Sitting of 12 May 1848

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—10 Friendly Societies; Qualification and Registration of Electors (Ireland); Election and Polling Places (Ireland).
20 Scientific Societies.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Mr. William Marshall, from Carlisle, in favour of the Borough Elections Bill.—By Mr. Cobden, from Nottingham, for Extension of the Elective Franchise.—By Mr. Robert Palmer, from Wokingham, and its Vicinity (Berks), for Adoption of Vote by Ballot.—By Mr. Hume, from Members of the Baptist Church and Congregation, Gosberton (Lincoln), for Discouragement of Idolatry (India).—By Mr. Forbes, from the Provincial Synod of Moray, against the Jewish Disabilities Bill.—By Colonel Hanson, from West Bromwich (Stafford), and by other Hon. Members, from several Places, for Better Observance of the Lord's Day.—By Mr. Elliot, from Commissioners of Supply for the County of Roxburgh, against the Marriages (Scotland) Bill (1847).—By Mr. Cowan, from Inverness, and by Mr. Hume, from Members of the Presbyterian Congregation in Maryton, in favour of the Places of Worship Sites (Scotland) Bill.—By Captain Boldero, from Chippenham, for Inquiry into the Case of the Rajah of Sattara.—By Mr. Forbes, from Stirling, for Alteration of the Banking Law.—By Mr. Gardner, from several Lodges of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, Manchester Unity, in favour of an Extension of the Benefit Societies Act.—By Sir R. H. Inglis, from the Parish of West Croker (Somerset), against the Diplomatic Relations, Court of Rome, Bill.—By Captain M'Clintock Bunbury, from the Parish of Tullow, Diocese of Leighlin, and other Places, for Encouragement to Schools in Connexion with the Church Education Society (Ireland).—By Viscount Castlereagh, from Killyleagh, in the County of Down, against the Imprisonment for Debt (Ireland) Bill.—By Sir Benjamin Hall, from Owners and Occupiers of Houses in St. Marylebone, respecting the Marylebone and Finchley Roads.—By Mr. Ord, from George Straker, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Shipowner, respecting Declarations of War as regards the Merchant Shipping.—By Mr. Hudson, from Shipowners residing at Newry, and other Places, against Repeal of the Navigation Laws.—By Mr. Hume, from the Guardians of the Bangor and Beaumaris Poor Law Union, for Alteration of the Law of Parochial Assessments.—By Sir George Clerk, from Parish Schoolmasters within the Presbytery of Burravoe, Zetland, for Ameliorating their Condition.—By Lord Ashley, from St. John's, Clerkenwell, and several other Places, in favour of the Public Health Bill.—By Sir B. Hall, from a Representative Vestry of St. Marylebone, for Alteration of the Law respecting Remedies against the Hundred.—By Admiral Gordon, from the Presbytery of Alford (Aberdeen).—By Mr. Arkwright, from Leominster, and its Neighbourhood, to take the Turnpike Trust into Consideration.

NOVA SCOTIA.
MR. B. COCHRANE begged to ask the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies the questions of which he gave him notice yesterday. First, whether the Colonial Office had received any information that the Legislature of Nova Scotia had removed from the situation of Colonial Secretary Sir Rupert George, a most able, meritorious, and persevering public servant, who had filled that situation with honour and credit for a period of thirty-five years; and at the same time he had only been voted a retiring allowance of 400 l. per annum; whereas, under such

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circumstances, it was usual to give the whole salary for a retiring pension. Secondly, whether the Houses of the Legislature had enacted that for the future the Judges are to be removable on a petition from both Houses to the Governor, without any fault alleged or reason stated? And, thirdly, whether the Legislature had voted Sir John Harvey, the present Governor, a salary of 3,500 l. per annum, and 450 l. contingencies; but at the same time enacted that after Sir John Harvey no future Governor should have more than 3,000 l., and no allowance for contingencies; and this, moreover, was only to be voted annually? It appeared to him (Mr. Cochrane) that if the Legislature had acted in this manner, a grave injury had been done to a public servant in the person of Sir Rupert George—that the independence of the Judges would be destroyed—and that no future Governor could conduct the administration in a manner to maintain his own character and the dignity of the British Crown.
MR. HAWES replied, that the Government had recently received despatches from the Government of Nova Scotia, stating that Sir Rupert George, who had long occupied the post of Colonial Secretary, and who had discharged his duties very ably, had resigned his office. The allowance to be made to Sir Rupert George, in consequence of his resignation of that office, was, as had been stated by the hon. Gentleman, 400 l. a year; but Sir Rupert George held another office, on his retirement from which he would receive a pension to nearly double that amount. He would be quite ready to lay any papers relating to this subject which were in the possession of the Government upon the table of the House. In reply to the second question of the hon. Member for Bridport, he begged to say that it was quite true that an ordinance had been passed by the Assembly of
Nova Scotia, which had been sent to this country, altering the tenure of office with regard to the Judges, and that ordinance was now under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. The statement of the hon. Gentleman as to the salary of the Governor of Nova Scotia was quite correct. A salary of 3,500 l. a year had been voted to Sir John Harvey during his tenure of office, which salary would be reduced whenever a vacancy took place, and there would then be no further allowance for a secretary and for contingencies. The hon. Member for
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Bridport was probably aware that a change of government had taken place in the colony, which had undoubtedly led to the resignation of the Colonial Secretary, and to the prospective reduction of the Governor's salary. He (Mr. Hawes) might add, that he was quite ready to lay on the table any despatches for which the hon. Member for Bridport might think it right to move.

NOVA SCOTIA.

  THE NATIONAL LAND COMPANY.
  SIR. B. HALL wished to put a question to the hon. and learned Member for Nottingham (Mr. F. O'Connor) with reference to the National Land Company. He had made inquiries at the Registration Office, and he found that nearly 100,000 names of subscribers to that Company had been registered. The Company had, as yet, been only registered as a Provisional Company, although the hon. Member for Nottingham had stated in July last that the Company would be completely registered within a week from that time. It appeared from the records of the office, however, that no such registration had been made, and that no copies of deeds had been lodged in that office which would entitle the Company to a certificate of complete registration. He wished, therefore, to ask the hon. Member for Nottingham whether, as one of the leaders of this Company, it was his intention to place the Company in a position to obtain a certificate of complete registration?
  MR. O'CONNOR replied, that as soon as the Company was established, he applied to the certifying barrister for a certificate of registration; but that gentleman declared that he considered it was not in his power to certify the Company. He, therefore, had the Company provisionally registered; and although the hon. Baronet seemed astonished at the number of names that had been registered when he made inquiries at the office, he would find, if he took the trouble to inquire now, that that number had been very considerably increased. Having proceeded to a certain point, he (Mr. O'Connor) found that the expense of complete registration would be enormous. He learned that many companies were only provisionally registered, as that gave the members of the Companies sufficient protection; but he was most anxious that this Company should be completely registered. He was, however, recommended to bring in a Bill to do away with the necessity for complete registration

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  in this case. He brought in such a Bill at as early a period as possible—it had been presented to the House, and had been ordered to be printed—and he (Mr. O'Connor) had named the earliest day he could for the second reading. He might also state that, in the event of the House refusing to sanction the Bill, it was his determination, cost what it might, to procure the complete registration of the Company, for nothing would give him more satisfaction than to be altogether discharged from the onerous responsibilities which naturally attached to a person who held the position he occupied with regard to a society numbering—as the hon. Baronet said—100,000 persons.
  SIR B. HALL understood that the hon. Gentleman had fixed the second reading of his Bill for the 14th of June; and he wished distinctly to understand the hon. Member that, if the Bill did not pass, he would proceed to obtain the complete registration of the Company.
  MR. O'CONNOR said, it was Ids determination, if the House refused to sanction his Bill, at once to obtain the complete registration of the Company.

  RUSSIA AND TURKEY.
  MR. URQUHART would take that opportunity of enabling the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) to contradict two rumours which were rife in foreign countries. One of these rumours was, that an offensive and defensive treaty had been agreed upon, or was on the point of being concluded, between Russia and Turkey, during the absence of Sir Stratford Canning; and the other rumour was, that Sir Stratford Canning had been instructed to bring about such a treaty.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON stated that Her Majesty's Government had no knowledge of any such treaty as was referred to by the hon. Gentleman being concluded between Russia and Turkey, and certainly no instructions had been given to Sir Stratford Canning to further such a treaty.

  POSTAL COMMUNICATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.
  On the question that the House at its rising adjourn to Monday,
  MR. W. BROWN said, that his constituents and the manufacturing interests of the country were very anxious to see a satisfactory postal arrangement concluded with the United States; but he was sorry to find from American papers, and from what had fallen from the Chancellor of the
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  Exchequer, that there was little hope of that being effected. That the House and the country might more clearly understand how the matter stood, he might state, that on the arrival of the first American steamship in August last, we claimed and charged 1s. on those letters coming by her, which had previously paid 1s. to their own Government, and which the American Minister remonstrated against, as letters by British packets arriving there only paid one-halfpenny in addition to the inland postage, which was 2½d. for 300 miles, and 5d. for any further distance of 2,000 miles or more. After various communications between the Marquess of Clanricarde and the American Minister, from August to February, the former proposed that each party should charge 2d. for inland postage, and 10 d. for sea-going postage, making 1s. 2d. in all. This the American Government rejected, as, from the great extent of their territory, they could not carry letters on the same terms there that we could here; but as they could not meet the wishes of the British Government on this head, they had no desire to meddle with our internal arrangements, nor could they agree to any country interfering with theirs; but were quite ready to put British letters arriving in the United States upon the same footing as those of American citizens, provided we would put letters arriving by their packet-ships from the United States upon the same footing as those of British subjects. As to the sea-going postage, they would fix any rate that would meet the wishes of this Government, from 7½d. to 1s. Our not acceding to these propositions had induced the American Government to bring in a Bill to enable them to retaliate on us, so long as we persisted in their packets being placed on a worse footing than that on which they had placed the packets of this country. If he (Mr. Brown) was not misinformed, our postal arrangements with France only carried letters as far as Paris, and then the French Government charged a further sum, depending on the distance to which the letters were sent. This was what the United States seemed to contend for. This postage disagreement was not the worst of it: it furnished an argument to the manufacturers of the United States to go to their Government for increased duties on goods imported from this country. He trusted that Her Majesty's Government would put an end to this state of things; that harmony might again be restored;

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  and that we might avoid collision with a country a good understanding with which was so necessary to the welfare of both nations.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON complained that the hon. Member was departing a little from the ordinary practice of the House. The hon. Member seemed to think that the American Minister was not sufficiently competent to urge his own case, and therefore the hon. Gentleman had thought it right to be his advocate in the House upon a matter pending between the two Governments. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had already stated in the House, that when the question was settled he should be ready to give an explanation of the grounds upon which the decision was come to; but it was inconvenient that an hon. Member should get up and state in detail the case of the Government which was in adverse negotiation with Her Majesty's Government, under circumstances which made it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to state the reasons for their proceedings. The British Government were very anxious that the question should be settled upon fair and equal terms, and upon no other terms were they likely to agree to any settlement.

  METROPOLITAN IMPROVEMENTS.
  SIR R. H. INGLIS asked the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests in what state were the several improvements recommended by Her Majesty's Commissioners of Metropolitan Improvements in their successive reports, and reminded the House that the embankment of the river from Westminster-bridge to Blackfriars, and from Vauxhall to Chelsea, an improved communication between Pimlico and the west front of Westminster Abbey, besides improvements in the sewerage and drainage in the neighbourhood of Her Majesty's palace, were recommended in five different reports of the Commissioners; but, though the recommendations were approved by the Government, and the Commission was continued, the improvements were not carried out. It was a serious evil to many persons who had property in the places proposed to be altered. He (Sir R. H. Inglis) could not omit the opportunity, even in the presence of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), of acknowledging the munificent offer of the Duke of Bedford to expend no less than 13,000 l. for the improvement of a portion of the metropolis.
  VISCOUNT M0RPETH regretted that the proceedings in regard to these metropolitan improvements must be reported as almost wholly stationary, not in consequence of any want of confidence in the Commission, but solely owing to the conclusive reason of want of money. The money required to carry the recommendations into effect must be raised in the first instance by mortgage of the land revenues; and all that could be fairly relied upon from this source had been anticipated for the four main lines from the Docks to Spitalfields, Coventry-street, Oxford-street East, and Endell-street.

  STAMFORD ELECTIONS.
  MR. PAGE WOOD rose, pursuant to notice, to move that—
  "A Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the allegations contained in the Petition of certain Electors and Inhabitants of the borough of Stamford, which was presented upon the 14th day of March last, complaining of the interference of the Marquess of Exeter, a Peer of the Realm, and Lord Lieutenant of the county of Northampton, at the late and former Elections of Members to serve for the said Borough."
  He regretted that the subject which he was about to introduce to the House necessarily involved charges against an absent person; and he hoped that the House would bear in mind that the case he should endeavour to make out was one for inquiry, and for inquiry only. He was bound in justice to the petitioners and to himself to state, that when he was requested to take charge of the petition, he made it his first duty to state to the petitioners, that in his opinion theirs was a petition which ought not to be presented or proceeded with, unless they were prepared to assure him that they were confident of being able to establish the facts they alleged by the most unquestionable evidence. That assurance, however, he received in such a manner as to induce him now to assure the House, that the petitioners were most earnest in alleging their grievances, and were most confident of their ability to prove the facts which their petition set forth. That petition proceeded from more than one-third of the whole constituency, and was also signed by 193 non-electors. It complained of grievances of long date, stating as it did that the interferences complained of had taken place in Stamford at various periods, from the year 1830. The position of the borough was a somewhat singular one. In 1830

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  a severe contest for the representation took place, at which time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lambeth (Mr. C. T. D'Eyncourt) was an unsuccessful candidate; but in 1831 that right hon. Gentleman was returned against the influence of the Marquess of Exeter. At the time of that election Stamford was a scot and lot borough. It possessed 810 electors; but when the Reform Bill was passed, it had been thought expedient by this House, that a parish which originally formed no part of the borough of Stamford, and which was in fact situated in another county, should for all electoral purposes be added to the borough. That was the parish of St. Martin, situated on what he might call the Burleigh side of the river. The electors remonstrated against this arrangement, representing to the House that they were a scot and lot borough—that they had hitherto secured the return of representatives, notwithstanding the amount of family influence brought to bear on them; but that if the parish of St. Martin were to be added to the borough, and the 10 l. franchise introduced, that the inevitable consequence would be the sinking of the borough under the domination of the noble Lord, of whose interference they now complained; and they therefore prayed, that if this parish should be added to the constituency, the elective franchise should be transferred from them to some other borough. Well, the evils which in that petition had been predicted were now fulfilled, and the prayer of the petitioners was, either that the grievances of which they complained might be redressed, or that their borough might be disfranchised. In 1832, after the addition of the parish of St. Martin, the constituency amounted to 850. The present constituency on the register amounted only to 575, although the borough now included the additional parish. Thus the number of voters was reduced, while the influence complained of increased. Of the 575 who were at present on the register, upwards of 190—that was to say, about one-third—were tenants of the Marquess of Exeter, while upwards of 194 signed the original petition, and seventeen had since signed a similar supplementary petition, making in all 211 electors, out of the whole number of 575, who alleged the facts which he should detail to the House. This was not, he might observe, a party petition, or one got up for party purposes. The last candidate for Stamford would, had he succeeded,
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  have taken his place on the other (the Opposition) side of the House. Neither was it on the ground of breach of privilege that the petitioners brought forward their case, but on the grounds of elective interference, and in order, if the borough were to be represented, to make that representation a real and bonâ fide one, and not a delusion and a snare. The petition commenced by stating that the freedom of election was obstructed by the interference of the Marquess of Exeter, who was the owner of much property in the borough. It went on to set forth—
  "That the said Marquess further interferes in the said elections by authorising and sanctioning promises in his name to many of the electors, that they shall occupy, as tenants, property belonging to him in eligible situations in or near the said borough, provided they will vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him, and by b authorising and sanctioning threats in his name to many of the electors who are his tenants, that they shall be discharged from such tenancy if they do not vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him. That the said Marquess further interferes in the said elections by fulfilling the promises and threats so made in his name, and by giving the tenancy of premises to electors who have voted in accordance with his declared views and wishes, and discharging from their tenancy many of the electors, being his tenants, who vote in opposition to such his views and wishes. That the said Marquess, being such Peer of Parliament as aforesaid, has so interfered at all the recent elections for Members to serve for the said borough in Parliament, and in particular he did so interfere at the last of such elections. That the said Marquess, by such his interference, influences votes, and procures them to be given contrary to the intentions and opinions of voters sufficient in number to control and decide the election, so that in fact the Members returned to represent the said borough are the representatives of the Marquess, and not the representatives of the majority of the electors of the said borough. That such the interference of the said Marquess, as your petitioners submit, without reference to his Lordship's position as a Peer of Parliament, is a violation of the undoubted right of the electors of the said borough freely to elect Members to serve for them in Parliament, and amounts to the systematic bribery and intimidation of the electors of the said borough by him, within the meaning and intent of the laws in force against bribery and intimidation. That the said Marquess, being a Peer of Parliament, has, by so interfering and concerning himself in the said elections, also contravened the resolution of your honourable House on that subject, and has thereby infringed the liberties of the Commons of the United Kingdom. That, in verification of the foregoing statement, your petitioners rely on the following facts, which they pledge themselves to prove, if your honourable House shall deem an inquiry into the case advisable or necessary. At the general election which took place in July and August, 1830, it was notorious, in the said borough, that two of the candidates, namely, Lord Thomas Cecil and Lieutenant-Colonel Chaplin,

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  were approved by the said Marquess; and such his approbation of them, and also his opposition to Mr. Tennyson, the other candidate, were openly and constantly communicated by the persons canvassing for the said Lord Thomas Cecil and Colonel Chaplin, and by the agents of the said Marquess, to such of the voters as were likely to be influenced by such communications; and at the same time promises and threats, to the effect hereinbefore mentioned, in reference to the tenancy of the property of the said Marquess, were openly and constantly made by such persons to the said voters; and immediately after the election such promises and threats were carried into execution; and, in particular, upwards of thirty tenants of the said Marquess, who had in any way promoted the election of the said Mr. Tennyson, or who had abstained from promoting the election of the said Lord Thomas Cecil and Colonel Chaplin, were, immediately after the said election, discharged from their tenancy, while none of the electors who had forwarded the declared wishes and views of the said Marquess were so discharged. Precisely similar proceedings were adopted by and in the name of the said Marquess at the election of Members to serve in Parliament for the said borough, which took place in the month of December, 1832, when Colonel Thomas Chaplin, and George Finch, Esq., were the candidates approved by the said Marquess, and Mr. Gregory was the candidate in opposition to his views and wishes. At the recent election, which took place in the month of July, 1847, there were three candidates, namely, the Marquess of Granby, the right hon. J. C. Herries, and Mr. Rolt. The first announcement of the Marquess of Granby and Mr. Herries as candidates was made to some of the principal inhabitants of the town, by letter from Mr. Walford, the London solicitor of the Marquess of Exeter. Mr. Walford has no connexion with Stamford except as such solicitor for the said Marquess, and is in frequent communication with the authorities of the said borough, and with the inhabitants, on the Marquess's affairs, and not on any other business. During the election statements were constantly and openly made by persons canvassing on behalf of the Marquess of Granby and Mr. Herries, and by the agents of the said Marquess, to the effect that the Marquess of Exeter approved of them as candidates, and was opposed to Mr. Rolt; and promises and threats, to the effect hereinbefore-mentioned, in reference to the tenancy of property of the said Marquess, were constantly and openly made by the persons so canvassing, and by the said agents, to such of the voters as were likely to be influenced thereby. Reference was frequently and openly made at public meetings, as well on the hustings as elsewhere, and in public journals and other publications, to the facts, that the voters were threatened with the Marquess's displeasure if they, in any way, promoted Mr. Rolt's election; and that the voters believed, and were acting under the belief; that they would be discharged by the Marquess from their premises if they promoted his election; and the facts so referred to were never controverted by any one except by the candidates themselves averring that they were not the nominees of any one; and, on the contrary, the understanding which openly and notoriously, and with just reason, prevailed amongst the tenantry, that they would be discharged from their premises if they
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  did not promote the election of the candidates approved by the Marquess, was, in every way, encouraged by many of the persons who canvassed for the said candidates, and by the agents of the said Marquess. At the election twenty-seven of the tenants of the said Marquess of Exeter, and the son of another tenant, promoted the election of Mr. Rolt, either by voting for him alone, or for him and also for one of the other candidates, or by abstaining from voting at all. Since the election, and previous to the following quarter-day, discharges or notices to quit had been served, by the authority of the said Marquess, on twenty-two of the said twenty-seven tenants; while no other general change had been made in the tenancy of the said Marquess's property. After such notices to quit had been served, one of the said twenty-two tenants waited personally on the said Marquess, and explained, consistently, as your petitioners believe, with the fact, that he had voted for Mr. Rolt by mistake, and in consequence of the confusion he was in at the polling booth; and the said Marquess replied to him, that he did not believe in the mistake, and that he should consequently not allow the notice to be withdrawn."
  The hon. Gentleman continued: Were these facts to be proved, a clear and distinct case would be made out, with which he considered that the House was bound to interfere. The House would observe that the petitioners alleged that promises were made and threats held out by the agents of the Marquess to induce parties holding under him to vote for or abstain from voting against certain candidates; that the Marquess sanctioned and ratified the acts of his agents by causing notices to quit to be given with reference to the election; and when one of the parties thus served requested for a withdrawal of the notice, on the ground that he had voted for a certain candidate by mistake, the Marquess would not consent, on the plea of his not believing the excuse urged, thus showing that the notice had been served because the party bad voted against the wishes of the Marquess. The petition then went on to allege certain other matters. The petitioners stated—
  "That local questions requiring the assistance of Parliament sometimes arise in which the interests of the Marquess of Exeter and of the inhabitants of the said borough are opposed to each other; and in particular a question of that nature arose in the last Session of Parliament in reference to a Bill prosecuted in Parliament for a railway to Stamford, which Bill was unanimously supported by the inhabitants of the said borough, but was successfully opposed by the said Marquess, after he had failed in obtaining from the railway company a large price demanded by him for land required for the said railway; and your petitioners and the inhabitants of the said borough believed, and still believe, that the effect of the influence successfully exercised by the said Marquess in the return of the Members serving for the said boroughs, was to place them the inhabit-

