Sitting of 21 July 1851

MINUTES.
NEW MEMBER SWORN.—For Knaresborough, Thomas Collins, Esq.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Sheep, &. Contagious Diseases Prevention; Commissioners of Railways Act Repeal; Attornies and Solicitors Regulation Act Amendment.
2° Commons Inclosure (No. 2); Soap Duty Allowances; Militia Pay.
3° Merchant Seamen's Fund.

DAVID SALOMONS, ESQ.—THE "VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS.
MR. SPEAKERstated, that he had received a Letter from David Salomons, esquire, relative to the entry of the Proceedings of the House on Friday last in his case, which he read, as follows:—
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"Great Cumberland Place, July 21st, 1851.
"Sir—I take the liberty to call your attention to a very important omission in the record of the Proceedings of the House of Commons on Friday last, of all notice of my demand to subscribe the Oath of Abjuration, and to declare to my Property Qualification.
"Immediately after I had taken the Oaths, I read from a paper which I held in my hand the following words: 'I have now taken the Oaths, in the form and with the ceremonies that I declare to be binding on my conscience, in accordance with the Stat. 1 and 2 Vict. cap. 105. I now demand to subscribe the Oath of Abjuration, and to declare to my Property Qualification.'
"No notice has been taken, in the Proceedings above referred to, of my having made this demand. You will therefore, I am sure, Sir, pardon me for drawing your attention to the subject, and respectfully requesting that the Minutes of the Proceedings of Friday last be amended. With the utmost respect, I have the honour to be Sir, your most obedient and humble Servant,
DAVID SALOMONS
"To the Right Honourable
The Speaker."
I ought to state to the House that the entry in the Votes was carefully prepared; and although what was spoken by the hon. Member was perfectly audible in this part of the House, yet it appeared to me, after the Clerk had reported the omission of certain words in the oath, and I had directed the hon. Member to withdraw, it was his duty to have withdrawn immediately; and any statement made by him at the table after that order had been given, could not properly be entered on the Votes. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Order of the Day.

DAVID SALOMONS, ESQ.—OATH OF ABJURATION—ADJOURNED DEBATE.
Further Proceeding on administering the Oath of Abjuration to David Salomons, Esq. resumed.
SIR BENJAMIN HALL: Sir, it may now, perhaps, be convenient that I should repeat the question which I put to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Friday evening, and which he requested might be repeated this evening when the noble Lord at the head of the Government should be present. It will be in the recollection of the House that after the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich withdrew from the table, he occupied the seat where the hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark (Sir W. Molesworth) now sits; and that when you, Sir, repeated your desire that the hon. Gentleman should withdraw, he withdrew below the bar of the House. It will also be in the recol-

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lection of the House that after the hon. Gentleman had so withdrawn, I stated to the House that it was the anxious desire of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich to take such steps as might be necessary for carrying out not only the wishes of his constituents, but also to take such steps as might be necessary for asserting his own right to occupy the seat in this assembly to which he has been elected; and that the hon. Member did not desire to take any course which might be displeasing or inconvenient to the House, but that he was resolved, so far as lay in his power, to take his seat as a Member of the Legislature. I asked my right hon. Friend on Friday night whether, as the hon. Gentleman had certainly taken a seat within the bar of the House—whether, under such circumstances, if the Government might think that he has became amenable to the law, they would direct the Attorney General to prosecute the hon. Gentleman, in order to bring this question fairly to issue? And I intimated further that, if they did not think that the hon. Gentleman had up to that point become amenable to the law, or that a prosecution would fairly he against him, the hon. Gentleman would take the still further step, if possible, of voting as a Member of the House, and thereby render himself perfectly amenable to any penalties that the statute might impose. The question I have now to put is, Whether the noble Lord will authorise a prosecution at the instance of the Attorney General against the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I think the hon. Baronet is hardly authorised in asking me what course the Government will or will not pursue in regard to the prosecution of an hon. Gentleman for taking his seat without having taken the oath of abjuration. However, I am ready to say that, reserving to the Government full liberty of action hereafter as we may think proper, we are not at present disposed to think that we ought to prosecute the hon. Member for Greenwich for the offence.
SIR BENJAMIN HALL: Then, Sir, I have further to intimate to the House what is the course which I believe the hon. Gentleman intends to pursue. Whatever difference of opinion may exist amongst us, I am sure all can agree upon this point, that, so far as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich has acted, he has acted fairly and honourably towards the House. He has not condescended to any
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subterfuge of any sort or kind whatsoever. In consequence of the answer which the noble Lord has now given, I think the only course which the hon. Gentleman can pursue is to come within the House, and take his seat in this assembly to which he has been elected.
Alderman Salomons, who had hitherto occupied a seat below the bar, here entered the House, and took his seat within the bar, on the front Ministerial bench.
SIR ROBERT H. INGLISrose, amidst great confusion, and appeared to he about to address the House; but was interrupted by—
MR. SPEAKERwho rose, and, silence being restored, said, "That he saw a Member had taken his seat without having taken the oaths required by law; he must therefore desire that the hon. Member do withdraw." [Great cries of "Withdraw!"]
LORD JOHN RUSSELLrose, but the incessant cries of "Order!" "Chair!" and "Withdraw!" compelled him to resume his seat.
MR. SPEAKERsaid: An hon. Member (Mr. C. Anstey) has put a Motion into my hand. The question now before the House is a point of order, which has the precedence of every other question.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLagain rose, but the continued cries of "Chair!" "Withdraw!" and "Order!" rendered it impossible for him to be heard, and he again sat down.
Meanwhile, Mr. Alderman Salomons continued in his seat within the bar.
MR. SPEAKERagain rose and said: I ought to explain to the House that if the hon. Member refuses to obey the order of the Speaker, it is for the House to support their Speaker. This order can only be enforced by a vote of the House. [Great cheers.]
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: And, Sir, it was for the purpose of supporting the Chair that I rose. It seems to me, Sir, perfectly clear, and it is a matter on which I will not waste any words, that the House ought to support the Speaker. I do not believe that the Speaker has authority to enforce the order that he has given without a regular Motion before the House; and therefore I now move "that Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw." [Loud cheers from the Protectionists.]
SIR ROBERT H. INGLISseconded the Motion.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw."
MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: I rise, Sir, to move an Amendment, the purport of which I have placed in your hands. I beg, Sir, that in order to save the time of the House, you will read that Amendment. I ask to have it read for the convenience of the House.
Amendment proposed—
"To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'David Salomons, esquire, having been returned to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Greenwich, and having taken the Oaths required by Law in the manner most binding on his conscience, is entitled to take his Seat in this House,' instead thereof."
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEY: Sir, I second the Amendment.
MR. SPEAKER: The Motion is, that Alderman Salomons do now withdraw. The Amendment is, to leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, in Order to add the words, "David Salomons, Esq., having been returned to serve in this present Parliament for the Borough of Greenwich, and having taken the Oaths required by law, in the manner most binding on his conscience, is entitled to take his Seat in this House," instead thereof. The Question I have to put is, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
Loud cries of "Divide!" followed this announcement, and Mr. Speaker ordered strangers to withdraw.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEY, however, rose and attempted to address the House. For some moments he could not proceed owing to the deafening cries of "Oh, oh!" He said, Mr. Speaker—[Cries of "Oh, oh!" and"Order!"] Mr. Speaker, as soon as—[renewed interruption]—as soon as the noisy Members of this Christian House are silent—["Oh, oh!"]—as soon as those who have been characterised as roaring Protestants and roaring Christians—["Oh, oh!" and laughter]—are silent, I will give them an opportunity of answering the case, which they are bound in duty as Members of this House, and bound in honour as gentlemen to attend to. ["Oh, oh!"] Yes, because the case on which you are going to vote—yes, because the case is one of a judicial pharaoter—yes, because it is a case which affects the right of an hon. Gentleman who sits beside me to occupy the seat which he has most properly and most constitutionally taken, Sir, it was not ray intention to
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offer anything which should have eyen the appearance of putting myself in collision with the Chair; but I wished to draw attention, when the letter of my hon. Friend behind me was read, to what I conceive to be a very material error in the Minute of what passed in this House on Friday last. It was stated there, Sir, that the hon. Member for Greenwich did not take the oath prescribed by law. Sir, I deny that the abjuration oath is an oath prescribed by law. It is also stated that the abjuration oath, assuming its legality, has not been taken in the form prescribed by this House, Sir, I deny that this House has prescribed any form whatever to take that oath. Hon. Gentlemen wish to divide, They wish to unseat the hon. Member for Greenwich without inquiry, I ask hon. Gentlemen, is it seemly, is it decent, is it respectful to themselves, to interrupt, in the manner they are doing, that which they are bound by every consideration to which I have adverted to listen to, and to listen to with all respect? [Marks of impatience continued.] If hon. Gentlemen are in this temper they will not effect their object; for I conclude with the Motion, "That this debate be now adjourned." [Cries of "Oh, oh!"]
Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"
The House divided:—Ayes 65; Noes 257: Majority 192.
Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
MR. MILNER GIBSON: Before the debate begins, I wish to ask you, Sir, a question. I understood you to say, Sir, on Friday last, and to repeat in substance this afternoon, that the hon. Member for Greenwich must withdraw, because he has not taken the oath in the sense in which the House understands the Act. I believe those were your words exactly on Friday—and in substance tonight. Now, I wish to ask you, Sir, whether you can refer me to any minute of our proceedings in which will appear the sense in which the House understands the Act?—for I desire to proceed with as much information on the question as possible, I wish to know in what form, during the present Session of Parliament, the sense of the House has been taken as to its understanding of the Act, for it is on that our proceedings are now founded.
MR. SPEAKER: I made no reference whatever to any decision of the House

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during the present Session. I referred to a decision of the House during the last Session of Parliament, made under precisely similar circumstances; when Baron Rothschild, who had been returned to serve for the City of London, took the oaths precisely in the same way as they have been taken by Mr. David Salomons, and the House came to a direct vote that Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was not entitled to vote or to sit in this House until he shall have taken the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law.—. [3 Hansard, cxiii., 771.]
MR. MILNER GIBSON: I was not here then, Sir; but I wish to ask whether a Resolution of the last Session, relating to one person, under, for aught I know, different circumstances, is binding upon us this Session in reference to another person? I wish to ask, also, whether the words of that Resolution say more than this—that the oath must be taken in the form required by law? Does the Resolution say that the form in which Alderman Salomons proposes to take it is not the form required by law?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: With regard to a point of order—I must say I do not think it is convenient for hon. Members to enter into a debate with the Speaker, or to put to him questions which, though when put to Ministers of the Crown, they may be exceedingly proper, are hardly proper to be put to the Speaker of the House. There was a Resolution passed last year, that Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was not entitled to vote in this House, or to sit in this House during any debate, until he should take the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law. That is the Resolution of the House, and I conceive that the Speaker went by that Resolution, and did not regard the oath of abjuration as having been taken in the form appointed by law—the usual form in which it is administered in this House. It appears to me, therefore, that the Speaker has acted with perfect propriety.
MR. MILNER GIBSONrose to make his apologies to the House and to the Speaker, if, in putting the questions he had done, he in the least appeared to wish to draw the Speaker into a debate. He confessed he had been, perhaps, a little betrayed into error, and would take another opportunity of addressing the House.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEYsaid, as his attention, and that of the House, had been, directed by his right hon. Friend
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(Mr. Gibson) to the precedent—the supposed precedent, as he must call it—of the return of the hon. Member for the City of London, he would say a few words on that subject. The point brought before them by the right hon. Member for Manchester related to the decision of that House on the question of the return of the hon. Member for the City of London, Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild, The noble Lord was perfectly right in saying that the House came on that occasion to the resolution he had read; but he had forgotten that they had previously come to another resolution negativing in a direct and formal manner the proposal pf the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon (Sir F. Thesiger) to declare the seat of Baron de Rothschild vacant. That Motion was negatived, and by a large majority, the noble Lord, the colleague of Baron Rothschild, voting with the majority go that occasion, It should also have been stated that when the House came to that ambiguous declaration of its opinion, the terms of which had just been read, they also adopted another resolution, to the effect that the previous question demanded the serious attention of Parliament, and should receive that attention early in the next Session of Parliament—a promise which to this day had not been fulfilled. ["Oh, oh!"] He heard hon. Members interrupting, and expressing surprise at that statement; but did they think that the Bill which bad just been rejected with so much contumely elsewhere, was a fitting mode of redeeming the pledge given to Baron Rothschild f It was not the case of the Jews, it was the case of the City of London, with respect to which that pledge was given; and to this hour no Parliamentary inquiry had taken place, no Parliamentary satisfaction had been given, either to the City of London, virtually disfranchised of one-fourth of its representation, or to the Member whom they had, by a singular inconsistency, at one and the same time declared to be the sitting Member for the City of London, and yet had prevented, so far as in them lay, from taking his seat, In the annals of Parliamentary inconsistency there could be found no precedent that would justify the course which at that late period of the Session was taken by that House, Some explanation, no doubt, might be found in the fact which he had just stated that the period of the Session was late, and the House weary, and the Ministerial dinner at Greenwich had been ordered a

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fortnight before. But justification there was none; and he should say, were it the precedent of a former Parliament, to whose memory he should owe no respect, and not the precedent of the present Parliament, to which he owed every respect—that on that occasion, and by that double vote, the House had most solemnly and most egregiously stultified itself. If the case rested there, he should refuse to be bound by that supposed precedent, but it did not. Baron Rothschild made a statement at the table which the hon. Member for Greenwich had not made; he stated that he omitted from the abjuration oath the words "on the true faith of a Christian," because he did not esteem those words to be binding upon his conscience. But the hon. Member for Greenwich had not only made no such statement, but he solemnly declared his reason to be, in a statement now upon record, that he had taken the oath in the form he used, inasmuch as he considered it to be the form prescribed by the statute of 1 and 2 Victoria. The question which the House had to decide in the case of the Member for the City of London, was simply, whether he was authorised to omit words merely because they were not binding upon his conscience; but the question which the House had now to decide, and which it would not decide, he trusted, until after grave and anxious deliberation, was, whether a vote of that House was to deprive his hon. Friend (Alderman Salomons) of the seat which he occupied by virtue of an Act of Parliament. ["Divide, divide!"] Hon. Members who expressed such earnestness for an immediate division, only showed that they had prejudged the case. The Act of Parliament to which he alluded was a declaratory Act; and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole), and his other hon. and learned Friends who had taken part in the recent debate upon the subject of Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, had so well explained the immense distinction between a declaratory Act and a mere enactment, that it would not be necessary for him to trouble the House with any observations upon that part of the subject. However, this was a declaratory Act, and these were the terms of it:—
"Be it declared and enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assem-
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bled, and by the authority of the same, That in all cases in which an oath may lawfully be and shall have been administered to any person, either as a juryman or a witness, or a deponent in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court of law or equity in the United Kingdom, or on appointment to any office or employment, or on any occasion whatever, such person is bound by the oath administered, provided the same shall have been administered in such form and with such ceremonies as such person may declare to be binding."
Now that was the ground on which his hon. Friend near him stated that he had actually taken the oath of abjuration in the form prescribed by law, and the Resolution of the House in the case of Baron de Rothschild required no more than that; it simply stated that Baron Rothschild should not be entitled to take his seat until he had taken the oath in the form prescribed by law. There was not a word about the sense which that House might attach to it; not a word about Parliamentary precedents; not a word about that usage which he should now endeavour to show to the House, had been an erroneous and depraved usage, although sanctioned by Parliament for the long term of about forty years. He went further than his hon. Friend; he maintained that not only had his hon. Friend taken the oath in the form prescribed by law, assuming it to be legal, but he had sworn a great deal that he could not legally be required to swear. He affirmed that the oath in question was one which could not be lawfully administered at that table, or the table of the House of Lords, to any man whatsoever. He said this without fear of being accused of inconsistency; for, being a Roman Catholic, the oath was never administered to him; had it been so, he should have stated at the table, or in his place, or at the bar, his reasons for thinking that, since the death of George III., that oath had ceased to be lawful. Its history was this. It was first enacted by the 13th William III., c. 6, and the form as there set forth was to be found in the Report of the Committee of that House. That oath abjured the right of James III., lately called the Prince of Wales, and bound the person taking it to support and maintain the succession of the Princess Anne of Denmark, and further to maintain the contingent succession, when it should fall in, of the Electress Sophia of Hanover. The unexpected death of William III. made it necessary to alter the oath. It was felt that the oath expired with the dynasty for whose protection it had been enacted; but,

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notwithstanding, the two Houses of Parliament took it upon themselves, by a special resolution founded upon the reports of Committees of their respective Houses, to make certain alterations in the wording, leaving out the words "our Lord King William," and inserting the words "our Lady Queen Anne," and substituting the word "Queen" for "King" throughout the oath. In the House of Lords' Journals an entry of the fact appeared, under date March 10, 1701, and the oath was ordered to be engrossed on a roll of parchment; and in the House of Commons' Journals, under date March 24, 1701, it was stated that the Speaker and the Members present took the oath provided by an Act passed in that Session, entitled an ".Act for the further Security of His Majesty's Person," &c, with the variations ordered by the House. So far, hon. Members would see, there was an opportunity of declaring, by a Resolution of the House, the variations which it was fit to make in the wording of the oath. In the same Session of Parliament, the Act of 1st Anne, cap. 22, was passed, entitled, an "Act to declare the alterations in the Oath appointed to be taken by the 13th William III.;" and enacted that for the future the oath, with the alterations made, should be taken by Members of Parliament. Similar alterations were made by the Act 1st George I., cap. 13, the contingent succession of the Electress Sophia of Hanover having fallen in for the benefit of her son the Elector. The last occasion on which this oath was altered was in the beginning of the reign of George III., and the oath, as set forth in the Act then passed (6 George III., c. 53), entitled "An Act for altering the Oath of Abjuration and the Assurance," was in the same form as that now on the table, with the exception of the words "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" for the words "Great Britain" only; and the name "Victoria" for that of "George III.," and "Queen" for "King;" and the first recital of the preamble of that Act expressly states that, in consequence of the political events which had happened, namely, the death of George II., and of James III., and the accession of Charles Edward to his pretensions to the sovereignty of this realm, it had become necessary to alter the oath. At that time the line of the Stuarts was still in existence, and the oath of abjuration had its appropriate meaning; it was levelled against the de-
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scendants of James II., and upon every new demise an alteration in the wording was made. That princely house was now extinct; and he had, therefore, a right to assume that if the question had been again submitted to Parliament, it would have been proposed entirely to repeal the oath of abjuration, those against whose claims it was levelled existing no more, and the Jacobites of this country and Ireland having been absorbed in the ranks of the Tories. It was the object, at that time, to conciliate the sympathies and affections; of the Jacobite interest; and nothing but the conviction that the oath itself had become obsolete, and that there was no occasion to pass an Act repealing an oath which no longer existed, prevented its statutory repeal from being immediately effected on the death of the last survivor of the Stuart line. Two remarkable occurrences had taken place before the final extinction of that line. Upon the death of Charles Edward, Henry Duke of York assumed the style and title of Henry IX. That was an event which would have justified an alteration, but none was made. So also, at the union of Great Britain and Ireland, and the creation of the United Kingdom, no alteration was made. Since the death of George III., in 1820, he maintained that the oath had been taken without authority. But thirty years could not give prescription legal force in a matter that involved popular rights and Parliamentary privilege. The first point, therefore, that those who contested the right of his hon. Friend to remain in the seat which he then occupied, and again to exercise, as he had already once exercised, the right of voting in that House, must begin by proving that the 6th George III. was in force for any purpose, and that any Member of that House was compellable, without an Act of Parliament, or even without a Resolution of that House, to take the oath altered as it was by the caprice or whim of former officers of that House, or to take the oath without those alterations. And when they had proved that, they would still have to argue the question presented to them last year—and he had looked in vain to the lawyers who led the van of what they called Christianity for an answer—whether the words "on the true faith of a Christian" belonged to the oath at all, or were simply part of the ceremonial or solemnity of taking it. Now, if a doubt upon this matter could be shown, the benefit of that

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doubt clearly belonged, as a matter of right and privilege, to the individual who was put upon his trial, and whom it was sought to disfranchise and deprive of his privilege, and much more when it was also sought to subject him to vexatious and heavy penalties at law. On the subject of penalties he might state that one part of them were of such a character that that House, and it alone, could apply them, while the other and least grievous portion was capable of being applied only by the Courts of Common Law; but it was the same offence and the same Act which subjected the presumed delinquent to both classes of penalties—so that if that House were to declare his hon. Friend (Mr. Salomons) a Popish recusant convict, he would suffer accordingly, and would be for ever ineligible to sit in Parliament. Now, let the House see what it was about to do if it voted, either on that or any other occasion, that which might be quoted as an authority in a Court of Law. By the Bill of Rights it was for ever conceded to either House of Parliament, that the freedom of speech in debate, or of the proceedings in Parliament, should not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament, so that when that House, by a hasty vote, decided that which in any way impeached the right of his hon. Friend to the seat which he occupied, a Court of law would be obliged to pay the highest respect to their decision; they would not dare to question or impeach it, for the Judge who did so might be questioned at the bar of that, and impeached before the other House. On the other hand, if the noble Lord at the head of the Government had, in his capacity of leader of that House, accepted the invitation of the hon. Member for Marylebone (Sir B. Hall), and had given a promise that the Government would bring this matter before a competent Court of Law for decision, and in the mean time that House had suspended its proceeding, there was no doubt whatever that the judgment of the Court of Law, though not binding on that House, would be entitled to the highest attention within its walls, and that whatever had been the decision of the Court of Law, such would become the decision of Parliament. At present they had no decision of any court to guide them, and they were left dependent upon such statements of the law as were made by hon. and learned Members upon one side or the other. Now
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it was well known that there were no questions more wearisome to hon. Members, or which the House was less fit to decide, than legal points; and for that reason it was not fitting that it should become the judge on questions of law involving the rights of individuals and of constituencies, and the constitutional privileges of the people. Such, however, being the decision of the noble Lord, the duty was imposed upon himself and those who thought with him, of explaining to the House the decision at which they had arrived, and of endeavouring to obtain to that decision the assent of the majority. The broad question at issue was, whether a gentleman of the Hebrew persuasion had now, by the common law, or by statute law, or by vote of that House, to take his seat within that House, being elected thereto by a free constituency. That he had that right, he (Mr. Anstey) had no doubt whatever. He had it at common law; for there was no doubt that the Jews born in this realm were, by the common law, natural-born subjects, and not aliens, and were therefore entitled to all those privileges which in later times had been denied them. The authority of Bracton (the highest known in this country upon feudal law) showed that in his time they could hold land, for he said that the cases of the Jews and of monks stood precisely on the same footing with regard to the right to hold land; that land might be given in mortmain, and to the Jews, except in cases where the giver thought himself prevented by some clause in the deed under which he himself claimed; and he went on to use these strong expressions:—Et quod talibus personis dari non poterit sicut aliis, nulla ratio vel necessitas illud inducit, nisi tantum modus donationis. The authority of Coke and Selden was to the same effect; and Madox, in his History of the Exchequer, set forth writs by which it appeared that great part of the land of the country, notwithstanding the feudal laws, was vested in the Jews by name, and that without the intervention of trustees they bought, sold, gave, and received land down to the reign of Edward I. The Jews had therefore the position of freemen in this country; and the same writer, in enumerating the different classes of men in England, thus distinguished them as "barons, vavasours, knights, freemen, and villeins," but made no other distinction; and all the rights belonging to freemen, being Christians, belonged equally to freemen being

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Jews. Those communities, or bodies, too, which preceded the constitution of the present High Court of Parliament, and exercised, each in its degree, a part of the functions which now belonged exclusively to Parliament as a whole, were accessible to the Jews. They were members of the tithing, the hundred, and the shire courts; and they sat in the communities of merchants, to whom, before the institution of that House, the Sovereign was obliged to have recourse for the powers to tax his people, or to change the law under which they were governed. Just before the rebellion of Simon de Montfort, a large subsidy was granted to Henry III., by a body called the Community of the Jews, elected in pursuance of the King's writs issued to the bailiffs of every town, or the sheriffs of every county, in which the Jews resided; that body sat by the side of the Convocation of the Clergy and the body of Nobles, and exercised the same powers over those of their own community which these bodies exercised in the realm. The Jews did not appear in the first Parliament, that of Edward I., because in the meantime, by an ordinance emanating from the King, but not sanctioned by the Estates of the realm, every Jew had been forced to go abroad, and the whole of his property had been taken from him, and vested in the King; no Act of exclusion was, however, passed, and if the Jews had thought fit to return to the country, and to trust themselves to that which they had too much right to distrust, the protection of the English law, they might have re-entered upon all the rights of which they had been thus deprived. Coming down to the next period of constitutional history, he found that the question of whether Jews were aliens or not, was raised in the reigns of Charles II., James II., and William III., and, after elaborate argument, it was decided in their favour by the Privy Council, who released them from the payment of alien dues. In the reign of William III., Parliament attempted to impose upon them an exceptional tax, in order to raise a subsidy of 100,000 l.; they petitioned against it; it was justified by the assertion that they were aliens, but they proved at the bar of the House that they were not; the Bill was dropped, and they were taxed on the same footing of natural-born subjects, at a rate equal to one moiety of what the nonjuring Protestants and Roman Catholics were taxed at. Such was the decision of a Parliament which for a pe-
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riod of twelve years left them eligible to a seat in Parliament; for there was nothing which now prevented them taking their seats, except the 13th William III., which for the first time introduced into what the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) properly called "the fag end" of the abjuration oath, the words, "on the true faith of a Christian." It became, therefore, the question, whether the words thus introduced, constituted an objection to the admission of the Jews into Parliament. Now the very words "abjuration oath," showed significantly enough that it was not intended to guard against any mischief or danger apprehended from the Jews, but that it was passed to guard against those which were likely to arise from Roman Catholics, or from those whom in our modern nomenclature we should call Tractarian Protestants—the High Church party among Anglicans, and the Roman Catholics generally, being then much attached to the cause of the exiled house of Stuart. That oath should be no objection to the admission of the hon. Member if its substance were regarded; it was an abjuration of the exiled line, and a declaration that Queen Victoria was the rightful Queen and Governor of these realms: now in the first two oaths which he had taken, his hon. Friend (Mr. Salomons) had affirmed both these propositions; and he had moreover done, what he (Mr. Anstey) would never do—renounced all ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction within this realm claimable by any person other than Her Majesty; so that he had shown himself, according to those who raised this objection, more loyal and better fitted to sit in Parliament than the Roman Catholics, and still they proposed to exclude him. Then that oath which operated to keep him (Mr. Anstey), and such as him, out of Parliament, so long as the Stuart line lasted, had been repealed so far as they were concerned—that oath was put to them no longer—and that, he thought, proved the justice of what he had said before, that if the attention of Parliament had been deliberately drawn to the subject, in the reign of George III. or George IV., before this question was raised, they would have repealed this senseless oath altogether. But the question still arose—if this oath was a legal oath, as he was persuaded it was not, and not a voluntary and unlawful oath, could Parliament, however alive to the grievance and absurdity of depriving a man of his right by virtue of the fag end of an oath

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not intended to apply to him, grant relief unless both Houses concurred. It was a question of the privileges of the House of Commons; and he thought that when that House had most injudiciously asked the concurrence of those in another place, the latter would have shown a better sense of their own dignity, and a greater desire to preserve a good understanding between the two Houses, if they had acquiesced in the decision of that House, and had passed the Bill which the House of Commons had sent up to them, without remonstrance. They had, however, refused to do so, and the House of Commons was therefore thrown back upon its undoubted privileges. The case was further advanced than it was last year. The hon. Member for Greenwich was in his place. He had shown a courage which should have been shown by others. And furthermore there was a claim upon the House of Commons for the performance of the pledge which they had given to the other Member of Parliament who had been prevented from taking his seat—that in conjunction or not in conjunction with the other House of Parliament, they would apply themselves earnestly to remedy the mischief and the grievance of which he so justly complained. Now that House had the exclusive jurisdiction over all questions affecting the seats of their own Members, and it had also the power of removing all obstacles which might be placed in the way of the title of any claimant in whose favour they decided, or of its exercise by him. That was the case of Baron Rothschild. For form's sake they had invited the House of Lords to concur with them in a declaratory Act; they had not chosen to do so, and they were therefore called upon to decide whether they could not do that by a Resolution which they had proposed to do by a declaratory Act. A declaratory Act did not change the law, but only affirmed the law. They did so in the case of Mr. Pease, which was even a stronger case than the present, for he refused to take any oath at all; whereas the hon. Member for Greenwich had taken all three, two without dispute, and the one now under consideration. In the case of Mr. Pease they might have followed the precedent in the case of O'Connell, where they decided that, however willing they were to grant relief, and however much inclined they might have been to allow him to retain his seat, if his objection had taken some other form, they were obliged, in consequence of his distinct refusal being
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on record, to declare the seat void, and to order a new writ to issue. But Mr. Pease was allowed to enter the House; his seat was unquestioned, and they seated him by a Resolution, and then asked the House of Lords to agree with them in a declaratory Act, the only utility of which was, that the practice of both Houses might thereby be rendered uniform, and a Quaker might sit in the House of Lords. Why, then, was a different course to be taken now? Why was the House of Commons to begin by asking the House of Lords to qualify any gentleman whom Her Majesty pleased to honour to take his seat in the House of Lords as a condition precedent to the Commons venturing to admit him to a seat which they had declared to be his by law? This was a surrendering of their privileges, of which there was no precedent upon their Journals since the bad days of the Stuarts. He contended, however, that there was really nothing in the oath or in the law to keep the hon. Member out of the House. What was the fag end of it? "Upon the true faith of a Christian, so help me God." Now it was admitted, he supposed, that the words "so help me God" were not material; because, strange to say, if material, they did not appear in the Act George III., and had, therefore, been added either by a vote of the House or by their officer. Now if these words were immaterial, the only words which it was said were material were those "on the true faith of a Christian." Now hon. Gentlemen who pretended that that House had power to change "George III." into "Victoria," "King" into "Queen," make changes of that kind, and continue the whole substance of the oath after the Act intended to preserve it had expired, by a singular inconsistency also contended that Parliament could not omit words of ceremonial and solemnity, because, forsooth, they were contained in this Act of Parliament. Would the Judges of the land allow the course of justice to be obstructed by such miserable sophistry as that? Why those who presided in our Courts, and even in our ecclesiastical courts, changed the simple form of abjuration into what many hon. Members would consider to be blasphemous, idolatrous, and almost obscene attestations, in accordance with the faith of heathen witnesses. If they had power to do this, they would have had the power, and would have exercised it, to qualify the Jew by omitting the words which were not binding upon his conscience. A believer in Buddha

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was sworn in the form he believed binding; he declared, as in the presence of Buddha, that he was unprejudiced, and he continued—"If what I have spoken shall prove to be false, or if, by colouring the truth, others shall be led astray, then may the three holy existences, namely, Buddha, and D'hamma (Dhurma, or the sacred Bali writ, personified), and Phra Sangha (or the hierarchy), in whose sight I now stand, together with the glorious Dev'atas, of the twenty-two firmaments, punish me." The oath went on to invoke vengeance upon the migrating soul. This oath was administered to a Chinese woman by the House of Lords (who were against the admission of the Jews) in a divorce case in July, 1846. The following was what passed:—
"On calling a Chinese woman servant, with a gentleman who acted as interpreter, Lord Brougham inquired whether it was not required of her to break a saucer before she gave her evidence? The interpreter said that she was very reluctant to be sworn a second time, and that her gods would be very angry with her. Lord Brougham: 'Tell her that her gods will punish us, and not her, if anything wrong is done.' The interpreter endeavoured to induce her to take the oath, but she still declined. Lord Brougham: 'Tell her that no calamity can befall her if she will consent to be sworn.' She still persisted in adhering to her religious opinions. After several ineffectual attempts to have her sworn, Lord Brougham said to the interpreter, 'Tell her that we shall be under the necessity of committing her to prison if she will not be sworn.' She ultimately consented to be sworn.' Next day, 'The female Chinese, whose name was Kowhan, was then called in, and Lord Brougham desired the interpreter to tell her, 'that now she has been sworn (this was done yesterday with the formality of breaking the saucer), if she does not speak the truth her gods will punish her.' The interpreter then made her acquainted with the noble and learned Lord's remark. Lord Brougham: 'Now ask her who are her gods.' In reply, she said, through the interpreter, that the chief was Buddha. Lord Brougham: 'Tell her that Buddha will punish her most severely if she does not speak the truth, and that she will be also punished in this world if she does not speak the truth.' This observation being explained, she replied in Chinese, 'I will speak the truth.' The witness was then examined."
This was a very good doctrine to come from a noble and learned Lord, a member of that assembly which had so conscientious an objection to the House of Commons exercising its own privileges in connexion with one of their own members. He was not, however, at all finding fault with Lord Brougham, who had, he thought, acted quite correctly, and who did not participate in the miserable bigotry of which they were now complaining. He would only state in addition to this, that when a
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Mahometan was sworn, the oath, according to his own faith, was merely recited to him by the officer of the court, and he said, "Yes." In a case in the Central Criminal Court, 'Regina v. Entrehman and Samut, (Carrington and Marsham, 248), the prosecutor (Assang) was called, and, on getting into the witness-box, immediately knelt down, and a China saucer having been placed in his hand, he struck it against the brass rail in front of the box, and broke it. The crier of the court, who swears the witnesses, then, by direction of the interpreter, administered the oath in these words, which were translated by the interpreter into the Chinese language: "You shall tell the truth and the whole truth; the saucer is cracked; and, if you do not tell the truth, your soul will be cracked like the saucer." The prisoner was found guilty, and sentenced to fourteen days' imprisonment. Now, if that branch of the Legislature forfeited its Christian character by exercising its constitutional privileges in the admission of his hon. Friend by a Resolution, he wished to know whether the Central Criminal Court, or the Privy Council—which continually received and acted upon depositions received from India—or the House of Lords which passed the Divorce Bill on the evidence to which he referred, forfeited their character as Christian courts? He contended that his hon. Friend was entitled to the rights which the constitution gave him, and that his constituents were not, by a vote of that or the other House, to be defrauded of the right which belonged to him. If the seat was full, the House had no power, according to the precedent of last year, to order a new writ to issue, neither had it power to prevent his filling that seat, and exercising the privileges which appertained to it. It was upon these considerations—first, because the Act 1st and 2nd Vict., of which Lord Denman had the immortal honour, had placed the Jew in all respects in a state of perfect equality in the matter of oaths, and entitled him to insist on the dispensation which he claimed; and, secondly, because he thought the oath as it was put was not a lawful oath, and there was no power in the House to impose it upon any Member; and, thirdly, because it was the person who claimed the franchise that ought to have the benefit of the doubt, and not those who challenged the franchise, and would trample it under foot, that he asked the House to do justice by admitting

