Sitting of 22 March 1849

MINUTES.
PUBMC BILLS.—1o Mutiny; Marine Mutiny; Prisoners' Removal (Ireland).
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Admiral Gordon, from the Presbytery of Deer, in the County of Aberdeen, against the Parliamentary Oaths Bill.—By Mr. Benjamin Smith, from Inhabitants of Dunfermline, in favour of the Affirmation Bill.—By Mr. Rakes Currie, from the Parish of St. Giles, Northampton, for the Abolition of Church Rates—By Mr. H. E. Adair, from Ipswich, in favour of the Clergy Relief Bill.—By Colonel Arbuthnott, from the Presbytery of Fordoun, against the Marriage (Scotland) Bill.—By Mr. Deedes, from Attorneys and Solicitors practising at Sandwich, Kent, for Repeal of the Duty on Attorneys' Certificates—By Lord Rendlesham, from the Parish of Bedfield, Suffolk, and from several other Places, for Repeal of the Duty on Malt.—By Mr. G. Sandars, from the Borough of Wakefield, for Reduction of Public Expenditure.—By Mr. Brotherton, from the South Eastern Railway Company, respecting Taxation on Railways.—By Sir W. Clay, from Churchwardens, Overseers, and Others, of the Parish of St. Mary, Whitechapel, for

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Repeal of the Duty on Windows.—By Mr. G. Hamilton, from the Ratepayers of East Skull, Skibbereen, for Relief of Distress (Ireland).—By Sir Charles Lemon, from the Guardians of the Penzance Union, for the Suppression of Mendicancy.—By Colonel Ferguson, from the Seaport of Kirkaldy (Scotland), against the Navigation Bill—By Mr. Hume, from Edward Emery, and Others, for Abolition of the Palace Court, Westminster,—By Sir W. Clay, from William Robert Cooke, and Others, for the Promotion of Peace.—By Sir De Lacy Evans, from Out-Pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, respecting Deductions from their Half Pay.—By Viscount Castlereagh, from Hillsborough, in the County Down, and from several other Places, against the proposed Rate in Aid (Ireland).—By Sir De Lacy Evans, from the Masters, Matrons, and Others, connected with the Workhouse of St. Margaret's Parish, Westminster, for a Superannuation Fund for Poor Law Officers.—By Mr. Busfeild, from the Wesleyan Congregation, at Kirkgate, Bradford, for the Suppression of Promiscuous Intercourse.—By Viscount Emlyn, from the Guardians of the Cardigan Union, for an Alteration of the Public Roads Bill.—By Colonel Arbuthnott, from the Presbytery of Fourdon, against the Registering Births, &c. (Scotland) Bill.—From the Presbytery of Strathbogie, and several other Places, against the Marriage (Scotland) Bill.—By Mr. Hardcastle, from a Public Meeting held at Colchester, respecting the Rights of Conscience.—By Mr. Hume, from Inhabitants of Finsbury, against any Interference with Rome.—By Captain Pechell, from Brighton, for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.—By Mr. Bright, from the Parish of Eccles, near Manchester, and by other Hon. Members, from a Number of Places, for Referring War Disputes to Arbitration.

THE CHARTIST CONVICTS.
MR. F. O'CONNORrepeated a question he had previously addressed to the Home Secretary as to the alleged ill-treatment of one of the Chartist prisoners now in Newgate—the complaint relating partly to the deprivation of knife and fork, and partly to the withholding of books sent by the prisoners' relatives.
SIR G. GREYsaid, it should be understood that the prisoner (Shaw) was subject to no special regulations with respect to his confinement in Newgate. A regulation was made at the last court depriving all prisoners of the use of knives and forks, but it would be reconsidered at the next meeting of the justices. Some of the hooks sent to Shaw by his friends were deemed by the chaplain of the prison improper books for his perusal, and were therefore rejected by him; but the fact was, that the chaplain had no jurisdiction over prisoners not members of the Church of England, and the prisoner, who, until then, had not intimated that he dissented from the Church, having then declared himself a Dissenter, the prohibition of the books on the part of the chaplain was withdrawn, and the matter referred to the visiting justices, who allowed some of the books but disallowed others, of which one appeared to partake of the character of a parody of the Holy Scriptures.
Subject at an end.

WAR IN THE PUNJAUB.
MR. HINDLEYrose to give notice of his intention to ask the right hon. the President of the Board of Control, "Whether the statement in the public journals is correct, that the Governor General of India has decided that the property taken at Moultan is to go to the captors of the place as a prize?—Whether the Government have any information confirmatory of the statement in the Bombay Times to the effect that the troops having made their way in numbers into the fort of Moultan, a scene of plunder ensued in the last degree discreditable to the discipline of the Bengal army—the details being too distressing to be dwelt upon, and that the amount of plundering in the town of Moultan permitted by the Bengal troops was fearful, and the work of spoliation was by no means confined to the men?—Who were the parties responsible for having permitted such excesses, and (if the statement be substantially correct) what steps the Government intend to take in order that the perpetrators of them may be brought to justice?"
SIR J. C. HOBHOUSEsaid, he would answer those questions now. And first, with respect to the distribution of prize-money. The question had arisen, whether the commander-in-chief of the main army was entitled to a share of the Moultan prize-money, and had been referred by the Governor General of India to the home authorities, and would by them be decided in the usual way according to precedent. With regard to the other questions, he had only to say that he had that day gone through the whole of the despatches respecting the taking of Moultan, and particularly respecting those transactions which had been so much misrepresented; and he could assure the hon. Gentleman that unless facts occurred which did not appear and were not even hinted at in those despatches, the rumours he alluded to—and where he read them he (Sir J. C. Hobhouse) was at a loss to know—were totally unfounded.

RAILWAYS IN INDIA.
VISCOUNT JOCELYNwished to ask the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, whether any arrangement had been made between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, with reference to railway communication in India? if so, whether that arrangement was likely to be satisfactory to parties desirous of investing capital in these undertakings?
SIR J. C. HOBHOUSEsaid, that after the long consideration which the Board of Control had given this important subject, they had thought it their duty to transmit to the Court of Directors a plan, with regard to which they had thought it likely the court might come to some terms with the different railroad companies. That plan had been laid before the Directors last Monday, and would receive their earliest consideration. He believed the court coincided in the views of the Board of Control on the subject; the plan only awaited the decision of the different railroad companies, and the moment that was obtained he should inform the House of the result.
Subject at an end.

EMIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA.
MR. F. SCOTTbegged to put the following questions to the hon. Under Secretary for the Colonies:—"Whether any official information has been received by the last packet from any, and which, of the Australian colonies upon the subject of emigration?—What debt has been incurred in New South Wales on account of emigration since 1st January, 1847?—Whether any further loan has been recommended forestalling the annual revenue derived from the Land Fund in New South Wales?—Whether such proposal has been rejected by the colony?—Whether the funds applicable to emigration to that colony are not expended, and if not, how much remains?—How much of the colonial fund available at the meeting of Parliament has since been expended in Dorset and Wilts alone, to pay the whole passage money of emigrants from those counties only?—Whether it is known to the Government that shoemakers and other mechanics have been passed by the agents of the Government as "agricultural labourers eligible for free passages;" and whether those agents have received a commission of 15 s. a head for passing such emigrants, and if it is intended to continue such a system of percentage to agents?—Whether Her Majesty's Government mean to persist in restricting the number of emigrants, and limiting the benefits of emigration to persons whose entire passage money is paid for them, or whether it is intended to economise the funds, and promote a continuance of emigration upon a principle of mutual advantage, by giving a preference to equally eligible emigrants who contribute towards their passages?—Whether there is any intention of reducing the number
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of clerks or others in the emigration department in Park-street, Westminster?"
MR. HAWESsaid, with regard to the first question asked by the hon. Member, none but the ordinary information had been received, merely referring to the arrival of emigrant ships, &c., and none of that general character which the hon. Gentleman desired. To the second, third, and fourth questions, he could only answer generally, that a loan had been proposed for meeting the difficulty, but that loan had not yet been called into operation. With respect to the fifth question, the balance was small, but more than 5,000 l. As to the sixth question, he expected to have had an account sent him before to-day, in order to have been able to answer the hon. Member's question, but he had not received it. He hoped to have it to-morrow. With respect to the seventh question, he was not aware of the circumstances alluded to. He had made inquiry whether any mechanics had been passed by the agents of the Government as "agricultural labourers eligible for free passage;" but he was not aware of any such parties having been (at least to any extent) so passed. Isolated instances might have occurred; but, generally speaking, he did not think there had been the impositions alluded to. As to the eighth question, in reference to the assistance of emigration, the subject was of considerable importance certainly; and since 1842, 2,450 persons had been sent out with assistance. In reply to the ninth question, he had only to say, that the correspondence in the emigration department was daily increasing, and increasing to such an extent, that rather an augmentation than a diminution of the clerks would become necessary.
MR. SCOTT, as to the seventh question, asked if he were to understand that the emigration agents had actually received the commission of 15 s. a head on the emigrants they obtained? That is, for allowing such impositions on the colonies as I have alluded to.
MR. HAWES: No; I cannot admit the facts that there has been (to any extent) such impositions.
MR. SCOTT: Will the hon. Gentleman receive evidence of the fact?—for I beg to assure him it is the fact.
MR. HAWESmade no reply.

CANADIAN REBELLION.
MR. GLADSTONEsaid, he would take this opportunity, in consequence of the intelligence

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lately received from Canada, of asking Her Majesty's Government the two questions of which he had given notice. The first was, whether any instructions have been given to the Governor General of Canada as to the course which he is to pursue, in the event of its being proposed to him by his advisers to allow them to introduce into the House of Assembly any Bill giving compensation to any persons known to have been implicated in the rebellions of 1837 or 1838, on account of the damage sustained by them in those rebellions, or in the event of the passing of any such Bill through the two Houses of the Provincial Legislature? His second question was, whether, according to the usage of Canada, if any such Bill should have passed through both Houses of the Legislature, and should have become an Act by the Governor General's assent, without a suspending clause, the money thereby authorised to be paid would be payable forthwith, or before Her Majesty's servants had had an opportunity of advising Her Majesty with respect to the allowance or disallowance of such Act? And, perhaps, for the convenience of the House, he had better put a third question—namely, whether any official information had been received by Her Majesty's Government from Canada with regard to these proceedings; and if so, whether they had any objection to place it upon the table of this House?
MR. HAWESsaid, in answer to the first question of the right hon. Gentleman, he had to state that no instructions whatsoever were given to the noble Lord at the head of the Canadian Government with reference to the introduction of this Bill, or in contemplation of any such measures. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) had entire confidence in the noble Lord the Governor General's judgment and discretion, and was not in the habit of giving him instructions of that kind. With regard to the second question of the right hon. Gentleman, who had himself filled the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, he had to state that all colonial laws—he believed universally—having passed through their formal stages, and received the assent of the Crown, through Her Majesty's representative in the colony, come into immediate operation, unless they contain a suspending clause. This would apply, of course, to all Acts, whether they were for the appropriation of money or not; and, therefore, from the passing of such a Bill,
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of course the Act would come into operation and would continue to have the force of law, unless disallowed by Her Majesty. In that case, it would only cease to be law upon the arrival of the specification of Her Majesty's disallowance in the colony. With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's third question, he had to say that no despatch whatever had been received from the Earl of Elgin with reference to this transaction, either before or since the same question was asked the other day; and, therefore, he had no despatch to produce to the House. He used the word "despatch" advisedly. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) had a private letter from Canada, which he only received yesterday; but with regard to any public despatch, nothing of the kind had been received.
MR. HUMEbegged to ask whether the sum which the Government of Canada had agreed to advance was not proposed to be granted pursuant to the recommendation of a commission, which was appointed by Lord Metcalfe, for the purpose of considering the losses that had been sustained during the rebellion? Was not the advance for compensation recommended by a Committee appointed with the unanimous consent of the Legislative Assembly of that day to examine into and report upon the damage that had been sustained; and did not the report advise that 100,000 l. should be paid, excluding rebels or persons concerned in the rebellion?
SIR G. GREYthought it was better to postpone a question of that kind until the Government were in possession of official information, which would be laid before the House. He was aware of the fact to which the hon. Gentleman had referred; but if an answer were given to the question, it might lead to a discussion, because it would be difficult to answer it by a single affirmative or negative. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose assumed that the Bill had passed; but it appeared, from a private letter addressed by the Earl of Elgin to his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Department, that the Bill was not passed. It had yet to pass through Committee, and notice had been given of several amendments. That was the reason, no doubt, that the noble Earl had abstained from addressing any official communication to his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office on the subject.
MR. HUMEhad asked of the Government a distinct question, which he might also put to the right hon. Gentleman the

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Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone), who was Colonial Minister at the time. It was announced in a despatch to the Government from Lord Metcalfe, that a commission had examined into the losses that had been sustained, and had reported that 100,000 l, or, he (Mr. Hume) believed, a larger sum ought to be paid. Was not that the origin of the question?
SIR G. GREYbelieved that there was a circumstance of that kind, but an answer to the inquiry of the hon. Gentleman might open a question for discussion as to whether the objects contemplated by that commission were the same objects that were contemplated by the persons who introduced this Bill; and, at present, they did not know whether the legislature would ultimately sanction this Bill, or the recommendation contained in the report of the commission; it was better, therefore, to postpone the question until official communications on the subject were received.
MR. GLADSTONEcould hardly consider that the question of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose was addressed to him; but he held in his hand the votes and resolutions of the Legislative Assembly, and the resolutions as passed by the Legislative Assembly, together with the amendments that it was proposed to make, and which were rejected by that body. ["Order, order!"] He was in the hands of the House, and it was for the House to say whether he should read the resolutions or not.
SIR G. GREYrose to order. He begged to remark that the right hon. Gentleman had received an answer to his question; if the resolutions were read there must necessarily be a debate. There had been a commission appointed to inquire into this question; and it appeared to be a disputed question in the Assembly in Canada, whether the present Bill was one to carry out that intention.
MR. GLADSTONEmust say this, that he thought the course he took in offering to read what was public and official, was not an unjust one. At any rate, he must say this, that the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State to the question of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose was calculated, in his judgment, to convey an incorrect impression.
MR. ROBINSONwished to know if the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies, when he made use of the expression, "when the measure receives the
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assent of the Crown, it will come into immediate operation," meant the Governor General?
MR. HAWEShad said, that when the measure received the assent of the representative of the Queen in the colony, it would come into immediate operation.
Subject dropped.

MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA.
LORD DUDLEY STUART*rose, pursuant to notice, to move for copies or extracts of any correspondence between this Government and the Governments of Turkey and Russia, relating to the occupation by Russian troops of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. The noble Lord said: I am quite aware how very little attention questions of foreign policy generally excite in this House, and I regret my own want of ability to invest my present subject with the interest which I conceive it deserves. I am, however, deeply impressed with the importance of the question, and trust the House will extend to me some indulgence while I endeavour, to the best of my power, and in as short a time as I can, to discharge what I believe to be my duty, by laying before it a statement on the subject of which I have given notice. Some hon. Gentlemen may think that time employed on discussions relating to foreign affairs is wasted. Such, however, has not been the opinion of our best and greatest statesmen. In support of that position, I might quote authorities from Lord Chatham down to the present day; but I shall confine myself to a reference to the opinions of one on whom I look with great respect, and which, I presume, will not be treated lightly by any one sitting on the Treasury bench, for they are the opinions of one who must be allowed to be, as well by his enemies as by his supporters, one of the ablest Ministers to whom the Foreign Department of this country has ever been entrusted. The authority to which I refer is that of the noble Lord the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. My noble Friend, some years ago, made use of the following language:—
"I know that there are many persons in this House who look with great indifference, if not with actual repugnance, at discussions which turn upon our foreign relations; who think that they sufficiently perform their duties in this House, by devoting themselves sedulously to our domestic concerns; who are willing to leave our
* From a printed pamphlet.

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foreign affairs to the unquestioned discretion of His Majesty's Ministers; or who, at least, believe those affairs to be matters of peculiar mystery and craft, upon which none but the fully initiated are capable of arriving at sound and satisfactory opinions. Why, as well might a man think that provided he looked carefully after his estate, and managed his household with economy and order, it was unimportant to him what might be his behaviour towards his neighbours. When we consider how much our purely domestic interests are concerned in our diplomatic relations with other countries—when we reflect what influence the foreign policy of so great a Power as England must necessarily have upon the transactions of the world, and how much it must affect the welfare and peace of nations—it is plain that both those who look only to our own selfish interests, and those whose views take a higher flight, ought equally to watch with jealous anxiety every step of the Government in these matters. But then, as to the difficulty of understanding these things. It may suit the purposes of some to endeavour, like the high priests of Egypt, to keep knowledge to themselves, by locking it up in mystical and unintelligible language; but the days are gone by when diplomacy was an occult science; the intercourse of nations must now be conducted upon the same principles as that of individuals. I say, then, that every English gentleman, who brings to the debates of this House an honest mind and a manly and generous spirit, will find it just as easy to judge of these matters, if he will only insist upon having proper information, as he would of anything else to which he may direct his attention. I, therefore, implore this House to rouse themselves from that apathy as to our foreign affairs which has prevailed so long; for they may be assured that never, upon a matter of high national concernment, was the salutary control of their interference more urgently required."
I will show that the subject to which, on the present occasion, I ask your attention, is one of high national concernment. Those persons who are the most averse from interference with the affairs of other countries, even the total abstinence men, the teetotallers in politics, are apt, when they declare against all interference, to make a reservation with regard to questions in which our honour or our interest may be directly concerned—I will show that the present question affects both, and that it is precisely because we are a commercial nation that we are deeply interested in it. Now I beg the House will not be alarmed—I am not going to urge it into war—far from it. I do not even wish the Government to assume an attitude hostile to Russia—I know the nation is determined to remain at peace—everyone is for peace—I am for peace—and I have given security to that effect in the votes I have recorded in favour of the proposals of my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, for the reduction
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of our forces and the diminution of our expenditure. It is not for war, then, that I am about to ask in my present Motion, but for information. If my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs will say that there is no correspondence on the subject referred to, then there is an end to the question. But my noble Friend knows, and the whole world knows, that there has been a vast deal of correspondence on the subject, and that it has occupied the attention of the Governments of various countries for a length of time. In order to understand the question it is necessary to inquire what are Moldavia or Wallachia—what is, and what has been, their political condition? These princicipalities, which contain a population of about three millions, lying on the north of the Danube, and placed between that river and Russia and Hungary, form parts of the Turkish empire. They have done so for four or five centuries. The inhabitants after struggling long for their independence, at length submitted to the rule of Turkey, and entered into treaties, or capitulations as they are termed, by which they acknowledged the Forte as their Suzerain, on certain conditions most favourable to their liberty. The first of these capitulations was signed in 1393. It stipulated, amongst other things, that the Wallachians should always be governed by their own laws; the other capitulations were signed in 1460 and in 1513. Those capitulations have been acknowledged and confirmed not only by Turkey, but also by Russia, even so recently as in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. The inhabitants, notwithstanding that they are of the same religion as the Russians, and notwithstanding the intrigues of the latter, have remained firm in their allegiance to the Porte, and are more so now than at any former time. It is true that for some fifteen or twenty years they have been anxious to introduce reforms into their institutions; and that desire, though not occasioned by, has doubtless received an impulse from the electric shock communicated to all nations by the events of February, 1848. This, in the course of last year, led to petitions, on the part of the Moldavians, for reforms. The Hospodar, instead of agreeing to them, threw the petitioners into prison, and Russian troops then entered the territory. This occurred about the end of June. In Wallachia, about the same time, a new constitution was adopted, with the consent of the Hospodar,

