Sitting of 11 July 1853

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Liverpool, Hon. Henry Thomas Liddell, and Thomas Berry Horsfall, Esq.
PUBLIC BILLS.—3° Stamp Duties (No. 1); Land Revenues.

LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND) BILL.
Order for Committee read; House in Committee.
Clause 70 (What may be taken as a Distress).
Amendment again proposed, in page 23, line 39, to leave out the words "growing corn, hops and roots, fruits, and other produce."
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 62; Noes 54: Majority 8.
Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."
Mr. KENNEDYsaid, he should move the expunging of the clause, on the ground
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that it was fatal to the rights of tenants, which as much deserved to be respected as the rights of proprietors.
MR. NAPIERsaid, the clause had been fully discussed on Friday last, and, now that a fair division had been taken upon the question, he trusted that no further opposition would be offered to the passing of the Bill through Committee, which he was most anxious to effect that day.
MR. LUCASsaid, he had understood that the words on which they had just divided were not to be pressed; and upon that understanding many hon. Members had absented themselves from the House that morning. For himself he could not admit that there was any necessity for the Bill passing through Committee that day; and if such enactments as those contained in the clause under consideration were to be persisted in, he should not care if the Bill never passed at all. He should vote for expunging the clause.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, he must deny that there had been any arrangement or understanding on Friday last that the words in question were not to be pressed.
MR. DUNLOPsaid, he could see no difference between growing crops and crops after they had been severed from the land. No such distinction was recognised in Scotland or England; and what objection could there be to assimilating the law of the three countries in this respect? With every feeling on behalf of the tenant, he should vote for the clause.
MR. V. SCULLYsaid, he looked upon the Bill from beginning to end as one of pains and penalties against the tenantry of Ireland. He admitted that it was difficult to distinguish in principle between growing and cut crops. He had come to the conclusion, on the whole, that the right of distress should not exist at all unless there was reason to suppose that fraud was contemplated by the tenant—in fact, that the distress should operate simply in the way of a ne exeat regno, or an injunction. If the clause were agreed to, he should certainly take the sense of the House on the third reading.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, he must regret that be was not in his place before the last division was taken, to make the few observations which he would now take the liberty of addressing to the Committee on the subject of this clause. If he was not mistaken, they were now discussing the question of whether the right ought to be conferred upon the landlord of distraining

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upon the growing crops of his tenant: that was substantially the question they were discussing. It was right, however, that he should state that in 1846 he introduced au Act of Parliament altering the law in that respect. He took that course in conformity with what appeared to him to be a wise recommendation in the Report of the Devon Commission, as well as in conformity with the wishes and opinions of the Lord Lieutenant of the time, and under the advice of the present Master of the Rolls. That change in the law he had no reason to regret, for although during the fatal period of the famine in Ireland there did occur an occasional instance of the surreptitious removal of growing crops, yet he was now happy to say that he was not aware of any recent instances of that nature which could justify their reverting to the old system. Whatever might be the right of the landlord in England respecting growing crops, it certainly had seldom or never been enforced in giving the power of distraint. For himself, he must say, after pretty long experience as a landlord, that he had never exercised the power of distress upon a tenant of his own; and, if it were now proposed practically to extend to Ireland a right of distress upon growing crops, which did not exist in England, he should certainly take the opportunity of voting against such a proposition.
MR. NAPIERsaid, he must support the clause as it stood; he could mention several cases where crops in Ireland had been cut down and carried off on a Sunday. Such proceedings invariably led to scenes of confusion and demoralisation, and he therefore hoped the Committee would not hesitate to change a law which served to encourage such a bad state of things. He hoped they might be able to abolish the right of distress altogether; but he thought that, taken in connexion with the other parts of the Bill, the clause was necessary. The Bill was improved in one respect, upon which he regretted that the right hon. Baronet was not present to hear the discussion on Friday. It was, that whereas the landlord had the power of distress for the recovery of six years' arrears, this Bill reduced it to one year, while great improvements were introduced in the mode of proceeding. He therefore trusted the Committee would allow the clause to stand part of the Bill.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, that he thought he had reason to believe that his right hon. and learned Friend himself had no very strong opinion on this subject.
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His right hon. and learned Friend said he hoped to see the right of distress abolished altogether, and yet he retained that right in its most obnoxious form in the present clause. With regard to the removing of the crops on the Sunday, that was provided for in the Bill, because it was made a misdemeanour, and that was certainly a stronger law than any that existed in England.
MR. CONOLLYsaid, he should support the clause. He had known numerous cases in which bands of infuriated men had assembled on the Sunday, and carried off the whole of the crops from the ground.
MR. G. A. HAMILTONwould suggest that the discussion should be taken upon I the third reading, because there were other matters contained in the clause besides that under review, and matters which it would certainly he desirable not to negative.
MR. GEACHsaid, he was opposed to the clause. The question seemed to be treated as if the tenant had no other creditor but his landlord. It was the oppressive power already possessed by landlords over tenants which frequently prevented independent persons coming to their rescue, and assisting them with their capital, as was frequently done in the case of trade.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 103; Noes 74: Majority 29.
Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 71 to 72.
Clause 73 (Distress not to be made on Sunday or at night).
MR. LUCASmoved to omit the words "unless the same shall become necessary by reason of any fraudulent removal of the goods and chattels liable to such distress."
Amendment proposed, in p. 24, 1. 21, to leave out from the word "sunrise" to the end of the Clause."
MR. SERJEANT SHEEsaid, he objected to the clause, and must express his surprise that the Bill should in any case permit distresses to be made on Sundays. They were now endeavouring to close the Crystal Palace on Sundays, and he was shocked that such a power as this should be taken, under such circumstances, in favour of the landlords of Ireland.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, the views of the hon. and learned Serjeant were exceedingly strange. The clause decided that distresses should not be levied on Sundays,

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Good Fridays, or Christmas Day; and the words objected to merely provided that the distress should be made on those days, in the case of a fraudulent removal. Nothing could be more reasonable than such a provision.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 106; Noes 60: Majority 46.
Clause agreed to.
Clause 74 (Removal of property after sunset to evade a distress a misdemeanour).
MR. LUCASsaid, he should move its omission on the ground of its excessive hardship. If a tenant merely dug up potatoes upon a Sunday night, he would be liable to be punished as for a misdemeanour.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, it was not necessary to constitute a misdemeanour that crops should be removed; they must be removed fraudulently with the object of evading the payment of rent.
MR. M'CANNopposed the clause; but before the hon. Member had concluded his objections, four o'clock arrived, when the Chairman left the Chair.
The House resumed.
Committee report progress.

RUSSIA AND THE PORTE.
MR. DISRAELI: I rise, Sir, to put two questions to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London with respect to the present state of affairs in the East. The first refers to a document which has reached this metropolis to-day, and which bears the title of a "circular despatch," addressed to the diplomatic agents of the Court of St. Petersburgh, and purports to be signed by Count Nesselrode. This document states that the occupation of the Danubian principalities by the Russians has been occasioned as much by the naval occupation of the Turkish ports by the combined fleets of England and France, as by the refusal of the Sultan to give that satisfaction to the Emperor of Russia which he demands; and it further states, that the Emperor will not retire from the principalities until complete satisfaction has been accorded to him by the Sultan, and until the combined fleets of England and France have left those ports in the Sultan's dominions which they at present occupy. I wish to know whether a copy of this circular despatch has been presented to Her Majesty's Government; and if it has not been
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presented, I wish to know whether, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it is an authentic document?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL said: In the last despatch received, Sir George Hamilton Seymour stated that he had not seen the circular despatch said to be signed by Count Nesselrode. I have no doubt, however, that, substantially, the despatch to which the right hon. Gentleman has alluded, and which has been published in the public journals, is authentic. I will not enter into the particulars to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred; but I do not think, in the first place, that Her Majesty's Government can in any manner substantiate the fact that the entry of the Russian troops into the principalities was caused by the sailing of the English and French fleets into the waters of Turkey; and, in the second place, I do not know, from my reading of the document, that there was any declaration in it to the effect that matters would not be arranged between Russia and Turkey unless the English and French fleets first left the Turkish waters.
MR. DISRAELI: The next question I have to ask Sir, is, whether Her Majesty's Government have received any information of the occupation of the Bosnian provinces by the Austrian army?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: We have not received any information of that nature. Indeed, the Austrian Minister has communicated to the Earl of Clarendon his total disbelief of any such occurrence. He says that he believes the report has been owing to the occupation of Peterwariden, a town within the Austrian territory, and he supposes that that step has given rise to the report.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA BILL.
Order for Committee read; House in Committee.
Clause 3 (Empowering Her Majesty to appoint three of the first Directors for two, four, and six years).
MR. VERNON SMITHsaid, he did not at all agree with the complaints which had been urged against the Government, relative to the position in which that House had been placed with regard to the India Bills—such complaints as that the measure had not been introduced earlier in the Session; while, if any were made at all, it ought to fall upon the Ministry of 1850 rather than upon the present Government, for not baying appointed a

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Committee of Inquiry similar to that appointed in 1830; and he hoped hon. Gentlemen opposite would excuse his saying that some degree of blame attached to the Opposition. The noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), on the second reading of the Bill, introduced the question of the expediency of delay in legislation—a question which, in his opinion, ought to have been, if raised at all, raised on the first reading; and the result was, that, although there had been a long discussion as to the necessity of delay, in strict truth, there had been none whatever upon the second reading of the Bill. There were principles involved in the details of the clause under consideration which made him feel desirous of provoking a discussion upon them, and for that reason he had risen to address the Committee. There were two questions decided by the vote of the other night: the first was, that there should be no delay in legislation, and the second was that the double government should be continued. He had not entered into the discussion, but recorded his vote without any consideration of the period of the Session, or the time of the introduction of the measure. As regarded the double government, he quite agreed with the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn, that, as far as the term was concerned, it was impossible to imagine a more unsatisfactory one. The very name implied in itself evils and confusion. The truth really was, that it was a system of mixed government. It was most important that, if a check were exercised upon the power of the Crown, it should be one of a perfectly independent nature, and he hoped that his Amendment would go towards accomplishing that object. He did not wish, like some hon. Gentlemen, to contract the principles of the Bill by his Amendment, but rather to carry them more fully into effect. He would, in proceeding to notice the principles of the clause, protest against the supposition that he was bringing forward anything adverse to the Government measure; he was, he believed, making a proposal which would give force to the measure, and he hoped that his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control would support it. What was the proposal of the Government with regard to the constitution of the Court of Directors? They proposed appointing a number of nominees on the Direction; the mere word itself, which described them, was associated with feelings of odium—
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Why do you use it then?
MR. VERNON SMITH: He could not help it, because it had come to be appropriated to persons appointed by the Crown; it was a word well known in our Colonial Government, and the noble Lord knew it well himself; or he might appeal to the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), whose experience in the Australian Colonies must have led him to take the same views as himself on the subject of the odium in which nominees of the Crown were held. He did not mean to say that nomination in a representative assembly in the Colonies was quite the same as nomination in the present instance would be to the Court of Directors. But who were those who would be appointed, if the Bill in its present shape were carried? The persons whom the Government had to put into the Court were those who had returned from service in India, and had procured seats in Parliament. The first object of those persons, after procuring a seat in that House, would be to go to the Treasury, and to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, or the noble Lord, to put them on the list of Directors for India. The claim of a seat in Parliament would be felt to be quite strong enough. A great cause of the inefficiency of the present system had been the difficulty of placing able men in the Court of Directors, well acquainted with Indian affairs; but he did not think that the present measure would obviate that difficulty. In the course of the inquiry, names of persons of high eminence had been brought forward, who had refused to enter the Board of Directors, on account of the system of canvassing. Now, he would not enter upon the question of canvassing, but would simply ask was it very likely that the men who had been deterred by that system from taking a seat at the Board of Directors, would consent to sit there as Government nominees? It was not to be expected that such men as Sir Charles Metcalfe, Lord Elphinstone, or Sir Henry Pottinger, would consent to be placed in the Court of Directors with a small salary, in order merely to become the instrument of Ministers, for the purpose of attending the House of Commons, to make a House and keep a House, which were the duties which Mr. Canning assigned to similar offices. He believed that the present proposal of the Government to add six nominees to six old Indian servants elected by the Court of

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Directors, in addition to six more elected by them, for what qualifications was yet unknown, if carried into effect, could not by possibility be brought to work harmoniously, for each section would be resolved to have their own way, as thinking it of necessity the only course which was correct. Again, what would be the position of the Crown nominees in the Court? If the nominees were men of activity and of great ability, they would say—"The House of Commons and the Government have selected us, and we will override the other Directors elected by the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors;" and if they were not active and able men, the other Directors would say—"We are the real representatives, you are but the nominees, and the power must belong to us." What now were they to do with the Secret Committee, which was composed of old Indian servants, and the effect of which was to reduce gentlemen to the mere duty of registering in the books of the Company the opinions which were approved of by others. If the nominees of the Crown would embarrass the Court of Directors, how much more would the President of the Board of Control be stultified by his own nominees if he purposed to continue the P.C. correspondence. The right hon. Gentleman had a veto vested in him; he might think that a particular despatch was objectionable; a meeting with the Court of Directors was the consequence; but when he should object to it, he would find himself answered by the Court asking how he could object to it, since it was chiefly supported by his own nominees, or how he could wish to undo his own arrangements, which had placed these six gentlemen in the Court? He should be glad to see the President of the Board of Control under the same roof as the Court of Directors; and it might still be desirable even now to introduce a clause into the Bill which would have the effect of bringing that about; for no man who had ever trod the floor of an office could doubt for one moment that much time might be saved, and a vast amount of business got through, if both the parties concerned in it were under the same roof. That, besides, would have the effect of checking the little jealousies which were but too apt to grow up between the two offices, such as, indeed, he had himself witnessed in operation, manifested by the one office picking holes in every thing which was sent up from the other. As to the President himself, he had no wish to diminish his power, and he was
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only sorry to see the right hon. Gentleman was not taking any means to increase it. The President of the Board of Control did not fill that office in the Cabinet which he ought to do. He did not mean that he ought to be a Secretary of State, because there would be a difficulty about a Secretary of State issuing orders to the Court of Directors, which was a very sufficient reason for not making that change. But he would increase his salary, which had been cut so low in one of those hot fits of economy that the office was now become either a stepping-stone or a refuge. It was very evident that the President did not have that sway which his position entitled him to, and his functions would require. In support of his opinion respecting the Court of Directors, he might refer to the opinion of the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay), and if he were in the House he trusted to have his support. That right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh said—
"The plan suggested by Mr. Wynn, is, I think, the very worst I ever heard. He would have Directors nominated every four years by the Crown. Is it not plain that these Directors would always be appointed from among the supporters of the Ministry for the time being?—that their situations would depend upon the permanence of that Ministry?—that, therefore, all their power and patronage would be employed for the purpose of propping that Ministry, and, in case of a change, for the purpose of molesting those who Wright succeed to power?—that they would be subservient while their friends were in, and factious when their friends were out?"—[3 Hansard, xix. 516.]
His Amendment was, to leave out the words, "It shall be lawful that Her Majesty, by Her Sign Manual;" and if he were successful in that, he proposed introducing in their stead the following: "The Court of Directors, with the approbation of Her Majesty, to be signified by Her Royal Sign Manual, countersigned by the President and Commissioners for the Affairs of India." The effect of it would be to make the appointment an appointment by the Court of Directors, limited, if it pleased the House to do so, to three-fourths of the assembly, which was the minimum required by the Act of 1773. He would further limit them by excluding ex-Directors from the list of those who were eligible, so that it might not be said they were choosing one another. He should also say that those who had been absent more than a certain time from India, ought not to be eligible. At the same time that he laid these views before the Committee, he

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wished not to be supposed as thinking that Her Majesty's Ministers, with the public eyes upon them, were capable of transacting a job in the constitution of that Court which they professed a desire to improve, and not to deteriorate. In the main, he found himself supported in these views by Lord Harding, who, when before the Committee, said that, of two members chosen by the Court of Directors, one ought to be taken from among their Indian servants. Mr. Halliday, one of the best of our East India public servants, stated in his evidence before the Committee—
"I have heard it proposed that they should be nominated by the Crown. I have heard it proposed, also, that they should be partly elected as at present, and partly elected by the body of Directors themselves. I have heard it proposed, also, that they should be elected by the holders of East India stock here and in India. Of those methods of appointment or selection I confess, on the whole, I am inclined to prefer, with great reserve and diffidence as before, the plan of electing them as at present for the most part, and, as vacancies occur, allowing a portion to be nominated—say one-third or one-fourth, as the case may be—by the Directors themselves. It appears to me that you would then, perhaps, have greater security on the whole for the selection of fit persons than you have at present, and you would, at all events, open a door for the election into the Court of those fit persons who are occasionally found in circumstances which deter them, or render it unfit or impossible for them, to incur the expense and delay and trouble of a canvass."
Another eminent authority to whom frequent reference had been made in that House—Mr. Marshman—stated in answer to a question put by the Committee—
"I have sometimes thought, if you still continue to keep up this system of a double government—that is, the Court of Directors and the Board of Control—it would be an advantage if one-fourth, or even one-third, of the Directors were appointed by direct nomination from among those who have had long Indian experience, whether acquired officially or non-officially. With regard to the nomination of those Directors, if it was considered constitutionally improper that they should be appointed by the Crown, they might then be selected by the Court of Directors, and the Minister for India should have a veto upon their nomination."
He did not believe, as had been insinuated, that the President of the Board of Control framed this clause with a view to ultimately getting rid of the Board of Directors altogether. If that had been the right hon. Gentleman's intention, he believed he would have declared it; but others might have that object in view, and be prepared to support the proposed plan as an experiment, which, if successful, might be
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carried further. At any rate, the Government had not fairly submitted to the House the constitutional question whether it was advisable to increase the influence of the Crown in reference to the nomination of a portion of the Court by the Crown. If such nominees should obtain seats in that House, they would be as likely to be as subservient to the Crown, as any of the officers of the Crown. Their tenure of office would, no doubt, terminate in six years, but that was the average duration of a Ministry. The nominees might, therefore, probably leave office at the expiration of a Ministry, and it would be open to the new Ministry to appoint new Directors, and thus obtain an undue influence in the Court of Directors. The Court of Directors would, in fact, by such a system as that proposed by the President of the Board of Control, be superseded. The plan proposed was an attempt to get in the small end of the wedge; and that was the chief ground on which he (Mr. V. Smith) opposed the plan. He was most decidedly in favour of the system of a mixed government. It was his firm conviction that the present double system of government had contributed most materially to the quiet and happinesss of our Indian empire. If hon. Gentlemen compared the condition of the aboriginals of that empire with those of any of our Colonies, they would find that the condition of the former was infinitely superior to that of the latter. Some hon. Gentlemen might point to the days in which the Great Mogul ruled the destinies of the people of India; but the vision, if any, must be dazzled by false glory, who believed that the natives of India were not now in a much better condition than they were under the reign of the Mogul. In New Zealand, Ceylon, and other Colonies, our Government had been of much more doubtful good. Who could compare an Indian administration with the result of our administration of affairs in the Cape of Good Hope? We had there inflicted the greatest barbarities, and incurred the heaviest expenditure. It might be true that there were some evils connected with the mixed government of India; but he believed that it was a system which had prevented more evils than it had created. It might not have stimulated the growth of cotton as it ought to have been stimulated; it might not have dealt with the salt monopoly as it ought to have been dealt with; but hon. Gentlemen should take into consideration how miserable India would at