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  ants in a worse position in Parliament than they would have been in if there had not been any Members serving in Parliament for the said borough; and your petitioners submit that the existence of such Parliamentary questions, in which the said Marquess and the said borough have or may have adverse interests, is an additional reason for preventing the said Marquess from controlling the return of Members for the said borough, or for disfranchising the said borough altogether."
  With respect to the complaint of the petitioners as to their local interests, he would only say that they did not shrink from the proof of that part of the case; the consequence of the opposition of the noble Marquess to the Railway Bill therein referred to was to leave Stamford without a railway nearer than four miles; and the petitioners had declared to him that it only arose because the noble Marquess was not satisfied with the terms offered by the company for his land, although the railway company had offered him eighty years' purchase. With respect to the higher and more important complaint which they made, he should have thought that the mere statement of the case would have been sufficient to induce the House to assent to an inquiry. He did not ask that the truth of the statement should be admitted; but it was obvious that the representations of either side could not decide the question; and the more directly the statements were at variance the greater the reason for inquiry. As, however, he understood that his Motion was to be opposed, he supposed that some other grounds would be stated independently of the truth of the allegations. He could scarcely conceive that, at the present day, it could be said, that, if the statement of the petitioners were proved, it was not a grievance. It was true that in 1830 a similar Motion had been made with respect to Newark, and rejected; but that was a much weaker case, and then it was urged that there was no distinct allegation that the ejectment of the voters was connected with the elections; that case also occurred two years before the Reform Act, and he could understand that in those days it might be conceived that this was one of the rights of property; but that at the present day there should be found any one in that House who could justify this course of proceeding, or uphold the famous saying in the Newark case, that "a man may do what he will with his own," was to him inconceivable. Sic utere tuo, alienum ne lædas, was a general maxim of the law; and he submitted that no person had a right to accumulate voters of this description in
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  any borough, any more than to create any other nuisance. Suppose that a landlord inserted a condition in his leases, that they should determine upon the tenant not voting according to the directions of the landlord, would it be said for a moment that such leases would not be contrary to law, and void? It might be said that he ought to have applied for a reference of the matter to the Committee of Privileges, or that the subject ought to have been submitted to an Election Committee. But with respect to the Committee of Privileges, it would be found, on a reference to former cases, that the intervention of such a tribunal would afford no relief to the petitioners. The only instance of any relief in respect of breach of privilege was, the removal of a bishop of Worcester from the post of Lord High Almoner to Queen Anne. The real principle which those petitioners desired to establish was, that of freedom of election. It was only on the principle that the House should interfere to secure freedom of election, that they, at various times, proposed resolutions against any persons meddling with elections whether they were connected with the other House of Parliament, or might be supposed to be under the influence of the Crown from any other cause. In 1784 they passed resolutions against the interference of any custom-house or excise officer, and prohibiting any other person holding a situation under the Crown from exercising any authority in the election of Members of Parliament. It was evident that where a Peer of the realm interfered, it was a great, aggravation of the offence, inasmuch as he had a distinct and powerful influence, independently of that which he thus unconstitutionally exercised. In 1641, the Commons' House of Parliament asserted their rights by passing strong resolutions respecting the conduct of Peers who had written letters in reference to the election of Members, which they asserted to be a high breach of privilege. The reason for considering the interference of a Peer to be more objectionable than that of a person in a humbler station was, that the Peer possessed influence in the House of Parliament wherein he sat by right. His voice was given not in the election of a representative, but as of itself countervailing in Parliament the voice of the representative of such boroughs as Liverpool or Manchester; and it was essential for that branch of the Legislature which did not depend for existence on the mass of the people,

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  to be maintained in as respectable a position as possible, and for that end to confine itself within the limits of its own proper privileges. He felt that when a Peer of the realm stepped out of his proper sphere, and, not contented with exercising his rights and influence in his own House of Parliament, interfered with the election of Members of the other House, the Commons of England had a right to interfere also, and to tell that Peer they would not allow such unconstitutional and illegal conduct; that he should confine himself to his own House—
  " illâ se jactet in aulâ,
  Non illi imperium pelagi."
  By the Declaration of Rights, and by the 2nd William and Mary, the House had defined and secured their privileges. The latter Act was passed in order to restrain the nomination of Members for the Cinque Ports by the Lord Warden, and forbade that officer to interfere in future with such elections. The present case, therefore, was not a mere matter of privilege—it was in effect a question whether the election of Members of the House of Commons should or should not be free. If the House did not step in and vindicate their rights—if this course were pursued in future—it would be impossible, as it would be impolitic, to give this borough the right to return Members to Parliament. The question of presenting an election petition on this question had been mooted, and it would no doubt be contended that such would have been the proper course to pursue. But who was to present it? The grievance complained of did not affect the successful candidate; it might not much affect him who was unsuccessful. He might not wish to incur the expense and vexation of a petition to the House. Was he (Mr. Wood) to be told, then, that the rights and privileges of the electors were to be outraged and set at nought, and that when they complained of the invasion upon them, they were not to be listened to unless they could fight under the shield of some person who thought the conflict was calculated to promote his own interests? A doctrine of so monstrous a character could never, he was sure, be sanctioned by the House of Commons. But there were precedents in support of the views he entertained on this subject. The noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly, previously to the Reform Bill, and more par-
  940
  ticularly in the years 1829 and 1830, endeavoured to carry some strong resolutions in the House with regard to general bribery at elections—independently of any particular acts of bribery in the case of any individual borough; but the noble Lord was not
  successful. In the fifth and sixth years of Her present Majesty, however, a Bill was passed, by which a power was given to investigate cases of general corruption by Election Committees of that House. In the year 1835, however, before the Act he referred to was passed, petitions were presented from the city of York and the borough of Great Yarmouth, complaining of general and universal bribery and corruption. A Select Committee was moved for to inquire into these allegations. The argument used against the Motion on that occasion, and which he supposed would be used now, was, that you should not send those cases to a Select but to an Election Committee; but that argument did not avail. The noble Lord contended that there were no other adequate means for investigating the allegations but by referring the petitions to a Select Committee. The Committee was accordingly appointed, and that Committee reported to the House. This he conceived was a case directly in point. In the present case, to which he was calling the attention of the House, the allegation of the petitioners was, that general intimidation had been exercised over the voters in the borough of Stamford. Now, according to the present law, charges of general intimidation could not be inquired into before an Election Committee, any more than charges of general bribery and corruption could be inquired into before such a Committee previously to the passing of the Act of 5 and 6 Victoria. When, in 1839, the present Secretary of the Home Department moved for an inquiry into the state of the law with reference to bribery and intimidation, with a view to put a stop to intimidation as well as bribery, the right hon. Gentleman observed that it was the duty of the House to inquire whether it would not be beneficial to enable Election Committees to deal with cases of intimidation as well as with bribery and corruption. But no Act had yet been passed empowering Election Committees to inquire into that branch of the evil. He would contend, therefore, that the two precedents to which he had referred, namely, the case of the' city of York and that of Great Yarmouth, were exactly applicable to the present case. At present

  941
  there existed no legislative power to refer cases of general intimidation to an Election Committee; in 1835 no such power existed to refer cases of general bribery and corruption to an Election Committee; but as in 1835 cases of general bribery and corruption were referred to a Select Committee, so now, in 1848, might a case of general intimidation be also referred to a Select Committee. He might be asked what remedy he would suggest for an evil like the one of which these petitioners complained? He might, if he pleased, suggest the ballot. But if that were not adopted, and if no other means could be devised to protect the parties from intimidation, why, then, they might be disfranchised. Ay, these petitioners had a right to be disfranchised—strange as the words might sound. True, at the present moment, the franchise was becoming too highly appreciated to be lightly diminished; but if, under the name of a highly important political right, it really proved to be nothing less than "a mockery, a delusion, and a snare" to those who possessed it, then he would contend that the parties so grievously affected had a right to be delivered from that mockery, and rescued from the degradation to which they were subjected. He believed that these persons were desirous of retaining their rights, but not on such conditions as made it impossible for them to exercise those rights in a free and independent manner, and in a way which could alone make the franchise valuable to them. The House, then, having already adopted resolutions in respect of bribery which bore most strongly and distinctly upon the very point in question, and there being no power to refer cases of intimidation to any but a Select Committee for inquiry, it would be most inconsistent for them now to take a step in a contrary and retrograde direction. Even very lately the House had, in regard to the influence on tenants to whom holdings were promised, passed resolutions on a case similar to the present, so that they would be very inconsistent indeed if they now turned round and went in a totally different direction. He referred to the report of the case on the Lyme Regis election, in which it was stated that a gentleman had lent money to persons on the condition that they should vote as he wished; and the noble Lord (Lord Ashley), who was chairman, reported in their name that they desired to impress on the House the necessity of putting an immediate
  942

  check to such transactions, which would totally destroy all freedom of election. Would any one point out to him the difference which existed between giving money to persons to vote as the giver wished, and putting them as tenants into houses on a similar condition? The cases were entirely parallel. Every one of the tenants who voted against the wishes of the noble Lord had been dispossessed, and others put in their place, with the single exception of the individual who had held the extraordinary conversation alluded to in the petition. If the House refused to interfere in such a case at once, the country would think there was some special cause for their refusal to investigate; and what the cause was he could not imagine, unless it were that the offender was a Marquess. These complaints against the noble Lord were not new; for years he had been complained of as taking the same course with respect to this borough. Mr. Parkes, a parliamentary agent, who was examined before a Committee of the House some years ago, declared that the borough of Stamford was a most striking and singular instance of intimidation; and the inhabitants had constantly complained of the manner in which the noble Marquess had interfered with the freedom of election. In bringing this question before the House, he was actuated by no party spirit—he begged entirely to disclaim all political partisanship. Many of the persons who signed the petition held totally different opinions; and the very first name on the list was that of a gentleman to whose views he (Mr. Wood) was entirely opposed. The present was a most favourable moment for entering into this inquiry, because there was an absence of those more acrimonious party feelings that sometimes existed in the House; but it was not a favourable moment to refuse it. Was that a time to shut the door against inquiry, when questions were raised respecting the purity of the returns of Members to the Legislature? Was it not desirable that the people of this country should have the most complete respect and confidence in those who represented them? It was equally of extreme importance to Members of the other House, and to the noble Marquess himself, that this charge should be answered, for they could not afford to treat with disrepect the Members of the House of Peers, nor to shake the good feeling which the people entertained for them. If the principle which led to the destruction

  943
  of decayed boroughs was to be abandoned—if the principle of the Reform Bill was not to be carried out bonâ fide—if the House were to make a retrograde step, and shield from injury a borough as corrupt as any which existed under the old system, the House would take a most dangerous course. He did not desire to see any change of a serious or sudden character effected from without, or through any other instrumentality than that of the Legislature itself. On the contrary, be thought all our improvements should be connected with the past state of our constitutional Government, and be carried out by constitutional means. Everything of a legislative change which was not connected with the past, would, as he believed, have a very brief future. He should be sorry, indeed, to see any departure from the method by which the country had carried the Reform Bill, namely, by the established channels of our Legislature; and it had been an object of rejoicing with him, as with others, that they had succeeded in carrying that Bill so long ago; for if the storm which had burst upon Europe last February had come over this country at a time when that great measure had been refused, who could tell what would have been the consequences? Many who opposed the Reform Bill in that day were now most delighted that it had been successful, and that the tempest which spread over Europe had not found this country in a state of political agitation and in a struggle for political rights. It was satisfactory to find that the old channels in which the streams of the constitution were wont to run, had not become so obstructed by age and corruption but that they were able to bear the mighty throbbings of the nation's heart, and to convey to all its members the wholesome currents of strength and nutriment, by means of which this country had been enabled to hold her ground during the present formidable career of revolution. No one could say what would be the state of the country, or what would be the effect on the minds of the people, if, by refusing this inquiry, the House evinced a tendency to a retrograde policy. The House signed their death-warrant the instant they showed, by one single act, that they ceased to possess that principle of vitality which alone should animate them—the principle of progress. Then, indeed, they would enter on a period of decay, the end of which must be dissolution. On the
  944
  grounds of public benefit, in a strictly Conservative view in the strongest sense of the term, he came forward to call their attention to this subject; and, in conclusion, he would say that, by remedying the evils he had pointed out, they would secure the continued felicity and prosperity of the empire. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by submitting his Motion to the House.
  MR. T. D'EYNCOURT rose to second the Motion, which, in a speech as convincing and eloquent as it was refreshing, from its true constitutional spirit, his hon. and learned Friend had made to the House. He agreed in every sentiment of that speech, and in every opinion the hon. and learned Gentleman had uttered. The course the House must take was plain. Who could suggest any other course than that proposed to them? How was the case to be met? In no possible way but by the denial of the facts alleged in the petition. No one could defend the course taken by the noble Marquess, if these facts were true. Did the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Granby) mean to assert that the Marquess of Exeter had done nothing condemned by law, and had only exercised his rights as a landlord? Would he attempt to say the noble Marquess had a right by law to turn out his tenants because they did not vote according to his views? His hon. and learned Friend had brought forward a great constitutional question, and as such the House should deal with it. If they refused to grant this Motion, they would become parties to the deeds of the noble Marquess, and mix themselves up in the blame attributable to his conduct. Thus they would give their assent to one of the grossest violations of the constitution ever brought under the notice of the House; and the people would look upon it in the same light, and estimate them accordingly. He had suffered in 1830 and in 1831 from similar acts on the part of the noble Marquess, who gave notice to quit to those tenants who voted for him (Mr. D'Eyncourt). In 1830 and 1831, a question arose as to whether the district of St. Martin's, nineteeen twentieths of which belonged to the Marquess of Exeter, should be included in the borough of Stamford. It was decided that it should be, although that district was in another county, and on the other side of the river; and at that time he (Mr. D'Eyncourt) predicted that the time would soon arrive when there

  945
  would be plenty of food for another Schedule A, as this system of adding large tracts of land to boroughs would have the effect of swamping the town constituencies, and placing the representation in the hands of the landholders. There could be no doubt of one fact connected with the present case, that public opinion loudly condemned all those proceedings. The House would not do well in rejecting that Motion. His hon. Friend near him (Mr. Hume) suggested to him that if they did, it would afford great help to him on the Motion which he intended bringing forward for the general improvement of the representative system of this country, on the 24th of the present month. He contended that they had no right to inflict on the people of any borough a franchise, the exercise of which would be in opposition to their conscientious feelings; and the petitioners from Stamford called upon the House to relieve them from such a condition of slavery as that to which they were at present subjected. It would be better for the Parliament at once to say, Let Lord A or Lord B return Members for such and such places, than make human beings slaves as they were under the present system. It was a system which gave a show of representation to a constituency, but which in reality placed the power in the hands of a few individuals. He thanked the House for thus allowing him to state his reasons for thus seconding the Motion of his hon. and learned Friend.
  The MARQUESS of GRANBY was anxious to take as early an opportunity as he could to answer the speeches of the hon. Members opposite, as well as the allegation, contained in the petition to which they had referred, in order that the House might come to a fair and proper conclusion on the subject which had been brought before it. He acknowledged he had no reason to complain of the speeches of the hon. Members who had introduced and seconded the Motion; but at the same time he should have felt more obliged if they had taken a little more pains to separate the wheat from the chaff, in referring to the charges contained in the rather lengthy document which was presented to them. He confessed it seemed rather difficult to divide the important matter from that which was not so. He did not like to trouble the House by again reading the petition, which had already been referred to at so mud length; but he could hardly answer the allegations of that petition without reading
  946
  them. The petition commenced by saying, that—
  "Freedom of election in the said borough is obstructed and prevented by the interference of the most hon. Brownlow, Marquess of Exeter, a Peer of Parliament, Lord Lieutenant of the county of Northampton, in which county part of the said borough of Stamford is situate, and also Lord Lieutenant of the county of Rutland; that the said Marquess is the owner of large property in the said borough, and that a considerable portion of such property is occupied by persons who are, by virtue of their tenancy thereof, or otherwise, electors of the said borough; that the said Marquess interferes in the said elections, by nominating and selecting candidates to be submitted to the electors; and that after such candidates have been so nominated and selected by him, the fact of such nomination and selection by him is made public in the said borough."
  Now, with regard to the imputation that the Marquess of Exeter had interfered with elections in the borough of Stamford, he believed that the hon. and learned Member had himself stated that it was not upon that ground that he was going to move for a Select Committee, though that was certainly an aggravation of the charge. He thought that the hon. and learned Member had taken a correct course; for, although there was a resolution of the House of Commons in existence that no Peer of Parliament should interfere in elections, still that resolution was never put in force, and could not be enforced until it became the law of the land. But he would rest the defence of the Marquess of Exeter on different grounds. He should be able, he trusted, to prove to the House that that noble Lord had neither violated a resolution of that House nor a principle of the constitution. It was quite true, as alleged in the petition, that Lord Exeter had a large property in the borough of Stamford; it was true that that property gave him that constitutional influence in the place to which he had an undoubted right. But the noble Lord had another influence derived from a nobler, a higher, and more exalted source than that which his rank, station, and titles gave him—the influence of his virtues. As to the nomination of candidates, he denied that Lord Exeter did nominate candidates. The next allegation in the petition was as follows:—
  "That the said Marquess further interfered in the said elections by authorising and sanctioning promises in his name to many of the electors, that they shall occupy as tenants property belonging to him in eligible situations, in or near the said borough, provided they will vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him; and by authorising and sanctioning threats in his name to many of the electors who are his tenants that they

  947
  shall be discharged from such tenancy if they do not vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him."
  Now, in reply to that allegation, he had to state most positively, that on no occasion had any agreement been entered into with the tenants as to the manner in which they should vote; and that no promises had ever been made, and that no threats had ever been held out, to tenants, with regard to any votes they might give. The petition went on to allege that—
  "Such interference of the said Marquess is, as your petitioners submit, without reference to his Lordship's position as a Peer of Parliament, a violation of the undoubted right of the electors of the said borough by him within the meaning and intent of the laws in force against bribery and intimidation."
  The hon. and learned Gentleman who had brought the subject under the notice of the House, had anticipated the objection which he was about to make to that allegation. It was this—that if any interference of Lord Exeter had amounted to systematic bribery and intimidation of electors, the proper, the constitutional, and the straightforward course for those who complained of such interference would have been to have presented a petition against the return of the sitting Members. But, no doubt, wise and prudent considerations had prevented those gentlemen from adopting that course. No doubt they had directed their attention to the recognisances into which they should have entered. No doubt the words "frivolous and vexatious" had risen up before their frightened minds. No doubt the memory of certain agreeable evenings during which their minds had been feasted on hope, and their bodies on more substantial fare, had pleaded eloquently against the adoption of the course in question. It might be said that Mr. Rolt was poor, and was unwilling to present a petition against the return of his opponents. But it should be remembered, that a Bill introduced by the noble Lord opposite in the year 1842, gave to electors the power of petitioning Parliament against a return which they might have reason to believe had been effected by bribery and intimidation. That was, he maintained, the natural and proper course for the parties who had signed the petition before the House to have pursued. The hon. and learned Gentleman had compared that case to the recent case of Mr. Attwood. But there was a material difference between the two cases, inasmuch as no agreement with respect to their votes had ever been
  948
  entered into with Lord Exeter's tenants at the period of their taking their holdings. He would not then enter into any discussion of the proceedings which it was alleged in the petition had taken place in the year 1830; that was to say, seven years before he had had the honour of a seat in Parliament. It seemed to him that it would be a mere waste of the time of the House to go back to the transactions of so distant a period. He would, therefore, proceed at once to what he conceived to be the principal charge made against the Marquess of Exeter. That charge was—
  "That twenty-seven tenants of the said Marquess of Exeter, and the son of another tenant, had promoted the election of Mr. Rolt, either by voting for him alone, or for him and for one of the other candidates, or by abstaining from voting at all; and that notices to quit had been served on twenty-two of the said twenty-seven tenants, while no other general change had been made on the said Marquess's property."
  Now he would, in the first place, suppose that that allegation was strictly and entirely correct; and he would then ask the House whether it could interfere in such a case, if he could show, as he believed he could show very clearly, that there had been no previous intimidation of the electors, and that there was no connecting link between the notices to quit and any threats or promises held out to the voters before the election? The House could only interfere in that case, as far as he could see, in one of two ways. They should either lay down a broad, distinct, and universal rule that a tenant who might have voted against the opinions, or the supposed opinions, of his landlord—and in these days it was not always easy to know what were the opinions of any man—could not afterwards be ejected from his holding without a violation of the freedom of election; or that that House should become a sort of general agent for the property of the kingdom, and determine what were the motives which might have influenced landlords in their dealing with their tenants. Those were the only two ways in which the House could interfere in such a case as that; and he believed it would at once be admitted that each of them would be inexpedient and impracticable. There was a passage in the petition which showed that the petitioners themselves did not wish for the adoption of any such course. He alluded to that passage in which they stated that—
  "None of them desired in any way to interfere with the rights of a landlord over his tenants, or

  949
  to disturb what the said Marquess had thought fit to do with his tenants."
  He submitted that from those words of the petition itself it would be impossible for the House to interfere in the matter. He had been arguing as if the allegations had all been strictly true, whereas they were in reality gross exaggerations. The petition stated that there were 28 persons who either voted for Mr. Rolt, or had abstained from voting all. Now, instead of 28, the number was 29. The petition went on to allege that out of the 28 no less than 22 had received notices to quit. The fact was, however, that instead of 22 the number was only 14. [Laughter.] Why, that was a reduction of one-third. He had further to state, that two tenants who had voted for his hon. Colleague and himself had received notices to quit, and that notices to quit had been served on tenants who had no votes, while 13 tenants who had voted for Mr. Rolt had received no notices whatever. The hon. and learned Gentleman had talked of the grossly unfair means by which the Marquess of Exeter had influenced the elections for the borough. Now, in reply to that charge, he (the Marquess of Granby) had to observe that no less than 27 females occupied houses above the yearly value of 10 l., on the property of the Marquess of Exeter in Stamford. Surely if the object of the Marquess of Exeter was solely to get the borough under his control, he would have given the houses of those females to persons who would have a right to vote. But there was a special case, which was said to be one of great hardship. He alluded to the case of an elector who, it was alleged, had gone to the Marquess of Exeter and stated that he had voted for Mr. Rolt by mistake, whereupon the Marquess said he did not believe it was a mistake, and that he should consequently not allow the notice to be withdrawn. Now he had to declare that at the time of the alleged interview no notice had been served on the tenant in question. That tenant had, during many years, been employed as an artificer by the noble Marquess at wages of 5s. a day, and had received from him innumerable favours. When Lord Burghley had come of age, that tenant had, in common with all the other artificers employed by the family, received a sum of 25 l. Now, he did not think it very extraordinary that so long as human nature should continue what it was, the Marquess of Exeter should feel the ingratitude of that man. He did not think that the Marquess of Exeter would
  950
  have acted a harsh or unfeeling part, even though he should have deprived that tenant of his house. But the fact was, that he had not deprived him of his house; he had merely raised his rent from 30 s. to 40 s. a year. He confessed he somewhat regretted that the hon. and learned Gentleman should have mixed himself up with that petition, knowing as he did the constitutional views which the hon. and learned Member entertained. He regretted it, because he believed that the object of many of the petitioners was not to present a petition against an improper interference at the late election for Stamford, but to prevent property having that influence to which it was justly entitled, and to prevent virtue receiving its reward. He believed the hon. and learned Member had taken that foundling petition under his charge, in order to hang a ballot-box around its neck. He admitted that the hon. and learned Gentleman had not expatiated much on the question of the ballot. For his part he would make but one remark upon the advantages or disadvantages of that mode of voting; and it was this—that he believed the great majority of the people of this country, from habit and from feeling, whether they wished to vote for their landlords or against them, would prefer doing so in the face of day. He was afraid that if the system of voting by ballot were adopted, much evil would arise from the fact that a large class of persons could no longer be guided in their votes by those on whom they were disposed to look as examples. He was afraid it would destroy many of the best feelings, and would prevent open and honest hearts from expressing their admiration and their gratitude to those from whom they had received favours and indulgence. Let him remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that the weapon he had then taken up had two edges, neither of which, however, was very sharp. In the first place, if the facts detailed in that petition afforded a good argument in favour of the ballot, they would also afford a good argument against an extension of the suffrage, because if intimidation and corruption prevailed under the present franchise, it was evident that it would prevail to a greater extent under a lower franchise. In the next place, he would remark that the petitioners had expressed a wish to be relieved from the franchise, which they stated to be a real burden. But he should object to the House of Commons acting in that case as a special con-

