had advised Her Majesty to use in Her Gracious Speech, he felt strongly

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with the hon. Gentlemen opposite (the Mover and Seconder), both of whom had rather appealed to the Opposition side of the House on the point, that the present was not a moment for party struggle. He did not wish to address the House that evening in any party spirit. He admitted the importance of our showing to Europe and to the world the example not only of a united Parliament, but of a united nation. He adopted this part of the language of the Address most cordially; and if they had duties to discharge which implied the existence of differences among them, let it be clearly and broadly understood that those differences referred only to the mode in which they best could support their Sovereign in the endeavours She was now making to conduct this great struggle to a successful issue. But, on the other hand, he would not admit that it could be consistent with the duty of Members of that House to abandon their right to criticise the conduct of the Government. On the contrary, he thought that now that they were about to intrust to the Government large powers and great resources—now that the Government were appealing to the House for the means of carrying on a European war of such magnitude—it became the duty of the Members of that House—a duty from which they could not shrink—to state what grounds of complaint they thought might exist against the manner in which the Government had conducted the war hitherto, and to call upon them for sonic explanation on those points in respect to which public anxiety doubts the wisdom of their course. This was a right and duty which he, for one, could not consent to abandon; and there was an impression strongly existing in the public mind, that whatever anxiety the Government might have had—as he questioned not they had been anxious—to carry on this war to a successful issue, they had not shown that wisdom, foresight, or prudence, in the measures which they had taken which were most likely to conduce to the great end which they must all alike have in view. In the last Session of Parliament, Members on that side of the House had found it their duty to criticise the conduct of the Government in respect to their negotiations. It was then averred, and he thought with truth—for it was never refuted—that at the time when, during those negotiations, which unhappily terminated in war, it was Most essential that the conduct of the Go-
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vernment should be marked with firmness, energy, and decision, and by language the most intelligible, their conduct, on the contrary, was timid and vacillating; and now, when the nation was unhappily involved in an arduous war—more arduous than the Government have yet shown they deemed probable—when it was the paramount duty of the Government not only to show the boldness, decision, and courage, which were the common inheritance of Englishmen, but at the same time to temper those qualities with the caution, prudence, and foresight of statesmen, he feared they must be accused—as the hon. Seconder of the Address seemed to anticipate—of rashness and imprudence. The public mind was at the present time so entirely engrossed by the events passing in the Crimea, that for the moment attention was diverted from the great expedition to the Baltic Sea. But public attention would again turn to that subject; and when they considered the magnitude of the armament and its absolute fruitlessness—when they reflected on that magnificent fleet, composed of the combined navies of France and England, the finest that had ever floated on the ocean, and considered that it had returned without accomplishing any one act that could be named ["Oh, oh!"], they had a right to demand some explanation on the subject from the Government. He heard some expressions of dissent from Gentlemen opposite. Did they allude to the capture of Bomarsund, and think that the event was of importance enough to call for eulogies and thanks? Because, if they did, he must say that he did not recognise the capture of that place as forming any exception to the description he had given of the results of the expedition. In fact, knowing the gallantry, the zeal, and spirit, of our sailors, and believing that, both in the Baltic and Black Sea, they were actuated by a desire to emulate the brave deeds of the British army, he could only compare the whole history of the expedition to the Baltic to that well-known military exploit of which they had not lately heard much, but with which they were all familiar in their early days—
"The King of France marched up the hill
With twenty thousand men,
And when he got up to the top
He straight marched back again."
He would not allude in terms of censure to the Admirals of our two fleets, because at present there was no informa-

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tion to justify it; and because, if he did allude to them, he might anticipate the discussion which he believed was expected to take place at a dinner at the Reform Club, which possibly might be given to those Admirals on their return to England, when no doubt the First Lord of the Admiralty, even in a more triumphant tone than he assumed last spring, would congratulate the club that both the Admirals belonged to it. He (Sir J. Peking-ton) intended to pass no censure on either of those Admirals, but lie thought he had a right to ask the Government what had been the causes of the failure which had undoubtedly, to a great extent, attended our naval operations?—what was the cause that so grand an armament had produced such small results? He believed that the real fault was, that the Government adopted an unwise course in sending so large an armament to the Baltic. The Russian fleet was not likely to come out. They all knew that the Russian fleet was not disposed to meet the British unless on very favourable terms; and with a fleet of the magnitude sent to the Baltic it was not to be expected that the Russians would contend. Then, again, our ships were so large, that they could not approach the coast; and for the purposes of blockade the armament was altogether on a scale, in his opinion, perfectly unnecessary. There was another subject on which the public mind was much excited—the conduct of the fleet, namely—owing, he presumed, to the instructions given by the Government—with respect to the bombardment of Odessa. The bombardment of Odessa, if he recollected aright, was accompanied by something like an apology from the Admiral of the Black Sea fleet, excusing the incivility which he had been obliged to show in attacking them as he did, and which he said arose from the sole ground that the Russians had fired on a flag of truce. But why had Odessa been left undestroyed? Had not subsequent events—had not the operations at Sebastopol—made it clear how unwise it was on the part of the Government to leave the town of Odessa untouched? Was it respected because it was a commercial town? But Odessa could hardly be regarded merely as a commercial town, when they found the extent to which it was fortified—when they found a large military force constantly established in it. Its peculiar situation, with respect to the Principalities on the one hand, and with re-
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spect to the Crimea on the other, must be borne in mind; and it would be found that Odessa had practically been a great centre of military operations, and had mainly aided in sending reinforcements to the Russian army in the Crimea. His own impression was—and he believed it was that of the public—that the Government had acted unwisely in leaving to the Russians a place like Odessa, from which they could throw reinforcements into the Crimea, and which they could make a great centre of military operations. He should now approach the conduct of the Government in respect to the attack on Sebastopol. He did not think that the present was a moment in which it was proper to raise the question as to the policy of our attack upon Sebastopol, or for calling on the Government for an explanation of their policy in having made that attack. They had loudly professed, and only recently the noble Lord the Prime Minister had repeated the declaration in a marked manner, that theirs was a policy of peace. Now he (Sir J. Pakington) thought it very questionable whether by the attack on the Crimea war had not been greatly protracted; but he did not at present mean to imply any opinion of his own as to the policy of that attack, as the time for entering on that subject had not yet arrived, and he reserved to himself the right to concur in the wisdom of that course, if the Government could convince him, as they probably might, that it was the best course that could be taken. But there was another view of the subject which he thought they were in duty bound to take, and to which no answer could be given, and that was, that Government were not justified in attacking the Crimea at all unless in a manner which should, humanly speaking, ensure success, and that, whatever the abstract policy of the attack might be, the Government were bound by their duty to their Sovereign and country not to attack a great fortress such as Sebastopol with inadequate means. Such was the impression of the country, and Members of that House would depart from their duty if they did not call on the Government for explanations on this point. Public opinion directed three accusations against the Government—first, that they had attacked that great fortress with inadequate means; second, that the forces they sent to the Crimea for this purpose had been left uncared for and unsupported; and third,

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that if anything could have added to the difficulties and dangers of the undertaking, it was the unwise manner in which the Government and the organs of the Government advertised, if he might so speak, and proclaimed the intended measures, and put the Emperor of Russia on his guard with respect to the attack which was to be made on his territory. He held in his hand an extract from a speech made by the noble Lord opposite on the 24th of July last. The noble Lord had not long since made a speech at a public dinner given to him at Bristol, in which he made a statement which, so far as his recollection served, had not previously been placed before the public—namely, as to the time at which the Government made up their minds to attack Sebastopol, and the time at which they communicated that decision to the generals of the army. The noble Lord stated at Bristol that the instructions of the Government to attack Sebastopol were sent out—he was now speaking from memory—so that the generals would receive them at Varna about the middle of July. The decision must therefore have been taken not later than the commencement of the month; and, looking to these dates, he presumed it was likely that when the siege of Silistria was raised, the Government then took into their consideration the policy of attacking Sebastopol, as, according to the noble Lord, instructions were sent out so as to reach Varna about the middle of July. On the 24th of that month the noble Lord seemed to have been unable to restrain his eagerness to communicate the fact to this House; and in these terms the noble Lord made the communication—
"But, Sir, there is another mode in which the position of Russia is menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey. I mean the establishment of a great fortress, prepared with all the combinations of art, and containing within its port a very large fleet of line-of-battle ships, ready at any moment to come down with a favourable wind to the Bosphorus. I say that is a position so menacing to Turkey, that no treaty of peace could be considered wise which left the Emperor of Russia in that same position of menace."—[3 Hansard, cxxxv. 608–9.
The noble Lord, upon the same day, when he found that all parties in that House had put that construction on those words, which in his (Sir J. Pakington's) humble judgment was the only construction open, endeavoured to qualify their force and remove the impression they had produced, and he (Sir John Pakington) well recollected the surprise that attempt produced. But repeating the words again, he (Sir John
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Pakington) asked, what would be the construction naturally put on them, coupled as they were with almost daily declarations from one leading paper in London, that an attack on Sebastopol was the only means of humbling Russia, and that by the attack on Russia the great ends of the war were to be attained. He asked, not only what other construction could be put upon these words within the walls of that House, but what other impression could be made upon the Emperor of Russia? These words, of course, would speedily wing their way to St. Petersburg; and depend upon it that from that moment the defences of Sebastopol were strengthened, and not a moment was lost in preparing for our reception. On the 5th of August the Times excited a general feeling of wonder in the country, by declaring, in a remarkable paragraph, that on that very day the expedition was to sail. I maintain that in this way the Emperor of Russia had a warning that he ought never to have had, which in common prudence he could neither mistake nor neglect, and which they might rely upon it he did neither mistake nor neglect, which enabled him fully to provide for the defence of this great fortress. And he had ample time. The Government had sent out their instructions in the beginning of July, and the expedition did not sail till the beginning of September—a very late period for commencing such an enterprise. And what was the amount of force sent? 27,000 English troops only landed in the Crimea in September. He believed that the whole force, English and French, for the investment of Sebastopol, did not exceed 50,000 men. He also firmly believed—for the conviction was forced on him by the events which had taken place—that that force of 50,000 men was sent to undertake this great enterprise without the Government having any knowledge whatever of the Russian force in the Crimea, or the strength of the fortress which they were about to attack. The great error which had beset the Government, and which had paralysed and weakened all their measures, had been that of underrating the strength of the enemy with whom we were to contend. He was confirmed in this belief by the language used by the Prime Minister at a festivity which took place in the town of Aberdeen. The noble Lord, as usual, spoke much of peace, and he went on to say—
"Still, when war became inevitable, I declared that, so far as I was concerned, it Should be

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carried on with the utmost vigour and energy of which the Government was capable. Gentlemen, perhaps the moment is not opportune to ask whether that pledge has been fulfilled? If, gentlemen, you will consider what has been done in the course of six short months, I think you will admit that this country never made an exertion at all comparable with that which she has just made. An army has been collected and transported from the shores of this country, such as never left them in preceding history—an army such as the Duke of Wellington never commanded, and appointed in all its parts in a manner which, humanly speaking, is calculated to ensure its success."
He traced in those words the error which had pervaded the whole conduct of the Government. It was perfectly clear to him, front that language of the Prime Minister, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the War Department, that they were ignorant of or underrated the strength of Sebastopol. This force of 27,000 English was landed on the shores of the Crimea under the idea, that as soon as it was there, they had nothing to do but to march upon Sebastopol and take it. In this there was no foresight or prudence; and no allowance was made for the necessary casualties of war—for those who must fall in battle, and those who sunk under the climate of a foreign country. Lord Aberdeen said, that the army was appointed in all its parts in a manner to ensure success; and yet it was, when landed in the Crimea, deficient in artillery, and almost without cavalry, and with a most scanty provision of such equipments as are essential to the health and comfort of the men, and especially tents and covering for service in the field. Could the House forget the description of the suffering of our officers and men during the first three days after their landing? The Prime Minister, therefore, was anything but justified in his boast of the completeness of its appointments. The gravamen of the charge against the Government was, that they sent the army to attack the Crimea without any of the reserves essential for their support. He called upon the Government for an explanation on this point, and he thought the House and the country had a right to demand it. Were the Government justified, he would ask, in sending an expedition into the Crimea without providing a reserve for its support when it had landed? The conduct of the Government in this respect was open, he thought, to grave doubt—nay, more, he was afraid, to severe censure. The country had a right to call upon the Government to explain why the expedition in the Crimea had been left
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without reserves and without reinforcements; and he hoped the Government would lose no time in giving this explanation. He was not in possession of any official information, but, speaking from those sources of information which were open to all the world, and speaking merely from memory, he believed he was perfectly correct in saying that the army in the Crimea received nothing worthy of the name of reinforcements from the time when it landed in the beginning of September, till the 46th Regiment landed in November, after the battle of Inkerman. He was quite aware that, shortly after the battle of the Alma, a body of 3,000 men, 1,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, landed at Balaklava. He made no complaint against the Government for not having sent a larger force into the Crimea in the first instance, for he was quite aware that the difficulties of conveyance might be urged as a reason for not having landed a larger force than 27,000 men; but the 3,000 men landed at Balaklava a few days after the battle of the Alma did little more than fill up the gaps which had been created by the battle. Yet, from the time that the army sat down before Sebastopol, it was left there—numbers falling daily in the trenches, diminished in numbers by the loss experienced in the battle of Balaklava—decimated by disease and suffering from change of climate and exposure to cold and fatigue—without any reinforcements whatever, except some few draughts which were sent out to various regiments from time to time, but which in the aggregate made no serious addition to the army, until the day that the 46th Regiment landed. It was under these circumstances that this gallant band of men, dwindling away day by day, was on the 5th of November attacked at Inkerman by the Russian forces. What, he would ask, was the actual force with which we had fought at Inkerman? 27,000 men were landed originally in the Crimea, 3,000 men were landed a few days afterwards; but on the 5th of November—on the day of Inkerman—had they 20,000 men present? Had they 18,000, or even 15,000, effective men along the whole position from Balaklava to the heights before the town? He believed not; but this at least they knew on the authority of Lord Raglan himself, that the men who resisted time Russian army on that day did not exceed 8,000 men. The hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address talked of fearful odds; but how was it that they had had

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to contend against those fearful odds? We ought to thank God that the British forces were not destroyed at Inkerman. But it was not to the credit of the British Government that there should have been only 8,000 men to resist the Russian force. The valour of our soldiers—and, as the Royal Speech has said, history hardly records such a struggle as that—alone saved us; and it was, indeed, little less than marvellous. It was only by the mercy of God that that gallant band had been able to withstand the power of the Russian forces. But why were there only 8,000 men there? Their valour was, indeed, such as to claim the highest credit. It was no common valour; it was not the mere courage of man fighting against man; but it was an enduring, indomitable courage, which enabled this band of heroes, hour after hour, to struggle against those heavy masses of Russians that were hurled upon them. 'T was nothing less than miraculous that we were now able to congratulate ourselves upon their victory, instead of having to mourn over the loss of our whole force. But how was it that there were only 8,000 men left to sustain this conflict? They had a right to demand from Government an explanation why those odds existed on that day? His firm persuasion was, that, if the Government had shown a proper degree of foresight, if they had been up to their own undertaking, if they had formed proper reserves for the army, if they had taken means to fill up the vacancies occasioned by battle and disease, and to keep up the army even to its original number of 27,000 men, in that case he believed no battle of Inkerman would ever have been fought. To parody a trite phrase well known in the sister country, "England's weakness was Russia's opportunity." The Russians had gathered together their legions. She knew the British army was reduced to a handful of men, and, brave as they knew the British soldiers to be, they had hoped to overpower them by the force of numbers; and under that impression she attacked them at Inkerman. This he firmly believed they never would have done had we been there in that strength which common prudence and foresight would have told us we ought to have been. But this was not all. What had been the sufferings of our men since that time? They had been on those bleak heights under canvas in the worst weather, the ground impassable around them, exposed unprotected to
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the severity of the climate, and to the fury of that awful hurricane which had been so fatal to our shipping. But why was it so? Why were they left thus unprotected? By the improvidence of Her Majesty's Ministers. He thought he had a right to ask the Government to explain why this was so. The House of Commons had liberally granted supplies, and furnished them with the means of sending forth this great army—and it had a right to ask why the Government had left this army to perish of cold, exhaustion, and even of hunger? Within the last few days he had seen a private letter from a distinguished officer in the Crimea. Of course he was not at liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself to the House that he was an officer of high rank in the army and a man of unimpeachable character and veracity; and in a letter of his to a member of his own family occurred these few but most important words, "the spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are almost beyond endurance." He could scarcely advert with calmness to such a state of things, and he could see no excuse for it. Who could read the newspapers of that very day, who could read Lord Raglan's despatch, and the account which he gave of the state to which the weather had reduced the ground, and then say that the men ought now to be under canvas, exposed to the rigour of the climate? The Government could not, in answer to this part of the case against them, plead that they had been taken by surprise. They might have foreseen these things, they could have foreseen them, and they ought to have foreseen them. The expedition did not leave Varna until September. He was greatly inclined to believe that if they could dive into the real ideas of the Government it would turn out that they had expected to take Sebastopol by a coup de main. Perhaps it was possible that they might have so taken it; but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Government had no right to presume upon doing so. Whatever their views might have been as to the result of a sudden attack, they were bound to be prepared for the other alternative. They had no right or reason to expect a speedy capture of Sebastopol. It was a great fortress, and whether we were or were not prepared for the actual extent of the Russian resources, no man could think the Czar would consent to surrender his stronghold at the first summons; neither had they any reason to expect that the climate of

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the Crimea would change simply because they had sent the flower of the British Army to be exposed to its severity. They had no right to expect a speedy capture of Sebastopol, for it must be recollected that the expedition was not sent to the Crimea until the middle of September, and then the Government did not send men enough to secure the speedy attainment of their object. They talked of the "siege" of Sebastopol, but it might almost be doubted whether we were justified in calling it a siege. Was I that a siege where the attacking army was so weak in numbers as not to be able to invest the fortress, but was only able to draw themselves up on one side of it, leaving the enemy free to come and go and to bring in their supplies and reinforcements just as often and as largely as they wished. Under these circumstances, what right had the Government to suppose that such a fortress would at once yield to an attack? We might ultimately triumph, and he hoped to God we should! We might capture Sebastopol; but under such conditions of attack, being unable as we were, to invest the place, but only to draw ourselves up on one side of it, it was certain, and must always have been certain, that the attack must be a protracted one; and it was equally clear that if it was protracted, and if our army were to remain there until the advent of winter, the men, if unprotected by better shelter than canvas tents, must be exposed to the sufferings to which he had already adverted and had described in the language of a man who had experienced them. But this was not all. The force was so reduced in numbers that these brave men did not suffer only from cold and privation. but were forced to endure fatigue to such an extent that it was wonderful that sufficient men were still left for the necessary labours of the siege. Why, it actually appeared that the officers have to spend two nights out of three in the trenches. Perhaps the Government might toll them that supplies of warm clothing and other articles had been sent, and had been most unhappily lost by the visitation of Providence in that unfortunate vessel, the Prince. That was, indeed, a most lamentable accident, and one for which the Government, of course, could in no way be held responsible; but then he had a right to ask how was it that the warm clothing which was on board the Prince had not been sent sooner? How was it that it had not arrived until the month of November
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—until after we heard that the cold was so intense and unbearable that even the soldiers who slept under their tents could scarcely endure it? And when were the huts to be sent out to cover the men who would probably have to remain before Sebastopol to carry on a protracted siege during the winter? They were only now going—in December. Had any of the materials even yet left England? He knew not. He only knew that he that morning met an officer who was about to leave England to superintend the erection of the huts, and he believed it was impossible that these men should be covered by anything better than canvas tents before we were far into January. It was painful to contemplate the consequences which might ensue to the lives and health of these men, whose bravery they now acknowledged in high-sounding phrase, while they did not even extend to them the common care which was due to every one engaged in fighting the battles of their country. He thought he was justified in saying, that they would be abandoning their duty that day if they did not call upon the Government to explain these things. They were bound to call for an explanation, not only in the name of the people of this country, but also in the name of the army which was undergoing these sufferings. If the Government would give a satisfactory explanation—if they would show that hereafter the House of Commons might rely, not only on their good intentions—which he had never doubted—but also on their exercising that prudence and foresight which hitherto had not been manifested, they would have nothing to fear from the Conservative party. Hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House were not the Whigs of 1793, they were not the Coalitionists of 1853. They desired nothing but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their country. If the Government asked for supplies, they should have them with no niggard hand; if they asked for Parliamentary support, they should be met in no factious spirit; but if this concession were made on the one hand, they must exact this condition on the other—that the war should be conducted with vigour, wisdom, and foresight greater than that which had hitherto been displayed. For these explanations, therefore, he asked, and the Government was bound, in duty to the country, to give it. Parliament would hear it. He asked them what was to be their future course, and by their answer it

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must be judged whether the House of Commons would be justified, and whether the people could be satisfied that the future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the existing Administration.
SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, the right hon. Baronet who had just addressed the House had thrown quite as much spirit into the character of his observations as the justice of his complaints required. He (Sir R. Peel) was not, however, going to quarrel with him for that. He liked every man to express his opinions with determination and decision; and, in fact, his own object in rising was to give expression to his own sentiments with some little spirit. The right hon. Baronet had made a very straightforward speech; but if that House was prepared to endorse the right hon. Baronet's opinions, he thought it would be far from reflecting the general sentiments and views of the country at large. The right hon. Baronet said, that he must do his duty here in expressing his opinions freely, and certainly he did not think that a full discussion on this subject would be distasteful either to the House or to the Government, for he believed the Government would be most anxious to listen to any complaints or criticisms that could be made, since it was from such complaints generally that investigations and inquiries arose, which, happily, in this country rarely failed to remedy what was deficient, and to better that which was wrong. They might perchance, as usual, have a little effervescence of party spirit that evening, but that over, he could not but think that the result of any discussion must be that that House would confirm the favourable opinion which had been expressed over and over again in the country with regard to the conduct of this war. If, however, it was to be the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite, as the right hon. Baronet has just stated, to find fault with the conduct of the war, he thought it was the duty of the supporters of the Government to endeavour to refute such complaints. Nor did he think that it would be difficult. For some of these attacks were unfounded, and some were mischievous. But at any rate we had of late had so little opportunity of seeing any serious attack on the conduct of the Government, that the announcement of the right hon. Gentleman was quite refreshing. Indeed, it must be welcome to the Government, for they were quite losing caste in the country for want of a sufficient opportunity to defend them-
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selves. The war had only lasted a short period, but it must have struck every impartial observer that the hostile attempts made by the opponents of the Government against them had been singularly unfortunate. We had had sarcasms without end, and charges of the most awfully serious character, but evidently made, not in the idea that they were well founded, but merely to gratify a fanciful alliteration of terms, and to display a little opposition. This, however, was quite a new policy, for the recognised leader of the Opposition, in bringing forward his brilliant and well-conditioned attacks against the Government, had always avoided impugning the conduct of the war. From the commencement of the war the greatest valour had been manifested by our troops, and he did not believe there was a single man in that House or in the country whose breasts did not fill with sentiments of gratitude and admiration on reading of the chivalrous conduct of our officers and the indomitable bravery of our men. They were mostly men who for the first time in their military career had met the awful shock of battle, who had never before seen human blood spilled in deadly combat, but their courage and their steadiness in resisting the overwhelming forces of the enemy had been such as had never been equalled in the heroic stories of ancient Greece. This war had taken away from us some of the last-surviving heroes of the Peninsula. Cathcart and Strangways both fought in Spain and at Waterloo, and now after forty years' repose they had fallen together, and now he believed shared the same grave, surrounded by their companions in arms, whose exploits presented the most brilliant and enduring record of the character and reputation of the British arms. He did not see any reason for despondency in the position of our army before Sebastopol. We knew that in former times great military manœuvres had been carried out in the winter. It was then that Napoleon inaugurated that splendid campaign which, crowned with the victory of Marengo, freed Italy of the Austrians, by passing through the defiles of the St. Bernard. Nor did Wellington hesitate to engage in a campaign during a Pyrenean winter, in the face of such an army as that commanded by Soult. Therefore, he saw no objection to our present operations in the Crimea, but, on the contrary, regarded them in a favourable light, and for this reason:—Supposing

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that we had taken Sebastopol at once by a coup de main, we should never have been able to keep it for any length of time; and besides, we should not have known the spirit of our men, after forty years of peace; and certainly we could not have known anything of the genuine character of our alliance with France. Instead of that, however, we had successfully met and conquered the best and bravest of the Russian troops and the ablest of the Russian generals; we had likewise cemented, as it were, by a baptism of blood, our alliance with the French; and now, if Sebastopol should fall—as he trusted it speedily would—it would not fall as the hazardous result of a sudden manœuvre, but as the crowning victory of a brilliant campaign. But he had heard with surprise the charge of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington), that the Government had left the troops in the Crimea to perish from cold and exhaustion. This was an accusation, he must say, that was most unfounded, and that must be freely repelled. True we had three of the worst scourges attacking us; namely, the ravages of actual warfare, the stealthy inroad of pestilence, and the fury of the elements. These combined evils had made sad havoc with our troops, and deprived them of those necessaries and comforts which the Government had forwarded to them; but still he was sure that there was no class of men in this country who would be so unpatriotic as to give the cue to the spirit of despondency, just because the inevitable casualties which invariably attend warlike operations had, from our inexperience, unfortunately outstepped our calculations. The right hon. Gentleman said, that only 27,000 were landed in the Crimea, but he (Sir R. Peel) believed that there were only 24,000 actually landed, which force at one time was reduced as low as 15,000, but if that number had since been thus greatly reduced, they must recollect that the losses that had been sustained did not exceed the unhappy losses incurred in the last war. If they turned to the pages of the concluding part of the last century, they would find that a large army was sent out to the West Indies in 1794, and that we lost in a single year no fewer than 18,500 men; while in the two following years, so heavy were the casualties, that they amounted to upwards of 40,000; and if, in 1813, after we had been seventeen years at war, with a population of only 13,000,000, we were able to equip the large force of 237,000
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men, surely, with a population now far exceeding 20,000,000, with such resources as we now had at our command, and with a man, let him say, of the abilities of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) for our Chancellor of the Exchequer, was it possible, he asked, that we could have any difficulty in replacing our armaments? Why, none whatever; the only thing was, that we must set at once about it. Therefore, he thought the Government had acted prudently and wisely in calling Parliament together at present, in order to obtain powers for sending the militia to our dependencies abroad, so as to allow our regular troops at once to proceed to the scene of action. Looking at the aspect of affairs in an impartial spirit, it would be unfair to attribute our losses, grievous as they had been, entirely or even principally to the Government's want of foresight; because he firmly believed the present position of affairs was in a great measure owing to the vacillating policy of Prussia and to the dubious policy of Austria. They did not know exactly what were the terms of the treaty of alliance recently entered into with the latter Power; but, as the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) had acutely observed, there could be no doubt that the presence of the Austrian troops in the Danubian Principalities had enabled the Emperor of Russia to concentrate his forces in another quarter where he expected an attack to be made by the Allies. He sincerely trusted, however, that this treaty would be universally beneficial. As regarded Prussia, he did not believe that the Sovereign of that country truly represented the sentiments of his people. He believed they were far too noble a nation to sanction the policy which their Government had pursued. But the King seemed to be acting up to the character of his race. When Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, M. Haugwitz, the Prime Minister of the King of Prussia, went to congratulate him on his success; whereupon Napoleon turned round and replied in terms which were as applicable to the same quarter now—" What! you want to be the ally of all the world, without giving any pledge of your sincerity." Prussia had always been as unstable as water. She was the first to declare war against France in 1792, and she was also the first to conclude a hollow and ignominious peace with the same State. Pretending friendship to George III., she seized upon Hanover to gratify her own ambition, and in obedience

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to the commands of Napoleon; but she scarce enjoyed her spoils, and, the following year, was cursed beneath the withering blast of war; and our King, George III., in declaring war in those days, observed, what can be again so justly applied to her—" It seems as if Prussia's ancient sentiments of honour were utterly extinct." But, whatever might be the policy of Austria or Prussia, let us have confidence in ourselves. Hand in hand with our French allies, let us put forth our whole power to vindicate in the face of the world the cause of justice and civilisation. There was nothing now to impede us; everything was in our favour. We have not been forced into this war, as Walpole was in 1739, by the people, who were led astray by the leading men of that time; no cry for war has forced the Government in vulgar haste to assume the offensive—on the contrary, the supreme appeal to arms has been adjourned until all efforts have failed to avert it. We have immense resources. The nation is unanimous about this war; but, having once thrown down the gauntlet to our enemy, he said, let us all pursue the contest with the utmost vigour. A French General once went to Napoleon when he was about to enter into a great engagement, and warned him that it would cost a great deal of money and men's lives, but Napoleon only rejoined, "Quand il est question d'une grand bien, il faut yaller rondement." So with this country at present. We have a great struggle on our hands, and we must go at it like men. Let the Government fully accept the responsibility which the confidence of the country devolved upon them, and let their supporters in Parliament show a little more spirit than characterised debates on this subject during the last Session of Parliament. But, Sir, whilst we are shaping the course of this great struggle in harmony with France, there is one topic to which he wished to draw attention, for he was sure there were very many in the country who, equally with himself, felt indignant at the continuance of the nuisance to which he was about to refer. He yielded to none as a friend of liberty, and sympathiser with the exiles of oppressed nationalties, but they must all have observed with disgust, that there were foreigners who had taken refuge within the hospitable limits of this country, who embraced almost every public occasion to abuse the Sovereigns whom the people and the Government of this country had
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accepted as their allies. He went the other day to St. Martin's Hall to hear Kossuth, and, though we were just entering into a treaty with Austria, that individual, who was glad to find shelter in this country against the storms in his own, delivered a most brilliant invective against the Emperor of Austria, and told us that we had more need of Poland than Poland had need of us. We might very well despise all this trash in time of peace, but in time of war it was a serious question whether foreigners should be permitted thus to assail those who were in alliance with us. Victor Hugo also held forth in the same strain at Jersey. That individual had a sort of personal quarrel with the distinguished personage whom the people of France had chosen for their Sovereign, and he told the people of Jersey that our alliance with the French Emperor Was a moral degradation to England. What was all this to M. Victor Hugo? If miserable trash of this kind was to be addressed to the English people by foreigners who found a safe asylum in this country, he would appeal to the noble Lord the Home Secretary whether some possible step could not be taken to put a stop to it. There was only one other topic on which he wished to touch. He would not like to say an unkind or unhandsome word of anybody, but he thought that some explanation was required with regard to the operations of our Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and the persons in command of them, in order to clear up the feeling of dissatisfaction existing in the country respecting that subject. The Admirals had had, no doubt, a delicate task to perform, and he was not disposed to judge them in any harsh spirit; but he hardly thought Admiral Dundas had shown all that vigour that might have been desirable; and he could not help feeling that, if the flag-ship had been the Agamemnon, and not the Britannia, a different course would have been pursued. We ought, however, to bear with the course that had been adopted, and hope that the explanations to be offered would clear up this matter. With respect to Admiral Napier, although there might be a feeling of dissatisfaction entertained in the public mind, still it would be most unjust to cast a slur upon him and his fleet, as the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) had done, as if Bomarsund was their only achievement. He thought Admiral Napier had exercised a wise discretion in not risking his force if he had ina-

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dequate means at his command. We must recollect, also, that in the last war—which was all that we had to refer to for examples—an army of about 20,000 men, under such experienced commanders as Lord Keith and Abercromby, sailed in a fleet of 120 ships for Cadiz, and attacked that place unsuccessfully. This showed how difficult it was with a large land force to conduct operations of this kind, and we know that Sir C. Napier had no sufficient means at his disposal for undertaking extensive operations. All he hoped, however, was, that next year, and even at the present moment, this contest would be carried on with increased vigour. We all knew now the kind of enemy with whom we had to deal—he had been unmasked. What a hypocrite! He had roused the religious fanaticism of his subjects, and encouraged his troops in the indulgence of sensual excesses to blind them to the perils to which they were exposed and the certain destruction into which they were often remorselessly sent. We know, also, the barbarities to which they resorted. It was to be feared, indeed, that the Czar was determined to carry on the war to the last extremity in justification of his own policy; and, indeed, he did not believe that a peace would now be cemented upon the ruins of Sebastopol, or when the triple standards of the Alliance floated on the turrets of St. Vladimir; but we knew whom we had to fight—we knew that our foe valued no friendship and respected no rights; and if he was contented to live without faith, without pity, and almost without respect, he hoped that Her Majesty's Government, in connection with the Government of France, and irrespective of any other vacillating or dubious Powers, would be enabled, under Providence, with the confidence and support of the British people, to teach the Emperor of Russia to feel that his lawless ambition and his aggressive aspirations would add neither dignity to his own Crown nor imperil the liberty or the independence of Europe.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, the charges which have been brought against the Government to-night are of a character so serious that I hope the House will grant me their attention while I endeavour to give an answer to the statements of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich, and to offer that explanation of the course of the Government which he claimed as a right, and justly claimed it, as a Member of Parliament, to exact from them. That explanation I will endeavour
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to give by a plain and straightforward narrative of the events of the war as they occurred, so far as they came under the direction of the Government; and the House of Commons must then judge whether, when they have considered the past conduct of the Government in the prosecution of the war, the Government are entitled to ask for further powers and further assistance for the purpose of carrying it out with vigour. Sir, the charges, as I understand them, which have been made by the right hon. Baronet are many in number. He states that the army was originally sent out by the Government without any distinct plan or intention; that when at last the Government resolved upon a plan, it was not such a plan as was justifiable, considering the forces at their command, and the information they possessed of the power and strength of the enemy they were about to attack. The right hon. Gentleman says further, that the army was too small for its object, that that army was not a well-appointed, but an ill-appointed army, and he quoted instances in which it had suffered in its efficiency from the want of due preparation on the part of the Government. He says, also, that that army was sent out too late, that the reinforcements were not sufficient—that that army, too weak in the first instance, was allowed by the neglect at home to dwindle down till it was absolutely insignificant. Now, Sir, I cannot do better than state—and I will do it in a very few sentences—what was the intention of the Government at the time that this army was first sent into the field; and I will show next what efforts were made in order to produce that army on the field in the highest state of discipline and efficiency; and thus you will see how much truth there is in the allegations that the army was too weak for its purpose, and that it was suffered to become still weaker by the want of sufficient reinforcements. Now, it was in April that the Government sent instructions to Lord Raglan as to the course he should pursue with the army under his orders. That army was numerically very inferior in strength to that now under his command.
Let me here say that in every step we took at home or abroad, through our Ministers here, through our Generals there, we acted in concert with our Allies, whose good faith in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field; and when I speak of instructions given or intentions

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entertained, I speak of intentions entertained and instructions given, not by the English Government alone, but by the allied Governments acting in strict concert together. Well, at the time this army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory, we had a large fleet in the Black Sea. There was then a very powerful Russian army occupying the Danubian Principalities. There had been but few contests then between the Turkish and the Russian forces, and the strength of the Russian army had not been broken by disease and the deficiency of their Commissariat. Those who had the best means of forming a military opinion in this matter had not then very great confidence in the power of the Turkish army to resist the attacks which the Russians might direct against it, and thought—and I believe justly thought—that in the then aspect of affairs there was danger that a bold stroke might be made against the Turkish capital, and that the Bosphorus might fall into the hands of the Emperor of Russia. I am not now speaking of things that were probable, but in war you must also look to things that are possible, and guard against them. There was, also, the possibility that if the Turks failed to resist successfully the attacks on their position at Widdin and Kalafat, the Balkan might be turned, or that the Russians might, without crossing the Balkan range, go to the right of it, and advance down on Constantinople, and that that capital would in that way have been endangered.
Well, the English and French armies were occupied in ascertaining what would be the best line of defence, and strengthening it, in order to keep Constantinople safe from any coup-de-main. But Lord Raglan, in his instructions, was told that a portion of our army should be encamped at Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account of the salubrious and well-watered nature of that portion of the country, but also because it placed him within reach of Varna, should the line of the Balkan be attempted to be forced by the Russians; and, likewise, if any attempt should have to be made on the Russian territory, such as was ultimately contemplated, great advantages would be enjoyed there for carrying out that object. I mention this to show that the Government had a distinct plan, which was—first, to secure the Dardanelles; next, to defend Constantinople; next, that capital being safe, to defend
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the lines of the Balkan; and, lastly, to be ready, should opportunity arise, to strike a blow at some vital part of the Russian Empire. That which had been foreseen took place—the Russians forced the Danube, Silistria was invested, and Omar Pacha considered that he was in great danger, and that he should be unable to maintain that fortress unless the Allies made a combined advance that should threaten and menace the Russian army, and so force them to raise the siege. We all recollect the events of that siege. We all recollect the gallantry of our own countrymen in a miserable outpost of that fortress—but it was not their gallanty alone, or their valour, but it was a consciousness on the part of the Russians, that an advance of the French and English armies from Shumla and Varna would render it impossible for them to maintain their position, that caused them to raise the siege. We are very apt, after the fact, to underrate the value of successes achieved, and I have to-night heard hon. Gentlemen speak of gallant exploits elsewhere in a tone that I did not expect to have heard. Silistria, however, was relieved. An argument may be advanced, as to whether the importance of such relief should have been allowed to interpose before other military operations. No doubt that interposition lost time, but you gained immensely by it; you gained for the Turkish army a great moral prestige, and destroyed that prestige which had so long throughout Europe been attached to the Russian army. It was the first great enterprise of the Russian arms in this war, and it failed. Do not undervalue the importance of that at the outset of a contest. Well, that accomplished, it remained for the Government to decide on the next enterprise which would most tend to strike some effectual blow at the power of Russia in the Black Sea, and so place her neighbours for the future in a state of comparative tranquillity. On the 22nd of June the siege of Silistria was raised, and on the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan—who, from the first, had been desired to ascertain, by every means in his power, the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea, and to ascertain how far, with the powers at the disposal of the Allies, an attempt on Sebastopol would be successful. The officers who commanded those two armies were men of great military experience, and the Government reposed in them—one of whom

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is now no more—as it does now in the survivor and in the successor of the other, unbounded confidence. The right hon. Baronet asks whether we gave them any positive instructions after we had received any positive information on which we could rely? If we had shown so little trust and confidence in those men who were selected to hold posts of such responsibility as the command of our armies, we being six weeks distant from the scene of action—if we had had so little confidence in them as to have told them, whether your information be favourable or not, you must wait until we have decided on it, and weighed the grounds of your recommendation—then the allied Governments would not only, as the hon. Baronet has said, have lost weeks, but months, and delayed so long that no expedition could have been attempted. Well, those officers took every means to ascertain the force of Russia in the Crimea. They held a council of war, and decided, as I think they had a right to decide, that the attempt should be made. They knew the forces at their own command, and, from information received, they also knew what forces they would be likely to meet; and Lord Raglan knew better than any man what accession to his forces he could count upon, for no man knows better what is or is not the military capacity of England. From the moment they had come to a decision, the allied Commanders applied every energy of their minds to make preparations for that immense armament which conveyed our armies to the Crimea.
Right hon. Gentlemen talk of the lateness of the expedition, and think nothing so simple as the embarkation of 50,000 men, and of carrying them across the sea, and landing them in face of an hostile army, with boats built and prepared for the landing of horses and siege guns. Right hon. Gentlemen talk of this as of landing at a pier in a time of profound peace. These preparations took much labour, and reflect infinite credit on those engaged in them, and I do not know that any expedition ever sailed so perfect and complete in all its departments, and with the exception of that confusion which must of necessity arise in moving so vast a body of men on so capricious an element as the sea, I do not think that there was ever moved so immense a force with so little loss and with so great success. Now, I ask, was the army landed in the Crimea so insufficient for the purpose for which it was
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intended? Lord Raglan took with him 27,000 men to the Crimea, which, together with our Allies, formed a force of more than 50,000 men. What had they to meet? Nearly the whole of the Russian force in the Crimea, and they met it in an entrenched position, which gave to their numbers an advantage almost equivalent to doubling their force. They held on the heights of Alma a position as strong as that which we held at Inkerman; but they held it with a very different result.
Let me now inquire whether there was nothing else that delayed this expedition? Before it sailed from Varna there broke out a fearful pestilence among our troops; that pestilence thinned their ranks most grievously, and our troops had to meet an enemy worse than any human enemy, and far more dispiriting and terrible to the soldiers. We were, unfortunately, not the only sufferers; our Allies suffered also from this disease, and among them its ravages were more fearful than among our own troops. I do not exactly know the extent of the loss they suffered, but I know the loss from disease was far greater than any which we sustained in action. No sooner had that disease culminated, and commenced to decline among the troops on land, than it broke out in the fleet, which put to sea, as it was thought that the disease could so best be remedied; but the fleet soon returned, having in a few hours sustained a loss the mortality of which, from its rapidity, was fearful in the extreme.
Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had now to recruit their army, and to raise them from that depression consequent on sickness, while making the preparations for the invasion of the Crimea. It is quite clear that, had they been able to land in the Crimea earlier, they would have been enabled to have gained much as compared with the enemy? The difficulty which the Russians had to contend with in receiving reinforcements arose from the difficulty of passing over a soil which became broken up in wet weather. Therefore, the longer the fine weather, the longer could the Russians pour in reinforcements; that they made good use of their time none could deny, and I suppose that there never was an army moved on land so skilfully and rapidly as was the corps of General Dannenberg which was brought from Odessa. The right hon. Baronet has said, that we have underrated the power and skill of our enemy. I recollect that last Session I

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made some observations on that head; and I said that the public opinion of the country was doing that which the right hon. Baronet now accuses us of doing. From the campaign on the Danube, which had this peculiarity, that there was not one pitched battle fought during it, the public chose to assume that the Russian power was waning, if not extinct, and that there was nothing easier than to conquer whenever we chose. I pointed out that the Russian soldier, who is a Russian peasant, is a man of a primitive nature, and, like all primitive people, is strongly and ardently attached to his native country. We are apt to think that those of a country who have no free institutions like our own are unable to feel that patriotism which we feel; but we have had a lesson in this respect, and others will admit, now that they have seen the defence made of Sebastopol, the tenacity with which the Russians defend their country, a tenacity to which, when I formerly alluded to it, I was accused of connivance. But the right hon. Baronet states that the army was insufficient in number, and has been utterly without reinforcements. Now, the army, when first sent out, was composed of four divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and light division, besides cavalry and artillery, and it consisted of 22,680 men. In June, before the orders were given to make a descent on the Crimea, if circumstances were such as to justify such an attack, a fifth division was formed and placed under the command of the lamented Sir George Cathcart. Now, let me state the reinforcements that were sent out to the army:—In June, there were 941 men; in July, 4,588 men; in August, 2,032 men—yet the right hon. Baronet tells us that from the moment that the expedition was decided on no reinforcements were sent to the army. [Sir J. PAKINGTON: I did not say that.] Then I was so unfortunate as to have misunderstood the right hon. Baronet; but, perhaps he will admit that, subsequent to the orders and subsequent to the landing in the Crimea, he said no attempt was made to reinforce the army. But to continue: in September there were 1,286 men sent out; in October, 2,855; and, in November, 7,037. Now, these were before other reinforcements, which I admit were called for by subsequent events, and which were requested by Lord Raglan; but I do not count them, or seek to take any advantage from them, but, month by month, state to you the number of troops
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which were sent out. But you may argue that these reinforcements were small for a Power like England, that can pour out its battalions like water. But I ask, on whom rests the responsibility that England, at the commencement of a war, must make small wars? It has been the fault of every Parliament; we have always had the same stereotyped system of economy in military affairs. I am speaking the whole plain truth in this matter. I am as much to blame as any one. I have held for some years the responsible situation of Secretary at War, and I know what have been my own shortcomings in this respect, but whenever I have brought forward, as I have done, what are called Peace Estimates, I have constantly been met with Motions for large reductions. I say, therefore, that it has been the fault of all parties, all Administrations, and every Parliament. I am afraid I cannot give my assent to any exception, however eager I may be to do so. I have seen Administrations formed of various parties—I have seen them taking different courses on almost every conceivable subject, but on one they have all agreed, and that has been the one to which I have alluded—one of improvident economy. What has been the result? At the commencement of the war we had to make means and to create an army, and to use it at the same time. I recollect at the time when the Militia Bill was brought forward by the right hon. Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole)—and every year that has passed has confirmed the opinion I entertained of the wisdom of that measure—we had a great many discussions on the military available strength of the country, and hon. Gentlemen used arguments to show that after deducting the troops necessary for the occupation of our garrisons, we had not 10,000 available bayonets left in England. I have shown the number of men originally sent out, and of the reinforcements since sent; I will now add to them those that have been ordered to embark from the different Mediterranean garrisons, and which are sent from home, including also 1,700 men still waiting for ships. I am not now speaking of what have been actually under Lord Raglan's command, but of those which are passing under his command, which when they have passed there will, from first to last, have been, in cavalry, infantry, artillery, and sappers, 53,044 men. This is the number of