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this time most probably be had there not been a double government. Without that double system, at the bidding of British constituencies, and for the interests of British consumers, the cultivation of cotton in India might have been urged to a greater extent than justice to the natives could bear, and some alteration might have been introduced with respect to the monopoly of salt which might have been detrimental to the revenues of India. He asked hon. Gentlemen, then, to support by their votes that night the system of double government. If they assented to the proposition of the President of the Board of Control, they would in effect destroy the independence of the Court of Directors.
Amendment proposed—
"In page 2, line 33, to leave out at the beginning of the Clause the words 'it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, by Covenant under the Royal Sign Manual,' in order to insert the words 'the Court of Directors of the said Company shall, subject to the approbation of Her Majesty, to be signified in writing by Her Royal Sign Manual, countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India,' instead thereof."
SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, that two things seemed now to be agreed upon—first, that the double government should be maintained, and, secondly, that a certain number of persons should be introduced into the Court of Directors as members of that body by some other mode than election by the proprietors of East India stock. The next point to be decided, then, was, by what means should these persons be introduced into the Court of Directors? The Bill proposed that they should be nominated by the Crown: the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) wished them to be elected by the Court of Directors. The proposition brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman had come under the attention of the Government, was duly considered, and rejected. Much, undoubtedly, might be urged in favour of the proposition; but, after mature deliberation, the Government decided in favour of the plan proposed in the Bill, as best calculated to insure the independence and efficiency of the Court of Directors. There had been times—and they might occur again—when party spirit ran high in the Court of Directors. On such an occasion the majority might be induced to elect two partisans, in order to destroy or reduce to insignificance the minority oppesed to them. The exercise of the veto of the Crown would be insufficient to guard against that evil. The
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right hon. Gentleman said that the plan proposed in the Bill would be likely to create dissension between the Court of Directors and the Crown; but really it appeared to be less open to that objection than the scheme suggested by the right hon. Gentleman himself. In the case supposed—that of the majority of the Directors having elected two of their partisans to swamp the minority—if the Crown should withhold its approval from them, there would not afterwards be much cordiality existing between the Court and the Government. As to what the right hon. Gentleman had said about Directors nominated by the Government being expected to come down to make a House and cheer Ministers, it was purely imaginative. A Minister who could select for the office men who would condescend to do such work, would be guilty of a shameful abuse of trust. The Government of the day would have the strongest interest in putting into the Direction the best men they could find. The salaries assigned to the Directors under the Bill were not sufficient to attract persons not in independent circumstances, while to men of independent circumstances the office would be an object of honourable ambition. The plan denounced by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Maccaulay) in 1833, was not similar to that now proposed. If the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) had referred to what then took place, he would have found that the proposal to which the right hon. Member for Edinburgh objected was one which would have given the Crown power to nominate the whole Court of Directors. Little apprehension need be entertained that persons returning ripe with knowledge of Indian affairs, would, on entering the Court of Directors, permit themselves so to be mastered by English party feelings as to take a course which would be detrimental to the interest of India. Regarding this point also, it should be borne in mind that it would always be in the power of successive Governments to neutralise the appointment of partisans by their predecessors. Once appointed, there would be no distinction between the Directors nominated by the Crown and the other Directors. His right hon Friend said the word "nominee" was an odious word, but he could not at all see the matter in that light. All that the Government had in view was, that the body of Directors should be as effective as possible; and he did not think there was the least danger of that body being made dependent

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on the Crown by the system of nomination which was proposed. He believed that the nomination, which was to be restricted to persons who had served for a particular time in India, was not likely to be conferred on persons who would be dependent on the Crown. He did not see, for example, why so great a name as that of Mountstewart Elphinstone might not have been selected for such a duty, or that there would have been anything degrading or derogatory in his being selected on the ground of his great knowledge of India, and on that ground alone, to be a Member of the Court of Directors, and to give them the benefit of his pre-eminent qualifications. It was so much the interest of the Government to have at the head of the Indian administration, men of the highest intelligence and ability, that they would not fail to appoint those whom they believed to be in the highest degree qualified; and he was satisfied that, on the whole, the mode which they had proposed, was the most efficient that could be adopted. He therefore committed it with confidence to the consideration of the Committee.
MR. HERRIESsaid, that the right hon. Gentleman had argued this subject so temperately—he had stated so fairly the different sides of the question, that those who entertained a different opinion, as he (Mr. Herries) did, might perhaps fail in inducing the Committee to come to a different determination. He had intended to move an Amendment, the effect of which was to negative all the clauses relating to the proposed constitution of the Court of Directors, with the view of offering the most strenuous opposition to that system of mixed nomination by the Crown, and election by the proprietors, which he conceived to be so objectionable; but the Amendment moved by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith) met so completely the intention which he (Mr. Herries) had in giving that notice, that he did not feel disposed to submit any Motion on the subject; and he should, therefore, give in his adhesion to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, because he really thought that the whole object which he had in view would be completely answered by the proposition which had now been submitted to the Committee. He should, therefore, confine his observations entirely to the question of mixing nomination by the Crown with election by the proprietary body, and refrain from entering upon those general questions which had been very properly
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discussed in the second reading of the Bill. He might, however, observe that the House had already determined that legislation should take place now, and in the spirit of the existing Government of India. It was because he thought that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government introduced a new constitution of the Court of Directors, which was not in accordance with the principle of maintaining the existing form of government, that he now opposed the clause. It was the essence of the present constitution of what was called the double government, that the administrative body, acting under the control of the Crown, and advising the Crown, should be a perfectly independent body; and the question was now whether it could be so considered, if a considerable portion of its members were appointed by the Crown. He rejoiced that the opposition to this measure came from the other side of the House, for it removed from hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House even the suspicion that they were influenced by party views. The first difficulty which presented itself was this—the impossibility that a body of men, consisting partly of members who owed their existence to one authority, and partly of members who owed their existence to another authority, could act harmoniously together. He could not understand how it was expected that the nominees of the Crown would consider themselves or be considered by their colleagues, as being on the same footing altogether as the members elected by the proprietors? It seemed so difficult to entertain this belief, that no sooner was the provision known, than one universal feeling of condemnation was expressed. The press, so far as it reflected the feelings of the public, expressed a decided opinion against it. What was the reason? Because common sense and common reason must tell every one that a body so constituted could not act homogeneously. He would not go into details as to the working of the Board of Control in reference to all matters connected with the administration of affairs in India; but, he would ask, was it likely that members of a Court, some dependent upon the appointment of the Crown, and others elected by the proprietors, could consult together on equal terms, and concur in the advice to be given to the Government? If these appointments were worth holding at all, there would just be the nomination of the individuals, and then

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there would be the influence to be exercised by them; and he said it would only be in accordance with human nature that the persons nominated by the Crown would, in a great measure, conform to the wishes of the President of the Board of Control. Viewing the matter in this aspect, there was a danger of another kind to be apprehended. Moreover, the members nominated by the Crown were to possess the same amount of patronage which was possessed by the elected members. This patronage, he could not help thinking, would be, more or less, at the disposal of the President of the Board of Control. He, therefore, could not help thinking that he would obtain a very considerable share in the distribution of that patronage. The amount of patronage had hitherto been the only obstacle to entrusting to the hands of the Government the administration of Indian affairs—the immense influence, he meant, which that patronage would give to the Crown. He did not impute to the right hon. Gentleman any design in that respect. It had long since been determined that the Crown ought not to possess that patronage; but., according to the system now proposed, the President of the Board of Control would have a considerable share in the distribution of the patronage of India. A change of this kind, and of such great importance, ought not to be effected by a side wind. But the right hon. Gentleman had argued that an influence of another kind would be created. He said that authority and influence would be exercised by different parties in the Court of Directors. He (Mr. Herries) must say that during the time he mad the honour of discharging the office of President of the Board of Control, he knew nothing of any parties, nor of any dissensions, in the Court of Directors, nor did he believe that it was the habit of any President of the Board of Control to govern by means of any divisions in that Court. But let them look at the effect which this mixed council of administration would have on the public. He thought that the effect would be considerably to lower the character of the Court of Directors of the Company. He thought that if they introduced this check by means of the appointment of nominees of the Crown, they would taint in some degree and lower the character of the Directors in public estimation. It would, in fact, be saying that the proprietors were not able to select properly-qualified persons. On the other hand, the members introduced by the Crown would be suspected of being
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under the influence of the authority from which they derived their existence. Both these considerations were worthy of attention; but he must say that to lower the character of the Directors would be an egregious blunder, and would lead to the ultimate absorption of all power by the Crown. This was a step, as had been suggested, towards the government of India of the Crown; but it would be a wrong step if they wished to preserve to the Company while it lasted all the prestige, the respect, and the honour which at present belonged to it. Was it likely that a body so constituted would act harmoniously? The nominated members would regard with jealousy the elected members, and the elected members would not unnaturally suspect the nominated members of being under the influence of the President of the Board of Control. He could not imagine how the right hon. Gentleman had failed to see the natural consequences which must follow from this mixed system of nominated and elected members. The proposal made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith) obviated all these difficulties; for, as the choice would be limited to persons who had served in India, the Directors would be better judges of the services of these persons than any Minister, and no danger would arise from appointments made by the Directors in the first instance. The Board of Control might accept or reject them, but there would still be a homogeneous body deriving its authority from the same source, from election by the proprietors. These were an obvious objections to the plan of the Government. They seemed not to have been sufficiently weighed by the right hon. Gentleman, who, by his answers, had not removed in the slightest degree from his (Mr. Herries's) mind the opinion that great disadvantages would occur from the proposed mode of nominating the Directors. He had confined himself altogether to the question now under discussion, and would avoid detaining the Committee by going into any other part of the subject. He agreed entirely in the view taken of the question by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), and would be heartily glad if the Government would consider his observations in the spirit in which they were offered, which was, he felt assured, not an unfriendly one. For his own part, he had stated his views with the most perfect freedom and candour; he had supported the Government on the second reading of the Bill; and his sole aim

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was to make the measure as useful and as unobjectionable as possible. This scheme of the Government certainly was not unobjectionable; on the contrary, it had been objected to in almost every influential quarter which had expressed any opinion on the subject. He therefore once more entreated the President of the Board of Control to reconsider that portion of the Bill to which the Amendment referred, for it was of the first importance. He should give the Amendment of the right hon. Member for Northampton his entire sympathy and support.
MR. LOWEsaid, he trusted he should be enabled to answer the observations of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, with the same abstinence of party spirit as that professed by the right hon. Gentleman. He could assure the Committee that it was not until after the most anxious consideration that Her Majesty's Government had decided upon taking the course to which the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be so decidedly opposed. There was much in the constitution of the Board of Directors as it now existed, which it had been clearly shown by the evidence which had been adduced before the Committee upstairs, it was extremely desirable to have remedied. Though nobody denied that the Directors were pares negotiis, yet instances had occurred, creating no little scandal, of many eminent men, though anxious for the honour of a seat in the Direction, being deterred from seeking it by the dread of the annoyances and humiliations of a canvass. The power of the Court of Directors was of one kind, and that of the Board of Control of another. The power of the Board of Control consisted in acting and deciding; whereas the power of the Court of Directors was that of reasoning and argument. One was more of an intellectual, the other more of a physical power; and the two powers might well work together for the benefit of India. He made these observations because they appeared to answer the objections urged with respect to the independence of the Court of Directors. Independent, in one sense, they could not be, because the law had placed the final decision with reference to their measures in the hands of the President of the Board of Control. In another sense they might, no doubt, be said to be independent, inasmuch as by offering sound advice and advancing strong arguments, they had it always in their power to exer-
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cise a most important control over a Minister who was responsible to the country for the line of policy which he might adopt. That latter description of independence it would be the effect of the proposal of the Government to augment rather than to diminish, inasmuch as it would tend to introduce into the Board of Directors men of greater experience, ability, and eminence, than up to the present moment could find admittance into that body. He had not the slightest doubt that the object of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), in proposing the Amendment then under their consideration, was to secure what he supposed to be the best form of government for India; but the right hon. Gentleman did not seem to be taking a course which was likely to effect the precise object which he had in view. There were at present three classes of offices, the appointments to which were in a position exactly similar to that in which the right hon. Gentleman appeared anxious the appointment of one-third of the Board of Directors should be placed. The offices to which he (Mr. Lowe) referred were those of the Governor General of India, that of the fourth Member of the Legislative Council, and of the governors of subordinate presidencies. The appointments in those three instances were supposed to be made by the Court of Directors, subject to the approbation of the Crown. The result had been, that those offices were virtually in the nomination of the Crown; and the practice had been for the Board of Control to suggest the names to the Court of Directors, and the veto, when at all used, was used by the Directors. Thus, the course pointed out by the Act of Parliament was virtually reversed. Now, supposing the present Amendment carried, would not something of the same sort take place; and would the right hon. Gentleman gain anything by merely saying that the persons who would be, after all, nominees of the Crown, should not be elected ostensibly by the Crown, but should appear to be elected by the Directors, subject to the subsequent approbation of the Board of Control? The Amendment would, indeed, have the effect of relieving the President of the Board of Control from all, or nearly all, responsibility, and would thereby remove the best safeguard against that officer using his power in an improper way. But, arguing the question on the right hon. Gentleman's own ground, be contended that the Amendment would be perfectly

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nugatory. The power of rejecting the persons nominated by the Court of Directors could only be exercised by the President of the Board of Control, in the improbable case of their making grossly improper appointments; but no one acquainted with the Court of Directors would suspect them of doing anything of that sort; and then again, with respect to what was wanted—the admission of persons of great eminence and distinction into the Directorship—how that could be brought about by giving a veto to the Crown he could not see, unless the Crown fixed upon certain persons, and told the Directors at once that those were the persons whose nomination should receive the sanction of the Crown, and the election of all others would be vetoed. In this case the nomination would virtually pass to the Crown, while, if the Crown confined itself to its statutory function, its interference would be absolutely useless. Supposing, then, the Crown confined itself to its statutory function, the nomination would be in the Court of Directors. Now, for many years past, the Directors had had great influence in the elections for their own body; and the changes introduced in the present Bill with respect to canvassing and retrenchment of patronage, would probably throw into the hands of the Directors more influence than they even now possessed over the elections. Would it be wise, then, when things were tending in that direction, still further to increase the power of the Directors in the same line? The effects of self-election were known to everybody. All persons in giving their votes were prone to be influenced by indirect and improper considerations. But in no case did these considerations come so home to a man, and operate so forcibly on his mind, as in the case of self-election. The individual elected was either a partisan gained, or an opponent introduced into the body; and that circumstance afforded the very strongest motive for warping the elector's judgment, and inducing him to take the worse and reject the better candidate, if it should be his interest to adopt such a course. Now, as the object which they all desired to attain in that instance was the selection of the best men, it would be inexcusable on their parts wilfully and knowingly to introduce into the case the considerations which were of all others the most calculated to pervert the judgment and to warp the choice of the electors. It was said that the nominee members would be the mere
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creatures of the Crown; but be did not think the prize was sufficiently high for such a purpose. The salary was to be small; the Directors were not to be brought into immediate contact with the Crown; and the votes they might give, would, if they pleased, never be known. He believed that the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman would tend to exclude men of the highest character and capacity from the directorship. He could not help thinking that men who had filled important offices with great distinction in India, would shrink from the attempt to canvass even a small body of Directors, and would not expose themselves to the risk of a rejection of their solicitations even on the part of such a body. It appeared to him that one great advantage of the system proposed in the Bill was, that, as under that system there would be a twofold mode of election, an emulation would naturally arise between the Crown and the proprietors as to which of them should elect the men who would do the greatest credit to their choice. The right hon. Gentleman who had last addressed the Committee, had adopted what seemed to him (Mr. Lowe) an inconsistent course of argument. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the only serious objection to placing the Government of India in the hands of the Crown was the difficulty of disposing of the patronage—a difficulty which the right hon. Gentleman had told them had not yet been solved. He appeared to consider that in twenty years the Government of India must fall to the Crown, and that the ultimate absorption of the Company was inevitable. But if that were to be the case—if the Governments of Mr. Pitt, of Lord Liverpool, of Lord Grey, and of Lord Aberdeen had all concurred in diminishing more or less the power of the Court of Directors—if from the nature of the terms of the India debt, it would be the interest of the Government to pay off the proprietors in the year 1874, so that the very basis of the present Court of Directors would be removed—if those were the views of the right hon. Gentleman, how could he consistently object to the introduction of nominees of the Crown into the Court at the present moment? What would become of the Government of India if the event which the right hon. Gentleman seemed to foresee were to take place, and if the proprietors of India stock were no longer to exist? Could the right hon. Gentleman or the Committee suppose that the Ministers of

