Sitting of 10 May 1847

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS. 1° Vexatious Actions; Turnpike Roads (Ireland); Lunatic Asylums (Ireland).
2° House of Commons Costs Taxation.
Reported.—Transference of Lands (Scotland); Heritable Securities for Debt (Scotland); Burgage Tenure (Scotland); Punishment of Vagrants, &c. (Ireland); Poor Relief Supervision (Ireland) (No. 2).
3a and passed: — Naval Service of Boys; Drainage of Lands.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Mr. East, from Winchester, for Alteration of the Law of Marriage.—By Mr. Baine, from Westminster, and Captain Boldero, from Chippenham, for Inquiry respecting the Rajah of Sattara.—By Mr. Brotherton, from several places, against the Use of Grain in Breweries and Distilleries.—By Mr. Forbes, from Commissioners of Supply of the County of Stirling, for Repeal of the Bank of England Charter Act.— By Mr. B. Denison and other hon. Members, from several places, for Regulating the Qualifications of Chemists and Druggists.- By Mr. Dugdale, from Solihull, and Lord John Russell, from Pattishall, in favour of the proposed Plan of Education.—By several hon. Members, from a great many places, for and against the Health of Towns Bill.— By Sir W. Clay, from the Parish of Saint Mary, White-chapel, London, and Earl Jermyn, from Bury St. Edmund's, for Alteration of the Health of Towns Bill. — By Mr. Smollett, from Commissioners of Supply of the County of Dumbarton, in favour of the Heritable Securities for Debt (Scotland); Burgage Tenure (Scotland); Transference of Land (Scotland); Service of Heirs (Scotland); and Crown Charters (Scotland) Bills.—By Mr. Stansfield, from Huddersfield, against the Highways Bill. —By several hon. Members, from a great many places, in favour of the Medical Registration and Medical Law Amendment Bill.—By Mr. Liddell, from South Shields, against the Repeal of the Navigation Laws—By Colonel Austen, from Officers connected with the Administration of the Poor Law in England and Wales, for a Superannuation Fund.—By Mr. Mr. J. O'Connell, from Dunamaggin, for Alteration of the Poor Relief (Ireland) Bill. —By Admiral Gordon, from several places, against the Registering Births, &c. (Scotland); and Marriage (Scotland) Bills.—By Sir W. Clay, from Mile End, for referring National Disputes to Arbitration.

SUSPENSION OF THE CORN LAWS.
MR. BAILLIEsaid, that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had the other night stated, that it was not his intention to take any steps for prohibiting the exportation of corn from this country; but since the noble Lord made that statement corn had risen in price nearly 30 s. per quarter, and there was all probability of a further rise taking place. He now wished to ask, whether the Government had any intention of prohibiting the use of grain in distilleries for a limited period?
LORD J. RUSSELL: I am not prepared to answer the hon. Member's question with regard to the use of grain in dis-

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tilleries; I will, however, state, that on an early day I shall propose a continuance of the suspension of the corn law for three months.

THE MONEY MARKET—LOAN (DISCOUNT ON INSTALMENTS).
House in Committee on the Loan Acts.
The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am not aware that I need add much to what I stated to the House on Friday night, as to the intentions of the Government with respect to the course they intend to adopt in the present state of the money market. I stated on Friday that I should propose in the Committee tonight a resolution enabling Government to allow interest by way of discount upon all sums of money paid up by the contractors for the loan in anticipation of the instalments due on a future day. That, Sir, is the resolution I am about to put into your hands. I have already said that it is not necessary that I should state much in addition to what I addressed to the House on Friday night, because I then put the House in possession of the views of the Government on the subject, with the exception of the precise amount of the discount which it was our intention to propose. But it may be as well that I should make some additional statement to what I then advanced, and I will do so very shortly. We do not suppose, as has been represented, that this measure will be sufficient to put an end to all panic and pressure on the money market, which would be anticipating from it consequences utterly disproportioned to what it is calculated to produce, and disproportioned to what any Government could possibly effect in such a state of things as the present. Every one who considers the present high price of corn, and the pressure which it occasions among the manufacturing classes of the community, as well as the high price of cotton and other articles—chiefly those of general consumption—must be conscious of the pressure and suffering which are felt among various classes. To relieve that to the full extent, is, I am persuaded, beyond the power of any Government. While, therefore, I do not anticipate that any complete relief can be given by the measure I now propose, I may be permitted to make a statement of what I do anticipate from the measures which the Government are about to adopt. I am aware that by the proposals we make, an additional burden will be placed upon
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the public; but I think it would be bad economy if this burden were not submitted to, and this course not adopted. I think the House will be of opinion, that it may be well worth while to pay an additional sum at present, for the advantage of keeping up the price of Government securities of any and every description. The House is aware of the high rate of interest on money at the present moment; of the high price which all are obliged to pay who want it; and that the rate of interest upon Exchequer-bills is much below that of those other securities which come into competition with them. Exchequer-bills have, in consequence, if saleable at all, been selling at a discount, and great loss has been sustained by those who held them. I think it right, therefore, and good economy, to raise the rate of interest on them, so as to bring them to a level with other competing securities. I also believe it will be advantageous, and will tend to relieve the pressure on the money market, if we allow, as I propose, a discount on prepayment of the loan. I believe that the two measures we propose, of raising the rate of interest on Exchequer-bills, and of allowing discount on advances upon the loan, are indispensably necessary for the sake of the credit of the Government, and to keep up the price of its securities; and, moreover, that they will facilitate the operations of the money market, partly by letting loose a quantity of money which has been held in consequence of the alarm, and still more by removing that want of confidence which has pervaded all classes of the mercantile community. The representations which have reached us have been, that the merchants and manufacturers have not been able to carry on their operations because they could not get their bills discounted, and that the country bankers could not discount their bills because they in turn could not get their bills re-discounted in London, as they had been accustomed to do. I have also been informed, from authorities on which I can rely, that the large sum of money which has been advanced on railroad shares, has affected, to a considerable extent, the amount of available capital which would otherwise have been employed in discounting bills. I find also that a system which formerly prevailed, to a small extent, has recently been extensively adopted; and that monied men in London, instead of investing their money in securities, have been in the habit of placing it at call with the bill brokers.

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The amount, therefore, placed with the bill brokers induced them to look far and wide for bills to discount, and this tended very much to increase the amount of bills discounted and re-discounted in the country. When the alarm came, then the bill brokers were obliged to return the money which had been thus deposited with them; and this increased, to a great degree, the pressure on the money market. From the unsaleability of Exchequer-bills, the parties who held them, having been unable to realize money upon them, were under the strongest necessity of calling on the bill brokers to return the money which had been deposited with them. The consequence of raising the rate of interest will be, that a premium on Exchequer-bills will enable these parties to dispense with the necessity of calling upon the bill brokers, and thus contracting the means of discount. I believe, therefore, that an advance in the interest on Exchequer-bills will have a considerable effect in alleviating the pressure on the money market; and I confidently hope, from what I hear, that the effect of the measure will be to put a good deal of money again into circulation. I am not prepared to say that it would have been possible for the Bank of England to have done this, except for the last power which I propose to give by the resolution of the Committee, enabling the contractors for the loan to pay up their contributions upon receiving interest by way of discount upon their instalments. The object of the Government was to put themselves in funds, without its being necessary for them to make demands on the Bank for assistance. The statements that are abroad of the demand made by the Government on the Bank during the last quarter, have been exceedingly exaggerated. I had forewarned the Bank early in the quarter of what the probable amount would be; and, therefore, I made neither an extraordinary nor an unexpected demand on the Bank. But I was told that something like an assurance or pledge was given when the Bank charter was passed, that no such assistance would be required. I never entertained such an expectation; but I did expect that in consequence of another measure—that for the equalization of the payment of the dividends in the four quarters of the year—there would be less occasion for assistance from the Bank in two of those quarters, because, as there was a larger amount of dividends due in January and July than in April and October,
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the necessity for extraordinary aid was greater in the two first-mentioned quarters. I, therefore, thought that it was an exceedingly wise measure, in reducing the 3½ per cent Annuities, to make the dividends payable in April and October, instead of in January and July: but the inevitable consequence was, that so far as the April and October quarters are concerned, the probability of a demand for assistance from the Bank was increased and not diminished. Now, with respect to the practice of requiring advances from the Bank at the periods of payment of the dividends, generally, if I may be permitted, I will read an extract from what I said in 1844, for the purpose of justifying myself against the supposition of having anticipated that the Bank would not be required to give the usual advances on Exchequer-bills, and which it is perfectly safe and proper for them to do. On the 20th of May, 1844, I said—
"With these powers, I apprehend that the Bank of England will continue to perform all the functions which she has hitherto discharged with so much advantage and convenience to the public; as, for instance, making the quarterly advances at the payment of the dividends. There will be no less need of this than before. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my approval of the course which the Government took in reducing the 3½ per cents, of transferring the payment of the dividends on the new stock to the spring and autumn quarters. This will have the effect of equalizing the payment of the dividends in the four quarters, and is a very judicious measure. In the same way, the Bank will, I conceive, as heretofore, make advances on deficiency bills, and for rendering assistance to the trade of the country in periods of difficulty. There is no reason why this should not be done out of the capital of the Bank; and, with proper caution and prudence, I believe no difficulty need arise. The only mistake which has been to be deprecated is, when the Bank made the fatal mistake of substituting for advances of capital, increased issues of notes."
No other person but myself adverted to the subject during those discussions. The probable demand in future quarters of this assistance was thus foreseen, and no expectations were held out that it would not be made; though, by equalizing the payment of the dividends, the probability was, that no excessive amount would be required. The time of requiring these advances may always be foreseen, and the Bank has ample time to make provision for them beforehand. I am ready to admit that it is very desirable to avoid making similar demands as much as possible, and that we should pay the dividends without requiring the aid of the Bank. With that view, I think it desirable

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to hold out inducements to the contractors of the last loan, in order that by the instalments being paid up, the balances in the Exchequer may be such as to enable us to dispense with the assistance of the Bank. I believe that it will be good policy and good economy to ease the money market in any way we can. I shall always be glad to afford any reasonable facilities to the gentlemen who contracted the last loan. In consequence of circumstances which neither they nor the Government could foresee, it has not been a very good bargain for them. I believe it is no advantage to a Government in any of its departments to drive a hard bargain, for if it attempt that it is sure to pay for it in the end; and I believe it is equally opposed to the interest of both parties. Neither do I agree that this need necessarily entail any considerable loss upon the public. It is quite certain, that if trade comes to a stand-still, the revenue must inevitably suffer. Within the fortnight during which the panic prevailed, the receipts in the Customs and other branches of the revenue fell off; but matters have since resumed their usual course, and I am glad to hear to-day that they are in a much better condition—that the power which many persons have felt they had of obtaining loans on Exchequer-bills, has to a great extent obviated the necessity of making those loans; and that the demand upon the Bank for loans, even at the rate of 5 per cent, has been to a very much less amount than was anticipated at the time the announcement was made. I stated, on Friday, the amount which had been advanced by the Bank on that day; on Saturday and today no very great amount has been asked for, and in all respects the money market is easier. The price of stocks has to a small extent declined; but that has been partly owing to the rise of price of Exchequer-bills, compared with which they are rather lower then they otherwise would have been. The report I have to-day received from the Governor of the Bank of England is, that, upon the whole, things have been easier to-day; that there has been a very moderate demand for loans on Exchequer-bills; that there has been a further influx of gold from Holland, to the amount of 29,000 l.; and that late news from America brings such advices with regard to the exchanges as to render the further export of gold from this country exceedingly improbable. I should be much more confident as to our future prospects
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but for the one circumstance of the rise in the price of corn. So far as the mere monetary pressure goes in London, I hope it is to a certain extent passing away; and I trust that, with renewed confidence in the City, confidence may be restored in the provinces, and that the check to trade which has been anticipated may not take place. It is, however, impossible to deny that the price of corn does constitute a most material cause of anxiety. It is right the House should know that the importation of corn goes on to an extent, I should have thought, perfectly sufficient to check any rise of price. A certain quantity of corn has been exported from this country: about 132,000 quarters were exported in the course of the last month; but in the same period we imported 432,000 quarters. In the week ending the 28th of April, the quantity of wheat and wheat flour, Indian corn and Indian corn meal, entered for home consumption was 200,034 quarters; and the entries of all descriptions of grain, amounted to 333,273 quarters; being equal to the food of 17,000,000 persons for a week. These importations are so considerable, that it might have been thought they would have checked the rise of prices. [Lord G. BENTINCK: Are these the actual importations?] No; but the entries for home consumption. [An Hon. MEMBER: What were the imports?] I cannot give you the imports of the different kinds of grain, but I can state that the imports of breadstuffs were about 196,000 quarters, and the diminution of the quantity in the warehouses during the week had been about 3,000 quarters. I do not know that I need state anything further on this subject. I will only add, that, since Friday night, I have determined to make a slight alteration in the terms of the payment of discount. I have this morning seen the contractors for the loan, and they represented to me that if they were forced to pay up their instalments within the time I named on Friday, it might have the effect of considerably depressing the price of stock, and would, of course deprive them of one of their great inducements to pay up the instalments; and they suggested that a further time should be afforded. I propose, therefore, to give them an inducement to pay up a portion of the loan before the 18th of June, and also a further inducement—but not at so high a rate of interest—to pay up the remainder of the loan before the October dividends become due. The right hon.