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who, however, shortly after abdicated. No violence was employed—no blood was shed—no disturbance occurred; a Provisional Government was established, and governed the country to the satisfaction of the inhabitants for three months. In the meantime a deputation was sent to Constantinople. The Sultan appeared at first to approve of what had been done, but required some alterations in the composition of the Government, which were immediately assented to. The Emperor of Russia, however, thought proper to interfere, and he declared to the Porte that, if she did not put down by force of arms the new state of things in Wallachia, he would. The Porte applied to England and France for advice, and was recommended to submit to the wishes of Russia.
Turkish troops were then sent into Wallachia, they entered Bucharest on the 25th of September, accompanied by the Russian General, Duhamel, overthrew the Provisional Government, and re-established the former order of things. Notwithstanding that all pretext for further interference was thus removed, a Russian army entered Wallachia a short time afterwards; and General Duhamel proclaimed that he took possession of the province in the name of the Czar, his master. This occupation was accompanied with circumstances of insult to the Turks, and oppression to the inhabitants; all authority, civil as well as military, was usurped by the Russians, all legal as well as illegal acts were performed by them. A Turkish subject was arrested in the house of the Turkish commander-in-chief. An English subject was dragged to prison, in spite of the remonstrances of the British Consul. All persons obnoxious to Russia were thrown into prison; and, what was worst of all, the Russian army, amounting to no less than 60,000 men, was maintained at the expense of the wretched inhabitants. At first, contributions in money were levied, and, as may easily be imagined, found their way as often into the pockets of the officers as into the military chest; then provisions were ordered to be supplied; but when it appeared that the troops were in danger of starvation, the Emperor generously permitted the Wallachian Government to open a credit at St. Petersburgh; thus saddling the country with a heavy national debt, and preparing pretexts for future oppression. Towards the close of the last Session, I asked my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office, whether it was
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true that Russian troops had entered Moldavia; and my noble Friend stated in reply, that they had so entered without the authority of the Czar, and at the request of the Moldavian authorities; but that that movement had taken place solely for the purpose of restoring order in the province, and that the occupation was not to continue for any length of time. My noble Friend, however, must since have found out that he has been grossly deceived on the subject, for the Russian troops are still in Moldavia, and the Emperor has also taken military possession of Wallachia. The Russian Government has been extolled on account of what is termed its dignified attitude, its moderation, and its forbearance from intervention with the affairs of other States in the eventful year 1848. But it must be owned that such forbearance has not been exemplified in Wallachia. To march an army into the territory of a neighbour, occupy provinces belonging to an independent State with 60,000 men, and force the inhabitants to maintain them at their own expense for six months, is conduct which, at first sight, looks more like lawless aggression, than moderation or forbearance—it makes a pretty strong primâ facie case against the Power pursuing such a course; and unless reasons can be assigned giving Russia a right so to act, and making it justifiable for her to exercise the right, it must deprive her of all title to be looked upon in any better light than she has always been considered—that is, as a Power seeking unscrupulously her own aggrandisement, without any regard to her engagements, or any respect to the most solemn treaties. But was there anything to justify that interference on the part of Russia? I contend that there was not. In the Treaty of Kainardji, adopted in the year 1774, it was declared by the 16th Article—
"The Porte consents, that according to the circumstances of the two principalities, the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia may speak in their favour; and promises to take into consideration such representations conformably to the amity and respect which it has for the Powers."
But that stipulation, which strongly contrasts by its moderation with the arrogant tone now assumed by Russia, cannot give her that power of interference which she claims. In the Treaty of Bucharest, and in those of Ackerman and of Adrianople, there were stipulations in favour of the

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principalities; but those stipulations have in no way been violated; it is not even alleged that they have been violated; and they cannot, therefore, justify the course which Russia has taken. A guarantee, in order to be performed, must be claimed. There is no guarantee on the part of Russia in these treaties, except one, which is of so extraordinary a nature that it must excite the greatest surprise, and that certainly has not been claimed.
The 5th Article of the Treaty of Adrianople runs thus:—
"The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having by a capitulation placed themselves under the Suzerainté of the Sublime Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity."
The Emperor Nicholas is a powerful sovereign, no doubt, and a great potentate; his will is law, or he thinks it ought to be; but he is, I believe, the first mortal who has thought of giving to any country a guarantee for its prosperity. One Emperor of Russia did, indeed, declare himself to be God, proclaiming that as God was his God, so he was the god of his subjects; and really, in reading this article of the treaty, one must conclude that the Emperor Nicholas arrogates to himself the attributes of the Deity. I believe that after the present Motion has been disposed of, a question will come on relating to the actual condition of Ireland. Let hon. Gentlemen from that country apply to the Emperor Nicholas for a guarantee. Oh! if he would only extend his benignity to Ireland—if he would only take Connemara under his protection, there would be no more potatoe rot—no more famine—no squalor—no evictions—no emigration—no further occasion for a rate in aid; and the right hon. Member for Tamworth need not, in pursuance of the plan which has occasioned so much delight in Ireland, lay out his money in the purchase of Ballynahinch, but might save his thousands without stirring from the shades of Whitehall Gardens or the schools of Tamworth. Where is the hon. Member for Macclesfield? Let him get a guarantee from Nicholas the Great, and the prosperity of Regent Street may be ensured. Where is my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham? He should get a treaty negotiated with Nicholas, and with a guarantee for the prosperity of Birmingham he might stroke his beard with complacency, undisturbed by advertisements announcing the importation of scissors and knives from Germany!
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But, besides this guarantee, there is something else in the article I have been referring to; it states that Russia having guaranteed the prosperity of the principalities, it is understood that they shall preserve all the privileges and immunities granted to them in virtue of their capitulations.
Now, what were those privileges and immunities? First and foremost, the right of making their own laws. However absurd the first part of the article, there is certainly something logical in the sequel; for the best mode of carrying into effect a guarantee for the prosperity of a people is to allow them to govern themselves; therefore, immediately after the guarantee, conies, as a consequence, the stipulation for self-government. Now, how has Russia, which has provided for the prosperity of the principalities by saddling them with the expense of maintaining 60,000 troops, how has she evinced her respect for their rights and privileges? On the publication of a new edition of the Organic Statute or Constitution of the Provinces, Russia interfered in a manner wholly unjustified by treaty. It was necessary that the Organic Statute should be voted by the Legislative Chambers. Russia procured the adoption of some words by which she was termed the protectress of the provinces, and endeavoured to get inserted in it additional words, prohibiting any change in the constitution without the consent of the protecting Power. The Chambers indignantly refused. Nevertheless, the Russian Minister procured the surreptitious introduction of the words into the official copy of the Act; but the Assembly having immediately and formally protested against it—and the protest may be read in Martens' collection of treaties—it cannot be considered as having any validity. It can have no more validity than an Act of Parliament would, if words were interpolated in it without the sanction of this House. It is upon such pretexts that Russia has violated the territory of a neighbouring State with an army of 60,000 men, and forced the inhabitants to maintain them for more than six months at their own expense; and Russia has been eulogised for its moderation, dignity, and forbearance, and has received this eulogy from those who can set no bounds to their vituperation of Charles Albert and of the King of Prussia, for their interference in Lombardy and in Schleswig-Holstein. Let those who are so loud in their denunciation of Governments whom they accuse of disregarding

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the obligations of treaties, in order to assist and defend popular and national rights, display equal indignation at similar conduct when the object is to oppress and to trample down such rights; or let them stand forth in their true colours, not as the scrupulous defenders of good faith, but as the friends of despotism; and let it be seen that their pretended attachment to the faith of treaties is but a mask to disguise their hatred of liberty, and the desire which lurks in the bottom of their hearts to put down all popular rights, and to see mankind subjected to the degrading yoke of arbitrary power. It may, no doubt, he very convenient to Russia to hold possession of these provinces, in order to menace and overawe those who are struggling for their liberty in Hungary. So, too, it would be convenient to her to occupy the Ionian Islands, in order to intimidate the patriots of Italy; and who can doubt that she would do so, if not deterred by one only reason—namely, that they are in the hands of a powerful State; and that, in short, she dare not. Who can doubt that if these islands had been in weaker hands, that they would have been treated like the principalities of the Danube?
She has already, under pretext of invitation from the inhabitants of Hermanstadt and other frontier towns—and by what arts such invitations are obtained, it is not difficult to imagine—advanced from Wallachia into Transylvania. And what has been her conduct there, where she professes to have gone solely for the benevolent purpose of preserving the inhabitants from the evils of anarchy and confusion? Finding some unfortunate Wallachians, who had fled into exile in order to escape from her fury, and who fancied themselves in safety in the territory of another State, she has seized them, and, without respecting sex, has sent off even women and unmarried girls prisoners into Russia. The preservation of the integrity of the Turkish empire has always been considered an object of the utmost importance by our statesmen. It has been declared to be so in many a Royal Speech from the Throne. It has been proclaimed by Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, and by Prime Ministers, belonging as well to conservative as to liberal Governments, and even by hon. Gentlemen who may possibly belong to future Governments—by protectionists. Our statesmen have vied with each other in declarations on this subject. My noble Friend at the head of the Foreign
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Office, in the course of a debate which took place on the 4th of February, 1834, said—
"I consider it of the greatest importance to this country, and to the balance of power in Europe, that the Turkish empire, such as it subsists, should be maintained in all its independence and integrity; and it was not without due consideration that this was pointed out in the Speech from the Throne as a matter deserving of the serious attention of Parliament."
It is, however, unnecessary to quote speeches when facts can be referred to. For what did we incur the risk of war with France, and encounter not the risk, but the reality—which I trust sincerely may never occur again—of a misunderstanding of long duration with that country—for what but to prevent the Pacha of Egypt retaining possession of Syria? Was it a more serious blow to the independence of the Ottoman empire that Egyptian troops should occupy Syria, than that Russian troops should take possession of Moldavia and Wallachia? But perhaps there is a change in the views of those governing the country. Perhaps it is a mistake to consider it of consequence that the integrity of the Turkish empire should be maintained, and, perhaps, that is now considered a matter of trifling importance.
I hope the noble Lord will tell us—I call upon him to declare, for I think the House has a right to know—whether the views of Government have undergone a change in this respect, or whether the same importance is attached to it as heretofore. For my part, I hesitate not to declare, that I think it deserves, not only as much, but greater attention than ever.
I said that I would show that it was in its commercial bearings that the question I have ventured to bring before the House was especially important. I think I can do that in a very few words; and I would intreat the calm attention of the House to this part of the subject, I have endeavoured to avoid all asperity in bringing forward this Motion: I have given no expression to those feelings which, I am not ashamed to confess, never fail to rise in my breast when contemplating the acts of the oppressor of Poland. I would beg the House to meet me in the same spirit, and enter dispassionately on the consideration of this branch of the question.
The military occupation of the Danubian principalities must be regarded as the first step towards the dismemberment of the Turkish empire—that conclusion to which the policy of Russia has always tended—or

1137
not the first step; for many such steps have been taken already, sometimes boldly and openly, sometimes insidiously and stealthily, and sometimes, as I hope will be the case in the present instance, they have been, though always unwillingly, retraced. The occupation, then, must be regarded as a step—as another step towards that end. There is no Government so liberal in its commercial dealings as Turkey; none embraces so practically the doctrines of free trade; and any change in the affairs of the world that should place Turkey under the rule of any other Power would be a heavy blow to our commerce. It behoves us, therefore, to be exceedingly jealous of any beginning that may by possibility have such an end. Gentlemen who are disposed to think or speak lightly of such a result, forget that whilst the tariff of Russia either prohibits the introduction of almost all our manufactures, or saddles them with duties of prohibitive amount, Turkey admits them all at the duty of from 3 to 5 per cent.
It appears, from official returns, that only three countries are better customers to us than Turkey—namely, Germany, which is the best of all, then Holland, then Italy, and the Italian Islands. France, though our nearest neighbour, is only on a par with Turkey. No other country comes near her. Russia is more than half a million below Turkey. Prussia, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, all together, do not equal her. Portugal, our ancient ally, supposed to be of so much importance to us in a commercial point of view—Portugal and Spain together, with the Azores, and with Madeira, and the Balearic Islands too, do not reach her; and even if our own possession, Gibraltar, which annually takes more than half a million, be added, barely surpass her. This appears from the revenue and population returns for the year 1846—a year not the most favourable for my purpose, but it is the nearest to the present time to which I have access. I beg to call the attention of the House to some observations powerfully supporting my view of the importance of our trade with Turkey, which appeared on the 24th of December last, in an ably written paper, having a large circulation in the manufacturing district, the Manchester Guardian:—
"Few Englishmen—few English manufacturers even, are aware that the narrow passage of the Dardanelles is continually traversed by fleets freighted with the produce of English looms, of
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English mines, of English workships, and of English colonies; that this great stream of commerce, having arrived at Constantinople, and having suffered there such diminution as serves to supply the wants of that capital and its surrounding provinces, passes on to the Black Sea, where, dividing into two branches, the smaller seeks the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, through the mouth of the Danube, whilst the larger, reaching Trebizond, is again subdivided, diffusing itself over Persia on the one hand, and on the other stretching, by means of the great caravan lines, into the boundless east, as far as Caubul, Khokand, Bokhara, and Chiva. The ignorance which prevails respecting its resources can only be explained by the circumstance that it is carried on almost exclusively by the agency of foreigners. Yet this trade is important on account of its present magnitude, and still more important by the promise which its rapid increase affords of an almost indefinite future development. The question is sometimes asked, "What interest can England, a Christian nation, have in the preservation of the Ottoman empire? When the facts which we have just stated are known, the question admits of an easy answer. Whilst countries, which boast of a higher degree of civilisation, have vied with each other in inventing complicated contrivances, having for their object the protection of native manufactures, to the certain injury, and sometimes to the utter destruction of their foreign commerce, the Turkish Government has adhered to its ancient maxims, and on this point as well as on some others, has set an example of liberality which has been little applauded, and still less imitated, by western Governments. Now, suppose for a moment that any European Power—Austria, France, or Russia, obtained possession of Constantinople, would the manufactured goods of England be permitted in that case to pass into the Black Sea, as they are permitted at present, on paying a small ad valorem duty of between 3 and 5 per cent? Is it not more rational to conclude that any European Power, on gaining the command of the Dardanelles, would extend its present tariff to its new dominions? Now, the tariffs of France, Germany, and Russia are prohibitive of British manufactures, with the exception of the half-manufactured article of cotton twist, which is admitted into the two latter countries as a great favour, at an ad valorem duty of 30 per cent. We must, therefore, expect, if the rapidly approaching frontier of the Russian empire should ever reach the banks of the Hellespont, not merely to see the increase of our Eastern, or Greek trade, as it is termed in Manchester, receive a sudden check, but we must be prepared for the almost total annihilation of that valuable branch of our commerce. Nor does this opinion rest merely on a calculation of probabilities; it has received the confirmation of actual experience. Up to the time when the Russians took possession of Georgia, merchants from that country visited Constantinople in considerable numbers for the purpose of purchasing English manufactured articles; but a few years after its annexation to the Russian empire this commerce ceased, and the Georgian traders have entirely disappeared from Constantinople. The late Earl Grey is reported to have said that the meanest artisan in the kingdom is interested in preserving the balance of power. The observation is no doubt correct; but the

1139
interest must in many instances be somewhat remote. The interest, however, of the Manchester operatives in preserving the independence of Turkey is direct and obvious."
The trade with Turkey is not only large, but it is steadily and rapidly increasing. In a speech which I made in this House in the year 1836, I showed that the declared value of our exports to Turkey was, in the year 1827, little more than 500,000 l.; in 1834, l,200,000 l., that is, the exports to Turkey had increased by 700,000 l. Since the last-mentioned period they have further increased by 1,200,000 l., that is, from 1834 to 1846 they have doubled; whilst from 1827 to 1846, in twenty years, they have increased fivefold. This increased and increasing power of consumption of our manufactures, forms, I think, a sufficient answer to those who speak of the Turkish empire as effete and in a state of decay; it shows that it has resources in abundance; and surely demonstrates that if it was important to us that the integrity of that empire should be maintained twenty years ago, it is, in a commercial point of view, still more important now. Now, compare the progress of the trade of Turkey with that of Russia. In twenty years, while our annual exports to Turkey have increased by 2,000,000 l., our exports to Russia have increased only by 500,000 l. Twenty years ago the declared value of our exports to Turkey was less than half that of our exports to Russia. Now, our exports to Turkey exceed those to Russia by more than one-third.
I have stated that twenty years ago our exports to Turkey were only half a million; by the latest returns they are nearly two millions and a half; and during the time that our exports to Turkey have risen from half a million to two millions and a half, those to Russia have only risen from 1,200,000 l. to 1,700,000 l. But what I have said forms but an imperfect picture of the relative value of the trades; we must inquire of what the exports consist; a large portion of those going to Russia, nearly one-half, is composed of the half manufactured article of cotton twist, which is worked up by the foreign manufacturer into goods, and afterwards brought into competition with our own. The value of cotton manufactured goods exported to Russia is perfectly insignificant; it does not amount to 50,000 l. The trade to Turkey presents an aspect precisely the reverse. The value of cotton twist exported is small, and almost the whole of our exports
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to that country consists of cotton manufactured goods. In 1847 the declared value of cotton goods alone exported to Turkey equalled, within a few pounds, the declared value of goods of all sorts, cotton twists and all, exported to Russia. It is well known how much more valuable the trade in cotton goods is than that in cotton twist. This has been well expounded in a pamphlet which has lately been published, from which the following are extracts:—
"Of course the greater the amount of labour and capital required to produce any manufactured article, the greater is its value, in proportion to the value of the raw material of which it is composed. Out of the price of plain and printed calicoes must be paid, not merely the expense of the labour and the interest of the capital employed in producing the yarn, but also the labour of weaving and printing, and the interest of the capital employed in those processes; and according to the best estimates which have been formed on this subject, whilst the value of cotton twist is about double the value of the raw material which has been worked up in making it, the average value of the plain and printed calicoes, of which our exports consist, is about five times greater than that of the raw material. Deducting, then, on this account one-half from our exports of cotton twist, and one-fifth from our exports of plain and printed calicoes, we shall find a residue of 1,424,548 l., which must have been received in the shape of profits and wages, by our capitalists and workmen engaged directly or indirectly in the cotton manufacture, on account of our exports to Turkey in the year 1847; and the sum of 413,177 l. only as the amount which they received in profits and wages, during the same year, from our exports to Russia. As far as the cotton manufacture is concerned, the Turkish trade is therefore more valuable to England than the Russian, nearly in the proportion of five to two, and as this remarkable difference arises from the liberality of the Turkish tariff, which is uniformly low for all manufactured goods—from three to five per cent on the actual value—whilst the Russian tariff is almost as uniformly prohibitive, it is probable that an examination of the relative value of the Turkish and Russian trades with reference to other products would show a result no less favourable to the former than that at which we have arrived as respects the most important branch of our manufacturing industry."
I shall be told that some of these goods are only sent to Turkey in transitu to Persia and other parts of Central Asia; but should we enjoy this advantage if Turkey were in the hands of Russia? And if that event should happen, how long would Persia remain independent?
It will be urged that the aid of the smugglers would be called in to prevent the exclusion of our goods; but this would only operate as a mitigation of the evil, and not as a cure; for if you do not pay the tariff, you must pay the smuggler. It never can be argued, that it is of no consequence

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to us whether the tariffs of foreign countries are favourable to the admission of our goods or not. It is admitted, on all hands, to be a great advantage that our manufactures should be admitted at low duties. Even the protectionists admit that; but they object to free trade because they see in other countries no disposition to reciprocity, and though we adopt low duties, other countries refuse to do so. In Turkey, we have a country which sets us the example of free trade, and is ready to take all our manufactures: ought we not to be concerned in maintaining the independence of a country of so much importance to our interests? At this late hour I will not point out the various machinations of Russia, all tending to the detriment of Turkey, nor detain the House while I recount how she has filled with her agents and intrigues Bulgaria and Servia, and other portions of the Sultan's dominions. There is a great deal to be said on these matters, but it would take too long on the present occasion. I have been accused of introducing sentiment into politics: am I not on this occasion, appealing to you in behalf of your interests? On what was called the monster debate, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that nations were influenced only by their fears and their hopes—that Turkey, in reference to Russia, was actuated by fear; and in reference to England, by hope. I trust that my noble Friend will not deceive that hope, and that he will take such measures as that Turkey shall have less reason for fear of Russia, if, indeed, she does not entertain any fear. I, however, am inclined to believe she does not. She is not in the weak state she was in some years ago; and her army is large, and full of spirit. All that she now requires is the moral support of England. On a late occasion, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told the House that the character of England was unshaken, that her moral influence stood high—that we were in a condition to give advice; and when given, it was listened to, and not despised or spurned. Let him now exert that influence. Every one connected with the East—every one that has been there—every one that knows anything about it, concurs in saying that all that is required by Turkey is that this country should assume a firm and resolute tone in her behalf. Though I see much to approve and admire in the conduct of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign
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Department, I cannot help thinking that his language and attitude are not always sufficiently determined when he has to deal with powerful States. If he had remonstrated energetically when Russia first entered Moldavia—which she did with great hesitation, at first, disavowing the general whose act it was—and had shown that the British Government regarded that step with decided disapprobation and aversion, the proceedings of the general would perhaps never have been sanctioned, and at all events, the troops would soon have been withdrawn. The production of the papers for which I have moved will show how far this opinion is well founded. I hope they will not be withheld; and, thanking the House for their great kindness in listening to me with so much attention, I will only further observe, in words used on a former occasion by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it is matter of deep interest and high importance that—
"we should know what have been the principles on which our Government has acted—what has been the spirit in which the influence of England has been exerted, what objects have been aimed at, and by what means we have sought to attain them."
Motion made, and Question proposed—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House Copies or Extracts of any Correspondence between this Government and the Government of Turkey, and between this Government and the Government of Russia, relating to the occupation, by Russian troops, of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia."
COLONEL THOMPSONseconded the Motion. Hon. Gentlemen who were in the habit of looking round the political horizon must often have felt a suspicion that the influence of England, like all other sublunary things, must be, in all political respects, far from stationary, and that our naval supremacy ought not to be calculated upon as something which was always to be preserved. A vast republic was growing up on the other side of the Atlantic, which it was probable might not always be animated by the most friendly feelings towards this country. A writer of an American Guide-book could not pass the Horse Guards without indulging in the anticipation, that perhaps within the sight of living individuals, there might be an army of 50,000 Americans drawn up in line behind that building. And when the same writer saw the standard waving over Windsor Castle, he thought it probable that "the