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this country would attempt to construct out of new elements a fresh body of Directors and of proprietors? Did the right hon. Gentleman think that after that mighty Company, which had produced so many generals and statesmen of which any empire might well be proud, should have been destroyed, another would be set up to replace it? Such a conclusion would be manifestly preposterous. The right hon. Gentleman had truly said, that when the event which he contemplated should take place, the Company would be absorbed in the Crown; and when it was so absorbed, how was India to be governed? When the veil between the Crown and the people of India should have been removed, what other agency would it be possible for human ingenuity to devise between the Crown and its Indian subjects than that very agency which the right hon. Gentleman at present denounced and repudiated—the agency of those very nominees of the Crown? Something like that machinery was the only agency which could then by any possibility be adopted. Therefore, taking the right hon. Gentleman's own premises, it would be wise to begin betimes, if they were to be driven to that Crown Government of India of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke, and make the experiment on a small scale, dealing with the embryo and the germ, rather than to be afterwards compelled to do the thing all at once, uno flatu. Arguing, then, upon the right hon. Gentleman's own premises, he should say, let them not wait for that great catastrophe unprepared, but let them make an experiment now, and if it should be found not to work, there would then be a locus penitentiœ, and the matter might be reformed in time. A good deal had been said in disparagement of nominees of the Crown; and he admitted that he had himself never been very friendly to the nominee system in the Colonies. But he believed that they could only be led into error and confusion by comparing India with the Colonies. The two cases were not only dissimilar but were diametrically opposed to each other. The essence of colonial government was representative government resident on the spot; the essence of Indian government was representative or quasi-representative government resident in a remote country. The essence of colonial government was responsibility to persons residing in the Colony; the essence of Indian government, and that which mitigated our despotism there, was respon-
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sibility to the people of England. In the Colonies a governor was looked upon as a subject discharging limited duties—as a mere officer or Minister of the Crown; in India the Governor General was put forward as a person who combined in himself the highest powers, and almost all the attributes of sovereignty; and we endeavoured to keep as much as possible in the background that machinery by which his powers were controlled. In the Colonies we looked forward to a brilliant future at no distant period, when nations would arise equal to ourselves in arts, in arms, and in every element of civilisation. In India the most sanguine could not for many centuries hope to see realised any such prospect. But, above all, the nominee system in the Colonies was regarded as the system of irresponsibility and repression; while in India the nominee system was regarded as the symbol of progress—as a means of giving a higher intellectual tone to the government of that country. Moreover, let it be remembered that nominees were introduced into colonial Legislative Councils for the purpose of voting away the money of the people without being their representatives, and that they had entrusted to them the very highest functions of a Government against the will of those whom they governed; while in India those who might be elected by the Company, as well as those who might be elected by the Government, must both be nominees, for neither could derive their power from the will of those whom they governed. There was this further distinction between the two cases, that a nominee in the Colonies was a legislator who had the power of the purse-strings; while it was not the duty of a Director of the East India Compay to act or to decide, so much as to suggest, to advise, to initiate, and to reason. In the case of a Colony there was a great necessity for combined action; in the case of India it was so far from being desirable that the action of the Directors should be combined, that if any strong combination should exist among them it would be the duty of the Government to introduce, if possible, into their body some heterogeneous and independent element which might lead to that conflict of intellect with intellect from which alone truth could be elicited. Under these circumstances, he contended that there was no inconsistency in his advocating the nominee system in India while he was opposed to that system in the Colonies.
MR. ELLIOTsaid, that, until this debate commenced, there was hardly a person in that House who had not always been accustomed to hear, and who did not fully believe, that the great merit of the Court of Directors was, that it was a thoroughly independent body, and free from all political bias or influence. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down said he believed the Court would be a more independent body by the introduction of nominee members; but it required even more ingenuity than the hon. Gentleman was possessed of to make that clear. He (Mr. Elliot) did not think that either the President, or the Secretary of the Board of Control had convinced the Committee—certainly they had not convinced him—that an additional degree of independence would be given to the body by making one-third of it Government nominees. There was a peculiarity connected with these nominee Directors which he thought it right to mention. They were not to be appointed permanently, but only for a certain period, and they would sit at the Board with the expectation of being renominated. He was the last man to suppose they would do anything unworthy of themselves; but human nature was human nature, and he could not help thinking they would not occupy seats at the Board in that free and independent capacity in which all members of it ought to be placed. The great private and personal motive of persons desirous to get on the Directory had been the power of providing for a certain number of their own sons, and the sons of their relatives and friends. It was in vain to conceal the fact, that that was the great inducement which operated on the minds of those who returned to this country, like himself, after twenty or twenty-five years' service in India, and became candidates for Directorships. But was it likely that persons who came home, after a long life spent in India, would try to enter the Court of Directors when it was lowered in its character by being deprived of the most valuable portion of its patronage? He must say, that he should not himself consider a seat at the Board a distinction under such circumstances. The persons he had mentioned would consider the appointment derogatory to the position they formerly held in India. He knew several who, since the Bill had been made public, had declared that, however anxious they might have been formerly to become Directors, they were no longer so now. It
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was futile to allege that the patronage, which unquestionably had formed a leading attraction with the candidates for a Directorship, would still remain to that body, when the only patronage left to it was cadetships, an object comparatively indifferent; to take away the other patronage, and to give, instead, a mere increase of cadetships, was just like saying to a child, "Give me that sixpence, and I'll give you these two large pennies." He thought he was authorised, therefore, in drawing the conclusion, that it was not safe to establish this nominee system. He was very much afraid the Government would not succeed in obtaining the best men from India to accept a seat at the Board. He thought they would be more likely to get persons who would consider 500 l. a year an object. It was absurd to suppose that men, who had received between 2,000 l. and 3,000 l. a year in India, would consider 500 l. a year sufficient amount of remuneration after the service they had seen. It had always been an acknowledged principle that the Government of India should be kept free and distinct from all political influence; and he confessed he viewed, with some apprehension, the first step which was now proposed to be taken in opposition to that. He believed they would continue to go on in that course until the Government obtained possession of the whole of the Government of India, and the result would be that there would be more frequent discussions upon the affairs of India, and greater interference on the part of that House in regard to them. In his opinion, there could be no greater misfortune to India than the perpetual intermeddling of that House with the internal administration of that country. There were not ten men in the House who knew anything about India. The President of the Board of Control, and other Members of the Government, had endeavoured, in a most praiseworthy mannor, to become acquainted with India; he believed they had failed, for he had heard sentiments come from them, which no man who knew anything of the country, would have expressed. It would seldom happen that the President of the Board of Control could have any real knowledge of who were the best, most practical, hardworking, and serviceable men in India, to appoint to the Board of Directors. Then, how was he to find them out? He must go to the Court of Directors, who were the most qualified persons to give him the information. If that were so, why

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should the power of appointing the nominees not be given to the Directors?
LORD STANLEYsaid, he thought it was very desirable that they should confine themselves as strictly as possible to the subject which was absolutely before them; and such being his views, he would not, therefore, say one word on the various topics which, while they were not strictly comprised in the Amendment, had been introduced into that discussion. The right hon. Gentleman who had moved the Amendment had said something about the amalgamation of the two offices. Now, that was an important point, and one upon which, if it had been brought regularly before them, he should have been most happy to have supported the right hon. Gentleman. But that was not the question which they had then to consider. Another question had been raised as to the position which the President of the Board of Control ought to occupy, and as to the insufficiency of the salary which he at present received. There again he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman; but that was not the subject he had brought before them in that Amendment. The whole question they had then to consider was, as he understood, whether it was desirable or not that a certain number of the Court of Directors should be appointed by the Crown. Upon that point he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman in disapproving in many respects of the proposal of the Government. He thought that the right hon. Gentleman had criticised that proposal with great success; but he also thought that the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, when it had come to his turn to reply, had criticised with not less success the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. It appeared to him that it was hardly possible to deny that persons appointed by the Crown—that was to say, by the Minister of the day—for a short period, who were to be re-eligible to be appointed, and who were to be allowed to sit in Parliament, would, to a very great extent, be dependent upon the Government of the day. He did not think that would be any the less the case because those persons received a comparatively small salary. He was afraid that the smallness of the salary would only have the effect of rendering the office an object of ambition, not to the persons best qualified to fill it, but to those qualified in an inferior degree. The lower the salary was made, the lower would be the class of those who would
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offer themselves as candidates for the office; and he did not think it could be argued that the smallness of the salary would contribute to render those who might receive it more independent of the Government to which they might owe their appointments. He feared, therefore, that there was some real danger that they would not get the best class of Indian officials to accept these appointments. But when he came to consider the remedy proposed by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith), he certainly felt considerable objection to that proposal. It was, in the first place, a plan of self-election. Now, he did not believe there was any instance on record, in our present system of administration, of a system of self-election. But his main objection to the plan of the right hon. Gentleman was, that from its very nature its continuance was made dependent on that which he (Lord Stanley) believed most of them desired, and all of them expected, to see abolished in the course of a few years—namely, the continuance of the Court of Directors, and which, indeed, would expire of itself in the year 1874. But whether the Court of Directors expired or not in that year, the whole system on which the Directors were elected must be changed, because the elective body would then no longer exist. He objected to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, because it seemed to him to be calculated to give permanence if not pepetuity to that very part of the present system which it was most desirable that they should do away with. He spoke with great diffidence upon that subject; but admitting fully, as he did, the difficulty of dealing with that question, he still thought there were some matters of detail in which the proposal of the Government might be improved without trenching on the principle on which it had been brought forward. For instance, he entertained a very strong objection to that part of the proposal of the Government which occurred in a subsequent clause, but which naturally fell into the present discussion—he meant that part of the proposal by which Directors nominated by the Crown were permitted to retain seats in Parliament. Of course, it was possible for a man to have a seat in Parliament, and not to be a political partisan. But if there should be such a case, it would be the exception and not the rule. As a general rule, he thought that when Members of that House were nominated by the Government to administer an office, although that

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office was to be held for a certain fixed period, and not during the pleasure of the Crown, the effect of such nominations would be to induce those Members to consider themselves—he would not say the tools—but necessarily and effectually the allies of the Government which had appointed them. But for that evil, however, there was a very obvious remedy; and that was to nominate those persons for a longer period than that proposed in the Bill—to nominate them for a period of ten or twelve years, or, at all events, for a time considerably beyond the average duration of Governments in this country, and then to refuse to make them re-eligible at the end of that period, and so to take away from them the hope of receiving in the same department of public affairs any future favour from the Government. In conclusion, he had to state that, although he did not approve of the whole of the Government plan, and although he felt it was liable to the objections of detail which he had mentioned, he felt himself unable to support the Amendment.
MR. HUMEsaid, he did not think the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) was very intelligible, and he would have preferred his moving the rejection of the clause altogether. He (Mr. Hume) was one of those who was ready to vote for any Motion which was directed against, the system of nominees. He was for continuing the principle on which the East India Company had hitherto been maintained, and he could not understand by what course of reasoning the Government, who had spoken in such eulogistic language of the way in which the Company had been conducted during the last twenty years, should propose now to destroy that principle. The Court of Directors was a body constituted by several Acts of Parliament. The right was given to the proprietors, for pecuniary considerations, to elect those Directors, and Parliament had no power to take that right from them. He thought the Government of India by the East India Company had been productive of more benefit to that country than had been the Government of any other of our distant possessions to those possessions. The arguments of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had only made the subject more confused, for instead of considering the Bill before the House, he had made a flimsy attempt to show what might be the state of things in the year 1874, and what Parliament might have then to do. He had heard no objection to
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the system of election, except that certain persons of high rank and great experience who had come from India had not been able to get on the Direction. If this were the only objection to the system, it might be got over without destroying the independence of the Board. He regarded this portion of the Bill as destructive of the independence of the Board of Directors. It might be said that the Board had yielded too much to the President of the Board of Control; but this was no reason why Parliament should destroy their independence altogether. He saw no reason why the Board should not be reformed by letting in men with 500 l. stock, so as to increase the constituency, and to keep up a check upon the controlling power. He regretted that the Government had not allowed the present system to go on until 1874, when the proprietors would be paid whatever India owed them, and when a thorough reform might be effected. The Government had not objected to this form of administration during the last twenty years; but they were now about to introduce a measure, under the guise of an Amendment, the effect of which would be to unsettle everything, while it secured nothing. A great deal had been said as to the abuses which existed in India. He admitted that there were abuses in the administration of India; but the evidence given before the Select Committee showed, that looking at the circumstances of the country, and the difficulties to be encountered, there were more abuses in the public departments in this country than there were in India. He asserted, without fear of contradiction, that there were greater abuses in the present day in our Law Courts than had ever been traced to the Government of India. At the present moment, contentment and peace reigned over the whole of India, and there was every disposition on the part of the Directors to improve the condition of the country. In fact they had anticipated us in almost every question of public policy. They had opened their ports to ships of all nations—they had extended their commerce to different parts of the world—and they had removed all those duties which at one time formed so objectionable a feature in their Government. What Parliament ought to do, therefore, was to extend the system of election, to give more power to the Directors, to require the Secret Committee to keep records of all questions upon which they differed from the Board of Control, and to direct them to be supplied every month with an account of the expenditure. He

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greatly objected to the power which the Bill would give to the President of the Board of Control—a power which was greater than even that of the Crown. The President of the Board of Control could declare war, expend money and borrow money, without the consent of the House of Commons, or the sanction of the Court of Directors. This was the case during the last Affghan war, when 30,000,000 l. had been expended without the knowledge or control of the Court of Directors. On these grounds he would vote for the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman; but he would much rather see the clauses relating to the mode of government expunged altogether from the Bill.
SIR JAMES W. HOGGbelieved, that the single question before the House was, the best mode of selecting one third of the Court of Directors. It appeared that the House, whether rightly or wrongly, were agreed as to the expediency of selecting a portion of the Directors. That was the principle of the clause under discussion; and the object of the House—and he should hope of the Government also—was to adopt that form of selection which was most likely to produce the most able, the best informed, and most independent men. With respect to the system of selection, he could not help asking at the outset, if the selection were left to the Crown, or to the Court of Directors, what gentlemen coming home from India would become competitors for the office? Every distinguished Indian servant who thought he was fit for a seat in the Direction, would find himself, on his arrival in England, one among six similarly situated; and the chances were, that by adopting that mode of appointment, they would deteriorate the class of men who would come forward and offer themselves for office. He did not agree with those fastidious gentlemen who expressed such a horror of canvassing for a seat in the Direction. He thought there was something very un-English in that feeling. What would be said by any Gentleman who had the honour of a seat in that House, if he were told that he should not go amongst his constituents, or humble himself by soliciting their "sweet voices?" They all had to do that, at each and every election; whereas the candidate for a Directorship, if he succeeded in the object of his wishes, and afterwards discharged his duties ably and efficiently, was not elected for the short period of a Parliament, but for life. For his colleagues and himself, he indignantly repudiated the notion that there was any
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thing humiliating or dishonourable in canvassing for a seat in the Court of Directors. He would never have been a Director, if he had thought or believed that there was anything humiliating or dishonourable in aspiring to that office. With regard, in the second place, to the question as to the best mode of selection, he would briefly state the objections to the two plans before the House, leaving the House to judge which preponderated. The proposal of the Government was, that six Directors should be nominated by the Crown. Against that, it had been urged, with some weight, but not he thought with the force that had been attached to it, that those gentlemen when placed in the Direction would render themselves dependent upon the Crown, and would be so far influenced by an illegitimate feeling in the discharge of their duty. He was bound to say that he had no such apprehension. He believed that Gentlemen who had passed their lives in the civil and military services in India, and who had attained that position which rendered them eligible for a seat in the Direction, would discharge their duty honourably, independently, and uninfluenced by any considerations with regard to the person who appointed them. The noble Lord opposite had suggested, by way of amending the proposal of the Government, that the gentlemen so selected by the Crown should not be re-eligible. He trusted the President of the Board of Control would not adopt that recommendation. It meant that when a gentleman had been for six years, or whatever the time might be, in the discharge of his duty as a Director, and when he had acquired such experience as rendered his services useful to his colleagues and the country, he was to be excluded from the Direction, and likewise from a seat in that House. Now, if, according to constitutional principles, a person selected as a nominee of the Crown should be excluded from a seat in that House, there was at once an end to the whole question, because he thought it was impossible to agree to a plan which would subject six out of the eighteen Directors to political disqualifications; on the other hand, there were objections to the system of selection by the Court of Directors. He thought it was self-election to a certain extent, and he therefore so far disapproved of it. But the question for their consideration was, not whether this plan was perfect in itself, but whether it was less objectionable than the other. In addition to the objection already stated, there was

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this further reason for opposing the system of selection by the Court of Directors, that inasmuch as there was always a diversity of opinion in the Court, there was a danger of the majority selecting a gentleman who, when he joined the Direction would strengthen their party. That was a difficulty of considerable importance; but he was bound to admit that the right hon. Gentleman had almost if not quite removed it, by the provision that there should be the acquiescence of three-fourths of the Directors, who were unquestionably the parties most competent to select Gentlemen to act as their colleagues, as they were undoubtedly possessed of better means of knowledge than the President of the Board of Control. He believed that if the President of the Board of Control had the right of selection in his hands to-morrow, the first thing he would do would be to request the Court of Directors to recommend Gentlemen for the office. Whether, therefore, the selection rested with the Crown, or with the Court of Directors, he had no fears whatever as to the practical working of the plan, nor had he any apprehension that gentlemen so selected would be in the slightest degree dependent upon the Board of Control. It had been said that the situation would not be much coveted; if so, there was no use arguing the question any further. The object would be to get the best possible men—to secure men of the highest order, men of the most superior degree, men who would not condescend to any solicitation. But where were they to get these extraordinary men? Lord Metcalfe and Mountstewart Elphinstone had been talked of, as if such men were as plentiful as blackberries; but where did they find men like Metcalfe and Elphinstone? If these men had intimated, the day they arrived from India, that they desired to have a seat in the Direction, he (Sir J. W. Hogg) would say with confidence that, without soliciting a single vote, they would have come in the next vacancy. That statement he limited to men of that high stamp. The same thing was said by a very distinguished witness before the Committee, Sir George Clerk. He was a man of a very high order, of very superior abilities, and a man who had rendered distinguished services. He stated that he had been assured, when he returned from India, that he might, if he wished, come into the Direction, without the trouble of a canvass. But if they were to have men of that stamp, they must reward them in some way if they took
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from the Court the patronage which they had hitherto enjoyed. They (the Court) had been, in public estimation, the governors of India; they had been the fountain of all honour, of all appointments. Every servant in India knew that he derived his appointment from the Court of Directors. But now the Court stood partially condemned before the public by one-half of their number being withdrawn; they were no longer to have the appointment to the highest offices, formerly within their own exclusive nomination. They were no longer to appoint their own Advocate General; they were no longer to appoint Members of Council. These appointments were to be subject to the approbation of the Crown. They were no longer to appoint officers to the civil service. This was to be open to public competition. The same with regard to the medical service. The Government Bill had left them with the whole prestige of their power, but with all their patronage taken from them, with the exception of direct appointments, which amounted to no more than three or four in the year. It appeared as if they endeavoured to make the situation as little desirable as possible, that it might not be an object of solicitation or ambition. He would urge upon the House to make the situation as important as possible; that either in the way of position, or influence, or salary, or by some means or other, men of first-rate ability and experience might be introduced into the Direction; that the body to which they belonged might stand well before the public; and that the office which they filled might be an object of honourable ambition to such as desired to serve their country.
MR. CUMMING BRUCEsaid, he believed that the Bill now before the House, and particularly the clause under discussion, was calculated to extinguish the Court of Directors, and put a speedy end to the present system of government in India. He was at a loss to understand what line of conduct the hon. Baronet who spoke last intended to pursue. The hon. Baronet had blown hot and cold upon the question before the House. In the first place, he had stated strong objections to the principle of nomination by the Crown; and, in the second place, he had urged equally strong objections to the principle of selection by the Court of Directors—
SIR JAMES HOGG: I object to both plans, but more especially to the system of nomination by the Crown.
MR. CUMMING BRUCEsaid, he was