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non-commissioned officers and privates, exclusive of officers; if you add them, the numbers will he between 54,000 and 55,000 men. I do not believe that the country is aware of the efforts that have been made—they have seen it stereotyped through leading articles that Lord Raglan has been left with 16,000 bayonets. But what does 16,000 bayonets mean? It means all that are left, after deducting all the men on detachment duty, all the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and all officers and non-commissioned officers; and the 16,000 bayonets are put forward as the whole available army. Why, the Duke of Wellington had at the battle of Waterloo only 18,000 British bayonets, and, if you subtract all the officers, non-commissioned officers, cavalry, and artillery, and men not actually engaged, you will attain your object in making a small show upon paper, but you will deceive yourselves and the country as to the efforts she is putting forth.
The right hon. Baronet has said, and with perfect fairness and truth, that the Government has no right to complain of the House of Commons, and they have behaved with fairness and liberality, and have not made objections to any call or demand which the Government has made; but the right hon. Gentleman says that the question is, whether these powers or further powers should be intrusted to the hands of those who have shown so little wisdom, prudence, and foresight? The right hon. Baronet drew a picture of a Member of Parliament's duty: it was his duty to give his support to a war which he felt to be just, and to give his support also to any Government he thought capable of conducting it efficiently. But, according to the right hon. Baronet's own statement, he has given extraordinary powers to the present Government, whom he thought incapable of using them with sufficient wisdom, prudence, or foresight. If that be his rule, it is not mine. If we are to derive any advantage from this strange proceeding on his part, I reject it; if he thinks the Government incapable of carrying on affairs, it is not his duty to intrust them with power, but to transfer it to some other men more honest and capable of conducting affairs, so as to satisfy himself and the country. The right hon. Baronet has also asserted that they had neglected to supply the army with proper appointments; he founds his charge on a proceeding which, in a military point of view, was necessary, and on which the
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Government could not have dictated, and neither did they pretend to dictate, to military men. The right hon. Baronet says they lauded without tents, and he conceives that the Executive were in fault for having sent out a great army without a sufficiency of tents; but every regiment that went out with its arms and munition took also tents, and I do not believe that any army ever before went out so perfectly appointed in these respects. There is no doubt about their having the tents, but it is said Lord Raglan landed on the 16th of September without tents. The night was wet, and the men were exposed to a great deal of suffering, but they only did for a few days that which the Duke of Wellington and the Spanish army did for four years. No doubt much sickness was caused by this—it is very easy to judge of this after the fact, and Lord Raglan is blamed for having landed without tents, and having brought them so unprovided to Balaklava. But let me put another question, and then let any one judge whether Lord Raglan is to be blamed. He knew that they had to meet a very powerful army, which had intrenched itself, and it was very obvious that within a short time of landing, and probably at the time of landing, they would have to meet an energetic, determined, and skilful enemy. Lord Raglan might have brought all his tents, but then he would have left behind him all those battalions the space for which would have been taken up by the tents. A powerful force is stationed at the Alma, and nothing can be done until their position is forced or turned. Now, if the result of the battle of the Alma, instead of being a glorious victory, had been an undecided success in consequence of the want of two or three battalions, the expedition would have been lost, and what would then have been said of Lord Raglan? It would have been said, "Why did you fill your ships with ambulances and tents when you had men, and such men, lying idle at Varna? You were going upon an expedition in which you knew that the first blow was everything, and to take men with you, and plenty of them, should have been the one and the only consideration." But now the battle of the Alma has been won, it is easy for the right hon. Gentleman to say that it might have been won with fewer men. Just so. The right hon. Gentleman thinks nothing of the expedition to Bomarsund. There was certainly, he says,

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a blockade, but you sent your great ships into the Baltic upon an expedition ending in nothing. One right hon. Baronet thinks nothing of the capture of islands almost inaccessible, held by a very powerful enemy, in which buildings had been marked out for erection which would have made them into another Cronstadt or another Helsingfors, so that there might be in the Gulf of Finland another perpetual menace to another capital. This is the result which the right hon. Gentleman treats with such supreme contempt; but the Emperor of the French differs from him in opinion, for he gave a marshal's bâton to the general who commanded the French troops engaged in the expedition.
I now come back to the Alma, and the right hon. Gentleman's charge, that tents were not provided for the troops. I hope the explanation I have given will be obvious to every one and satisfactory to the country. I do not believe that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan for that proceeding. I believe he did what every man in his place ought to do—he judged of the circumstances as they then stood, he did not pretend to prophecy the success of the army, but he took every means to ensure it. It is now easy to say that his success was certain, and that he should have left men behind and taken tents with him instead.
I must here diverge for a moment to meat a charge which the right hon. Gentleman has not made, but which has been frequently made elsewhere, and I shall make a very frank statement on that subject to the House; nor shall I, in defending what appears to me to be defensible, condescend for one moment to conceal what I think, with respect to details which have been in my opinion, unsatisfactory. Last Session we had a great deal of discussion as to the merits of the Commissariat, and the Commissariat was then subjected to much popular criticism. I believe that the opinions then formed with regard to the Commissariat were exaggerated, and not founded on fact, but I am not prepared to say that at the end of a long peace the Commissariat or any other department of the army was necessarily, or could be, in as perfect a state as experience arid practice could make it. I have no doubt, therefore, that there was ground for a certain portion of criticism upon the part of those who were determined to find fault; but the Commissariat has outlived those criticisms, and I believe it is now
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universally admitted that there never was an army better fed than the army of Lord Raglan. Their rations have been increased, and they are now 50 per cent larger in meat than the rations of British troops have been at any previous time. When fears arose as to their health from the nonuse of vegetables, immediate steps were taken to supply them from Trieste, Venice, and Smyrna with fresh vegetables; and when I beard that they were being sold to the men, I wrote to Lord Raglan, that, in my opinion, whatever was necessary to make the soldiers efficient in the peculiar position in which they were placed with a view to the public service ought to be supplied at the expense of the public. But it has been stated that there has been great mismanagement with respect to the medical department of the army during the campaign, and I am very anxious that the House should know the exact truth upon this subject, because, I think, nothing can be so detrimental to the public service as for the public to imagine that when our bravest men were laid prostrate by suffering, be it from wounds or be it from sickness, they met with heartless neglect, at a time when they had earned for themselves a right to the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what was the amount of the staff which we sent out. For a long period no army had left the shores of England so large and so well appointed; and certainly none had ever left it to conduct operations so important, but so hazardous, as the army of Lord Raglan. It was felt that, going to a climate so doubtful, the efficiency of the medical staff was a matter of paramount importance. When, therefore, the army was first organised, the Government took the opinion of a gentleman upon a matter of detail, which I instance in order to show the care and attention with which these matters were looked to; they took the opinion of Dr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent, who had stated that there was an error in the organisation of the medical department. He said—
"You have but three medical officers to a regiment; you have a large staff; the staff surgeon has none of that local interest in a regiment which the regimental surgeon has. In the field, the regimental surgeon has the strongest interest in bringing his men to a state of health as rapidly as possible, and getting them back to their battalions, while the staff surgeon has no interest, one way or the other, in clearing the hospitals, and therefore do not give so many men to your staff, but give a fourth surgeon to every re-

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giment, and your medical department will be more efficient."
Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the medical department of the Army, differed from Dr. Guthrie upon that question. He said—
"In no battle is every regiment engaged; and, if you give a fourth surgeon to every regiment, those regiments which have suffered most will not have enough, while those who have not suffered at all will have too many. Those who have suffered must depend on the staff; but the staff will be weakened, and the colonels of the regiments which have not been engaged will not let a surgeon of their own go, for they will say that their own regiments may be engaged on the next day."
I consulted Lord Raglan as to which system he preferred, and he said he thought Dr. Guthrie was right. But there was great authority on either side, and we said to Dr. Guthrie, "Take your large regimental establishment;" and to Dr. Smith, "Take your large staff establishment." Dr. Andrew Smith had devoted himself to the work night and day; he collected all the purveyors of hospitals who had had experience in previous wars. They met at his house, and drew up a report as to the proper amount of stores to be sent out for the use of the army. They drew upon their recollections of the Peninsular war, and made their calculations at so much per head. Well, we trebled it. The Government felt that since the period of the Peninsular war great improvements had been made, the comforts of the soldiers were now more attended to, and more must be done than had been done in the campaigns of Wellington. I mention this to show that it was our object to make these preparations for the army as good and as ample as possible. I am not saying that all has been done successfully, or could not have been done better, but that we spared no exertion to make it as efficient as we could.
But now, what number of medical gentlemen were appointed to the army? Of staff medical officers there were 280, of regimental medical officers 192, and of ordnance medical officers fourteen, making a total of 486; or, with the nine medical officers of the 5th Division, of 495. I think it only fair to state, that upwards of 100 of these have been added since the battle of the Alma; but at that time also it must be recollected that the force was much smaller. At that battle the medical establishment, as it was at first fixed for the army, amounted to 275. On looking at the Moniteur de l' Armée, I
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find that the medical establishment for the French army amounted to exactly the same number, although their army was numerically—I speak of the two armies as sent to Turkey—larger than ours. If we had chosen to limit our medical staff to the number engaged in the Peninsula, we should have sent out one surgeon to every 145 men, while the number we have sent to the East is one to every seventy-seven men, or very nearly double the number. Much complaint has been made upon this subject, and a great deal of the blame which has been cast upon it is just in this sense—that when sickness makes its ravages upon an army which is at the same time engaged in constant operations against an enemy, the strain upon the medical officers becomes so great that no number you can send out will be sufficient. But was there no difficulty in getting together this large staff? It was necessary to send all the most experienced men we could find, and we drew from the depôts all the regimental surgeons of military experience to send to the East; but it was also necessary to keep some at home, because we had the cholera in England as well as in Turkey, and we could not trust entirely to civilians for attendance upon the troops, because, when any virulent disease such as the cholera arises, a civilian, who has a large practice in the country, and whose clients are very important to him, says, "It will not be honest in me to receive your pay, as I can no longer attend to your regiment." We had great difficulty in getting these men together, for they were scattered about in emigrant ships, in merchant ships, and in various other vocations in different parts of the world. We also employed numbers of civilians, giving them a temporary rank in the army, and they did not wish for more, as they were only desirous of the opportunity of getting practice and experience. I think the House will do me the justice to admit that, as far as the medical staff is concerned, the Government cannot be charged with looking at it in a niggard spirit, or with not anticipating great drains upon that establishment, which was just double in number that which had ever before been sent with an English army. I must not take up the time of the House by reading the long lists which have been published of the matériel which was sent out. I am not speaking to that which is the weak point in the department—namely, its distribution, but to the fact of its having

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been prepared and sent out—to the fact that Dr. Smith was indefatigable in his endeavours to supply the army with every possible comfort, nay, with every possible luxury, that could be of use in a hospital. The list contains the items of blankets and bedding, of good cotton sheets 19,000, and everything upon that sort of scale. I will not say more on this part of the subject, but I wish to impress upon the House and upon the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) that it has not arisen from heartless indifference to the sufferings of the troops that they have been exposed to privations.
I have already alluded to a statement, that after the battle of the Alma a great deal of unnecessary suffering was inflicted on our troops in consequence of the bad arrangements of the medical staff. I can refer upon this subject to documentary evidence, but I think I can put the case to the House in a manner which will convince them that there has been great misapprehension and great exaggeration of the evils which have existed, and which at the commencement of a war always must exist. It was stated, for example, that the wounded of the British army at Alma lay upon the field of battle untended for two or three days—that they were brought down to the ships with their wounds undressed, and put on board one of them in such numbers that it was rendered unsafe. I believe that a great deal of this misapprehension arose from ignorance of what happened in places beyond the observation of those who made the allegations. The French army took fewer men than we did, and carried their ambulances with them; they had, I rejoice to say, fewer wounded than we had, and, being nearer to the sea, all their wounded were carried immediately to the ships. Our troops were some of them four or five miles from the sea, and a field hospital was established at some farm buildings at or near the spot where they had fallen. All the men whose cases permitted them to be moved were moved into it, and those who could not be moved were treated on the field, their wounds were dressed, and as much comfort afforded them as possible.—little enough that is. All such plans after a great battle, and upon the battlefield, are necessarily rough and inefficient for the comfort of the men, but this is one of the stern necessities of war. The men were brought down the next day, or the day following, from the field hospital, or from the field, and placed
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on board ship. It was supposed that those who were thus carried down were being brought for the first time from the spot at which they were wounded, and that no treatment had yet been afforded them; but I have evidence which satisfies me that in not one single instance was a man allowed to leave this field hospital without his hurts being dressed; but I will take a previous case, namely, that of the Kangaroo, after the landing at Old Fort; but it is quite true that a number of men, far beyond what she could possibly carry, were in the first instance placed on board the Kangaroo. The statement, however, that 1,500 persons were placed on board is an exaggeration, for I believe that the number did not much, if at all, exceed 700. It was stated that the officer in command made a signal that he was overloaded, and that the medical officer remonstrated against so large a number being placed on board, and 450 only were sent in her. The medical department was free from blame; but persons commanding transports, and those who are without the same responsibility as medical men, are often very unwilling to put themselves out of the way for a department which is not their own. But the wounded were immediately removed from the Kangaroo to another vessel. It was also stated that 100 died of the cholera during the passage; the number, I believe, was really twenty-two, and that is a small proportion, when it is recollected there were many cholera cases, and at that period the proportion of deaths to sickness was greater than it had ever been before in any of the London hospitals. I admit that there was great discomfort, but I maintain it could not be avoided. The men could not be left on the field, Lord Raglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the spot, because he was aware that if he left them they would be massacred by the Cossacks; and, of course, their sufferings on board ship were great before they reached the general hospital of Constantinople. But it is said that their wounds were not dressed during the whole time that they were on board ship. I am informed by surgeons accustomed to the treatment of gunshot wounds, that no surgeon would think of dressing or re-dressing a wound of this description within three or four days after it had been made; the great object being not to disturb the wound, and to keep the dressings wet. It may, therefore, most likely be true, that the wounds were not dressed on board, and yet that the sufferers

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did not experience any unnecessary neglect. I have dilated rather at length upon this subject, because I do feel that, if it were true that anything like systematic or heartless indifference had been manifested by any department, but above all by the medical department, it would produce a terrible reaction in the spirit of the people of this country, and destroy that confidence in the administration and management of the army, which has of late years made it so much more easy to recruit its ranks.
As I am upon this point, I will now say a few words with regard to the general hospital at Scutari, and this is a subject which, I admit, has caused me much anxiety. The distance at which we are placed from the scene of action is such, that we are helpless to assist in any great emergency; we can send out stores and men, but we cannot direct their immediate application. I will not conceal what I consider to be the real truth with regard to this hospital, although I have seen evidence upon both sides so contradictory that I would defy any man who was willing to give credit to either party to know what conclusion to come to. We have been told, for instance, that it was not possible to procure lint in the hospital, and the greatest indignation has been expressed against the persons charged with these matters for leaving the hospital so unprovided. I have accounts from medical men, which I will not read. They are the persons who have been impugned, and unjustly impugned, by public opinion, and their statement is, that there never was for a moment a deficiency of lint, of linen, or of anything else; but there had been the greatest mismanagement as to their distribution. At the time the army left Varna the general hospital was there, and orders were then given that the stores should be sent down to Scutari, but that order, in the hurry and bustle of the departure, was never executed. The principal portion of the stores remained at Varna, while the whole mass of the wounded were sent to Scutari; fortunately there was, with the assistance of the Turkish Government, a sufficiency to meet the difficulty of the moment. There never was a deficiency of these things, but, such a deficiency being apprehended, the medical officers accepted a loan of a quantity of lint and other articles from the Turkish Government for the use of the hospital. Therefore there was at one time an apprehended deficiency; there never was a positive de-
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ficiency; but I will tell you what there has been—there has been a system engendered during the peace which has greatly incumbered the hospitals of check and counter check for the purpose of economy. There have been all manner of forms to be gone through before stores could be issued to the medical officers. Every account I get says this; the medical men in their vocation are beyond all praise, says the gentleman at the head of the establishment; they work night and day—their tenderness to the sick, their humanity, their zeal, their energy, are mentioned by every one, friend and foe. But it does appear to me that the deficiency is this, that, with plenty of stores, no one seemed to know where to lay their hands upon them; with plenty of materials at their disposal, the forms were so cumbrous that they never could be produced with that rapidity which was necessary for the purposes of a military hospital. The moment we heard complaints of this kind we sent out a commission with authority to inquire into the causes of these evils, and set them right. We thought there might be timidity on the part of some of the officials in asking for what they might require, and we telegraphed to Lord Stratford, telling him the supplies were to be unlimited, and that the hospital was to be provided with everything. We did everything we could, and I am glad to see, by the accounts I get from persons on whose judgment I can depend, that things have been set right. One gentleman, whose letter is private, but whose name alone would be a guarantee that he was not disposed to criticise too favourably upon this subject, says—
"I see there much to blame and much to praise. But day by day I see manifest improvement. To manage more than 3,000 casualties of the worst nature is indeed a task to be met in an entirely satisfactory way by nothing short of a miraculous energy."
He says—
"With regard to the past, I could pick many a hole, and show where head has been wanted and duty neglected; but I see so much exertion being made that I will throw a veil over that; if the wheel is in the rut, at any rate I can say every one is putting his shoulder to the wheel to get it out again."
I do believe that those who have been so free to blame have not really considered and made allowance for the difficulties of the case. When 1,000 or 1,500 sick and wounded men are simultaneously brought into a hospital, if you had all the order and all the appliances you could wish, you never could prevent a scene of confusion

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arising from the sudden influx of so many disabled men. I hope the House will do me the justice to acknowledge that in speaking on this question I have not concealed my honest opinion. I might have read to you flat contradictions of everything that has been advanced, written by men who made their statements in perfect good faith, who could give the dates of the particular cases with the greatest accuracy, and I have no doubt they would give to the House the exact facts, but they would not give to the House what I should like it to have—a fair general view of the real circumstances of the case. If I might be allowed to say one word on this subject before I leave it, it is this:—one thing which the Government did to ensure the comfort of the sick and wounded has been eminently successful. The House will recollect that, some time ago, a lady, Miss Nightingale, undertook to carry out to Scutari a number of nurses for the purpose of alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded. I have received, not only from medical men, but from many others who have had an opportunity of making observations, letters couched in the highest possible terms of praise. I will not repeat the words, but no higher words of praise could be applied to women for the wonderful energy, the wonderful tact, the wonderful tenderness, combined with the extraordinary self-devotion, which have been displayed by that lady, and I am glad to say that the characteristics which have been shown by that lady, the force and influence of her character, seem to have penetrated all those working with her, and I believe, not only the patients themselves, but every person connected with the hospital will be benefited by the admixture of this new element in the management of a military hospital.
I have been led away from my subject in this digression, but I hope the House will pardon me, and I will now come back to What I was saying in answer to the observations of the right hon. Baronet. I have stated what was the force of our armament—I have shown the amount of the army which was originally sent out, and which is now about to be sent to Lord Raglan, taking the reinforcements due to him, and adding them to those already in his possession, and a letter has just been put into my hand from Sir Henry Ward, stating—and I was delighted to hear it—that he had letters from Admiral Boxer, in which he mentioned that 24,000
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English and French troops had passed through the Bosphorus up to the 5th of last month. I have shown you the number of the reinforcements; I have shown you that they amounted, first, in June, to 941; July, to 4,580; August, 2,032; September, 1,286; October, 2,855; and November, 7,037; making altogether 18,739, exclusive of the reinforcements since sent; and I have shown you, including the original army and the other reinforcements, we have sent out 54,736 men; and I ask you whether, consulting our history, England, in the first year of any war in which she was engaged, ever sent forth such an army as this? You say, and say with truth—and I believe you— "You have absorbed our reserve." We have done so. The right hon. Baronet says the questions he put to-night were not all, and that on another day he might call us to an account for sending an expedition against Sebastopol at all. I will not wait for that time, but I will tell him why we did so. Because we knew that Sebastopol is the stronghold of the power of Russia in the south; we knew that the blockade of Russia, however effectual, will not strike home in a manner that will be sensibly felt; and we knew that the destruction of her fortresses along the Circassian coast, although it shakes her power to the centre in those provinces of Asia which she has of late years appropriated, is not still such a blow as would be inflicted if by any means at our disposal we could destroy her fleet and arsenal at Sebastopol. It was a great undertaking; I admit it was a great hazard, but I tell you next year it would have been impossible. Round that mighty fortress, day by day, and night by night, have been rising chains of forts; and if we were to give them time, they would continue to rise until the fortress would be absolutely impregnable. If Sebastopol is not taken or destroyed in this campaign, it will never be taken or destroyed. There was a great risk in the undertaking, it is said. 1 say there was. But I recollect an hon. Member in the last Session saying he had seen a gentleman of influence in the City who had told him there was but one feeling there of unanimity as to the way in which the war should be carried on. He said, "We all hope that the war will be carried on with the utmost vigour and determination, but no risk must be run whatever." Now, if we can conduct a war with that happy mixture of energy and determina-

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tion, combined with no risk to ourselves—that happy mixture of prudence and boldness which would inflict all the loss upon the enemy, and none upon ourselves, truly we might say the golden age of war has come. But in carrying on war, you must run great risks if you would acquire great advantages. It is said it was a great hazard. Unquestionably it was; but I know that many military men with, in many respects, opinions adverse to my own, have said, "They must do it now, or they never will do it at all." I admit that there was very great hazard, but it struck me that the prize was of such enormous importance that we should have been unworthy of our places if we had not attempted, while we could with any chance of success, to strike a blow at the only vulnerable place, which is the very centre and heart of the power of Russia in the Black Sea.
Well, I hope, Sir, that the right hon. Baronet will be satisfied with this answer, which is the only one I can give him, and that the result will prove the wisdom of the proceeding. We know the hazards of war; but it is easy to judge of events after they have taken place. But let the right hon. Baronet reflect on the course which was taken by certain parties with reference to this subject during the last Session. I confess that all last summer, when I heard the language in which the Government was urged to make an attempt upon Sebastopol—they thought the subject had escaped the attention of the Government, I suppose—but the language in which it was urged was in itself so arrogant, so ignorant, and so presumptuous, that I used to feel when I heard it a sort of superstitious fear that such arrogance and such presumption would bring down the vengeance of Heaven upon us. They talked of Russian power, judging from the weakened, dispirited, and demoralised army, that could make no progress in the campaign upon the Danube. They talked of the power of Russia as if it were nothing. We did not enter into this war in that spirit. We knew the great resources she possessed, and we did everything in our power to ensure success. It is true that I have heard a criticism made by some military men upon the whole proceeding. They say, "You have sent out more men than you can well maintain, you have sent out a number that you will find it difficult to feed and to clothe; it is
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much more than you can manage." That was the difficulty I spoke of before—of making a great start in the first year of the war. It is a difficulty which you have had to encounter when you have had to make an army, when you have it not ready made. But recollect this—we have not well-seasoned soldiers in this country. See the difficulties we have bad to encounter. We have no conscription in England; we have no compulsory service whatever in England; we have to trust entirely to the voluntary system. You cannot make an army as other nations may. You cannot make an army by a stroke of the pen, or by an ukase raise 100,000 soldiers. We must get men willing to come; but on the other hand, when they do come, you have got the materials which no conscription in the world can furnish, you have got for your materials men not dragged from their reluctant homes against their wills, and from their peaceful pursuits, to be forced into scenes of blood and scenes of horror to which they were totally averse. You have got free men—men animated by high spirits, young adventurers, full of life, full of enthusiasm, full of ambition—men whom no suffering can break, who can never complain that one hardship or suffering to which they have been exposed has been forced upon them by a tyrannical Government. You have had that difficulty, but you have had another—at least when we are talking of augmentations—we have had a difficulty which has pressed very hardly upon us; for some time past emigration to a considerable extent has been going on from this country, and more especially from the sister country—Ireland—which has dried up to a certain extent the sources of our military supply. You have, at the same time, had great prosperity in trade and agriculture, which has produced an enormous demand for labour and consequently created high wages; now all that would not be in favour of the recruiting sergeant. But when I look back to the records of history, and see what were the means by which in former wars we attempted to get men, how we persuaded men into the militia by a bounty of 10 l., and draughted them out of it by a bounty of 11 l., and, after all, we could only raise something like 24,000 men in one year, and when I look at what has been done during this the first year of the war, I must confess the contrast is not unfavourable. Taking into account the enlistments,

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both in the regulars and the East India Company's service, and all other additions, we shall by the end of the month have added by free enlistment something like 40,000 men, such as I have described, to our army. I do say, then, I reply with confidence to the inquiry as to the augmentation of the army. We are getting men not faster than they are required, but faster than we can form them into regiments, drill them, and make them skilful and useful soldiers of their Queen and country.
On that point I will stop to say that Lord Hardinge, the Commander in Chief, at the very commencement issued a regulation in regard to the troops for the East, that he would not allow a single man to go out unless he was previously practised in the use of the Minié rifle. It has been the fashion, I regret to say it, for some time past to depreciate the value of the services of Lord Hardinge. I have served with Lord Hardinge as Commander in Chief, and with others as Commander in Chief, and I have been able to see what Lord Hardinge has been able to accomplish under circumstances of great and extraordinary difficulty. If you look at the nature of the successes which our arms have achieved in the Crimea, I think it will strike you that the next thing to be noticed, after the indomitable courage and fortitude of the men, is the skill with which they have used their weapons, and the superiority of the weapons which have been placed in their hands. If it had not been for Lord Hardinge, I do not believe you would have had a single division armed with Minié rifles. I do not mean that Lord Hardinge sent them, but, if he had not during the short time he was at the head of the Ordnance Department insisted upon their introduction, that they would not have been in use now. Many officers of high military rank were notoriously prejudiced in favour of the old regulation muskets, and could not be got out of the routine, and even such men as the late gallant Sir Charles Napier had said, "There is nothing like Brown Bess; for God's sake don't take away Brown Bess." But Lord Hardinge had laid down a regulation that not a recruit should leave this country unless he was properly instructed in the skilful use of this formidable arm. And what is the opinion of the men of the division who are armed with the Minié as to the use of this rifle, and what was the
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opinion of the rest of the men from witnessing its effect? That opinion was manifested on the dreadful day of Inkerman, where, whenever a man, not having the rifle, saw a man fall who had, he ran, seized his Minié, and used it for the rest of the day. It is not only the superiority of the weapon, but the consciousness which it gives the man who has it that he is dependent upon his skill, and must devote his mind to exercise that skill. The result is, that, instead of firing at random, and only one ball in 600 or 700 taking effect, they saw the soldier using his weapon with the facility and activity with which a gamekeeper would his fowlingpiece, and taking the proper precaution to make every shot tell. Well, Sir, we have had this army to create, to drill, and to send out. Men are coming in rapidly; we shall be able to augment the regiments largely, and thus establish a reserve, so that another year it shall not be said, as it has this year, "You have put our all upon one great effort." It has been said, we should have sent out, earlier, two, three, four, five, or six regiments; but could we have done so? What will the right hon. Baronet say when he is told how long it takes to make a soldier? What were the regiments that have been sent out? Three months ago regiments that have been sent out were in our Colonies, or returning from a tropical climate, mere skeletons of regiments. They were to be engaged in Crimean duty, and had to be totally reformed. Some of these regiments were not in England at this time; some were in Canada; others in the West Indies. How, then, can it be said to us, reinforcements should have been sent out three months ago? We could not get a man of those regiments which the right hon. Baronet says ought to have been sent out, and he must recollect that we cannot create an army, we must get the men first, then make them into soldiers by drilling them and instructing them in the skilful use of their weapon; for nothing would be so injurious to the reputation of our army as sending men into the field inefficient for their duty.
I hope, Sir, that this House will believe that the Government have not been neglectful of these considerations, and have made every exertion to raise and strengthen our army. Look back at the history of all previous expeditions, at the commencement of our wars and show me one which has been equal in strength to that which

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has now been sent out. Show me one in which at the end of the first campaign they had come out with a higher reputation. Can it be said now, as Sir Henry Banbury says of our army before the expedition to Egypt, that the public had lost all confidence in the skill, and even the courage, of our officers and men; and that one of the greatest benefits of the successful campaign of Sir Ralph Abercrombie was to restore the reputation of the armies after the disastrous disgraces which England had undergone. But I want to know what is our position at present. I want to know whether, at any period in the history of England, our military character stands higher than it does at present. I want to know what is the effect upon the public opinion of Europe of the manner in which our battalions have conducted themselves. I want also to know what is the effect upon Russia, and upon its armies, of the manner in which our battalions have repulsed every attack they have made; and I must say I think that those persons who take upon themselves to criticise our operations, and to say that Alma ought to have been turned instead of stormed, could not have studied the map of the country on which their opinions are offered, or they would see that the ground on the right of the Russians on that occasion was so steep and so inaccessible that its commander did not even think it necessary to strengthen it; and if Lord Raglan, whose conduct has been attacked and whose reputation has been assailed for not turning that position, had adopted the course which has been so suggested, he could have done nothing which the commander of the Russian troops could have more desired. He would have desired nothing better than to have separated the English and French armies, and to have placed his own army between the English forces and the fleet which formed the basis of our operations. So, likewise, it has been alleged against Lord Raglan that he ought to have assaulted Sebastopol immediately after the march to Balaklava. But, Sir, I don't think that we, sitting here, are very good judges of such operations. I know that many eminent military men thought the army was not sufficiently strong, and were highly averse to such an undertaking. Talk of leading flesh and blood against batteries, and that that ought not to be risked, because the position might have been turned! What would such men have said if he had led the troops
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against a town of which we knew nothing of the interior, where it was impossible to say how much of Prince Menchik off's array might have been, of the defences of which we knew nothing, and where our soldiers might have been exposed to massacre in detail in a town, every house of which was a fortification. I confess I do defer to the opinions of the eminent men who commanded the French and English armies on that occasion.
But now, Sir, is it true, as has been asserted by the right hon. Baronet, that we took no precautions with regard to warm clothing. Warm clothing was sent out, and that brings me to another point. It has been, as we all know, a matter of time greatest regret that the ship Prince, conveying those stores, was unfortunately lost. But I must say that that loss has been greatly exaggerated. The value of the cargo of that ship was estimated at no less a sum than 500,000 l.; but I understand that it was not more than 180,000 l. This was, no doubt, a great loss, but much less than has been reported. However, immediate steps were taken to remedy that loss; supplies were obtained from Constantinople, and there is reason to believe that that loss has not been seriously felt. With regard to the clothing of the army, it so happened that when Lord Raglan applied for clothing, the answer was, "it has been already ordered and a great part has been already embarked." So that the letters of Lord Raglan, in asking for supplies, had already been anticipated Then the Government have been charged with being ignorant to the severity of the climate of the Crimea, and had not adopted those means which are best calculated to protect the troops from its injurious influence. Now, what is the position in which we have been placed? I have a letter from a gentleman a Member of this House, but whom I do not now see in his place, who says—
"Experto crede, I know the climate of the Crimea well; don't believe the accounts that are published about the temperature; but whatever you do, follow the custom of the country; they must know best, and they clothe themselves in skins, and not in woollen."
I then requested the opinion of a gentleman of great experience in Arctic researches, and he came to me and said— "Don't dress the men in skins, stick to wool, that is the only thing to keep them warm." Now I ask the House, how was I to decide between these two eminent au-

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thorities? Without attempting to do so, I thought the safest thing—and in that view the Duke of Newcastle coincided—was to take the advice of both, and to send out both skins and woollen; and my hope is, that before long, every man in the army will have a change, both of woollen and of skins, from top to toe. But, besides that, we have sent out seal-skin caps, which are so made as to cover the face and ears; waterproof leggings also are supplied; likewise an outer coat of waterproof, under which can be worn a long vest made of tweed lined with hare-skin, rabbit-skin, cat-skin, and every other kind of skin. Besides this, we have sent out a peculiar description of coat—not lined in the usual style, but according to what is called the Canada fashion; and lastly, there will be a sheepskin coat I hope for each man. Thus, I think it will be seen that the men will be supplied with ample means to clothe themselves both with skins and woollens that must keep them warm.
Then with regard to providing huts for the troops, what have the Government done? They felt that, in this particular, time was everything. To have them built here at home and then send them out to the Crimea was felt to be a process that would occupy much too long a space of time; but the moment the requisition for huts arose, we telegraphed to Lord Westmoreland at Vienna and to Lord Stratford at Constantinople, desiring them to send out instantly such huts as they could have constructed in those countries. Lord Westmoreland immediately forwarded all the huts he could procure by way of Trieste; and huts, and materials for constructing them, were also forwarded from Malta and Constantinople. If, therefore, any huts or buildings should be sent out by us from this country—and which I hope will be the case—whenever they may arrive at the Crimea, they will be rather accessories and additions to what have already been supplied, than that of furnishing an article not yet possessed by the army.
It is thus, then, that I answer the charge brought against us of having shown a heartless neglect, and a gross indifference to the comfort and safety of what I believe to be the noblest army in the world. I have alluded to the manner in which our army is raised, and which I consider to be the best mode that any nation can adopt. What is the proof of that? Witness their conduct at the battle of the Alma. I do
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not believe that any action was ever more difficult in point of attack than the carrying of the heights of Alma. Nor do I believe that you ever before heard an instance of such self-reliance, of such self-confidence, as was displayed at Balaklava, especially in sustaining the charge of the Russian cavalry by the 93rd Highlanders, under that tried soldier, Sir Colin Campbell. Every man remained in his place as they stood, two deep; as it has been well described—" As the Russians came within 600 yards, down went that line of steel, and before that fire and those immovable ranks the Russian horsemen turned and fled." Well, what have you at Inkerman? The commencement of the battle at Inkerman evidently showed that it had been in preparation weeks before. So far back as the 24th of October, a council of war was held by the Russians, and the whole of the battle was well arranged. The country, for upwards of 100 miles round, was swept of everything. Every cart, every bullock, every horse, every carriage, was appropriated to bring troops to this action. I believe the course taken by the enemy watt unexampled in the history of military warfare. It was preconcerted that this attack should take place. Everything was to depend upon it; and the Emperor of Russia was assured that the result was certain. Our men, who, on coming back to the camp after keeping their lonely watch, said that they heard the bells tolling in the churches of Sebastopol, and that the murmuring voices of great masses of men were heard. No doubt the religious ceremonies of the Church were used—it were to be wished that they had been used for an occasion of a more sacred character, but no doubt appeals were made to the patriotism and religious feelings of those large masses of men. In the night heavy artillery was moved up to heights commanding our camp. As at Talavera, it was a surprise; men in the guise of deserters drew our sentinels from their posts, so that no alarm was given. At last came that terrible onslaught of 40,000 men on 8,000. Yes. Well, the morning came, clouded by a heavy mist. There were 8,000 men—as one right hon. Gentleman has said, who brings a charge against the Government for that fact, as if the whole army consisted only of 8,000 men. Those 8,000 soldiers stood for hours, hurling back, with a fortitude and a courage more

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like gods than men, the attacking force that had come against them, and whose numbers were so great, that, as one body was repulsed, another and another came up and took its place. Sir, I do not believe, if we were to go back to those battles of old which have attained a sort of mythical position in history, that any instance could be found of such courage, such unshrinking valour, as those 8,000 men displayed under such trying circumstances, for so long a period, and against such immense odds. It was a thorough soldier's battle. There was, there could be no manœuvring. There you saw the character of the English soldier—led, no doubt, by regimental officers, but it was the battle of the soldier standing in the ranks, and dying or conquering where he stood. Who were the men who displayed such signal courage? Why, Sir, they were the soldiers themselves. I rejoice at the number of the letters that have been published in the newspapers written by soldiers. I rejoice that the people of England should know of what materials their armies are composed. The people of England are apt to look at a soldier as only fit for parade, and at an officer as exclusively possessing the moral and intellectual qualities of a soldier; but, after seeing the courage, and good conduct, and the patience displayed by these men under unheard-of difficulties and sufferings, that opinion can no longer be entertained. I ask the House to look at that army which is without a crime, in which the office of Judge Advocate is a sinecure, and mark the simple piety shown by the men writing to their wives, saying to them that they are sure their children's prayers are heard, that God may protect them in the hour of action. Another speaks of eight officers being buried in one grave, and that there was not a dry eye among all the men who witnessed the solemn ceremony. These were the men who showed mercy to the vanquished, and that under circumstances of the most horrid provocation.
But now, Sir, comes the picture too truly drawn, I admit, by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, of the melancholy losses which our army have sustained. Among them is one, Sir George Cathcart, who, to the qualities of an accomplished soldier, added the enlightened views of an able administrator. There was no man whose single life was more valuably used. He had qualities of the highest character,
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and his loss is a public loss, which will not be easily repaired. It is impossible not to he struck, in reading the names of those who have fallen, with the numbers of those who have gone to the war from a sense of duty, and who have shown in these latter days how little even high position and those luxuries which wealth commands can enervate the spirit of men who are devoted to the cause of their country. This spirit has animated the army from the lowest to the highest ranks. It is, however, a painful subject to dwell upon. I lament, as much as the right hon. Gentleman can do, the losses which we know that many even in this House have sustained. I cannot look around me without knowing that there are the parents, and brothers, and other relatives of many of those gallant men who have so cheerfully laid down their young lives for the service of their country. But I turn from this painful subject, and say that, at any rate, it is satisfactory to me to know that after all the great loss during these operations, that loss has not been so large as on former occasions. England has undergone far greater losses at Talavera and Albuera than it has sustained in the Crimea. At Albuera, out of 6,000 or 7,000 men, only 1,800 escaped unwounded, whereas in all the engagements in the Crimea, from the beginning to the end, there has not been a greater loss by the sword in battle than 1,350. More have died—our whole loss amounts to no less than 4,456; but this number includes 2,782 who have died of disease and of wounds, as well as 1,350 who have been killed. Now, sad as that record is, still it is much less than what the exaggerated statements I have seen make our losses to be. I have, therefore, thought it my duty to make this statement in order to remove any more painful feeling than the truth really warrants.
In conclusion, let me say here, that we hope that the most public recognition will be made which we can give, of the assistance we have received, and of the gallantry with which that assistance has been given by our powerful Allies. I can assure you that it is a pleasure to me to read those private notices which have passed between General Canrobert and Lord Raglan, in which they speak in terms of the greatest praise of each other. It is delightful to know that our army cheered most enthusiastically the advance of General Bosquet's division when

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they came up at that opportune moment and relieved the shattered battalions that had been resisting for so fearful a period the attacks of the almost overwhelming enemy. I believe it is impossible to overrate the good which will result from the union of the French and English armies on the field of battle; the effect will be far greater to both countries than the most skilful diplomacy could have accomplished, and I am glad to see such frequent public recognition of the services which our Allies have rendered us. We are now in alliance with the most military nation on the face of the earth—long our rival, once our enemy. She is now bound to us in the strongest bonds of friendship. While we shall be acquiring the dash of the French, the French will be acquiring the firmness of the English. I believe in that union of the two armies we see the best prospect of attaining that great end we have in view in this war. I ask those who, two months ago, were looking despondingly at the state of things, to look at the position of England now; and also to look at what has been the effect of the war already upon our enemy? In previous wars we had alliances with countries who took our money, but the Governments of which too generally intrigued against us. We are now in alliance with the most military and chivalrous nation in Europe, and we see the opinion of Europe day by day coming nearer and nearer to us, while Russia is placed in a state of degradation and isolation. Her hostile army is now entrenched above her own chief arsenal, and her fleet has been sunk by her own act, while her forts on the Caucasus have also been destroyed by her own hand. These are the effects of the first campaign. I ask, where can you find, in the history of this country, a campaign of not more than a few months' duration attended with such results? But still I hope to see our army considerably increased, and if you, the House of Commons, think it ought to be, tell us so. I tell you that the country is determined, at all hazard and at all cost, that the army of Lord Raglan shall be supported. If the House of Commons does not answer to that feeling of the country, then the House of Commons must take the consequences, for, depend upon it, there is but one feeling upon this subject. We are engaged in a war which was entered upon with reluctance; we must carry it on vigorously to obtain that
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which is the object of all war—namely, peace; for peace to be obtained must be obtained by conquest. Let no exertions be spared which will enable us by vigorous operations to gain that end. I say further, if you think the Government worthy to be intrusted with those powers, then intrust them; but I would sooner a thousand times sink ten Governments rather than any other policy should be adopted. I care not in whose hands the war is placed provided it be carried out with vigour and determination; and provided the representatives of the people honestly and truly carry out the will of the nation, that the noblest of armies shall be assured of the means—so far as human means can avail—to obtain a perfect and a glorious triumph.
MR. LAYARD:* Sir, few Members of this House have risen to address you under a more painful sense of responsibility than that under which I labour at this moment. My embarrassment is considerably increased by having to follow the speech of consummate ability and great eloquence which we have just heard from my right hon. Friend. Every man who loves his country, and exercises an influence, however humble, in her councils, must feel that, at a moment like the present, an act of indiscretion, or an error of judgment, may be attended by the most serious consequences. No one can be more persuaded of this fact than I am. At the same time I am labouring under those conflicting feelings which must agitate, more or less, every Member of this House. I cannot but ask myself whether at such a critical period as the present it were better to avoid all allusion to the past—to hope that the lessons we have received may enable us to do better for the future—to overlook all the instances of mismanagement and neglect which have undoubtedly occurred, and to support the Government, without any reference whatever to their policy, past, present, or future, and to their conduct of the war? or whether it be not the duty of those who may yet have it in their power to raise their voices once more in this House, to warn the country of the calamities which may still be in store for it—to point to the misfortunes under which we have suffered, in the hope of avoiding similar misfortunes hereafter—and to obtain from the Government, once for all, such a declaration of the policy they intend to pursue as may warrant this House and the country in placing confidence in