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his hon. Friend to the privileges to which his seat entitled him, and to disregard, as contrary to their own rights, the adverse assumption of the House of Lords.
The gallery was cleared for a division; but Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE rose to reply amidst loud cries, and said, he thought, before they came to a decision, he had a right to address the House. He believed he moved the substantive Motion, and he thought that the Speaker was mistaken in deciding that he could not do so.
MR. SPEAKER: I will tell the hon. Member exactly how the question stands. The hon. Member for Greenwich having taken his seat without having taken the oaths, a Motion was made that the hon. Member do now withdraw. That Motion has precedence of all others, being a question of privilege. To that Motion the hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne) moved an Amendment; and, in doing so, forfeited his right to address the House on that question. The hon. Member put an Amendment without making a speech, and then claimed to have the right to be heard upon it.
MR. HOBHOUSE: I understand the hon. Member did not make the Motion which you suppose him to have made; so I presume you will retract your judgment, and allow the hon. Member for Middlesex to address the House.
MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is mistaken in supposing that no Motion was made. A Motion was made by the noble Lord the Member for the city of London, that Alderman Salomans do now withdraw; and on the question being put, an Amendment was put into my hands by the hon. Member for Middlesex; and having put that Amendment into my hands, he has forfeited his right to speak until the Amendment has been disposed of.
MR. T. B. HOBHOUSEsaid, the judgment of the Chair was indisputable in that House; he bowed with deference to the expression of the Speaker's opinion, and he took it to be the proper decision on the subject; but he believed that he was himself entitled to speak, and being entitled to speak he might suggest to the House that some grave difficulties might arise if they ordered the hon. Member for Greenwich to withdraw from the House. On a former occasion he had heard the hon. and learned Gentlenman (the Solicitor General) express himself with the greatest zeal and judgment, and with the greatest ability and legal acumen, in favour of their breth-
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ren the Hebrews; he hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman would be inclined, on the present occasion, to rise and favour them with his opinion on the subject of this debate. As far as he (Mr. Hobhouse) could examine the subject, his opinion was that a Member elected to that House might sit and vote if he chose to run the risk of incurring the penalties appointed by law if the case were decided against him. He believed that many minors had sat in that House; in the reign of Charles II., Waller, the eminent poet, sat there at the early age of sixteen; and he believed that Charles Fox, an eminent statesman, revered by one side, however he might be perhaps repelled by the other, sat in that House when he was a minor. He did not know that either the one or the other had voted in that House, but he believed that both the one and the other might have voted in the House, provided they were ready to incur the responsibility appointed by law. He believed this was the case of the hon. Member for Greenwich. He (Mr. Hobhouse) believed he might sit and vote, as far as he had heard, and he should like to be enlightened on the subject by the law officers of the Crown, fie believed the hon. Member might sit and vote and incur penalties, and then it was for any Gentleman at the other side of the House to enforce them—no person out of the House could do so, for strangers were excluded on divisions; but any Gentleman at the other side might pursue the hon. Member (by a prosecution) for the penalties. He, (Mr. Hobhouse) would advise the Speaker humbly, and with great respect, not to render himself liable to any penalties. He would advise him to let the subject be taken before a Court of law, which had before overruled the proceedings of that House. He would remind the House of what had taken place in the case of the Sheriffs, where it was virtually determined that they had no power to commit, and they might perhaps now determine and advise the jury that an action for penalties did not lie, and if so, the hon. Member for Greenwich would take his seat in the House; and when he did take it, no person would be more ready than he (Mr. Hobhouse) to shake him by the hand, though he had not the honour of his acquaintance. No person would be more glad to see him place himself at the table of the House; and as he had already sat with the penalties of the law suspended over him, no person would be more desirous to see him take his seat, without the fear

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of those penalties, amongst Christians and amongst men willing to discharge their duty to their country. The electors had a right to return the man of their choice, and he thought it was an infraction of their privileges to presume to control their judgment. He respected the decision that had been come to in another place, so far as the decision was worthy of respect, and not one bit further. He thought that the Commons ought not to invade the just rights of the House of Lords, and he believed there was no man in that House who would desire to enter into a collision with their Lordships. It was quite enough to say that a way was proposed by which the difficulty might be avoided. He believed it was proposed to be evaded by the hon. Member for Greenwich taking his seat by law—that was, by the decision of the Judges of the land; and on that ground, and on the arguments urged in favour of this case, he would not be inclined to vote that the hon. Member for Greenwich should withdraw. He would vote that he should take his seat there forthwith; he would vote that the hon. Member should subject himself, if he pleased, to the risk of the penalties. Whether he was ready to do that, he (Mr. Hobhouse) knew not. He was not of the Jewish councils—he had not taken any part in the deliberations on the subject; but of this he was sure, that if many Christians performed their duties as well as some of the Jews, they would have an improved state of society. It mattered nothing to him whether he received applausive cheers or ironical cheers. He was there to do his duty and he would do it. He believed that on a former occasion he had been the means of preventing the noble Lord at the head of the Government from doing wrong, and of saving the House from being misled. The hon. Gentleman had been properly elected Member for Greenwich; no petition was presented against him—no person complained of an undue return for Greenwich. The hon. Gentleman was as much a Member of the House as the right hon. Gentleman who filled the chair. [Cries of "Question!"] The question before the House was the Jewish question, and on that question he was determined to deliver his sentiments. They might be involved in proceedings that would derogate very much from the dignity of the House, and he was anxious to hear several Members on the Treasury bench—he was anxious to hear the law officers of the Crown on the subject. When he saw that
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a case of this constitutional magnitude and gravity was to be determined almost like a Turnpike Bill, or a Private Bill—when he saw those things were to be let pass by in that way, like the idle wind which they respected not—he warned the House against the course which they were taking; he warned them that the hon. Gentleman had a right to take his seat—and he warned the right hon. Gentleman in the chair that he had no right to direct him to withdraw. He might as well tell him (Mr. Hobhouse) to withdraw, as the hon. Member for Greenwich. That hon. Gentleman had taken his seat in that House as a Member of it; as a Member, he (Mr. Hobhouse) was determined to support him, and maintain the constitution.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that, in consequence of the appeal which had been made by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Hobhouse) to the law advisers of the Crown, he was induced to trouble the House with a few words. To him the question appeared simple and plain. His hon. and learned Friend had just suggested that the hon. Member for Greenwich should be allowed to take his seat and vote in the House, subject only to those penalties that he might incur by doing so, to be enforced elsewhere, before the ordinary tribunals of the country. In that view he (the Attorney General), for one, could not concur. The House had another duty to perform. The Act of Parliament expressly prohibited any Member who did not take certain oaths—amongst them the oath of abjuration—from sitting or voting in that House. [Cries of "No, no!"] Some hon. Gentlemen might say "No;" but he could only say that they must not have read the statute. Nothing could be more plain—the Act of Parliament prohibited it in the most express terms—there could be question about it. [Cries of "Read!"] He would read it in a moment. It was enacted—
"That from and after the 29th of September, 1715, no person that is now, or hereafter shall be, a Peer of this realm, or Member of the House of Peers, shall vote or make his proxy in the House of Peers; nor any person that now is, or hereafter shall be, a Member of the House of Commons, shall vote in the House of Commons, or shall sit there during any debate in the said House of Commons, after their Speaker is chosen; until such Peer or Member shall, from time to time respectively, take the Abjuration Oath aforesaid, instead of the Oath of Abjuration which before by law ought to have been taken, in such

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manner, and together with such other Oaths, and Declaration against Transubstantiation, as the said former Oath of Abjuration ought to have been taken."—1 Geo. I., st. 2, c. 13, sec. 16.
[An Hon. MEMBER: Do not go so far back.] The present law refers back to this Act; it said the oath was to be taken in the same way, and this Act of Parliament was still binding on all persons. [Cries of "Read!"] He would read it, and if hon. Members conceived he had read it wrongly, they would have plenty of opportunities of examining it. But he believed he was right; he had not a shadow of doubt that such were the words of the Act of Parliament—that those words were binding—and that no person could sit or vote without taking the oaths. The question was, would the House allow any Member to sit there who had not taken the oaths? It was said that certain penalties were attached, and that it would be sufficient to have them enforced. He (the Attorney General) said No. He said that the House were rather to take cognisance of a question affecting their rights and privileges. Any Member who sat and voted was subject to the cognisance and jurisdiction of Parliament alone. True, they had abandoned the jurisdiction of Parliament in certain cases by statute, but that only related to elections and returns; this was not a question of election and return, but a question that arose after election and return as to certain oaths to be taken by a Member after he is elected to the House. It was a question within the immediate jurisdiction of the House; and when a case had arisen like the present, and a Member had been returned to Parliament who presented himself at the table, and declined to take the oaths in the manner prescribed by law, there was the duty imposed upon the House, not only to obey the law, but to enforce the law. He took that to be the clear duty of the House, from which it could not and dare not shrink. He was aware that certain hon. Members contended that the hon. Member for Greenwich had taken the oaths; but on that question the House had come to a positive and solemn decision last year; in that decision he most solemnly concurred, with the greatest possible reluctance, for none of those Gentlemen who were anxious that the hon. Member for Greenwich should take his seat, could feel a deeper anxiety on the subject than he (the Attorney General) did. He believed that the operation of the existing Acts of Parlia-
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ment to the exclusion of the Jews was merely an accident in legislation, and that the law was never intended to apply to them; it was a disgrace to the law that such an accidental operation of the law should be experienced; but while he felt that strongly, and desired the law to be altered, he felt also that the House, acting on a matter within its judicial cognisance and jurisdiction, had but one course to pursue, namely, to administer the law. He felt they had no alternative; and being satisfied that the oath had not been duly taken—partly from his own view of the law, and partly from the Resolution to which the House itself had come last year—he could not for a single moment conceive that the House could hesitate as to the course it ought to pursue. The rule upon which they acted when a petition was presented, did not apply to a case where there was a statutory prohibition against a Member taking his seat; and that was the case here. The hon. Gentleman refused to take the oaths, and they had only one straightforward course to take—that was to obey the law, and to enforce the law, because they were the only tribunal to administer it. As to the notion of this matter being decided by one of the Courts of Law, on the hon. Gentleman sitting and voting and subjecting himself to penalties, that was another question from that which they now had to decide; but that House could not give up their right of jurisdiction over a matter that came within it. And, indeed, if the question of penalties was determined by a Court of Law, that would not determine the question as to whether the hon. Gentleman had a right to sit in that House, nor would it warrant the House in shrinking from he duty they had to perform. Whatever desire there might be on his part to take an opposite view of the question, he would not be discharging his duty if he did not at once boldly declare his opinion, that the hon. Gentleman not having complied with the requirements of the Act of Parliament, and not having taken the oath prescribed by law, there was only one course to pursue, and that was that he should be ordered to withdraw.
MR. MILNER GIBSON: Sir, I concur very much in one part of the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, namely, that in which he said the House has a jurisdiction of its own, and must decide whether the hon. Member is entitled to sit and vote here or not. But, inasmuch as

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the decision to which this House must come ought to be founded on its understanding of the law, as a Member of this House, I feel entitled to say what I believe ought to be the understanding of the law. It is not so very easy a question as might be supposed. Just observe what is our position. First of all, we have an Attorney General of a former Administration (Sir F. Thesiger) who tells us that the swearing upon the Old Testament is illegal. If I understand him right, he tells us he thinks that even if the hon. Member for Greenwich did pronounce the words "on the true faith of a Christian," inasmuch as he would not have been sworn on the Holy Evangelists, the oath would not be a good one, and he could not sit or vote. Thus we have one eminent law officer of the Government who considers the New Testament a sine qua non. There is another, the Attorney General of the present Government (Sir A. Cockburn), who tells us that the hon. Member is at liberty to swear on the Old Testament, provided he will say "on the true faith of a Christian." That is his understanding of the law. He says the oath will have been properly taken by a Jew swearing upon the Old Testament, and using the words "on the true faith of a Christian." Then we have another hon. and learned Gentleman, the Solicitor General. What does he say? He says that if the hon. Member for Greenwich swears upon the Old Testament, though he omits the words "on the true faith of a Christian," he will have complied with the law, and the oath will be a good one. Now, Sir, with the greatest respect for the House, I do say that we are placed in a position of more than ordinary difficulty, when we find the two law officers of the Crown differing entirely from one another, and the chief law officer of a former Government differing from both of them. To suppose that the House must consider this as a clear and obvious matter, would be to entertain an hypothesis which is entirely out of the question. I foresee that there may be great difficulty in this question, and the feeling of my mind is this, that as you are going to impose a penalty, not only on the hon. Member for Greenwich, but also on the constituency which has returned him to this House, it is not an unreasonable idea that in a case so entirely doubtful you should give the benefit of the doubt to the man on whom it is proposed to impose the penalty. Is it not a principle of law in our
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courts, that if there be any doubt as to the effect of penal statutes, the benefit of that doubt should be given to the prisoner? So I say, in this case, without going into the question of law myself, that the mere fact of our seeing all these eminent legal Gentlemen at direct issue with each other on this question, should induce the House to entertain a prepossession in favour of the hon. Member for Greenwich, and to say, "Well, after all, if this be really such a very doubtful point, why should the House of Commons identify itself with one side of the question, and put a construction on a difficult point of law which may have the effect of inflicting such grievous injury on the hon. Member for Greenwich, and on those who have sent him here?" Well, now, with regard to the swearing upon the Old Testament, it does appear to me a very strange thing that if you are convinced in your own mind that the words "on the true faith of a Christian" are of the essence and substance of the oath, you should have acted as you have done. If you knew this beforehand, what sense was there in your allowing the hon. Member for Greenwich to be sworn on the Old Testament? Why, I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon, that if it be of the essence of the oath to pronounce the words "on the true faith of a Christian," the House ought not to have allowed the oath to be administered on the Old Testament. It is absurd to say that the sign of an oath ought to be one thing, and the words in which you pronounce the oath another. I say that the words of abjuration, and the sign of abjuration, must stand upon the same footing. If you abandon the sign of abjuration, you must allow the words of abjuration to be omitted also. I contend that the argument which was used by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, as to what was done on some former occasion, in the reign of George I., when it was intended to allow Jews to omit the words "on the true faith of a Christian," applies in this case. By the 10th of George I., I think, it was intended that Jews should be relieved in a particular case from the necessity of using the words, "on the true faith of a Christian." Well, then, says the noble Lord, "I find that when the Legislature meant these words to be omitted in the abjuration oath, it distinctly enacted it, and, inasmuch as we have no similar enactment for the case before us, we must enforce the words. But just observe what that Act

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said. Did it refer merely to the words "on the true faith of a Christian?" No, it went further; it gave permission also for the Jew to be sworn as in a court of justice, on the Old Testament; otherwise he would have had to be sworn on the Evangelists. The Act placed the words and the sign of abjuration on the same footing; for while the Act gives permission to omit the words, "on the true faith of a Christian," it goes on to say, "And the taking the said oath by persons professing the Jewish religion in like manner as Jews are admitted to be sworn and to give evidence in courts of justice, shall be deemed to be a sufficient taking of the abjuration oath." Well, then, if the Act also gave an express permission of the use of the Old Testament only in the particular case, what becomes of the argument of the noble Lord founded on this Act of George I., now that he has agreed to the use of the Old Testament without a statutory permission to do so in the case now before the House? I therefore, Sir, view the matter in a different light altogether, and it appears to me this very Act of George I. that has been quoted against the claim of the hon. Member for Greenwich tells rather in his favour, for it shows the Legislature has dealt with those words of the adjuration and the sign of the adjuration at the same time, and seems to have understood that they should be put on the same footing. Therefore, I say, if you have allowed the Old Testament to be used, you must permit the words "on the true faith of a Christian" to be omitted. I would put it to the House whether that is not the natural inference. I am no lawyer, and on a legal question I speak with all deference; but in considering this question as a Member of this House, I wish to bring common sense and reason to my aid. And when the hon. and learned Attorney General tells us that no man can sit and vote in this House without first taking the oath of abjuration, I want to know what he means—whether he means, without taking the oath as the law stood when the original statute passed, or without taking the oath as the law stands now? I entirely concur with the Resolution of last Session, if I read it properly. I think it is obvious that no man can sit and vote in this House until he has taken the abjuration oath in the form according to law. I admit that; but the question is, what is the form according to law? And with submission I say that the form according to the present law, is not the form according to the law as
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it stood when the Act was passed. Then the oath must have been taken on the Evangelists; and as you have yourselves decided it may now be taken on the Old Testament, to what conclusion are we brought? Why, the obvious inference is, that it will satisfy the law, and the oath will be taken within the meaning of the Abjuration Act—if it be taken as the law may require it to be taken from time to time. Then comes the question, how does the law now require the oath to be taken? I say the answer to that question is to be found in the statute of Victoria; and, as has been said by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal, the law now requires that the oath should be taken with that form and with those ceremonies which are the most binding upon the conscience of the person who is about to be sworn. It appears to me that we must read the Abjuration Act as if the statute of Victoria were incorporated with it—as though that statute were one of its provisions; and a person would be taking the oath within the meaning of these statutes so considered, if he took it in that form and with those ceremonies which were binding on his conscience. Take this Act of Victoria. It evidently draws a distinction between forms and ceremonies. Forms and ceremonies could not mean the same thing, or the same words would be repeated. I understand the ceremony to be the kissing of the book, and the particular book used, and I understand the form to be the form of words in which the adjuration is made—whether that form be simply "So help me God," or "On the true faith of a Christian, so help me God." And I contend that the statute of Victoria entitles us to omit the words "on the true faith of a Christian" in the case of a person swearing upon whose conscience those words have no effect, as much as it entitles us to change the sign of faith in the particular book on which the oath is taken. I, Sir, can attach no other meaning to the words. Reading the two statutes together, the Abjuration Act and the recent Act of Victoria, and feeling bound to suppose that they are not inconsistent with each other, both being in force at the same time—putting on this state of things the only construction I can, I am bound to come to the conclusion that under the statute of Victoria we are bound not only to permit the use of the Old Testament to the Jew, but to permit him also to omit from the oaths the words "on the true faith of a

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Christian." In the case of Mr. Pease, which has been frequently quoted in the course of these discussions, a course perfectly analogous to that for which I am contending was taken, as being the only one which offered a solution to the difficulty that then presented itself. It was clear that Mr. Pease was entitled by the statute to affirm instead of taking the oath; but if it had been contended that though he was entitled to affirm instead of taking the oath, that with regard to the words "on the true faith of a Christian" in the abjuration oath, there was no statute to enable the House to allow their omission; it would have amounted to this—that the Member claiming to substitute the affirmation for the oath, might affirm, provided he used words at the end of the affirmation which were tantamount to the taking of an oath. And it is precisely the same with the Jew. You allow him to take the oath in the form which is binding an his conscience as a Jew—that is, on the Old Testament, provided at the end of the oath he uses words signifying that he is a Christian. The House in the case of Mr. Pease took the reasonable and common-sense course; it omitted the words implying an oath at the end of the affirmation. But there was no express law to entitle Mr. Pease to the privilege; there was no Act of Parliament passed for the purpose; and, though the course then taken might have been in accordance with the Common Law, there was no statute law to say, in so many words, that the words "on the true faith of a Christian" should be omitted; but you acted upon the principle of common sense, and taking into consideration the declaration of the law in former times, and the statutes which had passed since, you allowed the words to be omitted. I cannot now remember the exact words of a late right hon. Member of this House, who was a great authority on such questions, in reference to the case of Mr. Pease; but the substance of what Mr. Wynn said on that occasion was, "drily and technically we are not bound to grant this privilege to Mr. Pease, but it is not clear that we ought to refuse it; therefore, taking a liberal and a generous view of the law, when we have the power of putting our own construction upon it, and passing our own judgment and decision, I think we ought to give the benefit to Mr. Pease." So I say in this case, let us take a liberal and generous view of the law, and give the benefit to the hon. Member for Greenwich. Unfortunately, I am afraid, there
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are difficulties that will now arise from our being about (as I am sorry to say I expect) to take an illiberal view of the law. I am afraid that some hon. Members present are about to allow their own personal feelings against allowing Jews to sit in Parliament to influence their judgments in the decision of a judicial question. But that is not the course those who entertain those feelings should adopt. If they are determined that Jews shall not sit in Parliament (and this oath goes to no such extent), let them bring in a Bill declaring that Jews shall not be eligible to sit in this House. That would be the obvious and the legitimate course; but if the hon. Member for Greenwich is entitled to a seat in this House, do not let us allow our own personal feelings, either on the one side or the other, to interfere to prevent his having the benefit of those privileges which the law gives him. I will take the liberty of reading to the House the opinion of a great authority, Lord Denman, on this question, of excluding men from office by means of oaths, when the intention in imposing such oaths was never entertained by the Legislature to exclude them. Lord Denman, when Common Serjeant of the city of London, on the question of admitting Jews to corporate offices, said, in speaking of the oath—
"The return then states, that by the custom all persons of a certain description are admissible. A second custom is incorporated with the first, that all admitted shall take the freeman's oath. A third custom is superadded, that mat oath shall be administered on the New Testament. The two first customs are clearly unobjectionable; the effect of them is, that all persons of the given description shall be admissible, that is, without exclusion by reason of their religious faith. But I cannot see how the particular mode of swearing can be an essential part of such a custom. The only object of an oath is to bind the conscience of him who takes it, and in any other form it is both nugatory and blasphemous. If, on the other hand, the mode of swearing is considered as a test for detecting and excluding a particular religious class, it would be inconsistent with the custom first set out, which makes all admissible; and, in contravention of one of the first principles of English law, would effect indirectly what cannot be done directly."
It appears to me that that opinion conveys, in beautiful and forcible language, the real meaning of the question now before us. If you mean, by excluding Mr. Salomons under this Motion, to give a deliberate opinion that the law is against him, I think we run the risk of doing him a great injustice; while, on the other hand, seeing there is considerable doubt in the case, if we do

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not exclude him, but allow him to continue to sit here, you run no risk of any kind. You will have made no authoritative declaration on the one side or the other that can possibly bring the House into collision with the courts of law; and the Judges of the land will have it in their power on the fitting occasion, when an action is tried, to decide whether the hon. Member for Greenwich has taken the oaths within the meaning of the statute or not. I confess I have great difficulty in opposing the Motion of the noble Lord; for, in doing so, I feel I am not only opposing my opinion against his, but may appear to be unwilling to pay due respect to the authority of the right hon. Gentleman in the chair. That, however, is not the sense in which I shall give my vote against the noble Lord's Motion; but merely in this sense, that I do not think the law sufficiently clear upon the point to justify me in pronouncing a deliberate opinion that the hon. Member for Greenwich is not entitled to take his seat in this House; and being called upon to pronounce an opinion one way or the other, I feel I could not reconcile it to my conscience to abstain from giving my vote against the noble Lord's proposition.
The SOLICITOR GENERALtrusted the House would excuse him while he stated, in a few brief sentences, the grounds of the vote he was about to give. He felt he was entitled to explain those grounds, not only on his own account, but also on account of some observations which had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Youghal. With reference to a similar question which arose in the case of Baron Rothschild, the hon. and learned Member had spoken of the want of courage in another hon. Member. [Mr. ANSTEY: On the part of others.] He was glad the hon. and learned Member said, "on the part of others," for he (the Solicitor General) took on himself the whole responsibility of the course which Baron Rothschild adopted in not taking his seat in that House; and the reasons for which he had given that advice, were these. It appeared to him (the Solicitor General) to be absolutely necessary that the House should come to a conclusion one way or another, whether the oath of abjuration had been taken or not. The House did come to a decision on that question, and he did not think, with the hon. Member who had last spoken, that it was desirable to evade that decision, and so leave it uncertain whether
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an hon. Member of that House was or was not contravening a statute. He (the Solicitor General) argued the question which was then before the House in the case of Baron Rothschild in the best way he was able, not as a partisan, not as an advocate, and not, he hoped, with an undue degree of political bias. He argued it on what appeared to him to be the law of the case, and he was far from saying the law on the subject was clear. He was supported in the view he then took by the opinion of the late Mr. Wynn, a great authority in that House, and he had not changed his opinion on this subject. The question having been argued befere the House, they came to a decision by, he believed, a majority of seventy-four—
"That the Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild is not entitled to vote in this House, or to sit in this House, during any debate, until he shall take the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law."—[3 Hansard, cxiii. 770.]
At that moment Baron Rothschild had done everything that Mr. Salomons had done. It was the judgment of the House that Baron Rothschild had not taken the oath in the form required by law, and that being a judicial decision, the Speaker had no alternative whatever, as it appeared to him (the Solicitor General), after that decision, and after exactly the same had been gone through, which the House declared to be not consonant with the law, but to see that the law should be enforced. If the oath of abjuration was not taken, it was perfectly clear that no Member had a right to sit and vote in that House; and therefore, when once the Speaker had come to the conclusion that the oath had not been taken, it was perfectly clear that the Member refusing to take it must not sit and vote; and that the Speaker had no other alternative but to direct him to withdraw. Now, the only Motion before the House was, that the Speaker should order the hon. Member for Greenwich to withdraw. Now on that Motion, he (the Solicitor General) was compelled, with however great reluctance, to vote in the affirmative. So long as the decision of the House in the case of Baron Rothschild stood, the oaths had not been been taken by the hon. Member for Greenwich. When that decision was given, he (the Solicitor General) did recommend Baron Rothschild not to take his seat, because it appeared to him that the only point to be determined was, whether the oath had been taken or not; and when the House came to a different con-

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clusion, he did not think it proper or decorous to recommend Baron Rothschild to take his seat. Before he had the honour of being connected with the Government, it was no part of his intention to ask the House to rescind that Resolution in the present Session, so recently after such a decision as that had been arrived at. If that decision was, as he conceived it was, at this moment a binding one, there was only one simple corollary which flowed from it—the House could not permit a Member who had not taken the oaths to remain and keep his seat in that House. The House had an imperative duty imposed upon it. There was not only the clause in the Act of Parliament imposing penalties which the hon. Member had chosen to risk; but there was the chief clause which in mandatory terms directed that no Member should sit or vote until the oaths had been taken. The House had got a decision on its Votes, that the oaths had not been taken, and they had got the mandatory clause that no person should sit or vote until those oaths had been taken; and until that decision was reversed, and that clause repealed, he conceived the House had no other course open to it than to affirm the Motion before it.
MR. CLAYcould not help thinking that this question was virtually settled. They had a Jew sitting among them, one of the most amiable and intelligent of an intelligent and well-conducted class. What was the course which the House had pursued? A majority of that House had endeavoured to procure the admission of Jews to sit in Parliament—not in the right way however, or they never would have consulted any other body. They should have asserted their right to alter, not the substance of the oath, but the mode of abjuration, to suit the case of the Jews, as they had done to suit that of the Quaker or the Moravian. They had not taken that course—they consulted another will, and they had been beaten; and if the Jew were sued for penalties, they would be beaten by the courts of law. In the meantime the Jew would walk into that House, hardly knowing whether he did so in despite of that House, or in accordance with its wishes. They would be beaten on all sides. They would end, indeed, in having their own way, but not in having their own way of having it. He could not believe that was a position in which the dignity of that House would be supported. He believed it would be a better course, even at the
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eleventh hour, to declare that they had the power and the will to admit the hon. Member for Greenwich to those rights which his constituents had conferred on him, and to which his courage entitled him.
MR. C. P. VILLIERSthought this was a question of too much importance to be disposed of with anything approaching to levity. He therefore felt grateful to those Gentlemen who had risen to discuss it as a question affecting not only the privileges of that House, but the rights and privileges also of the constituencies. He certainly thought this question was still in a most unsatisfactory state, whether considered in a legal or constitutional point of view; but he conceived there was some mistake as to the decision which Mr. Speaker had given upon the matter, while the readiness which the House had shown to dismiss the question, arose very much from the natural disposition which they had to support the right hon. Gentleman in the chair. In directing the hon. Member for Greenwich to withdraw, he did not understand the Speaker to give any interpretation of the law: he had simply done that which it was his duty to do—viz., to state to the House the nature of the Resolution passed last Session, in the case of Baron Rothschild; and having referred to that Resolution, to desire that the hon. Member for Greenwich should retire from the House. But still that left the case wholly undecided; for, though a Resolution of a particular description was passed last Session relative to the case of another hon. Gentleman, they all knew that a Resolution passed in one Session of Parliament might be rescinded the next. The question, therefore, still remained, what was the law? and was the hon. Member for Greenwich entitled or not to take his seat, having taken the oath according to the form binding upon his conscience? He should certainly like to hear from some of his learned Friends what their opinion was of the words of the 1st and 2nd Victoria, which prescribed oaths to be taken according to the forms and ceremonies binding on the conscience. And he should like to know from them whether the hon. Member for Greenwich, having taken so much of the oath, having taken the whole that was essential in the oath, came under the description of the person referred to in the 1st and 2nd Victoria; and whether, if he violated that oath, he was one that would be regarded as having sworn

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falsely, and become liable to the penalties. Supposing, for example, there now existed a royal Stuart dynasty, and the hon. Member for Greenwich were to act publicly in their favour, would he, having taken this oath of abjuration, be liable to an indictment for perjury and to the consequent penalties? He had no hesitation in saying that, if the House of Commons acted upon a principle adverse to the claims of the hon. Member for Greenwich, the country at large would be entitled to charge them with entertaining feelings that were but too common—hating those whom we had persecuted, and indulging a vulgar prejudice against the Hebrew race; and he said that they would feel towards them feelings of scorn and contempt, which they would but too justly deserve. He repeated, that, if the people thought the hon. Member for Greenwich had taken the oath essentially, and was liable to the pains and penalties imposed by the Act for violating that oath, and that because by accident there were words introduced into the oath that were merely formally and not essentially there, he was excluded from taking his seat, then they would unquestionably come to the conclusion that they were acting in that House upon a base sentiment in so excluding him from his place in Parliament.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I don't think that my hon. Friend who has just spoken has really attended to the question now before the House. The state of the matter is this: the hon. Member for Greenwich having appeared at the table, and taken so much of the abjuration oath as had been taken by Baron Lionel de Rothschild, a question was asked of me in this House whether I thought it would be right to prosecute him, if he were to sit here, for the penalties incurred under the Act of Parliament. I said, I thought the Government would not think it their duty so to prosecute, and I was then about to move a Resolution in the very same words as that which was moved in the case of Baron Rothschild. If I had moved that Resolution, the whole question would then have been before the House, either to confirm and repeat the decision we arrived at last year, or to reverse that decision—that is, if we gave an erroneous judgment last year, to come now to an entirely different resolution. But that was not the course which was pursued. Before I could make that Motion, an hon. Gentleman declared that the hon. Member for Greenwich would
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come into the House, and sit and vote in this House; and the hon. Gentleman having come into the House accordingly, you, Sir, I think, had no other duty to perform than that which you did; which was, referring to what had been done in the last year, and stating that the hon. Member for Greenwich had not taken the oath of abjuration in the manner in which the House thinks it ought always to be taken, to ask the hon. Member to withdraw. He did not withdraw, and therefore I was compelled to ask this House to agree to the Resolution which is now before it. My hon. Friend who last spoke said this was a question which should not be discussed lightly, and that it should be made matter of very grave deliberation. Now if I had proposed my Motion as I originally intended, the House would have undoubtedly entered into that full discussion which my hon. Friend so much desires. But the question now before the House is simply this, whether or not the House having adopted a Resolution last year to this effect, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich not having withdrawn, the House will confirm that Resolution. I cannot think that is a question on which the House ought to doubt. The House having come to the resolution that Baron Lionel de Rothschild could not sit, having refused to take the oath of abjuration in the form prescribed by law, that another hon. Member should come and sit in this House without question; and that he should be allowed to sit and vote in this House, although there applied to him the very grounds on which you had determined Baron Rothschild should not sit, does seem seem to me a very monstrous conclusion. It appears to me that even those who maintain that the decision we came to last year was erroneous and contrary to law, must at all events be ready to say, "Let the House respect that Resolution so long as it stands on the Journals of the House, and do not let it be treated as if it were of no value, but, after the hon. Member has withdrawn, let us come to a resolution reversing that decision. But if that is the case, my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton is not right in saying that the question before the House is being lightly discussed. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester has hardly stated the proper effect of the Resolution to which the House came last Session. He says the House came to a Resolution that no Member should sit in this House

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without taking the oath of abjuration according to law. The Resolution was, after hearing Baron Rothschild at the table, and after having seen the form that he went through there, and the oath that he took, that Baron Rothschild was not entitled to vote in this House, or sit in this House during any debate, until he shall take the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law. What is more clear than that the hon. Member for Greenwich has not taken the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law? Sir, I think there is no other course for the House now to take than to decide that the hon. Member for Greenwich should withdraw from this House. What we shall proceed to do after that decision is another question. The hon. Member has no doubt placed himself in a very different position from that in which Baron Rothschild placed himself, for he has already sat and voted in this House; and I think it is a grave question for this House to consider what difference that will make, if any difference, in the proceedings which they took last year in the case of Baron Rothschild. But, at all events, I cannot agree with what was stated by the hon. Member for Hull (Mr. J. Clay), and the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. C. P. Villiers), for they say that all those who are for the admission of Jews into Parliament are therefore bound, whatever may be the words of the law, to declare by a Vote of this House that they are entitled to sit in the House of Commons. I cannot come to that conclusion. I should indeed be very glad if I could come to the opinion that the terms of the Act of Parliament entitled us to come to a decision that every member of the Jewish persuasion was entitled to sit and vote in this House. I think that the present state of the law is most unsatisfactory. When the question is with respect to Quakers, then the Acts of Parliament and the Journals of this House make it plain that the words "on the true faith of a Christian," are considered unnecessary, and are to be treated as mere forms. It has been stated over and over again, that with respect to Quakers, the forms may be changed—that the words may be omitted. Therefore, all Acts of Parliament and proceedings of this House relative to Quakers, are, as I believe, they ought to be, in common sense and common justice, estimated as mere forms. But immediately you come to the question of a Jew, the very game words, "on the true
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faith of a Christian," are no longer considered as matter of form, but as part of the substance of the oath. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last asked a question with regard to the Act of Parliament. There was a great difference with regard to the Act of Parliament relating to the Jews and that relating to the Quakers. As to the Act affecting the Quakers, it declared that the person who is required to take the oath, may demand to take it in such and such a form, that it may be administered in such and such a form, and that those who take it in that form are liable to the ordinary penalties, the oath having been taken in the form of affirmation. I do not know that I can state the words correctly, but I am quite sure that I am correct as to the sense. But when we come to the case of the Jews, it does not say that the oath may be taken in a different form; it only says that they shall be liable to perjury if they take it in such a form. There are here no words varying the form of administering the oath as in the case of the Quaker. There is another remarkable difference. There are laws enacted with regard to the Jews in two instances—two particular and special instances—in which they say that these words, "on the true faith of a Christian," may be omitted, and that the one oath may be omitted, and that the oath may be administered on the Old Testament. I infer from these Acts that, as Parliament has made these special exceptions, they meant the exceptions to govern these particular cases only, and that the general case of the Jews is left outside these exceptions; and that therefore neither the House nor any person in it has a right to administer the oaths in such a form as this, except in the courts of common law, or in the cases referred to by the statutes to which I have alluded. I think that that makes a great difference—a difference which it is necessary for us, if we would set an example of obedience to the law, to observe. I think that it is an unjust distinction, a most unsatisfactory state of the law, which states that in the case of a Quaker you should regard a certain part of the oath as of the form, and not of the substance of the oath; that, as such, you can dispense with it; that, in his case, he may leave out the words "on the true faith of a Christian," and that, notwithstanding, his affirmation is to be regarded as complete and satisfactory; and that on the other hand, when you come to the case of a Jew, a contrary