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Baronet concluded by moving the following Resolution:—
"That every contributor towards the Loan of eight millions made in this present year, who shall pay into the Bank of England any sum of money on account of any future instalment of his contribution, on or before the eighteenth day of June next, shall be allowed an interest by way of discount, after the rate of five pounds per centum per annum; and every contributor who shall in like manner pay up any sum of money after the eighteenth day of June, on or before the tenth day of September next, shall be allowed an interest by way of discount, after the rate of four pounds per centum per annum, on the sum so advanced on account of any such instalment, to be computed from the day on which such payment shall be made, to the day on which such instalment would be due, in pursuance of the contract entered into for raising the said Loan."
MR. HUMEconsidered that the right hon. Gentleman who had just addressed the House had given no satisfactory reason for the course he was pursuing. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the course taken by capitalists, in placing their money in the hands of individuals, from whom they might have it at their call, was one of the circumstances which had produced the present pressure. Why, he had always supposed that one of the great advantages of banking would be to place disposable capital where it would be ready at command, and thus prevent the embarrassment that might result from fixed investments. The hon. Baronet had also attributed the pressure to the system of discount and re-discount; but he (Mr. Hume) wished to know what that had to do with the currency of the country? He certainly expected that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have taken a review of the changes made in 1844 and subsequently; that he would have considered whether the anticipations then held out had been realized; and that, if they had not been realized, he would—as he possessed better means of obtaining information on the subject than any Member of that House—have given some explanation of the extraordinary pressure which had taken place. The right hon. Gentleman, however, had not taken this course, but had read a quotation from one of his own speeches, which certainly did not agree with his recollection; for he remembered that the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir R. Peel) stated that the arrangements he had made for separating the bank of issue from the bank of deposit would place the currency of the country in quite a different situation from that in which it had
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previously been. He (Mr. Hume) considered that it was most wise and prudent to separate those two departments; but the great change which took place at the time he referred to was the fixing of the amount which the bank of issue should be at liberty to issue. Another great change then made was that which placed the Bank of England, with all its resources, exactly in the same situation in many respects with all other banks in any part of the country. The managers of the Bank of England had the full discretion of discounting of not, as they chose; and, whatever opinion might have been formed of the proceedings of the Bank within the last two or three months, he (Mr. Hume) could only say that its managers were bound, in conducting their business, to pay regard to the customers they had to deal with, and to the deposits placed in their hands; and they alone could be the judges of the extent to which they should go in discounting. On this ground, he (Mr. Hume) was not disposed to criticise the conduct of the Bank of England with regard to these transactions, because, unless they were conversant with the affairs of the Bank, and with the nature of its securities, it was utterly impossible for any individuals to form a correct opinion on the subject. He believed that the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir R. Peel) never contemplated the dependence of the Government upon the Bank for advances; and when that right hon. Gentleman was in office he believed there was money enough in the Treasury, at any time for the payment of the dividends. He had always contended that the Bank of England ought not to be allowed to pay in notes, while other bankers were compelled to pay in bullion; and he had also objected to any connexion between the Government and the Bank of England. He considered that one of the first and most important duties of a Chancellor of the Exchequer was to see that the Government was able to pay the regular demands made upon it, without being obliged to apply to any man, or anybody of men, for assistance. If this course had been pursued, he believed that the alarm and pressure which were now experienced would never have existed. He thought, therefore, that the Government ought not to be allowed to depend upon the Bank for advances to assist in the payment of the dividends. He thought that freedom ought to be allowed to any body of men to issue notes as they pleased, so long as they paid them in

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gold; for his observations must be always understood as having reference to a bullion standard. If the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth could not give a better explanation than had been given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of the present pressure, then that House had better consider whether a wrong course had not been entered upon, and whether it would not be advisable to retrace their steps. The question ought not to be allowed to remain in the present vague and unexplained state.
MR. MASTERMANdid not rise to object to the proposition made by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but he could not anticipate that it would afford such a relief from the existing pressure as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to expect, or do anything to alleviate the uncomfortable feeling in the money market. It was well known in that House that he (Mr. Masterman) was one of the few who predicted that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth would find his Bill not available at all periods. The alarm which had been recently created, had, he was satisfied, arisen from the improper arrangement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But he was of opinion that it was impossible for the Bank of England, under the existing Act, to come forward at those quarterly periods to advance two millions or three millions on deficiency bills, and at the same time do justice to the commercial community. He was satisfied that any assurance held out to the public that such demands would not be made on them in future, would do more to alleviate the existing pressure than anything else besides. He should therefore like to make a small addition to the Motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because he wished an announcement to go forth from that House assuring the country that, if the Government wanted any assistance for the payment of the next quarterly dividends, it should be provided for in a different manner from that in which it had hitherto been provided. He would now read the proposal, which he desired to move by way of addition to the resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he really thought that it would do more to relieve all present inconvenience than anything else. His proposed addition was to the following effect:—
"The Committee, however, are of opinion that nothing would tend so much to relieve the present pressure upon the money market as an assurance
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from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he would apply to Parliament for powers to enable the Bank of England to make such advances as he may require for the payment of the July dividends out of the issue department of the Bank, instead of the banking department; such advances, of course, to be repaid out of the growing revenue, and the same regulation to apply to all future advances for the payment of dividends."
The CHAIRMANintimated that it was not competent for the hon. Gentleman to move the proposed addition, because it did not apply to the matter referred to the Committee, which related to a proposed allowance, by way of discount, on the prompt payment of instalments of the loan.
MR. MASTERMANthought, nevertheless, that the two subjects were closely connected together.
MR. BROWNsaid that, considering the constituency which he had the honour to represent, he could not let this opportunity pass over without laying before the House the total prostration of credit that now existed in Lancashire, which had brought the business of that section of the nation to nearly a dead lock. Hon. Gentlemen were probably aware, that when houses in Liverpool, London, or Glasgow, received imports from abroad, they were either drawn on by the houses shipping the produce, or by houses in Manchester or elsewhere, who had orders for British manufactures, in payment for them. At present the alarm and want of confidence were such, that orders for human food to the United States and other countries were, in many cases, countermanded, prudent houses not choosing to risk their credit by being drawn upon until they should see what steps Government might take to restore the healthy action of trade. Houses, also, in the manufacturing towns, found that bills on London or Liverpool, however good, could not in many cases be turned into money to pay their workmen. This very much decreased the exports and the means of bringing the exchanges in our favour; and it therefore followed that, placed in the situation we were in, we must either export gold or increase the distress that already existed in the country for want of food. It was a fallacy to say, as the Bank of England had 20,000,000 l. out, the circulation was ample, when it was hoarded up, and not available for the healthy circulation of commercial enterprise: and he totally dissented from what had been stated, that there was more commercial paper offering for discount than usual. He believed there

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was less, and, in its general character, for strictly legitimate commercial objects. It had been his duty to call on Ministers, the Bank of England, and the right hon. Baronet, Sir Robert Peel, frequently, in the course of the last ten days, with deputations, on this subject: they were always received with the utmost courtesy, but asked what remedy they had to suggest. They, however, considered it was the duty of the Government to provide a remedy, their object being to point out the state of the country, the number of mills that had stopped, the hands that were out of work, and the distress which the advance of provisions was increasing. The alarm, he had no doubt, arose from the famine and high price of food, the absorption of capital by the railways, the high price of cotton, and the Bill of the right hon. Baronet. Without discussing its merits, he thought there was the means of getting great relief without infringing its principles. There was believed to be from 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 of sovereigns in circulation; these he would replace by 1l. notes, putting a certain amount of them in the deposit bank, and investing the rest in Government securities. This latter portion could be made available for exportation and the purchase of food until the tide turned, when they could be called in, and the gold again be thrown into circulation. He did not suggest this on slight authority, as the late Mr. Huskisson stated to a friend of his (Mr. Brown's), now in London, that it was his desire to get sovereigns into use in place of 1l. notes, in order that if ever such a state came as that with which we were now afflicted, they might be the means of relieving us from embarrassment and difficulty. He seemed to have an intuitive foreknowledge of the very calamity that had occurred. He was much pleased to hear the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer say, he was willing to adopt any plan that would relieve the country from its difficulties. He did not mean to propose anything at present; but, as these discussions could not rest here, he hoped the right hon. Baronet would think of what he had suggested.
MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to say a few words, because in 1844 he had protested against the measure proposed by the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel), and had predicted its failure—a prediction which, unhappily, had too soon been verified, for on its very first real trial the measure had failed. It was perfectly clear
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that it was quite unfit for periods of difficulty like this; and, among practical and experienced men, it was considered, as it had been termed in 1844, only a "fair-weather boat." He hoped that if any such plan as that suggested by the hon. Member who spoke last were ever adopted, that there would be no tampering with the system—no temporary issue of 1l. notes, without an ascertained and definite basis, as in 1823, to be followed, as in 1825, by a disastrous panic. Let anything that was determined upon, be done upon a sound basis, with the object of maintaining a circulation, not merely of staving off a difficulty. The right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) had determined to prevent the Bank issuing upon its securities beyond the 14,000,000 l. he had prescribed for it; but that was a limit purely arbitrary, and for which it would be difficult to assign an intelligible reason. The plain fact was, that a currency based only upon bullion could not possibly with the present standard be upheld. He (Mr. Newdegate) had no objection to the principle of the currency convertible into bullion; but he was satisfied that, with the present distribution of the bullion as apportioned by the standard, it was not possible to secure perfect convertibility. The right hon. Baronet always talked of convertibility being satisfactorily established by the Bill of 1819, whereas by the standard then enforced he had rendered perfect convertibility impossible. He supposed he should be asked his definition of a pound sterling. He had no difficulty in accepting the definition of the right hon. Baronet, and to say that it was a certain portion of the precious metals, with a mark upon it to denote the amount of that metal and its fineness. But that one word "certain," caused the real ambiguity of the definition; for the possibility of a truly metallic circulation turned upon this, namely, into what certain portions must the bullion be distributed, so as to secure a metallic circulation adequate to the wants of the community? Now he maintained that by the exclusion of silver, and the apportionment of gold into too large pieces, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth had rendered perfect convertibility impossible; and this was proved by the necessity of so large an issue on securities. How did the issues of the United Kingdom stand in this respect? The paper issues of the Bank of England, and the other banks of the three countries were, by the last accounts,

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40,000,000 l., whereas the gold scarcely reached 16,000,000 l., proving they were not within 150 per cent of a truly metallic currency. The right hon. Baronet was fond of casting contumely on the opinions of those who differed with him on this subject; but there was great reason in their statement of the case, and there was this fundamental fallacy in the argument of the right hon. Baronet—he assumed the gold standard to be the ancient standard of the reign of Elizabeth; which was not the fact, for the standard of Elizabeth was silver. The Act of 1819 was based upon the principle of the ridiculous resolution proposed by Mr. Vansittart, that a 1l. note and 1s. were equal to a guinea; whereas it was well known they were 5s. or 6s. less in value. And the practical effect of the measure was, that pecuniary engagements contracted in a depreciated currency were rendered payable in a currency 20 or 25 per cent higher in value. The consequence was, that the pressure of every private and of the public debt was enhanced proportionally; and taking this additional pressure at only 10 per cent, this boasted Act of 1819, by its effect upon the national debt alone, imposed upon the people of this country an additional burden of 80,000,000 1.; in fact, however, the increase had been much more than 10 per cent. The gold standard (as had been well shown by Lord Ashburton in his speech of 1844) was a new invention, not older than 1798. Previously to the Act of that year, a man could have paid 100 l. in silver or gold; and if paid in silver, the value of which in 1844 was 5s. 2d. per ounce, the 100 l. would have been, at that rate, paid by 95 l. 6s. 8d. The Acts of 1798 and 1819, however, obliged a man to pay his debts in gold, which alone taxed the debtor to the extent of 4l. 13 s. 4d. per cent beyond the debt he had contracted, owing to the different value of the precious metals, gold being in that proportion dearer than silver. The imposing of an enhanced standard upon the people of this country, forcing the people to deal in dear money, entered into the cost of production and added to it, thereby detracting from the profits of the agriculturist and of the manufacturer, and the earnings of the labourer. He had urged this question in that House and out of it, in private and in public. When he saw the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth bring forward his great free-trade measure of last year, he told him that he
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maintained a monetary system adverse to that recommended by the greatest authorities on the question of free trade. The right hon. Baronet seemed determined to subject the producers of this country to a degree of competition greater than Adam Smith or Ricardo contemplated, knowing well that he had burdened them with a currency far more expensive and costly than those authorities ever contemplated. It had been said that the Act of 1819 might have been an injustice, but that those who suffered from it were dead—that their broken hearts had ceased to beat— that their children had sunk into a lower rank of life, and were content; but he knew that it was a fallacy to restrict the effects of that Act within so narrow a compass; and for these reasons, he (Mr. Newdegate) would maintain it was an axiom, that any measure which went to alter the value and the quantity of money in any country, could neither be partial nor temporary in its effect. It could not be partial, because money was the universal medium of exchange; and it could not be temporary, because money was the token of account. He would repeat, that the effect of any measure which permanently altered the currency, could neither be partial nor temporary in its effects; and if the House were told, as they had been by the right hon. Baronet himself, that the Bill of 1844 must be considered as the necessary complement of the measure of 1819; and if the result of that measure were, as had been stated by the hon. Member for Lancashire (Mr. Brown), that we must either modify the system, or starve the population, he trusted that when the House entered upon the consideration of the question, the inquiry would not be a partial one, but that there would be an efficient and a searching inquiry. The right hon. Baronet argued the other day that the amount of the standard of value could not determine the exchanges, and that it could not alter the effect of a drain of bullion; but from this opinion he (Mr. Newdegate) begged to differ, his conviction being, that if the currency were more diffused—if it were more ample—although it might still be based on a lower metallic standard, that any contraction which might occur would not be so severely felt by the producers in this country. Why, was it not clear, that if a convertible currency were ample, as ours might be rendered, that an abstraction of any proportion of it would be less felt than if it were, as it was, insuffi-