  951
  stable, and enabling the petitioners to commit a kind of political murder on their townsmen. He should object to allowing those deluded men to cut their own throats. If it were true that the petitioners had no real grievance to complain of, he might be asked why it was that they had presented the petition? Now, he thought he could give a sufficient reason for their having taken that course. He must inform the House that the last election for the borough of Stamford had been attended with a severe contest, and that the self-styled oppressed minority had obtained within 48 votes of the number by which his right hon. Friend had been returned. It was not for him to state by what means—whether fair or foul—that result had been ensured; but the fact was as he had stated. The petitioners stated that—
  "Local questions sometimes arose in which the interests of the Marquess of Exeter and of the borough were opposed to each other, and in particular, a question of that nature arose in the last Session of Parliament in reference to a Bill presented in Parliament for a railway to Stamford, which Bill was unanimously supported by the inhabitants of the said borough, but was successfully opposed by the said Marquess, after he had failed in obtaining from the railway company a large price demanded by him for land required for the said railway."
  Now the facts of the case relative to the railway were these:—In 1845 two lines were proposed, one called the Direct Northern, and the other the London and York. The Direct Northern was thrown out on Standing Orders. The Marquess of Exeter said he would oppose the London and York line, unless they made a branch to Stamford. They consented, and a negotiation was entered into. In the following year another line of railway was proposed between Peterborough and Syston. The inhabitants of Stamford then changed their opinion, and said they would prefer the Syston and Peterborough to the London and York, whereupon the Marquess of Exeter entered into a negotiation with the former company, which was carried out. The line was made, and was opened the whole way on the first of the present month. Last year an amalgamation took place between the London and York and the Direct Northern, and a deviation was proposed to Stamford. The Marquess of Exeter said the ground was occupied, and the necessity for the line superseded by the Peterborough and Syston Railway, and that he should oppose it. The line was referred to a Committee of that House, who
  952
  decided, not only in consequence of the opposition of landowners, but also upon public grounds, that they could not grant the deviation. The benefits conferred by the Marquess of Exeter upon the borough of Stamford were acknowledged by a great majority. That some discontented individuals might be found there he did not deny; and although the attacks of such persons, when made against the Marquess, might fall harmless, he must be allowed to remind the House that, if they gave their sanction and encouragement to the presentation of such petitions, petitions might be presented against individuals whose honour might be as untarnished, though their position might be less exalted, than that of the Marquess of Exeter, and whose virtues, though as real, might be less generally known. Such accusations as these, he repeated, although false and unfounded, might be difficult of immediate refutation, and might inflict wounds in the breasts of such individuals which a life might scarcely suffice to efface.
  MR. COCKBURN said, that, the House owed it to itself to entertain this petition, and the more especially as the statements of the noble Lord who had just sat down appeared to him to confirm, in the main, the allegations of these petitioners; for the noble Lord had gone so far as to admit that, if not twenty-two, at all events fourteen, of the voters referred to had been turned out of their houses. But the petition went on to state—"That the said Marquess further interferes in the elections for the borough of Stamford, by authorising and sanctioning promises in his name to the electors." And the answer to that was the statement that the agents of the Marquess did not insist in the agreements with the tenants on a condition to vote for his nominees. Of course not; because any such agreement would be unlawful, and would; besides, invalidate every vote given in respect to which such an agreement existed. But he would ask, if the course taken by the Marquess at former elections had impressed upon the farmers of that neighbourhood the belief that if they wished for beneficial leases they must vote for their landlord's nominees, the effect would not be the same as if a direct agreement had been made? He submitted that they ought to take the allegations as true until they were inquired into, for the petitioners did not seek to take steps upon them as facts; but they said, "Give us the opportunity, and we pledge ourselves to prove

  953
  them." The House must not, then, be led away by statements made on behalf of the party accused. If the House were anxious to put a stop to what he must at present call a system of gross corruption, it must take measures for the establishment or non-establishment of the facts alleged. But it was
  said, this was not the proper course of proceeding—that the parties should have had recourse to an Election Committee. He would join issue on that point, and he asserted that it was not possible to prefer an election petition which would meet the circumstances of the case. An election petition could only be preferred with respect to matters affecting the return, and it was very doubtful whether the charges alleged against the Marquess of Exeter amounted to bribery. It could not hold unless the systematic corruption of lame bodies of voters were involved, and of that there was no proof. It would, in fact, be perfectly idle to attempt to unseat the present Members, for the simple reason that the Marquess of Exeter could not be proved to be their agent. But then it might be said, why not proceed under the 5th & 6th of Victoria?—and on that point the same objection held good. The allegation in the petition, in a moral sense, amounted to bribery and corruption; but it was doubtful whether to a degree which would nullify the election under the 5th and 6th of Victoria. The noble Lord the Member for Stamford refused to go into what had taken place in 1830 as irrelevant; but when it was alleged that thirty tenants were then discharged in consequence of their votes, he thought it was material to inquire into that election, as proving the general interference at the elections alleged. In 1847, it was alleged that twenty-seven or twenty-eight persons received notice who voted against the sitting Members; and the noble Lord (the Marquess of Granby) acknowledged that fourteen had so received notice, and that twelve of the notices had been acted upon. One of these cases was a remarkable one. A man who had received one of these notices went to the Marquess to deprecate his resentment, and excused his vote by saying that it had been given in mistake. He happened to see the Marquess of Exeter in person; but that noble Lord refused to receive his excuses, and would not allow time notice to be withdrawn. What was that but the admission on the part of the Marquess of Exeter of the truth of the allegations, though it seemed that the notice was
  954
  not enforced? [An Hon. MEMBER: It was never given.] Well, be it so; that was not at all material. [Ironical cheers.] Well, it certainly could not be material, because that was not put forward as a case of particular hardship, but as a proof of the means taken to get rid of those tenants who did not acquiesce in the election of the Marquess's nominee. Then the noble Lord (the Marquess of Granby) had mentioned that as a case of gross and extraordinary delinquency on the part of the voter. The man was, it seemed, an artificer at Burghley House; and shortly before, on the eldest son of the Marquess coming of age, he had received, in common with other persons employed, a donation of 25 l., and yet the man had ventured to vote as he liked. This was the base ingratitude which the noble Lord the Member for Stamford had denounced so eloquently. He (Mr. Cockburn) took a different view of the franchise. He did not think it was held for the exclusive advantage of the voter, or that it could be given to confer a gratification upon any other person, or to follow up sentiments of gratitude, favour, or affection. It was, on the contrary, entrusted to the holder for the benefit of the country, and he was bound to exercise it from a sense of duty only. It was, therefore, a monstrous and untenable position to say that because a man received a gift of 25 l. he was the bondsman for ever of the donor. Well, were these allegations to be inquired into or not? How stood the law? Was there a principle more clearly established than that interference in the elections by the Peerage was a violation of the rights and privileges of the House? If the facts alleged by the petition were true, there had been a gross violation, in repeated instances, not only of the privileges of that House, but of the rights and privileges of the Commons of England. It was, therefore, the bounden duty of the House to institute a searching inquiry into the facts. What the remedy would be, they ought not then to stop and inquire. The law of England said that there was no wrong without a remedy. The House of Commons would not, he was sure, suffer such a wrong to exist without seeking and finding a remedy; and as the admissions of the noble Lord the Member for Stamford proved the case of his hon. Friend, the House was bound to prosecute this inquiry.
  MR. HERRIES thought that the hon. and learned Gentleman who spoke last had not only distorted the meaning of his noble

  955
  Friend (the Marquess of Granby), but the facts of the case. The hon. and learned Member had also travelled very much out of the record; and he therefore must be allowed to recall atention to the contents of the petition itself, and he would show that the House could not, if it preserved consistency between its own acts, agree to the Motion now made. He would first discuss the position in which the petitioners presented themselves, and show that they were not in a position to ask the House to inquire into the allegations by a Special Committee. He would then prove to the House—but not as a reason for objecting to the inquiry, but in vindication of the Nobleman so unjustly assailed—that the allegations, in all material particulars, were decidedly and distinctly false. He would also show that the House could not pursue a course less suited to the honour and dignity of the institutions of the country, than the one proposed by the present Motion. He begged to state, in the first place, that the petition, by a most distinct and logical argument, led to a positive conclusion. He should assume for a moment, for the sake of the argument, that all the allegations were true; for it must be on that ground alone that the petitioners had any right to claim that their charges should be entered into. They alleged that the Marquess of Exeter interfered at the late election; and, to make it more plain, he would distinguish the late election from those which were antecedent, for the latter were only brought in to make the charges cumulative. How could they now inquire into matters which took place in 1830 and 1832? To apply himself to these would only be detaining the House unnecessarily, and withdrawing its attention from the real point at issue. But the allegations of the petition were explicit and distinct, and led most logically to a distinct conclusion respecting the election of 1847. They alleged that the Marquess of Exeter does, and did on the late occasion, interfere, by authorising and sanctioning promises, threats, and engagements, and—
  "That the said Marquess further interferes by fulfilling the promises and threats so made in his name, and by giving the tenancy of premises to electors who have voted in accordance with his declared views and wishes, and discharging from their tenancy many of the electors, being his tenants, who voted in opposition to such his views and wishes. That the said Marquess has so interfered at all recent elections, and, in particular, he did so at the last of such elections."
  Nothing could be more clear and distinct;
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  and to show that the petitioners knew all the consequences, and that they thoroughly understood what it necessarily led to, and how far the conduct they complained of was within the law and what were the laws offended against, he need only quote another passage, in which they stated—
  "That such the interference of the said Marquess is, as your petitioners submit, without reference to his Lordship's position as a Peer of Parliament, a violation of the undoubted right of the electors of the said borough freely to elect Members to serve for them in Parliament, and amounts to systematic bribery and intimidation of the electors of the said borough by him, within the meaning and intent of the laws now in force against bribery and intimidation."
  Now, it was perfectly clear from this, as his noble Friend had already said, that if the allegations were honestly and truly made—if the petitioners knew that they could substantiate these charges—the course for them to adopt was perfectly open, and the conclusion naturally arrived at was, that they had the power to bring them before a Committee of the House of Commons, under the laws now in force for that purpose, and which had been recently made, in order to open the door as wide as possible to all cases such as this. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Cockburn) had said that it was a case which could not be made subject to an Election Committee; but he dissented from that opinion entirely. He believed that if any set of men could prove distinct acts of bribery and intimidation such as those alleged in the petition, and that the electors were induced to vote by such corruption, that they would succeed in setting aside the election at which such practices had taken place. But the noble Lord at the head of the Government had thought it his duty, in 1842, to bring in an Act specifically to provide for cases in which the electors might have difficulty in presenting their petition before it was too late by the rules of the House. That Act expressly provided for cases of this description. The noble Lord, by it, opened the door to parties bringing in petitions of this nature; but in order that all interests might be fairly dealt with, the power of doing so was restricted within a fixed and reasonable time. The noble Lord thereby provided that the Committee to be appointed for this special purpose, should have power to investigate such allegations upon oath; but in order that parties might not make with impunity frivolous, unjust, and unfounded accusations, they were to be bound by recog-

  957
  nisances to be duly entered into, by which they became responsible for the expenses of the petition if not well founded: and the witnesses were subject to the pains and penalties of perjury. Those plain conditions were not very hard upon honest accusers; and if the present petitioners were such, they had the door wide open to them. But it might be said that it was possible that in this case the petition could not be got ready by the time Parliament met. On that point he held proof in his hand that, long before the meeting of Parliament, the petition was prepared and engrossed, and ready for presentation. The principal petitioner, indeed he might say, virtually, the only petitioner, the person whose name was signed at the head of the list (Richard Newcomb), was a person of property, and the proprietor of a newspaper at Stamford. In that newspaper he published, on the 10th of November, eight days before the meeting of Parliament, the following paragraph:—
  "The petition to Parliament complaining of the unconstitutional interference of the Marquess of Exeter, at the last election, has been engrossed and submitted to the inhabitants. The allegations of that petition are of such a nature that it will not be possible for the new Parliament to refuse to take cognisance of them."
  Why, then, was it not brought before the new Parliament? Why were not those allegations at once brought to trial in the way the law provided? Why did they shrink from this tribunal? They knew the law well; they show in the very words of their petition how well they were acquainted with it—for they distinctly declare that the acts of which they complain came "within the meaning and intent of the laws now in force against bribery and intimidation. "They had therefore no excuse on the score of ignorance to allege. But because they knew what the law required, and what conditions it imposed—because they knew that it rendered false accusations punishable as perjuries, and frivolous petitions subject to certain pains and penalties—they determined to have nothing to do with the tribunal provided by Parliament, and to evade the responsibility of making unfounded accusations, by making their application to this House out of time and rule, when no other investigation could be made into their complaints, except by a Select Committee. Now, the noble Lord must stand by his own Act, if he valued his consistency. The course prescribed by the law was
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  open to the petitioners; and that law having been framed with the view of preventing such debates as the present, no policy could be worse than to reintroduce such discussions in the body of the House, because upon all questions connected with elections, it was impossible for the House, however disposed to do justice, to avoid being influenced by party feeling. But what was the defence of the hon. and learned Member for the petitioners not having taken this course? The hon. and learned Member had not stated any reason why there should be a Special Committee instead of a lawful Committee. The fact was, they dared not adopt that course; and the House was bound to consider whether it would be honest, fair, or just to those who were accused, to allow so unusual a proceeding. He hoped the House would stand by its own law, its own consistency, and its own character. It could not do better for the maintenance of its own character than pay respect to the character of others. He trusted, therefore, they would stand by the principle laid down by the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) in his own Act, and by the spirit of the constitution and laws of England. Gratitude to the majority by which he had been elected compelled him to take up this question; for the whole body of his constituents was more or less implicated in these charges. There must necessarily be two parties in all such corrupt engagements as were alleged to exist at Stamford. If the Marquess of Exeter, or his agents, entered into unlawful and unworthy engagements with the electors, they were no less guilty than himself in coming under corrupt obligations towards him. He (Mr. Herries) had the most full conviction that the accusation was equally unfounded with respect to either party. He was confident that the whole of these unsustainable accusations and aspersions had no other origin than in the vexation and disappointment of a small portion of the defeated minority at the last election; for the larger portion, even of them, would disdain to have recourse to them. In what he was about to state, in order to show how false and unfounded were the main allegations contained in the petition, he begged to be clearly understood by the House as not intending to make his denial and disproof of those allegations a ground for the rejection of the petition, or of the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. He had already urged the higher

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  grounds upon which that petition should be rejected; and he was well aware that the facts which he was about to state, and the letters to which he should refer, ought only to be received as counter assertions and declarations to those contained in the petition. It was necessary, however, for the vindication of those whom he was bound by every consideration of honour and justice to defend, that he should state the real facts of the case; and he trusted that the House would do him the justice of believing that he would state nothing but what he believed conscientiously to be true. The first and most prominent part of the case of the petitioners was, that the Marquess of Exeter habitually made engagements with his tenants, in which their holdings were made subject to the condition that they should vote according to his wishes. He (Mr. Herries) declared there was not one word of truth in that. He repudiated any subterfuge, such as that alluded to by the hon. and learned Member, that the engagement did not appear in the leases. He denied entirely that there was any such condition, or even any such understanding; and denied it on the authority of all the persons he had access to, who were most capable of giving exact information on the subject. The Marquess of Exeter had somewhere about 600 tenants in and near Stamford, and, of course, amongst so large a number, there must be constantly many changes. The agent employed by the Marquess of Exeter in the letting, &c. of all this property, had—unsolicited by him (Mr. Herries), but hearing of this petition, and the allegations it contained—taken the trouble of writing to him a letter, the contents of which he would state to the House. The letter bore date the 7th of March, and the writer stated, that in consequence of the allegations contained in the petition presented to Parliament relative to the late Stamford election, he felt it incumbent upon him to affirm, that neither he, nor any person under his direction, had at any time asked any tenant of the Marquess of Exeter to vote for Lord Granby and himself at the late election for the borough of Stamford. This gentleman also stated that he had been previously desired by the London solicitor of the Marquess not to ask any tenant to vote for the Marquess of Granby or himself; and he added that, on the very day of the election, he was earnestly entreated by the father of a voter to influence his son, who was considered to be
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  wavering, and he refused to comply with the request. The same gentleman said, with regard to the charge of intimidation, that he never heard of a threat being held out to any voter, and that he did not believe any such threat had been made; and he stated further, that all the property of the Marquess of Exeter in Stamford was let through his hands, and that on no occasion had any condition been required from any person previously to his becoming a tenant of the Marquess, that he should vote for any particular candidate to be nominated at any future election. He considered, therefore, that the allegation of the petition that the Marquess of Exeter had authorised many of the electors to occupy, as tenants, property belonging to him in eligible situations in the borough, provided they would vote for the candidates selected by him, was satisfactorily answered. The petition also alleged that the Marquess of Exeter put forward his nominees as candidates for the borough of Stamford, and that the first intimation that the Marquess of Granby and himself (Mr. Herries) were candidates for that borough at the late election was by letter from Mr. Walford, the London solicitor to the Marquess of Exeter, to some of the principal inhabitants of the town. Now, what were the facts? Mr. Walford was a very old friend of his; and being well known by the solicitor of the Marquess of Exeter, it was most natural that he (Mr. Herries) should avail himself of Mr. Walford's services, when he entertained the idea of presenting himself as a candidate to the electors of Stamford. But Mr. Walford wrote only two private letters, and those under the immediate direction, and in the presence of himself (Mr. Herries), announcing his intention. The Marquess of Exeter had no more to do with the matter than any Gentleman in that House. Mr. Walford wrote one of these letters to the mayor of Stamford, simply mentioning that he intended to become a condidate for the borough; and at the same time Mr. Walford also wrote a confidential communication to the gentleman whose services, on account of his high character and station in the borough, he (Mr. Herries) was anxious to secure as the chairman of his committee. The first of these letters was formal and complimentary only, being addressed to the mayor on account of the office which he held, although he was well known to be hostile to the principles which he (Mr.

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  Herries) professed. The other was private and confidential. It so happened that those letters were transposed in the envelopes, and the confidential letter, addressed to the chairman of the committee, fell into the hands of the mayor; while the letter intended for the mayor was delivered to the gentleman who was requested to be the chairman of the committee. Now, he thought the House would admit that this would have been a very unfortunate circumstance if the letter intended for the chairman had contained any language which could have been twisted into a support of the allegations embodied in this petition. It contained nothing of the kind, and was, with some slight variations, only a mere repetition of the letter addressed to the mayor. Those variations related only to himself and to the peculiar grounds on which he hoped for the services of the gentleman applied to. So much for that part of the petition which sought to attach undue importance, and to give a false character to those communications from Mr. Walford. But he now came to an important charge which was made against the Marquess of Exeter by the petitioners; that which related to the dismissal of his tenants after the election. When he had seen the petition, he at once inquired whether the notices to quit, served by the agents of the Marquess of Exeter upon some of his tenants, subsequently to the election, were such as to afford just grounds for the allegations in the petition. He applied to the person most competent to afford him full and accurate information on the subject; and from that person, upon whom he could place the most entire reliance for the accuracy and fidelity of his statement, he received the following communication:—
  "I think it right to put you in possession of the true facts of the ease. There were in all 29 notices to quit given to tenants, for various reasons. Of these there were, of electors who had voted for Mr. Rolt, 12; for Lord Granby and Mr. Herries, 2; who had not voted at all, 2; and of persons not being in any way electors, 13."
  Of the 29, then, there were 17 who could not be supposed to have received their discharges on account of the way in which they had voted; and he contended that the House had no right to infer that the remaining 12 had been discharged on that ground. It had been asserted, that this was not a party petition; but he would venture to say, that a more completely party petition had never been presented to that House. It was the production of the
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  Radical party, of whom there was a good sprinkling, some of them very respectable people, in Stamford, and who bore, as was the case in other places, very considerable animosity to the Conservative party. The petition was drawn up with great skill—he would rather say craft—and there was great unfairness in its representations. In order that the personal interference of the Marquess of Exeter might be inferred, it was stated that an old servant of the Marquess, who had been his tenant, and who had been served with a notice to quit, waited upon the Marquess, and stated that he had voted for Mr. Rolt by mistake, and that the Marquess replied that he did not believe in the mistake, and should not allow the notice to be withdrawn. Now, the fact was, that this person, who had been employed in the artificers' yard belonging to the Marquess, had been discharged from thence. He called upon the noble Lord, in all appearance artfully prepared on that subject, and thrust himself upon his notice to make his complaint, stating that he had voted for Mr. Rolt by mistake; in reply to which the Marquess merely said to him—"You are perfectly at liberty to vote as you please; but when you say you did not know which way you were voting, I cannot believe you." He would not for a moment suppose that the House would attach the slightest importance to such a trumpery attempt as this to convert a very natural, and in all probability perfectly true, expression as this into a confirmation of the charges made against the noble Lord: although there was no want of cunning in the mode in which it was introduced. But the House would be still more disposed to treat it with the contempt which it deserved, when he informed them that at the time when the interview in question took place no notice to quit had been given to this man; and, moreover, that he was at this very time still a tenant of Lord Exeter. Having thus disposed of all that was really material in the charges against Lord Exeter, in the petition, he would come to one of the statements which it contained, which was beyond all question strictly true—that Lord Exeter possessed great property in Stamford and its neighbourhood, and that by reason of that propertyhe also possessed great influence in the borough. There could indeed, be no doubt that those who presented themselves as candidates for that borough, would feel that his support, and countenance, and influence, must greatly assist

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  them in their chance of obtaining the seat. The Marquess and his family had been closely connected with the borough for more than 300 years; and the great possessions which he was there master of, as well as the high rank and station which he filled, had descended to him through a long line of ancestry, from one of the most remarkable and most honoured statesmen in the history of this kingdom. What an imputation would it not be upon the character of a nobleman so descended and so endowed if it could be truly said of him, that in the immediate neighbourhood of his own princely abode, he possessed no influence? Nothing less than the absence of those public and private virtues, which in this case no man who knew the noble Lord would assert to be wanting, could deprive him of such influence. That such influence was truly legitimate and entirely consistent with the constitution of this country, he could not better show than in the words of the noble Lord now at the head of Her Majesty's Government. He well remembered to have heard those words delivered upon a most memorable occasion, and when he listened to them with great satisfaction, as some compensation at least for the distaste occasioned to him and those who thought as he did, by the proposal then made to Parliament by the noble Lord—he meant the announcement of the Reform Bill. On that great occasion the noble Lord said—
  "It may be said, that one great and injurious effect of the measure which I propose will be to destroy the power and privileges of the aristocracy. This I deny. I utterly deny that this plan can have any such effect. Where the aristocracy reside, receiving large incomes, performing important duties, relieving the poor by charity, and evincing private worth and public virtue, it is not in human nature that they should not possess a great influence upon public opinion, and have an equal weight in electing persons to serve their country in Parliament. Though such persons may not have the direct nomination of Members under this Bill, I contend that they will have as much influence as they ought to have."
  Such, and such only, was the influence which Lord Exeter possessed, and legitimately exercised. But there was another great authority in that House, who addressed it in 1846, when Mr. Collett brought an accusation of interference at elections against certain Peers and great landed proprietors; and the object of which, like that of the present petition, was to attack the influence, not only of the aristocracy, but of the proprietary of the country. The right hon. Baronet the
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  Member for Tamworth (Sir R. Peel) then said—
  "Now, to deny that Peers do exercise an influence upon elections would be perfectly absurd; and I hope the day may never conic when the legitimate influence which they may exercise may be extinguished. But extinguish it, in fact, you cannot. Pass what laws you will, while the constitution of England continues, and while the feeling of Englishmen remains what it is, you never can extinguish that legitimate influence of which I speak. Take the case, for instance, of a Peer of great property"—
  and here he (Mr. Herries) might be permitted to observe, that it might be almost imagined that his right hon. Friend had in his eye, while drawing this picture, the very nobleman now charged with such unworthy practices by these petitioners—
  —"the Lord Lieutenant of his county, having devoted his life to the performance of local duties—having been kind to his tenantry—having set an example of improvement in his neighbourhood—being at the head of the local society of his county, not by rules, but by character and station—to tell me that you can extinguish that legitimate influence to which I allude—why it is out of the question! And God forbid that the day should ever arrive, when the virtues of a Peer should not have their proper influence upon society!"
  Such was the influence of the Marquess of Exeter; such was the wealth, and station, and conduct, and character, upon which that legitimate influence reposed, and which no attacks such as those which the petitioners directed against him could deprive him of. He would detain the House no longer, but upon these grounds call upon it to reject the Motion. The greater part of the petition was unworthy of notice, was mere trash. With respect to that part of it which was of a more serious character, he must again repeat, that if the petitioners really believed that they could prove the facts which they brought forward—if they were truly honest in that belief—they had a remedy by the law of the land which they ought to have availed themselves of.
  MR. HUME admitted that the right hon. Gentleman had made the best apology that could be offered by bring forward matters which had nothing to do with the subject. He had stated the Marquess of Exeter was a nobleman of great possessions, and of high character, benevolent, and respected by his tenants. The hon. and learned Member by whom the Motion was introduced had not used any expressions at all derogatory to the Marquess's character; on the contrary, he admitted that it was deserving of respect. No one on that

