Sitting of 17 February 1848

MINUTES.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Captain Pechell, from Sussex, for the Abolition of Church Rates.—By Mr. Bell, and other hon. Members, against the Jewish Disabilities Bill.—By Mr. Beckett, and several hon. Mem-
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bers, from a great number of places, in favour of the Jewish Disabilities Bill.—By Mr. Law, and Mr. Rufford, against, and by Mr. Blewitt, and other hon. Members, in favour of, the Roman Catholic Relief Bill.—By Sir J. M'Taggart, from Wigtown, for Alteration of the Law of Sites for Churches (Scotland).—By Mr. Hume, from Shoreditch, against the Sunday Trading Bill (1846).—By Mr. Headlam, from a great number of places, for the Repeal of Duty on Attorneys' Certificates.—From Paisley, against the Resumption of the Corn Laws.—By Mr. Hume, from Montrose, for Inquiry into the Excise Laws.—By Mr. Robinson, from Poole, for Rating Owners instead of Occupiers of Tenements.—By Mr. Beckett, and other hon. Members, from several places, for Reduction of Duty on Tea.—By Mr. W. Heneage, and other hon. Members, from various places, for Repeal of Duty on Windows.—By Mr. M'Gregor, from Glasgow, for Repeal of Duty on Class Room Windows—By Mr. Herries, from Liverpool, for Repeal or Alteration of the Bank of England Charter Act.—By Mr. Forbes, from Stirling, for Repeal or Alteration of the Bank of England Charter Act, and Banking (Scotland) Act.—By Mr. Pilkington, from Members of the Royal Prince Albert Lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, Manchester Unity, for Extension of the Benefit Societies Act.—By Lord Dudley Stuart, from the Literary and Scientific Institution, John Street, Tottenham Court Road, respecting Mr. Robert Owen.—By Mr. Cobden, from Singapore, for Alteration of Law respecting Constables and Peace Officers (India).—By Mr. Cardwell, from Liverpool, respecting Fees in the Court of Chancery.—By Mr. Repton, from Hertford, for the Suppression of Dog Carts.—From R. E. Johnson, 20, Austin Friars, London, for Production of Papers respecting the Dover and Deal Railway Bill (1846).—By Mr. W. Miles, from Bath and Wells, for Alteration of Law of Education.—By Mr. Maxwell, from Cavan, for Encouragement to Schools in Connexion with the Church Education Society (Ireland).—By Mr. Busfeild, from Bradford, and Viscount Ingestre, from the Smethwick Temperance Society, for Sanitary Regulations.—By Viscount Ingestre, from J. R. Burton, Captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy, respecting the State of our National Defences.—By Mr. Beckett, and other hon. Members, from several places, for Retrenchment in the Naval and Military Expenditure.—By Mr. Dodd, from Relieving Officers, &c., for a Superannuation Fund for Poor Law Officers.—By Sir J. M'Taggart, from Wigtown, for Alteration of Law of Prisons (Scotland).—By Lord Nugent, from Shropshire, for Abolition of Punishment of Death.—By the Earl of Lincoln, from Lanark, for Inquiry respecting Turnpike Roads, &c. (Scotland).—By Mr. Brotherton, and other hon. Members from various places, for referring War Disputes to Arbitration.

NOVA SCOTIA.
MR. HUMEwished to put a question relating to the colony of Nova Scotia. A general election had taken place there, and he wished to ask whether it was the intention of the Government that in that colony responsible government should be carried out, as declared in Lord John Russell's letter.
MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, that he, perhaps, could best answer the hon. Member's question by stating what had actually occurred in the colony. An election took place in August, the result of which was that the Liberal party, which had previously been in a minority in the House of Assembly, obtained a majority there. The House of Assembly met on the 22nd of January, and the first thing it did was to pass a

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vote of confidence in the Executive Council, which was conveyed to the Governor, Sir John Harvey, in an address. The Governor replied that he would adopt such measures as appeared to be expedient upon the occasion. Thereupon the Members of the Executive Council tendered their resignations, and Sir J. Harvey wrote on the 1st of February that he thought he would be able to form a Government without delay. From that statement of facts his hon. Friend would see that the principle of responsible government was in active operation in Nova Scotia.

THE BANK CHARTER ACT.
MR. HERRIESrose to move the following Resolution:—
"That, looking to the state of distress which has for some time prevailed among the commercial classes, and to the general feeling of distrust and alarm, by which the embarrassments of Trade have been aggravated, it is the opinion of this House that Her Majesty's Ministers were justified, during the Recess of Parliament, in recommending to the Bank of England, for the purpose of restoring confidence, a course of proceeding at variance with the restrictions imposed by the Act of the 7th and 8th of Victoria, c. 32. That this House will resolve itself into a Committee upon the said Act."
In the event of the House assenting to the Motion for a Committee, it was his intention to move in the Committee the following Resolution:—
"That it is expedient that the limitations imposed by the Act 7 and 8 Victoria, c. 32, upon the Bank of England, and the Act 8 and 9 Victoria, c, 36 and 37, in relation to the issue of notes payable on demand, be suspended, subject to such conditions as may be provided by any Act to be passed for that purpose."
He had given notice of this Motion before the recess, but having then been unable to bring it before the House, partly on account of the very urgent Irish measures which occupied it, and partly by reason of the adjournment which took place on the day before that which was fixed for his Motion, he had now taken the earliest opportunity of doing so. He was not, however, without the hope that the discussion of the subject might be more carefully, because more calmly and dispassionately, conducted now than it would have been at an earlier period, when very great excitement prevailed respecting it. The propositions he had to submit to the consideration of the House were founded upon events which had occurred in the course of last year, and which were fresh in the recollection of the House. Those events, it was well
804
known, were of the most calamitous kind, and excited more of alarm and misfortune, more deep distress and calamity, than had, perhaps, ever before been produced in the commercial world by any antecedent shock within the memory of any man. Perhaps there never was seen a more disastrous prostration of wealth and trade than had occurred in the period to which he referred. Extensive failures happened in the latter part of the year, which were the cause of wide-spread desolation and ruin. According to a statement which he found in a publication devoted to these subjects, and which appeared to be carefully prepared from authentic sources, 220 mercantile houses of the higher class, being a portion only of the total number of failures which had occurred, had fallen within the period of a few months, or, he might say, of a few weeks only. The liabilities of 85 of these 220 firms were estimated at 12,000,000 l., and the total loss occasioned by the whole of the failures was estimated at not less than 30,000,000 l. Such an event as this in the history of a commercial country could surely not be passed over without exciting the utmost solicitude in every person, whether in the Government or in the Legislature, at all responsible for the administration of the public affairs, to ascertain the causes of such a monstrous calamity, and the best means of averting the recurrence of it. It was with this view that he proposed his Motion, which was of a twofold character, as it embraced two distinct propositions. But inasmuch as these separate resolutions were so interwoven by the nature of the subject with each other, that the fitness of adopting the one would mainly depend upon the grounds on which he should endeavour to establish the other, he conceived that he should best consult the convenience of the House by combining in one speech the arguments for both, and thus spare the House the inconvenience of being addressed by him a second time. He proposed therefore, in the first place, that the House should now express a distinct opinion upon the conduct of the Government when they took that important step by which the wide-spread ruin of the commerce of the metropolis was arrested, and which was announced as the most prominent topic of communication in the Speech from the Throne. He proposed that they should declare and record upon the Journals of the House, that the measure so announced was well-advised. And, surely,

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some distinct expression of an opinion on this point was indispensably necessary for the dignity of the House and the regularity of its proceedings. Now, what was the position in which the House was now placed? Her Majesty had been graciously pleased to announce to them that her advisers had adopted a course which was certainly a very extraordinary one, however justifiable it might be found—the course of authorising the violation of an Act of Parliament recently enacted, of the most stringent character, having for its object and its very principle that of insisting, in the most rigorous degree, on the execution of its provisions. To that announcement the House had hitherto responded only by thanking Her Majesty for the communication. Since that time nothing had been done to ascertain or record the opinion of that House upon this most extraordinary proceeding—this undoubted violation of the law. It was true that it had been asserted, that, inasmuch as the strict provision of the Act had not been literally broken through, there was no such violation of the law as might require a Bill of Indemnity. Upon that point he had much doubt; but he would not discuss the question now, as his present proposition was limited to a simple expression of the opinion of the House upon the merits of the transaction. If the House thought Ministers were justified in the proceeding, it was right they should record their opinion to that effect. He was obliged to say, that Ministers had not in this matter dealt with the House with that frankness and openness which he thought necessary to be observed in such cases. There had been from the beginning an evident desire to avoid a debate on the subject, challenged as Ministers had been, on various occasions, to come forward and give explanations. On the very first night of the Session, there was a kind of rush on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give notice of a Motion for the appointment of a Committee, with a manifest desire to supersede the necessity of any discussion. Even that Committee, however, could not touch the question which his Motion brought under the consideration of the House; they could express no opinion in these respects as to the conduct of Ministers in violating the provisions of a most stringent statute, which had not been in operation longer than two years. In the discharge of his duty, he thought it right, therefore, to bring forward this subject,
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that the House might pronounce its judgment upon the conduct pursued by the Government in suspending the operation of the Bank Charter Act of 1844. And, presuming that the House would, without much difference of opinion, and certainly with no opposition from Her Majesty's Ministers, adopt his first resolution, approving of the course pursued by the Government, he would now proceed to the consideration of his second resolution, namely, that the limitations of the Acts of the 7th and 8th and 9th of Victoria, in relation to the issue of notes payable on demand, should be suspended, subject to such provisions as might be provided by any Act to be passed for that purpose. If the provisions of the Act of 1844 were not the chief cause of the embarrassments felt on the 25th of October, and which induced the Government to interfere, then indeed the step taken by the Government was not justified. But he believed it would not be difficult to show that the Government was justified by necessity, and that if it had not adopted the course it did, the commerce of the country within one week would have been prostrate. He would make a brief statement of the principal facts connected with the critical condition of commercial credit at the period now under consideration, and all of which were subjects of universal notoriety. The Bank was then in possession of gold in its issue department to the extent of about 8,000,000 l. Its circulation (that is, its notes in the hands of the public) was something more than 20,000,000 l.; the amount at which it had stood, with little variation, for some time past. In its banking department the deposits, public and private, were about 17,000,000 l.; while the notes and coin in that department—the only available means for the payment of demands upon it, or for making advances on securities of any kind—were together not more than 1,600,000 l.; the former being 1,170,000 l., and the latter something more than 400,000 l. The very mention of these facts was sufficient to show the critical position in which the Bank was placed. A demand upon it for 1,700,000 l. (at a time when the pressure for money was extreme) would have brought it to a standstill. It must have stopped its payment—pointing in vain to the 8,000,000 l. of gold in its cellars. The alarm occasioned by the general knowledge of this state of things, acquired by the weekly publications under the Act, was such that credit was annihi-

807
lated; every man locked up his money, whether notes or gold. No man would lend, and that of itself was enough to produce the effect which finally obliged the Government, whether disposed to do so or not, to take steps to give relief by restoring freedom to the operations of the Bank. He was aware it had been said that this state of things was not the necessary eon-sequence of the Act of 1844, but that it arose out of the ill-management and improvidence of the Bank of England. He thought it would not be difficult to show that this was far from being the case—that the evil was inherent in the Act itself—that experience had shown, upon more than one occasion, that the provisions of the Bank Charter Act must lead to the crisis which had occurred—and that no management, no skill, on the part of those who superintended the affairs of the Bank in times of difficulty, could avert the evil. He could not better enforce that view of the subject than by referring the House to the events of 1847, which led, at two different periods, to the same result—an embarrassment of the Bank, and the distress of the country. In the first period (between January and April, 1847), there was a great demand for the export of gold to foreign countries for the all-important object of purchasing food for this country. A considerable action consequently took place upon the bullion in the hands of the Bank, by which, however, it was not reduced to a lower point than 9,000,000 l.; from which it rose again between the middle of April and the end of May to upwards of 10,000,000 l. Throughout this period there prevailed no other cause for a foreign drain of gold from this country. There existed, therefore, no ground for apprehension on the part of the Bank; and if it had been left in the unfettered exercise of its own discretion it would, no doubt, have permitted the gold to go forth freely for the fulfilment of the great national purpose which could in no other manner be accomplished—well knowing that in due time it would return again to their coffers. But the Bank Charter Act forbad that salutary course. It imposed upon the Bank the imperative condition that every diminution of its stock of gold, from whatever cause it might proceed, should be counteracted by a restraint upon its issues. The Directors had therefore no choice but to put on the screw as it is called. The rate of interest was raised. A pressure upon commercial credit was created. That pressure
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was increased by alarm, and an action took place upon the reserve of notes and coin in the banking department which reduced it so low as to threaten a crisis such as subsequently occurred in October. On this occasion it was very narrowly avoided; and although the Bank just got through the difficulty, the commercial world suffered most severely by the efforts which it made. It had been said, and was said still, that all this danger and inconvenience had arisen from the mismanagement of the Bank Directors. Now, he had looked very carefully into the matter, and he could find nothing like mismanagement in the course they had pursued. It had been said, that the Bank ought to have increased its rate of interest more rapidly between January and April; but if that which he had now stated was a correct view of the circumstances of the case, that course would only have created greater distress and have produced a severer crisis. Before he proceeded to call the attention of the House to the second and more severe embarrassment which occurred to the Bank, and the consequent miseries inflicted upon trade, in the ensuing month of October, it was natural to consider what must have been the effect both upon the Government and the Bank of the awful monition presented by the fearful occurrences of April. It would be doing the greatest injustice to both of them to suppose, that either could for a day or an hour be unmindful of the magnitude of the danger to which, by the working of this Act, they were constantly exposed. He readily gave them credit for anxious solicitude and un-abating vigilance to avert by the application of the utmost prudence and good management the renewal of the difficulties which they had so recently experienced. But all this prudence and attention were unavailing; and it might therefore safely be affirmed as a proposition requiring no farther argument or demonstration, that the second and more formidable explosion which so speedily ensued was the effect of the faulty construction of the machinery itself of the Act, and not of the negligence or indiscretion of those who administered it. He was, surely, warranted by these facts in asserting that the whole evil was in the principle of the Act itself; and because it was in the Act and not in the Bank or the Government, he felt it to be his duty to move the House to suspend the statute, and thereby prevent the otherwise inevitable recurrence of those fearful conse-

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quences to the commerce of the country to which he believed it would always he exposed, while the Act of 1844 remained in force. He was extremely anxious not to lead the House into a debate on the general question of the currency. He was too well aware that if that topic were once entered upon, the House would embark upon an ocean of controversy, the termination of which it might not be easy to foretell. Such a discussion was wholly unnecessary for his present purpose, which was of a purely practical character. He merely invited the House to consider the principle and operation of the restrictive provisions of the Act of 1844, which was all that was required to convince the House that the evils which we were deploring, sprang immediately out of the working of those provisions, and were not attributable either to indiscretion in any quarter, or to mere accident of any kind. The principle maintained at the time of the passing of the Act, and which was immediately derived from the author of the theory on which it was built, was expressed in this short dictum: "The contraction of the circulation is to be made precisely coincident as regards both time and amount with the diminution of the bullion." This dictum was founded upon the assumption that the Bank possessed the power of increasing or contracting the circulation by a direct action upon it; that the variations in the amount of the circulation would increase or diminish the prices of commodities; and that, through these, the exchanges would be affected so as to regulate the export or importation of gold. In opposition to this theory he ventured positively to assert, that it was wholly inconsistent with fact, and was unsupported by experience; which showed that the extent of the circulation in the hands of the public was not directly regulated by the Bank; that prices were not governed by the amount of the circulation; and that the exchanges were not controlled by that mode of agency. On the contrary, it was now made manifest, by a careful attention to actual results, that the amount of the notes in circulation was determined by the wants and demands of the public, and that the Bank possessed no power, by a direct action upon it, to regulate the exchanges. It followed that the Bank was enjoined to do that which in reality it could not do; but in the endeavour to fulfil the injunctions of the Act of 1844, it had no alternative but to do that which in a time of difficulty and embarrassment
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must lead to a panic and a crisis such as they had recently experienced. The theory of the Bank Charter Act was, that the circulation ought to be regulated in accordance with the amount of bullion in the coffers of the Bank; and this point had been referred to both by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the right hon. Member for Portsmouth. Now, it was undeniably true that the circulation of bank notes had not conformed to the fluctuation in bullion; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pointing correctly to the fact, as exhibited by the published accounts, made it a subject of congratulation to the public, that even at the most trying passage of the late difficulties, the circulation had not been materially, if at all, diminished. Now, this fact was inconsistent with the theory propounded by the supporters of the Bank Charter Act. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth, with more ingenuousness than was displayed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, observed, that there must be something wrong in this—something at least which he could not reconcile to the theory and proper working of the Act, when he saw that, although the stock of bullion in the Bank had been diminished to the extent of 8,000,000 l. or 9,000,000 l., there was no corresponding contraction in the amount of the circulation. The right hon. Gentleman was undoubtedly right in his reference to the principle of the Act; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer was equally so in congratulating the public that the result had not been conformable to it; for, the rule being that for every million of gold abstracted, an equal amount should be drawn from the circulation, and there having been 9,000,000 l. of gold exported between the autumn of 1846 and April 1847, in what state would the country have been if 9,000,000 l. had also been abstracted from the circulation? The 20,000,000 l., or thereabouts, which it usually required, would, in that case have been reduced to 11,000,000 l. This showed, if anything could show, the inherent faults and errors in the Act. In the second of the periods to which he had alluded—in October last—the Bank of England undoubtedly was brought to this absurd and lamentable catastrophe, namely, that with 8,000,000 l. in its cellar, it would have been, but for the interference of the Government, compelled to stop payment. If he was told that the Bank might, in order to replenish their

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reserve, have taken their securities into the market, the answer was, that securities of all descriptions were then un-saleable; and even if they could have been sold, it must have been at such a price as would have broken down the property of a large portion of the community. If they had brought Government stock into the market, the Three per Cents might have been at 50. He had stated that he considered that there had been no mismanagement on the part of the Bank. He knew that they were accused of having discounted bills at too low a rate of interest in 1844; but the Act of that year, which imposed upon the Directors such severe restrictions with respect to their issues of notes, set them perfectly at liberty with respect to their banking department. They were told that while they must strictly conform to the provisions of the Act to secure the convertibility of their notes, they might and ought, as bankers, to act as prudence suggested for the advantage of their constituents. His right hon. Friend (Sir R. Peel) expressed an opinion to that effect—an opinion which, like every other opinion which proceeded from his right hon. Friend, was entitled to the greatest respect. He believed that, previously to the Act of 1844, the Bank had never discounted under 4 per cent; but although he might himself greatly doubt the propriety of the Bank lowering its rate of interest so as to run a race of competition with the private discounters for the benefit of its own constituency, the framers of the Act in question had no right to complain of the reduction to 2½ per cent, because that reduction did, in point of fact, produce no effect whatever on the amount of bullion in the Bank coffers. A very short time before the Act passed, there was 16,300,000 l. of bullion in the Bank of England. From that time up to the middle of the year 1845, no material variation took place; but in June in that year, it had risen to 16,600,000 l., the highest amount that ever was known. His right hon. Friend (Sir R. Peel), when in 1845 he reviewed the intervening period between the passing of the Act of 1844 and the period at which he spoke, expressed himself satisfied with the progress and position of affairs; and indeed they were flourishing in every way. If the Bank had in the meantime done wrong, and had deviated from the principles of the Act of 1844, he was quite sure that his right hon. Friend would have complained of it. Now, at what other
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period was it that imprudence was alleged against the Bank? If anybody would take the trouble of following up the progress of the bullion, and watch its increase and diminution, he would find that the Bank did reduce or increase their rate of interest just as the bullion rose or fell. They continued to discount at 2½ per cent till November, 1845, when there was a sensible decrease in the bullion, which only amounted to 13,700,000 l., and the Bank consequently raised their rate of discount to 3½ per cent. From that period the bullion remained steady, and the rate of interest the same, until August, 1846, when the bullion rose to the imposing sum of 16,366,000 l., and the rate of discount was diminished to 3 per cent. From August, 1846, till January, 1847, the bullion did not vary in a very sensible degree; sometimes it was rather higher, and sometimes rather lower; but in January, an action on gold manifestly began, the bullion fell to 13,949,000 l., and the Bank raised its discounts to 3½ per cent. In the following week, seeing that the action on gold continued, and that the amount had gradually decreased until it reached 9,867,000 l., they raised the rate to 4 per cent, and subsequently to 5 per cent. He thought, therefore, that if the House looked to the rate of interest charged by the Bank, and found it rising and falling as the bullion rose or sank, they would discharge the Directors from blame in respect of imprudent changes in the rate of discount. He would now advert to the very important point of the supposed security afforded by this Act for the convertibility of the bank note. He entirely denied that the Act ensured that object. He knew that it was upon the effect of the Act in this particular respect that its authors and advocates chiefly relied, and that their opinions were founded upon the theory on which it was constructed. When he avowed himself convinced that that theory was fallacious, and that the conclusions at which they had arrived were erroneous, he was aware of the great weight of authority to which he stood opposed, not only of persons of much talent and ability out of doors, but also of the large majorities of the two Houses of Parliament by which the Act had been approved of and passed. But although he was almost overwhelmed when he contemplated the magnitude of this adverse authority, his convictions were nevertheless so clear and positive that he was compelled to assert

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them. He would ask, then, what proof there was that the Act of 1844 had secured the convertibility of the bank note under the severe pressure of the two critical periods of April and October, 1847? It was observed that in each of those cases the Bank had still retained a large stock of gold—the best assurance of its ability to maintain the convertibility of its notes. But it ought to be borne in mind that in the year 1846, before the time at which the action on its gold had commenced, the Bank had possessed the largest stock of gold that it had ever held—more than 16,000,000 l.; and although it was true that about half that amount still remained after the pressure in April and October, it was also true that the amount which had been withdrawn from it was equal to the largest quantity that had been abstracted in any former crisis of a similar character; the difference being, that on those occasions (he referred particularly to 1825) the action on the gold commenced when the stock on hand scarcely exceeded the amount which in 1847 was withdrawn, and that the exhaustion was consequently nearly completed. It was clear, therefore, that no conclusion in favour of the power of the Act to secure convertibility could be drawn from these facts. And upon what ground could it be asserted that the farther exhaustion of the gold in the Bank wag prevented by the Act of 1844? He would suppose that the Government had not determined to suspend the law in October, 1847, when the panic was in full force: what would in all probability have been the consequence? The internal drain of gold would have been increased by the increasing fears and commercial alarm and distrust in all parts of the kingdom; and the Bank might have been deprived of its last sovereign in the convulsion which must have ensued upon the discredit occasioned by the stoppage of the banking department. Such being the dangers and vicissitudes to which the operation of the Act of 1844 gave rise, he contended that the monetary system as it existed prior to the passing of it was safer, under all circumstances, than the present one. He would endeavour to show how the Bank might have acted, if unfettered by the Act of 1844 in the two critical periods of danger in 1847. In the former of these—between January and April—at the commencement of which they possessed fifteen millions of bullion, they would have looked at the causes which produced a gradual
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diminution of that stock. They would have observed that the Continental exchanges were not materially affected; that there was no drain in that direction, except for a supply of food; and that the principal efflux was towards America for that object. Under such circumstances, they might have exercised a sound discretion in not creating alarm or cramping commerce by too severe a counteraction of the movement of the gold. The severe pressure of April might have been avoided; and if the alarm and excitement of that period had not been created, the subsequent drain to the interior, which prevailed from the month of May to the 25th of October, might never have existed at all. In the second period (after the beginning of May), the export of bullion had ceased, and the exchanges were in our favour. The action upon the gold of the Bank was for an internal demand only, and therefore the effect of want of confidence, which would have best been restored by a readiness on the part of the Bank to give assistance to commerce, instead of withholding it, as they were compelled to do. He therefore had a right to assume that if the Bank had been in the same position as they were before the Act of 1844, they would, by the exercise of a sound discretion in the employment of all their resources, and taking a wise view of all their liabilities, have passed through the period without any shock or danger; but in consequence of that Act they were reduced to the most miserable exhibition of riches and distress which this country ever witnessed. This lamentable exhibition had occurred twice in one year, and that, too, under the joint supervision of the Government and the Bank, who had full warning of the danger, and were therefore not taken by surprise. The Bank and the Government had taken charge of the monetary affairs of the country; with a full knowledge derived from the occurrences in April of the dangerous character of the machine which they were working; and yet, with all their care and attention, within six short months it exploded in their hands. Was the House to continue to trust to the working of such an instrument, even under the wisest management? He did not intend to impute any want of skill or prudence to Her Majesty's Ministers. He believed that no other men would have done better in their places. It was the system—it was the Act—that was in fault. The Ministers had avoided a de-

