Sitting of 16 July 1851

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Local Acts (Preliminary Inquiries).
3° Stock in Trade.

METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY.
MR. T. DUNCOMBEwished to know what were the intentions of the Government as to legislating upon this subject during the present Session?
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he had to state, in answer to the question of the hon. Gentleman, that seeing the lateness of the Session, and looking to the protracted inquiry now being carried on before the Committee to which the Bill of the Government had been referred, it was not the intention of the Government to proceed to legislate on the subject of the water supply for the metropolis during the present Session. At the same time he felt it his duty to state that it was very desirable that the Committee should proceed with their investigations, so that at the close of the Session they should report their opinion to the House with respect to the general question of water supply for London. He considered it likewise desirable that they should report the evidence collected by them; and if they were able to report their opinion and the evidence before the close of the Session, he thought the House would he in a position to proceed with the measures regarding the water supply next Session with far better information, and with better means of coming to a useful and beneficial decision, than they were at present.

HARWICH ELECTION.
MR. BANKESsaid, that some weeks ago he had presented a petition to that House signed by several electors of the borough of Harwich, complaining of Government interference at the last election for that borough. He had intended then to have moved for a Select Committee to inquire into the allegations contained in that petition, but he was informed that that would not have been a convenient opportunity for doing so, as an Election Committee was at that time trying a petition complaining of an undue return for Harwich. He had then deferred to the general opinion of the House, and postponed the Motion he wished to introduce on the subject; and as the Election Committee had since concluded its labours, and declared that the last election was void, he was now anxious to proceed with his Motion. He, therefore, wished to know from the right hon. Gentleman the Speaker whether he could do so at once by bringing forward the question as one of privilege; or whether he must give notice of a Motion on the subject?
MR. SPEAKERsaid, that if the electors complained of undue influence at the election, the hon. Gentleman could bring the matter forward at once as a question of privilege.
LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, he wished to call the attention of Mr. Speaker to the fact that some of the signatures to the petition were stated to have been subscribed "by authority." He therefore submitted to Mr. Speaker whether these could be received as the legal signatures of the parties?
MR. SPEAKERsaid, these names must be considered as if they bad never been attached to the petition at all. Those signatures only were legal which the parties had attached in their own handwriting.
MR. BANKESthen said, he should submit to the House his Motion that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into, the allegations of the petition; and, although it appeared that some of the names were not legally affixed, yet there was a sufficient number of valid signatures to entitle the petition to the favourable consideration of the House. For his own part he had no personal connexion with the borough of Harwich, and he merely brought forward the question as a matter of public importance, and as affecting the interests of the electors and of that House. It was, however, a matter of great importance that elections should be conducted without the interference of the Government. He had heard that at the last Greenwich election, holidays were granted to the electors, in order that they might exercise the right of the franchise; but what would be the use of granting holidays if the voters were to be subjected to the undue influences of those above them? He did not assume that this had taken place at Harwich, but there was an allegation that such had been the case, and he did ask that an inquiry should be made into that allegation. He trusted, therefore, that the Government would not offer any objection to the appointment of the Select Committee for which he asked; and if his Motion were acceded to, he would prefer having the Committee nominated by the Committee of Selection, rather than undertake the task of selecting the Members himself. Without further remark, he would now submit his Motion to the approval of the House.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I have only one word to say, and that is that there is no intention on the part of the Government to oppose any obstacle in the way of the proposed inquiry.
MR. GRANVILLE BERKELEYhaving had the misfortune to be a Member of the Harwich Election Committee, which had sat for eighteen days, begged to re-

837
commend that the inquiry should extend to the previous elections for some time past.
MR. BANKESwas quite willing that such should be the case.
Select Committee appointed—
"To inquire into the allegations contained in a Petition from certain Electors of the Borough of Harwich, presented on the 16th day of June last, complaining of the conduct of persons connected with the Government at the last Election for the said Borough."

CHARITABLE PURCHASE DEEDS BILL,
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The SOLICITOR GENERALsaid, he felt bound to give the Bill his decided opposition. The Bill proposed to alter in a small degree the Law of Mortmain, respecting which there was at this time an inquiry going on, and upon which there was no necessity for hasty legislation. He should therefore move that the Bill be committed this day three months.
Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "this House will, upon this day three months, resolve itself into the said Committee," instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
MR. MULLINGSdenied that the effect of the Bill would be as described by the hon. and learned Gentleman. Its object was only to cure certain technical defects in deeds relating to certain charities. At present, the mode adopted was to convey the property in trust, and as this could not he done with copyhold estate, the Bill was meant to meet that case.
MR. HEADLAMsaid, the Bill would apply to both past and future Charitable Trusts. But as there was no pressing-necessity for the Bill this Session, he should oppose its further progress.
MR. CHISHOLM ANSTEYsaid, that the Committee on Mortmain had taken some most important evidence, which would shortly be reported to the House; he should therefore oppose the further progress of the Bill. He should oppose every attempt at granting further facilities for charitable endowments, until the House had considered the question whether concessions made to charities should not be accompanied by restrictions. The Statute of Mortmain was palpably ineffectual for
838
preventing undue spiritual influence. He was opposed to the Bill as granting concessions to an interest which was more deserving of restriction at the hands of Parliament.
LORD HARRY VANEexpressed his hope that the Bill would be withdrawn. It was desirable that the Statute of Mortmain should be dealt with comprehensively.
MR. MULLINGSsaid, he would not press the Bill against the feeling of the House.
Amendment and Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill withdrawn.