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cient. Was it not easier to give from or to lose from their abundance than from their poverty, even if their gift or loss bore the same proportion to their all in the one case, and in the other? The real question, however, which had been raised that evening was, whether the Bank of England should be allowed to advance further on securities. The point seemed now to be, whether the sum of 14,000,000 l., which was allowed under the present system to be issued on securities, was sufficient; and he trusted, that if the result of inquiry should be to show that a further issue upon securities could be allowed, he hoped it would be a permanent increase of the power to issue on securities—a permanent relaxation of the currency. There was one subject raised during the discussion, which deserved to be seriously considered. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth—and he must refer to him because he was the author of these measures—had repeated over and over again the other evening, that the present pressure would not have occurred had the Directors of the Bank of England acted according to the spirit of the Act of 1844. Now, what was the spirit of that Act? Was it contained in the measure itself? The right hon. Baronet had assigned a definite principle for the issue department, which was to work according to a certain rule; but, to use the right hon. Baronet's words of 1844, "With respect to the banking business of the Bank, I propose that it should be governed on precisely the same principles as would regulate any other body dealing with Bank of England notes." Whence then did this spirit emanate? How was it to be defined? It was not in the Act of 1844, for that did not regulate the banking department; on the contrary, the banking department was told to mind its own business, and to look solely to its own interest, and yet it was of the non-observance of some principle by the banking department, of which the right hon. Baronet complained. He supposed that this spirit was the right hon. Baromet himself, and that it was he who was intended to rule the banking department: he (Mr. Newdegate) held that nothing could be more dangerous. Lord Monteagle, when speaking of the Act of 1844 in the House of Lords, had spoken most ably upon that point, and had called upon their Lordships never to consent, under any circumstances, to allow any Government or any Minister to have the management of the
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affairs of the Bank, either directly or indirectly; and he trusted that the warning then given by the noble Lord would have its effect. To subject the power of the Bank to any Government or any one individual, was to place the property of millions under his feet, subject to his caprice or his political bias. He must say he was not prepared the other evening to hear the right hon. Baronet declare that he expected the Bank directors to conform their practice to the wants of the country. Why, they had no alternative but to act as they had done; for in 1844 the right hon. Baronet stated that he expected the banking department should be governed on precisely the same principles as regulated any other body dealing with Bank of England notes. If the Bank directors understood what the spirit of the Bank Act was, he (Mr. Newdegate) was satisfied that they knew a great deal more than the House of Commons did. But it appeared from the right hon. Baronet's remark, that the Bank directors had not found it out yet. Well, now the right hon. Baronet declared he expected the directors to regulate their business with a view to the convenience of the country: this was contrary to what he had stated, both in 1844 and 1819. Sir Robert Peel declared in 1819, that "they, as a public body, must not be surprised to have their official conduct questioned; and that the House of Commons should, at least, doubt whether that was the institution, to the discretion of whose directors were or ought to be confided the pecuniary and commercial interests of the British community." "Whatever were their opinions, it was now the proper moment to relieve them (the directors) from the duty of attending to such concerns." Lord Grenville, in the House of Lords, spoke of the Bank directors as a body of individuals who took upon themselves, forsooth, the guardianship of the interests of the country; contemptuously remarking "that he wanted no such guardianship." If, after having for thirty years attempted to establish a self-acting principle which should relieve the Bank directors from the exercise of any discretionary power, the admission was now made that the Bank directors ought to have exercised a control through the banking department, with a view to the public safety, then he would assert that the object of the Acts of 1819 and of 1844 had failed, and that the self-acting principle upon which the right hon. Baronet's currency

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system rested had proved futile. He did not think that that was the position in which the affairs of this great country should he placed; for existing circumstances proved that an Act like that of 1844 was not adapted to circumstances of difficulty. When the country found itself reduced to the alternative, as he believed it was at present, of reducing the circulation, which would cripple employment, in order to provide means of payment for imported corn, or of starving the population outright by ceasing to import; might he not express a hope that the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Ministers would consider the subject with the anxious attention which its importance demanded? That noble Lord might be, to some extent, compromised himself; he might he still more so by his Colleagues; but he had the opportunity at his command of striking at the root of an evil, deeper and more ruinous in its tendency than any grievance which had been the subject of legislation for many years past; and if the noble Lord really loved his country, he would apply his mind to it. He (Mr. Newdegate) believed that the noble Lord upon due inquiry would find that the present monetary system lay at the root of the unequal distribution of property which was going on, and which was so generally complained of, and also that it was the fruitful cause of pauperism. And let him (Mr. Newdegate) ask the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, that if one of the main objects of his measure of 1844 was not to check speculation—let him ask him if speculation had not been as general, and carried to as great an extent, under the Act of 1844, as it had at any previous period? How could the right hon. Baronet say the measure had been successful? He would show what the state of the country was during the existence of a different system; and he thought he could not refer to a higher authority than the right hon. Baronet himself. When introducing his Bill of 1819, the right hon. Baronet used these words—and he (Mr. Newdegate) believed they conveyed a true representation:—
"The House should recollect, that in all the efforts which she had been called upon to make, England had preserved her faith inviolate. This feeling it was that prevented her from taxing the funded property of foreigners. This upright conduct it was that cheered the country in the hour of danger, and caused her to exult in the hour of victory, from a feeling that her dangers had been surmounted, and her victories gained without the
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slightest violation of her honour. This feeling it was that supported the country in that dark and dismal voyage through which she had gone; and now that they had reached the other shore in safety, let them not abandon the great principle which had been instrumental to their safety—let them not discard the guide by which they were led and protected. Let them adhere to that good faith in time of peace, and towards the public creditor, which they had practised in war, and towards the foreigners whose country was at war with them."
The right hon. Baronet had a right to say this. He had a right to say that this country had maintained her faith; and he might have added, that she had preserved the liberties of the world under a monetary system very different from the one about to be introduced during a period of unparalleled difficulty. Under the system which was then to be supplanted, there had been no succession of monetary difficulties; vast and successful exertions had been made to avert the danger which threatened the existence of the empire. Well, after thirty years' experience of the new system, the right hon. Baronet told the House, in 1844, when introducing his Banking Bill—
"But my gratification will be of a much higher and purer description than any satisfaction of a merely personal kind, if I should be fortunate enough to have contributed in any material degree to prevent a recurrence of those calamities which, at different intervals, have marked the last twenty years—such as the panics which occurred in 1826, 1834, and 1839. When I see the danger arising from the Bank of England having recourse to foreign establishments; when I look at the fluctuations which have taken place in our currency, defeating; all the calculations upon which commercial enterprise could rest; when I look at the failures of joint-stock banks; when I remember the amount of the dividends paid; and when I know that the amount is no test of sufferings and anxieties of the humbler classes who have been connected v pith them; when I see joint-stock banks paying their dividends after long and tedious processes; when I remember the number of 10 l. and 20 l. shareholders; when I recollect the ruin they have occasioned—into the details of which I will not now enter; my gratification will be of the highest and purest kind, if I prevail on the House to adopt a measure that will give steadiness to the character of our resources, will inspire confidence in the circulating medium, diminish all inducements to fraudulent speculation and gambling, and insure its just reward to commercial enterprise, conducted with honesty and secured by prudence."
Now, could there be a stronger contrast than the description of the state of the country given by the right hon. Baronet in 1819, when supplanting Pitt's system,' and that given in 1844, when remodelling his own system? Could there be a contrast more unfavourable to the system of 1819, or more to the credit of the ancient system

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which preceded it? And now the right hon. Baronet, after telling us that the Act of 1844 was the necessary complement and inevitable consequence of the Act of 1819, tells us, that, come what may, we must adhere rigidly to this Act of 1844— an Act which had obliged the Chancellor of the Exchequer to discount his own loan that he might be enabled to keep faith with the public creditor—which had caused mills to stand still, not for want of orders, but for want of money—with the population on the verge of famine, and commercial engagements in so dead a lock that it seemed doubtful whether we could procure corn from abroad to feed our starving thousands. He would not longer detain the House; but he could not help saying, that he did feel a deep and sincere conviction that the period had arrived, when the monetary system must undergo a decided change. Could the House forget what occurred in 1823 and 1825, when the system of 1819 gave way, and 1l. notes were issued, when the Bank was on the verge of stopping payment, and the bullion was reduced to 600,000 l. value in gold, and 420,000 l. in silver; and when the Bank was obliged to go to a great private capitalist—Mr. Rothschild—to get the silver exchanged for gold? By that transaction alone, according to the evidence given by Mr. Ward, Mr. Rothschild gained 100,000 l. Could it be forgotten that, in 1839, that had it not been for the assistance of the Bank of France, the Bank of England would have been obliged to stop payment? Could it be forgotten, also, that under an amendment of the Act of 1819, or under its complement, as it was called by its author, the aid of Russia had been required by the Bank, and that the people were actually on the verge of starvation, while nine millions of bullion were in the Bank coffers? He (Mr. Newdegate) would conclude by expressing his fervent hope, that whatever remedy might be applied, would not be of a temporary but of a permanent character.
MR. FORBESsaid, that his constituents had all expressed their wish to be relieved from the cruel oppression caused by the present monetary system. Since the Bill of 1819, the country had been suffering, and was still suffering, the greatest evils in connexion with it. He hoped, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government would see fit to interfere in the matter, and not bind themselves to the Act of the right hon. Baronet. He could not see why the Legis-
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lature should not interfere with the currency when their interference was needed, as well as they did with the corn law, when no such necessity existed. The pressure in Scotland at this moment was quite dreadful, and all practical men were satisfied that it would still continue for a long period. He therefore asked the House whether, having so completely introduced the principle of free trade in. everything else, they should not also introduce it in money? And whether, having altered the Act of 1842, without repugnance, they should hesitate to alter that of 1844, if necessary?
MR. FINCHconsidered that the best currency would be paper, if there was never a balance of trade against this country; but its disadvantages were, that when such a state of things took place, they were obliged to put on the screw to get back the gold. It was from that circumstance that the periodical confiscations of property which were so frequently witnessed had taken place. The country was occasionally subject to a short harvest; and when that occurred the gold went out, and the screw had to be applied to get it back. Under the present system, trade was paralysed every year till they knew what the harvest was to be. The Currency Bill failed, therefore, in its great object, which was to facilitate the interchange of commodities. At the present moment we were threatened with starvation, because speculators dared not send for foreign corn. The manufacturers also were subjected to great inconvenience. A few days ago they were paying from 20 to 30 per cent for accommodation; and the first time there was a failure in the harvest this must occur again. The pressure was excessive. There was no chance of the price of corn falling, and it was the general impression out of doors that it would yet be higher. He hoped, therefore, the Government would take the matter into their most serious consideration.
LORD G. BENTINCKspoke as follows: Sir, I speak with great hesitation, in the presence of those who are far more able to speak on such a subject than myself, upon the question now before the House. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said that he thought it good policy to ease the money market by any means in his power; but I confess that it seems to me that the propositions which he has laid before us with the view of easing the money market, are, at most, but very

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helpless efforts towards such an object. The whole of his measures will go no further than merely to save himself, and will not give that ease to the trading and commercial interests of the country which they so much require. My right hon. Friend has told us that it is also good policy to place an additional burden on the country, rather than to bear severely on the trade and commerce of the nation. But, Sir, when he proposes to discount his own loans —when he tells us that he intends to discount the instalments that may be paid by the 18th of June at 5 per cent, he does not tell us that he has any substantial reason for assuming that the contractors for the loans will agree to discount at that price; and when we all know that not less than 7 or 8 per cent has been paid in the city of London, in Manchester, and in Liverpool for the best paper having no more than sixty days to run, I confess, for my own part, that I do not feel very sanguine that this temporizing method of my right hon. Friend will be successful, and that, after all, he may not again have to call upon the Bank of England to assist him in the payment of the next dividends. I must say, Sir, that I had hoped to have heard from ray right hon. Friend that the Government had in contemplation some more substantial and efficient measure to ease the trade and commerce of the country. My right hon. Friend has said that things are easier in the money market than they were. Sir, I remember that my right hon. Friend told us on a former occasion that the worst had passed over; but, at present, I own I cannot see any very great improvement. True it may be that the repayment of the loan by France —true it may be that the payment for some of that corn which we have exported —may have brought back some of our gold into the coffers of the Bank of England; but when the price of corn is at its present amount—wheat having sold at 120s. a quarter this day—when the stocks in the hands of all parties are very low; when we consider that the exports last year fell off, as compared with the previous year, to the extent of 10,000,000 l. sterling; that as measured by the official standard of value, lue, they fell off from 83,000,000 l. to 73,000,000 l.; whilst, at the same time, the imports of food were greater than on any former occasion—I, for one, do not see whence the confidence arises that in the natural course of trade, unassisted by legislative interference, you are to rely in a
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reasonable time for the return of bullion to this country. And now, with regard to cotton, it appears by the official returns that the importation of last year, as compared with that of the year before, was only 13,000,000 l. sterling, against 23,000,000 l. Here is, then, a falling-off of more than one third in the importation of cotton; and yet whilst this falling-off shows that the stock of cotton is reduced by one-third, we have it on the assurance of writers in America — indeed, the price itself would tell us— that the sum of money paid for that reduced quantity of cotton, exceeds the sum paid for the larger quantities which were imported in the years 1844 and 1845 respectively. It therefore, Sir, appears to me, that whilst the price of wheat indicates that we import large quantities of corn, for which we pay a great price, we have no opportunity now, as we had before—as we had, for instance, in the years 1824, 1825, and 1826—we have no opportunity now, by selling, even at a depreciated rate, our large stocks of imports to bring back our gold into this country. No; your only chance is, under the present law, by continuing on that which is called the Bank screw. The first effect of raising the price of money and of refusing to discount bills will be, that orders for grain and provisions and cotton must be curtailed; and I must say, in the present state of the corn market, with the prospect of a late harvest, whilst, too, the greater portion of our granaries are empty, that it is a serious consideration whether it is safe for this country, in reference to its supply of food, that you should continue to adopt these measures of bringing back your gold by raising the rate of discount, especially if the necessary consequence must be to diminish your chances of a sufficient supply of corn. My right hon. Friend has said that the noble Lord at the head of the Government has adopted the most efficient course he could adopt, by giving notice of his intention to continue his temporary measures for the suspension of the duties on corn, and of the navigation laws. Why, Sir, under the old law, there would have been at present no duty at all. But my right hon. Friend says, that things have come better from America. It is true, that the exchange is 105½, while the par of exchange is between 108 and 109—it is true that the exchange is less against us than it was; but the reason, I apprehend, is this, that the late period at which the winter has