815
cision upon its merits in this House. They had transferred the matter to the investigation of a Committee—a Committee which some thought might be of endless duration; but he was inclined to believe that Ministers expected that, after a considerable lapse of time, the report of that Committee would lead to some changes in the measure, in such a way as might cover an apparent defeat, and evade a direct recognition of its fundamental defects. Now, he thought that would be a course much less satisfactory, even to themselves in the end, than at once giving some remedy such as that now proposed. He had now attempted to show what was required as a measure of relief in present circumstances; and he hoped and trusted the House would not refuse it. He asked them to place matters in this country, as regarded trade and commerce, in a position of safety. They were, beyond all question or dispute, at present in a state of great danger; they had hanging over them the possible return in a short period of renewed commercial distress, with all its lamentable consequences; and he could tell them that the apprehension of such a result was almost universal, and that it was sitting like an incubus on the springs of confidence and credit. He had still, however, great faith in the commercial enterprise and activity of this country. He could not doubt that that commercial activity and enterprise would spring again to the height from which it had so lamentably fallen; but it would not be under the provisions of this Act. He much regretted to be compelled to add, that it was not only in this part of the country that the ill effects of these monetary regulations had been experienced. He believed the representatives from Scotland would be able to confirm a belief he strongly held, that in that country there had also been great dissatisfaction with the provisions of the Act. He always regretted that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Peel) had resolved to interfere with the system of banking which had so long and so beneficially prevailed in Scotland. His object, as enunciated by him, was undoubtedly to secure a larger metallic basis for our monetary system, by compelling the Scotch and Irish banks to take their part of the burden in sustaining that system; but he thought there had been a great mistake in that conclusion. He did not believe that this compulsory distribution of gold throughout the country had added
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anything to the amount of the precious metals in the United Kingdom. He apprehended that it only had the effect of causing a separate allocation of them, instead of their being concentrated as at present in the coffers of one bank. The gold was now distributed partly in Scotland, partly in Ireland, and in other private banks throughout the country; but that he regarded as a disadvantageous state of things, as he contended that for all the purposes of securing the convertibility of the notes it was more advantageous that the Bank of England, as the great central bank of the kingdom, should be in possession of the bullion, than that it should be spread throughout the other banks of the country. If the additional 3,000,000 l. that had been thus lodged elsewhere, had been wholly available by the Bank, it would have placed them in a stronger position to meet the wants of the commercial community during the late panic. His main objection was to that provision of the Act which assigned 14,000,000 l. as an impassable limit to the credit circulation of the Bank. He was convinced that any such specific limitation would be found ultimately as impracticable as it was unwise. If as had been said, nature abhorred a vacuum, political economy equally abhorred a maximum. He would not go into any further or more minute consideration of this question, nor was it his object to propound any theory. He was only asking, for the safety of the commerce of this country, labouring and prostrate as it yet was, that they should accede to his proposal of an immediate practical relief. He asked it for the sake of the industry of the country—for the sake of those manufacturing districts that were now labouring under the severest depression, and which suffered in a peculiar degree from the pressure of this Act; for without confidence and commercial credit there was no facility for the export of goods; and without exports there was no employment for the manufacturer. He asked it on behalf of all the moneyed interest—not of those who had been accumulating large fortunes through the vast fluctuations in credit and capital caused by this Act—but on behalf of the moneyed interest engaged in the commercial and manufacturing industry of the country. He entreated the House to place these various interests, at least, in that comparative state of safety—indeed, he might say complete safety—in which they were

817
before the passing of this Act. He entreated the House to suspend of this Act only so much as might remove the positive restrictions on the amount of credit-paper which might be issued. There were many other provisions of great consequence, which at present he had no intention to discuss; but if Parliament should consider this whole measure, and determine on some new system in place of that which now existed, he, for one, would have no objection to enter at any time into the consideration of it. Before he concluded, he ought perhaps to remark that with regard to the first of the Motions which he should propose, it might be objected by some parties that they were not quite satisfied with the conduct of Her Majesty's Government—that they were not quite prepared to express an opinion favourable to the course they had pursued in regard to the suspension of the Act. Their objection might he, that Government should have interfered sooner, and that if they had done so much mischief would have been averted. He was undoubtedly of opinion that if that Act had been sooner suspended, we should have been saved much misery; but at the same time he believed that Ministers could not be expected to suspend the law till the very last extremity. As an objection to his second proposition, it might probably be urged that this subject was under investigation before a Committee, and that that Committee would report at no distant time. Of course, he could not expect those who entertained so improbable an opinion to give him their vote on the present occasion. It might be urged as another objection to his Motion, that Parliament being now sitting, might interfere in any emergency, and that Government having already interposed to suspend the Act, might be expected to do so again. But no reliance should be placed on these expectations. They had no assurance that the sittings of that House might not soon cease, and they could not tell whether Government would be disposed to take the responsibility of again putting aside the Act, while, if they did, their interference might again come too late. In conclusion, he would say that he saw no other course likely to secure the present safety of the commerce and credit of the country but that which he now proposed, and which he hoped would receive the sanction of that House.
MR. HASTIEseconded the Motion, with a feeling of the strongest conviction
818
of its necessity. It was quite clear, that if this Act were permitted to remain, whenever we had any disturbing cause, such as a short harvest or a foreign loan, ruin to all would be the consequence, unless the Government again set aside the law by a suspension of that Act. Had not the Government stepped in to relieve the monetary system of the incubus imposed on it by artificial restrictions, no language could describe the disastrous results that would have followed. But the calamities of last year only gave a foretaste of what might be expected in coming years if those absurd and impolitic restrictions were not removed. Whenever there was a drain of bullion expressly for the purpose of importing from foreign lands food for our people, the same thing would occur that took place last year. Everywhere there would be confusion, distraction, and distrust. It was a mistake to suppose that the effects of the late panic had as yet subsided, or that they were limited to this country. In the present state of uncertainty merchants were afraid to risk their capital. So far as the East Indies, China, and America were concerned, no merchant would come under the usual acceptances at six months for the export of goods, fearing as they did a recurrence of the disasters which they had so lately witnessed. If the Act possessed any utility, as those who promoted it would have them believe, still he contended there was no occasion whatever for its continuance. It had in no degree bettered our position. Down to 1844, when the Act came into operation, the Bank of England had never reduced its discounts below 4 per cent. The Directors were then told that they had nothing to do but as bankers to attend to their own business; and therefore, having a large amount of notes in the banking department, they naturally and properly took steps to turn those balances to the best account, by reducing their rate of discount to 2½ per cent. The consequence was to bring to the Bank of England all the short bills having less than ninety days to run, while the brokers discounted the six month bills at 2¾ per cent. This produced an extension of credit and that undue speculation which succeeded. The Act of 1844 had done all this, and would do so again. When money was plentiful, it rendered it more abundant; and when money was scarce, it aggravated the scarcity. In that respect no Act of the Legislature could have a more mischievous effect on

819
the commercial interest. The Act of 1844 created a greater fluctuation in the rate of interest than ever existed before. All fluctuations in the rate of interest were highly detrimental in a commercial country. A rise of one-half per cent in the discount of the bills circulating in this country to the amount of 600,000,000 l. a year, was a charge of 20,000 l. a month on the commercial interest; but the rise in the rate of discount had been not one-half per cent, but 3 and even 4 per cent. If anything could convince the House of the impolicy of the Act of 1844, it was the speech of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer in moving for the appointment of the Committee. He stated that he had seen deputations from various parts of the country, and heard the suggestions they were prepared to offer by way of remedy, some proposing the issue of 4,000,000 l. of paper, and others an advance by Government on goods hypothecated by merchants; but after hearing all their plans, and giving his undivided attention to the whole subject, he had come to the resolution that nothing would do but a suspension of the Act itself. Such was the magic of that suspension that cashboxes which had been locked up, containing large amounts of notes, were immediately opened, confidence was restored, and not more than 400,000 l. was required from the Bank of England. Nothing could be more condemnatory of an Act, which had already proved well nigh the total destruction of credit, and the continued operation of which would involve the ruin of half the commercial classes in the country. He had great pleasure in seconding the Motion.
The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The right hon. Gentleman at the outset of his speech stated truly, that although it might be somewhat inconvenient to listen to two speeches from him, yet the two portions of his Motion were nevertheless perfectly distinct in their nature, and had not necessarily any connexion with each other. Certainly no person reading his resolutions could entertain any doubt on this subject. One of his propositions is an expression of approval of the course which the Government took in October last; and the other pledges the House to an opinion that the Act of 1844 and the Act of 1845, for regulating the issue of bank notes in the United Kingdom, should forthwith be suspended. No doubt it is perfectly possible that we may have been right in suspending
820
the Act in October, and yet it might be wrong to suspend it now; on the other hand, we may be blamed for what we did then, and nevertheless it may be right to suspend the Act now. I shall, however, follow the course of the right hon. Gentleman, and refer to both resolutions in one speech, because I think it would not be expedient to have a separate discussion on each. The right hon. Gentleman said that we evaded the discussion of this subject on a former occasion. I really don't know what he meant by that assertion, because we certainly gave the fairest opportunity for discussion when this subject was last under the consideration of the House. I stated at considerable length—greater, I am afraid, than the House was disposed to think altogether agreeable—the views which the Government entertained, and I invited discussion on the subject. For three nights was the question debated—twenty-two Gentlemen expressed their opinions upon it—and simply from the unwillingness of other parties to speak, the discussion was brought to a close. The debate might have gone on to any length to which hon. Gentlemen were willing to prolong it. With regard to the resolution of the right hon. Gentleman, expressing approbation of the conduct of the Government, of course I cannot say that we were wrong in what we did. My opinion at the time was, that we were right; and, upon subsequent reflection, I remain of the opinion, that, in the circumstances in which the country was then placed, the course we adopted was the proper one. We did not, and do not, think it necessary to ask for any expression of approval of our conduct. During the former discussion on the question, no person blamed the conduct of the Government. So far as I remember, during the whole of the debate many hon. Gentlemen expressed their approbation of what we did; but no one blamed us. I might ask, then, Quis vituperavit? We were perfectly content with that general opinion, and do not seek any more formal expression of approbation from the House. If it should be thought necessary to pronounce the approbation expressed in the first resolution, we of course shall receive it with gratitude; at all events, I cannot oppose a resolution approving what the Government has done. With regard to the second resolution, I cannot express the same opinion. I think it an ill-timed and in some respects a mischievous

821
resolution. I consider it would have been advisable not to move it. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not persist in his Motion. If the right 'hon. Gentleman withdraws the second, Her Majesty's Government will be well content that he should withdraw both his resolutions together; and I will not complain of his not persisting in his approbation of our conduct. The right hon. Gentleman proposes to suspend the Acts of 1844 and 1845, that is, those laws under which the issue of bank notes throughout the country is at present regulated. That suspension may of course be either temporary or permanent. The right hon. Gentleman left us in doubt which of the two he intended. Taking them separately, it does not seem to me that the slightest case has been made out by the right hon. Gentleman for a temporary suspension. The right hon. Gentleman has stated very fairly that the alarm both in April and October last arose from the state of the reserve in the Bank of England. I entirely concur with him in that opinion. I believe that in April the restrictive measures which the Bank took were rendered necessary by the low state of the reserve; and although the alarm and failures which took place in August and September, were, as I formerly stated, neither caused by the conduct of the Bank of England nor by the operation of the Act of 1844, still, a larger reserve in the Bank might have rendered the issue of the letter of October 25 unnecessary. I do not wish to advance any controvertible position; but there can be very little doubt that the commercial distress was caused to a great extent by the want of that accommodation in the shape of discounts which the merchants had previously enjoyed. There was a great abstraction of floating capital, partly for the purchase of food and partly for the construction of railways, and to that extent the available means of discount had been curtailed. In the course of the autumn more than one bill-broker either stopped payment or suspended operations, and the consequence was that demands for discounts were made on the Bank of England, quite unexampled in former years. The amount of bills discounted by the Bank of England in October last was double that of October preceding. In the two or three months previous to October the Bank of England increased the accommodation to the public to the extent of between 6,000,000 l. and 7,000,000 l.; they reduced their reserve to the point stated
822
by the right hon. Gentleman; and great apprehension prevailed on the part of the London bankers and other parties that the Bank of England would no longer be able to extend to them further accommodation. In that state of things they apprehended that discounts could neither be had at the Bank of England nor from the bill-brokers. A panic was thus produced by the low state of their reserve; and the real effect of the letter of the 25th of October was to place the Bank of England in the same position as if there had been a larger reserve. Confidence was restored, parties believing that they could obtain assistance from the Bank if they asked it. In point of fact they did not want it, the whole amount of assistance asked for being under 400,000 l. I do not mean to blame the Bank for reducing its reserve, or say that parties were justified in looking to the Bank for assistance. I wish to avoid all points which can be disputed; all I say is—and that, I believe, no one is disposed to deny—that it was owing to the low state of the reserve that apprehension was entertained. Now, what is the state of the reserve at the present moment? According to the return which appeared in the Gazette last Friday, the notes and coin amounted to 8,685,000 l. I received just before coming into the House the weekly account sent into the Treasury on Thursday, which appears in the Gazette on Friday, and I find from that statement that on Saturday last the notes and coin amounted to 9,686,000 l. The most timid merchant—the most timid man in England, can be under no apprehension that the Bank will be unable to meet any demand that can be made upon it. Though very slowly, yet I believe trade and commerce are gradually reviving, and there is no probability of any demand being made which a much lower reserve would not be able to meet. There cannot, therefore, be the slightest need of any temporary suspension. The Motion of the right hon. Gentleman first stood for the 14th of December. If there had been a very low reserve, great pressure, and an improbability of the Bank being able to meet the demands upon it, there might have been at that time some cause for moving such a resolution as this. On the 18th of December, however, before Parliament separated, the Bank had a reserve of eight millions and a quarter; and I think it will not be said that there was even then any probability of any immediate

823
demand for bullion; but certainly at the present time, with a reserve of above 9,600,000 l. in its coffers, we cannot contemplate the possibility of any demand upon the Bank which it would not be perfectly able to meet. If such a case should arise, it is competent to Her Majesty's Ministers to come to Parliament and to ask for such powers as they may think necessary; and if they did not do so, it would be competent to the right hon. Member for Stamford, or any other Member of this House, if they thought fit, to move resolutions condemnatory of the course pursued by the Government. I think, then, that not the slightest case has been out for the temporary suspension of the Acts of 1844 and 1845, and that there is no need to call upon the Government to provide against a danger which appears to be of the most problematical character. But the right hon. Gentleman indicated more than a mere temporary suspension of these Acts; and I must say, I think it would have been much better if he had moved at once for the repeal of the Acts, instead of asking for a permanent suspension, which, if it means anything, means repeal. I think he ought at least to have moved for the repeal of so much of the Acts as he conceived ought not to remain the permanent law of the land; but under the guise of suspension the right hon. Gentleman proposes a virtual repeal of the law. I must say that to move for a virtual repeal of the existing currency laws, when a Committee which was unanimously appointed by the House to inquire into the operations of those laws, and to consider whether any alterations or amendments should be made in them, is at this moment pursuing its investigations, appears to me to be a course which completely stultifies the proceedings of the House. In our schoolboy days we read of a judge who decided first and heard the case afterwards; and this seems to be pretty nearly the course proposed to be adopted by the right hon. Gentleman. Many Gentlemen consider that alterations may be made in these Acts with advantage; but various opinions are entertained on the subject, and various amendments in them have been suggested. I may here observe, however, that the right hon. Gentleman was in error when he stated that numerous deputations have waited upon the Government to recommend amendments in the law. The fact is that we received only two deputations—one from Liverpool, and
824
the other from Birmingham. The opinions entertained with reference to the proper substitute for the Acts of 1844 and 1845, differ most widely. The right hon. Member for Stamford might be satisfied with the mere suspension of those Acts; but I see an hon. Gentleman near him, who, I believe, would consider that no substantial benefit was gained unless we meddled with the Act of 1819. It has been said that the Act of 1844 was the necessary complement of the Act of 1819; and that opinion is entertained by many Gentlemen, who consider that unless we repeal the Act of 1819 as well as the Act of 1844, we shall effect no substantial good. The Committee to which I have referred, and which was recently appointed by the House, comprises Gentlemen entertaining various shades of opinion on this question; and I hope that from their inquiries we shall obtain much valuable information; but the right hon. Gentleman calls upon us before we receive that information—before we know even what the facts are in many respects—to decide the matter at once. Of course the right hon. Gentleman will follow up this Motion by another to rescind the resolution of the House under which that Committee was appointed; for it would be a useless waste of labour for that Committee to continue their inquiries when the House had adopted a decision which would render them useless. The right hon. Gentleman observed that it was essential that we should know correctly what was the state of the Bank of England at the period which has been referred to, and for some time previously—that we should know what had been the conduct of the Bank, and its position, during the preceding eighteen months. Well, before the Committee we are to examine the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England; and I doubt not that we shall obtain, from those able and intelligent Gentlemen a full and complete statement of the conduct of the Bank for years back. But, when it is admitted that these disclosures are necessary, in order to enable us to form a just opinion of the conduct of the Bank, and of the value of the Acts of 1844 and 1845, it does appear a most premature proceeding to call upon the House to come to a decision upon those subjects before we are in possession of this information. The right hon. Gentleman stated that he was very anxious to avoid a general discussion on the currency, and upon that point I entirely agree with him; for I

825
think, to use his own metaphor, that to commence a discussion upon that subject at this period of the Session would be to embark upon an ocean in which I know not where we should find a haven or reach a shore. If the discussion on the currency had been continued before Christmas, no particular inconvenience might have been occasioned, for at that time there was no heavy pressure of business; but now, when it is absolutely necessary that public business should be proceeded with, very great inconvenience would be occasioned by a currency debate, which might be protracted, as currency debates usually are, for four or five nights. To-morrow my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) makes his financial statement; the time has arrived when the estimates must be voted, and when the proposals of the Government with respect to taxation must be submitted to the House; and it is most important that we should proceed with this business without delay. I do hope, therefore, that the House will not encourage the commencement of a long debate on the subject of the currency. There are, however, one or two points in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman to which I wish to advert, merely to correct any misapprehension which may exist with respect to them. He has said, that the promoters of the Acts of 1844 and 1845 blamed the Bank for having reduced the rate of discount to 2½ per cent in 1844. I do not know who the promoters of those measures are to whom the right hon. Gentleman referred; for, to the best of my recollection, none of the promoters of the Acts of 1844 and 1845 did blame the Bank on that ground. I know that several opponents of the measures have laid down the doctrine that the Bank ought at all times, and under all circumstances, to discount at one uniform rate. That position is maintained certainly by one great authority on monetary matters, who is opposed to the Act of 1844, and is not maintained, so far as I know, by those who supported it. Let the right hon. Gentleman blame persons for holding such extravagant opinions, if he will but at least let him put the blame upon the right shoulders. The right hon. Gentleman also stated, that the effect of the Acts of 1844 and 1845 was to entail upon the country bankers in England, Scotland, and Ireland, the necessity of holding from 3,000,000 l. to 4,000,000 l. of gold. Now this was not the case. Those measures did not entail upon the country banks of
826
England the necessity of holding a single additional sovereign. An issue of 8,000,000 l. was given to the English bankers, without the necessity of holding a single pound more than they did before. Nor did those measures entail upon the bankers of Ireland the necessity of holding a single sovereign more than they previously did. Why, last October the circulation in Ireland was actually 1,000,000 l. below its authorised amount. The Irish banks might, last autumn, have issued notes to the amount of 1,000,000 l. more than were actually in circulation, if it had been necessary to meet the wants of the country, without the slightest deviation from the Act of 1845, and without holding a single additional pound. With regard to Scotland, the case was, no doubt, different. The actual circulation of the Scotch banks, last autumn, was higher than the authorised circulation by about 470,000 l., and they were under the obligation of holding gold to this amount. The real fact was, then, that at that time it was only necessary, in the three countries, that an additional sum of less than 500,000 l. in gold should be held by the bankers, under the requirements of the existing law. The right hon. Member for Stamford (Mr. Herries), also stated that I had said that there had been no great diminution of the circulation at the time when my right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. F. T. Baring) said, that there had been a great diminution of the circulation. Now, substituting for the expression "circulation," the expression which I think ought to be used, namely, "notes with the public," it is true that I did state, that in the course of the last autumn there was no great diminution of notes with the public, but on the contrary a slight increase. But that was not the period to which my right hon. Friend referred. What he said was, that between August, 1846, and April, 1847, there was a diminution of 9,000,000 l. of bullion, and no diminution of notes with the public, while under the operation of the law there ought to have been a diminution. My right hon. Friend's remark applied to the autumn of 1846 and the spring of 1847, while my observations applied to the autumn of 1847, so that we were referring to totally different periods. I thought it my duty to notice these two or three points, because I wish the House not to remain under any misapprehension as to the facts. With regard to any general

827
discussion of the currency, I do not think this is the time when we ought to enter upon such a debate. I have stated my opinions on that subject at great length on former occasions, and I do not now wish to obtrude them again upon the House. I think the right hon. Gentleman has made out no case whatever for the temporary suspension of the Acts of 1844 and 1845; and the House will have a future opportunity, when they have all the facts of the case before them, of judging calmly and deliberately upon the more permanent operation of those measures.
ALDERMAN THOMPSONsaid, that, if he correctly understood the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he rested his opposition to this Motion upon three points, namely, that the present condition of the Bank of England, as compared with its condition in October last, was so improved, and there being no appearance of pressure, there could be no danger of any difficulty in that quarter; his second objection to this Motion was, that Parliament was sitting; and thirdly, that a Committee of the House had been appointed to inquire into the cause of the commercial distress which prevailed in the country. With regard to the first statement, namely, the improved condition of the Bank, he had the satisfaction of entirely agreeing with the right hon. Gentleman; but he begged to be permitted to remind the right hon. Gentleman what the condition of the Bank of England was about this time last year. He would remind the right hon. Gentleman that the bullion in the Bank of England in January, 1847, was within a mere trifle of 15,000,000 l.; that the reserve on the banking account was upwards of 8,000,000 l.; and by the month of April, the bullion was reduced to the extent of 5,000,000 l., and the reserve to the extent of 6,000,000 l. It might be said that at this present time there was no prospect of an export of bullion, or an unusual importation of corn; but that, in his humble opinion, was not a sufficient answer. He might ask the right hon. Gentleman if he felt perfect security with regard to the state of Italy and France? Might not Europe be so involved in war and strife as to cause a large drain upon the bullion in the Bank of England? Therefore they could not trust to such arguments as the right hon. Gentleman had used. With regard to the other point, namely, that Parliament is sitting, he would remind the House of the manner in which
828
the late Parliament had treated the petition of the merchants of the city of London, which was presented by his hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon in June last. That petition pointed out the dangerous position in which this country was placed; but did Parliament listen to it? No such thing. And what ground had the commercial and manufacturing interest for supposing that this Parliament would pay more attention to any representations they might make? The third objection of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was founded on the fact that a Committee of this House was now sitting to inquire into the operation of the currency laws. He hoped he was not divulging the secrets of the Committee of which he was a Member, when he stated that it met on the 4th of February; he was speaking on the 17th of February, and they had examined two witnesses! Considering what the suffering of the country had been, and still was, did they think it would satisfy the country to wait for the report of that Committee? He would say, that if the House of Commons entertained any such expectation, he was afraid it would end in bitter disappointment; and he would further say, that those who had the opportunity of witnessing the calamities that had taken place, could come to no other conclusion than this—that it was utterly impossible for this country to endure a second time such a financial pressure on its mercantile and manufacturing interests. It was impossible for any man who was acquainted with the state of the country to think that they could go through, in the year 1848, the same trial as they had to encounter in 1847. The right hon. Member for Stamford had told them that during the pressure of last year, 220 houses had failed, whose obligations amounted to 30,000,000 l. But, though we knew how many houses had fallen, we did not know how many had been ruined. At no former period in the history of this country had the loss of capital been so great. It had been truly remarked by the hon. Member for Paisley, that the trade between this country and India—one of the greatest and most important branches of our commerce—had been laid prostrate. There was no longer an adequate capital in India to carry on the great commercial transactions of that empire. Bills to the amount of 7,000,000 l. or 8,000,000 l. had been returned upon Calcutta. Without the intervention of the East India Company, the produce of India