CORONERS BILL.
Order for Second Reading read.
MR. BOUVERIEmoved as an Amendment that the Bill be read a Second Time that day three months. The hon. Gentleman who had charge of the Bill was not present, but he understood there was no objection on his part to the Amendment.
Second Reading put off for three months.

LAW OF EVIDENCE AMENDMENT BILL.
Order for Committee read.
House in Committee; Mr. Bernal in the Chair.
Clause 1.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that the first and second clauses of this Bill contained an alteration in the Law of Evidence of such vast importance, as connected with the administration of justice in this country, that he felt it his duty to make a few observations on the clauses before asking the Committee to agree to them. The Committee were doubtless aware that, as the law of England now stood, in some of the most important proceedings in our courts of justice, the parties to the suit were not competent to give evidence. Public attention had been directed to this subject, and the present Bill, after undergoing very mature consideration before the other House of Parliament, and receiving the sanction of the great legal authorities who had seats in that House, now came down to the House of Commons for its consideration and adoption. It appeared to him, after careful deliberation, that the advantages likely to arise from this alteration, preponderated so vastly over the objections to the measure, that he, for one, gave it his most cordial support. There could be no doubt that it

839
would occur to any one, on the first view of the subject, that, unless some great disadvantage was likely to ensue from such a course of proceeding, they should at once have recourse to the parties in the suit, as the parties who could give the best and most accurate information on the subject-matter of the trial. In the great majority of the transactions which became the subjects of inquiry before the courts of justice, the parties in the suit were the only persons who could give information on many points connected with the inquiry; and in almost every case they were the parties who could furnish the best information. They all knew that, in the common transactions of life, where parties were called upon to arbitrate between individuals having a difference, the first step would be to hear what the parties who were principally interested, and who were the only parties who were really privy to the transaction in all its parts, had to say on the subject in dispute. So with regard to courts of justice. Everybody at all familiar with the practice of the courts of justice, and even those who were not, could readily understand how it was that justice was constantly frustrated by the impossibility of proving the facts necessary to be established for the due administration of justice, in consequence of their being within the exclusive knowledge of one or other of the parties to the suit. Nay, to such an extent did this go, that it frequently happened that the plaintiff was nonsuited, or failed in getting a verdict in his favour, simply because he was not in a condition to prove some fact that lay within his own knowledge; and the consequence was that a man who had a just claim was unable to enforce it, and instead of being the creditor whose suit was successful, he was often converted into the debtor of a man who owed him money, simply by reason of his being unable to adduce the evidence which would secure him a verdict, and thereby being made liable to all the costs of an unsuccessful attempt to substantiate a just claim. No one, therefore, could hesitate to admit that, in endeavouring to elicit the truth, they ought to hear the evidence of the parties best informed on the subject. The question was, would they admit the persons who were most familiar with the subject of the inquiry, who were the best competent to give information regarding it, and who in many instances were the only parties who could give that information. He knew it might
840
be said that by admitting the parties to a suit to give evidence in their own favour, they would open the door to perjury. Those who contended for the exclusion of this evidence, would maintain that the present Bill would have a twofold mischievous effect; because, in the first place, by admitting false testimony it would tend to mislead the tribunal which had to decide the case; and, secondly, it would induce persons to commit the crime of perjury. It must undoubtedly be admitted that when interested parties were allowed to give evidence, the tendency to falsehood was increased, first, on the part of persons who were not affected by those considerations which operated upon men of religion, morality, and honour; and also by that bias which insensibly acted upon the minds even of the most upright and honourable persons, from the natural tendency of parties to see things in a favourable view for themselves. So strongly was this felt, that by the ancient law of England, even persons who had only a secondary or indirect interest in the issue, were excluded from giving testimony. The law had, however, been altered, under the auspices of that able and venerable Judge who had so long filled the chief seat of the Queen's Bench, but who had unfortunately been compelled, by age and infirmity, to retire; and none of the baneful effects which had been anticipated were found to result. On the other hand, there were various secondary checks which operated with a contrary tendency—first, as respected the virtuous portion of mankind. The very fact that a man was called upon to depose in his own cause, would lead him to weigh most cautiously every word he uttered, and to view the facts in a light rather unfavourable than otherwise to his own interest. Again, a man who was not under the influence of the same sanctions to just and upright conduct, coming forward to give evidence in his own favour in a public court of justice, and having the strongest motives to misrepresent the facts to his own advantage, would be conscious how narrowly and closely his evidence would be scrutinised, and, therefore, would speak with the utmost caution. It must not be forgotten that they could not exclude perjured testimony now. The experience of all courts of justice showed that innumerable instances occurred where testimony was given with a perfect consciousness in the parties that they were speaking falsely. Those who did so were