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them for the future? Did I believe that this momentous Eastern question would end with the capture of Sebastopol, I should have little difficulty in making up my mind as to how I ought to act, I believe that Her Majesty's Ministers will make every effort in their power to accomplish this object. I have no doubt that the Government are at this moment making every human exertion to prosecute with vigour the war in the Crimea, and to capture that vast stronghold which we are now besieging. But it is, at the same time, my conviction that the capture of Sebastopol, however gigantic that undertaking may be, is only the first link in the chain—only the first step in that great war in which we are now engaged. I believe that whether Sebastopol fall or not, we shall have to choose between a hollow— I might almost say disgraceful—peace, utterly inconsistent with the great sacrifice of blood and treasure that this country has been called upon to make; or a struggle which, for its severity and the magnitude of its results, has, perhaps, been unequalled in the history of the world. Such being my conviction, how can I after that which has passed, by words express, or by silence infer, any confidence in Her Majesty's Government? If I could bring myself to believe that the calamities over which we have to mourn—for calamities they undoubtedly are—were the results of mere mismanagement or mere inexperience, and that in future those who have the direction of affairs would profit by their former errors, even then I would not withhold my confidence from Her Majesty's Government. But I am convinced that the greater part of what has occurred is to be attributed to a want of principle in the conduct of the war, to a want of definite policy. And how could it be otherwise? It is impossible that a Government constituted like the present could act upon any political principles, or with any definite policy. How could that be expected from a Cabinet the Members of which embrace every shade of political opinion—from that of the Holy Alliance down to the most advanced stage of modern liberalism? It must be evident, that to come to any understanding between themselves, men of such conflicting and opposite views must surrender at least half their opinions to meet half way. A half-and-half policy and half-and-half measures are consequently inevitable. But, Sir, this is not a moment for half-and-half measures or a
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half-and-half policy. We cannot conceal from ourselves that the country is in danger, and that we are in a most momentous crisis of our history. If at any time vigour and decision were necessary, it is surely at such a time as this. I am perfectly well aware of the weight of the appeal that has been made to us this evening, and which has over and over again been made to us in this House and out of doors. At such a moment of national difficulty, we are told, it is the duty of all to work as one man. This is not the time to oppose the Government, however wrong or incapable its Members may be. Support them now, and they will do better for the future. But what has been the case for the last two years? When we were in the midst of those unfortunate Vienna Conferences and negotiations, I was told, when I wanted to warn the country against the inevitable result to which they must lead, that as we were trembling between war and peace, it was better to remain silent, and not by any unwise discussion or exposure impede the action of the Government. I need scarcely recall to the recollection of the House the result of our silence. Again, at the end of last Session, when I ventured once more to warn the House against the calamities that were inevitably in store for the country if we persisted in the doubtful and uncertain policy which we were then pursuing, I was urged, even by persons in whose judgment I had great confidence, and to whom, therefore, I looked for advice, to abstain from any attack or observations upon the Government, which at such a time might lead our enemies to believe that we were not an united people. I listened, to a certain extent, to this appeal. Would that I had been able to avert those calamities which I then foresaw! Would that I had had that influence in this House and in the country which might have compelled the Government to listen to the words of caution which I ventured to address to them! The confidence of this House was most generously and liberally accorded to Ministers. We have seen the results. Nothing whatever have they done, except after the strongest possible expression of public opinion—I might say of public indignation—it is only then that they have been driven into doing what is right. But, let me ask, is this statesmanship? Are our Ministers to remain idle until they are afraid of losing their places, and then only to do just as much as the public voice may

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demand? If so, any twelve men we could collect between Westminster Hall and Charing Cross would be just as capable of administering the affairs of the country as as those who now form the Cabinet. But before I proceed to make any remarks upon what has passed, or to suggest any policy for the future, let me be distinctly understood upon two points:—In the first place, let me be foremost to declare that there is a duty incumbent upon all—a duty from which no man who values the character of his country, and who can appreciate the noblest examples of devotion and courage, could shrink—that of giving the most efficient and immediate succour to that band of heroes—for heroes they are, Sir, such as the world has never seen, or may, perhaps, never see again—who, thrown upon the inhospitable shore of an enemy, are engaged in an undertaking of unexampled magnitude and difficulty. I will support the Government, heart and soul, in any effort they may call upon us to make for this object. They may command me as they would one of their most ardent and devoted supporters. In the second place, let me declare that I am faithful to those principles upon the profession of which I was elected to this House. Although it has been my misfortune to differ completely from Her Majesty's Ministers on their foreign policy, and in their conduct of this war, I still look up to my noble Friend the Lord President of the Council, and those who hold his political opinions, as the great leaders of the party to which I belong. With regard to those charges, of a personal charge, of faction, and of disappointment, which are liberally thrown abroad, and I regret to find encouraged by some Members of the Government, I can afford, from a conviction of my honesty of purpose, to treat them with the contempt they deserve. There is one other point which I do not wish to overlook. It has been said, with the sanction of Ministers too, that any attack or criticism upon the policy or conduct of Her Majesty's Government will be at the same time an attack and criticism on that of our ally. Feelings of delicacy, which I believe the House will appreciate, prevent me going as fully into this question as would be necessary to refute the charge altogether. The same insinuation was thrown out last year, and I met it by proving from State documents, published by ourselves, that the French Government had taken the initiative in every single instance in the
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policy which the British Government was reluctantly forced to adopt. I should have no difficulty in doing the same now; but I will content myself in calling to the remembrance of the House, that there is a wide difference between the position of the Government of the Emperor, our ally, and our own; and that considering the very great difficulties with which he has had to contend, instead of making any reflection or criticism upon him, we should express only admiration and gratitude at the courage, consistency, and ability with which he entered and has subsequently maintained an alliance, the result of which may confer greater lustre upon that name than even those mighty deeds which have rendered it immortal. I cannot omit this opportunity of again bearing my humble testimony to the extreme integrity and ability with which his Minister (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) has seconded a policy, which, from his knowledge of our national character and our language, he is so well calculated to carry out; nor would it be pardonable in me to omit an allusion to the great debt the country owes to that noble Lord (Lord Cowley) who has so well represented at the French Court, during a time of such extreme difficulty, the interests of this country.
If I may refer without presumption to anything that I may have said last Session, I will remind the House, that on one occasion, after drawing the public attention to the state of affairs and the policy of the Government, I declared that I had at least the satisfaction, melancholy as that satisfaction was, of having twice warned my country against the calamities which were impending over it. Would that I had proved a false prophet! But it was too evident to those who were acquainted with the East, and with the mode in which Ministers were dealing with this question, that that which has occurred was inevitable. Although I should have no difficulty in showing how utterly deficient were our preparations for war—how completely the Government rejected all advice and neglected every precaution—how the commonest foresight might have prevented the gravest misfortunes—I do not wish to enter into details, nor would I even allude to them, unless almost challenged to do so by the statements, so much at variance with the facts, which we have just heard from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. I shall, however, only refer to these statements incidentally, and as the occa-

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sion may require. I wish to avoid mere matters of detail, in which there is always much to criticise and to condemn. Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, who has avoided the great points and principles at issue, and has endeavoured to blind the House by a cloud of details, I wish to treat this question in a manner worthy of its immense importance, and as one of general policy.
Sir, I have always divided the so-called Eastern question into two distinct phases —that during which peace was possible, and that during which peace was impossible. They are separated by the passage of the Pruth. I have still, and ever shall have, the solemn conviction, not founded upon mere conjecture, but upon the impression I received when present at Constantinople during the mission of Prince Menchikoff, that had the Government assumed a proper tone, the war would have been avoided. Now that we have learnt the vast power of Russia, increasing from day to day, and the extent of her ambition, it may, perhaps, be considered fortunate that peace was not maintained. This, however, is no justification of the conduct of the Government. The Pruth once passed, war became inevitable. Most unfortunately Her Majesty's Ministers shut their eyes to the fact. They still believed that war could be avoided; not perceiving that Russia had embarked in an enterprise, and taken a step, from which she could not recede without either obtaining advantages and concessions, to which we could never accede, or forfeiting that influence in the East to which she attached such immense importance, and which was the fruit of so many years of steady and persevering labour. It was then that the Government, instead of adopting a policy worthy of the country, and taking a line of their own, threw themselves into the arms of Austria, who became at once the arbitress of the question. Hence those Vienna Conferences which so greatly embarrassed us and gave rise to many of the most serious difficulties which have arisen. Even still hoping in peace, we declared war; but we were both unprepared and unwilling to take any serious steps towards prosecuting a war. We began by sending a few troops to Malta—believing, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has admitted, that we should soon have to bring them back again. This step did not, as we had vainly expected, intimidate the Emperor of Russia. Something else was therefore
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to be done. We determined upon moving our troops a step onwards, and they were sent to Gallipoli. Let me remind the House that all this while, in our belief that we should escape war, we had utterly neglected even the commonest precautions. It is scarcely credible that we had not even ascertained the number and condition of the Turkish troops opposed to the Russians on the Danube—that we were completely ignorant of their position, and of the probable nature and duration of the defence they were able to make. It was not until the spring of this year that Sir John Burgoyne was sent to Omar Pacha's camp. He declared, on his return, that the line of the Danube was untenable, and that the Turkish troops bad only to retire behind the Balkan. His opinion was far from being borne out by the result; but, unfortunately, our troops were detained at Gallipoli, and had now commenced entrenching themselves in the expectation of the Russians advancing on Constantinople. However, the Turks maintained their ground, and it was necessary to take another step. Without any regular plan whatever of campaign having been determined upon, the Government now ordered our army to be sent to Varna. I earnestly entreated the Government, as soon as I heard of the destination of our troops, to reflect upon the step they were taking. I pointed out to them that Varna was one of the most unhealthy spots in Turkey in Europe, and that pestilence and disease would inevitably fall upon our army. The right hon. Gentleman who has spoken this evening met my warning as such warnings are usually met by him. From that Pandora's box before him, from which issues every manner of delusion and deceit, he pulled paper after paper, return after return, to prove that Varna was the most healthy place in the world, and that our troops had never been so well even in English barracks. While the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, the Angel of Death was already hovering over our devoted men. Ere long our army was decimated. I loath these official returns, which will prove everything and anything —which would prove, like a lawyer's plea, to the dying man—neglected and alone—first, that he was not dying at all; and secondly, that, although dying, he was surrounded by every assistance — every comfort. Fortunately for us, the siege of Silistria was raised; and, in alluding to Silistria, I trust I may remind the

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House that, although the hon. Member who moved the Address only spoke of Captain Butler, yet there was another British officer there to whose courage, ability, and energy the successful defence of the place may partly be attributed: I mean my gallant friend, Major Nasmyth. But, had the siege not been raised, we could not have relieved the fortress. I had warned the Government that our army would find no means of transport in Bulgaria. And so it proved. Our movements were paralysed owing to this want. As yet we had done nothing. The Government felt that the popular feeling was against them. Fearing that this feeling might lead to their fall, they determined upon doing something, and hastily resolved upon the expedition to the Crimea. Now, I do not intend to enter into any military criticisms. I have neither the knowledge nor the experience to enable me to do so, and I confess I think it would have been wise in the right hon. Gentleman to have abstained from defending those military manœuvres which have never been attacked. But this I may be allowed to say, that either one of two things must have been contemplated by the expedition to the Crimea—the taking of Sebastopol by a coup de main, or by a regular siege. Supposing it had been possible to take Sebastopol by a coup de main—and I do not deny the possibility—and it had thus fallen, what would you have done? Abandon the place, as you did Bomarsund? If so, what would have been the use of taking it, except merely for the satisfaction of destroying it? Even in that case you must have moved your armies somewhere. But you could not have given up at once the only guarantee you had in your hands. If, on the other hand, a regular siege was anticipated, it could scarcely have been commenced before the winter. In either case, therefore, our army would have to be supported and maintained during the winter. Is it, then, credible that, such being the case, our troops were sent to the Crimea without any reserve—any depôt—any base of operation? They were entirely dependent for everything upon this country. The Government had been warned over and over again that supplies could not be procured from Bulgaria. The country had been depopulated and devastated by three armies. Sinope had been pointed out to them as a port on the Black Sea nearer than any other to the Crimea, and communicating with the fertile pro-
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vinces and large cities of Asia Minor, from which not only cheap and abundant provisions, but supplies of all kinds might be obtained. But these warnings and recommendations were made in vain. I know nothing more reprehensible—I had almost said more wicked—than this abandonment of a gallant army on an enemy's shore, without a reserve, and without supplies; whilst those who bad thus sacrificed them appear to have given scarcely one thought more to their fate.
The right hon. Gentleman, in describing the armada which conveyed our troops across the Black Sea, and which I willingly admit to have been the most magnificent that ever sailed upon the face of any sea, attributed the admirable arrangement and disposition of the ships to Lord Raglan. I feel certain that Lord Raglan would be the last man to wish to appropriate to himself that credit which was due to my gallant friend Captain Mends, of the Agamemnon. It was he who drew out those directions and instructions which have deservedly excited so much admiration, and who, with remarkable energy and skill, superintended their execution. The right hon. Gentleman then described the landing of our army, and, in doing so, he dwelt upon the sufferings our troops had endured during the first night, exposed to a heavy rain without tents. He then accounted for this want of tents, and explained to the House, with great apparent candour and his wonted skill, the reason why they were not at hand. The explanations given by the right hon. Gentleman illustrate so remarkably the mode in which the House and the public are deceived in matters of this nature, and the value of Government statements, that I cannot but allude to them. We were told that the importance of tents to the health and comfort of the men was well known, and by no man more felt than by Lord Raglan; but that as he had to choose between bringing over tents or battalions, he did not hesitate. Would the House, continued the right hon. Gentleman, blame him for doing so. Had he preferred the tents, what might not have happened at Alma, and then what would the country have said. But the troops, too, with true English feeling, preferred enduring every discomfort and suffering to embarrassing the movements of their general by asking for their tents. The House cheered this explanation; and it well deserved their cheers, supposing it to be the true one. But, what was the

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fact? Neither the tents nor the battalions were left behind. The tents were not only brought, but they were landed, and our troops slept for two nights under canvas. The difficulty lay in want of transport—a difficulty felt throughout the campaign, owing to inconceivable neglect—and the tents were reshipped because there were no means of carrying them. The troops might have had their tents every night except perhaps one, that of the forced march; as it was, they were without them for nearly three weeks, a want of proper protection to which may be attributed much of the cholera and disease which visited the army after its landing in the Crimea. Now I am upon this subject I will allude to several other statements of the right hon. Gentleman, winch I regret to say are of similar value. He has entered into an elaborate defence of the Commissariat. I really know not why, as no one has attacked it. I do not wish now to go fully into this question, although I am far from agreeing in all that has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, and cannot certainly admit that the answer we hear so often, that our armies are as well off now as they were in the Peninsula, is a sufficient excuse for that which has occurred. Amongst other merits he attributed to the Commissariat was, their having been able to supply—unheard-of luxury!—vegetables to the troops. Now, what was the fact? Vessels with vegetables had certainly arrived at Balaklava, but, owing again to the utter want of transport, their cargoes could not be conveyed to the camp, and few, if any, of the regiments ever received them. The right hon. Gentleman told us, too, that in order to bring battalions to the Crimea, the ambulances had been left behind, and that Lord Raglan was quite right in doing what he had done, as the ambulances might have impeded our advance at a moment when promptitude was of the utmost importance. What was the fact again here? The House will not forget that the day after the battle of the Alma, Marshal St. Arnaud proposed to Lord Raglan to follow the enemy at once, a step which might have been attended by the most important results—perhaps the total rout of the Russian army, and the fall of Sebastopol. Why did Lord Raglan decline to advance? Because he had no means of moving his wounded. Had the ambulances been there, as they ought to have been, this might not have been the case. The history of these
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ambulances will illustrate the manner in which the Government has managed details during this war. Instead of young and active men having been sent out to attend to the wounded, old pensioners, who after long service had retired to pass the remainder of their days in the sanctum of the public-house, and most of whom were suffering from delirium tremens, were selected for this duty. They were expected to take charge of mules—animals of all others the most difficult to manage, and which they had probably never seen before. The result was, that the woods about Varna were soon full of wild mules and fragments of harness, the pensioners were found dead by the roadside, and the ambulance corps became perfectly disorganised and useless. Notwithstanding all that is known in this country, the right hon. Gentleman denied the stories that have been current with regard to the medical staff. He contradicted the statement that many of the wounded had been left for two nights on the field. On this subject I can speak with some confidence, having myself been a witness to the fact. I should be the last man to condemn the medical staff, which, with one or two exceptions noticed by Lord Raglan himself, has nobly done its duty. But I think it unwise in the right hon. Gentleman to deny such established facts, and to justify neglect of duty which Lord Raglan himself has condemned. He has endeavoured to explain away that lamentable story of the transport so laden with the dead and dying, that her captain was compelled to hoist a signal of distress. To this fact, too, I can bear personal testimony. The medical officer, through whose neglect the vessel was detained twenty-four hours, was tried by a court martial, and acquitted on a technical point; but Lord Raglan, in confirming the decision, which he did most reluctantly, administered a severe reprimand, both to those who formed the court and to the medical officer. Whilst having thus to speak of the misconduct of one medical man, I cannot refrain from calling the attention of the House to an act of true heroism and devotion on the part of another. Dr. Thomson, with his Irish servant, one Magrath—and his name well deserves to be recorded—was left in a miserable half-ruined village, after the battle of Alma, with 700 wounded Russians. His only protection was a note written by Lord Raglan to any Russian officer who might chance to come to the spot. For five days and nights those two men re-

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mained amidst the dead and the dying, burying with their own hands nearly fifty every day, dressing their wounds, administering to their wants, and feeding them from the small stock of provisions which had been left for their support. On the fifth day they were relieved by the officers of Her Majesty's ship Albion, when, almost exhausted, amidst a heap of dead and dying, they were watching the approach of a body of Cossacks, the advanced guard of a Russian division. I can scarcely picture to myself a position more truly worthy of compassion than that of these two men. It grieves me to add that Dr. Thomson fell a victim to his devotion the day after he rejoined the army. I cannot but think that, if there be any members of Dr. Thomson's family living, some acknowledgment of this noble act would be well bestowed, and would not be distasteful to the Crown or to the country. After the victory of the Alma—a victory which for the glory it has shed upon our arms and upon our national character has scarcely a parallel in our history—the army, by a forced march, suddenly appeared before the southern side of Sebastopol. Had the Generals who commanded the allied forces deemed an immediate assault either advisable or possible, the time for attempting it would have been when the Russian garrison and Russian army suddenly found that we had turned their flank, and had appeared before a part of the town which had been scarcely defended—which was, indeed, almost open. It was only by taking advantage of the panic which appears undoubtedly to have prevailed in Sebastopol, that a coup-de main could have been successful. When one day had been allowed to elapse without an assault, it was evident that a regular siege became absolutely necessary. The Government must or ought to have been aware of the fact within a very few days. How was it, I ask, that no exertions were then made to send out reinforcements of any kind? How was it that every effort was not made to enable our army to undertake the siege of so gigantic a fortress? One would have thought that after such a battle as that of the Alma even the Government would have seen the absolute necessity of immediate reinforcements and a reserve. Were we in a condition to embark upon such a siege as that of Sebastopol? Were we provided with even the necessary materials? I remember two or three days after our batteries had opened their fire, reading the report of a speech
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made at a public meeting by a noble Friend of mine, and a Member of Her Majesty's Government (Earl Granville), in which he declared that if he only ventured to tell his audience the number of guns and amount of ammunition sent out to besiege Sebastopol, he should be laughed at as inventing a Munchausen tale! This seemed like mockery to those who now stood almost inactive before that stronghold bristling with cannon. It may astonish the House to learn, and the fact is strictly true, that had we continued the fire we opened the first day, and which barely sufficed to keep down that of the enemy, our ammunition would have been exausted in six days. Against an inexhaustible supply of materials of war of every kind—against the greatest arsenal in Russia—the united Woolwich, Plymouth, and Portsmouth of the empire, we could only bring sixty guns and mortars without having recourse to the armaments of our ships of war. After the first two days, consequently, the siege was virtually suspended, and from besiegers we became besieged. Our difficulties now increased from day to day. Deceived by the assurances of the Government that Austria was faithful to us, and that Russia could not withdraw her troops from Bessarabia, our Generals trusted in a false security. Day by day, unknown to them, reinforcements were arriving from Odessa. The corps d'armée which had recently occupied the Principalities, and which, if Austria had acted with common good faith, would still have been required on their frontiers, marched into the Crimea. Nearly 100,000 men were gradually collected on our flank. Then was fought that fatal battle of Inkerman, a battle which, glorious as it was, is yet one too many in our annals. Great as was the sacrifice—great as may have been the mourning and sorrow which it may have brought on many a home—yet that grief may be somewhat alleviated by the reflection that with one voice the civilised world has proclaimed its admiration, which history will re-echo, of the unparalleled courage and heroism that were shown by those that fell on that memorable day. The House, too, has to mourn more than one of its Members, and to rejoice over the gallant deeds of those who are still spared to it. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) has alluded to the distinguished services of my gallant Friend the Member for Westminster, who rose from a bed of sickness, and hastened

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to that terrible scene where his high sense of duty called him—whose calm courage and eminent military abilities were never more displayed than in the expedition he has now unfortunately been compelled to quit, an event which must be regarded as a public misfortune. I cannot omit a reference to another Member of the House, and a gallant Friend of mine, the hon. Member for Ludlow (the hon. Percy Herbert), whose chivalrous bravery and indomitable energy have secured for him the confidence and admiration of the British army. But, as General Bosquet has so well observed, to speak of those who distinguished themselves would be to speak of all who fought on that day. And in mentioning the name of my gallant friend (General Bosquet), let me bear my humble testimony to the display of those eminent qualities which have rendered him the object of admiration—I may well say of enthusiasm—to the British army, as it has more than confirmed the opinion which his country had already entertained of his fitness for a great commander. Never were those qualities more signally displayed than on this memorable day. With admirable coolness, judgment, and courage, he led his division to the support of the British army, overpowered by numbers, decimated by the severest of fires. Well might our gallant troops, when he had redeemed the fortune of the day, look upon him as their deliverer, and cheer him with that hearty English cheer, which, as he has told us himself, made so deep an impression upon his noble heart. I trust that Her Majesty's Ministers will not forget that upon no one could be conferred a mark of Her Majesty's favour that would cause greater satisfaction to our army or to the country, and I may confidently add, to the French people. This great battle has been already well described. It was, indeed, a battle of heroes, and "a soldiers' battle." The highest military authorities have declared, that in war bayonets have rarely, if ever, been crossed. But on the heights of Inkerman, from early dawn to the middle of the day, it was one terrible struggle hand to hand. Our weary soldiers stood as ramparts before the overwhelming columns of the enemy; it was only by opposing their bodies to them that they could check their advance. Terrible as were the losses of that day, they were not, I trust, suffered in vain. At Alma, the British and French troops fought apart;
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but at Inkerman theyf ought side by side. They charged in one line, and their cheers of victory were mingled together. A mutual feeling of confidence, of esteem, of admiration, was thus engendered, which, I trust, may last through many generations, and may cement for ever an union which may be the source of boundless security and happiness to the human race.
The enemy were defeated at Inkerman, but was our position changed? No, we remained, and still remain, the besieged. We are still before a fortress of gigantic strength, with an army outnumbering oar own upon our flank. Nothing but almost superhuman exertions can maintain our position. Of this I am certain, that everything that courage and devotion can accomplish will he accomplished. Upon those gallant and devoted men who are struggling with unparalleled constancy and long-suffering against dangers, privations, and difficulties, which might appal the firmest mind, I have every reliance. But it is for the Government to do its duty. No exertion should be spared to relieve and assist them. The country will never permit them to be sacrificed. Let them be properly succoured—let the resources of this great country be rightly applied—and Sebastopol must fall.
Having thus reviewed the conduct of the war in the East, let us turn to the policy of Ministers in the West. Again we have that same want of any definite policy, of any well-matured plan, of any well-directed effort. What has been done in the Baltic? I do not wish to criticise the deeds of our Navy, and of its Commander, which my right hon. Friend has, I think, somewhat needlessly defended. I am quite willing to believe that they have accomplished all that was practicable. I do not wish to underrate the importance of the capture of Bomarsund, or the difficulty of that undertaking; but what I wish to ask is this, what fruits has the country gained by this feat of arms? You have destroyed the fortifications of Bomarsund, but have you prevented their reconstruction? Have you any pledge that in a few years hence they will not be rebuilt? and in a manner which may not admit of their being again captured with so little trouble and loss? I cannot understand the policy of deserting the place the moment we had captured it; nor can I understand the mockery of addressing a proclamation to the unfortunate inhabitants of the Aland Islands,

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scarcely 20,000 in number, whom you had inveigled into joining you against their Sovereign, warning them at their peril from entering into any future relations with the Emperor of Russia! Your conduct with regard to Bomarsund, so far from having had any good result, appears to me to have been productive of great mischief. You have shown to Sweden, who might have proved a most valuable ally, and who might have become a real check upon Russian ambition in the north, that our policy consists merely in isolated acts, and has no definite object. You have led her to believe, and very justly, that if she were to declare for you, and engage in war with a powerful neighbour, you would desert her as soon as you found it convenient—probably addressing her a recommendation such as you have insultingly and in mockery addressed to the in-habitants of the Aland Islands, not to have any future relations with Russia! Can you then expect that Sweden will be your ally, or that you will obtain any definite result by your ill-digested expedition in the Baltic?
But, Sir, to whatever quarter of the globe I turn, I find the same want of design and of principle in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It is really so important that this state of things, which must inevitably lead to misfortune and disgrace, should be properly placed before the House and the country, that I venture to claim the attention of the House to the few remarks I think it my duty to make upon the subject. I will take Greece as my first instance. We have not forgotten that the Greeks, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in its greatest straits, made a wanton and scandalous aggression upon the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. They ravaged these provinces, drove off innumerable flocks and herds, and plundered the property of the unfortunate inhabitants. The sufferers were principally Greeks and Christians like themselves. is it not natural that, after the world had declared this to be a most unjustifiable and unprovoked aggression, we should support the Porte in a most just and legitimate claim for indemnity? Have we done so? No! on the contrary, we have used our influence to make the Porte withdraw its claim for indemnity, and, on a shallow pretence, we have released Greece from paying that penalty which she had most justly incurred. What has been the in-
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evitable result? Why that the Christian population of Thessaly and Epirus, whom, above all other Christian subjects of the Porte, it was of the utmost importance to conciliate, have found that they can hope for no protection or relief from their Government, and that their only chance of safety hereafter would be to join with the invaders. The inhabitants of Greece at the same time see that they can commit an act of wanton aggression on a neighbouring State with impunity. Do you not think that, if we should experience any reverse in the East, such a state of things will inevitably lead to fresh outbreaks of a most formidable and embarrassing nature, in Turkey in Europe?
Look again at our policy in Asia. It was of the utmost importance that the Circassians and Georgian tribes hostile to Russia should be aided and encouraged in assuming the offensive, in order to prevent Russia removing her troops and garrisons from Circassia and Georgia and throwing them into Sebastopol. What have we done to effect this object? We sent to Circassia two utterly incompetent agents—unacquainted with the language and the manners of the people. Their mission, as might have been expected, proved a complete failure. We have opened no communication with Schamyl, and we have completely overlooked the importance of a flank movement upon the operations of our enemy in the Crimea. Again, with regard to Persia. It was of no less importance that that Power should be induced or compelled to declare itself. Like Prussia, it wished to maintain a neutrality which could only be dangerous or inconvenient to us. It would have been of incalculable advantage to us if Persia could have been brought to join us against Russia. With such an enemy on her flank, the movements of Russia in Asia Minor would be paralysed. We know the importance she attached to the neutrality of Persia during her war with Turkey in 1828. I repeatedly called the attention of the Government last Session to the state of our relations with Persia, and an hon. Friend of mine, the Member for Poole (Mr. H. Danby Seymour) placed a notice of Motion upon the books of the House on the subject. It is only at the last moment that the Government have thought it necessary to send a fit agent there, who cannot arrive at his post before the mischief is well nigh done. Again, we left the Turkish

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army in Asia to perish, without taking a single step to ascertain its condition—without offering to send one officer to aid in perfecting its discipline or directing its operations. When that army is defeated and almost destroyed, we despatch a British Commissioner to report upon its condition! Had it not been for the diversion made in the rear of the Russian army by the indomitable Schamyl, the whole of Asia Minor might even now have been in the power of Russia. As it is, our culpable neglect will probably entail upon us an immense loss of life and treasure. Such having been the policy of the Government in all parts of the world, such having been its results, I again ask what, with the exception of having obtained an uncertain footing in the Crimea, has been done towards the true and satisfactory settlement of this great question?
As I have ventured thus to criticise and condemn the past policy of the Government, I may be reasonably asked what I have to suggest for the future. But before pointing out what might be done, what policy might be pursued, it is of the utmost importance to ascertain the true position of Austria. Without some positive and definite assurance upon this point we cannot act with decision or upon principle. Not only for the sake of our future policy, but to set at rest the anxiety felt in the country, we should be fully informed on this subject. We hear that there is a probability of fresh negotiations, under Austrian superintendence, which may lead to peace. After what has passed under similar auspices, it is but right the House should know something about the probable nature of these negotiations. We are about to separate, and may not be called together again for one or two months. After the experience we have had of the diplomatic capacity of the Government, can we with any confidence permit them to engage in fresh Vienna Conferences? I am again told, as we were told last Session, that we have at last succeeded in obtaining the alliance of Austria. The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty will not, I should presume, go so far now as to add Prussia. But if such be the case, as I conclude we are bound to assume by the expression in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech, I should like to know why the treaty, which we are told has been concluded with that Power, has not been laid upon the table of the House. The other treaties referred to have been—why
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not, therefore, this treaty? We must infer that the Government have some good reasons for wishing the contents of the treaty not to transpire whilst this debate is pending. But before we vote the Address in answer to Her Majesty's Speech, it appears to me to be of the utmost importance that we should know what the provisions of that treaty really are. As the Government has not thought proper to inform us upon this point, I must assume that they are such as I have been able to ascertain than to be from reliable sources. If so, I will venture to assert that your treaty is worth little more than waste paper. Instead of leading to a solid alliance, it will only prove a fresh obstacle and difficulty in your way. I believe the effect of the treaty to be this, that unless Russia should consent before the end of the year to certain propositions as the basis of a peace, Austria will enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with England and France. What are these propositions? They are founded upon the four points of which we have heard so much. Now I, for one, believe that these four points are most mischievous—that they contain admissions on questions of principle to which this country ought not to accede. I am convinced that if they are received as the basis of negotiations, and form the grounds of any peace with Russia, the whole question for which we are now sacrificing our best blood will be left completely as it was when we began this war, and that we shall only be deferring to a period when we may be far less able to meet it than at this moment, the settlement of a question of the most vital importance to the civilisation and liberties of the world. What, let me ask, are these four points, the concession of which you deem sufficient to repay us for the sacrifices we have made? The first converts the sole protectorate of Russia over the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek faith, into a quintuple guarantee in favour of all Christians in Turkey. After all, a guarantee in such a case can amount to nothing else but a protectorate. If you cannot enforce your guarantee, it is of no value. Will any one believe that this quintuple guarantee will not eventually enable Russia to resume her former influence in Turkey, and to push her former claims in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte professing the Greek faith? They would look up to her as their real protector, and over them she would still exercise that influence which, founded

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upon a similar creed and mutual sympathies, we have admitted to be so dangerous to the independence and very existence of Turkey. Moreover, we all know what the result of a triple protectorate has been in Greece, what mischief it has caused, how fatal it has been to the advancement and prosperity of that country. Can any one believe that a quintuple protectorate in Turkey will create anything else but interminable squabbles and dissensions, and may not lead to a more serious state of things than has even hitherto existed? No more effectual means could be devised of defeating our own object with regard to Turkey, of checking the progress of the Christian races, and of rendering them incapable of governing themselves. I am as ready to admit as any man, that, after what has been done for Turkey, after the sacrifices we have made in her behalf, we have the fullest right, in fact I may say it is our duty, to demand that the fullest protection and liberty should be granted to her Christian subjects. But if a protecting power be absolutely necessary to enforce the guarantee, then why not have recourse to a second-rate Power, which has no great political interests in Turkey, and whose influence in that country is neither the object of fear nor of jealousy? Why not vest the right of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte, of all denominations, in Sardinia—in whose liberal and enlightened policy we have the best security for its fair and just exercise? Let us now turn to the second point—the one which contains to my mind the admission of a principle of the utmost danger. It converts that which was a mere guarantee on the part of Russia—a guarantee of so uncertain a nature that politicians of high authority believed it to have long since ceased—into a quintuple protectorate over Servia. With regard to the quintuple protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia, mischievous and inconvenient as it may prove, I believe to be of such immeasurably less importance than that over Servia, that I shall not do more than allude to it. But if you give Austria the power of interfering in the affairs of Servia, you will destroy every prospect of the only ultimate settlement of this great Eastern question which has so long, and which will yet for many years, threaten the peace of the world. Let your protectorate be quintuple or separate, it must inevitably get into the hands of either Russia or Austria. Servia is too remote
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from England and France to permit of our supervision or interference. Austria already assumes that she will be your delegate, and will exercise for you the protectorate. In your name she will crush those germs of liberty and independence, and that inherent love of free institutions which distinguishes the Servian, and to which I look with confidence for the true settlement hereafter of the Eastern question. You know, by the protest laid upon the table of this House last Session, how the Servians view Austrian interference, and, depend upon it, that by sanctioning that interference, you are committing a terrible act of injustice and wrong, besides defeating your whole policy. The third point is the free navigation of the Danube. But how can you make the navigation of the Danube free without any territorial change? By the Treaty of Vienna, Russia binds herself to maintain the free navigation of the Danube, and she asserts that she has never impeded it. If one treaty be of no avail, what will a second do? Nothing. With Bessarabia in the hands of Russia, every stipulation for the free navigation of the Danube is a mere farce. My only hope, Sir, is in the fourth point—the revision of the treaty of 1841. It is of so vague and indefinite a nature that we may include anything in it—the destruction of Sebastopol, the cession of the Crimea, the independence of Circassia, and I cannot believe that, under it, Ministers will dare make proposals to Russia which will not give effective guarantees of a substantial peace, and which, consequently, Russia cannot possibly accept.
These negotiations, founded upon the four points, will be carried on through Austria. Again you have made her the arbitress of the fate of Europe. Again you have resigned yourselves into her hands. Austria may turn round upon you, and say that Russia having accepted these propositions—and I can tell the House she has done so without reserve—she, Austria, cannot admit any construction that you may choose to place on the fourth Article; that she is consequently relieved from all further obligations; and that, as far as she is concerned, the casus belli ceases. And can we expect any other course after the policy she has pursued? It is not by what we may wish her to do, or we may think that she ought to do, but by what she ever has done, that we must form an opinion upon the policy she is likely to pursue. The true policy of Aus-

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tria was admirably summed up in a sentence spoken scarcely two months ago by her representative in the Principalities, Count Coronini, at a public dinner in Bucharest, at which the British representative was present. "Austria does not wish you success in the Crimea, nor does she wish you failure!" No! she neither wishes the allies success nor failure—but she eagerly waits until we, as well as our enemy, may be weakened, when she can step in as the arbitress and carry off the spoil. What has her conduct hitherto been? Have we derived any assistance from her? Far from it. She has so treated the inhabitants of the Principalities, as if they were her conquered subjects, as to make them pray for a return of even the Russians. She has impeded or checked the movements of Omar Pacha and his army; and though she knew that we were fighting her battles, she has had the selfish, mean, and cold-blooded policy to allow the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia in order to pour them upon our devoted bands in the Crimea. How many times during the last year might a word, a movement on the part of Austria, have spared us the worst calamities of the war! Can we hope now that Austria will turn round and adopt any other policy? I, for one, cannot believe it. You tell us that this treaty with Austria anticipates negotiations for peace—that there is a possibility of negotiations for peace during the recess—will not this House be wanting in its duty to the country if it separates without obtaining from the Government some distinct account of the nature and object of this treaty. But, whatever the Government may wish, I be-believe peace at this moment, and upon such conditions, to be utterly impossible. There are no terms we can offer, after the sacrifices we have made, and the lengths we have gone, that the Emperor of Russia can, consistently with his honour and his dignity, accept.
Peace being then, I believe, impossible, it remains to be seen how the war is to be conducted, and what policy we are to pursue. Ministers are not, I am convinced, aware of the magnitude of the struggle in which they have embarked; nor are they alive to the difficulties and dangers which await them. Up to this moment their policy has merely consisted in providing for the emergencies of the moment, or in waiting until they were pushed into action by the pressure of public opinion. But this
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will not do. It is full time to look this great question in the face, and to be prepared to deal with it in a manner worthy of its magnitude and of its vital importance to the country. If we are not prepared to do so, we should not have entered into this war. As yet, you have not looked beyond the Crimea. But you must now do so. The vigorous prosecution of the siege of Sebastopol is not the vigorous prosecution of the war. Suppose Sebastopol taken—what then? The Russians may shortly have 200,000 men in the Crimea. ["Oh, oh!"] An hon. Gentleman cries "Oh, oh!" Well, let him give his attention to the matter for one moment. Last Session I was laughed at for saying that the Russians could send reinforcements into the Crimea. The march from the Principalities would, I was assured, take at least three months—if, which we were told was not to be contemplated, Austria would permit the departure of the Russian troops. What has happened? In our camp before Sebastopol we acted as if such were really the case. Our generals unfortunately relied upon the assurances of the Government, and in one night we found that Russia had at least 100,000 men on our flank. The Secretary at War has gone into details respecting small matters—let me ask the House to go into details for one moment upon great matters. According to Lord Raglan's despatches, and according to the estimate of the French Commander in Chief, there were 60,000 men engaged in the attack on the heights of Inkerman. Amongst these troops, we are told, on equally high authority, there were none which were engaged at Alma. Now, estimating the remainder of those who had been at Alma at 3,5,000 men, we have 95.000 men. But there was Liprandi's corps, recently arrived from the Principalities, amounting to between 20,000 and 25,000 men, which made the feint on Balaklava; 10,000 men, it is believed, were engaged in and supported the sortie on the French lines, at the extreme left of our position; the batteries, continuing their fire as usual, must at least have required 5,000 men more. If these numbers be correct, and I take them from official despatches, the whole number of troops on the 5th of November, in and near Sebastopol, must have amounted to nearer 150,000 than 100,000 men. We have since heard that another corps d'armée is advancing. What is there then, I ask, to prevent the Emperor sending 50,000 men more into the Crimea?

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We have taken away our fleet from the Baltic, and, consequently, released the Russian troops from the defence of that portion of the empire. What is there to prevent the Emperor from sending his Guards into Poland, to relieve such troops as might at the same time be marched towards the Crimea? It is very well to say that we are now in the winter season—that the roads are bad—that armies cannot be moved. But the fate of an empire—the results of the policy of a long line of great monarchs—the fruits of years of wisdom, cunning, and toil—are at stake; and will they be sacrificed without almost superhuman exertions? No. The roads might very well be impassable under ordinary circumstances, but we have seen that they are not impassable now. Even post-horses and waggons have been employed to bring down one division of the Russian army, and similar efforts will be made to move other reinforcements. If you are determined to make war upon new principles, you must expect such results as these. The only mode of preventing Russia moving or feeding her troops was by dealing with Odessa differently from the manner in which you treated that great station and granary, in that absurd and useless attack you allowed our fleet to make upon it. Had Odessa been Rome, Naples, or Athens, I can well understand the feeling which might have prompted us to spare it. But Odessa has no historic fame—it is not the repository of art. It is nothing else but a great depôt: one of the granaries, not only of Russia, but of Europe—a station for troops, and the place from which the Russian armies, both in the Crimea and Bessarabia, and, consequently, those engaged in an attack upon Turkey, and in war with us, are supplied. I respect that feeling of humanity which might have led you to avoid, if possible, a bombardment. But what, under the circumstances, would have been the proper course? It appears to me that you might, consistently even with your principles, have summoned the garrison to lay down their arms, and to surrender the granaries and military stores within twenty-four hours; and have declared that, in the event of refusal—giving them that period to send out their women and children—you would have used force. Do you think a Russian fleet would have spared Liverpool or Hull? Again, up to this very moment, there has been no effective blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. On the 24th of September,
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after the British troops had landed, and when the Russians had sunk their seven ships of war in the mouth of the harbour of Sebastopol, so ignorant were we of what was going on, and so lax and ineffective had been our blockade, that, although we were actually within sight of the place, a great part of our fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and to put to sea, to follow eight Russian vessels, which were supposed to have sailed for the purpose of making a descent upon the Turkish coast! The trade between Constantinople and the Russian ports of the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azof, is, and has been, carried on as usual, notwithstanding the war. The only difference has been that the export of wheat has been, very naturally, prohibited by the Emperor of Russia; but that of linseed—a most important branch of Russian trade in the East—is carried on as usual, and the article regularly quoted in the Constantinople market. Thus, whilst British merchants have been compelled, by the uncertainty and inconveniences of a nominal blockade—and, perhaps, may even have been induced by national feelings—to withdraw from the trade, at great loss and inconvenience, Greeks and others, our enemies, have profited by their withdrawal, and have made large fortunes at our expense. It is impossible to carry on war effectively on such a system.
I will suppose Sebastopol taken. Will that settle the question? Certainly not. The Russians may withdraw their troops from the fallen fortress, and, leaving a sufficient number at Perekop to prevent you quitting the Crimea, at the risk of losing the fruits of your hard-earned victory, they will march the remainder into Asia, to reinforce those they have already collected there. At this moment they are preparing for such a measure. They hold Bayazid, a place of great military importance, from its position at the junction of the frontiers of Georgia, Persia, and Turkey, and as commanding the high roads to Tabreez, Erzeroum, and Bagdad. General Bebutoff is now collecting troops and supplies at this point, and there is nothing to prevent him next spring from overrunning the whole of Western Asia. Should he obtain possession of large portions of Persia and Asia Minor, with the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris, what would be the effect upon our Indian possessions? Could we then treat, on anything like advantageous terms, with Russia? Could we leave these countries in her hands?