1143
piece of flaunting bunting might be superseded by the modest American stripes and stars." A serious American politician had also given his authority to the probability of the fact, that within the moderate compass of human life a period would arrive when the physical power of the United States would be much greater than that of this country. It might be so. The ground might be slipping away from under us; and—like Genoa, Venice, Holland, and other countries—a time might be coming when England might cease to be as powerful as she was now. She ought, therefore, to contrive to make friends somewhere or of somebody, and to place herself at the head of the great struggle which was going on between civilisation and freedom on one side, and barbarity and despotism on the other. He would not omit the opportunity to set before the Government, that there was in this country a strong current of public opinion in favour of our assuming the same position which Elizabeth and Cromwell—the woman and the man to whom our greatness was mainly owing—had in their day taken. He would not admit that he stood there to plead for war, or that any ancient habits or professional recollections were prompting him to express these opinions. He "hated war." A great leader had said so, and he might be allowed to follow him. But there was such a thing as incurring danger through being afraid of it. Did any man go about proclaiming, that if he were attacked by robbers he would not resist, because robbers were malevolent and strong? Believing, therefore, that the people took a vehement and deep interest in the progress of civilisation and freedom in other countries, and regarding this as an opportunity for the Government to lay before the world some evidence that they regarded foreign affairs with the same views, he would second the Motion.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONthought he should best perform his duty to the House by rising immediately after his hon. and gallant Friend who had seconded the Motion, in order to state the view which he took of the Motion of his noble Friend the Member for Marylebone. He fully retained the opinion which his noble Friend had quoted from a former speech of his, that it was desirable for the interest of this country, as well as creditable to the honour of that House, that the House of Commons should take a lively interest in the foreign relations of this country; and
1144
he owned that sometimes, both in and out of office, it had been a matter of regret to him that the foreign relations of the country excited, comparatively speaking, so little interest within those walls. Although no doubt, it might be inconvenient to the person who filled the situation which he had the honour to hold, to be called on frequently to discuss matters of this kind in that House, yet any man who felt that he honestly and to the best of his ability discharged his duty, must look with confidence to the support of the great majority of the House; and if with that feeling he found himself supported by the House of Commons, he need not say how much that support would contribute to strengthen the hands of the Government in dealing with foreign affairs. Nevertheless, he did not feel it to be consistent with his duty to accede to the Motion, on the ground that the papers which were called for were connected with discussions which were still going on, and also on the ground that the House had invariably acknowledged the inconvenience of producing an unfinished correspondence on matters still pending between this country and foreign countries. He could assure his noble Friend, however, that he would be greatly mistaken if he supposed that the subject to which he had drawn the attention of the House was not considered by Her Majesty's Government of great national and great European importance. He was quite ready to concur in every syllable of what his noble Friend had stated with regard to the necessity of maintaining the independence of the Ottoman empire. He held it to be of vast importance to this country, both in a political and a commercial point of view. With regard to the political branch of the subject, it was not necessary for any man to go into an argument to show that if those vast possessions—for vast they were—which were now under the rule of the Sultan, were to be partitioned among the other Powers of Europe, such a partition could not be effected without great European conflicts, and would materially damage the existing balance of power, to the detriment of those nations which did not participate in the spoil. Now, as England, under any circumstances, could not wish or expect to share in the spoils of such a transaction, it was obvious that it was neither her desire nor her interest to assist in such a partition. That feeling, however, was not confined to this country, and the House might be assured that the

1145
other leading Powers of Europe were as sensible as we were of the great importance of maintaining the integrity of the Turkish empire. That was expressly recognised in a preliminary paragraph of the Treaty of 1841, regulating the passage of ships of war through the Dardanelles; and he was satisfied that none of the great Powers who were parties to that treaty would think of infringing the principles which were so solemnly laid down in the preamble of that public Act. He had said that, politically, the independence of Turkey was of great importance; and, commercially, his noble Friend had in no degree overstated his case. It was true that there was no foreign country with which we carried on commercial intercourse in which the tariff was so low and so liberal as that of Turkey. The trade with Turkey, also, was an annually increasing trade. So far from its having reached its maximum, he believed that, if the improvements which were now making in the internal administration of Turkey were carried out, we should find that step by step our commercial intercourse would increase; and not ours only, but the commercial intercourse of all the trading nations of Europe also; and those regions which in former times were the centre of civilisation, would again approach their former condition. Of course, then, under these circumstances, and with these views, it would have been a dereliction of duty on the part of the Government if they had seen with apathy and indifference transactions which in any way, however indirect, would appear to bear on the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire, and such undoubtedly would be, primâ facie, the occupation of two Turkish provinces by the army of a neighbouring Power. An explanation, however, of that step was given at the time by the Russian authorities, and communications, some written, some verbal, had been going on since, not only between the Russian Ambassador and himself at this Court, but between the representative of Her Majesty and the Russian Government at St. Petersburgh, and the British Ambassador, the Turkish Government, and the Russian Minister at Constantinople. These representations had been made on our part in a most friendly spirit—in that spirit which was suited to the friendly relations which, he was happy to say, existed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia. They had been received in the same
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spirit; and whatever might have been the substance of those communications, he thought that the House would be gratified in knowing that they had in no degree produced any change in the friendly relations between the two Governments. When the occupation first took place, a circular was issued by the Russian Government, a copy of which he held in his hand, stating the reasons which had induced the Russian Government to sanction the advance of Russian troops towards these provinces, and stating the contingencies under which that occupation would cease. The general ground on which that sanction was given—he said "sanction," because he believed that the immediate advance of the Russian force arose from communications on the spot between the authorities of the principalities and the Russian general commanding, but was sanctioned afterwards by the Russian Government—was stated in the following passage, which explained the contingency on which the duration of that occupation would depend. Count Nesselrode, after alluding to former occupations, and the evacuations consequent thereon, said—
"The same thing will happen this time also; and from the moment that, in Wallachia and Moldavia, legal order shall have been established, or that the Porte shall think that it has acquired a sufficient guarantee for the ulterior repose of those provinces, our troops shall be withdrawn from them, to go and reoccupy immediately that strictly defensive position which they occupied before."
Now, of course, it was open to anybody to say that, when a Member of the Administration expressed his confidence in the intentions of any foreign Government, that he reposed an undue belief in those intentions, that he was not sufficiently watchful, and that he had not profited by past events. In answer to that, he could only say that, whatever might be said of the validity of the grounds on which the occupation had taken place, he was confident that the Russian Government had no intention of making any permanent encroachment on the Turkish empire; and he was satisfied that the question between Russia and any other Power was a question merely of time, and not a question of ulterior intention. It was but fair to say, that since those events which during the last twelve months had agitated Europe, the Russian Government had evinced a great desire to remain in an expectant attitude, and, with the exception of this occupation, had not interfered in the internal affairs of other

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countries. As to the grounds on which Russia had occupied these provinces, it was not for him to discuss their validity now; but the grounds assigned were, that the revolutionary movements which had taken place in these provinces were connected with much more extensive arrangements, and that it was in order to guard her own provinces against a similar movement that she interfered, and assisted the Turkish Government in putting down the revolt. His noble Friend had stated, very correctly, the progress of that, insurrection. It was perfectly true that Wallachia and Moldavia had been for some time dissatisfied with the arrangements of the Turkish Government; and he believed that the Turkish Government itself was convinced that improvements and reforms were necessary to produce contentment and promote prosperity in those provinces. The conduct of the Turkish Government had been most satisfactory; for they had not only given an amnesty for what had occurred, but they had shown an anxious desire to investigate the causes of the discontent which prevailed, and to introduce such improvements as would satisfy the reasonable desires of the people. These matters, and the manner in which the evacuation should take place, were matters for discussion between the Russian Government and the Government of Turkey; and, pending these discussions, he was quite sure that his noble Friend would not—that he could not, consistently with his duty—produce the papers which he had called for. He agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend who seconded the Motion, that it was fitting for this country to maintain the moral position which a great country like this ought to hold, and must always continue to hold, unless by her own fault she forfeited it. He could assure his hon. and gallant Friend that it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government to maintain that position, and to maintain it by those peaceable means which his hon. and gallant Friend had so ably and so justly recommended. He was sure that the Government of every country which was strong in itself, and which could not be suspected of being actuated by fear in any tone which it might take in its communications with foreign countries, and which might, therefore, couch its communications in a manner not calculated to wound the feelings of any other country with which it might communicate, might, and must frequently, have it in its power to promote
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the progress of those principles to which his hon. and gallant Friend had adverted. With regard to the present question, Her Majesty's Government had taken the part which they thought most adapted to forward the objects which they had in view; and he trusted that the question of time would be the only thing between Turkey and Russia that could call for adjustment. He should have finished what he had to say long before, had he not been aware that some uneasiness existed out of doors, from an apprehension that the occupation in question might lead to an interruption of the friendly relations between Turkey and Russia; and certainly the orders given by the Turkish Government had tended to impress people with the notion that a rupture might take place. A proclamation had been issued by the Turkish Government, on the 5th of the present month, ordering the usual equipment of a squadron for summer exercise, and the march of troops towards the northern frontier, but disclaiming any notion of hostilities. Looking, therefore, at the assurances given by the Russian Government, and the well-known intentions and interests of the Turkish Government, he trusted that the apprehensions to which he had alluded would be found to have no foundation, and that the negotiations which were now going on between the Turkish Government and the Russian Government, at Constantinople, would terminate to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, and without disturbance to the general peace of Europe.
MR. C. ANSTEYsaid, matters had now assumed so serious an aspect in the east of Europe that if England was what she had formerly been, she would not then be discussing the present question in the House of Commons. He maintained that a fearful blow had been struck at British interests when the first Russian soldier had passed the boundary of those principalities. They had seen on the part of Russia perfidy after perfidy, and fraud after fraud, and yet the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told the House that he relied upon her honourable intentions, because she had signed the Treaty of June 1841. He contended that the English Government was bound to interfere, and to insist upon the immediate withdrawal of every Calmuck and Russian from that soil, which they polluted by their presence. These provinces were 30,000 square miles in extent, and no less than 20,000 of them were rich and fertile lands.

1149
This territory was inhabited by a population now of upwards of 40,000,000. This population was capable of supplying our markets with every commodity which we were now reduced to purchase, at enhanced prices and inferior quality, in Russia. They were willing to receive payment for their commodities, not in money, but in British produce. The mouths of the Danube were so choked up with sand as to make it impossible to carry on properly the timber trade, which was formerly the most thriving trade in those parts. At this moment there were not more than eight or nine feet of water, and the vessels that could enter there were of too small a size to conduct properly that trade. Russia had beset every mouth and access with her quarantine regulations; so that if even a letter were allowed by the Russian authorities to pass, we owed it to their forbearance, or, as the phrase is—their magnanimity. The consequence was, that British trade in Moldavia and Wallachia was now wholly extinguished. Our merchants were forced against their will to go to Odessa and other ports, which, it might be said, enjoyed the advantage of the prohibitory tariff of Russia. The question the House had now to decide was, whether we were strong enough in our foreign, commercial, and political relations, to submit to this great loss of political influence and commerce in the territory he had described. If Wallachia was suffered to import and export freely, the trade of Russia was gone. So that this was a case of life and death to Russia. If the policy of Russia—and he was afraid he might say the policy of Great Britain—were suffered by Parliament to be carried out in respect to these provinces, he feared that what had been done in Moldavia and Wallachia would be imitated by Russia in every other part of the Turkish dominions, so that the future occupation of the Dardanelles would not be a question for the statesman to consider, but for the historian to record. He did not know what information the noble Viscount had received from his diplomatic agents in this quarter; but he was authorised to say, by one of the highest authorities on this subject, that every attempt was now being made by the Russian general and the troops under him to stimulate and exasperate, not only the population, but the Turkish army of occupation, to aggressive measures against Turkey. As to the noble Viscount's confidence in the disclaimer of Russia in respect
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to any aggressive intentions, it should be recollected that Russia had never yet invaded any country without heralding her advances by a disavowal of aggressive designs. It was quite clear that Russia would remain in these provinces in spite of all that had been said and done; so that it was too much for the noble Viscount to say that Russia would withdraw her troops. He should vote for the Motion of his noble Friend the Member for Marylebone; and he hoped that the noble Lord would not yield to any persuasion to withdraw it. If the noble Lord did give way, he (Mr. Anstey) should feel it to be his duty to ask the House to come to a division upon the question.
MR. MONCKTON MILNEStrusted that the hon. Member would not persist in his intention to divide the House on this subject, for it would do no good to obtain an expression of opinion in so thin a House; and it would give a very erroneous notion of the opinion entertained as to the importance of the subject. He trusted that the hon. Gentleman would allow himself for the present to be satisfied with the declaration of the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary. He did not agree with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Youghal as to the propriety of going back so far as to discuss the policy of the treaties of Akerman and Adrianople. If this country had failed, as was stated by the hon. Gentleman, as a matter of humanity, in seeing these treaties carried out, it was not the fault of the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary. If the expectations of the noble Viscount were not fulfilled, he trusted that the whole subject would be again brought forward. It was very well to speak as if the fiat of England must at once settle all these matters; and he saw no good in concealing from ourselves the truth that the relations between Turkey and Russia could not always be arranged just as we wished; but still we could do much by exercising a moral influence. It should be recollected, that these relations were the relations of conterminous countries, and there had been going on for a very long period a number of circumstances which excited causes of dispute and difference. We should be cautious not to do anything which was calculated to increase the disturbance of the relations between them. It would be most indiscreet for a Minister of the Crown of this country to use such language towards

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Russia as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Youghal had resorted to. The forcible occupation of these principalities by Russian troops, and the making the inhabitants of these poor countries maintain and pay those troops, was an undoubted injury and injustice; and the noble Viscount would do well to make a representation to the Russian Government, that such proceedings met with the strong and general disapprobation of all parties in this country. He knew that this interference was justified in the dubious word protection; but experience, during the French revolution, and long previous, showed what acts were done under that name, and nothing could be more unjust than resorting to such a pretence. There was no doubt as to this protection, as it was termed, having originally been intended to be given with the view of defending the Christian inhabitants of those principalities against the violence and fanaticism of the Mussulman population; but matters now assumed a very different form, and it was in vain for them to suppose, however much they might conceive themselves to be justified by treaties in interfering, that they would not ultimately arouse public opinion throughout the rest of Europe to a pitch of indignation on this subject. He did not believe that this aggressive spirit was attributable to this or that Emperor of Russia; but it was the policy of that country, and it might be forced on the sovereign of that country rather than that the initiative originated with him. On this ground it was most desirable that no Russian sovereign should give any ground for the supposition that he was of an aggressive disposition. As for carrying out the favourite notion, said to prevail in Russia, of an empire from the Baltic to the Dardanelles, it never would be permitted by the maritime Powers. A general combination of other nations would be formed to prevent it, as was the case in the wars with Louis XIV. and Napoleon. If ever a war would be justifiable, it would be for such a purpose, as it would be indispensable for the safety of the rest of Europe. He looked forward to the continued invasion of these territories by Russia as an object which the noble Viscount should strongly keep in mind; and he (Mr. Monckton Milnes) was sure that, in any remonstrances, or other steps, which he might deem it expedient to adopt on the subject, he would secure the cordial support and assistance of France. Let him take firm ground on these matters,
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but take care not to dictate in a way which could not be enforced. He believed the advice of England would not be lost on Russia. If this advice was given wisely and opportunely, he did not despair that it would attain that very desirable result, of the restoration to these principalities of that independence to which they were entitled.
MR. URQUHARTfelt that there was great truth in the objections urged. England could no longer stand by herself, or take her own part; but then they should not presume to discuss subjects on their merits. It was hardly necessary for him to give expression to his loathing as to the malignant influence of Russia on the foreign policy of other countries; but it was not against her, but her mean dupes and victims, that his indignation was aroused. He did not conceive that the thin attendance of Members that evening was a sufficient reason for abstaining from coming to a vote. On the contrary, he considered that to exhibit the thinness of the House on such questions, was the greatest service that could be rendered to England. He saw a number of Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House who had declared themselves in favour of international arbitration. They of course would not venture on a thought derogatory to their well-beloved Czar—under whom if they carried out their projects, they must place England and Europe to be arbitrated for as Poland, and pacified and set in order as Wallachia and Moldavia. He begged the House to recollect that the question before it was not a vote for papers, so as to enable them to obtain information; but whether or not, an aggression having been committed against an ally of the British Crown, we should stand by to approve by our silence. The noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary did not deny the aggression, but had showed his sympathy with the aggressors. He had pledged his word that this was merely a question of time; it had always been so between Turkey and Russia. The question of time was when Turkey should be relieved from the incubus of Russian domination, which for 150 years had pressed so heavily upon her. What further information did they desire—what further explanation could they receive? They knew this to be an aggression on a Power whose independence we had guaranteed by many solemn treaties. Her territories had been invaded by another ally of the British Crown, who was one of

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the parties guaranteeing that independence. Europe was menaced by two evils, Muscovite domination and popular frenzy. Turkey alone offered resistance to the former, and she was one of the few Powers unaffected by the latter. After the length to which the discussion had extended, he would not trouble the House further upon this subject; desirous as he might be to go over many parts of the subject—much as he might wish to expose the tyranny that had been exercised over the Ottoman Empire—and great as his desire might be to show how easy it would be for a Minister of England to manacle that power of Russia, before which they all trembled. He hoped his noble Friend would press this question to a division, if only for the purpose of showing how few Members were present, and how small was the amount of opposition which the House could present to the practices of the noble Viscount at the head of the Foreign Department. It was to be hoped that the avowal which that noble Lord had made, of entire reliance and perfect confidence in the acts of Russia in the East, would at least produce this effect, that, henceforward, that confidence would not be placed in him by the Ottoman Empire which the Poles had so bitterly repented having bestowed.
MR. HUMEdid not understand what the purport of the hon. Member's arguments were. He had raised the forces of Russia in his mind to an enormous extent beyond the reality, and in like manner he magnified the danger to be apprehended from that quarter. He (Mr. Hume) had always warned the House against the aggressions of Russia. One solitary voice had been raised in that House in favour of the Czar when he brought the question of Poland forward; but there was nearly the universal sense of the House expressed in his condemnation, and that decision was applauded by the whole nation. Was not that a check upon the despotism of the Russian Emperor, when the independent community of England censured his acts, and none of his allies approved of them? Was that no inducement for him to halt in his career of cruelty and tyranny? He, for one, believed that Russia was in as much danger as any State in Europe. The Emperor's counsellors were leading him into danger, and before long he might be as helpless as any of the despots whose kingdoms had been plunged into anarchy. The noble
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Viscount at the head of the Foreign Department, so far from extenuating the faults of the Emperor, had censured them. He had offered the advice of the independent people of England, and that was all he could do. When the noble Viscount spoke to the Czar, he was backed by the whole authority of the people of England, and that ought to have some weight. The noble Viscount's advice was an honest counsel; and he (Mr. Hume) thought it must have an effect—the more so, that his confident opinion was that Russia did not contemplate the permanent violation of the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia. Under the present circumstances, it was a wise policy in the Government to offer a moral influence in cordial co-operation with France; and he looked to this union as the means whereby the peace of Europe would be preserved. That object would be still further promoted by the co-operation of the other States of Europe; but so long as France and England were joined in a bond of union, they had the power to effect that object. At any rate, the explanation given by the noble Viscount ought to be satisfactory at present; and it would certainly not be wise to divide the House on the Motion. The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone ought to rest satisfied with the repeated declaration of the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary, who had already answered the question now involved in the Motion, when he stated that the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by Russia was only temporary. That statement had been repeated by the noble Viscount; and for the several reasons which he (Mr. Hume) had urged, he thought he might fairly urge his noble Friend the Member for Marylebone not to divide upon the Motion.
MR. DISRAELIadvised the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone not to call upon the House to divide. He would not, thereby, advance the interests he advocated. He (Mr. Disraeli) was opposed to those interests, and, therefore, the noble Lord would receive his advice with that qualification. The hon. Member for Montrose, as one of his reasons for recommending the noble Lord not to divide, said that he had sat in Parliament a long time, and that there had always been an unanimous feeling in the House against the policy of Russia—that that policy was never mentioned without being denounced; and he, therefore, proposed that the same course should be adopted which, he said, had been