841
frequently the friends, relatives, or servants, of the chief parties to the suit, in whose favour they gave testimony; they became partisans and mixed themselves up in the cause. But the tribunals which had to weigh the value of testimony was not so much upon its guard in the case of individuals whose bias was not apparent, as it would be in the case of an individual who came forward openly to give evidence in his own favour. Again, if a man was so wicked that he would not be deterred by the- sanction of an oath from speaking falsely, what was to prevent him from obtaining, under the present system, perjured testimony, and suborning others to swear falsely? A man giving testimony in his own suit was under strong corrective sanctions, and spoke under all the checking which arose from the knowledge of the Judge and jury as to the position in which he stood. But he might remind the Committee that, as the law now stood, in a great number of instances we admitted the testimony of parties to causes. In all criminal prosecutions, where the motives operating on a man's mind were sometimes quite as strong as in any civil case, the parties were admitted to give evidence, and no inconvenience was found to result. In proceedings in the Courts of Equity, also, the defendant was put to his answer upon oath. He admitted that proceeding was, perhaps, of no very great value, because the defendant gave his answer upon oath to written interrogatories, which he answered at his leisure, leaving it to his lawyer to frame the answers property. Again, in all proceedings in the Courts of Common Law, with the exception of trials before juries, questions which arose were determined upon affidavits, and the Courts had invariably the affidavits of the parties interested in the cause. Indeed, not only were the affidavits of the parties admitted, but the omission of the affidavit of either party would be immediately matter of observation by the opposing counsel and by the Court. It was said, that the effect of the change would be to put an intelligent person on one side, and a dull or ignorant man on the other, on an unequal footing; but that inequality already existed from the nature of circumstances. But that that inequality had any great influence in the administration of justice, he did not believe; for the simple and ignorant man, who came into a court to speak the truth, was as readily believed, to say the least, as the astute and cunning
842
one, who possessed cleverness, which might enable him to throw a veil over it. He thought, therefore, that a vast additional amount of light and information would be thrown on the administration of justice by this Bill, and that there was no well-founded objection against it. He might state that those distinguished ornaments of the legal profession, Lords Denman, Brougham, Campbell, and Cranworth, were in favour of the alteration proposed by this Bill, and he hoped it would receive the assent of that House. They were not without experience to guide them in deciding the question, for the admission of parties to suits to give evidence had been in actual practice for several years under the system of administration of justice in County Courts. The whole body of County Court Judges, with, he believed, only one exception, were unanimously in favour of the plan involved in this measure, because they found it simplified the administration of justice, and enabled justice to be done in many instances in which otherwise it could not be obtained. The evils likely to result from the change contemplated by this Bill, had, he thought, been greatly exaggerated, and he was perfectly satisfied it would be found to work well.
Clause agreed to; as was also Clause 2.
On Clause 3, which prevents the wife being examined on behalf of the husband, or the husband on behalf of the wife,
MR. HENLEYsaid, he was inclined to think that the balance of advantage and disadvantage was in favour of admitting the evidence of the interested parties in a suit; and as the principle had already been acted upon in the County Courts, he did not see how they could rationally or consistently refuse to extend it to all civil actions whatsoever. He wished to know why, after the principle of the admissibility of parties to give evidence had been so broadly laid down by the hon. and learned Attorney General, they were to agree to the provisions of this Clause, which formed a decided exception? The effect would be to exclude a shopkeeper's wife, who might have sold goods in a shop to a customer, from giving evidence for her husband relative to the transaction.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he never used any argument on a subject so important as that of the administration of justice, which he thought ill-founded, and therefore he must at once frankly say that he could not defend this exception. He

843
knew of no good reason for it; but he understood there was a strong opinion in the other House in favour of excluding the wife from giving evidence, and he feared if they altered this Clause it might be fatal to the Bill.
MR. CROWDERquite concurred in the view so clearly expressed by the hon. and learned Attorney General, that parties to a suit should be admitted to give evidence, and he thought also that the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) was quite right in objecting to the exception made by this Clause, and that husband and wife should be admitted to give evidence for each other. By the 83rd section of the County Courts Act, husband and wife were allowed to give evidence in each other's cause; and if they passed the Clause as it now stood, the law in the superior courts would be different from that in the County Courts. He should propose, therefore, to strike out the words, "or shall in any proceeding, civil or criminal, render any husband competent or compellable to give evidence for or against his wife, or any wife competent or compellable to give evidence for or against her husband," and to insert a proviso, "that husbands or wives shall be competent to give evidence either vivâ voce or by the practice of the Court for each other, but that nothing shall render any wife or husband competent or compellable to give evidence against her husband or wife respectively, except on cross-examination after an examination in chief." The exclusion of the wife's evidence against the husband, rested on policy, for the sake of averting domestic broils, and he thought it desirable to leave the law in this respect as it now stood.
MR. J. EVANSthought if any amendment in that House would peril this invaluable Bill, they should abstain from making any; but he did not see, if a proper amendment in the Bill were made, why it should be rejected in the other House. He thought, however, there were the most material objections to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Crowder), which went to the repeal of part of a Clause in the County Courts Act, which had had the most beneficial effects; whereas they ought rather to assimilate the law in the superior Courts to that in the County Courts. If they allowed the wife to give evidence for her husband, it was right also that her evidence against him should be admitted.
SIR GEORGE STRICKLANDthought
844
they should by all means put in the Bill what they thought right, even if they ran the risk of losing it in another place. It was a measure so much in accordance with the wants and wishes of the people, that if not carried this Session, it certainly would be in the next.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALwas decidedly of opinion that, if the principle of admitting the wife's evidence were to be recognised at all in civil cases, it must be recognised as well against the husband as in his favour. He would not oppose any modification in the Clause having for its object the admission of the wife's evidence either for or against the husband in civil cases; but an ancient prejudice made it desirable that they should not attempt to introduce the principle of allowing the wife to give testimony against her husband in criminal cases. He was far from saying that such an exemption was defensible upon any high moral principle; but so strong a prejudice existed in its favour, that any alteration of the law in this respect would most probably cause the loss of the Bill.
MR. WAKLEYbelieved that the better plan would be to omit the Clause altogether. He had no doubt the other House would give way in deference to their opinion.
MR. HENLEYthought that the object which was sought to be secured by the Amendment of the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Crowder), would be obtained in a more direct and satisfactory manner by making a verbal alteration in the third clause. He would suggest the omission of the words "civil or criminal," and the insertion of the word "criminal" before "proceeding," thus restricting the operation of the clause to civil cases only.
The ATTORNEY GENERALthought the suggestion of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire a most valuable one, and one that entirely met the sense of the Committee. He would then not introduce any alteration in the law of evidence as regarded criminal cases. The law proceeded in all its departments on the identity of husband and wife. Now, they did not compel the husband to give evidence against himself, and therefore neither should the wife be compelled to give evidence against her husband.
Clause, as amended, agreed to; as was also Clause 4.
On Clause 5, providing that a party intending to give evidence on his own behalf