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Undoubtedly not. She would hold as vast and as substantial a material guarantee as we should have in the Crimea. I do not wish to weary the House by entering fully into this question—notwithstanding its enormous importance—but I warn the House and the country that, unless we do something more than we have hitherto done to meet the difficulties which are arising in that direction, we shall have fresh disasters and calamities in Asia, far greater than any that have hitherto befallen us. We do not even know at this moment what number of troops the Russians have collected upon their Asiatic frontiers. We are utterly unprepared to meet any army, however small, in that part of the world. As for the Turkish army, which was defeated in Asia Minor last year, it has dwindled down to nothing. Had we sent out proper officers to assist the Turks in that quarter last year—had we sent fit agents to Circassia and to Schamyl—had we placed our relations with Persia upon a proper footing, we might have prevented Russia collecting an army at Bayazid by threatening her on her rear and flank; but it is now too late; and whatever will have to be done hereafter will have to be done, as heretofore, with terrible sacrifices and loss.
But supposing that we could successfully undertake a war in Asia, and that Russia could even be driven out of those provinces which she has torn from Persia and Turkey, will any definite and permanent result be obtained? Will any additional security be afforded for the protection of Turkey, and for the effective control of this colossal Power? Certainly not. Did we enter into this war, let me ask, for a great end? Is it one on which the very existence of this country may be at stake? Is it one which we are waging on behalf of the liberties and independence of Europe? If, as I believe it ought to be, such be really our object, then any hollow, unsubstantial peace will be far more dangerous, far more fatal, than any loss or any disaster we can contemplate in the struggle. I believe this war to be such as I have described it to be. I believe that no war was ever waged in which were involved such vast results, not only to Europe, but to the world. We now find that this gigantic Power has been advancing silently, but securely, from year to year—that it extends with a consolidated strength which almost defies us from Kamschatka to the Baltic Sea. It would, indeed, seem
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that Providence had willed that Russia should have chosen such a time as this to defy France and England, when, united, they may still be able to check, ere it be too late, the progress of this mighty Power. Had she waited until she could have availed herself to the fullest extent of all her vast resources—had her railways been extended to Odessa and Sebastopol—had she been provided with all the inventions of modern science applied to war, who could have foretold the issue of a struggle which would have threatened the independence of almost every nation in the world? But do you think now that you can ultimately cripple her, and prevent her assuming that dangerous preponderance by making an isolated and ill-digested attack here—destroying a fortress there—invading an Asiatic province or half checking a lucrative trade? It is in Europe alone that you can effectually stop her progress and prevent the accomplishment of her object; it is by establishing an independent kingdom, with free institutions, on her frontiers—a kingdom embodying the Sclavonic element, and becoming the rival of that vast Sclavonic Empire in the north. I know that false enthusiasm and ill-advised efforts have, unfortunately, brought discredit upon the cause of Poland in this country, and have, I fear, caused us to look upon it with indifference, if not with stronger feelings; but, depend upon it, that it is alone by erecting Poland again into an independent kingdom, that you can obtain the only results which can justify your baying entered, as you have done, into this terrible struggle.
Now one word as to the management of the war. Ministers are determined upon carrying it on upon three new principles—the greatest economy, the greatest humanity, and the greatest publicity. They must consequently be prepared for the inevitable results of such a system—immense sacrifice of life and money. What is their greatest economy principle? To do everything on the smallest scale at the greatest possible expense. I could cite instance after instance in proof of this to the House. I saw a letter a few days ago from a merchant at Liverpool, who, being himself a gainer by the prodigality of the Government, would not have written as he did were not the facts of the case as gross as he stated them to be. After describing the manner in which, at the last moment, transports had been taken up by the agents of Government in the most reckless man-

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ner, and contracts for horse-boxes entered into without any stipulations whatever, he ends by saying, that this lavish expenditure of the public money had almost turned his hair grey. I need scarcely remind the House of the fate of those horse-boxes. The first time the vessels in which they were fitted up were exposed to a slight sea, they all gave way, and above 200 of our cavalry horses were thrown overboard, at a time when cavalry was of the utmost importance to our operations in the Crimea. Scarcely a day passes that I do not receive from some quarter or another letters from persons who bring to my notice, because I have taken a part in this question in the House, similar instances of wanton extravagance and culpable neglect. Up to the present moment the Government have endeavoured to carry on this war upon principles of economy utterly inconsistent with its objects, and the magnitude of the undertaking. Now they find that the nation is indignant at the shameful instances of mismanagement and negligence which have occurred, they are rushing into the wildest extravagance. Any proposal, however ridiculous, any invention, however absurd, is taken up. I verily believe, that if a man were to propose to make cannon out of green cheese his offer would at once be entertained. But this is not the way to carry on a great war. Is there to be no statesmanship, no forethought, no precaution? Then there is the greatest humanity principle, of which I have already given an example in the treatment of Odessa. This principle appears to me to consist in sacrificing ten British lives for the sake of one Russian, and destroying our trade for the benefit of that of our enemies, a principle to which, however generous and noble, I cannot, I confess, subscribe. There remains the greatest publicity principle. Now I should be the last man to say one word against the freedom of the press. The Government, on the other hand, has certainly no reason to complain of the press, for the Government itself has given it that importance and influence which it enjoys, and the existence of which Ministers find so inconvenient. The public find that it is only by pressure brought to bear through the press that Ministers can be brought to do their duty. It has been the press which has roused public indignation by descriptions of the sufferings and wants of our gallant troops, and which has compelled the Government to provide a tardy
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remedy. It is the press, too, which, by its descriptions, in some instances—and I allude especially to those of a leading journal—most truthful and graphic of the deeds of our heroic countrymen, has cherished the national enthusiasm and brought recruits to our ranks. It is not for us then, or the Government, to complain of the press. Yet how have the statements put forward by the press been denied by the Government, nevertheless they have proved too true. Let me take the medical staff as an instance. The right hon. Gentleman had again to-night, with his wonted ability, entered into an elaborate argument to disprove the statement made with regard to that department. Again he tells us that all those medical stores and comforts of which the army stood so much in need had been sent out. But where were they, I ask? I know that a medical man stated that he could dispose of all his medicines and medical stores for half-a-crown, and be a gainer by the bargain. At the last moment, in consequence of the repeated representations of the press, the Government has sent out a commission to inquire into the conduct of the medical men attached to the army. But we do not blame them, they for the most part have done their duty; it is the Government that we blame, who entered into war without making any proper provisions whatever for the safety and comfort of our troops; who appear to have imagined that battles could be fought without killed or wounded; who neither provided means of transporting the sick and maimed, nor established a proper hospital for their reception, until, as usual, it was too late. But do you think that you will obtain any reliable information, or get at the truth, by your commission? I doubt it. I heard a medical officer say that if he gave such evidence before it as he conscientiously believed to be true, he would probably find himself soon afterwards gazetted to Cape Coast Castle, Demerara, or some equally healthy and desirable station. Unfortunately the Government by their conduct have compelled the public to seek for the truth in the press. But whilst the country thus reaps the benefit, it must also be prepared to meet all the disadvantages of publicity. We must have accurate descriptions of the dresses of our generals—the result is, that when the next battle is fought we lose eight generals killed and wounded. We must know at what time our reliefs are sent down to the

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trenches and in what number—the enemy avails himself of the knowledge to inflict considerable loss upon our troops. We must be told that our position has weak points, and that our guns can only fire so many rounds—the besiegers are naturally encouraged in their attack and persevere in their defence.
As to the materials we have for carrying on this war, they are such as this country—indeed, no country—ever possessed The great battles which have been described this evening sufficiently testify to the courage and devotion of our soldiers. Our navy is not inferior. Never, perhaps, have the two services been more efficient, nor men more admirably officered—never has there been a more cordial unity existing between them. From various circumstances the navy has had less opportunity of engaging in active operations than the army, and, consequently, less opportunity of distinguishing itself. But it has nobly shown its devotion, and the deep sense it has of the conduct of our soldiers, by the manner in which it has treated the sick and wounded. It would be difficult to describe all our gallant seamen have done in this respect—indeed it would be difficult to say what we should have done without them. With that gentleness and kindness so peculiar to the British seaman they brought down the wounded from the field of Alma, tended them like nurses, and carried them on board our ships. The officers, with indefatigable zeal, directed their exertions and shared in their labours. Where all have done their duty so nobly it is almost impossible to single out a name for special mention. But there is one name dear to the House and the country which I cannot omit—that of my gallant friend (Captain Peel), one always foremost in the work of humanity and in the hour of danger, whose calm and undaunted courage are only equalled by his tenderness—those two elements in the character of a hero. Nor can I, upon such an occasion as this, pass over the name of that gallant and able Commander who has been the soul of this expedition—who, in the midst of difficulties and dangers, has inspired our army as well as our fleet with hope and with confidence. I allude, of course, to Sir Edmund Lyons, to whom, indeed, this country owes a deep debt of gratitude, Not only on sea, but on land, has he ever been ready to share in the dangers and sufferings of all, and has
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shown that indefatigable zeal, that undaunted courage, and that deep sense of duty, which distinguishes that great school of British seamen, of which the immortal Nelson was the type. And while speaking of our army and our navy, let me not overlook a somewhat humbler, may be, but certainly not less useful or honourable, class of men—I mean our merchant service. Both officers and men have distinguished themselves, no less than the navy, in the zealous and punctual discharge of the arduous and responsible duties which have devolved upon them. They have always been foremost in danger as well as in every good work. If I were to mention one name amongst many deserving the highest commendation, I might cite that of Captain Methuen of the Colombo, who, at all times ready to undertake any duty which might be considered necessary for the public service, offered to tow a man of war into action on the day of the bombardment of Sebastopol,
I feel that it would be impossible to speak too highly of our army. It was argued at one time, that if we educated our soldiers we should render them less brave—less efficient. The result of this campaign has for ever destroyed this narrow-minded prejudice. Their heroism in the field—their high sense of duty—their forbearance under unequalled provocation—their tenderness to the wounded—have excited the admiration of their countrymen and of their allies. Would that the regulations of the service and our antiquated official routine were not opposed to the mention in public despatches of the names of those who specially distinguished themselves! This omission is a proof of narrow-mindedness, and is an act of injustice utterly intolerable, utterly inconsistent with the spirit of the age. It cannot be continued. I wish others would imitate the example of that gallant officer (Sir De Lacy Evans), who, with true good taste and feeling, recommended to the notice of the Commander in Chief a sergeant (Sulivan) who had shown remarkable courage and coolness in action. It has hitherto been the custom to reward a man who has distinguished himself in the field by giving him a five-pound note, or some such reward; but do you not think that the heroes of Alma and Inkerman would set far greater value on an honourable badge than on a mere pecuniary recompense? You are endeavouring to raise the moral and intellectual standard of your men; let the mode in which you

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will in future show your sense of this improvement be more consistent with it. Can any one doubt that those who have served their country so well, would not be proud to have their names brought to the notice of their fellow-countrymen in a despatch? Let us devise some mode similar to that introduced by the French Emperor into his army, of recompensing the soldier for his services on the field. Let there be an order of merit—some badge—to which shall attach an honourable distinction, and which, not given indiscriminately, a man may be proud to wear. Such a recognition of their services would elevate the character of our soldiers, and render them still more fit to rise from the ranks. I could relate a thousand anecdotes to illustrate the courage and devotion of our troops in the present campaign, but I will only refer to an instance of a noble sense of duty which particularly struck me. A sergeant in the artillery, lying on the ground, with both his legs taken off by a cannon-ball, turned to his commanding officer, and asked him whether he thought he should die. "That is in the hands of God," was the reply. "But whatever He may will, you will have the satisfaction of feeling that you have done your duty." "I am proud to hear you say that, Sir," was the noble answer. "If I die I shall die happy; if I live I shall remember what you have now said to me to the end of my days." Does not such a man as that, I ask, deserve a place in a despatch? And such was the noble feeling—the feeling that they were doing their duty, and that in the knowledge of having done their duty was their chief reward—which enabled 8,000 men on the day of Inkerman to wage a hand-to-hand fight with an overwhelming enemy from the dawn to the middle of the day. It was this high sense of duty—this consciousness that the eye of their country was upon them—which has made them brave every danger and patiently submit to every privation. What reward could we find too exalted for such men? Be assured that the more consistent those rewards may be with that high standard of education which you wish to introduce into our army, the more will they be prized. Do not fear, as some would fain make you believe, that such a mode of treating the soldier will be destructive to discipline—would destroy the necessary distinction between officers and men. These are the narrow prejudices of narrow minds. While speaking on this subject, let me also
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advert to the officers of regiments. They are almost as much overlooked as the noncommissioned officers and rank and file. The Commander in Chief's despatches are but too frequently the records of the imaginary deeds and virtues of generals, aides-de-camp, and officers of the staff. The more humble individual who does the real work, who has the greater share of the danger, who endures all the privations, and is exposed to all the sufferings, is but too generally forgotten or overlooked. Let us remember for a moment what our battalion officers have gone through in this expedition to the Crimea; and in alluding to those officers, I include those of the battalion of Guards also. They have been landed without any means whatever of transport. They have had to carry upon their own backs all their baggage, together with provisions for three days; a hardship, I believe, never before endured by the British officer, and to which the French officer has not been exposed. Had proper precautions been taken, they would have had at least the means of transporting such things as were absolutely necessary. It may be said that the common soldiers have been subjected to the same hardship; but it must be remembered, that from their previous condition in life they are far better able to bear such fatigue than their officer; that, moreover, as soon as they reached the end of their day's march they would throw off their packs, whilst the officer was obliged to place the pickets, see to the comfort of his men, and to perform many other necessary duties before he could relieve himself of his burden, or obtain a little rest. The sufferings of the officers in this campaign have been unequalled. I remember hearing one say, that out of seventy-six hours he had only slept four. They have had not only to lead their men to battle, and to go through all the ordinary duties of a camp, but they have had to pass hour after hour, night and day, in the trenches, exposed to a heavy fire, and suffering from wet, cold, and hunger; and yet all these hardships and privations have been borne patiently and unostentatiously, with the knowledge that they are never to be mentioned in despatches, brought to the notice of their country, or to share in the rewards of their more favoured companions in arms. Their only reward has been the feeling that they have done their duty. The description of their sufferings, and those of their men, and the testimony to their heroic conduct

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in the public press, have justly excited the sympathies and admiration of the country, and have led to most laudable exertions towards giving them some consolation and relief. I trust I may not be considered impertinent, if I warn the public not to run into extremes, as is somewhat too frequently the practice in England. Our Government has been allowed almost to leave our men to perish through want, and then, when a sudden reaction comes, we overload them with indiscriminate kindness and charity. Let us not forget that in all human probability we are only at the beginning of a great war, and that yet much will have to be done by the country. Let us not waste our money in sending out jams and marmalades, and such like delicacies, or in objects which will perhaps arrive too late, and prove utterly useless. Let us husband our resources till they are required; and, above all, let us not, by doing too much, relieve the Government from the responsibility of doing their duty. Our Commissariat, as well as the other departments connected with the provisioning and maintenance of the Army, must be improved; and it is only by a strong expression of public opinion, or by compelling the Government to do that which they ought to do, and not by doing it for them, that we can hope for a better state of things, or for more than temporary amendment. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to tell us that our troops are as well provisioned now as they were during the Peninsular war. Has no progress been made in the space of nearly fifty years? Have the public profited by every modern invention and improvement, and is the Commissariat alone to stand still? Let us hear nothing more of the Peninsula, but let this department, and all those connected with the public service, be administered as any private undertaking would be if it had the slightest chance of success. I cannot see that that Government deserves much credit which can only say that our Army is as well provisioned now as it was in the Peninsula. I do not hesitate to declare, that in this, as in every other department, you must change your whole system. This is not a moment to stand upon punctilios of etiquette, upon precedence, and upon official routine. The public interests—the safety of our troops—are at stake, and they are of more importance than red tape. I tell you plainly, although such plain speaking may be unpalatable, that you must cut down boldly to the root of the
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evil. Service in the Peninsula must no longer be the qualification for high and responsible posts in the Crimea. Men of seventy years of age may have been most gallant and able officers, but nature, at that age, will no longer support the fatigues, privations, and hardships which those who are charged with arduous duties in war must of necessity go through. To place men of that age in such positions is as unfair to them as to the public. You expose them to the loss of a well-earned reputation by entrusting them with functions which they are physically incapable of discharging to their own credit, or to the satisfaction of the country. We want younger and more active men. We may shut our eyes to these facts for the time, but depend upon it they will be forced upon us sooner or later with terrible reality. Our fear to look them in the face has already been the cause of great misfortunes, I may say calamities. I do not wish to mention names; the Government know well that there are men at the head of departments who are, I will not say incompetent, but physically incapable, of doing the work required of them. If any private establishment were to attempt to carry on business as Ministers have attempted to carry on this war, it would be bankrupt in a week.
I must apologise to the House for having intruded myself upon its attention so long. I have endeavoured to treat this question as a great question, and to go beyond mere details; into which, however, I have to some extent been dragged by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. I am aware that these discussions are not palatable to the House; but I trust I may venture again to warn it, that unless the Government be forced, by some expression of our opinion, to take a more vigorous and definite course, equal to the magnitude and importance of the struggle into which we have entered, or to adopt a policy more intelligible and defined, calamities even more terrible than those which have fallen upon us are yet in store. All those from which we have hitherto suffered have arisen from the want of a definite policy, and from the absence of those ordinary precautions which any well-digested plan would have enabled us to take. I do not hesitate to say, that at least one-third, if not two-thirds, of the lives that have been lost in battle and by disease might have been spared had the Government done its duty. Let Ministers take warning in time by what has passed. Let them, although it

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is now late, adopt some policy, and take a larger view of this great question. I entreat the Lord President of the Council, by the illustrious name he bears—I implore him, by the position he holds as the head of the great Liberal party in this country—to use the influence which he so justly possesses to prevail upon his colleagues to adopt, ere it be too late, a policy which may not, perhaps, be so well calculated as that they have hitherto unfortunately pursued, to reconcile the conflicting opinions of a Coalition Ministry, but which will be more consistent with the honour, the true interests, and the immortal traditions of this mighty empire.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that he would not have risen to address the House were it not that no Member of the Government had attempted a reply to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had directed the defence of the Government upon the attacks which he assumed to have been made upon the officers in command of our forces in the East; but he (Colonel Dunne) denied that any attacks had been made upon our officers, or even upon those officers who had the direction at home. The real attack that had been made, and one which was supported by the country, was directed against the Ministers of the Crown for the manner in which they had carried on the war. He would abstain from entering into the cause of the war, although he believed it to be now generally admitted that it was mainly owing to the vacillation of the Premier and the weakness of the Government; and therefore their conduct of it ought to be strictly scrutinised. The first subject touched upon by the Secretary at War was the accusation that the army had been unduly detained at Varna. He (Colonel Dunne) believed that the delay at Varna was the result of no policy whatever—that there was no military ground for it—and that the simple reason for the step was that the army was not prepared to go elsewhere; no means of conveyance were provided for an advance into the Dobrudscha or Moldavia, and Sebastopol was then comparatively undefended on the land side; there could be little doubt that the time we wasted at Varna was employed by the Russians in strengthening the fortifications, whilst our army was greatly weakened by disease during their detention at Varna. The right hon. Secretary at War stated that the number of men at first sent out
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was 22,680; and that, subsequently, in the months of June, July, and August, reinforcements of 941, 4,588, and 2,032, respectively, followed. Now, the fact was, that these three so-called reinforcements were no reinforcements at all, but were parts of the army originally sent out, which was intended to be a force of 32,000 men. Again, the requisite proportion of cavalry and artillery was not furnished for the support of the infantry, and we had a fewer number of guns in proportion to the amount of infantry than any other European army. Russia had three guns to every 1,000 men, while the practice of our service required that our army should have two and a half guns for every 1,000. Now, he asked the Secretary at War, had our army either the proportion of guns or of cavalry which was considered to be necessary, according to the recommendation of the Military Commission, which was appointed soon after the close of the last war? He (Colonel Dunne) admitted that the Commissariat had latterly done its duty well, but it was badly served at first. On this head he would not bear hardly on the Government; for he would admit that the long peace had made it extremely difficult to get together an organised corps of officers perfectly competent by training and experience for such peculiar duties as the Commissariat had to perform, and great allowance for their shortcomings ought, therefore, to be made. With regard to the medical department; it was a mistake not to attach the medical officers to the brigades in the first instance, as their services would thus have been rendered much more speedily and effectively available. Officers and stores were sent out in abundance by the Government; but, unfortunately, the stores did not reach their destination, and there was so much confusion that the stores were in one place and the wounded in another. Again, when the army landed at the Crimea, the Government had not prepared proper reserves. The Secretary at War said, that in the months of September and October 3,041 men were sent out as reinforcements; but nearly the whole of this number would be required to replace the loss at the Alma. Military men calculated that, after an action like that, the effective strength of the force would be reduced by one-third of the number engaged; but, after establishing a base of operations at Balaklava, we had only 3,041 men to replace our losses. The deficiency of the force of the British army was shown by

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the fact that Lord Raglan had been obliged to relinquish a portion of his position because he had not men to bold it. He was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War had replied to some criticisms that had been made on those in command of the armies; but he thought there was one criticism that had appeared in the papers which was just, and that was with reference to the state of the position attacked at Inkerman. Sir De Lacy Evans had pointed out its danger, and why was it not fortified? Simply because Lord Raglan had not sufficient men to do so without stopping the siege; and this, together with passages in Lord Raglan's despatches, proved that he had not a sufficient number of men under his command. The right hon. Secretary at War said that the army sent out to the Crimea was well appointed in all its details. But the siege train, such as it was, did not reach Varna until June, and even then it was totally, inadequate for the attack of a fortress like Sebastopol, and our troops would have had no guns for the purpose had not the Russians, by sinking their ships, set free a portion of the armament of our fleet for use on land. He did think that all that could be done by the army would be achieved by our army in the Crimea—he thought that Sebastopol would ultimately be taken; but the fact was, that throughout the war every step had been taken too late, and the consequence was, that the success which he hoped and believed would ultimately attend our efforts would be purchased at double the cost at which it might have been secured by more efficient measures in the first instance.
MR. DISRAELI: I participate, Sir, in the surprise expressed by the hon. Member that none of Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it necessary to reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury. He is not a supporter of this side of the House. He does not sit upon these benches, and he somewhat ostentatiously informed the Lord President that he was peculiarly attached to him. I have no wish to tamper with the allegiance which the Member for Aylesbury owes to the Lord President, but on the subject before the consideration of the House I have given him that respectful attention due to every Gentleman who is master of the subject on which he addresses the House. I could not also forget, in the individual instance of the Member for Aylesbury, that a man of genius addressed the House; and, remem-
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bering that he has come from the scene of those memorable actions which now fill the minds and touch the hearts of the people of this country, and that he has risen to make serious charges against the Ministry, the fact that he has not been answered by the Government is not a circumstance which the hon. Member need consider as one which will depreciate him in the public estimate. So far as I can judge of the fortunes of a human being—so far as I can form an opinion upon the course of human life—I think the Member for Aylesbury will be remembered when the great portion of the existing Cabinet will be forgotten.
I did not expect, Sir—and I witnessed with regret the necessity—that I should have again felt it my duty on the present opening of Parliament to vindicate the freedom of discussion. Remembering the position of this country—remembering what has occurred since we last met—remembering that the fate of this empire is perhaps at stake—remembering the thrilling events that have happened—remembering that the people of this country expect, if not redress for their grievances, yet some sympathy with their deep emotion—I was surprised to find that the Government should have advised the Sovereign to assemble Parliament, and should have given instructions to their followers that discussion should not only not be encouraged, but resisted. That they should have attempted to conduct affairs—that they should have attempted to govern this country—without unnecessarily appealing to the sense of the House of Commons, I can easily comprehend. Their difficulties are great—their embarrassments are increasing. They might have thought that time and fortune might have so mitigated their position, that two months later they might have appealed with more advantage, but having felt it their duty or necessity to take this step, I was surprised that an hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address, and the brother of a Cabinet Minister, should have impressed on the House the expediency of its silence. But this is not all. We have had the luxury of one Cabinet Minister on this memorable opening of Parliament, and while he has chiefly filled his speech with a vindication of his own office, which had been only partially attacked, he favoured us with the discreet admonition that the loyalty and discretion of the House of Commons would be best proved by not at the present moment expressing opinions in the face of an anxious country; to say no-

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thing, Sir, of an absent army, which must, I think, under all its difficulties, under all its sufferings, under all its deeds of heroic achievement, have been sustained by the conviction that when the representatives of the people of England assembled they would have expressed their sympathy with their sufferings, and perhaps have criticised a Ministry, who, in their opinion, had not done their duty to relieve them. It may be clever in the Lord President to be silent, and the other taciturn Secretaries of State who surround him, but I doubt whether that silence is a proof of respect for public feeling, and whether a sense of duty ought to have impelled them to restrict that frank expression of opinion which is the soul of the House of Commons.
Sir, my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich has to-night taken a course which will be appreciated by the country; and had this debate terminated with the answer to his speech I should have been content to be silent, for I think that he has indicated the course which it becomes a Conservative Opposition to pursue. I am totally at a loss to comprehend how right hon. Gentlemen can bring themselves to such a pitch of feeling that they can rise and protest against the critical opinion of a Member of Parliament on the conduct of the affairs of the country. I had last year to refer to this; there was not an occasion on which the Government brought forward measures, in every one of which they were ultimately defeated, when Gentlemen on these benches expressed a criticism, that they were not challenged to propose a vote of want of confidence in the Government; as they had been challenged to-night by the Secretary at War, if they had not faith in the Government, not to trouble the House with factious criticisms—not to echo here what, perhaps, may be the opinion of the country —but to test the opinion of the House as to their trust in the Ministry. I had occasion last year to notice the unconstitutional course so freely adopted by these Gentlemen. I had occasion to show then, that such a course struck at the root of public discussions and public freedom. I held that it was a privilege of Members of this House freely to canvass the conduct of Government, without being forced to incur the responsibility of asking the House of Commons to sanction a change of Ministry. In 1803 we had a Ministry carrying on a war—we had an Opposition supporting the measures of the war; and when Mr.
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Wyndham canvassed the policy of the Government—and he was no mean authority, and eminently qualified, from his official experience, to speak on such a subject—Mr. Wyndham said, that he trusted that the unanimity of the nation on the subject of the policy of the war would not for a moment be mistaken for a unanimity of sentiment as to the conduct of the war. So spoke Mr. Wyndham, and he was followed by eminent Members of the House, and no one impugned their privilege so to address the House; or, when they criticised the conduct of the Government, told them to refrain from such remarks, and to test the question by a vote of want of confidence in the Ministry. Yet this repartee of last Session has been brought forward again by the Secretary at War. Sir, I protest against these opinions. I see their object, and know what their consequence will be. It will stop debate, it will degrade the character of the House, and put an end to discussion, which is the soul of truth, and without which this House can never exist.
But an hon. Baronet, who bears an honoured name, also rose early and unexpectedly in the debate, and made a remarkable observation. Indulging, as I thought, in a misapprehension, to which I am surprised his acute mind could be liable, the hon. Baronet referred to a speech which I bad felt it my duty to make last year, in which I said, in speaking of the causes of the present war, that no captious criticism respecting the conduct of the war would ever, I hoped, be heard from us, and so seemed to think that he had established a case of inconsistency against my right hon. Friend in the course we are now pursuing. I think I then said, representing the feelings of my friends around me, that no future Wellesley, on the banks of the Danube, should ever complain, whatever other difficulties he might have to encounter, of the obstacles offered to him by an English Opposition. I need hardly say that observation referred to the military conduct of the war. I meant to say, and I think my meaning was understood by the House, that we had neither the presumption nor the wish to criticise the conduct of naval and military commanders—that we would place in them that unlimited confidence which we were sure the country was prepared to place in men who had been selected by the responsible counsellors of Her Majesty; and that, whatever might be the fate of their operations, they should not look back

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with feelings of bitterness to the factious criticism of political parties as having prevented or retarded that success to which their genius and their labours might have entitled them, But surely the hen. Baronet the Member for Tamworth would not lay down for a moment that it is not the duty of the House of Commons carefully to scan, and severely even to criticise, the military expeditions conceived, and planned, and matured in the Cabinet of the Sovereign? The hon. Gentleman will not, I suppose, for a moment maintain that Walcheren expeditions are not to be criticised, that conventions of Cintra or Sarratoga are to be passed by a humble House of Commons in subdued silence? Why are we a House of Commons? What chance have we of commanding the confidence of the people as being the sacred depositaries of the national sentiment, if, when national disasters occur, no echo to the feeling of the people is to be found in this House? If here, of all places, we are to be met by a Minister who says, "If you disapprove of what has occurred, notwithstanding the emergency, notwithstanding the difficulties in which the Sovereign and the nation are placed, we call upon you to put your opinion to the test, whether or not there shall be a sudden change of the Ministers of the Crown." I am sure that Gentlemen, on whichever side they may sit, will see upon reflection that these are principles too dangerous to public liberty to be encouraged, and that we must not for a moment sanction the appeal of a Government that, upon their measures, whether successful or unsuccessful—however they may have been conceived, whatever may have been their objects or their consequences—it is the duty of the House of Commons, from a feeling of patriotism, to be silent, or to incur the responsibility of administration. Why, suppose that the House of Commons were silent—suppose that in this probably brief Session we had abstained from all criticism upon what has occurred and is occurring—suppose that we had met and adjourned, having passed those necessary and formal measures which the Lord President has ready to propose to our notice —should we prevent discussion?—should we prevent the expression of dissatisfaction and discontent in the country? You would have a dissatisfied people out of doors, who, feeling that they could not give a constitutional expression to their sentiments, would have recourse to agitation—more inconvenient, I should have
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thought, to a Minister, than the discussion of public questions in this House, where observations are at least conceived in the spirit of patriotism and expressed in the language of gentlemen.
Having adverted to this remarkable expression on the part of the Government of a principle so unfavourable to public discussion, let me recall the House to the consideration of our actual condition. I want to divest the subject of that cloud of official statistics which the Secretary at War has found it convenient to throw into our faces. I find no fault with the Secretary at War for taking this his first legitimate opportunity to vindicate the conduct of his office with respect to many accusations which have been made against it, not in this House; but allow me to remind the House, that the Secretary at War has been most successful in answering the charges which have not been made in the House of Commons. We are called upon to-night to decide whether we will agree to this Address, which, as far as I can follow its language, is an echo of the speech in my hand—a speech in some circumstances most remarkable, inasmuch as I believe it is the shortest speech that ever yet was delivered from the Throne, and is confined almost to one subject. Let me remind the House, however, that this speech commences by an admission of great importance—by an announcement which is certainly calculated to excite the attention of the whole country. We have here, in the gracious Speech of Her Majesty, an announcement that Her Majesty is involved in a great war. Now, I want to impress the importance of this expression upon the notice of the House. This time last year, when we were virtually, though not formally, in a condition of hostility, no Minister acknowledged that the war, which was soon formally to be announced, was a great war, The most distinguished Member of the Cabinet, the Lord President himself, had his hands so full of business last year that he had hardly any time to think of the war. Far from its being a great war in the opinion of the Lord President when Parliament last met, it was scarcely a war at all; but, even if it did result in such a catastrophe, the noble Lord was almost prepared to carry on a little civil war of his own. I do not mention this to taunt Her Majesty's Ministers, but these are the only traits by which we can ascertain what were then their feelings and opinions with respect to

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this immense event. But when it became a formal as well as a virtual war, when it became necessary that a message from Her Majesty should be delivered to this House, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in consequence, to explain to the country and to the House how the war was to be carried on, it is quite clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not consider it to be a great war, for he brought forward a very meagre estimate, which anticipated the expense of the transport of troops to foreign countries, and also the expense of their return, both included in the estimate of the year. I believe I am not misrepresenting the right hon. Gentleman when I say that we have upon our votes of last Session a sum of money for the transport of 25,000 men to Malta and back again, a vote proposed by the Minister of Finance, and passed by a subservient and uncritical Parliament. It is quite evident, then, that these eminent Gentlemen had not the least idea that they were engaged in a great war. The noble Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer may have thought we were engaged in war, but they cannot have believed it was a great war, when the noble Lord was so indifferent to these foreign and external circumstances that he was prepared to propose a reconstruction of this House, and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when called upon in his official capacity to propose the first vote for the carrying on of the war, anticipated, not merely the expenditure necessary for the transport of troops, but the expenditure necessary for the return of those troops to this country, all in the course of the year. I think, therefore, Sir, it is necessary for us to consider the great importance of this phrase. Last year, according to the noble Lord, a war with Russia was a circumstance so insignificant that it ought not to prevent a reform in Parliament. The noble Lord now has found out that this is a great and not an insignificant war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he was of such a sanguine complexion, that on his first proposition of expenditure he anticipated that the troops would return to this country in the course of the year, proved that, in his opinion, the war would not be a war really, but a demonstration. I am not now imputing it to the Government as matter of blame; at the same time I reserve to myself the right to impute it to them as matter of blame—but I say it is quite clear that the Ministers of this country, at the
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commencement of last Session, had no conception whatever of the position in which they were, or of the magnitude of the circumstances which they had to encounter.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich has, I think, indicated, under these circumstances, the course which a Conservative Opposition, rightly distinguished from other Oppositions to which he has referred, is justified in taking. When Her Majesty appeals for support—when Her Majesty announces She is involved in a great war, and asks us for our assistance—it is our duty to express to Her Majesty that there are no means at our command that we will not place at Her disposal; but surely, if it is so evident, so demonstrative, so transparent that Her Majesty's advisers find themselves in a position which they did not anticipate—which they had not the prescience or sagacity to suppose would occur—it surely is not an unreasonable or factious course that, while we say we are prepared to support Her Majesty in this great struggle by every means in our power, we reserve to ourselves the right of expressing an opinion on the conduct of the Government in respect to this war in the interval, and to judge from that conduct of the manner in which they may spend the resources which we may place at their disposal. We have had a speech from the only Minister who has condescended to address the House of Commons thus suddenly summoned. We have had a speech of detail—I may say of statistics—adverting to subjects which never have been introduced into our discussions, and which have really in no sense met the great objection which has been urged by my right hon. Friend. The Secretary at War has proved to us, according to his view, that the hospitals at Scutari at this moment are admirably attended to and regulated. I hope they are. I am willing to believe, upon the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, that they are so. The right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured to persuade us that the medical assistance which our army enjoys is sufficient, or, at least as great as any Ministerial ability could have supplied. I hope that it is so. All that the right hon. Gentleman says I wish to believe. But were it otherwise—if it were true that there had been this cruel suffering and apparent neglect—if it were true that the Commissariat (which no one has attacked, but which the right hon. Gentleman has so elaborately vindicated) has been so defi-

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cient—if there had been too few surgeons, too few nurses, and a meagre Commissariat—I am sure that I should not have been one who would have attempted, from such circumstances, to bring charges against the Administration of this country. I remember—and I may refer to the words, for I dare say no one else remembers them—that, having last year to touch on this subject, I said myself that at the beginning of war, after a peace so prolonged as that by which the blessing of Providence we had enjoyed, the difficulties of inexperience must be so great that it would be most unjust and unbecoming for the House of Commons critically to examine the conduct of individuals a ho, after all, must be animated by sentiments as humane and influenced by responsibility much greater than ourselves. And tonight, Sir, I have not heard any expressions used in this House impugning the arrangements of the Commissariat or arrangements of a similar kind to which I have adverted: but to accusations that may have appeared in anonymous quarters the right hon. Gentleman has found time to make an elaborate answer, though no Member of the Government has found time to make an answer to charges brought in debate against the Administration by a Member of this House, expressed with a knowledge of the subject, and conveyed with ability and in a spirit deserving, in my opinion, the thought and attention of this assembly. I will advert in a moment to what was the charge brought forward by my right hon. Friend—a charge, let me again impress on the House, not brought forward in the way of ostentatious accusation as the foundation of Motions against the Government—not brought forward with any anxiety to damage the character of the Government—but brought forward necessarily from the position which we all occupy at this moment, from the sudden summoning of Parliament, which calls upon us, by the Address moved by the hon. Gentleman opposite, to express our opinion on public affairs. Before I advert to what was the distinct and really the only charge, yet so important that no other was necessary, which has been made by my right hon. Friend, let me for a moment take this great question out of that cloud of the details of office with which it has been conveniently incumbered by the Secretary at War, and place it in its true and rude simplicity before the consideration of the House of Commons and of the country.
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It is some nine or ten months ago, after an agitating year of warning, that Her Majesty was advised by Her Ministers to send a Message to Parliament to announce a declaration of war against Russia. I say that no Ministers ever gave such important advice to their Sovereign under such favourable circumstances as my Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues. Why, look at the facts! They had a unanimous Parliament, and a unanimous people. The war was popular. This House had expressed its willingness to vote any supplies, without any reference to party confidence whatever, which Her Majesty's Ministers might propose. They had an overflowing Exchequer. They had a prosperous people. In addition to all these advantages, they had the most powerful ally in the world. Let it be understood you entered upon war under these circumstances. These circumstances are forgotten in the petty views and the petty details and the petty consequences which have been permitted to steal into our debates. We hear of the inconvenience of free government to powerful political action. It is said that, although the public spirit under a despotic Government may not be equal to the spirit of a free people—that, although the conscript (not too adroitly introduced by the Secretary at War) may not fight as the militiaman who has been voluntarily enlisted, a despotism has still the advantages of unity of design, of singleness of purpose, and of that decision, vigour, and effect which is the consequence of such antecedents. But Her Majesty's Ministers had both the unity of despotism and all the spirit of a free people on their side. What they wanted they might have had as readily as the Emperor of Russia when he signs a ukase. There was no number of men, no amount of treasure, which they might not have commanded, and the money was given freely by a free people, and the men were animated by that immortal spirit which has rendered their achievements the mark for the approbation of an admiring world. They had, then, an overflowing purse, a prosperous people, and a popular war. They had the most powerful ally in the world. They had this combination of circumstances in their favour, on entering into this war, which no Ministry at any period ever enjoyed before. I now ask the I House for a moment to turn round and consider, not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what was the number of pots of mar-

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malade which should be sent out towards the support of our starving troops—but I ask the House to consider what have been the results which this Ministry, with these enormous advantages, have obtained.
You determined to attack the powerful ruler of a country against whom you had declared war in two opposite quarters of the world—the extremities almost of his vast dominions; you fitted out armadas to attack him in two seas; you sent out an army which was to encounter him on the most important European river. What have you done? The Secretary at War sneers at the notice which my right hon. Friend took of the achievements in the Baltic. If the ideas of the Secretary at War, that such success is a sufficient return for the efforts of this country are correct, then I confess I have little hope of the successful conduct of the war by the present Government. Why, Sir, let me recall to the house the strength of the united fleet that entered the Baltic. It was greater than any armada that ever figured in the history of our times; it was greater than the united fleets of France and Spain that met Nelson at Trafalgar. Let me recall to the House the circumstances under which the sailing of that fleet was inaugurated. It occasioned a debate in the House of Commons, and, therefore, I have no doubt it will be in the recollection of every one present. The head of the Admiralty of this country, the profound statesman and experienced senator who had so long presided, at various periods, over that department, himself was a guest at a public dinner which was given to the commander of that important enterprise. A veteran statesman, one who had presided long over the foreign affairs of the nation, a department which, it is supposed, imparts a peculiar character of discretion to human conduct—that noble Lord was also present upon that occasion, and in the face of Europe, and before an applauding country—these, two of the men of whom, in this House, we are most proud—statesmen to whom Europe looks up with respect and awe—were the principal guests at a public banquet given at a political club, in order to inaugurate the captaincy of this great enterprise. What were the expectations which these speakers permitted the country to indulge in? We are at this moment entirely engrossed in the important affairs which have taken place in the Black Sea. For more than two months
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the feelings of every hearth in this country have been there absorbed; but at that moment no one thought of the Black Sea, or of Sebastopol. They were of minor importance and of diminutive proportions compared with those vast preparations and that enormous armament which was draughted from our shores under the blessings and the benison of our most experienced statesmen, and had the advantage, moreover, of being commanded by a true Reformer. Well, the Secretary at War pretends that the capture of Bomarsund was all that was intended or thought of at that moment. I will not say that the Secretary at War had then never heard of Bomarsund, because he is a well-informed Gentleman, and it might be personal; but this I do know, that I have read, in an authoritative document, that it was not only projected, but that at one time it was settled, that the half-finished fortifications in the Baltic should be destroyed by Russia preparatory to the entrance of our fleets into that sea; and, therefore, under those circumstances, and remembering tile policy which was afterwards partially followed, I hardly think it was worth while to send for a marshal of France and 10,000 French troops to destroy that which a company of marines would have finished in a few hours, and which, at all events, was not accomplished by that vast armada which had been sent out. Surely, then, my right hon. Friend was not irregular in alluding to the expedition to the Baltic, and saying that, although one of our greatest enterprises, it has not been attended by any results at all commensurate with the expectations of the country. If my right hon. Friend were not justified in this observation, why did not the noble Lord the President of the Council propose a Vote of Thanks to those who were concerned in that enterprise? Had the noble Lord proposed such a Vote, we should have been enabled to make inquiries, and the Ministers might have been able to throw some light on that perplexed and obscure subject, and have afforded some satisfaction to the public mind.
Then, Sir, I come to the second act of this war, which, let me impress upon you, was entered upon with advantages which no Ministry ever yet experienced, and with a combination of circumstances in our favour which never can occur again probably in the history of this country. What did you do with the army which you sent?