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rule is to prevail, and these words are not to he considered as form, but as of the substance and essence of the oath. After what I have said, I think hon. Gentlemen will see that it is with reluctance—that it is with great pain—I assent to an interpretation of the oath which excludes a Jewish Member from this House. But I cannot agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, that because you carefully and scrupulously look to the words of the Act of Parliament, and are anxious to obey them, that therefore you will be looked upon with scorn, contempt, and indignation, by the people of England. [Mr. P. VILLIERS: I did not say that] I certainly understood my hon. Friend to say that. My belief is that the people of this country, more than any other people on the face of the globe, are obedient to the law, and carefully scrupulous not to exceed the limits of the law; that they are ever ready to exert their rights if they believed them to be infringed; but, at the same time, that they are willing to render to others everything that the law requires them to do. I believe that they are obedient to the law, and that they will be glad to see the House of Commons, whatever may be our views of policy—whatever may be our views of expediency—whatever may be our views even of natural justice—yet ready to set the first example of a full and exact obedience to the law; and that when the law prescribes a certain course of conduct, no consideration will induce it to depart from so great and salutary a principle.
MR. BETHELLwas sorry that he could not agree with the noble Lord who had just sat down; but if he should be so happy as to induce the noble Lord to agree with him in the views he took of this matter, it would relieve him of much of the embarrassment and pain which he felt in taking his present course. Having watched all that had passed in relation to this question, without having hitherto taken any part in it, and having for himself deliberately examined the question, he would venture now with the greatest humility and deference to those who preceded him, to express his opinion as a lawyer that both from the principles of common law and the language of statute law, and even according to the Resolution of this House, the oath in question had been well and legally taken by the hon. Member for Greenwich; that they were bound to admit him to a seat in the House; and that, legally speaking, they had no authority to order him to withdraw.
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He begged, in the first place, to state that no one would venture to deny that the hon. Member for Greenwich had a right to come to the House, and demand that the oaths should be administered to him. The next proposition he would affirm was, that they were bound to administer the oaths to him according to law. He would presently point out the ductile character of that oath; that the manner of administering it necessarily altered to suit the changing circumstances of events. But what he called upon the House to do now was, to grant him this first postulate, that they were bound to administer the oaths. The principle of law which controlled the enacting of all oaths—however they might be expressed—was this universal principle, that each man who was under an obligation to take an oath, or who had a right to require that an oath should be administered to him, had this title also to have this oath administered to him in a manner that would be binding upon his conscience. If there was any formula or particular set of words in the oath, that formula must yield to the universally controlling principle, that the oath must be administered to the party in the form that was binding upon his conscience. He did not wish the House now to grant him the opinion that these words, "on the true faith of a Christian," were only the sanction of the oath. His own opinion was that they were; but he was willing to concede to the other side of the House that by Act of Parliament they were made a substantive part of the oath, and not the mere sanction of the oath. But suppose they were part of the oath; if they held the universally controlling principle that every man had a right to have the oath administered to him in the form most binding on his conscience, while, at the same time, they held that they were precluded from making any alteration in the form of the oath, they would be involved in this absurd anomaly and contradiction, which law rejected and repudiated—that two contradictory things were at one and the same time enjoined. He would therefore say, with all humility and deference, that there was no lawyer who was at all versed in the principles of common law, or who was at all acquainted with the manner in which statute law ought to be construed, who would not agree that the formula of the oath in all cases yielded to the principle he had stated; that they were bound to administer the oath according to law; and that the party taking the

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oath had a right either to retain or to reject the formula, according as it was binding on his conscience. He would now advance a step further, and he would beg with great submission to point to a circumstance in the statute law, to which he thought sufficient attention had not yet been directed. But he would first of all beg to remind the House, that the oath of abjuration had from time to time received an alteration in its formula, according to the alteration of circumstances. There was a series of Acts of Parliament altering this oath according as an alteration took place in the circumstances of the Pretender; but through all these Acts of Parliament there was no attempt to alter the substance of the oath as it was originally framed. Now let them observe the statute of the 10th George I. cap. 4. It recited the 9th George I. cap. 24., which again referred to the prior statute of the 1st George I., which first rendered it incumbent on Members of Parliament to take the oath in question. In the 10th of George I., there was this express proviso:—
"Be it declared and enacted, by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and the Commons in Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That in all cases in which an oath may lawfully be and shall have been administered to any person, either as a juryman or a witness, or a deponent in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court of law or equity in the United Kingdom, or on appointment to any office or employment, or on any occasion whatever, such person is bound by the oath administered, provided the same shall have been administered in such form and with such ceremonies as such person may declare to be binding; and every such person in case of wilful false swearing may be convicted of the crime of perjury in the same manner as if the oath had been administered in the form and with the ceremonies most commonly adopted."
Now the 1st George I., on which this Act was founded, and to which it referred, was the Act which imposed the oath upon Members of Parliament; and, therefore, what was palpable on the face of this statute was, that here Parliament had come to the aid of the Jew, and had given to him as well as to the Quaker an opportunity of qualifying himself for the enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, and for participation in all the civil rights which the country afforded to every portion of His Majesty's subjects. Now, he would venture to say that according to the principles of the statute, as well as according to the principles of the common law, they had here a direct Parliamentary enactment, the object of which
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was to give the Jew all the privileges of citizenship, and which directly stated that the Jew should be held to have qualified himself for the possession of them, if he took the oath without the words in question. It might be said that this Act referred to the oath prescribed by the 1st Geo. I., and that it did not apply to the present oath, which was prescribed by the 6th Geo. III. But he would beg the attention of the House to the language of the 6th Geo. III., which did not affect to impose a new oath, which only altered the terms of an oath already existing, which treated that oath as a thing well known in law—substituting, indeed, new for old terms; but accompanying that substitution with express directions enacting—
"And that all and every person and persons who are enjoined and required to administer, take, or subscribe the oath of abjuration and the assurance in the said above-mentioned Act contained, shall respectively administer, take, and subscribe the oath of abjuration, and subscribe the assurance according to the form herein set down and prescribed in such courts within such time limited, in such manner and with due observance of the same requisites, and with benefit of the same savings, provisoes, and indemnities as by the said Acts above-mentioned, or by any other Acts, or any part of them now subsisting, are directed and enacted."
It appeared to him that this was perfectly conclusive so far as the language of the statute was concerned; and that the 10th Geo. I. threw round the Jew peculiar privileges with reference to this oath of abjuration, which the 6th Geo. III., in altering the form of oath, had taken care to repeat. Now, he begged the House further to observe, that it appeared from the Report of their Committee that the licence which it was contended they possessed to alter and modify the form of the oath, as circumstances might arise, was far less than that which was taken from year to year, and constantly allowed in the inferior officers who were called upon to administer oaths in every petty court in the kingdom. They knew from historical events that the language of the oath was rendered inapplicable from time to time; as when, for instance, the allegiance was required to be altered from the King to the Queen; and they would find, in a part of the Commons' Report, it was stated that, in order to comply with the law, according to the alteration of circumstances, there was not an inferior officer, in the most petty court in the kingdom, who would not take upon himself the authority to make the necessary alteration in the form of the oath.

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By the very Act of this House, in permitting the hon. Members to take the oath on the Old Testament, they had expressed their opinion that they had authority to alter the form—that they were bound to administer the oath in the form that was binding on the hon. Member's conscience; and yet; after making that concession, they mocked the hon. Member—they mocked the law—they violated the principle of the law by telling him that though they conceded the principle so far—though they gave him the Old Testament on which to be sworn, and by that very Act rendered it incumbent on themselves to obliterate the words, "on the true faith of a Christian," yet they refused to obliterate them. He said again they mocked the law, and they mocked common sense by insisting on such a course. He submitted, therefore, that if the House had any regard for principle—if they had any regard for statute law—if they had any regard for that universal rule which was recognised by common law, and proofs of which had been collected in the decisions of many eminent Judges—then they were bound to say that the Jew had a right to take the oaths in the form most binding on his conscience, unless there was something in the oath which excluded him. Now, he contended further that there was nothing in all this at variance with the Resolution to which the House had come last year, though, even if there were, that decision was embodied in language which might be rescinded. In that Resolution there was nothing binding them to continue in their present position, though there was much that bound them if they had any regard to their own consistency, intelligence, and common sense to go forward; and when they had once conceded the point that a man might be sworn at the table of the House on the Old Testament, they were under a moral obligation to follow that up by omitting the words "on the true faith of a Christian." He could not therefore come to the conclusion that the hon. Member for Greenwich ought to he ordered to withdraw, because he believed that by law the hon. Member was as much a Member of the House as any one now sitting in it.
SIR FREDERIC THESIGERsaid, it certainly required some little courage in any man to rise after the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury, who, in express terms, had declared that those who did not agree with him in the views he had taken on this question, were not acquainted
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with the force either of the common or of the statute law; and as he (Sir F. Thesiger) took an entirely opposite view from that of the hon. and learned Member, he certainly fell under that description which he had applied to all those who were opposed to him; and he therefore addressed the House under all that embarrasment and diffidence necessarily arising from the position in which his hon. and learned Friend had placed him. He, however, quite agreed with his hon. and learned Friend in one position, that the House had brought itself into a position of inconsistency, by allowing two out of the three oaths which were required to be taken before a Member could take his seat in this House to be taken upon the Old Testament. He resisted that to the best of his ability, for it did appear to him that as all three oaths must necessarily be taken before a Member could sit in the House, and as it was perfectly clear that one at least out of the three could only be taken in a Christian sense, therefore, though it was perfectly clear that, in general cases, a man ought to be allowed to swear in that form which was binding on his conscience, yet that, in this particular case, the Legislature must have intended that all the three oaths should be taken in the same way. The House, however, had come to a different conclusion, and he was bound to bow to the decision to which they had come, though his hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General said he did not acquiesce in that decision. That, then, being the position in which they were placed, let them see what it was that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aylesbury had argued on the present occasion, and what was the position that he had assumed. He said, in the first place—and there, of course, every one would agree with him—that any person who took the oath was entitled to take it in the form that was most binding upon his conscience. But then his hon. and learned Friend, in proceeding to consider what was the character of the words of the oath of abjuration "on the true faith of a Christian," used, he presumed designedly, the word "formula" to express his sense of their meaning; and it would be seen that he had indicated an opinion, though he had not boldly stated it, that these words were not a substantial, but only a formal part of the oath. If his hon. and learned Friend had, indeed, been able to satisfy the House that these words really formed

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no substantial part of the oath, then there could be no doubt that any person taking the oath in the form most binding upon his conscience would he entitled to omit them. But that was not the argument of his hon. and learned Friend. His argument was that the Legislature had shown, by its having authorised the words "on the true faith of a Christian" to be omitted in certain cases by the Jew when taking the oath of abjuration, that they were intended to be omitted on every occasion; and his hon. and learned Friend had supported this position by reference to the 10th George I., as it was contained in the report made a short time ago by a Committee of their House; and his hon. and learned Friend, with that authority which belonged to his character and station in the profession, told the House that this Act of George I., in his opinion—and that any body who held a different opinion must be utterly ignorant both of common and of statute law—applied in every case, and every circumstance, in which a Jew could be placed, and that it enabled him to take his seat in this House though he omitted these words, "on the true faith of a Christian," from the oath of abjuration. He did not know if his hon. and learned Friend had looked further than the Report; whether he had turned to the Act of Parliament itself. [Mr. BETHELL: I have.] If he had turned his attention to the Act of Parliament itself, he must say he was surprised beyond measure to hear his hon. and learned Friend assert, in the face of this House, that that Act of Parliament, in his opinion, rendered it lawful for a Jew to take the oath of abjuration, on every occasion when it was tendered to him, without using these words. His hon. and learned Friend must know, if he had read the Act, that this was a mere temporary Act for a particular occasion; that certain parties had been required to take the oath of abjuration within a limited time by the 9th of George I., and that the Act in question, the 10th of George I., was introduced for the purpose of enlarging the time during which the oath was to be taken, and that the proviso made with regard to the Jews, which was contained in the Act, was, like the Act itself, of a temporary character, for a particular occasion; and his hon. and learned Friend must either not have turned to the Act in question, or he had not seen the effect of it, or else he must have forgotten it; for, otherwise, he could never have pressed upon the
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House, with all the weight that belonged to his opinion, that this was an Act which enabled Jews to take seats ill this House omitting the words in the oath of abjuration, "on the true faith of a Christian." He drew an inference from this Act very different from that of the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury; he inferred that the Legislature had declared authoritatively their opinion that those words were of the substance of the oath, and not a mere formula, and that therefore an Act was necessary to omit those words before the Jew could take the oath. There was another Act which bore out this opinion, the 13th of George II. That Act provided—
"That whenever any person professing the Jewish religion shall present himself to take the said oath of abjuration, in pursuance of this Act, the said words, 'Upon the true faith of a Christian,' shall be omitted out of the said oath, in administering the same to such person, and the taking and subscribing the said oath by such person professing the Jewish religion, without the words aforesaid, and the other oaths appointed by the said Act, in like manner as Jews were permitted to take the oath of abjuration, by an Act made in the 10th year of the reign of his late Majesty King George I., intituled, 'An Act for explaining and amending an Act of the last Session of Parliament, intituled, an Act to oblige all persons being Papists, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, and all persons in Great Britain refusing or neglecting to take the oaths appointed for the security of his Majesty's person and Government, by several Acts herein mentioned, to register their names and real estates, and for enlarging the time for taking the said oaths, and making such registers, and for allowing further time for the enrolment of deeds or wills made by Papists, which have been omitted to be enrolled, pursuant to an Act of the third year of his Majesty's reign, and also for giving relief to Protestant lessees,' shall be deemed a sufficient taking of the said oaths, in order to entitle such person to the benefit of being naturalised by virtue of this Act."
The 10th George I., cap. 4, recites an Act of 9th George I., cap. 24, which requires the oath of abjuration to be taken as there mentioned within a given time, and then after amongst other things, giving further time, and permitting Quakers to declare the effect of it, the Act proceeds to enact as follows in respect of the Jews:—
"And whereas the following words are contained in the latter part of the oaths of abjuration, namely, 'upon the true faith of a Christian,' be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That whenever any of his Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish religion shall present himself to take the same oath of abjuration in pursuance of the above recited Act, or of this present Act, the said words 'on the true faith of a Christian' shall be omitted out of the said oath, in administering the same to such person, and the taking the

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said oath by such person professing the Jewish religion, without the words aforesaid, in like manner as Jews are admitted to he sworn to give evidence in courts of justice, shall be deemed to he a sufficient taking of the oath of abjuration within the meaning of this and the said recited Act."
Well then, they had a legislative decision that this was an essential or substantive part of the oath. Could they get rid of an essential part of the oath merely because it was alleged by some one that it was not binding on his conscience? If such a principle was admitted, where would they stop? The hon. Member for Greenwich objects to the words "on the true faith, of a Christian." He says that they are not binding upon his conscience. Some other person may have conscientious scruples against other portions of the oath. Where then is the limit to the argument that, if any person entertains a scruple, he is to be allowed to satisfy his conscience by the omission of the words on which his scruples are founded; and what becomes of the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman which was to demolish them? Why, it had failed entirely, and failed in a signal and remarkable way. The hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury could not have prepared himself by a reference to the Act of Parliament, so as to have enabled him to come down to the House and deliver his opinion to the House with all the weight and authority to which it was entitled. His hon. and learned Friend, like many other speakers, had lost sight of what was the question really before the House. The question was, whether Mr. Alderman Salomons be ordered to withdraw or not. Now he confessed he thought that the noble Lord had adopted a very mild form of proceeding on the present occasion. The House would be pleased to recollect what occurred on Friday last. With the entire concurrence of the House, after the hon. Member for Greenwich had refused to take the words "on the true faith of a Christian," he was directed to withdraw. It might be in the memory of the House that the hon. Gentleman having failed to withdraw entirely, he (Sir F. Thesiger) had called their attention to the fact. Again, with the concurrence of the House, he was ordered to withdraw. Now, he thought after this course had been pursued, with the perfect sanction of the House, that the presence of the hon. Member for Greenwich on the present occasion within the walls and precincts of the House, was contumacious; that it was
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a disobedience to the orders of the House, and a contempt; and he should have been, quite prepared to have concurred in a vote (which he thought would have been the proper one to have been proposed) that the hon. Member be committed to the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms for that disobedience and contempt. The noble Lord had pursued a milder course: could any one doubt that he was not perfectly justified? Certainly not. But let them consider what it was they were called upon to decide in voting upon this proposition of the noble Lord. There was, as the noble Lord had stated, a clear and distinct Resolution of the House upon the point at issue, which had been passed in the course of last Session upon a state of circumstances which were precisely similar. He could not help thinking that the hon. Member for Greenwich was perfectly familiar with the proceedings of their House upon that occasion, because he observed that the very expressions which were used by Baron Rothschild, when he presented himself at their table, were the very words used by the hon. Alderman. Well, then, they had a Resolution of the House applicable to precisely similar circumstances. As long as that remained an unrescinded Resolution—as long as it remained declared that Baron Rothschild had no right to sit in the House—could they endure that the hon. Member for Greenwich, in defiance of that Resolution, should brave their authority, and should not be required and compelled to withdraw? He was not prepared for the course which the hon. Member had thought fit to adopt. He expected that the noble Lord would have moved a Resolution in terms similar to those carried in the course of last Session. On Friday last, he (Sir F. Thesiger) had intimated his intention to pursue the same course he had adopted last year, and to move a new writ for Greenwich. But after discussing the question with some friends, upon whose opinion he entirely relied, although he entertained still most strongly the opinion that they made a serious mistake in the course which they pursued with regard to the Baron Rothschild, yet still, in deference to the opinions expressed by his friends, and because there might be considerable evil in departing from any course which had been adopted by the House, he had made up his mind to follow the noble Lord, and vote in favour of any Resolution which he might propose. Under these circumstances, he perfectly concurred in the

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Motion submitted by the noble Lord, and he thought it impossible that the House could differ with him in the views which he had taken.
MR. BETHELLbegged to assure his learned Friend that he had taken pains to refer to the Acts of Parliament to which he referred. The 9th of George I. was not found in the ordinary Statute-book, and he had been at some trouble to obtain it. The 9th of George I. designated the classes of persons to be affected by the Act; and the 10th of George I. showed in what manner the oath should be administered.
MR. AGLIONBYwould not enter into a consideration of the legal points at issue. It appeared to him that the able and lucid argument of the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury was unanswered, and that it was unanswerable. He wished to guard any vote which he was about to give from being construed into a want of respect for the right hon. Gentleman who presided over their discussions, for he looked upon him as the most able and impartial expounder of the forms of the House who had ever occupied the chair. The hon. Member for Greenwich meant no disrespect to the Speaker in this apparent defiance of his authority. He (Mr. Aglionby) felt sure that when the Speaker ordered Mr. Salomons to withdraw, he did not mean to express an opinion upon the question of privilege, but that he was merely expressing the general opinion of the House. The noble Lord treated the decision of last year as if it were a judicial decision. The nation would laugh to scorn its receiving such an interpretation. Every hon. Member who voted on the Resolution last year, came down to the House with his mind perfectly made up on which side he would vote, quite independent of any arguments they might hear. Did they suppose that any arguments, no matter how forcible, could alter one vote? He was very sceptical upon the point. Why, it was a mockery to call it judicial. It was only a decision which gave expression to their own private feelings. He did not claim any merit as an impartial person—in fact he was not impartial—but he would vote nevertheless. He believed that the Member for Greenwich was as good a Member as any of them, and if time was taken to consider the masterly speech of the Member for Aylesbury, he believed that no lawyer in the kingdom could doubt the fact. Looking upon the concluding portion of the
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oath to form no part whatever of its substance, he should give his vote in favour of the hon Member for Greenwich.
SIR ROBERT H. INGLISsaid, the hon. Member for Cockermouth had avowed an unhesitating deference for the judgment of Mr. Speaker; and he (Sir R. H. Inglis) rose not so much to defend the decision of that right hon. Gentleman, as to support the decision of the House itself, of which their Speaker was the exponent. The case of the last Session was precisely similar to the case now before the House, with the name only changed. The hon. Member for Greenwich came to the table and performed exactly the same part as his predecessor had done twelve months before. The hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury had proved too much in the first part of his speech; in the end, however, he had proved nothing. He (Sir R. H. Inglis) appealed, not to lawyers, but to men of common sense, whether such was not the case, when the hon. and learned Member stated, as an argument in this case, that it was within the competency of the lowest officer of the lowest court of justice in the kingdom to change the form of the oath in question, by the substitution of the name of Victoria for that of William IV.? The alteration, however, which he now supported was much more than the change of the name of the Sovereign. If such a proposition were admitted, it could not be denied that a Resolution of that House was sufficient to override an Act of Parliament. But if that were the case, why was it that four Bills had been passed in that House, and as many rejected by the other House within the last twenty years, with the same object in view as that under discussion, if the power was in their own hands? Could it be reserved for the hon. and learned Member to discover, on the 21st of July, 1851, this secret which had lain so long concealed, not only from the lawyers of his (Sir R. H. Inglis's) side of the House, but also from the piercing vision of the hon. and learned Solicitor General, and from that of the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown, all whose feelings and principles were engaged in support of the cause which the hon. Member for Greenwich unhappily represented? The course suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon was that most consistent with the dignity of the House. The authority of the House had been defied; the representative of that authority had been dis-

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obeyed; and it was the duty of the House to sustain him by an immense majority in enforcing the decision of last year. Did any one contend that the slightest difference existed between the case of the hon. Member for Greenwich, and the case of Baron de Rothschild? Both were elected by large constituencies—both were prepared to take similar oaths, The hon. Member for Greenwich took two of the oaths presented, but he did not take the third, as required by law; but he had, notwithstanding, ventured to take his seat among them. If it were in the discretion of the hon. Member to omit the seven words in question, it would be also in the discretion of other persons to omit any words they chose, and so to cut and carve the oath as they might see fit. It was the animus imponentis that gave to the oath its value; the oath was meant to be taken in its plain and literal sense; it was open to those who objected to any part of it to refuse it altogether, but not to alter it to suit their individual convenience. The hon. Gentleman had, however, omitted the words "on the true faith of a Christian," thereby daring and defying the House. The simple course to have taken was to have done what it was whispered would be done—namely, to move to rescind the Resolution of the last Session; and however stultified the House might have been by a Tote to that effect, the ground would be clear for the hon. Member for Greenwich. He (Sir R. H. Inglis) concurred in the proposition that the hon. Member should withdraw. What was to be done afterwards be should consider; but he certainly did hope that the suggestion of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Abingdon would be adopted.
MR. BRIGHTthought the noble Lord at the head of the Government was not aware of the precise question now before the House. The noble Lord spoke as though the only question before the House was whether the hon. Member for Greenwich should withdraw or remain there. If he was not under a mistake, there was before the House a distinct Amendment, equal to the rescinding of the Resolution of last year. The question stood exactly as if the hon. Member for Middlesex moved the Resolution which he intimated it was his intention to do; and if that were so, he thought the Solicitor General was not quite consistent in the course which he adopted. The Motion now before the House, coming after the Motion of last
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year, which went to affirm that the oath was not taken within the meaning of the Act, was directly contrary to it, and affirmed that the oath had been duly taken, and that the sitting Member was lawfully entitled to take a part in the discussions of the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman voted last year in favour of Baron Rothschild; and how he could reconcile a vote which would be now adverse, he could not possibly see. There were two modes in which the House might look at the question—one as arguing it only as a question of Jaw, the other as a question of precedent. He would not go into the question of law, because he thought that his right hon. Colleague (Mr. M. Gibson) had shown that, as far as law was concerned, they were completely in the dark. The most distinguished lawyers appeared to be very much at sea, and if it had not been for the lucid and masterly speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury, they might be excused for taking their opinions into consideration at all. But with regard to the question of precedents, the case was wholly different; and it was upon this point that he wished to offer to them a few observations. The Resolution of last year he understood to be taken as a precedent for this Session, and the House having come to the resolution that Baron Rothschild was not to be admitted, they wished to enforce the same regulation against the present Member for Greenwich. If, however, they were to be guided by precedents of this nature, why should they not go further back, and follow a precedent which enlarged the powers and privileges of Parliament, while it at the same time enlarged the freedom and rights of the people? It was that of a gentleman, a friend of his, a member of the same sect to which he belonged; but he did not think that the House had fairly looked at the point involved in that case. He was satisfied beyond all question that the House, in the instance to which he referred, had taken upon itself to do very much more than it was now asked to do. In the case of Mr. Pease, the House not only altered the form and substance of the oath, but left out a most essential portion of it—in point of fact, dispensed with the three oaths, and compressed them into one single declaration. If the House did that in 1832, had it not equally the power to do it in the case of the hon. Member for Greenwich? He held in his band the declaration which he took at the bar of the

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House. He wished to point out an essential difference in the declaration which he had taken, and the oath taken by Members when they presented themselves at the table. The declaration which he had taken was nearly identical with that which Mr. Pease had taken before the Act passed which enabled him to take a seat in that House. The general oath began, "And I do swear that I will bear faith and true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and Her will defend to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies, and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against Her person, crown, or dignity;" but the declaration framed for Mr. Pease, and all other persons of his sect who might become Members of the House, merely set forth that the person taking it would be faithful to the Crown against all traitorous conspiracies, omitting all mention of defending Her Majesty, because the term "defending" implied "by force of arms," and, therefore, the term was omitted in deference to the peculiar views entertained by the Society of Friends on the subject of peace. They had all sworn to defend the Crown; but he (Mr. Bright) had not declared that he would defend the Crown; The Committee which was appointed on the subject in 1832 did not recommend that Mr. Pease should be compelled to declare that he would defend the Crown; and the House of Lords assented to the alteration in the oath, and the Act was passed into a law. Now he put it to the House whether they did not come with a stronger case than Mr. Pease came with? In the case of Mr. Pease, the House left out the words "on the true faith of a Christian;" he was a Christian, and there was no need for the omission. He did not like to use the words "on the true faith of a Christian," because he understood the expression to be in the nature of an oath—and to oaths of any kind the Society of Friends entertained a conscientious and insurmountable objection—and the House dropped them. But it did more—it did not require him to promise to defend the Crown; and it, moreover, absolved him from taking several oaths, and permitted him to make one affirmation. Why, then, if Members of the Society of Friends, being Christians, were permitted to omit these particular words from their Parliamentary declaration, was Mr. Salomon not being a Christian, to be compelled to repeat these words, he declaring them to
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be in no way binding upon his conscience, and offering, at the same time, to take the oath which was binding on his conscience? In the case of Baron Rothschild, they permitted him to take an oath upon the Old Testament, because it was most binding on his conscience; but, having given him half a right, they refused him the other, and they insisted on giving a most unfair and most unjust meaning to those words, which it was not possible could have been attributed to them in the case of Mr. Pease, which meaning operated as a bar to his taking a seat in the House. They were in a difficulty, because they did wrong last year. The noble Lord at the head of the Government was very rash, and his rashness last year had raised one, more barrier against the cause of the Jews. But let the House bear in mind this—the Attorney General had said those words were discreditable to their legislation. The Solicitor General argued last year that the oath was taken according to law; superadded to that, they had the testimony of the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury, whose opinion would have the greatest weight attached to it throughout the kingdom, that the Member for Greenwich was thoroughly entitled to take his seat. He wished to know whether this' was not an amount of evidence on their side sufficient to warrant them in laying aside the strict interpretation of the law, and acting upon the precedent set in the case of Mr. Pease, in which they omitted these very words, "on the true faith of a Christian?" They did not always act up to the strict letter of the law either in the public or private transactions of life, Let not the noble Lord think that the people would hold him blameless for the difficulties in which he had placed the question. The constituency which he represented had re-elected two or three times a colleague for him of the Jewish persuasion. Another constituency, after all the discussions which had taken place in Parliament on this subject, had returned a Member of the Jewish persuasion; and he would ask the noble Lord, were the opinions of these constituencies to go for nothing? He could only say, that if a gentleman of the Jewish persuasion presented himself to a constituency before this question was settled, he would have a very good chance of being returned. The noble Lord, it appeared, would rather have the elections of these constituencies made null and void, and leave the question to remain as it was,

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than fairly grapple with it as a question which had been passed in that House year after year, and as pertinaciously refused by the other House. Two branches of the Legislature were in favour of the admission of the Jews. ["No, no!"] Yes, that House had over and over again declared itself in favour of it; and the Queen, through Her Ministers, was also in favour of it. [Cries of "Order!"]
MR. SPEAKERsaid, the hon. Gentleman might not be aware that it was very irregular to use the name of the Queen in debate.
MR. BRIGHT: He bowed to the decision of the Chair; but he had only been following a high authority in another place, where it had been used as an argument that the other House and the Crown being both in favour of a measure, they ought not to refuse to pass it. The frequent rejection of this measure by the other House was a strong reason why they should examine narrowly whether it was not in the power of that House to do what was necessary by itself, and to grant to the hon. Gentleman, having taken the oaths as he had, the right of sitting in that House. With regard to the oaths generally, he just wished to say this, that there was nothing more useless or more deserving the condemnation of sensible men, than the oaths taken at that table. They were the result of prejudice, and of long-continued habit; but hon. Members should no longer allow themselves, like children, to be put through the form of taking those oaths. They held no man to loyalty—they held no one to religion. The people of this country were loyal enough without those oaths. No men were sent there who needed to be bound in their allegiance to the Sovereign, or their obedience to the law, by any oaths whatever, especially by such oaths as those passed two or three centuries ago. He should like some clean sweep to be made of these oaths, and that they should regard each other, as he believed they were, as patriotic citizens of their country coming there to do that which was their duty to their country, and not binding themselves in the slightest degree by those antiquated forms of asseveration which our ancestors of old had enacted, and which were totally unsuited to the times in which we lived.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, the hon. Member for Manchester had congratulated himself upon not having taken the oath to defend Her Majesty. He begged to
1200
congratulate the hon. Member upon having escaped that which would have been to him a dilemma; for if there was any Member in that House to whom such an engagement would be embarrassing, it was the hon. Member for Manchester. The hon. Member was the representative of a small religious sect, yet no hon. Member appeared to pay such little consideration to the religious feelings of others. The hon. Member in politics pursued a course as aggressive as in matters of religion; he was a consistent supporter of those who urged that House to grasp in their own hands the legislation of the country, without waiting for the sanction of the Crown, in utter violation of the law of the country, and the declared opinions of the House of Lords. But the point to which he wished to call their particular attention was the manner of this aggression. ["Hear!"] He repeated the words, it was an "aggression." There sits the elected of Greenwich in defiance of the law. They had been frequently reminded of the appearance of Baron Rothschild at that table. There were many painful recollections connected with the appearance of that Gentleman, who left a fictitious qualification paper on that table. He (Mr. Newdegate) did not know whether there was any more such rubbish left upon the table of the House on the present occasion; but they had the opinion of the Speaker that Baron Rothschild's paper, which he supposed was originally intended by its author for the archives of this House, was fictitious and illegal, and the Speaker had most properly directed that fictitious document should be consigned to some rubbish closet. The appearance of Baron Rothschild at the table of the House had been characterised by an attempt to play a trick. What had characterised the appearance of the elected of Greenwich? Why, an audacity unparalleled. He came there, and, setting at defiance the Resolution of that House, and in direct violation of the law as declared by the proceedings of both Houses of Parliament, he attempted to take a seat. He agreed with the hon. Member for Cockermouth, that they were proceeding with extraordinary lenity towards him. If they were to have persons sitting in that House in opposition to all law and order, how could order be, in future, preserved? Why should he or any other Member be bound by order, when they saw it so wantonly violated? The elected of Greenwich was returned

1201
under distinct pledges that he would violate both the law and the order of the House. The hon. Elected had been desired to retire, and he did once most unwillingly retire. But at the next meeting of the House, in defiance of their order, he took a seat. If they were to preserve the characteristics of the House of Commons—those characteristics of orderly debate which might well be followed as an example by the constituent assemblies of other countries—it was their bounden duty to maintain the authority of their Speaker, and to insist on the elected of Greenwich quitting this House, and that he should cease to violate that order which they were bound to preserve.
MR. J. EVANSdeprecated the discussion of this question under excited feelings. The importance of the question could not be exaggerated. The House was in collision with two large constituencies, and had been so for four years with that of London. He did not remember an instance of the House coming into collision with a constituency without being defeated. He had heard of such a collision with the electors of Middlesex, and the proceedings had to be erased from their Journals. How was this to end? There had been four or five attempts at passing a Bill which was rejected by the other House. In coming to a decision, they ought to take care that it was well founded. Last year they had decided that Baron Rothschild should be sworn on the Old Testament, and immediately afterwards they decided that he could not be admitted because he would not take a Christian oath. Which of these were they to be bound by? Or would they go back to the decision in Mr. Pease's case? They were in a difficulty owing to the Resolution of last year; and the noble Lord ought first to have proposed that it should be rescinded. As he had not done so, the question might be discussed on the Amendment before the House. He had no doubt the opinion of the Solicitor General, that there was nothing whatever in the substance of the oath which required the words "on the true faith of a Christian," was a correct one, and the House ought to be bound by it. Every lawyer knew that an oath consisting of a promise and an adjuration, the latter could be altered, while the former could not, otherwise it would be impossible to bind the conscience of any one. The adjuration did not in the slightest degree affect the substance of the
1202
oath—the oath was finished before the adjuration was arrived at, and it was sworn on the true faith of a Christian if the party was a Christian—on the true faith of a Jew if the party was a Jew. Therefore, he doubted not the oath had been properly taken by the hon. Member for Greenwich. A native-born Jew of this country was entitled to all the privileges of citizenship, unless it could be shown that he was deprived of them by statute.
COLONEL THOMPSONsaid: I only wish to justify myself to my constituents, in case they ask whether I listened to any great absurdity without raising a voice in opposition. It was plain there was no evidence whatever to show that the framers of the oath of abjuration ever wished, or intended, or dreamed of doing anything but to find out who would stand by King James, and who would not. Did anybody suppose it was the intention of the framers to leave Jews and Quakers to support King James if they liked? On the contrary, it was plain that whenever a desire arose to have their declarations, the phraseology they objected to was dispensed with. It was a solemn mockery for this House to place the Old Testament in an hon. Member's hands, and thereby call upon the Almighty to attest his asseveration, when they knew all the while they had a quirk lying in wait to baulk him in the middle of it. The responsibility is not on this side of the House, for we own no Deity but one we reverence. It is plain your Deity is not our Deity; is this the way you treat your Jupiter? Religion and the duty of impressing the sanctity of its forms were oftener in the mouths of the other side of the House; but this side practises.
MR. CROWDERobserved, that the real question which, as he understood, the House was now called upon to decide was, whether the hon. Member for Greenwich had taken the oath of abjuration or not? He thought it was impossible to come to a decision upon that question without looking at it judicially. It was impossible to decide it except as judges, and deciding it as judges it appeared to him that they ought to do so with calmness and deliberation; but he thought some portions of the discussion had been very unlike the deliberation of judges upon a judicial question. He felt called upon to state his opinion upon the point of law, because this was really a question of law, and he was sorry the lawyers had not agreed in their opinions.