829
could not be sent forward to England. The right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told the House that there was certainly a great deal of pressure in the commercial world last autumn, but that the pressure was caused principally by the failure of the large bill-brokers, which failure cut off the resources of all the houses that depended upon their discounts for the carrying on of their trade. He would, however, remind those hon. Gentlemen who happened to be in town last November, that the failures and embarrassments were not confined to the bill-brokers and their customers. He would ask hon. Gentlemen if the alarm was not so general—if the rate of discount was not so wide—that there were few establishments, bankers as well as others, whoso credit was not then labouring under great suspicion? They could hardly pass the corner of a street without hearing doubts thrown upon the solvency of the first houses in the world. At that time it was utterly impossible to negotiate bills upon foreign countries drawn against actual shipments of produce. Bank notes could not be found wherewith to cash these bills. Parties said, "We will take your bill, but we have no bank notes to pay for it. If you can wait for fourteen days, we will endeavour to accommodate you." And what was the feeling on the Continent with respect to the state of things in England? Foreigners believed that all London was bankrupt. Those who owed money to parties in this country would not remit; they would not go into the market and purchase bills on England, as they would gladly have done under ordinary circumstances; they expected that the parties upon whom the bills were drawn might be bankrupt before their acceptances reached maturity. What was the state of things at Newcastle-upon-Tyne? But for the prudent intervention of one excellent individual, whom he (Mr. Alderman Thompson) was proud to acknowledge as a personal friend, Mr. Grote, the manager of the branch bank, the whole town of Newcastle, and the densely populated district by which it was surrounded, would have been in a state of barter in less than twenty-four hours. He very much doubted whether the peace of the district could have been preserved under such circumstances. What was the state of the whole country from the east to the west? In Liverpool, in Manchester, in Yorkshire, discounts were as difficult to procure as they were in London. And
830
what was the cause of all this difficulty? The Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them to-night—although the right hon. Gentleman had used other and contrary language on a former occasion—that he did not attribute the commercial crisis of 1847 either to the conduct of the Bank of England, or to the operation of the Act of 1844. Then to what cause or causes did the right hon. Gentleman attribute the fearful crash? The right hon. Gentleman was of opinion that it was owing mainly to speculation and miscalculation. In answer to the deputation from Newcastle, who waited upon him at his seat in Yorkshire, the right hon. Gentleman said there were plenty of bank notes in the country—that there was no scarcity of money for the legitimate purposes of trade. The right hon. Gentleman could not have foreseen the extent of the mischief which actually occurred between the 23rd of September (the day the deputation waited upon him), and the 23rd of October, or he would never have made such an observation. No; the right hon. Gentleman never dreamt of a necessity for writing the letter to the Bank of England. He entirely subscribed to the necessity which then called for so decided a step on the part of the Government. The letter had the immediate effect of stopping the alarm, and mitigating the pressure of the panic. Money at the present time was abundant, and might be had on good security, on very easy terms. And yet the public were actually in possession of 2,000,000 l. less of notes now, than they were on the 25th of last October—when every one expected ruin in consequence of the difficulty in obtaining discounts. One solution to this apparent anomaly readily presented itself—panic and alarm caused the hoarding of gold and notes to the extent of 6,000,000 l. The increase in the issue of notes by the Bank of England, between the 25th of September and the 30th of October, 1847, amounted to 2,754,000 l.; within the same period there had been an increase in the gold in the issue department to the extent of 2,202,000 l., making a total of 4,956,000 l. With all that money in the Bank, and in the hands of the public, bills at long dates could not be discounted under 17 or 18 per cent. Merchants holding eight and ten months' bills on India and China, would cheerfully have paid even higher rates than 18 per cent; but they could not raise money on such long-dated paper at any

831
rate. In such a state of things, all calculations of profit and loss were necessarily put aside; and the enormous losses entailed by these high rates of discount were not all the merchants had to contend with. As the value of money increased, as the rates of discounts rose, the value of all kinds of produce fell. With regard to the charge of speculation, he would beg to remind the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that, with the exception of the single article of sugar, there Lad been an almost total absence of speculation. And there was a special reason for that. The House would recollect that an alteration had been made in the duty upon sugar. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in bringing forward his measure for the alteration of the duty, told the House that the consumption of sugars could be immensely increased in this country. An opinion to that effect, coming from so high an authority, induced merchants to import more largely than they would otherwise have done. Then with regard to the speculations in corn. In the early part of 1847, the Government were themselves importers. He did not blame them for taking that step—it was forced upon them. Every week during that period, hon. Members were getting up in the House and asking why the ships of war were not pressed into the corn trade. Some hon. Gentlemen asked whether Ministers were not prepared to offer a bounty on the importation of bread-stuffs. Then, had they not a day of public humiliation—the general fast? All these circumstances led merchants to embark their capital, and apply their energies to the corn trade. They ransacked the whole world for grain, and they saved this country and a portion of the Continent from the horrors of famine. Instead of being abused and stigmatised as speculators and miscalculators, those merchants were entitled to the gratitude of the country. The average price of wheat in London in the month of May was 105 s.; in August it had fallen to 51 s. per quarter. What calculation could have availed against so sudden and so unexpected a change? He did not consider any man to be a speculator who was an importer of goods. That was the legitimate enterprise of merchants—that was not speculation. The man who went into the market and bought up articles of general and necessary consumption, in order to raise prices, was a speculator. The merchants who imported the corn, calculating upon the
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market prices, and the probability of their still continuing to range high, did not deserve that name. Theirs was a legitimate commercial enterprise, and it was not right to stigmatise them as speculators. The House had been told by the promoters of the Bill of 1844, that, although it might not have the effect of preventing commercial panics, it would certainly mitigate their effects. He took no blame to himself for the Bill of 1844. He was one of the few Members who opposed the Bill; and at the time of its passing, he offered his humble but sincere opinion that it would prove a mischievous measure. He was then told that as the bullion came in, the Bank would increase its issues; and that as the bullion went out, the Bank would contract its issues; and that the foreign exchanges would be rendered more steady, and that discounts would be maintained at a more uniform rate. Experience had proved the impracticability of the measure, and the complete fallacy of such predictions. Under the operation of the Bill, discounts had varied from two to twelve per cent. Under the operation of the Bill the country had encountered the evil of adverse foreign exchanges, coupled with increased discounts and panic at home. Experience had shown that it would be utterly impossible to maintain the Bill in its integrity. The promoters of the Bill told the House that after the measure became law, the Bank Directors had only to raise the rate of interest, and they would at once stop the efflux of bullion and lessen the demand for discounts. But experience had proved that the more the Bank raised the rate of interest, the more widely-spread were the dismay and alarm, and the public procured notes in larger quantities and sooner than they would otherwise have required them. Hence the raising the rate of interest increased the demand for discounts. He had alluded to the state of credit in this country during the months of September and October last, and he had told the House the opinions held on the Continent with regard to the then existing state of England. By the permission of the House he would read them the opinion then entertained and expressed by the people of the United States. [The hon. Gentleman read an article from the New York Herald of November 20, to the effect that the scarcity of provisions and subsequent panic in England, had thrown into the hands of the American

833
Government that supremacy which they had long been striving for—that the resources of England were nothing as compared to those of the United States—that the pressure for money in England would revolutionise the Government, destroy the nobility, and work out organic changes in the state of society. It concluded by stating that the manufacturers of the United States were never in a more prosperous condition.] What was the state of public credit at that period? Exchequer-bills were at the enormous discount of 40 per cent, and continued so for some time. On Tuesday, the 5th of October, the difference in the price of Consols for money and Consols for account indicated a rate of interest equal to 50 per cent per annum. He might not consider it absolutely necessary to repeal the whole of the Bill, but he was anxious that the House should go into Committee on the Bill. He should like to see the House strike out that portion of the Bill which limited the discretional issue to 14,000,000 l.; and he was anxious also to strike out the clause which limited the amount of silver coin upon which notes can be issued. He was entirely opposed to the doctrines of what had been termed a domestic currency. Domestic currency, in his opinion, was only another name for a depreciated currency. As in Russia they had their silver and paper roubles, so we in England should have our Bank of England notes, payable in gold at the rate of 31. 17 s. 10½d. per ounce, and another kind of note payable in nothing at all. To the latter sort of currency he was decidedly opposed; but he had heard no valid reason urged against the right of the Bank Directors to issue what amount of notes they thought proper on the security of silver. The circulating medium of the Continent is silver; and when the exchanges are unfavourable to this country, the Bank first losses its silver, and then the gold follows. In his opinion an increased stock of silver would act as a protection to the gold. With respect to the issues of the country bankers, in spite of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—in defiance of his threatening circular—he could tell the right hon. Gentleman that that part of the Act of 1844 was evaded, and would be evaded if the want of a sufficient circulating medium in the country required it. In conclusion, he would implore the House to adopt the resolution of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Herries), and not allow the credit and character of the commercial interests of this country—in-
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terests which he had always looked upon as of the highest importance—to be sullied by an obstinate adherence to a policy which had already proved so mischievous.
MR. W. BROWN: I never rose to address the House with more anxiety, considering the great importance of the subject, and how much the prosperity of the nation depends on having our monetary affairs well managed. I am, however, encouraged to offer my opinion from the nature of my pursuits in life, for the last forty-seven years having been more or less connected with business and money transactions, which have naturally turned my attention to those subjects. Although I am not so presumptuous as to think that the views I entertain must necessarily be right, and those of Gentlemen who differ with me wrong, still I feel a deep interest in our monetary affairs being well managed, as anything and everything that prevents disturbance in them is not only a benefit to the merchants, but to every individual in the country. It is therefore most important, as far as it is practicable, to prevent those extreme fluctuations, and to mitigate the intensity of those panics, which too frequently occur; but I do not believe that in any active, enterprising, commercial country it is possible to prevent them altogether. The famine was certainly the primary cause of our distress: it was one of those dispensations of Providence which no human foresight or prudence could control, and which has drawn from us 33,000,000 l. to buy food from other countries to relieve the sufferings of a starving people. But it was the means of affording an additional proof of the advantage of commercial freedom, for the merchants would not have dared, with the risk of ruin to themselves, to have ransacked every quarter of the globe for supplies, if a high fixed duty or sliding-scale had been added to the risks of a falling market. In addition to this there was the great demand for money for the railroads, which raised its value so much as to bring down many houses depending on discounts which could not be obtained. Some of these must sooner or later have fallen; but the more those misfortunes could have been spread over time, the less severe they would have been on the general trade of the country, and less injurious to solvent houses, many of whom have made sacrifices to sustain themselves that have all but brought them to the verge of bankruptcy. Then comes the Bill of 1844. I do not attribute to it, as

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many do, all the guilt of its being the sole cause of our sufferings; but its promoters thought it would do everything for us, as may be seen by reference to their speeches in Hansard at the time it was under discussion. It was to be ballast for the commercial ship; but to the period of the money pressure it was a dead letter. Any frail bark can get along with safety in a glass smooth sea; but we want a vessel that can breast the storm and ride out a gale of wind in safety; but the Bill of 1844 foundered the very first sea that struck it. What has it done for us? It has not prevented imprudent speculations in railroads to a frightful extent: although some of these are valuable acquisitions to the country, others are as worthless as the South Sea bubble of 1721. It has not equalised the price of money; that has been lower and higher since its enactment than in modern times. I have obtained the rate of interest charged in the London money market every year since 1824; and if this is any criterion to judge of the severity of the pressure (which I think it is), taking the years of the greatest difficulty, they stand thus:—1825, lowest rate 3½ per cent, highest 4½, difference 1 per cent; 1832, lowest rate 2¾, highest 4 per cent, difference 1¼ per cent; 1837, lowest rate 3¼, highest 5½, difference 2¼ per cent; 1839, lowest rate 3¾, highest 6½, difference 2¾. Now, let us look at last year, the lowest rate being 3¾, the highest 10 per cent; but in addition to this 10 per cent, there was in many cases a commission charged, making the interest equal to from 15 to 20 per cent; and at two periods, April and October, discounts to any extent worth notice could not be obtained at all on the very best description of paper. I think you will agree with me that we have encountered one of the most disastrous panics on record, for the price of money proves it to be so; and many of the most practical and independent men I know agree with me in considering it greatly aggravated by the Bill of 1844. Was not the discount branch of the Bank of England on the very verge of stopping payment on the 25th of October, when the Government letter was sent to their relief? And that letter virtually annulled and condemned the Bill of 1844. Without this guarantee of indemnity, the bank of discount had it not in its power to draw one sovereign from its copartner the bank of issue, under the same roof, without cancelling an equal amount of
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notes, although there was upwards of 7,000,000 l. in its vaults. On all former occasions, an export of seven to ten millions of specie was found sufficient to pay off foreign balances and turn the exchanges in our favour. The very consternation that this Bill produced by its iron rule—its arbitrary maximum—when it was found to begin to act on the money market—without the power in any quarter to relax it or give relief unless by violating an Act of Parliament—made bad worse. I cannot see where this Bill has a single redeeming feature: it puts an unnecessary shackle on commercial freedom, and it has induced very extensive hoarding. Hon. Gentlemen may not understand why hoarding took place to so great an extent as has been stated when all was tranquillity at home. Merchants, who in the course of their dealings were passing bills through their hands, when any want of confidence in those bills being paid at maturity took place, found it necessary for them not only to see that they had available means to pay their own engagements, but to retire any bills of others that might be thrown back on them dishonoured. I have little doubt that 1,000,000 l. to l,500,000 l. in Liverpool alone was held back from the ordinary pursuits of trade to meet those contingencies; and Bank of England notes answered this purpose so long as we had no internal disturbances; but events might have arisen that they could not answer at all. A million or two handed over from the issuing department to the banking department, in time to have enabled it to discount all good legitimate paper at a fixed price, would have greatly decreased the intensity of the panic, and allowed export orders to be more freely executed, which, until the Government came forward, were almost at a dead lock. By their letter, bills of an unquestionable character were made available, which for some time previous were literally useless: without this relief some most respectable houses must have stopped; we would have had something like a national bankruptcy. Although failures and much want of confidence would have taken place, my firm conviction is, the Bill, without forewarning men of their danger, and making them cautious, only lulled them into the fatal security that it would keep all right and prevent credit from being shaken, as it would secure the convertibility of bank notes into sovereigns. But let me ask, would that have prevented the utmost consternation and increased

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distress, if the bank of discount bad been so far pressed as not to be able to meet the checks of its depositors? And such would have been the case—as 11,000,000 l. of their capital was lent to Government, 3,000,000 l. locked up in the bank of issue, and the other public securities they held could not have been made available in time to meet the exigency without an enormous sacrifice, if they could have been sold at all—had not the Government letter restored confidence, so that the funds immediately rose, the demand for discounts rapidly decreased, and the hoarded money was let loose. Can we want further proof of the injurious effects of the Bill of 1844? I see nothing to shake my confidence in perfect freedom in banking with secured convertibility; and I entertain strong doubts of the advantages of a great banking concern like that of the Bank of England, which, by the way, I think, is very unfairly expected to serve two masters with different and conflicting interests—the stockholders and the public—and to hold gold to meet the reserves of other banks of issue, without having the profit of their circulation. But its standing and position are such, and so bound up with the feelings and opinions of the nation, that it is now of no use discussing its eligibility or ineligibility. There it is, guarded by special privileges; and it ought to be made the most efficient instrument possible for public good. But the Bill of 1844 has relieved the Bank from all responsibility as to their being the conservators of public credit; they now stand in the position of a private bank, and have only to consult the interest of their stockholders. When the interest of money materially advanced before the Government letter made its appearance, there was no danger to the Bank in discounting freely all the good business paper that offered; for the pressure was to pay bills that were due, and not for new operations—so that if bank notes went out at one door, they came in at another. Unquestionably the Bank Act of 1819 was good, so far as it brought us back to cash payments, and confirmed our standard of value in weight, viz., that 3l. 17 s. 10½d. in bank notes should represent an ounce of gold. If we had either decreased the standard in weight, or debased the coin, the exchanges of the world would have immediately responded to it; for instance, if we had made half an ounce of gold to be represented by 3l. 17 s. 10½d. in notes, which are quite con-
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ventional—valuable only on the strength of the security that gives them value—a bill negotiated on England in any foreign country, would only sell for half the value it now does. It is therefore clear, that would not benefit us with other nations, but be a fraud on all our creditors. I know that some Gentlemen argue, that inasmuch as a large amount of our national debt was negotiated in a depreciated paper currency, that the debt, or the interest of it, should be settled in a currency of the same value. Those Gentlemen must lose sight of the fact, that when those large contracts were negotiated with Government, an Act of Parliament existed, pledging the Bank to resume specie payments six months after a definitive treaty of peace was signed. The contractors never dreamt—no one even supposed—that the depreciated bank notes were to be redeemed or paid in a less weight of gold than the acknowledged and known standard. Had any fear existed on the part of the contractors, that the Bank would be authorised by Government to pay in less weight of gold of the same fineness, they might not have got the loan at all, or at prices that would have been ruinous, and we might at this moment have been a colony of France. National faith should ever be maintained at all sacrifices. A steady standard of value is of the first importance to a commercial country, to secure the integrity of contracts: what confusion would the having of an unsettled standard lead to; wheat for instance, sometimes worth 2l. per quarter, and sometimes 5l. If we had a standard of value for the first time to fix, I should discard the word "value," and say "weight;" it would be of very little importance what weight we assumed, but having fixed it, it should be rigidly adhered to, to preserve the integrity of contracts. Buyer and seller—borrower and lender—agree to take their chance of the increased or decreased value of the weight of gold contracted for: we know of no article, at present, so nearly of the same relative value all over the world. As to a double standard of gold and silver, I see no great benefit that would arise from it: silver will buy gold, and the latter has the advantage of being less subject to variation; and it is, besides, the most easily transportable merchandise in the world, valued and prized by all civilised nations, and hence well suited to adjust the balances of a commercial country. Thus far I go with the Bank Act of 1819: by that Act, the Government permitted the Bank to issue 14,000,000 l. of notes on

839
Government securities; and, so far as the home trade goes, and while we are free from internal disturbances and panics, it may answer every purpose; but notes are valueless in foreign markets to pay for grain or anything else. At that period, we had in round numbers about 14,000,000 l. of inhabitants; now we have about 21,000,000 l.; and the trade of the country is probably increased something in the same proportion; a sum in specie, which at that time was considered sufficient to secure convertibility, might be totally inadequate now. I am most anxious to press this consideration on the House, that it is extremely dangerous to allow the credit and prosperity of this country, to rest upon 14,000,000 l. of notes based upon the security of a mortgaged estate; for 11,000,000 l. of the capital of the Bank is lent to Government at 3 per cent, and 3,000,000 l. of their public securities are locked up in the bank of issue. The banks have literally no available capital, for their rest (about 3,500,000 l.) is partly in buildings and mortgages, and in the dead weight. Their deposits must be considered as part of their circulation, as they are totally out of their control, and may be called for any hour; it is not likely they will be called for all at once—still it is the capital of others they are trading on, and unsafe to depend on to any extent; for in times of pressure the owners of those deposits may want to use a large amount of them; and an efflux of gold may soon carry off the amount that has been hitherto considered a sufficient reserve to meet them, secure convertibility, keep all safe, and give confidence. How severely merchants are censured for basing their operations on fixed property, locked-up funds, or the capital of others! Is not this the position of the Bank? Who is to blame here? To put the transactions of the nation on a more stable footing, Government should pay off this debt, or a great part of it, or the Bank increase its capital, convert it into specie, and allow it to remain in the vaults of the Bank to meet any contingencies. I know this would be a great loss to the stockholders; but as it is a national object that this great banking-house of the world and the country, should stand on a more solid basis than it does, let the nation sustain that loss: it is a drop in the bucket, compared with the suffering and depreciation of property below a price at which it could be produced, that we periodically go through. The Bank, with a greater amount of specie, need never refuse to
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discount good bills: they might more gradually and not suddenly raise the rate of interest, if they found speculation running wild, and always be in a position to mitigate the distress which is felt in such times from the lowest to the highest. You must leave a discretionary power somewhere. Who would think of governing a merchant's counting-house by Act of Parliament? Neither can you govern a great national or any other bank by such a rigid rule. There may be an influx or efflux of gold—good trade or bad—a foreign or domestic loan—foreign war or domestic difficulties—a good harvest or a bad one—or possibly a few deficiency bills to discount, all of which must be met, as far as practicable, by the judgment and foresight of the parties managing our monetary affairs. I feel strongly that if the monetary affairs of this country are to be placed on a footing that will decrease the intensity and frequency of panics, the Bank of England must at all times have sufficient specie to make it impossible that any demand on her to pay her notes will compel her, in order to save herself from stopping payment, suddenly to decrease her accommodation, and add to existing distress, as was the case last October. I deprecate all Parliamentary maximums or minimums, sliding-scales or restrictions—more or less demand for money should regulate the interest—and the Bank, as a great trading company, should deal with it accordingly. It should never permit itself to be in a position of alarm from any quantity of specie leaving its vaults—it should always have enough and to spare. There is no guarantee that any Government can give that will make their notes equal to gold but a certainty of their convertibility under all and every conceivable circumstance. I want to see the Bank of England in the same position that the Bank of France was when the Allied armies entered Paris in 1815. Having only granted discounts and accommodation to the amount of their available capital, no one could make a run on them, and their business went on as uninterruptedly as if no foreign foe was in the country. The Bank of England would not have felt, under similar circumstances, quite so much at ease, with their capital locked up in unavailable securities. This great institution should be put on a different footing. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth admits that in some respects he was disappointed in the working of the Bill of 1844.