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  side of the House would deny to property and character their legitimate influence; it was not against legitimate, but against illegitimate influence, that their efforts were directed. He had never heard a case more ably made out than that brought forward in support of the allegations in that long petition; and if the allegations of the petition were not proved, they at least demanded inquiry. The character of the House was impugned by such statements; and if the House did not attend to reports of that kind, made time after time, its character would not be safe, nor could the principles of the constitution with regard to elections be preserved. The right hon. Gentleman had produced two letters from Mr. Higgs; but he had not admitted what the House had a right to conclude, that there were many doubts about the previous conduct of the Marquess of Exeter. He had forgotten former instances in which the Marquess had not confined himself to interfering in the election. There was a right hon. Gentleman sitting near him (Sir G. Clerk) who could tell him that the Marquess had not only interfered in the nomination, but had afterwards used intimidation, because a vote had been given in Parliament in opposition to his own views. He considered the case for the petition to have been made out; but he cautioned hon. Gentlemen opposite against entertaining the idea that individual Members on that side of the House, who were in favour of changes in the representation, would ever refuse to property its just weight, or deny to noblemen and men of superior merit that just influence which they ought to possess, and which he hoped they always would possess.
  MR. GRANTLEY BERKELEY had expected that before the House went to a division, some Member of Her Majesty's Government would rise and say a few words, in order to justify the vote which he believed they were prepared to give, to reconcile it with their exertions to shield a great Lord Lieutenant on a recent occasion. He should be unfit to represent a free constituency if he shrunk from his duty, and he certainly felt it to be his duty to call attention to what had been done by a Peer in a county before they proceeded to a vote in reference to what had been done by a Peer in a borough. Two petitions had been presented to the Crown, complaining of the conduct of a Lord Lieutenant; and on all occasions when such petitions had been presented, an inquiry
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  had usually taken place under the direction of the Secretary of State. In the instance to which he referred, no notice was taken of the petitions.
  If any magistrate had been guilty of the same conduct as the Lord Lieutenant had been in the case to which he alluded, he would have been removed from the commission of the peace, and an officer in the Army would have lost his commission. The voters of the county which he represented, now felt that they had no chance of obtaining redress at the hands of the Government.
  SIR R. H. INGLIS said, the House was not then called upon to decide upon the merits of Earl Fitzhardinge, or to pronounce an opinion with respect to any contested election. The question was one of a very different character; and he should regret to find any hon. Member voting in favour of the petition if he had not heard the admirable speech of his right hon. Friend. He appealed to any man who had heard that speech, whether the principal allegation in the petition, namely, that as to bargaining by promises and threats, and the allegation as to enforcing the threats, after adverse votes had been given, had been sustained?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL said: Sir, I think it right to state, as shortly as I can, the reasons which will govern my vote on this occasion. I wish to say also, that I have made up my mind upon this question with very considerable doubt; that I shall give my vote personally, after hearing the whole of the debate, upon my opinion; and I do not wish in any manner to influence the opinion of any other Member of the House who may have come to a different conclusion upon this, which, though a constitutional, is, at the same time, in a great degree, a personal question. Sir, this case has been brought forward in a petition very artfully drawn, going into minute details and into a number of circumstances, stating that the petitioners do not wish to interfere with the legitimate influence of property, and, with great moderation, asking for some remedy against the grievances under which the petitioners declare they suffer. This petition, thus drawn up, has been very ably enforced by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, in a speech likewise very temperate in its tone, very clear in its statements, and very powerful in its arguments. The question is, whether we shall make any further inquiry on this occasion? Now, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Herries) met, in a most

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  powerful manner, the allegations of the petition and the question before us. He based his opposition, first, on the ground of the remedy sought for not being a right remedy, supposing the facts to be grounded in truth; and, secondly, he denied altogether the main part of those facts. Now, with regard to the principal allegation, I own that my impression, from any recollection which I have of precedents in this House, and from what I have read in books concerning elections, and confirmed by so good an authority as the hon. and learned Member for Southampton (Mr. Cockburn), my impression is, I say, that supposing certain tenants of the Marquess of Exeter to have been told that they must give their votes according to the Marquess of Exeter's wishes—supposing them likewise to have been ejected from their tenancies in consequence of the votes they had given—yet, if those acts did not clearly affect the majority of votes at the election, the petitioners would not have had a remedy before an Election Committee. That is certainly my impression with regard to the state of facts, supposing those facts to be proved. Now, Sir, with regard to the matter upon which we arc asked to inquire, there is, in the first place, a statement that it has been a practice to let houses to tenants, in suitable and advantageous situations, with a promise that they should keep them if they voted according to the wishes of the Marquess of Exeter; and a statement that they would be deprived of them if they did not. The right hon. Gentleman opposite has read a letter from an agent of the Marquess of Exeter entirely denying that such is the case. Now, if I am to give my own personal conviction, I must say that it agrees with the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman. I do not think that such a declaration would have been made by the agent, who must have been cognisant of all the facts, if it were not founded in truth; and I cannot therefore believe that any such condition has been imposed on the tenants. At the same time, there is an allegation brought forward in this petition, signed by very respectable persons, as they are admitted to be, I think by the right hon. Gentleman himself—whether they belong to the Radical party or to any other party, they are respectable in their station and character. This is their allegation; and although unless there were some further statements in the petition, it might not be worth while to have an inquiry, yet I do think it would
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  be an advantage that there should be an inquiry as to the facts, and that the public mind should not rest upon such allegations if they can be disproved. But, Sir, there is a further allegation to which the contradiction is far less satisfactory—I mean with regard to the allegation, that certain tenants of the Marquess of Exeter, having given their votes in favour of another candidate than the one whom he favoured, had received notice to quit. The statement of the noble Lord the Member for Stamford with regard to that allegation—and I must say that with regard to that part of the case my mind is not satisfied—is, that the occupation of these tenants was not put an end to in consequence of their votes at the election. With regard to that part of the case, too, the right hon. Gentleman opposite says, that for some years previously there had been a number of removals—in some cases exceeding, and in others falling short of those which occurred in the year 1847. That, I say again, is a matter in which an examination should be made. The persons making those allegations having failed to prove that there was an evident political cause for those removals, and that there was a greater number of tenants removed after the election than had been on ordinary occasions, the substance of their allegations would be likewise removed. Now, Sir, with respect to a matter in regard to which there are allegations which may be proved, or of which the proof may fall short, with regard to the interference—I will not say of a Peer, but of a great landed proprietor, in the election of Members to serve in this House, is it worth while for us to-night to resolve that this House should institute a special Committeee of Inquiry? I should say that in voting that Committee of Inquiry, if the resolution of the House appointing that Committee were to be considered as in any way a condemnation of the conduct of the Marquess of Exeter, I should not concur in that vote; because, after hearing the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, I cannot but think that it is extremely probable—indeed most probable—that the allegation will be disproved, and that the Marquess of Exeter will be shown to have acted as the right hon. Gentleman has stated, which is, that the Marquess of Exeter, having considerable influence—legitimate influence—from his possession and property, that that influence was used in favour of those who agree with him in that political

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  conduct which has never been concealed by him, and which is well known to the public from his votes in the other House of Parliament. If that influence, which may be fairly and legitimately exercised, be all that can be shown to have been used, and if those charges should prove to have been brought forward without being sustained, the public will be satisfied. And if, on the other hand, the allegations should receive any further corroboration, then, certainly, we should feel satisfied at the original institution of the inquiry. I certainly come to the conclusion, that those allegations having been thus made and thus supported, it is far better that there should be some inquiry, than that by our vote tonight we should agree that no further inquiry should take place; and I cannot leave entirely out of the question, any more than the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford the peculiar time at which this has occurred. If more is proved against the Marquess of Exeter than I believe is capable of proof, I believe there will be more advantage to the public by having the whole of the circumstances examined by a Committee, than by any one having it to say that there was a strong case brought before the House—that the allegations were not disproved—but that the House of Commons were ready, on the mere statements of the opposite side, partially to give their verdict without any further evidence. These, Sir, are the convictions in my mind—not arrived at without great doubt; and, admitting the great power and ability of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stamford, I shall give my vote in favour of the institution of the inquiry.
  MR. BANKES said, he had heard with the deepest regret the speech of the noble Lord. He regretted to find that the noble Lord was at this moment not only admitting the failure of the Reform Bill, which was to have set at rest all questions of bribery with regard to the constituencies, and charges of undue influence with regard to the aristocracy, but that he was shrinking from the principle he announced in introducing that Bill respecting the just and legitimate rights of the aristocracy. The noble Lord said he had come to the determination to vote for inquiry, after much doubt, difficulty, and hesitation, and that it was not his desire to influence the vote of any hon. Member in the House; but the noble Lord knew very well that his speech would determine the judgment of the
  970
  House. And what was the tribunal to which this inquiry was to be referred? A tribunal which would conduct the inquiry without the sanction of an oath. The noble Lord must admit that the case was entirely without precedent, and if an inquiry were granted no one could say what would be the end of it. Supposing the statement of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) turned out to be correct, and that the tenants of Lord Exeter who were displaced did not vote at all, where would the noble Lord be then? He (Mr. Bankes) could not but feel that the situation in which the noble Lord placed his party in the House was a most unfortunate one. The grievance complained of was that of an election petition combined with a railway petition. This Mr. Newcomb, the petitioner, was obviously a great authority in Stamford. He was standing forward against the person whom he chose to consider the village tyrant of Stamford, and having failed on his election and railway petitions separately, he said, "We will bide our time—we will combine those several grievances, and hereafter we shall, when the proper time arrives, bring them before the House of Commons in another shape." He now brought them forward, when the noble Lord said it was difficult to resist them on account of the political affairs of Europe; but was it right for the head of the Government of Great Britain to take such a course in reference to a matter which he admitted to be so doubtful? He was surprised to find a statesman of the noble Lord's experience and standing take such a course.
  SIR R. PEEL: I concur with the noble Lord at the head of the Government in thinking that the decision of this question involves judicial as well as political considerations. In discussing it I shall attempt to exclude from my mind any bias which might improperly interfere with judicial determination; and, although I am not blind to the force of the arguments which the noble Lord has drawn from passing events and the temper of the public mind, I think that in a matter, if not exclusively judicial, partaking largely of the judicial character, it is, on the whole, the wisest and safest course not to permit ourselves to be influenced by temporary and extrinsic considerations, but, on the contrary, to adhere to principles applicable to all times and all circumstances. It is of the utmost importance that the House should not lightly depart from the pre-

  971
  scribed mode by which the right of persons to sit in this House is determined. We have ample experience in past history of the abuses, I may say the corruption, which arises from permitting these matters to be decided by majorities. It is little more than 100 years since the termination of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole; and every one who has paid the slightest attention to the history of that time is aware that Walpole's fall was preceded by constant conflicts as to the right to seats in Parliament, and that the decisions of the House were given not upon the merits of the particular case, but as the results of regular party conflicts, the contending parties invariably voting on opposite sides according as party feeling or party interest determined them. The very vote which determined the fall of that great Minister was one connected with the right to sit for some small borough—Chippenham, I believe. The House was at length so satisfied of the danger of permitting these questions to be determined by party rather than by judicial considerations, that some twenty or thirty years after that period Mr. Grenville introduced a Bill which attempted to put a check to the abuse. Since the introduction of the Grenville Act, constant attempts have been made still further to remedy the abuse—I mean the abuse of permitting the judgment of the House in such matters to be influenced by party and purely political considerations; and no one has laboured more than the noble Lord to elevate the character of Parliament, and to insure that the decisions of the House should be founded upon judicial considerations. The question then arises, shall we now supersede the tribunal which is appointed by law for the decision of these questions—a tribunal which has great powers adapted for the special purpose, conferred by Act of Parliament, one of them being the power of examining witnesses upon oath. As the law stands we have provided not only the means to decide judicially on contested claims to seats in Parliament, but also to check the practice of bringing frivolous and unfounded charges of bribery or other malpractices, by taking the precaution of compelling those who prefer such charges to enter into recognisances as a guarantee for their sincerity? Nothing can be more important than that a Member of Parliament should be able to exercise his functions independently, without molestation from parties preferring frivolous complaints. And if
  972
  there be any party to whom it is of importance that the guarantees against such complaints should be maintained inviolate, it is the party which is in the minority. There would be the greatest danger to the free exercise of our functions in this House if a powerful majority could harass a minority, weak as far as numbers are concerned, by dispensing with the securities which the law has wisely provided against frivolous complaints of undue election. At the same time I am willing to admit that if any special case of gross abuse is brought forward, we are not to be prevented by a rigid adherence to existing forms from exercising those functions with which this House, as the great inquisitorial tribunal of the country, is invested. Does this petition allege gross abuses, the investigation of which is not provided for by law? It alleges distinct acts of bribery. I do not form that opinion from mere inference. In express terms the petitioners declare that—
  "The interference of the Marquess of Exeter, without reference to his position as a Peer of Parliament, is a violation of the undoubted right of the electors of the said borough freely to elect Members of the said borough to serve for them in Parliament, and amounts to systematic bribery and intimidation of the electors of the said borough by him within the meaning and intent of the laws in force against bribery and intimidation."
  And that is not a mere general allegation, for the petition continues:—
  "That the said Marquess further interferes in the said elections by authorising and sanctioning promises in his name to many of the electors, that they shall occupy, as tenants, property belonging to him in eligible situations in or near the said borough, provided they will vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him, and by authorising and sanctioning threats in his name to many of the electors who are his tenants, that they shall be discharged from such tenancy if they do not vote for the candidates nominated and selected by him."
  There is a distinct allegation in the petition, that the Marquess of Exeter said to many of the electors, "You shall occupy houses at reduced rents in a favourable part of the borough, provided you give a vote for the candidates of my choice." Who can doubt that that is an act of bribery? The petitioners assert that they do not complain of an isolated case, but that there has been a systematic course of bribery. I ask, then, why did they not observe the law and usage of Parliament, and present a petition at the time and according to the forms presented by that law and usage? They did not do that; and is

  973
  there no danger, that if you permit persons to whom a tribunal is open—to whom you have given a power of appeal, provided they will only give a guarantee as to their sincerity—is there no danger, I ask, that, if you permit them to escape from that guarantee, and exempt them from the ordinary conditions of inquiry, this series of Acts, beginning with Mr. Grenville's Act, and terminating with the Act of the noble Lord, will be virtually superseded? Is there no danger that, instead of resorting to a judicial tribunal, you will have again appeals to this House, with the same results—decisions on mere party grounds, and grievous injury to the character of the House of Commons? But you say that the petitioners are poor—that the Marquess of Exeter is very powerful—and that these persons, groaning under oppression, have at length approached Parliament with a petition. But you have provided for that case of poverty on the part of petitioners. The noble Lord, in 1842, foresaw that the Committee might neglect its duty—that there might be collusion—that the petition might not be proceeded with—that the party petitioning against the return, fearing exposure, might withdraw from the petition—and that the party returned might also, from fear of exposure, relinquish his seat. The noble Lord provided for these contingencies, and in that Act of 1842 which greatly widened the opportunities for parties to complain of bribery, inserted a provision that when a petition, alleging general bribery, is presented within, not a fortnight, but within three months after the commission of an act of bribery, the House may consent to entertain it, and appoint a Committee, with all the powers of an ordinary Election Committee. In this case, therefore, if these petitioners, alleging systematic bribery, within three months after the commission of any act of bribery, had presented a petition in the ordinary way, this House was empowered to appoint a tribunal for the purpose of inquiring into it. But does the case stop there? Suppose the parties are so poor that it is impossible for them successfully to prosecute the complaint, the noble Lord has provided—
  "That if the Committee shall report that there was reasonable and probable ground for the allegations of the petition, the said Committee shall have power to order that the costs of the petitioners shall be borne as in the case of a Committee on any public matter ordered by the House of Commons."
  974
  Now, has not the House, while it has taken precautions against frivolous and vexatious complaints, given every fair opportunity to aggrieved parties to be heard? I do not tie you down to the presentation of a petition within a fortnight of the meeting of Parliament, but I ask you why the petitioners, who allege systematic bribery, did not take advantage of that clause in the Act which provides for the case, and ask for a Committee? And if they were so distressed in their circumstances, that it was necessary for them to apply to Parliament in formâ pauperis, why did they not take advantage of that other clause in the same Act which enables the Committee to give them their expenses? In considering this question I have endeavoured to exclude every other consideration than those of a judicial nature; and I feel satisfied there is danger of great public inconvenience if we depart from that course to which we have hitherto adhered, and teach petitioners that they are at liberty to exempt themselves from the conditions we have thought fit to apply to the investigation of complaints of improper practices at elections. If such complaints are to be decided on by this House, not in a judicial but a political capacity, not by a Select Committee of seven Members, but according to the discretion of some 400 or 500 Gentlemen influenced by the natural bias, from which, whatever may be their attempt to purify their minds from party considerations and political feelings, they cannot entirely relieve themselves—all that we have hitherto done to ensure just decisions will have been done in vain. Upon these grounds I shall give my vote against the House setting an example which I think will be fraught with such evil consequences.
  MR. W. P. WOOD said, the right hon. Baronet had spoken of the danger they would incur in bringing back to that House the consideration of election petitions, and the right of Members to sit in that House; but he begged to remind the House that they were not discussing the right of any Member to sit in that House. The petition was in no sense directed against any Member, but the question was, whether the Marquess of Exeter—assuming the petition to be true—or the inhabitants of Stamford, should return two Members for that borough. Then the right hon. Baronet said, the petitioners might have redress under an election petition; but that could not be, for supposing the petitioners were correct, and

  975

  there was systematic bribery, still it was by the noble Marquess, and not by a candidate or his agent. Then, said the right hon. Baronet, the 5th and 6th of Victoria had provided for this special grievance; but if the petition were correct, the bribery was in placing persons in houses under the condition of voting for particular candidates; and, as the persons must have held their houses a year to enable them to vote, the bribery must be inferred to have taken place a year at least before the election; and the Act only provided that a petition should be presented within three months of the time the bribery was committed. Again, that Act applied in no sense to any case of intimidation, and yet that was nearly the whole case which the petition made out. And now he would ask any hon. Member in that House to point out any relief under any Act which these petitioners had? But were they to be wholly without a remedy; and if there were no statutory remedy, were the statements in this petition to remain a dead letter, and grievances of this kind not to be inquired into? If the question had rested on the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Granby), he would have divided without any reply, because they had been compelled in substance to admit the whole case; but when he heard the powerful speech of the right hon. Baronet, and knew the impression it would produce, as everything that fell from him always must, he felt it was incumbent upon him to reply, and to restate the legal position of the case. He was sorry the right hon. Baronet had not been in the House when the state of the law had been so clearly and ably stated by his hon. Friend the Member for Southampton. It had been admitted by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) that the announcement of his being a candidate was made to the principal inhabitants of Stamford by Mr. Walford, the London agent of the Marquess of Exeter, thus so far bearing out the statement of the petitioners in this respect. It was true the right hon. Gentleman stated that Mr. Walford was a friend of his own; but, considering that Mr. Walford had no connexion with the borough of Stamford, except as the solicitor for the Marquess of Exeter, it was a natural enough assumption on the part of the petitioners that the announcement was made to the inhabitants solely as the accredited agent of the Marquess.
  976
  How, of all his friends, the right hon. Gentleman had thought of selecting Mr. Walford to announce his appearance as a candidate, he (Mr. Wood) did not know; but it had been admitted that he had done so, and the statement of the petitioners had thus been so far confirmed. It had been further admitted, that fourteen persons who voted in favour of Mr. Rolt had been ejected. Having, then, the broad fact before them, that a number of persons had been ejected from premises belonging to the Marquess of Exeter because they had voted against the candidates approved by him, and having this further fact, that the Statute 5 and 6 Victoria provided no tribunal for cases of this description, he thought he had made out a clear case for the inquiry which he now sought.
  The House divided:—Ayes 178; Noes 177: Majority 1.

  List of the AYES.

  Abdy, T. N.

  Dundas, Adm.

  Adair, H. E.

  Dunne, F. P.

  Adair, R. A. S.

  Ebrington, Visct.

  Alcock, T.

  Ellice, E.

  Baines, M. T.

  Elliott, hon. J. E.

  Baring, rt. hon. Sir F.T.

  Evans, Sir De L.

  Barnard, E. G.

  Evans, W.

  Bellew, R. M.

  Ewart, W.

  Berkeley, hon. Capt.

  Ferguson, Col.

  Berkeley, hon. H. F.

  Fordyce, A. D.

  Berkeley, hon. G. F.

  Forster, M.

  Birch, Sir T. B.

  Fortescue, C.

  Blake, M. J.

  Fox, R. M.

  Blewitt, R. J.

  Fox, W. J.

  Bouverie, hon. E. P.

  Freestun, Col.

  Bowring, Dr.

  Gardner, R.

  Boyle, hon. Col.

  Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.

  Bright, J.

  Glyn, G. C.

  Brockman, E. D.

  Granger, T. C.

  Brotherton, J.

  Greene, J.

  Brown, H.

  Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

  Brown, W.

  Grosvenor, Lord R.

  Bunbury, E. H.

  Hall, Sir B.

  Buxton, Sir E. N.

  Hardcastle, J.A.

  Carter, J. B.

  Hastie, A.

  Caulfeild, J. M.

  Hawes, B.

  Clay, J.

  Hay, Lord J.

  Clay, Sir W.

  Hayter, W. G.

  Clements, hon. C. S.

  Headlam, T. E.

  Clifford, H. M.

  Heathcoat, J.

  Cobden, R.

  Henry, A.

  Cockburn, A. J. E.

  Heywood, J.

  Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

  Hill, Lord M.

  Cowan, C.

  Hindley, C.

  Cowper, hon. W. F.

  Hodges, T. L.

  Craig, W. G.

  Horsman, E.

  Crawford, W. S.

  Howard, hon. C. W. G.

  Dalrymple, Capt.

  Howard, hon. E. G. G.

  Davie, Sir H. R. F.

  Howard, P. H.

  Devereux, J. T.

  Hume, J.

  Drumlanrig, Visct.

  Hutt, W.

  Duff, G. S.

  Jackson, W.

  Duncan, Visct.

  Jervis, Sir J.

  Duncan, G.

  Keppel, hon. G. T.

  977

  Kershaw, J.

  Rich, H.

  King, hon. P. J. L.

  Robartes, T. J. A.

  Langston, J. H.

  Romilly, J.

  Lennard, T. B.

  Russell, Lord J.

  Lewis, G. C.

  Rusell, F. C. H.

  Locke, J.

  Rutherfurd, A.

  Lushington, C.

  Salwey, Col.

  M'Cullagh, W. T.

  Scholefield, W.

  M'Gregor, J.

  Sheil, rt. hon. R. L.

  Meagher, T.

  Simeon, J.

  Maitland, T.

  Smith, rt. hon. R. V.

  Mangles, R. D.

  Smith, J. A.

  Marshall, J. G.

  Smith, J. B.

  Marshall, W.

  Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W.

  Martin, S.

  Stansfield W. R. C.

  Matheson, Col.

  Stanton, W. H.

  Maule, rt. hon. F.

  Strickland, Sir G.

  Melgund, Visct.

  Stuart, Lord D.

  Mitchell, T. A.

  Sullivan, M.

  Monsell, W.

  Talbot, C. R. M.

  Morpeth, Visct.

  Talfourd, Serj.

  Morison, Gen.

  Tancred, H. W.

  Morris, D.

  Thicknesse, R. A.

  Mostyn, hon. E. M. L.

  Thompson, Col.

  Mowatt, F.

  Thompson, G.

  Muntz, G. F.

  Thornely, T.

  Norreys, Sir D. J.

  Towneley, J.

  O'Connell, M. J.