845
should give fourteen days' notice to the other side, and that if he intended to call the opposite party he should serve the summons upon him four days before the trial,
MR. J. EVANSsaid, it would be found productive of great practical inconvenience and injustice to require a party intending to give evidence on his own behalf to give notice.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that he had communicated with a learned Gentleman who took a great interest in this Bill, and who was peculiarly competent to speak with respect to it, and he understood from him that this clause was inserted because it was thought that it might possibly happen that where a party came forward to give evidence in his own favour, he might, if he knew that his adversary was absent, make a false statement as to what passed between them, which no one but his opponent could contradict. The object of the clause was, therefore, to give a party the means of being present at the trial if his adversary intended to be examined, and at the same time to relieve him from the inconvenience of doing so if he did not.
MR. STANFORDsaid, he should support the clause, because a case had occurred in which a decision had been given against him in the County Court, in consequence of his not being aware that the plaintiff intended to give evidence; for had he known that, he should have attended, and could then have contradicted certain statements which he had made.
MR. HENLEYsaid, that the argument of the hon. Member would go so far as to require that notice should be given of all witnesses intended to be called. He (Mr. Henley) objected to this clause, because if it were adopted its principle must be extended to other cases, and he could not see why a man could not make a good defence without knowing the names of the witnesses who would be brought against him.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that he thought it would be very inconvenient to compel both parties to be present on every occasion in order to watch what their adversary might say if he were called. At the same time he quite felt the force of what had fallen from the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). He thought that the latter part of the clause was of no use, for he could not see why the opposite party should have either four days or four hours' notice that he was required to at-
846
tend and be examined; it was sufficient if he received sufficient notice (whatever that might be in the particular case) to enable him to come to the court. He therefore proposed to omit the words "four days," in the latter part of the clause. It would be quite enough if he were subpoenaed in time like an ordinary witness.
MR. CROWDERobjected to the introduction of a principle different from that which was at present applied to the practice in County Courts.
The ATTORNEY GENERALthought that they should not follow the practice of the County Courts slavishly. He would introduce a proviso exempting County Courts from the operation of the clause.
MR. J. EVANSsaid, that he considered the clause so objectionable that he should divide the Committee upon it.
Motion made, and Question put, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided:—Ayes 37; Noes 29: Majority 8.
Clause agreed to; as was also Clause 6.
On Clause 7, authorising Common Law Courts to compel inspection of documents whenever Equity would grant discovery,
MR. MULLINGSobjected that this would enable a party who brought an action for ejectment, and found a few days before going to trial that his title was defective, to compel his adversary to give him an opportunity of completing it from an inspection of the deeds which he might have in his possession.
The SOLICITOR GENERALsaid, that this was not so, for the power proposed to be given by this clause was confined to cases in which a party might at present obtain an inspection by filing a bill of discovery before a Court of Equity; and the effect of the clause was therefore merely to substitute for that very expensive process a cheap and simple mode of attaining the same object. In the case put by his hon. Friend, of an action for ejectment, the Court of Chancery would not compel the defendant to show his title-deeds to a stranger, or to any one whom it did not consider to have some hold upon his conscience; and the Common Law Judge would be guided by the same principle. No doubt he would be obliged to decide the point upon equitable principles; but Courts of Law were already obliged ill many cases to take cognisance of the principles of equity. And indeed he regarded this clause with peculiar favour on that