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pursued on former occasions—namely, that these denunciations should be continued for the sake of their moral influence, but that a division was unnecessary. Now, the only inference which he (Mr. Disraeli) could draw from the circumstance of this constant denunciation, if it were so, would be against the advice given by the hon. Member; because speeches made in the House of Commons, and followed by no result, had apparently produced little effect on the policy of the Emperor of Russia. But he must remind the hon. Gentleman that his statement was not exactly accurate, that the policy of the Emperor had always been denounced, and never vindicated. He, for one, was not ashamed to say that on more than one occasion he had not scrupled to vindicate that policy. At this moment there were few who were not ready to admit that there had been on the part of Russia great forbearance, a great wish to maintain that peace which was a matter of so much importance with hon. Gentlemen opposite, and a sincere desire to secure the tranquillity of Europe. What might be the objects and designs of that Power he did not pretend to say, as he did not share in those powers of divination which noble Lords or hon. Gentlemen on either side of the House might possess; but he thought that it was a policy on which he might fairly congratulate this country, that a Power of the importance of Russia, under circumstances of such temptation as had offered themselves during the last few months, should have evinced a disposition, which no one could deny had not only materially tended to, but had been one of the main causes of, the preservation of peace. Contrast the proceedings of Russia, during the last twelve months, with that of the French Republic some forty or fifty years ago. Imagine the course open to a great and disciplined Power like Russia, had she chosen to seize the opportunity that had lately offered, and what suffering, what bloodshed, what loss of civilisation, must have been the immediate result, and the necessary consequence. Nothing, therefore, was, to his mind, more unwise than that hon. Gentlemen opposite should take every opportunity of expressing opinions concerning the character and conduct of one of the greatest Powers of Europe, not on account of what that Power had done, but of what that Power might do, according to the prophetic powers of those hon. Gentlemen. The conduct of Russia was
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to be decided upon by what she did; and it was apparent that her course in late transactions had been characterised by temperance and forbearance. In the instance before the House, the occupation of those provinces might have originated in a false interpretation of treaties, or in a misconception of the diplomatic position of Russia with those places; under such circumstances, the conduct of Russia, even though considered opposed to the interests of this country, or adverse to the law of nations, afforded one of those cases in which we must look with confidence to that Minister of the Crown—of whatever party the Ministry might happen to be formed—whose office it was to conduct such transactions. This was an occasion on which full confidence ought to be given, and negotiations allowed to have a fair trial. If the result proved hostile to the interests of England, then would be the time for the House of Commons to interfere; but to attack a great Power, not on ascertained facts, but on account of certain visionary results which might occur, was certainly not the way in which, as practical men, they ought to act. They might as well put an end altogether to the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to the whole diplomatic department of the country, as upon occasions like the present to express decided opinions with such very crude materials as they had to deal with; such a course must lead to results not only highly inconvenient to our diplomatic transactions, but dangerous to the tranquillity of Europe. He hoped the House would not divide upon this question, because, by so doing, a false impression would be spread abroad. He did not want the Emperor of Russia, or any other Power, to suppose that there was a want of sympathy in that House with any States who were not treated in accordance with the law of nations; but, at the same time, he hoped the Emperor of Russia would just understand that it was not the opinion of the House of Commons, or, as he believed, of the English people, that he was a despot whose conduct no one could vindicate, and that the whole object of his career was to tyrannize over mankind. He hoped the Emperor of Russia would understand that speeches like that of the hon. Member for Montrose were no fair representations of what was felt by the majority of that House, or by the majority of the people of England. He (Mr. Disraeli) believed, on the contrary, that the general

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opinion of the sensible portion of the community was, that, without giving an opinion on the constitutional or political circumstances of the people of Russia as they exist, they did recognise in the ruler of that country an individual of great ability, marked among those who occupy the thrones of the world as a man of intellectual power, and who had, upon the whole, exercised his influence with a due regard to the duties which had devolved upon him. As to speaking of the Emperor as if he had committed some outrage on human nature, in not having been horn under a constitution of King, Lords, and Commons, and in not having a Parliament and Parliamentary Committees to keep him in chock, he did not believe that such was the disposition of the majority of that House, or the feeling of the people who were walking in the street at that moment. The time had gone by for such crude and ignorant sentimentality to have its unchecked course. The hon. Member for Montrose had boasted that, for thirty years, he and others had, without fear of criticism, gone on pronouncing such opinions on the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, and talking what in his (Mr. Disraeli's) opinion was—and he hoped the hon. Member would forgive him saying so—unmitigated nonsense. They submitted the acts of the Emperor to the same criticism as they would apply to the conduct of the Sovereign of these dominions; and because he was not surrounded with constitutional checks, they described him as not only a despot, but as a sort of ogre, causing and exulting in the misery of humanity. He (Mr. Disraeli) could not concur in these views, regarding, as he did, the Emperor of Russia as an able personage, who, throughout his career, had proved himself in advance of the people he governed, and who at this moment was as fairly entitled as any of those who occupied thrones, to the respect of mankind.
SIR H. VERNEYremarked, that if the Emperor of Russia was as forbearing and moderate as had been represented by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, he might on recent occasions have exercised a very powerful and beneficial influence in promoting peace—and in illustration, he (Sir H. Verney) would refer the House to the case of Denmark and the contested claims upon the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Other Powers had expressed strong opinions upon that question, but Russia none. The subject before the
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House was of great importance, but he doubted the expediency of a division.
MR. J. A. SMITHdissented very decidedly from the opinion expressed by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, that there was no general feeling in and out of that House against the policy of Russia. His belief was, that there was a very strong and general feeling against it, and that the Emperor of Russia, perhaps from the policy of necessity, was the unscrupulous and determined enemy of the progress of constitutional liberty. The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, in recommending confidence in the statements of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, seemed to have forgotten the plain, honest, and undisguised opinions which that noble Lord had expressed in his place in Parliament concerning the conduct of Russia. He (Mr. J. A. Smith) joined with those who advised his noble Friend the Member for Marylebone not to divide; but at the same time he thanked his noble Friend for bringing the subject under consideration. The moral influence of opinion would, on this as on other occasions, have its full force and effect. He had full confidence in the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary, and he could not forget how justly he claimed that confidence, believing that it was to his policy that we owed those relations with France upon which mainly depended the peace of the world. He (Mr. J. A. Smith) concluded by saying that while he deprecated harsh language, he protested against the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia as an oppression upon the rights of humanity.
MR. J. O'CONNELLcongratulated the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire upon the cause and the client he had taken up. He (Mr J. O'Connell) agreed with the last speaker, except as regarded harsh language being applied to the conduct of the Emperor of Russia; for if there was any occasion when it was excusable to use strong language, it was when the proceedings of that monster were under consideration. What was he but the scourger of women, and the destroyer of men? Let the House remember the case of the unfortunate nuns of Minsk, who were brutally flogged and otherwise abused, and all with the full cognisance and express written approbation of the client of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire. Upon these poor women, devoted to religion, guilty of no crime or fault against man or God, a ruffian soldiery were left to commit the last violence, and

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to commit murder. And the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire stood up to defend this man. But was this all that had been heard of the acts of this Emperor—of men being banished for fifteen years for crime merely imputed—of the conscription of the Polish children, torn from their mothers, and exiled to Siberia, and when some of the little creatures pined and died upon the road, more of them being taken to make up the number required by this hideous monster. He was glad that a protest on the subject before the House had been made in moderate and temperate language. Yet no man of humanity could blame him for using strong language in expressing, not morbid sentimentality, but the feelings of a large portion of the English people. He knew he spoke the sentiments of the Irish people. He would vote with the noble Lord if he pressed his Motion to a division.
LORD DUDLEY STUART, in reply, said: I give full weight to the opinions of those hon. Members, whether agreeing in my views or not, who have recommended me to withdraw the Motion. I have heard with some surprise the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire say, that on this question, he advocates opposite interests to those espoused by me. I am endeavouring to defend the interests of the Turkish empire; and I think I recollect that, not very long ago, the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, in a most eloquent speech on the question of Servia, expressed as strong an opinion on the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire, as could possibly be imagined. I have, throughout my observations, endeavoured to express myself with temper and moderation, and I will not be seduced by the exaggerated language in which the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire has thought proper to support his views, or be led to resort to intemperate expressions by way of retort. This is the more easy for me, as I am at present in very good humour. I am very much pleased, and have reason to be so. The opinions of the hon. Gentleman appear to find no echo in the House—and I am sure they will find none in the country, which is much more likely to coincide with the feelings of the hon. and learned Member for Limerick. I confess I have heard the observations of that hon. and learned Member with pleasure. Such generous sentiments do honour to him who delivers them, and to the assembly which receives them with approbation. The hon. Member
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for Buckinghamshire, however, takes another view—and he has a right to his opinions. His motives, no doubt, are excellent. Possibly, he may think, now that his contemptuous treatment of the Consolidated Fund, which he termed a dung-hill, has made his being Chancellor of the Exchequer out of the question, that, in the Protectionist Government which is about to be formed, the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may suit him, and that, in that situation, it will be more easy and agreeable to him to carry on business if he be on good terms with the Czar. The hon. Member has pronounced the most unbounded eulogium on the Emperor of Russia. He has said that he is the most magnanimous, the most peaceable—the least ambitious of sovereigns, and the least likely to cause apprehension to other States; but I think, notwithstanding this, that the hon. Gentleman has betrayed, in the course of his speech, considerable doubts of the accuracy of what he has himself stated; for he has proclaimed it as matter of congratulation that the Emperor of Russia has not interfered with any other country. Why, what right has he to interfere in the affairs of other countries? What reason is there for him to do so? How can he intervene without violating the faith of treaties and the law of nations? He has, in fact, interfered in the only quarter in which he durst. The hon. Member for Buckinghamshire said that he was not gifted with the power of divination, as we on this side of the House seemed to be, so as to divine the intentions of the Emperor of Russia. As we judge of a tree by its fruits, so we, seeing what Russia has done—what has been her conduct in Poland, in the Crimea, and in Turkey—how, by insidious proceedings, she has extended her frontiers and enlarged her territory, we naturally conclude that she is going to do that which she has done before. I believe that all the Turkish empire wants, is some moral support from this country. When two such countries as France and England are, as happily they now are, cordially united, I do not believe that, if they spoke out and declared their opinions forcibly, they would find any country in the world to go against them. I am gratified that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary appears to participate in my views. I must, however, correct one error into which the noble Lord appears to have fallen. The noble Lord has stated that the Russians were invited into the principalities by the

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authorities. I believe that the Hospodar of Moldavia invited the Russians, but that it was entirely against the will of the mass of the population. As to Wallachia, the Russians entered it gratuitously, without any invitation whatever, and after all pretext had been taken away by the Turks. The noble Lord professes to feel great confidence that the Russian troops will withdraw, and says that it is only a question of time; but during this time the unfortunate inhabitants of the principality are forced to pay for the maintenance of these sixty thousand Russian troops. The noble Lord has been deceived before in this very instance by the Russians, who told him last year that they were going to evacuate Moldavia. The noble Lord says that, except as regards the subject of the present Motion, the conduct of Russia had been marked by dignity and forbearance. The exception is a large one. It reminds me of what recently occurred to a friend of mine, who is known to many hon. Members—I mean the celebrated writer, Mr. Charles Dickens. He was walking in the street, when he felt a man put his hand in his pocket; he seized him, and had him taken before the Marylebone police court, where he himself attended. Mr. Dickens, having visited the prisons, recognised the man as one whom he had before seen, and said, "Have you not been in prison before? ""No, never," was the answer. A policeman who was by, and happened to have conveyed him to prison, immediately nudged him, and exclaimed, "What are you talking about?" "Well," said the prisoner, "I never was—except for two months." Russia has not interfered in the affairs of any other country, except to march an army into the territory of a neighbour, and to take possession of provinces with which she has no right to interfere. In reference to the Motion before the House, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having stated that the production of the papers might interfere with negotiations now pending, I shall acquiesce in the recommendations made to me from all quarters; and, satisfied with the expression of opinion I have elicited from the noble Lord and from the House, I will not insist on going to a division.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF MADRAS.
MR. ANSTEYrose, pursuant to notice, and said, after the time occupied in the discussion of the Motion of the noble Lord
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the Member for Marylebone, he would content himself with a mere outline of the facts of the case upon which his notice was founded. In the year 1844 a court-martial had been held upon seventeen sepoys, private soldiers in the Madras cavalry, for an offence committed, or alleged to have been committed, in the year 1843. He disputed the fact that any offence had been committed, and was prepared to show that it was a case of the greatest tyranny. According to the Madras pay regulations, copies of which he had moved for, the sepoys, when leaving their stations for field service, were in the habit of receiving an increase of batta to enable them to bring their families with them. The Marquess of Tweeddale refused to allow this addition to the regiment in question, on an occasion when they had been ordered on field service, and for four days the regiment would not move, not consenting to saddle their horses. The Marquess found subsequently that he had committed a mistake, and gave orders that they should receive the batta as before, and the consequence was that the men returned to their duty. The Marquess of Tweeddale, however, expressed his dissatisfaction with their conduct, and informed them that, in consequence of what had taken place, they should not be selected for some post of honour for which they had previously been destined, but should be detained where they were. They were then put on ordinary duty for nine months without interruption, and, to the astonishment of every person in India, after that period had expired they were tried by a court-martial on a charge of mutiny. Some native officers who had been examined at that court-martial for not giving evidence of mutiny, conspiracy, and administering of oaths, of which they might not have been cognisant, had been subsequently dismissed the service. The men had been tried for a capital offence by a court consisting of only seven officers, although it should have consisted of nine members; and, moreover, the accused had been refused copies of the charges against them, as well as the assistance of professional men for their defence. So strong a sensation had been created by the affair, that an old peninsular officer had asked the Marquess of Tweeddale not to enforce the sentance. However, two of the mutineers had been shot, one acquitted, and one pardoned for giving Queen's evidence, and thirteen had been sentenced to banishment for life. All had been, however,

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subsequently pardoned, except two, who were transported for seven years, and it was for the recall of these two latter persons his present Motion was made. He had no interest in the present matter. It was chiefly promoted by persons of high respectability in India, who had no possible quarrel with or pique towards the Court of Directors, or the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control. He contented himself, then, with moving for the papers of which he had given notice, but he could promise when they were produced to institute a more searching inquiry into the matter to which he had referred. The hon. Member concluded by moving—
"That there be laid before this House, Copies of the Proceedings in the Court of Inquiry and the Court Martial held at Arcot in the year 1844, in the case of the alleged mutineers of the 6th Regiment of Madras Light Cavalry, and of all Memorials and Correspondence relative thereto, or to the punishments or commutations of the punishments of any such mutineers; and also, of the Madras Pay Regulations, and the Native Mutiny Act."
MR. J. O'CONNELLseconded the Motion.
SIR J. C. HOBHOUSEsaid, that when he saw the notice which had been originally given, he was in hope that the hon. Gentleman would not bring forward this question. For the many years that he had been in Parliament he did not think that he recollected a single instance in which the proceedings of a court-martial either in England or in India had been the subject of an inquiry before a Committee. In this instance, the inquiry was in 1843 and the court-martial in 1844; and why was it that this transaction, if it was so monstrous, had hitherto slept? Why had not the indignation which was so universal in India reached this country? He thought he could explain to the House of Commons why it was that, after having slumbered and slept, it had been brought forward on the present occasion. Although the parties who gave the hon. Member for Youghal information might be most respectable gentlemen, yet the hon. Gentleman must permit him to remind him that the commencement of this attack on the Marquess of Tweeddale began with the presentation of a petition to the House of Commons, which being referred to the Committee that sits on petitions, the same petition was found to be so libellous that they refused to place it upon the table of the House. It was perfectly true that the hon. Gentleman had,
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with a wisdom for which he was to be applauded, proceeded upon the statement, as far as the House knew, of the petition; but it was his (Sir J. Hobhouse's) duty to state to the House, in defence of the Marquess of Tweeddale, what he believed to be the case—viz., that had it not been for some unfortunate transaction which took place with respect to the petitioner, Mr. Malcolm Lewin, the House would not have heard of this transaction. There was some unfortunate difference between the Marquess of Tweeddale and Mr. Lewin; that gentleman, having been in several places of high trust in Madras, having been made a member of the council, being in the enjoyment of consideration in the presidency, and against whose private character he had not a word to say, pursued a course of conduct which forced him (Sir J. Hobhouse) to perform a most painful duty—he was removed from the provisional council of Madras, and was obliged to quit India. This was the plain and unvarnished statement of the facts as to this gentleman, the petitioner against the Marquess of Tweeddale. If the hon. Gentleman who had brought forward this case, chose on any future occasion to call for papers, it would be his (Sir J. Hobhouse's) painful duty to present papers signed by the gentleman, which would be a full justification for the course pursued by the Marquess of Tweeddale and the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. The hon. Gentleman's statement was founded almost verbatim on the statement made by Mr. Malcolm Lewin. He had told the hon. Member privately what he now said publicly, that he was confident there was no case, and that the moving of this matter originated from a great deal of private feeling. Having said this with reference to Mr. Lewin, who first presented the petition to the House, which could not be printed on account of its libellous matter, he would advert shortly to the statement made by the hon. Gentleman. He held in his hand the general order which the Marquess of Tweeddale published on the 2nd November, 1844, in which he found an hitherto uncontradicted report of the whole of this transaction. The reason why these men could not be tried at the time their mutinous conduct took place was this, that a great portion of the whole regiment was implicated in the transaction, in consequence of the disappointment arising from the batta question; also, because they were stationed, not in the Madras presidency, but in the Bengal presidency; and

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it was thought it would not be right that they should be there tried and afterwards marched into the presidency to which they belonged. At the time the transaction was going on, it was expected that a general action would take place, which did shortly afterwards happen, viz., the celebrated battle of Gwalior. If an immediate inquiry had taken place it would have been necessary to have had artillery on the ground to enforce the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, for it was not certain it might not be necessary to fire upon them. In this state of things was it not right that the regiment should be removed from the scene of dispute; and that before the inquiry took place it should be in such a quarter that the result of the inquiry could do no mischief? As to the time that had elapsed he granted that it was a misfortune; but that arose from circumstances over which the Marquess of Tweeddale had no possible control. The mutiny was one of the most serious character. It embraced not only the privates but a great number of the native officers. Secret oaths were taken, meetings were held; there was a positive refusal to go upon the line of march; they would not parade upon duty; there was the violation of all duty, without which it was impossible that any discipline could be maintained. Was it not rather an awkward time to make these complaints against the mode in which military discipline was maintained in India? If it were true that the Marquess of Tweeddale was guilty of injustice, and tyranny, and cruelty—if that could be proved, and the hon. Gentleman had moved only for the papers, it would have been a proceeding more conformable to common usage. Was this the time that any man invested with so high a character as the Marquess of Tweeddale could be guilty of that with which the hon. Gentleman charged him? The real fact of the case was just the contrary. The Marquess of Tweeddale was too much of a gallant soldier to be a cruel man, and too honourable to shift from himself the responsibility which fairly belonged to him. There were no less than 13 men condemned to be executed, and of these 13 the Marquess of Tweeddale required the execution only of two, and they were the two who had administered these illegal oaths, or who had endeavoured by combination to destroy all discipline in the Army, and to march back this regiment to a quarter where it was to be headed by a zemindar or subahdir of its own. He thought it
1166
must be clear to any dispassionate judgment, therefore, that under the circumstances of the case, no unnecessary severity of punishment had been visited upon these men. He deemed it a fortunate thing that this case was one of no recent occurrence. It was almost unnecessary for him to remind the House that the first representations upon the subject were addressed to the Home Government, at a period when it was presided over by the right hon. Baronet opposite, the Member for Tamworth. Now, although he (Sir J. Hobhouse) had not at that time, of course, any official connexion with the Ministry of the day, yet from former associations and old connexions with the Government of India, he naturally felt a great interest in the affair, and took care, at that time, to institute inquiries into the particulars in quarters which he thought the most likely to furnish him with the desired information. The result of those inquires had satisfied him that the views which he had ever since entertained upon the state of those transactions were correct. He believed he was not mistaken in affirming that the Home Government of that period referred the case to the Duke of Wellington for his Grace's opinion. He held in his hand a copy of the minute which his Grace the Commander-in-Chief thereupon had drawn up; and without occupying the time of the House by reading extracts from it, he would only remark that that distinguished personage had handled the question with all that clearness, precision, and sound judgment which he was so well known to bring always to hear upon any military topic. There were many others in the regiment who were proved to have been guilty of acts of decided insubordination; but the thirteen whose offences had been adjudged to amount to mutiny were condemned by the court-martial to death. The minute adverted to the fact that many of these parties had been sent down to take their turns, in the regiment, of certain duty after the inquiry had taken place; and it seemed to be assumed that they must have had reason, therefore, to suppose that no sentence would be enforced against them. But it seemed very doubtful whether they had at any time done anything more than mount guard about the tent of their commanding officer. There was no pretence to assert—and he believed no evidence of the fact—that, in all the interval which elapsed before the execution of the capital sentence on the two mutineers condemned to death, they were brought under fire.