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You explained your conduct, end you explained their course; but your explanations do not affect the result, and you cannot deny that they have accomplished nothing—that the plans which you had devised were barren and fruitless. The Secretary at War tells us that the Government were watching all that time the course of events, and that such troops as might have been spared by the pest, which was not contemplated, would have acted at the right moment and in the right quarter on the Russian forces; but he has not told us that if it was necessary to move those troops there were any means to move them. Whatever might have been the fate of Silistria—whatever might have been the conduct of the Turkish army on the Danube—you have not answered the question whether you had prepared adequate, or any, means to move our army from Varna to the scene of action; and I think the hon. Member for Aylesbury has fully demonstrated that you had not. What is your next act? You attack with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men a fortress probably as strong as Gibraltar, and better provisioned. And under what circumstances did you undertake this enterprise? The Secretary at War tells you that their object was to strike at the heart of Russia in the south; and therefore they attacked Sebastopol. It was true, he admits, that in so doing our army was prepared with no reserve. Brave words, these! But why attack the place at the wrong time, and with ineffective means? It may be a question whether there should be a campaign in the Crimea; none that there should not be a winter campaign. But you have chosen a winter campaign, and what have been your preparations for it? In November you gave orders to build huts. You have not yet sent out that winter clothing which is adapted to the climate. My right hon. Friend (Sir John Pekington) fell into a slight error, which I am sure he will permit me to correct, in his allusion to time loss of the Prince. He said that the winter clothing had been despatched by the Prince, and that the Government were exonerated because that clothing was lost. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) speaks the truth, and frankly. He seems to think there is nothing like a clean breast for a Minister in a scrape, and he takes great credit for this specific clothing for the Crimean climate; but the fact is, that the cargo of the Prince did not contain any special
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winter clothing. It was only the common warm clothing for the troops, and not a cargo in any way occasioned by the winter campaign, which your policy has rendered necessary. You have invaded the Crimea; you have attacked Sebastopol; but you have chosen to do so at the very worst period. You have commenced a winter campaign in a country which most of all ethers should be avoided. You have commenced such a campaign—a great blunder—without providing for it—the next great blunder. The huts will arrive in January, and the furs probably will meet the sun of May. These are your preparations!
But you say that time was of the greatest consequence—that if you had delayed fresh frosts would have been encountered. Surely, however, when a Ministry has so managed the affairs of a country as to bring it to such a condition that at last they have to go to war with one of the greatest military Powers in the world, you will agree that the decision should be arrived at after deep thought, with ample knowledge. Surely one would have thought that statesmen who arrogate to themselves all the ability and all the experience of this House would so have played their cards, that in trying this great issue they would have essayed it under the most favourable circumstances, and not have incurred fearful odds. It is now two years since you were dallying with Russia with your diplomatic overtures. You may possibly have supposed that your negotiations would terminate in peace. I believe the majority of you did; because I know that when a body of men of different opinions counsel together, they always take refuge in the consolatory conviction that they will not be called on to act. I believe, then, that this Cabinet of Coalitionists from the first flattered themselves that the tremendous circumstances they have to encounter, and which engage their most anxious thoughts by day and night, would never be a part of their lives. The First Minister of the Crown had never dreamt that at the termination of his career he would be acting against that Russia of which he was the cherished and almost the spoiled child. And another Minister, who has indulged in dreams of political Liberalism, scarcely thought that the latter days of his eminent career would thus approach his purpose. We know this from the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Manchester, and front his Budget in the House of Commons. We know by your confession that not two of

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you are of the same opinion; yet, as responsible men, it was your duty to have formed some policy two years ago. You appear to me not to have embraced any definite object or adopted any definite system. If you had, you would not have told us now that you are obliged to enter upon a winter campaign in the Crimea, because time is precious and that another month's delay would have rendered it impregnable. This I maintain—that the Ministry which has involved this country in a war with Russia ought not to have taken such a course, unless they were prepared for all those consequences which men of experience, ability, and knowledge must have known, unless they shut their eyes wilfully to those consequences, must have ensued.
I said just now that they had called Parliament together unexpectedly; but what I object to in the Government is, that they have done everything unexpectedly in this great affair; they have done everything too late; and in all they have recommended they have given signs of vacillation of opinion and uncertainty of purpose, and, necessarily, feebleness of execution. These are little things—they may be nothing; but the doctors came after the men were wounded, and the nurses appeared always after the wounded had expired. These things were never cared for until the indignant sorrow of the nation called upon them to exercise the duties of Ministerial humanity. But the same fate seems to await them in all their course. Now it is the surgeons that are too late, now the nurses; after the battle reinforcements arrive; and at last the storm and hurricane, that everybody had been expecting, overwhelms our navies. This is not an overcharged picture, for it is founded upon fact. Does the House think it is judicious that, under such circumstances, Parliament should meet sub silentio? But even the resolution to call Parliament together was taken too late. They prorogued the Parliament to the 14th of December, and then, so uncertain was their purpose—so vacillating their conduct—so undefined their object—that, having assembled and counselled the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament to the 14th of December, they find it necessary to invade the prerogative, and are obliged to avail themselves of the scurvy aid, comparatively speaking, of an Act of Parliament, to call us together on the 12th. I should like to know what influenced these
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Gentlemen when they counselled the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament to the 14th? And yet these are the men on whom the fortunes of the country depend. What are we to think of men who, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the nation, recommend to the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament till the 14th, which, virtually, was a meeting after Christmas, and then, in a panic, avail themselves of an Act of Parliament, and call us together on the 12th? I want to know why they changed their opinions? I want to know why it is necessary to provide now for an immediate increase of the forces, and why that was not done when it was recommended and sanctioned by the Sovereign? It is in perfect keeping with the whole conduct of the Government, and adds another to the catalogue I have mentioned. I want to know, in the dismal and deplorable circumstances in which we are placed, and in which we are alone sustained by the unsurpassed heroism of the English troops, why they determined upon a winter campaign in the Crimea, without that assistance and support our soldiers ought to have received? Such a step would have been considered most unnecessary and unwise if Ministers had only ordinary foresight and sagacity. I will not say the disastrous position of our forces, when I recollect the glorious feats of arms they have accomplished—but certainly I may say that it is a deplorable state of things in which we find ourselves.
It appears that towards the end of Her Majesty's Speech there is a specific for our dangers. It is not from the deeds of daring of our own gallant countrymen, or the enthusiasm and loyalty of the country, we are to look for extrication from the position in which we have been placed; but rather, as it seems to me, from the fact, as Her Majesty informs us, that, "together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded an alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause." If the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) condescends to address the House, I would impress upon him that it is expected from him, by the House and the country, that on this subject he should speak with some degree of frankness. We are asked in the Speech from the Throne to maintain this great war, and to prosecute it with vigour and force. I maintain that it is impossible to form an estimate of what our means will be to enable

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Her Majesty to prosecute the war, unless we have some idea of the assistance she is to receive from her Allies. We know the assistance she receives from her Ally the Emperor of the French. It is precise, it is generous, it is cordial, it is sincere. It is doubly generous, because it is accorded to a Government, many Members of which were distinguished for the vituperative language in which they have spoken of that Prince. I know of nothing more to the credit of the French people—I know of nothing more to the credit of the French ruler and the French people—than the cordial manner in which they have co-operated with the present Government in this war. I remember when the First Lord of the Admiralty inaugurated his manifesto against the Government of Lord Derby by a diatribe against the Emperor of the French—while I remember that another Member of the Cabinet, not so eminent, determined, in order to make Ids court in the proper quarter, to outdo the right hon. Gentleman; and, not satisfied with abusing the Emperor of the French, maligned and slandered the people of that country—when I remember these facts, and that the chief of the present Cabinet raised an opposition to the Government of which I was a Member on account of our indecent and precipitate recognition of Napoleon as Emperor, I must say that I admire the candour and generosity of our Allies. In his character, and in the character of his people, I have unlimited confidence. I believe the motives of our alliance are beyond the intrigues or the insolence of individuals; it is a principle of civilisation, and a question of high feeling, which the Government, in my mind, do not comprehend, which will continue to bind together France and England. France is an ally that does not want to be paid for the aid she gives you. She is not to be subsidised. She is a friend with whom a treaty need have no secret article.
A year ago, after the massacre of Sinope, when the Parliament met, and there were indignant demands from the Government of some explanation of their conduct, the First Lord of the Admiralty rose—and they could not trust a bad cause to a better man—and, with all his specious eloquence, came forward to the table, and told us then, "I will not defend the past; it is liable to much misconception. We may have been idle or vacillating, but we bad a great object to gain and to accomplish, and that is the alliance of the
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German Powers." The massacre of Sinope took place in order that we might obtain the alliance of the German Powers. Well, have they become our allies? I do not see that there is a treaty yet with Prussia; but Austria, we are told, has entered into a treaty from which we anticipate great advantages to the common cause. Now, I say that we should be the most spiritless body of men that ever lived, if, recollecting that a year ago an attempt was made to excuse your backslidings by the alliance with the German Powers—when we recollect that a year has elapsed, and that this treaty has not yet been brought into action—I say that we should be the most spiritless body of men on earth if we did not demand from the Government some franker explanation than we find in this niggard notice in the Speech of the Austrian Treaty. The noble Lord may say that it is not yet ratified, and that it will be laid on the table, and then we may all read it, but I can hardly believe that a man of his ability and spirit will make such a wretched excuse. I may agree with him that it is unusual, but the noble Lord should make a precedent on such an occasion, when sacrifices are demanded from the country, and should frankly inform us of the terms of this treaty.
Sir, if the assistance we are to derive be of a provisional and contingent character, I should say that, although we are ready to support Her Majesty with all the means in our power, it will be the greatest hallucination if we imagine that Austria is going to supply any of those means. I should have thought, indeed, that the noble Lord and his colleagues had had enough of the four points. If I remember right, the present Government was formed upon four points. Was not there the preservation of peace—was not there there the extension of free trade—thirdly, was there not Parliamentary Reform—and then, as the fourth point, was there not national education? It was upon these four points that the Coalition Ministry was formed; but if we are to judge by this precedent—if we are to suppose that the four points which Austria is to secure are not easier of accomplishment than the four points which the noble Lord promised us, and for which some hon. Gentleman opposite sacrificed their principles, and some only sacrificed their party—but for which the noble Lord sacrificed both—I should certainly feel that we were not entitled to receive much encourage-

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ment from this promise of the Austrian alliance. Sir, I maintain that it is the duty of the Government, on the subject of this Austrian alliance, to be frank. If they will not be frank with their opponents, whether they sit upon this side of the House or the other, I would humbly venture to say it would be wise upon the subject to be frank with the people of this country. The people of this country are not so blind to questions of this character as they were a few years ago. The people of this country are now beginning to comprehend the enormous issue at stake; and if they find that, with Parliament called together, their affairs in an unsatisfactory state, this old ghost of the Austrian alliances is again to haunt the Chamber of their representatives, as our main hope and aid, I think it is not at all unlikely that they will feel considerable disrelish at our condition, and think, therefore, it would be wise in the Government to tell us what Austria really means. I think the House of Commons ought to know whether Austria intends merely to watch the game, and profit by the first opportunity, or whether she means to employ her troops? Is she an ally in spirit and in blood, as our ally in France? Yes, England has a right to demand that from the Government which has the management of the crisis, and I suppose we shall hear to-night; for, if not, I am convinced that this meeting of Parliament, and this communication from Her Majesty, will not have the effect on the country which I, for one, earnestly desire. But if we are to have only an equivocal alliance—if we are only to have an interference that will serve but to bewilder and to mystify—if we are to negotiate when we ought to act, to stop the course of national conduct when the country, slow to enlist in questions of this kind, but when, as their blood is up, determined to accomplish their object, I say, if that is what we are to have, for me, at least, let there be no Austrian alliance—no four points, no subsidies, no secret articles—but let France and England together solve this great question, and establish and secure the liberties of Europe.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington), in a speech of remarkable ability, and, at the same time, I think, of great fairness, asked for an explanation from the servants of the Crown with respect to the circumstances upon which he entertained doubt, and with
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respect to certain points of policy that have been pursued; and he ended with saying, as I understood him, that, although he entertained those objections, it did not appear to him that they amounted to such a charge against the Government as would induce him to take part in any Motion for a change of Ministers; but that, if hereafter he did not find that those warlike operations were carried on according to what he believed to be the true policy of the country, he would himself join in any Parliamentary effort that might be made with reference to such a state of things. That declaration was in itself a satisfactory one, and with the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman I have no fault to find. But the right hon. Gentleman who has now spoken (Mr. Disraeli) has spoken in a totally different spirit. He has attempted by every means—while he, like his right hon. Friend, does not propose to displace Her Majesty's Ministers—he has attempted to weaken the confidence which the country may feel in their efforts—he has attempted to weaken the alliance between this country and France—he has thrown out every objection that can occur to his fertile mind with respect to the alliance into which we have recently entered, and he has, in short, said everything that could be calculated to damp the hope which this country, as I believe, confidently entertains of a glorious termination to the war. Sir, I cannot say, therefore—while I admire the speech of the right hon. Member for Droitwich, and especially the feeling with which he spoke of two hon. Members of this House, one of whom is now no more—I cannot say there was a single gleam of patriotism throughout the whole of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire. The right hon. Gentleman began with a most curious prologue, which seemed to me, at that late hour of the night, peculiarly unnecessary—namely, a protest in favour of liberty of speech in this House, and said it was his determination to resist any attempt by Ministers to suppress that freedom of speech, Sir, which you ask from Her Majesty at the beginning of every Session. Why, I am accused in certain not unpleasant publications of never speaking without uttering an encomium on Magna Charta, but an encomium on Magna Charta would not be more unnecessary or out of place than the eloquent protest of the right hon. Gentleman in favour of liberty of speech. But he is so indignant upon this subject be-

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cause he imagines that certain directions have been given which have not been given or thought of—but given to certain Members of this House—orders given, the right hon. Gentleman says, to the creatures of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman, who respects freedom of debate, calls a number of these Members the creatures of Government. That is not very respectful to that part of the House to which he refers. We certainly have a very great question before us, and we are engaged in a great contest. The right hon. Gentleman says that we have never conceived the true magnitude of the war. The right hon. Member for Droitwich alluded to a speech of mine last year. In this very speech of mine I find that I most distinctly recognised the importance
and magnitude of the enterprise. I said—
"It is in this mighty contest that Europe is engaged, and I should be misleading the House if I were to tell them that, when engaged in a conflict with such an enemy, with a Sovereign of immense power, of great influence, and of great talents, we may hope for an early termination of the contest." [3 Hansard, cxxxv. 611]
That shows, at all events, that I did not attempt to diminish the greatness of the contest, or induce the House to hope for a very speedy termination. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has so eloquently enlivened and unravelled the details of this subject, I will not attempt to go over the same ground; but I will touch on some of the greater points of this question before the debate is closed. In the first place, with respect to the army we have sent to the East. That army, at the request of Omar Pacha, took up a position in Varna and the neighbourhood, from which it was supposed an effort might be made to raise the siege of Silistria. But it is said that we have not shown that that army was provided with the means of transport. I can only say that the means of transport were collected, and that if the siege of Silistria had not been raised, those means would have been sufficient, and the army would have advanced, though it was by no means an easy operation at that season of the year. But is it such an easy thing at the commencement of a war to provide all the means for carrying it on? I remember the Duke of Wellington saying in private that he was obliged to leave a brigade of infantry at Lisbon for three months because he had no means of transporting it to head-quarters, although all the means of Portugal were at his command. But the hon. Member for
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Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) said, you suffered the army to land on the beach of the Crimea without any provision for them on that occasion. Would he have had Lord Raglan to have sent word the night before, that the means of transport might have awaited his arrival? With an enemy in his neighbourhood, could he have said that be intended landing at Eupatoria? Still there were means provided at Varna and its neighbourhood. But the main question is, whether such an expedition should have been undertaken. In considering that question I beg the House to consider what must have been the alternative. We had sent an army to assist Turkey; not only an English but a French army was assembled in that country, and the Danube having been recrossed by the enemy, what was the course open to us? Should we have taken the army back to Constantinople, and allowed it to remain there the rest of the summer? No; it is quite obvious such a course would have been a great disappointment to the people of this country; it would have been a great disappointment to the army itself, and the national spirit would have been shaken by taking a course which implied so great a fear of the forces of Russia. Well, then, should we order the army across the Danube to act against the Russian army? If we had done so, we should have been met by the immense forces concentrated in Bessarabia, and, therefore, no such movement could have been undertaken with any effect. There remained, therefore, the question of the expedition to the Crimea, and although there were many parties against that expedition, there were some of the ablest men both in the French army and fleet and the English army and fleet who spoke with confidence of such an expedition. I confess I was one of those who felt confidence in it. I believed it was a great risk, but I believed there was a great object to be attained; that if we destroyed that stronghold of Russian power—Sebastopol—we should be enabled to give to Turkey that security which was the great purpose of the war. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich alluded to a speech of mine, and said that in that speech I gave notice to Russia that such an expedition was to be undertaken. But the tone of that speech was entirely misapprehended. It had often been asked what was the object of the war; and I was endeavouring to point out those guarantees upon which

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Turkey, might again be enabled to resume her relations with Russia. I said that the Treaty of Adrianople could not be renewed, and that no security for peace could be had so long as Russia had a stronghold supplied with all arms, and a large fleet ready to sail with a fair wind down upon the Porte. But, Sir, with respect to the sentiments which I then uttered, I have referred to them now not merely for the purpose of showing what a wrong interpretation had been placed on them, but for the purpose of saying that what I considered to be necessary then I consider to be necessary now. believe no peace will be safe for Turkey, I believe no peace will be honourable to this country, which left Sebastopol in the same menacing position in which it had been of late years before the war. Well, if that is the case, how important it is that, by our success in the Crimea, we should attain the means of fixing these conditions. The question really was, whether an expedition should be sent against Sebastopol this year before any additional fortifications could be constructed for its defence; or whether it should be sent in some future year, when our own army might be stronger, but when not only Sebastopol, but the intrenchments of every landing place in the Crimea, would have been strengthened. I will not refer to what the right hon. Gentleman opposite said with respect to the Baltic fleet, except to say that I think the Admirals who have commanded both in the Black Sea and the Baltic have been very unfairly attacked. I believe that it would have been a great misfortune if, by an unsuccessful attack on a place like Cronstadt, which has great means of defence, we should have involved the loss of three or four of our line-of-battle ships. The panic caused by such an event would have been very injurious to us, and would have impeded the general progress of the war. Nor will I enter upon the question of reinforcements, as the subject has already been alluded to at great length by my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War. I will only say that, in the war of 1793, and in the war which followed the peace of Amiens, we were only able to send, in the first instance, 1,700 men, and in the second instance, 3,000 men, even after the war had lasted for four years. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich, and my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, referred to the treaty with Austria; I do not pretend to give the
House an accurate state-
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ment of the terms of that treaty, but I am quite ready to say what I think has been the position, and what is the position, of Austria in regard to this country. I have never been satisfied that Austria has pursued that course which her duty to Europe should have induced her to take. I think that in this case, which concerns all Europe, and with which the independence of Europe is intimately concerned, Austria, as a great European Power, ought to have earlier joined the maritime Powers. I think, besides, that Austria was more nearly affected by the question at issue, and that her danger was greater than that of England and France; but, on the other hand, a cautious Power like Austria saw that the danger to her of a war with Russia was greater than it could be to England and France. Neither England nor France had anything to fear from an invasion of their territories by Russia. No one could expect a Russian army of invasion to land in France or England; but not so with regard to Austria. Austria had got a large army in Poland, and if Gallicia had been attacked by Russia, after one or two victories the road to Vienna would have been open. The military establishment of Austria was low, and had been reduced very lately, and her first step was to increase her military force. It was only at the end of July last that her preparations were nearly completed; and I remember perfectly well at the end of the Session that I stated, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Montrose (whose absence this evening I lament)—that I said, though Austria was pledged not to make any arrangement with Russia, except on certain bases that had been laid down, she was by no means pledged to undertake a war in conjunction with the maritime Powers. She has now gone a step further, but she has not even yet gone so far as to say that, if before the end of the year peace be not made with Russia, she will become a belligerent. She has only gone this length—she has agreed that, if she should be at war with Russia, a treaty offensive and defensive should ipso facto exist between Austria, England, and France. She has likewise agreed that, before the end of the year, she will take into further consideration what steps she will be prepared to take with respect to the terms of peace with Russia. Now, I understand the meaning of that article—certainly as not containing anything very precise in itself—I understand, however,

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the meaning of that article to be that, if England and France shall propose conditions of peace which are in conformity with the four bases, and which seem to Austria to come within the terms of those bases, and if Russia shall refuse her assent to such treaty of peace, then Austria will no longer hesitate, but take part in the alliance against Russia, and that an offensive and defensive alliance will take place. I do not wish to overstate the engagement in any way; and I admit that Austria might still, at the last moment, say that the terms proposed—these four bases explained in a way I did not expect —would reduce Russia too much, and diminish too greatly her weight in Europe, and that she could never be expected to agree to them. Such might be her language. She leaves herself at liberty to say this without any breach of faith, and one of the last things I should wish to do would he to impute to Austria a breach of faith if ultimately she did not form part of the alliance; but my explanation is that she does concur with us in respect to the bases that are absolutely necessary for the security of Turkey; and that if Russia does not consent to a treaty of peace founded on those bases, then that in the next campaign the forces of Austria will be joined with those of England and France. It may be said that we should have gone further and have got better terms. It is easy to say that these are terms which should not have been accepted; but we could not force terms on an independent Power; and it is better to have such a treaty with Austria rather than leave Austria unconnected with us and without any ties to bind her to us. That was the belief of Her Majesty's Government, and still more strongly the persuasion of the Government of the Emperor of the French—that it was wise to enter upon these engagements, such as they were, and that the success of the war was thereby promoted. I have always thought it was much to be lamented that Austria should be so tardy, and Russia had been enabled to despatch a part of her troops on the Danube to the Crimea, which placed our gallant troops there at so great a disadvantage. I would agree with much of what the hon. Member for Aylesbury has said with respect to three of the conditions, but that I never have been able to get anybody to tell me how we are to effect our object except by a long and protracted war. I cannot see how the Emperor of Russia, being of the same religious com-
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munion as 11,000,000 of the subjects of the Sultan, and having their sympathy, how he is ever to be prevented from having a considerable influence over those subjects. I believe we may limit that influence, and prevent his having the power which the Menchikoff note proposed he should have. I believe by uniting the other Powers in a general guarantee, and accepting from the Sultan, instead of a treaty with Russia, a general declaration in favour of his Christian subjects, we may deprive Russia of her protectorate. But I do not believe that any articles that could be framed could entirely deprive Russia, in time of peace, of the influence I have mentioned. If that be the case, so much more necessary is it that we should not allow to Russia the means of invading or conquering Turkey. This appeared to me, in July last, to be the essential terms of peace, and I have not altered my opinion. I was sorry to hear my hon. Friend speak of the battle of Inkerman as a "fatal battle." Now, my belief is, that though the losses were heavy, and though the nation has great reason to deplore those losses, and although many families will spend the approaching season in affliction who might have hoped to pass it in joy and comfort, yet that, for a great national object, the victory has not been thrown away. The bravery, the unflinching valour, which were displayed upon the heights of Inkerman, will teach the nations of Europe to respect our character and the military prowess which we have shown, and it is as likely as almost any event that could be named to bring about the conclusion of an honourable peace. Deeds like these, you may depend upon it, though not followed by the rout of an enemy, or accompanied with the gain of a large territory, or the surrender of a fortress, will be fruitful of consequences. They maintain the character of the nation by whose soldiers they are achieved. While this country has such deeds of heroism to boast of, you may depend upon it that the mightiest nations of Europe will dread our enmity, and be anxious to secure our friendship. With this persuasion, I shall, on a future occasion, ask the House to vote its thanks to those gallant men, and to our gallant allies, the French army, who fought by the side of our troops at Alma and Inkerman, and assisted them to defeat the enemy. With such an alliance, with such prudent conduct in regard to other Powers, and with the determination in this country, which I believe is

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strong, that the war in which Her Majesty is at present engaged must be brought to a just, and honourable, and glorious termination, I feel full of hope for the result of the contest.
Question put, and agreed to.
Committee appointed, "to draw up an Address, to be presented to Her Majesty upon the said Resolution:"—Mr. Henry Herbert, Mr. Leveson Gower, Lord John Russell, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Viscount Palmerston, Sir George Grey, Sir James Graham, Sir Charles Wood, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Sir William Molesworth, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir John Young, Mr. Cardwell, The Judge Advocate, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Hayter, and Mr. Bouverie, or any Five of them:—Queen's Speech referred.
Adjourned at half after Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—la Select Vestries; Enlistment of Foreigners.

MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT.
THE PARLIAMENT,which had been prorogued successively from the 12th August to the 19th October, to the 16th November and to the 14th December, having been summoned by Proclamation to meet on the 12th December, met this day accordingly.
The Session of the Parliament was opened by The QUEEN in Person.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.
THE QUEEN,being seated on the Throne, and the Commons being at the Bar, with their Speaker, HER MAJESTY was pleased to make a most gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament, as follows:—
"My Lords, and Gentlemen,
"I HAVE called you together at this unusual Period of the Year, in order that by your Assistance I may take such Measures as will enable Me to
2
prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost Vigour and Effect.
"THIS Assistance I know will be readily given; for I cannot doubt that you share My Conviction of the Necessity of sparing no Effort to augment My Forces now engaged in the Crimea. The Exertions they have made, and the Victories they have obtained, are not exceeded in the brightest Pages of our History, and have filled Me with Admiration and Gratitude.
"THE hearty and efficient Co-operation of the brave Troops of My Ally The Emperor of the French, and the Glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the Union which happily subsists between the Two Nations.
"IT is with Satisfaction I inform you, that, together with The Emperor of the French, I have concluded a Treaty of Alliance with The Emperor of Aus-

3
tria, from which I anticipate important Advantages to the common Cause.
"I HAVE also concluded a Treaty with the United States of America, by which Subjects of long and difficult Discussion have been equitably adjusted.
"THESE Treaties will be laid before you.
"ALTHOUGH the Prosecution of the War will naturally engage your chief Attention, I trust that other Matters of great Interest and Importance to the general Welfare will not be neglected.
"I REJOICE to observe that the general Prosperity of My Subjects remains uninterrupted.
"THE State of the Revenue affords Me entire Satisfaction; and I trust that by your Wisdom and Prudence you will continue to promote the Progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures.
"Gentlemen of the House of Commons,
"IN the Estimates which will be presented to you I trust you will find that ample Provision has been made for the Exigencies of the Public Service.
"My Lords, and Gentlemen,
"I RELY with Confidence on your Patriotism and public Spirit. I feel assured that in the momentous Contest in which we are engaged you will exhibit to the World the Example of a united People. Thus shall we obtain the Respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the Blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful Termination."
HER MAJESTY then retired.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH.
THE QUEEN'S Speech having been reported by the LORD CHANCELLOR,
THE DUKE OF LEEDSrose to propose that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, in answer to the most gracious Speech they had just heard. His Grace said, that he felt deeply the importance of the duty he had to perform at such a time as this, and, little accustomed as he was to address their Lordships, he trusted to their indulgence on this occasion. In the first place, Her Majesty informed them that Parliament was summoned at this unusual period of the year in order, that by their assistance, She might be enabled to take measures for the prosecution, with vigour and effect, of the great war in which this country was now engaged, and She expressed her firm confidence that that assistance would be readily given, for there could be no doubt how of the necessity of sparing no efforts to augment the forces now engaged in the Crimea. He was sure that Parliament and the country would, with one voice, one heart, one soul, respond to Her Majesty's appeal, and that whatever supplies of money, men, or arms, the exigencies of this war, with its attendant expenditure, might require, they would be granted at once, and with no sparing or niggard hand. This would be done, well knowing that, as it had been well said, England could never afford to wage a little war, and that the more vigorously the war was carried on, the sooner might we hope to arrive at its result—a permanent and honourable peace. Her Majesty told them—
"The hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of my ally the Emperor of the French, and the glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the union which happily subsists between the two nations."
Her Majesty next said—
"It is with satisfaction I inform you that, together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded a treaty of alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause."
And next that She had—
"concluded a treaty with the United States by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted."
This latter agreement, he trusted, would strengthen the bonds which united two nations having one permanent interest and being of one common race. But, with reference to the alliance which Her Majesty and the Emperor of France had jointly

5
concluded with the Emperor of Austria, we might well rejoice that the righteousness and justice of the cause in which we were embarked was thus bringing a great Power like Austria over to our side, notwithstanding the ties of long and firm alliance which had previously existed between her and that other Emperor, with whom we are unhappily at war. This approach, on the part of Austria, to the views and policy of our own country and France, afforded the surest—he might say the only—chance of restoring to the world the blessings of tranquillity and peace. To that great nation, with which we were now so closely, and, he trusted, indissolubly united—to whose hearty and efficient co-operation with its brave troops we owed so much—matchless sharer in all those victories which would for ever shed imperishable glory upon our united arms—honour be to that great nation, and to that great man who has been called to rule her destinies, whose great sagacity and true patriotism have convinced him that the close and intimate alliance of France with England; afforded the best security for the future peace of the world. Her Majesty, in alluding to the splendid actions of our soldiers in the Crimea, said that the exertions they have made, and the victories they have obtained, have not been exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, and had filled her with admiration and gratitude. He need but refer to the brave deeds by which our gallant Army and Navy, with those of our ally, would be immortalised. He thought, indeed, that history could afford no equal example to that of the daring valour with which the almost impregnable position of the enemy on the heights of the Alma, strengthened by every means that art as well as nature could provide, was assailed and taken. And where could we find any parallel to that desperate and headlong charge of our scanty force of cavalry at Balaklava? Where could we find a parallel, he repeated, to that resolute and indomitable valour with which our handful of brave men, attacked unexpectedly under cover of darkness and mist, fought at Inkerman, hand to hand, foot to foot, bayonet to bayonet, for hours against the overwhelming masses of a resolute and barbarous enemy? They fought, until our brave Allies, with their fiery and effectual charge, came to our assistance, and, by their force, united with our own, drove the assailants back to the shelter of their batteries. Alas! these
6
engagements had been not only most glorious, but they had been most fatal; and many of their Lordships' House, and many a family throughout this realm of Britain, were left to deplore the loss of some near and dear relative. In their sorrow all must sympathise; but it would be some consolation to the bereaved, and they might find some comfort in the reflection, that their relatives had met a glorious death, fighting for their Queen, for Europe, and for freedom's cause. Their names shall ever be immortal in the roll of fame; all honour to the brave survivors a grateful country will not fail to pay. He was quite unable to do justice to all their deeds of heroism. From their commander—the brave companion in arms of the illustrious Wellington—the leader whose daring genius planned and executed that unrivalled movement, after the victory of the Alma, by which our armies were enabled to take up a commodious and impregnable position on the most assailable side of the fortress, had shown his generalship to be worthy of the incidents of his earlier career; and that illustrious Royal Duke, who had shown that he possessed all the skill and coolness of a great commander, with all the hereditary valour of his illustrious race—from officers of every degree, and of every military rank from highest to lowest, down to the toil-worn private sentinel, one and all had shown that "every man" had "done his duty." England still owned sons who would continue to make her name honoured and respected to the ends of the earth. And, while the Army had done all this, honour was also due to the nation, for never had there been a time when the unanimous spirit of the people was expressed with higher enthusiasm, or with a stronger sense of the justice of our cause, than the spirit which now pervaded all ranks and classes of society throughout this realm. The ranks of labour contributed their means, and day by day we saw a multitude of recruits leaving their homes and ordinary occupations to uphold our standard and to fill our camp. We saw, day by day, large contributions of money, intended not only to afford relief to the widows and children of those who fell in the war, but to afford comfort to the sick and wounded, and succour to the worn-out men of the army, whose strength was broken by their toil. All ranks, too, had united to give to the struggling soldier the comforting assurance, in the hour of trial and danger, that whatever fate befell them-

7
selves, their wives and their children would be provided for at home. To secure this, a fund had been raised by voluntary offerings which exceeded by far any similar contribution that had ever been made. And here we owe a tribute of grateful feeling to that fine Colony across the broad Atlantic, whose people, loyal, true, and brave, have so nobly come forward to assist with their contributions the fund provided for the relief of the widows and orphans of the bravo defenders of their parent country. What esteem and gratitude do we not owe to those excellent and pious women—not only those who from holy and religious feelings devote their lives to attending and comforting the sick, but to those who, leaving all the comforts of friends and home, have freely offered their services of mercy to encounter all the drudgery of the hospitals in its most hideous form—honour, my Lords, all honour be to those angelic women, those blessed ministers of mercy, whose gentle and tender care would visit the disabled soldier, and soothe him upon his cheerless couch of pain! And now, in conclusion, let him express a hope that ere long success might crown our efforts, and that, by the blessing of Divine Providence, peace might soon again resume its wonted sway, and the gentler arts of commerce and industry, so roughly interrupted by the rude voice of war, might again flourish; and, above all, he hoped that with returning peace the blessed light of Christianity might spread its benign influence through those fine regions where it was as yet unknown, or known only to be despised. Then, indeed, glorious would have been the cause for which such great calamities had been endured, and for which our bravest and our best had bled. His Grace concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in answer to Her Gracious Speech from the Throne."
The following is a copy of the Address agreed to—
"MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,
"We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to convey to Your Majesty our humble Thanks for Your Majesty's most Gracious Speech from the Throne.
"We humbly Thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Your Majesty has called us together at this unusual Period of the Year, in order that by our Assistance Your Majesty may take such
8
Measures as will enable Your Majesty to prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost Vigour and Effect.
"We assure Your Majesty that this Assistance will be readily given, and that we fully agree with Your Majesty in the necessity of sparing no Effort to augment Your Majesty's Forces now engaged in the Crimea; while we rejoice to learn that the Exertions they have made, and the Victories they have obtained, which are not exceeded in the brightest Pages of our History, have filled Your Majesty with Admiration and Gratitude.
"We participate in the Conviction expressed by Your Majesty, that the hearty and efficient Co-operation of the brave Troops of Your Majesty's Ally The Emperor of the French, and the Glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the Union which happily subsists between the Two Nations.
"We learn with Satisfaction that, together with the Emperor of the French, Your Majesty has concluded an Alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which Your Majesty anticipates important advantages to the common Cause.
"We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Your Majesty has also concluded a Treaty with the United States of America, by which Subjects of long and difficult Discussion have been equitably adjusted.
"We thank Your Majesty for the Announcement that these Treaties will be laid before us.
"We humbly concur in the hope expressed by Your Majesty, that although the Prosecution of the War will naturally engage our chief Attention, yet that other Matters of great Interest and Importance to the general Welfare will not be neglected.
"We rejoice to learn that the general Prosperity of Your Majesty's Subjects remains uninterrupted, and that the State of the Revenue affords Your Majesty entire Satisfaction; while we humbly beg to assure Your Majesty of our Desire to continue to promote the Progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures.
"We humbly thank Your Majesty for the Confidence with which Your Majesty relies on our Patriotism and Public Spirit, and for the Conviction expressed by Your Majesty, that in the momentous Contest in which we are engaged we shall exhibit to the World the example of a united People; and we share Your Majesty's Opinion, that we shall thus obtain the Respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the Blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful termination."
LORD ASHBURTON: My Lords, on rising to second the Address to Her Majesty which has just been read, I cannot but express my regret that the sudden illness of a noble Earl lately called up to your Lordships' House should have deprived your Lordships of that attractive interest with which his recognised talents and original turn of mind would have invested this hackneyed task. I shall, however, do my best to follow the able and comprehensive speech of the noble Duke. Absorbed by the fearful interest of the war, he has scarcely alluded to the solution, by treaty, of our long-pending differences with America, a solution which will be hailed with joy wherever the English language is spoken, a solution which gives evidence of the wisdom of the rulers of the two countries who are now, as they have I been under former auspices, ready to submit to the decisions of reason rather than appeal to the vengeance of the sword.
The Address which I have the honour to second, pledges your Lordships to no opinion upon this subject, nor, indeed, upon the subject of the other communications made in the speech, but it does pledge you to a solemn engagement with regard to the future conduct of the war in answer to the solemn appeal which fell so impressively this morning from the lips of Her Majesty.
I believe if the question had then been put at once, there would have been an answer, as plain, as simple, as unanimous, as enthusiastic, as the response to Maria Theresa from the magnates of Hungary. Never, perhaps, at any period of our history has unanimity been more important to the vital interests of the country than it is at the present moment. It is desirable even as regards the enemy with whom we are engaged in arms.
Let us leave him no hope that, from internal dissensions, from hesitation of purpose, from doubt or distrust of the justice of our cause, we may fail to push hostilities with all our heart, and soul, and strength, without stint of men, without stint of expenditure, until we shall have obtained a righteous settlement of our claims. It is due to our faithful and gallant allies, the French people, the unflinching partners of our dangers and of our glory—it is due to the straightforward loyalty of their Emperor—it is due still more to our new allies, the Austrians, in proportion to the magnitude of the peril which they encounter in our
10
united cause. We venture at most 30,000 men, landed on the extreme south of the Russian dominions. They are attended by a fleet in which they may be withdrawn in case of reverses. The Austrians, on their part, venture not 30,000, but 300,000 men, exposed along their whole eastern frontier to the masses of the enemy. To them there is no retreat, no security, but in victory. It is due to our brave army that lavishes its blood, performing deeds worthy of the most heroic times of chivalry; it is due lastly to the desires and demands—it is due to the example of the entire people of Great Britain, who, setting aside party differences and religious animosities, are ready to devote their lives, their fortunes, to the success of this contest, which your Lordships by your decision this night may either greatly imperil or greatly promote.
Never, perhaps, has been seen such a concurrence of noble feelings in the prosecution of a noble cause. No sex, no age, no station, has been backward in sacrifices. The old have brought their contributions, the young have enlisted, pauper school-children subscribe their mite; noble women, nurtured in luxury, have deserted their homes, their all, to attend hospitals in a barbarous land; the very criminals entreat to be allowed to starve themselves, that the widow and the orphan of the soldier may be fed.
Excuse me, my Lords, if I may, for a moment, have seemed to urge these facts as if you alone in the midst of a united people were inaccessible to the same generous influences. I have stated them because I deemed it would be grateful to you to meditate, as it is grateful to every generous mind to expatiate on whatever is great and good in the conduct of those whom he loves and prizes as his countrymen. It is with perfect security that I leave this question in your Lordships' hands. You will not exhibit this night to the world the example of disunion in this the most august assembly of the realm.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, Her Majesty has called us together at an unusual period of the year to deliberate upon subjects of the highest and gravest importance, not to this country alone, but also to Europe and the world; and if, under these circumstances, it had been my duty to raise any objection or any cavil to the terms of the proposed Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne—if it

11
had been my intention to propose any Amendment, or to enter into any controversy—I should undoubtedly have preferred that some of Her Majesty's Ministers should have first had the opportunity of stating fully their views and of explaining the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government, in order that I might have had the advantage of referring to their statements. But, my Lords, upon the present occasion I have no such intention; for, under existing circumstances, even were the Speech from the Throne open to greater objections than, I am happy to say, I consider it to be, I should think it my duty to abstain from moving any Amendment, or adopting any step calculated to interrupt the general unanimity of the House. I have thought it more becoming and more convenient, honoured as I am by the confidence of a large number of Members of your Lordships' House, that I should take the earliest opportunity of declaring, on the part of the great Conservative body of this country, the view which they take, and the course which they are prepared to pursue, at this momentous crisis. Both my noble Friend who moved and my noble Friend who seconded the Address, have, so far as my friends are concerned, done us but scant justice in supposing the impossibility that, upon such an occasion as the present, there should be anything but unanimous agreement. The present is no time for discussing whether the war might or might not have been avoided. This is no time for considering whether, by a different course of proceeding, Her Majesty's Ministers might have effected the objects they had in view, without involving the country in the dangers and calamities of war. In that war we are now, as a nation, fairly embarked; in that war the nation, as one man, sympathises with the Crown and with the Government; in the prosecution of that war the nation, as one man, is pressing forward with a unanimity of feeling and an abnegation of every selfish consideration which are almost unparalleled in the history of our country; and I may truly say, that in the prosecution of this contest it is not the Government who are appealing to the country, but it is the country that is urging upon the Government the prosecution of the war with vigour. My Lords, I rejoice at the altered tone of the present Speech from the Throne as compared with the Speech prepared by the Ministers for the opening of the last Session. I rejoice that at last the gravity of the circum-
12
stances has forced itself upon the mind of the Government; that even the noble Earl at the head of the Government—that médecin malgré lui—appears to see that there is no course now to be taken but that which is the most direct—the safest and the most honourable because the boldest—and the most consistent with the principles of justice. At the opening of the last Session of Parliament, I confess it was with surprise that I heard in the Speech which Her Majesty had been advised by Her present counsellors to deliver to Parliament, to see how little the Government anticipated the probable, nay, almost the certain, war which was impending, and how calmly and deliberately they talked about the various measures of internal improvement, or the various measures of internal innovation, which were to be introduced and carried through both Houses of Parliament during the Session. I remember that at that time the noble President of the Council, in bringing forward one of the suggested measures, and one not the least important—a projected reform in the constitution of Parliament—stated that a war with Russia need not be considered as a matter of such importance as to interfere with the ordinary deliberations of Parliament. Nay, more, the noble Lord said that he thought the period at which we were entering upon war with Russia was the period of all others to select for the amendment of the constitution of Parliament, and that it would be a splendid moral spectacle for Europe and the world to see that we considered a war with Russia as a matter of such trivial and unimportant concern that we hardly gave a side glance at the war, but turned our main attention to the arrangement of our own internal affairs, and, among others, to the revision of our Parliamentary system. Various other measures suggested in the Speech from the Throne were either brought forward or promised. Peace we were told to look forward to, and meanwhile the Government were drifting towards war. That, my Lords, was the expression of a Member of the Government. But while the Government was felt to be drifting towards war, there was no end to the promise of measures which were to be brought under the consideration of Parliament. Votes were to be taken for the war; some thousands of men were to be sent to the East, and great expectations were held out of the marvellous successes to be achieved. Now, my Lords, I rejoice greatly in the altered tone of the present Speech

13
from the Throne. The promises of last year failed. Those promises produced no fruit. Of all the great measures which were proposed, hardly one—if one—was eventually carried. The Government were compelled to abandon the whole of them in consequence of the universal conviction that the war with Russia—the probability and almost the certainty of which was denied by the Government—was the one event upon which the hearts, the minds, and the feelings of the whole country were set, and was the subject which alone deserved serious and important attention. Now, forgive me for saying that a tone more worthy of the occasion pervades the present Speech from the Throne. My Lords, it recognises this as a great and important occasion. It recognises the war in which we are engaged as a great contest, calling for the united efforts of the whole country, and requiring that it should task its energies to the utmost. Her Majesty, devoting almost the whole of Her address to Parliament to that single and engrossing topic, expresses a confidence, which is not misplaced, that towards the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war no efforts on the part of the people, no energy on the part of Parliament, no sacrifice on the part of the country will be felt too great in order to support Her Majesty in the most just and honourable course which she is pursuing.
My Lords, before I proceed to comment upon any portion of the Speech relative to that absorbing topic, I will in a very few words, pass over the few other subjects to which the Speech refers. Of course, it must be a matter of sincere rejoicing to all to be informed, upon the authority of the Speech from the Throne, that the state of the revenue is highly satisfactory, and that the general prosperity of the country is uninterrupted. Undoubtedly, so far as the agricultural interest is concerned, the blessing of Providence, which has given us a bountiful and abundant harvest, combined—by a curious and unprecedented coincidence under such circumstances—with a range of prices higher than were ever known under any similar circumstances, has added to the means of those directly interested in the land, and has placed them in a position of greatly increased prosperity. I hope, my Lords, that the same may be the case with other branches of commerce. I learn with satisfaction that it is so from Her Majesty's Speech. But I confess that, unless I am mistaken, the
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present prosperity of some of the manufacturing districts is not such as to be made a subject of congratulation in the Speech from the Throne. It may be that there is a fair amount of business doing, and that a fair amount of profit is realised; but this I know, that in Manchester, and in some of the manufacturing districts in that part of the country, a number of mills are working short time, and a considerable number have stopped altogether. There is at this period less demand than I ever recollect for land for building purposes; and certainly, though I do not pretend to say—for I am thankful that it is not the case—that any great and extensive distress prevails, I should hadly have thought that our manufacturing prosperity at this moment was such as to demand peculiar notice in the Royal Speech. I may add that, for the first time for a long period, considerable facilities have been afforded for recruiting Her Majesty's military forces in Manchester and the adjoining towns, arising partly from the general stimilus which has been given to the feelings of the country on the subject of the war, but in some measure, doubtless, from a considerable number of hands being unemployed.
Her Majesty informs us that she has concluded a treaty with the United States of America, by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted. It must, of course, be a matter of satisfaction for us to know that any subjects of difference—and especially of longstanding difference—with a community connected with us by the ties of blood, of language, and, in a great measure, of laws, and with whom, upon all occasions, I trust it will be the desire, as I am sure it is the interest, of this country to keep up the most close and intimate connections, have been adjusted. That treaty will be laid before your Lordships, and until it is before us it would be improper for me to pronounce any opinion upon its merits, or as to how far it deserves the character given of it by the advisers of the Crown.
My Lords, the other subjects which are to occupy the attention of Parliament in the course of the present Session—the species of "et cœtera," which is substituted for the magniloquent promises held forth in former Speeches—are included in a very modest paragraph, which expresses a hope that, "amid the pressure of War, other matters of great interest and importance to the general welfare will not be neglect-

15
ed." We have not received, either from Her Majesty's Government or from the Mover or Seconder of the Address, any intimation of the character of those various important measures. They are perhaps in the secret knowledge of the Cabinet; or, for ought I know, they may be hidden from the discernment and knowledge of the Cabinet itself. Upon this topic we may safely express our most cordial concurrence in Her Majesty's Speech; for I am confident that whenever "any matters of great interest and importance" are introduced by Her Majesty's Government, they will receive due consideration. That is a sentiment upon which there can be no difference of opinion.
Now, my Lords, having touched upon those questions mentioned in the Royal Speech which have no reference to the war, I proceed to that much more important and all-engrossing topic to which the greater portion of the Speech from the Throne is devoted. And, in the first place, I must be permitted to express my cordial concurrence in the language which is now in the Speech with regard to the hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of our ally the Emperor of the French, and in the hope which Her Majesty entertains, as well as in the conviction which She expresses, that common dangers, common perils, common glories, and common interests, may cement more strongly the alliance which happily subsists between the two countries. My satisfaction at this recognition on the part of Her Majesty is increased by the knowledge that its importance is also recognised by Ministers, who not very long ago entertained very different views. I rejoice to think that that passage in Her Majesty's Speech has been fully concurred in by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty and by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control. I rejoice also that the noble Earl at the head of the Government can feel and can acknowledge that there is a great important advantage to be derived from an intimate alliance between this country and France, although the destiny of France may not be swayed by the House of Orleans. The Royal Speech refers to the gallant and cordial co-operation and the - entire harmony which have prevailed between the troops of our ally and those of our own army, as well as to their heroic achievements. Private and public accounts concur in showing us that two nations, which for
16
many years have been accustomed to regard one another with feelings of enmity, have not only laid aside altogether those feelings of enmity, but, side by side, are rivals in glory and brothers in arms on fields similar to those where they formerly encountered one another as foes, breast to breast, and hand to hand. As upon those occasions former experience led each to respect the valour of the other, so present experience leads them to regard each other as brothers in arms, engaged in a rivalry without jealousy, in the accomplishment of a common object, each doing honour to the courage and bravery of the other, and animated by a common feeling of glory. Words must fail to express the debt of gratitude which this country owes to those gallant and devoted men; but doubtless comfort and satisfaction will be carried to many a gallant heart when the assembled Parliament of England record their admiration of the deeds and their gratitude for the services of our gallant troops. My Lords, when I remember that, of that numerically small army which was sent out from this country a few months ago, probably not one in 100 of the privates, and probably not one in ten of the officers, had ever before heard a shot fired in anger; when I remember that they went forth, at the first outset of their campaign, to pine away in inaction, and that their ranks were thinned by disease—morally depressing, if anything could depress, their indomitable courage—when I remember that an army composed of such materials, so weakened, so dispirited, was led to invade the dominions of a powerful enemy; when I remember that they were led forth with the most scanty equipments, having with them nothing but what was absolutely necessary for their march, and hardly sufficient for their due provision and sustenance; when I remember that such a body of men, under such circumstances, found themselves in front of a force numerically superior, entrenched upon heights, fortified with all the skill and all the power which the might and military genius of Russia could supply, and fortified upon ground the natural difficulties of which were such as to impede even an active and unincumbered man in the ascent, although not checked by the enemy; when I remember that these heights were bristling with batteries, from which shot and shell were poured which mowed down the ranks of our men as they ascended that glorious but blood-stained hill; when I remember, too, that in the face of num-