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glad to hear it, for he also strongly objected to the proposal of the Government, and would join the hon. Baronet in opposing it. For his part he could not understand the indignity of canvassing proprietors of India Stock. They were a non-political body, as also was the Court of Directors; and he thought, if the Government plan of nomination were once introduced, the effect would be to do away with that non-political character, and consequently he should oppose it. The gentlemen who came forward to solicit a Directorship were canvassed with a scrutiny very severe by those whom they solicited, and if found not honourable they were immediately rejected, He should say he preferred, to the plan of Her Majesty's Government, or the plan of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith), the system of open election to all members of the Directors' Court. For if they impaired the independence of the body—if they so packed it as to render it subservient to the Minister of the day, they would aggravate a hundredfold the evils of the despotic system at present existing. At present the Government of India was regulated on the principle that the administration abroad had to render an account to a superior authority at home; and therefore he (Mr. Bruce) felt the strongest possible reason for providing that that authority should be constituted in a way so as to be perfectly free and independent in itself. With respect to public opinion in this country, it was never perfectly informed on Indian matters, and it was only when questions of this kind were agitated that any feeling of interest was inspired. By this measure the functions of the Court of Directors would be absorbed by what was called the Crown, but which really and substantially, under a Parliamentary administration, would be absorbed by the House of Commons. But this was not the only consideration for which he must decline to give these powers to a Board of Control. He would not trust a Minister of the Crown with such power and patronage as would be conferred upon him by this measure; and in order to show how much the independent action of the Board of Directors was interfered with by the action of party politics in this country, he need only refer to what occurred in 1835, when Lord Heytesbury was appointed to the Governor Generalship by Sir Robert Peel. What happened then? Why, the very day that the noble Lord embarked with his suite, the Government was changed. A Whig
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Administration succeeded to power, and the appointment of Lord Heytesbury was cancelled, and a supporter of the new Government was nominated in his stead. And it was his firm conviction that, in consequence of that change there ensued that deplorable and disastrous chapter in the history of India—the Affghanistan war; for if Lord Heytesbury had been allowed to proceed to India, that war would never have occurred. He therefore contended that they ought not to weaken the check of the Board of Directors over the powers of the Board of Control. It was quite impossible that gentlemen nominated to the Court of Directors could enter that body without carrying with them a strong leaning and favour towards that party by whom they had been nominated. They would carry with them political opinions, which would be introduced into that Board; and he could conceive nothing more prejudicial. It would cause everything which was done in India to be discussed in Parliament, and set up as a shaft of political enmity to the Government of the day. The introduction of these nominees would make the Court of Directors more and more a Court acting under party and political feeling, and the appointments themselves would fall, as a matter of course, under the ordinary system of political places, and everything would be given over and sacrificed, not to the interest of India, but to promote the interest of parties. He certainly could not agree with the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), because he considered the system of open election by far the best; but he must say that he greatly preferred that Amendment to the course proposed by the Bill. He should, however, vote for the Amendment, inasmuch as he should take every opportunity of voting against the Bill.
MR. J. PHILLIMOREsaid, it was his intention to vote for the clause as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, for he certainly preferred the nominees of the Crown to the mode of election by the proprietors of East India Stock in the manner it was constituted at present; and he thought every one who gave a calm and dispassionate consideration to the question, could not fail to come to the same conclusion. The present system had no connexion with the important duties which the men were so elected to perform. It had inspired the most able men with the deepest disgust, so much so that the most distinguished men

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in the service of the East India Company had said, without exception, that in spite of the power and the patronage, to the amount of 15,000 l. a year, the humiliation of the canvass for an East India Director was so great they would not undergo it. He could have no object in saying anything offensive to any body of men; but any person who could maintain the opposite, he could affirm, was contradicted by the most recent facts. Had the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) forgotten the case of Mr. Morris, for that was a proof that the choice of the electors did not always fall upon those who were most eminently entitled from their services to a place on the Direction? He (Mr. Phillimore) could say, with the greatest sincerity, that he believed the places in the Board of Directors were not rewards—they were not given to promote the interests of India, or to reward eminent merit, but to those who, like the heroes in the Dunciad, "could dive the swiftest through the mud."
MR. MARJORIBANKSsaid, he regretted the allusion of the hon. and learned Gentleman rendered it necessary for him to trouble the Committee with a few words, not for the purpose of depreciating the services of Mr. Morris, a civilian of standing, of much ability, and of great local knowledge, whom he knew and esteemed, and of whom he would not say one word of disparagement, but on his own behalf and in vindication of the recent election. No one had attempted to controvert the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, which had been borne out by the recent evidence before the Committee on Indian Affairs to the fullest extent, that English gentlemen, by which English gentlemen without Indian antecedents must be meant, must be admitted into the Direction if they wished to preserve its tone. If the hon. and learned Gentleman granted the correctness of that opinion, he must admit that the recent election afforded a fitting opportunity to carry it out, fifteen years having elapsed, and seventeen elections having taken place since the admission of such a person into the Board. He could not approve the system of nomination by the Government, nor that proposed by the Amendment.
MR. PHILLIMORE,in explanation, said, that he objected to the system, but was sure a better selection than the hon. Member could not have been made.
MR. THOMAS BARINGsaid, he wished to observe at the outset of his observations,
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that the hon. Gentleman who had just resumed his seat (Mr. Marjoribanks), bearing as he did a name so familiar to East India Stock proprietors, need have offered no excuse for having been a candidate for a place in the Direction. The name of Marjoribanks was one ever to be honoured by those who had any interest in Indian affairs, and surely, therefore, any relative of the late Campbell Maijoribanks might well be considered to have claims upon the consideration of the proprietors. He believed that it was very desirable they should look to the origin and course of this clause, which had been stated to be based upon the evidence given before the Select Committee, namely, that the duration of the service of distinguished officers of the Company militated against their chance of being elected to the Directory on their return from India. And though the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) said that it was altogether ascribable to a morbid sensitiveness that such persons would not submit themselves to a practice so general and so common in England as that of canvassing a body of electors, yet he begged to remind the hon. Baronet, that it was a very different thing to pursue such a canvass after a residence of some twenty or five-and-twenty years in India—perhaps the individual in question being a person of high reputation, and with an honourable title, which alone might give him a claim for favourable consideration. He must confess he saw in that circumstance a very great impediment at any such person undergoing the trouble of a prolonged canvass. He could not understand what the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control proposed to himself, if it was not to adopt the best possible mode of selecting the Directors of the East India Company. He confessed he should have been puzzled by the clause if it had only the mere object of introducing individuals distinguished with respect to Indian affairs, and not also to strengthen the influence of the Board of Control in a way which it had never been pointed out that it was desirable to increase that influence. The clause gave the Crown the nomination of one-third of the Directors. He would pass over this point to the system of patronage which was thus introduced, and which he thought extremely objectionable. In his opinion, placing in the hands of the Crown the nomination of six individuals possessing great powers, and allowing them to sit in Parliament, was a great and serious objection. They were

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placed upon a different footing to the rest of the Directors, although the object was to assimilate the two portions, and to give them similar powers and similar privileges. Now, by the 10th clause, the duration of their office was made dependent upon the pleasure of the Crown. By that clause, consequently, their tenure of office depended upon the will of the Minister of the day. With respect to these gentlemen having a seat in Parliament, he differed with the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) on this as well as on other points, for he thought it was most desirable that they should have seats in that House. He thought, however, they would have a very different position if they came in with the joint assent of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. He felt quite sure that if it was their wish to promote the harmonious working of the Board, that object would be much more likely of attainment by requiring the joint, rather than the single, assent to their nomination. Any gentleman who returned from India would rather sit at the Board of Directors knowing that he possessed the confidence both of the Directors and of the Crown, than enter that body as a mere nominee of the Crown. He thought the position would be more agreeable to the gentlemen themselves; but, according to the present proposal, a line of demarcation would be drawn between them, which would lead to unceasing jealousies. If the object then was, as he believed it was, to introduce gentlemen who from their prejudices did not wish to canvass, or who from their age did not wish to wait too long, the mode was to make their introduction to the Board as similar as possible to that of the other Directors. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) objected to giving the Directors more power, which he said would be the case if the Amendment were adopted; yet he said they would have more power under the Bill as it stood. Now he (Mr. Thomas Baring) confessed he could not see how that could be, seeing that all their authority would be taken away. At the same time he would prefer to see their power increased, rather than it should be limited by the influence of the Crown. Those who seemed to favour the views of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, did so, as it appeared to him, because they wished to put an end to the present system—that system having been adopted by the present Ministry—of the agency of the Directors. His most anxious
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desire, then, was to see the Bill amended by the Government themselves. After having ascertained the feelings of the Court of Directors, and the views of those who wished to see the measure pass, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would take those feelings and views into consideration; and if their only object was to improve the Court of Directors without throwing into its composition the elements of discord, and planting in it the seeds of decay, they would, he thought, be disposed to adopt some suggestion like that made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, he could assure the Committee that the hon. Member who had just sat down had done no more than justice to Her Majesty's Government with regard to the point they were now discussing. Her Majesty's Government had no object, and they could have no object, but to do that which their duty compelled them to do, namely, to provide, by the arrangements they were now making, for the security and independence of the Board of Directors, and for maturing the best system of government for India. It was their sincere desire, whilst maintaining the independence of the Court of Directors, to take ample securities that it should be a most efficient and vigorous body—a body exercising no direct power, yet exercising great moral influence by means of the knowledge of Indian subjects which they pre-eminently possessed. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. T. Baring) seemed to think it was possible for the Government to increase their controlling power by nominating some persons with that particular view; but they, as a Government, could desire no additional power to that which they already enjoyed. Their power was already as large as the most ambitious ruler could desire, for the power of governing India was really vested in the President of the Board of Control, whilst the influence which was exercised by the Board of Directors was moral influence alone, so that, just in proportion as you added to the ability and knowledge of that Board, just in the same degree did you increase their moral influence. As far as related to direct power, the Government, therefore, asked for no additional power by seeking to add members to the Board of Directors in this way; but the moral influence of the Directors was increased by giving them additional weight. His hon. Friend (Mr. T. Baring) laboured under great misappre-

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hension if he thought that any power was given by the Bill to remove the nominees of the Crown at the pleasure of the Crown; because, so far from any such power being given, the words used in reference to the appointment of Directors were, he believed, the identical words used in the Act appointing County Court Judges, whose offices were held not during pleasure, but during good behaviour. At all events, it was these words specifying good behaviour which created the tenure under which these appointments would be held. But objection was taken to the power of removal. There must be some power of removal under peculiar circumstances. If he were not mistaken, the Court of Proprietors had already the power of removal, under circumstances described in the law for inability or misbehaviour. Surely it must be absolutely necessary that, as the Crown was to nominate, it should have the power of removal as well as the Court of Proprietors for inability or misbehaviour. His hon. Friend had used some strong expressions as to this Bill, which he called a rash and illusory measure. But what was the course he would adopt? He proposed more extensive changes than those proposed by the Government. He agreed with his hon. Friend, that, if there was any one point as to which all the evidence they had heard was conclusive and unanimous, it was against the system of canvassing. In the first place, it was quite certain that many most distinguished servants of the East India Company returned to this country after a long absence from it, having acquired habits which made it impossible to induce them to undergo a long canvass as a prelude to an election. Then, again, he was sorry to say he was convinced that, although there might be exceptions, in consequence of the present amount of patronage, coincident with the canvass, there had been promises of present and future distribution of patronage, which, he must say, threw some discredit upon the Court of Directors itself. It was necessary, he thought, to put an end to the system of canvassing, and they would be striking at the root of the evil by diminishing the amount of patronage. He certainly was of opinion that there was great force in the observation made by his hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), founded upon an assumption made by the right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Control (Mr. Herries). He said it would be in vain to
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arrest the time, which was inevitable, when the present system on government for India must cease, when it must be vested in the hands of the Crown, and when the double system must terminate. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) had stated that truly. Then in what year must it take place? In the year 1874. The term of the proprietary must be the period of its conclusion. At the conclusion of that time the present scheme of election by the proprietors as applied to the Court of Directors must terminate. This was the longest period for which the scheme would last. Now he had stated, when he addressed the House upon the second reading of the Bill, that this was a measure more or less experimental in its character. If it were successful, as he hoped and believed it would be, he had no doubt it would endure without any material change for the next twenty years; but, on the other hand, if it should not succeed, then he was satisfied that the next material change would be the substitution of a single government in the hands of the Crown. Was it prudent, then, when they were making changes, not to prepare for ulterior changes which were inevitably in view? In twenty years hence the government of India must be exclusively in the hands of the Crown. Possibly that event might be anticipated, and it might become necessary for the Crown to take the government earlier; but the great object was, on the part of the Government which introduced the measure, and on the part of the Legislature which had to deal with so important a matter, to make that inevitable change, come when it might, as little convulsive, and as easy in its transition, as legislation could make it. His own confident belief was that the proposition made by the Government was based on that view. He believed that the introduction into the Direction of a small proportion of Directors nominated by the Crown, would form the nucleus of a consultative body hereafter which should be the council of the sole Minister of India, named by the Crown. Then came the question, how, during the interval, would this mixed system work? His hon. Friend (Mr. T. Baring) said that it was absolutely necessary that this body should be homogeneous. But from its composition he (Sir J. Graham) did not believe it would be a discordant body; for it was impossible for a gentleman who had served in India, whether in a civil or military capacity, for several years, not to have a com-

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munity of feeling and habits with the body of Directors. Associated in the same Direction, they would have common interests and common views; and though one portion of them might draw their nomination from the Crown, and the other and larger portion, for the present, from the proprietary, still, when they were assembled at the Board, there would be such equality of position, and such perfect uniformity of past habits and feelings, that he felt confident there could be no division in the tenor of their proceedings. He did not, therefore, anticipate any discordance of opinion. He must say, also, it was quite open to discussion, when they came to the subsequent clauses, to consider whether six years should be the duration of the office held by the nominees of the Crown. It was quite possible that that period might be somewhat prolonged. It might also be a question whether ten years' service in India might not be deemed too long. A shorter period of service in India, and a longer duration in office after election, were both matters open for consideration. A prolonged period of service would materially diminish the objection as to the recurrence of favour or expected favour, on the part of the Crown, with regard to the nominee. Judging from past experience, the President of the Board of Control, who nominated, was not likely to be the President of the Board of Control at the end of six years from the nomination. He knew not whether a sense of past favours was a stronger motive to gratitude than, as was sometimes said, the sense of favours to come; but there could be no doubt that, generally speaking, the Minister who nominated for six years, would not be the Minister to nominate at the election after the expiration of that time. He must say, that although the question was of an embarrassed and difficult character, looking at the circumstances of the case, and carefully weighing the conflicting opinions, he certainly thought that, for the reasons he had stated, the proposition of the Government was the one which he hoped Committee would adopt; and he did not anticipate from it any of those evils which hon. Gentlemen had prophesied, but on the contrary he was strongly of opinion that from the system of self-election more evil was to be apprehended than from any nomination on the part of the Crown, particularly when that nomination devolved upon a Minister himself responsible to Parliament.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, the right hon. Baronet had made an able speech against the system of nomination on the second reading of the Bill; but it appeared to him that the speech just made by the right hon. Baronet justified the course that he (Mr. Bright) and his friends then took by his argument against the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton. Unless it could be shown there would be no party spirit in 1874, that faction would be banished from that House, that patronage would not injure the Minister, and that several other things would not be just the same then as they were now, it appeared to him that the arguments of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Jocelyn) would be just as strong in 1874 as they were at this moment. If it would be safe in 1874 to have a consultative Council and a responsible Minister for India, it would be just as safe to have them in 1853. The change which must come then, might as well be made now. With regard to the particular question, he conceived that the right hon. Member for Northampton had put himself in the worst possible position by the Amendment he proposed. If he had moved that eighteen Directors should be elected instead of twenty-four, he would have had a fair case against the proposition of the Government; but it appeared to him (Mr. Bright) that the proposition of the President of the Board of Control was admirable compared with that of the right hon. Gentleman. It was admitted that the twelve Directors were so badly elected, that it was proposed to put six in by another channel, in the hope of improving their quality; yet, after having consented to the twelve who were so badly elected that they could scarcely be tolerated at all, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) suggested that six of their own election; should sit with them—six who must become dependent upon them, more dependent upon them than they were upon the Crown. If the Minister appointed the six, there would be responsibility to public opinion, and to that House; but if the twelve appointed them, he did not know where they would have to look for responsibility, or for any guarantee that they would not appoint relatives, friends, and people of I their own. Under such circumstances, there could not be a doubt as to what the decision of the Committee would be between the two propositions. Objectionable as he considered the Bill, the Amendment would make it far more unsatisfactory than it