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In his speeches at that time, when this measure was under discussion, he raised an argument in favour of it, on the ground that, as a great number of American banks had stopped payment, although guarded by the personal liability of partners, that this was no security for convertibility. Certainly not; but the right hon. Baronet has fallen into an error in this, for there is no individual responsibility in any American bank that I am aware of; therefore, any argument in favour of the Bill of 1844, based on this error, must fall to the ground. The hon. Member for Westbury's suggestions for circulating one-pound notes and calling the sovereigns in, would no doubt save capital, and might do very well if we were sure of no panic or run on the banks; but in that event, it would only aggravate the evil. I therefore think it better for the country to lose the advantages he points out, rather than adopt his plan. My views go no further than to call in sovereigns as a temporary measure to purchase food in the absence of alarm, and to send them into circulation again at the earliest possible period of their return. Although we have had no internal disturbances, and although the Bank has been enabled to stand firm by the aid of Government, yet as it is believed that the internal drain on it for gold was 3,000,000 l. or 4,000,000 l., that gives us a foretaste of what we might suffer if we were more dependent on a paper currency, and had any internal disturbances or alarms to contend with.
MR. HUDSONwas not going to trouble the House with many observations; but he could not help commenting upon some of the observations made by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That right hon. Gentleman had complained that the question had been forced upon the House after a sufficient opportunity had been given, upon a previous occasion, for the full discussion of it; and he had added, that the former debate had terminated in consequence of there being no hon. Member left who was prepared to take a part in it, or offer any further arguments upon the question. Now that was not so. The right hon. Gentleman had forgotten the facts and circumstances of the case. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth rose upon that occasion at a very late hour of the night, and did not conclude his speech until about one o'clock. The hon. Member for Newark moved an adjournment of the de-
842
bate, which was resisted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite: thus the debate was unfairly terminated. There were, besides, many hon. Gentlemen who had no objection to the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry, but who wished to have the Bank Charter Act repealed, and not merely suspended. For his own part, he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) had not brought forward his present Motion at an earlier period. The country expected that something more than the mere appointment of a Committee of Inquiry into the causes of its commercial distress would have been done; and nothing could have been more disappointing to the country at large than to find that the Government was unable to legislate upon the subject. The appointment of the Committee was in fact a mere subterfuge to get rid of the question without incurring the responsibility of either adopting it, or rejecting it altogether. He knew it was very convenient for the Government so to act; but the real question which the House ought to consider was, whether the Bill of 1844 was or was not entitled to the approbation of the country? That question was attempted to be kept out of view. They had been asked, were they going to repeal the Bill of 1819? But that was altogether beside the question. And he hoped, that no more hon. Gentlemen would attempt to pull or force the question of the repeal of the Act of 1819 into the one really under consideration. If any hon. Gentleman wished to repeal the Act of 1819, let him by all means try to do so. Let him propose a measure for the purpose. But the simple question at present before the House was whether they were prepared to repeal the Act of 1844 or not? But the Chancellor of the Exchequer wanted to carry the House away from the real question. He had alleged that if those discussions were to be thus raised, they might be carried on for months. He (Mr. Hudson) had no desire that the debate should last for months; but he wished to see the question dealt with, because he thought the measure of 1844 was fraught with evil to the country. On the former debate, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth had asked the opponents of the Bill of 1844 whether they wished to return to the state of things which existed when the Northern and Central Bank was in being? If it were a question of going back to former periods, they might as well go back further. Thus much he thought,

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or rather he might say he knew, that the effect of the Bill of 1844 was the curtailment of the benefits which the country derived from the banking system. As to what had been said about the joint-stock banks, his belief was, that if they had been let alone, they would have recovered themselves, and the country would have had a sound system of banking finally established. It had also been said, that the making of railways had, to a great extent, involved the country in its difficulties. He denied that. They could not shut their eyes to the fact, that the calls had been going on, and that the amount of calls made on account of railway shares in January, 1848, was larger than that made in January, 1847; and yet they found money plentiful: they were told that at this moment it was not worth more than 3 per cent in Lombard-street. If railway calls were the cause of the pressure, why did not money fetch the same high rate of interest now as it commanded at the close of 1847? Why was it to be had on easier terms than in October last? Hon. Gentlemen ought likewise to look at what the amounts of the private deposits in the Bank of England were. They would see that they were the same in October, 1847, as they were in October, 1846. The deposits in the Bank of England, in fact, had not been intrenched upon at all, and the money had all found its way back again into the coffers of the Bank, though he would admit that some private bankers had suffered by having their deposits drawn out. This admitted of a very easy explanation. There was now money to be obtained; but that was explained by the fact that it was no longer necessary to export gold to furnish food. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, that upwards of 6,000,000 l. of notes were in the hands of the public more than at former periods. That might be; but by the operation of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 insecurity was generated, and people, instead of putting their money into circulation, hoarded it. This was owing entirely to the restrictive powers of the Act. The present system imposed such hardships upon the commerce of the country, that, at a time of panic and alarm, it was utterly impossible to obtain means to meet the undertakings and commercial engagements of the day. In the month of October last, the bank at Newcastle was in a position of the most imminent danger. Representation was made to the Government that if
844
money was not forthcoming, the Government must send troops to keep the peace in that district. Assistance was rendered to the bank. If that had not been done, no person could say what amount of disaster would have occurred in that part of the country. But when he and those who were opposed to the restrictions inflicted by the Bill of 1844 complained of the check given to trade by it, and pointed to the number of houses that had failed, they were told that they ought to have failed long ago—they were told to look at the condition of those houses, and look at their balance-sheets, and wonder that they had so long remained erect. For the sake of the argument, he would admit that they were insolvent. But what he contended for was, that solvency was not protected in consequence of the measure of 1844. No matter how high the character of any commercial house, no matter how solvent it were, the consequence of the Bank Restriction Act was to have its solvency brought into question, and its position rendered doubtful. The most solvent houses had been spoken of in consequence of that Act as being in a tottering condition. If, then, it had not preserved solvency, why should it be retained? They had already virtually repealed it. Why not repeal it altogether? He objected to its being left to the Government, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the First Lord of the Treasury to decide when it would or would not be right to suspend its operation temporarily. They had not interfered soon enough to effect that suspension. He repeated it: they had not interfered soon enough; and those parties who had to pay 50 or 60 per cent for the accommodation they had received before that suspension had been directed by the Government, had good cause to complain of the loss inflicted upon them by the delay, and of the unfair advantage given to those who had subsequently profited by it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might defend the Bill of 1844; but where was a commercial man to be found who would undertake to defend it? He knew of none. By the common consent of all commercial men, the part of the Bill which enacted those restrictions was condemned as most obnoxious and unwise. Why then should the House wait until the Committee should have reported before venturing to repeal the Act? He thought the Government were bound to prove that they were justified in retaining it. On the previous occasion, when the question had been debated, the Chancellor

845
of the Exchequer had thrown some blame on the Bank of England; but that night he had withdrawn his censure. If the Act were still to be retained, he (Mr. Hudson) hoped that some measure would be introduced to prevent the Directors of the Bank of England from being obliged to lend money to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the prejudice of its other customers. It was notorious that on one occasion the Chancellor of the Exchequer had gone to the Bank and had swept away the entire of the reserve; and the consequence was, that the Bank had to send to all its agents throughout the country directions to limit their accommodation to commercial houses to one-half of what they had been accustomed to grant, because the Bank had been obliged to lend the whole of its reserve to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The corn merchants also had been blamed for having by their indulgence in over-speculation caused a great deal of the pressure and commercial distress that had arisen. But the circumstances should be remembered. There was a very fair prospect of success being attendant upon their speculations; but they had turned out less successful than the speculators had calculated. It was altogether impossible to lay down a fixed rule on which they could act on all occasions, without any deviation. It was impossible that they could at all times have the same amount of money at command. No private individual in the management of his affairs could lay down any fixed and inflexible rule for their management. He thought it desirable that the country should know what the Government was prepared to do, and should plainly understand the principles on which the Government were prepared to act in matters so gravely affecting the most important interests of commerce and the country. Without great consideration he would not venture to say that he would give unlimited powers of issue; but at the same time it was with him a matter of grave doubt whether the restrictions which they at present maintained tended to any right purpose. This was at all events a circumstance very remarkable, but at the same time indisputable—that in those parts of the country where the bankers issued their own notes less commercial distress had prevailed than existed in those parts of the country where the issues were uncontrolled under the operation of this system. He would assert as his opinion that the princi-
846
ple on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer acted in his letter so the Bank of England, in fixing the rate of interest at eight per cent, was most unwise, for he thought that that proceeding had had a greater effect in raising the interest of money throughout the country than any other measure whatsoever. He knew that in those parts of the country where bankers issued their own notes, the rate of interest had been very little raised, if at all. He thought that the simple question which the House had to consider was, whether they should not repeal that part of the Bill of 1844 which operated most injuriously on the commercial classes. He did not say that this Bill had been the entire cause of the recent distress; but its operation had aggravated the pressure—had increased the distress—and made it almost intolerable. It was quite impossible that they could keep the circulation of the country under control, in the manner laid down by this law; it was generally agreed that they could not keep the circulation of the country under this inflexible control, and if that was the case, would it not be better to put an end to this law altogether? Would it not be better for them to repeal the Act at once? He thought it would, and he had great satisfaction in supporting the Motion.
MR. M'GREGORsaid, that he presented himself to the consideration of the House under circumstances of great disadvantage, and would willingly have abstained from doing so, but that he felt it his duty to state his opinions briefly to the House, representing as he did a great commercial community. It was his opinion at the time, and his opinions had not changed, that the Bank Charter Act of 1844, was not at all suited to the wants of a great commercial country like this. It was not an Act suited to the commercial wants of an empire situated in every respect as the British empire was. By the Act of 1845, the provisions of that Act were extended to Scotland and Ireland; but, unfortunately, the operation of that law was not at all adapted to those kingdoms. He believed that it was as impossible for Parliament to regulate the prices of money as to regulate the contraction and expansion of the mercury in the barometer. In fact, a law of this kind was not at all adapted to any kingdom or country whose resources were expansive. He did not know any country in Europe to which a law of this kind was applicable, unless to some village in Holland, where the population had not

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increased for the last six hundred years. Many had attributed the commercial calamities of October and November 1847 to improvident speculations on the part of our merchants and capitalists. He did not join in the blame of those who had so suffered. He believed it to be impossible that the commerce of this great country could ever be carried on without, in some degree, the speculations of her merchants being attended with risk. He believed that our merchants could not carry on the commerce of this great commercial country with all the nations of the earth, carrying out our manufactures, and bringing back the products of every part of the world—he believed that in carrying on a commerce so extensive as this, that our merchants must enter into many speculations which must necessarily be attended with risk. But he denied that the failures of individual speculations could affect the prosperity of the country. The history of this country, and of all countries which had risen by means of commercial enterprise, proved that this country and countries similarly circumstanced had become rich and had thriven notwithstanding the occurrence of individual failures and calamities. When failures were announced of various large houses throughout the kingdom, it had been said that those houses were unsound—that they ought to have given up long ago. For his part, he lamented the fall of those houses, for the sake of the individual partners, many of whom were so circumstanced as to be entitled to sympathy. He regretted to hear observations of this kind made with respect to those houses. He thought that they acted most beneficially on the trade of the country. They gave the required impulse to our commerce, carrying our goods to distant parts of the earth, and bringing back the products of those distant countries in return. The great commercial power of this country gave her a preponderance in the world which was universally admitted. There was an anecdote mentioned of Napoleon, that some days before the battle of Leipsic, when a proposition was made to him, based upon an expectation of crippling the power of England, he replied that he must give up all hope of crippling or destroying the power of England so long as she maintained her vast commercial credit. So long as England maintained her vast commercial credit and superiority it was impossible that any power could injuriously affect her. Now, the question which they had to con-
848
sider was, how should they best be able to maintain the credit of the country? With respect to the Bank Charter Act of 1844, he thought that it was imperfect in itself, and that it was not calculated to answer the purpose for which it was intended. It had not had the effect of preventing excessive speculation, neither had it prevented fluctuations in the exchanges; and in 1847 they had seen a most extraordinary variation take place in the rates of interest. He (Mr. M'Gregor) was prepared to contend that the Bank Charter Act of 1844 was a measure in which the country at large had no confidence—in which, in fact, no great interest in the country—neither the landed interest, the commercial interest, nor the shipping interest—had any confidence. He believed that the confidence of the country had been totally withdrawn from that Act; and he was convinced that the time was not far distant when the House would be obliged either totally to repeal that Act, or, at all events, to take the whole subject into consideration, with a view of producing a measure free from the most pernicious provisions which the present measure contained. Now, looking to the history of banking in Scotland, from the year 1695 down to 1847, he found that the whole amount of loss suffered by the public from Scottish banks did not amount to 10,000 l. That was a proof how well that system worked. What the people of Scotland complained of was, that they were not allowed to go on in their own way—in the way they had found beneficial; but that that House came and prevented them from continuing to do their business in their own way. They had been told, in reply to their remonstrances, that one of the reasons of this interference was that the Bank of England was obliged to keep cash for the use of Scotland. There was one security against over-issue in Scotland—namely, the system that prevailed amongst the Scotch banks of exchanging their notes amongst each other. This operated perfectly as a check against over-issue. For the reasons he had stated, he felt bound to say that he could not see that the Bank Charter Act of 1844 was at all applicable to the circumstances of Scotland; and although he regretted to differ with the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he felt himself altogether unable to concur with him on the present occasion.
MR. MASTERMANfelt desirous to

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express his thanks to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) for the Motion which he had brought before the House. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman who had originally brought forward this measure was not aware, with all his knowledge and with all his practical experience, that it was not at all practicable to limit the circulation of this country. When this measure was first brought forward by the right hon. Member for Tamworth, in 1844, he expressed his objections to the measure. On that occasion he brought forward a Motion to express his opposition; but which, as it was not in accordance with the forms of the House, he felt himself obliged to withdraw. He well recollected how he was taunted on that occasion by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, for having expressed those objections to this measure which were now so generally entertained. Many hon. Gentlemen who were not so conversant with commercial affairs as he was, were not aware of the difference that existed between the issue and the banking department of the Bank of England. He believed, that the right hon. Gentleman, with all his good sense and his practical knowledge, was greatly mistaken with respect to this measure. His proposition was, that in order not any further to disturb the circulation or credit of the country, the Government should have the opportunity of taking from the issue department what money they required; and that that money should be replaced by the growing revenue of the country. That was his proposition, and he felt assured that it was a measure which, if adopted, would be found attended with the most beneficial effects.
MR. HUMEsaid, it was a matter worthy of inquiry how it happened that those crises and those panics which they had so recently witnessed, occurred so often in this country, and in this particular department—banking. When the Motion was made for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the commercial distress, he (Mr. Hume) foresaw what would be the result, and he endeavoured to persuade the House not to consent to the appointment of that Committee. He foretold, that when they sought to probe and discuss this question, they would be told by the right hon. Gentleman that they should have patience until the Committee should have inquired into the subject, and should have made its report, It appeared, however, that the right hon. Gentleman and his Col-
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leagues, without any inquiry—without the production of any correspondence—undertook for a certain period to repeal this Act of Parliament. The causes that led to that proceeding sufficiently showed the inadequacy of this Act to meet the purposes for which it was intended. He was sure that this proceeding had been undertaken by the right hon. Gentleman with the sincerest intentions; but when the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord undertook to suspend that Act, might not he ask, were they not in the situation of that bad judge to whom that right hon. Gentleman alluded, and who postponed inquiry till after he had adjudicated? He contended, that a measure or operation which affected the property of every individual in the community ought not to be subject to the caprice of any individual. This was a matter for the most grave and serious consideration. He would venture to say, that the losses incurred by the commercial interests of this country, arising out of the late commercial embarrassments, could not amount to less than 150,000,000 l. It was impossible to estimate the extent of the injury that had been suffered in this way. Under these circumstances—seeing the extent of the evil that had arisen, and the extent of the injury that had been suffered—he thought that it should have been the first act of the Government to have brought this entire subject before the House, instead of referring it for inquiry to a Committee upstairs. During the late commercial crisis, men looked on with astonishment at what was taking place—nobody knew where it would end. During that period, an individual called on him and stated, that he had been obliged to pay 23 per cent, to relieve a bill of his, and that he should have to pay twice that amount of interest the next day to avoid ruin. With all due deference, he submitted that it was the duty of the Government to have taken the whole subject into consideration, and have brought it under the notice of the House. With but one exception, all hon. Gentlemen who had spoken that evening, were agreed that this Bill, which had worked so injuriously, ought to be repealed; for it was impossible to believe that the country would submit to have its monetary and commercial affairs placed in this state of jeopardy again. His own opinion was, that protection and interference had proved injurious to every interest in this country that had been protected. Protection and monopoly went hand in hand, and those interests

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which they were applied to were invariably distressed; for instance, let them look at the effects of the system on the West India interest, the shipping interest, and the silk trade. In tracing every panic from 1793 to 1823, he found that every branch of business which was the most protected Buffered the most, and was the most distressed. He attributed the commercial panics to the circumstance of the currency being on an improper basis, founded on false principles, and fostered by monopoly; and every attempt to palliate the evil effects had been a failure. He would do the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) the justice to believe, that in bringing forward his measure in 1844, he was actuated by the best intentions. However, there was only one part of that measure of which he (Mr. Hume) could approve, and that was that part of it which fixed the standard of Value. The first operation of the Act was, that every bank in England, Scotland, and Ireland, knowing that the Bank of England could not assist it, was compelled to keep a much larger reserve; and the consequence was, that 7,000,000 l. or 8,000,000 l. of capital was thus locked up. Was not that a valid ground of complaint, even were there no other? All that had been predicted of the effects of the Act had now been realised, and the country was no longer in a condition to countenance the maintenance of it. The Act ought to be repealed at once. If the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman were carried, as he (Mr. Hume) hoped it would—that would amount to a virtual repeal. He could not understand how the Government could have the face to propose that it should be continued, after they had been compelled, as they themselves admitted, to suspend its operation for a short period, in consequence of its evil influence upon the trade of the country. He thought there ought to be an inquiry into the subject. Let them, then, with the experience they had had on this subject individually, both in and out of the House, supported by the experience which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stamford and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had gained by their official position—let them inquire into this matter, and he believed the result would be to satisfy them that the Bill ought not to continue in force. But if Her Majesty's Ministers did not choose to act consistently with themselves, let the House act. He thought it was the unanimous opinion that this Motion ought to be carried. He
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thought that they should judge the Bill by those principles which were now generally admitted as the leading principles that ought to govern the trade of this country; although there was a time, which he well recollected, when he could scarcely mention the name of free trade without exciting at least a smile upon the countenances of many hon. Members; but the time was now changed, and very few hon. Gentlemen stood up in that House who did not advocate that principle, unless it were that small number of hon. Gentlemen who called themselves Protectionists. He wished they were all quite unanimous with him. But seeing that the Government had been proceeding upon the principle of free trade—seeing that they passed every measure that they could to extend our connexions with foreign countries, to the extension of our own trade and the reception of foreign produce—seeing that they had opened every possible market for our manufactures—it was extraordinary to him that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) should still propose to continue this Bill, which all agreed was. a restriction upon the trade of the country. Nothing could be more certain than that the feeling in Scotland was opposed to the principle of this Bill; at least every person with whom he had had any opportunity of communicating on the subject was perfectly convinced that the Bill of 1844 was a restriction upon the trade of the country; that it increased the difficulty of obtaining discounts, multiplied the difficulties of carrying on business, and of course caused great loss to the public. The public at large, of course, desired to benefit by the employment of their capital; and his Scotch friends all agreed that it was useless and unnecessary to retain so large an amount of bullion lying idle as this Act of necessity required. It was well known that in Scotland very little gold was in use. If gold were offered in payment to a Scotchman, it was looked at, turned over and over, and, in fact, the Scotchman would rather take a piece of paper than a sovereign. Was it not, therefore, extremely unsatisfactory to have this measure forced on an entire nation against their will, against their wish, and against their best interests? It was well known that in times of monetary pressure, both Scotland and Ireland had been of considerable assistance to their neighbours, and had been able to relieve them of a portion of their difficulties. He was rather surprised to

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hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer say that the people of Scotland had no right to complain. What had been the actual result of the Act in that country? What was the amount of bullion generally in use in Scotland? He found that on the average of the two years, 1842 and 1843, the amount of gold in the banks of Scotland was 428,843 l.; while in the two years, 1846 andl847, the amount was 1,119,000 l.—showing an increase of 800,000 l. of bullion in the banks of Scotland upon the years 1842, 1843. With regard to the notes in circulation in the same periods, he found that in the years 1842, 1843, the amount of notes was, on the average, 2,700,000 l.; while in the years 1846, 1847, it was 3,325,000 l. And although the banks of Scotland during the latter period had been so pressed for advances, they had not issued notes for all the gold in their possession. But for this Act, they might have employed the whole of their capital; and yet they were told that the Bill did not tend to restrict the trade of the country. On this ground it was he complained that Scotland was crippled by this Act. At the time it was proposed, he had endeavoured, though he did not succeed in his opposition, to prevent its being passed; he divided the House upon every occasion, because he felt certain that with regard to Scotland it would prove highly injurious. Why should the people of Scotland be restricted in their trade, as it had been proved before Committees of that House they were, by this Bill of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth (Sir R. Peel)? As to the loss that had been spoken of, he could not find that any had occurred. In 1840, Mr. Kennedy, in the evidence which he gave before a Committee of that House, declared that no loss had taken place in any Scotch bank, chartered or unchartered, since 1825. They must have free trade in banking; they must leave every bank free from restriction, except that which no doubt would be thought necessary—a deposit sufficient to guard against ultimate loss. He would have only one bank of issue, and that should be under the control of the Government, and every other bank should be allowed to carry on its own trade as might be deemed advisable by the proprietor. He would ask the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Wood) whether he were prepared to bring in a Bill to limit the number of bakers, butchers, or tailors in any one town? He held it to be trifling
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with the great interests of the country, and he did not think the House ought to submit to the chance of the recurrence of such crises as those from which they were just now emerging. They would again occur if this Bill were allowed to continue. The Directors of the Bank of England had, no doubt, a very difficult duty to perform, and he did not mean to cast any blame upon them; they had to protect the interests of their proprietors as well as those of the public, and Parliament ought to relieve them from their difficulties. Let them trade on their own capital, and not upon that of the public. As the matter now stood, they were in a false position between applying their capital to serve the trade of the country, and supplying the wants of the Government. The free-traders proposed that every man should be allowed to help himself, to go to the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest, without the interference of the Government in the matter of banking, which, of all others, had the most important effect upon the interests of the trade and commerce of the country. It was not the banker or the merchant, it was the workmen and artisans, who suffered most by their interference in these matters. A witness had declared only a few days ago on a Committee that was still sitting upstairs, that he could not describe the loss and injury that was inflicted upon the poorer classes by the Act of 1844. He thought the House ought in justice to support the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, and to compel the Government to bring in a measure which should place the banking system upon a proper footing—which would prevent the recurrence of such a crisis as that under which the country was now suffering. In conclusion, the hon. Member thanked the House for their attention, and hoped that ere long they would coincide in the opinions he had expressed.
COLONEL THOMPSONhaving for thirty-seven years been something like an amateur student on this question, thought he might be considered as having an average right to give his opinion upon it on the present occasion. He understood it had been settled that there should not he any attempt to get up a currency debate, and that there was no idea of mooting the question of an inconvertible currency. Neither of these points, therefore, would he attempt to touch. The question, as he understood it, then, was, whether the Government was or was not bound to keep an office for utter-

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ing Bank of England notes to accommodate traders who found themselves in need of assistance? It might be a rude comparison he was going to utter, but it struck him as a forcible one:—if any trader or many traders who found themselves in danger of appearing in that awful list which was published in the Gazette, conceived the possibility of taking 1s. a head from every passenger on the Great Northern Railway, and carried it out into practice, was it not clear that the assistance which they thus received was taken from the community? So was it, he was afraid, when a trader meditated obtaining assistance for the relief of his wants from the purse or chest in the Bank of England. That was the ground on which he was disposed to rest the success or non-success of this measure. The Act of 1844, if he understood it aright, was an Act for fending off, if he might use the word, all the demands of this kind which should pass beyond a certain rule considered by the Government to be one of discretion. The question was, whether that rule should be given up or not? He had heard it asserted that the Government had conceded the point, and that they had given up that rule. He doubted that statement, however, because he could see reasons besides an approbation of the law that might have guided them. It was somewhat difficult for a Government to resist the demands of men in distress. The present Government was not the only one that had been engaged in this practice. They were not responsible for its commencement, and therefore they were only to a partial extent responsible for its consequences. He had heard the words "free trade" and "monopoly" used in the course of the debate; but he wanted to know what that free trade was, and what that monopoly. There was a great want of clearness of ideas on this subject, for sometimes they were told it was one thing, and sometimes another. When free trade was advocated in that House, what were the arguments used by those who were called Protectionists? Whenever those Protectionists—if the term was lawful—attacked the rule of free trade, they were let down by the fact that all that they professed to give to one portion of the industrious classes was taken from another portion, so that the only result was that the consumers paid a higher price for the article, whatever it might be. Now, what part of this argument was applicable to the discounting of bills by the
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Bank of England? If Gentlemen on the other side saw any comparison between the two things, let them say so, and enlighten his darkness. In advocating free trade, his side of the House had been met with many taunts—they had been told they would next demand freedom of trade in the contents of other men's purses; and it was even said—he was not answerable for the applicability or decorousness of the saying—that they would demand free trade in females. They could only defend themselves from these taunts by demanding proof of how the argument for freedom of trade applied in the cases with which they were taunted; and they would demand the same proof now. If there was any applicability to the case of banking in these taunts, let it be proved, and he would yield his judgment to it. On the subject of Scotch banking, an hon. Gentleman said that 10,000 l. was the only sum at issue. Now, the circulating medium of Scotland was stated at 3,000,000 l; and he would ask whether that 3,000,000 l. was to be placed to the account of the Scotch people, or carried off by their bankers? He should wish, like the hon. Member for Montrose, to see but one bank of issue, and to let the others confine themselves to what appeared to him to be the legitimate objects of banking. But the great question was, whether the Government were right in endeavouring to maintain those barriers that now existed against every man who, finding himself in difficulties, should think it right to apply to the public purse for help.
MR. MUNTZsaid, that he, like the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down, (Colonel Thompson) was quite at a loss to understand what was meant by a free trade in banking; but he had now some hopes of his hon. Friend below, the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume); he evidently had become wiser from experience, for he had stated that this country was subject to frequent crises of distress and panic; and he had truly said, that this was owing to our unsound and improper currency laws. The right hon. Gentleman in the chair might possibly recollect, as well as many hon. Members of that House, that in 1844, when the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth introduced the Bill now complained of with all that pomp of circumstance which he so well knew how to assume, even when doubtful of the soundness of his proposals, he (Mr. Muntz) had then told him that he was confident he could