  Townshend, Capt.

  Ogle, S. C. H.

  Tufnell, H.

  Palmer, R.

  Tynte, Col.

  Palmerston, Visct.

  Villiers. hon. C.

  Parker, J.

  Vivian, J. H.

  Pearson, C.

  Walmsley, Sir J.

  Pechell, Capt.

  Ward, H. G.

  Pendarves, E. W. W.

  Watkins, Col.

  Perfect, R.

  Wawn, J. T.

  Peto, S. M.

  Westhead, J. P.

  Pigott, F.

  Wilcox, B. M.

  Pilkington, J.

  Williams, J.

  Pinney, W.

  Williamson, Sir H.

  Pusey, P.

  Wilson, M.

  Raphael, A.

  Wood, rt hon. Sir C.

  Rawdon, Col.

  Wyvill, M.

  Reynolds, J.

  Ricardo, J. L.

  TELLERS.

  Ricardo, O.

  Wood, W. P.

  Rice, E. R.

  D' Eyncourt, rt. hn. C.T.

  List of the NOES.

  Adare, Visct.

  Bramston, T. W.

  Alford, Visct.

  Bremridge, R.

  Arkwright, G.

  Broadley, H.

  Bailey, J.

  Brooke, Lord

  Bailey, J., jun.

  Buck, L. W.

  Baldock, E. H.

  Buller, Sir J. Y.

  Bankes, G.

  Burghley, Lord

  Barkly, H.

  Burrell, Sir C. M.

  Baring, H. B.

  Carew, W. H. P.

  Baring, T.

  Chaplin, W. J.

  Beckett, W.

  Chichester, Lord J. L.

  Benbow, J.

  Christopher, R. A.

  Bennet, P.

  Christy, S.

  Bentinck, Lord G.

  Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G.

  Bentinck, Lord H.

  Cochrane, A. D. R. W.B.

  Beresford, W.

  Cocks, T. S.

  Bernard, Visct.

  Codrington, Sir W.

  Blackstone, W. S.

  Coles, H. B.

  Boldero, H. G.

  Conolly, Col.

  Bolling, W.

  Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

  Bourke, R. S.

  Currie, H.

  Bowles, Adm.

  Davies, D. A. S.

  Brackley, Visct.

  Deedes, W.

  978

  Dick, Q.

  Manners, Lord C. S.

  Disraeli, B.

  Manners, Lord G.

  Dod, J. W.

  March, Earl of

  Dodd, G.

  Maunsell, T. P.

  Drax, J. S. W. S. E.

  Maxwell, hon. J. P.

  Drummond, H.

  Moore, G. H.

  Duncombe, hon. A.

  Morgan, 0.

  Duncombe, hon. O.

  Napier, J.

  Dundas, G.

  Neeld, J.

  Du Pre, C. N.

  Newdegate, C. N.

  Egerton, Sir P.

  Newport, Visct.

  Egerton, W. T.

  Newry & Morne, Visct.

  Emlyn, Visct.

  O'Brien, Sir L.

  Estcourt, J. B. B.

  Ossulston, Lord

  Farnham, E. B.

  Paget, Lord G.

  Farrer, J.

  Palmer, R.

  Foley, J. H. H.

  Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

  Forbes, W.

  Peel, Col.

  Forester, hon. G. C. W.

  Pennant, hon. Col.

  Fox, S. W. L.

  Pigot, Sir R.

  Frewen, C. H.

  Plowden, W. H. C.

  Fuller, A. E.

  Power, N.

  Galway, Visct.

  Powlett, Lord W.

  Gaskell, J. M.

  Prime, R.

  Gladstone, rt. hn. W.E.

  Pugh, D.

  Goddard, A. L.

  Reid, Col.

  Godson, R.

  Renton, J. C.

  Gooch, E. S.

  Repton, G. W. J.

  Gordon, Adm.

  Richards, R.

  Gore, W. R. O.

  Rushout, Capt.

  Goring, C.

  Sandars, G.

  Greene, T.

  Seymour, Sir H.

  Gwyn, H.

  Sibthorp, Col.

  Hale, R. B.

  Slaney, R. A.

  Halford, Sir H.

  Smith, M. T.

  Hall, Col.

  Smyth, J. G.

  Hamilton, G. A.

  Somerset, Capt.

  Harris, hon. Capt.

  Somerton, Visct.

  Hencage, G. H. W.

  Spooner, R.

  Henley, J. W.

  Stafford, A.

  Herbert, H. A.

  Stanley, E.

  Hildyard, R. C.

  Stuart, H.

  Hildyard, T. B. T.

  Stuart, J.

  Hodgson, W. N.

  Sturt, H. G.

  Hood, Sir A.

  Taylor, T. E.

  Hope, Sir J.

  Thompson, Ald.

  Hope, H. T.

  Thornhill, G.

  Hornby, J.

  Tollemache, J.

  Hudson, G.

  Townley, R. G.

  Ingestre, Visct.

  Trollope, Sir J.

  Inglis, Sir R. H.

  Turner, G. J.

  Jocelyn, Visct.

  Tyrell, Sir J. T.

  Johnstone, Sir J.

  Villiers, hon. F. W. C.

  Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.

  Vyse, R. H. R. H.

  Jones, Sir W.

  Waddington, D.

  Kerrison, Sir E.

  Waddington, H. S.

  Knightley, Sir C.

  Wall, C. B.

  Law, hon. C. E.

  Walpole, S. H.

  Lewis, rt. hon. Sir T. F.

  Walsh, Sir J. B.

  Lindsay, hon. Col.

  Welby, G. E.

  Lowther, hon. Col.

  Wellesley, Lord C.

  Lowther, H.

  Willoughby, Sir H.

  Lygon, hon. Gen.

  Worcester, Marq. of

  Mackenzie, W. F.

  Young, Sir J.

  Macnaghten, Sir E.

  TELLERS.

  Mahon, Visct.

  Herries, rt. hon. J. C.

  Mandeville, Visct.

  Granby, Marq. of

  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Twelve o'clock.

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—Several Lords.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1a Petty Bag Office.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. From several Charitable Institutions, praying to be Relieved from the Payment of Legacy Duty on Bequests made to them.—From Hereford, Leeds, and several other Cities and Boroughs, in favour of the Jewish Disabilities Bill.—From the Clergy of Southampton, and several other Places, against the Jewish Disabilities Bill.—By the Earl Fitzhardinge and Lord Beaumont, from the Members of several Lodges of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, Manchester Unity, and the Ancient Order of Foresters, praying that the Provisions of the Benefit Societies Act may be extended to that Order—From a Number of Tradesmen, Mechanics, and Others, for an Alteration of the Poor Law, in order to Relieve the Present Condition of Agricultural Labourers.—From Lancaster, Great and Little Eccleston, and a Number of other Places, against the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sundays.—From Ross, that all Post Offices may be closed on the Lord's Day.—From the Kirk Session of the Parish of North Bute, against the Marriage Bill (Scotland).—From the Commissioners of Supply of

877
the County of Lanark, against the Registering of Births, &c. (Scotland) Bill.—By the Earl of Galloway, from the Elders of the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale, against the Diplomatic Relations, Court of Rome, Bill.—From the Magistracy and Town Council of the Burgh of Tain, in favour of the Crown and Government Security Bill.

CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION AND AMENDMENT BILL.
LORD BROUGHAM:* Aware that I cannot bring before your Lordships the great subject which I have undertaken to discuss this day, without occupying your attention for a long time, I proceed at once, and without preface, to the task before me. It is true, that the matter is as Important as it is extensive; and yet it is of so forbidding an aspect, of a nature so little attractive by any connection with party interests or personal feelings, that I am surprised, though doubtless agreeably surprised, to find so large an attendance of the House as I have now the honour of addressing. I should ill repay the honour you do me by trespassing longer upon your patience than is necessary. The topics I am to handle are, indeed, not at all of the class termed vital questions, of which it was once said, not more wittily than truly, that while they never failed to excite the greatest interest, their importance was so small, that it signified nothing at all what way they were determined. Those questions which I am now to discuss, are, on the contrary, of incalculable importance, how dry and even forbidding soever they be when in debate.
I shall now state why I have chosen this time for bringing forward the discussion, and in what order I propose to undertake it. Twenty years ago, being then a Member of the other House, I brought before it the whole subject of the law and its defects, only excepting from my view, for reasons which I assigned, the Commercial Law, the Criminal Law, and the Equitable Jurisdiction of Chancery. In consequence of the Address which I prevailed on the Commons to present, the Crown, under the advice of my noble and learned Friend near me (Lord Lyndhurst) issued a Commission to eminent conveyancers, over whom presided my noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Campbell), and another Commission to common lawyers, most of whom are now on the bench. From the inquiries and reports of those learned and able individuals, resulted many highly important measures for the amendment of the law, measures in passing which
* From a pamphlet published by Ridgway.
878
I afterwards had a large share, from having subsequently succeeded to the Great Seal. The changes thus effected in our jurisprudence removed a large portion of the defects which I had complained of; and as the whole have not been removed, I feel that the time has now arrived for urging Parliament to finish the important work thus happily begun, as well as to embrace in its amending operations, cautiously and safely, though steadily carried on, those few branches of the subject to which my Motion in 1828 had not been directed. The past success naturally holds out this encouragement; the interval that has elapsed, too, enables us to tell by the experience afforded of our changes, how far these have worked well in practice; and we may conveniently and usefully now pause to decide, whether or not the measures adopted have been wisely framed, and whether or not we should go on in the same course. Such is my reason for now instituting this inquiry. The order in which I would arrange my statements, I shall now state, and I think I have distributed the subject in a manner which is at once distinct and exhaustive. I shall first consider law-makers—or who make our laws? Secondly. Law-making—or how do they make them? Thirdly. Law made—or what is the fabric of our jurisprudence? Fourthly. The promulgation of the law. Fifthly. Its Administration.
First, then—Who make the laws? How is our Legislature constituted?—that is, the representative part of it—of whose structure alone any consideration can arise. I do not mean even to touch upon the constitutional questions, but only the legal ones connected with this subject. But I cannot dismiss the political, without making a frank and candid admission, that the late experience of a neighbouring nation has materially affected the opinion which I had so long entertained against the almost indefinite extension of the elective franchise. We have seen Universal Suffrage tried upon an enormous scale, and in a country peculiarly ill adapted to the successful issue of that experiment: 10,000,000 of voters have been called upon to choose the deputies, who should represent them in a National Assembly, and the result has been almost entirely contrary to what the adversaries of such a scheme had ever predicted. The elections have been conducted with exemplary order, and the deputies returned belong to the classes of society, in whose hands legisla-

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tive power may be the most safely vested. That a Parliament has been chosen which is very little likely to work well, and that under its sway France is doomed to the reign of uncertainty and even anarchy, may be quite consistent with what I have said of the elections; for this and the other evils now pressing upon that ill-fated country may be traced, and easily traced, to other causes—to circumstances now unhappily existing in the position of France, and the necessary result of its late revolution. But that the experiment of Universal Suffrage has been tried, and has succeeded beyond all expectation, truth and candour compel me to confess. I derive from hence the most sanguine hopes that many years may not be suffered to elapse before we too extend our elective franchise to the great body of our fellow citizens, who compose the labouring classes—the very source of our wealth, and the pillar of our strength as a nation—men whose virtues are equal to their industry—men whose steady attachment to the Government and its rule, bids defiance to all the attempts ever made to seduce them from their allegiance.
But if I pass over the qualification of electors, I cannot so easily part with the qualification of Members. How much longer is it to be endured that men shall be suffered to act the part of lawgivers, who set their creditors at defiance—that men shall represent the property of the country who have squandered away their own; that insolvents, unless they be traders, in other words, insolvents without any excuse for their insolvency, shall beard their creditors, the honest tradesmen, whom they have ruined, and insult the community by taking a forward part in making the laws which are to bind it, while they set themselves, openly and audaciously, in defiance of the very laws they are making? By an Act passed in 1812 (52 Geo. III. c. 96), introduced by my lamented Friend, Mr. John Smith, himself a trader, and within its provisions, we have excluded from Parliament all traders who have become bankrupt, and do not within twelve months pay their debts in full, and supersede their commission. Yet the trader thus dealt with has many excuses for his insolvency. The failure of others, the accidents of the winds and the waves, the acts of Government, over which he has very little control, or of foreign States, over which he has none; the frauds of customers, of the man in high station who obtains his property, and cannot or
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will not pay for it—all these things leading to the misfortune of bankruptcy, without any fault of the party, are, in most cases, an extenuation, and in many a defence for the trader, and yet we exclude him from the Legislature, on the ground set forth in the preamble to the Act—
"That it is highly necessary for preserving the dignity and independence of Parliament, that Members of the House of Commons who become bankrupt, and do not pay their debts in full, shall not retain their seats."
But how would the preamble sound which should state in words the course of conduct we hold with respect to insolvent Lords and Gentlemen?—"Whereas it is highly necessary, for preserving the independence and dignity of Parliament, that those who run in debt with bankers, tradesmen, and others, without any means of payment, by extravagant living, by dicing, by horse-racing, by keeping of mistresses, and by various other devices of spendthrift and profligate men, and who cannot or who will not pay any part whatever of their just debts, should retain their seats in the House of Commons, and have a share in making those laws in daring contempt whereof they are living." To remedy so enormous an evil, and put an end to this outrage on all honest principle, and indeed on all common decency, I four years ago presented a Bill for extending to all insolvents the statute excluding the more innocent class of bankrupts; but I was not fortunate enough to obtain the sanction of the Legislature to that measure. I shall certainly again present it this Session.
Unable to pass over the Qualification of Members, I am equally compelled to speak of the arts used for obtaining their election—I mean the scandalous bribery and corruption practised in all the vile branches of that odious traffic in the consciences and souls of men. To this subject I have oftentimes directed the attention of your Lordships, and I have the happiness of thinking that we are agreed upon it. A stringent declaration of each Member, with a promise not to pay any expenses unlawfully incurred, and subject to the pains of perjury for a breach of truth, is the remedy to which I look as most efficacious and most suited to the nature of the mischief. I am happy to find that elsewhere this subject has been lately taken up with adequate zeal; and I believe wholesome inquiries are now instituting there for the purpose of detecting and punishing offenders. But I greatly doubt if an error has not been com-

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mitted in some instances, from the desire to visit such practices on the sitting Members. It rather should seem as if Committees, led away by the natural indignation which the description of general corruption excites, have resolved upon convicting whoever was accused, without any regard to the material point of agency—thus punishing one man for another's offence.
This leads me to the last matter I shall dwell upon connected with the composition of the Legislature—the Constitution of the Tribunals which try the returns of Members, and the needful improvement of which would, while generally amending the course of such important procedure, tend more to repress bribery, by an equal administration of justice, than any efforts of a well-meant but irregularly directed indignation at the offence. The Commons parted with their exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of elections as far back as 1770, when the celebrated Grenville Act was passed (10 Geo. III. c. 16), one of the inestimable benefits conferred upon their country by that illustrious family. But experience has shown, that although many material improvements have been since made in the constitution of the tribunal, especially by the statutes diminishing the numbers of their Members, and doing away with the anomalous character supported by the nominees, yet another step remains to be taken in order to render the trial of petitions anything worthy the name of a judicial proceeding. It must be transferred to a judicial body, unconnected with the House of Commons, in accessible to party claims, uninfluenced by personal feelings; a body not chosen accidentally for particular occasions, and composed of men without experience or learning, and acting without any responsibility—a body, in a word, which will act as judges act, regarding only the merits of each case, and pronouncing decisions on legal points, with a careful regard to consistency and uniformity; not as now, holding one day one opinion, another day the opposite, on the same point, simply because different men sit on several days, and diverse interests or feelings sway them. Some such amendment of the Election Laws as this must needs, sooner or later, be undertaken; for in no other way can the opprobrium be removed, which now rests upon the conduct of Committees, and the character of the House of Commons.
Second. From considering the makers of the laws, I pass on to their conduct in
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making them; and here a scene opens to our view at once strange and painful to contemplate. No system whatever, nothing approaching to systematic, is to be seen—all is random—all hap-hazard—all blind-chance; all acting in the dark, without rule, or guide, or compass, or concert. The Bills propounded have a twofold origin; they come from boards or departments of the State: or they come from private individuals, whom without any disrespect I may term amateurs in legislation. But the boards, independent and separate, act without any concert, any communication whatever; one entirely ignorant what the other is doing; each proceeding upon principles of its own, if principles any of them ever think of; each taking its own views of the same subject-matter on which the other is composing law; each employing a phraseology of its own; all generally in collision and often in conflict. As for the amateurs' work it is worse performed, if worse can be; and the way in which the worthy dilettante is suffered to make our laws really merits attention, as showing how little care the State bestows on this important operation. I will give your Lordships an instance. In 1814 a learned person who adorned the coif, was minded to be placed upon the Bench of Wales. He conceived, and for ought I can tell, so might the Principality, that he had pretensions to judge the Welsh. The Ministers of the day held a different opinion; but as the Serjeant was their firm and faithful supporter, always being disposed to vote with them, and indeed with all Administrations, so considerable a merit must be rewarded, and as he was refused a Welsh judgeship, he was allowed by way of compensation to repeal the Statute of Apprenticeship. To make up for his professional disappointment he was to have the senatorial honour of giving his name to an Act for repealing an Act passed in the fifth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth for regulating Apprenticeships. Now when we look to his Statute (54 Geo. III. c. 96), we find that it consists of only two sections; but so inartificially is it drawn, so little care has been bestowed on a subject of such great importance, that there is appended to the second—a repealing section which professes to deal with all the provisions of the Statute of Elizabeth (5 Eliz., c. 4) from the 25th to the 30th—a query to which of the numerous matters in their several clauses the repeal is in-

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tended to apply; and I defy any one from comparing the two, to answer the question, or form a confident opinion on the subject. This amateur, however, was a lawyer; and we may well suppose how much worse fare the laws, and the courts required to construe them, and the subjects commanded to obey them, when country gentlemen are allowed to disport them in dealing with trespassers and poachers, and the various other subjects of their legislative labours; or when traders take up the bankrupt code, in a Bill to amend which I lately read a clause making death without naming executors an act of bankruptcy.
The result of all this habitual carelessness and want of system in the preparation of our laws might easily be foreseen. A mass has been engendered in which the obscurity of darkness alternates with the glare of cross light, meagre explanation with inexcusable prolixity, repetition with omission, repugnance with truism—a mass, which if it be not termed nonsense and contradiction, only escapes those epithets from the respect due to the venerable name of a statutory record. For, unhappily, the obvious principles which should guide the lawgiver in his labours, I mean the formal or mechanical part of his task, to which my inquiry is under this head of the subject confined, are neglected so habitually, that the value of these rules becomes the more sensibly felt from witnessing the consequences of their being violated. I shall first mention three such canons, and then illustrate their violation by examples. The propositions are almost self-evident; they require no demonstration. 1. A statute should never be made without a cereful regard to former statutes in pari materia. 2. One part of a statute should ever have regard to all its other parts. 3. Alterations made in passing a Bill should carefully be made having regard to the parts that are left unchanged. Now let us see how these plain rules are broken.
i. Statutes are made as if in ignorance of others before made, or other laws or customs before existing. In 1842 was passed the 5th & 6th Victoria, c. 29, which most properly swept away all former provisions giving double or treble costs, as in every way absurd, and indeed professing to do what in practice none of them did. One might have expected the memory of lawgivers to last at the least a couple of years—but no such thing. In 1845, were passed no less than three Acts, all giving double
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and treble costs, which my learned Friend the Chief Baron's Act had abolished universally, in all cases. I allude to the Lunacy Act, 8 & 9 Victoria, c. 27; the Trade Act, 8 & 9 Victoria, c. 23; and the Smuggling Act, 8 & 9 Victoria, c. 87—all three Statutes dealing with matters of great moment and all three Government Acts. Again, in 1843, was passed the 6 & 7 Victoria, c. 75, for regulating the Practice of Attorneys; and it threw open the court of the Lord Mayor of London to all practitioners—but this was plainly done in utter ignorance or entire disregard of the known custom, by which attorneys of that court purchase their exclusive right of practice at sums ranging from 3,000 l. to 9,000 l., and the whole value of which the Court of Queen's Bench have found to be entirely destroyed by this careless enactment (Rex v. Ashmead). Nor were our predecessors much more attentive to the legislation of those to whom they had succeeded, little as they, in comparison with us, had to distract their attention. The great Game Act, 22 & 23 Chas. II. c. 11, was plainly made with perfect inattention to the first Game Act, 1 Jac. I. c. 27; for the statute of Charles gives the qualification to the eldest son and heir apparent of an esquire, or person of higher degree, saying nothing of the father, from whom the statute of James had withheld the right to kill game. So that the son is qualified because heir to a person not qualified, and yet the son's qualification is in respect and on the supposition of the father's, which does not exist. This was held by three Judges out of four in the King's Bench (Jones v. Smith) 1 T. R. 44—a remarkable case as being one of the very few in which during Lord Mansfield's time there was any division on that Bench. That great Judge was so much moved by this gross absurdity apparent on the face of the statute, as to hold by and stoutly contest that it included the esquire himself; but he of course yielded to the majority of his brethren, and the law was declared as I have stated it.
ii. But though the lawgiver does not remember former statutes, he might at least be expected to recollect while passing one part of the same Act, what he had just been doing in the preceding portions. No such thing—one part of a statute is made without regard to the other parts of the same statute. The sixteenth section of 3rd Geo. I. c. 15, states in its preamble, the fitness of taking away the She-

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riff's poundage in extending an estate under a writ of elegit; the process, as your Lordships are aware, by which lands and tenements are partially seized by creditors to satisfy their debts out of the rents and profits. But though this is one of the main objects of the section, the word 'elegit' being by a curious infelicity wholly left out of the enactment, the Sheriff has been held entitled to his poundage, though the blunder was so gross that those before whom the matter came seemed at first to suppose it must be a mistake in the printing, and desired the original record to be examined. In that record the omission is found to exist. Price v. Hollis, 3 M. & S. 105. Here our ancestors forgot the preamble in the five or six succeeding lines. We have somewhat improved in our legislative memory, for we only forget what we said three sections back. By the Highway Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vic. c. 50, in section 95, costs are given to be paid by a rate; in section 98 all this is forgotten, and they are directed to be paid by the party unsuccessfully defending.
iii. Now we come to errors which no care in preparing the Bill can prevent—I mean the making of alterations during its passage through Parliament, without regard to the parts left unchanged. Take for an instance the important Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vic. c. 113, for allowing copies of documents to be given in evidence; it had in this manner an addition made during the passage of the Bill, apparently for greater caution, and the result is to make such nonsense of the whole that no man can tell how to apply it. The words added are, "in every case in which the original could be received in evidence"—but the section had before been confined to those cases only in which the originals could be given in evidence. Here the Legislature bears the aspect not of a doating person, who forgets in old age recent events, not recollecting one day or one hour what he had said the day or the hour before; but of one who being in the very last stage of mental imbecility, forgets at the close of his sentence what he had said at its commencement.
iv. I come now to the Diction—the words used in framing our statutes—and here the cardinal rules are as plain as those I have already stated, and they flow from the simple principle of keeping in mind to whom all laws are addressed, not only the lawyers and the courts of law, but the people.