1203
Lawyers on each side had said there was not a shadow of doubt upon the subject; and he must say that he really had no doubt in his own mind. He would have felt the greatest satisfaction if he could have brought himself to the conclusion that the hon. Member for Greenwich could take his seat in that House according to law, because he did not yield to any man in his strong desire to get rid of that exclusion of particular sects which he thought a disgrace to the legislation of this country. But, looking at this as a question of law, the only conclusion he could arrive at was, that the hon. Member for Greenwich had not taken the oath. He was very much surprised at the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Bethell), because he believed no lawyer in that House or in the kingdom entertained the notion that, under the statute 10th George I. chap. 4, if properly construed, any Jew might come to the table without the necesity for any other Act of Parliament, and take the oath of abjuration with the omission of certain words. That statute, among others, was set forth in the Report of the Select Committee which sat upon these oaths, and was open to the inspection and consideration of all those who took part in the disscussion of this question last year; but he was not aware that any one had expressed such an opinion as that to which he had just alluded. He certainly differed altogether from his hon. and learned Friend. He considered that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Abingdon (Sir F. Thesiger) bad taken a right view of this question, and that the 10th George I., cap 4, referred to a particular subject, and had no reference whatever to the oaths taken by Members of Parliament in that House; and he thought this fact furnished one of the strongest arguments to show that the words "on the true faith of a Christian" could not be omitted without legislative interference. He might add that two other statutes bearing upon the same point showed that before these words could legally be omitted, the Legislature must interfere, and pass an Act of Parliament. The 13th George II., cap. 7, referred, among other things, to the naturalisation of certain Jews and foreigners, and it provided that whenever any person professing the Jewish religion should present himself to take the oath of abjuration in pursuance of the Act, the words "upon the true faith of a Christian" might be omitted from the oath, &c., "in like
1204
manner as Jews are permitted to take the oath of abjuration by the Act made in the 10th year of King George I." There was also a subsequent Act, the 8th and 9th Victoria, cap. 52, which was passed for the purpose of relieving Jews in the case of the declaration for the taking of municipal offices, substituted for the sacramental test. That Act referred to a declaration—not an oath, showing that with respect to a declaration equally with an oath the terms must be literally adhered to, and it expressly gave permission to Jews to leave out the words "on the true faith of a Christian." But he must ask the House how they could deal with this case without reference to a case which, under precisely the same circumstances, they had themselves decided after much discussion last year, the decision being recorded in the Journals of the House. The hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury had said, "There is nothing in the language of the Resolution of last year which would impugn your decision at present, that Mr. Salomons has taken the oath of abjuration." There might be nothing, perhaps, in the precise language of the Resolution, if the hon. Gentleman chose to construe it according to a legal sense, but it was well known the circumstances were similar. It would be remembered that on the occasion to which he referred, Baron Rothschild came to the table and took such parts of the oath as had been taken by the hon. Member for Greenwich. What distinction, then, was there here? It was impossible that the House could decide in favour of admitting the hon. Member for Greenwich, without going directly in the teeth of its former decision. It was said that the former decision of the House might be rescinded; but he would ask whether it ought to be rescinded by a side wind in the manner now proposed? It had been said that the words "upon the true faith of a Christian" might undoubtedly be omitted, because this was only a jurat; but he held that such was not the case, and that without an Act passed for the purpose, those words could not be omitted any more than any other of the words from the beginning to the end of the oath. The 2nd Victoria, to which reference had been made, was merely a declaratory statute, declaring what the common law of the kingdom was as to the manner of taking oaths generally; and it was clear that when an oath was directed to be taken, if no form of language was prescribed, every

1205
man might take it according to the ceremonies which hound his conscience. The fallacy of all the arguments of the hon. and learned Solicitor General on this subject was, in construing the word "forms" in that Act as including "forms of words;" to which it clearly had no application. How could it rationally be contended that where a form of words was prescribed, as in the present case, a man might leave out such portion of this long oath as he pleased, provided he adhered to its substance and said, "I abjure the Pretender?" If the House decided that the words might be omitted, they would take upon themselves the functions of the Legislature, because the Legislature had chosen to prescribe a form of language complete in all its parts. He did not advocate the necessity of this oath in this present day, for he agreed with those who thought that there was now no need for the oath of abjuration; but he also agreed with those who considered that they could not erase that oath from the Statute-book except by an Act of Parliament.
MR. MUNTZhad taken no part whatever in the debates on this question, and had contented himself with giving a silent vote for the admission of Jews to Parliament. He never could understand why the question of life and death should be left to the determination of a Jew in the jury-box, or why the office of sheriff should be open to his acceptance, and yet that he should be denied the right to sit in that House, It appeared to him that the House was in a very anomalous position. He (Mr. Muntz) did not take part in the proceeding that recognised the right of the Jew to be sworn on the Old Testament. But it appeared to him that those who voted in favour of the Resolution, either intended to admit the Jew to that House, or to directly insult him, by putting to him an adjuration which he knew to be false. While the Jew did his duty, as well as other citizens, and enjoyed other privileges equally with other members of the community, he could not refuse the claim which was now put forth in his behalf.
MR. WAWNwas understood to support the right of Jews to sit in the Legislature; but the hon. Member's attempt to address the House was inaudible, in consequence of the cries for a division.
MR. J. A. SMITHsaid, he had just been requested by his hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich to state, that though he voted on the first divison which took
1206
place that evening, yet, as the division to which they were now proceeding involved a question personal to himself, he therefore, in obedience to the custom of the House, would retire without voting. But at the same time his hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich respectfully requested it to be understood that by his retirement he did not abandon one tittle of the right which he came there to maintain.
ALDERMAN SALOMONSthen rose, and having bowed to the Speaker, withdrew from the House.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided:—Ayes 229; Noes 81: Majority 148.

List of the AYES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Codrington, Sir W.

Adair, R. A. S.

Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

Adderley, C. B.

Coles, H. B.

Arbuthnot, hon. H.

Collins, T.

Archdall, Capt. M.

Compton, H. C.

Bailey, J.

Conolly, T.

Baines, rt. hon. M. T.

Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

Baldock, E. H.

Cotton, hon. W. H. S.

Baldwin, C. B.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Bankes, G.

Craig, Sir W. G.

Baring, H. B.

Crowder, R. B.

Baring, rt. hn. Sir F.T.

Cubitt, W.

Baring, T.

Currie, H.

Barrington, Visct.

Curteis, H. M.

Barrow, W. H.

Denison, E.

Beckett, W.

Dick, Q.

Bellow, R. M.

Divett, E.

Beresford, W.

Drummond, H.

Birch, Sir T. B.

Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.

Blackstone, W. S.

Duncombe, hon. A.

Blair, S.

Duncombo, hon. O.

Blandford, Marq. of

Duncuft, J.

Booker, T. W.

Dundas, Adm.

Booth, Sir R. G.

Dundas, G.

Bouverie, hon. E. P.

Dundas, rt. hon. Sir D.

Bowles, Adm.

Dunne, Col.

Brisco, M.

East, Sir J. B.

Broadley, H.

Ebrington, Visct.

Brockman, E. D.

Edwards, H.

Brooke, Sir A. B.

Egerton, W. T.

Brown, H.

Elliot, hon. J. E.

Buller, Sir J.Y.

Estcourt, J. B. B.

Burghley, Lord

Fergus, J.

Burrell, Sir C. M.

FitzPatrick, rt. hon. J.

Burroughes, H. N.

Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W.

Cabbell, B. B.

Fortescue, hon. J. W.

Campbell, hon. W.

Fox, S. W. L.

Cardwell, E.

Freestun, Col.

Carew, W. H. P.

Freshfield, J. W.

Cavendish, hon. C. C.

Frewen, C. H.

Child, S.

Gaskell, J. M.

Childers, J. W.

Gilpin, Col.

Christopher, R. A.

Glyn, G. C.

Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G.

Gordon, Adm.

Clive, H. B.

Goulburn, rt. hon. H.

Cobbold, J. C.

Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.

Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.

Granby, Marq. of

Cocks, T. S.

Grey, R. W.

1207

Grogan, E.

Paget, Lord C.

Grosvenor, Earl

Pakington, Sir J.

Guest, Sir J.

Palmer, R.

Gwyn, H.

Palmer, R.

Halford, Sir H.

Palmerston, Visct.

Hall, Col.

Parker, J.

Hallewell, E. G.

Peel, Col.

Hamilton, G. A.

Peel, F.

Hamilton, J. H.

Pigott, F.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Ponsonby, hon. C. F.

Hatchell, rt. hon. J.

Portal, M.

Hawes, B.

Prime, R.

Hayes, Sir E.

Pusey, P.

Headlam, T. E.

Reid, Col.

Henley, J. W.

Renton, J. C.

Herbert, H. A.

Ricardo, O.

Herbert, rt. hon. S.

Rice, E. R.

Herries, rt. hon. J. C.

Rich, H.

Hervey, Lord A.

Richards, R.

Hildyard, T. B. T.

Romilly, Col.

Hindley, C.

Romilly, Sir J.

Hodges, T. L.

Rumbold, C. E.

Hodgson, W. N.

Russell, Lord J.

Hornby, J.

Russell, F. C. H.

Hotham, Lord

Sandars, G.

Hudson, G.

Scott, hon. F.

Inglis, Sir R. H.

Seymer, H. K.

Jermyn, Earl

Shelburne, Earl of

Johnstone, Sir J.

Sibthorp, Col.

Johnstone, J.

Smyth, J. G.

Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.

Somerset, Capt.

Jones, Capt.

Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W.

Knightley, Sir C.

Spearman, H. J.

Knox, Col.

Spooner, R.

Knox, hon. W. S.

Stafford, A.

Labouchere, rt. hon. H.

Stanford, J. F.

Lacy, H. C.

Stanton, W. H.

Langston, J. H.

Strutt, rt. hon. E.

Langton, W. H. P. G.

Stuart, H.

Legh, G. C.

Stuart, J.

Lennox, Lord H. G.

Sturt, H. G.

Lewis, G. C.

Talbot, C. R. M.

Lindsay, hon. Col.

Taylor, Col.

Lockhart, A. E.

Thesiger, Sir F.

Lockhart, W.

Thompson, Ald.

Mackinnon, W. A.

Thornhill, G.

Magan, W. H.

Trollope, Sir J.

Manners, Lord C. S.

Tyler, Sir G.

Masterman, J.

Verner, Sir W.

Matheson, Col.

Vesey, hon. T.

Melgund, Visct.

Vyvyan, Sir R. R.

Meux, Sir II.

Vyse, R. H. R. H.

Moffatt, G.

Waddington, H. S.

Monsell, W.

Walpole, S. H.

Moody, C. A.

Walsh, Sir J. B.

Morgan, O.

Watkins, Col. L.

Morris, D.

Wegg-Prosser, F. R.

Mostyn, hon. E. M. L.

Wellesley, Lord C.

Mullings, J. R.

Wigram. L. T.

Mundy, W.

Williamson, Sir H.

Naas, Lord

Willoughby, Sir H.

Newdegate, C. N.

Wilson, J.

Newport, Visct.

Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

Noel, hon. G. J.

Wood, Sir W. P.

O'Brien, Sir L.

Wrightson, W. B.

Ogle, S. C. H.

TELLERS.

Packe, C.W.

Hayter, W. G.

Paget, Lord A.

Hill, Lord M.

List of the NOES.

Adair, H. E.

Anstey, T. C.

Aglionby, H. A.

Armstrong, Sir A.

Alcock, T.

Armstrong, R. B.

1208

Barron, Sir H. W.

Milnes, R. M.

Bass, M. T.

Mitchell, T. A.

Bell, J.

Molesworth, Sir W.

Bethell, R.

Muntz, G. F.

Bright, J.

Norreys, Lord

Brotherton, J.

Norreys, Sir D.

Brown, W.

O'Brien, J.

Clay, J.

Pechell, Sir G. B.

Clay, Sir W.

Pilkington, J.

Cobden, R.

Power, Dr.

Collins, W.

Reynolds, J.

Crawford, W. S.

Salwey, Col.

Currie, R.

Scholefield, W.

Dawes, E.

Scobell, Capt.

D'Eyncourt, rt. hn. C.T.

Scully, F.

Duke, Sir J.

Seymour, H. D.

Duncan, G.

Sidney, Ald.

Ellis, J.

Smith, rt. hon. R. V.

Evans, Sir De L.

Smith, J. B.

Evans, J.

Strickland, Sir. G.

Forster, M.

Stuart, Lord D.

Fox, W. J.

Stuart, Lord J.

Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.

Sutton, J. H. M.

Granger, T. C.

Thompson, Col.

Greene, J.

Thompson, G.

Hall, Sir B.

Thornely, T.

Hastie, A.

Tollemache, hon. F. J.

Hastie, A.

Villiers, hon. C.

Henry, A.

Walmsley, Sir J.

Hobhouse, T. B.

Wawn, J. T.

Hodges, T. T.

Westhead, J. P. B.

Horsman, E.

Willcox, B. M.

Kershaw, J.

Williams, J.

Locke, J.

Williams, W.

Lushington, C.

Willyams, H.

M'Cullagh, W. T.

Wilson, M.

M'Gregor, J.

TELLERS.

Marshall, J. G.

Smith, J. A.

Milner, W. M. E.

Osborne, R. B.

After the division, Mr. Alderman Salomons re-entered the House, and took his seat as before.
Question again proposed, "That Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEYwished hon. Members to consider the importance of the question on which they were now about to come to a division. He was happy to see that the hon. Member for Greenwich had returned to his place; he thought his hon. Friend had been wrong in yielding to an excessive delicacy, and in withdrawing before his question was put. He thought it was his hon. Friend's duty to suppress all feelings of that kind, in consideration of the major question, which he was there to defend. The present question would, in fact, decide the fate of his seat; for, if the House had power to order him to withdraw below the bar, it had power to unseat him, and to order the Speaker to cause a new writ to issue. He was happy to see that this interpretation was adopted by hon. Gentlemen opposite, though there was an ominous silence on the Treasury bench. He hoped that on

1209
the present question, involving the fate of his seat, the hon. Member would consider his constituents more than himself, that he would stay and vote, and leave the responsibility of consequences on those who, whether led by intolerance, or a worse feeling—for he thought concessions to intolerance worse than intolerance itself—would have contributed to swell the majority against him. The question now was, that the hon. Member for Greenwich be ordered to withdraw; and he had to ask the House, when they had carried that Motion, whether it was their intention that the hon. Member should withdraw out of the House, or whether he should withdraw simply from his seat. It was perfectly plain that when the next question came to be put, namely, that for his contumacy in disobeying that order (as he must disobey it, if he was satisfied that the majority had no rightful power over him), he be committed to the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms, when that question came to be put, which hon. Gentlemen anticipated with cheers of frenzy and delight, it would then be for some one to move, and he would himself move it in the absence of any one more qualified to do so, that the hon. Member be heard in person or by counsel against that sentence. The House had now to consider to what part of the House they were going to order him to withdraw; and when the Motion was made, that the hon. Member be heard against the execution of the order, he thought that, even in the present temper of the House, there would not be one Gentleman who would refuse him a hearing. He (Mr. Anstey) should move that the hon. Member be heard in his place; but if there were those present who thought that, in the face of an order directing him to withdraw, the hon. Member could not be so heard, he would ask them if it was their intention that the hon. Member should be heard as a stranger—as one not of them—at the bar of the House? He asked those who relied on that view of the case to point out to him the passage in the so much relied on Act of Parliament which justified them in proceeding to that extreme act of exclusion? He found nothing in the Act depriving the hon. Member of the right to be heard in his place. Were hon. Members prepared without further inquiry, in a case of so much magnitude and importance, to adopt the Resolution of the noble Lord, which, he believed, would not have been moved had the noble Lord waited till that stage of the debate, as the
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arguments of the hon. and learned Member for Aylesbury, and others who spoke on that side, must have satisfied him that there must be much graver doubt than, when he moved that Resolution, he might be supposed to believe. He could not but think that great discourtesy had been shown towards the hon. Member for Greenwich: first, in the indisposition of the House to listen to any arguments on the subject; and, next, in the utter silence maintained by the Government, for none of the Ministers appeared to deem the rights of the great constituency of Greenwich of sufficient importance to induce them to address a single word to the House on the subject. To this moment the argument remained unanswered on the main question, namely, the power of that House to administer the abjuration oath in any shape or form—not one word had been said by the Government, by the law officers of the Crown, or by any Gentleman who had spoken in favour of the Resolution. He said, until that question was settled, the House was not ripe for the decision; and he thought the fittest course for the noble Lord to have taken would have been to move for a Committee, and to refer the question to it for consideration. If they feared the arbitration of the Courts of Law they ought to shrink from deciding it in ignorance and haste. The House, last Session, decided that the hon. Member for the City of London was entitled to be sworn at the table as a Jew—that the seat was full—but that he was not entitled to vote until he had taken the oath in the form appointed by law; but what form that was, the House refused to pronounce. If they had proceeded so cautiously in that case, would they not show even greater caution here, when a question of still graver importance—the right of the hon. Member for Greenwich to continue to hold the seat he had assumed—was before them, especially when all the hon. Gentleman asked at their hands was an opportunity to submit himself to the decision of a Court of Law? They denied that the law was against the worthy Alderman, and pointed to former and undisputed precedents. In the form of affirmation permitted to be taken by Quakers, the House had omitted the words declaratory of belief in Christianity, as being words of form and solemnity only, not of substance. In order that they might not decide this question over hastily, that they might have time to consider what was done and promised last

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year, and what the dignity of that House required from them in the assertion of its I privileges against the usurpation of the other House, he would move the adjournment of the debate.
MR. BRIGHTseconded the Amendment.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I will state in a few words the course which I think the House ought to pursue. I, of course, cannot think of agreeing to the Motion for adjournment, for which the hon. Member who has just addressed the House has not assigned any reason whatever. With respect to the question before the House, I think the House ought at once to come to a decision as to whether the hon. Member for Greenwich ought or ought not to withdraw. It was my intention, as I stated in an early period of the evening, to have made a Motion similar in terms to the Resolution which was adopted last year in the case of Baron Rothschild. I do not wish, however, that the House should come to an immediate decision on that question—and I shall be ready to make that Motion to-morrow, leaving time for hon. Members to consider what course they may think fit to adopt respecting it. But, with respect to the Motion immediately under consideration, I do think the House is in a situation in which it can fairly decide upon it. The hon. and learned Member for Youghal has stated that, in the event of the House adopting the Resolution which I have proposed, the hon. Member for Greenwich will, of course, refuse to withdraw.
MR. ANSTEY: No. I said I hoped he would do so.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: The only precedent which I can find upon this subject is one which is more favourable to the hon. Member for Greenwich, than the case of Baron Rothschild. With regard to Sir W. Windham, there were some words of his which were found fault with in this House. He was ordered by the Speaker to withdraw, but refused to do so. I find the transaction thus noticed in the Journals of the House:—"Motion being made, and Question put, that Sir W. Windham do retire, the House divided: Ayes 206; Noes 127." "And thereupon," the Journal says, "the Motion was resolved in the affirmative, and he withdrew accordingly." I believe that, in so acting, he only paid a proper respect to this House. It will be remembered that Sir W. Windham was, at that time, an undoubted Member
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of this House, and that he had spoken in debate. He declined to withdraw on the order of the Speaker, but retired at once in deference to a resolution of the House. If the hon. Member for Greenwich will not pay that respect to the House, of course other measures must be taken. But when the authority of the Speaker is confirmed by a resolution of the House, I do hope there will be no hesitation on the part of the hon. Member in withdrawing.
SIR BENJAMIN HALLsaid, he saw no practical good that was to result from an adjournment of the debate. They had already had enough of discussion, and he thought that under the circumstances in which the hon. Member for Greenwich was placed, and considering the great difference of opinion which existed amongst the high legal anthorities in this House, the hon. Member had taken a wise and proper course, both as regarded himself and the constituency he represented. He (Sir B. Hall) had no knowledge of the intentions of the hon. Gentleman after this division; but he would take upon himself to recommend the hon. Gentleman to let the House come to some decision now. No good result could accrue from an adjournment; and no further debate could throw greater light upon the subject.
MR. WAWNsaid, that the hon. Member for Greenwich was allowed to take the oath on the Old Testament, and he wished to know why other words should be added which were inconsistent with the Old Testament.
MR. HOBHOUSErose amidst loud cries for a division. He said he had but one observation to make, and that was that the hon. Member for Greenwich would weaken his own case if he did not rise and state, however briefly, the course he meant to pursue. The hon. Gentleman had sat and voted in the House, and assuming that he had the right to do so, it logically followed that he had also the right to speak. What the hon. Gentleman ought to say it was not for him to declare—but whatever his intention was, he thought it would be better for the hon. Gentleman to state by his own mouth, and not by that of another Member.
MR. ALDERMAN SALOMONSrose to speak, amidst cries of "withdraw;" but the House showing a general desire that he should be heard, the hon. Gentleman spoke as follows:—"Sir, I should not have presumed to address you, or this

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House, in the peculiar position in which I am placed, were it not that I have been so pointedly appealed to by the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. I trust the House will make some allowance for the novelty of my position, and the responsibility that I feel in the unusual course which it may be thought I have adopted. But I beg to assure you, Sir, and the House, that it has been far from my intention to indulge in anything contumacious or presuming towards either. But having been returned to this House by a large constituency, and believing that I labour under no disability whatever, and that I am in a position to fulfil all the requirements of the law, I thought I should not be doing justice to my own position as an Englishman and a gentleman did I not adopt the course which I thought right and proper of maintaining my right to appear on this floor—without thereby meaning any disrespect to you, Sir. I thought I was bound to take this course in defence of my own rights and privileges, and of the rights and privileges of the constituents who have sent me here. In saying this, Sir, I shall state to you that whatever the decision of this House may be, I shall willingly abide by it, provided that just sufficient force be used to make me feel that I am acting under coercion. Having expressed these sentiments, I will not intrude on the time of the House further than to say, that I trust and hope that in the present doubtful state of the law—doubtful, as shown by the different opinions of the most eminent lawyers who have addressed this House—no final order or resolution will be adopted towards me or my constituents without affording me an opportunity of addressing the House, and, stating before the House and the country what I believe to be my rights and privileges, what I believe to be the rights of my constitutents, and what I believe to be the duty of this House. I hope this House will not refuse that which I believe no court in the country ever refuses to the meanest subject of the realm—that it will not refuse to hear me before it comes to a final decision.
MR. BRIGHTsaid, that he had not seconded the Motion of adjournment for any factious or unreasonable end; but he thought that the House, before it came to a decision, should do so when it was less excited that it was at present. It would be admitted that the law question had been more thoroughly sifted that night
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than it had been on any former occasion, by the most able men in the House, and he thought there was no Member who must not feel that the law was open to great doubt. He was much mistaken, or the noble Lord would confess that the case presented itself to his mind in a less clear form than when he advised the House to come to a Resolution last year—a resolution which he thought rather increased than diminished the difficulties of the question. He was, therefore, the more anxious that the House should not come to a hasty resolution on the present occasion. He should therefore suggest that the debate be adjourned till to-morrow. In the meantime the noble Lord could consult the law officers of the Crown; and the Members of the House would do well to review the whole of the proceedings. If the majority continued to be of the same opinion, and should still refuse to admit the hon. Gentleman, their decision would then be more respected, and would have more weight in the country. After the temperate, wise, and judicious speech of the hon. Gentleman, he thought it was the more necessary for them to adopt the course he suggested.
SIR DE LACY EVANScame to the same conclusion as the last speaker, and particularly that the House might have an opportunity of considering the Resolution which the noble Lord had submitted to them. If that was a judicial tribunal, they had not treated the question with the dignity which a judicial tribunal should do. He regretted the course which had been taken by the other branch of the Legislature, who had not treated the respresentatives returned by the people and large constituencies with proper respect. He thought the course pursued by the House of Lords was an improper interference with the rights and liberties of the people. Whoever would take the trouble of looking at the history of the country must be satisfied that the contest would come to a speedy conclusion. Whether the hon. Member for Greenwich would be given into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms or not, the country would entertain a different opinion upon the subject than appeared to prevail in that House, which had treated the hon. Member for Greenwich with something like ridicule. The country would sympathise with the hon. Gentleman, and would acknowledge that it was he who was contending for the just rights of the people, and the House that was disregarding them.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: After the appeal which has been made to me, I must say one word upon the adjournment of the debate. The hon. Member for Greenwich has spoken so temperately on this occasion, that I regret I am not able to comply with any request that may seem favourable to his being fully heard. I have already said, with regard to the question itself, I am quite willing, and it is my intention to postpone its consideration until to-morrow. If the House should think, as I confess I do not, that the law is at all favourable to the hon. Gentleman, and that he should be allowed to take his seat, the House might then come to a Resolution upon that subject, and he would then be fully entitled to come into the House and take his scat according to that Resolution. But I own I do not think it is possible, in any case after Mr. Speaker has ordered him to withdraw, and has, in fact, appealed to the House to support his authority, that in such a case I can consent to the adjournment of the debate. It appears to me that the House must decide on this point, leaving completely untouched the substantive question, whether they shall come to-morrow to a Resolution in conformity with that which they came to in the case of Baron Rothschild; or, having heard the whole, shall reverse that decision.
MR. BERNAL OSBORNEsaid, that he would not do anything which was opposed to the respect due to the right hon. Gentleman in the chair, as a gentleman and as Speaker to that House; but there were rights superior to his, and he would not remain silent when he thought a great injustice was going to be committed, merely because Mr. Speaker had pronounced from the chair that the hon. Gentleman withdraw. The case of Sir William Windham, which the noble Lord had adduced, was materially different from the present one. Sir William Windham had spoken some words which were offensive to Members of that House; but the hon. Member for Greenwich had not said anything that was offensive to any Members of the House. He had been returned by the electors of Greenwich to take his seat in that House; it was not a question of a mere form of words, and the hon. Member could not, in his opinion, leave his seat until he was taken into custody by the Serjeant-at-Arms. He advised the hon. Member to take that course; for however adverse that House might be to him, there was a power
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out of doors which would compel them to rescind their Resolutions, and would bring noble Lords in another place to their senses. He thanked the hon. Gentleman for doing that which he thought would mainly conduce to carry this question. If the noble Lord did not make the question a Cabinet question, they might go on, Session after Session, passing Bills, and the House of Lords would reject them. They would reject them until the large constituencies of the country spoke out, and caused the question to be made a Cabinet question. He called upon the hon. Member for Greenwich to retain his seat in that House until he was removed by the Serjeant-at-Arms; and not many months afterwards the House would be compelled to grant full and equal justice to the members of the Jewish persuasion.
Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."
The House divided:—Ayes 75; Noes 237: Majority 162.
Question put, "That Mr. Alderman Salomons do now withdraw:"—Ayes 231; Noes 81; Majority 150.
Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER stated, that the hon. Member for Greenwich had heard the decision of the House, and hoped that he was prepared to obey it.
Mr. Alderman Salomons continuing to sit in his scat, Mr. SPEAKER directed the Serjeant-at-Arms to remove him below the bar:
Whereupon the Serjeant-at-Arms having placed his hand on Mr. Alderman Salomons, he was conducted below the bar.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEYwished to ask Mr. Speaker if his attention had been drawn to the language of the Act of Parliament, and whether the hon. Member for Greenwich could stand at the bar in the place appropriated to Peers?
MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Gentleman may take his seat in the place where hon. Gentlemen usually sit before they take the oaths.
MR. BRIGHTbegged to ask a question of the noble Lord at the head of the Government. There was some misapprehension as to what the noble Lord had said with respect to the Resolution he intended to move on the next day. Would the Resolution he intended to propose with respect to the hon. Member for Greenwich, be precisely similar to that which was carried last year with respect to the Member for the City of London? Before the House adjourned it would be well to know

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precisely what it was they were expected to do next day.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, the Resolution he should propose was exactly similar to the Resolution which the House had approved of in the case of Baron Rothschild. He should move that David Salomons is not entitled to sit or vote in the House during any debate, not having taken the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law. He understood that Alderman Salomons had expressed a wish to be heard at the bar, and in that case he would move that he be heard in the same way as Mr. O'Connell had been heard at the bar of the House.
LORD DUDLEY STUART: At what hour, to-morrow, will the noble Lord move the Resolution? Is it at twelve o'clock?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: At five o'clock.
MR. BRIGHTbegged to ask the noble Lord whether he would make any statement of his intentions to-morrow night on this question? because if that was all the noble Lord proposed to do, which he stated he would do, the House would be just where it was this time last year.
SIR FREDERIC THESIGERsaid, he thought it right to inform the House that he should not now make the Motion which on Friday night he intimated he would make, but should agree to the Resolution which he understood the noble Lord intended to propose.
MR. BERNAL OSBORNEbegged to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government, whether he should now feel it his duty to institute a prosecution against the hon. Member for Greenwich?
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I should think if the hon. Member for Greenwich wishes to be prosecuted, he will be able to find some person who will do it.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEYwished to ask whether on the hon. Member for Greenwich being called on to make his election to-morrow, to be heard at the bar or not, the noble Lord would then consider the propriety of prosecuting him?

GENERAL BOARD OF HEALTH (No. 2.) BILL.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
SIR JOSHUA WALMSLEYmoved
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for the appointment of a Select Committee, to inquire by what means the Board of Health had issued the provisional order for applying this Bill to Great Yarmouth, contrary to the protest and remonstrance of the mayor and a large majority of the ratepayers of that borough, or what improvements by drainage are now carrying on under that contract, to the satisfaction of the inhabitants and ratepayers of that borough, as in public meeting expressed. He assured the House that 1,500 ratepayers out of 2,500, and all the authorities of the town, were opposed to the powers which the Commissioners sought by this Bill. He must oppose Mr. Speaker's leaving the chair.
Amendment proposed—
"To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, 'this House do not resolve itself into the said Committee before the Provisional Orders of the General Board of Health be laid on the Table of this House,' instead thereof."
LORD SEYMOURsaid, that it was necessary to do something with respect to the public health in Yarmouth. There had been a paving commission for the last forty years in the borough, that had done nothing. That body had elected itself, was irresponsible, and did not publish its accounts.
Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
The House divided:—Ayes 92; Noes 12: Majority 80.
Main Question put, and agreed to. Bill considered in Committee.
House resumed.
Bill reported as amended.

THE VETERINARY SURGEONS' EXEMPTION BILL.
House in Committee.
MR. BOUVERIEmoved that the Chairman should leave the chair.
After a brief discussion, in which Mr. NEWDEGATE and Mr. BASS supported the Bill,
Motion made, and Question put, "That the Chairman do leave the chair."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 24; Noes 13: Majority 31.
House resumed.
The House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Tithe Rentcharge Assessment; Charitable Institutions Notices; Victoria Park; Copyhold, Inclosure, and Tithe Commissions.
2a Woods, Forests, &c.
Reported.—Canada and New Brunswick Boundary; Turnpike Acts Continuance; Turnpike Trusts Arrangement; Inhabited House Duty.
3a Burgesses and Freemen's Parliamentary Franchise.