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never carry out the Bill, but that there was one satisfaction in the measure, which was that it tied up both the right hon. Baronet himself and the Bank of England, and for the future prevented those relaxations of the system which had been resorted to for many years, and which had prevented the 1819 Bill from being carried out and understood. In future times of pressure, the soundness or impracticability of the system must be proved. The House might judge of the mortification he therefore felt when, last year, at the moment such proof was at hand, the Government interfered, and suspended the Bill of 1844. No doubt by such interference they prevented a crash, and saved many from ruin; but he (Mr. Muntz) was confident that a greater crash, and more ruin, would be caused by the re-enactment of that Bill, at a future period, than had been averted by the late suspension of it. But the extraordinary manner in which the Government acted ought to be noticed. Their very letter to the Bank described the Bill as perfection itself, and required that it should be put in force again with as little delay as possible: it seemed difficult to understand, if it were so perfect, why it had been relaxed. He, however, thought that hon. Members must have very short memories, or they would recollect that we had had many panics before the Bill of 1844 was enacted. He might refer to 1839, 1837, 1825, and others. It was therefore clear that that Bill was not the cause of the present difficulties, but the Bill of 1819, which was not yet half carried out. Why the Bill of 1844 was stated by its father, Sir R. Peel, and by its godfather, Sir Charles Wood, to be the complement of the 1819 Bill, and to be introduced because the 1819 Bill would not work alone; it was therefore too much for the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Hudson) to say that this debate should be confined to the Bill of 1844. Then it was said by Ministers that the law had not been infringed by their letter to the Bank. But this was untrue; for although the Bank had not in a legal sense infringed the law, it had virtually done so, as when the Bank was protected by the Government letter, they could, and did, reduce their reserve of notes two millions lower than they otherwise durst have done, which produced the desired effect and reaction. The fact, however, was, that the theory upon which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth and the Chancellor of the Exchequer based their measures, was unsound,
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and therefore no good result could arise from their proceedings. And what was their theory? Why, they said that they never could reduce the circulation of Bank of England paper below fourteen millions without producing a reaction, and therefore if that sum was issued on securities, and the rest against gold, the whole circulation of paper and gold was together of the same value as if it were all gold coin. Now he (Mr. Muntz) denied this in toto; and he believed that no man in that House would have the assurance to get up and affirm, that the gold coin in circulation being fifty to sixty millions, and the banknote circulation of the United Kingdom forty millions, the said joint circulation of paper and gold, being together one hundred millions, was of the same value as if it were all gold coin. If it were so, what was the advantage of having any paper? The only way to prove that it was of the same value would be to buy up the paper with gold, and thereby settle the dispute. But did the House know what had been the state of the circulation during the last 150 years? Why, from the establishment of the Bank of England till 1717, the notes in circulation had only reached two millions; in 1785 it had only increased during seventy years, to six millions; but in 1791 it was eleven millions; in 1795 it was thirteen millions; in 1796, sixteen millions; now, it was nearly forty millions—yet the same value of the coins and the same rate of the exchanges existed at every period he had named. Was not this proof enough that the coins and the circulation were of very different values? The truth was, that the circulation of metal and paper together had been depreciating for more than a hundred years, and there had been no standard of value; neither had there been more than a nominal convertibility, for whenever an attempt to convert was made, not twenty-five per cent could be effected without ruin, stagnation, and paralysis. That was a point of convertibility which really only regulated the quantity of paper in circulation, and that point or value of gold would not keep in circulation enough paper to support such a range of prices as was required to enable the country to pay its rents, taxes, and liabilities: the question which now wanted solving, therefore, was, what was the convertible value of paper with the precious, metals, which would enable us to keep in circulation that quantity of paper which was required for the prosperity of the

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country? It was clear to any one who looked minutely into the subject, that the circulation had been depreciated, as compared with the coins, upwards of thirty-three per cent, for a number of years, and therefore that the greater part of the debt and other liabilities had been contracted at such value. And how was it that such variation in value between the coins and the circulation caused the panics and ruin which we had repeatedly suffered from? Why, because the coins fixed the par of the exchanges, and thereby the selling prices of our manufactures in all other countries; such prices being lower than our taxes, rents, and liabilities would allow us to sell at without loss; and, therefore, when any circumstance arose which enabled our labourers to emancipate themselves from such loss, they raised their wages and prices above the price of their foreign competitors, and contracted the export trade; but the same circumstances increased the import trade, making a balance of payments against us which could only be paid in gold, and it needed then no bank screw, as it was called, to make money scarce; the natural effect was, that notes must go into the Bank to get the gold out, which of course reduced the circulation. And how did the reaction take place? Not by the legitimate course of trade, or the alteration of the exchanges, as was pretended, but because the pressure here reduced the value of Government securities and other property till foreigners were thereby induced to send gold here to buy them, and also because paper on England was at such discredit that no one would buy it, but would send gold instead. What had caused the late importations of gold? Certainly not improved exports, for trade had been constantly worse; and as to the discredit on drafts upon England, he (Mr. Muntz) need not refer to others for authority upon that subject, for he could assure the House that during the panic he had received letters from his correspondents in all parts of Europe, stating that the credit of English merchants and bankers was at such a low ebb, they could not, and would not, risk buying paper negotiable upon them, but that if he would draw upon them at ten days' date they would pay. He (Mr. Muntz) had heard it said in that House, during a late debate, that England was not in a disgraceful state; but he could fancy nothing more disgraceful for a commercial country than such a state of her merchants and bankers. He did not be-
860
lieve that the present state of trade would long continue; money would be abundant for want of employment, and when men had forgotten their late troubles they would speculate again, as they had before, perhaps in railroads, although they had been said to be the cause of the late panic; how they were so he (Mr. Muntz) could not well understand, for nearly all they were constructed of was obtained at home. But it was said that the labourers consumed so many articles of importation that they thereby deranged the monetary system. Why, what did that prove but that the system would not allow of the people being properly remunerated and fed, and therefore must be altered? The truth was, that with free trade, and the present so-called standard of value, or point of convertibility, panics must constantly recur, and each one would be more injurious than its parent. The following night he had no doubt would show them that if revenue was reduced by unnatural legislation, it must be made up in another way. No doubt an increase of property-tax would be again resorted to, and perhaps other means also. It had long been evident to him (Mr. Muntz), that in that House the dishonesty of extracting money out of men's pockets was not determined by the quantity extracted, but by the plan upon which it was done. For example, if any alteration of the system was proposed which might in a slight degree reduce the income of the public creditor, or annuitant, the proposer was designated as a thief; but if three times the amount is extracted from them upon what is called a principle it was said to be justifiable. He (Mr. Muntz) could not learn that the fundholder had lent his money expecting to pay property-tax, under all its inquisitions, and vexations, or that the small annuitant had ever heard of such intention; but it not unfrequently happened that those most ready to do unjust things were prompt in making charges against others. That he was then speaking in advance of the House, he felt assured; and that because hon. Members did not generally come in contact or collision with those circumstances which enabled them to judge upon such subjects. But the time would come when they would understand the question, and then he (Mr. Muntz) would go minutely into it; when they found a reduction in revenue with an increase of taxation, an inability to pay the dividends, and a population unemployed, they would think seriously upon the

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subject; and when the Gentlemen opposite, from the effects of Continental prices of their agricultural produce, found their rents impaired, their land thrown out of cultivation, and their labourers in the overflowing workhouse, they would agree with him that a System which produced such results Could not he honourable or justifiable. He could assure the House, such was the state of the export trade that he had entirely lost the sale of not one or two articles, which he used formerly to export in large quantities, but he had lost ten such trades, and was losing more, although such articles were consumed in larger quantities than ever, but were made elsewhere than in England; and unless some steps were taken to remedy the evil, the export trade would become valueless. With respect to the Motion of the right hen. Gentleman, he would with pleasure vote with him for the repeal of the Act of 1844; not that he believed that such repeal would prevent future panics, but because he considered it childish and absurd to keep upon the Statute-book a law which could never be carried into effect by any Government.
MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, the right hon. Gentleman who had brought the subject before the House had urged them, with great earnestness, not to allow themselves to be drawn from it into a general discussion of the currency question, and had entreated them to confine their attention to the definite and distinct propositions he laid before them. The course the debate had taken had, no doubt, convinced the right hon. Gentleman that there was a great deal of danger in his plan of proceeding; and the speech of the hon. Member who had just sat down must more especially have shown him how difficult it was to keep within the exact question at issue, and not to wander into a wide field of inquiry into which the right hon. Gentleman had no intention of entering. In the few words he should address to the House he should confine himself strictly to the proposal immediately submitted to the House, and would seek to offer some reasons why they should not assent to the course proposed for their adoption. It had been admitted universally by every hon. Member who spoke on the question, that it would be unwise to make a reversal of the decision of the House to appoint a Committee. ["No, no!"] Hon. Gentleman denied this; but almost everyone who had addressed the House in support of the Motion had
862
had the candour to admit that it would be unwise to demand, not the mere suspension of the enactment till the Committee investigated the subject, but that it should not be called upon to pronounce the opinion that the present limitations and restrictions on the Bank to issue notes payable on demand should not continue. He considered that the Government, in moving for this Committee, had entered into an engagement to consider, maturely and fairly, the laws which now regulate banking in this country; and he, for one, was not so far prepared to prejudge the question as to pledge himself to the opinion that, after due inquiry, it might not be safe in some degree, and with certain restrictions, to relax the limitations placed upon the Bank of England. Holding the position he had the honour to fill, and connected as he was with the Government, he should think it wrong to prejudge a question which deserved such deep consideration; at the same time, he objected to the House pronouncing a decision on the subject after delegating the inquiry to a Committee. Such a course, without any change of the circumstances under which the Committee was appointed, would have no other effect than that of lowering the opinion of the country as to the wisdom of the House, and the value of their deliberations. The right hon. Gentleman who brought forward the question had admitted—and it had been forcibly shown by the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer—that if they looked to the circumstances which had occurred since the appointment of the Committee they would find anything but reason to alter the course they had determined to pursue. No one could affirm that there was anything in the present position of the Bank to inspire alarm, which did not exist when the Committee was appointed; on the contrary, the aspect of its affairs had improved, and it was more secure now than it had been then. It was quite true, as they had been told that night by an hon. Member, who was a Bank Director, they could not be sure this state of things might not alter; but when the hon. Gentleman, in order to point out good cause for apprehension, was obliged to go into questions of foreign policy and to enlarge upon the reasons which gave rise to his fears of disturbances in Europe, he saw no reason to join in the apprehensions of the hon. Gentleman, and could not believe that the hon. Gentleman would induce the House to depart from the de-

863
termination to which it had so recently arrived. Some hon. Members said that the law, as it stood at present, was condemned by all, and especially by the Government, because they had suspended some of its provisions; and the hon. Member for Montrose had urged that argument against it. But he denied the soundness of the assertion; for in his mind it was quite different in an emergency and for a temporary purpose, to suspend the operations of an Act of Parliament, and to pronounce condemnation upon its principle. On matters of this kind, let them frame laws as they pleased, it was utterly impossible that they could guard against the occurrence of circumstances which might call for the interference of the officers of the Crown. It was not, therefore, a just argument to say that, because, under circumstances of the most extraordinary pressure, and at a time when a variety of circumstances combined to undermine the commercial and financial affairs of the country, they had modified its provisions—they had condemned it. As to what had been said by the hon. Gentleman during the present discussion, with respect to the recent commercial distress—a distress which, although the panic had passed away, was only to be removed slowly and gradually—he was sure he could not speak without feelings of the deepest sympathy for individuals, nor without the strongest sense of the distress of the country at large. They had heard from his hon. Friend the Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Brown), a statement of the causes which, in his opinion, had produced that distress, and in two of them he entirely agreed. In the first place, he believed the importation of corn had very much to do with it; and in the next place, he agreed with his hon. Friend in attributing a part of the distress—though not so much as his hon. Friend—to the absorption of money to pay for railways; but he could not concur with him in thinking that the Banking Bill had produced any part of that melancholy state of affairs. Something had been said of over-speculation and overtrading, and great blame had been thrown on those who had expressed the opinion that the rash speculations of particular merchants was one of the causes which had led to embarrassment and distress. One hon. Gentleman went so far as to say that he would not call a merchant who imported to a very large extent on the chance of the market a speculator; but surely it was
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impossible to deny that he was a speculator, and might be a rash speculator in his importations, as well as any one else in a different line. He should be surprised to hear any one acquainted with the mercantile transactions of the country deny that the importing trade had not carried on their operations in a rash and imprudent manner, extending them far beyond the capital at their command; or that over-speculation had not largely produced the distress which had recently prevailed. That expression of opinion was, however, he hoped, perfectly consistent with the most sincere sympathy for the honourable men who had become victims; but, at the same time, he thought it would be shutting their eyes to the real facts of the case if they did not say that a very widely-spread spirit of speculation had added to those difficulties they all deplored. Let them adopt whatever system of banking they pleased, it would be impossible to have such a one as would enable merchants to go to the Bank and get credit when they wanted it. Speculation could only work its own cure; and if by fictitious and artificial means they had administered food to that spirit, it would only have protracted the evil, and the crash would at last have been more severe, and the ruin more widespread. He hoped the House would not, upon the present occasion, adopt a course which appeared to him entirely inconsistent with that unanimous vote by which they had appointed a Committee to inquire into the whole matter. He was told that to appoint a Committee was a mere farce—a mere way of getting rid of the whole question. All he could say was, that no step, with respect to the banking and monetary affairs of this country, had ever been taken yet, without the House thinking it necessary that all the circumstances of the case should be sifted and investigated by a Committee. He believed that there was great wisdom in that course, and that the details of these things could be better examined by a Committee upstairs than by the whole House. He hoped the House would not now depart from that wise and prudent course, nor take the subject out of the hands of a Committee so recently appointed, and thus adopt a precipitate step which might lead to the most unfortunate result.
MR. HERRIEShad only a few words to say in reply. The discussion had been almost exclusively upon one side of the House; but he believed the result would

865
be in favour of the Motion he had had the honour to make. In all sects and parties there had been a growing feeling and conviction that the system established by the Act of 1844 was defective, and must be modified by new legislation. The only semblance of objection which had been brought against his Motion was, that there was a Committee now sitting, and that it was the general rule for the House not to judge of questions consigned to the deliberation of a Committee upstairs. Certainly he had never meant his Motion to constitute an exception to that rule; but the Committee had not under consideration all the topics embraced in the propositions he had submitted to the House. The object he had in view was, that the stringent and dangerous parts of the Act of 1844 should be suspended until the Committee could make its report, and Parliament pronounce definitively upon the question, with a view to prevent the recurrence of such evils as they had recently witnessed.
The First Resolution moved by the right hon. Gentleman was agreed to.
On the Second Resolution being put,
The House divided:—Ayes 122; Noes 163: Majority 41.

List of the AYES.

Anderson, A.

Crawford, W. S.

Anstey, T. C.

Davies, D. A. S.

Arbuthnott, hon. H.

Deering, J.

Bagshaw, J.

Disraeli, B.

Bailey, J.

Dodd, G.

Bailey, J. jun.

Duff, G. S.

Baldock, E. H.

Duncan, G.

Bankes, G.

Dundas, G.

Baring, T.

Edwards, H.

Barrington, Visct.

Ellice, E.

Bell, M.

Farrer, J.

Bennett, P.

Floyer, J.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Forbes, W.

Blewitt, R. G.

Fordyce, A. D.

Bouverie, E. P.

Glyn, G. C.

Bremridge, R.

Granby, Marq. of

Broadley, H.

Greenall, G.

Broadwood, H.

Greene, J.

Brown, W.

Gregson, S.

Bruce, C. L. C.

Grenfell, C. P.

Buck, L. W.

Grenfell, C. W.

Buller, Sir J. Y.

Gwyn, H.

Burghley, Lord

Hall, Col.

Burrell, Sir C. M.

Hamilton, G. A.

Caulfield, J. M.

Hamilton, J. H.

Cayley, E. S.

Harris, hon. Capt.

Cholmeley, Sir M.

Hastie, A.

Christopher, R. A.

Henley, J. W.

Codrington, Sir W.

Herries, rt. hon. J. C.

Cole, hon. H. A.

Hildyard, R. C.

Coles, H. B.

Hildyard, T. B. T.

Compton, H. C.

Hodgson, W. N.

Conolly, Col.

Hood, Sir A.

Corbally, M. E.

Hope, Sir J.

Cowan, C.

Hope, H. T.

866

Hotham, Lord

Perfect, R.

Hudson, G.

Plumptre, J. P.

Hume, J.

Renton, J. C.

Humphery, Ald.

Rufford, F.

Ingestre, Visct.

Sandars, G

Law, hon. C. E.

Scholefield, W.

Lookhart, W.

Scott, hon. F.

Long, W.

Seeley, C.

M'Gregor, J.

Sibthorp, Col.

Manners, Lord G.

Smith, M. T.

Masterman, J.

Smith, J. B.

Maunsell, T. P.

Spooner, R.

Meux, Sir H.

Stuart, J.

Miles, P. W. S.

Sullivan, M.

Miles, W.

Thompson, Ald.

Moody, C. A.

Tollemache, J.

Morgan, O.

Trelawny, J. S.

Morris, D.

Trollope, Sir J.

Mowatt, F.

Urquhart, D.

Muntz, G. F.

Wawn, J. T.

Mure, Col.

Westhead, J. P.

Neeld, J.

Williams, J.

O'Brien, W. S.

Williamson, Sir H.

O'Flaherty, A.

Willoughby, Sir H.

Osborne, R.

Ossulston, Lord

TELLERS.

Packe, C. W.

Beresford, Maj.

Pattison, J.

Newdegate, C. N.

List of the NOES.

Abdy, T. N.

Drummond, H.

Adair, H. E.

Duncuft, J.

Adair, R. A. S.

Dundas, Adm.

Anson, hon. Col.

Dunne, F. P.

Anson, Visct.

Ebrington, Visct.

Armstrong, Sir A.

Ellice, rt. hon. E.

Barkly, H.

Elliot, hon. J. E.

Baring, rt. hon. F. T.

Fitzwilliam, hon. G.

Bellew, R. M.

Foley, J. H. H.

Berkeley, hon. H. F.

Fox, R. M.

Birch, Sir T. B.

Gardner, R.

Blake, M. J.

Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.

Bowles, Adm.

Cower, hon. F. L.

Bowring, Dr.

Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.

Boyle, hon. Col.

Greene, T.

Bramston, T. W.

Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

Brockman, E. D.

Grosvenor, Lord R.

Brotherton, J.

Hall, Sir B.

Bunbury, E. H.

Hamilton, Lord C.

Busfeild, W.

Hay, Lord J.

Campbell, hon. W. F.

Hayes, Sir E.

Cardwell, E.

Hayter, W. G.

Carter, J. B.

Headlam, T. E.

Cavendish, hon. G. H.

Heathcote, Sir W.

Charteris, hon. F.

Heneage, G. H. W.

Chichester, Lord J. L.

Henry, A.

Childers, J. W.

Heywood, J.

Christy, S.

Hindley, C.

Clay, J.

Hodges, T. L.

Clay, Sir W.

Hollond, R.

Clements, hon. C. S.

Howard, hon. C. W. G.

Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G.

Howard, hon. E. G. G.

Clifford, H. M.

Hutt, W.

Cobden, R.

Jackson, W.

Cochrane, A. D. R. W. B.

Jervis, Sir J.

Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

Jervis, J.

Corry, rt. hon. H. L.

Keogh, W.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Keppel, hon. G. T.

Craig, W. G.

Kershaw, J.

Currie, R.

King, hon. P. J. L.

Davie, Sir H. R. F.

Labouchere, rt. hon. H.

Deedes, W.

Lascelles, hon. W. S.

Devereux, J. T.

Lemon, Sir C.

867

Lewis, rt. hon. Sir T. F.

Sheil, rt. hon. R. L.

Lewis, G. C.

Shelburne, Earl of

Lindsay, hon. Col.

Sheridan, R. B.

Locke, J.

Simeon, J.

Lockhart, A. E.

Slaney, R. A.

M'Naghten, Sir E.

Smith, J. A.

Mahon, The O'Gorman

Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W.

Marshall, J. G.

Spearman, H. J.

Marshall, W.

Stanley, hon. E. J.

Martin, C. W.

Stansfield, W. R. C.

Martin, S.

Strutt, rt. hon. E.

Matheson, Col.

Stuart, Lord D.

Maule, rt. hon. F.

Stuart, H.

Mitchell, T. A.

Talbot, J. H.

Monsell, W.

Talfourd, Serj.

Moore, G. H.

Tancred, H. W.

Morpeth, Visct.

Tenison, E. K.

Mostyn, hon. E. M. L.

Thicknesse, R. A.

Nugent, Sir P.

Thompson, Col.

O'Brien, T.

Thornely, T.

O'Connell, M. J.

Towneley, J.

Ord, W.

Townshend, Capt.

Paget, Lord A.

Traill, G.

Paget, Lord C.

Turner, G. J.

Pakington, Sir J.

Vane, Lord H.

Palmerston, Visct.

Verney, Sir H.

Parker, J.

Walmsley, Sir J.

Pearson, C.

Ward, H. G.

Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

Watkins, Col. L.

Pigott, F.

West, F. R.

Pilkington, J.

Willcox, B. M.

Power, Dr.

Wilson, M.

Raphael, A.

Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

Ricardo, O.

Wood, W. P.

Rich, H.

Wrightson, W. B.

Romilly, J.

Wyld, J.

Rutherfurd, A.

Wyvill, M.

Sadleir, J.

TELLERS.

Seymer, H. K.

Tufnell, H.

Seymour, Lord

Hill, Lord M.

House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock.

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—Several Lords.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Diplomatic Relations with the Court of Rome.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. From Islington, Twycross, Wethersfield, Canterbury, Blandford, and Wrexham, against the Admission of Jews into Parliament.—From Inhabitants of the Parish of Ingrow-cum-Hainworth, against the Diplomatic Relations with the Court of Rome Bill.—From Lichfield, for the Removal of Jewish Disabilities.—From Independent Order of Odd Fellows, Manchester Unity, of Tewkesbury, that the Provisions of the Benefit Societies Act may be extended to them.—From Parish of St. Mary, Islington, and other places, for the Adoption of Measures to Impose the severest Penalties on all those Roman Catholic Priests who shall Denounce Persons from the Altar.—From Clerks, Masters, and Matrons of different Workhouses, that Provision may be made for the Superannuation of all Meritorious Officers who may become permanently disabled.—From Landholders, and others of the City of Aberdeen, for the Repeal of the Inventory Duty on Personal Estates (Scotland).