1. Always use the least equivocal and the plainest terms.

2. Never use a word that has two senses without defining in which it is used.

3. Never use the same words in two senses.

4. Never use different words in the same sense.

5. Never assume as known what has not been expounded.

6. Never, if possible, enact by reference to another statute.

7. If, to avoid great prolixity, you must import one, regard carefully the text of the Act referred to.

Only see, my Lords, in what daring neglect of all these rules we lawgivers live! I will take from a single Session my example of the very different forms we use to express the same things, the Session 1844, the 7th & 8th Vict.—and the three most ordinarily occurring clauses are those which I select: First, the provision that the Act shall be a Public Act, is framed in four several ways, and to the effect of making it even somewhat doubtful in some of them whether the Act must not be specially pleaded. Second, the clause now inserted in all Acts to avoid the consequences of the fiction that all chapters of a Session are parts of the same Act, and pass in one day—the clause allowing each to be altered the same Session: this is framed in no less than eight different ways. Thirdly, the repeal of other provisions; a most important enactment, and fruitful of litigation and of doubts in courts of justice, is effected in twelve different ways. So that these three objects, instead of being accomplished by three forms of expression, require four-and-twenty. I have given all the Acts to which I refer on this head, in a paper which I now lay on the table, in case any of your Lordships would see the details.
But worse remains behind. In 1846, an Act was passed of a highly important kind, to amend the poor-law, 9 & 10 Vic. c. 66. If any piece of legislation demanded peculiar care in its composition, it was surely this—yet the words employed were "is" and "was"—now, "shall be," then "may be," and "may have been;" again, "shall have been"—the changes rung on the unhappy substantive verb from the present to the future, the potential, the pluperfect, to the confusion of the sense, and the bewilderment of the more unhappy Judge, have ended in making it wholly impossible to discover whether the

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Act is prospective only, or retrospective as well; and what is the consequence? No less than three-and-forty cases are now pending upon this construction of a statute passed less than two years ago. So, on the same important subject, it was the Legislature's design to give an appeal on all cases upon the merits, only shutting out from this review those upon matter of form; yet so ill contrived is the provision, that a learned Recorder, presiding over one of the greatest towns in this kingdom, informed me only this morning that in ten years he has only known two appeals brought.
The use of different terms to express the same thing, I have already illustrated by sufficiently striking examples. The same term used in different senses is as fruitful a source of difficulty and doubt to the subject and to the courts. Thus the word "licenses" being used both for ale and spirits, and with the Justices and the Excise granting both, gave rise to much obscurity, as the Court of Queen's Bench found to its sorrow, and the parties to their heavy costs, in Rex v. Downes, 37. R. 569.
The use of undefined expression is a yet greater fault of the same kind, and fruitful in evil consequences. Take, for instance, the litigation occasioned by the Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vic. c. 36, exempting from rates "societies for science, literature, and the fine arts," and see what the Judges say who had to construe these unexplained terms in Rex v. Pocock, 8. L. Queen's Bench, 740; Rex v. Phillips; Rex v. Jones, ib. Lord Denman, C. J., observes that it is "impossible not to express regret that such loose language should have been employed. There is hardly," says his Lordship, "any society respecting which doubts might not be raised." "All which," he adds, "show how great hardship is imposed on the court, on parishes, and on societies. The natural meaning of the words would point to the very institutions least requiring exemption, those consisting of wealthy members." "I only hope," he adds, "that we may have some enactment made to show us what Parliament really does mean." Mr. Justice Patteson and Mr. Justice Williams entirely concurred with his Lordship, and all seemed agreed in considering that the decision they were compelled to give, frustrated the probable intentions of the Legislature.
The errors produced by incorporating former provisions in the way of reference, are
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endless. Thus in 1835 the 5th & 6th Will. IV. c. 76 was passed, and it gives an appeal, not directly, but by reference to the 55th Geo. III. c. 51, the result of which has been the taking away the right of appeal intended to be given. Lord Denman, Rex v. Recorder of Bath, 9 Ad. and E1. 837, in so ruling, said, he saw what was meant, and had to lament that the Legislature should have proceeded by way of reference to another Act, instead of declaring its meaning at once and directly. I have preferred giving such examples as are more recent and of more ordinary occurrence, rather than the old one of a clause cut out by the scissors, the great legislative agent in modern times, whereby the punishment of fourteen years' transportation was awarded—one moiety going to the person suing for the same, the other to his Majesty, his heirs and successors. But one effect of such operations is of more frequent recurrence; the word "said" or "aforesaid" is often used when nothing has been previously said. Whoever has answered many cases will at once recognise the puzzle this creates.
Hitherto we have been observing the effects of carelessness in matters which did not seem to call for special attention; but it is still worse where the Legislature applies itself in a peculiar manner to the performance of its task, and particularly to the duty of making itself intelligible, that its failure is signal and lamentable.
v. For I now come to that famous freak of modern lawgivers, the Interpretation Clause. Its assumed office, its pretension, is to prevents all doubts by precisely declaring the sense in which words are used. Its
actual result is the creation of fresh doubts, the failure in most difficulties to clear them away, and the inevitable carelessness which it encourages in drawing the statutes as well as in passing their provisions. This has become a very serious evil. For instead of weighing well the words employed, and taking constant care to preserve accuracy and uniformity of expression, all draughts are carelessly made to save trouble, in the expectation that everything will be cured by the Clause of Interpretation. Thus, in 1844, an Act was passed requiring Joint Stock Companies to register their shareholders. 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110. The 26th section, which standing alone would perhaps have been clear enough, refers you to the Interpretation Clause, or rather clauses; for, with a marvellous absurdity, there are two

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and not one such, and you arrive at section 2, which, as Mr. Baron Alderson showed in Young v. Smith, 15. M. and W. 121. raises the whole difficulty; for instead of saying that a Joint Stock Company shall be understood to be one, the stock of which is divided into shares, it adds an exception, whereby you are referred back to the rest of the Act, and thus all companies requiring Acts to work them, are exempted from registration. Bousfield v. Wilson, 16. M. and W. 185. Here let us pause to consider the utter absurdity of introducing an exception into such clauses—they are truly definitions; and who ever heard of an exception in a definition? When Euclid describes a triangle to be a figure of three sides or three angles, we understand him, and can reason upon the figure's properties. Had he defined it to be a figure of three sides in all cases, unless where the context required it to mean a figure of more sides, or to mean a figure bounded by one straight and one curved line, we should have been continually at a loss in our reasonings, and the name of that celebrated geometrician would certainly not have come down to us as designating the first of didactic writers, or his work been regarded as the most perfect model of perspicuous explanation. The various ways in which these exceptions are framed by our legislative Euclids further give rise to great embarrassment. Thus, "unless another sense plainly is shown by the context, or by some positive enactment to the contrary." Now, subtle men like lawyers, will very readily deny that the other sense is plainly shown, or by positive words, or to the very contrary, though they may admit that there are some conflicting words. Again, in 7 & 8 Vic. c. 15. (1844), "unless otherwise specially provided, (it is not even said where) or the subject or the context be repugnant;" while no definition is given of what is special, or what is subject. Further, in 7 & 8 Vic. c. 122, s. 70, we are told that this Act is to be "construed beneficially to creditors, and by analogy to the laws in force relating to bankrupts, and the practice thereof;" while I really should like, for curiosity sake, to know how laws shall be construed by analogy, what laws are in force relating to bankrupts, and, above all, what is the practice of those, or indeed of any laws. No less inconsistent with the nature of such clauses is the practice so prevalent of borrowing into one from another Act framed with
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different scope; and a fruitful source of error as well as of considerable absurdity does this practice prove. Last year the General Act for giving Town Police Clauses passed, the 10 & 11 Vic. c. 89., and as this was to be the model statute by which all subsequent Police Acts were to be guided, we might expect it to have been carefully drawn, and not concocted by the scissors merely. Well, let us see how the interpretation is given in the third section. Cattle is defined to mean horses, mules, sheep, goats, swine; but not a word is said of oxen or cows, and yet an overdrove ox was a much more likely visitor of a town than a goat, or even swine. My respect for the drawers of such Acts, will not permit me to remark on their omitting also any reference to another animal, found in town as well as country, asses.
vi. We have thus seen that the Legislature departs the further from clearness and precision in proportion as it is minded to employ more strict and entire attention to its task, and that it is never so little explanatory as in its explanations. But where the subject is such as to require undivided attention—where all doubt is out of the question—where it says exactly what it means—where what it does is perfectly of purpose and forethought, and is wholly designed and intended, we shall see such things as raise its mere slips into a respectable position for accuracy and sense. We have been contemplating the lawgiver's skill in definition—his powers as logician—no less eminent is he as a natural philosopher and a mathematician. The 35th Geo. III. c. 114, was passed in 1795, for regulating the Glass Duties. It speaks of plate-glass unpolished, and plate-glass unground, apparently without the knowledge that no polished glass can be unground. But letting that pass, the preamble states that, "the regulations hitherto made for the glass duty, have proved ineffectual, and that new ones are become necessary." And the statute proceeds to order that all "annealing ovens shall henceforth be made in a rectangular form, with the sides and ends perpendicular and parallel to each other respectively." Now, if the form be rectangular, the sides must of necessity be perpendicular, that being the meaning of a rectangle. Moreover, the opposite sides must of equal necessity be parallel, if the adjoining sides be perpendicular. This is the nature, and the eternal nature of lines; and it would pass the power of Omnipotence

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to vary it. Yet the cautious Legislature, to prevent the possibility of that being done, which is thus absolutely and necessarily impossible, annexes a penalty of 100 l. to the breach of the rule laid down—declaring that whoever shall do that which no power, finite or infinite, can accomplish, shall pay 100 l. by way of fine. It sagely protects the eternal laws of mathematics by this pecuniary penalty—to be sued for by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information in any Court of Record. When we compare such feats of legislative care and diligence with the less marvellous exhibition of careless efforts, we may well say: Mallem, mehercule illorum neligentiam, quam istorum pravam diligentiam.
Hitherto we have been considering the manfacturing of Public Acts. The confusion of all principle, the gross errors at every step, and mischiefs of a far worse kind, are much more flagrantly conspicuous in the great department of Private Bill legislation. The importance of this manufacture is, however, exceedingly great; its extent is enormous. Thus in the year 1836, no less than 191 Private Acts were passed, filling about 9,000 folios. In twelve years 278 were passed for forty-five towns, or one for every two years on an average for each. Dublin obtained ten, Southampton twelve, Edinburgh and Glasgow twenty each, Liverpool twenty-three, or two a year. The parish of Marylebone since 1795 has had Acts made for it filling 480 folios, or half as much again as the Code Civile of Napoleon. The nature of the provisions in these Acts is yet more important than their bulk or number. They deal with private vested interests, and unquestionable legal rights, in every one instance and in every one provision. The reason, and the only reason, for passing each of them is, that the law of the land has protected some party whom it is desired to strip of his rights. This branch of law-making is truly transcendental; it is wholly occupied with transferring to one man the property of another; compelling persons to part with their estates for the benefit of others; breaking contracts already made; annulling settlements of estates; setting aside the wills of persons deceased; dissolving the tie of marriage, by law indissoluble; abrogating laws made for the whole community in favour of some individuals, or against others. Such a branch of legislation requires of all others peculiar care, and close and scrupu-
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lous attention to avert error and prevent abuses; yet error flourishes and abuse triumphs here far more than in the construction of public acts. First, there is here no responsibility at all, not even that shadow of responsibility which the departments of Governments offer for public statutes. Secondly, the whole process is conducted in the dark, as a hidden manufactory; the public attention which through the press and by the debates of the two Houses, prevents many faults in Public Acts, has here no part, the whole being carried on in secret. Thirdly, worse than neglect, fraud and jobbing of every kind prevails. Once a clause was fraudulently introduced into a public or Revenue Bill to benefit a private party; it was instantly discovered, and the attempt frustrated. In Private Acts this is of daily occurrence. All is here done by compromise among a few parties, and the public is always disregarded, the weaker individuals and their rights and interests continually set at nought. Thus such provisions are to be found in Private Acts as could not be believed, did we not read them in the Statute-book. I recollect my noble and learned Friend behind me (Lord Lyndhurst) would not credit my statement, till I brought forward the Great Western Act, in which a clause is actually inserted, enabling the company to give a copy of its books in evidence, without any proof of the copy being accurate; but that is nothing; the company is also enabled to prove its having made certain large payments (the parish rates), by the entry in its own books that these same have been paid. Thus any one writing an entry, and entitling it a copy from the company's books, can prove its having paid the rates. Sir Samuel Romilly once stopped a Lincolnshire Poor Bill, in which he had accidentally found a power given to the master of the workhouse to flog the paupers at his pleasure.
The grievances arising from this manner of passing our statutes, public and private, are enormous. The errors and the frauds are never discovered, until the remediless mischief has occurred, and the courts are called to construe unconstruable clauses, and reconcile self-repugnant provisions, and the parties to suffer the hardships of oppression, and delay, and expense. Thus the fine of a shilling for not going to the parish church, lurked in the Statute of Elizabeth till, in 1841, five or six poachers were sent before the Lancashire Justices, who failed to convict under the Game

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Laws. "Were you at church last Sunday?" said the worthy magistrates. "No." "Or the Sunday before?" "No; nor for five successive Sundays"—and forthwith all the poor men were fined and sentenced to pay costs, and in default of payment sent to prison, where they lay many weeks, when I presented their petition to this House, and they were liberated. But had I held the Great Seal, I should at once have removed the justices for this gross malversation. Thus bad clauses lie torpid like vipers, till, warmed to life by the heat of party, or personal malice, they sting some unhappy individuals. The instance lately occurred of an Act declaring an individual liable to pay the debts of a company to which he never had in any way belonged: he found himself thus made liable only when sued, and the court which tried the cause could not allow proof of his entire ignorance of the company and all its concerns; because the statute named him as answerable with others, and all of them being insolvent, he, the only solvent person named, was sued, and had judgment against him. The loss of time to Courts of Law and Equity is equal to the vexation occasioned to parties by this reckless system. But as the extent and bitterness of the mischief needs no proof, I shall shortly indicate what I take to be the appropriate remedy for preventing it in future, if we cannot hope to cure it in the past.
(1.) I have often urged the necessity of a board being formed of skilful professional men, not to supersede but to aid both Houses of Parliament, in the preparation of Public Bills. It is a task which no one man, how gifted soever, can hope satisfactorily to execute, because several men are required, of different habits of thinking, of various turns of mind, to sift the subjects successively dealt with in our numerous statutes. At the head of this board should be the Minister of Justice or his deputy. The necessity of this office I have repeatedly urged, and I may before I sit down once more recur to this subject.
(2.) The Private Bills should undergo another scrutiny. I am sensible that much has of late been done to improve the proceedings in Committees. In 1837 I had the honour of propounding a great and most salutary alteration in the Committees of this House; and after examination above stairs, the Standing Orders which I proposed were unanimously adopted by your Lordships; they have been found to work well, and, after some years delay, they have been
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adopted by the other House of Parliament. Yet I still am decidedly of opinion that we only took the second best of the three plans which I submitted to the Committee's consideration. By far the most effectual, and the best calculated both to prevent error and injustice, and to save delay and expense to parties, was grounded on the important suggestions of my noble and gallant Friend (the Duke of Wellington), made in 1834, and at that time worked out by me in conjunction with him. I am convinced that it afforded by far the best remedy. It is to have a jury de medietate, as it were, formed in each case—a joint Committee of twelve—seven Commoners and five Lords—to examine the whole of the Bill, to hear counsel, and take evidence, under the presidency of a Judge—a professional man, unconnected with Parliament altogether—the joint Committee to find a special verdict, setting forth the whole facts of the case; such verdict to be conclusive on both Houses, and to form the groundwork, in point of fact, of all their legislation in the matter of the Bill. I laid before the House, both in the last and in a former Session, a series of resolutions for working out this principle, and applying it to all Private Bills; and as I am clear that it is the only effectual remedy, so I have sanguine expectations of its being one day adopted.
(3.) Such subjects as are rather judicial than legislative, ought at once to be abandoned by Parliament, and given over to the established tribunals of the country. Thus Estate Bills are truly of a judicial character; Divorce Bills still more so; and a Committee of this House has already reported in favour of transferring these to the cognizance of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Assuredly as the law now stands on this subject, nothing can well be imagined more unjust or more anomalous; the practice and the expense in both Estate and Divorce Bills may truly be said to give a remedy to the rich, and withhold it altogether from the poor. In making the transfer which I recommend, we shall not be acting without a precedent. The extension of patents has been, by my Bill of 1835, vested in the Judicial Committee, by a concurrent jurisdiction, of course, with Parliament; for no Bill can prevent Parliament from legislating on any matter whatever. But not a single instance has, I believe, occurred of a patentee applying to Parliament for an Act since the doors of the Privy Council were

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thrown open, and the Council's proceedings have given general satisfaction.
We have considered who make the law, and how they make it.
Third. Come we now to cast our eye over the result of their labours, and see what is the system of our jurisprudence thus formed, with a view to its amendment. That it is attended with many evils, gives birth to great vexation, involves the affairs of the community in lamentable uncertainty, imposes upon the citizens who live under it a heavy expense, cannot be denied. To take only the last item of expense. The amount of costs taxed in Equity alone was last year, 615,000 l., and the expense to the public of the taxation 13,500 l. But two-thirds as much more must be added for the bills of solicitors, paid without taxing by their clients; and thus a million of money was spent in that department of the law.
The field over which we are now to glance is so extensive as to discourage any attempt at fully examining it. But I cannot help deriving great comfort from the success which has attended former attempts at improving it. The famous Commission under the Commonwealth, in 1654, presided over by Lord Hale, reported in favour of some fourteen changes in the law; and ten or eleven of them are now on the Statute-book. Between 1785 and 1790 Sir Samuel Romilly, as appears by his papers, proposed many legislative reforms, few of which he himself brought forward. Of these one-half had been adopted twenty years ago, when I brought this subject forward in the other House; and now almost all of them are introduced into our jurisprudence. Of above seventy defects whereof I complained on that occasion, about sixty have since been removed; nor were those slight defects, or those changes small innovations. I complained that party prevailed over the selection of Judges; and of late years, both while I held the Great Seal, and in the time of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) who succeeded me, as well as while my noble Friend on the Woolsack has held office, no party considerations have been allowed to influence the selection of those high functionaries, any more than Sir Robert Peel had previously to 1828 been swayed by party considerations in naming the Judges of Scotland. I complained of the Welsh judicature: this has since been abolished, and the Principality subjected, as I recom-
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mended, to the same tribunals with the rest of the realm. I complained of the Court of Delegates: it was abolished by my Act of 1833—of the judicial system prevailing in the Privy Council: it was reformed by the same statute, and the Judicial Committee substituted for the trial of all appeals, both from the Consistorial Courts, the Court of Admiralty, and all our various and extensive foreign possessions. I complained of real actions, including fines and recoveries: real actions, with the the single exception of quare impedit, are swept away, and fines and recoveries altogether. I complained of many defects and anomalies in the Law of Evidence: these defects have been almost entirely removed by the admirable Act of Lord Denman, though one important step in the same direction yet remains to be taken by examining parties themselves. I complained of the period of limitation, especially of the suffering it to be interrupted by the duration of estates tail, and of the immunity from all limitation enjoyed by Church rights. The Acts of Lord Tenderden in 1829 and 1832, and those to which my noble Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) and I obtained the concurrence of Parliament in 1833, have removed those defects, so that now the opprobrium of the law exists no longer, by which rights might formerly have been enjoyed, as against the Church, for centuries, without the least security to the possessor, and by which, in one case, a large estate in the north, after being possessed for above a century and a half, and being made the subject of settlement, and sale, and mortgage, over and over again, was found to be the property of a mere stranger, in consequence of estates tail not having been determined, and no adverse possession having been had as against the reversioner. I complained that the Statute of Frauds had not been united with that of Limitations; and now writing is required to prevent the time from running.
I had complained loudly of the impediments to settlement by arbitration; this defect has been removed by the Act of 1833, as well as many others in our system of pleading, on which I had dwelt particularly in 1828. The cruel and unjust, as well as inconsistent and impolitic law of arrest for debt, of which had also complained, has been entirely changed; arrest on mesne process was abolished by my noble Friend on the Woolsack in 1837; and my Acts of 1844-5 have abolished

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arrest altogether; Acts framed upon the principle which I propounded in 1828, that debtors should only be imprisoned for the crime of fraud or gross extravagance, or for refusing to give up their property to their creditors.
In branches of the law to which my Motion of 1828 had not extended, various improvements have likewise been made. It may be enough to recite the great mitigation of the Criminal Code, now as mild as it ought to be made; the allowing prisoners full benefit of counsel in felony, of which I at first doubted, but these doubts have by experience been removed; the improvement of the mercantile law, by the new Statutes of Bankruptcy; the law of insolvency which has generally been much amended. The arrears in Chancery have been got rid of by the additions made to that judicature, and many serious evils have been removed from the Master's office, where, however, not a little in the way of amendment remains to be done. The retrospect of the improvements which have been made during the last two centuries in our jurisprudence, and this view of the accelerated pace at which law amendment has of late years moved, is calculated to inspire sanguine hopes, I may say, even to give us the confident expectation of all being soon accomplished which it yet remains to achieve for the improvement of the system. We seem to have completely witnessed the truth of Lord Coke's famous dictum, so consolatory to the friends of human progress, so little resembling the general course of that great man's opinions and prejudices—that no good proposal for the amendment of the law was ever made which did not, sooner or later, bear its fruits. Encouraged, then, by the result of the view we have just been taking of the past, let us see what remains to be done in the same excellent career.
i. I begin with the Criminal Law. It has been made as mild, generally speaking, as can be desired. The restriction of capital punishment to treason, murder, and one or two other very grave offences, gives all the mitigation that is desirable to our penal jurisprudence. I am very clearly of opinion that we may here pause; I think, and I decidedly and on much reflection think, that there is no good reason for dispensing altogether with the punishment of death; I hold the doctrine, without any hesitation, that we have a right to inflict that highest of all penalties on malefactors, with the view of preventing a repetition of those
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crimes by others, stamping, as it were, with a peculiar awe those graver offences; and I hold that we have no other or better right to inflict punishment of an inferior kind, than the right which we derive from its high expediency—the same being the ground of our right to punish capitally. These opinions, I am aware, are not popular; I know that out of doors they will give rise to dissatisfaction; and it is therefore for the sake of truth, that I think myself bound to give them utterance in this place, and upon this occasion.
But I am as clearly of opinion that there are other matters in which our recent legislation has not gone far enough, and that it has even retrograded in some particulars. The punishment of fine is much too often awarded by the Acts continually passed to repress offences; and though I admit the advantage which probably has recommended it to lawgivers in most countries, the facility of apportionment by the amount of the punishment denounced being made according to the proportion of the pecuniary sum; yet I am sure a little reflection will show how very unequally this punishment falls on different parties guilty of the self-same offence. To one it is the payment of a trifle; to another it becomes a serious injury; to a third it is not fine at all but imprisonment; while to a fourth, a poor man, taken from his business for months, it is absolute ruin. Thus the Malicious Trespass Act, passed in 1820, at the suggestion of a worthy friend of mine, Mr. Nicolson Calvert, was one against which I always protested, especially in 1828, when I expressed my hope that he would survive the offspring of his legislative labours. Unhappily, he has predeceased it; and we have still on our Statute-book a law which punishes the same offence with a few shillings, or at most five pounds penalty in a wealthy man, and with six weeks' and even in some cases three months' imprisonment in a poor man. To suit the taste, too, of the sportsmen, who administer the law, the offences committed by gentlemen are excluded; for a proviso prevents the Act from extending to trespassers for hunting or shooting.
ii. The late Act on Evidence requires to be extended. Interest is no longer an objection to a witness's competence; and all the contradictions and anomalies of the law in this respect are by that most salutary amendment swept away. Then, why should not parties be examined at law, their interest being the only objection, and