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Had they been brought under fire, the Duke of Wellington admitted that, in the event of the question having been referred to him, it would have been the inclination of his mind to recommend them as objects of mercy. But this state of things could not be pleaded as their case. He did not think it necessary to go much further into this distressing subject. ["Hear, hear!"] Well, it was a distressing subject, though not to him in particular, except in so far as he regretted that the hon. Gentleman from whom that cheer had just now proceeded, should have thought fit, at a period like the present, to dring forward a Motion of so untenable and so mischievous a character. For his own part, he must certainly object to the production of the papers moved for. He believed it was not very often indeed that the minutes and proceedings of courts-martial were ever called for in that House, and they were certainly never laid before it except on grounds of far more weight and expediency than any which the hon. Gentleman had been able to assign in calling for those now in question. It must be assumed—and he thought it only fair to assume—that military courts generally administered military law with fairness and impartiality; nor could he be brought to believe, except upon the most clear and positive evidence, that British officers, in high military stations, had any such political tendencies to exercise the authority with which the law invested them, in dealing with offences of this nature, with such unnecessary harshness or tyranny as should induce the House to support an application like that before them, which went to revive, before Parliament, the proceedings of a case so long by-gone, without any adequate reason stated to justify such an appeal. The pardons granted to the other parties who had been proved guilty of mutinous practices, were extended to them at a subsequent period, simply on account of the good conduct afterwards manifested by them. It was thought necessary after justice had been done upon the two criminals, who, in addition to specific acts of personal mutiny, had been detected in administering oaths to their comrades, binding them to refuse discharging their duties of rendering obedience to their officers in future, and thus attempting to debauch the fidelity of whole regiments, that the pending sentences against the other parties should be tempered by mercy and consideration manifested for those who by their confessions had not been drawn into the
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same malpractices. Upon these grounds, then, he could not consent to the production of the papers.
MR. J. O'CONNELLthought that no clearer evidence could be adduced of the weakness of the case which the Government had undertaken to vindicate, than that the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, with all his ingenuity and talent, could make out no better one than he had attempted to establish in excuse of these proceedings. It was idle to press upon the House the length of time which had elapsed before this grave complaint had pressed its way to the ear of Parliament. That delay was quite sufficiently accounted for by the general inattention or indifference which was paid in England to Indian affairs, and by the necessary lapse of time that would always intervene before such complaints, from such distant quarters, could reach their destination. But there was one important point in the case on which the right hon. Baronet's speech had not touched at all. The whole of these sentences were necessarily illegal, because they had been passed by a tribunal manifestly not constituted according to the Articles of War. Article 7 expressly required that no court-martial should be competent to pass sentence of death unless it was composed of thirteen officers, except within certain limits. This court was assembled at Arcot, and therefore not within the jurisdiction which alone could have made any lesser number of officers a competent tribunal to pronounce a capital sentence; and it consisted only of seven officers. But there was yet another informality. It was declared that the court should not consist of less than nine officers to give effect to its sentence. Now, how the sentence of seven could comply with this condition, he was yet to learn. The plea of inconvenience was one he had been surprised to hear urged by the right hon. Baronet against a case which involved questions so important to law and justice. He should support the Motion.
MR. HUMEexpressed a similar intention. There were some points connected with these transactions which loudly called for explanation. What he wanted to know was, why were their several sentences suspended over the heads of these men for nine long months—most of the men in that interval, too, being allowed to do duty of a certain kind—if it was intended finally to punish them? No man was better aware than he was of the absolute necessity

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for maintaining discipline and subordination in an Indian army, and repressing by exemplary punishment any attempt at mutiny. But to keep such sentences as these in abeyance for such a period, appeared to him a proceeding as illegal as it was cruel. Then came the next question. If there was anything in the excuse that it had been attempted to plead for the delay—namely, the difficulty of finding an adequate number of officers properly to constitute the court which was to try the offenders—why were not the men marched at once into some one of their numerous military stations, in any of the three presidencies, wherein the assistance of an abundant supply of officers could have been immediately secured? Far from thinking that this was, for reasons which the right hon. Baronet who had just spoken had rather hinted at than stated, an improper time for instituting such an inquiry as it was the object of the Motion for these papers to establish, he contended that this was, of all others, the most proper time for such a purpose. It was now most essential to impress the minds of all our native soldiers in India with the conviction that the British Parliament would insist on their being treated according to the institutions of law and justice. Here had been great responsibility incurred, in the first instance, by the extraordinary conduct of superior authorities somewhere. He wanted to know, first, who ordered the war batta allowance to be withdrawn? Was that withdrawal—afterwards repudiated by the act of the Indian Government themselves—a legal or an illegal act? He, for one, attached no sort of value to the report of Mr. Lewin, on which the right hon. Baronet had laid much stress in his speech. He thought it had been introduced into the debate rather for the purpose of distracting the attention of the House from the main question before it, than affording any information to guide the judgment of hon. Members upon it. The point which neither the right hon. Baronet nor Mr. Lewin's statement had touched, was the all-important one—had the Marquess of Tweeddale exceeded his powers and the law by ordering the execution of those two men, so long after their sentence had been passed without being acted upon? He was strongly of opinion that these papers should be granted.
MR. ELLIOTdesired to explain the manner in which the discussion had originated about the order for the reduction of
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the batta allowance. No doubt, such an order was issued by a mistake on the part of the official finance authorities at Madras; but the mistake was discovered and rectified within two days. In that time a new order was promulgated, retracting that which had diminished the batta, and putting the allowance on the old footing. When it was argued, therefore, that this reduction had been the cause of the meeting of these sepoys, it should be understood that they continued under such misapprehension for no longer a time than forty-eight hours. How could such a plea, then, be urged for the insubordinate courses to which the men committed themselves? It was quite impossible that the mutinous conduct of the troops could have passed unnoticed. The natural course would have been, to institute an inquiry on the spot; but, for certain reasons, it was necessary that a removal should take place. They were marched into their own territory, and the trial took place immediately on their reaching Arcot. Until that time the ringleaders were unknown. Thirteen of them were then arrested, tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to be shot; but the Marquess of Tweeddale confined the punishment to two cases. The example was found to have had a good effect; and the regiment having returned to its duty, the noble Marquess determined to make the punishment as lenient as possible. He was not then prepared to offer any explanation with respect to any of the other points that had been raised in the course of the discussion.
MR. AGLIONBYsupported the Motion. He thought it due to the characters of all those connected with the prosecution of the court-martial, as well as the character of the proceedings itself, that some further explanation should be given. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control intimated that he had the means of giving an explanation—that he had the papers in his possession—but he declined to do so. It would have been as well now, perhaps, after the lapse of so many years, that the subject had not been revived; but as it had been raised, it was absolutely necessary that the public mind should be satisfied, and that the matter should be set at rest. The hon. and learned Member for Limerick, quoting from the Articles of War, clearly showed that the court-martial itself was illegal—that injustice had been done, and that the law had been transgressed—yet, not one

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word of explanation had been offered with respect to that subject by the right hon. Baronet or the Secretary of the Board of Control. The public mind would require to be satisfied, and after a public discussion of the matter in Parliament the papers relating to it should certainly be produced.
SIR R. PEELsaid, that after the allusions that had been made to him in the course of this debate, he could not remain altogether silent whilst the discussion was proceeding. He had not expected this Motion to come on, or he would have made himself master of the facts of this case, so far as the Government with which he had been connected was concerned; and he was bound to say that he had not now such a recollection of those facts as would enable him to hear his testimony with reference to these transactions. He could not, however, agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman who spoke last, who thought it a great misfortune that this matter should now be brought forward after so long a time had elapsed; and yet, because one single Gentleman chose to bring it under discussion, considered that the Parliament must be fettered by the indignation of a single individual, and had no option but to proceed to an inquiry. [Mr. AGLIONBY: No, no!] He did not quarrel with the hon. Member for Youghal for bringing forward this Motion. He was doubtless actuated by his own sense of justice; but other persons might be less discreet and less prudent; and if any other Gentleman chose to bring forward a Motion for inquiry of a similar nature, and if the House were unanimously of opinion that it would be unwise and improper to discuss the question, and yet were to be told that the question having been started, they had no option but to vote for the inquiry, he must say he could not assent to such a doctrine without the utmost reluctance. In the first place, with regard to courts-martial, it would be very inconvenient if that House were to be made the court for the revision of the decisions of every military tribunal. Military men were frequently compelled to assume grave responsibility, and proper allowance ought to be made for the position of those who being intrusted with the management of military affairs, were called upon to meet particular emergencies. From all he had known or heard of the Marquess of Tweeddale, and from his long and distinguished career under the Duke of Wellington, he (Sir R.
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Peel) felt a strong conviction, that he was the very last man who would be guilty of oppression or cruelty. He believed all his tendencies were tendencies to kindness and forbearance towards his brother soldiers, and not to any undue or excessive harshness of military discipline. Now, what were the circumstances of this case? Certain soldiers were tried and found guilty of administering illegal oaths, binding the privates of a certain regiment not to perform their duties. There was no sudden, instantaneous act of severity. A long time—nine months—elapsed between the arrest and the trial. He was not to sit in judgment with regard to that delay—he was satisfied that many reasons might exist to cause that delay—gentlemen connected with India, and with military affairs, thought that such reasons did exist; and must he not act in some measure upon confidence in others in judging of such matters? If the sentence had been instantaneous, and the execution sudden, there might have been room for suspicion that an act of severity had been committed through excitement; but when nine months were suffered to intervene before the execution of the sentence, and when thirteen men having been condemned, two only, and those the ringleaders, were executed, he must say that such facts raised a strong presumption in his mind that, no unnecessary severity had been practised. He heard, moreover, that the Duke of Wellington, the Commander-in-Chief, had inquired into all the facts of the case, and pronounced a deliberate judgment that, upon the whole, the sentence was perfectly justifiable, and that no such—[Here some hon. Member made a remark, in interruption, but its import did not reach the gallery.] Hon. Gentlemen might disregard the opinion of the Duke of Wellington; and if it was to be a question of authority on military duties between this House and the Commander-in-Chief, they might certainly supersede him in the exercise of his functions if they thought proper; but he was perfectly convinced of this—that the British Army would be much less satisfied with their decisions. It was utterly impossible that this House could discharge all its other legislative functions if they were also to sit as a court of appeal upon matters of this kind; and, with a perfectly safe conscience, he should give a vote against the precedent for revising the sentence of an East Indian court-martial.
MR. AGLIONBYrose to explain that he had never said, that if any Member of this House chose at any time to reintroduce a matter of this kind, which had long been allowed to slumber, the House was bound, however ill-advised it thought the step, to agree to an inquiry: he had never wished to lay down any principle of this kind. What he said was, that he might regret, that at such a distance of time, and with very little prospect of advantage either to the parties or the service, a question of this sort should now be brought forward; but. that after the Articles of War, as quoted that night, showed that a number of men had been condemned by an illegally constituted tribunal, and two of them executed, it was desirable, in behalf even of the authorities themselves, to mention no other consideration, that, seeing those Members of this House connected with the Government of India had given no answer or explanation on the subject, that an investigation to clear up the matter should take place.
The ATTORNEY GENERALwould appeal to his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Youghal on the ground of his knowledge of the practice of the profession, and confidently ask him to withdraw this Motion. He (the Attorney General) hoped to be able to dispose of this Motion without the necessity of adverting to the facts, because by it they were called upon either to lay down a very bad precedent, or were bound to resist the attempt now made to lay such a precedent down. Assuming that they had the papers brought there to refer them to a Select Committee, for the purpose of appealing against a decision of the constituted military authorities, they would actually be referring it to a Select Committee of unpractised non-professional Members of the House of Commons to determine the question of the legality or illegality of the constitution of a court-martial. If the House were about to supersede the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, this effect would certainly spring from it, that they would be letting the soldiers of the Army know that, whenever they thought they had reason to be dissatisfied, they would always find this House open and ready to listen to their appeals. What must be the effect of a course like that which the hon. and learned Gentleman had taken? The result would be that in every case they would have appeals from military tribunals. It would be a most dangerous precedent to set, and destructive of all
1174
subordination in the Army. Were the soldiers in India to have a right of appeal on every question of this sort, and were they to assume that the Government had not done their duty? In conclusion, he again appealed to his hon. and learned Friend to withdraw his Motion.
MR. ANSTEYsaid, that it appeared to him that his hon. and learned Friend who had just sat down had completely answered what had been said by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth. The right hon. Baronet said that he (Mr. Anstey) had not made out a sufficient case for the production of the papers, while his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General seemed to think he had gone too far, and if the papers were granted, the House must appoint a Committee to show whether or not the Marquess of Tweeddale had been guilty of murder. He was sure hon. Gentlemen would recollect that he had given notice of this Motion before the receipt of the late disastrous news from India. On the receipt of that news, he consulted some friends whether he should persevere with his Motion, and, under their advice, he did so. He considered that the main point in his case had been altogether overlooked, namely, that the case was not tried till after the men had returned to their duty, and they had on their removal to Arcot been punished for their offence. They had been told that night that there was not an opportunity of the parties being tried before, but their removal to Arcot disproved that. The Marquess of Tweed-dale, and all the officers, knew who the men were who had been guilty of the mutiny, and yet they had been employed about him prior to the trial. The moment the men refused to mount their horses, the mutiny was committed. The administration of the oath was only an aggravation; and the evidence relative to those oaths completely broke down. The fact was, the troops were punished for their mutiny by being removed to Arcot, and deprived of the honours of Gwalior; and, therefore they ought not to have been tried a second time nine months afterwards. It had been said that there was no precedent for his Motion; but if there were not with regard to courts-martial, there had been inquiries with regard to higher courts, to consider the conduct of corrupt judges, unjust jurors, and profligate Attorney Generals. But the House had even inquired into the decision of a court-martial with regard to Lord Brudenel (now Earl of Cardigan), and

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it was owing to that interference that the noble Lord came out of the inquiry in a manner which was highly to his honour. The reason why these cases were not more frequently brought before the House was, that they very rarely occurred. This, however, was not the only case of mutiny which had occurred in India. There was a case in which the British troops, with matches lighted and colours flying, proceeded to take possession of a fort from the servants of His Majesty George III., in order to procure the payment of their batta. The senior officer in that case was dismissed the service, but two years afterwards he was reinstated, and last year—if he was not so now—he was the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. With this example before their eyes, these poor men might think that they were not so much to blame. He did not say this with a view of excusing their conduct. He thought they ought to be punished, but he did not think they ought to be punished twice, and for that reason he must press his Motion to a division.
The House divided:—Ayes 14; Noes 54: Majority 40.

List of the AYES.

Aglionby, H. A.

Pearson, C.

Fox, W. J.

Pechell, Capt.

Hastie, A.

Stuart, Lord D.

Hodgson, W. N.

Thompson, Col.

Hume, J.

Urquhart, D.

Kershaw, J.

Lawless, hon. C.

TELLERS.

Meagher, T.

O'Connell, J.

O'Connell, M. J.

Anstey, T. C.

List of the NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Jervis, Sir J.

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Lewis, G. C.

M'Gregor, J.

Baring, rt. hn. Sir F. T.

Mahon, The O'Gorman

Bellew, R. M.

Maule, rt. hon. F.

Blackall, S. W.

Melgund, Visct.

Blair, S.

Milner, W. M. E.

Brotherton, J.

Newdegate, C. N.

Clay, J.

Paget, Lord A.

Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

Palmer, R.

Duncuft, J.

Palmerston, Visct.

Ebrington, Visct.

Parker, J.

Elliot, hon. J. E.

Peel, right hon. Sir R.

Ferguson, Sir R. A.

Raphael, A.

Fordyce, A. D.

Rendlesham, Lord

Goddard, A. L.

Rich, H.

Granby, Marq. of

Romilly, Sir J.

Hay, Lord J.

Russell, F. C. H.

Hayes, Sir E.

Scott, hon. F.

Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.

Somerville, rt. hon. Sir W.

Henley, J. W.

Strickland, Sir G.

Herbert, rt. hon. S.

Stuart, J.

Hindley, C.

Tenison, E. K.

Hobhouse, rt. hon. Sir J.

Thornely, T.

Howard, Lord E.

Tufnell, H.

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Verney, Sir H.

Wyld, J.

Willcox, B. M.

TELLERS.

Wilson, J.

Hill, Lord M.

Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

Grey, R. W.

PROTECTION OF JUSTICES (IRELAND) BILL.
Bill, as amended, considered:—Amendment made:—Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be read the third time To-morrow."
MR. J. O'CONNELLopposed the measure altogether, as being injurious to the poor man, and as depriving him of all means of redress against magistrates who acted unjustly. He therefore moved, that it be put off for six months.
Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "To-morrow," in order to add the words "upon this day six months," instead thereof.
MAJOR BLACKALLdefended the gentry of Ireland from the supposition that they would act unjustly.
SIR W. SOMERVILLEbriefly defended the Bill, and explained that it was intended by it to give the same protection to magistrates in Ireland as in England.
Question put, "That the word 'Tomorrow' stand part of the Question."
The House divided:—Ayes 38; Noes 2: Majority 36.

List of the AYES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Lewis, G. C.

Anson, hon. Col.

Mahon, The O'Gorman

Anstey, T. C.

Maule, rt. hon. F.

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Milner, W. M. E.

O'Connell, M. J.

Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T.

Paget, Lord A.

Blackall, S. W.

Palmerston, Visct.

Brotherton, J.

Parker, J.

Christy, S.

Raphael, A.

Cubitt, W.

Rich, H.

Duncuft, J.

Sandars, G.

Ebrington, Visct.

Somerville, rt. hon. Sir W.

Ferguson, Sir R. A.

Thompson, Col.

Fordyce, A. D.

Tufnell, H.

Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

Verney, Sir H.

Hayes, Sir E.

Willoughby, Sir H.

Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.

Wilson, J.

Heald, J.

Wyld, J.

Hobhouse, rt. hon. Sir J.

TELLERS.

Hodgson, W. N.

Hill, Lord M.

Howard, Lord E.

Grey, R. W.

List of the NOES.

Devereux, J. T.

O'Brien, T.