17
bers not inferior to their own, against all the difficulties of position, against all the opposition of the most powerful artillery, they advanced, weakened in numbers, falling by scores, but the survivors closing their ranks and pressing forward with indomitable courage; when, under these circumstances, hand in hand, that body of men, who had never before heard a shot fired, repulsed a veteran army from a position so fortified, that it had been the boast of Russia that no army could dislodge them in less than three weeks, while this great success was achieved by our raw army in the course of three hours; when we remember that within a fortnight afterwards, the position of our men being changed, they being the besieged instead of the besiegers, they were assailed by an army seven times their number; when we recollect that—although no doubt having some advantage of position—our troops were called to the conflict from successive and continuous labour at the intrenchments, suffering from cold, from privation, from hunger, in some cases from all but nakedness; when we remember that they were placed under the disadvantage of a surprise in the darkness of a foggy morning; when I find that these men, who won the heights of Alma in the course of three hours from a numerically superior army, resisted the assault of an army seven times stronger than themselves, and for eight hours maintained the unequal contest, sometimes even without ammunition, our troops, reinforced and supported by a portion of their gallant allies, maintained their position on these blood-stained heights; when I remember these deeds of arms—aye, and even the unfortunate but astounding charge made by our gallant cavalry—I say that no words can do justice to the merits of such brave and heroic soldiers. I say that when we read the history of this campaign—when we read it, not as politicians, but as men and as Englishmen—there cannot be a heart that does not throb with honest and generous pride that these much-enduring, all-daring, all-achieving men were our countrymen; that they were British subjects like ourselves; and there is hardly an eye from which a tear will not spring unbidden when we reflect that so many of them are numbered with the dead. My Lords, I will not dwell further on the subject, on the glory that has been achieved, upon the sacrifices they have made, or the sufferings they have endured. Their country will remember them. Their country will know how to value those who
18
still remain; and, whatever may be the honours and rewards by which this country can show its gratitude to those who, in such unequalled circumstances, and under such serious difficulties, maintained, upheld, increased the glory of the British flag, those honours and those rewards will certainly be granted with no nigged hand, but with universal approbation, and with the cordial consent of a grateful country. While I am speaking of honours to be conferred upon our own gallant officers and men, I know not whether I am going beyond the limits of Parliamentary licence, and trenching upon that which is the prerogative of the Crown, if, while speaking of the honours to be conferred upon our own gallant officers—I know not, I say, whether I am trenching upon the prerogative of the Crown—but this I know that at the head of the army of our ally there is a General who has acted with ours in the most cordial and uninterrupted harmony, by whose advice we have benefited, by whose assistance we have largely profited—I know not whether I am making a suggestion which I ought not to make, when I say I am satisfied that nothing could be more grateful to the feelings of the British army and of the country at large—nothing, I think, would be more due to the gallantry and cordiality with which the whole of the French forces have supported ours throughout this great contest, than, if it were possible, to confer upon General Canrobert some mark of military honour.
I have now attempted to do justice to my own feelings with regard to the merits of this gallant army, and with regard to the sacrifices and privations which it has had to contend with. I wish, my Lords, that I could here close the observations I have to make; and I hope it may not be considered inconsistent with the determination with which I started of endeavouring not to disturb the unanimity of your Lordships, when I say that it will be necessary for me to comment to a certain extent upon what appear to have been some of the shortcomings of the Government in the mode in which they have conducted the war. My object, however, is not so much to revert to the past as to ensure attention for the future. I am deeply sensible, my Lords, of the responsibility attaching to every man who upon this subject utters an opinion, and I am most especially anxious that not a word should fall from me which might savour of exaggeration with respect to our apparent losses and the difficulties which

19
our army has had to overcome. I am also anxious that not a word should fall from me which could give the slightest encouragement to that powerful adversary against whom we are at war, and against whom we are determined to contend to the utmost of our power, even to our last man and our last shilling. Nor do I intend to cavil at those minor details in which a better and more effective arrangement might have been made, though I must be permitted to say that when Her Majesty's Government, in order to ensure the more effectual carrying on of the war, received the assistance of an additional Secretary of State, relieved from the charge of any other department, and charged alone with the superintendence of the war, we might have expected that greater attention would have been paid to these minor details, that there would have been less omissions, and that better provisions would have been made for carrying on the war than in any former war in which this country has ever been engaged. But, my Lords, I am well aware that there must be omissions in carrying on any service of so extensive a character, and I am not disposed to cavil at minor details, or to enter into discussion upon this or that matter in which I think a better arrangement might have been made. My complaint against the Government is this—that they have from the commencement, and before the commencement of war, lived, as it were, from hand to mouth; that they have never anticipated in due time the contingencies of the struggle in which they were about to engage, that they never considered the greatness of the undertaking upon which they were entering, and that they never made adequate and timely provision to meet, not the contingent exigencies of the day, but those exigencies which the fortune of war rendered inevitable. I have always understood that one of the first maxims of war is to leave as little as possible to chance—to be prepared against every possible contingency, and to make those preparations—extravagant if you will—but certainly on such a scale as to prevent anything going wrong, which might have the effect of deranging the whole plan. I cannot but entertain a doubt, however—knowing the unwillingness and reluctance with which Her Majesty's Government permitted themselves to be dragged into the war—I cannot but entertain a doubt whether they had among them those who were capable and disposed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of
20
the great and important interests involved in this war, and of its mighty consequences and requirements, or that, if there was such a man, he was not able to impress the reflections of his own mind upon those of his colleagues. From the very first to the very last, there has been apparent in the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government a want of previous preparation—a total want of prescience; and they have appeared to live from day to day providing for each successive exigency after it arose, and not before it arose. "Too late" have been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct of Her Majesty's Government in the course of the war. We were "too late" in our declaration of war. We were "too late" in deciding that the passage of the Pruth was a casus belli in the first instance. We were "too late" in sending our troops to the Black Sea, and we were too complaisant to the Emperor of Russia, who thanked us for refusing to act in concert with our French allies and send a fleet into the Black Sea at a time when the French thought it desirable. Our co-operation then would have been of immense importance, and our noncompliance, which extorted thanks from the Emperor of Russia, controlled to a great extent the action of our allies. We were "too late," my Lords, in declaring the war, we were "too late" in entering the Black Sea, and we allowed the massacre of Sinope to take place. At that time the Turks were under the pledge of protection from this country, but in the teeth of a powerful armament Sinope was taken and destroyed; the Turkish fleet was destroyed in its own waters, and we were standing idly by, not at Sinope, but in the Black Sea; and, for the purpose of co-operation, were either powerless or unwilling to interfere in time. And, my Lords, when we did go to war, what was the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government? It was thought fit—I know not for what reason—but it was thought fit, in the year 1854, to bring forward a financial Budget at an unusual period—the 6th of March. On the 6th of March the financial Budget was brought forward; and, though war was not declared until the 27th or 28th of March, it was proposed to take an increase of something like 10,000 men in the Army, and I think a small increase was to be taken in the Navy. And what was the calculation the Chancellor of the Exchequer made for the probable additional expense to be incurred in consequence of

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the war? The calculation was 1,250,000 l., being an expense of 50 l. for the transport of 25,000 troops. And where? To meet the Russians? To defend Constantinople? No; but to take them to Malta and to bring them back again. This was the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—namely, that the intention of the British Government was to ask Parliament for the means only of sending 25,000 men to Malta and back again, and for such an object the income tax was to be doubled for half a year. These were the provisions made upon the 6th of March, in reference to which, when proposed in the House of Commons, it was said—" When Russia sees these preparations she will indeed be aware of the energy and determination, the vigour and decision with which this country is about to carry on the war." Why, my Lords, when the Emperor of Russia read that declaration, he could but come to one of two conclusions, either that the British Government were gulling Parliament and imposing upon British credulity, or that they were not really in earnest. These 25,000 men might go to Malta and back again; but as to interfering with any of the military operations of Russia, that was impossible. Now, my Lords, what was the force which we sent out? One remembers—and remembers with mingled feelings of satisfaction and regret—the mustering of those gallant men, the élite of the British army, from 25,000 to 30,000 strong, who were sent from this country, and with regard to whom the Government took the greatest possible credit for the unparalleled exertions they had made in sending out in the course of so short a time—namely, in the months of March, April, May, and to the beginning of June—so numerous a force. I do not deny the exertions of the Government, and I do not deny that during those three months the utmost activity prevailed in every department; but is the sending out of an army of 30,000 men from a country like this an achievement to be looked upon with national pride? I do not deny the activity which prevailed during two or three months, but why was not that activity anticipated by two or three months? What did you do? You sent out from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and, having done that, you folded your hands and said, "We have done all that is necessary." You exhausted every available means to send out these 25,000 or 30,000 men, and you then had to depend
22
upon a raw militia and to your recruiting power for making a slight increase to the army. And when you sent out these men in conjunction with the French army, did you suppose that neither disease, nor the sword, nor casualties would have the slightest impression upon that small force of 25,000? If such misfortunes were to occur, where was a body of men to come from to reinforce them? Where were your Mediterranean garrisons? Why were they not increased beyond their ordinary and very insufficient strength? And where was your second army of reserve? Where were your reinforcements? You had them not. You had nothing in the shape of an army of reserve except the reserves you had in England, which were unavailable in case of disaster, and consequently you launched forth your army to depend upon its own resources without sufficient provision being made for them, or due foresight exercised upon the part of the British Government. Perhaps it may be said—though that would be no answer to the question—that the object for which the troops were sent out was the defence of Constantinople and the support of the army of Omar Pacha, in preventing the Russians from penetrating further into the Principalities. Setting aside the very subordinate condition in which that hypothesis places the British army, I say that, from the first, that was not the declaration of the British Government of the intention and object of the war. Nor was it possible for the war to be limited to such an object. I remember that on the 19th of June, in answer to my noble and learned Friend, who is not now in his place (Lord Lyndhurst), the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) opportunely declared, as he had declared before, that the object of the war was not merely to afford protection to Constantinople, but to settle at once and for ever that question of Russian supremacy which had been growing in importance for years, not to say centuries—which had been forced upon us, and which was to be settled once and for ever. That was the declaration made by the noble Earl on the 19th of June; and it was made in almost similar terms on the 31st of March, the day on which the Queen's Message announcing the declaration of war was delivered. It may be said, that when the Principalities were relieved from Russian invasion, the whole course of the campaign was altered—that, in fact, the Allies assumed the offensive, and gave up the defensive. I

23
can understand that argument, but I don't admit it, because I consider that before the siege of Silistria was raised you were bound to ulterior objects, to attain which a force of 25,000 men was entirely inadequate. But when the siege of Silistria was raised, what had you to say? The siege of Silistria was raised about the 23rd of June; the Turkish troops had been victorious, and, by their own unassisted efforts, had repelled the invaders, who from strategical reasons had retraced their steps, and withdrew from the Principalities. Then, my Lords, some alteration of your course followed upon that altered state of affairs, and indeed we have from the declaration of the Government themselves an intimation that, towards the middle of July, the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon. The noble Lord the President of the Council, on the 24th of July, made a most remarkable statement in the House of Commons, in which he declared that there could be no hope of a just and honourable peace so long as Russia was permitted to hold the menacing position she occupied in Sebastopol. I remember that when a noble and learned Friend of mine referred to the conduct of the war, and to an expedition to the Crimea, the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government reproached him as indiscreet, observing that he was only affording the Emperor of Russia an opportunity of fortifying and strengthening the works of Sebastopol. I don't think the Emperor of Russia required any such warning. On the contrary, he seems to have been much more alive to the exigencies of the case than Her Majesty's Government, and for years he appears to have been incessantly labouring in fortifying Sebastopol, and rendering it as impregnable as possible. Well, my Lords, on the 24th of July, Lord John Russell, in the other House of Parliament, announced that Russia could no longer be permitted to hold her menacing position in the Crimea, and we knew, from the explanations that took place at that period, that an expedition to the Crimea had been decided upon. And decided upon by whom? It was decided upon by the Government at home. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), in the beginning of October, in an address to the Staffordshire yeomanry, was one of the Members of the Cabinet who furnished that information to the public out of doors. He said—
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"Government did not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services an attack upon Sebastopol; they were not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers of every country in Europe, that, if not impregnable, the attempt was of a most difficult nature; but they did feel that the independence and integrity of Turkey were a mere joke so long as that fortress was deemed impregnable. …And they (the Government) did think that, with the assistance of the French, those two forces, acting in cordial co-operation, could achieve all that it was possible for men to accomplish,"
Lord J. Russell on the 27th of October observed—
"Immediately after the siege of Silistria was raised, it became a question both with the Government at home and with the generals, what should be done on the shores of the Black Sea."
I should have thought that even before the raising of the siege of Silistria, it had been considered what should be done next, supposing the siege to be raised. It appears, however, that only on the event of the siege of Silistria being raised did the Government determine what to do next. The noble Lord continued—
"The Government at home thought the time was come to occupy the Crimea and capture Sebastopol. The instructions of the Governments of England and France were received at Varna about the middle of July; a meeting of the generals of the allied forces took place, and the expedition was resolved upon."
Thus, by the confession of two noble Lords, one in this and one in the other House of Parliament, it was the Government at home, notwithstanding the representations made by generals of high distinction, in every country, of the insuperable difficulties of an attack upon Sebastopol, who urged on the commanders of the allied forces the necessity of making the attempt. It was not the act of the generals in command of the army, but it was urged upon them by the Government at home; and, being so urged, it became doubly the duty of the Government at home to see that no single circumstance was omitted, and no provision neglected, which was calculated to diminish the difficulties with which the enterprise was beset, and which could render the task not merely practicable, but comparatively more easy of fulfilment. Well, my Lords, what steps were taken? What steps were taken from the middle of June until the end of June, when you received intelligence of the raising of the siege of Silistria, and when you began to consider "what next?" What steps were taken to reinforce your

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army originally of 25,000 men, for the more extensive field of operations upon which you determined to place them? I believe that reinforcements were sent out of something like 5,000 men; and from that time till the day after the battle of Inkerman — I don't mean to say that driblets here and there may not have gone out—but from that time till after the battle of Inkerman, when the 46th Regiment arrived at Balaklava, the army, which was originally composed of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, was left without reinforcements. The battle of Inkerman was fought by not more than 8,000 out of from 14,000 to 15,000 British bayonets, which constituted your whole force then left in the Crimea. In calling attention, then, to the course which Government pursued, I cannot refrain from saying that they took steps in the dark without calculating the consequences of their actions, and without making provision to secure success.
My Lords, I have now to mention a subject which, perhaps, I ought to have mentioned before. Her Majesty's Government sent out these troops originally to Varna, and I must ask your Lordships' permission to read to you a statement from an eye-witness, a gallant friend of mine, well known to your Lordships, but whose name I am not permitted to name at present, as I am anxious that in the discussion this day justice should be done to the merits of the army, and no undue reproaches cast upon them. My gallant friend says—
"I have no idea what line you intend to pursue, but I do hope that there is to be no reproach of delay at Scutari or Varna. From too close an economy we had given up all those necessary appendages for a field army, without which it can neither take care of itself nor move against the enemy. We had regiments and very good ones, but nothing else. No commissariat, no staff corps, no waggon train, no medical establishment for the field. All this, and, still more important, a transport system for cavalry and artillery, had to be formed and organised in a country affording absolutely nothing to help you, and I protest when I look back on the work done in the organisation of the army at Scutari and Varna, I am sure that nothing but the spirit and zeal of English officers could have carried it out. The chief blundering was in the shipment of stores without method or order, by which no one knew where to find them. One day I had 100 men searching the Turkish Custom house fir missing tent poles, which were found after eight hours' labour."
What was the consequence of all this? Was the army incapable of movement? No; but it was detained in inaction, amid
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the pestiferous atmosphere of Varna, and there, "night by night," says my correspondent—
"Those dreadful graves, fifty or sixty feet long, were dug of an evening on the hill near Varna, for the poor fellows sure to die in the course of the night."
Surely these are circumstances which raise to the highest pitch the indomitable courage and energies of the men. It might be necessary, my Lords, that when the army marched to the banks of the Alma, or even when it marched from Alma to Balaklava and Inkerman, it should carry with it the smallest possible incumbrance. It would hardly be possible for an army to carry with it any superfluities to the field, but certainly it ought to have had medical supplies and comforts for the hospitals at Varna and Scutari. If such advances as have been made were to be attempted, these supplies ought to have been at hand. The Government had ample means of taking them, and every arrangement ought to have been made to secure them. At one time it was denied that there was any want of medical attendance; we were told that there was a larger proportion of medical officers attendant upon our force than ever had been known upon any previous expedition sent out by this country. I remember seeing two or three columns occupied in one of the newspapers full of particulars as to the amount of stores; and when public charity and sympathy came forward with offers of assistance—of stores of all descriptions, linen, rags, and other appliances for the wounded —they were told that there was abundance of everything, that there was no want of supplies, that there was abundance both of medicines and of medical officers. Well, a lady has been sent out under the sanction of the Government—a lady to whose heroism and that of her companions it is impossible for language to do justice—who, sacrificing as they did all that can render life attractive, giving up all the comforts and luxuries of life, devoted themselves with noble self-devotion to mitigate the sufferings of our wounded and dying soldiers in the crowded and pestilential hospitals of a foreign country. What was the account contained in the very first demand made by these ladies sent out under the sanction of Government? Why, it was an ardent, an almost importunate request to the British public to send out those very articles which the Government said were already supplied in profusion;

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and this was accompanied by the statement that in one day eleven men had sunk from exhaustion, in consequence of not a single bottle of wine being at hand for their relief. Now, this is a subject in regard to which, I say, a heavy responsibility devolves upon the Government. I cannot tell how far these charges are correct, but I know they are in every man's mouth; and I felt, consequently, that it was my duty as a Peer of Parliament, and as one deeply interested in the welfare of the brave men whom we have sent out to fight our battles, to comment upon what is generally said; and I therefore ask the Government not only to deny, but to disprove these statements, if disprove them they can. Well, then, you have lately sent out—" too late" again!—you have sent out on the 15th of October, for the first time, a supply of winter clothing for the troops, who were absolutely in rags and about to encounter the horrors of a Crimean winter. On the 15th of October you sent out to Balaklava an abundant supply of winter clothes. You embarked them on board a magnificent vessel—how manned and commanded, I ask the noble Duke to explain? You sent out also large stores of ammunition, together with this supply of warm winter clothing, as well as a large supply of medicines and medical comforts. The medical stores ought to have been landed at Scutari; but when the vessel arrived there it was found that all these stores, although directed first to Scutari, were deposited in the hold beneath piles of ammunition and shot, so that it was impossible to get at them without discharging and unloading the whole of the ammunition and general stores. Consequently the vessel went on to Balaklava without landing them at Scutari. At Balaklava Bay, if I am not misinformed, this vessel, after losing two of her anchors, was for seven days allowed to drag outside, although having on board a cargo of inestimable value—in money value, I believe, something like half a million, but of a value at that moment not to be measured by money. Yes, I am told—but I can hardly believe it—that for seven days that vessel was dragging in thirty fathom water in the open sea outside the roads of Balaklava—that she was not taken inside; and the consequence was the loss of that vessel, of her cargo, ammunition, warm clothing, and medical stores. And now there is another question I wish to ask the noble Earl and Her Majesty's Government. I don't wish to cast any unjust or unde-
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served stigma upon those who are responsible to the country; but I am told (and I have it on authority which I believe to be valid) that representations had been made to the First Lord of the Admiralty to the effect that the commander of the ship to which I am referring—the Prince—to which you were intrusting such a priceless cargo, was wholly incompetent to take such a trust, and had proved himself so incompetent upon his voyage to the Baltic that, in the opinion of a distinguished officer, if that vessel were sent out under the command of that captain, she would be lost upon her voyage. Moreover, I am told that the officer whose opinion was thus expressed was asked if he would commit this statement to writing; that he did so; that that statement was handed to the First Lord of the Admiralty; and, notwithstanding such a statement was received on such an authority, this vessel, purchased by the Government, was not sent out under the command of an officer in Her Majesty's service, but was sent out under the command of that very commander of whom this character had been given to the First Lord of the Admiralty. I do not state this as a fact within my own knowledge; but I ask the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) if it be so? and, if so, I ask whether, for the loss of that vessel—of her priceless cargo, and her crew of 150 men—Her Majesty's Government are not deeply responsible? But whether the facts on this point are, or are not, such as they have been represented to me, why was this vessel, with such a cargo, permitted so long to drive outside the bay? Why was she not, at any risk and at any inconvenience, taken into Balaklava, by which this casualty and the lamentable loss we have sustained through it would have been prevented? Now, my Lords, in making these comments I hope and feel that I have made them with no desire to embarrass the Government, but for the purpose of affording the Government an opportunity, if possible, of repudiating and refuting them; and, if they cannot, of strongly urging upon the Government to avoid such acts for the future.
But, my Lords, when I charge the Government with an utter unconsciousness of what they were about to do, I cannot have a stronger proof of the justice of the charge than the very circumstances under which we are meeting this day. Parliament stood prorogued until the 14th of

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November. On the 10th or 11th—I am not certain as to the exact day—a Privy Council was summoned for the purpose of further proroguing Parliament, and a further prorogation accordingly took place from the 14th of November to the 14th of December, without being accompanied by the words, "then to meet for the despatch of business." It was thus perfectly clear, then, that on the 10th of November the Government had not the slightest inkling as to the actual meeting of Parliament on the 14th. I admit it is perfectly competent for the Government, upon any unforeseen emergency, to call Parliament together at an earlier period than that to which it is prorogued, but in this case, from the terms of the notice officially issued—from the omission of the words I have mentioned—there was a general understanding that there would be a further prorogation, and that Members of both Houses would be enabled to form their engagements accordingly, without inconvenience. Well, but on the 20th of November "a change came o'er the spirit of the dream" of the Government, and that which they evidently considered unnecessary on the 10th they deemed so urgent and pressing on the 20th that they immediately summoned Parliament together—not on the day to which it had been prorogued, but two days earlier. There was therefore, in the opinion of the Government, not an hour to be lost. Now, what was the sudden exigency which had arisen in those ten days? What had occurred in the interval to make the meeting of Parliament expedient on the 20th of November which did not make it equally expedient on the 10th? Undoubtedly, in the meantime the news of the battle of Inkerman had arrived. But am I to be told that a provision which was so urgent that the period to which Parliament had been prorogued must be anticipated in order to meet it—which was of such importance and pressing urgency that Parliament must be called hastily together in order to provide for it—am I to be told that the necessity of such a provision was simply occasioned by a battle in which, undoubtedly, you lost a large numerical proportion of your men, but which is yet not to be compared with many engagements of modern times? If you calculated that you were going to take, to keep, and to raze Sebastopol without any addition to that small force, was it only on the 20th of November, and not previously to that
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day, that it came into your heads that it was possible and advisable to take measures for increasing the effective strength of your army? Your Lordships must remember that the Government have not yet condescended to inform us in what manner it is intended to strengthen the army, or what they mean to do to meet the emergency. We have been told, indeed, by the organs of the Government that they have money in abundance, and don't stand in need of a loan; and it is also hinted that it is intended to take powers to enable a portion of the militia of this country to volunteer for foreign service, and occupy the places of some of our foreign garrisons. Now, if that is the case, did not the necessity for that measure exist, and was it not foreseen before the 20th of November, or was it that, after establishing a Minister of War in the middle of June, you and the rest of his colleagues threw upon him all the responsibility and labour of the war, scattered yourselves all over the country, never taking into consideration the pressing military emergencies of the country until you met in November? At all events, upon the face of the case, I cannot but think that the Government stand convicted of a want of foreknowledge of the exigencies of the country up to a very late period, as exemplified in the time to which they had prorogued Parliament, and the sudden reflection which led them to desire an earlier meeting.
My Lords, I have spoken of the gallant services of the army in the Crimea; and gallantly have they been supported—more especially on shore—by the sister service. I, however, observe no reference in Her Majesty's Speech to the success achieved by our arms in the Baltic, or to the great progress made by our exertions there towards arriving at an honourable and successful issue of this great struggle. Now, I should be sorry to say a single word of disparagement of the gallant men whom we sent out there, but, certainly, never did a mighty force—one of the most powerful armaments which this country has ever sent forth—sent, too, with no little amount of self-laudation—accomplish so little. Your Lordships will all remember a certain Reform dinner, at which much was said of the mighty deeds to be done by a Reform Admiral, and at which very considerable powers were given to the Admiral to proclaim war; and, when it was proclaimed, it was rather boastfully done.

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Your Lordships cannot have forgotten that order of the day—that signal which was given in language, perhaps, not so concise as that of Nelson, but in the same spirit. I am sure you recollect the injunction to every man on board the fleet to sharpen his cutlass and prepare for immediate action—to give a good account of the Russian fleets if they happened to meet them, and if they slunk in their harbours they were to be pulled out by main force. I am not about to depreciate the conduct of our fleet. On the part of individual officers an opportunity has been afforded for the exhibition of great skill and seamanship and of great valour. But as far as all the results of war go—of all that most expensive and most formidable fleet—those results are literally nil. You crumbled down a half-finished fortress which you were not able to occupy; and now one by one your ships are dropping home from the scene of their labours, but not of their exploits. Now, I need not say that I am not a naval man, and so far, perhaps, do not speak with much authority; but I apprehend that the Government ought to have known beforehand the strength of Cronstadt—ought to have been aware of the peculiar characteristics of the Baltic, which is a sea not altogether unknown to British navigators—and the peculiar strength possessed by the Russians for the defence of their forces there. What did the Government do? Why, they sent out a fleet of such superior power that it would have been an act of madness on the part of the Russian fleet to come out and meet them in the open sea; and at the same time they sent out a fleet the vessels comprising which, in consequence of their magnitude, were of such a draught of water that it was absolutely impossible, looking at the depth of water in the Russian strongholds, that they and the enemy's ships could come into conflict. The consequence of this was, that Sir C. Napier had been condemned to an ignominious inaction, which is only paralleled by that old verse, which many of your Lordships no doubt remember—
"While Chatham's Earl, with weapon drawn,
Was waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Was waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
So stood Sir Charles, and so stood the Russian Admiral. Both were, no doubt, longing to engage, but somehow, from the nature of things, it was impossible they should come to blows. This is another
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instance in which the Government will be fairly charged with having condemned to ignominious inactivity one of the finest fleets sent out from this country, and this from neglecting the most ordinary precautions which the exigency of the service required. Other persons communicated with the Government on this subject, pointed out the shallowness of the water, the necessity of employing vessels of small draught of water; but the Government took no notice, or only said, "Pooh! pooh! What do they know about it?" Their views were altogether neglected, until again it was too late; and when it was too late, and a whole year had been lost, then the very vessels which ought to have been constructed at first were begun to be built. Thus the expenses and opportunities of one year were altogether thrown away, and we are, so far as the Baltic is concerned, in the exact position in which we were before. Now, I repeat that I allude to all this, not for the purpose of discouraging those gallant men who, whether in the Baltic or the Black Sea, have done their best to maintain the honour of our flag; but if we are to come to a successful issue of this great and serious war—if we are to look to conquering an honourable peace—we must strike decided blows; I say "conquering" an honourable peace, because I feel assured that without conquering a peace you will not obtain it. Depend upon it, knowing as I do the resources of the Russian Empire, and knowing the character of the great man who rules it—for he is a great man, although now employing his vast resources for unworthy purposes—you will obtain no peace unless you conquer it. You must obtain by your arms such advantages and such a superiority as to force the Emperor—reluctantly as it may be—to submit to your terms of peace; but if you do not achieve some great successes you may have a prolonged, a sanguinary, and possibly a disastrous war, but an honourable and a successful peace you cannot have.
There is only one more passage, my Lords, in Her Majesty's Speech to which I consider myself compelled to refer. Her Majesty announces with satisfaction that She has concluded a treaty in conjunction with the Emperor of the French with Austria, from which She anticipates "important advantages to the common cause." My Lords, I confess that this is a paragraph which creates some considerable doubt in my mind. There can be no doubt

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that if for the prosecution of the general cause of the war we have drawn to our side, instead of being in a very doubtful neutrality, the great military resources of Austria, the hearty co-operation of Austria in the war will be of the greatest importance, and of signal benefit to the Powers already allied. But, looking to the course which Austria has hitherto pursued, I must be pardoned if I hesitate to express my satisfaction at such a treaty having been formed until I, in common with your Lordships, am made acquainted with the nature of the stipulations and conditions of that treaty, the engagements into which Austria has entered, and those by which we are mutually bound to Austria. I do not deny that we ought to make every allowance for the position of Austria. She has been playing a dangerous and not very dignified game, and has been playing it with considerable dexterity up to the present time. She may now feel it her interest and safety to throw off that doubtful mask which she has hitherto worn, and throw herself frankly into the arms of the Allies, and join in a sincere confederacy with the Western Powers. I trust it may be so. Up to the present moment, however, although it was a favourite text with Her Majesty's Government that negotiations were protracted in order to secure the immense advantages of the co-operation of Austria and Prussia, I have yet to learn what practical result, what benefit we have derived, and what co-operation we have had either from Austria, or still less from Prussia. So far as I can make out the course pursued, with regard to the first of these Powers, she appears to have been doubtfully neutral, and the other doubtfully, or rather practically, hostile; and looking to the part which Austria has played throughout this campaign, I am not at all sure that she has not been in a great measure the cause of your want of success in the Crimea, and of the lamentable loss of life there. It was not till after the success achieved by the Turkish arms at Silistria that Austria volunteered her intervention; but when the siege of Silistria was raised—when the Russian army was in full retreat—when Omar Pacha, at the head of a triumphant army, might have found occupation for a large portion of the forces of the Czar's army—at that moment Austria came in with her intervention, concluded a treaty with Turkey, the effect of which treaty was to give her the occupation and control of the Principali-
34
ties, to cover, in point of fact, the Russian retreat, to prevent the Turkish advance, to produce the demoralisation of that hitherto successful army, and set at liberty the whole of those forces which the Russians had concentrated in Bessarabia. The Czar was thus enabled to throw these forces upon our troops, which were already outnumbered by the troops they were besieging, and this fresh reinforcement, raising the armies opposed to them to four, five, and six times their numbers, was poured upon them mainly, as it appears to me, in consequence of the intervention of Austria. Well, when I consider that this has hitherto been the effect of the intervention of Austria, I may be permitted to doubt the effect of the advantages of the treaty which we are told has been entered into—at all events, until the terms of that treaty are before us. We may possibly have entered into what, for anything I know, may be exceedingly inconvenient engagements, and bound ourselves to conditions which it may be very difficult to accomplish; but which we should in honour be bound to carry out. I know not what are the stipulations which have been made, but I am sure that Her Majesty's Government will feel—and it is the only point in which I shall attempt to state an objection, not to the Address itself, but only to the terms of the Address—that it is unreasonable to call upon the House of Lords to express their satisfaction at a treaty the contents of which are known only to Her Majesty's advisers, who may, indeed, fairly express their own sentiments on the subject, but who must feel it impossible to call upon us to do so, inasmuch as for good or evil we know not one single sentence of what it contains. I feel quite confident that, having made this suggestion, the Ministry will look upon it as so reasonable that they will consent to modify so far the terms of the Address as not to call upon the House of Lords to express satisfaction at the conclusion of a treaty of which they know nothing, but couch the Address in the ordinary form, and declare the gratification of your Lordships that Her Majesty should, in conjunction with Her ally the Emperor of the French, have concluded a treaty with the Emperor of Austria. I do not move this in the form of an Amendment, but am quite certain the Government will themselves see the reasonableness of making such an alteration as will relieve us from all difficulty whatever with regard to the unanimous adoption of this Address. My Lords, I feel it to be of

35
deep importance for the prosecution of this war that we should have not only, as we have, the cordial, deliberate, steady, reflecting sanction of the people of this country, but also that we should have the opinion of Parliament expressed in the most unmistakeable terms; that no questions of difference as to the mode in which the war has been or may be conducted should interfere with the unanimous declaration of Parliament that we will give to Her Majesty every support in our power; that the world at large may see the spectacle of a great nation sinking all political animosities, all party contention—uniting heart and hand, with all the means at their disposal, with all the influence they can exercise among their fellow-countrymen, to prosecute the war, and—even although they may not entertain confidence in those who have the management of that war—giving them to the full extent all the support they can require. And I think I am speaking the sentiments of the country and of my own friends and supporters when I say that, so far from grudging them any supplies, any support which is necessary for the successful prosecution of this great and important war, it will be the country which will urge forward the Ministers to spare no pains, to omit no exertion, to make every sacrifice and every effort for the purpose of securing a just and honourable peace, in consequence of a successful and vigorously prosecuted war. And to those gallant men who are at the present moment, under circumstances of considerable difficulty, gallantly fighting the battles of their country, who have now to a certain extent been reinforced, and who have exhibited indomitable perseverance and a noble courage under all the circumstances of difficulty and discouragement to which they have been exposed—to them I would say, yet a little more patience, a little more courage, a little more perseverance; the end is not yet, but the end is approaching; the eyes of the country are upon you, and the united hearts of your countrymen are with you; their sympathies are with you in your unparalleled exertions; men, women, and children are collecting stores to alleviate your distress, to minister to your comfort, and to assuage your sufferings; fresh reinforcements are at hand, and your unflinching courage and perseverance during your obstinate resistance shall serve as a model to them, exciting them to emulate your glory and prove themselves worthy of being your fellow-
36
soldiers. Go on, I would say, in the gallant course which you have commenced, and believe that the hearts of your countrymen are with you, that there is a tear for those who have fallen in their country's service; and when you return from this expedition, which, with all its difficulties, with all its glories, and with all its labours, must and will be successful, your example will inspire others, and you will be the men who will have brought peace to Europe and maintained untarnished the honour of the British flag, who will have defended the weak from the power of the oppressor, and who will deserve and will receive the blessings of England and of the world.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, whenever upon former occasions it has been my duty to follow the noble Earl who has just addressed your Lordships, I have always felt the position in which I stood, and the difficulty against which I had to contend in endeavouring to reply to arguments brought forward by so able and practised a debater; and, unquestionably, on the present occasion, so rightly characterised by the noble Earl as one of momentous importance, I feel this difficulty to be so much greater than it has ever before been, that I must beg the indulgence of your Lordships whilst I endeavour to reply to the statements of the noble Earl as to the conduct of the Government, and more particularly as to the administration of the department of which I have the honour to be the head.
My Lords, let me at the outset say that I rejoice that the noble Earl, in the speech which he has addressed to your Lordships—although, indeed, I think that in the latter part of that speech he rather departed from the spirit of its commencement, and entered somewhat into unfair and party attacks—I rejoice, I say, that in that speech the noble Earl has informed our powerful enemy that the only cause of disunion which can be found in your Lordships' House is the question whether Her Majesty's Government have been energetic enough in carrying on this war. I rejoice in this, because at a moment like the present the interests of a humble individual like myself, or of any Government, are small indeed when compared with the interests of this great country. Better that we should suffer in the estimation of every man in this country, or in the world, than that the Emperor of Russia should be under the smallest delusion as to the sentiments of the country or of this House.

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My Lords, in the answer which I hope to make to the speech of the noble Earl, I am not about to attempt what might be called an "out-and-out" defence of the policy of the Government, or of the administration of the department to which I have the honour to belong. I am far too sensible of my own shortcomings, and of the difficulties of administration, to be prepared to say that everything that has been done has been done in the best possible way, that no mistakes have occurred, or that if we were now to begin again as on the 29th of March—the day on which war was declared—with the knowledge and experience we have acquired, we should do the same things exactly in the same manner; but, on the contrary, I can say that some things not done then would now be done, and some things done then would now be omitted or amended. Before, however, I proceed to comment on the principal charges of omission or commission brought by the noble Earl, I must, in justice to the Government, endeavour to recall to the attention of your Lordships the circumstances attending the declaration of war and the measures adopted by the Government since the commencement of hostile operations. The noble Earl opposite appeared to appeared to me to be somewhat inconsistent in the charges which he made against the Government; for he began by saying that it was clear that at the commencement of warlike operations we had some other object in view than the mere defence of the Turkish territory and the assistance of the Turkish forces; but shortly afterwards, when it served his purpose, he endeavoured to prove that until the siege of Silistria was raised we had no notion as to what was to be done next. My Lords, I say without hesitation that the first presumption of the noble Earl was the correct one, and that we had from the very first a double object. One of those objects undoubtedly was the support of Turkish interests and the protection of Constantinople from any possible attack by the Russian forces at that time in the Principalities; but the second object was, that if war should once be declared, and if we should be compelled to send an army to the East, we would not be satisfied with the mere expulsion of the Russian troops from the Principalities—we would not be content with the status quo—but would endeavour to obtain such security for the future as would prevent the recurrence of the evils which had involved us
38
in war, and the renewal of any attempt on the integrity mid independence of the Turkish empire. Let me add, my Lords, that in keeping in view this double object, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been identical with that of the Government of the Emperor of the French; and, let me tell the noble Earl, that not merely from the first moment of warlike operations, but from the very commencement of the negotiations which preceded the declaration of war, our policy has been in entire accord with that of the Emperor of the French, and our union with that great empire has been most complete. I must say, my Lords, that I rather pity the noble Earl for his not very dignified attempt to sow dissensions between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, by resuscitating on this occasion some miserable election speeches delivered long ago by Members of the Government; for the noble Earl knows as well as I know that there never was an alliance more firm, and never a determination to maintain it more fixed in the minds of every Member of a Government than is this alliance and our determination. And when the noble Earl turns round and taunts my noble Friend at the head of the Government with having at last, at a moment like the present, discovered that an alliance with France is worth having—even with others than Orleanists—he must be well aware that the policy of my noble Friend and of the Government has always been to strengthen and cement that alliance: that, as when Louis Philippe was on the French Throne, we were faithful to our alliance with the French people, so, and, perhaps, even more so, is it fixed now in consequence of the resolute character of the Emperor of the French and the open-handed spirit of confidence he has shown. My Lords, I have already stated that the policy of the Government as regarded the war was twofold in its purpose, commencing with the immediate protection of the Turkish empire; and, in the second place, having for its object the prevention of a recurrence of evils similar to those which have led to the present war; and, I apprehend, that the noble Earl might have discovered that fact for himself if he had considered the steps taken by the Government at the commencement of the war in a quarter of the world to which he had referred at the conclusion of his speech—of course I allude to the Baltic. The noble Earl has commented with con-

39
siderable severity upon the result of the operations in the Baltic, and upon the conduct of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Commander in Chief in that sea; but, my Lords, I think that even if the results which were anticipated from our operations in that quarter have not been achieved, nevertheless they undoubtedly have not been unattended with beneficial results. It is true that Cronstadt and Sweaborg have not fallen, and that the Russian fleet is yet intact—but let your Lordships bear in mind the results to the pride and position of Russia—that fleet yet intact has never been able to take the sea, and the trade of Russia has been entirely suspended. ["No, no!"] Noble Lords opposite say "No;" but I am not alluding to trade carried on overland through a neutral State, but to the trade with which a fleet could interfere, and I repeat that the trade of Russia in the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland has not only been crippled, but has been completely suspended. It is not unnatural that the public should look somewhat slightingly upon the capture of Bomarsund, partly on account of the facility with which the operation was completed, and partly owing to the far greater magnitude of the other siege operation we have undertaken; but if your Lordships will consider, and if the public will consider, not what Bomarsund was, but what it was rapidly becoming, I think that both your Lordships and the public will be of opinion that a great object has been attained by its destruction. It was a fortress to which in a few years Sweaborg and Cronstadt would have been as nothing, and in its harbour and under its guns the whole fleet of Russia would have been able to lie in security. I have no hesitation, my Lords, in saying that had Bomarsund not been destroyed, in a few years the Gulf of Bothnia would have become a Russian lake, and Stockholm would at any moment have been at the mercy of Russia. I say, then, that the noble Earl was not justified in commenting upon the operations in the Baltic in the manner which he has thought fit to adopt. But I will now pass to another subject.
The noble Earl commented upon the Budget which was proposed to Parliament at the commencement of the war, and he said that the Government had prepared an estimate for merely sending 25,000 soldiers to Malta and back again, and the noble Earl dwelt upon a phrase which appeared very agreeable to him, "Malta and
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back again." I do not know where the noble Earl found any such phrase in any speech of a Member of the Government, or whether it is only a picture of his own imagination; but I can safely assert that it never was intended that the troops who were sent to Malta should come back, unless the Emperor of Russia should abandon his views and sue for peace before they got any further—a contingency which was considered by no means probable. The number of troops originally sent out was between 28,000 and 30,000, and part were despatched to Malta before the commencement of hostilities, not to remain there or to be brought back, but to facilitate the conveyance of the whole force to Turkey. When the noble Earl also laughed at the supposed boasted activity of the Government, which he said consisted in the operation of sending a body of 25,000 men, in a period commencing with March, and extending over April, May, and even the beginning of June, I beg to acquaint him that he is entirely mistaken. The whole force was sent to Turkey, with the exception of some regiments of cavalry, before the end of April, and Lord Raglan, on the 22nd of April, received from me instructions to move forward his forces towards Varna. That force, in conjunction with the army of the Emperor of the French, was, in the first instance, ordered to Gallipoli. This was done, acting on the opinion of military men, who recommended that we should take up a position at Gallipoli, with instructions to the commanders of the united forces to throw up new works, and to occupy a position between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea. The march of the Russian forces across the Danube took place, and on the 22nd of April orders were issued to move troops to Varna for the support of that place, and subsequently for the support of Silistria. I may here mention that about this time a new complication in the aspect of affairs appeared in Greece, which threatened to embarrass the operations of the other nations engaged in the contest; and I think that it was on the 20th of May that forces, both English and French, were sent to the Piræus to secure that neutrality on the part of Greece which had already begun to be somewhat doubtful. The noble Earl then came to that part of his case in which he thought it favourable to his views to represent that it was only after the siege of Silistria was raised that we contemplated the invasion of the Crimea; and in support of that state-