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broken up in the United States has kept the inland navigation closed, so that the corn of the country will not arrive at the seaboard until the middle of this present month; and I hear to-day from Liverpool, that so overwhelmed is the freight market waiting for cargoes that it is hardly possible to charter a ship, whilst the freight has fallen at New York to 4s. 6d. per barrel, and fresh ships are in sight, coming into the bay. But the reason why freights fall is, that all the corn at the seaboard is exhausted, and there will be, for a time, a consequent cessation of payment for corn in this country; but, in proportion as the time of payment is postponed, the price will rise, and the result of this will be that a still larger amount of bullion will be required than was before expected, although it may be at a later period of the year. And the same argument applies to all other provisions. I fear that among the many disasters which have befallen Ireland, it is not one of the least that, in the course of the past calamitous winter, the Irish people have killed a great portion of their store of pigs and poultry. I saw a return the other day which stated that in Cork market during the last season, i. e., I believe, in October and November last, no fewer than 15,000 dead pigs were sold against 3,000 in 1845, and 2,700 in 1844; and from this I gather that the prospect of a supply of provisions from Ireland is but a very poor one—that the supply is nearly exhausted —and that we shall, in this respect, also, require larger supplies from abroad. But, looking at all stocks of every description, I feel that justice is only done to the manufacturers of this country when we are told that trade is in a sound state. It is not the fault of the merchants—they cannot be told that it is owing to over-speculation; for, with the exception perhaps of tea, and, to a very small extent, of sugar, the stocks of all sorts of produce, foreign or colonial, are low in this country. Neither can the manufacturers be charged, on the other hand, with having worked their mills full time; for, in Lancashire, out of 1,061 mills, there are short time, or wholly closed, 728; and out of 226,000 workmen, upwards of 100,000 are working short time, while 23,000 are wholly out of employment. Unless, then, you do something to ease the money market, you must have great distress arising from want of employment on the part of the operatives in the manufacturing districts. The market has no produce here by the sale of which
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it would be possible to induce the gold to come back, whilst I apprehend such does not apply to the stocks of British manufacturers abroad. Therefore, I see no prospect of any early return of our gold to this country. Well, then, if that be so, is it not trifling to come down with these temporising measures, and offer no relief to the money market and trade of the country? We have at the present time all the manufacturers suffering; and all the railway companies also, if money continue at 8 per cent, will curtail their operations, and stop all the contracts they can—and then you will have, in addition to the manufacturing operatives, the railway labourers out of employment; and after them will come the miners of Staffordshire and Wales. What, then, is the state of the case? The difficulty is not that the Bank of England has been overtrading any more than the merchants. When the Bank Charter Act passed—for which I voted—it was contemplated that the Bank should issue notes to the full amount of its bullion; and the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) himself contemplated that the circulation of the Bank of England notes might rise to 28,000,000 l. or 30,000,000 l., whilst all the promoters of the measure intimated their opinion that its ordinary circulation, in prosperous times, would amount to 24,000,000 l. But it has never exceeded 21,400,000 l. in the amount of its issues; and it is unfair to charge on the Bank of England any conduct different from that which the promoters of the measure themselves intimated to the directors of the Bank they should pursue. In what position, then, are we now? It is this—that whilst the Bank coffers are crammed with gold and silver, the Bank itself has been—under the restriction of this Act—very nearly stopping payment—and that a house of highest credit—men that could pay 80 s. or 90 s. in the pound—is in this position, that unless something be done to set credit and money free, four weeks will not elapse before it may stop payment. Such, indeed, is the position of affairs, that, with an unmixed standard of gold, I am assured that a great house in this city, with 60,000 l. of silver bullion in its possession, has been unable to raise money upon it. Can anything, then, be more monstrous than that a man should not be able to pay his way with 60,000 l. of that metal in his possession, which is the money of all the world except England, and, I believe, Portugal? I assure the House I have heard

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this on such authority that I cannot doubt the statement. Well, then, Sir, we are in this position, that all the trade of the country, whether export or import, is, as has been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Lancashire this night, brought to a dead lock for want of money; and this whilst the credit of the mercantile and manufacturing community is good, whilst the credit of the Bank is good, and whilst her coffers are full of bullion, but of bullion which your Bank Charter Act forbids her to touch. Does not then the common-sense way to get out of this difficulty appear to be this—to remove this restriction on credit, that is starving and destroying the trade of this country — and that will soon starve the people of this country? For if my argument be worth anything, that the contraction of credit will make it necessary to withdraw orders for provisions from America, I am only speaking literally, when I say that the effect of this will be that three months may not elapse without the country not finding a sufficiency of food for the population. There is food enough in the world if credit were set free; but we shall be in the position of starving the bellies of the people, in order that we may feed with gold this idol of yours, the Bank Charter Act. If, then, that be the obstacle in the way of your trade, and if it is clear that free trade and a restrictive currency cannot work together, for God's sake, and for the sake of humanity, let us be quick in repealing these obnoxious measures. I well remember that Mr. O'Connell said, not long since, when speaking of supplies for the people of Ireland, that "rapidity of action was the essence of humanity and of political sagacity. I agreed with him in that opinion. You have seen the fatal effects of leaving the people of Ireland to supply themselves. Take warning by the fatal consequences that have followed your course in Ireland, and now have recourse, not to temporising measures, but to "rapidity of action," and believe that in such "rapidity of action" now will be found the "essence of humanity and political sagacity." Let but the trade of this country once receive a fatal check, and you know not where it may stop. It is apprehension, it is true, just now; but this apprehension may, in the course of a few weeks more, be turned to reality. I am told that there is in Lancashire one great house, whose solvency is above all question, and yet which, unless
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something be done to bring credit into operation, will be in the situation of stopping payment; and I understand that if that house stop payment, with it will fall no less than thirty other firms. Let bankruptcies once begin, and the whole credit and commerce of the country will go down like a pack of cards; and therefore it is that I call upon my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and upon the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) to look to the great interests of the trade of the country; to remember that the present difficulty is not limited to cotton speculators—that it is not limited to railway proprietors; but that those who are walking in the steadiest manner, in the legitimate course of trade, whether it be with the East Indies or with the United States, or with the West Indies, or elsewhere, will be immersed in one common ruin. You have tried this measure — you see you cannot have free trade—and that you cannot encourage unusual importations, not only of corn and provisions, but of foreign sugar or foreign manufactures, without paying for them in gold. You promised that foreign countries would take your manufactures in return for what they sent you—and God grant it may be so!—but the time has not yet come when any very strong indication of it is perceptible. I fear, indeed, that the only indication we have is, that the late elections in the United States induce us to believe that the tariff from which the Americans raise the greater portion of their revenue, is not so likely to be relaxed as to be restricted; and that, as America is receiving more gold for the reduced amount of cotton with which she has supplied us, than she formerly received for the larger quantity she furnished, and receiving English gold wherewith to carry on her Mexican war, she will not relax that system which has contributed to bring this country to such a crisis. And as regards Russia again—Russia, of whom it was said she could not go to war for want of money, and without the aid of the Barings and the Rothschilds—why, she is herself obliged to come to the help of Western Europe, and I do not think there is much prospect that Russia will speedily change her policy or reduce her tariff; whilst Prussia—that country of which last year it was said, she was already "shaken," has actually raised her tariff on all our manufactures. It seems to me, therefore, that any expectation on our part that we can recover our gold by any early change in the commer-

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cial policy of these countries from which we take their produce, is but a very faint and slender expectation; and I do trust, then, that, under these circumstances, her Majesty's Government will condescend to copy the example of great Ministers that have preceded them; and that when they find the trade and commerce of the country unable to move in consequence of your monetary regulations, they will come forward, as Mr. Pitt and Lord Liverpool did before them, not only to take off this mischievous restriction on the operations of the Bank; but also, with advances of Exchequer Bills, to set the trade of the country at liberty. You have tried this Bank Charter Bill, and it was harmless so long as it came not into operation; and yet it is a measure of a description which involves great danger, if, under certain circumstances, such as the present, you persevere in maintaining it. The right hon. Baronet said, and I was delighted to hear him say so, "that he had no parental affection for that measure which would induce him to maintain it after he should be persuaded it was not for the benefit of the country." I think he must see that it was not successful in preventing great speculation in this country. Happily that speculation was of a nature which led to the employment of money and labour at home; but, so far as speculation is concerned, it never run riot more uncontrollably than in the year 1845. And now that another change has come—now that we have had bad harvests and short cotton and hemp crops, and limited supplies of tallow and such like productions have succeeded—it is perfectly clear the Bill will have a most disastrous operation. And when it is recollected that, amongst other operations of the Bill, every sovereign drawn from the country not only withdraws a bank-note at its back, but also that we are getting near that verge when silver under the Bank Charter Act will not be sufficient to represent notes, I think that it is high time to consider whether we had better not suspend that Bank Charter Act. I think I am correct in stating, that while silver is not the legal standard of this realm above 40 s., the Bank is entitled to count it as part of their bullion, but only to the extent of one-fourth of the gold in its coffers. We are not told what the proportions of gold and silver coin are in the returns of bullion; but, referring to the issue department, we find that there is of gold 7,120,000 l., and of silver 1,429,134 l.
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We may therefore calculate that there is only a margin of 356,867 l. of gold over and above that amount which can be represented by silver; that is to say, that after 350,000 l. more is drained from this country, then not only the bank notes must be withdrawn, but silver must cease to count as a basis of note circulation. Well, then, supposing there should be a drain to the amount of 716,536 l. of gold, the effect would be that it would neutralise 179,134 l. of silver, on which the Bank, so long as it has gold to the amount of four times its silver, would be entitled to issue notes. If the drain continues, and the amount of gold is reduced to 4,000,000 l., out of that 4,000,000 l. there would be 1,000,000 l. only which would he available for the issue of notes; so that we are getting very near the verge, when the Bank Charter Bill will be more restrictive in its operation than it is at present—when silver, not being the legal standard, will be not available for any purposes further than those of commerce. We saw in former times, in 1793, when the trade of the country was in difficulties, Mr. Pitt issued 5,000,000 l. of Exchequer-bills, and that pressure was at once relieved; and so, at various times in the course of the French war, the same process was resorted to. In 1816, when I think there were no less than 2,000 bankruptcies, the Government of that day came forward and postponed the hour of a return to cash payments, and instantly prosperity was restored. And when the Bill passed in 1819, and again restricted the currency, there was the same distress; we then got out of the difficulty by an issue of 1l. and 21. notes. So in 1825 and 1826, when Mr. Huskisson said we were within four-and-twenty hours of barter, the Bank of England happily discovered a million of 1l. notes, which served the purposes of the trade of the country; because, though it is true that bank notes are not available for the payment of foreign accounts, they are perfectly available at home, and a supply of bank notes would set at liberty a great part of the thirty-five or forty millions of sovereigns which are supposed to be in circulation in the form of what is called the "small change" of the country. I was speaking of credit, and the way in which it would be affected by a repeal of the Bank Charter Act, and I will give an instance of the effect of credit. Lately the Bank of France and the trade of France was very much in the same predicament as that in which we now are; the