TELLERS.

Lawless, C. J.

O'Connell, J.

Main Question put, and agreed to.
Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.
The House adjourned at a quarter after Eleven o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—Received the Royal Assent. Overseers (Cities and Boroughs).
PETITIONS PRESENTED. From Hull, that the Rules and Practice of the County Courts may be Inquired into and Revised.—From Thornham Magna, and a number of other Places, for the Repeal of the Malt Tax.—By the Duke of Richmond, from Holderness, East Riding of Yorkshire, for the Adoption of Measures for the Relief of the Agricultural Classes.—From Longstock, for the Repeal of all Enactments occasioning Unequal Competition between the English and Foreign Grower.—By Lord Monteagle, from Donegal, and other Places, against the proposed Rate in Aid, and for the Amendment of the present Poor Law (Ireland).

THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR IN THE NORTH OF ITALY.
The EARL of ABERDEENrose to move for papers respecting the renewal of the war in the north of Italy. The noble Earl said: I think your Lordships will acknowledge that the present state of affairs in the north of Italy may reasonably call for the most serious attention of this House. My Lords, I have for some time viewed

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with apprehension the probability of that result in the affairs of the north of Italy which has now occurred. The whole conduct and language of the Sardinian Government, for some time past, only made it too likely that such a result should be brought about. I have, however, abstained hitherto from bringing this subject under your Lordships' notice, and I should have been content to have abstained so long as there was any hope that the conference at Brussels, which was proposed to take place, would give any practical effect to the mediation by this country and Prance, for the restoration of peace in Italy. I should have done so, my Lords, as long as any the slightest chance existed of success, however inconceivable it might have appeared to me that this conference and mediation could ever have led to any practical result. But those arrangements being at an end, I am now about to move for such correspondence as has taken place between this country and the representatives of Foreign Powers, in order to afford your Lordships information of the steps which Her Majesty's Government have taken with a view to prevent the renewal of this war; for, although we have not heard that the first blow has been struck, we know that the armistice is at an end—that a proclamation of war has been signed—and that theho stile troops are advancing, or are otherwise in motion. I feel it incumbent upon me to make this Motion, because, in my opinion, the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government, both in the north of Italy and in the south, has been deficient in all which sound policy should have dictated, and has been wanting in justice and good faith. Still further am I disposed to make this Motion at this moment, because I think that, a year ago, when the war was first commenced, that war might have been stopped altogether, if proper means had been taken by Her Majesty's Government; or, at all events, I think Her Majesty's Government might have made other efforts to maintain peace. My Lords, it is now just a year to a day since the King of Sardinia, by an act of perfidy almost unparalleled, invaded the territories of his neighbour, his ally, his kinsman, and his benefactor. My Lords, I say "perfidy almost unparalleled," because, for several months, in answer to inquiries and remonstrances from the Austrian Government, the Court of Turin repeatedly declared its earnest desire to cultivate relations of friendship
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and peace with the Austrian Government; and even on the 21st of March, in answer to the application of the Austrian Ambassador, the Sardinian Government again declared that they had no other object at heart than to live on terms of friendship and good will and neighbourhood with Austria. Yet, on the following day, without any, the slightest, provocation—without a declaration of war—without the slightest allegation of any grievance suffered or injury done, the Sardinian array was ordered to advance into the Austrian territories. But before I touch upon the progress of the war which was thus commenced, I wish to advert to the position occupied by Her Majesty's Government between the two contending parties at that time; and to this part of the case I am extremely anxious to call the serious attention of your Lordships. Your Lordships may recollect that early in the last Session of Parliament, the noble Marquess opposite laid on the table of the House certain papers connected with the territorial arrangements in Italy. Those papers were laid on the table by command of Her Majesty, without any address from this House on the subject, and they were produced by the noble Marquess without any explanation of the object for which they were produced. I confess that, at the time, I was not able to comprehend with what view those papers were produced; at present the motive is not so unintelligible. My Lords, those papers consisted of two despatches from Prince Metternich, dated the 2nd of August, 1847, on the affairs of Italy at that time, in which he declares that the Emperor of Austria, his imperial master, had no other object in view than to defend his own territories from attack, and to rest on the guarantee of those great principles on which the security of the peace of Europe had for so many years depended; and he called upon the British Government to state whether she still acquiesced in those principles as secured by treaty. The answer of Lord Palmerston, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, given on the 12th of August, was, that—
"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the stipulations and engagements of the Treaty of Vienna ought to be adhered to in Italy, as well as in all other parts of Europe to which they apply, and that no change can properly be made in the territorial arrangements which were established by that treaty without the consent and concurrence of all the Powers who were parties to it."

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He further added, that—
"With reference to the posture of things in Italy, Her Majesty's Government would wish to observe that there is another right besides that of self-defence and self-maintenance, which is inherent in independent sovereignty, and that is, the right which belongs to the Sovereign Power in every State to make such reforms and internal improvements as may be judged by such Sovereign Power proper to be made, and conducive to the well-being of the people whom it governs."
The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs made very light, however, of the condition of Italy, and stated that Her Majesty's Government had received no information as to the existence of any such scheme as that which Prince Metternich mentioned as being planned for the purpose of uniting the then separated States of that country into a great federal republic. Subsequent events will have shown whose information was the most correct; but that was a very satisfactory answer, so far as it went, to Prince Metternich. But Her Majesty's Government, moved, I suppose, by information privately received from Italy, or influenced by the violence of Italian journals, took it into their heads to imagine that the Austrian Government entertained projects of ambition and aggression in that country; and had the Austrian Government entertained such projects, undoubtedly it would have been the duty of the British Government to oppose them. I presume that such must have been the case; for in a month after his despatch of the 12th of August, Lord Palmerstonad dressed another despatch, dated the 11th of September, to the English Ambassador at Vienna, in which these representations of Austrian aggression were alluded to—a despatch which concluded with expressing a conviction on the part of the British Government that—
"Neither with regard to the King of Sardinia nor with regard to the Pope, could the Austrian Government have any intention of converting any measures of internal legislation or administrative reform which those Sovereigns might think fit to adopt in their respective dominions, into an occasion for any aggression whatever upon their territories or rights. Her Majesty's Government, indeed, would deeply regret the occurrence of events which it would be impossible for Great Britain to view with indifference. The Crowns of Great Britain and of Sardinia have long been bound together by the ties of faithful and intimate alliance; and Great Britain can never forget or repudiate claims founded upon such honourable grounds. The integrity of the Roman State may be considered as an essential element of the political independence of the Italian peninsula; and no invasion of the territory of that State could take
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place without leading to consequences of great gravity and importance."
That, my Lords, is the effect of the papers laid on your Lordships' table by the noble Marquess. Now, the language used takes very much the shape of a threat, in respect to the supposed intentions of the Austrian Government; because when such a country as this says that it will not view with indifference the proceedings of a foreign Power, it is using expressions which, in diplomatic language, are well understood to mean more than the mere words said. Here, then. Her Majesty's Government received great credit for having checked the course of Austrian ambition, and for having put a stop to those encroachments and to that invasion which had been reported as imminent by writers in Italy and other countries, who seem to have influenced the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government. Your Lordships will remember, however, that six months afterwards, after these papers had been laid on the table of the House, my noble and learned Friend near me (Lord Brougham) moved for additional papers on this subject, which might have been received by Her Majesty's Government. It then turned out that an answer had been given by the Austrian Government to the despatch of Lord Palmerston of the 11th September, but of which, up to that time, your Lordships had heard nothing. Now, the answer to that despatch is dated the 27th of September. In that despatch the Austrian Government laid down these principles—that every independent Sovereign had a right to make, within his own dominions, such reforms and improvements as he might judge conducive to the welfare of the people whom he governed, and that no other Government could be entitled to forbid or to restrain such an exercise of one of the proper attributes of independent sovereignty. That was the proposition of our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Austrian Government thus made known its assent to it, declaring, at the same time, that it was a principle which it had been the first to proclaim, and which it had held and established at every period of its history. The despatch proceeded to state that explanations had repeatedly taken place on the subject of the alleged aggression between the Courts of Vienna and Turin, and that the Austrian Government had received repeated assurances that no apprehensions of such aggression were either entertained or ought to be entertained by

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Sardinia. Reckoning the King of Sardinia among its allies, the Imperial Government expressed its readiness, if required, to place itself by the side of Great Britain to defend that Sovereign from aggression from any quarter. I anticipate, my Lords, that your Lordships will think that this was a very satisfactory reply to the last despatch of the British Government. Now, why had it been kept back? The British Government had been in possession of that despatch for four months before it thought proper to lay the accusation against the supposed intentions of Austria upon the table. Now, my Lords, I am quite certain that the noble Marquess was not aware of the existence of this answer at the time when he laid these despatches from Prince Metternich and the other papers upon your Lordships' table—I say it is not possible for the noble Marquess voluntarily to have produced papers which were calculated to make the impression on your Lordships that we had been the means of stopping an act of aggression and of encroachment on the part of Austria, when, at the same moment, we were actually in possession of a most satisfactory answer—a most decided answer—from that Power to any such imputation. What, then, was there to warrant the course which Her Majesty's Government on that occasion pursued? They must have seen in what position the parties in Italy were placed by the only papers which were produced; they must have known they were in possession of an important document, which contained an effectual answer to imputations made at the time against one of these parties; and yet, knowing that they possessed such an answer, it was, nevertheless, studiously withheld. Can we, my Lords—can the Austrian Government—regard such a proceeding as this without feelings of indignation, and without having that indignation painfully increased by the remembrance of the friendly alliance that had long subsisted between England and Austria? But what was the position of the noble Marquess opposite in this matter? The course which has been taken is such as to convey to all an erroneous impression of what was the truth, and he was made a party to the suppression of the truth, which, in its practical effect on the minds of your Lordships, amounted to a palpable falsehood. But, at the same time, I am quite certain that the noble Marquess could not have been
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aware of the state of these papers when he laid them upon the table of the House—that he was ignorant of the contents of the answer to Lord Palmerston's despatch when he presented the other despatches to the House. The noble Marquess merely laid upon the table papers placed in his hands for that purpose. Every one knows the high character which the noble Marquess has always maintained in this House and elsewhere; and I appeal, my Lords, to your feelings as gentlemen, whether you can for a moment suppose that he is capable of voluntarily conveying an impression which, as I have pointed out, is manifestly false? But at the time when these papers were laid upon the table, I was unable to understand how Austria should acquiesce in such an imputation as the papers then conveyed. Shortly after the war commenced, however, I did ask the noble Marquess whether similar representations had been made to Sardinia, inasmuch as, although it had been given out that war had been avoided by our interference in checking Austrian aggression, and as, on the contrary, the King of Sardinia had entered the Austrian territories, I did ask whether similar representations had been made at the Court of Turin. The noble Marquess on that occasion did say that such a representation had been made at Turin, and gave the House to believe, that although these representations had failed in preventing the war, yet they had been the means of retarding the aggression subsequently made by the King of Sardinia. I am of opinion that the noble Marquess then fully believed what he stated to be the true facts of the case, as my noble and learned Friend near me did also. But my noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham) afterwards moved for the other papers connected with these transactions; and I must say, from having read these documents, that so far from representations being made which could by any means have prevented the steps taken by the King of Sardinia, there was the greatest possible remissness in doing anything at all; and the little which was done was quite incapable of producing any such effect as the noble Marquess had imagined. Now, the intimation to Austria to which I am referring was dated in the month of August—namely, the 12th of August, 1847—according to the first papers laid on the table of the House; and by the papers presented, in answer to the Motion of my noble and learned Friend, I find that the first intimation

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of any interference on our part with the proceedings of the Court of Turin, was made on the 13th of March, 1848; so that not one word could have been said during the whole of the autumn and the winter previous to the war, and indeed not a word previous to the French revolution. The first thing which I find does not at all answer the description given of it by the noble Marquess; it is a letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 13th of March, 1848, and addressed to the Hon. Mr. Abercromby, our Minister at Turin, and contains the following paragraph:—
"Her Majesty's Government have felt great pleasure in learning that the Sardinian Government have determined to pursue that which is the best and wisest course in the present state of things; that they have resolved to give no cause of offence either to France or to Austria, to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of either, and to maintain a strict and rigid neutrality."
Neutrality in any war between Austria and her revolted subjects in Lombardy. Such was the satisfaction they expressed with the state of things as they then were, and they no doubt believed in this view of them on the 13th of March. But Mr. Abercromby becomes uneasy, and his words betray a lurking suspicion of hostile intentions on both sides. He writes on the 20th of March, 1848, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in London, and concludes his despatch by stating—
"Nobody under the present aspect of politics can reasonably take umbrage at this country for protecting her frontiers from whatever side an attack may be possible; and the armaments she has made are only those which a wise and provident Government are called upon to make by the exigencies of the moment; but to employ them for acts of hostile aggression would be to endanger not only the interests of the House of Savoy, but those of the whole country, and of Italy in general. Such being ray view of the present crisis in the politics of this country, I shall conform my language to it on all occasions when talking with the Members of the Sardinian Government; and it will be a great satisfaction to me to learn from yeur Lordships that I have taken ground of which you approve."
I conceive that from this despatch of Mr. Abercromby it is quite clear that at the time of writing it he had received no instructions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the line of policy which he should pursue; for he expresses a hope that the language which he had held, or rather intended to hold, to the Sardinian Government would be deemed worthy of approbation—language, I beg your Lordships to remark, used only two
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days before the declaration of war against Austria was issued by the King of Sardinia. In answer to that despatch the Secretary of State writes on the 27th of March, 1848, to Mr. Abercromby in the following terms:—
"You will have seen by my despatch of the 13th inst., forwarded by Count Revel's courier, and which you must have received soon after the date of your despatch of the 20th inst., that in the advice which in that despatch you state it to be your intention to give to the Sardinian Government you were correctly anticipating the instructions which were on their road to you. I have therefore now only to instruct you to hold the same language and to give the same advice to the Sardinian Government, and to impress upon the minds of the Ministers of the King of Sardinia the great risks and dangers of many kinds which they would bring upon their country by involving it in unnecessary and aggressive hostilities with Austria."
That is advice which might have been given to the King of Sardinia if he had been going to engage in unnecessary and aggressive hostilities with any other Power—for all hostilities are accompanied with great risks and dangers—but there is nothing particularly applicable as a warning against the hostilities in which he was needlessly about to engage with a Government with which Great Britain and himself were both in alliance. In the next extract which I shall read from Mr. Abercromby's despatch, dated Turin, the 27th of March, 1848, when the war was actually in progress, I find this statement:—
"I this morning had a conversation with Marquess Pareto upon the intentions of the Sardinian Government, now that the determination has been taken to advance the Piedmontese army across the frontiers of the Austrian provinces in Italy. The Marquess Pareto stated that this declaration of war against Austria had a twofold object—first, to drive the Austrians for ever out of Italy—secondly, to assist the Provisional Government formed at Milan."
In reply to that despatch Lord Palmerston, on the 11th of April, 1848, wrote as follows:—
"With reference to your despatch of the 27th ult., reporting on the supposed intentions of the Sardinian Government with regard to Lombardy, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Marquis Pareto on this subject; and I have to instruct you to say to the Sardinian Minister that the conflict into which Sardinia has entered must be admitted to be one of doubtful result, and that the principle on which it has been commenced is one full of danger."
Now, I think, that the noble Marquess will not contend upon these premises that any great effort was made by our Government to prevent the war before it

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broke out, seeing that everything which was done, however insufficient, actually took place after the war had commenced. Such is the state of the case on the papers which have been laid before Parliament. Well, then, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives them the advice not to engage in unnecessary hostility. Of the two latest papers which are included among those laid upon the table, one is an extract from a letter by Mr. Abercromby, dated the 27th of March, when the war was already in progress, in which he states that, at a conference with one of the Ministers of Sardinia, the Minister stated that they were determined to advance the army across the Sardinian frontier, and to drive the Austrians out of Italy. Well, the answer to that is contained in the last of these two papers; it stated that Her Majesty's Government approved of the language held by Mr. Abercromby on that occasion; but what the language was which is thus approved of, it does not state. It adds, however, that "the conflict which they have entered into is one of doubtful result." These are the intimations made to Sardinia, and included in the representation made to us by the noble Marquess, which intimations were made after the war was actually commenced, and also when, only two days preceding the declaration of war, Mr. Abercromby states his intention to hold certain language to the Sardinian Government, as if apprehensive of some distant possibility. Now, the noble Marquess must admit that neither any great effort had been made to prevent the war, still less can be imagine that anything was done after the war had commenced which could have retarded it. Yet such are the facts of the case, and so it stands. I will say that Her Majesty's Government have been guilty of most unjustifiable neglect in all the documents which they have transmitted into Sardinia. I maintain, that the attack of the King of Sardinia upon the territories of his ally the Emperor of Austria was most unjustifiable; and yet the advice which our Minister gave him while meditating this aggression, was such only as he might have given him had his cause been the best which ever existed. I find in the documents nothing about the infraction of treaties, nothing about the violation of engagements on the part of the Government of Sardinia; and, above all, I see nothing in the shape of a protest or remonstrance on the part of the British Government against
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any part of its proceedings. Now, my Lords, you will recollect that the King of Sardinia was not only a party, an acceding party, to the Treaty of Vienna, but that he actually came under specific engagements to this country, as well as to all Europe, to maintain the observance of that treaty; and therefore the violation of it required, on the part of this country, not only the use of much stronger language than had been employed in the papers now on the table; but at the very least it demanded to be met with a formal protest. The terms in which the Sardinian monarch contracted with this country were definite and specific, and also rendered him amenable for all the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna. The Act of Accession of the King of Sardinia to the final Act of the Congress of Vienna, on the 9th of June, 1816, was couched in these words:—
"His Plenipotentiary declares that His Majesty the King of Sardinia accedes by the present Act to the said treaties, conventions, declarations, regulations, and other Acts mentioned in the 118th Article, which Acts shall all be considered as if inserted here word for word; engaging himself formally and solemnly, not only towards His Majesty the King of Great Britain, but also towards all the other Powers and States, which, either as signing, or acceding, have taken part in the engagements of the Act of the Congress, to concur on his side in the fulfilment of the obligations contained in the said treaty which may concern His Majesty the King of Sardinia."
Therefore, in addition to that violation of public law, and that scandalous violation of peace, without any assignable cause or pretext, there is a violation of the guarantee entered into specially with this country; and the least that Her Majesty's Government could have done, upon such an occasion as that, was to have entered their formal protest. Why, they had a modern example before them of a case somewhat similar, by which they might have framed their remonstrance. Your Lordships will recollect that some time ago the three northern Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had taken measures by which they deprived the republic of Cracow of certain of its privileges and of its independence. Though those measures unquestionably constituted a violation of the Treaty of Vienna in the opinion of two other of the great Powers, France and England, yet it was a violation trifling and insignificant when compared with that which has been perpetrated in the north of Italy. It was even a matter open to discussion and doubt, for three of the five great Powers of Europe, who have