ECCLESIASTICAL TITLES ASSUMPTION BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: My Lords, in moving the Second Reading of this Bill, the object of which is sufficiently indicated by its title, it will be my duty to explain to the House the grounds upon which it is proposed for the approbation of your Lordships. My Lords, I must confess in the outset that that is a duty which it is painful to me to discharge; because, my Lords, I cannot dissemble that to me, who have been for the last forty years and upwards a strenuous advocate, under all and the least favourable circumstances, of the claims of my Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen of this United Kingdom—who have omitted no opportunity and no exertion within my reach in and out of this and the other House of Parliament to procure the sanction of the Legislature to those claims which I conceived to be their due—it is most particularly painful to me to take any course which may by misrepresentation, by misconstruction, or misapprehension, be deemed inconsistent with the course that I have hitherto pursued, or to be in any way injurious to the feelings and claims of a body which I so entirely respect for their many virtues, and, in many instances, for their most warm and devoted loyalty. But, my Lords, it is not with them we have to deal, but it is with the conduct of a Foreign Power, and, my Lords, it is some consolation to me to consider that, in now addressing the House upon this subject, it will be no part of my duty to enter into any consideration of the character and doctrinal teachings of the
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Roman Catholic religion. It is also a consolation to me to think that, as I hope to be able to prove to your Lordships, in what I have to propose for your adoption this night, I have nothing to propose in the slightest degree inconsistent with the exercise of that religion, which, having once placed under the protection of the principles of religious liberty, we are still disposed so to protect. I have to show your Lordships, in the first instance, that a necessity has arisen for introducing some legislation on this subject—some enactment to guard against that which few persons can doubt has assumed the appearance, and in my view of this subject has had the reality, of an aggression upon the part of a Foreign Power. My Lords, I shall have to prove that the measure which I have to propose will not in any degree place any new impediment upon the exercise or administration of that religion. My Lords, if I do not prove both of these cases, I am ready to say—reject this Bill. If there has been no aggression—if nothing that has been done on the part of any Foreign Power is calculated to throw dishonour upon the Crown, and interfere with the prerogative of the Sovereign of this country, I say, reject the Bill, because it is unnecessary. If, my Lords, there is anything that interferes with the practice of that religion which we all wish should be practised, I say, again, reject this Bill, because you do not mean to withhold any part of those privileges, or of those rights, from your Roman Catholic fellow-citizens. But, my Lords, I have to state (and I shall have to state them very shortly, because all the facts are familiar to your Lordships), that within some few months past a Rescript and other documents have appeared sanctioned by the Court of Rome, and assuming to itself in this kingdom, in distinct and unqualified terms, the right to confer territorial titles in this country. My Lords, this right has been practically assumed; it has been loudly proclaimed, I will not say in what terms, because, as I consider them to be offensive terms, and I have no desire to add to any acrimony that may arise in the course of this discussion by dwelling upon the offensive nature and character of those terms, repeatedly used, ignoring the power and existence of the State and Sovereign of this country—it is sufficient for me, without dwelling upon those terms so ostentatiously employed, to deal with the act itself. I say that that act has been committed, that it is avowed,

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and that it has been committed and avowed without having been preceded, accompanied, or followed by any explanation calculated to mitigate the offensive character of that aggression. My Lords, I say that has been a peculiar character of these proceedings, and one with respect to which you have to deal. Now, my Lords, is that an assumption of any importance, or is not? My Lords, I need not recite to your Lordships the terms of the Bill which I have to propose, which is a short one, and which is in your Lordships' hands. The question that I have to answer is, "Why do you move at all under these circumstances?" My answer is, because the movement has been made against us; because that movement is of no insignificant value or consequence; because there is a degree of assumption of power in the terms which have been used upon this occasion inconsistent with the rights of the Crown. My Lords, it is all very well to say that these titles are of no consequence, are not necessarily attended with or accompanied with power. But, my Lords, if the assumption of these titles is left unnoticed and unreproved, the time will come when they will be followed by an assumption of power. My Lords, I say you must in the outset of the matter protest against that assumption. My Lords, can it be said that titles are of no importance? They are things of substance, although they appear to be only things of show. It was not because Mr. Selden, one of the most patriotic, and learned, and distinguished men that this country ever produced—it was not because he entertained a childish reverence for titles, that he spent a great part of his laborious life in an examination of their origin and nature—but it was because he felt them to be intimately connected with those monarchical principles to which he was attached, and because he considered them to have a most material effect—first upon the imagination, and subsequently upon the actions of men. I know that all the wisest men of this country have ever attached an importance to titles so used and employed; but if they have so regarded titles of a mere profane nature, how much more important must they have regarded ecclesiastical titles which a foreign Power has for its interest to dispose of by assumption, and by assumption only. My Lords, I have always attached great importance to this subject. I have always felt it to be a very wise system upon the part of this Government, more especially of
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the foreign department of this Government, that it has so steadily, and some have thought so stiffly, refused and prevented the use of foreign titles and foreign station in this country, except in very rare cases and under very rare circumstances. They have refused it because they felt that such titles ought to flow from the fountain of honour, and that the fountain of honour ought to be preserved untouched to the Crown, and to the Crown only. And Parliament itself, which has at different times, with caution, no doubt, interfered more or less with the prerogatives of the Crown in other duties and privileges belonging to it, has constantly observed the most entire forbearance on this point, and has never presumed to suggest to the Crown, or to interfere with the Crown, in that which it felt to be its first and exclusive prerogative and right, to determine who shall wear and who use distinctions of this nature. My Lords, this consideration reminds me of a somewhat homely saying of a Sovereign of this country, whom we all consider to have been one of the greatest, and whom even the Roman Catholics acknowledge to have been one of the ablest, of our Sovereigns—I mean Queen Elizabeth. I say this subject reminds me of a homely saying of hers (but which, like all her homely sayings, have a great deal of depth and of truth in them), when it was proposed to her, and urged upon her by some of her Ministers, to permit the ancestors of a noble Lord in this House, who had won great distinction in the East—in wars in which this country was not concerned, to wear certain orders and certain distinctions which had been conferred on him by a foreign Power she said, No; She did not choose to have her sheep tarred by other shepherds. My Lords, I say again, that this is a homely saying, but it is a wise one—one on which your Lordships will do well on all occasions to act. I say, therefore, my Lords, that this is in reality a thing of substance, though apparently a thing of form, and that your Lordships will only do your duty in preserving untouched in the Crown that right which has been so distinctly and ostentatiously assailed by a foreign Power. Now, my Lords, I would observe to your Lordships, that while we all resent these proceedings of the See of Rome, we have had an opportunity of showing at least that we recognise in the fullest degree that observance of form that attention to the rights and independence of other countries, which we claim

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from this and from every other foreign Power towards ourselves. My Lords, we have recently had an opportunity of showing that in our own time. Not many years have elapsed since we appointed a Bishop of Gibraltar, and a Bishop of Jerusalem. Now, my Lords, did we appoint these bishops in the same manner and in the same mode as the See of Rome has made these appointments of which we complain? No such thing. We gave to the Bishop of Gibraltar territorial authority, because Gibraltar is a territory belonging to the Crown; but to the Bishop of Jerusalem we gave personal authority only—implying thereby, that we claimed no right to create a territorial jurisdiction; and that, by appointing the Bishop of Jerusalem, we only meant to give to Christians resident in that part of the world the benefit of episcopal superintendence. Now, my Lords, nobody wishes to deny to the Roman Catholics of this United Kingdom the benefit of episcopal superintendence. We wish to secure to them such superintendence as they may think necessary for the exercise of their religion; and if they think it important to have episcopal superintendence, I should not be indisposed to allow them to have it, provided the appointment were unaccompanied by an usurped authority. But now, on the subject of recognising this foreign authority, I know it is asked why we have moved in this matter? and I know that there are some who, admitting the offensive character of the proceeding which has taken place, and the impropriety of the terms which have been employed, nevertheless are willing that we should do nothing upon this subject—who say, "The public feeling has been aroused, and not unnaturally; but who knows that that feeling won't subside? Do nothing; wait till it does subside. We admit that an aggressive act, or, at least, an act having the appearance of aggression, has been committed by the Court of Rome; but who knows that it will be followed by any other act, and who knows that any dangerous consequences will ensue from it; wait and see." Why, my Lords, I say that the surest way to produce these consequences—the surest way to maintain alive the state of indignation in this country upon this subject, would he to show to this country a Parliament determined to do nothing on this subject. I say that that is the way to encourage the Court of Rome; and every one who has observed the proceedings of that
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Court at different times, must have seen how it has felt its way in these usurpations, and observed which of them will be tolerated, and which will not—which admit of being repeated, and which will not—which admit of being aggravated, and which will not; and I ask, after observing the history and policy of the Court of Rome, as a temporal as well as a spiritual Government, are not your Lordships satisfied that no surer mode could be had recourse to of inviting the aggressions of the Court of Rome, than by showing the Court of Rome that you are not prepared to make a stand upon principle, or to express a national opinion upon this subject when the rights of the Crown are assailed. My Lords, I therefore think I have said enough to show to your Lordships that this is not an occasion on which it is possible, consistently with respect to the Crown, and with respect to the feelings of the people, for Parliament to remain silent and acquiescent, opposing nothing but a species of indifferentism to a course so distinctly marked, and so openly avowed. Well, my Lords, I will now go from that part of the subject. There remains for me a point which I hold to be no less important a part of the argument I have to lay before your Lordships, namely, to prove that the Catholic religion in the Catholic sense, and with legitimate Catholic objects, will in no degree be impeded or embarrassed by the operation of this Bill. And, my Lords, on this part of the subject I am justified in at once throwing the onus probandi upon those who may oppose this Bill, because it is for them to point to any one portion of the Bill by means of which this embarrassment can be effected. I am not now speaking of that interference, which I hold to be unnecessary—that interference which I hold to be unlawful, not under this Bill, but unlawful by the constitution and law of this country—by that law and constitution which was not less strong, but more strong, in Catholic times than it is now. Because, my Lords, I will only ask you to go back to the proceedings that took place in this country long ago, in reference to the acts of the Court of Rome—I mean the proceedings upon what is called Lalor's Case, which occurred in the reign of James I. [2 Howell's State Trials, 532.] Those proceedings you will find in the report of the law officers of the Crown. They state the reasons for the particular mode of proceeding which they adopted; and as these reasons are very singular and curious, I will take the liberty of reading

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them to your Lordships, because they are full of sense, full of meaning, and full of instruction with regard to the subject. They said—
"We did purposely forbear to proceed against him upon any latter law, to the end that such as were ignorant might be informed that, long before Henry VIII. was born, divers laws were made against the usurpations of the Bishop of Rome upon the rights of the Crown of England, well nigh as sharp and severe as any statutes which have been made in later times; and that therefore we made choice to proceed upon a law made more than 200 years past, when the King, the Lords, and Commons which made the laws, and the Judges which did interpret the laws, did for the most part follow the same opinions in religion which were taught and held in the Court of Rome."
They go on, in a subsequent part, to say—
"For the Commons of England may be an example unto all other subjects in the world in this, that they have ever been tender and sensible of the wrongs and dishonours offered unto their kings, and have over contended to uphold and maintain their honour and sovereignty."
My Lords, I say that these laws have over been in force for certain purposes, and were only partially repealed by what is called the Emancipation Act, which granted to the Roman Catholics of the United Kingdom immense privileges and immense advantages; but which wisely reserved to the Crown privileges upon certain points, including, amongst others, that most important one, namely, the right of appointing bishops to particular sees. My Lords, under the laws existing, as I have shown you, from a very early period, repealed only partially, and only sought to be so repealed under that Act by which you made them less severe, these bishops are prohibited from taking any title conferred by the Court of Rome. Under the Emancipation Act, nevertheless, all the functions, all the administrations, and all the duties of the Roman Catholic religion, have been satisfactorily performed. And, my Lords, I appeal to your recollection, whether when that Act passed, the Catholics did not express their gratitude for it? whether they did not express, by a public declaration, their entire acknowledgment of the kindness of Parliament in passing that Act? whether they did not state that that Act would confer on them inestimable privileges, for which they owed an infinite amount of gratitude? My Lords, I therefore say it is too late now to tell you that it is impossible to perform the functions of the Roman Catholic religion under that Act. You cannot be told, when the bishops
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have fully exercised their ministrations under that Act, when under the name of vicars-apostolic (under which name, as I have been informed, one-third of the bishops of the Roman Catholic world perform their functions) these bishops have been enabled to discharge satisfactorily all the functions which they had to perform—I say you cannot be told that this Bill will at all embarrass the exercise of the Catholic religion in this country. No impediment under the existing law has been offered to ordinations, to marriages, to any of these sacred rites which derive their authority from the Church, and which, we all admit, are necessary functions of a religious body—functions which, far from wishing to disturb, we must all wish to secure; but which, nevertheless, we contend may be secured hereafter as they have been secured hitherto, without any violation of the prerogative of the Crown. If your Lordships will look to the very full and instructive evidence which was given before a Committee of this House by Dr. Doyle, you will find a careful enumeration of all the rites and all the duties of the Roman Catholic religion. You will find that there are none of those duties and none of those rites described by him to be essential to the performance of the rites of the Catholic religion, which have not been since performed, which may not be performed, and which will not be performed, when this Bill shall have been passed into a law, without let and without hindrance, and with that satisfaction to Her Majesty's Catholic subjects which they cannot fail to appreciate when they come to see this Act stripped of all those misrepresentations with which it has suited certain parties and certain interests to cloak it. Now, my Lords, I therefore think your Lordships need not be under any apprehension that you are disturbing the functions of the Catholic religion. My Lords, I should be prepared to sacrifice much, and to incur risk, before I would consent to disturb the religious peace and religious independence of a large portion of my fellow-subjects. But because I feel there is no such apprehension, because I feel that there is no such intention, and that there is no such accidental result to be apprehended from this Bill if it pass into a law, I venture to recommend it to your Lordships' approbation. My Lords, if I am asked whether I consider this Bill to be essential to the maintenance of the Protestant religion? I must answer that I do not—because, my

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Lords, I am one of those that think the Protestant religion does not rest for its support on Acts of Parliament, or upon contrivances of any sort. My Lords, I am one of those that think it is with the Protestant religion as it is with a State. In the words of a celebrated lawyer, orator, and poet, I agree—
"What constitutes the State?
Not lofty battlements nor laboured mound,
High walls or moated gates.
No—Man—high-minded man."
And so I say it is, with regard to any religion, that its real security, and its best security depends upon the sincerity, the virtues and conduct of those who are its professors. But because, my Lords, I do believe it to be independent of protection as long as these virtues are preserved, I am nevertheless of opinion that it is incumbent upon the country and incumbent upon Parliament to proclaim its adherence to those opinions which I have expressed, and its determination to support the Crown in the maintenance of all its privileges, connected as those privileges are both with the State and with religion. And, my Lords, I think it is a duty which you owe to your Sovereign, it is a duty which you owe to the people of this country, to stamp these opinions with your approbation, and to recognise, by this declaratory enactment, what the privileges of the Crown, in connexion with religion, has been, and what you are determined it shall always be. My Lords, I therefore think that your Lordships will do well to pass this Bill, as I trust you will pass it, by a large majority. I believe there never was a moment when the people of this country were more resolutely determined to maintain their own faith, and to maintain their own religion, and, above all, to maintain undisturbed and uninterfered with, by any foreign Power, that most sacred gift of God to man, the liberty of conscience and the right to free inquiry. They are determined that they will preserve these rights; and I believe they are disposed, as far as is consistent with these rights, to give all due freedom and all due facility to the enjoyment of the opinions and religious liberty of others. But these have no right to come to us and say, "Because you have given us much, therefore give us more; because you have given us that which is essential to our character as citizens and inhabitants of a free country, allow us to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Crown." Why, my Lords, we might say to them—"We are
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disposed to withdraw no privilege; we give you all that you can have under the Emancipation Act, and under every law most favourable to you that has been passed within the last hundred years. Come to London, if you will, and build up a St. Paul's in London, although you would not allow us to build a St. Peter's in Rome. We have given you that which you do not concede to us; we wish to see those privileges undisturbed; but while you have them undisturbed, do not make it a part of your system to attack us, and assert that function which, beyond all others, Parliament has held most sacred as resting in the Crown, and in the Crown alone." My Lords, I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill.
Moved—That the Bill be now read 2a.
The EARL of ABERDEEN* said, that although he was always reluctant to obtrude himself upon their Lordships' attention, he confessed that on that occasion he had felt some anxiety to avail himself of the earliest opportunity to lay before the House the views which he took of the Bill now under consideration, and the feelings and motives which had induced him to adopt the course he had hitherto pursued, and in which he intended to persevere. In doing that, he was most certainly not disposed to imagine that he ought to entertain any hope of making an impression on their Lordships' minds, or of obtaining for himself any sympathy or concurrence from any large portion of the House. He merely desired to be considered as giving vent to the dictates of his own conscience, and expressing his deep conviction of what was due to the cause of truth and justice. It had always been his opinion that the great act of Catholic relief was carried in opposition to the feelings and wishes of a numerical majority of the people of this country. That was his opinion at the time, and it had been confirmed since by the demonstration he had recently witnessed, and the excitement that had taken place. This excitement had been general, and was perfectly natural, not only from the feelings in which it had originated, but from the active means employed to give it force and vigour. So far as it had been a demonstration of sound Protestant feelings, he entirely rejoiced and concurred in it. He thought it was highly satisfactory to witness it; and that it was of infinitely greater importance and value in the preservation of the Protestant religion of this country

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against any aggression than such a wretched piece of legislation as that now on the table of the House. But in so far as that demonstration had degenerated into a mere "No-Popery" cry, or a blind hatred of the Roman Catholic religion, as too frequently had been the case, then he had no sympathy with it. It was said that no such excitement as this had taken place since the Revolution. It might be so; and undoubtedly the opinions of the great body of the people of this country must be always treated with the utmost respect and deference; nevertheless, in matters of this kind, numbers were not infallible. Their Lordships would recollect that not since, but shortly before the Revolution, excitement of a somewhat similar description was produced by a somewhat similar cause. Their Lordships would recollect that on that occasion, to use the words of Mr. Macaulay, "the capital and the whole country went mad with hatred and fear." Their Lordships would recollect also, that, although that excitement was as general as the present, the country in a very short time became thoroughly ashamed of the delusion under which it had laboured; and he confessed that, when he felt oppressed by the unanimity which prevailed, and the numbers arrayed against him on this subject, he thought of the Popish plot, and was comforted.
The noble Marquess had felt the painful position in which his duty had placed him that evening—he had felt that the act in which he was engaged was alien from the course he had pursued through a long political life. He (Lord Aberdeen) had, though differing from the noble Marquess on many, on most, subjects, humbly supported him in the efforts he had made in the cause of religious liberty, and in securing the rights and privileges of their Roman Catholic fellow subjects. The noble Marquess was the last person in the world deliberately to support or countenance anything that savoured of persecution or harshness. But the noble Marquess must recollect that persecution was a relative term. He did not speak of former times of persecution; but if they considered the difference of those times, it was very possible that measures which then might have appeared to be liberal and indulgent, would now have the character of a very scant measure of toleration. He had heard over and over again, twenty times in that House, from the woolsack, from Lord Eldon, of the great names of
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Lord Somers and Mr. Locke, who held the opinions which he had himself adopted respecting the condition of the Roman Catholics; but he (Lord Aberdeen) felt that, whatever justice there might be in those views in the days referred to, they were entirely inapplicable at the present time. The noble Marquess also turned a deaf ear to those professions of toleration from the woolsack. Notwithstanding the absence of the grosser evidences of persecution, yet he believed that Roman Catholics would feel this measure in its consequences to be a grievance intolerable, perhaps more so than those civil disabilities from which the noble Marquess and himself had united to relieve them; for although those disabilities might have been oppressive and unjust, yet it was at least within the province of the State to inflict them. But they were now going out of their province; the were dealing with that which was beyond their control, and were thereby inflicting wounds which, although not apparent in a material sense, would operate as severely on the conscience as the restrictions to which he had alluded. As had been truly observed by Mr. Hallam, in his Constitutional History, in dealing with religious sectaries there was no middle course between the persecution that exterminated, and the toleration which satisfied. They had for 200 long years been doing their utmost to exterminate, but they had failed: they had entirely changed their principles of government; and, especially for the last twenty years, they had made a rapid progress in extending the principles of toleration—a course they had adopted when they found that extermination failed. By the present Bill they were about to take the first retrograde step in the path of intolerance. How this would end, and to what it might lead, no man could tell. Now this Bill dealt with a matter purely spiritual, and, as such, contained the grievance to which he had referred. The noble Marquess would not deny that the creation of bishops was an act purely spiritual. It was true that they were accustomed here to connect with the episcopal character the incidents of temporal rights of Lords of Parliament, and of baronies, conferred by the Crown; but a bishop, as a mere bishop, had not only no temporal authority, but, properly speaking, he had no title of dignity. It was a spiritual office in the Church, and many existed without any of those incidents with which the episcopal character

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they were accustomed to recognise was clothed. If they denied a Church its regular government, they no longer tolerated that Church. Did they mean to refuse to the Roman Catholic people of this country the government of their Church by bishops in ordinary? If so, they did not tolerate that Church. All he desired was the regular constitution of that Church—the regular constitution of the Church under bishops—not the exceptional government as it had existed theretofore. No one would deny that the regular Church was governed by bishops and not by vicars-apostolic. He would refer to a remarkable statement of his noble and learned Friend behind him when he moved the repeal of the mass of odious statutes which had too long disgraced the Statute-book, and especially the statute of 13th of Elizabeth, which forbade communication with Rome. That forbidding of communication with Rome, in fact, denied the possibility of the existence of regular bishops in the Roman Catholic Church. His noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) said—
"They tolerated the Catholic prelates, and they knew that those prelates could not carry on their Church establishment or conduct its discipline without holding communication with the Pope of Rome. No Roman Catholic bishop could be created without the authority of a Bull from the Pope of Rome; and many of the observances of their Church required the same sanction. The moment, therefore, that they sanctioned the observances of the Roman Catholic religion in this country, they, by implication, allowed the communication prohibited by this statute, and for which it imposed the penalties of high treason. If the law allowed the doctrine and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church, it should be permitted to be carried on perfectly and properly, and that could not be done without such communication."
It was absurd to suppose that Roman Catholic bishops could be created without the authority of the Pope. But, in addition to that statement, he found, in an answer to an address from the clergy by the right rev. prelate the Bishop of Norwich—an answer, he might be permitted to say, full of wisdom, moderation, and justice—that right rev. Prelate said—
"An episcopal Church is not tolerated if we interfere with its liberty to appoint bishops, to determine their number and rank, and to bestow on them any title, provided those titles infringe on no existing rights."
Infringing on existing rights! Were there any bishops whose rights were infringed on? They could not suppose an episcopal Church to exist without those rights and
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privileges which they now denied to the Roman Catholic Church. He might rest his case here; but he would ask the right rev. Prelates, who regarded with such care the apostolical succession, how they would feel if the due exercise of that character and power were to be interfered with and thwarted so as to impede the regular function of that principle? Let them recollect that the Roman Catholics had adopted the same view of the constitution of their Church, and they were doubly bound to adhere to it, because they must refer to the supreme head of their Church as the source from which the power and sacred character of the episcopal body would be derived. He asked for the Roman Catholic Church no more than the State allowed to the internal government of every dissenting Church in the kingdom. He wished to put the Roman Catholic Church on no other footing than a dissenting Church. It was so regarded by law, and so he desired it to be.
Now, the history of this Bill was somewhat singular. There had been three editions of the Bill, all of which he had before him. It was certainly no rare event that any measure, in its progress through Parliament, should meet with many alterations, and should come to that House in a condition very different from that in which it was introduced; but when the Government, after mature consideration of several months, produced a Bill which they thought adequate to the urgency of the case, and which provided a remedy for this aggression of which they complained; and when, after it was read a first time, the proposers, of their own accord and mere motion, imparted to it a new character, and struck out all that constituted its force and vigour, and then, after another stage, allowed the Bill to be not only restored to the strength of which they had deprived it, but to receive additional stringency at the hands of their opponents, was a history not very intelligible. He could not understand the contrivances by which it had been brought into its present shape. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury had offered the Bill in its maximum form of legislation for the acceptance of his right hon. Friend Sir James Graham and himself. Although less offensive than in its first shape, they still perceived in it the principle of intolerance and persecution, and they rejected it accordingly. It was fortunate they had done so; for most assuredly they could never have consented to such a change as

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had now taken place in the whole character of the measure.
His first great objection to the Bill was, that it was at variance with the fair interpretation of the Relief Act. By the 24th section of the Belief Act, it was enacted—
"That if any person after the commencement of that Act, other than the person thereunto authorised by law, should assume or use the name, style, or title of archbishop of any province, bishop of any bishopric, or dean of any deanery in England or Ireland, he should for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of 100 l."
Now the fair logical inference from that provision was, that the assumption of titles not possessed by bishops of the Established Church was not forbidden. By a well-known rule of law, assertio unius est exclusio alterius. Again, that was a penal clause, and, according to the rules of law and justice, they were bound to construe it strictly, and not to extend it to that which was not expressed. He had the honour of being a Member of the Cabinet by which the Belief Act was brought in, prepared, and passed. He would not undertake to say what were the intentions of His Majesty's Ministers with reference to that particular point; he spoke only of his own impressions; but this he would say—he had been asked twenty times why the Roman Catholics had not Diocesan bishops in England as they had in Ireland, and it never occurred to him to suppose or say it was illegal. He thought it entirely depended on arrangements for their own convenience and pleasure connected with the government of their Church. Therefore, his conviction was undoubtedly that by the Act, and in fair construction their Lordships must admit it to be so, it was not forbidden. But there was another reason, which he thought still more conclusive. Let their Lordships observe that the clause provided that no person should assume the title of any see or deanery in England or Ireland; but no mention was made of Scotland. Why? Because in Scotland there were no bishops, no deans, no persons in possession of those titles that were recognised by law. There were certainly rev. gentlemen assuming titles in Scotland, and permitted to assume them; but they had no legal recognition, and therefore the law did not prohibit persons from taking those or any other titles in Scotland; but it prevented them from taking those titles which were in existence in England and in Ireland. He thought this demonstrative of the intention of the framers of that Act,
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because it would have been just as easy to prohibit the assumption of titles in Great Britain, as it was in England and Ireland, had it been desired. This, therefore, was the first great objection he had to this Bill. He thought it to be a breach of faith—a violation of that great Act which he humbly contributed to support; and he would not be a party to any provision that interfered with the privileges which he considered were intended to be conferred upon the Roman Catholics of this country.
But, let him ask, what had been the acts done to warrant this Bill? The noble Marquess had talked in high-sounding language of the aggression committed, and of the rights of the Crown which the Pope had invaded. But, after all, what was it? What act had the Pope really done? What was the head and front of his offending? Why, he had converted vicars-apostolic into bishops in ordinary. He (the Earl of Aberdeen) said that was the whole the Pope had done. He spoke not of the language by which this act had been accompanied. If their Lordships were going to outrage the feelings of one-third of the population of this country, in order to answer an insolent manifesto, let that be avowed. Now, in his opinion the Pope had a perfect right to convert the vicars-apostolic into bishops in ordinary. It was, in fact, to make a change from a system that was irregular and exceptional, to the regular government of the Church. As far as their Lordships and the Protestant people of this country were concerned, he wanted to know how the Roman Catholic bishops in ordinary differed from the vicars-apostolic? Had they more authority or greater revenues? Did the law regard them differently? Was there, in fact, the slightest difference except in their own church government, and the more regular administration of their internal affairs? None, that he could see; and when, therefore, the noble Marquess talked of territorial titles, he must remind their Lordships that the Pope must describe these bishops somehow. He must describe his vicars-apostolic as vicars of certain districts, comprising certain counties. And he must now describe his bishops in ordinary as bishops embracing the jurisdiction of one or more counties, according to the circumstances of the case. True, the Pope might have described the diocesee of these bishops by parallels of latitude and longitude; but he must have some mode of intrusting the faithful of his Church, in certain districts,

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to the authority and administration of the bishops placed over them. He said, then, that this talk of territorial titles, as if these titles conveyed any right or possession, or the exercise of any temporal jurisdiction, was a complete misapprehension of terms. It was the ordinary mode by which the Church of Rome appointed bishops. Look at the bishops lately created in a friendly Protestant State with which the Pope of Rome had a concordat—the bishops of Prussia. The most minute particulars, the names of every village, were described in setting forth the sees of these bishops. But these bishops in Prussia had no more power and authority because the sees were thus territorially described in which they held spiritual jurisdiction, and in which, let their Lordships recollect, they had no more authority than if they were described by any other mode. They had heard much of the establishment of a Catholic hierarchy in this country; but it was incorrect to say that any such hierarchy had been established. Nothing could properly be said to be established that was not established by law. So far as Protestants were concerned, there was nothing real in it. Did they suppose, because the Pope had issued decrees appointing these new bishops, that the law would give any effect to these rescripts or letters? None at all. The new hierarchy was constituted for the purpose of internal government and administration; but, as far as their Lordships were concerned, this new establishment had no existence except in words, and could not operate in any degree whatever upon the interests of the people of this country. This was the act which they had heard from high authority was the beginning of a system of despotic government, and of reactionary principles over the whole of Europe. This, according to the same authority, was the first step taken in this country, because we were the most free nation in Europe, and likely to feel more deeply the assertion of any such ultramontane and absolute doctrines. Vastly well; but let him refer their Lordships to what was the history of this change. A diocesan government had been at all times desired by the Roman Catholics, instead of the rule of vicars-apostolic. So long ago as under the Administration of Mr. Pitt, this change was desired by the Government of this country. Sir J. Hippisley, who was empowered to negotiate this matter between the Court of Rome and this country, said, in 1812, in a speech in the House of Commons—
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"That he obtained from Pope Pius VI., as well as from his principal Ministers, a declaration that such a reform would be granted whenever it should be desired by our Government."
This was in 1794. Mr. Pitt's Government thought it best to have no direct communication with the Court of Rome, and he did not ask for this change; but that it was desired by him and by the Government of that day, was attested by the frequent speeches of Sir J. Hippisley. This change was not only desired by Mr. Pitt and other Members of his Government, who might be said to be inclined to despotic principles, but let him direct their Lordships' attention to the opinions and writings of an hon. Baronet, who was certainly no lover of despotism, who was one of the friends of the people in 1792, who was connected with the father of the noble Earl (Earl Grey), at that time Member for Northumberland. This hon. Gentleman was not only a man of extreme liberal opinions, but he was a Whig, and something more. In his letter to the Catholic clergy, urging the appointment of bishops instead of vicars-apostolic, Sir J. Throckmorton said—
"Our present government by vicars-apostolic is, then, contrary to the rules of the Church, the practice and regulations of the apostles, and was unknown in the purer ages of the Christian religion. Nor is there any power in the Pope which can legalise so irregular a system; nothing can justify it but absolute necessity. If it be proved that our present method is the only one by which we can obtain bishops, it would doubtless be better to acquiesce in it than to be totally deprived of their essential ministry. But this pretence has not been mentioned, nor is there the least ground to allege it. It must appear that a more easy and certain method may be adopted; and, as the laws of the Christian Church require it, is it not our duty, Gentlemen, to take the necessary steps to put it in execution?"
Ought their Lordships, then, to consider the establishment of regular bishops in the place of vicars-apostolic so gross an invasion of the prerogative of the Crown as it was represented by the noble Marquess, and as a proof of the despotic tendencies of the Court of Rome? In addition to the opinion of Sir J. Throckmorton, he might quote the statement of a right rev. Prelate, whom he did not then see in his place, the author of the History of the Church of England, who said, speaking on the subject—
"The real difference between the bishop of a see and a vicar-apostolic is, that the commission of the latter is only during the Pope's pleasure. Ireland has Roman Catholic bishops of her own, who are independent of Rome as far as Roman Catholics can be; and the members of that communion

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in England have much reason to complain that they have never been allowed this privilege."
He therefore thought it trifling with their Lordships to pretend that that which was desired by men of all parties—by the Catholics themselves by their petitions over and over again—should be spoken of in the terms used by the noble Marquess. Be it recollected, too, that the real practical effect of the change to the Roman Catholics—for to their Lordships the effect was the same—was, that the Pope somewhat divested himself of the power he now possessed by the substitution of ordinary bishops for vicars-apostolic, for over the vicars-apostolic he could act as he pleased. He might recall them at a moment; they were merely his deputies and agents; whereas the bishops in ordinary could only be deprived for canonical offences canonically proved, and were, as much as Roman Catholics could be, independent of the Pope, certainly much more so than the vicars-apostolic.
But the noble Marquess had discovered that this was not only a violation and an aggression against the honour and independence of the nation, but he had also discovered that this act was illegal by the actual law of the land. Now, he could not assent to that doctrine. The Government had revived an obsolete statute, that had slept for 250 years, for this purpose—a statute, the existence of which, so far as its applicability to the present circumstances was concerned, had been unknown for that time. They had declared that such was the law. The noble Marquess had referred to the case of Robert Lalor, in the time of James I., the only unhappy instance in which this statute had been put in force. The noble Marquess had referred to the trial of Lalor, and he (the Earl of Aberdeen) wished to show, in the first place, that this statute of prœmunire had no application whatever to the act that had now been performed. Whatever Lalor's case might have been, the law was not applicable to the case of the late Rescript. If it were, then all he could say was, that it was quite as much applicable to the appointment of vicars-apostolic as to the appointment of bishops in ordinary. Why, Lalor himself was only a vicar-apostolic, and was proceeded against accordingly. If their Lordships would permit him to read an extract from Sir John Davis's report of Lalor's case, they would see that that law was applicable to a state of things entirely different from that which now ex-
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isted, and originated in motives altogether of another kind. Sir John Davis, giving a history of the statute of prœmunire, said—
"The (the Commons) complain that by Bulls and processes from Rome the King is deprived of that jurisdiction which belongs of right to his Imperial Crown; that the King doth lose the service and counsel of his prelates and learned men by translations made by the Bishop of Rome; that the King's laws are defeated at his will, the treasure of the realm is exhausted and exported to enrich his Court; and that by those means the Crown of England, which hath ever been free, and subject unto none, but immediately unto God, should be submitted unto the Bishop of Rome, to the utter destruction of the King and the whole realm."
Thus the statute 16th of Richard H. was enacted to prevent the translations of prelates to Rome, to prevent the appointment of foreigners here, and the export of the treasure of the country to Rome. If the Pope had been satisfied to create fifty bishops, provided they had confined themselves to spiritual matters, and did not interfere with temporal affairs and the regalities of the King, he would have been made perfectly welcome to do so, so far as the framers of this statute were concerned. It was the temporal rights and claims which belonged to the prelates of the Court of Rome in that day that induced the Crown and the Parliament to resist the pretensions of that Court. But the law of prœmunire did not in the least apply to the new Roman Catholic bishops, who possessed no authority except that which their own followers conceded to them—who were all Englishmen—who were not going to export any treasure to Rome—who were perfectly welcome, so far as he (the Earl of Aberdeen) was concerned, to transport themselves to Rome—and whose temporal jurisdiction in this country was purely imaginary. The statute of Richard II. had, then, no application to the present case; but the Government had revived this Act by the first clause of the present Bill, and in a shape in which the most frightful consequences would ensue. The first clause made the appointment of these bishops unlawful and void. All the acts which these parties performed, therefore, were unlawful. The bishop who might consecrate, the bishop who was consecrated, and the priest whom the bishop might ordain, were all concerned in acts which were illegal and void. There was a highly venerated prelate who had acted with the universal respect of all who knew him—he meant the Roman Catholic Arch-

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bishop of Dublin. He was an aged man, and might soon be removed from his present sphere of useful action. His successor would be appointed by the Pope; but the archbishop himself and all concerned in his consecration were to be guilty of an unlawful act. Let their Lordships see what awful consequences must ensue. If the acts performed by the bishops were void, then the marriages celebrated by the priests they might ordain, the ordinations of the priests, and every act of the bishops so consecrated, were, under the first clause of the present Bill, null and void. In consequence of this declaration of the law, under these ancient statutes, it had been laid down by high legal authority that an indictment might be framed against any of the persons exercising "jurisdiction, authority, or pre-eminence," by virtue of the Papal Bull; and this without the permission of the Attorney General, but simply as proceeding against a person guilty of an unlawful act, for a misdemeanor. Now, if this were so, it opened up such a prospect that he really was unwilling, by any description, to encounter the circumstances which would follow from such an arbitrary and tyrannical law. There might be a difference of opinion among legal authorities respecting the extent of the consequences to which he referred; but at all events, with such a declaration of illegality and nullity, the most serious alarm was fully justified.
He would dwell no more on that part of the subject, and he proceeded to notice what the noble Marquess had urged relative to the violation of the supremacy of the Crown, and the contempt that had been shown, according to the noble Marquess, to the rightful prerogative of Her Majesty. Indeed, this had almost been made a question of loyalty. The country had been called on to come to the succour of the Queen of this realm. If he thought that there was any peril of this kind, most assuredly there were few men in their Lordships' House who would more readily respond to that call than himself; but, believing that any danger of this kind was a mere chimera, he could not listen for an instant to such a call as that. He wanted to know how the supremacy of the Crown had been evaded. They could not expect the Pope to acknowledge the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Queen. They might as well expect him to approve of their Reformation. The Pope had acknowledged her practical and temporal power, but Her
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spiritual supremacy he could not acknowledge, and he acted over the Catholic members of his Church as if the Reformation had never occurred, and as the supreme bishop of the Christian world, But he wanted to know what this supremacy of the Queen was at present. He knew what it used to be; the denial of it was punished with death; but fortunately the supremacy of the Queen was not the supremacy of King Henry VIII., that sanguinary butcher, who made himself the Pope of this kingdom, and took upon himself the whole power of the keys. But the precise limits of that supremacy had never been accurately traced out and defined. Should their Lordships appeal to the right rev. Prelates for information on this point? He thought not; for they had had great difficulty in describing it for themselves. A short time ago an address was presented by the right rev. Prelates to Her Majesty upon the occasion of this so-called aggression. They might on such an occasion be expected to describe that of which he now so anxiously desiderated an explanation. In the first address to the Queen which was drawn up they said—
"An unparalleled insult has been offered to Your Majesty's prerogative, and to the Church of which Your Majesty is the earthly head in this kingdom."
An exception was taken to this, as an incorrect description of the Queen's supremacy. It was said that the Queen was not the head of the Church in any such sense as was here set forth, and the phrase was corrected. The next attempt, made in the course of a week, was as follows:—
"An unwarrantable insult has been offered to the Church in this kingdom, over which Your Majesty's authority is supreme."
Even that was not quite the thing, and, after a little further reflection, the right rev. Prelates fell back upon safe ground—upon the words of the 37th Article, which they had all signed, and which they knew must mean something, although it was not very easy to say precisely what. The right rev. Prelates finally adopted the following words of the 37th Article:—
"An unwarrantable insult has been offered to the Church and to Your Majesty, to whom appertains the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil."
Nobody could be displeased with this, and he (Lord Aberdeen) certainly could not object to it. This, then, was the supremacy which was so much valued, and the invasion of which struck the noble Mar-