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Bank of France then succeeded in obtaining a loan of 800,000 l. from this country. Well, no sooner was it known that the Bank had obtained that amount of bullion from this country than confidence was restored, and trade revived so much, that the Bank of Prance was enabled to forego the demand of the whole of that sum. The last instalment of 200,000 l. never left this country. That shows how all turns on credit. Set the Bank of England free, and confidence will be at once restored, and they will cease to have these urgent demands for discounts. We have tried this Bank Charter Bill now for three years, and having found it to fail, reason points out to us that we should not persevere in maintaining it. I think that as we have found that this is a tree which has not borne good fruit, we should follow the example of a certain man in the parable, who had a fig-tree in his vineyard which brought forth no fruit, who said to the keeper of his vineyard, "Behold, these three years have I come, seeking fruit and finding none; cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground?"
MR. CARDWELL: If I thought the present a proper occasion for importing into the discussion of this question a party character, I do not think I could help making merry with the concluding paragraph of the noble Lord's observations. I would congratulate him on the discovery he has made, that when a great measure, which has been passed for three years, has remained practically inoperative during that period, and under peculiarly ad verse circumstances has suddenly become operative, it is right and proper for its promoters to abandon it. The time has arrived, in the judgment of the noble Lord, who voted for the Bank Charter Bill, at which even the advocates and supporters of that Bill may without any disparagement to their consistency, come forward and vote for its repeal. But I do not think the present is the time for inculpations of this nature; and the few observations which I shall venture to address to you, I hope I shall offer with all respect for the House and the noble Lord, in perfect soberness and earnestness. In that spirit the noble Lord will allow me to say that those who heard the premises with which he introduced his speech, must have been greatly disappointed with the conclusions at which he arrived. I listened to the early paragraphs of the noble Lord's speech with great satisfaction. I heard him tell the House that wheat was 120 s. the quarter; that stocks, both of our own pro-
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duce and foreign produce exportable were low; that the price of cotton had unfortunately risen very high; and I heard him go on and say that he saw no reason why the present pressure should be temporary; and that if for a temporary purpose you did encourage foreign importation and domestic consumption here, then the state of things would justify the belief that you must infallibly have to pay for it in the end. These were the premises with which he started; and since, unfortunately, these things were true, I confess I heard them put in the foreground of his speech with very great satisfaction, because I thought they would bring him to a sound and legitimate conclusion. But all his premises have been addressed to the real gist of the question—the great pressure upon us in reference to the amount of our capital, forming the effective and substantial means we have in our power; whilst all his remedies are directed to a totally different subject—the regulation of our currency. I wish those who speak so freely as to the regulation of our currency would consider for a moment what the function is which that currency performs in the commercial world. I believe they will find this to be the fact; let them manage the arrangement of that currency how they will, they can never extract any artificial advantage from that arrangement. Let the Bank fail to manage it soundly, and those derangements which an unfortunate state of trade produces are most grievously aggravated, and their intensity heightened by any mal-arrangement of the currency. Adam Smith likens it to the operation of a wheel, which creates nothing in itself, but carries round in regular course that which has been created; and it is this doctrine of Smith that those who wish to effect a different arrangement are so fond of relying on. But let them consider to what this illustration carries them. The currency may perform its functions accurately or inaccurately. If accurately, then, when trade and commerce are disturbed and confidence is shaken, the circulating medium will be proportionally contracted; you will economise when the pressure begins, and you will never have to feel its utmost intensity at last. But if the currency act irregularly, it will appear to give you abundance when in reality there is scarcity before you; you will not use economy in the outset, because you will be misled by an erroneous currency to believe there is abundance; the want of economy

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at first will ultimately diminish the supplies you have at command; and then at the end will indeed come upon you the real intensity of the pressure, and the currency will have aggravated the wants which the real exigency of the crisis has brought upon you. What are the real causes of the pressure that is now felt? Are they far to seek? Has not everybody who has spoken alluded to them? Not long ago, by the blessing of God, we enjoyed good harvests, and were in a state of very great prosperity. This country undertook, I think in an intoxication caused by that prosperity, to execute far larger works than this or any other country was capable of accomplishing in the time. It was a very little thing to embark the small percentage required in the first instance; but before your great works were completed, you had great exertions to make, and an arduous task to confront. Whilst you are in the act of performing this, before you yet feel the pressure severely, what comes upon you? One of the greatest calamities that ever afflicted any country in the world; one which the noble Lord at the head of the Government told us revived in the present day the mournful recollections of the Middle Ages. Cast as you were into this calamity, what did you do? It becomes me not to speak in terms of any great disrespect of the persons who manage the great establishment to which so many allusions have been made; but perhaps I may be permitted to say that it would have been more fortunate if the alarm had been taken earlier in that quarter. I do not think it inconsistent with the respect I feel for them to say, that if they had seen earlier that the contraction was begun, more fortunate results would have ensued. I dare to speak in this same spirit of the operations of the right hon. Gentleman opposite; I hope he will not think me wrong to say that, while the country was labouring under the combined results of its own intoxication, and a great restriction of circulation, when he saw that the Bank had not contracted its issues on the first moment of danger, it would have been fortunate if he had not found it necessary to demand from the Bank of England a considerable assistance at the instant when they were sustaining, from other reasons, great pressure. As regards the currency more immediately, every one will admit that there are two duties, and two only, to be expected from it: the first, truthfulness of standard; the second, and a very subordinate one, eco-
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nomy of application. With respect to the truthfulness of the standard, you adopted in 1844 a measure which was expressly stated to be only the complement of the measure of 1819. That measure of 1819 secured to you the right of converting your bank notes into gold, but failed in securing you absolute convertibility; for you found by experience that where great and general inducements were offered, the temptation to let out at the moment was too great for individual prudence to resist, and that very thing was done which high authorities have asked the House to do to-night—the circulation was increased, when, upon the ordinary sound principles of currency, it ought to have been diminished. It is a mistake, then, to say that there was any new principle in the Bill of 1844; its principle was to give you in practical effect that to which you had a legal and undisputed right under the Bill of 1819. The first effect of the Bill of 1844 was to produce some considerable drain of gold from the coffers of the Bank of England, which was not exported to foreign countries, but distributed in the coffers of private hankers and others in Scotland, Ireland, and the country districts of England. We are now told that the Bill has been inoperative, but that is not so; it has saturated the country with gold, where otherwise it would have been filled with country notes—no doubt with some sacrifice of economy. But did our trade languish because there was more gold, and our currency was maintained at a greater expense? Not at all; our trade was never more prosperous. Why have you had the command of all the granaries of the world? Why, in a time of famine and of unexampled pressure, have there hitherto been no failures? Why has our trade been in a comparatively sound state? Because the Bill was operative during those two years. Now we are told that the Bill had been found to do mischief, because it contracted the circulation; and in the next breath we are told that the circulation was never very considerably affected: that it was now 20,000,000 l., and the maximum 21,500,000 l. Another Gentleman said that there is no confidence. How do you propose to increase confidence? Do you think that announcing to the world that Government had made arrangements with the Bank of England, and that they are going to tamper, in a time of distress, with that which had served in a time of prosperity, will create confidence? I believe that it would create distrust and alarm to an extent

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of which few can form an idea. If you make the alteration, will the foreigner be content? The argument stated is, as there are bank notes at home, you will very easily be able to send your gold abroad. What do you propose to do? By increasing the total amount of money in circulation, to raise at home the price of all the articles in the market. What is the way to avoid a drain of gold? Why, to pay with other things, and not with gold. And how are you to do that unless you induce the foreigner to take those things, and not gold? And how are you to induce him, if, by sending four additional millions of bank notes into the market, you raised in this market the price of every article? I am astonished to hear this doctrine here tonight. We need not disguise the fact. It is not agreeable to reduce prices, and let a foreigner have a thing for 180 l., or 150 l., or 120 l. which is worth 200 1. We must pay, however, for what is imported; if not in gold, we must induce the foreigner to take other articles. How does your Currency Law apply to this? There are 35,000,000 sovereigns and bullion in the Bank of England. If we reduce the circulating medium of the country, every sovereign abstracted from the circulating medium will tend to raise the price of money, and depress the price of commodities. It tends to induce the exportability of other things, and to prevent gold from going out. When this measure passed in 1844, we were plainly told how, in a time of prosperity, it would saturate the country with gold; and I agree with the hon. Member for South Lancashire, whose opinion is deserving of much respect, that the opinion attributed to Mr. Huskisson must have been that by thus saturating your country with gold in a time of prosperity, you would have gold which, you could export when a time of adversity arrived; but Mr. Huskisson never meant to say that when the necessity for importing corn—that necessary of life which, at all hazards, you must have—arrived, he would tamper with the currency—that for every guinea that went out for corn, he would provide a paper guinea—and keep up the tendency for other guineas to go, and diminish the tendency for other articles to go. This brings me to the suggestion of the hon. Member for South Lancashire, who proposes, as there is a large part of the circulation in gold, that Government shall call in the gold, send a part abroad, and retain part in the coffers of the Bank, to secure the convertibility of
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the rest. The hon. Member must excuse me if I point out another great fallacy. It is argued from experience, that a certain amount of gold in the till of the banker is enough to answer a certain amount of liabilities in circulation, and it is supposed that you have only got to take all the circulation of the country, and lock up a third part in the coffers of the Bank, and you may, without the least objection, issue the other two-thirds; and it is assumed that the experience of bankers proves this point. It proves no such thing. What it proves is this—that the circulation of the country being in a healthy state, gold being in the hands of private individuals, small traders, and dealers, throughout the country, one-third will be sufficient to answer the probable demands on the Bank. The noble Lord who has last sat down, who said that the pressure was only temporary, was the most strenuous in exhorting the House to attempt an alteration in the currency. If it is to be permanent, for every departure from sound principle of which we now attempt to be guilty, we shall have a double penalty to pay on some future occasion. Why, knowing what the pressure now is, we should be disposed to run ourselves into double danger, the noble Lord has not stated anything which deserves to be dignified with the title of an argument. I will briefly recapitulate my arguments. Our misfortunes or our prosperity depend not upon currency, but upon the amount of our capital; and our currency represents our capital, correctly or incorrectly, according as it is a good currency or a bad one. If it represent it correctly, which is the most favourable condition of things, then we shall always have to suffer such misfortunes as any pressure on our capital may create; if it represent it incorrectly, then we shall have to suffer such calamities besides as the aggravation of circumstances might cause—the original evil of pressure upon our capital, and the additional evil of derangement of our currency. Truthfulness is the first object of currency— economy only the second. In a time of prosperity, with experience before us, we settled a scale of currency, and the amount of the issues of the Bank. The effect of the Bill has been to saturate the country with gold, without pressing on the energies of trade. We are now called upon, under the pressure of distress, to tamper with the currency—we are told we cannot rely upon the pressure being temporary. We know, however, that if we depart from

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principle, we shall have to pay for it. We have no reason for believing that the time when we have to make a double payment will be favourable; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the mischief will be greatly aggravated. We are required, I think, to say to the people, "We call upon you to accommodate yourselves to the necessity of the position in which Providence has placed you. You have been afflicted with scarcity—you must practise economy—corn you must have, and corn you must pay for. You must pay for it in gold, and the gold must contract the currency until there is a temptation to the foreigner sufficient to induce him to deal with you in other articles. Then the drain on your gold will cease; and above all, considering the clouds that frown upon you, you must not dare—great as the present danger is—to face the far greater danger which in this state of the country a departure from sound principle would most certainly bring about.
MR. T. BARINGcould not agree with his hon. Friend the Member for Clitheroe, that the distress under which the commercial body throughout the kingdom were now labouring, proceeded entirely from the effects of large importations of corn, the results of railway speculation, or the mismanagement of the Bank; nor could he agree with his hon. Friend in the conclusion he sought to establish, that no new principle had been introduced by the Bank Charter Act of 1844, for that it was to that measure we owed the influx of gold into this country. At other periods it was well known that large importations of corn had taken place without their being followed by similar disastrous consequences. In 1839 and 1840 there had been large imports; but the commercial community had then the means of meeting their engagements, and there was not that excess of anxiety which now existed. Other countries had much wanted corn, and had imported it to a great extent. The wants of France, for example, had been great; but still she was not in that state of financial difficulty which was experienced in this country. It was true that there was a larger metallic currency in France as compared with the paper currency, being 30,000,000 l. of the first, to 15,000,000 l. of the latter; while we had 30,000,000 l. of paper, against upwards of 20,000,000 l. gold. But the question was this: had the Bank of France, in the difficulties of that country, refused those facilities of com-
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merce which the Bank of England had lately refused, and been obliged to refuse? The Bank of France had not. With regard to speculations in railways, he was one of those who thought that operations of that kind had been carried too far. With all the advantages that railways lent to the country in the development of the national resources, still it was impossible not to see that when a great amount of capital was abstracted from the usual channels, and devoted to some one particular purpose, as long as the money market remained favourable, the investment was as transferable as bank notes; but when once a turn took place in the market, those who had invested their money in those securities found them totally unavailable. Still there had been other times when speculation ran high; and yet there had not been that total want of means upon even the best possible security to meet the pres-sing engagements of the day which had lately been experienced. The right hon. Gentleman had hinted that the Bank had a little mismanaged matters; and that the Bank Act had not been exactly worked as it ought to have been by the Bank. If he understood the Act of 1844, it was that Bank notes were to be issued as gold came in; and if the Bank had upon that principle issued last year four or five millions more notes, as it might have done, then when a drain came, instead of withdrawing seven millions, there would have been a withdrawal of eleven or twelve millions. He did not mean to say that the reduction of interest in August was not an unwise step. He believed it was; but at the same time it was a step which it was competent for the Bank to take, according to the terms of the charter. His right hon. Friend had said that the Bank ought early in the year to have raised the rate of interest; but his right hon. Friend should recollect that when he brought forward his budget in February, his right hon. Friend stated, amongst other favourable circumstances, that he was gratified and surprised to find that the whole importation of corn, which had been above 5,000,000 quarters, had not reduced the bullion of the Bank when compared with February, 1846, to a greater amount than rather above a million sterling. Why, then, was the Bank bound by its own act to make money so much dearer? It was no want of discretion on the part of the Bank which had produced a pressure totally unparalleled since 1825. He believed that without a limit on the