847
very account; and was very glad to see a clause of a similar character in the Bankruptcy Bill, which would soon come before that House, and by which the Courts of Law were enabled to proceed by injunction in certain cases. He believed that these were steps to the establishment of an important principle, that where any Court of Law had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of dispute, it should exercise also all the ancillary jurisdiction which was at present exercised by a Court of Equity.
MR. MULLINGSsaid, that there was nothing in the Clause to point out the evidence which it was requisite should be before the Judge.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that the Court would only compel a party to allow an inspection of documents upon a statement of sufficient facts to justify it. The Court would compel him to say what deed he wanted, and to give such a description of it as showed that he knew something about it. What was desired was to get rid of expense, and to have a short simple summary mode of proceeding, instead of the dilatory and expensive bill of discovery. He joined with his hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, in hailing this as the commencement of a new era in our system of judicial proceeding; he hoped that we were now getting the fine edge of the wedge in, and that it would end in that fusion of law and equity, short of which he was convinced that the public would not be satisfied.
MR. HENLEYhad no objection to this Clause so far as it did not exceed the operation of a bill of discovery, but he objected to that portion of which compelled a man to give a copy previously of any document which he was compellable to bring into court under a subpœna duces tecum; such a summons would compel a man to bring any deed into Court.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that he should have no objection to strike out the words "to take examined copies," so as to meet the objection of the hon. Member.
MR. STUART WORTLEYsaid, there were many cases in which it was desirable that a previous inspection should be allowed of documents which a party was compellable to bring into Court under a subpœna duces tecum, because at present the opposite party who had obtained the summons, frequently found that the document when produced in court defeated them on some
848
technical point. He thought that it was desirable to pass this Clause, which was one means of breaking down the barrier between the two classes of courts, and thus preventing the glaring injustice of a man being driven "from pillar to post," going into a Court of Law and being told his remedy was in equity, and going into a Court of Equity, and being told his remedy was at law.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he was willing to leave out so much of the clause as related to documents produced under a subpœna duces tecum.
Clause, as amended, agreed to; as was also Clause 8.
On Clause 9, declaring apothecaries' certificates admissible in evidence without proof of seal,
MR. WAKLEYsaid, he thought that the same provision should be applied to the diplomas of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians.
The ATTORNEY GENERALagreed very much with his hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury. He believed that the Bill as it came down from the other House would have a most beneficial effect, and he therefore accepted it; but he begged it might not be thought that all the amendments requisite in the law of evidence were provided for by it. That subject would soon come under the consideration of the Commissioners for the Amendment of the Common Law, who intended to make a searching inquiry into it; and he hoped that they would be able to suggest many improvements and ameliorations in that branch of the law. Something of the kind suggested by his hon. Friend (Mr. Wakley) would, he had no doubt, be considered by them.
MR. CROWDERcould not see why the provision suggested by the hon. Member for Finsbury could not be inserted in the present Bill.
Clause agreed to; as were the remaining Clauses.
MR. STUART WORTLEYthen proposed the addition of a Clause to allow the production in evidence of a certificate of the substance of a record in all cases in which it was now necessary to produce the record itself in order to prove the acquittal or conviction of a prisoner. This course was at present followed in some cases under Sir Robert Peel's Act; but there were others (such as actions for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment) in which it was still necessary to produce the record

849
itself, a step which was attended with great expense.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that he considered the Clause of the right hon. and learned Gentleman contained a most valuable provision.
MR. STUART WORTLEYsaid, that he must not he taken entirely to approve of the measure. He had considerable hesitation with respect to allowing the introduction of the evidence of the parties interested; but he could not understand why, if admissible at all, it should not be admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. One of the hardest cases with which he was acquainted, was when a poor man charged with crime, or a particular crime, said that he was at home all night, and yet was not allowed to call his wife to prove the fact.
Clause agreed to.
House resumed; Bill reported.

THE PHARMACY BILL.
Order for Committee read.
MR. WAKLEYmoved that the House should go into Committee on this Bill. This Bill was read a second time, by consent, a fortnight since, in order to enable the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Bell) to introduce certain amendments into it, and on the distinct understanding that the Bill was not to proceed further during the present Session. On Friday last, however, he (Mr. Wakley) asked the right hon. Secretary for the Home Department whether, if all opposition from other parties were withdrawn, the Government would allow the Bill to proceed during the present Session; and the right hon. Gentleman said that in that case they would. Although, however, the Bill was one of the smallest measures of medical reform that could be produced—almost the first brick in the fabric—it could not proceed during the present Session, he-cause he now found that there were still some objections raised against it, and he could not, therefore, urge its further progress. The Members of that House, he feared, had no taste for physic. He hoped that in the early part of the next Session this subject would be entered upon in a friendly and liberal spirit, for the House might be assured that by legislating on this subject they would confer an essential service upon the public. He thought the House would admit that it could not be otherwise than beneficial to the public, that a body of 10,000 men, highly edu-
850
cated in the different departments of science, should be diffused through our smallest towns. A doubt had been raised whether the Pharmaceutical Society were competent to undertake the duties proposed to be imposed upon them by this Bill. Now that society had been in existence since. 1843, when it was incorporated by a Royal charter; and although he was connected with a journal which circulated through the profession, he was sure that since that society undertook the important duties allotted to it, he had never heard a single complaint with regard to the manner in which it had discharged them. The hon. Member for Oxfordshire, however, thought that evidence of these facts should be adduced before a Select Committee.
MR. HENLEYsaid, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wakley) had treated the House with some injustice when he accused them of having a very great distaste for physic; for they wished to leave open the trade in physic, which the hon. Member sought to restrict. He (Mr. Henley) viewed the Bill as dealing with one part only of a large and difficult subject; and he thought that more inquiry was necessary. The society to which reference had been made, might be well adapted for its purpose, but the House had no evidence on that point; the Bill would give the society great power; and the proper course, he thought, would be for the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Bell) early next Session to move the appointment of a Committee with the view of procuring further information on the subject.
MR. J. BELLhad no objection to move for a Select Committee, and proceed with the measure in that way, as soon as Parliament met next Session. This Bill was not intended to restrict the sale of medicine, or to create a monopoly. It was only intended to improve the education of persons engaged in that pursuit. Even if the Bill were passed immediately, several years must elapse before it could come into complete operation. The effect would be gradual, and would not do injustice to any one. He was anxious the Bill should not be mixed up with the question of medical reform. For sixteen years he had been watching the progress of the numerous Bills that had been brought forward for medical reform; and if his measure were mixed up with that question, it might share the same fate.
Committee put off for three months.