41
ment, he quoted passages from speeches made by the noble Lord the President of the Council and my noble Friend near me (Earl Granville). The noble Earl said that it was only after the siege of Silistria was raised that we began to inquire what was to be done next, and that the generals received orders to proceed to the Crimea; and he proceeded to say that it was in spite of the representations of the generals that that order was given by the Government at home, and without due deference to military opinion, which, he was persuaded deprecated the undertaking. Now, let me inform the noble Earl that he is in error in the whole of that statement. From the very first the invasion of the Crimea was contemplated, and I only wish that it were consistent with my duty to lay before your Lordships the despatches between Lord Raglan and myself with reference to the conduct of this war; but I think, my Lords, that you, would agree with me that this is not a fitting time for the production of such documents, and that if, during the conduct of the war, I were to produce them, it would be dangerous for the public service; but the production of these documents would prove that which I now ask you to believe on my authority, that on the very day on which the first official instructions were first given to Lord Raglan, instructions were also given him in a separate despatch to make inquiry with reference to the condition of Sebastopol, the forces in the Crimea, the means of invasion, and the best mode of carrying it out; and when the noble Earl says that the orders for the invasion of the Crimea were given in spite of the opinions of the generals, I admit that the orders were given by the Government at home, but I deny that they were given in spite of the opinion of any generals, but, on the contrary, as far as any military opinions were received, they were in favour of undertaking the expedition, and all the information we were able to acquire—I admit it was less than we could have obtained in any other country—tended to show that the operation was one proper to be undertaken. Well, my Lords, the noble Earl proceeded to say—upon the authority, I believe, of some speech he had seen in a newspaper—that it was not until the end of July that these orders were issued—and in that statement he is again in error. The siege of Silistria was raised about the 22nd of June, and the moment that intelli-
42
gence was received, the Cabinet met and decided that now, as the first object of their policy was accomplished, and any immediate march of the Russians into the Turkish territory prevented, the moment had arrived for attempting the second object of the war, and for striking a home blow at the power of Russia; with the view of depriving her of the means of aggression which she had employed against the Turkish empire. On the 29th of June—only seven days after the raising of the siege of Silistria—directions were given in a despatch to Lord Raglan to undertake the expedition to the Crimea. The noble Earl has commented on the allegation that, when the expedition was ordered, we did not strengthen the forces under the command of Lord Raglan to the extent we ought to have done; but I cannot forget that at the time of which I am now speaking—the end of June—there was not a voice in this House or a voice in this country, which, although raised in condemnation of acts of the Government, did not assert that our forces were sufficient to accomplish the object in view, and did not deprecate delay, for which it was said there was no reason. Let me call your Lordships' attention to the circumstance that the noble Earl, in dealing with the question of the insufficiency of the force employed, has entirely thrown out of the account the fact that the expedition was not undertaken by our own army of 30,000 men alone, but that it was undertaken in conjunction with a great military Power; and certainly, in speaking of the sufficiency or insufficiency of a force, we ought to speak of it in the aggregate. But, my Lords, the first step which we took in directing that expedition was to send out to Lord Raglan such reinforcements as were in a condition, at that moment, to take the field effectively. So long as the defence of the Balkans was the only consideration, we thought the force under Lord Raglan sufficient for the purpose; and, believing that it might be possible to carry on operations in conjunction with France in other quarters, we had reserved at home a fourth division of infantry as well as some companies of artillery. The moment, however, it was determined that the forces were to be concentrated in the Crimea, that reserve division was sent out under the command of that gallant officer Sir George Cathcart. Three companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and a second battery train of forty-two guns—a

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previous battery train with the same number of guns, with an abundant supply of ammunition, having been before sent out—were added to the force. Here let me point out, in reference to the insufficiency of stores complained of by the noble Earl, that I believe there never were in any former war two battering trains sent out in so complete a state of efficiency, or with anything like so large a supply of ammunition. I can only say that I believe, if you look back to the annals of the Peninsular war, you will find no example of such a force. I can only say that as regards the amount of ammunition sent out, those who were considered to be most competent to give an opinion having given it in conjunction with my noble Friend the Commander in Chief, I issued directions for doubling the amount which they had recommended.
The noble Earl touched lightly upon a point which has been more vehemently complained of out of doors—namely, the delay which took place between the 29th of June and the embarkation of the troops from Varna; but he read a letter from an officer, who said that it would be most unjust to accuse the troops or any one concerned in the movements of the army on account of the delay which had taken place. My Lords, I say at once that by me certainly no blame whatever shall be cast upon any portion of that army. I believe that no blame belongs to them; and certainly I am not the man to blame them. But, my Lords, if the noble Earl means to say that, because no blame attaches to the army, it therefore does attach to the Government, will he be good enough to look at the facts of the case, and, having studied them, then pronounce an opinion? If he do so, I cannot help thinking that it will be somewhat different from the opinion which he so recently expressed. In the first place, the operations of the Turkish army on the Danube necessarily, and without any blame to the allied Generals, entailed seine delay; for the late Marshal St. Arnaud had thought it desirable to send forward a portion of the French army in the direction of the Danube, and those operations of course caused some delay; but that was of minor importance. The preparations which had to be made for embarking so very considerable a force as the united armies unavoidably occupied a considerable time. I believe that at no former period has so large a fleet of transports ever been con-
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gregated for the passage of an army from one shore to another as was collected upon that occasion; but though the officers employed in that service had used their best exertions, sufficient time had not elapsed to enable them to provide such a number of flat-bottomed boats, and other materials and appliances for embarkation and disembarkation, as was necessary. With the greatest energy and activity, Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir George Brown, and other officers, were employed for nearly a month in obtaining those materials and planning those operations the neglect of which might have occasioned the embarking and disembarking of the troops to be attended with very different results from those which actually ensued. By far the most serious cause of delay, however, was the breaking out of cholera in the camp; but when the noble Earl states that the army was quite wasted by cholera, and that orders were given to go to the Crimea only after the army had so suffered, I must tell the noble Earl that he is wrong again, both in his facts and dates. The order was given to go to the Crimea before the breaking out of the cholera, and it was subsequently to that event that this frightful malady afflicted our troops and caused increased delay. The way in which it afflicted our army may have been somewhat exaggerated by the noble Earl when he drew that sad and touching picture of the graves prepared in the night for the burials in the morning; but, at the same time, I readily admit that the calamity was most serious. It caused a considerable number of deaths in our force, and a still greater number, I regret to say, in that of our French Ally. But that was not the worst effect. Those who died were few in comparison with those who were debilitated and incapacitated for a time from any exertion, however slight. The army was barely recovering from that disaster when the fleet was prepared for embarking a portion, at any rate, of the troops, and a sudden blast of that malady at night appears to have blown from the shore, and to have struck those ships which were ready to embark our troops. Adopting what is considered the best practice in such cases, they put to sea; but I believe that in one ship, in one single night, nearly 100 men perished of that fell disease. They put to sea with a view of stopping the disorder. A gale came on, and in the eveinng they were obliged to close the hatches. The result was that

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the malady increased, and I need hardly tell your Lordships that additional delay was the consequence. My Lords, let me say, in passing, that I, for one, greatly doubt whether the misfortune of that delay—except as regards its cause—was so great as has been represented. The climate of the Crimea is very peculiar, and during the summer months that of the neighbourhood of Varna is far more salubrious than a portion of the Crimea. So I am informed, at least, by a medical man who is very conversant with the subject; and I greatly doubt whether, if we had gone to the Crimea at an earlier period, we should have escaped that great calamity, the cholera, which befell us in Bulgaria. My Lords, as regards the deficiency of preparation which the noble Earl charges against the Government, I really do not know to what the noble Earl refers, except what he has specified, the paucity of men. I can only say that those preparations were not only immense, but minute; I can only say that the transports collected and sent out for the purpose were such as I believe in no former period of this country it would have been possible to have obtained, and which we were only able to procure in consequence of the immense increase of steam navigation within the last two or three years; I can only say, as regards the quantity sent out from this country of stores and ammunition of all kinds, that no practical man has ever expressed an opinion of their inadequacy; but, on the contrary, as I said of ammunition, so I say of medical and other stores, that the quantities which were pronounced by those best able to judge to be sufficient were in most cases doubled, and in some cases trebled, by us. I said at the commencement of my observations that I was not about to tell your Lordships that there were no mistakes—that I was not about to tell you that every arrangement had been perfect. I say, then, that it is not sufficient to prove that this immense amount of ammunition and stores was sent out if it were not available at the moment where it was wanted; and here I readily admit that mistakes have been made, and that there have been defects, which, I hope, in the future progress of the war, may be avoided. But the noble Earl really speaks of this expedition to the Crimea as if the force which was carried across those seas was of so small and trivial an amount that it was not worth speaking of. He forgets the great opera-
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tion of embarkation, and he forgets the still more admirable and successful manner in which that great armament was disembarked. The English force alone was 27,000 men, and the French force amounted to 24,000 men. I am speaking now of the two forces which were carried across at the same time, and which were disembarked within a few- hours of one another. Besides these there was, I believe, a body of 8,000 Turks attached to the French army. My Lords, that body of nearly 60,000 men landed at once on the shores of the Crimea; and I believe that the records of history do not show any undertaking upon such a scale so successfully accomplished throughout. Then came the battle of the Alma. The noble Earl, with his accustomed eloquence, has dwelt upon the courage and enduring gallantry of our troops. I will not at this moment break in upon the answer which I am making to the noble Earl by attempting to add anything to what he has said upon that subject. Then followed that flank march to Balaklava which was so justly characterised by the noble Duke who moved the Address. But I now come to the charge of the noble Earl with reference to the want of reinforcements. I have already stated that when the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon, the original force of Lord Raglan's army, which amounted to something not much short of 30,000 men, was increased by about 7,000 additional troops.
The noble Earl said that no reinforcements were subsequently sent, except a few driblets, until after the battle of Inkerman. The noble Earl is again not accurate. I do not wish to quibble upon figures; I do not wish to take advantage of small mistakes on the part of the noble Earl. I will endeavour to explain to the House why it was impossible to send out larger reinforcements at that moment, even if reinforcements had been considered necessary; but I say that the noble Earl, nevertheless, is not correct, and that reinforcements were prepared as soon as the force of 7,000 to which I have referred were sent off, and that before the news of the battle of the Alma had reached this country a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 more men was under orders to proceed to the Crimea. The Prince steamer carried the first portion of those reinforcements as well as the stores to which I shall presently allude; and if the remaining reinforcements did not proceed with the rapidity with which previous ones bad been

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sent out to Lord Raglan, it was because the whole available steam transport service at that moment in the country had been sent out to the Crimea. Others were coming in, no doubt, from our Colonies and from distant parts, and as they came in they were taken up by the Government; but at the moment when those 7,000 men were ready to be embarked, steam transports were not at hand for their conveyance. The noble Earl says that throughout these transactions there has been a want of prescience on the part of the Government,—that our policy has been one of hand to mouth,—and that we never anticipated from one day to another what we should be called upon in the future to undertake. My Lords, the noble Earl seems to forget that no country can possibly enter upon war at its commencement in so perfect a state for carrying on that war as it will become in a short time—in some months, or a year or two, perhaps—after that war has been commenced. Not even the most military nations of the Continent can do this; and still less a country like this, which has never kept up a large standing army, but whose army has generally been in great part scattered over the whole surface of the globe—a large portion in the Colonies, and only a fraction, so to say, within the precincts of this island. Well, but did we show that want of prescience which the noble Earl ascribed to us? What were the steps which were taken by the Government when I held in conjunction the offices of Colonial Secretary and Secretary of the War Department? Upon the first declaration of war I sent out to all the Colonies to withdraw as many regiments as possible from them, with the view of strengthening the home force. Ten regiments of infantry were at that time ordered home, besides several companies of artillery, and I may state that, at this moment—to show that there was not that want of prescience and foresight, but that, on the contrary, we have already profited by that prescience—at this moment, some of the regiments which, a few months ago, were in the Colonies, having been recruited—inadequately, I admit, on account of the exigencies of the service—since their arrival here, are now upon their way to reinforce the army of the Crimea. But I readily admit—and when your Lordships look at the extent and distance of the Colonies you will not be surprised at the fact—that some of those regiments have not yet arrived, and
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that even after they shall have arrived, it will be impossible for some time to recruit them properly and to make them fit for foreign service. I have alluded to the impossibility of commencing a war with such forces as, no doubt, it might be desirable to pour into a country with which you are engaged in hostilities. With reference to this subject, I ask you to look at the position of our great and powerful military ally. France has now collected a very powerful army; but was it not the fact that at the commencement of hostilities she was unable to send those reinforcements which she is now pouring in? Look again at another Power, which I rejoice to think we may also call our ally. Look at the great military Power of Austria. What have they been doing during the last four or five months? Were they in an effective state to take the field at the time when war was declared by this country? Certainly not; and if they had been obliged, as we were, to send a force into the field, is it not notorious that they would have been obliged to send one much more inadequate and much less fitted for the service in view than they will now be enabled to do? My Lords, if that is the case with great military nations—nations whose whole military system is based upon conscription—what must it be with a country whose military system rests entirely upon voluntary enlistment? This country never undertook a war under the circumstances in which the present war has been undertaken. On former occasions we had a mixed system; but now it is entirely and simply voluntary. On former occasions we had the power of impressment as regards the Navy, and we had the ballot as regards the militia. True it is that have the power of the ballot still with regard to the militia; but I rejoice to think that at present, at any rate, it has not been found necessary to call it into operation; and I say that it is a proud thing for this country, so long as we are enabled to maintain our position in Europe, to assert our rights, and to espouse the cause of justice on behalf of others, without compelling men to enter into our armies and to fight our battles. But of course, when it has been the policy of this country to keep a very limited force—when the economical feeling of the House of Commons has placed great restrictions upon expenditure in all the military departments—it is not wonderful that at the commencement of a war our forces should not be of such

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an amount as the energy and zeal and keen anxiety of the country might desire; or that those recruits whom we should be able at first to collect should not be sufficiently trained to send out to serve with those more practised and admirably disciplined troops which at the beginning proceeded to the Crimea. I have no difficulty in saying, moreover, that for an occasion such as this, the voluntary system has this inconvenience. It has been practically found hitherto, and it is now more especially evident, that men in this country are more anxious to enlist when success has been somewhat retarded, when increased energy appears to be necessary, and not when all is proceeding with every probability of an early and successful issue, This theory, if theory it be, has been completely established by the experience of the last few months. At the first declaration of war recruits came forward freely; but they soon relaxed, and during the summer months they were few indeed in number—so much so as to cause very considerable anxiety on the part of the Government. But as soon as it appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was likely to be protracted, and that the undertaking was one of greater hazard and difficulty than had been supposed—from that moment, when the energy of the people was aroused, the zeal and readiness of the young men of the country to enlist also increased, and week by week it has been progressing, until last week, I believe, we more than doubled the number offering in any previous week since the commencement of the war, and enrolled six or sevenfold the number which we had the power of recruiting some five or six weeks ago.
My Lords, the siege of Sebastopol commenced, after a considerable amount of necessary preparations, upon the 17th of October, and it soon afterwards became apparent, from the intelligence which reached this country, that that siege was likely to be more protracted than I readily admit the Government at first expected. I say I readily admit—if that be any blame to the Government—that we did hope and believe that long before the time at which we are now assembled that fortress would have fallen; and if we erred in that expectation—if we were over-confident—I believe that we erred in common with many men of great experience in war, and men whose opinions were well worth having—and we erred in our confidence in common with the public at large both in this coun-
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try and in France. My Lords, from the moment it appeared that that siege was likely to be protracted, every exertion was used by the Government to obtain reinforcements, and to send them with as little delay as possible to the Crimea; and here, again, I am about to admit that, under any other circumstances than those which existed those reinforcements ought not to have been sent, because the regiments which have gone out have arrived too recently in this country to be effectively recruited, and men have gone out in those regiments who have not been trained so efficiently as we could wish, and who have not become habituated to the life on which they are about to enter. I do not hesitate to say—your Lordships may blame me if you will—I do not hesitate to say that it has been my duty to order those troops to proceed to the East with very great regret, and the Government has only done so because it felt the exigency of the moment required that every possible exertion should be made to succour our brave army, at whatever sacrifice. And, my Lords, when you blame the Government for not having sent these reinforcements sooner, let me tell you this, that the generals on the spot who are most competent to judge did not desire to have recruits, such as we have now sent, prematurely. They would rather they had been reserved for the next campaign, unless those events had arisen which rendered it necessary—which induced Lord Raglan to press for them—which induced the Government to send them without any delay. My Lords, that events have turned out differently from what was contemplated in more respects than one I have already admitted. Undoubtedly, we did not expect the Russian power in reinforcing her troops before Sebastopol would be so great as it proved to be. We did not doubt her military power. We were aware of that; but we did not expect than an army could be moved from Odessa to Sebastopol with the marvellous rapidity with which that movement was effected; and, probably, some of your Lordships will be surprised to hear that, through the extraordinary efforts of the Russian Government, by the means they were able to command of an unlimited number of cars and cattle, their marches were effected at such a rapid rate that on one day a march of forty-two miles was actually effected. Now, I may be imprudent in making these confessions, but I wish to deal frankly with your Lordships.

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I have said we do not profess perfection. I am ready to admit that errors, if errors they are, were committed. We did not calculate on the powers of the Russian Government to send reinforcements to Sebastopol in time for the battle of Inkerman, and I believe, my Lords, that there are few in this country—few in any other country—who did expect it. If the siege had been protracted some three or four weeks longer, we might have expected them; but certainly we did not expect them at the time of their arrival. I can only say that we did not form our opinions on any haphazard or guesswork, but we took the best opinions we were able to obtain in this country—of those who could inform us as to the means and capabilities of the Russian forces and the character of the country they would have to traverse.
What have been the reinforcements which in reality have been sent out from this country? The noble Earl and the country at large have greatly underrated them. Since the month of June more than 20,000 men have been sent from this country to the army under Lord Raglan, and in the course of the last two months (the greater portion being within the last three or four weeks) 12,300 men have been sent—of course being a portion of the 20,000. I believe your Lordships will be surprised when I tell you that the whole number of men which from the time of the commencement of hostilities up to the close of the year (for few more have to be sent out before the close of the year) has been sent out, including officers, will have exceeded 53,000—when you consider this, too, is an army in reality sent out almost on a peace establishment, for the war establishment has hardly come into operation. The noble Earl thinks I have given him an advantage in that admission. What I mean by a peace establishment is this; that the increase of the army has hardly become available subsequently to the 29th of March, when the declaration of hostilities was made, and I consider all this has been done on an establishment not yet raised to that strength to which I hope before many months it will be raised. When you reflect that not many months ago we were told on high authority that, in the event of that, I am sure I may now call it, bugbear invasion, not 10,000 men of our regulars could be brought to defend our own shores, and how we have been able to send out this large force to the Crimea, I do not think the exertions of this coun-
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try ought to be underrated, or that, in reality, so little has been done as has been represented by the noble Earl. My Lords, even looking back at operations conducted by this country at a time when we had been longer at war, I doubt greatly whether on any former occasion within the same space of time so many British troops have been sent out under the command of any English general. The noble Earl alluded, in the course of his speech, to the inadequate supply of stores of all kinds which have been sent out to Sebastopol. I feel I should be trespassing too long on your attention, otherwise I have returns here which will show the enormous amount of gunpowder and guns which has been sent out for the service of this army.
THE EARL OF DERBYwas understood to say, he had not charged the Government with having failed to send out gunpowder and guns.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: But the noble Earl is aware that Government has been taxed with neglect on this point, though not by him or in this House; and, if I touch upon a question not alluded to by the noble Earl, I think your Lordships will not feel I am dealing unfairly by you if, at this early stage of the debate, I enter into details with which it is my peculiar province to be intimately acquainted, and which any other Member of the Government may not have so readily at hand, for the purpose of refuting any accusation which may subsequently be made. With regard to the provision of ordnance, sixty-two position guns were sent out at the commencement. I have already said two complete battering trains of forty-two guns, with an enormous supply of shot and shell, were sent out; seven nine-pounder batteries, with two troops of horse artillery, were also sent; and I believe, on no former occasion was the same amount of ordnance supplied to any British army in so short a period. This statement will bear, perhaps, on the face of it snore tangible proof of the exertions which have been made to leave no arm of the service unsupported. The small-arm ammunition sent out, on the whole, amounts to the enormous quantity of 22,933,000 rounds, of which 18,000,000 rounds were for Minié arms. I can only say, if you are not satisfied with these exertions, we are still sending more, and, if ships can be obtained, we shall continue to send more ammunition of all kinds. What I have stated to your Lordships, however,

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does not represent the whole force at the disposal of Lord Raglan, even as regards guns and ammunition. From Malta, besides what I have mentioned, there have been sent forty-two large guns and mortars, 9,000 shells, and something like 27,000 round shot, principally of very large size.
I now come to a matter of charge on which the noble Earl commented with considerable severity. He said we had shown no foresight as to the requirements of the troops in clothing, and that on the 15th of October the first supply of warm clothing arrived in the Crimea. The noble Earl is quite right with regard to that single fact; but I think the noble Earl will not deny that if the supply sent out in the Prince, taken with the supply sent contemporaneously in other steamers, had all arrived at its destination, there would not be much to complain of with regard to the privations of the army, considering the character of the climate, and the period of the year when warm clothing becomes necessary in the Crimea. I have no hesitation in saying that supplies of warm clothing were sent out in time, and, but for that great calamity which befell the Prince, the whole army would have been supplied before any suffering from cold could have arisen. I should say that orders for the supply of warm clothing were given by myself in the months of July and August, and, as soon as steamers were provided and the orders executed, it was despatched to its destination. The quantity which was sent out and lost in the Prince alone consisted of 35,700 pairs of woollen socks, 53,000 woollen frocks, 17,000 flannel drawers, 2,500 watch-coats (double coats to go over the ordinary great coats), 16,100 blankets, and 3,700 rugs. I am quite afraid of wearying your Lordships, but it may be desirable, with a view of showing the care that has been taken of the army, to state the sum total of the supplies, sent out for its service, some, of course, very recently, because fresh supplies were ordered on the less of the Prince becoming known. The number of worsted socks is 150,000; of woollen frocks, 90,000; of flannel drawers, 90,000; of boots, 91,397 (pairs); of shoos, 13,000; of woollen gloves, 80,000 (pairs); of overcoats, 30,000; of fur caps, 35,000; of leather gauntlets, 20,000; of long woollen stockings, 80,000 (pairs); comforters, leather mits, and other articles in proportion. Also 40,000 railway wrappers, 40,000 waterproof capes, 12,000 buffalo hides, 12,000 pairs of seal-
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skin mits, 40,000 fur coats, besides horsecloths and a variety of other articles. That your Lordships may see that the Government has not been neglectful, I may mention that before we were aware that the Prince was actually lost—when we received the rumour of her loss by the telegraph—we immediately sent agents to Glasgow, Nottingham, and Leicester, and the woollen manufacturing districts, for the purpose of buying up all stores of the kind upon which they could lay their hands, so that if their loss should be confirmed, we might be able to replace them. Before authentic intelligence of the fate of the Prince reached us, those stores were in a great measure replaced, and within two or three days of their arrival, the greater portion was embarked, and on their way to their destination. They consisted of 54,896 woollen socks, 24,200 woollen frocks, 34,100 flannel drawers, 3,475 watch-coats, 39,550 blankets, 22,800 rugs, and 14,457 great-coats. The whole of these articles have been supplied and sent out since intelligence of the loss of the Prince has been received. The greater portion of the vessels have sailed, and many that have not sailed will sail within the next two or three days at the utmost. This, however, is not all that the Government has done with a view to securing the health and comfort of the troops by supplies of warm clothing. As soon as it became apparent—I will not say apparent—but as soon as it became probable—that the troops would have to winter in the Crimea without the protection of roofs over their heads, orders were issued for a supply of sheep-skin coats for the clothing of the whole army. It was found to be an article not much used in this country, and only 5,000 could be supplied in England; but larger quantities were procured from France, the Austrian provinces, and other places, and so confident were we that Parliament would not grudge any expenditure, that I sent, through my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Stratford, at Constantinople, to endeavour to buy up 25,000 sheep-skin coats there. I would not have entered into all these details if the noble Earl had not endeavoured to raise an impression that the comfort, safety, and protection of the army had been neglected. Great, indeed, would be the responsibility of any Government guilty of conduct so cruel and so disgraceful to humanity as that which has been surmised. Huts, also, have been ordered for the

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troops, because tents must be utterly inadequate, and I am happy to say that, independently of those already provided from Turkey and from Malta, a certain number have been supplied from Trieste. Huts for 11,500 men have been already sent from this country, and huts for 3,200 more are in vessels which will sail in the course of the next day or two. A further supply will speedily follow. The noble Earl alluded in one part of his speech, to the condition of the army, stating they were nearly in rags. This is, undoubtedly, the fact; that, in consequence of the hard labour to which the troops have been exposed in the trenches and elsewhere, the uniforms with which they left this country have been completely worn out. But this consequence was anticipated, and before any representations were made from those in authority in the Crimea, complete new suits of uniform were ordered for the whole of the army—not the regular uniforms supplied at stated periods, but a third suit in addition to those usually given, which have been supplied gratuitously, without any deduction to which the soldier is ordinarily subject. Those uniforms have all arrived in the Crimea by this time, presuming that calamities, which no human power can control, have not occurred to some of the vessels. The greater part we have heard of having arrived, and in all human probability the whole must be there by this time. The Government has taken upon itself to act towards the army on a scale of liberality heretofore unusual, confident that Parliament and the country will approve of what has been done in this respect. Besides these clothes being given without deduction, extra rations have been served out of all descriptions—meat, spirits, and vegetables— and no deductions have been made for these extra rations.
Let me here remark upon some words which fell from the noble Earl—that the army was half starved. Now, that I must entirely deny. I admit that accidents have occurred; I admit that everything has not been perfect; but this I say—and I say it fearlessly—that no army ever was better fed than this army has been; and that is universally admitted by all the officers and men with whom there has been any communication. My Lords, I can confidently assert there has not been even a single day—unless it was the day when the first march from the place of disembarkation took place—when regular
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rations have not been supplied to the troops; and, if they have more frequently been salt rations than might have been desired, I think your Lordships will admit the peculiarity of the service, and the position of your army, justify the circumstance; and it is, perhaps, only wonderful that the Commissariat has been able to supply so large a quantity of fresh provisions—which have been served out to the army, I believe, generally speaking, not less than three or four times a week.
THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he had not remarked on the general condition of the army with regard to provisions. He had stated only that a considerable portion of the troops engaged at Inkerman retired from the trenches, and had not had any food, before engaging in the battle.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I misunderstood the noble Earl. Of course, the fact is undeniably true, and does greatly enhance the conduct of the men on that occasion. The men, most of them, had come from the trenches; the remainder of the 8,000 troops engaged were called from their quarters so unexpectedly that they had not received their breakfasts, and, until a late hour in the afternoon, they were fighting without having had any food. My Lords, I believe that it is unnecessary to make any statement with reference to the Commissariat beyond what I have already said as to the supply of rations, and the condition of the army. That there were, in the first instance, mistakes, was unavoidable; but I believe, on the whole, the Commissariat has done its duty well, and given satisfaction to the army it has served; and I believe, also, that those who most desponded of the operations of that branch of the service, have since most readily admitted that its performance has exceeded their expectations. I have here a return of the quantity of commissariat stores sent out, and the number of officers employed, but I will not trouble your Lordships with them, because I confidently expect that the blame supposed to have attached to that department, at the commencement of operations, was blame—so far as it was just at all—only called forth by the novelty of the duty and the exigencies of the service, and subsequently most amply atoned.
The noble Earl commented with much severity on the medical department. Here, again, let us bear in mind the position in which this department was at the commencement of the war. I am not about

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to defend it—quite the reverse—but I say that its defects were consequent on that ill-judged economy which prevented an efficient medical department being kept up in time of peace; and that the blame ought not to be attached to those under whom the medical department had acted, and still less to the medical department itself. I ask your Lordships to consider in how different a position our medical department has had to conduct the business of the war compared with that of our gallant Allies. When the war broke out, the French had an organised hospital corps; we had none. We had not even a code of hospital regulations. The whole thing had to be created denovo; and under these disadvantageous circumstances, it is almost wonderful that greater errors have not been committed, and that greater calamities have not occurred. My Lords, I regret to think that more suffering has, under these circumstances, been entailed upon our gallant men than might have occurred under a different system; but if the noble Earl wishes to represent that the Government is to be blamed for any want of care or forethought in this respect, let me mention a few facts which will exonerate us from any such charge. Your Lordships will remember that in February or March last Mr. Guthrie addressed a letter to the newspapers with respect to the number of army surgeons to be sent out, stating that the number of army surgeons with our troops in the Peninsula was quite insufficient, and that we ought to add a third assistant surgeon to every regiment sent out. I consulted with Dr. Smith—the head of the medical department—who was adverse to an increase of the regimental surgeons, and who was of opinion that the best mode of strengthening the medical department was by adding to the medical staff, and not to the regimental surgeons; experience having shown, as he stated, that the greatest requirements were in the hospitals, where the regimental surgeons were not available. I had to decide between these two opinions, and I came to this conclusion—that both were right, and that the best way was to increase the number both of the regimental and the staff surgeons. The staff was, therefore, increased, as was recommended by Dr. Smith, and the regimental staff was increased in the mode pointed out by Mr. Guthrie. Now, my Lords, what is the number of medical officers at the present
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moment serving with the army? The number of staff medical officers is 280, of regimental medical officers 192, and of Ordnance medical officers fourteen—making 486; or, including nine staff medical officers who are ready to join the army, giving a total of medical officers of the army in Turkey of 495. This gives, according to the present estimated strength of the army in the East, one medical officer to every seventy-seven men—being about double the number of medical officers that served with the army in former wars. I do not compare what has been done now with what was done fifty years ago with a view to show that there is nothing more to be done to complete the medical administration of our army. On the contrary, I believe that there is a great deal yet to be done, and that, while we have improved on the system of former wars, a great improvement—I am speaking, of course, of our medical department—may be made in our present system. The noble Earl said that the charity of this country had been called into requisition to supply the deficiency of hospital stores in the East. That the charity of the country has been called forth is a fact at which I, on the part of the Government, rejoice; but that it has been called forth by any insufficiency of supplies sent from home, I cannot admit. That the charity of the country has been called into action by the insufficiency of supplies upon the spot, where, and at the moment when they were wanted, may be true, and the report that the stores wanted in the hospital at Scutari were at the bottom of the ship that was lost the other day, while those which were at the top were obliged to be taken on to Balaklava, is but too true; and I am bound to admit that the same thing has occurred in two or three instance. The supply of beds and bedding sent to the army in the East was calculated upon the number of 16,000 patients. That this supply was all sent out at the commencement of the operations I will not asserts. As we began the war without a hospital corps, the greater part of this supply had to be contracted for, and some of the supplies were not delivered so fast as they ought to have been, although they were supplied before they were wanted. Now, take an article upon which a great deal has been said. The quantity of lint sent to the army was 26,564lbs. Now, my Lords, I dare say that this immense quantity of pounds will not convey to your minds a more accurate impression of the

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real quantity sent out than it did at first to my own. It will, perhaps, give your Lordships a better idea, when I state, from a computation which has been made, that this quantity of lint would cover no less than thirty-six acres of ground. Then the bandages of calico and linen were 117,500, and of adhesive plaster 20,550 yards were sent out. I think your Lord- ships will now believe that great exaggerations with regard to these deficiencies have been current, and will believe that they have all been on a much larger scale than the noble Earl supposes. The noble Earl said, that when the nurses arrived at Scutari they were unable to supply port wine to the sick.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I said that eleven died in one night from exhaustion in consequence of the want of such nourishment as they ought to have had. This statement appeared in a letter from one of the nurses.
THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I have not seen the statement, hut if it has been made by one of the nurses it must be believed, because I cannot think that any one who has gone out in the self-sacrificing spirit which has distinguished those noble women would place her hand to any statement that was not literally correct. But your Lordships must not suppose that there has been that neglect on the part of the Government in the supply of this article that might be inferred from this statement. The quantity of port wine sent out for use to the hospital at Scutari was 4,880 dozen, and the greater portion of this supply ought to have been in store long before the arrival of the wounded patients from the battle of the Alma; 1,200 gallons of brandy were also sent out, and 31,1801bs. of sugar, and all other articles of medical comfort, as they are called, have been sent out in similar proportion. My Lords, that those who have visited these hospitals should have been painfully struck with the scenes of suffering in them is not to be wondered at. An influx of thousands of wounded men must strike every bosom with horror, and I fear that snfficient precautions had not been taken for the disembarkation of those men from the ships that brought them to Constantinople, so as to save them a great amount of suffering. But those who have in the hospitals of this country witnessed any sudden influx of wounded persons under similar circumstances, and the confusion which arises, will make some allowance for
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the authorities of this establishment, though it will not diminish their sympathy for the sufferers. I am bound to say that I think the management of the hospital at Scutari has been influenced too much by those feelings of attention to economy which, although right under ordinary circumstances, are wrong under circumstances such as the present. I think also that there has not been that complete organisation in this establishment without which it could not be expected to work effectively. But, my Lords, what are the steps which the Government have taken to rectify these errors? Instructions were sent out as soon as any deficiencies were complained of to get, at any cost, the supplies requisite for the wounded. For the better administration of the hospitals, a general officer was directed to proceed to Constantinople to take charge of the hospitals and their military affairs, with a view of improving the organisation of its medical system, and the Government have also sent out a commission of three gentlemen, two of whom are medical men, for the purpose of inquiring into all the complaints which have been made on this subject, not so much with the view of condemning or punishing individuals, as to ascertain the facts, and to rectify all just cause of complaint. I am sorry to find that an impression has gone forth that this commission has only been issued by the Government in order to bolster up a defective system, and to make up a case that is to be laid before Parliament to show that no blame is to be attached to any one. Now, my Lords, I think I have proved to your Lordships that no such idea could have actuated the Government, and that no such disposition animates the gentlemen on the commission. And whatever their report may be, the only desire of the Government in appointing the commission is that the public services shall thereby be benefited. I regret to say that one of the gentlemen forming this commission (Dr. Spence) perished on board the Prince, He was the individual whose appointment to this commission gave colour to this rumour, because when in this country he was assistant to Dr. Smith. To show that there was no such desire on the part of the Government or the commission, the two survivors, who were empowered to fill up any vacancy that might occur in their number on the death of Dr. Spence, with the view of laying bare everything that was wrong, and of rectifying what was defective, pro-

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posed to the Rev. Sidney Godolphin Osborne, who happened to be then at Scutari, that he should be joined in that commission. I do not think that any one will deny that this gentleman is a most ardent investigator of abuses, and that in his hands the deficiencies of the Government and of the medical department are not likely to receive too lenient a construction. That rev. gentleman was at Scutari upon a charitable commission, which he is discharging most ably and admirably, and he declined to serve on the medical commission, and I therefore mention the fact, only in order to disabuse the public mind of any error as to the principle upon which that commission was constituted.
My Lords, the next and most important matter to which I shall advert, is one to which allusion has been made both by the noble Duke (the Duke of Leeds) and by the noble Earl opposite. When, at the commencement of the war, the practice of the French to employ female nurses in their hospitals was spoken of, the opinion of the medical men and of the medical department was given against the employment of female nurses. I did not feel myself at liberty to act at variance with that opinion and the experience on which it was founded, although I now feel that that experience was based upon a totally different state of things, and that those opinions were formed upon circumstances which did not in the least resemble the present. The reason why, in former times, nurses were found unsuited to the care of English soldiers was, because the women selected for that service were not, as now, women of education and of pious feelings, who volunteered their services, but women hired for the service, who, both abroad and at home, grew callous, and manifested a harshness and want of sympathy with the sufferers that rendered them unfit for the due performance of their duties. My Lords, when complaints first reached this country of the state of the hospitals at Scutari, we again directed our attention to the plan of sending out nurses, and we intrusted the organisation of that establishment to hands which, humanly speaking, must ensure success. I cannot give too high praise to those ladies who have so nobly volunteered their services—the names of Miss Nightingale and of those ladies who have nobly stepped forward in the cause of Christian love, will be handed down to posterity in company with those of the gallant men who have been
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wounded in the service of their country. They have left comfortable and, in many instances, luxurious homes, for the purpose of adopting a profession which is most distasteful to women of delicate minds, in the hope of assuaging the sufferings of our gallant countrymen, and of fulfilling a Christian duty. I believe that through the instrumentality of these ladies more will be done to re-establish the efficiency of our hospital establishments than has ever been done by the medical men themselves, although there never have been greater exertions, greater self-denial, or greater zeal, shown by the members of that profession, with hardly a single exception, than have been evinced by that large class who have had to undertake these onerous duties. A charge has been made by the noble Earl with reference to that ship whose loss has been attended by such serious consequences to the comfort of the army in the Crimea. He said he had been given to understand that the Admiralty had been warned as to the efficiency of the officer in command of that vessel. [The Earl of DERBY: I did not state it of my own knowledge.] No, I stated the noble Earl said he had been given to understand that the captain of the Prince was unsuited to his duties, and that the Admiralty had been warned that the vessel would be in the greatest danger if it were sent to sea under the command of that officer. Complaints were also made relative to the time that had elapsed between the arrival of the Prince and the disembarkation of her cargo, during which interval she lay in the roads without having her cables clinched, and without disembarking the valuable cargo she had on board. Now, I will only say, that when I heard of this delay in the discharge of her cargo, I wrote at once to Lord Raglan. The first impression on my mind was, that great blame was attributable to some department, and I directed that immediate inquiry should be made into the cause of that disaster and delay. No answer, of course, could be received by this time; but I am bound to say, in extenuation of the conduct of the captain, that I have been informed, on the authority of one who was present during the storm, that the state of the sea during the whole of those days was such that the vessel could neither be brought into the narrow harbour of Balaklava nor discharge her cargo, and that she was only enabled, with the assistance of small steamers, to disembark that por-

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tion of the 46th Regiment which she conveyed to the Crimea. With regard to the other statement, of the incompetency of the master, I never heard, until the noble Earl made that statement, one word on this subject. I was not aware that any such accusation had been made; but when I heard it, I requested a noble Friend to leave the House and endeavour to obtain the facts for me. He has just placed in my hands the following statement, which will, I think, place the conduct of the Admiralty in a very different light—
"The Admiralty were informed by a naval officer that he distrusted the ability of the master who commanded the Prince, upon which an inquiry was instituted, and the directors of the steam-ship company under whom the master of the Prince had been employed declared they had the greatest confidence in him. The result of the inquiry being favourable to the master, he was continued in his command, but two naval officers were placed in the vessel—Commander Bayntun, as skilful an officer as is to be found in the service, and a lieutenant. Both of them were on board at the time of the accident."
I think, therefore, however deeply we may lament the loss of the Prince, that this House will not condemn the unfortunate officer who was in command of the vessel; still less will it condemn the Board of Admiralty, who appear to have taken every possible precaution, first, in ascertaining the character of the captain; and secondly, in endeavouring to obviate the possibility of accident by giving the commander the assistance of two naval officers.
Now, my Lords, before I conclude, I think I ought to remark that, from what the noble Earl has said, he appears to have lost sight of the power and strength of our Allies. He seems to have forgotten that we are not fighting alone, but that there is a large French army, and a considerable body of Turks. My Lords, we have, on the part of this country, done everything that we could to facilitate the operations of our Allies—and most rightly have we done so, for we owe to her generous confidence much of the assistance we have derived from France on every occasion. But the means of transport in the power of France being so much inferior to those possessed by this country, we are at this moment conveying 8,000, or, I believe, nearer 10,000 troops of the French army in British transports from Toulon to the Crimea. We have conveyed other French troops from other ports, and shall continue to render such assistance, feeling confident that in no way can the ships of
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this country or the money of this country be better applied than in assisting that gallant army to arrive at its destination to fight in the common cause to which we are committed.
I am really almost afraid to state what we have done, lest it should create—what the occasion forbids—a smile, when I mention the attempts which have been made in other ways by the Government to facilitate these operations and to assist our army. We have sent out increased means of conveying heavy guns and various stores which it has been found so difficult to carry up to the works, even during the dry season, and now, of course, much more difficult at this period of the year. We are sending out a complete railroad, stationary engines, and other appliances for the purpose of saving the physical exertion of the men, and allowing guns of large calibre to be carried to their positions, which otherwise, I believe, it would be impossible at this period of the year to do. I must, however, mention that we have not undertaken to carry this out ourselves. We are quite aware of the way in which Government undertakings sometimes fail in comparison with private enterprises. We have called in the assistance of most competent persons to carry this plan into effect. And now let me say to the country that the two gentlemen, Mr. Peto and Mr. Betts, who have undertaken the task, on my first proposing it to them, at once said, "Every exertion in our power shall be used—all our property which may be required, rails, engines, everything, shall be placed at your disposal. One condition alone we make; that is, that we shall not derive one farthing of profit from this affair in any way. "They said, "It shall not be undertaken as a contract; we will act as your agents, and do everything for you, sending to the Treasury the bills which, under ordinary circumstances, would come to us." I feel bound in justice to make this statement; it is what might have been expected from the known character of those gentlemen; it is, moreover, only what we have met with daily in lower grades of life and among those of lesser means. I mention this to their honour, but also as a sample of the spirit and energy of the country. As Messrs. Pete and Betts, with large means, have acted, so, I am convinced, would act the humblest man in vindication of the cause he believes to be right, and for the support of those who fight for that cause.