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was now. Such a mass of inconsistency as had emanated from the Treasury bench on this subject, he had never before witnessed. Some papers had been presented from the India House which had not before been in the hands of Members; amongst which was a long letter from the Chairman of the India Board, and the sermon of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, in which, in combating the arguments of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman, the right hon. Baronet availed himself of all the arguments of himself (Mr. Bright) and his friends against his own Bill.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he did not think, after what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), that any man who respected the system of double government could vote for the proposition of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said, if they wished to provide for its suppression even before 1874, they ought to support the clause as it was framed. After all the civil speeches that had been made to the Directors, and the acknowledgment of the services rendered, of benefits conferred by them, nothing could be deeper than the ingratitude of leading them to rely upon a measure that was to provide for the destruction of their corporate independence and authority. He really hoped this clause before the Committee was better understood by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, than by the President of the Board of Control, who either did not comprehend the true bearing of his own measure, or had misled the House. He wished to ask the right hon. Baronet whether he intended that these nominees should be eligible for the chair of the Board of Directors? In such an event, the present clause would provide that those who were organs of the Court in direct communication with the Government, should be the Government's own nominees. If these nominees constituted the Secret Committee, it could not be considered independent. He had heard it attributed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that they had exhibited great extravagance in the wars which had been carried on in India. Nothing could be more unjust; for if there had been extravagance at all on this subject, it lay at the door of the Board of Control, not of the East India House, since the Directors had no power to decide upon either making war or maintaining peace. He deeply lamented the perseverance of the Government in pushing for-
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ward this clause. If it was intended that nominees should be eligible to the chair of the Directors—in that case, the pure nominees would be eligible to form the Secret Committee, and to be the sole cheek on the secret acts and conduct of Her Majesty's Government by whom they were to be appointed. He felt the full force of the appeal of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), who called upon the Committee to preserve that independence of the Government of the day, of faction and of political parties in this country, which had sustained the high character and the influential position which the Court of Directors had hitherto enjoyed. It was not possible to expect that men of first-rate abilities, who had been labouring in India for the advantage of the country, would again labour for India unless the position was given to them which their services merited, any more than to expect that our leading merchants would consent to become the dependents of the ever-changing Administrations of this country. He believed the Court of Directors, as constituted, had proved of advantage to England, as it had proved of advantage to India. The existence of such a body as the Court of Directors had hitherto afforded to the commercial aristocracy of England an honourable object; it withdrew them from the pursuit of mere gain, and elevated them to a sphere worthy of their ambition. The Government and their supporters were about to strike down one of the most legitimate objects of ambition for the aristocracy of the middle classes of the country. If the hereditary and lauded aristocracy of England were so unwise as to make the office unworthy of the position which the Directory now afforded, they would bring on the middle classes to trample on their heels, and to tell them, "You have deprived us of that object of honourable ambition, that means of usefulness, for which our previous education and habits of life fitted us, and we now call on you to find us a position equal to that from which you have hitherto excluded us." These opinions might be untasteful to hon. Gentlemen opposite—to Gentlemen of the Manchester school, who called themselves the representatives of the middle classes; but, he repeated, they were seeking to destroy a position for the middle classes which they ought to maintain by all their power, if they had any real respect for the honourable ambition, the usefulness, and the character, of the middle classes.
MR. MANGLESsaid, he would have abstained from addressing the Committee on this question had it not been for the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir James Graham), who had managed to throw into the debate a little dash of personality even stronger than any that had fallen from the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright). That hon. Member had been contented with disparaging the constituency; and on this point he (Mr. Mangles) must say that, whether they took the test of intellect, or of character, or of wealth, there was no Gentleman who sat in that House who was elected by so respectable a constituency as the body of East India proprietors. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Cowan) was a proprietor—he supposed they would admit that he was respectable. Mr. Hallam was also a member of that constituency; so was Lord Campbell. [Laughter.] He was simple enough not to understand that laugh; he had supposed it would be admitted that the Chief Justice of England was a man of some weight. And, with the exception of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), every eminent man in the City of London belonged to the body of East India proprietors. However, the charge of the hon. Member for Manchester was but a light matter compared with what had fallen from the lips of the First Lord of the Admiralty. One reason alleged for introducing this new element into the Court of Directors was, that distinguished Indian servants would thereby be saved from the harass and annoyance of a canvass. But the right hon. Baronet assigned another reason, which they had not heard before, namely, that the change was necessary in consequence of the promises which a candidate was compelled to make during his canvass being a source of discredit to the Court of Directors; but he would like the right hon. Baronet to adduce any single instance where such had been the case. He could say, for himself, that during the course of his canvass he did not gain a single vote in return for any promise of appointment; and many of his colleagues had told him the same thing. He could not see what right the right hon. Gentleman had to frame charges against honourable men, and then to adduce those charges as a source of discredit to the Board of Directors. The Government had professed that the primary consideration was to secure the independence of the Directors, and, the secondary
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one, to gain admission into the Court for men well skilled in Indian affairs without their having to undergo a canvass; but it seemed to him that the attainment of the second object would defeat the first. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control said, that if the election were given to the Court of Directors, the majority would elect; and he seemed to think that there was always a majority and a minority in the Court of Directors, as in that House. Such, however, was far from being the case; it was constantly changing. If the election were entrusted to the Court of Directors, he believed they would elect the most eminent men they could find.
MR. HILDYARDsaid, that the only question which the Committee had to decide was this—both the Directors and the Government being equally qualified to judge who would be the proper men to be appointed the six Directors of the Court—the question was which of those two parties would act under the greatest responsibility. The hon. Member for Manchester said that the twelve Directors would job the appointments; and certainly if there was the least chance of their doing so, there was an end of the question. But did any one believe that they would do so? The Directors had no term of office under this Bill, and the effect of their jobbing these appointments would be that when it became known to the country, they and their nominees would be swept away together. But under what responsibility would the Government act in this matter? They all knew that the responsibility under which the Government acted was a majority in that House; and in case they had a majority, they might do as they pleased. He believed that the Directors would be under a much stricter responsibility than the Government; and he should, therefore, vote for the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith).
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 193; Noes 111: Majority 82.
MR. HUMEsaid, he wished to ask the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty whether this Bill was introduced with the view of establishing a Council, and entirely abolishing the Court of Directors? For, if so, he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Manchester, that it would be much better to come forward and do it openly. The right hon. President of the

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Board of Control had distinctly told them that he approved of the double government, and would support it. One right hon. Gentleman had told them one thing, and another right hon. Gentleman told them another, and so led them into perplexity. It appeared now to be the intention of the Government to pull down the establishment which had governed India quietly and efficiently for so long a period.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, the hon. Member for Montrose appeared to be somewhat slow to apprehend the meaning of what had been proposed; but his perplexity did not appear to have been shared by the Committee, who, by a decisive majority, had marked their approbation of the measure. His anxiety was to maintain the system of double government, which had been most successful; but, at the same time, he could not shut his eyes to the fact, on which the right hon. Member for Stamford (Mr. Herries) had dwelt, that the time must come, and that, probably, at the expiration of the next twenty years, when the system of double government must cease; and he thought it was wise to make provision for that inevitable occurrence. He thought the proposition now made did make that provision.
SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he would now move the Amendment of which he had given notice. The Committee had determined that Her Majesty, under the Royal Sign Manual, should appoint three of the Directors. His Amendment was that the appointment should be made from a list prepared of twelve persons who had served in India from twenty to thirty years. This was a very different proposition from that which had lately been under discussion, and the objections which had been urged to the last Amendment did not apply to this, which was a compromise between the two extremes that had been proposed.
SIR CHARLES WOODobjected to the Amendment, because it restricted the eligibility to twenty years' service, when the person to be elected might be disqualified by age, and because there was no provision for the removal of Directors. He was opposed also to any interference with the nomination of the Crown.
MR. HUMEsaid, that if the period was thus limited it would only let in the Judges.
Amendment negatived.
MR. RICHproposed an Amendment by substituting for the "one" Director, who is to be appointed for the first period of four years, the word "two," and also generally
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to amend the periods of service to three, six, and nine years.
SIR CHARLES WOODobjected to the Amendment on the ground that it would render it necessary that the elective Directors should be elected for no shorter period than nine years, which was more than double the time for which they were elected at present.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, he objected to a short term of service, and he thought that the clause before the Committee ought to be considered in connexion with a subsesequent clause, which made Directors eligible to seats in the House of Commons. The clauses in conjunction would destroy the independence of Directors. What he desired was, that Directors should be elected for a fixed period—say eight or ten years—and be not eligible to re-election. If a man elected to the Direction in 1854 knew that he must go out of office in 1864, without pension or allowance, and be incapable of re-election, he would be totally independent of the Government; and if he should happen to be a Member of the House during the period, he would have no temptation, as the year 1864 drew near, to be more assiduous than usual in his attentions to the Treasury bench. It was supposed—whether truly or not he could not say—that there was always a strong leaning towards the Treasury bench on the part of Directors as the termination of a Charter approached; and he certainly had noticed recently an increasing affection between the East India Directors and the President of the Board of Control. It was not at all certain, therefore, that if the Bill should pass in its present shape, the Directors might not feel still more dependent on the Government—not dependent in the way in which some Members on the Ministerial benches were, but dependent as clerks were on the head of an office. If the clause should pass as it now stood, he would propose the omission of the clause allowing Directors to be Members of that House; for if there should be three or four elected Directors, and five or six nominees of the Crown in that House, an independent Member, on bringing forward any question connected with the Indian Government, would have to encounter not only the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), and the President of the Board of Control, as at present, but the fresh auxiliaries by whom they would then be supported, and would thus be borne down by the accumulated evidence of persons interested in giving a colour to transactions, or even in suppress-

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ing the truth. The clause ought to be postponed to afford the President of the Board of Control an opportunity of altering it to meet the wishes of the House. It would be much better to have the service terminable at the end of ten years, without any power of re-election. Perhaps the Government would agree to postpone the clause and consider that point.
SIR JAMES W. HOGGsaid, the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) never could rise to discuss a question before that House without introducing matter of a personal nature into it. He had never known any occasion on which the hon. Member rose that he did not avail himself of the opportunity of saying something personally offensive. He had thought proper to allude to him (Sir J. W. Hogg); and he called on the hon. Member to state what he meant by his reference to the hon. Member for Honiton, and his vicinity to the Treasury bench. He (Sir J. W. Hogg) told the hon. Member that his conduct in Parliament had been at least as honourable and as independent as that of the hon. Member; and he had had an opportunity afforded him, which, perhaps, had not been afforded to the hon. Member, of evincing that independence, and evincing it too in connexion with his regard for India, and his desire to render that country any service in his power. The matter he was about to refer to he had never mentioned, either in public or in private; and he only now adverted to it in consequence of the observation that fell from the hon. Member a few nights ago, leading to the belief that the hon. Member had something on his mind which he had not the manliness to state. He would tell the hon. Member that he (Sir J. W. Hogg) was not devoid and—he did not pretend to be devoid—of that honourable ambition which led men to aspire to the honours of office and the emoluments of office; but it was upwards of nine years ago since he had the honour of being sent for by Sir Robert Peel, and offered a high office in the service of the Crown, including a seat in Her Majesty's Privy Council. Any man might have been justly proud of such an offer, and from such a man, coming, as it did, not only without the slightest solicitation, but without the slightest wish on his part. The offer was made shortly after he had been elected Deputy Chairman of the East India Company. He (Sir J. W. Hogg) thought it was desirable, not only for a person to be independent, but to take care that he was
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free from the very possibility of imputation. If he had been a simple Director he would gladly have availed himself of Sir Robert Peel's offer; but having been selected by his colleagues to fill an important and responsible office, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to abandon his colleagues or his duty to India on that occasion; and although there were in the Direction men as able as he was to discharge the duties of that office, he intimated to Sir Robert Peel that he could not consistently abandon the position in which his colleagues had placed him. He pledged his honour that he never hinted to a single individual of his colleagues the offer that had been made to him; and he pledged his honour also that though it was now nine years ago since the circumstance occurred, there were not more than three or four living men to whom he had ever mentioned the matter, though it was an offer of which any man might be proud. He regretted the necessity which had arisen for introducing a matter personal to himself; but he could not refrain from doing so, and hoped that he had shown that he was not influenced by the low considerations which the hon. Member would seem to impute to him.
MR. BRIGHT: Sir, the hon. Baronet has alluded to something which passed in a former debate, when he says I had not the manliness to say what I thought. I am of opinion that I generally say pretty much what I think. I did, on the occasion referred to, allude to the hon. Baronet's ambition, but not, I trust, in an offensive sense. I do not blame the hon. Baronet for being ambitious, and I think that men generally would perform much less if they were not ambitious. I think the Committee will agree with me in thinking that I did not to-night utter a syllable which any man had a right to deem offensive. Perhaps I have not been sufficiently regardful of the delicate position in which Directors of the hon. East India Company are placed, and of the state of feeling which may exist under such circumstances. I will try to be more careful in future, and avoid wounding them on such a very tender point.
LORD STANLEYsaid, that it did not appear that the Court of Proprietors had exercised much control over the policy of the Directors. If the Amendment was pressed to a division, he should vote for it.
SIR HERBERT MADDOCKsaid, he thought that if those nominees were capable of being reappointed, they would not

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get that infusion of fresh blood into the Court of Directors which seemed to be so much desired. He should be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), and consent to postpone the clause, in order that it might be revised.
MR. CAYLEYsaid, he would also suggest the postponement of the clause.
MR. RICHsaid, as the question involved the important one whether the Directors should have seats in Parliament, he would take the sense of the Committee upon it. It was desirable that as many persons of great influence and high character should have seats in that House as possible.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, he would advise the hon. Gentleman not to divide. He had made the suggestion because the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had admitted that the clause might be improved.
Amendment negatived.
On Question, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill,"
MR. T. BARINGsaid, he wished to propose to add the words "and shall not have quitted such service for more than five years." His object was to provide some security that the nominees of the Crown should be persons who possessed a recent acquaintance with the state of India.
SIR CHARLES WOODthought it very desirable that such a limitation should be imposed. Cases might occur—though they would probably be exceptional cases—where it might be important to appoint to seats in the Direction persons who had been absent from India for a longer period than five years. It was, of course, extremely desirable that there should be in the Court of Directors an officer of eminence in the military service of the Company; but the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman would exclude from the Court—if his presence were thought necessary there—one of the most eminent military officers in the service of the Company, who had now been absent from India more than five years. The object the hon. Gentleman desired to secure was, that there should be in the Court of Directors persons who had come fresh from India, and he (Sir C. Wood) fully admitted the importance of that object; but, at the same time, he thought the limitation proposed by the hon. Member might operate injuriously to the public interests.
VISCOUNT JOCELYNsaid, he would ask his hon. Friend whether it would not
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be desirable at present to suspend this question. He concurred with the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Wood) that it was most undesirable to adopt a limitation which would exclude from the Court of Directors men of distinguished eminence in the administration of Indian affairs.
MR. T. BARINGsaid, that after the observations that had been made, he would not press the Amendment.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, he would ask if the Committee thought it was necessary to retain that part of the clause whereby it was provided that every person who was nominated by the Crown should be possessed of as much stock in the Company as should now be possessed by an elected Director. It was not desirable that the Crown should be limited when they came to choose the persons who were to fill those offices. It was stated with respect to a distinguished servant of the Company, that it would be exceedingly inconvenient for him, and perhaps impossible for him, out of his own funds to purchase as much of the stock of the Company as would be the qualification required by this clause. He would therefore propose that the words to which he referred should be left out of the clause.
SIR HERBERT MADDOCKsaid, he perfectly agreed in the recommendation of the hon. Member for Manchester. The Amendment which he had on the paper, but which he was precluded from bringing forward at that moment, involved the omission of this latter part of the clause.
SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, so far as the Crown was concerned, they had no object in proposing this qualification; but as there prevailed a general impression that the Directors appointed by the Government should be assimilated in all respects to the elective members, the greatest possible pains had been taken to put them in all and every respect on precisely the same footing. Those persons who were appointed by the Government, would be Directors of the East India Company for all and every purpose, as well as for the Government of India, and it was, therefore, thought proper that they should be qualified in exactly the same way as the other Directors. The Crown had no interest in maintaining this qualification, but it was thought desirable that there should be a perfect identity of feeling and interest between the two classes of Directors.
MR. BOWYERsaid, that, considering that the persons to be appointed were men who had either filled important offices in