VICTORIA PARK BILL.
Order for Committee read.
House in Committee.
Clause 1.
MR. WAKLEYwished to know when he might expect to see the Battersea and Finsbury Parks completed. He could assure the noble Lord the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests, that, with respect to the latter park, great anxiety existed in the metropolis. A large quantity of land which was available for the purpose might be obtained upon very reasonable terms; but as buildings were continually being erected on the plot to which he alluded, it would soon be hopeless to attempt to convert it into a park. He therefore trusted that the noble Lord would, as soon as possible, bring forward a Bill for the purchase of the land alluded to, and with which he believed the noble Lord was well acquainted.
VISCOUNT DUNCANsaid, that Victoria and Battersea Parks were purchased with money derived from the land revenues of the Crown; and if a new park were to be formed for Finsbury, he hoped the noble Lord would state from what source the funds were to be taken.
LORD SEYMOURsaid, that one of the objects of the Battersea Park Bill was to relieve the Crown lands from all charges on account of that park. They had only been deceiving themselves when they paid such charges from funds which otherwise would have been carried to the public account. He was aware that there was a strong desire in Finsbury and the adjoining district that a park should be formed in that neighbourhood, and he had taken pains to ascertain the possibility of making a park there. The first difficulty would be the raising of the necessary funds. If those funds were raised, he believed that there would be little difficulty in procuring a site.
MR. BROTHERTONsaid, people in the country did not grudge to contribute the necessary funds when they wanted to form parks. They did not ask that the national funds should be resorted to for their peculiar enjoyment, and he hoped that the wealthy metropolitans would be ashamed of taking a difierent course.
SIR HENRY BARRONcomplained of the gross injustice of making the people of Ireland contribute funds for the formation of parks for the special enjoyment of the people of London. He was glad to hear that the Government had determined, for
852
the future, on making such districts as desired to possess the advantages of parks, contribute the necessary funds.
Clause agreed to; as were the remaining Clauses.
House resumed; Committee reported.

COUNTY COURTS FURTHER EXTENSION BILL.
Order for Committee read.
House in Committee.
Clauses 13 to 15 agreed to.
MR. CROWDERproposed to insert the following Clause:—
"And whereas it is expedient to render appeals from the County Courts more efficient; be it enacted, That so much of 13th and 14th Victoria, c. 81, sec. 14, as limits the Court of Appeal to the Puine Judges of the superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, and the sitting of the said Court of Appeal to a time out of term, is hereby repealed, and that all appeals now depending or hereafter to be brought before the said superior Courts, shall be heard and determined in term by the Judges thereof as part of the ordinary business of such Courts, or out of term by any two or more of the Judges of the said superior Courts sitting as a Court of Appeal for that purpose."
MR. J. EVANSbelieved that the present system of appeal gave satisfaction, and had never been complained of.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsupported the clause, which would considerably tend to expedite cases of appeal.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMwished to appeal to the hon. and learned Attorney General, and to Her Majesty's Government, to let the matter stand as it now was. He agreed with those who thought that we should have, in the cheapest and most expeditious form, the best mode of appeal that could be established. Now, as he uuderstood the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Crowder), objection was taken to the existing tribunals for appeals. He was certainly not disposed to overlook the importance of the superior Courts in Westminster-hall, and of the Bar there; for he believed that it was for the public interest that the Bar should be upheld in its independence and high position, but at the same he did not think that any sacrifice of the public interest should be made even for so great an object. He could well see that it would be for the advantage of the Bar in the present case that the appeal should he to the superior Court, not to a portion of the superior Court, but to the Court itself, with all the advantage of the Bar. But the question which the House had to consider was, whether that would be for