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the Courts of Equity always examining them even before the late change? If it be said that this examination must be mutual, and that one party may be disabled by sickness, or absence beyond the seas, surely this difficulty could easily be got over by postponing the trial, or by excepting the cases of permanent disability. At all events, there can be no objection to examining both parties, where both consent to be heard upon oath, or to examining either, if the other consents to his examination without reciprocity. As for the old objection from fear of perjury, the late Act gets rid of that entirely at law, and it never at any time was allowed to prevail in Equity. Indeed, the practice always established, in all courts, legal as well as equitable, of allowing affidavits of parties, where there can be no check from cross-examination, sufficiently proves that the fear of perjury cannot be made a ground for upholding the exclusion. May we not now also extend to all contracts whatever the law requiring written evidence, unless where there has been part performance? I think we safely may.
The late improvement of the Law of Libel by the Act of my noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Campbell) removes one of the complaints made by me in 1828; and carries into effect the object of a Bill which I twice brought into the other House, having had the invaluable assistance of the late Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (Sir N. Tindal), in preparing its provisions, both in 1816 and 1830. I have to lament that the late Act leaves out the most important and, I think, most wanted part of the amendment which my Bill proposed; for it is confined to cases of private slander, whereas the political offence far more deserves mercy and protection. The truth cannot yet be given in evidence in any prosecution for libel upon the Government or its officers in their public capacity; and this I conceive to be a great defect still existing in our law.
iii. No branch of the law is more important or more interests the strong feelings of mankind than that relating to personal status—Marriage—Divorce—Legitimacy. It is of extreme importance to every one that there should exist no doubt whatever on the question whether he is married or single—legitimate or bastard; and yet the conflict which exists between the law of England and Ireland on the one hand, and of Scotland on the other, with the daily increasing facility of communication be-
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tween the three countries, raises continually difficulties of the most distressing kind on these subjects. The validity of Scotch marriages, long ago settled by the cases of Crompton v. Bearcroft, in the Delegates, and of Ilderton v. Ilderton, in the Common Pleas, has entirely frustrated the provision of Lord Hardwick's Marriage Act, 26 Geo. II., c. 33, because the very parties whom that statute was intended to affect—rich heirs and heiresses—can be withdrawn from its operation by a journey to the Scotch border; and those poor people whom it had not in contemplation are alone bound by its provisions, because they cannot afford the expense of the journey to defraud the law. The Act has, indeed, this great defect, that it professes to do one thing and does another; professing to require the consent of parents and guardians before an infant can contract marriage, it only requires such steps to be taken as are likely to fail, for it only gives the parent or guardian notice of the intended marriage by banns published, which proceeding if taken in a parish where many banns are published, or in a remote parish, gives no notice at all. The possibility of a Scotch journey completes the defeat of the statute, and its defeat in the very quarter which it behoved to make the strongest. But the conflict is greater still, and its consequences more vexatious, as regards divorce. This has been well known to lawyers, and to some of the Members of your Lordships' House, ever since 1813. Lolly's case was then tried and determined. I was counsel in the cause at Lancaster, and afterwards argued it before the twelve Judges, when they held that a respectable merchant of Liverpool, who had been married in England and divorced in Scotland, and believing, according to the advice of the most eminent Scotch lawyers that his marriage was effectually dissolved, had married again, but in England, was thereby guilty of polygamy; and he was sentenced to seven years' transportation. Lord Eldon, then Chancellor, kept him two years in the hulks, in order, his Lordship said, to show clearly that such was the law—to show that the Scotch Courts could not validly dissolve an English marriage. The unfortunate gentleman was compelled as it were to teach this lesson of law in his own person; and such of your Lordships as, in precisely the same circumstances with respect to divorce, had taken the precaution of contracting the second marriage in

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Scotland escaped all punishment. Yet see the result. All the Judges in Scotland hold the second marriage in Scotland valid; all the English Judges hold the divorce void. Then quid juris as to the issue of the second marriage? No lawyer of either country will venture to give a confident opinion upon their legitimacy, or upon the question whether the parents are living in the state of holy matrimony, or in concubinage. So a party in Scotland where he is domiciled, marries after cohabitation and the birth of a child—the Scotch Courts hold that child legitimate by virtue of the subsequent marriage; the English Courts hold him bastard—but not generally. If he claims personal estate he is legitimate; if he claims real estate he is bastard—in England bastard in one court; legitimate in another—in Scotland legitimate to all intents and in all courts. Surely, surely, such a state of the law it perfectly disgraceful, and should not be suffered to continue. In 1835 I presented a Bill to remove the grievous defect, and it then met with acceptance from the Scotch Bar and the Scotch Bench. I trust it may soon be adopted and passed into a law. It went to cure the defect in the Scotch marriage law, by which the most important of contracts may be entered into without any forethought by persons of tender years; to make the status of legitimacy general over the whole empire; and to allow Scotch divorces as well as marriages a validity within reasonable limits in respect of acquiring a domicile.
Of the English divorce I have already spoken; it can now only be effected by an Act of Parliament. It is only the remedy of the rich; and the greatest oppression is practised on parties by the expense of process. I have known instances of men absolutely ruined by having to pay all the heavy costs of both sides in Doctors' Commons and the Privy Council, one suit and two appeals; so that before they could obtain their divorce in Parliament they had spent their last shilling. One of them is now suing before this House in formâ pauperis, from these misfortunes. The remedy is to send
such cases before the Judicial Committee, and to require neither verdict nor consistorial sentence as a condition precedent to the dissolution of the marriage. A difference should be made, no doubt, and for obvious reasons, between the conduct of the husband and of the wife; but within certain limits this highly important remedy
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should in England as in Scotland, indeed in all other countries, be made accessible to both parties.
iv. Next to marriage and legitimacy, the question of Partnership is, in a commercial country especially, of high importance; and nothing can be more disgraceful to our law, than the difficulty which persons every day find in ascertaining whether they have by their transactions made themselves partners or not. On this, on the law of debtor and creditor, and especially on the laws regarding bankruptcy and insolvency, I shall not dwell, because they are on all hands admitted to require a full revision, especially with a view to digesting them into one code or system. Many groundless theories are afloat upon the subject; and while many persons who ought to know better have made proposals unworthy of attention, others have misunderstood with marvellous pertinacity both the scope, the reasoning, and even the history, though very recent, of the changes which have been introduced. But I have no hesitation whatever in submitting such part of these late measures as I brought forward to the scrutiny of further inquiry; and though my own opinion remains unchanged—though I hold that my Acts for abolishing imprisonment for debt, when duly guarded, as they have been, by remedies to the creditor, and punishment to the criminal or contumacious debtor, still deserve the countenance of the Legislature, I yet am perfectly willing to receive and act upon the lights which experience may have shed on this important subject, and even to reconsider the question of arrest on mesne process, strong as my conviction is that we cannot restore it. Meanwhile, I have presented to your Lordships a Bill containing some most important amendments in the practice of the bankruptcy jurisdiction, suggested by the experience of those learned persons who are engaged in administering it. All are agreed that my Act of 1831 has worked a most salutary change in the law, and generally in the mercantile system of the country; and those further improvements of that Act I am willing to send before the Committee which shall be appointed to consider the whole subject.
v. I now, my Lords, approach a yet more important branch of my subject—the Law of Real Property—the interest of which to the community at large cannot be overrated, but, above all, to the Members of this House, peculiarly the lords, as you

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are, of the soil of England. To improve the security of its possessors, and to increase the facility of its transfer, must ever be the great end of the lawgiver in all his plans for amending this great branch of our jurisprudence. So thought Blackstone—so thought Locke. The learned Commentator says—
"Experience shows that property best answers the purposes of civil life, when its transfer and circulation are free and unincumbered."*
Locke, in his famous Essay on the Value of Money, says—
"None can expect that men will risk richly laden ships among shoals and quicksands; or expend their money on estates which may have bad titles. The daily wrecks which strew our coasts shew the numbers of those who have miscarried."
How many a title is there of which it may truly be said, and indeed is daily felt by owners, that it is good enough to keep, but not to sell—that a willing purchaser may take it, but an unwilling cannot be compelled after he has agreed to buy? But also how many titles are there which an owner feels himself insecure in holding, and bitterly laments having ever bought, or if he took by descent, anxiously dreading eviction and ruin! Then, is it not a shame to our system that such doubts, such difficulties, and such darkness should hang over this most important branch of the nation's property? Is it not a scandal to our law, that my learned and right hon. Friend Sir Edward Sugden, one of the greatest lawyers and first conveyancers of the day, should in his admirable and truly practical work have a whole chapter on important points yet undecided? Is it not, again, a deep disgrace to our principles, that the expense of conveyancing should be so enormous, owing to legal difficulties, and that as much cost should be incurred by the purchaser of an acre, as by him who buys land worth five thousand a year? But is it not also truly impolitic to place such difficulties in the way of land purchases, in a great commercial country, where by our habits, or by our institutions, there is such a tendency to realise fortunes by purchase of land, and also where persons of humble fortune are enticed naturally to similar investments of their more humble savings? It was reckoned by Dr. Beke, in 1801, that there were not more than 200,000 owners of land in England, and 8,000 only in Ireland—1 in 75 of the people in the one country, 1 in 1,000 in the other. In France there are above
* 2 Com. 288.
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11,000,000, or 1 in 3, and above 5,000,000 paying under 4s. land-tax, or possessing on an average 10 s. a year land revenue. Of course I feel no envy of a state, of things just as prejudicial to the agricultural and the commercial, as to the political welfare of that great country. Yet some middle point all must allow to be desirable, and no one can believe that the working of any system is good which confines landed property to so few hands.
Now, many amendments of this law are required to place it upon a proper and reasonable footing, and to give both owners and purchasers their due protection. To these I must shortly advert, and I would begin by stating the opinion to which I have come, modifying only that which I formerly inclined to think the safer, and holding that we can hardly hope successfully or even securely to amend the law of real property, unless we do so upon an extensive scale; taking large views of its scope and operation, and not selecting insulated portions for the subject of our amendments. There is so intimate a relation between its various parts, so close a connexion between the different arrangements of a system extremely artificial, yet the growth of many ages, such a mutual dependence of each portion upon all the others, that we cannot safely reckon upon the effects of a partial change being confined within the bounds which we intended to prescribe, and cannot be at all sure we may not be affecting other parts when we only mean to touch one, nor even be aware in what manner the operation of the one measure may tell upon other departments of the complex system. Even to a registry would I apply this observation, at least to the extent of holding that its beneficial effects would be much circumscribed, and its salutary operation weakened, were it unaccompanied by other improvements. However, I by no means deny that this change would be to a certain degree both safe and salutary. But I speak of amending the Property law at Large.
1. The grievous condition of parties in possession or parties intending to purchase, from doubts how their titles may fare when brought into Courts of Law and Equity, I have already adverted to. A suit must actually exist before they can have the possibility of being quiet and secure. Now there is an easy remedy for this serious evil, by introducing, as I proposed to do by my Bill, presented three years ago—the Declaratory Action from

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the Scottish Law. Succeeding Chancellors, myself included, have often lamented the want of this most useful provision in our system. A possessor of real estate thereby raises an action of declaration, as it is termed, making parties all persons who may have any interest vested or contingent in disputing his title, and after full discussion of the case, he obtains a judgment which binds all these parties and their heirs for ever; he thus possesses his estate from thenceforth as securely, and deals with it, if he is unfettered by any entail, as beneficially, in selling, exchanging, and mortgaging, as if he had the title of an Act of Parliament. In England he must wait until some one chooses to dispute his title, which, perhaps, no one may do until there be some defect of evidence, or some new decisions of the Courts pronounced, or some new doctrines ventilated among lawyers—for these have their varying modes and fashions like other men. It is not till then that any man in this country can call himself sure, because till then the Court has not given any judgment. But the Scotch proceeding enables him to anticipate future events, and to enjoy and use his estate exactly now as if he had survived his own day, and lived in a future period of time. I shall deeply lament if this improvement be not soon made in our law. The objection that we may thus bind persons not yet in existence, is really futile. We do so every day, not merely in Private Acts of Parliament, but in proceedings at Law, and still more in Equity; and the protection thrown round all possible interests by the declaratory process, makes it really no more hazardous to unborn parties than any suit is to a man's successors, which he brings or defends, with all the admissions he makes in the course of it.
2. The late Acts have greatly improved, and chiefly by shortening, the period of limitation, now for the most part twenty, and never more than forty years. Yet I cannot help hoping that this may be further shortened. In France ten years possession, accompanied with proper notices and advertisements to incumbrancers and other claimants, gives an owner a complete and indefeasible title for ever, and against all mankind.
3. The greatest mischiefs have, in my humble judgment, arisen to our law, and the greatest burthen been cast upon our Courts, from the unfortunate distinction between the rules of construction for wills and for deeds. The ground or pretence
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of this diversity is the desire to get at a man's real intention. But is it not equally our object to arrive at the intention of parties to a conveyance? If, again, it be said that wills are often made with less help of professional men, or with less care on the part of the testator, than conveyances inter vivos—let us only reflect, first on the fact, that almost all wills of any valuable property, especially of real estate, are prepared, and their execution witnessed by men of skill, which indeed the very acts requiring a particular kind of attestation almost assume in every case; and next, that do what you will, you are after all compelled to adopt certain fixed rules for construing the words of wills. It really seems that there is as much technical nicety in the rules applied to construe the will as in those applicable to the deed, only that the two sets of rules are wholly different, and yet both are to be used in pari materiâ. I need not remind lawyers either of the endless litigation hence arising, and the extremely numerous doubts in which the diversity of the rules has been fertile; nor of the signal failure which has been so often exhibited by lawyers and by Courts in hunting after the real intent, and of the frustration of that chase by the rules introduced for sacrificing the particular to a general intent. I believe few persons would be more astonished at the intentions ascribed to them by the decisions of Courts, as well of Equity as of Law, than the testators themselves, to ascertain whose design the rules have been framed. What would John Williams, whose will gave rise to the question in Perrin v. Blake, and caused the application to devises of the rule in Shelly's case, have said, if, having given an estate to a devisee for his life "and no longer," he had found that adding the limitation to heirs of his body, enlarged the gift to an estate instantly convertible into a fee? Nor can any one doubt that these rules have been the cause why many persons, thinking they have devised an estate to the object of their bounty, have only bestowed upon him a series of lawsuits. To take an instance at once of the multiplication of suits, and the frustration of intents—the rule of perpetuity which governs executory devises, had in Lord Thurlow's time given rise to fifty-six reported cases in the books, beside the vast number that never came into court at all. I once asked an eminent conveyancer, who was arguing before me a question of this description,

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to how many the decisions now amounted; and he said between seventy and eighty. Now, from the nature of the thing, all these cases arose from putting constructions upon the words of wills; and a single rule, such as is adopted in constructing the clauses of a deed, and such as has lately been sanctioned by the late Wills Act (1 Vic. c. 26), would have prevented all these and similar disputes from ever arising. Mark, too, that wherever the words were found to give too remote an interest to satisfy the rule against perpetuities, the testator's intent was of necessity disregarded, and his object frustrated; for no man in his senses could ever mean to create a void executory devise.
4. The excessive length of deeds is another evil justly complained of. The expense which this accumulates is not confined to the original conveyance; it extends to each time that the property is affected in any way, nay, to all proceedings in Courts concerning the title. But the heavy cost is not the worst of it; the chances of error and oversight are multiplied in proportion to the length of the instruments. Varieties of expression creep in, and constructions are raised in consequence; omissions occur, often fatal to titles, often misleading the Courts that have to decide upon them. "This wordiness," says Lord Redesdale, "puzzles both the draughtsman and the Courts." He gives a remarkable instance of its effects in a case, which, after lasting for a great length of time, was determined by the Master of the Rolls, and when an appeal from his decision came on before the Lord Chancellor, a clause was discovered lurking in the many folds of the lengthened deeds—that clause at once disposed of the case; it left no doubt at all on the question so long and so expensively litigated; and the decree at the Rolls was reversed as a matter of course. Here all the delay, anxiety, and expense was owing to the prolixity of the instruments; and had the losing party remained content with the judgment below, irremediable injustice would have been wrought. I had a case before me in this House which had run the gauntlet of the three Courts, Chancery, King's Bench, and Common Pleas, all tried upon an error in transcribing, by which one line had been left out of the will or settlement, I forget which, executed by a party in disposing of a large estate; the effect was to pass over the first son, and begin with a gift to the second. I agreed
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with the Common Pleas that the context and the whole frame of the settlement as well as the general remainder to all other sons after the sixth, let in the first; but the King's Bench had decided otherwise; and so the prolixity of drawing was near working a manifest injustice, and disappointing him who was the first object of the maker's bounty. Now to remedy this evil I obtained in 1845 the concurrence of Parliament for passing an Act greatly assisting all leasehold conveyances in towns, by making certain abridged words refer to the more extensive clauses, and operate as if these were inserted at length; so that by a few lines any town lease may be completed or transferred. I afterwards extended the same plan to farm leases and to sales, mortgages, wills, and all other dealings with real estate, by another Bill of much greater length. But it was deemed expedient to delay the proceeding with this important measure until the new Real Property Commissioners, headed by the Master of the Rolls, should have completed their inquiries and made their report. Meanwhile I must observe that the plan of awarding payment to practitioners according to the value of the property dealt with and the labour of the drawing, and not according to the length of the draft as at present, would be of inestimable importance if generally enforced, and I shall present a short Bill to your Lordships, directing this principle to be applied in all taxations of costs. It has been found to succeed perfectly in Scotland, and it has even been tried with success in the Antipodes; for in Australia it is the established practice.
5. I need hardly dwell on the benefits of a registry for securing titles and facilitating transfers of property. England is nearly the only country which is still without this advantage. When in office I caused a measure of this nature to be prepared and introduced into the other House by an hon. and learned relative, then Member for the borough as well as a Master in Chancery. The clamour of country practitioners raised against it, had the effect of misleading the country Gentlemen, who were made to believe that their titles would thus become published, whereas the most stringent regulations were made in the Bill to prevent the possibility of any one seeing a single line of any title without the express permission given by the owner in writing under his hand. Of course when a sale or exchange or mortgage was in negotiation, the lender or purchaser must have

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access to the deeds; but so he would, whether they were put upon the register or not. Connected with a registry should be an authentic and detailed map, the result of a survey of each county or smaller district—what the French call a Cadastre—to which on each sale, mortgage, or other conveyance, reference should be made; each change of possession being entered upon the face of the plan. Nothing can better tend to both conciseness of conveyancing and security of title than this scheme; and the experience of Belgium and some other parts of the Continent pronounces amply in its favour.
One kind of Register I must advert to, because that none of the objections can by possibility apply which are made against a General Registry—I mean a public office, in which any person may deposit his will for safe custody, and under his own seal, so as not only to be accessible to his representative, but also on his decease to be examined by all devisees and legatees. At present no one can tell how he is to secure his will from loss by accident, or indeed from destruction by interested parties. The heir disinherited, or the next of kin wholly or in part passed over, are generally the persons who have access to a man's repositories on his decease, and by them spoliation may easily be committed, if it be their interest to cause an intestacy. I have often been asked how a person should secure his will. Bankers may break, solicitors may die, and no one succeeding to their business, documents in their keeping may, as has once and again happened, be cut up into tailors' measures. Even making duplicates, previous to the late Wills' Act, was attended with risk under the nicety of the law, which made the destruction of one copy a revocation, unless it could be satisfactorily shown to have been done without the intention of revoking. A greater relief to testators, I am certain, could not be given than such a Register-office, and the expenses of maintaining it would, I am sure, be willingly reimbursed by payment of the fees.
6. But I cannot leave this branch of the subject without impressing on your Lordships the expediency of another scheme sanctioned by all the consideration which eminent men have given to the subject—I mean the introduction of Insurance into dealing with real estate—in a word, the Insurance of Title. When once any title is examined, as by offices lending money upon it, why should not this investigation
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suffice as often as any other transaction takes place respecting the same title? Yet, if ten times money is to be raised on lands all held in the same right, ten times is all the delay and expense to be incurred, when once ought to have sufficed. A Government office, established to give all owners security, would be a blessing to the whole proprietary portion of the community. The terms of insurance must needs be moderate; for all are agreed that the vast majority of titles are really good, and such as give small chance of eviction; and the profits of the depositors would be in proportion to this preponderance of safe titles, and the rare occurrence of an owner being evicted. These profits would suffice to pay the party whom the law should deprive of his possessions; and to leave a considerable surplus for the expenses of the office. When we consider the proceedings of Insurance-offices, and other bodies lending money on real security, we shall perceive that they really act upon the very principle which I am recommending for adoption.
I cannot proceed to broach a new subject without congratulating your Lordships and myself, if I may make so bold, upon the entire success of the Terms Bill, passed three years ago, and at that time the subject of no small obloquy from ill-informed persons, but also, I fear I must add, from some who should have known better. It has already done much to prevent frauds; and its operation in lessening expenses to landed proprietors may be better understood by an example than by any general description. I was present at a meeting of our Law Amendment Society, when the respectable solicitor of a noble Duke—an extensive proprietor in the north of England—stated that the savings to his client in one year, in consequence of that Act, had amounted to between 4,000 l. and 5,000 l. The gathering such fruits of our labours is truly gratifying, and it naturally must encourage us in persevering until we have finally accomplished the great work of safely and cautiously, but with an unflinching hand, amending our law.
Fourth. The law made in the manner we have seen, and composed as we have seen, whatever may be the merits or defects of the process, and of the fabric to which it has given rise, must be published to the people who are to obey it. This is the bounden duty of the lawgiver; and it implies that he is to make his commands

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fully known by giving them such a form as shall make them of easy comprehension, and of easy recollection. Both the Judges who are to administer the law, and, above all, the subjects who are to obey it, have an indisputable right to this. In proportion as the system of jurisprudence has become extensive, and the subjects which it embraces are various, it is the more necessary that the whole should be reduced into a convenient shape, and arranged in a proper order. Hence all good lawgivers have had recourse to a code or digest, necessary for all laws, but especially for those defining crimes and denouncing punishments; nor can a more flagrant neglect, nay, breach of duty, be committed by any Government, or a greater oppression upon any people, than omitting to furnish a Digest of its Criminal Law. The Digest, however, should extend to the Civil Law as well, nor is it always easy to separate the two branches of the system.
In England, more than in any other State, more even than in Rome, where Justinian began his labours at a time when the civil law was said to be a burden for many camels, this process has become absolutely necessary, because our law, whether made by Parliament, or existing in tradition, or declared by the Judges, has attained an unprecedented bulk. The Reports of Cases in the Courts fill five hundred volumes—the Statutes near forty, or between thirty and forty thousand quarto pages—while Napoleon's whole Codes, five in number, crept into seven hundred and fifty duodecimo pages. Well might he boast that he should descend to future times with his Code in his hand! Our want of care in making the law known even when it is to be obeyed on pain of death, has occasionally been shown in a remarkable manner. The 43rd of George III., commonly called Lord Ellenborough's Act, by which some eight or ten capital felonies were created, was to take effect in six days, when it could hardly have reached the remote parts of Ireland, where the acts made capital were most likely to be done. Though nothing like a Code or Digest has yet been prepared by us, yet great steps have been taken towards it. The experiment has been tried on some classes of offences, especially by Sir Robert Peel, whose Acts for the digesting of these have been carefully formed, and are productive of great advantage. The Revenue Laws, too, have from time to time been digested, with good effect to their
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administration; and it is an additional reason for undertaking this process on an extensive scale, that nothing of the kind has ever been done without leading almost necessarily to salutary amendments of the existing law, by showing its defects in a striking manner, and by the comparison of its inconsistent provisions which arises out of their juxtaposition under the heads of the arrangement.
Although the labours of the Commission which I issued in 1833, to Messrs. Starkie, B. Ker, Amos, and others, and which my noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) and my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) most wisely continued in 1846, have rendered the task easy for Parliament by the digests reported, and have recommended it by the reasonings in their most valuable reports, and although some inducement is offered to have the whole work done at once, yet I am clearly of opinion, as are my learned Friends the Commissioners, as well, I believe I may add, as my noble and learned Friend, and my right hon. Friend, whom I have just named, that we shall act more judiciously if we at first rest satisfied with forming and passing a Digest of the Criminal Law, by far the most imperatively required; and I accordingly, in 1845, brought in a Bill to this effect. At the desire of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst), I postponed the passing of this measure, in order that it might be referred to a new Commission, composed of the former Members, with one or two important additions. Those learned persons have now more thoroughly investigated the whole subject; they have reported a Digest of the whole Criminal Law, excepting Procedure, on which we may in a few months expect their final report; and I am now prepared to lay a Bill on your table enacting a Criminal Code—a code defining all crimes, with their punishments; and I promise to follow it with a second, enacting a Code of Criminal Procedure.
But there is one thing which I must strongly recommend to be done forthwith, and I know I have in this the entire concurrence of the learned Commissioners, especially my friends Mr. Starkie and Mr. Ker, and the learned and able Secretary to the Commission, Mr. Lonsdale. Let us, without delay, direct to be prepared a work which will require little labour, and will prove both invaluable in itself, and a most useful preparation and help for a complete Digest. Let all our Statute Law be brought