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India in the service of the Crown or in that of the Company, he thought it was perfectly unnecessary to exact from them the possession of a certain qualification in order to insure their feeling the necessary interest in the good government of India.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, he had not heard from the right hon. President of the Board of Control a single argument in favour of retaining this qualification. He seemed to want to make two things look alike which were essentially different. Really, that was too puerile for the House of Commons. He believed that many of the best servants returned from India with little more than their pension, and that it would, therefore, be impossible for them to purchase this qualification with their own funds. True, they might borrow the necessary sum; but it was a bad way to get into office by getting into debt, and he did not think it was desirable to surround a man with additional pecuniary cares and embarrassment at the very time that important public services were required from him. Could the noble Lord the Member for the City of London give any good reason why this qualification should be insisted on?
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he thought there was great weight in the observations of the hon. Member for Manchester, and that he had given very good reasons why these words should be omitted. The qualification was inserted in order to place on an equality the Directors nominated by the Crown, and those elected by the Proprietors. If, however, the Committee thought that the former would not in the absence of the qualification be placed in an inferior position to the latter, he should not object to the omission of these words.
MR. DISRAELIsaid, he was glad the noble Lord had come to this decision. Nothing could be more injurious than that of going out of the way to make a factitious pecuniary qualification. He thought also, that the observations of the hon. Member for Manchester as to the ill effect of surrounding a man with pecuniary difficulty when you wanted the concentration of his mind on the public service, were very forcible.
MR. HUMEsaid, he would express a hope that the qualification would also be abolished as to the Directors elected by the Proprietors.
SIR HERBERT MADDOCKsaid, the hon. Gentleman would presently have the
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opportunity of supporting an Amendment he intended to move for that purpose.
Words struck out; Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 4 (The present Directors, and the Directors out by rotation, should appoint from their own body fifteen of the first Directors under this Act).
SIR JAMES W. HOGGsaid, he hoped that the Committee would not impose upon the Court of Directors the painful task of reducing the number of their own body, and of thus declaring some of their members less efficient than others. He would suggest that the selection should be made by Her Majesty's Government, who had ample means of knowing who were the fittest Directors to be retained, and the most competent for the post.
MR. DISRAELIsaid, he should certainly dissent from the suggestion of the hon. Baronet, which would have the effect of increasing the influence of the Crown, as every member of the Court so selected must be added to the number of the Government nominees.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, he thought it would be better that the Directors to be retained should be selected by the Court of Proprietors. A more unpalatable, a more unfair, a more disgusting duty, was never imposed on any public body than that which was assigned to the Board of Directors by this clause.
MR. OTWAYsaid, no answer had been given whether the thirty Directors were to elect the fifteen. If they were, he concurred in thinking the worst fifteen would be elected. There was recently an election, and one of the candidates was a gentleman eminently qualified, and the other was a gentleman having no acquaintance with Indian affairs. He was informed that of the thirty Directors, twenty-six voted for the one, who, to say the least, had no great acquaintance with Indian subjects, and only four for the gentleman who had been twenty-eight years in India, and was eminently qualified for the situation. Seeing this, he had no confidence whatever in any election by the present Directors.
SIR JAMES W. HOGGsaid, he could only express his surprise at the remarks of the hon. Member, after the statement of the hon. Member for Berwick. It was quite true the great majority of the Directors, twenty-five or twenty-six, did support Mr. Marjoribanks. The law of the land was, that the Directors should be selected by the proprietors, and there was no stipula-

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tion as to their having been in India. If the hon. Member had read the proceedings of the Committee he would have found that all the public servants, the Governors General of India, and every person competent to form an opinion, were decidedly opposed to the Court of Directors being constituted exclusively of Indian servants. If they were to collect at that Court thirty men of the same calling, who had all passed their lives in the same country, they would have that which some called an accumulation of experience, but which was more properly called an accumulation of prejudice. For the last twenty years, only one Director had been elected who had not been in India; and the time had arrived when the selection ought to fall on a gentleman who had not been in India. He knew that to excite prejudice it was said that Mr. Marjoribanks was a member of a banking house. He never was in a banking house in his life, and he had no occupation except that of an East India Director and a Member of that House. That hon. Member was well qualified by birth, station, fortune, and education for the appointment; and he told the hon. Member who had questioned the election, that it was as good an election as was ever made by the East India proprietors, and that the great majority of the Directors who supported his election was strong evidence of his fitness for the office to which he was elected.
MR. OTWAYsaid, he understood the law perfectly well, but dissented entirely from the views of the hon. Member.
MR. RICHsaid, he thought that it would be better to send back the whole of the Directors to their constituents, and let them select whom they thought the fittest.
Clause agreed to.
House resumed.
Committee report progress.

COPIES OF SPECIFICATION REPEAL BILL.
Order for Committee read.
MR. COWANwished to know if there was any objection to make it imperative on patentees to lodge specifications at Dublin and Edinburgh?
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he only proposed at the present time to go into Committee pro formâ, in order that the numerous alterations might be printed. In answer to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, he must inform him that the requirement suggested would entail upon patentees a
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great deal of expense, and therefore was open to serious objection.
MR. WHITESIDEsaid, he must complain that this Bill would interfere with an Act passed only last Session for the amendment of the patent laws, upon which great pains had been bestowed, and that the Amendments altered it essentially, and made it utterly ineligible and utterly unworkable. He protested against such a system of legislation, and should object to proceed any stage at that hour.
MR. BOUVERIEsaid, it was most unusual to object to go into Committee pro formâ.
MR. WHITESIDEwould ask whether it was quite usual to send a Bill to Members to read, and when they came to go into Committee to say, that was not the Bill, but it was quite a different Bill altogether?
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he objected to the system of centralisation so apparent in the measure.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that there was a clause in the Bill which would meet the hon. and gallant Member's objection. He would also state that it was the intention to make all specifications lodged in Dublin evidence for all purposes; but it would be a saving of expense to the patentee if printed duplicates were sent to Dublin from the Patent Office here instead of manuscript copies.
House in Committee.
Bill considered.
House resumed; Committee reported.

GENERAL BOARD OF HEALTH (No. 3) BILL.
Order for Committee read.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid, he must ask for the postponement of the measure, in consequence of the lateness of the hour [one o'clock].
SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTHsaid, that all he intended to effect by the proposed measure was, to apply the Health of Towns Act to those places where an anxiety prevailed for its enactment, but not to those localities where no desire for its extension had been exhibited.
COLONEL HARCOURTsaid, that in the year 1851 some persons in Ryde had expressed a wish to have the provisions of the Act in question extended to that town. There had been a large majority of the corporation of Ryde, however, opposed to it upon that occasion, and subsequently a petition against its enactment had been pre-

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sented upon the part of the inhabitants of Ryde to that House. It had been stated, he believed, by the right hon. Gentleman, that in those cases in which a majority of the ratepayers were opposed to the enactment of the measure, it should not be applied; and he (Colonel Harcourt) should therefore call upon him to take the sentiments of the inhabitants of Ryde as expressed with reference to the subject into his consideration. He contended that no additional power should be granted until the Board of Health was placed upon a different footing.
MR. GEACHsaid, it was a mistake to suppose that because a town council had voted in favour of this Bill, the borough which elected the council was favourable to it also. He thought this Bill ought not to be pressed on at that late hour, when the parties interested in it could have no opportunity of making their wishes known, and he hoped the House would not allow the Bill to be committed to-night.
MR. HALSEYsaid, he must also resist the Motion for going into Committee, and he begged to inform the House that the town of Hertford, which was included in this Bill, did not wish for the interference of the Board of Health.
MR. COWPERsaid, he must on the other hand, as one of the representatives for Hertford, declare that the majority of the inhabitants were decidedly in favour of the application of the Health Act to their town.
House in Committee; Bill considered.
House resumed; Committee reported.

BETTING HOUSES.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he would now beg to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the suppression of betting houses, and in doing so he considered it was not necessary for him to make any lengthened statement upon the subject, as the evils which had arisen from the introduction of these establishments were perfectly notorious and acknowledged upon all hands. The difficulty, however, which arose in legislating upon this subject was to be found in the disinclination which was felt against interfering with that description of betting which had so long existed at Tattersall's and elsewhere in connexion with the great national sport of horse racing. But these establishments assumed a totally different aspect—a new form of betting was introduced, which had been productive of the greatest evils. The
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course now was to open a house, and for the owner to hold himself forth as ready to bet with all comers, contrary to the usage which had prevailed at such places as Tattersall's, where individuals betted with each other, but no one there kept a gaming table, or, in other words, held a bag against all corners. The object then of this Bill was to suppress these houses, without interfering with that legitimate species of betting to which he had referred. It would prohibit the opening of houses, or shops, or booths, for the purpose of betting; and inasmuch as it appeared that the mischief of the existing vicious system seemed to arise from the advancing of money in the first instance with the expectation of receiving a larger sum on the completion of a certain event, it was proposed to prohibit the practice by distinct legislative enactment. The mischief arising from the existence of these betting shops was perfectly notorious. Servants, apprentices, and workmen, induced by the temptation of receiving a large sum for a small one, took their few shillings to these places, and the first effect of their losing was to tempt them to go on spending their money, in the hope of retrieving their losses, and for this purpose it not unfrequently happened that they were driven into robbing their masters and employers. There was not a prison or a house of correction in London which did not every day furnish abundant and conclusive testimony of the vast number of youths who were led into crime by the temptation of these establishments, of which there were from 100 to 150 in the metropolis alone, while there was a considerable number in the large towns of the provinces. He believed this Bill would have the effect of suppressing most of them, or, at all events, of preventing the spread of an evil which was admitted on all hands. It had been suggested that the more effectual course would be the licensing of these houses; but for his own part he believed that would be discreditable to the Government, and would only tend to increase the mischief instead of preventing it. He trusted and believed the Bill which he now sought to introduce, would have the desired effect, and he hoped the House would offer no objection to his bringing it in.
Leave given.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Attorney General, Viscount Palmerston, and Mr. Solicitor General.
The House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—The Lord Stuart de Decics.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Transportation.
Reported.—Savings Banks Annuities.

NAVAL PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENT.
THE EARL of HARDWICKErose, according to notice, to draw their Lordships' attention to the Order in Council of the 25th of June, 1851, bearing on the promotion and retirement of Officers of the Navy. The noble Earl said his Motion had no reference to the present Government, who had nothing to do with the Order in Council in question. Their Lordships would remember that at the time when the order in question was brought under the notice of the public, he had taken great objection to it in this House; and his present purpose was to try and induce Her Majesty's present Government to look again generally into the order, either for the purpose of rescinding it, or amending it in such a way as that justice might be
2
done to the officers in Her Majesty's service. In order, however, to obviate the objection that nothing had been done to revise the order when he himself was a Member of Her Majesty's late Government, he would at once say that his noble Friend had laid it down as a rule that matters requiring the most urgent attention should be first attended to; and until the decision of the country had been received, and it was ascertained clearly that Lord Derby would or would not continue to hold the reins, no details on Government would be interfered with. But if the late Government had continued in office he should have done in the Cabinet what he now proposed to do in their Lordships' House, namely, to call attention to what he considered the importance of that order, and also to its inefficacy for its proposed object. The order had reference, in the first place, to the instruction of midshipmen; secondly, to lieutenants and commanders; and, thirdly, as to post captains. Now, there could be no doubt that, in the early stages of the service, it was right that officers should receive such instruction as should enable

3
them hereafter usefully to serve their country, and he, therefore, had no intention to direct any attention to the first branches of the order. But to what he wished particularly to point was the order regulating the service of post captains to enable them to receive the rank of admirals upon the active list. The result of the order was this, that they must serve six years in time of peace, four years in time of war, and five years in the time of war and peace combined, in command of a rated ship. That was the sole and entire test of the ability of an officer, and, therefore, they had simply to serve that period of time to enable them to become active admirals. Now, there could be no doubt that the intention of the order was perfectly just, as well as its object perfectly clear, and that was to endeavour to place upon the list of admirals for active service young, active, and intelligent men, who were practised in their profession; and if that effect had been completely produced, he (the Earl of Hardwicke) could have no objection to its continuance; but he had always felt that it would be both productive of injustice, and inefficacious for its end. The injustice of it lay in this—that while it was desired that an office should serve in a rated ship, no rated ship was provided for him. An officer having entered the service, might expend the best part of his life in it; he might serve the best apprenticeship possible—he might distinguish himself in the procession by his zeal and activity—he might see service and might rise rapidly; but having attained a certain rank, he might not succeed in getting, a rated ship for six years, so that when at the top of the list, time door was shut in his face, and he was in fact dismissed from active service. On the other hand, although another party might not have very much distinguished himself, as in all professions there were were men of various abilities, if he happened to be possessed of powerful interest, from the simple fact of having commanded a rated ship for the requisite number of years, he would receive the appointment of admiral on the active list—and perhaps it was well for him to explain to their Lordships that the term rated ship implied all vessels from the smallest frigate up to the highest class line-of-battle ships. Well, since that was the case, he was prepared to maintain that the Order in Council had failed to carry out its own object, for it permitted a captain who had never commanded a line-of battle ship, and who consequently could
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never have fitted himself for those duties of the profession which the order contemplated, to obtain the rank of admiral on the active list—namely, that of sailing in the line of battle, and being practised in the manœuvres of a fleet. Thus, for instance, if, many years ago, an officer had commanded a frigate for some five or six years in time of peace, he was to this fact indebted for his promotion to the rank of an active admiral; while, on the other hand, one who had served for two years in a line-of-battle ship, and two or three in Frigates, and who had been constantly practised in all naval evolutions, was removed to the reserved list. Now, he contended that alone was sufficient evidence of the failure of the Order in Council. But he wished to call their Lordships' attention to another point, which bore upon the civil portion of the service. By one of these Orders in Council any officer having been at the head of a dockyard, a hospital, or any civil establishment of the Crown relating to the Navy, was thereby entitled to take his place upon the active list, and was competent to receive the command of a fleet. The order directed that the time passed in that service might be reckoned as so much sea-time passed afloat. That rule was, he believed, intended to apply immediately to the dockyards and victualling yards, and not to hospitals; and yet he knew of three distinguished officers who had served their time as superintendents of hospitals, who had been placed on the active list, which appeared to him to be a flagrant injustice. He wished, then, to know what had been the result of the order of 1851, and what had been the practice following on it? Whether had that practice produced on the list a body of young and active officers, who might be supposed from their youth to be more energetic and more able to command fleets; and whether the result of it had been to place upon the retired list the names of the old officers whose years justified and rendered necessary their retirement? He himself was able to testify, however, the effect of the order on the last sixteen admirals on the active list, and to compare them with the last sixteen on the reserved list. He found that the sum of ages reached 1,027 years on the retired list; and sixteen upon the active list. whose united ages were not less than 1,038 years, so that there was a small balance against the activity of the active List, and there had been placed upon the

5
active list a larger number of aged officers than on the retired list. And looking over the promotions of the last two years, be found on one side of the retired list that an officer of 60 years of age was placed against one of 68 on the active list. Again, one of 63 against one of 67, one of 59 against 60, and one of 59 against 70. It was quite plain, therefore, that the Order in Council could not be tested by the superior ability or activity of the class of officers whom it had promoted. The service of six years in a rated ship could not be any sufficient test of the ability of an officer, because officers might have served within a week or month of that time; while, on the other hand, you might have an officer pushed on in the service by interest, who might have served the required period afloat, and still might not be so efficient a man as the other, who had not served quite so long a period. If their Lordships took into consideration the mode in which the Navy was governed, it was the very last profession in this country which ought to be regulated by Orders in Council of this description. The theory, indeed, was, that the administration of the promotions and appointments was ordered by a Board of Admiralty, who had sworn to execute the office of Lord High Admiral; the practice, however, was totally different; or, at all events, so far as the promotion of officers was concerned, it was not directed by a Board, for it was wholly in the bands of one individual exercising the office of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Now, under the Order in Council of 1851 it must follow that the First Lord was very frequently placed in a very painful position, as his conduct would often be open to most unjust imputation, let him do whatever he might, and be as just as he could. And to take an instance that was very likely to occur: suppose the First Lord was to take the list of post-captains in his hand, and that he found some relative of his placed eighth or tenth on it, of course it was open to him, if he were so disposed, in case any of those preceding that name on the list had not served the requisite number of years under the order of 1851, to take care that they were not permitted to serve, that his relative might be an admiral as soon as soon as possible. Such a state of things placed the profession in a very anomalous position—a to which no other profession had to submit, for everywhere else men could rise to the top of the tree by
6
the exercise of talent and ability. And he would remind their Lordships that the recent Order in Council was only a repetition of an Order issued in 1827, but which vas repealed on account of its being considered unjust to the service, and there was substituted for it that order which was repealed by the order now under consideration. What he would ask the Government to do was, to examine the bearings of that, Order in Council, and to restore to the service the arrangements then effected, instead of those existing at present, which produced no financial advantage to the nation. The order substituted for that of 1827 would effectually meet the case which he had described, and would prevent any governing power being placed under circumstances of great difficulty, and from having its motives represented in a spirit totally foreign to its feelings and intentions.
The EARL of ABERDEENsaid, the noble Earl had rightly stated that Her Majesty's present Government had not originated the Order in Council to which he had alluded, and had also given a reason for not bringing the subject under the attention of the Government of which he himself was a Member. He thought he recollected that at the time this Order in council was issued, the noble Earl, with some of his friends, had made some observations on the subject. He believed the matter had been considered by the Government at the tune, and had also been fully considered by Parliament. Now, he (the Earl of Aberdeen) knew the subject was one upon which much difference of opinion prevailed in the naval profession, and he confessed that he himself was not very competent to offer an opinion upon any practical view which the noble Earl had taken upon the working of the Order in council As, therefore, the noble Earl had done nothing more than call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the subject, he would, without offering any opinion, or coming to any conclusion himself, simply engage that his right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty should give the subject his full consideration, and to had no doubt that ultimately a decision would be arrived at which would give some satisfaction to the noble Earl.
The EARL of HADDINGTONhad long been of opinion that the matter was one which needed consideration; but it was subject of very considerable difficulty indeed, and it was more easy to point out

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defects in the existing system, than to devise a remedy for those defects. He doubted whether under any general orders or regulations whatever, cases of hardship might not occur. He knew an instance in which an officer who had served five years and a certain number of months in a rated ship, was then put upon the retired list. He had previously, at the desire of the Government of the day, continued for a considerable time to serve in a sloop, and, if he had been allowed to count that service in the sloop, he would not have been put upon the retired list. That, he thought, was a case of great hardship.
LORD COLCHESTERhoped the whole subject would receive the careful consideration of the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty.
EARL TALBOTwas very glad the subject was about to receive the attention of the Government. It was a very important question, deeply affecting the efficiency of the Navy, and he believed the Order in Council alluded to had given rise to great dissatisfaction in the service generally.