853
the convenience and interest of the public? Even though the appeal might be better heard by the Supreme Court with the assistance of the Bar, yet the question was, would it, on the whole, he for the advantage of the public? He put it to the hon. and learned Attorney General, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board, whether there was on the whole such an imperfection in the existing appellate jurisdiction, that, taking all the circumstances into consideration, it was desirable to effect this change. Her Majesty's Government were the guardians of the public in that House, and he held that they should make themselves parties to no change, unless such as would clearly be for the benefit of the public generally.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he really did not see the necessity for the appeal that had been made to him by the right hon. Gentleman. It was the simplest thing in the world, and he did not think the right hon. Gentleman apprehended the nature of the proposed change. At the present moment an appeal lay from the inferior Court, presided over by the County Court Judge, to one of the superior Courts in Westminster, and was disposed of by the Puisne Judges sitting out of term; and the proposal now made was to enable appeals to be heard and determined in term by the Judges in the superior Courts. It would make no difference to the Bar whether the appeal was heard before the Puisne Judges or the supreme Court, nor would it make any difference to the suitors in point of expense. The only difference was this, that if the appeal happened to arise when the Court was sitting in banco, and if the Court was not so oppressed with business but that it might attend to it, then power should be given to dispose of the appeal at once. There was a difference in point of time—for by the present mode it might so happen that if the hearing of the appeal was postponed till after term, much time might be lost.
MR. CROWDERthought the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) had mistaken the nature of the Clause which he (Mr. Crowder) had proposed. It might happen that an appeal was made just at the commencement of the term; and, according to the present system, that appeal must necessarily stand over, though the Judges might be in a condition to dispose of it. His clause would obviate that evil.
VISCOUNT DUNCANunderstood the
854
right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) to have asked whether the practice at present followed had not been satisfactory to the country, and whether any necessity existed for the proposed change. He thought they should let well alone.
MR. CROWDERsaid, a case of inconvenience had occurred last term in the Common Pleas, in consequence of the Chief Justice being debarred, by the provision which had been referred to, from taking an appeal, except with the consent of both parties.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, he recollected that this very matter had been discussed in a former Session, and he certainly understood that, on the whole, the appeal clauses had given satisfaction to the country. He had yet to learn that they had not worked well; and he thought, before any change was made, that the inconvenience of the present system should be shown. There might be reasons as regarded the Courts for the change, but he could see none as regarded the public.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that with regard to public convenience, the object of all legal proceedings should be to do justice in the smallest possible period. Suppose a plaintiff got a verdict when the term was about taking place, and that the defendant wanted time, he brought his appeal, conscious that for three or four weeks he could interpose a delay; and there was an obvious inducement under the present system to bring an appeal for the purpose, under such circumstances, of gaining three or four weeks time. He could not see any substantial objection to the clause. If they could have an appeal disposed of at the commencement of a term, instead of waiting the whole term, and if that could be accomplished without one shilling additional expense to the suitor, he could not understand why that appeal might not be disposed of in term time. The only object of his hon. and learned Friend's clause was to expedite the appeal, and he (the Attorney General) thought that would be an undoubted benefit to the suitor.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, the great object to be attained was, that there should be the most speedy justice at the least possible cost. If he rightly understood the hon. and learned Attorney General, that Gentleman said, the effect of this Clause would be to expedite the appeal, and that in deciding it the suitors would have the assistance of a Chief Justice,