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hitherto assumed the control of such matters into their hands, declared that it was no violation of the Treaty of Vienna. These three Powers maintained—and I admit that they had had great provocation on the part of that State, and it was not to be denied that this provocation might have been made a justification for their interfering with Cracow, and in obtaining satisfaction and security for the future; but yet this country protested that it would be a violation of the Treaty of Vienna. France was of the same opinion; and we lost not a moment in entering our protest, our strong protest, against it. That was a precedent which I have every reason for thinking ought to have been followed in this case, which is tenfold stronger than the case in which the three Powers were involved. Now, as much has been said of the Treaty of Vienna, and there appears to be a good deal of uncertainty and difference about the obligations of that treaty, this may be a proper moment for me to state what, in my opinion, these obligations are. I think, then, in the first place, that the Powers, whether contracting or acceding to the treaty, are precisely on the same footing, and are all bound precisely by the same obligations. There is a moral guarantee given by every Power who signed or acceded, to observe, and to cause to be observed, the provisions of that treaty. I think, strictly speaking, that any violation of the provisions of that treaty may be a casus belli; but it must be determined by the view which the injured party takes of his own injuries, whether or not the violation should be followed by war; but that some notice ought to be taken of the infraction of the treaty there can be no doubt, either by remonstrance, or by formal protest, or by the withdrawal of the Minister, or by such other modes as may best express the opinion entertained by the respective Governments. I fully admit that neither we nor any other party to the treaty are bound by that moral obligation to make common cause with any party who may feel himself injured; that must depend upon the degree in which our own interests may be endangered, and upon the relations in which we may stand. There is another kind of guarantee contained in the Treaty of Vienna which rests on a different footing. The moral guarantee of which I have just been speaking does not bind us to make common cause with all that are injured; but there is also a special guarantee applicable
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to the neutrality of Switzerland, and to the possession of certain provinces by Prussia, by which, if the conditions be violated, we should be bound to redress the wrong by war, if necessary. Fortunately, this country has always had a great reluctance to enter into guarantees of this nature, and I hope will always cultivate such a reluctance; for if we enter into treaties thus specially guaranteed, we are obliged in every particular to fulfil them; but there is no prospect that the special guarantees contained in the Treaty of Vienna should lead to any such result. Returning more immediately to the subject before the House, I must remind your Lordships that the remonstrances which Her Majesty's Government made, being of the futile and insignificant description which I have described, could not have any possible effect on the progress of the war. That war, iniquitously as it was commenced, continued at first to obtain greater success than it deserved. The Piedmontese army advanced, took the Austrian army by surprise, and, unprepared for treachery of this description, drove it first hack to the Mincio, and afterwards to the Adige, and succeeded in depriving the Austrians for a time of the whole of Lombardy. In these difficulties, and distracted by a revolution in the capital, without resources, without a Government, without instructions, without orders, the Austrian army was for the time completely paralysed. In this emergency, the Cabinet of Vienna, notwithstanding the state of opinion in this country, still relying upon the old friendship and alliance which had so long existed between Austria and this country, sent a special mission over to this country to make overtures and concessions. I see that statements are made in a despatch, published in the newspapers, purporting to be from Prince Schwartzenburg, in reference to that mission; whether the despatch is authentic I know not; I do not know what the particulars are; but I know that the proposals made on that occasion by the Austrian Government were not received as sufficient to meet the exigencies of Her Majesty's Government; Her Majesty's Ministers required still greater concessions, although Austria offered to surrender the whole of Lombardy, and to acknowledge its independence. It, however, did not satisfy the demands of the British Government. Now, that Austria offered to concede the whole of Lombardy is quite clear, because at that time it appears, by a

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document before the public, that Baron Wessenberg, on the 13th of June, sent a commission to Milan to treat with the Milan Government, on the basis of the independence of Lombardy. The answer made to the Austrian Government, by the Provisional Government of Milan, however, was, that they must have the whole of Italy, and that they had already committed themselves to that, and nothing less. Happily the Austrian offers of concession made to Her Majesty's Government were declared insufficient for England taking up her cause by mediation. I say "happily," for shortly after this, the Austrian army having been reinforced, and a better spirit prevailing in the Austrian councils—although I should not wish to stigmatise the conditions which were offered to the Milan Government by the Cabinet of Vienna, considering the enormous difficulties and the anarchy and danger into which they were plunged at home—I say the Austrians, soon after, taking courage assumed the offensive, and from victory to victory pursued their enemy to his own frontier, and by a series of brilliant operations the campaign was brought by Marshal Radetzki to a successful termination. I think the whole conduct of that veteran commander was such as to entitle him to the highest credit, for it was as much distinguished by his ability in the field as by his moderation after victory. The veteran marshal exhibited as much vigour and activity throughout that remarkable crisis as when I saw him myself at the head of his victorious hussars five-and-thirty years ago. On arriving at the frontier, in the exercise of prudence, or generosity, or both, he abstained from following his feeble enemy into his own territory; on the application of the King of Sardinia he granted an armistice, with a view to the establishment of a real peace—a peace which, in all probability, would have been easily effected, requiring but little time for its accomplishment. But, in a few days, the Government of England and of Prance offered their mediation. That, of course, was gladly accepted by the King of Sardinia; and after a short time, though not so very naturally, it was accepted by Austria, with the understanding that the basis of the mediation was to be the subject of consideration between the two Powers. This mediation was most ill-timed, and most unequal in its operation, and offered no prospect of a satisfactory issue. When two Powers are engaged in
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war, very naturally and very laudably a third Power, allied to both, offers to mediate, with a view to facilitating their return to peace. The mediating Power may possibly be swayed by interested motives, and justice and impartiality may be sacrificed; but, at least, the action is simple, and the result speedy. When, however, two Powers offer their mediation, it is of the greatest importance that their interests should be identical. It is quite clear that England and France were both sincerely desirous of the return of peace; but it is not quite clear that the interests of England and the interests of France were identical, or that they agreed in anything else. On the contrary, the interest of England has always been to see North Italy reared into a barrier as strong as possible. This was the effect of the Treaty of Vienna in bringing the great military power of Austria in contact with the keeper of the passes of the Alps. Sardinia was greatly strengthened by the addition of Genoa, and the Imperial Fiefs, and the barrier was compacted along the frontier of the Alps. It was the interest of France, however, to weaken that barrier, and that never could be so effectually done as by weakening the power of Austria. I therefore think the prospect was unpromising of a satisfactory issue to the mediation, even if it had been undertaken on the most practical grounds. But when one comes to look at the mode in which these conferences and negotiations were intended to be carried on, it became evident that no permanent successful result could arise from them. It is easy to see a reason why Austria, from the first, was not disposed to concede a single inch of that territory which she had maintained by such efforts of courage, and at such sacrifices to herself. Indeed, I do not see why we might not have held the same language as we did in the late civil war in Switzerland, when, according to all appearance, with rather more ingenuity than good faith, we contrived that that war should be over before the mediators met, and then we said, there is no more need of mediation, for the war is at an end. Here, too, it might be said that the war was at an end; and the King of Sardinia, without any further pretext, might consider himself fortunate to have escaped as he had. Well, then, the war, after a cessation now of some months, has been renewed; and I sincerely hope, and fully believe, that this repose will not be found to have impaired the vigour and

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energy of Marshal Radetzky. I cannot possibly doubt that on this occasion Her Majesty's Government have made somewhat more strenuous efforts to prevent that renewal, than they made at the first breaking out of the war. What, then, is it which Her Majesty's Government propose to do under the present circumstances? I maintain that such is the character your double policy has obtained for you in Italy, that it is impossible for you to expect any one of the other Powers to believe your sincerity in objecting to the war undertaken by Sardinia, seeing the special engagements entered into with this country, as well as the gross violation of the Treaty of Vienna; and, in addition to this, seeing the contempt in which the King of Sardinia holds the mediating Powers, and that mediation itself—I say I know no one who would believe you sincere, unless you recall Her Majesty's Minister from the Court of Turin. Of the unprincipled conduct of the King of Sardinia the world are satisfied. I have read the voluminous manifesto in which the Sardinian Ministers have attempted a justification of the course they have pursued; and I will say nothing further of it than that it is a Jesuitical compound of facts misstated and audacity unparalleled. It is full of fine words—it speaks of good faith, justice, and honour. One would think that these words should have paralysed the fingers which wrote them. In it the King of Sardinia rejects all treaties, ancient and modern—quite forgetting apparently that it is by treaty he holds possession of Genoa, and of those fiefs which had been so long the object of his house; and that but for the Treaty of Vienna—that treaty he has now so grossly violated—he would at this moment see his dominions circumscribed to his island of Sardinia, and would never have been allowed to obtain those possessions which had been acquired for him by Austrian arms. The document shows the desperation and madness of his government. The justification pleaded for the war in this document is the violation of the armistice on the part of the Austrians, when it is notorious that the very first violation of it was committed on the part of Sardinia, in a most flagrant instance, when the Sardinian fleet continued in the Adriatic, contrary to the express stipulations of the armistice. This production will, no doubt, be speedily answered by the Government at Vienna in the manner which it deserves. There was one passage in
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the manifesto, however, which contained the whole pith of the document. "Having," they say, "weighed all the chances, examined the remote and immediate causes of the last events, the Sardinian Government has come to the conviction that it is not less necessary for Upper Italy than for the whole of the Peninsula, to be delivered from the present state, in which, otherwise, the most important conditions of political and social existence would be placed in jeopardy." Now, my Lords, this, divested of the verbiage in which it is involved, to use a homely but expressive English saying, is neither more nor less than "needs must when the devil drives." This unhappy Sovereign is impelled by a force greater than himself. He is made an instrument in the hands of others, who are as hostile to him as they are to Austria; and if he were to succeed in driving the Austrian army out of Italy to-morrow, his difficulties would only then begin. Now, my Lords, there is one matter worthy of observation in this manifesto. With all that the manifesto contains, we have hoard nothing about the slavery of the Italian subjects of Austria. We used to hear a good deal about the "leaden sceptre" and about the "iron rule" of Austria, and such like phrases. But I believe the Austrian provinces have long been the best governed of all the provinces in Italy. They had no constitutions or constitutional liberty; but property was secure in them, and justice was administered between man and man with as much fairness and impartiality as in any country in Europe. The police was excellent, and the prosperity of the country was great and increasing. But moreover, my Lords, the subjects of Austria in Italy will shortly have a constitution as free as heart can desire; and I only hope and trust they may be as happy and as prosperous with their constitution as they have been hitherto without one. However, that constitution they will have; and I cannot help taking this opportunity of expressing the joy I feel, that the Austrian empire possesses statesmen who have the boldness and the ability to frame such a constitution at this time. Some, indeed, there may be who may think the Austrians need not have gone so far as they have to procure a foundation for a free constitution—that they need not have crossed the Atlantic for a model. Nevertheless, my Lords, I honour their courage, and I give them credit for knowing what is best adapted to the wants

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of their own country, and what is most likely to be successful. I rejoice to see that this noble work—for noble work it is—is likely to be promulgated in Italy as well as in other parts of the Austrian empire; and I hope, for the sake of Europe, and especially for the sake of this country, that Austria will, under this new constitution, enter upon a long career of happiness and glory. If the noble Marquess shall tell me that the correspondence for which I move cannot be produced at this moment with convenience, I am perfectly ready not to press for its production. Some time or other, I presume, it will be thought fitting by Her Majesty's Government to produce it, as well as other matters explanatory of the whole of the proceedings connected with the war. But I thought that, considering what has taken place, and considering the great deficiency of information before the occurrence of the war in the first instance, it was incumbent upon me to move for this correspondence now. I am, however, perfectly willing not to press for its production at present, if the noble Marquess should think it would not be beneficial for the public interest to lay it upon the table.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I heard with great satisfaction the declaration with which the noble Earl concluded his speech, namely, that he would not press for the production of the correspondence, if assured by Her Majesty's Government that it would be an inconvenient step. That declaration has relieved me from the necessity, under which I should otherwise have lain, of troubling your Lordships at some length upon the particular points relating to the production of the papers for which the noble Earl has moved, and of showing to your Lordships—that which indeed it would not have been difficult to show, if the noble Earl had not himself, in some degree, anticipated me—that this is precisely the moment at which the production of those papers would be attended with the greatest inconvenience. In fact, it is not till all negotiations are at an end, until actual recourse has been had to arms—it is not until the consequences of all that has passed are fully developed, and that all the efforts that have been made to suspend the horrors of war have proved unavailing—that the British Government would be justified in making that explanation, which, if made at all, should be a most ample and complete justification of
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their conduct and proceedings. But, my Lords, I feel it necessary to offer a few remarks, which shall be as short as possible, upon some of the observations made by the noble Earl. The noble Earl commenced his speech by adverting, not to any recent negotiations—not to any papers which he is now desirous of having laid upon the table—but to papers produced at a former time; papers which were last year laid upon the table of the House, and this for the purpose of deducing a sort of accusation against Her Majesty's Government, that at an early stage of these proceedings a disposition existed upon their part unfavourable to the Austrian Government. Now, I do not admit that any such inference can be fairly deduced from those papers. The noble Earl will remember that upon the former occasion the statement he made was entirely different. And here I must say that I have some reason to complain of the noble Earl throughout the entire of his speech professing to connect these papers, which have been already laid upon the table of the House, with certain future papers about to be so laid, but which have nothing in common but that they all relate to Italy. The noble Earl seemed totally to forget, or, at all events, he suppressed, so far as avoidance of the subject could suppress it, that, in the interval between those negotiations about which he now requires to be informed, there had occurred one small event, namely, the revolution in Paris. And I am sure I need only appeal to the sound judgment of the noble Earl, and, perhaps, to the statesmanship which I admit he is at all times able to display, whether there was any possible event more likely than that revolution to cause the line of conduct existing between one country and another to be altered and modified, or, at least, to undergo a careful review? But, my Lords, the noble Earl has expressed his surprise that a despatch which he says he has seen, had not been laid upon the table with the other papers.
The EARL of ABERDEEN: I said that I saw it when it was laid upon the table, but that I never saw it before.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: I understood the noble Earl to refer to a paper which was not presented or laid upon the table.
The EARL of ABERDEEN: No, no; I feel that if I could make this matter intelligible to your Lordships, I have only to appeal to you as gentlemen. The noble

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Marquess produced, in the first instance, those despatches which ended with a despatch to the Court of Austria, containing a threat against Austria for her supposed interference in the internal affairs of the Italian States. That was a threat which might have been deserved; I don't believe it was deserved; but I say I admit it might have been. Well, six months after the impression had been made that we by our zealous interference had protected Sardinia from Austria, it appeared that Austria had sent an answer at once to that despatch, in which she not only denied entertaining any such intentions as had been attributed to her, but declared she was ready to act in conjunction with Great Britain. Now I call it a suppressio veri, when the Government had not produced that despatch, while they had produced the other.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: But that suppressio veri, as the noble Earl calls it, was actually laid upon the table the moment it was called for.
The EARL of ABERDEEN: It was not produced for six months after the other papers.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: It was produced the moment it was called for.
LORD BROUGHAM: But it was produced in consequence of my Motion, not of the noble Earl's.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE'Srejoinder to this observation was inaudible. He proceeded: At the time referred to, could any one say that there was not ground for apprehension that Austria would interfere in the peninsula of Italy, for the purpose of preventing the extension of constitutions to the various States—constitutions of less freedom than that which Austria has since given to her own subjects, and which the noble Earl himself seems now to think an inestimable boon. My Lords, it is fortunate for the world that Austria has discovered that it is a boon; and I am happy to find that the noble Earl has discovered that it is a boon likewise. But, my Lords, I say there were numbers of people then in Italy who believed themselves justified in thinking that Austria would not permit free constitutions in the Italian States bordering on her Italian possessions; and I am therefore justified in saying that the apprehension existed in Italy, and that Her Majesty's Government acted properly in removing that apprehension. In so doing, there was nothing in
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their conduct hostile to Austria. The despatches stated fully and explicitly what the views of this Government were with regard to independent States; and on looking back to the despatches, and contemplating the condition of things which then existed, contrasted with the great change of circumstances which has since taken place, I must say I see nothing in our conduct by which I am not prepared to stand, and by which I am not ready to abide. But, as I stated a few moments ago, a change came over the world which entirely reversed the order of things throughout Europe. The danger that was apprehended in Italy before that time was from the interference of Governments with the independence of States; but after that which took place at Paris, which impressed the whole world with alarm, and imposed upon this country new duties, and a new mode of executing those duties—I mean the revolution, with all its consequences—the danger which arose was, that a democracy without a throne would overturn all the crowns of Europe, spreading from France, establishing an influence and a power which it would be afterwards difficult to guide or regulate. My Lords, I say that under such circumstances it was wise, for the purpose of securing the world from the sudden irruption of revolutionary doctrines—and no more safe, and salutary, and certain expedient could be devised—that such an understanding should be established between the Governments of France and England as would make it impossible for Prance to act alone. By not compelling France to act alone, we have avoided those dangers to which I have alluded, and in the apprehension of which I am satisfied the noble Earl concurs. But the noble Earl's reason for not coming to an understanding with France, or not assisting in any plan of joint co-operation with Prance, is really singular. For he says, "I admit that Prance and you had, at the moment, the same interest in preserving peace in Italy, and that you had a right to believe that the French Government was quite ready to do everything to assist you in good faith." But the noble Earl then says that the motives of each were somewhat different. Because, "had there been war in Italy, France would have been obliged to take a different course from you." Why, surely, my Lords, that is the very best reason we could have for endeavouring to preserve peace, and for preventing war. But, up to the point of preserv-

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ing peace as long as it could be preserved, France was prepared to act with us; and yet the noble Earl thinks it was bad policy for France to be joined with us. My Lords, I, for my part, rejoice in the co-operation of France, and I am not willing to part with that co-operation. I am not prepared to think it of so little value as to be carelessly thrown away. There never was a period at which I thought the co-operation of France more important than at present. There never was a time when it was more desirable—when it was more desirable that there should be a co-operation, not of the Government merely, but of the people of France and England. It is to that cooperation, which I hope will continue uninterrupted, that we must owe the peace of Europe. The noble Earl has a right to comment upon that which he has heard. But commenting upon papers before they have been produced in this House, is surely an inconvenient course to pursue; and the noble Earl has adopted a proposition with regard to the proposed mediation upon which I shall have a few words to say. He has stated that the terms that were proposed by Austria as the foundation of the mediation, were not such as to satisfy the exigencies of this country. Why, where does the noble Earl find that we had any exigencies to be satisfied? I defy the noble Earl to point out anything which could justify his assertion. I defy him to produce his proofs. I say that throughout these transactions this country tried to act as a fair and impartial mediator. And what the noble Earl calls—invidiously, I must say—the exigencies of this country, were merely communications from this country, and the terms upon which England thought the mediation might prove satisfactory. Would the noble Earl, who has had so much to do with mediation, and who may have so much to do with mediations hereafter, enter upon one between any two parties upon any other ground than the ascertaining what each party was likely to agree to. For if you undertake a mediation with the knowledge that no concession would be made on either side, there is an end to all utility in the negotiations. Two parties have got into a dispute, and are desirous to make peace; and the intervention of a third party is wanted for the purpose of arranging those concessions which otherwise cannot be proposed by either, as neither can brook to yield a point to the other. If ever such a case was perfectly
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exemplified, it was that of the dispute between Austria and the house of Savoy. The conflict which had existed between them was characterised by the fiercest, the most sanguinary animosity, not only between the Governments, but between the nations themselves. And it was at that very moment, when the honour of each Cabinet was supposed to be compromised in the issue of the contest, that it was imagined that the interference of the two Powers, France and England, might enable the parties, with greater credit to themselves and greater satisfaction to their subjects, to come to a mutual understanding. Well, then, the noble Earl seems to think that we gave an undue preference to Sardinia, and to suppose that we did so in the belief that Austria was far weaker than she really was. It might be imagined, from the noble Earl's observations, that it was not Austria herself who, previously to the commencement of the mediation, had proposed to separate Lombardy from her empire. The noble Earl has alluded to a document which has been circulated relating to the communications which then took place, which document states that the proposition of Austria to abandon Lombardy was never made, and was never acquiesced in by Austria. I shall put the seal upon that despatch, by saying that instead of its having never entered into the thoughts of Austria to detach Lombardy from her empire, that was one of the concessions which M. Hummelauer agreed to. And when M. Hummelauer broke off the negotiations, it was not upon the question as to the separation of Lombardy that there was any difference. I am stating that which it is very important that the public should know. In order that there may be no further repetition of the allegations as to the propositions contained in that spurious despatch, that Austria was ready to detach Lombardy, the very best proof is to be found in the very despatch to which the noble Earl has alluded, that from Baron Wessenberg; and we have in our possession now a despatch which proves that when Baron Wessenberg was sent by Austria to open the negotiations at Milan, the basis of those negotiations was the detachment of Lombardy from the Austrian empire. [Lord STANLEY: Hear, hear!] The noble Lord opposite cries "Hear, hear!" as if all this was never brought in question.
LORD STANLEY: That statement—["Order, order!"] I have been distinctly referred to by the noble Marquess, and I