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power of the Bank, a smaller amount of notes might have sufficed. With respect to the Bill of 1844, he had felt incapable of giving a general opinion on its results; but he had ventured to express the belief that it was a bold experiment, but at the same time acknowledging, as he had done, that inconveniences then existed; and looking to the high authority from which the measure had proceeded, he had felt disposed to give it a fair trial. He had not felt prepared to predict what would be the consequences of the Bill; he did not know that he should have been ever able to answer the question put by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, "What is a pound?" but this much he could say, that having for a long time been engaged in commercial affairs, and having rather attentively considered them, he could state what facts were; and he knew that for ten days there was a total want of the means of obtaining accommodation by the most solvent houses upon the most undoubted security, and that because the Bank of England by its charter was unable to afford it; and he knew that it was impossible to raise a penny upon 60,000 l. worth of silver—a precious metal which was a legal tender in most parts of the civilized world. Parties who imported silver had money to pay; and the owners of silver came to the Bank to sell, and the Bank refused to buy. It was not a question of price with the Bank, but a question affecting its own safety. The Bank could only issue notes upon silver to the extent of one-fifth the bullion in the Bank. But it might be said, "Why not ship the metal to Paris or Hamburg, and draw against it?" But no one had money wherewith to take a bill of exchange. Then it might be said, "Send it, and get returns for it." But suppose that bills having a fortnight to run were sent in return to London, they would be refused discount. If such proceedings on the part of this country were not productive of so much inconvenience, they would be held up to ridicule by foreign countries. Was the case he had mentioned a satisfactory proof of the operation of the Bank Charter Act? He thought a discretionary power ought to have been left either with the Government, or that the House would in its wisdom modify the Bill when necessary. He was ready to allow that the Bill had worked well during the three years of prosperity in which it had been in operation, and that it had prevented any excessive
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issue on the part of the country banks. But when it came to a drain of gold to meet an unavoidable want, there ought to be some means of avoiding measures by which the commerce of the country would be dislocated. The commerce of this country was carried on upon a system of credit; and if they brought it to a ready-money system they paralysed trade in the manufacturing districts. What was required was to give facilities to exports, in order to pay for the corn in manufactured goods, because the houses in Manchester could not carry on their trade upon four months' bills which when carried into Lombard-street were no better than bits of blotting paper. Would not the manufacturers rather have cheap money than cheap cotton? Cotton was dear all over the world, and they shared the high price with their foreign rivals; but the low rate of interest on money was one of the great advantages in favour of the English manufactures. When they made the interest of money 3 per cent in August, and 13 per cent in April, they made trade the greatest lottery in the world. Something had been said about speculation in cotton; but it must be remembered that it was founded upon a deficiency of cotton. Now, if our manufacturers had large and accumulated stocks of everything, then, by making money dear, they might be forced to export and sell their goods. But it was not so, on the showing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. There had been no overtrading; the manufacturers had shown a sound and careful discretion, and yet it was that part of the community which was to suffer. The Bank might have mismanaged its affairs; the right hon. Gentleman had certainly mismanaged his; but the sound and careful commercial interest was to suffer, and the calamity was to be met by fettering commerce and by paralysing Manchester and Liverpool. Could the mercantile interest carry on the export trade, which must be carried on by credit, when all accommodation was refused them? Or did the right hon. Gentleman think he could secure the revenue and the prosperity of the country by a system which carried commercial affairs to a liquidation? Hitherto there had been a real pressure, but not yet a panic. But there might be a panic if credit were still refused. Hitherto there had not been a whisper of discredit against the commercial body. But the House must not fancy that their resources had not been disturbed,

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and that great sacrifices had not been made to meet difficulties which had not been of their own creation. It was highly desirable to know how a sudden drain could be met without a sudden depreciation of the property of the country. The country had exported, say 7,000,000 l. in gold, and the property of the country had been depreciated 100,000,000 l. in value. It was clear that this sudden drain could not be paid in manufactures immediately; it should therefore be spread over a longer term. They would pay for the corn in manufactures, but not all at once. He considered that they either ought to say that a discretion should be placed somewhere, or that in a case like the present, when there was a great emergency, the Bank should have a greater liberty of using its securities for issues of notes. He believed that if the Bank of England was willing to advance half a million of money to-day, it might do so, and thus liquidate private accounts, and yet find half a million in its deposits, with only a change from one deposit account to another. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that the present pressure had in no degree been occasioned by the operations of the Government. He was not actuated by any factious motive towards the Government, and he was still less disposed to attribute to them any share in producing the present financial difficulties beyond that of having supported measures which had led to or increased those difficulties. He was quite ready to allow that the system followed by their predecessors, which had been resorted to in the years of prosperity, of taking off duty after duty, on the supposition that an increase in the amount of duty paid would compensate for their loss, was very successful during such a period; but it did not allow any possibility of meeting a time of adversity without placing the Government in the situation in which they now were. Such a system rendered it necessary for the Government, unless it retraced its steps, either to contract a loan or to increase direct taxation; or, it might be, to resort to both those measures. The rule that two and two did not always make four, might be sometimes correct; but they had been going upon the principle that if two were taken from two, there always remained four. The Chancellor of the Exchequer-had said that he had nothing to do with the present pressure—that he had only taken his usual advance from the Bank.
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He begged to remind the right hon. Gentleman that he had not mentioned his want of advances from the Bank upon deficiency hills; that he had not led the public—and certainly he had not led the loan contractors—to suppose that he would want any deficiency bills. On the contrary, the statement of the right hon. Baronet (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was, "I want 8,000,000 l.; I will not give any discount; I want 1,000,000 l. each month, and I don't require it sooner or later." He certainly left the room, after the right hon. Gentleman had made that statement, under the impression that if the Government would not give the same rate of interest which they would have to give for deficiency bills, they would not want any deficiency bills. The right hon. Gentleman, therefore, certainly did not lead the public to expect—what he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) stated he had given notice of to the Bank—that he would require the ordinary amount of deficiency bills. He was aware that the loan contractors were not likely to find much sympathy from that House or from the public, and he did not think they needed it. He considered, however, that under the circumstances which, from the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) he believed to exist, although it was not a very lucrative affair, the price given was a fair one on both sides. The right hon. Baronet had stated that he thought this was a measure which would benefit the public. Undoubtedly if it benefited national credit and the funds, it would be an advantage to the public so long as the Bank was able to afford them the usual facilities. He trusted that the Bank might be able to afford those facilities; but if there was a demand for gold from America, and no supply was obtained in this country from other places, it must be met by a contraction of the circulation of notes. He thought his right hon. Friend would have pursued a wiser course if he bad not taken what he would call the narrow view of a needy Chancellor— an empty exchequer, but a wide and comprehensive consideration of all the interests of the country; and the right hon. Baronet would then have seen that it was not because we had 8,000,000 l. or 10,000,000 l. to pay to foreign countries that such an effect ought to be produced upon our commerce as to make our most solid and stable and prudent institutions tremble.
SIR G. CLERKconsidered that a great compliment had been paid to the operation of the Banking Act of 1844, for it had been admitted that that Act had prevented an undue issue of paper by private and joint-stock banks; and that if such an excessive issue had taken place, the difficulties of the present moment would have been greatly increased. He presumed, however, that the hon. Gentleman who had made this admission would consider that while it was quite right to limit the issue of private and joint-stock banks, because they had abused and were likely to abuse their powers, yet the past experience of the mode in which the Bank of England had managed its affairs, had shown that under no circumstances was it likely to increase the issue of notes, and so to encourage any undue speculation. Now, he believed he could refer the hon. Gentleman to statements made before Committees of that House, which would prove that, whenever great speculation was going on in this country, there would always be abundance of commercial paper offered to the Bank; that the Bank adopted no other criterion of judging of such paper but the solvency of the parties offering it; and that there was no security against an undue issue of Bank paper, which, whenever an undue pressure occurred, would occasion great inconvenience. He thought, however, that the hon. Gentleman had omitted to notice the broad distinction pointed out by the hon. Member for Clitheroe—the distinction between the currency of the country, or the mere machinery by which operations were carried on, and the surplus disposable capital of the country, which was the only fund upon which merchants could draw for the resources they required. What, he would ask the House, was the present situation of this country? We had, owing to a visitation of Providence, experienced an entire destruction of a great portion of the agricultural produce of this country, which had occasioned a deficiency of available capital to the extent of between 20,000,000 l. and 30,000,000 l. Under what circumstances did this calamity overtake us? There had been, during the last few years, extraordinary speculation in railways, and a consequent abstraction of a large proportion of the disposable capital of the country from the purposes to which it was formerly applied. The consequence was, that there was a much less proportion of that capital left, than there otherwise would have been, to aid and assist the com-
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mercial world in the present crisis. The necessity of purchasing large quantities of corn abroad, had led to the exportation of a considerable amount of capital; and as the famine had been experienced to a greater or less degree by the continental nations, they were able to devote but a small portion of their money to the purchase of our manufactures. We had, besides, incurred an extraordinary expenditure of 8,000,000 l. for Ireland; and the united effect of these causes had been to make a great drain upon that fund which, in ordinary years, was employed in giving assistance to the commercial world. Was it extraordinary, then, that the rate of discount should have risen from 2 per cent in August last, to the extraordinary amount which had been mentioned? He thought the House would admit that it had not been shown that these evils would be alleviated if the Act of 1844 were repealed, and if no restrictions were placed either upon the Bank of England or upon private banks. He might observe, that though in the months of January and February the extent to which the crops had failed was well known, the Bank for a long time took no steps whatever to reduce their issues by raising the rate of discount. The Bank went on without giving any warning or notice to the public till they began to feel the pressure themselves, and they then perhaps drew the cord too tight and refused to give sufficient accommodation. The necessary consequence was, that for a week or ten days the greatest distress prevailed in the money market. Within the last week the Bank had been enabled to give increased accommodation to the public; but that accommodation was afforded under the Act of 1844. He contended, that if the Bank had acted on the principles of the Act of 1844 at an earlier period, although a certain degree of pressure must have been felt, the country would have been saved from the aggravated pressure which had recently been experienced. He regretted, indeed, that with respect to a matter of such vital importance a debate should have arisen in so desultory a manner, and not on a Motion which could bring to issue the question, whether any of the evils now complained of were justly attributable to the Act of 1844; and he was surprised that the hon. Member for Huntingdon, holding the position which he did in the commercial world, did not give notice of a Motion to repeal the Act of 1844. In such a case he thought it would be found that the House would abide by the sound prin-

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ciples of currency laid down in that Act. It was true, that an Act of Parliament might he passed to make half a sovereign pass for a whole sovereign; and in paying a creditor any man would certainly be benefited by finding his half sovereigns rendered equal in value to sovereigns; but the next day if the same individual went to purchase any article with his half sovereigns, he would find that the nominal price of it had considerably risen, in consequence of the law making a half sovereign a legal tender for a whole sovereign. No advantage would be gained by such a measure; and the only result would be that the monetary transactions of the country would be thrown into confusion. The real fact appeared to him to be, that the people had undertaken too many great works within a limited period, which they had not the money or ability to pay out of their annual revenue. They had undertaken more railways than they could effect within the proposed time. This plunged us into difficulties, which however might have been surmounted if we had had an abundant harvest and an increased export of manufactured goods. But as the case was, the people were now obliged to draw on that surplus capital which otherwise might have gone to the accommodation of the commercial world. This caused the existing pressure; but the adoption of the strictest economy with respect to the public expenditure and every other branch of expenditure would tend to create an amelioration. Any attempt, however, to tamper with the currency, though it might act as a momentary stimulant, would, like all other stimulants, be followed by a reactionary effect. With respect to the particular measure before the Committee, he confessed that he entertained considerable doubts whether it would produce the beneficial effects which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer anticipated from it. He feared that persons who had subscribed to the loan, might continue to find that they could got 6 or 7, or 8 per cent by discounting bills; and in this case they would not be much disposed to advance the payment of their instalments of the loan, when they would get for the money so advanced only 5 and 4 per cent. He was, however, quite willing that the experiment should be tried, and had no wish to offer any opposition to the Motion.
MR. DISRAELIwas very glad that the hon. Member for Huntingdon had not pro-
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posed the repeal of the Act of 1844, because that would have been withdrawing the attention of the Committee from the real question before it. The hon. Member for Clitheroe, while expressing an opinion that the noble Lord the Member for Lynn had introduced the elements of a much wider discussion than the resolution submitted to the Committee seemed to warrant, had, nevertheless, himself pretty extensively travelled into the forbidden province, and touched largely on all the subjects which he had intimated ought not to be discussed. The hon. Gentleman had laid down certain principles for the establishment of a sound currency, the accuracy of which it would be difficult to challenge; but they did not appear to bear a very close reference to the circumstances with which the Committee had now to deal. The hon. Gentleman told the House, above all, in the establishment of the currency to beware of artificial arrangements; but he wished to know whether the currency in this country was not now founded on artificial arrangements? It was very easy to deliver an abstract lecture and lay down principles which might answer in Utopia for the establishment of a currency; but he apprehended that the criticism of the hon. Gentleman could not apply to the exceptionable circumstances found in every existing currency. The hon. Gentleman, however, after expressing these abstract opinions, delivered a panegyric on the measure of 1844; and if that panegyric were just, it must of course terminate all discussion on the subject. The hon. Gentleman said, that the object and result of the measure of 1844 was to saturate England with gold. We might be drained at present, said the hon. Gentleman—we might be subject to a most severe and unusual pressure, but by the providential arrangements of 1844 the country was found prepared for this pressure. The hon. Gentleman would have them believe, that, thanks to the arrangements of 1844, the country was literally saturated with gold; and this being the fact, severe as was the pressure, and severe as might have been the suffering of the merchants and the manufacturers, there was, of course, a fund prepared to meet the unexampled requirements of the exigency; and, of course, nothing could have gone wrong. If this was so, what was the meaning of any discussion whatever on the present state of the commercial world? But he feared that the hon. Gentleman had been rather too liberal of his assumptions. What was the state