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE COURT OF ROME BILL.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: In pursuance of the notice which I gave the other evening, I now rise to move the Second Reading of a Bill for enabling Her Majesty to establish Diplomatic Relations with the Court of Rome. I am perfectly aware, in calling your Lordships' attention to this matter, that it is one which is so far of a novel nature as never to have

761
been the subject of any definite proposition for legislative enactment in either House of Parliament. At the same time it has been incidentally adverted to more than once in the course of your Lordships' debates; and I myself, not long ago, in an incidental discussion in this House, ventured to intimate my own opinion (speaking, however, for myself alone), that it was most desirable that some such measure should be introduced. I have now, my Lords, the satisfaction, with the full concurrence of my Colleagues—with, I trust, the approbation of a large part of this and of the other House of Parliament, and also, I am sanguine enough to hope, with the approbation of a large portion of the inhabitants of this country—to move your Lordships to give the facilities required to Her Majesty for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Court of England and the Court of Rome. My Lords, it has been supposed by some that there are no impediments to the Sovereign establishing these relations without an Act of Parliament; and I know that I shall be met in some quarters with the objection—"Why is this Act necessary? Is not Her Majesty enabled, as the law now stands, to establish the same species of diplomatic relationship with the Court of Rome, as She is with every other civilised Court and kingdom?" It is the doubt which, I admit, hangs over this part of the subject which makes it necessary for me in some degree to justify the introduction of a Bill with respect to it at all, and to call your Lordships' attention to the circumstances in the law out of which this presumed doubt has arisen. It has then been supposed that in two Acts—Acts which in the Bill on your Lordships' table are more particularly referred to—in two Acts, one of them known generally as the "Bill of Rights," passed in the first year of William and Mary; the other, the Act for Settling the Succession to the Crown, passed in the 12th and 13th years of the same reign—Acts, the importance of not meddling with which, except after most mature deliberation, all of your Lordships will acknowledge—Acts, which I consider to be the muniments, and the safeguards, and the defences of the constitution of this country—Acts, against the spirit of which I should be the last man to propose anything—to propose any measure which could militate against the great, the constitutional, and holy object for which they became the law of the
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land, and for which I trust that they will ever continue the law of this land; with reference, my Lords, to these Acts, it has been supposed, not from anything in the Acts, but from certain doctrines held to be implied from an expression in the first of these Acts, and referred to in the second, that the Queen is by them, if not by the constitution previous thereto, disabled from establishing those diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome which it is the object of this Bill to enable her to set on foot. If I may be allowed to form an opinion, my Lords, on these Acts, I should be inclined to say that they do not so disable Her Majesty. The common sense and obvious understanding of these Acts, my Lords, I hold to be this, that they were intended to prevent any person sitting upon the Throne of these realms from being reconciled to or holding communion with the Church of Rome; that is to say, to prevent a spiritual and ecclesiastical reconciliation; but that they do not debar the Sovereign from establishing those diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome which the experience of the world has proved to be essential for political and temporal purposes. But there are those, my Lords, who think differently with respect to these Acts. Others have thought that, independently of these Acts, it was contrary to the law of England—Christianised as this country was previous to the time when these Acts were passed—for the Sovereign to send any diplomatic emissary or ambassador to Rome. As much, my Lords, has been said with reference to the case of Lord Castlemaine, I must direct your Lordships' attention closely to that case, for although it was held by some to bear out the doctrine of the illegality of sending ambassadors to Rome, yet I confess that I think it makes the other way, and proves the legality of sending ambassadors to Rome, although undoubtedly it would be illegal for the secret purpose for which it was suspected at the time, and, I believe, rightly suspected, Lord Castlemaine was sent. My Lords, that nobleman was selected for this commission, immediately previous to the Revolution, by that unfortunate Monarch whose peculiarity it was always to do the wrong thing at the wrong time, and to choose the wrong instrument for doing it. That the choice of Lord Castlemaine was wrong is very evident; indeed, at the time of his selection, Barillon, the French Minister at the Court of James II., observed, that in

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choosing Lord Castlemaine, the King had pitched upon the person who was exactly the most unfitted for the task—the most unfit, owing to the very little which was known of him, and the great deal too much which was known of his wife, who accompanied him. But however that may he, Lord Castlemaine proceeded on his mission, and found the Court of Rome much more occupied with temporal affairs than with those mere ecclesiastical objects which formed the immediate purpose of his visit. He came back therefore discontented, having effected nothing. Shortly afterwards the Revolution took place, and soon after the House of Commons, pursuing as it did, with commendable determination and perseverance, an inquiry into all the actions of the late reign, called Lord Castlemaine to the bar of their House to account for his conduct in accepting an illegal commission. The order made by the House of Commons was in general terms that his Lordship do stand committed. He was, however, afterwards heard at the bar of this House; and if your Lordships will refer to the State Trials,* you will find the whole of his interrogatories, and his speech in his own defence. Your Lordships will there see the grounds on which he based his defence. Now, the examination of Lord Castlemaine showed this, not that he went as an ambassador—not that he received instructions to go to Rome in that capacity—but that the object of these instructions was to effect a reconciliation between this country and the Papal See. And this was the sense in which the House of Commons understood the accusation, for it would be seen by referring to the resolutions of the House of Commons upon the subject, that they did not dwell upon the mere fact of the embassy to the Bishop of Rome, but upon the illegal object of the embassy. The resolution of the House ran thus:—
"That the Earl of Castlemaine be charged in the Tower, by warrant from this House, for high treason and other crimes and misdemeanours, and that there be inserted in the warrant these words, 'for endeavouring to reconcile this country with the See of Rome.'"
He was imprisoned—not, be it observed, for accepting a mission to Rome, but for accepting it with a certain object. Why, then, taking that case in testimony, as an exposition of the law at that time, I must say, I do not conceive that it shows visible grounds for supposing that Lord Castle-
* Howell's State Trials, Vol. vii. p. 598.
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maine did wrong in simply accepting a mission to Rome; but that he did so for the purpose of secretly effecting a reconciliation in religious matters. It is, however, but fair to state that, at the time, many persons, and some of them of high authority, entertained a different opinion. I think it but fair to state that one eminent man, Bishop Burnet, did not agree in the view I have taken; but still, the bishop was one of those historians, who, although I am persuaded that he thought and wrote with honest zeal for the interests of his country, are apt to be more or less carried away by the impressions and prepossessions which they themselves are liable to. Burnet, in his admirable history, says, he conceives that Lord Castlemaine had committed an act of high treason; but he adds, that the mission was undertaken for an improper purpose at the instance of James II. Lord Chancellor Jefferies found great difficulty in reconciling that which he knew to be the state of the law with that which he equally well knew to be the wish of his Royal Master. The following are the words of Bishop Burnet:—
"So they moved to the King to send an ambassador to Rome. This was high treason by law. Jefferies was very uneasy in it. But the King's power of pardoning had been much argued in the Earl of Danby's case; and was believed to be one of the unquestionable rights of the Crown. So he knew a safe way in committing crimes; which was, to take out pardon as soon as he had done illegal things."
Another historian of the highest character, and one who at the same time was one of the ablest amongst the constitutional lawyers of this country—I allude to Sir James Macintosh—in his most valuable dissertation on the Revolution, gives his opinion to the effect that the mission of Lord Castlemaine was an illegal proceeding. My Lords, I thought it fair to state these circumstances, because they throw a certain degree of uncertainty, and doubt, and suspicion over the whole of this transaction, which, in my opinion, makes it expedient for your Lordships, if you think fit to con-for this power upon the Sovereign, to do so by an enactive and not by a declaratory proceeding. My Lords, I have alluded to the expressions in the two Acts which I have quoted, and which have been held to make it illegal for the Sovereign to send an ambassador to the Court of Rome. Since their enactment a century and a half has passed, and difficult and delicate as may be the task, yet the fact is certainly susceptible of proof, nay, of notorious proof,

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that notwithstanding the opinion that the proceeding was illegal, yet such was the necessity of the case—such were the obvious advantages of a communication with the Court of Rome—such the necessities, as well in time of war as in time of peace—that scarcely a reign has elapsed from the period in question, in which, by indirect methods, by uncertain and indirect channels, negotiations have not been attempted to be set on foot with the Court of Rome, and the advantages of diplomatic intercourse obtained by more circuitous, and therefore by more imperfect, methods. In the following reigns one of the plans put into operation was the adoption of the agency of eminent Englishmen visiting the Court of Rome, and who were requested to communicate upon certain subjects. But surely such a mode of communication was more to be deprecated than a more open and direct method. The persons chosen might be objectionable, and they acted without responsibility, and without fear of being called to the bar of public opinion, which is, after all, the real control and the real safeguard against any mischief to be apprehended from such intercourse. The House of Hanover happily succeeded to the Throne of this country, and during the succeeding reigns of the Sovereigns of that House repeated communications with the Pope took place; and at no period were they more frequent than at the time when the country had the benefit of the advice of one of the greatest Ministers who ever was at the head of the Councils of this kingdom—I meant Sir Robert Walpole. This Minister, who bore upon his shoulders the weight of a mighty monarchy, and who was the prop and pillar of the Protestant Succession, and of the House of Hanover, which was so deeply connected with that succession—Sir Robert Walpole was in repeated communication with the Roman Pontiff. Frequently he employed his brother Horace for that purpose, and he had also repeated recourse to the instrumentality to which I have adverted, that of eminent British subjects travelling in Italy. Indeed, a somewhat amusing anecdote has been recorded upon the subject by Horace Walpole, who states that so great was the regard which the Pope entertained for his brother, Sir Robert, that he omitted no opportunity of paying him court. Sir Robert Walpole, being fond of the fine arts, had made a very large collection of paintings, to which he was desirous of adding a celebrated
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picture by Guido, "The Assumption of the Virgin;" but according to the foolish prejudices which prevailed at Rome, some difficulty was made regarding its exportation to England. However, as soon as it was made known to the Pope that the picture was for Sir Robert Walpole, he, for the purpose of gratifying that heretical Minister, and showing him the regard he entertained for him, gave orders that no difficulty should be made in sending it to England. Unfortunately it afterwards passed out of the country, together with the rest of the collection, and was transported to Russia. The Court of Hanover—the Protestant Court of Hanover—established relations and sent a Minister to the Court of Rome, not having an interest in the affairs of Italy or of Rome like that which we have, for the purpose of cultivating a connexion for political objects; but because it was part of the policy of this country to have a representative at the Court of Rome as a means through which communications could be had on behalf of our countrymen. My Lords, I come now to a somewhat later period—I come to the commencement of the French Revolution. At that time it was found expedient to have repeated communications with the Roman Pontiff. I remember to have been acquainted with Sir John Cox Hippesley, and to have been shown by him a great mass of correspondence which he conducted on behalf of the British Government with the Court of Rome. What! a Member of the British Parliament, in communication with the Government, resident at the Court of Rome, and who was in perpetual communication not only with the Pope but with the Pretender—Cardinal York—himself? Can we go farther than that? There was no Exeter Hall then; but if it was unconstitutional—if it was against the law of these realms—the fact was enough to have called forth ten Exeter Halls, and to have made them resound with denunciations. I may add that Sir John Cox Hippesley conducted a negotiation for allowing the Pretender a pension of 2,000 l. or 3,000 l. a year. Here was a negotiation carried on at the Court of Rome, by the authority of the British Government. I come now to a still later period. At the commencement of the French war we had a very large force in the Mediterranean Sea, under the command of Lord Hood. Lord Hood, whilst carrying on his operations (I believe he was blockading Toulon), found himself at a great

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loss to supply his fleet with water. It did happen that the best water he could obtain, and the nearest, was to he had in the Papal dominions; it was therefore necessary to make an arrangement with the Pope; but, although an excellent commander, he was no theologian, and though he had the benefit of a chaplain in every vessel, he had no lawyer. He therefore wrote for advice, both to Rome and to England, asking advice whether it was proper that he should establish communications with that Power. And I am the more induced to state these particular transactions, as they led to a declaration of opinion from the late Mr. Burke. This opinion is conveyed in a letter not in the published collection. Mr. Burke, when asked his advice upon the matter, whether Lord Hood could safely and properly obtain his supplies of water from a Power constituted as the Court of Rome was, and alienated from this country, says—
"Nobody can be so squeamish as to refuse benefits (nothing else will ever be offered by his Holiness), because they come from the Pope. He would be an admiral of wonderful theological talents, but of not quite such splendid military qualities, who should scruple the receipt of those indulgences called 'Munitions de Guerre et de Bouche' from a prince-prelate that believes in purgatory. I should not think a great deal better of a statesman at home who, from a disposition to polemic divinity, was so indifferently qualified for the conduct of any other kind of warfare. But we have no such admirals and no such ministers. I confess I would, if the matter rested with me, enter into much more distinct and avowed political connexions with the Court of Rome than hitherto we have had. If we decline them, the bigotry will be on our part, and not on that of his Holiness. Some mischief has happened, and much good has, I am convinced, been prevented by our unnatural alienation. If the present state of the world has not taught us bettor things, our error is very much our fault."
[Lord KENYON: May I ask the date of that letter?] The 3rd of October, 1793. I have discovered a much later instance of this description this very day, lying buried in a blue book printed for the use of the House of Commons. It could not, perhaps, have been more safely buried than in such a place; and if I commit any act of treason of this kind, I trust the record of it will be buried in a similar place. The law was violated, if it be law, by the late Duke of Portland, then holding high official position, who entered into communication with the Court of Rome for the laudable purpose of establishing Christianity in the Island of St. Domingo. The Duke of Portland communicated with Car-
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dinal Antoleddi, at whose instance a Prelate was sent over to London, who had repeated interviews with the Duke; and the latter expressed his high sense of gratitude at the conduct of the Pope towards this country. Things went on in this manner, the principle now silently, now forcing its way through all difficulties, until it became the custom of this country, if not the law. I do not trouble your Lordships with other instances: those which I have stated occurred within my own observation. I could cite many more, if I referred to the Foreign Office. During the Grenville Administration a petition was made to the Pope to permit us to recruit for our service in the Mediterranean Sea, and the greatest satisfaction and gratitude was expressed to the Pope for his permission. Nor was this all—a petition was made to the Pope to permit the passage of English troops through the Italian territories, the prayer of which was acceded to, and again the gratitude of the Government was expressed for the favour. I think I have established the necessity which has arisen from time to time of a correspondence with the Roman Court. But I come now to a question which has been repeatedly asked out of doors. Is not this for the first time recognising the authority of the Pope; and has the Pope up to this moment ever recognised the authority of the Queen or the Sovereign of this country? I am much surprised that this question should be asked, although I know it has been so. Not recognise the Pope, my Lords! I should be glad to know what becomes of the Treaty of Vienna, under which treaty Great Britain has become a party in securing, not only the possessions to which the Pope was entitled, but also other portions of Italy are transferred and guaranteed to him. Great Britain is one of the contracting parties; she has bound herself to a performance of this. And may I ask you, my Lords, who affixed the Great Seal of England to that treaty? Why, my Lord Chancellor Eldon—of whom I wish to speak with the most unfeigned respect; and he would not consider it disrespectful, nor would one of his posterity deem it such, to assert that he, of all public men, was the most adverse to the ascendancy of Rome or her scripture. Yet to that treaty you will find the Great Seal appended upon the responsibility of my Lord Chancellor Eldon. But does the Pope recognise the authority and sovereignty of the Crown of these realms?

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Why, my Lords, there has been no time when it was fit for him to recognise the Sovereign of these realms at which he did not do it. I find that a short time after the accession of His late Majesty King George IV. to the Throne of these realms, that the Pope addressed a formal letter to him, congratulating him upon his happy succession. This letter, with some difficulty, through some circuitous diplomatic route, at length reached His Majesty; and what did he do? Why, with the feeling and spirit of a gentleman, he immediately sat down, and with his own hand wrote a letter to the Pope, thanking him for his attention and kindness. The letter was sent, but no sooner was it sent than some over-cautious Minister conveyed to His Majesty his opinion, that, after all, in writing that letter to the Pope, he might be forfeiting His Crown, and a messenger was sent after to recall the letter; but it was too late, and it reached its destination, namely, the hands of the Pope. Quoad that letter His Majesty's right to the Crown was forfeited. My Lords, there is nothing in that objection. We have recognised the Pope again and again; and again and again has the Pope recognised the authority of the British Crown. He has repeatedly appealed for assistance to these countries, and repeatedly invoked both the aid of the arms and councils of this country. But I do submit, that if this species of intercourse must of necessity subsist, that it ought to be conducted under circumstances of undoubted legality and greater form, and more under the control and observation of public opinion, than can be effected through the means of those underground channels which are open to every sort of objection and difficulty. It ought to be conducted within view of your Lordships, and within view of the other House of Parliament, under the control of public opinion, which alone forms the best security for the country. I therefore submit this Bill to your consideration. I do think the time has come for making the law known and explicit; and I cannot bring myself to believe that your Lordships will be of opinion, because 180 years ago a Popish Sovereign of this country engaged in a guilty mission to the Court of Rome, which mission failed in its object, and which remains after the lapse of more than a century and a half the only instance upon which apprehension can be founded—I say I cannot bring myself to believe that you will reject this Bill. I cannot be-
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lieve, judging of the time and circumstances of the world—considering the increased facilities of communication, which has rendered diplomatic intercourse of tenfold necessity—that owing to one transaction, and the prohibition to which it gave rise, you will consent that Her Majesty shall remain debarred from establishing relations from which so much good may arise, and from which if any evil should arise, it shall at once meet with the check, the control, and the reprobation which it would merit. The laws prohibiting the exercise of any temporal or legal authority by the Pope within these realms will remain untouched: it is not the object of the present Bill to alter them. There are no words which I shall object to introduce which will make this Bill more secure, or prevent the Roman Pontiff from claiming the shadow of sovereignty in these realms. The mere purport of the Bill is to establish diplomatic relations, which I firmly believe to be connected with the best interests of the country in time of peace, and might be of the utmost importance in time of war, which, at all events, were fit to be incorporated with that general system of diplomatic intercourse they carried on with all other nations of the world; not Christian nations only, but with Governments of every clime and creed, and which was in every instance unattended either by mischief or danger. The noble Marquess concluded by moving that the Bill be now read 2a.
The DUKE of NEWCASTLEaddressed the House, but was scarcely audible. He was understood to oppose the Bill, on the ground that it was safer to adhere to the system prescribed by the present law. Nothing could be more dangerous than allowing another Sovereign, and that Sovereign the Pope, to interfere in the affairs of this country. If the people saw a Legate from Rome received, it would create an impression that Popery was acknowledged and established. If the present prohibition was removed, the other laws relating to the Pope's authority would soon follow. He moved that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. The noble Marquess who had brought forward the Bill in so eloquent and able an address, had admitted that it was necessary to make out a strong case in order to justify such a measure; and that was indeed the case when it was considered that the object of the Bill was to repeal two Acts of Parliament of such im-

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portance as those alluded to by the noble Marquess.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: To declare the construction of those Acts.
The BISHOP of WINCHESTERsaid, that the noble Marquess who introduced the measure had placed it before them with two arguments, upon which he mainly relied: one was the expediency of such a communication with the Court of Rome as this measure proposed; and the other was based upon the inconvenience which would arise from a continuance of an indirect communication with that Court; the noble Marquess at the same time fully admitting that, under the existing state of things, whenever the occasion arose, some mode of communicating with that Court presented itself. The noble Marquess had alluded to the inconveniences which were calculated to arise from an indirect communication with the Court of Rome; but there was one very important inconvenience to which he had not alluded, namely, the inconvenience which might arise from the establishment of diplomatic relations with that Court. Might it not happen that from the establishment of such relations inconveniences would arise of such a nature as ought to deter their Lordships from agreeing to this measure? Had they considered the question as to whom the Court of Rome should appoint as Minister in this country? They had all seen recently certain rescripts, as they were called, written in Rome, and addressed to a portion of the British empire. He had seen them, and he would confess that he looked with jealousy upon them, although he would admit that those which had recently appeared were in the right direction, and suggested the impropriety of encouraging assassination, and pointed out the evils which must arise from such a course of conduct. The Bill now before their Lordships forcibly reminded him how very easy it was to slide into the language of Popery insensibly, for he found that the Bill declared that it should be lawful for Her Majesty "to receive at the Court of London any Ambassador, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary, or other diplomatic agent or agents whatsoever, of and accredited by"—by whom? By the "Sovereign Pontiff." He believed that this was the first occasion since the Reformation upon which those words, "Sovereign Pontiff," were used in any Act of Parliament. They were not used in the Acts referring to prœmunire, which had of late been so frequently
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referred to—they were not used in the Act of Succession—they were not used in the Act for preventing granting First Fruits to the Church of Rome; and so lately as the 10th George IV., called the Roman Catholic Relief Act, they were not used. All these Acts to which he had alluded, and all other Acts since the Reformation which referred to the subject, cautiously abstained from the use of a phrase which appeared to sanction the alleged supremacy of the Court of Rome; and therefore in those Acts he was usually styled the Bishop of Rome, although occasionally he was called "the Bishop of Rome, sometimes called the Pope." In the Act of George IV., called the Roman Catholic Relief Act, he was called the Pope of Rome, those words being used in the oath. This was a case of somewhat more importance than the mere words. The noble Marquess who moved the second reading of the measure stated that on the occasion of the accession of George the Fourth to the Throne the Pope sent a congratulatory message to the King; in answer to which a letter was written by His Majesty: whether that letter reached the Court of Rome or not, this was certain—that if the letter had been sent to Rome, it was sent in contravention of the opinions of the law officers of the Crown. [Here the right rev. Prelate read an extract from the opinion of the law officers of the Crown of that day, to the effect that as the Pope claimed authority, jurisdiction, and pre-eminence over the whole Christian Church, and certainly over the Roman Catholic Church in these realms, that any letter to him would be interpreted into an admission and recognition of such claim, and would bring the writer within the penalties of prœmunire; and it went on to say that the Legislature had, by carefully adopting the title "Bishop of Rome," instead of Pope, in the various Acts passed since the Reformation, exhibited an anxiety to avoid any such implied recognition of the Pope's supremacy.] The right rev. Prelate said, that the extract which he had quoted would clearly show to their Lordships that the letter referred to could not have been sent with the acquiescence of the law officers of the Crown. He (the Bishop of Winchester) thought that the title "Sovereign Pontiff" did not agree in its meaning with that opinion; and he hoped the noble Marquess would so alter the words of the statute as to remove this objection, and make the measure more in accordance with the views

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of those who did not admit the sovereignty and supremacy of the Pope. There was one point connected with a debate on a question of this kind on which he felt some personal anxiety. He was aware that there were several of their Lordships who professed the Roman Catholic religion, to whom these discussions must be distasteful; and he was most anxious, in any observations which he might make upon this Bill, to avoid everything which could be in the least degree disagreeable to those noble Lords, for whom he entertained the highest respect. One word more, and he would conclude. If they passed this measure they could scarcely stop there; they must go yet a step further. As well as the Acts cited by the noble Marquess, they must repeal the 6th chapter of the 13th of William III., for that Act contained these remarkable words, the more remarkable as being in an Act of the Legislature where such expressions would hardly be looked for. The right rev. Prelate here read an extract from the statute, nearly as follows:—
"Upon which said Acts "(referring to the two Acts quoted in the margin of this Bill, "the safety of Your Majesty's person and Government, the continuance of the Monarchy of England, the preservation of the Protestant religion, the maintenance of the Church of England as by law established in these realms, the security of the undoubted rights and privileges of the people, and the peace of this kingdom, do under God entirely depend."
The right rev. Prelate concluded by expressing his intention to vote for the Amendment.
The BISHOP of ST. DAVID'Ssaid, that he would not have taken any part in this debate if he had not been urged—indeed he might say compelled—by the example of his right rev. Friend to do so; otherwise, he should have regarded the question as partly of a technical legal character, which might be left to the judgment of those amongst their Lordships who were more conversant than himself with legal technicalities; and partly of a political character, which might be safely left to those of their Lordships and of Her Majesty's Government who were best acquainted with such matters. He had not considered the question as one which involved any points to which it would be necessary for him to address himself; and it was in that position that the case appeared to him after the luminous statement of the noble Marquess who moved the second reading of the Bill. The noble Marquess
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had shown that so far as the present law was concerned there were doubts as to the legal impediments which existed in the way of holding communication with the Court of Borne; and he (the Bishop of St. David's) would add, that to any one who was not conversant with the law, and who looked at the letter of the law as it stands, and in the common acceptation of the words, it would appear evident that by communion with the See of Home was not meant a mere communication with the Court of Rome as a temporal Power and as the seat of the sovereignty of the Roman States. That was, however, a legal question, with respect to which it might be necessary to declare the law; but he would say that it could not be maintained to be so clear, as the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) who moved the Amendment assumed it to be, that this measure was an undoubted and unquestionable infraction of the Bill of Rights. With regard to the political necessity for such a measure, he (the Bishop of St. David's) thought it was quite clear that such a necessity had been made out—that such a necessity not only existed at present, but had existed in former times—and that to legalise diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, was only legalising the practice of all the Governments from the Revolution to the present time. It was quite clear that this measure caused no substantial innovation by legalising diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, as it would only render that public, open, safe, and honourable, which had hitherto been done indirectly, and in a mode which was neither safe nor honourable, because it was private and clandestine. If no such precedents as those to which the noble Marquess had alluded were to be found, he (the Bishop of St. David's) should rejoice to know and believe that at the present day there existed a political necessity for such a measure; and his satisfaction at perceiving that necessity was heightened by the contemplation of the brighter prospects which were opening upon one of the most interesting countries and one of the noblest nations in the world; and he did not rejoice at this the less because it so happened that the illustrious individual who, actuated by the very genius of good sense, and influenced by a spirit of the most exalted patriotism, had taken advantage of existing circumstances, and placed himself in afar prouder position than that which any of his prede-