TRANSPORTATION BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I can state with very great sincerity that it is a matter of deep regret on my part that it should be necessary at the present day to introduce a Bill of this description. I am not one of those who are inclined to think lightly of the advantages of transportation as a secondary punishment for crime of a serious kind; on the contrary, the experience I have obtained while presiding in criminal courts has impressed most strongly on my mind the conviction that transportation answers more effectively the ends of secondary punishment than any other that can be devised. It appeared to me to possess all the main ingredients of what was desirable in punishment; it created the maximum of apprehension, and the minimum of endurance; it excited great terror, without, perhaps, eventually inflicting great pain; and I do not know bow we can expect to obtain so desirable a secondary punishment. If this country, therefore—meaning by this country the United Kingdom—were alone concerned, I would deprecate any project that was to remove transportation, in any material degree, from the Statute-book as a punishment for crime. Those who were likely to
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commit crime, and were liable to temptations, were terrified, so far as considerations connected with punishment can operate in the way of terror, by the idea of transportation, and were, to some extent, deterred by it from the commission of crime; and to those who had actually committed crimes, and were subject to punishment, it afforded at the same time the best chances of reformation and amendment. Having thus stated the case against myself, in proposing to your Lordships a material alteration in the law, I must be permitted to observe that the views I have hitherto put forward are those in which the interests only of the United Kingdom are considered; but it must not be forgotten that the Crown is at the head, not only of Great Britain and Ireland, but also of numerous colonies dispersed over the globe, realising the observation much more truly than in the case to which it was first applied, that our Sovereign is at the head of an empire on which the sun never sets; and the question is, whether in order to facilitate our own social happiness—whether for our own social advantage—we shall persevere in a system of getting rid of the criminal population of the United Kingdom at the expense of those colonies to which we have hitherto been in the habit of sending them. On this question considerable discussion took place in your Lordships' House a few weeks since. I do not wish to revive that discussion; it seemed to me to be established to the satisfaction, if not of all, of the great majority of your Lordships, that sooner or later—there might have been some difference as to time—the opinion of the important colonies to which we have been in the habit of sending our convicts having been in an unmistakable manner manifested to us, that they would not, so far as their voice could be heard, consent to receive them—it appeared to be the opinion of all sides of the House that the punishment of transportation must be abolished—at least to the extent that we should not send any convicts to colonies unwilling to receive them. It is perfectly well known at the present moment that the population of that colony which has hitherto been the great depôt for convicts, Van Diemen's Land, have signified most decidedly their extreme reluctance to receive any more; and it was stated on the part of the Government, during the last debate, why it was we acceded to the representations coming from that colony. That being

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so, all that remains is to consider what quantity of convicts we can send to those colonies—or I shall limit it to the singular number, and say, to that colony—that is not reluctant to receive them; for we have come to the conclusion that we must abstain from sending convicts to become part of any colony that, on moral or social grounds, is unwilling to receive them:—the only remaining question is, how we are to continue to send convicts to that part of our dominions that have not the same reluctance to receive convicts as a part of their population. At the present moment there is no colony but Western Australia willing to receive convicts; and the question is, what is the quantity of convicts which that colony can receive? That point being once established, the course we have to take is to ascertain what is the number of convicts we can send to that colony, and which of the classes of convicts that we have been hitherto in the habit of sending to all the colonies, we shall now continue to send to that colony. On that subject it must be assumed that if we are to have transportation as a secondary punishment, and the next in point of severity to capital punishment, all we can do is to take from the bottom of the list of those that you were in the habit of transporting such a number as will leave no more than the colony is able to receive. With a view to ascertain that, the first point to be made is, what is the number of convicts that can, without inconvenience, be sent to Western Australia. It is impossible to ascertain that with absolute accuracy; but from the best information it may be assumed that from 800 to 1,000 is the largest number that colony will be able to receive annually. We must next, therefore, remove from the list of those sentenced to transportation so many as will remove trout that punishment all but 800 or 1,000; and, that being so, the next question is, what class of convicts shall be transported thither, and what is to be done with the remainder, who must be, in the eye of the law, the least culpable? For the purpose of ascertaining how we shall deal with them, I beg to call your Lordships' attention to a return of the number of persons who were sentenced to transportation in England and Wales in the year 1851. In the year 1851 there were sentenced to transportation in England and Wales 2,892, including 56 persons who were capitally convicted, but whose punishment was commuted to transportation.
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Out of that number 1,562 persons were sentenced to seven years' transportation only, and who therefore might be taken as the lowest class of criminals sentenced to this punishment; and, deducting those 1,562 persons from 2,892, there remain 1,330 persons who were sentenced to transportation for terms exceeding seven years, that is to say, who were sentenced to transportation for ten years and upwards; for though, according to law, there are some cases in which a person might be sentenced to transportation for eight or nine years, that practice is never adopted, and it may be assumed that the sentences that were for more than seven years were sentences for ten years and upwards. But Scotland and Ireland produced nearly the same quantity of criminals sentenced to transportation as England and Wales, but not quite so many. If they produced as many as England and Wales, the entire amount of persons sentenced to ten years and upwards would be 2,660, from which, if the same deduction were made as before, there would remain 2,400 or 2,500 to dispose of. Now, how are we to deal with them? Assuming that they can only receive in Western Australia 800 or 900, if we continue the punishment of transportation in those cases only where the sentence is transportation for ten years and upwards, the colony of Western Australia will only receive about one-third of the persons who are sentenced to that extent of punishment. And here, I beg leave to say, that it would, in my opinion, be a most unwholesome state of the criminal law that there should be a large number of persons sentenced in a court of justice to a punishment which every person knows, in two cases out of three, would not be carried into execution. In case, therefore, you can transport only 800 or 900 persons annually, it is obvious you must go one step further, and remove the punishment of transportation from such a number as will bring the number sentenced to transportation within the number that can be received in the colony. The question is, how that object is to be effected. You may take it that there are scarcely any sentences of transportation between ten and fourteen years. I remember that I myself, for some reasons which I cannot now recollect, once sentenced a man to be transported for twelve years; but I believe there are not half a dozen of such sentences in the course of a year, and therefore it may be taken that, practically, they do not exist. By a modern

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Act, the punishment for a particular offence is fixed at fifteen years; but by the old Acts, for some of the more serious offences, such as that of receiving stolen goods, the offender is liable to fourteen years' transportation:—so that you may take the next class as being convicts sentenced to fourteen years and upwards. Looking to the table, and deducting from those sentenced in England and Wales to ten years and upwards, those sentenced to be transported for more than ten, and not less than fourteen years—namely, 895—there were left for England and Wales 426 persons sentenced to be transported for more than fourteen years: and on making the same calculation with respect to Scotland and Ireland, and adding the product to 435, it will appear that the entire number amounts to between 800 and 900 persons. This leaves a little margin when compared with the number which Western Australia can receive; but I do not think that we could extend the number that are to be sent out to the colony below those cases where the term of transportation to which the convict is sentenced is fourteen years and upwards, because the practice generally is to go in a jump from ten to fourteen years. Moreover, this must not be lost sight of, that a great number of the persons who are sentenced to ten years' transportation are liable to be transported for fourteen years, Dr perhaps for life; but it being discretionary with the Judges whether they should transport them for ten or fifteen years, there often occurred cases in which though the Judge thought the criminal should be transported, he should be transported for the shortest period of time the law would allow. I cannot but look forward to the extreme probability that the Judges will no longer allow themselves this discretion in passing sentence, and that some persons who are now transported for ten years will, in the altered state of the law, be transported for fourteen years. I think it necessary, therefore, to have a considerable margin, and that being so, that we should not leave subject to transportation any person who is not now liable to transportation for fourteen years and upwards. That will include the more grievous offences, such as eases of receiving stolen goods, violent outrages, assaults causing grievous bodily harm, housebreaking, burglary, and will also include an offence that I was inclined to exclude—namely, cattle stealing; but inasmuch as this measure must, to a cer-
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tain extent, be experimental. I think it better simply to draw the line at the point it which the number enables us to deal with the cases included in it; and that which I propose will certainly include all the more grievous crimes. The usage has men that a great portion of the persons sentenced to transportation have not been, n fact, transported. The circumstances of age, health, and a variety of other maters, render it expedient that the Crown should occasionally interpose its prerogative in commuting sentences, and that has been done under circumstances which it has been said were not originally founded in right; but subsequently by an Act of the Legislature it was provided that persons sentenced to transportation might, instead of being transported, be imprisoned for a certain time, and be subject to a variety of regulations that still remain in Force; they may be made to work on the public works, and then after a certain period they may be transported. A person who is now sentenced to transportation for fifteen years, may be kept on the public works for the fifteen years if the Executive think fit, though in practice that has never been done. Carrying out this practice, and sanctioning by legislative enactment what has been practically done, I have thought, in conjunction with my Colleagues, that a reasonable course would be to impose on persons who might now he transported, a sentence as nearly as possible conformable to what would have been done by the Secretary of State in cases where the sentence of transportation has been pronounced, but has not been carried into effect. The ordinary course has been this—that where a party has been sentenced to transportation for seven years, he has been ordered to be imprisoned for two years, being kept during a part of the time in separate confinement according to certain reformatory principles; then he has been sent for a year, a year and a half, or two years, to public works, at the hulks, or to Dartmoor, Portland, Pembroke, or other places; and then he has been transported for three or four years with a ticket of leave. This last part of the sentence we cannot unfortunately execute any longer; but what we may endeavour to do is, to adopt as nearly as possible what has actually been done in the case of those prisoners who though sentenced to transportation were not transported. We propose that in those cases where a convict is now sentenced to be transported for

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seven years, he shall be kept in "penal servitude" for a term of four years. Of course the Crown will be able to remit a portion of the time on account of good behaviour or other circumstances. We propose that in those cases where a party is now sentenced to transportation for ten years, he shall be kept in penal servitude For six years; that where the sentence would be fifteen years' transportation, the period of penal servitude shall be eight years; and that where the sentence of transportation would be above fifteen years, the period of penal servitude shall be ten years. In proposing to effect this great change, it may seem that the statement I make is very short, but the truth is that the question lies in a very narrow compass. I have received communications urging me to do nothing, and suggesting that there are still statutes enabling the Crown to do all that I propose to do—that these statutes enable the Crown not to transport persons liable to transportation, but to deal with them as I now propose to do by this statute. I have considered that, and admit that there is a good deal in it, because it would enable the Crown to make a selection of those convicts who are to be sent to the colonies, which would be a considerable advantage; but weighing the advantages and disadvantages together, the course which we propose to adopt appears to me by far the best. It is very inexpedient that, at the assizes throughout the United Kingdom, sentences should be passed whereby 5,000 persons might be ordered for transportation, while it was well known that not 1,000 of them could ever really be transported. That would be a great inconvenience, and outweigh any advantage which we could derive from the adoption of the suggestion to which I have referred. I think it infinitely more becoming that in such a vital matter as the penal enactments of the country, nothing like mystery shall prevail—that the general normal state of those who are sentenced to transportation shall be that they will be transported—and that those who are not to be transported shall exactly know the nature of their punishment. The noble and learned Lord concluded by moving the Second Reading of the Bill.
EARL GREYconcurred with his noble and learned Friend in thinking that transportation was one of the most effectual secondary punishments, whether for the prevention of crime, or for the punishment of crime. Still, as the measures
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already adopted by the Government, and practically approved by Parliament, had rendered it necessary that the use of that punishment should to a great extent be discontinued, as he did not wish to renew the discussion on the course which had been pursued, he would not oppose the second reading of the Bill. He concurred with his noble and learned Friend in thinking that a great scandal was inflicted on the administration of justice by allowing the sentence of transportation to be pronounced upon a large proportion of criminals, regarding whom that sentence was never intended to be carried into effect. The punishment actually inflicted on criminals should be as nearly as possible in conformity with the sentence passed. But while, for this reason, he concurred in the second reading of the Bill, he could not help expressing his disappointment at not having heard from his noble and learned Friend a statement of the manner in which the Government proposed to deal with this most difficult subject. He certainly had anticipated that his noble and learned Friend would give some explanation of the mode by which it was intended to carry into effect their plan of secondary punishment, in lieu of that of transportation. He should like to have known to what extent the prisons at Portland and at Dartmoor were to be affected, and whether the Government had satisfied themselves as to the practicability of the change, and had provided the necessary measures for such change, so that no danger should intervene between the operation of one system and the other. He had hoped to hear what measures were actually in progress in order to provide for those convicts who were now at Portland and Dartmoor. Above all, he did anticipate that his noble and learned Friend would have satisfied their Lordship; an one point, concerning which considerable anxiety was expressed when this subject was last under discussion—he meant as to what was to be done with those convicts who, under the existing state of the law and the practice which till lately had been followed, had been led to expect that if they behaved well they would be relieved From the severe discipline of the establishments at Portland, Dartmoor, and Bermuda, by obtaining tickets of leave in the penal colonies after completing a comparatively short portion of their original sentences In the course of a conversation on that subject in the early part of the present Session he (Earl Grey) asked what was to be done

15
with those prisoners, and he at the same time stated that there would not be less than 3,000 or 4,000 to be disposed of in the course of the current year. The noble Duke at the head of the Colonial Department contradicted that statement, and said that he (Earl Grey) was entirely in error, and that the number of prisoners would not be much more than half he (Earl Grey) had stated. He at that time bowed to the noble Duke's superior information. But he afterwards moved for a return showing the number of convicts in the different prisons of this country entitled to enjoy the regulations which were in force when they were sent to those prisons, and showing also the number that had been removed in each of the last five or six years to the Australian colonies under the former system. The return showed that he (Earl Grey) had not been far wrong in his calculations; indeed he found from that return that his calculation that 3,000 or 4,000 convicts would have to be disposed of in the present year, was rather below than above the truth. It appeared that the total number removed to the Australian colonies in the last year was 3,735, the number removed the year before being 3,182. He was not aware of anything likely to occur to reduce the number persons of this description in the forth coming year; on the contrary, from a time at which the system now superseded was introduced, he should infer that the number had not yet reached its maximum. If there was that large number to be disposed of, he was anxious to know what was to be done with them. He was particularly anxious on this point, because he found from that return that at the present moment there were considerably above 1,234 convicts at Portland Dartmoor, Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Malta, who were entitled, under the regulations which were in force when they were sent to those establishments, to expect to be relieved before this time from the extreme severity of the punishment to which they were there subjected. Those who knew what that severity of punishment was—the continuance of labour, the strict discipline, the monotonous life—and recollected that it was the hope of being relieved from it which had in past years been the stimulus to good conduct on the part of the convicts would agree with him that it was extremely proper that their Lordships should know what was to be done with those persons. He was the more anxious to know this,
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because when he called for the return, he at the same time asked for the number of convicts who were removable, but who, it was natural to suppose, would not be sent abroad as heretofore; and he also asked what were the regulations which would be made with respect to them. The system of transportation was practically discontinued in the month of January last; therefore three months had elapsed at the time his Motion was made, and when he expressed his anxiety to know how these convicts were to be dealt with. [The noble Earl here referred to the return made to his Motion for the papers, which stated that Colonel Jebb having written on the 10th February to the Home Secretary to be informed whether the printed notice hung up in the prisons, holding out expectations of being relieved from the prison discipline, at the expiration of certain periods, should be withdrawn on the 29th of April, Lord Palmerston, in a communication, stated that many important considerations were involved in this question; and as Government had not then had an opportunity of deciding whether or not they would submit a Bill to Parliament for altering the present law of transportation, his Lordship could not at present come to any conclusion on the subject.] Now, as Lord Palmerston could not then come to any conclusion on the subject, he (Ear Grey) could not help thinking that it was quite natural to ask, when such a Bill as this was introduced, what was to be done with these convicts? He hoped some explanation would be given upon this point before the debate closed. Those were the main points on which he thought further explanation might have been expected from his noble and learned Friend on moving the second reading of this Bill. He would now proceed to make a few remarks upon some of the clauses of the Bill. He had already stated his general concurrence it substituting penal servitude instead of transportation; but he would point out what he thought a great defect in the system proposed by the Bill. Under the law as it now stood, a convict sentenced to transportation might be, at the pleasure of the Crown, kept under penal servitude during the whole time of his sentence. Practically, however, that was a system that was never acted upon. It had always been the practice that the convict should be released, either in this country or in the colony, at a period considerably earlier than the term of the sentence. The usual practice was,

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that if a convict were sentenced for seven years, and he behaved well, he would be discharged at the end of four years, the Crown, however, having the power to detain him till the end of the seven years. It was necessary that the Crown should possess that power, because he believed that the whole improvement which had taken place of late years in the system of punishment was founded upon that right of the Crown. The principle adopted by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) in 1842, and the principle adopted by the Government of which he had himself (Earl Grey) been a Member in 1847 and 1848 was, to make the release of convicts from the more severe part of their sentence depend upon their good conduct and industry Upon a daily record of the conduct of the convict, depended his final release. It was to the stimulus thus applied, and to a knowledge on the part of the convict that he was earning his freedom by his good conduct, that their Lordships were mainly indebted to the striking and happy contrast between the conduct that prevailed in our modern prisons, and that which formerly existed in the hulks. But, by shortening the period during which the convicts were to be at the disposal of the Crown, they would greatly diminish the efficiency of the power of the existing system. By the Bill of his noble and learned Friend, it was proposed that the convicts, instead of being sentenced to transportation, should be sentenced for a considerably shorter period to penal servitude; that a man who, under the present law, would be sentenced to seven years' transportation, should be here after sentenced to four years' penal servitude. That man, let him behave as ill as he pleased, at the end of the four years was to be discharged. The motive to good conduct was thus materially diminished What was the present practice? The man, practically, was enlarged at the end of four years; but it was known from the moment he was sentenced that he might be kept for the full period—namely, seven years; and he might be either confined banished, and his only hope of abridging that period was in his behaving well. It appeared to him (Earl Grey) that when the Legislature took away the punishment of transportation, it ought, in order to make up for that remission, rather to increase than diminish the period of penal servitude—at all events with respect convicts sentenced for short terms; for with respect to convicts sentenced to transpor-
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tation for life, he thought it was different. But the Bill was framed upon the very opposite principle, for while it still further abridged the term of punishment for minor offences, it provided that instead of convicts being transported for life, they might be sentenced to penal servitude for life. With respect to this provision he entertained great doubts. He did not think they could keep a man in penal servitude for life. He could understand a man being transported for life, but he did not believe, practically, that the country would endure seeing a man sentenced to penal servitude for life without any hope of mitigation. This appeared to be a deficiency in the Bill. There was also another defect. Under the present system of transportation it had been found of the greatest advantage that convicts should not be discharged at once from a state of punishment to a state of unrestricted liberty. The system, therefore, was to place them under a modified state of freedom by means of what were called "tickets of leave." For bad conduct those tickets of leave could be at once withdrawn. That system had been found to work well, and to have a very beneficial effect. Men with sudden and unrestricted freedom were much more likely to relapse into crime than men who enjoyed a restricted degree of freedom by means of tickets of leave. He thought, then, that when we were doing away with the system of transportation, it might not have been impossible to establish something of the same kind in this country. He was quite aware that in a country so thickly inhabited as England was, it would be utterly impossible to enforce precisely the same regulations which were now adopted in the colonies as regarded tickets of leave: but he did not think it at all impossible to devise means by which persons might be discharged from prison under condition which would enable the Crown to remand them into custody if those conditions were broken. They might be required to live in some extreme part of the country, and to give an account to the police of the means by which they got their livelihood. An arrangement of that kind would be the means of holding such persons to good bail, and during the present great demand for labour in the country he did not think ii would be impracticable to obviate some the difficulties connected with the change from a system of transportation to one of imprisonment. He would the more earnest press this upon the Government, because,