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of this country with respect to the precious metals before the introduction of the Act of 1844? How far was England saturated with gold at that particular period? He held in his hand the last return that had been published before the passing of the Act of 1844, and, by a reference to that document, he found, that on the 7th of September, 1844, the quantity of bullion and coin in the Bank amounted to 15,209,060 l. With that amount of bullion in the coffers of the Bank in 1844, it was evident, therefore, that it could not have been the measure of that year that saturated the country with gold. He would not pause to enter into the question of what degree of saturation would be required to enable them to meet the difficulties of the present juncture; but he would revert to the hon. Gentleman's position, that they were indebted to the saturating qualities of the Act of 1844 for being overrun with gold. If there were any hon. Members who were inclined to be influenced by that statement, he would take leave again to direct their especial attention to this fact, that in the year 1844 the Bank had on hands an amount of bullion and coin which had been scarcely exceeded in any account which had been subsequently published. The hon. Member intimated the causes to which he was himself inclined to ascribe the present state of the monetary system, and of the commercial world generally, to the fact, that alarm had not been taken earlier by the Bank: and in a manner more assured and explicit, he then proceeded to quote the opinion of a great authority, to the effect that the Bank ought to have contracted their issue when the danger first commenced; and that it was a fatal mistake on their part to have reduced their rate of interest in the month of August last. Now, notwithstanding the remarks of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Clitheroe, and those of the right hon. Gentlemen the Member for Tamworth, he was strongly inclined to think that it was the opinion of that House and of the country, that they had no right whatever, under the Act of 1844, to criticise the conduct of the Bank in its banking department. They had invented a perfect system of machinery, almost as perfect as the sliding-scale, for the regulation of the issuing department. It was announced by the Ministry, sanctioned by the House, and received by the country, as a system which was independent of the management of the Bank, of the panics of the public, and
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of the caprices of directors. If, therefore, the Bank had mismanaged their affairs, that was their own business and not the House of Commons'. If they had placed in intimate relation with the transaction of public affairs a body over which not only had they no control, but over which they had, by legislative enactment, ostentatiously announced their intention of not, at any future period, exercising any control—much as they might regret the mismanagement of that body's affairs; great as might be their own sufferings and those of the public; and embarrassing as the consequences might be to the Government—they were stopped from any criticism on its conduct. A feeling of self-respect and a due regard for the decent dignity of that House should put criticism under such circumstances entirely out of the question. What could be a greater opprobrium on the wisdom, prudence, and sagacity of that House than that, on referring to so recent an arrangement as that of 1844, they should now, on the first occasion on which its virtues had been tested, find it wanting? and what could be more inconsistent with their dignity than that, on making this discovery, they should turn round, like common scolds, and abuse the Bank, while, with the same breath, they acknowledged that they had no control over the Bank, and therefore no possible right to criticise? Remembering the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth, and bearing in mind words which still rung in the ears of all present, nothing but the perplexity of the House finding itself in a position from which it was impossible for it to extricate itself, could have induced the right hon. Baronet to turn round and criticise the Bank, as though it was the author of all the evil that had occurred and was occurring. He might take his stand on the non-liability to criticism of the Bank, upon the grounds he had mentioned; but he would not evade in such a manner the charge brought forward by the hon. Member for Clitheroe and the right hon. Baronet. On a subject so difficult and complicated, and in reference to which he spoke with unaffected diffidence, he should give no opinion of his own. He would mention nothing not fully substantiated by the admission of his opponents, or by documents which none could contest; but he maintained that the conduct of the Bank was not only not liable to the imputation made against it, but was entitled, on the contrary, to the expression of an opinion of a

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very different character. The Bank of England lowered the rate of interest in August of last year. Now, he wanted to know what there was in the state of the country in August last which should have made the Bank look with any alarm to the future? The Bank then had an almost unprecedented amount of treasure; perhaps the largest amount of reserved notes which they had possessed for a year and a half or two years. Looking to their own position, their command over the precious metals, and the amount of their reserve, as well as to the general feeling of the city of London, the Bank, as a mere banking establishment, had a right to suppose that they were justified in assisting liberally every well-founded commercial movement. The directors of the Bank were men of the world, of great character and experience. Some of them were Members of that House, and could not be solely influenced by the state of their till. They might by chance have heard some hon. Gentleman previous to that time predicting the possibility of a coming scarcity, and proposing that the ports should be opened. But did the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth sanction that proposal? Did the Government, which also exercised great influence on public opinion, adopt it? No. There was not, then, in August, when the Bank reduced the interest, having that great amount of treasure and reserved notes, notwithstanding the railway speculation, any apprehension in the commercial or political circles of England. The great statesmen—those who had possessed and those who then possessed power in the country—did not come forward and vaticinate apprehension and warn the Bank of a coming scarcity. What was the opinion of those who should have been better informed on this point than the directors of the Bank of England, or the merchants of the country, or Members of that House, or the Members of the present and late Governments? The best opinion on the subject was that of those engaged in the corn trade, and their opinion might be gathered from the prices which prevailed. The average price of wheat for the six weeks ending August, 1845, was 51 s. 11 d. per quarter; while the price, on an average of six weeks, ending August, 1846, was only 49 s. 2d. the quarter. When, therefore, fault was found with the Bank, it should be borne in mind that it was the opinion of the Ministry, of the right hon. Member for Tamworth, and also of the dealers in
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wheat, that there was no fear of a scarcity. What was the price in September, 1845, on a similar average of six weeks? It was 55 s. 7d. the quarter; whereas the price, on an average of six weeks, ending September in last year, was only 47 s. 3d. Was it to be tolerated, then, that the Bank was to be brought forward as a scapegoat under these remarkable circumstances, forgetting the significant silence of the men who were Ministers now and who were Ministers then, and the speaking language of these authentic documents? Let the House mark a little further how far there was any foundation for these imputations upon the directors of the Bank. In October, 1845, wheat was 55 s. 2d.; but in October, 1846, it was only 52 s. 11 d. Even in the month of November, when we were now told that the clouds were rising, it was only 59 s. 7d., and it had been 58s. 5d. in November, 1845. In the month of December it was 58 s. 9d. in 1845, and only 60 s. 4d. in 1846. Taking the average of the six months, July to December, it was 54 s. 8d. in 1845, and but 53 s. 7d. in 1846. Was not this alone a sufficient vindication of the Bank from the imputation that had been cast upon it—cast upon it, not by a casual word, not by an intimation in the heat of debate, but evidently from a foregone conclusion? Here was the Bill in distress, the great Charter of 1844 in distress. A scapegoat must be found. Let it be the Bank of England. The expression used by the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) was vague indeed. He seemed touched by a soft-hearted reminiscence; he spoke in a tender tone, and, so far as he was concerned, it might have been passed by. But the charge had been repeated—repeated in a manner the most decided, and by more than one right hon. Gentleman, as well as by the hon. Member for Clitheroe. It was the order of battle; it was the word given to the public—"It is the Bank of England that was not prudent, that did not watch the signs of the times." But what would have been the consequence if the Bank of England had not reduced its interests when it did, but had kept it as it was, or, following up the suggestion now made, had increased it? The most beneficial movement that for years had happened in this country, the most beneficial act, one that had spoken most for the prescience and foresight and admirable prudence of the body who performed it, was the act of the Bank in reducing the rate of interest under the circumstances.

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What had occurred from it? The confidence of the public was so great, when they found in August that the Bank did not increase their rate, that we were indebted to that foresight and sagacity for the fact that all the merchants of England scoured both hemispheres to procure corn for us. We were indebted to the Bank for the fact that we had had 6,000,000 quarters of corn sent into this country, and that we were at this moment exporting to France, and had the exchanges of the Continent mainly influenced in our favour. And it was not merely that the Bank of England had contributed to feed us, and was one of the principal causes of gold flowing in from the Continent to this country, without any expression of public approbation and of public confidence; but one who, upon such a subject, was a great authority, and the last from whom they should apprehend a rebuke, must seize upon the very first opportunity of branding them for that act, so politic, so sagacious, and so beneficial. Amidst all the incoherent judgments and hasty opinions upon the causes of panic, all agreed in believing that the Bank was the great criminal, and principally believed it from the intimation of the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel). He was not one of those who upon such a subject as this would appeal to the passions of the House; and he believed that if this question, on the Act of 1844, were calmly examined by an investigation of facts, and not by an assertion of windy opinions, the House might be led to a result highly beneficial to this country. What —he would not say he charged against the Act of 1844, because he wished to conduct the investigation in a temperate spirit— but what appeared to him to be imputable to it was, that it was an Act which could not prevent any of the mischiefs that under the previous system occurred, but could prevent much of the benefit that the previous system ensured. The Act, it appeared to him, and could be shown, he thought, by indisputable evidence—the Act had failed in every object which it held out as desirable to the public, and engaged to fulfil. We were told that it would prevent, or tend to prevent, anything like those financial disturbances and disorders which we associated with the name of panic. The House had had held before them, in the speeches with which the Act was introduced, and in the Committee that led to it, the instances of 1836, 1837, and 1839. It was by a picturesque representation of those disas-
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ters, and of the public discomfort, that the House, yielding to the. great authority of the individual who introduced this measure —legislating upon a subject which he had deeply studied, and of which, in a certain sense, he was a great master—were induced to pass that Act. Now, let the House observe, that if that Bill had been enacted previous to the monetary disorder of 1836–37, that disorder would equally have occurred. In the drain of 1836, from the end of March to the end of December —namely, eight months—the bullion in the Bank fell from 8,000,000 l. to 3,900,000 l., yet the circulation was never so great as the limit of the circulation would have been under the Act of 1844. If the Bank, in 1836–37, had been controlled (as the phrase was) by the Act of 1844, all the disastrous circumstances of 1836–37 might have occurred. He would prove that by the public records which he held in his hands. The circulation was 17,600,000 l. in March, 1836; but, according to the Act of 1844, it might have been 22,500,000 l. In April, 1836, the circulation of the Bank wasl8,500,000 l. and its bullion 7,500,000 l. Under the law of 1844, the circulation might have been 21,000,000 l. Not to go through these eight disastrous months in detail, which might weary the House, look at the result—look at December, 1836, the last month in the fatal record of that year's returns. There was a circulation of 17,000,000 l., December 6th, and there was in the Bank 3,900,000 l.; according to the Act of 1844, the circulation might have been 17,900,000 l. With regard, then, to what was termed controlling the discretion of the Bank, it would not have been done by the Act of 1844, if it had been in existence; and therefore that Act would not have prevented the evil of 1836 —that year of great disaster and of drain. Now, how would it have prevented the evil of 1839? In April, 1839, the Bank securities were 26,600,000 l.; the bullion had fallen continuously from November, 1838, from 9,500,000 l. to 5,200,000 l. OH the 16th of May, the Bank raised its rate of discount to 5 per cent; and on the 20th of June, to 5½; on the 13th of July, the dead-weight was offered for sale; on the 1st of August, the Bank raised the rate of discount to 6 per cent. Here was a period of gloom—of disaster—of ruin; the period when we went, he would not say begging, to Prance, but when, by the agency of the French money market, the Bank was saved from stopping. Now, what would have

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been the effect if the law of 1844 had been in operation? In November, 1838, the circulation was 17,800,000 l., and there was 9,500,000 l. bullion in the Bank; the maximum limit of the law of 1844 would have added 14,000,000 l. to the 9,500,000 l. in settling the amount to which the circulation might go. On the 16th of May, 1839, when the Bank raised its discount to 5 per cent, the circulation was 18,300,000 l. and the bullion 4,100,000 l., and therefore, even at that time, according to the law of 1844, the circulation of the Bank would have been the same within 200,000 l. On the 13th of July, when the deadweight was offered for sale, the circulation was 18,600,000 l. and the bullion was 3,400,000 l.; and therefore, oven at that gloomiest day, the circulation would hardly have been above 1,000,000 l. less with the new Act. In November, the bullion in the Bank was 3,400,000 l. and the circulation 15,900,000 l.; it might under the new Act have been 17,400,000 l. As far, therefore, as concerned controlling what was called the discretion of the Bank, which we were told was one of the great virtues of the Act of 1844, it was perfectly clear that, had it been law in 1836 and 1839, it would have operated no sensible difference; and in many months of the greatest disaster and disorder it would have permitted the directors to issue a greater circulation than they really did. Now, take another point which, in the year 1844, was particularly pressed on the House, and promised to the country—the fluctuation of the amount of notes of the Bank of England in comparison to the amount of bullion in the Bank; had that important promise been fulfilled? Take the weekly return of the 21st of September, 1844, the third return after the passing of the Act. The bullion in the Bank was 15,100,000.l.; the circulation was 20,600,000 l. In the eighth weekly return the bullion was 14,000,000 l.; the circulation 22,300,000 l. While bullion to the amount of 1,100,000 l. had run out, the note circulation was not reduced, but increased by 1,700,000 l. Take the close of 1844, the year when this Act passed to insure that the fluctuation of the notes should bear a relation to the bullion in the coffers of the Bank; it would be found that the bullion rose slowly to the end of the year to 14,800,000 l., while the circulation fell more rapidly to 20,100,000 l. In January, 1845, the bullion was 14,800,000 l. and the circulation 20,600,000 l. Three months afterwards, on the 29th of March,
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the bullion had risen to 16,200,000 l., and the circulation remained exactly the same as in the beginning of the year; so that during three eventful months, in which the bullion increased 2,000,0002 l., the circulation remained precisely the same. Yet it was to insure a correspondence between the fluctuation of the notes and the amount of bullion in the Bank, that the Act of 1844 was principally recommended to the House. Take, now, the 14th of June, 1845; there were 16,600,000 l. of bullion, and the circulation was only 21,600,000 l. On the 29th of October the bullion had sunk to 14,000,000 l., but the circulation had risen to 23,300,000 l. Thus, the highest amount of circulation during the two years was when the bullion had been falling continuously for four months; while the bullion sunk 2,500,000 l., the circulation rose 2,000,000 l. Then, if this Act did not control the discretionary power of the Bank, nor regulate the fluctuation in the notes with the amount of the bullion— if it had failed during these three years in both objects, what advantages had we gained by it to counteract the inconvenience which had been brought before the House by the hon. Member for Huntingdon? They had been told that there was an unprecedented state of affairs in the city of London—if not impending bankruptcy, a state of affairs, as far as difficulty to meet their engagements was concerned, which had never been equalled; and this when all agreed that the state of trade was sound. They were told that the Bank of England would not assist commerce, because, although it had the means to do so, it was obliged by a law, passed in 1844, to keep a great amount of treasure in a particular department. At the same time, the House had seen that this law had entirely failed in the objects it was to accomplish; that it did not exercise a control over the discretionary power of the Bank; that they might have the same state of affairs to-morrow as under the old law; and that the Bank might enter into engagements to-morrow under this Act, which it might not be in its power to meet. They ran all this risk, and met the inconvenience and injury; and yet they were told that this Act of 1814 was to produce a machinery which would curb the discretion, the fatal discretion, of the Bank, and regulate the amount of notes in circulation by the amount of coin and bullion in the coffers of the Bank. They were to pay for those two great advantages dearly, it was sus-