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cessors had ever occupied, by uniting the character of a temporal prince with that of the head of the Roman Church. Looking upon him in that light, he did not know anything in his (the Bishop of St. David's) character or position which ought to prevent him from paying this tribute of respect to that eminent individual. There was another view of the question, however, which their Lordships had been urged to take, for it had been suggested that this subject had a religious side and aspect; and he had therefore listened anxiously in order to learn what were the grounds upon which his right rev. Friend could found his belief that the interests of religion, particularly of the Protestant religion, could be affected by this measure; but he found himself unable to gather from the arguments of his right rev. Friend that there was any substantial ground for such an idea. The point upon which his right rev. Friend had dwelt most forcibly was, the use of an expression in the Bill relating to the individual with whom they were about to establish diplomatic relations, and which, his right rev. Friend had stated, described that individual in a character which was not recognised in this country. His (the Bishop of St. David's) opinion was different; he conceived that it was a familiar and common mode of describing that individual; and, he believed, it would be found that the phrase was frequently used in ecclesiastical history, and by Protestant writers, who described the head of the Court of Rome as "the Sovereign Pontiff." He was a temporal sovereign and also a Pontiff; and he could not see any objection to describing him as Sovereign Pontiff. But if that were the only objection there would be no difficulty in removing it when they went into Committee. He gathered, however, from some intimations which had fallen from his right rev. Friend, that his right rev. Friend had confounded in his mind two things which were very different, and which ought to be kept perfectly distinct in the minds of their Lordships, namely, the expediency of permitting Her Majesty to send an accredited Minister to the Court of Rome, and that of receiving an accredited Minister from Rome in this country. He hoped that with respect to this part of the measure, whilst, on the one hand, care would be taken to avoid anything offensive to the Court of Rome, as a temporal Power, due respect would be paid to the opinions of a large class of persons in this country, who
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viewed the question with jealousy. He would remind their Lordships that they must now consider themselves as legislating for the future as well as for the present; that they were establishing relations with the Court of Rome which would be permanent; and whatever confidence they might have in the character of the present Pope, care should be taken not to enter into relations with him, which with other parties and in other times might be found inconvenient. He ventured to throw out those considerations, though he was quite sure they would not have escaped their Lordships' attention; and he hoped they would be taken up by some noble Lord, in order to introduce some modification into the measure in Committee. Speaking of the measure, however, on the whole, he must say that he had heard nothing to shake his conviction that it was a measure absolutely required by the circumstances of these times; that it was one which was essential to the political interests of the country; and attended with no shadow of danger to the established religion. He hoped, therefore, that no slight scruple—no doubtful question of law—would prevent their Lordships from giving their assent to the substance of the measure that had been proposed.
The BISHOP of EXETERsaid, he was astonished to hear from the right rev. Prelate, or from any minister of the Church of England, that the style of "Sovereign Pontiff" applied to the Pope was an innocent expression, and one which Protestant writers were in the habit of using. Why, every bishop was a pontiff; but the words "Sovereign Pontiff" would place the Bishop of Rome above all bishops. He knew no Sovereign Pontiff. He emphatically declared against the principle, for the first time uttered by a Protestant bishop in a British House of Parliament. He must frankly tell their Lordships that he had great difficulty in assenting to what had been said on either side of the House that evening. He thought the noble Marquess had failed to make a case for a reasonable doubt respecting the question of the legality of the Crown to act as this Bill proposed; the Bill said it was expedient to enable the Crown to act; and for that reason he was disposed to object to the second reading, and to think that it ought to be rejected at its present stage. He had no doubt whatever, in spite of all that he had heard, with great respect to the noble Duke who had

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addressed their Lordships, and to whom the country was so much indebted for standing forward at all times in support of the best interests of the country—and the highest of all were its religious interests—yet, notwithstanding what he had heard from the noble Duke and his right rev. Friend nearest him (the Bishop of Winchester), he could entertain no doubt on the subject. In the Bill was recited the Act of William and Mary, by which it was enacted, "that all and every person and persons who was, were, or should be reconciled to, or should hold communion with the See of Rome," should be excluded, and for ever incapable to inherit, possess, or enjoy the Crown. Now, any person who received absolution was said to be reconciled to the Church; and to hold communion with the Church was a special communication—communicare in sacris. There could be no doubt about the meaning; but if there were any question as to the power of Her Majesty to send a Minister to the Court of Rome, there was a more constitutional and safe course than to ask their Lordships to pass a measure fraught with danger, scandal, and alarm of every kind, and which would spread itself over every part of the kingdom. The safe and constitutional course would be to call upon the Judges of the land to give their opinion to their Lordships as to whether there was any reason for a doubt; and if they said there was not, then let this measure be brought forward by the advisers of the Crown on their own responsibility, and not under such a miserable pretence as the present, which made it apparently necessary, in order to secure the title of the Crown, that they should say it was expedient that Her Majesty should be enabled to establish diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome. It was true that Prussia and Russia sent embassies to Rome by whom all diplomatic business was discharged; but they did not permit a Romish Minister to come either to Berlin or to St. Petersburgh—London alone would have the high distinction of the presence of a Nuncio. Were we to see Rome raise her scarlet head at St. James's? If the Judges were found to say there was nothing to prevent Her Majesty from having a Minister at the Court of Rome, and it were thought necessary, let Her advisers take the responsibility upon themselves of adopting that course. But let them not allow the Pope to have an ambassador here. Let them look to the consequences of such an event. He
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was perfectly certain that times had been, and were likely to be again, when it was of the utmost danger to have a Minister near the Throne accredited from the Court of Rome. Let their Lordships remember that a Minister to this country from a foreign Court, was absolutely free from all responsibility. They could not proceed against him for any offence he might commit in this country; the policy of the world said they should not, and it was the recognised law of nations. Now, suppose there were—he would not say an emissary, but—an accredited Minister to this country from the Court of Rome, having his views directed against the Protestant succession to the Throne, or against any of the great Protestant interests of the country; and suppose he made his house the place of meeting at which should be hatched plots the most pregnant with danger to the peace and safety of the Crown, perhaps to join any foreign Powers that should be proposed to disturb the succession to the Throne—what might be the consequences? Let us remember that a large portion of Ireland had declared itself eager to join any foreign country that should be prepared to draw the sword against this. Could he hesitate to say that it was the duty of a Protestant country to provide against the possibility of a Roman Minister in England being the instrument by which these persons should safely combine and make common cause with the Ministers of those countries who were prepared to take the first opportunity of war. He put it to their Lordships' common sense, whether the case he now supposed was not one that would probably happen? He should have looked at this Bill with incomparably less suspicion if it had simply said that "whereas doubts had been entertained whether Her Majesty was enabled to have diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, and it was expedient to remove those doubts, therefore," &c.; still by far the safest and most satisfactory course, in his judgment, would have been to call upon the Judges of the land. Having these views, he should decidedly vote with the noble Duke that this Bill be read a second time this day six months.
The DUKE of WELLINGTON: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government thinking it desirable, in the existing circumstances of Italy, to increase and to facilitate the means of communicating with the Sovereign of the Roman States, has called upon your Lordships to give a second reading

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to this Bill. My Lords, I confess when I first heard of the measure, I considered it with some degree of anxiety. My Lords, upon all occasions when I have had to make propositions to your Lordships in relation to the state of the Roman Catholics in this kingdom, I have always considered it my duty, with the utmost care, to endeavour to form a judgment upon those provisions of the law upon which are founded the Reformation in this country and the establishment of the Church of England. Certainly, it was the intention of those laws that there should be no communication, either political or otherwise, between this country and the Sovereign of the Roman States. My Lords, these laws remain in force at the present moment. A great alteration was made in these laws by the measure introduced into this House by my noble and learned Friend Lord Lyndhurst, viz. by the 9th and 10th Victoria, cap. 58, by which law the penalties have been mitigated, and in some instances entirely repealed. But, my Lords, all the noble and learned Lords at that time in this House, the noble Lord on the Woolsack, the noble Lord who sits near me (Lord Campbell), and my noble and learned Friend Lord Brougham, stated positively that the enactments of the law remained as they were; that some of the Acts prohibited by those laws were offences at the common law; and that they all remained as misdemeanors, although the penalties of prœmunire were abolished. I remained satisfied with that assurance. I confess that I felt exceedingly anxious respecting the effect of this measure upon these particular laws, and intended this night to give notice that I would move a proviso in addition to the proviso already in the Bill—of a proviso declaring that those laws securing the supremacy of the Crown—that Her Majesty was supreme head and governor in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil in England and the dominions thereunto belonging—should be considered as inviolable. I consider that this would be satisfactory to the people of this country, and it would be extremely useful in the measures to be adopted under the law, after it had received your sanction. It has been suggested to me that it would be probably more expedient to move a clause in the Bill, declaring that nothing contained therein should affect the laws which ensure the supremacy of the Crown in all affairs ecclesiastical and civil. In either of those two ways, as it may meet the approbation of your Lord-
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ships, I shall move an Amendment to that effect in the Committee on the Bill. Her Majesty's Government having desired to have a clear declaration of the law of England, and knowing that great advantages may be derived from regular diplomatic intercourse with the Sovereign of the Roman States, I am of opinion that it is desirable that that communication should be carried on regularly. If no other advantage is derived from it, you will have that of being certain to have true intelligence from responsible agents in a country in which Her Majesty's subjects have such interest as in the Italian dominions. Under these circumstances, my Lords, I shall support the second reading, and allow the Bill to go into Committee, in which I will move a proviso, which I will read to your Lordships, or else I will move an Amendment providing for the continued existence of the laws which I conceive it to be important should be maintained inviolable. The proviso is—
"Whereas it has been enacted and declared in the provisions of various ancient laws of this realm, that the Sovereign, acting by and with the advice and under the authority of both Houses of Parliament, should be sole and supreme governor of all matters ecclesiastical and civil within this realm and elsewhere within the dominions of the Crown of England; and whereas it is essential to the welfare of this realm that the said provisions as to the Crown and Government thereof should be invariably maintained, and it is expedient nevertheless to remove any doubt as to the competency of Her Majesty, her heirs, or successors, on the subject of relation with the Sovereign of the Roman States, be it enacted, &c."
That is the Amendment which I propose to move in Committee; but if your Lordships should be of opinion that it is more desirable to frame an enacting clause, I shall have no objection to move it.
LORD STANLEY: My Lords, if I entertained all the apprehensions which have been expressed by my noble Friend the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Newcastle), whose uniform sincerity and honesty of purpose render it altogether unnecessary that he should apologise for addressing your Lordships on this subject—if I concurred in the apprehensions which have been expressed by the noble Duke, and believed that this Bill, or a Bill founded on the principle of this Bill, was at variance with the spirit of those enactments on which I could repeat the strong language which was quoted by a right rev. Prelate opposite, but upon which I concur, in the language of the enactments, that much of the liberties of the country—much of the rights

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of the people of this country—a great portion of the monarchy of this country, mainly and essentially depend—if I could be persuaded that this Bill was contrary to those principles, and that it in the slightest degree endangered either the rights of the people or the rights and privileges of the Monarch—if I could believe that, by assenting to the principle of this Bill, we were in the slightest degree recognising, strengthening, or supporting any claim or pretext which the Sovereign of the Roman States may make to spiritual authority or temporal pre-eminence within these realms—no consideration of policy or expediency would induce me for a moment to hesitate; and, without doubt or difficulty, I should join with my noble Friend behind me in the direct negative with which he proposed to meet this question. But I confess I cannot go so far as my noble Friend appears to go in his view of the terrible consequences of the principle involved in this measure, or the apprehensions he entertains respecting it. I look upon the measure as one of great weight. I look upon it as a matter involving manifold and deep considerations of prudence and policy; but I do not look upon it as involving any dereliction of the principles upon which the Reformation proceeded—upon which the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement stand. At the game time, my Lords, when we reflect that the practice which it is now proposed to alter has existed for 180 years, or perhaps it is more correct to say for 300 years—that by the law and practice of this country intercourse with the Court of Rome during all that period was prohibited to the Monarch and subjects of this country—when we consider how deeply the feelings, the prejudices if you will, of the Protestant portion of this country are involved in the consideration of this question—I say it is one which your Lordships ought to approach with that respect which is due to the deep-seated religious feelings of the people, not less than to the importance of the measure. I say it is one which ought not to have been hastily introduced, and which ought not to be hastily carried through your Lordships' House. I say it is one upon which full explanation, not only to your Lordships, but to the people of this country, is due, and may be fairly expected by them. I say more—I say it with regret—but I say that the manner in which this Bill has been introduced is not such as we have a right to expect. My Lords, I do not stop to argue the question whether those doubts which
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are expressed in the body of this Bill, with regard to the proper construction of the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, are well founded; I think it would be a waste of your time to enter into discussion upon a point upon which I can speak with no authority—upon which the highest and greatest authorities have been at all times divided. It is sufficient to say, that the noble Marquess himself, on the part of the Government, by the introduction of this Bill, has declared that great doubts do exist as to the proper construction of those statutes—it is not necessary to say more than that Government not only consider that great doubts exist, but that recognising that the practice for the last 180 years has been contrary to the interpretation which they seek to place on these statutes—the very form adopted in the Bills being in the form of an enacting Bill, enabling Her Majesty to do that which the provision of the Bill assumes She was unable to do—I say I will not enter into this question, nor into the historical details with which the noble Marquess favoured the House. The noble Marquess has correctly stated the circumstances connected with the accusation against Lord Castlemaine. But if the noble Marquess's attention has been recently turned to that period of history, he will not forget that the Duke of Somerset, on being desired by James to introduce the Nuncio of the Pope, declined to perform an act which he held to be contrary to the law of the land; and James, far from contending for the legality of the act, said that be should be prepared to grant a pardon beforehand. In reply, the Duke of Somerset stated, that a pardon granted before the commission of the act was no pardon. The noble Marquess seems to have assumed that up to the period of the passing of these Acts no legal impediment existed as to free communication with Rome. But the discussion of these doubts are needless, because the noble Marquess himself admits the doubts; he admits the construction placed on them is adverse to the view now suggested, and he brings forward this Bill to remove those doubts, and enable Her Majesty to do that which without this Bill She would be unable to do. My Lords, I will now proceed at once to the policy and to the principle of the measure. I must say that I think upon a measure of this importance, involving a change of the law, or at least a change of practice which has existed for a long period of time, if it was the desire of the advisers of the Crown

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that Her Majesty should be set free from restrictions which they believed to be imposed by the statutes to which Her Majesty mainly owes Her right to the Crown of these kingdoms—I say that the proper, regular, and dignified mode of proceeding would have been for Her Majesty, in Her Majesty's Speech at the opening of Parliament, to have announced Her desire to be freed from those restrictions, and to have called upon Parliament for its sanction to such a step. It may be said by the noble Marquess, that at the period at which Parliament met it was uncertain whether, on consideration of the state of matters existing at Rome, it would be desirable or expedient to introduce this measure. Admitting that plea, at least it would have been proper to have sent down a Message from the Crown communicating in the most formal manner the desire of the Crown, or rather the advice of the Ministers of the Crown. Instead of that, however, when your Lordships' attention was about to be called to a subject of a totally different character—when you were about to discuss the price of sugar and the complaints of the West India planters—at the moment when I had risen to present a petition to your Lordships—the noble Marquess rose, and with no more ceremony than if he were proposing to lay a turnpike trust Bill on the table, announced to your Lordships, without preface or introduction, a Bill to enable Her Majesty to enter into diplomatic intercourse with Rome. The noble Marquess said that we had fair warning on this subject—that before Christmas he had informed the House of the intentions of Government. It is quite true that before Christmas, upon a casual incidental discussion, the noble Marquess did state his own opinion that it would be desirable, as a matter of policy, that the Crown should be enabled to enter into diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome; but I deny that there was any intimation or warning whatever of any intention on the part of the Government to propose such a measure to the House. Now I must say that that is not the manner in which such a great measure should have been introduced; and I trust that your Lordships will not permit a great measure of this kind to be hastily slurred over, before the people of this country have had due time to ascertain its real bearings. I say this for the interest of the measure itself. If I had the honour of being the Colleague of the noble Marquess, I should desire to have the fullest
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time given for the country really to understand that there was no danger lurking behind the apparent object of the Bill. I think even now that the noble Marquess might have stated to us something of those proceedings which have been going on at Rome—something of the peculiar necessity for the introduction of this Bill at the present time, and under present circumstances—something of the disposition which, I presume, although not officially, he had ascertained to exist at the Court of Rome with regard to diplomatic relations—something as to the concession to public feeling in this country—something as to the restrictions on the intercourse which it is the intention of the Minister to introduce—if restrictions there be. The noble Marquess may say it is impossible he can state to the House what has passed at Rome, because it is known that the very diplomatic intercourse which that involves is already assumed to be prohibited by the law of the land. It may be very convenient, but I do not think it very correct, that upon one occasion the Government should take one course, and then upon another occasion, in precisely similar circumstances, they should take another course, just as they happen to suit the purposes of the moment. If there be an unofficial and undiplomatic intercourse which cannot consequently be laid before your Lordships, I am at a loss to understand the production of certain papers to which I shall call your attention with reference to the mission of this very Earl Minto, and the negotiations of Earl Minto at the Court of Rome within the period of the last three months. I do not know whether the noble Earl has followed the precedent to which the noble Marquess has adverted. Looking at the document with which for a single moment I shall trouble your Lordships, I say that if there be any impediment at the present moment to diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Rome, Her Majesty's Government, and Earl Minto, and the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs, are in a very unenviable situation; because I find that on the 22nd October, 1847, the noble Viscount at the head of Foreign Affairs addressed to Earl Minto official instructions to the following effect:—
"I have to instruct your Lordship, when at Rome, to endeavour to persuade the Roman Government to recall the Jesuits from Switzerland, or at least to take some decided step with regard to them which may be calculated to lay the ground for an avoidance of civil war in Switzerland. Your Lordship's own judgment and the

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knowledge which, in your passage through Switzerland, you have acquired of the state of affairs in that country, and of the public feeling of the parties into which the Swiss nation is divided, will furnish you with better arguments on this subject than any which Her Majesty's Government can suggest; but of course your Lordship will not omit to press strongly upon the consideration of the Papal Government, that an ecclesiastical Power like that of Rome must above all things desire to prevent war, and to preserve peace among all mankind; and that in the present case the Pope has it in his power, by an exercise of his unquestionable authority, to remove at once a cause which threatens to involve a hitherto peaceful and happy nation in all the miseries and crimes of civil conflict."
These were instructions to Earl Minto, Lord Privy Seal, a Member of Her Majesty's Government proceeding to Rome, and to the post to which he had been appointed. Here is the answer of Earl Minto:—
"Rome, November 13, 1847.
"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd of October, approving of the language held by me to M. Ochsenbein in my passage through Switzerland, and directing me to urge the Papal Government to take steps for the removal of the Jesuits from that country. I have already had some conversation upon that subject with the Cardinal Secretary of State, whom I found not altogether averse, to a certain extent, to the interposition of the Papal authority, if by such means a conflict might be prevented in Switzerland. If the question rested entirely on the establishment of the Jesuits in Lucerne, I think that the assistance of the Pope might be obtained for their removal; but I have not been able to state that anything short of the expulsion of that society from every part of Switzerland would satisfy the demands of the Diet. This the Pope is not prepared to require, and he is unwilling to give gratuitous offence to the Catholic canton of Lucerne by a partial interference there, from which no benefit might accrue. His advice is all that he has yet given on that subject; and it has, I fear, been given to those who are unlikely to listen to anything short of a command. If it be not too late, and Switzerland be not already the scene of war, I shall continue to press for the interposition of the Pope's authority, at least with regard to Lucerne."
Now, my Lords, we have this fact in the face of a law which Her Majesty's Ministers assume to prohibit all diplomatic intercourse with Rome, and the existence of which law, and the impossibility of carrying on an intercourse under which, renders it necessary to introduce an abrogation of the law. We have these facts. An official instruction from the Secretary of State to one of his Colleagues as to the language which he should hold to the Pope in transacting the affairs of another country—the proceedings of Earl Minto at Rome, furnished with the instructions, and found-
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ed on the instructions—his conversation with the Cardinal Secretary of State, officially reporting to Her Majesty's Government the consequences and the progress of the negotiations—and these papers, in the most authentic and official manner, are laid before both Houses of Parliament by Her Majesty's command. My Lords, if this be not diplomatic intercourse, I do not know what is to bear that construction; and if it be true that, under the law as it now stands, such diplomatic intercourse and such official publication be not penal, I am at a loss to comprehend for what possible reason your Lordships are asked to pass this Bill. But, then, I say this; the Government are in this dilemma: they cannot refuse to produce Earl Minto's reports of his communications with the Cardinal Secretary of State in reference to the passing of this measure, and the establishment of diplomatic intercourse, upon the ground that they are private and unofficial. This, then, is the state of things—that the noble Marquess is not, according to his own showing, prevented by the present state of the law from sending any person whatever, of the highest authority, one of his own Colleagues, a Privy Councillor of the Queen, for the purpose of representing the views of Her Majesty's Government at the Court of Rome; but if that be the case, then, my Lords, I say that all the arguments of the noble Marquess which are grounded upon the inconvenience of the present system, under the present law, of establishing relations with the Court of Rome, are absolutely swept away by the very course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued upon the present occasion. The noble Marquess went on to say, that at various times, and from time to time, there had been direct communications between this country and the Court of Rome; but what were the instances which he adduced? Instances that occurred at the time of an European war, when you required "munitions de guerre et de bouche." Now I am not prepared to deny that there may be advantages and conveniences attending a direct recognised intercourse with the Court of Rome; but I concur with the right reverend Prelate that it is the duty of the Government and the Parliament well to weigh whether there may not be collateral disadvantages and inconveniences which more than counterbalance the advantages to be derived from that direct communication. My Lords, I must not be deterred, by fears of

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trenching upon delicate ground from stating my view as to the difficulties which may meet you at the very outset. We all take an oath that no foreign prince, power, or potentate hath, or ought to have, any spiritual power or authority within this realm; and it is right that we should distinctly consider and not delude ourselves as to the meaning of that spiritual power and authority of the Pope. I take it that the meaning of that oath is, that the authority of the Pope is one which rests upon opinion alone—that it is not upheld, enforced, sanctioned, or capable of being enforced by the law of this country—and that if any one of Her Majesty's subjects were to appeal to a court of law against any attempted interference by the Pope in the exercise of such authority, the court of law would set at nought the assumed authority of the Pope, and at once grant relief to the subject. But there is nothing in the law as it at present stands, which precludes the Pope from communicating with any individual—from communicating with the prelates of his own Church, as in a recent case, advising with them, and pointing out the course which they ought to take. That spiritual authority of the Pope is admitted by the Roman Catholics of this country. That spiritual influence cannot be denied by your Lordships. It is idle to pretend then that it is merely as the sovereign of a comparatively insignificant State in Italy that you desire to enter into these diplomatic arrangements with the Pope of Rome. If there were nothing more behind, this Bill would be an idle measure, which no Government would think worth its while to introduce. Whatever the inconveniences of the present practice might be, those inconveniences would have been submitted to, rather than you would have run the chance of creating a great ferment in the public mind by an unnecessary invasion of what has been hitherto considered a great constitutional principle. But, my Lords, this is what you mean by this Bill. You know that the Pope has influence over your Roman Catholic subjects; and you seek to obtain an influence over the Pope, in order to prevent his interference with your Roman Catholic subjects being carried on in a mode offensive to you. Now that is, in plain English, the object of this Bill, and I think that Her Majesty's Government will hardly deny that it is so. Does that object, if admitted, recognise the spiritual authority and jurisdiction of the Pope? My Lords,
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I think that it does not. I think that it gives to those letters from the Pope, whatever they may be, no further authority than they possess at present. They will come, in spite of you, whenever the Pope may deem it necessary to address the people of his own Church; and undoubtedly there may be convenience occasionally in having a recognised channel at the Court of Rome, through whom you may make your representations that certain particular advice may be detrimental or otherwise to the British Government. Now, I hope I am stating this part of the case fairly and candidly. I am certainly stating it as it strikes me, and I at once admit that there are circumstances in which it may be convenient to have a recognised envoy at the Court of Rome. But, my Lords, have you weighed the disadvantages which at the same time attach to this course? You give, it is true, no more weight to the advice of the Pope than it has in the minds of the Roman Catholics at present; but if ostensibly or openly you communicate or advise with the Pope with reference to the instructions which may proceed from him, you do, in my opinion, either one of two things. You either give an unnecessary sanction to those instructions, or you interpose a fruitless remonstrance. The right reverend Prelate (the Bishop of St. David's) who spoke in such commendatory terms of the present Pope, said very truly that we could not be certain that his successors would be disposed to use their influence in the same way that Pope Pius IX. was exercising his. I believe Pope Pius to be an amiable, well-intentioned, and sincere man; but whether he be a far-seeing, wise, and prudent man, or whether he have not hastily and imprudently engaged in dangerous reforms, I think it would be premature for us to determine. This, however, I will say, that of late years no man has succeeded to the Papal chair who seemed disposed to carry with so high a hand the spiritual prerogative and spiritual power of the See of Rome—no man who would tolerate so little interference on the part of any temporal authority with his spiritual functions—no man so little likely to attend to any representations from a temporal sovereign. It is quite true that upon a recent occasion the interference of Pope Pius IX. in the affairs of Ireland was of a most laudable and praiseworthy character; but how would it have been if his advice had been of a different character? I take a recent in-