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quess with such alarm. After all, this supremacy was treated somewhat cavalierly by Her Majesty's Government two years ago, when the noble Lord, now the First Lord of the Treasury, among various devices to introduce the Jews into Parliament, in 1849, brought in a Bill which repealed the supremacy. Now, if this supremacy were so sacred, he thought it was rather disrespectful treatment to repeal that oath of supremacy so far as Members of both Houses of Parliament were concerned. But let their Lordships go a little further. He need not inform their Lordships that the spiritual supremacy of the Queen was utterly rejected by the Church and people of Scotland, and by the Episcopal Church in Scotland. The Pope could not interfere with the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Queen in Scotland, for there was none there in existence. In Scotland, however, the Queen must have seen that those who denied Her supremacy were among Her most loyal, devoted, and attached subjects. Therefore, although he (the Earl of Aberdeen) was quite willing to acquiesce in that supremacy, so far as he understood it, when in Scotland all religious denominations utterly repudiated it, he could not consider it so much endangered by the late Papal Rescript of which the noble Marquess complained. The Episcopal Communion in Scotland acted without the slightest reference to the authority of the Queen and the Government. A respectable gentleman in his parsonage in Essex very recently found himself made a bishop, and translated to the see of Moray and Ross. A few years ago a new see, the bishopric of Argyll and the Isles, was founded, established, and endowed by the liberality of a prelate of that Church. Let not their Lordships forget that prelacy was abolished in Scotland—nay, that it was prohibited in terms ten times more severe than any of their laws against the Roman Catholics. He wished these respectable gentlemen to call themselves what they pleased, and to allow their flocks to obey them accordingly. The Government had in this Bill provided a clause to which he gave his entire concurrence, and he only wished it was extended to Roman Catholics. The clause said that the Act should not extend or apply to any bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Scotland; but that nothing in the Act should give any right to any such bishop to assume any name, style, or title
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which he was not by law entitled to assume or use. That was exactly the feeling he wished to see displayed towards the Roman Catholics. He would recognise them in the same way. He would not give them any legal right or authority, but he would acknowledge them exactly as the present Bill acknowledged the bishops of the Episcopal Church of Scotland. He could see no difference between the two cases. That description of the condition of the Episcopalian Church of Scotland was the wise and just mode of dealing with the Catholic Church; and if they failed to do so, their Lordships would witness the universal feeling of disappointment and resentment, produced by measures so unjust, in the minds of their Catholic fellow-countrymen. It could never be supposed that he had said anything against the respectability of the Episcopalian Church of Scotland. He honoured, esteemed, and highly venerated the prelates of that Church, and he knew the great blessings which attended upon their ministrations, and had always regarded them with the utmost respect. He thought they had got all they ought to have, and he desired to have no more for that great body of our fellow-Christians the Roman Catholics.
The noble Marquess told their Lordships the prerogative of the Crown was in danger also. If the act of the Pope had given any temporal power or authority to the new bishops—if it had qualified them to be introduced as Members of that House—they might indeed think that the prerogative had been invaded; but to say it was in danger because the Pope made a Bishop of Birmingham or Nottingham was surely wrong, because Parliament had only to ignore, as they ought to do, and as the law already did, the existence of the new bishops. By the way, since Roman Catholic bishops were named to these new sees, he thought it would be a very good exercise of the prerogative to appoint Protestant bishops to them. Had the act of the Pope done anything to impede this exercise of the prerogative in this manner? Nothing whatever. It was said that there was a practical interference with the Royal prerogative, because the new prelates were named by a foreign prince. But had they just discovered that the Pope was a foreign prince? That might be a very good reason for not tolerating or for counteracting his designs; but it was too late to make that discovery when they

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had agreed to give full toleration to the Roman Catholics in this country, and had done that, knowing that the bishops of that Church could not be named except by a foreign prince.
The arrogance of the act had been strongly dwelt upon: he did not defend it; but to complain of the arrogance of the Pope, was to complain of his existence, because that arrogance was inherent in the character of his office: and from a person who told you he was the vicegerent of God upon earth, there was an end of all humility, even although he added that he was servus servorum Dei. The expressions regere et gubernare were stereotyped terms, used upon all similar occasions, and it was preposterous to suppose for a moment that they were used with a view to insult the Crown or people of this country. In Prussia their Lordships would find the same inflated language as had given such offence here; but, as the assumption was that of spiritual authority only, it could not be in the least degree connected with an aggression upon the temporal authority of the Government. A great sensation had been created by Cardinal Wiseman talking of governing a certain district; but he only meant that he should govern as Roman Catholic bishop in ordinary; and his speaking in that sense was no insult to the Government of Her Majesty as Queen.
The noble Marquess had said that we had to deal with a foreign Power, and not with our Roman Catholic countrymen; but if this Bill were intended to resent an act of insolence, it proceeded to do so in a strange way, for the Bill did not affect the foreign Power whence that act of insolence proceeded, but its vengeance was confined to the Roman Catholic subjects of the Queen in this kingdom. The Pope, it was said, insulted this country; and in return the country was called upon both to insult and oppress the Ionian Catholic subjects of the Queen. If the offence was such as had been described, and the indignation of Her Majesty's Government was so uncontrollable, it was an offence amenable to public law, and ought to be proceeded against by the State, diplomatically or otherwise; and, instead of enacting some wretched penalties against those whose religion compelled them to obedience in this matter, they ought to have addressed themselves to the fountain-head. He knew it might be said, as it had been said, though not by the noble Marquess
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opposite, that Her Majesty's Government to a certain degree had been precluded from taking that course by what had happened in that House in 1848, when a Bill was brought in to establish diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, and when a clause was proposed and adopted prohibiting the reception here of any Nuncio from the Pope. That might be a very good reason by the way of pretext, but it was no reason that had any force or validity; for there was nothing in that circumstance to prevent the necessary communications with the Pope on this subject. Look to the great Protestant Power on the Continent—Prussia. That Power had always a Minister at Rome, but refused to receive a Nuncio. Look at Russia, a great schismatic Power. She also had a Minister at Rome, and never received a Nuncio. Hanover had a Minister at Rome, and, he believed, though he would not be positive, that Power never received a Nuncio. Therefore, he asserted that the clause he had referred to offered no impediments to the Government making known their opinions on this subject to the Pope. He had voted for that clause; and, upon reflection, he was of opinion that he did right in so doing. He was still of opinion that it was not desirable to have a Papal Nuncio in this country, for many reasons. In the first place, their Lordships would recollect that by the Treaty of Vienna precedence was given to foreign Ministers according to the date of their arrival at their posts. An exception—a special exception—was made in favour of the Nuncio of the Pope; and, by the effect of that, if a Nuncio were to be in this country, he would take precedence of all ambassadors and foreign Ministers. This was ever shown to be the case; at Paris, for instance, where Her Majesty's Ambassador had resided for five or six years, upon all occasions, public and private, he gave way in precedence to the Pope's Nuncio. He thought such a state of things would not be desirable in this Protestant country. Their Lordships would recollect that recently, just previous to the holding of that august ceremony by which Her Majesty in state opened the Great Exhibition, which had given so much satisfaction, an official notice appeared that the senior member of the diplomatic body would address Her Majesty on the part of himself and colleagues. That notice for some reason, the nature of which he did not know, but which probably was very sufficient, was

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not acted upon; but had it been acted upon, then, instead of the highly respected gentleman who would have represented the diplomatic body on that occasion, the Pope's Nuncio, if he had been sent to and received in this country, would have addressed the Queen. Now, he was not quite certain that it would have been altogether seemly and becoming that a Roman Catholic prelate, for such he must have been, should have immediately followed or preceded the most rev. Prelate (the Archbishop of Canterbury) in the solemn duties he was called on to perform upon that day.
With respect to the proceeding which had led to the introduction of the present Bill, he repeated that no step was taken in the way of resenting what was called aggression against the quarter whence it proceeded. After all, among the persons who had the most reason to complain, was the Pope himself, for if they had endeavoured to entrap him into this act, they could not have taken any better course than that which they had pursued. The whole course of their recent legislation had had that tendency. Look at the Bequests Act. If that Act did not actually describe the Roman Catholic bishops with their sees, it contemplated the existence of Roman Catholic bishops with successors; and the Dublin Cemeteries Act described Archbishop Murray as Archbishop of Dublin, and allowed him and his successors to appoint chaplains. In the colonies they had done exactly all that the Pope had done in this country; and Roman Catholic bishops had been appointed in the colonies, and had received titles without objection. It was, therefore, strange that an act which had been done over and over again, should now excite such indignation in this country. Again, honours had been conferred on Roman Catholic Prelates at Her Majesty's Court, and, though those honours conferred no legal station or right, still, when they were reported to the Court of Rome, they must have encouraged the Pope in a proceeding which, on his part, was one of a perfectly regular and ordinary character. The noble Earl (the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland), in a published letter addressed to a right rev. Prelate, but manifestly intended for the perusal of the Pope himself, had spoken of his Holiness with the most profound respect. The noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury had expressed himself in such terms as must have made
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the Pope confident that he was committing no offence in the step he had taken. In 1844 the noble Lord said—
"You provide by statute that they shall not be allowed to style themselves by the name of the diocese over which they preside. I think that a most foolish prohibition."
In 1846 the same noble Lord said—
"As to preventing persons assuming particular titles, nothing can be more absurd and puerile than to keep up such a distinction."
These were strong expressions; but they were made when the noble Lord was in opposition, and such declarations, perhaps, were not always to be taken as accurate exponents of the sentiments of a Minister. But here was what the Prime Minister said in 1848. Lord John Russell then said—
"I do not know that the Pope has authorised in any way, by any authority he may have, the creation of any archbishopric or bishopric with dioceses in England; but certainly I have not given my consent—nor should I give my consent if I were asked to do so—to any such formation of dioceses. With regard to spiritual authority, the hon. Gentleman must see, when he alludes to other States in Europe, that whatever control is to be obtained over the spiritual authority of the Pope, can only be obtained by agreement for that end. You must either give certain advantages to the Roman Catholic religion, and obtain from the Pope certain other advantages in return, among which you must stipulate that the Pope shall not create any dioceses in England without the consent of the Queen"—
(Therefore the noble Lord took for granted that the Pope could create dioceses without the consent of the Queen),
—"or, on the other hand, you must say that you will have nothing to do with arrangements of that kind—that you will not consent, in any way, to give any authority to the Roman Catholic religion in England. But then you must leave the spiritual authority of the Pope entirely unfettered. You cannot bind the Pope's spiritual influence unless you have some agreement. For my own part, I am not disposed to think that it would be for the advantage of this country, or that it would be agreeable to the Roman Catholics, that we should have an agreement with the Pope by which their religious arrangements should be regulated."
He (the Earl of Aberdeen) concurred in those observations, which he thought remarkable for truth and sound reasoning; but then it afforded ground to the Pope for supposing that his religious arrangements would not be interfered with. But there was a noble Lord opposite (Lord Minto) who had or ought to have cognisance in this matter. When the noble Lord was at Rome, on the 22nd of January, 1848, there appeared in the Roman Gazette an account of a ceremony—the con-

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secration of a church, he believed—for which funds were to be collected in England; and the Roman Gazette mentioned, among others who were to collect the subscriptions, Dr. Wiseman, "now Archbishop of Westminster." One would have thought that the noble Lord must have seen that. The noble Lord shook his head; and if the Roman Gazette had been anything like the gigantic papers here, which required half a life to read, he could have understood its escaping the notice of the noble Lord; but every syllable in the Roman Gazette might be read over in ten minutes. The noble Lord might, perhaps, have been so much engaged in driving the Austrians out of Italy as to find no time for such a perusal; but if the noble Lord did not read the paragraph in question, surely some of his family might have been expected to point the noble Lord's attention to it, and it seemed impossible that that which made the conversation of half Rome should not have been brought to the cognisance of the noble Lord. By the Italian papers laid upon the table it appeared that the noble Lord had, on the 23rd of January, a long audience with his Holiness, who, as the matter was in no way remonstrated against, would naturally regard that as an additional reason for supposing that there would arise no ground of complaint against him for taking a step which was now called an aggression. Her Majesty's Government had certainly no right to find fault with the Pope for anything he had done, for they had themselves afforded him every species of encouragement in the course he had pursued.
He had now fatigued the House and himself, but he could not sit down without saying a few words with respect to the fatal effect of this measure on Ireland. Their Lordships were aware that the Re-script of the 29th of September last year only made bishoprics in England, and had no reference to Ireland at all. Therefore the proposed legislation, as regarded Ireland, had been thought by many to be uncalled for; and it was urged that legislation should be confined to England, in respect to which the aggression, as it was called, was committed. No doubt there was plausibility in that view; but he must agree with the Government so far as to think that, if the present Bill was to be passed at all, it must necessarily include Ireland; for to admit that the Queen stood in a different relation in England from that which She held in Ireland, would be to de-
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cide the destruction of the Irish Church. The Queen's supremacy was the same in both countries; and if any violation of it had taken place, it must equally be resented in both. But this consideration made him only feel still more strongly that the Government ought to have paused before they made up their minds to bring forward a measure which, without being urgently demanded in England, must necessarily produce such mischievous consequences in Ireland. It had been said that the present Bill was a declaration of war against Ireland. He would not use an expression of that kind; but if the Bill passed, unless it became, as he devoutly trusted it would, a dead letter on the Statute-book, they would never see peace in Ireland. The penalties imposed by the Bill, would, if brought into operation in Ireland, produce consequences he feared to contemplate. By a clause, perhaps the most odious in the Bill, it was provided that any communication with the See of Rome for the purpose of appointing bishops should be visited with a penalty, to be recoverable by an informer, with the consent of the Attorney General. Though that was somewhat different from leaving the matter entirely to a common informer, yet it placed the Attorney General in a position which certainly any law officer of the Crown must feel to be most painful, and against which, as he was informed, the law officers of the Grown had strenuously protested. But the clause, if carried into effect, would be attended with endless difficulties. A refractory priest, censured by his bishop, might go and give information of the bishop having received a bull of the kind referred to; and in a hundred other ways the clause opened the door to vexatious proceedings. He would fain believe that the Government wished to see that clause executed as little as he did; but others might not share in their wishes, and then there would be a renewal of those scenes of discord, animosity, and rancour, which for the last twenty years had been gradually subsiding.
He could not help availing himself of this opportunity of expressing his deep regret at the absence of two noble and learned Lords—two long-tried and able advocates of civil and religious liberty. They were prevented from being present in their Lordships' House that day; but he was in possession of their sentiments, and he knew that, had they been present, they would have expressed the most un-

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mitigated aversion at the step the Government were about to take. Instead of listening to his feeble advocacy of the cause of religious freedom, he wished their Lordships could but have heard, and been persuaded by, the mild wisdom of Denman, and electrified by the fervid eloquence of Brougham. The noble Earl concluded by moving that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.
Amendment moved, to leave out "now," and insert "this day Six Months."
LORD BEAUMONTsaid, that he could assure their Lordships that he had seldom addressed them under circumstances of greater difficulty, or feelings of more embarrassment. The difficulty, however, did not arise from any doubt in his mind as to the course he ought to pursue; but from the peculiar character of the subject, which made it difficult to convey to the minds of others the impression which recent acts had produced on his own. The present legislation on the subject had been viewed from such different points of observation by different parties, that it was difficult to place before them the subject divested of all sectarian prepossessions and partial considerations. This difficulty, however, had in one respect been materially removed by the speech of the noble Earl, inasmuch as the dangers which he anticipated as the consequences of the Bill, and upon which he most dwelt, were completely visionary, as he would presently show; and those very circumstances which the noble Earl had put forth as excuses for the conduct of a foreign Court were rather aggravations than palliations of the offence. When the noble Earl pleaded that the indulgence, if not partiality, shown by the English Government towards Roman Catholics in this country, and their religious establishments, was an excuse as well as an encouragement to commit an act of hostility against the State, and to violate the spirit of the constitution, he (Lord Beaumont) felt, on the contrary, that that very liberality and indulgence on the part of the Government should have been a strong inducement and a motive for the Court of Rome to abstain from anything which might possibly be offensive either to the feelings of the people of this country, or to the dignity of the Crown. Before, however, proceeding further, in considering the question, he must observe that he stood
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in a peculiar position on this subject. He was, as it were, isolated and alone: he differed from most of those with whom he was connected, and in whom he felt an interest, on the ground of early associations. It was true that he had received many private communications from members both of the clergy and laity of the Church of Rome expressing sympathy with him, and approval of the course he was pursuing; but as those correspondents did not dare to come forward and assert publicly their opinions, he could not avail himself of their support, or claim any advantage from their authority. He was prepared, therefore, to stand alone, and bear the whole responsibility of the statement he was about to make. He knew that his words would be subject to misrepresentation, and that, however clearly he drew the line between spiritual and temporal matters, there were those who would wrest the words which he might use in speaking of the one from their true meaning, and endeavour to make it appear that they were applied to the other. He knew that this, and more than this, awaited him; but he would abide the result, for, on his conscience, he was confident that he was right in principle and right in the line he had pursued. He was right as a loyal subject, right as a friend of freedom, right as an Englishman, and right as a Christian. With these strong convictions on his mind, he would proceed to grapple with the subject. In doing so, he would start by laying down that broad principle which he believed was the principle adopted and acted on by the noble Marquess below him. He would consent to do nothing either by the present Bill or any other Bill, which would interfere in the smallest degree with the most complete civil and religious liberty this kingdom could enjoy. He would do nothing which could prevent the free exercise of religion by any sect, or any body in this country—nothing that could in any way interfere with the full development of what, in a spiritual sense, might be deemed either necessary or desirable in the Roman Catholic or any other Church or religious community. He would, in the first place, examine the position in which members of the Roman Catholic creed stood, as individuals, at the present moment, and then he would examine into the position in which the Roman Catholic Church, as a Church, was placed in by past legislation. By the Emancipation Act, and more recent legislative measures,

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Roman Catholics, as individuals, were released from all disabilities, and entitled to the most complete freedom. They were at liberty to act as they pleased in the exercise of their religion; no interference was authorised with respect to their devotional habits or religious practices. A Roman Catholic enjoyed in this country, a liberty which he did.not enjoy in most foreign countries, and certainly not in any Roman Catholic country. He could worship as he pleased, where he pleased, when he pleased; he was allowed to do as much as he pleased, and was not obliged to do more than he pleased; he was in every way a free agent, and a free agent he (Lord Beaumont) desired that he should ever remain. So far as to their position as individuals; now as to the position of their Church. The Roman Catholic Church in this country was tolerated; it was more than tolerated, it was protected. No one had a right to interfere with it. It was allowed to build its temples, to have as many ministers to officiate within those temples, and to have as gorgeous a ceremonial as it thought fit or proper. It had full liberty to conduct its services and promulgate its ordinances in the manner it thought best; it had free communication with the Pope of Rome; it was at liberty to receive from him as many bishops or archbishops as he wished to send it. It could arrange its internal government without let or hindrance; no one dictated to it, no one assumed authority over it; nay more, it had the perfect power and full privilege of having, if it thought proper, a regular hierarchy. He (Lord Beaumont) would leave it every privilege it now possessed, and he should not be sorry to see those privileges used in obtaining for it something in the nature of a regular national or domestic hierarchy, in the place of vicars-apostolic, or the system lately forced upon it by the Propaganda fide in the letters of Pope Pius the Ninth. But be that as it may, such as he had described was the position of Roman Catholics as individuals, and of their Church as a religious community. Could they be better off? Could the subjects of the freest country enjoy greater freedom? Could any religious body be in a more favourable position, which was not a predominant body, ruling and governing over other religious bodies? Here he must lay down another principle, which is necessary to carrying out, to its fullest extent, the great principle of civil and religious li-
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berty, namely, that individual liberty should only be limited where it interfered with the liberty of another individual, that is to say, that one individual should not have the liberty to trample on the liberty of another. In the same way the liberty of one Church should not destroy the liberty of any other Church, any more than the liberty of one individual should go so far as to destroy the liberty of another individual: these limits were necessary to obtain the greatest amount of liberty to all. In the same way the independence of the Church must not destroy the independence of the country; he might go further and say that the independence of the country was necessary for the independence of the Church. That portion of the Roman Catholic Church which was in this country, was more independent than those branches of the Roman Catholic Church which were in Spain or some other countries, front the circumstance of this country being more independent than those countries in their relations with Rome. In fine, the liberty of Churches and individuals must in a certain degree depend on the independence of the country in which they existed. It was necessary to guard against the possibility of any external power possessing the means to coerce or to induce any parties in this country to combine for the purpose of injuring any liberal institution or anything which savoured of national independence, or which was part and parcel of the free and independent action of the constitution of this country. A foreign Power might possess spiritual influence, but ought not to possess spiritual dominion supported and enforced by law; for if it did possess the power of enforcing its spiritual ordinances it would destroy the free action of individual independence. These principles, which their Lordships must continue to bear in mind, led him to the definition of what was temporal and what was spiritual in the subject-matter before them. The whole question as to the merits of the Bill rested upon that ground. It was necessary to examine what was the spiritual character of the Roman Catholic bishops and clergy before the promulgation of the Papal letter; then to inquire what change had been effected by that Papal letter in that spiritual character. Previous to the Papal edict the vicars-apostolic were endowed with full powers to administer in every particular to the spiritual wants of their clergy and people. Nothing appeared to be wanting to their

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full spiritual character as bishops. He (Lord Beaumont) had been anxious to know and had asked again and again, but without effect, what was the difference in a spiritual point of view in the position and attributes of the Roman Catholic bishops before and after the Papal Rescript. He wanted to know whether there had been any addition or any diminution of their spiritual power and authority. He wanted to know whether there was anything which they could not do of a purely spiritual nature as well without as with the Papal letter. It seemed that the same curiosity had been excited in the minds of the Roman Catholics generally, for they had crowded to hear, as they were unable of themselves to guess, what were the new and extraordinary spiritual benefits to be conferred on them. They had listened to the inflated and bombastic language of Cardinal Wiseman; they had been told "that this country was now to revolve round the sun of Rome in a regular orbit like other planets; they were told that the greatest of blessings was bestowed by the Papal letter on this prosperous land." These and other equally bombastic periods had raised the expectations of the simple-minded Roman Catholics, and naturally made them impatient to know and enjoy the promised blessings. But, alas! how were all these expectations answered; what explanations given to all these inquiries? Why, that so far as spiritual affairs were concerned, no change whatsoever had taken place. Why, that so far as the Roman Catholic laity were concerned, that they were just in the position they were in before. Why, that as far as the Roman Catholic bishops were concerned, they were just the same bishops they were before—that nothing had been gained—that nothing had been lost—that nothing had been changed. His authority for all this was Dr. Wiseman, whose very words he would quote, and to whose published lectures alone he would refer. And here, in passing, he begged to say that he (Lord Beaumont) had little personal acqaintance with Dr. Wiseman, but that he knew him to be a gentleman and a scholar, and that he desired to be understood as speaking of him as such, however he (Lord Beaumont) might differ from him regarding the wisdom of his acts, or the propriety of his conduct in a political sense. Dr. Wiseman then said, speaking of the bishops—
"He is not, and will not be one atom more a bishop than he was before; not one of them extends in any way the limits of his ecclesiastical
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jurisdiction; not one of the bishops acquires the smallest increase of jurisdiction or authority over clergy, or laity, or property, or trusts, or any person or thing. Every bishop is where he was, as he was, what he was before."
The sacraments would be as well administered, the services as well performed, and both would have the same effect, and no other effect. They might now meet in synod, but they might have done so before if they liked, for then as now there was no law to prevent synodical action if they chose to adopt it. They enjoyed, in other words, the freest self-government. Now, if this were true, and he had it on the authority of Cardinal Wiseman himself, he (Lord Beaumont) was warranted in assuming that, as regarded the spiritual character of bishops, there had been nothing changed—that their spiritual attributes were complete before, and that, as far as the spiritual necessities of the laity were concerned, no change whatsoever had taken place, nor was desired to take place, in administering to them. Now the same authority said that some change had taken place, and as that change was not of a spiritual character, it must of necessity have been of a temporal character. It was necessary, therefore, to draw the distinction between what was temporal and what was spiritual in the creation and nomination of a bishop to a see or a diocese. The whole was an ecclesiastical act, one part of which was spiritual, and the other part purely temporal. The creation of a bishop was a spiritual act; the imposition of hands upon a bishop, and the giving the pallium to an archbishop were acts of a spiritual character, and could only be performed by a spiritual authority. By these acts full spiritual powers were given. The Pope had thus complete liberty to bestow full powers on his bishops, whether they were vicars-apostolic or members of a regular hierarchy. No one objected or objects to his creation of as many bishops as he likes. He may send a hundred bishops or archbishops to this country; he may describe and fix the districts within which they are to exercise their functions; he may limit their jurisdiction to a county, a town, or a parish; he may, if he thinks proper, desire them, for convenience' sake, to give themselves each a distinctive designation; he may desire them to call one the Roman Catholic Bishop for Birmingham, another the Roman Catholic Bishop residing at Beverley, or that such a one should be Archbishop

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of the Roman Catholics of Westminster; he might have done all this before his edict; he might do it now; and he may do it after the Bill passes. This, however, is not what he has attempted to do. He was not content with the liberty he enjoyed, because that liberty did not go beyond the limits of the exercise of spiritual power. What, then, has he attempted to effect by these Letters-Apostolic? He has not, as has been already shown, done anything which affects the Roman Catholic laity. It was, however, well known to their Lordships that the laity of the Roman Catholic body were entirely excluded from the business of their Church, and were never consulted, and consequently had no voice in its government. Their duty was to obey; but that did not prevent them from pertinaciously inquiring if any change, and what change, in the position of their clergy had taken place. The answer, as he (Lord Beaumont) had already said, was, that no change in their spiritual character had taken place, and no change as regarded their position with the laity had taken place, but that nevertheless a change had taken place. The only conclusion, therefore, they could draw from the answer was, that the change was one of a temporal nature, and one which did not affect, and was therefore a subject of indifference to, the laity. Now, in the creation and appointment of a bishop to a diocese, there is a temporal part as well as a spiritual part, which together compose the complete ecclesiastical act. Throughout Europe, if the Pope makes the bishop, the Sovereign appoints to the see. The Pope in that case does all that is spiritual, and the Sovereign all that is temporal in the act. To a diocese certain temporalities appertain, and no subject can enjoy or administer these temporalities without the consent of its Sovereign. In the present case, however, as no temporalities were acknowledged as by law appertaining to the new sees which the Pope had created, no attempt had been made by that Act to transfer to an intruder the rights and privileges belonging to another. But though this consequence did not follow the recent act of the Pope, the appointment of a bishop to a see in an independent country was a purely temporal act. To prove this, he would quote an illustration from a recent act of Pio Nono himself. The King of Naples nominated a bishop to a see; the Pope consecrated the bishop in consequence. The King, finding
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the bishop too liberal a politician for his purpose, changed his mind, and refused to give him the see. He appointed another. The Pope consecrated the new bishop, who took possession of the see, the Pope in neither case disputing the right of the Sovereign of the country to nominate or to recall his nomination. A similar case has occurred in the same kingdom very recently. The bishops, however, were still bishops; and to prove still further the rights of the King of Naples to deal as he liked with his sees, the Pope appointed the bishops to bishoprics in partibus. He (Lord Beaumont) quoted this instance in preference to others, because, of all the sovereigns of the present day, the King of Naples was the most sincerely and devotedly attached to the See of Rome; and because the Pope, on the other hand, considered the King of Naples as the most devout and most dutiful son of the Church. It was evident that in this case the King on the one hand, and the Pope on the other, considered the appointment of a bishop as a purely temporal act. Now, it was a generally, or rather universally-received principle, that where there was the exercise of the temporal power, the Sovereign in whose dominions it was to take effect must have some say in the affair. The line which limited the spiritual portion of an ecclesiastical act, and defined where the temporal portion began was in some countries arranged by concordat, and in others by the common law of Europe. In both instances, however, the practice as well as the theory was the same. He (Lord Beaumont) had searched in vain for an instance to the contrary. Throughout Europe, sovereigns act as a matter of course in the appointment of bishops to their dioceses. Now, the Pope cannot and would not delegate any of his spiritual powers to any layman; therefore, in the case of a concordat the Pope must have considered the appointment to a diocese as a purely temporal act. Surely, then, if the appointment to a diocese is a temporal act, the creation of a diocese must, è fortiori, be a temporal act. It follows that it is a much greater usurpation of the temporal power and prerogative, inasmuch as it is purely an act of sovereign authority. So tenacious had been even the weakest sovereigns and smallest states of this their undoubted prerogative, that any attempt to create a diocese, or otherwise to interfere in the territorial arrangements of their kingdoms had been invaria-

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bly considered a casus belli. Even Parma and Ferrara, when independent, resisted such usurpation. He thought that he had now made out and proved the broad distinction which was drawn between what was temporal and what was spiritual. To the spiritual power of the Pope he would give the fullest liberty consistent with the liberty of the subject and the law of nations. He could not, however, leave it either to the Pope or to the Roman Church to interpret what was spiritual. The Pope and his adherents had shown their incapacity or at least unfitness for the task. For according to their doctrines they could comprise every act of sovereignty or of tyranny within the term of spiritual authority. He (Lord Beaumont) must protest against the doctrine recently put forward by some Roman Catholics in this country that the spiritual power of the Pope ought to extend to the limits which he, the Pope, in his infallibility thought proper to assign it. Such doctrine is Roman, and not Catholic, it is local and not universal, suited to the interests of the Vatican, and hostile to the welfare of distant churches; and would, if generally adopted, extinguish the independence of every Catholic country, and make Europe a mere jumble of conflicting jurisdictions. Such doctrines ought not to have come from either Englishman or freeman, for they were neither the doctrines of independence nor of common sense, but of slavery and usurpation. The declaration to which he had just referred was found in a published pamphlet signed by several Catholic Peers and other persons of that persuasion. He could not say they represented the intelligence of the Roman Catholics, but they professed to represent the body. He (Lord Beaumont) opened the pages in the hope of finding a statement of their rights, both as subjects of this country, and independent members of the laity. But to his horror, on looking into this precious document, he found that instead of boldly standing, as their ancestors had done in the time of Edward III., against all foreign usurpation, whether from Rome or elsewhere, instead of disowning any thought of submission to that tyrannical code which now regulates all things temporal, social, and domestic, within the Papal dominions—instead of finding the words of freemen, he found the following humiliating sentence:—
"We declare that the exercise of the spiritual authority of the Pope, belonging to him as the
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successor of St. Peter, can only be limited by his own free act and concession."
He would read no more; but he begged their Lordships to mark the consequence of this concession. Why, any deed, however monstrous, done by a Pope might thus be defended. All acts done by the Popes were declared by the Popes themselves to be mere exercise of their spiritual authority. The excommunication of Queen Elizabeth was a purely spiritual act—the celebrated Bull, in cœna Domini, was a purely spiritual act; so, too, was the anathema against King John, so was the Bull Unigenitus. The condemnation of the Queen's Colleges, and every other interference with the domestic arrangements of the country, were proclaimed as being mere exercises of spiritual authority. Modern civilisation, as well as the true spirit of Christianity, revolted at the acts and edicts of several past Popes; yet they were all done and proclaimed as the due discipline and spiritual authority of the Church. They could not be impugned without condemning the interpretation put by the infallible head of the Church on the character and extent of his spiritual power. To this doctrine, then, as laid down in this printed declaration of the Roman Catholic laity, he (Lord Beaumont) could not agree. He could not agree to allow the Pope to fix himself the limits of his spiritual jurisdiction; he could not allow the Pope any right to do any of the acts to which he had just referred. Neither could he agree that one sovereign had a right to throw in the face of another sovereign a document which ignored the existence of that other sovereign. He found no excuse for any Court in Europe addressing the subjects of another nation, as though those subjects had neither laws nor institutions which they were bound to obey and maintain. It was said that such was the usual form of such edicts; but in that he could find no excuse. What spiritual end or moral good could be obtained by using language which, taken in its plain and simple meaning, heaped insult on insult—which was offensive at once to the dignity of the Crown and the institutions of the country—which was certain to wound the feelings of the susceptible, and excite the ridicule of the indifferent—which, literally translated and put in force, would amount to an overt act, in total violation of the common law of this country; nay, he would go further, and say, of the common law of any independent country, in fact, of the common law of nations.

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He (Lord Beaumont) was sorry to hear the noble Lord defend the Letter Apostolic on the ground he had been combating, namely, that it was merely a spiritual act, and, therefore, merely spiritually binding on the consciences of those who were the willing subjects of the Church of Rome. Of course such subjects feel hound to religiously obey the spiritual commands of the Pontiff. They must, therefore, violate their consciences if they do not do that which the edict commanded them to do. The edict commands them to do that which is, and will be, declared to be unlawful. If it were merely a temporal matter they might, without offence to their religious feelings, decline to obey; but, as it is a spiritual matter, they have no choice left them. The noble Earl is perfectly correct that the act of the Pope was words without effect, that it had no force, that it could receive no effect from law, that no one was obliged to attend to it, that it did nothing, and undid nothing, and that, therefore, it might have been safely treated with the contempt it deserved, and that such a paltry display of impotent arrogance was not worth all the fuss that had been made, or taking any more trouble about. To a certain extent he (Lord Beaumont) agreed with the noble Earl; he thought that a ridiculous assumption of power had created more irritation than it merited; but, after all, ridiculous as it was, it was nevertheless an infraction, and an offensive infraction, of the spirit, nay even of the letter, of the law of nations. Government were therefore justified in noticing it, and he felt justified in supporting them. He would now consider in detail the position in which the late Acts were calculated to place the Roman Catholics of this country as subjects. He must remind the House that the hierarchy, professed to have been created, was not a hierarchy elected from among themselves and by themselves, but a hierarchy nominated and governed by the Propaganda. Upon this subject, namely, the nature of the hierarchy, he (Lord Beaumont) had received a great many letters from different quarters. Most of them, however, were written by Roman Catholic priests, but as the consequences might be serious to them if they were known to have made the communications to him, he would not mention the names—he would only say that two or three of them were men of distinguished ability, and he believed all of them men of sincere piety. He would quote one as represent-
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ing the feelings of many. That one said—
"A very general feeling exists among the English Roman Catholic clergy against being any longer under the Propaganda, even in spirituals, because it is a secret, exceptional, and despotic tribunal, that sets aside election arbitrarily, as in the cases of Wiseman, Cullen, and others, and is not tolerated in any Catholic State or real hierarchy."
Now it had been said, that by the late Rescript, instead of increasing his power, the Pope had abandoned a portion of the power and influence he had previously exercised over the vicars-apostolic, giving it out to be understood that he had done away with the power of the Propaganda over the bishops of this country, and that instead of being arbitrarily appointed at Rome, against the wishes of the general body in England, the bishops in this country would be elected exclusively by the portion of the Church that was in this country. In Ireland, up to a recent period, the Irish bishops and clergy had enjoyed many of the privileges, and were invested with many of the attributes of a regular hierarchy. The appointment of bishops in that country partook of the nature of a national or domestic arrangement. The clergy themselves selected three names, and placed dignus, dignor, dignissimus before them, according to their ideas of their merits. The Pope, invariably consecrated dignissimus. He (Lord Beaumont) would be very sorry to see the Irish bishops lose this or any other right of self-government. He wished them to exert themselves to preserve, or rather to recover this privilege, of selecting the most worthy person to fill up the vacant see. Unfortunately that character of freedom and independence, which went to constitute them a real hierarchy and made them national, had been lately interfered with by the Pope exercising arbitrary power over them, and trampling on their hitherto acknowledged rights. He had lately taken no notice of either dignus, dignor, or dignissimus, but sent Dr. Cullen and other Roman favourites to govern Irish Catholics, though they had not been recommended by the Irish Catholic prelates. The same spirit breathes through the Rescript touching England, and had dictated the following passage:—
"We recommend the aforesaid archbishop and bishops that they transmit, at due times to our congregation of the Propaganda, full reports of the state of their Churches; for we shall continue to avail ourselves of the services of the said congregation in administering all matters appertaining to the Anglican Churches."