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together in one body, and arranged under convenient heads. I am quite sure that whoever turns his attention to this subject will at once see the importance of the suggestion. Of course, I mean our statutes sifted from the vast mass of temporary and trifling matter which overloads and encumbers the Statute-book—in short the general and permanent laws of the realm. Sir William David Evans, a most learned lawyer, who was afterwards Recorder of Bombay, once undertook this task, and his book, which he did not well finish, will afford assistance to those whom we may appoint to undertake the work. I am of opinion that the labours of the existing Commission had better not be interrupted by imposing on them this additional duty; but that it might be more conveniently entrusted to a Sub-Commission, acting in concert with them. I shall lose no time in moving an Address to the Crown on this subject.
Fifth. At length, my Lords, we seem to be in sight of land, and I approach the last branch of this vast subject—the Administration of the Law, or the constitution and practice of the Courts. The importance of this subject is not to be doubted; it can, indeed, hardly be overstated. The saying, "Whate'er is best administered is best," may almost literally be applied to the law. This at least is undeniable, that a bad system of law may become comparatively in-noxious if administered by judges of great wisdom, capacity, and integrity, whose independence of all mankind is absolutely secured. Nay, so much more depends upon having your law well ascertained and fully known, and equally administered, than upon its actual structure, that it would be better for any people to live under an ill system well executed, than under a good system administered by incapable, corrupt, or dependent judges. Now, upon this important subject the principles are as little the subject of contest as under any of the former heads; ther application alone is to be considered.
As regards the Judges, the essentials are these:—

1. The separation of the judicial from the executive and legislative powers.

2. The absolute independence of Judges, both of the Crown and the people.

3. The securing of competent learning and skill in those selected to fill that high office.

4. Their payment by salary and not by fees.

In all these particulars our system is,
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generally speaking, sufficiently free from defect, though some exceptions there are. Regarding practice and procedure—the main point is to render it as expeditious and as little costly as may be to the suitor; to levy from him no duties for the State upon any law proceeding, only making him pay for what benefit he receives. But the best mode of ascertaining the truth in judicial inquiry demands more minute consideration, and may be reserved for the chapter of general defects. To them we now proceed.
i. In the condition of Judges the departure from principle has been considerable in some respects.
Justices of Peace furnish the first instances. That part of our system sins, but more in theory than in practice and in fact, against the two first of the principles just stated; for though they have large jurisdiction, and especially preside over by far the largest portion of criminal trials, and yet are both eligible to Parliament, and are removable by the Crown, yet they never are removed unless on conviction, after once being appointed. As to the third rule, to secure their competent qualification for their important office, requires a change in the law. It is, however, to be observed, that some subjects of magisterial jurisdiction are peculiarly ill adapted to that kind of tribunal. Thus I particularly think that questions on the Game Laws are little likely to be satisfactorily decided by country gentlemen, game preservers and game destroyers themselves. The conviction of a man for poaching, that is, killing game without a qualification, because he had snared a hare that had for weeks been destroying his garden, is one among other instances in support of my opinion. On this and other grounds, there is no doubt that a paid professional Chairman should be appointed to preside at sessions; and he might conveniently occupy an important place in preparing the cases for the assizes, so long at least as we continue, against all principle, to have no public prosecutor. He might fill too the place of Judge in the Local Courts. Against the third rule our Colonial Judicature sins most largely. Those who are to administer law in all its various forms among myriads of our people are so much underpaid, that while I held the office of Minister of Justice, or the only and most imperfect substitute which we have for that office, I constantly refused to recommend Judges for the Colonial Settlements, because I

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would not go into Westminster Hall to find fit persons for the office, when I could offer no salary sufficient to tempt well-qualified lawyers, and no retiring pension on their health being
broken down in bad climates. I know a most learned and able man, who has filled most underpaid offices for the greater part of his life, and who now has 1,200 l. a year, in a place where that sum is only equal to 600 l. in England, and who, if his health fails under a tropical sun, retires upon literally nothing. This remark applies not to our Indian Judges, and these accordingly are for the most part well selected. But exceptions there are, because there is no Minister of Justice responsible to the profession; and I grieve to say I have lately heard of one such exception, with a wonder shared by me with the whole profession of the law. The subject is painful because it is personal, and I willingly hasten away from it, preferring to lose myself in more general matter.
ii. The first and second rules which I stated are both violated in the highest of our judicatures; the judicial powers of the Chancellor must no longer be left in the hands of a Judge holding his office during pleasure, and the first member of a political party, as well as of a Ministerial body. There remain abundant duties for that high officer after this anomaly in our system is removed. He should be the Minister of Justice; a functionary much wanted in this country; the want of whom, indeed, meets us at every step, whether we regard the amendment of the law or its due administration; and I rejoice to find that on this important question we have now the sanction of my noble Friend the Master of the Rolls' high authority. On this subject I do not purpose to dwell longer on the present occasion; but having, as it were, got into Chancery on one point, I must, like the other parties who get there, be content there to remain for a space; and even to enter the most awful part of its penetralia—the Master's Office.
1. On this all seem now agreed, that the course of proceeding in that department affords the most just of all the grounds of complaint against our Equity judicature. I take my stand chiefly upon the undiscriminating reference of matters for inquiry, and the mischief that thence result to the suitors, by delay so endless, that the clerks of some Masters being lately examined, have not hesitated to declare that it is wholly in the power of a solicitor, whose interest might lie in delaying the proceed-
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ing, to protract it without any limit of time whatever. So says Mr. Pugh, clerk to Sir Giffin Wilson; so say others, his brethren. Now, the Equity Judges send all things before the Master, and thus appear to get through their cause paper, when in reality they are doing little but augmenting the costs, and extending the delay of the parties. First, they refer matters to be inquired of, on which no inquiry at all is wanted, because all parties are agreed on them. Secondly, they refer questions, much fitter for their own decision than the Master's—questions of mere law, as whether a power has been executed, always even after the facts are ascertained, so nice a point of law that I hardly ever gave an opinion upon it unless I found some decision upon the very same form of words; and yet the Master, after ascertaining the facts, has to report whether or not the execution is good in law. So upon the validity of a devise or bequest; and in all such cases, whatever way he decides, the losing party is sure to except; so back the matter comes, after useless, and costly, and dilatory litigation, to the Judge, who should in the first instance have pronounced his decision. Thirdly, matters of fact are referred, out of which, perhaps unexpectedly, emerge mere legal points. Now, in all cases these should be sifted from the whole matter, and reserved for the Court, and the inquiry of the Master limited to the questions, and the disputed questions, of fact. Nothing could be easier than this process. Parties might be called upon for their statements; the admissions might be taken of fact, as we have by the late improvements in procedure since the Act of 1833, done in the Courts of Common Law; or parties might agree on the points fit for the Court and for the Master respectively; and, above all, an easier intercourse might be established between the Master's Office and the Court. Had the Master a power of at once communicating with the Court, as the clerk has with himself, whenever he found that any thing emerged which was sure to end in exceptions, what way so-ever he reported upon it, he might at once send it back to the Court, and this whether the matter was one of law or of fact.
2. A great abuse would be prevented, and an incalculable saving of time as well as expense to parties be secured, by requiring the Masters to act de die in diem, on each reference, giving of course due notice to the parties, and calling on them, upon pain of exclusion, to be prepared with

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their witnesses and other evidence when wanted. This is the course at law, where, unless the party is ready, he must expect the verdict to go against him. In Chancery, the parties come before the Master for an hour one week, and then for another hour the week after, when half or whole of the last day's proceeding has been forgotten, and thus the inquiry and the expense never ends.
3. I have little to add on the Master's Office, except to express my regret that I was overruled in 1833, as to paying the Master by salary, or at least altogether by salary. The principle is no doubt as I have stated it, to pay Judges by salary and not by fees. Yet this rule cannot safely be applied to those who sit in private, however good it may be for those who sit in the eyes of the profession and the public; and if only such fees be allowed, as the functionary has no power of increasing by the steps or the length of procedure before him, he will be usefully quickened in discharging his duty, by being at least in part thus remunerated for his labours. I am certain that many fewer reports have been made by the majority of the Masters since the time when I was compelled to yield my opinion on this subject; and the abolition of the Master's fees is the only part of the late changes in the Courts which I lament.
4. The mode of taking evidence in Chancery is still as bad as possible, and loudly calls for alteration. Nothing can well be conceived more preposterous. The Examiner is a mere mechanical agent, and his office, though richly paid, could be performed by steam. He has only the power of reading the interrogatories and minuting the answers. These interrogatories are prepared by a draftsman who never sees the witness, and frames every question without the possibility of knowing how any of the former ones was answered. Thus, the first question being, Did you ever see the party? and the answer, Never; the second may be, What did he tell you when last you saw him? So cross questions are put in utter ignorance of the answers to the examinations in chief, or even of the questions in chief. My noble Friend behind me (Lord Lyndhurst) and myself in discussing this matter, with our experience of the far different proceedings in our own Courts of Law, have often agreed that the best we could say for the Chancery practice was, that we only wondered it brought out so much truth as it frequently did, or
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indeed any truth at all—a poor panegyric on any system of inquiry. Now if we are not ripe to pronounce for letting in viva voce evidence in all cases (the true remedy for the evil) at least we may call on Equity to adopt the far better course of examination used in our Civil Law Courts, where the Examiner is called upon to put whatever questions are suggested by the allegations, or the interrogatories, and also whatever questions appear to himself fitted to bring out the truth, only taking those instruments for his guide. Such of my noble and learned Friends as with myself have been used to sit on appeals from these courts, are well aware how greatly superior this kind of examination is to that of the Court of Chancery.
5. The vast amount of business in Chancery, as well in its administrative as its litigious department, is only exceeded by the great variety of the functions which it is called upon to perform. There are above sixty millions of personal property under its control or under its consideration, and perhaps as much or more of real estate; but also there are so many kinds of labour which it must undertake, that one is bewildered in thinking "how one small head can carry all it knows,"—or rather ought to know—for its ignorance and incapacity make the wonder cease. Chancery is truly a jack of all trades—a landowner, a farmer, a proprietor of bank stock, a holder of railway shares, a joint-stock director, a trader, a manufacturer, a minor, a shipowner, a fisherman, nay, the manager of a theatre. As truly as it is jack of all trades, does it verify the proverb, by showing that it is master of none. Thus to say nothing of commercial, or of manufacturing, or of theatrical concerns, we know that travelling in the country, and seeing a well-cultivated, thriving farm, we cannot tell to whom it belongs; but seeing an every way ill-conditioned estate, we hardly find occasion to ask, Whose is that? for we may at once conclude it is in Chancery. Now I would have better and official assistance given to this great administrative department. I would have a class of official receivers and other managers appointed, whom the usual emoluments would well reward. I would apply to this Court the institution of Official Assignees, which I introduced some seventeen years ago into the Court of Bankruptcy; an invention at the time loudly blamed by the profession, and to my astonishment as loudly complained of by the

919
mercantile community, whom it was especially designed to serve, but now with singular unanimity as loudly approved by both classes. After this experience we cannot hesitate in recommending its extension to the Court of Chancery.
That the defects I complain of exist, and that their remedy is loudly called for, who can now undertake to deny? I will only give your Lordships a few instances—first in the administrative, then in the judicial branch of Chancery. The accumulation of the rents under Mr. Thelluson's will was in that famous case represented as likely to prove so enormous as in half a century to create a fortune absolutely perilous to the balance of our monarchical constitution; and this was one of the arguments pressed upon the Court against supporting the will in favour of the testator's intention—Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futureœ! Little did the prophets know the powers of Chancery administration to arrest the accumulating speed!—The half century has now elapsed, and instead of 20,000,000 l. a year standing to the credit of the account, the income has not increased 20,000 l. But take an instance or two of more recent date as to the delays and the costs of litigation. A suit was begun in 1807 to which a London banker in the Irish Equity Exchequer was party. In 1845 it had gone through the Master's (Remembrancer's) office, and exceptions to his report were heard during eight successive days: this hearing ended in a reference back to that office, and there the suit rests after a period of forty-one years, during which the London banker has been deprived of his money. In the Chancery of this country the case of Cottingham v. Shrewsbury, begun in 1828, is still hung up in the same Court, though the funds are ample to satisfy all claimants. In another case of a like kind, after fourteen years, assets have been realised to the amount of 3,700 l. How much of this sum, think you, has been spent in the litigation? Why, all but 383 l. In another suit of a specialty creditor, 2,500 l. have been got in, but the costs only leave 35 l. to be divided among the unfortunate parties who have gained. As to the cases of partnership accounts, which in a suit to dissolve, must always be taken, and, of course, in the Master's office, things are worse if possible. A solicitor in large practice has declared, that after making a very extensive inquiry he can find no one case of litigated partnership accounts ever coming out of
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the Master's office at all. My Lords, I will detain you no longer on this head. I think I have proved my case, and so if it please you we may get out of the Court of Chancery, and be the envy of many a poor suitor who still lingers imprisoned there.
iii. The expense and delay of Appeals, I mean appeals to this House, and especially from decrees in Equity, has long and justly been complained of. Our fees and the fees of practitioners, and the delay from vacation to session, are paid in every case, but in small cases they amount to an absolute denial of justice. At present there can be no appeal in cases of a moderate amount; and of the numberless orders made upon Appeal Motions, often highly important in principle, not seldom decisive of the whole question between the parties, I am confident not an instance can be given of one being brought here, however manifestly erroneous in law or in fact the order may have been. This must really be altered; the dignity of your Lordships' House, as well as its character for justice, imperatively demand the applying a speedy and an effectual remedy to so great an evil.
iv. It is equally true that a denial of all justice by the Courts below, exists in cases of small amount. No man can obtain payment of a 50 l. or even a 100 l. legacy, if the executors or administrators of the deceased choose to refuse him, because no man in his senses would sue in Equity for such a sum, and in Equity alone can he sue for it. So the trustees of small charities, thousands in number, are wholly beyond the reach of the law—amended as it has been, and numerous and searching as have been the late inquiries into their malversation. Therefore I deeply lament the loss of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst's) Bill in 1846 on Charities; and I also lament the omission in the Local Courts Act, of the provisions which I had introduced on legacy cases into the Bill, when it was first presented by me to the Commons in 1830, and to this House in the following year. My hope is, that these improvements in our Equitable and our Legal judicatures may before long be made. And let me add, how evident is now the necessity of extending the jurisdiction of the Local Courts, when we find the great amount of business which they have so satisfactorily transacted to the incalculable relief of suitors. That amount has in every way facilitated the extension for

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which I am asking; because the fees, so easily collected, may now be considerably reduced to the suitor; the costs may be given to parties at present deprived of them; and, above all, the ablest professional assistance may be obtained by the considerable emoluments enjoyed by the Judges. Therefore, I venture confidently to hope, that among other improvements, will be made that of adding the voluntary jurisdiction clause, which my noble Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) author of the present Act, had introduced at my desire from the Bills of 1830 and 1838—by which, although the compulsory jurisdiction of the Local Courts was confined to 20 l., and to cases of personal rights, and indeed to actions of debt mainly, yet the Court could entertain any case of any kind whatever, and of all amounts, provided both parties should consent. All that is wanted in such instances is to provide for an appeal, in case the parties do not consent to make the Local Courts' decision final.
v. I cannot close my observations upon the defects still existing in the administration of the law, without adverting to one, and for the hundredth time denouncing it to your Lordships—because it affects our whole criminal law as regards its execution. We still—we alone, of all civilised nations—we, contrary to all principle, and in spite of all experience, still persist in leaving the criminal law to execute itself. No provision whatever is made in our system, for any one criminal being brought to trial, any one offence prosecuted; no provision, at least that is of the least certainty, or that may not just as well prove nugatory as effectual. A man is robbed; he has the additional misfortune of being bound over to prosecute the robber—his life is attempted; he has the additional risk of losing the costs of the trial, and the certainty of losing his time in urging it on. Public prosecutor we have none; all is left to hazard; the worst crimes may go unpunished; aye, and the most innocent parties may be involved in a prosecution. The Grand Jury, good for some purposes, is for others wholly useless, for not a few absolutely mischievous, if acting without the guard of an officially responsible prosecutor. I will give your Lordships only three instances, one of impunity to the guilty, the other two of vexation to the guiltless. A man in good business at Plymouth, some years back, committed for-
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gery to a large amount, and the party injured was bound to prosecute under a two hundred pound recognizance. Had the culprit been poor he would have been tried, and, as the law then stood, hanged. But no prosecutor appeared against the rich felon; he had made his peace and paid the forfeiture of the bond. In 1812 I was counsel for a gentleman, a respectable man, of 10,000 l. a year; but a Catholic, at the Lancaster assizes. The Grand Jury found a bill against him for murder; and it had been committed by his bailiff, or other servant, leaving a rope incautiously across a road under repair, without a lamp to warn passengers, whereby an old woman returning from market had broken her neck. The prosecuting counsel could hardly state the case with any pretence of seriously expecting a verdict. Mr. Baron Wood said, "Is the Grand Jury discharged?" We answered, Yes. "I am very sorry for it," said the learned Judge, "it is a most scandalous case," and he immediately ordered an acquittal. Yet here was a highly respectable man, who, all his life after, was known to have stood in the dock of a public court on a charge of murder, and in whose teeth any Protestant bigot could at any time, in the heat of political or religious controversy, fling this charge, and fling it with truth. Now, I will assert, that at no time, nor in any fervour of faction, civil or religious, would any public prosecutor, responsible in his own person for his official acts ever have chosen—I may say even have dared, to put Mr. Blundell, of Ince, upon his trial as a murderer, making him criminally answerable for the negligence of his servant. But the Grand Jury had none of these alarms or scruples. When called for by the Judge, to be severely rebuked—to receive such a reprimand as would have attended them all the days of their life—they were gone forth; they no longer existed in that capacity, in which they had done the most criminal act I ever knew a jury perpetrate; they had retired into the body of the community; and even if all their names had been made public, nay, if they had come to receive their sentence from the Judge, no man could have told to which of them it applied; because all being bound by oath to conceal their own counsel, and that of their fellows, no means existed of knowing who composed the thirteen or more that found the bill. Mr. Baron Alderson, at the last Central Criminal Court, had a bill for forging a will presented by

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a Grand Jury. No prosecutor appeared at the trial; the whole was the malice of a disappointed legatee; and the Grand Jury had found the bill without ever asking to see the will!
I am sure I have done more to recommend the appointment of a public prosecutor, by giving these three examples of the want of this office, than if I had argued for it during an hour. But I must add, that great as was the desire for this assistant to the execution of the law, when I first proposed it in my evidence before the House of Commons in 1834, it has now been rendered doubly necessary, by the Act allowing counsel to address the jury for all prisoners. The law has no longer a fair chance of being duly executed, for the prisoner who can afford it has always an able advocate to sway the feelings or perplex the understanding of the jury, while very often there appears no one to speak against him. The Judge, it is said, may in his charge take off the effects of the orator's eloquence or sophistry. But that is no part of any Judge's office, even were he always qualified to perform it: on the contrary, he is by the principles of our law held to be the prisoner's counsel; and at any rate he is chosen to be placed upon the bench for very different qualities from those which fit him to work on a jury's passions, or wrangle successfully with the bar.
I therefore do hope that a long time may not elapse before we borrow from our Scottish neighbours their invaluable institution of a public prosecutor, lending them in return our Grand Jury—against which I have not a word to urge, only desiring it to be accompanied with a learned, an efficient, and thus a well-qualified and a fully responsible officer, to superintend the enforcement of the criminal law. That law thus amended in its procedure and improved as it has been since 1828, would, in my humble judgment, approach so near to perfection as only to require being well digested, and thus made well known, to make it deserve and receive the cordial applause of a grateful empire.
I touch, my Lords, on the conclusion of my course, and I have to express my thanks for the patience with which you have deigned to attend me on it. We have traversed a vast expanse of ocean, but unruffled by any breath of faction, nor heaved up by the ground-swell of any personal interest, while the surrounding shores are at this moment shaken
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far and wide by convulsions that awe the soul. The mighty monarchy of France, destroyed in an hour—the dynasties of its Eastern neighbours crumbling to pieces—the perennial Empire of the Cæsars tottering to its fall—the janitor of the Alps flinging open the Italian gates to the Gaul—the Eternal City built upon seven hills shaken to their base by the populace thereof and their accomplice, the successor of the Borgias, inheritor of their ambition, but unsustained by their capacity or their courage—the air thus ringing with the crash of fallen thrones, the din of arms, the shouts of demagogues—aye, and with shame I speak it, of demagogue statesmen exulting over the havoc which their evil example has dealt all around. Through the air thus inauspiciously filled, let me hope that the feeble voice may pierce which I raise to implore, that while yet the storm only growls at a distance, you would perpetuate the safety you providentially enjoy, by removing every flaw in your system. It is because all other States are shaken, and ours alone is yet secure, that I would have you make those institutions perfectly to be loved which you bid the people press to their bosoms. The events at which all Europe stands aghast, are fitted to teach you this lesson. Listen not, I beseech you, to the thoughtless men, who wrapping up a false doctrine in a fallacious figure, would make you believe that you should not repair your cabin in the hurricane season. I tell you this is the time to repair; for on you the tempest has not yet begun to blow; and you ought to employ the interval while it only rages at a distance, to give all the solidity you can to your walls, and every strength you can impart to your timbers. I have the most entire and undoubting confidence in the powers of our constitution, and the loyalty, the virtue, the courage of my fellow-subjects to sustain it. But the better the law is under which they live, the cheaper is its administration to them, the closer its remedies are brought home to their doors, the plainer it is written for them to read, and the simpler to comprehend as digested, the more secure property becomes in the enjoyment, the easier to exchange and transfer—making it, as Blackstone says, answer more perfectly the purposes of civil life—removing as Locke hath it, the shoals and the quicksands which beset the course of

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those who deal with it—the better will our system deserve the people's love—with the more fervent loyalty will it be by them upheld—the more firmly nerved in its defence will be their gallant arms—the more inaccessible their honest hearts to the arts of all its enemies. Inspired with such sentiments, I twenty years ago addressed the Commons, beseeching them to help me in my endeavours. It is their business to amend the laws of the people who have chosen them to represent their will and guard their interests. But I have now the honour of addressing another, a more august assembly, one whose peculiar province it is to watch over the passing and the administration of the law. I address you who are its hereditary guardians, you who more eminently preside over legislative Acts, you above all who are the judges appointed in the last resort to perform the sacred office of administering its powers and its remedies, you the highest Court of Justice in the Empire. Your aid I implore in performing the office of improving our jurisprudence in all the branches that still require amendment; and my hope that the system thus improved will be as perpetual as its merits deserve, is grounded on the excellence of the fabric which you have to build upon—a constitution justly dear to those who live under it, and justly envied by those who unhappily enjoy not its blessings—uniting in itself the advantages of all other Governments, regal, patrician, republican, and clothed with their several virtues,—borrowing vigour from monarchy, stability from aristocracy, freedom from democracy. But if there remains any defect, anything for a friend to lament, and an enemy to rejoice over; that defect should by its friends be removed, and to its friends therefore I make my appeal. It is my fervent hope that, so improved, it may have a lasting duration. This is my earnest prayer, as it is yours, and I also pray that if, like all the works of man, it be fated to perish, I may not survive to read over its ruins a mournful lesson, how frail are the most perfect monuments of human wisdom.
I crave of your Lordships a first reading for this Bill, entitled—
"An Act to Consolidate and Digest into one Statute all the Laws of England, as far as relates to Indictable Offences and the Punishment thereof."
Bill read 1a.—House adjourned.