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have a right to explain. I say that that statement has been expressly made by the noble Earl in his speech. [Lord ABERDEEN: Hear, hear!]
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: And I as expressly state that the noble Earl has said that he knew not whether the despatch bearing the supposed signature of Prince Schwartzenberg was a spurious document or not. One would think, from the manner in which the noble Lord talked, that it would be charged against this country that we had proposed the separation of Lombardy from Austria. Not a day passes in which this charge is not made; and if it be not contradicted it will pass current for truth; but if properly and completely denied and disproved, we shall hear no more of such despatches going through Europe as if authentic and real. It may do very well to prepare adulterated papers and adulterated despatches that may be fit to supply the columns of newspapers, and may even answer for the whispers of drawing-rooms, but they are not fit for your Lordships' ears. We have had no wish to separate Austria and Lombardy, but the contrary. Nor have we wished to give over Lombardy to the Government of Sardinia. I say it could hardly have been foreseen that any such attempt would have been made; and it never would have been made but for the French revolution. No one could have foreseen the occurrence of the French revolution, which diverted into new channels all the political ideas of Europe. But from the moment that Mr. Abercromby, our Minister at Turin, took upon himself to express his entire disapprobation of the occurrences that took place, to the present time, no attempt has been omitted by Her Majesty's Government to induce the Sardinian Government to pause in the course of what I must now call injustice as well as great impolicy which had led her to covet the possession of Lombardy. When the papers are produced, your Lordships will see that warning was given of these events. You will find more than this—that among the different communications which took place between the two Governments of France and England and Sardinia, not only was warning administered on the part of England, but as often and as especially by the Government of France was warning given, in, if possible, still more emphatic terms; and, my Lords, if there is any chance, I may almost say if there is the continuance of a chance—because it is
1110
still possible, though barely possible, that hostilities may even yet be averted—if the continuance of such a chance still remains, it is through the exertions and the efforts of the French Ministry, specially employed in exhorting the Sardinian Government to consider the course which they are about to adopt, and assuring them that in that course they will receive from France, as from England, no support, no countenance, and no assistance whatever. My Lords, the papers for which the noble Earl has moved will shortly be laid before the House—they certainly will not be delayed many days—and then the questions put by the noble Earl shall have an answer. I cannot sit down without stating that I am ready to admit that in much of what the noble Earl has stated with respect to the conduct which the Government of Sardinia is now pursuing, I am ready to agree with him, as it is a course which we have endeavoured, as far as it was in our power, to induce the Government of Sardinia not to pursue. At the same time I am not prepared to make use of the strong language which the noble Earl has applied to the course taken by that Government, because I cannot but recollect that the state of Europe has been such as to afford, I will not say a justification, I need hardly say an excuse, but I may say something like a palliation for the course and for the systems of action adopted by that Government, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been altogether unjustifiable. It is easy for us in this country to blame the Sardinian Government; it is easy for the noble Earl to indulge in speculations as to what was the course they ought to have adopted; it is easy for those who are so disposed, to sit down and apply to all the events of the last year the strict rules and habits of diplomatic intercourse and international relations. But I submit to your Lordships what may be a defence, not of the Sardinian Government only, but of almost every other Government in Europe—I submit to your Lordships that during the time when those Governments felt the ground to be upheaved beneath them, and saw the clouds of the sky to be lowering above them—when they were threatened, some with immediate, others with more remote subversion and destruction, we must not too severely scrutinise, or in too nice a spirit of criticism review, the course which they have taken under such circumstances. I do not know what Government that was so

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affected by late events could stand such a test. Even that Government to which we are now particuliarly adverting, and which I respect and esteem as one of our oldest friends, and which in very difficult times has been the warm and close ally of England—the house of Austria—for I have already had occasion to state to this House my opinion of the natural connexion that exists between the interests of that empire and this country—I do not know that that country, acted upon as it has been by the events of last year, has exhibited to the world a course of conduct consistent either with the tranquillity of Europe or of Germany. But I do not condemn them on that account. I know that an empire so situated is bound to respect the feelings and even the prejudices of a great mass of its subjects. But if such Governments, under the pressure of these events, have been driven out of their habitual, and proper, and ordinary course, some allowance ought to be made for the smaller Governments, and for the heads of those Governments, when they were driven by late events into positions where they could not restrain the ardour and impatience of their own subjects, though, I admit, that on strict principle it cannot be defended. I say this, not because I feel that it is any justification for the conduct of the King of Sardinia, in renewing the war at this moment, but because I think some allowance ought to be made, under the circumstances of the case. I lament that there is now a stop put to the progress of that mediation to which they have been taught to look. I lament especially that the Government of Austria, which was the first that assented, as it did most clearly, to mediation, and which has given the strongest proof of its assent, in the despatches now read, should now—though for the last six months it has assented to that mediation—when the mediation is about to take place, and when the Plenipotentiaries appointed by other Powers have assembled to join in it, that Austria should, up to a short time ago, have withheld that nomination of its Plenipotentiary, which is necessary and proper to give effect to the mediation, and has thus given, I will not say a sufficient excuse, but at all events a pretext to that Sovereign, who has no power to control his own subjects, for renewing this unnecessary and most unfortunate war. I wish much that that pretext had not been given. But if war should take place, I can only say that we have done everything which
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our power and our exertions enabled us to do in order to avert it; and, looking to the future, I hold it to be of the greatest importance, and the most admirable security for the future restoration of peace, that we have now the evidence that two countries—countries I will not say the greatest in the world, but which are admitted to be among the greatest in the world, have exhibited and felt an interest in the continuance of universal peace; and, persuaded as I am, from what I have seen, that not only the Government but the people of France are deeply impressed with the conviction that their honour and prosperity will be more consulted by the preservation of peace and the improvement of their own internal condition than by any disturbance in Europe, I look forward with confidence to the time when, by the united exertions of these two countries, by their maintenance of the same policy, and having peace for their sole and ultimate object, the general peace of Europe will be restored and preserved. In conclusion, I have no difficulty in assuring the noble Earl that the papers for which he has called will be furnished, perhaps immediately, and, at all events, that they will be laid on your Lordships' table at no distant period.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he would not trespass long upon their Lordships' attention, after the full and clear statement which his noble Friend near him (the Earl of Aberdeen) had made of the whole case in his very luminous speech. He only rose to set right, in one respect, his noble Friend who last spoke (the Marquess of Lansdowne), and who did not appear to be in possession of all the facts of the case. But first he would say, that he heartily agreed with the two great propositions laid down by his noble Friend opposite: first, in respect to the infinite importance for the peace of Europe, as well as the best interests of this country, that they should preserve unbroken a good understanding with France; and he gave his noble Friends opposite all credit now, as he had done on the first night of the Session, for their well-meant though unsuccessful junction with France, even on that otherwise doubtful ground—the Sardinian mediation, of which he never could entertain any sanguine hopes. He, next, entirely agreed with the noble Marquess in his proposition, in which, however, his noble Friend near him went as far as he did, as to the infinite importance of retaining their old-established alliance with the House of Austria—an alliance not only in accordance

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with the ancient policy of this country, but also in accordance with the tenor of treaties from which honour and good faith required that we should never swerve. He was entirely satisfied with the doctrines laid down by his noble Friend opposite on this cardinal point; but he certainly wished that the Government of which his noble Friend was the representative in that House had attended a little more to those sound English as well as European principles of policy and good faith towards Austria in the month of September, 1847, and been then guided by the principles they now avowed, when he really did think that the negotiations, as given in the distinct and lucid narrative of his noble Friend near him, which took place at that period, did indicate anything rather than a spirit of kindness towards Austria—any thing rather than great tenderness towards either our own honour, or the interests, or the feelings of our old ally—anything, he might even say, rather than a wish to hold the balance even between the two parties of Sardinia and Austria; because he thought it was perfectly manifest that they had dealt out a very large measure of justice towards the one, and a very scanty measure towards the other. Only compare the language of the two despatches of the 11th of September, 1847—the two despatches, one to Sardinia, the other to Austria. To Austria they said—" At your peril interfere in Italy"—for it amounted to that. In ordinary language that would be the expression—diplomatic courtesy expressed itself usually in gentler terms, but quite as significant. It was just this—" If we, England, see that you, Austria, presume"—no, he begged pardon, that was too strong a word for diplomacy; it was—" if we, England, see that you, Austria, assume"—that was the diplomatic language—" if we see that you assume to act in Italy in such a way as to offend the popular party—if you interfere between the Governments of Italy and the peoples of Italy—if you make a cause of war to arise out of the fact of liberal institutions being granted to the peoples of Italy by their sovereigns—take you notice from us, that we, England, will not view this with indifference." It was neither more nor less than this:—" If you, Austria, interfere in Italy, we, England, will use force to prevent you. We give you notice, in plain language, we threaten you if you interfere in Italy." But what did we say to Sardinia? Did we say, "If you choose to break the peace which you have sworn
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to keep—if you commit an infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, which gave you Genoa, and Novara, and indeed Chamberry, and in fact Piedmont, because, but for that treaty, you would have been thrown back upon a barren island, and a savage people, and a pestilential climate, instead of possessing, as you do now, a fertile country, peaceful and civilised subjects, and the most salubrious climate on the face of the earth, if not the most delightful—if you choose to break that treaty to which you owe such inestimable advantages—to which you owe, in fact, your Continental existence among the Powers of Europe, and, instead of being relegated to Lilliput, are a Power in Europe"—if you do this, what would happen? Did England threaten—did she hold out any menace—did she tell Sardinia that she would not remain indifferent? No, nothing of the kind. She barely told Sardinia, as her confidential adviser—"We think you are pursuing a dangerous career—you are reckoning without your host—you are likely to have the worst of the bargain." But there was not a word of threatening. Now, this was not the language they held to Austria. They did not say to her—"If you interfere in Italy between the people and their sovereigns, and attempt to intercept the liberal institutions which the princes are disposed to confer on their subjects, we think you are unwise, and that you are pursuing a course which you will afterwards have reason to repent." No such thing; but they said, "If you interfere in Italy, we shall look upon it as an infraction of the peace, and we shall probably go to war with you in consequence." Therefore, he said again, he wished that the same friendly feelings towards Austria, their old and best ally, had prevailed in September, 1847, as on the 22nd of March, 1849. Now, with regard to the despatch from Austria, in reply to the one from the English Government, he was quite willing to acquit his noble Friend opposite of all intention of wilfully suppressing any such document, because he was perfectly assured that his noble Friend was altogether incapable of lending himself to such a proceeding. But the very justification of the proceeding which his noble Friend had offered, showed that he was not acquainted with the circumstances—that the particulars were not within his knowledge. Therefore, he (Lord Brougham) would explain it to him. The case was shortly this. The Government was said to be at the time in pursuit of Continental popularity—

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such was the charge; but possibly they might be actuated by a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Italy; but, being at the time in full quest of liberal popularity in Paris, and Milan, and Florence, and Rome, and Naples, the Government produced a despatch which held them up to the admiration of all liberal parties on the Continent—which exhibited them as deserving the gratitude of all liberal parties—which held them up to the well-merited approbation of the Milanese coffeehouse politicians—which held them up as the champions of the Mazzinis, and Sterbinis, and Mammianis, and Garribaldis, and Guerrarris, et id genus omne, down to the very gueux, to whom some of them were reported to have waved flags from balconies, and shouted "Live Italian Independence!"—they were held up as threatening Austria with England's imperial displeasure if she presumed to intercept the liberal institutions granted by the Italian sovereigns to their peoples. Liberal institutions granted by sovereigns at a moment when Europe generally was in a state of revolution! They took credit to themselves for that. They were in the mouths of all the men in Italy—of all the red party in France—as the most liberal Government in the world—as the only one that would interfere with the iron or the leaden rule of Austria over Italy. But after they had obtained all this honour and glory, what happened? It turned out that all the while they were in possession of a despatch, dated the 27th of September, which was the identical answer to the identical despatch dated the 11th of September. What did that answer say? He supposed it said something justifying the despatch to which it was an answer; that it said, "We are very sorry you have written this letter; we did intend to interfere all the world over against liberty; we had resolved to take all measures to prevent the sovereigns of Italy from conferring constitutions upon their subjects; we had resolved to march the Austrian columns throughout the Italian peninsula, to put down free constitutions, and to set up the cause of absolutism; we had resolved to attack your Sardinian favourite; but now that you have interfered, we see the whole thing is up, and you have the credit of being the saviours of the world, and the defenders of Sardinia." But it turned out to be unhappily the very reverse of all this. It turned out that the despatch of 27th September, in answer to the glorious liberty-
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mongering despatch of the 11th September, stated, in substance, "You are labouring under some hallucination of the brain; some one has been deceiving you; they have been making some game of you; we have not the shadow of a thought of the kind you impute to us. Far from interfering with the liberties of Italy, we wish them joy of them; and, as regards Sardinia, we are as friendly to Sardinia and to the independence of that kingdom as you are; and we are resolved to side with you, and to stand or fall with you, in maintaining the independence of Sardinia and the integrity of the sacred Treaty of Vienna." The first despatch was widely published, to the honour and glory of those who made it public, and who made and wrote it. But the second despatch, which made the first a fraud—an absolute delusion and a fraud—was carefully concealed—for how long? Oh, said the noble Marquess, it was produced as soon as it was moved for. Yes; but it was not forthcoming till he (Lord Brougham) made a Motion for it in August last; and then, no doubt, it was quickly produced; but that was because he told them he did not care a straw whether they produced it or not, for he had at the moment a copy of it in his pocket, and should read it—and then it was produced, no doubt. Now, how did the case stand? He should, to explain the matter, put it as between private persons. Suppose that he wished to win the favour of a particular individual, and, to do so, told him "There is another party who is determined to commence a lawsuit against you; I have done everything I can to prevent him, to save your estate from seizure and your person from imprisonment. I have written to him to say. Sir, if you presume to bring an action against my good friend, Mr. So-and-so—if you attempt to seize his estate, or to secure his person, I give you notice he is my friend and ally, and, therefore, I warn you to give over all thought of commencing this lawsuit; for if you persevere, you will find that you will have to contend against me and my purse as well as my friend and his small means." Suppose that he showed this letter to the individual; why, he would go down on his knees to him, and exclaim, "My dear Sir, you are the most delightful person in the world; you are a friend indeed, as you have proved a friend in need. I should have been a ruined and undone man but for you, I and all my family—but for you we were surely undone. How can I express my gratitude?

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Do with me whatever you please. My interest is yours—at all elections I am your servant." But suppose that some seven or eight months afterwards it should turn out that this true friend had a letter in his pocket from the individual who was said to be about to commence the lawsuit, saying, "What is the matter with you? You are labouring under some hallucination. I never meant to commence any lawsuit—it was farthest from my intention; on the contrary, I had determined to give whatever your friend the defendant wishes for—in fact, he is my friend as well as yours, and I would stand up with my life and fortune to see him righted, were he from any quarter threatened with wrong." Now, if that letter was produced, would it not place him (Lord Brougham) in a very awkward position? Would not the gentleman be apt to say, "Dear me! this must be a very odd sort of man, to alarm me with a lawsuit which never existed even in intention? He must be a very knavish person to cheat me out of my thanks—a very malicious person to charge my other friend with a design to work my ruin." He must be under the guidance of the eminent individual named by the noble Earl to-night—and who is said to be the father of misrepresentations. But it was very much the same course that had been pursued by the Government. There were some men who never could let well alone, and there were others who never could let ill alone. As the one party generally ended by making well bad, so the others seldom left off without making ill worse. Such was the case, he was sorry to say, with the noble Marquess, who was not satisfied with the case as it stood; for he went on to say, that a very awkward impression had gone abroad all over Italy—an impression that the Austrians were opposed to all free institutions—that they were against the people and for the princes; and that they were determined to prevent the people getting the benefit of the free institutions granted by their sovereigns. Well, then, was not that, of all reasons, the most convincing reason for producing, and not for suppressing the second despatch, in order to do away with this false impression? Yet the despatch was not produced, God only knew why; and it was possible that other being, who was said to be the author of all mischief, did know; but still no reason had been given why this despatch was not produced. On the subject of the Sardinian war, he partook of the
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anxiety of his noble Friend opposite, for though he did not doubt what the result would be to Charles Albert, he thought this collision a very bad thing for the peace of Europe, because at a moment like the present, when one stone fell out of the arch, no man could tell how much would crumble down, or how soon we should be involved in a general war. He felt anxious on this subject—at the same time he felt that the King of Sardinia was now more to be pitied than to be blamed. With regard, indeed, to the extenuation which the noble Marquess had offered on behalf of that King, he must say, he would have listened to it with more deference if it had not been for that monarch's past conduct. If his noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne) did not know, it was well known to the noble Viscount at the head of the Foreign Department, that King Charles Albert's designs were not of so recent a date as the noble Marquess had represented them—that his designs upon Italy were neither of so recent a date, nor very moderate, nor framed on anything like justifiable grounds. His ambition was known. To that ambition he had sacrificed himself in 1820 and 1821, and had led to the destruction of many of his adherents. He had conspired against his kinsman and lawful prince, and that being discovered, his accomplices in the conspiracy paid the penalty of his crime with their lives, though he himself escaped. His ambition after that was not gratified by his becoming the successor of that prince, which he was in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna. He was not satisfied with that arrangement, and he commenced a series of intrigues, of which the records of our Foreign Office contain the history. His purpose was by little and little to undermine the arrangements of 1815, and to unsettle the law of Europe, which, ever since that period, like the Treaty of Westphalia, and the preceding Treaty of Olwa, had been the statute law of Europe. He then ventured to break the peace which had existed ever since the Treaty of Vienna; he went to war with Austria, and that for the sole purpose of extending his own dominions. It was impossible, therefore, to make the same excuse for him now as if he had not been guilty of these previous aggressions. Nevertheless, Charles Albert was now comparatively in a state which made him an object of commiseration, for he was not the author of the present proceedings in Austrian Italy. Their Lordships might depend upon it that

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he had no more will in those matters than they had, and that he was as much opposed to them in his heart as their Lordships were. Indeed, he ought to be more against them, for his interests were far more deeply concerned than any stake their Lordships could have in them. His troubles had only now begun, for he was in the hands of a set of the most reckless and implacable tyrants—the rebellious parties in his States—the allies of the profligate, the bloody-minded Red faction in Paris, and aided, as had been the case everywhere of late years, by exiled Poles. He grieved to say it, for no man had ever more earnestly supported the Poles than he had done, according to the small measure of his ability; no man had ever more zealously made head against the cruelties and oppressions practised against that unhappy country, and of which those men were the victims. But, in common justice, he must say that of late years, wheresoever agitation had been going on, or rebellion had been at work—wherever any conspiracy was bursting forth against any established Government—be it carried on by had means or by means somewhat less bad—they were sure to find Polish agitators, if not at the head, at least concerned in the movement—and accordingly at the head of Charles Albert's army, which hoisted a standard of what was now claimed as the national colour, whose motto was the unity of Italy, and whose war-cry was the expulsion of the Austrians as foreigners—at the head of that liberal army whose object was to raise a national colour, to unite the long separated nations of Italy, and to expel the Austrians from Italy—at the head of that army was a foreign Pole, whose name was not at present known, probably seeking the fame of defeat; but who was about to peril his reputation—his small reputation—against the brilliant renown of the veteran Radetzky; and who, in all human probability, was not destined to lead the Sardinian troops to any splendid triumph. With respect to mediation, he had heartily desired that something might come of it; and he believed that one reason why Austria had hesitated so long was because she did not believe it could lead to any good result. How indeed could it after the battle had been lost and won? He (Lord Brougham) had often heard in his professional life at the bar and on the bench of arbitration before verdict—but never of one after verdict, and when proceedings
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had been entered up. In that case the beaten party would always be ready to refer—but never could a reference be effectual. So here, how expect a reference to succeed after Austrian victories on all points had declared she never would cede one inch of territory. It was perfectly hopeless. One word before he sat down about the proclamation of the King of Sardinia—a document almost unexampled in the history of human folly and human fraud—a compound of audacious misrepresentations with facts too well known—shuffling at obscure conclusions—made up of pompous assertion of truisms, which no man doubted, with a courageous propounding of falsehoods which no man could believe—a Jesuitical document, now arguing here, now tricking there, and then gaining a little when you were off your guard—full of ambiguities and a wrapping up of what might be anything with a constant attempt, under a multitude of vague words and false pretences, to keep the real objects and the real truth out of sight. But that real truth was this—"That I Charles Albert cannot resist the republican faction in Paris, and its representatives in Turin, and, above all, in Genoa—I cannot stand against the bad feeling that unhappily has got possession of a part of the Sardinian army, and therefore I am compelled, whether I will or not, to break the peace, though it is an infraction of the treaty, and just as much contrary to good faith to do so this year as it was last year; and I will, therefore, take the desperate chance of that desperate game, war, and try to extend my dominions, as I vainly tried last year."
Motion withdrawn.
House adjourned till To-morrow.