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From this and similar passages in recent documents emanating from Rome, he drew the conclusion that it was the intention of that Court to draw still closer the ties which bound distant Churches to the Propaganda, and to destroy whatever spirit of independence had grown up in them. More emphatic evidence of this intention, so adverse to the independence of English Catholics, was to be found in a document recently published in the Italian newspapers. It was there stated that the Pope had determined to bring the practice and discipline of his Church in England into closer conformity with the usages of Rome; that he purposed to give to the ceremonies and preaching in this country a character more closely allied to the principles and customs professed and adopted under the shade of the Vatican; further, that it was his purpose to establish for this end a purely Italian Church in London, and to send over to officiate in it native Italian priests as models to their English brethren. Nay, he had been just informed that the very last appointment made to one of the pretended dioceses had been a reverend gentleman from Rome, who had neither received the sanction nor was much to the taste of the Roman Catholic body. But with this he must admit their Lordships had nothing to do. Parliament was not to come to the rescue merely because Rome lorded it over her spiritual subjects here. It ought not to be a ground for legislation, that the Catholic laity or the Catholic lower clergy were oppressed by their superiors. That was an affair among themselves. No one compelled them to submit. Parliament left them to do as they liked; they might obey or they might take no notice of the ordinances of either Popes or Churches. They were left free agents. He, for one, would never ask the Legislature to interfere to protect the Roman Catholics in this country from the overbearing domination of a portion of the priesthood. All this, however, was very well for their Lordships; but in what a painful dilemma were the most zealous portion of the Roman Catholics left! They must either bow down humbly at the feet of the Pope, and implicitly obey his injunctions, however opposed to their national feelings and loyal sentiments, or violate the behests of Rome, and thus quarrel with their Church. They themselves say that—
"a refusal on our parts to recognise the new bishops, their jurisdiction, their titles, or their
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sees, would, according to our conscientious belief, be a wrongful act, and a breach of the bond of unity which indissolubly binds us to the See of Rome."
They were therefore in this position, that if they looked on the Pope's act with the eye of the law, and in the spirit of the constitution, they must consider the whole as null and void, and, if carried into effect, a breach of the law. But if, on the contrary, they looked on it as their Church commanded them to look upon it, they must consider it as having effect suo vigore, and doing all it pretends to do. In the former case they must allow that the titles conferred with so much pomp by the Pontiff were mere nicknames, and the announcement of the destruction of the ancient sees, and the establishment of a new hierarchy in their place, a harmless parade of idle words. They must say that Dr. Wiseman is only archbishop of the Roman Catholics residing in Westminster, and that no archbishopric of Westminster has been erected. They would agree, in fact, with Mr. Roebuck, who, in language which he (Lord Beaumont) refrained from using, had described the whole affair as a childish, meaningless, ridiculous display of impotence and folly on the part of a helpless priest; they would agree that his apostolical paper was mere waste paper; that as he has no jurisdiction here, he could do nothing here; that he has neither erected or suppressed anything; and that Canterbury and Westminster were just where they were. Of course if this were so, and if the Roman Catholics, not giving implicit faith and obedience to the Rescript, had considered that the Pope had literally done nothing, that he had neither suppressed the rights of ancient sees or created new ones, then all parties could have afforded to laugh at the pompous emanation of the Vatican, and all legislation on the subject would have been worse than idle. It would then have been easy to say that they could not make a law to prevent the Pope giving nicknames, albeit these nicknames were taken from towns and cities in England, and that it was useless to declare bulls and letters null and void because they were so already, and no new law could make them less than they were, because they were already nothing. But now take the alternative. If Roman Catholics could not conscientiously look on the Pope's Bull as a useless, meaningless decree, having no force or effect; if they regarded it as an obligation upon them,

1107
and felt bound faithfully to comply with its injunctions, and to give full force to its meaning; if they felt bound to do this, they must violate the law. The Rescript was not for them, as for the noble Earl, a mere form. It never was intended as a mere form; the Court of Rome meant this edict to be what on the face of it it professed to be. It was intended to have the effect of totally annihilating and destroying for ever all the ancient sees and dioceses which existed in this country before its promulgation. It was intended to hare the effect of suppressing the ancient archbishoprics of Canterbury and York, with all their rights, privileges, [and jurisdictions. The Rescript says—
"We, by the plenitude of our apostolic authority, take away and abrogate all power whatsoever of imposing obligation or conferring right from all customs at whatever period, even the most ancient or immemorial, they may have been introduced; further, whatever regulations in the ancient system of the Anglican Churches may have been imposed, shall henceforth carry no right or obligation with them."
But that was not all. The Rescript went further on to say that—
"these letters-apostolic shall always be valid and in force, notwithstanding all rights and privileges of the ancient sees of England and of all Churches whatsoever, notwithstanding all things to the contrary whatsoever."
Thus the Pope calls on all his faithful subjects here to sweep away the right reverend Bench on his (Lord Beaumont's) left, or, at any rate, the sees in virtue of which they sit, and to establish in their stead one metropolitan, and twelve suffragan bishops. But he was not content with merely this, for he goes on to decree
—"that if in any manner any attempt shall be made by any person or by any authority, knowingly or ignorantly, to set aside these enactments, such attempt shall be null and void."
Why, what was this? Was it not telling the Roman Catholics in this country to hold any act of the Legislature, or any Order of the Queen in Council, which might be opposed to his arrangements, to be null and void, and not to obey them? Was it not actually urging the subjects of this realm to set at defiance the constituted authorities of the country, and to rise in rebellion against the laws of the land? Was not this, under a spiritual guise, promoting disloyalty and disaffection in all those over whom he exercised spiritual authority: was it the act of a friendly Sovereign? was it the manner in which one country at peace with another should
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act? was it not on the contrary a direct interference in the most important and most jealously-watched interests of this kingdom, namely, obedience to the laws and respect to the Sovereign? Yet this was the very dilemma in which the Court of Rome bad wittingly placed some thousands of our fellow-subjects. Would Rome herself have been silent if the Crown of England had acted in the same manner towards it? If Protestant bishoprics had been attempted to have been created there, bibles distributed by the Government here, and the Protestant converts in Italy told to consider any decrees of their Sovereign contrary to the new jurisdictions null and void, would not in such a case the Pope have justly deemed this country guilty of a breach of international law? If so, in what other light could the recent appeal to parties in this country be regarded? They must take the documents of all foreign Powers in their clear and literal sense; and if they did so, they would find one portion of their countrymen engaged in an unhappy struggle between their duties as English citizens, and their obedience as the humble subjects of the Church of Rome. What were these unfortunate Englishmen to do? Were they to oppose the authority of the head of their Church, or were they to militate against the principles of the constitution? Their friends, both in doors and out, told them that it was a purely spiritual matter, as if that was any consolation; why, if it was spiritual, it was so much the worse, for it was then binding on their consciences. The Church used the argument to make them pay greater deference to the edict; the noble Earl and others used it to induce them to make light of it. It was at best an unfortunate argument, and had better never have been stated as a fact on authority. That the spiritual authority should override the temporal authority, is a maxim of the Roman Catholic Church; and if that maxim is applied in this case, the edict of Rome is to override an Act of Parliament. A choice must be made between the conflicting jurisdictions. Rome knew well enough that a struggle must ensue; she thought herself stronger than she has since found herself to be, and therefore knowingly provoked the contest. The noble Earl warned them of the consequences of the application of this Bill to Ireland; he (Lord Beaumont) allowed that it was a misfortune that they were obliged to do this or anything else which might

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give a handle to those who were ready to create confusion in that unhappy land; but the disturbances and violent proceedings the question had produced or was likely to produce in Ireland was no excuse, but rather an aggravation, of the Pope's offence against the country. It was not a mere error, but a crime, on the part of any foreign Court at peace with this country, to address a large portion of the population of England or Ireland in such a strain as it knew would create civil hostility and social confusion. The fact was, that this act was only a part or portion of a general effort now making in Europe to oppose or destroy liberal institutions. The noble Earl had alluded, albeit indistinctly, to the reactionary movement now in progress on the Continent; and he might have added, that the ultramontane party were the chief allies of that movement. It unfortunately happened that the ultramontane doctrines had for some time past been predominant in the Roman Catholic Church. This, at least, was the case on this side the Alps: a new light, it was true, of a very different character was breaking through the darkness which had so long reigned on the other side, but that circumstance had, at least as yet, no influence on the countries to the north of the Alps. In France, in Germany, in Switzerland, ultramontanism was the doctrine of the majority of those who still adhered strictly to the Catholic religion. It was easy to trace this fact to its source, and show the cause of this effect. It originated in the general indifferentism which pervaded those countries as far as Church matters were concerned; the great body of the educated classes or of the middle classes did not care about the question, and left to a few enthusiasts all discussion on the subject. When a more general zeal for the Roman Catholic faith pervaded the nominal followers of that religion, the Cisalpine party were predominant; but with the indifferentism which has now come over the industrious classes on the Continent, that party relaxed its exertions, and the ultramontanes remained still active in the field. The consequence was, that the whole Church had assumed that character, and a Gallican, or what was called a Cisalpine, is scarcely deemed a true Roman Catholic. The late proceedings taken in the name and by the authority of Rome were a necessary portion of this movement; they were attempts to bring the Roman Catholic establishment in this country into closer keeping with the
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character of the Church abroad; to give to the Roman Catholics here those ultramontane principles which govern the rampant Romanism of a party on the Continent; and to stifle and root out any liberalism which may have grown up of late years amongst the Roman Catholics of this country. It was an attempt to substitute what was Roman for what was merely Catholic, and to bring over the whole body of the laity (who were well satisfied with their position of equal civil rights) to the narrow-minded, illiberal opinions maintained by a few bigoted converts, who, by their fanaticism, had done more injury to their adopted religion than they had done harm to the faith of their fathers by leaving it; it was an attempt to inoculate with the extravagance and prejudices of those late-converted zealots, those honourable, straightforward Catholics of ancient family who were proud to conform and act up to the spirit of the free and independent constitution of these realms—it was an attempt to introduce priestly rule into what was purely secular, to put the laity beneath the foot of the clergy, and to give to the spiritual power what naturally belongs to the temporal authority. It was, above all, an attempt to introduce, what he hoped he should never see, the interference of the Church of Rome in the educational establishments of this country—to root out of Ireland all schools founded on liberal principles, and open to all persuasions—to destroy the Queen's Colleges, those greatest of blessings ever bestowed on Ireland—to undermine the national system of education, and thus, as it were, to build a wall round Roman Catholics, within which their minds could be trained in the doctrines of absolutism, and that system of blind obedience, which was the cornerstone of Rome—a wall which might successfully exclude those lights of science and literature which encouraged free judgment and free investigation—a wall, in fine, within which something in the way of an Index Expurgatorius might be established, which would guard Roman Catholics from everything in modern discovery or scientific progress, which, while it illustrated and reflected the spirit of the age, clashed with the obsolete doctrines and mediaeval prejudices of infallible Rome. This movement was a part of that system which suppressed chairs of modern sciences at Bologna—which warred against the Universities of France and Germany—which declared astronomy to be deism, and

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geology to be materialism—which forbids to its disciples half the literature of Europe, and bans as infidelity all modern philosophy. The end sought for by the promoters of this system was to crush all freedom of conscience and spirit of independence; and because it tended to destroy civil as well as religious liberty, the friends of absolutism, and the advocates of despotic thrones had combined to give it their temporary support. He (Lord Beaumont) believed that they were adopting an unwise policy in so doing, for though they intended only to use ultramontanism as an instrument to forward their own worldly ends, they would find it a weapon which, however dexterously handled, would break in their hands and wound themselves. They thought to gain to their own purposes the clergy and zealous portion of the followers of Rome, and to use their adherence as a tool for opposing the yearnings after liberty in the rising generation. It was for this that Austria had abandoned the wise and useful laws of Joseph II., and it was for this that Tuscany had allowed to be repealed the equally wise institutions of Leopold II. It was for this that both Austria and Tuscany had allowed religious bigotry to disturb those provinces, which before had, in consequence of the law to which he had referred, been, as far as religious questions were concerned, in a comparatively happy and contented state. Now, he (Lord Beaumont) firmly believed that what he had stated was the true character of this movement, and that the special act, to meet which the present Bill was prepared, was a part, and an important part, of that movement. In this full conviction he could not hesitate for a moment to join heartily in any attempt to protest against this daring invasion on the liberties of Europe—this war on the rights of conscience—this war on the principle of free judgment—this war on the very soul of civil and religious liberty—this war against literature and science—in fine, this attempt to force the world hack to the barbarism of the middle ages. He did not regard this Bill as a mere enactment against names or the assumption of titles of honour; he looked upon it as a declaration of principle, It was the expression of the will of this country; it was a declaration of national independence in spiritual as well as in temporal concerns. It was an avowal of our determination to oppose all interference with freedom of thought; it was, above all, a protest on the
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part of this free country against the attempt made to enslave the mind of Europe. A breach of international law had been committed, and an insult offered to the Crown. Government could not remain totally inactive under the circumstances. They must have done something. He would not say that what they had done was precisely that which he should have wished to have seen them do; but there was no choice, and he therefore accepted the measure of the Government in the light of a protest; not a very strong protest, but still a protest, against the spirit of absolutism of which Rome was the fountain-head, and of which the recent Bull was the exponent. He confessed that the details of the measure were not much to his taste. Had he been possessed of sufficient influence, or been the person to have acted in the matter, he would have humbly advised and have pursued a different course. He would have embodied the feeling of the country in a much more solemn and formal protest than the feeble document before them. He would have left pseudo titles and pretended sees unnoticed in their insignificance, and not have legislated against non-existing, though pretended jurisdictions: he would, however, have called to account the real offender, that is, the foreign Sovereign himself. He believed that he had never before in his life agreed with a noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Winchilsea); but on the present occasion he fully coincided in an opinion that noble Earl had expressed in a letter published some months ago. He would, as that noble Earl suggested, have sent a right-trusty servant of the Crown to Rome, and there have demanded a full explanation of the Pope's conduct, and, if need be, ample reparation for the insult. Had this course been pursued at an earlier period, much of the agitation which had shaken the friendly relations of different sects might have been avoided. He did not deny that that agitation had been natural, and even desirable, inasmuch as it was an expression of the national will; but in some instances it had degenerated into sectarian violence, and given occasion to the utterance of language breathing a dangerous spirit of rancour and bigotry. He was disgusted as well as grieved to hear Protestants who professed the doctrines of free judgment, giving vent to unnecessary narrow-minded and intolerant expressions of religious fanaticism. But the intolerance of some and the arrogance

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of others, was no reason why he should not do his duty by the country, and give his vote according to his conscience. They all knew that as far as the penalties went, the Bill would be a dead letter; but that was not a great demerit in his point of view, for it was as a protest, and a protest alone, that he gave his vote in favour of it. He had now, he trusted, clearly stated both his views of the case, and motives of his conduct. If in doing so he had used any expression which could give offence to any party, either within doors or out, he begged to assure those parties that no such offence was intended. He was anxious for the fullest as well as the most free discussion of the subject, and of his opinions of it. He was ready to listen to the objections and the views of others, in fact he wished the truth of the case to be elicited, and he would assure the noble Lords on the bench below the gangway, that he had their interests at heart, and would do nothing which he believed would injure them; but he must remind them that he had also the interests of the whole community at heart, and that he would do nothing to injure that great British society of which he as well as they were members. It was gratifying to him to have been allowed to have unfolded his mind at such length, and he begged in conclusion to thank their Lordships for the attention and patience with which they had listened to him.
The DUKE of WELLINGTON: My Lords, it was my fortune many years ago to prevail on you to accept the Roman Catholic Relief Act, and I have felt it my duty on all occasions, and under various circumstances, to object to any legislation which interfered with that measure. All its provisions were well considered at the time. They were founded on the petitions presented to Parliament by the Roman Catholics, with the view of obtaining an Act of that kind. All the endeavours which for thirty years had been made in order to obtain what were called securities for the Church, accompanying concessions to the Roman Catholics, were taken into consideration, and after all the Catholic Relief Bill was proposed to your Lordships, and carried through both Houses of Parliament by the aid of very large majorities. I shall always feel it my duty to maintain the provisions of that measure; and, I confess, I viewed with alarm, and felt great concern at, the Bull and other papers which appeared in the course of last year, and
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under which a hierarchy was appointed by the Pope, and those other proceedings adopted which have occasioned the Bill now proposed to your Lordships by the Government, whose organ is the noble Marquess opposite, because it was apparent to me that it was absolutely impossible to pass over these things without having recourse to some fresh act of legislation. The Pope himself is a man of mild character—he was a popular individual—he sought popularity on all occasions, and he states in the very Rescript which he sent to this country that he was sensible there were two modes of providing for superior ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Roman Catholics in this country, and he discussed in this very paper those two modes of obtaining the object he had in view. One of those modes was the appointment of vicars-apostolic, and the other the appointment of Cardinal Wiseman to the Archdiocess of Westminster; thus creating an archdiocess in a district which includes the Queen's Palace and the seat of the Legislature, and, moreover, establishing in this island a regular Roman Catholic hierarchy, with the seat of an archbishop and several bishops. The Pope took this latter course, and relinquished the old mode of effecting his object, which had been recognised and approved by the Government of this country. Under these circumstances—the character of the Pope being such as I have described—I confess I was anxious to know what could have been the motive for the preference given to the new mode of proceeding. The noble Lord who addressed you just now, with so much honour to himself, knowing the position of the Roman Catholics—knowing the state of opinion at Rome—being sensible that a desire is entertained to stifle liberal opinions in this country, thought he perceived the drift of the Rescript in reading it. For myself, however, I confess I could not discover the drift of the proceeding until I read the attack made by Cardinal Wiseman on the Dean and Chapter of Westminster. Then it occurred to me what was the object aimed at. It was the old object of antagonism to the Established Church of this country, and the course was taken by the advice of Cardinal Wiseman, as he himself states. At the same time at which Cardinal Wiseman published the Rescript which notified his own promotion, he made an attack, entirely undeserved, on the Dean and Chapter of Westminster. I then could doubt no longer as to the ob-

1115
ject of Rome, and I saw clearly that something like this Bill which I now hold in my hand must be brought under the consideration of your Lordships, or that I must give my consent to certain alterations of the terms of the Relief Act. My Lords, I cannot concur in the proposition of my noble Friend that the Bill shall be read a second time this day six months. Circumstances have occurred which render it impossible for you to return to the position in which you stood before this act of the Pope was committed. The object of the passing of the Relief Act was to repeal all the laws adopted against the Roman Catholics, first at the Reformation; next, at the time of what was called the Popish Plot; and, thirdly, in consequence of the Popish reign of James II., and the War of Succession in Ireland, out of which, and its consequences, grew all the penal enactments against Catholics in that country. It was, I say, the object of the Relief Act to get rid of these altogether. But those who brought forward that Act—those who urged your Lordships and the other House to support it—repeatedly stated that nothing therein touched the laws on which the Reformation was founded. That was cautiously avoided. When we, the authors and promoters of the Relief Act, were charged with having touched the Reformation, we distinctly proved the contrary, and showed that we had done nothing to affect the laws by which the Reformation was established in this country. In 1846, however—in the reign of the present Queen—certain old statutes were repealed, and among them one relating to the introduction of Bulls into this country. If that law had not been repealed, it would have been impossible that the act of the Pope could have taken effect, and, consequently, all fresh legislation would have been unnecessary. Cardinal Wiseman would not have dared to come to England and published the Pope's Bull or Rescript, establishing the new hierarchy. The thing was impossible; it could not have happened. Under these circumstances, I say you cannot return to the position in which you stood when the Roman Catholic Relief Act was passed, or before the Act of 1846 passed, which repealed the penalties attaching to all the Acts with which it dealt, but left the acts themselves standing as misdemeanours. The legislation on the subject stands in this state, that misdemeanours may be committed, but cannot be punished. Under these circumstances, I say you cannot stand on the Relief Act,
1116
but must pass a measure to meet the particular act of the Pope complained of, and to prevent the repetition of such acts in future. I have no desire to infringe the religious privileges of the Roman Catholics; on the contrary, I wish them to enjoy every means of following their religion with perfect freedom. I would wish to make no alteration in the Relief Act, but I do not see how this measure can be avoided. I confess I view without apprehension the effect which this measure may have in Ireland. We have had a good deal of experience of the effect produced in Ireland by measures passed by the Legislature. There was the Relief Act. A great deal was expected from that, and it was said that it would put an end to agitation in Ireland for ever. But in the very year—nay, I believe, almost in the very month in which it became the law of the land, Irish agitation recommenced. How often, since then, has the Crown, from time to time, had occasion to complain of agitation in Ireland? How often has the Crown come to Parliament to demand additional powers for the purpose of putting down the agitation, or worse than agitation, existing in that country—the Relief Act notwithstanding? My advice to your Lordships is to do that which is just and necessary to maintain the power and prerogatives of the Crown, and to protect the subjects of this country, and no more; and you may rely on it you will have the support and good wishes of the loyal people of Ireland as well as of this country. Having the misfortune on this occasion to differ from my noble Friend the noble Earl who addressed your Lordships second in the debate, I felt it necessary to trouble you with these few words, to show on what grounds I intend to support the Motion for the second reading of this Bill.
The EARL of MALMESBURYwas understood to say, that if he thought the measure was calculated to be at all hurtful to the feelings of his Roman Catholic fellow-subjects, he should not vote for it. But all fear of interfering with their religious principles or privileges had been removed by the speech of one of the most distinguished of its members which he had just heard. His feelings on the subject were those of millions of the people of this country. He admitted that the character of the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen), and the distinguished positions he had occupied, entitled his opinions to great weight; but, at the same time, as Secre-

1117
tary of State of a former Administration, it was his duty to see that the honour of this country should not be attacked or insulted by a foreign Power. Now, the present question he took to be this—that the Pope, a temporal prince, had, in the appointment of those bishops, in the face of Europe, and in the teeth of that great empire, declared that England was his fief, and that he would divide and govern it. It was to prevent the repetition of such an aggression that he recognised the necessity of the present Bill. He knew of no other country in which such conduct would have been tolerated; and he must say that the forms of common civility and common courtesy had been violated by such an unauthorised interference in the affairs of this country. The terms used in the Rescript were not usual in the case of one Sovereign addressing another; nor were they generally used by the Pope himself in addressing other Sovereigns. The noble Earl said, they ought to have attacked the man who had made the aggression upon them, and not their fellow-countrymen. Now, when the noble Earl was at the head of the Foreign Department, he had always considered him a peacefully-disposed person; but it would seem that, if he had been now in office, he would have adopted some other means of redress than the present. If the aggression was not met by an Act of Parliament, he (the Earl of Malmesbury) could conceive no other way in which it could be met sensibly and usefully than by sending one of Her Majesty's fleets to Ancona. The Government, at the same time, might have explained to other friendly Powers that they had no other intention in doing so than to oblige the Pope to retract those appointments which he had no right to make. That would have been the only other course, and that course he thought the noble Earl would never have consented to take. He need not remind their Lordships that in Queen Anne's reign, when an English nobleman was anxious to have included in his titles a French castle and town in Normandy, a correspondence took place between him and the Secretary of State, and it was considered right and proper, before the patent was made out, to obtain the consent of the French King. That principle had always been recognised. He believed if the present measure was properly applied and carried out, it would prevent the repetition of these proceedings, and he should with pleasure vote
1118
in support of Her Majesty's Government, although he did not entirely agree in the course they had adopted. He could have earnestly wished that his noble Friend—he meant a noble Earl who was not then in his place (the Earl of Derby)—had been there to explain again, as he had done once before, what his plan would have been in dealing with this question. The noble Earl stated that his line of proceeding would have been, first a declaratory resolution, by which he would have shown the Pope the feeling of the people of this country; and after that, having met the first head of the offence—the insult to Her Majesty, and the invasion of Her rights—after that, he would have obtained, by inquiry in both Houses, what position Her Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects really stood in both before and since the recent proceedings of the Pope. He thought the course suggested by the noble Earl might yet be followed out in another Session—for their Lordships could not rest content with this Bill, which dealt with only one part of the aggression. There were many points connected with the position of the Roman Catholic Church in this country which, in his opinion, called for serious inquiry. There was, for instance, the synodical power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which might be brought to bear on the minds of the Roman Catholic laity, in opposition to the laws and institutions of the empire. He thought, too, that it was very desirable to ascertain whether, after the changes which had recently been introduced into the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church in this country, Roman Catholics stood in the same position in which they had previously been placed; and if it should be found that they did, then the fears of the great mass of the people would be greatly diminished. Another fitting subject for inquiry was the state of the monastic establishments. Then, again, he thought it ought to be made clear what was the position of a Cardinal in England, that was to say, of a privy councillor of Rome, residing and exercising high spiritual functions in this country. All these points might, he believed, be even still advantageously investigated by Committees of both Houses of Parliament. But he would not trouble their Lordships any further. He thanked them for the attention with which they had listened to him; and, in conclusion, he had only to state that he felt much pleasure in supporting the Bill

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which had been introduced by Her Majesty's Ministers, and which, he rejoiced to find, had been strengthened by the Amendments of some Friends of his in the other House of Parliament.
VISCOUNT CANNINGsaid, he felt that the principle of religious liberty, which most of them had been in the habit of considering as secure in the constitution of the country, was, as rightly understood, involved in the present question. It was with some surprise he had heard the noble Marquess state in his opening speech that the matter with which their Lordships had to deal was the conduct of a foreign Power which had put dishonour on this country, and which had not been followed by any expression of an inclination to mitigate the offence. Surely the House would have a right to demand an explanation of the steps taken by Her Majesty's Ministers under such extraordinary circumstances, and to expect that they resorted to the usual measures of statesmen when a dishonour was placed upon the State. But the noble Marquess had most carefully avoided saying that the act of the Pope was an offence against the laws of nations, which had this peculiarity about it, that it pointed out, beyond all doubt, the mode in which it was to be vindicated. If it could be made out that a taint had been put on the honour of England, the proposal to send out a fleet to Ancona, little as was the favour it had met with in public, would have been really the proper course to have been adopted. He did not approve of direct hostility; but he thought Her Majesty's Government should show they had taken the other modes of obtaining redress through the representations of foreign friendly Powers, and had given the opportunity to the Pope of retracing his steps. They had been told no nation had offered to represent the feelings of England in this matter. Why, none of them had been asked; and how was the Pope to be made aware diplomatically of the offence he had given without such a communication; or did they expect him to take the initiative and recall his own acts? The noble Marquess had expressed an opinion on a former occasion that the act of the Pope was an usurpation; but he had not repeated the expression. A usurpation meant the assumption wrongfully of property belonging to another, and in that sense he could not understand how the Pope had been guilty of this offence. It would not be said he had assumed any power which belonged to the
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Crown. He had constituted here a hierarchy of his own Church. Could the Queen have done that? No, certainly not; and, so far from being able to create a hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, She was debarred almost from any communication with them or the Pope whatever. If the Pope committed an act of usurpation or of infringement, why was not the law enforced against those who were directed by him; as, for instance, in the case they had heard of St. David's see? He did not deny an insult had been committed; on the contrary, he admitted it; but the insult had been committed, not against the Crown or the nation, but against the Church of this country. He did not speak of the high flown bombastic language of Cardinal Wiseman, or with any reference to religious feeling. As far as one individual—and, he was afraid, a vain-glorious individual—was concerned, they might pass over his gratuitous insult, in his not very intelligible letter, in silence, and he certainly was not disposed to bring the machinery of Parliament to bear against it.
The DUKE of ARGYLL:* My Lords, at this late hour of the night, I shall proceed, without one word of preface, to deal with the main arguments before us. So far as these are represented in the speech of the noble Earl near me, who moved the rejection of this Bill, there are some to which I shall attempt no reply. First of all we had the argumentumad hominem, directed against the noble Lord at the head of the Government, founded on certain previous speeches of that noble Lord, and pointing to the conclusion that between his former course in relation to such questions—and generally the course of the great party with which he is identified—and the principles on which they are now acting, there is, to say the least of it, an apparent discrepancy. My Lords, with this argument I feel no interest in dealing. It has nothing to with the grounds on which the great majority of this House will, I trust, be prepared to vote. Neither do I conceive that we are called upon to deal with the arguments addressed by the noble Earl to the bench of Bishops. For my own part, I not only agree in the objections urged by the noble Earl against the manner in which some of the right rev. Prelates have sought to oppose the aggression of the Pope; but I avow my opinion, that principles have in some cases been propounded by them, involving everything that is most obnoxious and most fallacious in

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the pretensions of the Romish priesthood. With all this, however, we have nothing now to do. But since the noble Earl has dwelt so much upon the previous admissions of others, will he allow me respectfully to address a similar argument to himself. It may be in the recollection of the House that at an early period of the Session, during the Ministerial crisis, I took occasion to express the feeling, which I still entertain, of satisfaction that no Government had been formed in England on the basis of passing over, in total silence, an act which was in violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, both of the public law Of Europe, and of the municipal law of this country. The noble Earl immediately took occasion to complain, with some warmth, of the assumption—which he seemed to think injurious—that such would have been his course. He emphatically denied that he would have passed over in total silence the Papal act of which we now complain. In some form or other—though in what form he has never yet explained—the noble Earl seemed therefore emphatically to admit that the Government of this country must notice and protest against the act referred to. Now mark, my Lords, the consequences of this admission. We have before us, in that aggression, two documents only—one a Papal Rescript, the other a Pastoral Address by Dr. Wiseman. So far as the mere offensiveness of expression is concerned, the objection principally refers to the Pastoral. But I cannot believe that the noble Earl would have felt it consistent with his own high position, as a Minister of the Crown, to have called upon the Government or upon Parliament in any form whatever to condescend to notice the ridiculous pomposities of a proud and foolish priest. It must, therefore, have been the other document—the Papal Rescript—and not the Pastoral of Dr. Wiseman, that the noble Earl felt ought to be, and required to be, noticed in some form or other by the Government of England. Well—but what is it in that Rescript against which we are called upon to protest? Not the mere terms in which it is conceived, for the noble Earl has himself argued that its terms are nothing but the ordinary and usual terms used by Papal arrogance on all similar occasions. It follows, then, that it must be the act itself—the deed done by that Rescript, the giving of the titles, not the mere terms in which it was conceived—that the noble Earl would have felt imperatively called upon to
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notice in some form or other. But if the giving of those titles were perfectly legitimate—a purely spiritual act—why should the Government have noticed it at all? I come to the conclusion, then, that the noble Earl himself admits that the act of the Pope had in it something seriously objectionable—that it was not a perfectly legitimate exertion of merely spiritual power—but an act of such a character that silence on the part of the English Government would have been improper or impossible.
This being granted, the only question now for the House to decide is, whether the form of our national notice of this act of the Pope shall be legislative or not?—whether there is any principle which deprives us of the right of prohibiting by law the assumption of those titles, the pretended grant of which is admitted by most, if not by all, to have been a just occasion of offence. I shall not now argue on the particular form of prohibition adopted by the Government—or rather the mode in which they propose to enforce that prohibition. I wish now to argue on the point of principle, whether we have a right to prohibit by law the assumption of these titles; or whether there is ground for the strong language held by the noble Earl, that such prohibition is "unjust." My Lords, I seek for some general principle to justify such language; something which constitutes that prohibition necessarily in itself unjust. I see what the supposed principle is—I recognise it as having been involved in part of the speech of the noble Earl. First of all, it is said, that as we tolerate the Roman Catholics in the exercise of their faith, we are bound to tolerate everything requisite for the full and complete organisation of their Church: and when to this it is objected, that every country in Europe has found it needful to place restrictions more or less stringent on that full organisation, the reply is this—those restrictions are founded on no other right than that derived either from concordats, or from the fact of secular endowments being attached to the offices of that Church. Where no such concordats or no such endowments exist, no such right of restriction can belong to the civil government. The noble Earl did not lay down this principle quite so broadly as I am now doing, but he did refer to concordats as the basis on which those restrictions actually rested; and I find in the "Address of the Catholic Laity," that they emphatically take the