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stance—the intervention of the Pope with regard to colleges in Ireland; and I must say, my Lords, that I look upon that as a most unfortunate interference on the part of the Papal See. I think it was ill-judged. I think if you had had relations with the Court of Rome you might have succeeded, possibly, in preventing the issue of those recommendations; but I think it is much more likely that, in spite of you, they would have been issued: and I say, then, that that would have been an act offensive to your Government, and that the Secretary of State would have found it extremely difficult to have abstained from withdrawing his Minister from that Court; and if that is likely to be so in the very first instance in which the Pope sets your recommendation at defiance, I ask if the result will not be infinitely more prejudicial to the good understanding between the Court of Rome and this country than if there were no diplomatic relations whatever between the two Courts? I say, then, my Lords, that I entertain very great doubts whether the advantages which may possibly be derived from the influence which your Minister may have at the Court of Rome, may not be more than counterbalanced by the danger of the antagonism in which you may be placed after you have established diplomatic relations. I do not go so far as my noble Friend (the Duke of Wellington) as to think that because Her Majesty's Government have laid this Bill upon the table of the House, we ought therefore, without hesitation, to give it a second reading; but I do say this, that if upon the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government a measure of this kind be submitted to the consideration of Parliament, I, for one, am not prepared upon the first day on which we have an opportunity of discussing the merits, objects, or character of the Bill, to refuse to enter into a further consideration of the measure—to refuse to consider such amendments as may be moved in Committee, keeping myself entirely open, after the amendments shall be introduced, to reconsider the whole question, and maintaining my perfect freedom of action either to support or oppose the Bill as a whole; and I do hope that if the Bill should go through a second reading to-night, and through Committee to-morrow, the Government will see the propriety of giving a considerable interval between the Committee and the third reading, in order that the country may have a full opportunity of considering
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its provisions. I do not think, my Lords, that any person has argued that it is an objection to this Bill that we recognise in the fullest manner, and in ample terms, the temporal sovereignty of the Pope in his own dominions; but when the noble Marquess goes a little further, and says that there is no question as to the reciprocity of such a recognition, I must beg leave to doubt whether that recognition has ever been made in terms consistent with the honour of the Crown of England. On the contrary, my Lords, I think that claims have been brought forward from time to time by successive Pontiffs wholly irreconcilable with the recognition of the sovereignty of Her Majesty. All the noble Marquess was able to state was—and I confess I felt surprised as I took down the words—that there never had been a refusal on the part of any Pope to recognise the sovereignty of any Monarch in this realm, "when it was convenient so to do." Why, my Lords, that implies, upon the other hand, that the Pope reserves to himself full power of abstaining from admitting that supremacy whenever it may be inconvenient for him to recognise it. My Lords, I entertain great doubts whether it is consistent with the dignity of a great country like this to enter into diplomatic relations with any sovereign without a clear, distinct, and absolute understanding, and the declaration of an entire admission of at least the temporal supremacy of the Queen in these realms; and if it should be proposed as an amendment in this Bill that such a distinct declaration and assurance should be insisted on, I shall feel it to be my duty to support that amendment. Again, is there any provision in the Bill giving the smallest safeguard as to the appointment of the ambassador from the Court of Rome? None whatever. But is there none required? If the Government think that there is not, then they differ in opinion from every other State, both Protestant and Catholic, throughout the civilised world. There is no State, however Catholic, whether Portugal, Spain, Austria, France, or any other, which does not by its own internal laws place restrictions on the exercise of diplomatic functions with the Court of Rome, which it does not seek to place upon the Minister of any other State whatever. But if it be necessary to adopt safeguards and restrictions in Catholic countries, in regard to diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, it is still more necessary in a Protestant

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country, and most of all is it necessary in a Protestant country like ours, where there is great danger of the legitimate authority placed in the ambassador degenerating into a dangerous exercise of spiritual authority. Undoubtedly we cannot say that the diplomatic relations between Prussia and the Court of Rome have produced so little embarrassment in the temporal affairs of that country as to make that a very encouraging precedent for us to follow; but in Prussia it was made a sine qua non—there was a distinct condition—that no ecclesiastic should be received as a Minister from Home in the Court of Prussia. My noble Friend near me (the Earl of Eglintoun) has given notice of an Amendment, with the view of excluding prelates of the Romish Church from appearing as Ministers at the British Court; but Her Majesty's Government did not think it necessary to introduce such a provision into the Bill. I admit that there is a great distinction between the danger of having a Protestant envoy at Rome, and of having a Papal envoy in England; but if you impose no restrictions, I can have no hesitation in saying that the admission of a Papal envoy here, more especially if he is to combine with his diplomatic relations anything of a spiritual character, will be particularly dangerous to this Protestant country, and is calculated to excite the reasonable apprehensions of the people of this country. It may be that the privileges of an ambassador might not afford any additional facilities for the publication of bulls and rescripts from Rome. It may be so; but I think the people of this country will require to be satisfied that that is the case, especially when they remember that, by an Act passed two years ago, you abolished the penalties of prœmunire upon the introduction of such bulls and rescripts from the See of Rome. This Bill, however, cannot be construed as admitting bulls which are at present prohibited from circulation in this country; and I say, when you are about to introduce a Papal Minister here, that if you are deprived of that safeguard which Roman Catholic States have considered necessary for the peace and welfare of their dominions, still more does it behave you to make it clear that by the admission of an ambassador from the Court of Rome no greater facility shall, at all events, be given for doing that which the law of this country at present prohibits. These, my Lords, are the points to which I was anxious to direct your Lordships' at-
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tention, some of them, perhaps, calculated to satisfy the apprehensions of people out of doors, rather than to meet any real or great danger; others, however, calculated to meet real and tangible dangers founded on the experience of other countries, all of whom, without exception, have objected to an unrestricted intercourse with the Pope of Rome. Whilst I am not prepared on the one hand to join with my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) in giving a negative to this Bill in its present stage—whilst I have reason to hope from the candour and good sense of my noble Friend that he will abstain from pressing his Amendment to a division—and whilst I cannot refuse to give a reconsideration to the Bill—I wish to repeat that by allowing the second reading I do not pledge myself to any further support of it, and must again express a hope that in a matter of such importance ample time may be given between the Committee and the third reading for the full consideration of the subject by the people of this country.
EARL GREYsaid: In the first place I must express the extreme satisfaction with which I perceive that the noble Lord, with all his strong disposition to find fault—to scrutinise this Bill with a microscopic eye—to discuss every defect and every imaginary danger—that even he can find no greater fault with this measure than the manner in which it has been brought before you, and as to some points of mere detail; which latter objections arise, I think, from a misconception upon his part. The noble Lord began by finding great fault with the manner in which the measure was proposed, and stated that one of such importance, involving considerations of such serious political consequences, ought not to have been brought under the consideration of the House, without being in the first instance announced by Her Majesty in Her Speech from the Throne, or at least in a Message formally brought down from the Crown. That appears to me, however, to be wholly unnecessary. I do not think that a measure intended merely to clear up the state of the law upon such a matter, required to be introduced with all the formality for which the noble Lord appeared so anxious. My noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne) merely exercised that privilege which belongs to all your Lordships, of introducing a Bill, of whatever importance, without notice. My noble -Friend did not make any observations upon introducing this Bill; but I ask your Lord-

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ships whether, in moving the second reading, he has failed to lay the case before you, fully, completely, and in a manner well worthy the importance of the subject? I ask you whether the case which he made out in favour of this measure, did not carry with it conviction to the mind of almost every one who heard it, and whether he has not proved in the clearest manner the necessity and policy of this measure? I really feel that I should be doing injustice to the able speech of my noble Friend, if I were to say more in order to recommend it to your Lordships' best attention. The noble Lord then complained of the shortness of time that is to elapse between the second reading and the Committee. Now I really am surprised at this objection coming from the noble Lord, for it was actually adopted at his own suggestion: the noble Lord said if time were given between the first and second reading, there could be no objection to take the Committee upon the next day after the second reading. To that proposition my noble Friend assented; and I certainly am astonished now that the noble Lord should censure the arrangement which he himself proposed. With regard to the interval to elapse between the Committee and the third reading, I should think the noble Lord and his party would not think it necessary that Government should give such an interval as would allow an opportunity to those who might be ready to try the hopeless task, to see whether the country could not be stirred up to a furious opposition to this measure. I know not whether any persons in or out of this House contemplate such a step; I can only say that the Government do not consider it their duty to allow more than the fair interval to elapse which Parliamentary usages require. The noble Lord quoted despatches which had been written to Lord Minto, together with Lord Minto's replies; and he argued from them that already there was a clear diplomatic intercourse between Rome and this country, and that if the penalties of prœmunire were consequent upon that intercourse, those penalties had already been incurred. It was never pretended that Lord Minto was in Rome for his own pleasure. He is accredited there—he has most important functions to perform; but at the same time he has no regular and proper authority to act as the representative of the British Crown. But that is our case. The very case that we bring forward in favour of this Bill is, that a necessity exists, and has existed in all
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times of our history, for intercourse of a public nature between this country and the Court of Rome, and that intercourse taking place, it ought to be rendered legal, regular, and above all suspicion. For my own part, I think the manner in which it has hitherto been carried on is most unsatisfactory, not only by the present Government, but by every Administration for years past, even by the noble Lord himself. Communications have always passed between the Court of London and the Court of Rome, but, as my noble Friend has said, always in an indirect manner, until at last a state of affairs has arisen in which it is absolutely necessary that those relations should be placed upon a better footing. And, my Lords, I say, that unless your Lordships are prepared to say that Her Majesty's Government would have been justified in not taking any measures whatever, in the existing affairs in Italy, such as allowing communications of a diplomatic kind to take place with Rome, I am not aware that any blame will rest upon us. I do not think, however, it would have been right that Lord Minto should have received the instructions he did receive, if Her Majesty's Government had not contemplated the step they have taken in submitting the present Bill to Parliament, and putting this intercourse for the future upon a regular and proper footing. I believe, however, that even upon the most technical instruction the law has not been violated; still if it were the settled policy of this country to prevent intercourse between Rome and England, and the measure we have adopted were improper, I think it would be contrary to the spirit, at all events, of our policy. But that has not been the policy either of the present or of any preceding Government. In the clauses of the Bill—[Lord STANLEY: There are no clauses.] That, my Lords, is a remark of the same character as the other minute criticisms of the noble Lord to which I have already adverted. It is true the Bill consists of only one clause. At all events, with regard to an ecclesiastic being sent from Rome, as an ambassador to this country, it is remarkable that one argment used by the noble Lord upon that subject entirely destroys the force of all his other objections to the measure. He quoted the case of Prussia, which prevents an ecclesiastic coming into that country as an ambassador. Does that, my Lords, rest upon any law? No: it rests simply upon the pleasure of the King of

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Prussia and his Government. They decline to receive an ecclesiastic. It is open to Her Majesty's Government, be they whom they may, in the same manner, if they find inconvenience to arise from the appointment of any particular person as as ambassador, to decline receiving him; but it does appear to me perfectly unnecessary, when that power exists in the Government, that an Act of Parliament should contain clauses specifying who are and who are not fit persons to be received. It would be found somewhat difficult, with all the noble Lord's extreme verbal ingenuity, to frame a clause (not clauses) to define who is a safe ambassador from the Court of Rome. I think, therefore, it is much better that it should be left to the responsibility of the Government for the time being to decide who should be received. I must confess I was also surprised at the noble Lord's argument, that because this is a Protestant State there was peculiar danger in our receiving an ambassador from the Pope. It appears to me that the probability is exactly the reverse. A Protestant state, I think, has very little to fear from that; a Catholic State, on the other hand, might have a great deal to fear. In point of fact, the danger, if there be any, to which the noble Lord adverted, arises from the circumstance that we are not all Protestants; but I think his apprehensions entirely unfounded. The noble Lord has also adverted to the Amendment which the noble Duke (the Duke of Wellington) has signified his intention of moving in Committee. With regard to that Amendment, I can only say that I entirely approve of it. I believe, in point of legal effect, the Bill as it stands would be perfectly safe; but I freely admit that, in a matter of this kind, "assurance should be doubly sure," in order to tranquillise the mind of the country. Accordingly, my noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne) has been in communication with the noble Duke, and his Amendment will be introduced either into the preamble, or in the enacting part of the Bill (and I should prefer the latter), in the manner that may be considered most convenient. But, after all, the noble Lord, and the right rev. Prelates who have spoken, admit the expediency of opening diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome. One right rev. Prelate, however, (the Bishop of Exeter,) suggested that the proper course to effect that purpose would be, not to ask the House to assent to this Bill, but to proceed by asking the Judges
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to give their opinions as to what the law actually is. I beg to inform the right rev. Prelate, that, according to the forms of this House, if the Bill were not before it, it would not have been competent for us to have consulted the Judges. The Judges are not consulted upon any abstract questions; they are only consulted upon any question which arises in the course of the legislative or judicial proceedings of the House. Of course, therefore, the suggestion of the right rev. Prelate could not be entertained. I must also observe, that the right rev. Prelate, having admitted the policy of allowing diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Rome and the Court of England, described this measure as something too shocking to contemplate. But it all turned out to be an imaginary terror. The right rev. Prelate tells us that the Bill compels us to receive and send an ambassador, whether the Crown may intend to do so or not. Such is neither the purport of the Bill nor the intention of its authors. All that it is intended to accomplish, and all that it will accomplish, is to place the law clearly and undoubtedly upon the footing upon which the right rev. Prelate says that it now rests, namely, to make it lawful for Her Majesty to enter into diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, if, upon the advice of Her Majesty's responsible Ministers, She thinks it expedient to do so.
The DUKE of RICHMONDwas prepared to vote against the second reading of the Bill if his noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) should press a division, because there never was a time when the people of England ought to be less called upon to make concessions to the Roman Catholic faith. He put it to their Lordships, whether the concessions to the Roman Catholics of Ireland had been received in a proper spirit; whether, in point of fact, the more that was given the more was not demanded, and the more ungrateful they were found. He would request his noble Friend, however, not to divide the House, because in its present state the Government would have a majority which might go forth as representing the true feeling of their Lordships, and so prevent a liberal and constitutional Ministry from giving plenty of time for its consideration by the country. But they lashed the country to it. His noble Friends on the other side the House he had always thought to hold the doctrine that the people of England ought to be consulted upon measures

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which affected their principles. He did not mean to say they had ever lashed the people to support and pass any measure which they considered improper. He felt, however, that this measure ought not to pass; but if their Lordships did go into Committee upon it, he would most willingly support the clause of which the noble and gallant Duke (the Duke of Wellington) had given notice. With his noble Friend (Lord Stanley), he thought it would be proper to prohibit ecclesiastics from being received as ambassadors to this country; and in Committee he would himself propose another clause for the purpose of preventing the ambassador from Rome, or any of his suite, under the privileges they would enjoy according to the law of nations, from distributing any bulls and recripts or other documents emanating from the See of Rome, which by law no subject of Her Majesty could distribute.
The EARL of ELDONdenied that one single reason had been shown for the passing of this Bill. If noble Lords would take the trouble to analyse the arguments laid before them, he fully believed they would not find one reason why such a Bill should pass, and most especially no reason had been given why it should thus be hurried through the House without giving the country due time to consider its provisions. He hoped that if the voice of the country was not at that moment heard, it would not be supposed that the nation was insensible to the importance and probable consequences of the measure. A noble Lord opposite had spoken of a learned ancestor of his (Lord Eldon's) who had affixed the Great Seal to a document bearing some supposed analogy to the present measure. But he would undertake to say, that he would, in considering the present measure, have taken time to deliberate. It had been unanimously admitted by those who had supported the Bill, that all that could be done in the way of holding communication with Rome, was being done at this moment, and had been done for several years, without the sanction of the Legislature. He did not think the country had been treated, with respect to this Bill, in the manner it deserved. The noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond) had alluded to the empty state of the benches; but he hoped that the country would know that many on the Opposition benches had remained to the close of the debate, for the purpose of nobly discharging their duty, by voting against
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this Bill. Was there any reason why the noble Marquess should not postpone this Bill until the next Session, when notice of its intended introduction could be fairly given in Her Majesty's Speech? As they all knew that Rome had claimed supreme authority in this country, in matters temporal as well as spiritual—now, before the Government asked the Legislature to pass this Bill, let the Pope withdraw that claim; let official documents be produced from Rome, showing that Rome had resigned her unjust demands. When Rome had done so, he would listen as heartily as any one to such representations as might hereafter be made in support of such a Bill as this. If the House went to a division, he begged to say, that he, for one, would be found voting with the noble Duke who had proposed that the Bill be read a second time that day six months; but he left it to the noble Duke to say, whether, in the then state of the House, he would press for a division.
The EARL of ST. GERMANSsaid, he gave his cordial assent to the Bill, not so much because upon a former occasion the Pope had afforded facilities for our military operations, but because he was the spiritual head of a religion to which many of Her Majesty's subjects in all parts of the world belonged. With regard to what had been said respecting certain Catholic priests in Ireland, he apprehended that if the attention of the Pope had been called at an earlier period to their writings and speeches, they would not have remained so long unnoticed. The assumption of the title "Supreme Pontiff," was of little importance; he regarded it simply as a matter of form, and he did not at all participate in the apprehensions of the right rev. Prelate who objected to the appointment of an ecclesiastic as ambassador from Rome to this country. He believed, indeed, the best representative that could be employed would be an ecclesiastic, because it was principally upon matters connected with ecclesiastical polity that the Government of this country would mainly have to deal with the See of Rome. In fact, he regarded the apprehensions to which he referred as idle and chimerical, especially as it was perfectly competent for this Government to receive any person as an ambassador or otherwise. It was competent for the Pope to send any number of missionaries here of the different orders; in fact, they were in actual existence at this moment, notwithstanding what the law said against them.

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Was it to be supposed, however, that only the diplomatic agents of the Pope would be traced intriguing against the established laws and religion of this country? And were there not manifold instances of the representatives even of great countries having been arrested for violation of the laws of the countries to which they had been sent? Without supposing the accredited ambassador of the Pope would go the whole length which would justify his arrest, was there anything more easy, if the Government were dissatisfied with him, than to give him back his passports? Besides, this Bill did not compel Her Majesty to receive an ambassador from Rome; and if there were a less enlightened Pope than Pius IX.—one not disposed to listen to the representations of the British Government—the position of the British Government would be no worse than at present, for the Queen might at any time recall Her ambassador from Rome. Independent of general grounds, it was highly expedient that diplomatic relations should be opened with Rome. He referred, for example, to what had recently occurred in Malta between the late Governor and a Roman Catholic bishop. On the whole, therefore, he conceived their Lordships would not sanction the clause to be proposed by one of his noble Friends prohibiting the reception of an ecclesiastical ambassador. The clause of the noble Duke (the Duke of Wellington) was of a different nature; and he (the Earl of St. Germans) should support a declaration of the supremacy of Her Majesty in all matters, ecclesiastical as well as civil. In conclusion, he should give the Bill as it stood his willing support, and he hoped its framers would not permit it to be marred.
LORD REDESDALEexpressed his conviction that it would be absolutely necessary to restrict the Court of Rome from sending an ecclesiastic; and if there was one point which supported that view, it was the argument that the spiritual authority of the Pope was recognised by a large body of Her Majesty's subjects in this country. The danger which would arise from an ecclesiastic being the ambassador was, that he might exercise spiritual authority over a large body of Her Majesty's subjects. All who professed the Roman Catholic faith would look upon him as invested with spiritual authority. That had been found a just ground of exclusion even in Roman Catholic States; and he was sure it would be found no less necessary in this
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Protestant country. No doubt could be entertained that the authority assumed by the Pope did derogate from the dignity and supremacy of the British Sovereign, and even from the temporal authority of the Crown. He, therefore, did not think it was right that Parliament should repeal laws founded upon such a state of things, without taking care that, on the other hand, this country received an assurance from the See of Rome that that Court did not lay claim to any temporal authority in any part of the Queen's dominions, and did not profess to exercise the power of absolving Her Majesty's subjects from their allegiance. For these reasons he should propose in Committee a clause to the effect that it should not be lawful for Her Majesty to receive any ambassador, plenipotentary, envoy, or other person from the Court of Rome, until after the Court of Rome had declared it did not claim, and that it distinctly disavowed, all temporal and civil jurisdiction, power, pre-eminence, or authority, directly or indirectly, within these realms.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE, in reply, said he would leave it to the discretion of the noble Duke whether he would divide the House. Her Majesty's Government had not the least intention of making concessions to the Court of Rome by this measure. The grounds of it were, no concession to the Pope, but concession to expediency, arising out of necessity, and it was brought forward with no other purpose than that of promoting our own interest. He was extremely obliged to the noble Lord for having adverted to the visit of Lord Minto to Italy; and he begged to assure the noble Lord there was not one letter in the instructions to his noble Friend, nor one act done by him at Rome or elsewhere, which he was not prepared to defend, and to prove to have been attended with advantage to this country. It was that mission, indeed, which furnished the best, and strongest, and most unanswerable illustration of the necessity for this Bill. When the object was to prevent the dread of civil war breaking out in Switzerland, which might have agitated the whole of Europe, would the noble Lord, he asked, hesitate to take any step which was calculated to prevent such a result?
LORD STANLEY: That has nothing to do with the argument against this Bill.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE: It has much to do with the objections which

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you urged, as shown by the way in which the noble Lord quoted Lord Minto's despatches. Lord Minto was not received in Rome as a Minister. He carried no instructions as Minister to Rome; and it was in the power of the Pope or of the Cardinal Secretary of State to say to him at any time, "We do not acknowledge you as representing the Government of Great Britain; we will not attend to what you say; we will not attend to your advice because you have nothing to show us that you speak with authority." Would it make no distinction in this respect to have the present measure passed? Would their relations with Rome be the same after this Bill was passed as it was before? Did the noble Lord want them to accomplish by secret means what should be fairly and openly done? Her Majesty's Government asked Parliament to enable them to carry on the business of the country by open and avowed means, and not by indirect means to effect what they could not openly avow. He would say again, with respect to the mission of the Earl of Minto, that the noble Lord was accredited to Sardinia, to Florence, and also, at present, to Naples; and that, on his way from Florence to Naples, he passed some time in Rome, where his efforts, he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) would say, without hesitation, were most beneficial to the country. And he would add, that the necessity of the Earl of Minto proceeding without any distinct mission, or any direct authority from the Government of this country, to Rome, was in itself the best illustration that he could have of the necessity of adopting this measure. He had again to say, that he trusted their Lordships would agree to the second reading of the Bill without farther delay. In that case, he proposed fixing the Committee for to-morrow; and, in doing so, he hoped that he would not be accused of adopting too early a day for proceeding with the Bill.
On question that the word "now" stand part of the Motion—Resolved in the Affirmative.
Bill read 2a.
House adjourned.