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My Lords, although I have seen this morning a document bearing the authentic stamp of the party of which the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) is the head, in which "the critical position of our affairs connected with the war" is mentioned—I refer to a circular addressed to Members of the Parliamentary Opposition—I say of these affairs I, for one, do not despair. Things may be at first critical, as they are, and as all affairs in the course of a war will be; but I hope none of your Lordships nor the country will believe for a moment that the Government is at all dispirited—that we have no expectation of success. But what is still more important, let not your Lordships for an instant imagine that these brave men, with the gallant General at their head, are at all dispirited or discouraged. If I had not already trespassed on your Lordships so long with dry details, painfully to myself, but not uselessly, although I am aware tediously, I should be unwilling on this occasion to attempt any elaborate eulogium on that gallant army. My Lords, I feel they are above all praise of mine. I believe the records of war do not show greater deeds of valour, greater constancy, greater endurance, greater patience under privation and suffering, and greater courage in the moment of action. The same, too, must be said in a different degree of the naval force. Without the assistance of our fleet the efforts of our army would have been in vain, and whatever assistance our fleet could give to aid the efficiency of our army has been cheerfully given. Times have been in the history of this country when there has existed a jealousy between the two services. Thank God it exists not at this moment. I trust it never will again. So far from jealousy, the navy has shown—I speak not of the admirals nor of the captains, but of every man on board the ships—so far from jealousy, their whole anxiety has been to assist in every way the sister service. They have known that the ships of Russia were not for them to assail; they knew that those ships were placed beyond their power by those who feared to come out to face them; they knew that in alliance with France they could, if an opportunity had been afforded, have added another page to the book of fame, and proved that they, captains or men, were not degenerated from their ancestors—that they were still rivals of the fame of the sailors of Nelson—they knew that every one of those Russian ships which are now either tilted
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over in the harbour in order to bring their guns to bear on the allied armies, or sunk at its mouth, would, if they had ventured upon the ocean, have become an honourable prize to them and their friend and ally. But, finding this opportunity of obtaining glory denied to them, the navy has lost no occasion of slaving and toiling for the assistance of the army. To them is owing the manner in which the army was embarked. To them is due the success of the disembarkation. Let me not pause here. To them it is owing that, after the battle of the Alma, when heaps of our wounded lay on the field for miles, and when the means of conveying them were not sufficient, the navy assisted to bring them to the ships, and treated those soldiers during their passage in the ships to the hospitals with that same tenderness which has distinguished them towards their comrades in cases of cholera, attending upon them with an interest and with a kindness which reflects immortal honour on the service. I rejoice to think the seamen and marines of the fleet have been enabled to join, notwithstanding, in the siege of Sebastopol, and on land and in the trenches they have shown they are as gallant and as determined as their ancestors ever were.
My Lords, let me say one word more with reference to our Ally. From the first moment of this great enterprise all fears of mutual distrust and mutual differences have disappeared, and the greatest concord and friendship have existed between Lord Raglan on the one side, and Marshal St. Arnaud, so long as he was spared to us, and since then with General Canrobert, on the other; and not only between the generals, but among the officers, and even the private soldiers, has this spirit been exhibited. Side by side they have fought; side by side they have passed the weary moments of disease; and I believe never, under any circumstances, have two nations, even between whom long years of amity had existed, shown more true concord, more true co-operation, than has been evinced by these gallant allies and friends. My Lords, we can now refer with some exultation to the observations which we have heard of late years—to those prophecies that the military character of this country had perished through the long peace; that the enjoyment of luxuries and refinements and the acquisition of wealth had so weakened our energy and reduced our power that when war should come we should succumb to the first attacks of an enemy, and

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that we could never again make head against a foe who had been trained under a more military system than ourselves. My Lords, I think we have shown that such is not the case—that luxury has not weakened the character of the aristocracy or the gentry of this country. I think we have proved that years of peace have not enervated the spirit of the other classes of the community—that instead of being enervated, they have been elevated by the knowledge and civilisation which have spread among them.
My Lords, the noble Earl made an eloquent reference to the losses which we have sustained in these dreadful battles. It has been my painful duty on more than one occasion to break the sad tidings of the loss to affectionate relatives—to those who were always watching for reports of those who were most dear to them; and I have no hesitation in saying I have felt as keenly as any one the publication of those Gazettes which carry grief to hundreds of homes in this country. This very day there has been a Gazette with a number of men mentioned whose relatives—mothers, sisters, wives—have been anxiously waiting for the last three weeks for tidings. If I do not dwell upon this subject it is not that I do not feel as keenly as any one—that I do not sympathise with those who now mourn their losses, but that even at this moment the impression should not go forth that there was any spirit of weakness in this country. I believe those who are bereaved of their relatives are proud that they have fallen gloriously in the service of their country. In alluding to the army I must not forget to mention the absence of crime among it, which has been remarkable; and I think that fact must give the highest satisfaction to those noble Lords and others who occupy seats in this House and elsewhere who, during the last twenty years, have devoted their attention to the amelioration of the condition of the soldier in all respects. I think the conduct of the men in this war has shown the wisdom of the course which had been taken. We now see that the old theory, that men who are unfit for any other vocation make the best soldiers—that men devoid of religion, of faith, and of honour are the best fighters—has been refuted. We have seen our men fight as men never fought before, and yet they have shown by their letters home and by their conduct in the camp that they are men endowed with the highest feelings of piety and religion—that they are men as little
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given to the commission of crime of any kind as any class of men in the kingdom. What has been their, patience! We are frequently told that it is an Englishman's privilege to grumble. But it is we who grumble. It is we, who indulge in luxury and comforts at home, who are apt to grumble at little reverses and misfortunes. But what has been the conduct of these men, exposed as they have been to the chances of the climate, disease, and death? They have shown much enduring patience. Nothing can be more touching than the remark of a stalwart soldier, lying wounded in the hospital, on the arrival of the nurses—" This is indeed like England. Now we know our country cares for us poor wounded soldiers." That single reflection was a consolation to him for all he had undergone. Moreover, our soldiers had received such provocation as, thank God, no army before has received at the hands of any civilised enemy. This enemy which our men met, not content with the legitimate use of their weapons, had the barbarity—the atrocious villainy I will call it—to murder in cold blood the wounded soldiers as they lay helpless on the field; and not the ignorant serfs alone did that, but men holding the position of officers. Our men have had to tight the savage and uncivilised Kafirs, but in no instance have they experienced such barbarism as with the Russian soldiers. I believe that our men, influenced by a spirit of Christianity, have forbore to revenge themselves, and thus have shown themselves superior to the soldiers of him who is fighting, according to his own statement, as the special champion of Christianity.
I hope, before I quit this part of the subject, I may be allowed to say one word respecting my illustrious friend the Commander in Chief. Your Lordships have no conception of what that noble General has done. No one but one who has been in constant communication with him can form any adequate notion of his merits. I believe, highly as he is respected by the country, his merits will not be known until some future day, when not only his despatches, but his private letters, which at present are in my possession, and, of course, must for a long time remain there or with my family, are published. It would be almost insulting to speak of Lord Raglan's courage, for that he possesses with all his officers; but he has shown greater qualities than this; and a friend who has seen him on the field speaks of

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the "divine calm" which prevails in Lord Raglan's mind, whether under a shower of balls or when shocked by the news of such disasters as the wreck of our transports. It may be my duty on an early day to refer to the services of Lord Raglan, and therefore I shall say no more of them at present—but I could not avoid some slight allusion to them. The noble Earl opposite has put a question which he said might probably be beyond the province of a Member of this House, whether as we are now about rewarding the services of our army, and the admiration of our Sovereign has been expressed at their deeds, some expression of the admiration of our Sovereign and Her people for the army of our brave Ally should not be conveyed with it. I know not whether it be beyond the province of the noble Earl to make the suggestion, but it obliges me to make a statement. Her Majesty has not required the suggestion of anybody in the matter. A fortnight or three weeks ago I received Her Majesty's commands to convey privately to Lord Raglan Her intention to confer the Order of the Bath on General Canrobert, and to convey that determination either to the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French, or to the Emperor himself. The official notification has only been delayed because it was thought the compliment would be more highly appreciated if offered at the same time that it was conferred on our own gallant soldiers.
My Lords, the noble Earl has spoken—and I have more than once heard—of the resolution of this country to prosecute the war with energy. I am confident that that resolution exists. I look around me, and in every direction, and among all classes in this country, I see an ardent desire manifested for the energetic prosecution of the war—I see hardly a dissentient. In that country which we were once told never sympathised with us in any of our difficulties—I mean the sister country—we see the same feeling exhibited; and if we look to the Colonies, we find in each and all the most gratifying testimony of approval and support. We have lately received a most gratifying proof of the existence of this feeling in the Colonies, in the contributions to the Patriotic Fund, which have been forwarded from Canada; and I rejoice that these contributions were not remitted solely to this country, but that they were sent, in equal proportions, to France. That cir-
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cumstance shows the complete union of the French and English population of Canada, and the complete identification of that Colony with the struggle in which we are engaged. The army have done their duty, and the country is prepared to do its duty likewise. The blood of our soldiers must not have been spilt in vain. I am not afraid that we shall suffer any harsh judgment for our acts. The people of this country are generous and just, and I can only say—and I say it with truth—that I for one rejoice in the pressure which is placed upon us from every part of the country and by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) and many noble Lords who may, perhaps, follow him in the course of this debate, because I see in it a proof that there is everywhere a determination to carry on this war with vigour, and that any exertions on our part to ensure that object will be seconded by the Parliament and the people. I am deeply sensible of my own personal position with respect to these matters. I am conscious that there are many who could better have undertaken the heavy duties which have devolved upon me. Often have I reflected upon the position which I, a civilian, have been called upon to occupy in carrying out the arduous operations of the war, and I have felt that, with the exception of my noble and gallant Friend on the cross-bench (Viscount Hardinge), there are at the present moment in this country, and in an official position, which entitles me to claim their opinions and advice, to assist and guide me, none of those experienced generals who learnt the art of war under that great man who has so lately departed. Those officers have gone into active service with the army, and we have therefore been placed under the greatest disadvantage with regard to the small amount of military experience in our military offices—with the single exception of my noble and gallant Friend the General Commanding in Chief (Viscount Hardinge)—which we have had to assist us. I can assure your Lordships that we have no object but success, and to attain that object we are determined to make every exertion. Reverses in war must come; we must expect them; and I feel confident that the country will not be dispirited by them. I will promise that they will not cause the Government to flinch. If reverses come, I believe that the country and the Government will alike be urged to fresh efforts. It is said that

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an English army never knows when it is beaten, and I am confident that if we should fail of complete success it will be found that that characteristic of our Army still exists.
I ought, before I sit down, to explain to your Lordships the objects for which Parliament has been called together, at this unusual period, for a short season. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) rightly anticipated that one of the measures which the Government are about to propose is a Bill to enable the militia regiments to volunteer for service abroad. The object of that measure will be obvious at once—namely, to enable us to remove to the seat of war those regiments which at present garrison Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. By such means I hope that in a very short time we shall be enabled considerably to strengthen the army under Lord Raglan. As that measure will be immediately laid before the House of Commons, and will, I hope, soon afterwards, come up to this House, I will not now enter into any further details upon the subject. I shall have the honour of laying upon the table of your Lordships' House a Bill to enable Her Majesty to drill and pay, within this country, foreign troops to a limited extent. Your Lordships are aware that, under existing Acts of Parliament, although we may pay foreign troops on foreign service, we cannot drill or train foreign troops in this country. We believe that, as in the last war, so on the present occasion, it is very important that the Government should have this power. It will only be necessary to give it to a limited extent, inasmuch as the forces so drilled and trained will be sent out from time to time to join our army in the East, and therefore the numbers under training in this country at one time need not be very considerable. Another measure, which, however, does not require the assent of Parliament, but which the Government have decided upon and have already commenced, it is right that I should mention to your Lordships. It is that of increasing the organisation of the army by adding four companies to each regiment of the army sent on foreign service, thus rendering the number of companies in each of those regiments sixteen. I will explain the object of this measure. In conducting a war at the distance of upwards of 3,000 miles from this country, of course very great inconvenience is felt in sending out reinforcements of all kinds; it
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is therefore most desirable that, for the future conduct of the war, we should have an army of reserve in some form or another, and the most fitting place for at least a portion of that reserve would, in our opinion, be Malta. I do not mean to say that we may not be obliged to resort to other places; but our general proposal is, that, while eight of the sixteen companies shall form the fighting companies, as at present, for foreign service, four companies shall be advanced from the depôt at home to the depôt of reserve at Malta or elsewhere, while four more companies remain, as at present, in depot at home. There will be this further advantage in the plan—that whereas at present, as we have only four companies in depot at home, both subalterns and men are necessarily sent out to the army at too early a period of their training, the four companies of reserve will insure a more efficient training, and render their services more valuable when they join the army. We propose, in adding these four companies to the battalions, that, with the view of encouraging enlistment from the militia, commissions should be given, one in each battalion, to militia officers, upon condition of their bringing a certain number of men with them from their regiments. I think noble Lords will see that this measure holds out considerable encouragement to enlistment, while at the same time it does not inflict any hardship upon the officers of the army. Another, although a small addition to the army, which we propose, is one of considerable importance in my estimation. We propose to add to the two Rifle Brigades, as they are now called, a third battalion to each. The Rifle Brigade at present consists of only two battalions, and the 60th Regiment of Rifles of two battalions. The value of that arm of the service has been shown in the present war, as well as upon former occasions; and we believe it will be very desirable to increase the force by one battalion each. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be made, to bring the greatest amount of force to bear. I sincerely trust that it will not be necessary to depart from that glory of England—the system of voluntary enlistment. We have resorted to various modes of enlistment, and of encouraging enlistment. My noble Friend the General Commanding in Chief has, with the consent of the Government, given to each battalion serving under Lord Raglan two officers' commissions for sergeants. One of these commissions was

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given after the battle of the Alma, and another has since been given. I believe this measure will prove a very considerable encouragement to the soldier. It is a system which I am confident will be generally approved and found to work well, notwithstanding that in some quarters, undoubtedly, prejudices still exist against it. Lord Raglan has also been empowered to grant good-service pensions to non-commissioned officers under his command; and I can only say that, in conjunction with my noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge), I shall make every exertion to increase the efficiency of the force.
My Lords, I must apologise for having trespassed at such length upon your Lordships' attention; but as the noble Earl opposite entered into all those points of reprehension of the Government which have been rife during the recess, I felt that it was my incumbent duty upon this, the earliest occasion, to give such explanations as might be in my power of the circumstances to which he has alluded here, and to which others have referred elsewhere. I have not endeavoured to extenuate faults, but, at the same time, I have endeavoured to lay before your Lordships what I believe to be a correct statement of the exertions which the Government has made. This, I am bound to say, that if blame attaches anywhere, it does not attach to any one of the army, officers or men, who are serving in the Crimea. I can assure your Lordships that, if we possess the confidence of Parliament, we will prosecute this war with a firm resolve and with unflinching perseverance. My Lords, I do not understand the phrase of "moderation" or of "moderate counsels" in war. I believe that any such counsels as counsels of moderation in war are counsels of imbecility. I have said that we will prosecute this war with firm resolve and with unflinching perseverance. While, on the one hand, we will not refuse to entertain overtures of peace, we shall not assent to any which are not only honourable but safe. My Lords, we place the fullest confidence in the armies; we trust with entire confidence in a noble people; and firm in the alliance and the friendship of a brave, a generous, and a powerful Ally, we have no fear of the issue of this contest; but, believing in the justice of our cause, and with a humble but firm confidence in Him who rules the fate and decides the destinies of nations, we have the highest hope of bringing the contest to a satisfactory issue. It is not for us to determine the time when
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it will be possible to close a war like this; but with these aids and assistance we confidently hope to bring the mighty contest to such an issue as may assure for a series of years the repose, the civilisation, and the prosperity of those countries of Europe which have been so unfortunately plunged into confusion by the pride and ambition of one aggressive Sovereign.
EARL GREY: My Lords, having been one of the very few of your Lordships who objected to the whole of that policy which has brought us into the present war, I think I should state upon this occasion that I cordially concur in the Address which has been proposed, and which I trust will be unanimously adopted. For though my opinion of the original impolicy of the war—I might use a much stronger word—is not altered, but confirmed by all that has since taken place, I thought from the first, and I think now, that, being once embarked in the contest—having once taken that line which, unfortunately, as I think, was chosen—there is no alternative but to carry on the struggle with the utmost energy and firmness. I therefore cordially join with your Lordships in voting the Address to Her Majesty, of which, if I rightly understand it, the main object is to pledge this House to second to the utmost of its power the efforts of the Government in carrying on the present contest. I am also glad to take this opportunity of saying that, while I deeply deplore all the misery which the war has carried into so many families, the waste of human life, and the employment for mutual destruction by Christian nations of those resources which might have been made to contribute so much to the general improvement and happiness of mankind, I still gladly acknowledge that, in the midst of all the evils of war, some good has undoubtedly arisen. I cannot but rejoice that, in the course of this contest, it has been proved to all the world that the British nation has not degenerated from its ancient courage. Tales had been circulated, both in this and in foreign countries, that we were so intent upon the arts of peace and the pursuit of wealth that, if the occasion called for it, we could not sacrifice that beloved wealth, or peril the lives which had been made easy and prosperous by the arts of peace, in carrying on any contest in which the nation embarked. It has been said, too, that the form of our Government would prevent the general union of the whole nation so as to put forth its

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strength in any struggle in which it might have the misfortune to engage. I am glad that, by this war, such idle and unfounded delusions have been dissipated; that it has been shown that our soldiers are not less, but, if possible, more, heroic than in former time; that the country, when, rightly or wrongly, it has believed that justice called it to enter into a quarrel, will put forth its strength without stint, and without regard to the sacrifices which the struggle may impose upon all ranks of the people; and that our free Government, instead of being an obstacle to the exertion of the full force of the nation, is, on the contrary, that which gives it double energy. I rejoice that all these things have been shown, because I believe that they afford no slight guarantee for the future tranquillity of the world, when the present contest shall have been brought to a close. I should now have sat down, were it not that, very unexpectedly to me, the whole policy of the Government, the whole manner in which the war has been conducted by Her Majesty's Ministers, has been so elaborately discussed by the noble Earl opposite and by the noble Duke at the head of the War Department, who followed him; and the noble Duke more especially, in the course of his speech, has expressed opinions which seem to me so erroneous that I feel it to be necessary— not to follow him in the long examination into which he entered as to all the acts and measures of the Government—but to make a few remarks upon some of the statements which have fallen from him. I think the noble Duke is entitled to credit for the candour with which he has admitted that mistakes have been committed by the Government in the conduct of the war. I, for one, should never have found fault with the Government for mistakes of detail. Every man of common intelligence must be aware that when the country had been so long at peace, and when, after forty years without experience of war, we are at once engaged in such a contest as is now going on, it was unavoidable that mistakes, and great mistakes, should be committed. I should not, therefore, think the Government liable to any great blame if they had only fallen into errors of detail; but when the noble Duke challenges the House, as he has done in his speech, to approve the general conduct of the war by Her Majesty's Government, I cannot help saying that I think your Lordships and the country have no right to be satisfied with it. I think there has been one great
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and fatal error which has run through the whole of their proceedings—the error well described by the noble Earl opposite, who said that everything had been done "too late." In comparing the speech of the noble Duke with the statement of the noble Earl opposite, it is impossible not to see that he has failed to rebut its main allegations; he has not been able to show that there are not good grounds for believing that in the first instance the Government were not aware of the magnitude of the task they had undertaken—that they did not consider sufficiently what would be the nature of the contest in which they were engaged, and that they did not, with that foresight and with that judgment which we ought to expect in the rulers of a great empire, form the general plans on which they were to act. Some observations which had fallen from the noble Duke have, I think, shown where the original error was. I was more than once struck, during the course of the noble Duke's speech, by his reference to the wars of former times. He said the Government had sent out to Sebastopol a battering train of more than double the power which the Duke of Wellington had ever had under his command, and that there were means placed at the disposal of the commanders in the Crimea far beyond those which any British general had ever before possessed. The noble Duke said he had consulted with those who were experienced in war, and had met all they had pointed out as necessary. I fear that here is the noble Duke's error. He has looked at times past without considering how great are the changes which have taken place in the world in the course of the last half-century. Does he forget how greatly the country has increased in population since the time the Duke of Wellington conducted that memorable contest in the Peninsula? Does he forget that our increasing population is as nothing to our increasing wealth, and that even the increase of our national wealth is an inadequate measure of the great increase in our resources? When the Duke of Wellington was in Spain, steam power had not been successfully applied to ocean navigation. When the Duke of Wellington was in Spain, all those wonderful improvements in mechanical science which railroads have called into existence were entirely unknown. Science has since those days doubled, and trebled, and quadrupled the powers of man; and, under these circumstances, was it safe to follow the beaten I track, and to apply, as the noble Duke

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says he has done, to professional men, who could tell him the provisions of former wars, who could point out to him what was done in former times, and call upon him to follow the example? A very different course should have been taken. All the resources of modern times should have been called into vigorous exercise. The Emperor of Russia, as the noble Earl has well said, has shown himself alive to those resources; and indeed, the noble Duke says he never gave the Emperor of Russia credit for being able to make those prodigious exertions he has done, and for being able to make in a fortnight a march which it was thought he could not accomplish in six weeks. It appears to me that throughout the war our measures have not been duly considered, and adopted in sufficient time; and there has been the great error. The noble Duke says he has applied to some gentlemen connected with railroads who are now going to send out labourers and all the materials for the construction of a railway from Balaklava, in order to provide greater facilities for carrying guns and stores to the army. Now, my Lords, is it not rather late in the day to commence this kind of work? and was not the idea an obvious one from the first? The Government surely knew that they had artillery and stores to carry up to positions where they could be employed against the town, and they also knew that on every railway in the kingdom science had discovered modes of economising labour, and of giving greater effect to works of this description. If these measures had been adopted earlier, let us consider for a moment what might have been the result. We all know what was our position at the battle of Inkerman. It is utterly impossible to describe adequately the merits of the soldiers engaged in that struggle, and to express our feelings as to the heroism with which they encountered the difficulties of that day; but, at the same time, our reflections are mixed with pain, and not unalloyed with indignation, that our troops should have been exposed to so arduous a contest with odds so much against them. They were contending with—I am afraid to say how many to one—five or six to one, at the very least; and had they been repulsed, and had that position been taken by the enormous army which Russia brought into the field, I firmly believe that the capture or destruction by the enemy of the whole allied army would have been the probable consequence.
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We were fighting for our very existence, and, by a miracle, the heroism of our troops, favoured by Providence, prevailed. But is it right that so great, so extreme a danger should have been incurred, and that the most valuable blood of the country should have been shed like water, under difficulties so great, and in circumstances in which success was so nearly impossible? When I passed through Newcastle on Saturday I was told that some of the steam colliers belonging to that port had just been taken up for the public service, and were then preparing to carry the workmen who were to be employed in constructing the railway at Balaklava. It seems, therefore, that they are going out now, in the middle of the month of December; but if they had been sent out earlier a great risk might have been escaped. Before the battle of Inkerman, we are told, the necessity for additional works of defence to strengthen the position attacked by the Russians had been seen, and that, in point of fact, the reason for not executing them was, that the troops were too hard pressed by their labours in the trenches—that their numbers were so small that they were already overworked; and it being therefore impossible to impose this additional task upon them, reliance was placed upon the natural strength of the ground. If the assistance which now, so late in the day, is being sent out had been at hand, the position might have been made so strong that the enemy would never have risked an attack upon it. Then, again, it was only a week or ten days ago that the first ships conveying wooden houses for the troops to winter in left the shores of this country, and as, at the very earliest, they cannot be put up before the middle or end of January, a considerable portion of the winter will have passed over by that time. Surely the wintering of the troops was a matter which might have been foreseen by the Government; for, even if Sebastopol had fallen, the probability was that the town would have been destroyed in the struggle, and that some place or other would be required in which to lodge the troops. Even if they should have been withdrawn from the Crimea altogether, it was extremely improbable that provision could be found for them in any place it might be desirable they should be taken to, and huts for the troops to winter in would still have been necessary for their health and comfort:—and, therefore, months ago

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there were no reasons why these measures should not have been adopted. The noble Earl opposite has referred to the fleet in the Baltic, as showing a general want of plan for the conduct of the war. I do not see that this charge has been at all answered, for though it may be true, and I dare say is so, that it was impossible that more should be effected there, surely, before it was determined to send so large a fleet to the Baltic, it should have been considered what it was to do when it got there. If upon deliberation it was held that a blockade of the Russian fleet was all that could be accomplished, a smaller force would have sufficed for this purpose, and then some of the means there uselessly employed would have been set free for other objects. There were many other objects to which the means wasted in the Baltic might have been applied with more advantage. For instance, instead of fitting out so much larger a fleet of ships of the line than was wanted in the Baltic, why were steam gunboats not built at an earlier period? I have heard many naval officers discuss the measures that have been taken, but I never heard one who did not say that the moment there was a question of carrying on war, either in the Baltic or the Black Sea, the first thing to be looked to was a large flotilla of steam gunboats Now, it is true that steam gunboats have been built, but when? I believe it was not till the mouth of June that they were ordered, and though it was then shown that they can be built rapidly, they have been too late for the present season. The want of them should have been foreseen; and, the moment there was real cause to apprehend a quarrel, a large flotilla of steam gunboats should have been built, regardless of the expense, and despatched to where their services would have been of the most value. The importance of these gunboats cannot be overrated. For instance, if we are to judge from General Canrobert's despatch, the Russians have received considerable supplies from Asia, which have been conveyed across the Sea of Azoff. Our large ships cannot go into that sea; but if we had had forty or fifty gunboats, each mounting one gun of large calibre, the Sea of Azoff would have been effectually closed against Russia. What I feel is, that the whole subject has not been considered together; that a general scheme of the manner in which the war was to be conducted was not framed in the first instance, upon a careful review of all the
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information accessible to Government, and of all the circumstances of the country and the times in which we live. Instead of this having been done, if we look to the measures which have been adopted, we shall find great activity indeed in meeting wants when they are actually felt, but no foresight in providing against them beforehand—no anticipation of exigencies likely to arrive—and no taking of measures so that when the want arose the supply might be there. Instead of this, you first had to feel the want, and then to take measures to provide against it. There are some remarkable proofs of the absence of such a well-considered plan as would have ensured a uniformity of principle and consistency in all the operations of the war. Take one example. Some time ago Odessa was bombarded, but the batteries only were attacked, and it was said as a reason for sparing the town that it would be a dreadful thing to carry on war by a wanton destruction of private property; but in the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia a different principle has been adopted, and the Government has thought fit to sanction the destruction of private property, and to incur a risk far greater—namely, of arousing the hostility of a people whom it was their interest to conciliate. This was done because it was considered necessary to destroy the resources of an enemy in time of war; and, if that was a sound principle, was it not also equally sound to destroy the large resources and all the wealth that had been accumulated at Odessa? I have not the slightest doubt that the corn, and other stores at Odessa, were the very means which enabled the Emperor of Russia to carry his forces to the Crimea in a manner which has so much surprised her Majesty's Government. Though I feel it is assuredly a very dreadful thing to carry on war by destroying private property, still, I am afraid we cannot carry on war without it, and, when the expedition to the Crimea was despatched, I cannot understand why measures were not taken to prevent the resources then at Odessa from being made available to the Russians. After the Russians had sunk several of their ships in the mouth of the harbour of Sebastopol, our whole fleet was no longer of any real use off that port, but, by an attack upon Odessa, it might have made a most valuable diversion, which would have prevented our troops having so large a force to contend with. Having made these observations, I

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will only add that I really do not desire to criticise minutely and to point out all the faults which one might easily find in the conduct of the Government in the management of the war. All I wish is to show that there has been a want of foresight and judgment in some of their past operations, in order that they may be induced now to look a little further before them, and to take their measures accordingly. If they do this, it is all I desire from them, and my first wish would be to strengthen them as far as possible. This would certainly not be a proper opportunity for me to say a word with regard to the measures which are coming before us hereafter, and I have but one single observation to make on that part of the speech of the noble Duke. He says it has been determined by Government to reward the troops in the Crimea by giving to every battalion engaged one commission for each of the two battles of the Alma and Inkerman to non-commissioned officers. I entirely approve that determination, and I think it only fair and right to the noncommissioned officer. But it has hitherto been the custom, when sergeants have distinguished themselves, to give them ensigns' commissions, and that plan has not answered. I appeal to those who know the state of the Army, and who are acquainted with the manner in which the system of promoting non-commissioned officers has acted, to confirm what I say. A sergeant, when promoted, is required to live as an officer with the mere pay of an ensign, and, what is more—he is generally somewhat more advanced in life, has seen more service, knows more of the Army, and has been used to have more responsibility placed upon him than the ensigns Of eighteen or nineteen with whom he is associated, who have no responsibility, and who, in fact, are only beginning to learn their profession. Therefore, seeing the manner in which the system of promotions hitherto carried out has acted, I trust the noble Duke, in giving to sergeants a well-merited reward for their conduct in the field, will depart from former precedent, and give them commissions as captains of regiments. By doing this a real and substantial reward will be given them; they will be placed in a position of respectability, and with it the means of supporting that position. To follow the old system will place them in a position which has led to the ruin of many, for I have known many instances of ser-
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geants who have been promoted to ensigncies who have been ruined by their false position.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he thought Her Majesty's Government had no reason to complain of the tone and temper of the discussion which had taken place, and felt assured that the remarks which had been made upon the conduct of Government by the noble Earl opposite, and his noble Friend who had just sat down, evinced nothing of a factious spirit. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) said he was desirous of abstaining from entering into details, and wished only to notice general points in which a want of foresight had been exhibited. His noble Friend had, however, in his opinion, noticed nothing but details; and had entirely lost sight of the greater and more important features of the case, as it presented itself to the notice of the Government and of the country. The first point noticed by his noble Friend had reference to the intimation given by the noble Duke the Secretary for War that he had accepted the offer of a contractor for the formation of a railway between Balaklava and the camp of our army. His noble Friend asked if this was not a very obvious idea, and if it would not have been just as easy on the part of the Government to have provided for such a work long ago. Now, if Government had made any such provision at first, they would have been laughed at, and most deservedly too, for nothing but circumstances, which no human foresight could possibly have foreseen, could have rendered it possible that such a railway could be constructed. The fact of our army having landed at many miles distance from Sebastopol and the uncertainty of the direction of their operations after the landing should have been effected, showed at once how absurd it would have been to have contemplated any operation of such a nature. Nothing but the unforeseen circumstance of the flank march upon Balaklava, and of our having possession of the harbour there, could have rendered such an expedient possible. And, indeed, when we were in possession of Balaklava, he doubted whether by any aid the guns could have been placed in position earlier than in seventeen days, by which time they were actually employed. Another point of great importance, commented upon by both the noble Earls, was the preparations made for the despatch of the Baltic fleet. But there was one circumstance wholly kept out of sight by both. There was an old proverb,

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"Out of sight out of mind." Now, the Russian fleets had been so completely kept in their own harbours that everybody seemed disposed to forget that they existed. It ought to be remembered, however, that at the beginning of this war England was unprovided with a sufficient number of line-of-battle ships to meet the Russian fleet in the Baltic, and, consequently, if the Government had neglected to prepare men-of-war, and had devoted their attention to gunboats only, these would have been soon destroyed by the fire of the enemy's heavy ships. When our fleet first sailed to the Baltic the number of line-of-battle ships under Sir C. Napier did not exceed eighteen, while the Russians numbered twenty-seven; and so great was the disparity in number that he remembered a naval officer remarking that he supposed, of course, the Government counted upon a junction of a number of French ships. That junction, however, as their Lordships would remember, did not take place until some time afterwards. Although, then, it was a matter of obvious propriety to have both line-of-battle ships and gunboats for operations in the Baltic, yet the time of the Government was wholly occupied in preparing the former, in order to render the British fleet able to cope with that of the enemy; and had the labour in dockyards been diverted to the building gunboats they would not have been able to get the fleet ready for sea. The noble Earl, in his remarks on the forbearance of our navy at Odessa, had not been more fortunate. It might be a matter of opinion whether that town ought to have been destroyed, but his own impression was that if such a course had been taken the greatest possible damage would have been done to the Crimean expedition. There was good reason to believe that, although the newspapers of this country published at an early date that the expeditionary force was intended for the Crimea, the Russians did not believe we should be such fools as to publish our real intention to the world. They believed, on the contrary, that the expedition was meant for Odessa, and they congregated a large body of troops in its neighbourhood for the defence of that town, failing to send them to the Crimea. In this way the enemy were prevented from sending large reinforcements, which would have been long before on their march to Sebastopol had Odessa been attacked, as suggested. He declined altogether to go
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over the debates of last year in answer to the assertion of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) that war ought to have been declared earlier. He could only express his own gratification that no stone had been left unturned to secure the great objects which this country had in view by a course of negotiation; but although war was not formally declared until the 27th March, still active preparations for both Army and Navy were going on previous to that date. With regard to the noble Earl's attack upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer's financial arrangements in March last, as merely contemplating the sending of 25,000 men to Malta, and bringing them back again, their Lordships must remember that those were but interim arrangements, and that the more complete estimates connected with the war were brought before the House at a later period of the Session. The noble Earl appeared to think that, the army of Omar Pacha having repulsed the Russians, the inactivity of our army at Varna was very highly to be deprecated, and that the expedition to the Crimea was, more or less, a mere afterthought. Their Lordships must, however, recollect that, although the winter campaign had been more or less a defensive one upon the part of the Russians, a few days before the declaration of war in this country the army of the Russians had assumed the offensive, had forced the line of the Danube, and had advanced almost to the fort of Kostendje. Omar Pacha expressed anxiety for the safety of Varna itself. Under these circumstances, looking at the insurrection in Greece, and to the manifestation of sympathy among the Christian inhabitants of Turkey in favour of Russia, he thought the Government was justified in sending out the troops with a view, in the first instance, to the defence of the line of the Balkan. If the troops had been sent in the first instance to Sebastopol, such a course could not have failed to be considered in the highest degree rash. He believed that, in spite of the brave defence made by the Turkish garrison of Silistria, that place would have fallen before the repeated attacks of the Russians unless our army had been at Varna, giving the Turks the moral support of their presence, and unless certain arrangements had taken place with Austria, which he believed had had a material effect upon that portion of the campaign. As to the occupation of the Principalities by Austria, a very erroneous idea pre-

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vailed in this country with regard to it. The noble Earl opposite forgot that the convention between Austria and the Porte was entered into on the 14th of June, several days before the final assault on Silistria failed, and he could not doubt for a moment that considerable effect was produced on the Russian armies in the Principalities by the fact of that treaty having been concluded. The siege of Silistria, be it remembered, lasted upwards of two months; during that period Omar Pacha had a large force concentrated at Shumla, yet prudently declined a battle — a fact which proved that he did not consider his army able to contend alone with the Russian forces. If, therefore, the allied army had gone at once to the Crimea, it was by no means improbable that Omar Pacha would have been overwhelmed by the superior forces and superior numbers of the enemy. It was evident, indeed, looking to all the circumstances, that the Government, could not have undertaken the expedition to the Crimea until the siege of Silistria was raised. As to the treaty with Austria, on which the noble Earl commented, it had always appeared to him (the Duke of Argyll) that there were two great general views, one of which we must take, of this war. There was the view, which he was sure not one of their Lordships held, that the object of this war was some such vague one as had been mentioned on various platforms out of doors—some object of warring against despotic Governments, and of supporting what were called "oppressed nationalities." But if their Lordships did not adopt this view, they must heartily embrace the other—namely, that the only and single object of the war was to resist the progress of the dominion of Russia in the east of Europe, and that we must pursue that object in an unselfish spirit, as one in which the interests of all the rest of Europe were immediately concerned. He contended we ought to urge this object of the war on the existing Governments of Europe, and that we ought not to be discouraged in our efforts by any amount of reluctance or slowness of which otherwise we might have a right to complain. That was the course which the Government had pursued, and he thought it was a wise course; and though, perhaps, he was disposed to agree with those who thought the policy of Austria might have been better if a more frank and open part had been taken at an earlier period of the contest, yet he
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thought we were bound to let other nations judge for themselves of their own interest, and that we should not meanwhile use towards them the language of distrust and suspicion. He trusted that the measures of the Government in this direction would at last be crowned with a very considerable degree of success. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) had begun his speech by declaring that nothing which had occurred had shaken his original opinion of the impolicy of the war. Now, he (the Duke of Argyll) must express the very different impression which he had received from watching the progress of events during the last few months. He was convinced that if ever there was a war of European interest—if ever there was a war which was above all things in the interest of those Powers connected with the east of Europe—this was that war. This, too, was evidently the conviction of the Powers in question; but, notwithstanding, they were lagging behind us in the honourable course of asserting the independence of Europe and resisting the aggression of Russia. Why were they so lagging? Did it not prove that there existed that overweening influence on the part of Russia which his noble Friend was disposed to deny? He confessed that the impression he derived was that the fear of that Power was in every Cabinet, and was oppressing all the Courts of Europe. The day, however, had now come when a united stand ought to be made against her oppressions, and it was the duty and privilege of the two great Western Powers to take the lead in that great contest. So far, therefore, from being shaken in the least as regarded the justice and expediency of the war, the first of which not even the noble Earl had impugned, he was confirmed—and he believed, with some few exceptions, the people of this country were confirmed—in the belief that this was a war not only of justice, but of expediency.
THE EARL OF HARD WICKEthought that the result of the discussion in which they were engaged had been to leave their Lordships very much in the same position as they had been at its commencement—namely, to leave undisturbed the opinion that at the outset of the present contest the Government were not prepared to carry it out to the great extent which the occasion demanded. His noble Friend the noble Duke opposite had, indeed, made the admission that there had been considerable shortcomings upon the part of Her

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Majesty's Ministers, and, among other things, had informed the House that when the war in which we were involved had been entered into, the invasion of the Russian dominions constituted a portion of the design which the Government had in view in its prosecution. Well, but if that were the case, was not he (the Earl of Hardwicke) justified in saying that Ministers had made no adequate preparation for the attainment of the great object which they professed to have in view? But it appeared that when the design of invading Russia was formed, the Government were of opinion that the Russian forces in the Crimea could not have been reinforced with such rapidity as was actually the case. Now, that was an important admission and one which showed that the Government had not obtained sufficient information upon a point of considerable importance. They ought to have been aware that the Russian army in the Principalities having been set at liberty by the intervention of Austria, might, without difficulty, turn themselves to the prosecution of any operations which they might think fit. The greater portion of that army, thus released from the necessity of carrying on a contest with the Turkish forces, were in fact within twenty days march of the Crimea; and yet Her Majesty's Ministers had no idea that the troops in that quarter could be speedily reinforced. It might be true, as the noble Duke had stated, that upon no former occasion had so large an army been sent out for the purpose of military operations, as that which had lately been sent to the East. Such might have been the case; yet larger reserves had invariably been collected upon previous occasions than had been maintained in the present instance. He had risen principally to thank the noble Duke for having said a word in favour of the navy; for though the term "forces" was used, it was generally thought that the term applied to the army in the Crimea, and not to the navy. The noble Duke had done justice to the navy in the Black Sea, and he (the Earl of Hardwicke) begged to differ from his noble Friend near him (the Earl of Derby) in the opinion he entertained of the Baltic fleet. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had stated that gunboats alone would have been of no use in the Baltic; but he (the Earl of Hardwicke) would remind the noble Duke that between Cronstadt and St. Petersburg there was a flat of water ten or
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twelve miles long, about nine miles in breadth, and five feet deep; and he thought that a squadron of gunboats would have operated with great effect on Cronstadt, and even upon St. Petersburg. It would he too late next year for any operation of that sort. For himself, he never expected that Sir Charles Napier would attempt to deal with the strong fortresses of Cronstadt and St. Petersburg; but he knew well that if the Admiral met the Russian fleet in the open sea, he would have given an account of them. He was not one of those who thought that wooden ships could have any great success against stone walls and casemated batteries. He absolved his gallant Friend who commanded the Baltic fleet from anything like misconduct or neglect; but, on the contrary, he thought that he had very ably conducted our fleet without disaster, and believed that if he had attempted any attack upon the stronghold, disaster was likely to have ensued. If he had any fault to find with his gallant Friend it was that there had been rather too much jollifying before he went out, so that the public had been led to believe that something great was to be done. In the failure of the attack by the fleet on Sebastopol, Sir Charles Napier had a complete answer to any remarks that might be made on his conduct. Having said this much on that point, he wished now to ask what they were fighting for—what was the object of the war? The original object was to drive the Russians out of Turkey, and to keep them out; but by the invasion of the enemy's country and the attack upon Sebastopol, the character of the war had been entirely changed. The liberties of Europe were not now invaded, for the Emperor of Russia had been driven out of Wallachia and Moldavia, and was confined to his own territories. He wished success to our arms for the honour of the country; but in his opinion, even if Sebastopol were taken, they would be further from peace than they were now. They might hold the Crimea as a material guarantee, and blockade the Russian ports. But could they do it long? He did not think they could. They might depend upon it, that by and by the taxpayers of this country would seek to be told for what purpose the war was carried on. By permitting the Emperor of Russia to cross the Pruth and occupy the Danubian provinces they had committed him with his own subjects. His own opinion was, that they would have

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more difficulty in making peace than they imagined, unless they distinctly stated what their object was in detail. Not one word had been said by the Government with respect to the treaty with Austria, of which they were called upon to express their approval. He protested against being called upon to agree to an Address pledging the House to agree with what they knew nothing. If the Government were going to enter into a bargain with Austria to support her in Poland, Italy, and Hungary, in consideration of the support she was about to give France and us in this war, they might be assured that the people of this country would not for a moment support any such bargain.
THE EARL OF CARLISLEsaid, he wished to make a few observations with regard to the present position and prospects of the War. But, in the first place, he wished to say that he agreed most cordially with all that had been said as to the admirable conduct, the brilliant valour, and steady devotedness, which had distinguished both the naval and military service, and the army more especially, because upon it had devolved the greater share of the labour. It had been reserved for them, in connection with our gallant ally, to exhibit to the world some of the most distinguished excellences which had marked different epochs in the world's history—the steady devotion of the heroes of antiquity—the isolated daring of the days of chivalry—in combination with the resources of modern science and skill. In common with the people of this country, he thought it could not be denied that we had a just cause of quarrel in this war; but he would not say that he had so clear a conviction of its necessity, and he had felt that the tone prevalent in the expression of public opinion at the commencement partook too much of what he called swagger, and too overweening a confidence in the certainty of success. Feeling, however, that they were now embarked in a war which could not be said to have been undertaken from either ungenerous or self-interested motives, he thought it must be the wish of them all that while it lasted it should be carried on with all possible vigour, in order to ensure at the earliest moment an honourable and durable peace. The spirit and energy of the country were heart and soul in sympathy with the brave defenders of our cause. There was no danger of any Ministry that could exist in the country now failing either
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in vigour or constancy in supporting to the utmost of its power our gallant forces, nor was there the least danger of the Government assenting to any conditions inconsistent with the honour and credit of this country and of its allies. He hoped the Government would bear in mind that, though a portion of the public of this country might put itself forward to discourage any notion of peace, except upon extreme conditions and subversive bases, they might depend upon it that the calm, sober, reflecting, conscientious feeling of the country would be ultimately—he believed at once—with those who, on the indispensable conditions of the terms of peace being fair, safe, and honourable, should attain them at the earliest possible period. He believed that the Government, now that they were upon the alert, would carry on the war with all possible vigour.
THE EART OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, I should be sorry to detain your Lordships at this late hour for any length of time, but I wish to advert to some expressions which have fallen from the noble and gallant Earl opposite (the Earl of Hardwicke), and to refer to an objection taken by a noble Earl who spoke earlier (the Earl of Derby) to an expression in the Address. The noble and gallant Earl said, that this war was undertaken in defence of the liberty of the Turkish empire; but, he added, you have changed the whole character of the war, and this expedition to Sebastopol has removed you from the possibility of obtaining what you desire. Now, I humbly beg to remind the noble Earl that if there be one point more than another more vital to the safety and independence of the Turkish empire, and more clearly injurious to the power of Russia, it is the destruction of the fortress of Sebastopol. Therefore having driven the Russians out of the Principalities, the next direct object of the war, which everybody must have had in view from its very commencement, and from which we could only have been restrained by a doubt of its practicability, was an attack upon and destruction of Sebastopol. Notwithstanding the mistake in the eager desire and expectation with which this country viewed the first landing in the Crimea and its immediate consequences—a mistake in which all Europe shared at the time—still I think that there are good grounds to hope that success will attend our efforts. I totally disagree from the noble Earl in thinking that the prospect of peace wil be

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diminished by that success. Quite the contrary; I feel satisfied that nothing could contribute so much to the probability of obtaining those terms of peace which my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Carlisle) has alluded to as the signal success which I hope we may achieve in this undertaking. The noble Earl also referred to the mention of the treaty with Austria in the Speech, and said that he was unwilling to express satisfaction at a treaty of the contents of which he was ignorant, and which might bind us to terms of a highly objectionable nature, such as would not be sanctioned by the people of this country; and he talked of our supporting Austria in Italy, Poland, and Hungary, and denounced any such object as a part of that engagement. The noble Earl may make himself perfectly easy upon that score, as no engagement of such a description either exists or ever entered into our minds. It is unnecessary, however, to say this, as I presume that your Lordships do not think it possible that we should have made such an engagement. But the noble Earl who spoke early in the evening (the Earl of Derby) did not, I think, correctly understand the import of the sentence in the Address to which he objected. We do not propose that the House should express any satisfaction with the treaty. We propose only that the House should "learn with satisfaction" that Her Majesty has made a treaty from which She anticipates important advantages. That is all the satisfaction. It is not that we are "satisfied" until we know what it is, but that we "learn with satisfaction" that the Queen has entered into a treaty from which She anticipates advantage. Now, my Lords, I think that you may safely express as much satisfaction as that without committing yourselves to a particle of satisfaction with the treaty itself.
THE EARL OF DERBY: The phrase, as interpreted, then, is, that we are exceedingly glad that Her Majesty and Her Majesty's advisers approve of the treaty which they have made.
Motion agreed to, Nemine Dissentiente; and a Committee was appointed to prepare the Address: The Committee withdrew; and, after some Time, Report was made of an Address drawn by them, which, being read, was agreed to, and Ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.
House adjourned to Thursday next,