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ground, that they can be justified on no other grounds whatever. If the noble Earl declines to follow the argument to this extent, he, in fact, declines to found it on the only principle which bears at all on the question of right now before us. I proceed, therefore, to deal with it in the form in which it does bear on that question of right—in that which is logically taken by the Catholic laity—in that which, more or less unconsciously, more or less obscurely, is really involved in the reasonings of Protestant opponents of this measure.
My Lords, I deny that it is true, either historically or theoretically, that the restrictions put by all the Governments of the Christian world on the full organisation of the Romish system were founded ill any respect whatever, either on what are called State endowments, or on concordats with the Pope. Remember, my Lords, that we are now dealing with a theoretical explanation of an historical fact, which Romanists find it impossible to deny, and which they therefore endeavour to explain away. Let us remember, my Lords, that as a language must have arisen before its grammar can be written, so systems, of law have arisen in fact, before their principle has come to be explained in theory. It might have been true that ecclesiastical restrictions existed nowhere except in connection with the conditions referred to—without its having at all followed that the one was the actual cause or justification of the other—still more without its being true that from no other cause or justification could such restrictions have arisen, But I deny the fact, not less than the theory, of the connexion. It is not true that such restrictions have existed nowhere, except where there were endowments or concordats. It is not true that where these did co-exist, they were the historical origin of the restrictions. It is not true that when the theory of these restrictions came to be investigated by the great jurists of the Continent, they based them an the principle which is now asserted.
I appeal to the historical recollections of every noble Lord now present, whether the contentions which arose in every Christian State on the part of the Sovereign or the Government against the Romish priesthood, did not uniformly arise from an instinctive dread and jealousy of political dangers—arising out of the powerful action of a great organised hierarchy centralised under a foreign head. My Lords, I venture to as-
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sert as a matter of historical fact, that the ecclesiastical restrictions on the Romish Church have uniformly bad a national or political origin—that they were maintained to guard against political evils, and conger quently that, however they may have been made the subject of contest or of compromise, they take their origin in the essential rights of every civil Government in the—worlds—rights independent of, and anterior to, any agreement whatever with external powers. My Lords, I have high authority for the ground which I am now taking—both historical and judicial, Even in this country, where the restrictions upon the Romish Church have been severer than, in any other, their origin was the same—referring to the same kind of danger—and based on the same abstract rights. In one of the earliest of those magnificent speeches in which Mr. Canning conducted the cause of Catholic Emancipation, I find the following sentence; "In every stage of our preceding history, not religious tenets, but political disaffection, was the cause of the severities against Catholics; the penal code was not intended to exclude the believers in transubstantiation as a. sect, but to repress, pr disarm, or punish them as traitors,"
In every country it has been the same—in most the restriction being confined to the full organisation of the priesthood as the fountain-head of the dangerous claims against which it was desired to guard. I trust your Lordships have read those remarkable documents which have been lately reprinted—being the result of the labours of a Select Committee of the other House, appointed so long ago as 1816–17, to inquire into the laws affecting the Roman Catholic Church in the various nations of Europe. Among them your Lordships will find some forwarded by the late Sir Robert Gordon, relative to those laws in the kingdom of Austria. One of the great juridical works, most approved in that country, entitled, Enchiridion Juris Ecclesiastici Austriaci—and written by the Chancellor of the Bishopric of Lintz—lays down the principle that the right of the Sovereign to exercise control over the organisation of the Romish priesthood, rests entirely on the political dangers which the unrestricted action of that priesthood might entail; and comes to the same conclusion to which I have ventured to point the attention of the House, expressing it in these words: "A Catholic Sovereign has as Sovereign; neither more nor less rights and duties than

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another Sovereign who follows another Confession of Faith." Another great Continental Jurist, speaking on the same subject, says, emphatically, "To assert the right, there is, therefore, no occasion to look for an agreement between the Pope and the Sovereign."—Van Aspen,
Just conceive, my Lords, the consequences of admitting any other principle. Those States in which the Romish Church enjoys great privileges guaranteed by law—endowments, or of whatever other nature they maybe—are precisely the States which have least to dread from the hostile political influence of its priesthood; yet under the argument, these are the only States which are entitled to guard against such dangers. Those, on the other hand, in which the Romish Church is unrecognised by the law—States, whose institutions are Protestant—are precisely those which have most to dread from the dangerous powers which that Church is ever claiming, and ceaselessly endeavouring to usurp. They are, therefore, precisely the States which are most entitled, and most bound, to watch with jealousy, and restrict with firmness, the full organisation of its ecclesiastical system: and yet on the principle against which I am now arguing, such are the only States whose hands are tied. I repeat then, my Lords, that as it is neither true as a matter of history, nor sound as a principle of law, nor consistent with common sense, as a matter of reason and argument, that the right of civil Governments to restrict more or less the full organisation of the Romish ecclesiastical system stands on any lower ground than their own inherent authority to guard against every form of danger to their own Jaws and institutions—so we may safely feel assured that all the denunciations we have heard against the "injustice" of this proposed prohibition of certain territorial titles are based on assumptions utterly inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which the liberties of every State in Europe have been founded and maintained.
I pass, then, from the question of our right so to deal with the obnoxious titles, and would at once proceed to consider the arguments derived from the supposed inconsistency of this course with our own previous concessions to the Romish Church, were I not anxious to notice, first, another argument derived from an assumed analogy between that Church and other religious bodies. The noble Earl has himself, to-
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night, confined that analogy to the case of the Episcopal Church in Scotland; but by others it has been extended on the same principle to Wesleyans, to the Free Church of Scotland, and various other religious bodies. In respect to the Episcopal Church in Scotland, I freely admit to the noble Earl, that as the spirit and meaning in which the Bishops of that Church sometimes assume certain titles is equally offensive with that displayed by Dr. Wiseman, so it is equally our right, if it were worth our while, to prohibit that assumption; and waiving, for the present, the particular form in which such prohibition ought to be enforced, I, for one, have no objection to see it extended to the Episcopal Church in Scotland; but I protest against the argument, that because we do issue a prohibition in the one case, we are bound as a matter of principle to issue it in another. It is a mere confusion of thought to confound together the ecclesiastical districts of most religious bodies with the territorial claims asserted, and meant to be asserted, in the usurped titles of the Romish priesthood. Every "diocese" is indeed an ecclesiastical district, but every ecclesiastical district is not a diocese in the meaning attached to that word by that priesthood; and I deny that we can be called upon even seriously to debate the question, whether because ecclesiastical divisions of some kind or another are common to all, or almost all, religious communities, we are therefore bound to treat on the same footing, and with the same precautions, the clergy or ministries of any Protestant Dissenting Church, and that vast organised hierarchy, which for more than a thousand years has forced every Government in the Christian world into an attitude of self-defence.
And here, my Lords, I would impress on the attention of the House that you may be entitled and called upon to deal with one religious body in a manner very different from that in which you deal with others, in consequence of a difference between them in matters almost purely spiritual. Take, for example, the case of excommunication. If it is the religious belief of any body that such censure ought to debar from all Christian communion, and if, owing to that belief—in itself purely spiritual, that is to say, touching a matter of religious duty and obligation—its priesthood becomes invested with dangerous powers, you may deal with, and you do deal with, such a Church in a manner which would be grossly tyrannical in the

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case of other Churches whose religious belief on this matter is different. But then what becomes of the abstract principle laid down by so many of those who oppose this Bill—which we have had dinned into our ears week after week, and month after month, since this question arose, namely, that because we tolerate the Roman Catholic religion, we are therefore bound to tolerate the full and regular exercise of its ecclesiastical system? No function is more essential to the full organisation of a Church than the power of exclusion from its own communion; and if, on the fatal principle so carelessly asserted, you gave free reins to the Romish Church, none would be so dangerously, because none so powerfully, exerted. My Lords, I am dealing with no imaginary case. I hold in my hands a report of a most remarkable trial which took place in the North of Ireland, in 1844. The circumstances were these: a member of the Roman Catholic Church took it into his head that he might read the Bible in his native tongue. He next took it into his head that, as he might read it for himself, so also he might read it to others. Of course he incurred the enmity of his priest, who, after many endeavours to drive him from this evil practice, threatened finally the penalties of excommunication. He was a member of the Romish Church; he was amenable, in virtue of that membership, to its laws, and he was committing against those laws a great spiritual offence. At last, therefore, the sentence was pronounced—in the forms prescribed by the system of his Church. A bell was rung—a book was shut—a light extinguished; and, in conclusion, these horrible and blasphemous words were uttered from the altar: "My curse and God's curse upon Charles M'Loughlin, and upon all that work in the same field with him, or eat at the same table." My Lords, the effect of this excommunication, acting, be it observed, solely through the feelings of religious obligation entertained by the members of the same Church—was, that the man was nearly ruined. No one would deal with him—hardly speak to him. He was an alien in his own country, and among his own kin. But this was merely an indirect effect—the result of religious obedience to an authority acting in foro conscientiœ. Well, an action for damages was brought against the priest; and what was his defence? My Lords, if the opponents of this Bill had been retained for that defence, they could not more accurately have re-
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counted the arguments adopted, and the principles assumed by the lawyer who actually conducted it. You tolerate the Roman Catholic religion; you are bound to tolerate the full and free exercise of its regular ecclesiastical system—this is the principle which has been urged over and over again. Now let me quote the words of the counsel in the case in question:—
"This practice of excommunication is part of the rules or discipline of the Roman Catholic Church, and cannot affect Protestants. The plaintiff voluntarily submitted to the rules of the Roman Catholic Church: these rules are recognised by law, and the defendant had as good a right to exercise them as the minister of any other Church had to carry out the discipline of the body to which he belonged. By several recent Acts—the Charitable Bequests Act for instance—the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church is recognised," &c., &c.
Fortunately, my Lords, there was a Judge upon the bench, and there was a jury in the box, who repudiated such principles, and the priest was fined some seventy pounds. I understand the cheer of the noble Lords who oppose this Bill. I never supposed that they would entertain any other feeling than satisfaction on account of this result; but then, I say, be more cautious in the statement of your abstract principles. I admit that our existing law is strong enough to prevent the exercise of that particular part of the Romish ecclesiastical system, however necessary it may be to its full and free organisation and government. But this is the very point of my argument. Why is our law strong enough to do so? Precisely because it repudiates the principle so often founded on by the opponents of the Bill; and I contend that that principle, if logically pursued, not merely dictates the rejection of this new law—proposed to meet a new case—but the repeal of existing laws, admitted by all parties to be essential to the peace and safety of society.
I now pass, my Lords, to objections to this Bill of another kind—not founded on assumed general principles, but on the special concessions already made by our law to the Roman Catholic Church. Foremost among the arguments of this class stands that which has been dwelt upon by the noble Earl to-night: I mean the argument derived from the Roman Catholic Relief Act. The noble Earl said he had been one of those who assisted in the preparation and passing of that Act, and that he specially objects to this measure because it tends injuriously to interfere with

1129
the settlement then come to, and that in this respect he specially dreaded its effects in Ireland. I ask your Lordships to judge of the force of this argument, when you remember that that very Act to which the noble Earl refers—that Act to which he was more than a mere consenting party—has a penal clause against the territorial titles of the Irish Roman Catholic bishops, and that, so far as regards Ireland, this Bill will have absolutely no effect whatever, beyond that of extending to two Romish bishoprics, not strictly coming under the terms of that Act, the same prohibition which it applied to all the other existing Romish bishoprics in that country. I see no objection in principle whatever against the prohibitions proposed in this Bill, which would not have applied with equal force to the prohibitions contained in the Relief Act. There is, indeed, one difference between the two cases: the bishoprics in Ireland were of ancient and venerable date, and the people of that country had been accustomed, I believe from time immemorial, to designate their bishops under the territorial titles which the Relief Act prohibited; whereas those which we now propose to disallow under the same penalty, are certainly entitled to no favour from their age, and are open to infinite objection as regards the manner in which, and the occasion on which, authority has been assumed to found them.
I proceed, then, to another Act on which much stress has not, I think, been laid by the noble Earl to-night, but which has been greatly relied on by others elsewhere who are opposed to this measure. I refer to the Roman Catholic Bequest Act, passed in 1844. I hardly know what consequences have not been assumed to follow from certain forms of expression used in that enactment, in respect to the orders and succession of the Romish priesthood. Of one thing, however, I feel sure, that if there be any noble Lords, or any right hon. Gentlemen, who are more bound than others to see that no construction be put on the terms of that Act which shall interfere with the right of Parliament to guard, whenever it may deem it needful to do so, against the evils to be dreaded from the unrestricted development of the Romish ecclesiastical system, they are those who brought in that Act Under the Government of the late Sir Robert Peel. My Lords, the history of a part of that enactment is remarkable. As the Bill was
1130
originally framed and introduced into the House of Commons, the Bishops of the Roman Catholics were not even designated as bishops. "Persons in holy orders of the Church of Rome" was the nearest approach which it was deemed prudent to make in describing their spiritual rank. In passing through Committee in that House, it was urged on the right hon. Baronet, then Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir J. Graham), by the Roman Catholic Members, that this intended omission of the natural designation of their priesthood would be construed as a positive affront—that it would be more courteous and respectful to the adherents of that religion if a less jealous spirit were displayed. The concession was made. "Bishops" and "Archbishops"—not of places or territories, but simply as over flocks belonging to their own communion—were words admitted into the Bill; and I beg your Lordships to attend to the words in which Sir James Graham announced this concession to the House. "He had demurred, and he still demurred, to the right of the archbishop and bishops of the Roman Catholic Church claiming titles as affixed to certain localities and districts in Ireland, but having no other desire than, as far as was consistent with the maintenance of sound principles, to tender that which might be acceptable to their Roman Catholic fellow-subjects, the Government were anxious to make that tender in the form most acceptable," &c. Here, my Lords, we see not merely that the Bequests Act does not, in fact, use or sanction those territorial titles which are now treated sometimes as beneath the notice, at others as above the reach, of Parliamentary prohibitions, but we see farther that the omission of everything construeable into such use or sanction was not a matter of accident, but was deliberately weighed and considered, as involving a question of "important principle."
My Lords, I would here call upon the House to observe, in connexion with our previous concessions to our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects, that two lines of argument have been taken against this Bill, which are in direct contradiction to each other. In one breath, we are told that we have no right to interfere with or restrict their ecclesiastical system, because they are in this country nothing more than a merely tolerated sect—that they enjoy no advantages—no position recognised by the law—that they are to be, therefore,

1131
treated as the Wesleyans or any other religious body, in this respect similarly placed. In the next breath, we are not unfrequently told that we have already gone so far in giving legal recognition to their prelates, to their titles of archbishop and bishop, and to their succession—that we have so formally facilitated them in the acquisition, and secured them in the enjoyment and transmission of corporate property—that we have no right now to turn round and impede them in the full and free completion of their regular priestly system. I am not now dealing with the form in which the argument has been put by any Member of your Lordships' House—although I think something of the same incongruity has been involved in parts of the reasoning we have heard to-night—but I own I have been astonished at the boldness with which these two contradictory positions have been alternately relied on out of doors, as the convenience of the occasion required. Your Lordships have all, of course, seen two pamphlets, published by a learned gentleman, a member of the Roman Catholic Church, with the mysterious words, "By Authority," on the back. In one of these, the one line of argument is taken—in the other, the other. In that which pleads the extent to which we have already committed ourselves to the recognition of the Romish priesthood, after quoting various statutory concessions, Dr. Bowyer proceeds thus:—
"The question now arises, what consequences flow from this legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in the British Empire. That Church is not barely tolerated, but recognised by or known to the law of the land—not as a mere abstraction and a mere set of speculative opinions, but as a body of persons known to the law, and having certain essential and characteristic features, without which they would cease to be what they are, and the most prominent and (politically and legally) by far the most important of which is their adherence to the spiritual authority of the Roman See."
In another part of the same pamphlet, the same ingenious advocate tells us, "by authority," that, in consequence of another Act (Dublin Cemetery), we are bound to recognise
"Archbishop Murray, as exercising spiritual jurisdiction within the diocese of Dublin. His successors are included in the description. His spiritual jurisdiction within the diocese of Dublin is recognised."
And next, as a climax, we are informed
"The canon law is pro tanto recognised as prevailing in the diocese of Dublin, and to be administered by Archbishop Murray and his successors therein."
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Yet the writer of this pamphlet is not ashamed to tell us in another—also "by authority "—
"The law now regards the Catholic Church in England, not as the Church of England, but an a dissenting body, having no legal succession or benefices or dignities whatever."
And observe, my Lords, that though this last assertion is, in words, confined to "England," the previous assertion was extended to the whole1 "British Empire"—"a legal status" was asserted for the Roman Catholic Church in the "British Empire." But even if this distinction, between different parts of the empire were consistently adhered to, what bearing would it have on the two arguments against this measure? Ireland is specially the country where, according to one, we are least entitled to interfere, because that in which we have made to the Romish Church the largest and most definite concessions. Ireland, according to the other argument, taken for the case of England, is precisely the country where we are most entitled to put restrictions on its priesthood, because there we have placed it in nearest connexion with the law. My Lords, I will give the opponents of this measure the benefit of the distinction between England and Ireland; and the most logical conclusion, I take it, would be this: In England, we are free to adopt it, because we have no concessions which can even seem to stamp inconsistency on our course; in Ireland, we are specially bound to do so, because, whilst no concession we have made is really inconsistent with its provisions, every one of those concessions not only gives us a clearer right, but imposes on us an additional obligation to mark the point beyond which advance will be treated as usurpation.
My Lords, I protest against the arguments which have been derived from our past concessions to our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects. We have done quite enough to show towards them the largest spirit of justice and toleration; and to demand from them a scrupulous respect for our established institutions and principles of law. But we have done nothing—absolutely nothing—which can interfere in the slightest degree with our perfect right to restrict the full development of their ecclesiastical system wherever it shall appear to us to involve the recognition of principles dangerous either as regards the present or the future.
My Lords, I shall not long dwell on an

1133
argument of another kind which has been largely elaborated in another place, and has been alluded to by the noble Earl to-night. The establishment of territorial of diocesan bishoprics, we are told, in-instead of vicars-apostolic, is a great limitation of the power of the Pope, and was actually keenly desired on this very ground many years ago by the English Roman Catholics, with the full sympathy of the Government, In opposing this change now, therefore, it is argued, we are evidently favouring, rather than discouraging, Papal power. My Lords, I am astonished at this argument being brought forward by those who have urged it. What was the admission which accompanied it in another place?—that there is at present a great ultramontane reaction in the Roman Church—that the party attached to the principles usually described under this term are to complete ascendancy—and that all the measures of the Papal Court are dictated in that sense and spirit. Then are we to be told—even supposing that our policy ought to be guided by any Reference to such considerations—that that party, so powerful at present, does not itself know how its own interests may be best promoted—nay, that it is so stupid as to recommend measures which directly tend to the discouragement of its principles? My Lords, I should prefer, on a question of this nature, to trust the sagacity of the Romish party, in preference to the arguments, however ingenious, of Protestant Members of the British Parliament. But apart from this general trust, I cannot Say I see much force in the reasoning founded off the former feeling as to the tendency of this measure, No man who has looked into the history of the past can fail to have observed how one identical measure may be the exponent of one set of tendencies at one time, and of a directly contrary set of tendencies at another. Everything may depend on the manner in which, arid the circumstances under which, such Measure may be adopted and enforced. Nor is it difficult to see how, in this case, the manner and the circumstances will afford a splendid precedent for the unbounded pretensions of the Roman Pontiff. The new pretended Sees not only take their origin in the breath of the Pope, but are founded on his assumed right to abolish by the same breath all the ancient bishoprics of England! A stable basis, truly! for a National Church of Roman Catholics—disposed and enabled
1134
to resist the undue aggressions of Papal tyranny!
My Lords, in conclusion, I would entreat the House to mark, so that the country may thoroughly understand, that this measure is not brought forward on account of any advance, real or supposed, which the Roman Catholic religion, as a system of purely spiritual belief, propagated by purely spiritual means, may be making in this country. I unreservedly adhere to the principle, that the advance of error, as such, ought never to be met by the arms of power, I trust, and I believe, that the apparent advance to which I have referred, is the current of an eddy, and not the main current of the stream—I trust, and I believe, that it is the advance of a passing wave, and not the advance of a rising tide. But if my belief on this point were other than it is, I would still adhere to the opinion, that the floors of Parliament form no part whatever of the field on which such dangers must be met. But let us remember, my Lords, that the Romish Church is not a mere system of belief, propagated by purely spiritual means it is an organised system of government, aiming at commanding influence over the Whole range of human affairs; and by outward and visible assumptions of authority, fitted to impose on the imaginations of the vulgar—and not without their strange effect on minds of a higher class predisposed to superstitious feelings of respect—it is ceaselessly endeavouring to establish precedents on which it may convert mere influence into solid and legal power. Although, therefore, we roust leave to others, or to ourselves, acting in other capacities, the task of Contending against theological opinions, there is one thing, my Lords, which Parliament can, and Parliament is bound to do. Whatever advance the Roman Catholic Church may be destined to effect, it is dot duty to ourselves, and to the generations which are to follow, to see that that advance shall not be made by footsteps proudly trampling on the ancient principles of our public law, and the sacred prerogatives of this English Crown.
The EARL of AIRLIEnext addressed their Lordships, but he spoke in so low a tone, and the noise from conversation in the House was so great, that even the purport of his observations could not be gathered in the gallery, further than that he was Understood to support the Bill.
The BISHOP of ST. DAVID'Ssaid,

1135
that he had not risen immediately after the noble Duke, on account of the remarks which had fallen from him with reference to some Members of the right rev. Bench, because he felt that he himself was not at all affected by those remarks. But, though he was not in the habit of obtruding himself upon their Lordships, except on those rare occasions when he felt it to be inconsistent with his duty to remain silent, he had never been more anxious to say a few words in explanation of the grounds of the Vote he meant to give, than on the present occasion. One thing which he particularly wished to observe was, that if he had conceived this to be an occasion in which the interests of the Church of England wore alone or were chiefly concerned, he should hardly have desired to take any part in the debate. Whatever interest he might take in the question as an individual, it was not as a member, still less as a bishop of that Church, that he desired to address their Lordships. He conceived it to he very doubtful whether the interests of the Church of England were affected by the recent measure of the See of Rome. He was not sure whether the Church had sustained, or was likely to sustain, any injury from that measure; or whether the moral excitement which it had created in the country had not been, upon the whole, more favourable to those interests, than any measure that could possibly be passed by Parliament would be. If, however, this were not so, and if this, instead of being (as he considered it) a political question, were one of an ecclesiastical character, affecting the position, the privileges, the rights, and the interests of the Church of England, then he cordially concurred with the sentiments expressed by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) whose able speech had nearly exhausted the subject—that it was not to the Legislature that he would look for remedy or redress. He did not know whether, in this sentiment, he had the assent of his right rev. Brethren; but he believed he spoke their sentiments when he said that no provocation that could be offered them from without would ever induce them to wish to withdraw one jot or tittle of those privileges which had already been conceded to our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects in this country. In expressing that sentiment, he felt that he was only echoing those which were entertained by the great body of the clergy, as well as of the laity of our Church. He must, however, ac-
1136
knowledge that he had deeply sympathised with the feelings which had been so strongly excited throughout the country on the subject within the last few months, and he would take the liberty of briefly reminding their Lordships what were the causes of that excitement. He believed that there were three. In the first place, the people of this country had seen in the measure adopted by the See of Rome an extraordinary assumption of power. The language employed to express the nature of that measure carried their minds back to a period in our history when the Papal power was most absolute, and was exercised with the most pernicious and degrading influence on the liberties of the nation. If a Cardinal Legate had come to this country, preceded by a Pastoral, in the reign of King John, he could not have used language expressive of more absolute authority over this country in all its concerns, or greater superiority over the civil power of the realm, than was to be found in that Apostolic Brief of the Pope. Then, if the people of this country disliked the act in itself, they were not at all the more reconciled to it when they found that it was openly avowed to be only means towards an end, and that end the propagation of the Roman Catholic religion; for that was the avowed object of this aggression, and there was no pretence of any necessity to justify it. But this was not all. Offensive as the measure was, both in itself and in its professed object, the people of this country objected to it still more strongly because they looked upon it not as the last, but rather as the first, step in a long course of similar proceedings. Such had been the impression made upon his own mind, in common with most other persons, in the first instance, by the publication of the Papal Rescript. Yet he had suspended his judgment until he was enabled to compare it with the views and reasonings of other persons better qualified than himself to pronounce on the legal and political character of the measure, But after the most mature consideration he could give to the subject, he had been led to the conclusion that this act of the Church of Rome ought to be looked upon first as an insult, and next as an injury. As to the insult, there prevailed, both in and out of Parliament, as great a unanimity of opinion as had ever been expressed on any public question. Yet, strangely enough, he had seen his own name cited as an au-

1137
thority for the opinion that the act was not an insult, and it had been argued that before it could be properly construed as such, there must be proof of an intention to insult in the person who offered it. But he thought that nothing could be more fallacious than this reasoning: the argument was altogether inapplicable to this and to all similar cases. We could never enter into men's intentions: all we could do was to judge them by their words and actions. He certainly did not believe that there had been a deliberate intention on the part of the Pope to offer an insult to the Queen. That would have implied a strange mixture of folly and insolence in the Pope; and the more so, because it would have been utterly superfluous, inasmuch as any ambiguity in his expressions would be sure to be removed by his emissaries in this country, who would take care to give to his language, even if it was not offensive in itself, the most offensive interpretation; and the editors of the French and Irish papers had supplied the construction which should be put on the language of the Apostolic Brief. There was, however, no necessity for those aids, for the insult was obvious enough: it lay not in the language used, but in the act done; it consisted in passing over, in ignoring, in treating as non-existent, persons who had a right to be considered, who had a voice upon the question, who ought to have been consulted, and without whose concurrence and consent the measure ought not to have been adopted; so that the treating them as non-existent could not but be considered as an insult, whatever might have been the intention. But it had been said that, stripped of the swelling phraseology of the Roman Chancery, and the vapouring which appeared to be inseparable from documents emanating from the Court of Rome—which had been identified by the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) with arrogance itself—there was nothing either insulting or injurious in the Papal measure, and that it was neither an aggression nor an affront. He conceived, however, that there had been not only insult but injury, and that of a most grievous kind. They had often been asked to point out wherein consisted the harm and injury that would arise, either to the Church or to the State, from this measure of the Pope. But he contended that this was an argument which missed the point of the question, and that they were not obliged to point out
1138
all the remote consequences which might proceed from it in order to show it was injurious. If it had been established, as it appeared to be by preponderating authority, that the Papal Rescript was a violation of the law of the land, and that it assumed an authority to do that which no Sovereign in Europe had ever permitted to be done in his territory without his consent, that was sufficient for his purpose; it was not necessary to point out the precise character of the injury to be expected, or to prove that any injury would arise, or to trace out remote consequences; and he found the great weight of legal authority in favour of the position that, however harmless it might be in itself, and however small the change it might introduce into the condition of the Church, yet the arrogating a power which had always been reserved to the Sovereign of these realms, and which did not belong to any foreign Potentate, was an offence against our law, and against the law of nations. If it were said that it was scarcely worth while to legislate against an injury which appeared so problematical or inconsiderable, his answer was, that there was all the difference in the world between concession and compulsion—between giving away something of one's own will, and having it forced from one at the will of another. He had himself, on former occasions, at the Expense of much obloquy and other inconvenient consequences, advocated concessions to their Roman Catholic fellow-subjects; but he would not allow the same thing, or anything far less important, to be taken by a foreign Power without his consent. When he saw such an usurpation attempted, he thought that the honour and safety of the country required that a stand should be made, and that this violation of the Queen's prerogative should be firmly resisted. The noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) had used an argument which he did not remember to have seen urged before. The noble Earl had argued that the present measure was a breach of contract with the Roman Catholics, on the ground that there was a clause in the Relief Act which prohibited the assumption of certain existing titles in the Church of England, and therefore (as it was argued) recognised by implication a right to assume any others; and therefore, as the assumption of these titles was not forbidden, it must be considered as lawful. He was not now concerned to inquire whether the construction put upon

1139
this clause by the noble Earl Was the true one or not. He might be willing to admit that there was something plausible in it; but be thought that no one would contend that the Legislature in passing the Relief Act ever contemplated such proceedings as this on the part of the See of Rome. The recital in that Very clause expressly declared that the Protestant Episcopal Church of England and Ireland, and the doctrine, discipline, and government thereof, are established permanently and inviolably; and could it be said to be consistent with the contract, if contract there was, that the Pope should at once sweep away that Church and its whole hierarchy? The Pope had pretended by a Stroke of his pen to sweep away one hierarchy which, whether bad or good, was established by law, and to establish another in its place. Was he then to be told that if there was a violation of the contract contained in the Relief Act, it had proceeded from those who had brought in the present Bill, and that it was not rather the act of the Pope himself? And was not this a breach of contract, compared with which that which was alleged (whether rightly or not) by the noble Earl, sank into utter insignificance? That was one point in which he thought the argument of the noble Earl signally failed. But there was another argument of the noble Earl's to which he had listened with still greater surprise. The noble Earl had appealed to the right rev. Bench whether they did not admit the necessity of episcopacy in their own Church, and whether they Would deny that it was equally essential to the Roman Catholic Church; and then he had asked how would they (the right rev. Prelates) like their own Church to be forbidden to have their bishops, and how they could consistently object to the Roman Catholic Church being placed under episcopal superintendence? Now, upon what supposition did that argument proceed? It could only proceed from a neglect of one of the most prominent and salient features of the case. It assumed that such superintendence had been wanting in the Roman Catholic Church. Now, if there was one point more notorious than another, it was that before this Papal Brief, the members of the Roman Catholic Church in this country enjoyed, to all intents and purposes, the full advantages of episcopal government. With reference to spiritual purposes, the old government answered precisely the same purposes that the new
1140
hierarchy did. He could produce abundant proofs of that proposition; but he would confine himself to three. One was the silence of the Roman Catholics themselves, who had never complained of any such grievance as they were supposed to have been labouring under. This, however, might be considered as a merely negative proof; but he had proof of a more positive character as to the light in which the previous government of the Roman Catholic Church was considered by a person who must be admitted to be a very high authority on the subject. The effect of the change wrought in the Condition of the Roman Catholics by the recent measure, had been described by that very eminent person in his celebrated Pastoral, in language, to which he (the Bishop of St. David's) could not do justice Without quoting its exact terms. He said—
"The silver links of that chain which has connected their country with the See of Peter fn its vicarial government is being changed into burnished gold"—
A change which could be aptly represented by the substitution of one precious metal for another, could, he thought, hardly be considered as one of urgent necessity; but the writer proceeds to say—
"not stronger nor more closely knit, but more beautifully wrought, and more brightly arrayed."
Such was the estimate of the alleged necessity conveyed by the splendid imagery of that gorgeous period. But, though a Cardinal was very high authority, there was one still higher; and this had spoken more clearly and to the point upon this subject than the Cardinal himself. Looking info Butler's Historical Memoirs of the English Catholics, he (the Bishop of St. David's) had lighted on a passage in which after distinctly explaining the difference between the vicars-apostolic and bishops in ordinary, Mr. Butler said—
"The Popes granted the vicars-apostolic license and faculties to use and enjoy all faculties which ordinaries use and enjoy in their own sees and dioceses."
This then was the state of spiritual impotence and degradation, from which, according to the noble Earl's argument, the Roman Catholic Church in this country had been translated by the Papal Rescript; and this seemed enough to dispose of the argument, that the change was required to satisfy the spiritual wants of that Church. There were some other arguments which appeared to have made a considerable im-

1141
pression, and to which he, therefore, begged leave briefly to advert. It had been contended that they need not concern themselves about this act of the Pope's, because it only established an unendowed hierarchy. If, however, they were to submit to an aggression of this nature, and to give up what had hitherto been conceived to be rights inherent in the Crown of England, he trusted that it would be at least under the security of some better safeguard than the plea that an unendowed hierarchy might be safely invested with powers which would not be conceded in the case of an endowed hierarchy? Surely the whole course of ecclesiastical history proved that ft body which was not supported by any endowment, which had an unlimited career open to ambition and cupidity, was more dangerous and more difficult to deal with, than one which possessed an endowment. It was from an unendowed condition, and from a state of voluntary poverty, that the monastic orders had risen to a pitch of opulence and power, which had rendered them objects of jealousy and envy. Another argument on which much stress had been laid, was that the substitution of bishops in ordinary for vicars-apostolic, had always been opposed by the ultramontane party in this country. He believed, however, that the contests between the secular and the regular clergy, had turned not to much on this point as on the substitution of titular bishops in the room of the archpriest. But, without entering into this question, he would observe that any argument founded on that fact was wholly inapplicable to the present state of things. He agreed with the noble Lord Bear him (Lord Beaumont), when he expressed his regret at the ultramontane spirit which had spread over every part of the Church of Rome, which was still spreading, and which was more particularly gaining ground in those provinces of the Church which were most distant from the centre. In an Interesting work of Cardinal Pacca, which he had recently read, he found it said that the views and feelings which were represented by Bossuet and other great lights of the old Gallican Church seemed entirely to have vanished; and the Cardinal rejoiced to observe that there was a growing desire on the port of the French clergy to identify themselves and their interests more and more with the See of Rome. He was afraid that the same spirit was now displaying itself in this country, and that there was a close con-
1142
nexion between that spirit and the conversions which had recently been taking place from our Church to Rome. He believed with the noble Lord (Lord Beaumont) that those conversions would tend to corrupt the spirit which had hitherto prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church itself. No one who was acquainted with the writings of one of the ablest of those converts could fail to observe that they contained sentiments more ultramontane, more anti-national, more un-English, than anything that ever issued from the Italian press itself. A great Change was also taking place in the spirit and policy of the Court of Rome. It was impossible that any Pope, placed in the circumstances of the present Pope, after having been driven from his capital by his own subjects, and restored by foreign bayonets, should not begin to be aware that his authority could no longer rest on the support of the sscular arm. The consequence of that was that he was forced into an attitude of independence—into a state of aggression upon the secular authority of every State with which he had to deal, concentrating more and more his efforts on the establishment of his spiritual authority, and looking to that alone for the revival and extension of his secular power. But though oil these grounds, after the maturest consideration of the subject, he could give aft unhesitating vote for the second reading of the Bill, he would not pretend that he was completely satisfied with it. It was one, and only one, of several modes which might have been adopted for1 accomplishing the object. Another was that of a diplomatic representation rot the purpose of inducing the Pope to withdraw his Rescript. He was not very sanguine as to the success of such an attempt; and if it had failed, it would have left them to set about the work of legislation perhaps under some disadvantages, inhere was still another course which had been suggested by a noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), who unfortunately was not then present, which he would own he was inclined to view with a considerable degree of favour. It had been suggested that Parliament should in the first instance confine itself to a simple resolution; but should at the same time institute an inquiry in Committee to ascertain the practical bearings of the change introduced by the Papal Rescript, With a view to guard against any evils which might he likely to arise from it. And it was to him a great comfort to think that

1143
the present measure did not preclude such an inquiry; and he agreed with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), who had said that this was not the end of the story. He should be sorry if this measure was to be regarded as a final settlement of the question. When he looked to the other side of the Channel, notwithstanding the encouraging assurances which they had heard from the noble Duke at the table (the Duke of Wellington), he could not help entertaining some anxiety and misgivings as to the result of the measure in that quarter. He admitted that in theory, it was necessary to include Ireland in the operation of the Bill; and that was one of the strongest objections to which it was liable. Indeed, when he considered the wide difference between the circumstances of that country and of this, he could hardly suppress his regret that the rigid exactness of theory, so far as Ireland was concerned, had not been tempered by considerations of practical expediency. But as it was, he saw no alternative. The measure before their Lordships might, at least, answer the purpose of a strong remonstrance, and might dispose the minds of the parties to come to some reasonable compromise on the subject. Meanwhile, it secured the inestimable advantage of keeping inviolate and unimpaired that deposit of the law, the rights and the privileges of the Crown and the empire, which had been bequeathed to us by our ancestors, and committed to our charge.
Further debate adjourned till To-morrow.
House adjourned till To-morrow.