855
without any increase of cost whatever. If the hon. and learned Gentleman told him that, he (Sir J. Graham) was bound to admit that this Clause was a desirable one, because it would give more speedy justice, and that without any additional cost to the parties—if it fulfilled all those conditions, he (Sir J. Graham) had not a word to say against it.
The ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he had no hesitation in repeating his previous statement, that the Clause would have the effect of expediting appeals, for two or three weeks at the least, and be attended with no possible disadvantage to any one.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid, that if this Clause had a tendency to expedite the suit, it ought to have been introduced by the Government.
MR. STUART WORTLEYsaid, he would support the Clause, on the ground that it would secure two great objects, namely, greater despatch in disposing of the appeal, and greater weight and authority in the judgment of the court.
Clause agreed to.
MR. CROWDERthen moved the addition of the following Clause:—
"And whereas doubts have arisen whether the appeal given by 13 and 14 Victoria, c. 61, s. 14, lies in cases tried by the County Court Judge without a jury; be it declared and enacted, That if cither party shall be dissatisfied with the determination of the County Court judge, in point of law, in any case tried with or without a jury, such party may appeal to the said superior Courts."
He said, the appeal Clause in the 13th and 14th Victoria, c. 61, was thought to apply only to cases where there was a jury; so that if a cause was heard in the County Courts without a jury, however wrong the decision might be, there was no appeal whatever.
Clause agreed to.
MR. CROWDERthen proposed to introduce the following Clause:—
"And whereas it is expedient to provide for the removal of claims arising under 9 and 10 Victoria, c. 95, s. 118; be it enacted, That any such claim, and any summons issued in respect thereof, and any order made thereon, may be removed into any of the said superior Courts by leave of any of the said superior Courts, or any Judge thereof, on such terms as to payment of costs or bringing money into Court as such Court or Judge shall direct; and when any such claim, summons, or order shall be removed, the said superior Court shall deal therewith in the same manner in all respects as with inter pleader cases arising in the said superior Court."
He thought that a clause of considerable importance, because its object was to give
856
the right of appeal in cases where it did not exist at present. The clause which he wished to add had reference to the 118th section of the 9th and 10th Victoria, c. 95, which gave power to the County Court Judges to decide interpleader issues, without any appeal to any other tribunal. Even if it should be anxiously desired by both parties to an interpleader issue that it should be heard before a superior Court, it could not be done. It appeared to him very important that there should be an appeal in such cases.
MR. MULLINGSsaid, the only objection he had to the clause was, that it would give facilities for appeals to the superior Courts. He did not know of any case in which inconvenience had arisen from the present practice; nor had the hon. and learned Member for Liskeard pointed out any such case. He (Mr. Mullings) did happen to know that there was a strong inclination in the superior Courts to get causes out of the County Courts; and he was not willing to get rid of the great advantages of the County Courts by affording facilities such as were contemplated in the clause which had been proposed.
MR. CROWDERsaid, there might be inconveniences such as this clause was meant to remedy, without its being necessary to furnish given cases; but he was not at all aware that there was an anxiety on the part of the Judges of the superior Courts to take business from the County Courts.
MR. CLAYbelieved that cases such as had been suggested by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Crowder) were not cases where there was any difficulty in point of law. The difficulty was one of fact, and not of law, and a difficulty of fact was as well, if not better, ascertained by the mode of proceeding in the County Courts than by that in the superior Courts.
MR. W. WILLIAMSwished to know if there had been any complaints from the public, or from the Judges of the County Courts, who had constant opportunities of seeing the defects, if defects there were, ic the existing law? In the absence of such complaints, he was opposed to the addition of the clause.
The ATTORNEY GENERALwould suggest to his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Crowder) that he had better withdraw the clause. Such a clause was not absolutely necessary, and he did not think it was desirable to overlay the simplicity of the existing system.
MR. CROWDERconsented to withdraw the clause.
Clause withdrawn.
MR. CROWDERthen moved the addition of the following Clause:—
"And for preventing vexatious expenses and delay in prosecuting the said appeals; be it enacted, That the Judges of the said superior Courts, or any five of them, of whom a chief of one of the said superior Courts shall be one, may from time to time, if they shall think fit, make general orders for regulating the proceedings on appeals and the costs thereof; which orders shall be as valid and effectual as if included in this Act; provided always, that such orders shall not be in force until the end of the Session of Parliament next after the promulgation thereof."
He said his object in moving such a clause was to prevent vexatious expense and delays in prosecuting appeals before the superior Courts.
VISCOUNT DUNCANwould suggest to the Committee that they had better let well alone, taking warning from an epitaph he had seen on a tombstone the other day—"I was well, and, wishing to be better, here I am."
MR. J. EVANSsaid, he must oppose the clause. There was no complaint made of the law itself, as it at present stood; why, therefore, should all those cobwebs he spread around it merely for the purpose of catching victims?
The ATTORNEY GENERALwould support the clause, on the ground that it was desirable to have a uniformity of system with regard to appeals from the County Courts, in the three superior Courts of Common Law, instead of leaving each individual Court to make its own regulations. If they granted the power of appeal, it was desirable that it should he accompanied by certain well-defined regulations. The clause did not extend the power of appeal one tittle beyond what was given by the existing law.
VISCOUNT DUNCANdid not believe the costs of the superior Courts were at present so popular as to make the people wish that they should be extended to the County Courts.
SIR GEORGE PECHELLsaid, that a Committee was sitting upon this subject, and he should wish to know whether they had made any report as to the necessity of these alterations?
MR. BOUVERIEwas not aware that the question had come before the Committee alluded to by the hon. and gallant Member; but he thought it very desirable that the Judges of the superior Courts should establish some uniform system with
858
regard to the mode of proceeding in appeals, and also with respect to the costs thereof.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMsaid, if he were forced to a division, as at present advised, he thought he must support the clause. If the clause had tended to multiply appeals, he might have hesitated; but there already existed the right of appeal to the superior Courts. It happened, however, that there was not any uniformity either in the mode of proceeding with those appeals, or as to the costs. The clause now proposed would give the Judges of the superior Courts the power of establishing that uniformity. If the Judges of the land were to be trusted with anything, they certainly were fit to be trusted with such a power as that which this clause gave to them. There was one point, however, which he thought required explanation. The clause sought not only to regulate the proceedings on appeals, but "the costs thereof." He should like to know why it was necessary to refer to the Judges of the superior Courts the regulation of the costs? With that single observation he was prepared to support the clause.
VISCOUNT DUNCANsaid, that although he at first intended to divide, the Committee on the clause, and although he was still opposed to it, still he should not trouble the Committee to divide.
MR. CROWDERbegged to explain, that each of the superior Courts already possessed the power of regulating the proceedings in their own courts on matters of appeal, and also with regard to costs; but the object of this clause was that the Judges of the three superior Courts should unite and form one set of rules with respect to such appeals and costs in all the Courts.
SIR JAMES GRAHAMwished to know whether, at the present moment, the costs in the three Courts varied from one another?
MR. CROWDERwas not aware of the fact, but it had occurred that the costs were differently taxed in the different Courts. He, however, believed that there was now one uniform mode of taxing costs in all the three superior Courts. He had no objection to strike out the words "and the costs thereof."
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed; Committee report progress.
The House adjourned at thirteen minutes before Six o'clock.