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if he bad not been misinformed, something of this kind, which he (Earl Grey) himself had suggested, had been done in some o our colonies. When he held the office o Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, difficulties arose as to the punishment of offenders in various colonies owing to its having been found necessary to prohibit the practice which formerly prevailed of sending convicts sentenced to transportation from the other colonies t the penal ones. Among the measure which he recommended to meet this difficulty, one was that laws should be passed authorising the discharge of convicts with tickets of leave in the colonies where they had committed offences. He understood that in Barbadoes this suggestion had been acted upon, and that under a lax passed by the Legislature of that island convicts were now discharged there with tickets of leave. The system, he was told had answered extremely well. He saw no reason why such a system should not be tried in this country also; and though he knew the difficulties to be encountered would be greater, he did not think it impossible that it might answer. As it was possible that it would not be in his power to be present when their Lordships went into Committee, there was one point more to which he would call their Lordships' attention, and that was the 12th clause of the Bill. He could not find any noble Lord who understood that clause. That clause, enacted that "transportation should in elude banishment beyond the seas." He did not see how it could admit of doubt that transportation must usually include banishment beyond the seas; but it seemed to him it might be dangerous to enact the in the manner proposed, since the word might possibly be construed as depriving the Crown of the power it had hitherto exercised of detaining persons sentenced to transportation in the hulks or convict prisons at home, in eases when, owing to the, health of the individuals or from other reasons, their actual removal from the country was considered to be inexpedient.
The LORD CHANCELLORwas un derstood to say that the words "banished beyond the seas" were used to adapt the Act to the law of Scotland, where those words were well understood.
LORD BROUGHAMentirely agreed with both his noble Friends who had last addressed the House, and with his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, in thinking that, from circumstances over which
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we had no control it was now impossible to carry out transportation as a punishment to any great degree. With all the objections to which that punishment was liable, he thought it could not be denied that it had some advantages which were possessed by no other secondary punishment. In the first place, it was easily apportioned as a secondary punishment; in the second place, it had a decidedly reformatory effect; in the third place, it had terrors which he feared any other secondary punishment would fail to inspire; and, lastly, it had the effect of taking away from the community those offenders whose being turned loose amongst us after undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, he (Lord Brougham) regarded with considerable alarm. However, though fully alive to its value, he confessed he saw the impossibility of continuing the system of transportation which had hitherto been resorted to. There was a calculation made in a very useful and valuable work lately published by Ids noble Friend (Earl Grey), entitled the History of the Colonial Policy of Lord Johns Russell's Administration; that calculation he had repeatedly consulted, in reading the work, and it had led him with greater regret than ever to the conclusion that it was quite impossible longer to have recourse, to any extent, to the system of transportation. It appeared from that calculation, the materials from which his noble Friend (Earl Grey) had drawn from his own extended information on colonial matters, and from documents in the possession of Parliament and of the country, that no less a number than 48,000 persons were now in existence in the different penal colonies who had originally been sent out under sentences of transportation. That was a startling statement, and certainly fully established the necessity of putting a stop to the present system of transportation. The question then arose as to what should be substituted for it. He owned that it was a difficult question; but there was an old saying applicable here—it was, "When you cannot have what you would, you ought to endeavour to like what you have." That ought to lead us to cherish, with the view to improve, the system of secondary punishment which we still had. On this point he would say he thought there was much good sense in the statement of the noble Earl (Earl Grey) as to how much might be done for improving the system of secondary punishments by penal servitude in this country, coupled with something like the ticket-of-leave system. Without some

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modification of this kind, he feared that many very serious, if not fatal objections, would be taken to the present measure. There existed, at this moment, in the administration of criminal justice, a great and scandalous anomaly, which it was absolutely necessary to put an end to. He alluded to the general practice which prevailed of sentencing an offender to a description of an amount of punishment which it was known at the time would not be inflicted, The practice prevailed to such an extent that the chances were as ten to one in favour of the punishment inflicted being different from that pronounced in the sentence. When persons were sentenced to transportation for seven years, it was well known that it meant imprisonment for that period, and that if the prisoner behaved well he would be allowed to escape a year or two of the punishment. Nothing could be more anomalous or more calculated to bring the criminal jurisprudence of the country inn contempt. It ought at once to be abandoned, and in every case the punishment made to correspond exactly with the sentence pronounced by the Judge. But what was to be done by the present Bill? Why, in the case he had mentioned, namely that of seven years' transportation, the punishment was to be reduced to four years penal servitude. In his opinion it would be much better to continue the period a seven years, and call it seven years' penal servitude, it being distinctly understood at the same time that the duration of that penal servitude was to depend on the behaviour of the convict undergoing the sentence. He could see no difficulty whatever in giving to time Crown the power of remitting one, two, or even three years of the period, according to the behaviour of the convict. The secondary system had of late years received very considerable improvements, and there was every reason to believe that those improvements would be very much extended—so much so, indeed as to lessen, if not entirely to remove, the regrets of all reasonable men in the abolition of the punishment of transportation. From all the observations he had been able to make during the course of his legal experience as to the effect of our penal enactmeets—from all the information he hat been able to obtain from the Judges and from the Executive Administration—new as Compelled to draw the melancholy conclusion that the effect of punishment in deterring by example from the commission of crime was far less important, far less effective,
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than was generally hoped and believed. In his opinion, prevention was that to which wise lawgivers ought mainly to direct their attention; and if he stated that the first preventive of crime was education—moral and religious instruction—imparted to the people, he felt he was only utterance to what now-a-days must, be regarded as an unfruitful truism. But he would go a step Further, and would assert that there was me species of education which went more directly than all the rest to produce the best preventive to crime. He alluded to infant education—infant training. It was an acknowledged fact, patent to all whose duty or inclination brought them into contact with the lower classes of the people, that there was one peculiar section among them from which the greater proportion of the criminals brought to justice were supplied. A better, more complete, and more radical preventive of crime could not be imagined than the institution of infant schools for that portion of the community. Indeed, if that were done, they would have accomplished all that was in the power of human agency to lessen the supply of criminals. But there was another means of prevention to which it was necessary that attention should be directed; be meant the police system. He could not conceive that any pains of a wise and good Government could be better bestowed, or that any sums of money could be grudged, even by an economical Government, for improving and greatly extending our police establishments. He would not say that the object of time police was to detect for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but it was the existence of a good and efficient police which really and effectually deterred persons from the commission of offences. An efficient police sowed distrust and fear among the criminal classes of the community. A secret police, consisting of intelligent, active men, so dressed as not to put intending criminals on their guard, having the whole body of offenders continually under their eyes, and well acquainted with all their persons and habits, would always prove the best possible preventive. Such a force would completely destroy all confidence and trust among criminals, and prevent the adoption and execution of any criminal plan calling for the exertions of more than one person. It might be said that there would be two objections to the establishment of a perfect secret criminal police such as he meant. The first would, no doubt, be the point of expense. In his opinion that would be cheerfully

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borne by the community. The other objection he supposed would be, that it would sow distrust among members of the community. His answer to that was, that it would only create distrust among the wicked towards their own accomplices, or even distrust which wicked men would feel of themselves in the perpetration of crime. He had deemed it his duty on this occasion, as on all others, to address a few remarks to their Lordships on a question which all would consider of the very greatest importance. He would venture to remind their Lordships that in France the system of taking and reforming juvenile criminals before they had become hardened in crime, had been in efficient operation; and that in this country—in Warwickshire—a similar institution existed, in which juvenile delinquents were subjected to a system of penal labour, advantageous and productive to the establishment, and beneficial to themselves. He would urge upon the Government the necessity of extending their proposed alterations in criminal punishments in this direction, and of aiding as much as possible the establishment and continuance of such institutions.
The DUKE of NEWCASTLEapprehended that the measure would better be discussed in detail when the House went into Committee, and he would not therefore detain their Lordships long on that occasion. This might be the last occasion they would have of singing the requiem of transportation in in its present form and to its present extent, and he begged therefore to express his concurrence in the regrets expressed by the noble and learned Lord, and by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), at the absolute necessity of reducing that punishment to the minimum quantity. He quite agreed with them as to the advantages that system of punishment hade onferred on the country, by the removal of persons who had coin-witted crimes to distant lands. It was unnecessary to pursue that question further, inasmuch as there appeared to be a thoroughly unanimous opinion that the time had conic when it was necessary from imperial considerations to reduce that punishment to the small amount to which his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack had referred. He would not weary their Lordships by discussing the question of reforms in criminal jurisprudence; he would but express the hope that out of evil good might yet come—that from the importance of the subject, and the necessity of dealing
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with it, the attention, not merely of Government and of the Legislature, but of the whole of the inhabitants of the empire would be turned more than at any former period, not only to the improvement of the penal system, but also to the still more important subject of an improved education for the younger portion of the community. He certainly did not underrate the importance or the value of the steps taken in the last few years both by the Administration of which the noble Earl (Earl Grey) was a Member, and by Colonel Jebb and others acting under the direction of successive Governments, with the view of improving our penal system; but he was, at the same time, fully convinced that much more would have been done, that still greater attention would have been paid to the subject, had the public mind been more generally convinced that we could not for ever pursue the system of transportation, and continue to transfer to other countries the crime engendered in this. He did not anticipate that the present Bill would be the last effort which would be made in this direction. The attention of the Legislature and of the Government must henceforth be sedulously directed to the subject; the progress of legislation would be watched. The effect of the Bill, then, before them would be closely scrutinised after it had passed into a law; and experience would teach them what would be the best further remedies to be applied. He might remind their Lordships that only a few evenings ago his noble Friend, Lord Shaftesbury, to whom the country had been indebted for so many valuable acts of legislation, introduced a measure which he believed he was not too sanguine in anticipating would materially reduce the nurseries of crime in great towns. When they found legislation of this kind in progress, he thought it might be folly anticipated that, though the cessation of transportation at the present moment might be looked upon as an evil so far as this country was concerned, that evil would to a great extent, and very speedily, be obviated by these remedial measures. He felt that no apology was due by his noble Friend who first spoke in this debate (Earl Grey) for introducing observations which he himself admitted might be more properly made when the House were in Committee on the Bill; and he said this not only because the noble Earl would be unable to attend on that occasion, but because he felt that on a measure such as

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this, on which no party feeling could possibly arise, it was of the highest advantage that suggestions should be made which might lead to improvements being introduced by the Government, but which possibly might not be so maturely considered if left at a later stage of the measure. He thought the suggestions made both by the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord related to two points. They had remarked that they saw no reason why the period of transportation to which criminals had been sentenced, should be reduced to the period of penal servitude which would be established by this Bill. He admitted that this was a matter for grave consideration, and with regard to which some Amendment might possibly be made in Committee. He (the Duke of Newcastle) apprehended, however, that the reasons for the alteration proposed by the Bill were twofold. In the first place, persons who had watched punishments of tie nature of the penal servitude proposed by this measure, were of opinion that penal servitude for so long a period as that for which sentence of transportation had been passed, would be too onerous and severe for the endurance of criminals; because such servitude would, in fact, be a much heavier punishment than that for which it was substituted. As their Lordships were aware, sentence of seven years' transportation had not hitherto been carried into effect. Upon inquiry being made as to the periods of imprisonment which had been substituted, at the discretion of the Home Secretary for a long time past, for sentences of seven years' transportation, it was found that, practically, such, imprisonments had not been so great as those intended to be imposed by the present Bill. Under this measure four years penal servitude would be substituted for seven years' transportation; but the average period of imprisonment to which criminals sentenced to seven years' transportation had been subjected, was found not to have exceeded three years, while the minimum had been two years. This Bill would, therefore, establish a heavier punishment than that which had hitherto been practically inflicted. He admitted, however, that it was a matter well worthy of consideration, whether they should not impose a longer period of penal servitude, giving a recognised discretion to the Executive Government with regard to the duration of the punishment; for he readily agreed with his noble Friends that one of
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the greatest incentives to good conduct on the part of criminals, and one of the best means of carrying out the present system with advantage, was to hold out to criminals the hope that the period of their punishment might, within certain limits, be made to depend on their own behaviour. Another suggestion which had been made by the noble Earl, and in which the noble and learned Lord appeared cordially to concur, was, whether the system of tickets of leave, which had worked so well in the colonies, might not, in a modified form, be adopted in this country. The attention of Her Majesty's Government had already been turned to this point, and his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack would be prepared, before the Bill went into Committee, to submit a proposal to the House on this subject. The difficulty which had been felt was, whether, if a ticket of leave was given to a criminal in this country, he should be allowed—of course, under surveillance—to live in any part of the country he might himself select, or whether his location should be fixed in some particular county or district. That question was now under the consideration of his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor), and, as he had said, before the Bill went into Committee some proposal would be submitted to the House. He (the Duke of Newcastle) readily admitted that there were peculiar facilities for introducing such a system at the present moment, when extensive works were in progress of a defensive character, for establishing harbours of refuge, and for other important public purposes, which would enable them with great advantage to introduce the punishment provided by this Bill, and also the system of tickets of leave. He need not enter more fully into that subject on the present occasion; but two questions had been asked by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) which he was anxious to answer. The noble Earl asked what was proposed to be done with criminals who had already been sentenced to transportation, but to whom a promise had been held out that after a specified period of imprisonment they would be sent out of the country? He thought his noble Friend at the head of the Government had given a full explanation upon this subject on a previous occasion. It was true that there were in the prisons of this country a certain number of criminals who, if it had not been necessary to discontinue transportation to Van Diemen's Land, would before now have been on the high seas on their

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voyage to that colony; and it was intended that, if the Bill should pass in the form in which it now was, those persons should only undergo such further imprisonment as would complete the period intended by this Bill to be imposed upon future criminals of the same class. This provision would only apply to culprits to whom those promises had been made; as, of course, such promises and engagements had been discontinued so soon as it was ascertained that the punishment of transportation would cease, so that they would only have to deal in this manner with criminals who were in prison at the moment when the cessation of transportation was decided upon. The noble Earl had expressed regret that the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack had not, in his opening statement, explained the provisions and arrangements contemplated by the Government with the view of providing for the infliction of the new punishment now proposed to be introduced. He understood the noble Earl to refer particularly to the amount of prison accommodation existing in the country at the present moment—for, of course, under this measure the number of criminals retained in the country would be very materially increased. He (the Duke of Newcastle) had stated on a former occasion the exact number of cells which were vacant in the various prisons, and the arrangements that had been made for the accommodation of prisoners, which would be amply sufficient, at any rate, up to the close of the present year. He believed he might assure the House that there was at the present time ample accommodation in the prisons for any number of prisoners at all likely to accumulate before the period when, in the ordinary course, it would be necessary to submit estimates to the House of Commons for any additional works that might be required. He had not concealed the fact that, with respect both to the amount and character of prison accommodation a considerable expenditure would be requisite; but he believed he might assure the House, on the part of the Government, that it would not be necessary to incur any expenditure for this purpose until Parliament should meet in the next Session. But though it would be necessary to apply to Parliament next Session, the Government now made no other appeal than to ask their Lordships to sanction this alteration in the law on the punishment of transportation. It was unnecessary for him to trespass further on their
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Lordships' time, except to reiterate his confident expectation, and his most carries hope that public attention would be turned on the present Government, as well as on all future Governments, as regarded this important question; and that if they slackened in their attention to the amendment of their criminal code, and of their penal system, the public would keep on them and their successors a jealous watch, and take care that these important matters be, more duly and more satisfactorily attendee to than they heretofore had been.
LORD CAMPBELLcordially supporter he second reading of the Bill, the principal of which, in his view, was to make law and practice correspond. There had been, for years past, a great discrepancy between them, which had rendered the administration of justice in many cases most painful duty. He had himself felt when he had pronounced sentence of transportation, that it was a mere mockery, be cause he well knew that the sentence pronounced and tried to make terrible cool, not to be carried out. He was glad that he would only for a short time longer—though he might have to do so on his next circuit—be under the necessity of pronouncing fictitious sentences, and that in the spring of 1854, when sentence of penal servitude was passed, the punishment would be inflicted. When he said that h approved of this Bill, it must, however, be under the well-understood protest that it was not to be the requiem of transportation. [The Duke of NEWCASTLE: On it present scale.] Well, perhaps under the present circumstances of the world, transportation on its present scale could not be continued; but he concurred with hi noble and learned Friend on the woolsack in regarding transportation as the best secondary punishment that was ever adopted; and when he assented to this Bill, it must be understood that it was without prejudice to Government using their utmost efforts still to continue that punishment. At the present moment the only colony to which we could send convicts was Western Australia; but he did not despair of the establishment of new penal settlements which might lead to most beneficial results. He had been informed by persons well acquainted with the subject the there were other parts of the great continent of Australia where penal colonic might be beneficially founded, and he did not yet despair of this being done in the Falkland Islands. He considered that the

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Bill was susceptible of considerable amendments in Committee; but after those amendments had been made, he believed that it would effect a very material improvement in the penal law of this country.
The MARQUESS of CLANRICARDEhoped that some further explanation would be given—though it might be done on the next stage of the Bill—with regard to the treatment of those convicts to whom promises were stated to have been held out. If he understood correctly what, had fallen from the noble Duke, in the course of the present year from 800 to 1,200 convicts would be let loose in this country, who, if the old system of transportation had continued, were intended to be sent beyond seas. Now, he thought this was a matter for very grave and serious consideration. Such a proceeding would be one of an entirely novel description, and with regard to which full information ought to be given to Parliament. He must say that he viewed with alarm the proposal to abandon, or so materially to diminish, the punishment o transportation; but he would not oppose the Bill in its present stage.
On Question. agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and Committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.
House adjourned till To-morrow.