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pected, at the time; most intensely it was now felt; but it would be some case for the author of that Bill, and for the Government which supported it, if the country obtained the advantages which were promised in 1844—if the Act did regulate the circulation by the bullion, and had the power of controlling the discretion of the managers of the Bank. But when they had not the power of controlling the discretion of the Bank for evil, were they, by this law, to control its discretion for good? That was the point for the House to consider, and that was the point the country must decide. They might find that our assent to this law was obtained on false pretences—of course, he meant proved so by experience—he did not use the word offensively; all he meant to say was, that it had proved a failure; it had not fulfilled what it promised to fulfil. But while the country was experiencing the greatest possible inconvenience and injury, let not the House be satisfied because the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Peel), or the right hon. Baronet opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), turned round and said, "True, you are experiencing this injury; true, you are suffering in your fortunes; but you forget the immense benefits we have gained for you by this Bill of 1844. Do you want the panic of 1836 or 1839 brought back?" The promise that the fluctuations would be regulated, had not been fulfilled; and there was nothing in the Act to prevent the exercise of that fatal discretion which was deprecated on the part of the Bank directors. The same disasters as in 1836 and 1839 would have occurred had it not existed, and the same losses would have been experienced. The latitude of the discretion allowed to the directors was the same. But it was said these were only the superficial views taken at the first moment of public suffering. He held a document in his hand, however, dated June 11, 1844, addressed to "the right hon. Sir Robert Peel, Bart., M. P.," by the bankers of London. It was very short, very pithy, and quite apropos to the present question. It was right the House should be reminded that the united bankers of London addressed this memorial to the Prime Minister:—
"We, the undersigned bankers of London, are induced by the importance of the measure and our interest in its success, to address you upon the subject of the Bank Charter Bill now before Parliament. We were led to believe, when the measure was first brought forward—and we feel confident it was generally understood throughout the
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country—that although it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government that the paper circulation of the Bank of England in their issue department, should be limited to an amount not exceeding 14,000,000 l. upon securities, yet, that in the event of any particular crisis arising, a power was to be reserved by the Bill enabling the Bank of England, with the consent of the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Master of the Mint, to extend their issue upon securities beyond that amount. It is with considerable surprise that we find that the Bill now before the House of Commons does not contain any provision for an extension of the issue beyond 14,000,000 l. upon securities, excepting under the special circumstances named in the fifth clause of the Bill now before Parliament. We are apprehensive that the absolute limitation of the issue to 14,000,000 l., without any power of expansion being reserved, whether that amount be in itself a proper amount or not, will create a general feeling of uneasiness throughout the country, and, by preventing the satisfactory reception of the measure, will deprive the scheme of many of the advantages it possesses, and interfere with its success. We respectfully submit that the effect of such an absolute limitation will be to restrict the business of the country, by leading to a general withdrawal of legitimate accommodation, unless some power be reserved by the Bill for extending the issue, with the sanction of the authorities above alluded to, in cases of emergency, to be made apparent to such authorities."
Who, did the House think, signed that document? Did they think it was even the two Members for Birmingham? Was it the Society for the Emancipation of Industry? Were they practical men, or mere theorists? The House would allow him to read the names, and they were names fitted to create a delightful feeling from their association with ideas of substantial opulence:—
"Robarts, Curtis and Co.; Hanbury, Taylor, and Lloyd; Bosanquet, Franks, and Co.; Brown, Janson, and Co.; Barclay, Bevan, Tritton, and Co.; Hankey and Co.; Smith, Payne, and Smiths; Willis, Percival, and Co.; Masterman, Peters, and Co.; Rogers, Olding, and Co.; Spooner, Att-wood, and Co.; Currie and Co.; Glyn, Halifax, Mills, and Co.; Williams and Co.; Fullers and Co.; Barnard, Dimsdale, Barnard, and Co.; Barnet, Hoares, and Co.; Lubbock, Forster, and Co.; Stevenson, Salt, and Sons; Price, Marryat, and Co.; Sapte, Banbury, and Co.; Weston and Co.; Twining and Co.; Dixon and Co.; Coutts and Co.; Herries, and Co.; Ransom and Co.; Strachan and Co.; Scott, and Co.; Cockburn and Co."
The signatures to this memorial representing the whole banking power of London was preceded by one which none of those whose names were subscribed would, he ventured to say, consider inferior to any that appeared; it was the signature of Jones, Loyd and Co. It appeared, however, that one member of this firm had written a pam-

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phlet; but, as its representations did not agree with the memorial, that name had been scratched out. Little did that gentleman think that his pamphlet would be turned into an Act of Parliament. Such was the fate of authors; truly it might be said of them that they ruled the world. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth would seem to convey an impression that some desire existed to adopt a course on which there could not be two opinions among sane and substantial men, as if Lord Ashburton or the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring) would set aside the settlement of 1819. He (Mr. Disraeli) thought it as well to remind the House—which liked opinions given by practical men—of the practical opinion of Lombard-street. There was not a firm omitted, not a banking-house unrepresented in that memorial, which in the present state of affairs might be looked upon as a prophecy. There was not one, he ventured to say, who was ashamed of having signed that memorial. All he asked of the right hon. Gentleman was, to answer the opinions of these men. It was not enough to get up, and in this agony of the credit of England raise a question worthy to be discussed by the schoolmen as to what was a pound. That was a question worthy of the Member for Birmingham and his disciples. The right hon. Gentleman had had private interviews and correspondence with the Birmingham school. Let him continue that if he pleased; but let him not mix such considerations with this discussion. What he was called upon to do was to answer Lombard-street. If the right hon. Gentleman's Bill had failed in all its objects—if the fears of the bankers of Lombard-street had been justified by events—it was for the right hon. Gentleman to show why they should endure the injury and inconvenience that measure entailed upon the country? One could wish that this or any country had a currency such as accorded with the idea of the right hon. Gentleman, who was himself, however, obliged to set out in his arrangements on a basis not only imaginary, but arbitrary. Where a perfect metallic basis could not be obtained, it must be made as solid and substantial as possible. But a terrible and most unmerited loss ought not to be entailed upon the people of England because it was pretended to do that which it would baffle any Minister to accomplish. If the right hon. Gentleman admitted in a certain degree an imaginary
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and arbitrary basis, it was a question of degree whether there ought not to be a power given under the system, such as that indicated by the bankers of Lombard-street, which might be exercised on a great exigency for the relief of commerce. When the exchanges were against this country in 1825, and means were taken to give temporary relief to commerce, was not the general loss then sustained but a drop in the ocean of suffering as compared with that ruin which adherence to a false policy might produce? Was not loss, in short, preferable to ruin? He (Mr. Disraeli) now left the question in the hands of the House. His argument was founded rather on the documents to which he had referred, than on any considerations suggested by his own reflections. He submitted the views he had stated with great diffidence; and any opinion he had given could be regarded only as a link to connect the facts he had placed before the House. But he hoped that in the face of those facts the House would Hot arrive at an opinion which involved an unbending adherence to that Act of 1844, which he had shown to be a great delusion; a reality only as regarded the treasure which was locked up in the department of issue; a reality only now when the public wanted that treasure to assist in the operations of commerce. It was indeed a measure under the operation of which it seemed as if they had locked their treasure in the coffers of the Bank, and thrown the key into the river Thames.
SIR R. PEEL: The hon. Gentleman stated towards the conclusion of his) speech that he left this question in the hands of the House. Now, unfortunately, the hon. Gentleman does no such thing; for it is quite impossible that the House can pronounce any opinion whatever. We are discussing the question of the currency in the most inconvenient form possible. The right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) makes a proposition of which I, for one, most cordially approve, and which I believe will meet with general concurrence from the House. An hon. Friend of mine, one of the Members for the city of London, attempts an Amendment; and he has not had an opportunity of putting it in the hands of the Chairman before he is told that there is an objection in point of form; and my hon. Friend modestly retires from the field. Therefore, it is impossible that the House can come to a satisfactory conclusion in regard to the subject which has

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been submitted to its consideration in the course of debate. Before, Sir, the House forms an opinion on the propriety of taking some new course with respect to the currency, I hope that it will take warning from that which has occurred during the present debate. If this Act of 1844 be really so defective as it is alleged to be, it is extraordinary that there should be no approach to unanimity as to the defects of the measure. And I ask the House to consider whether the real object in view be merely some small modification of the Act of 1844, or whether many of those who press for the small modification of detail, do not expect to open a door to an infraction of the principle on which that Act was founded? Let me review the course of the present debate. My hon. Friend led the discussion; and all he proposes is, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should give an assurance that he won't borrow from the Bank on a deficiency. [Mr. MASTERMAN: From the banking department.] My hon. Friend says, if the right hon. Gentleman can give him that assurance, it will restore confidence in the City, and tend to relieve the pressure on the money market. But that is a very small measure. Supposing, however, the right hon. Gentleman is able to give him the assurance, that in July he will not require any assistance from the Bank, my hon. Friend would be content to permit the Bill of 1844 to remain in force. My hon. Friend thinks that the Government would act wisely in taking the course most likely to enable them to dispense with the aid of the Bank when the next quarter's dividend becomes due. He who leads the city bankers has no other proposition to make than that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should give an assurance that he won't ask the Bank for temporary assistance. In the event of its being necessary, my hon. Friend desires that for this purpose the Bank of England should be allowed to issue additional notes to the amount of deficiency bills. [Mr. MASTERMAN: Out of the issue department.] Out of the issue department! That is a different proposal from what was submitted by my hon. Friend.
MR. MASTERMANwished to be allowed to explain what his proposal really was. It was this—that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should apply to Parliament for power to enable the Bank to take money out of the issue department, and allow it to be replaced by the growing revenue,
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leaving the banking department to manage itself.
SIR R. PEEL: I thought I heard from my hon. Friend that it would be desirable that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should give an assurance to the House that he would not borrow money from the Bank for the purpose of paying the dividends. [Mr. MASTERMAN: From the banking department.] Yes, the banking department; decidedly so. There was nothing in the proposal of my hon. Friend, as I understood it, whatever object he may have contemplated, with respect to issuing notes from the issue department. Then followed the hon. Member for Montrose—
MR. MASTERMAN: I must say a word as to what I really did propose, for it does not seem to be properly understood. What I actually did say was, that I thought the proposal submitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer would tend to alleviate the inconvenience now felt by the public. I did not say that it was the best measure that could be adopted; but I did conceive that a modified measure of that kind, going forth with the authority of this House, would be extremely desirable under the pressure now existing. My object in the proposal which I made, was to remove any demand of the banking department upon the issue department, and to leave the Bank to act upon its own idea of what was right and proper for the national interest; for I conceived that the Bank had no power under this restricted Bill to grant accommodation to the Chancellor of the Exchequer without incommoding the public.
SIR R. PEEL: My hon. Friend has confirmed my impression, that he would be satisfied if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give an assurance that he would not require aid from the Bank to pay the July dividends. I now understand that if the aid had been given, my hon. Friend wished it to be given from the issue department. Then came the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). His proposal was this, that there should be unlimited competition in respect to banking. [Mr. HUME: Free trade.] That there should be free trade in banking—that the country banks should be allowed to issue five-pound notes to any amount—but that they should be required to pay their notes in gold. I beg to say that I do not think the adoption of that proposal would have any tendency to diminish the present pressure. The hon.

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Member is satisfied with the general principle of the currency; he only objects to the country banks being restricted in their accommodation, and in there not being imposed upon them the necessity of paying their notes in gold. There was next the proposal of the hon. Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Brown). That hon. Member proposed that the Bank of England should be permitted for a limited period to issue 1l. notes, and that they should hereafter be withdrawn. He may depend upon it, that after permission shall have been once given to the Bank of England to issue 1l. notes in lieu of gold, he would find it exceedingly difficult to persuade the House to retrace its steps, to recall the 1l. notes, and again to have a gold circulation distributed throughout the country. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rutland admitted that his object is an inconvertible paper currency; he says he would have a limitation of the amount, but that he is in favour of inconvertible paper. Such was the third proposal. Then came the fourth —that of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwickshire. The hon. Gentleman says distinctly—"What I most deprecate is any palliative or partial measure; the Act of 1844, which I admit is a necessary complement of the Act of 1819, is a miserable delusion."
MR. NEWDEGATE: I distinctly stated that that was the answer the right hon. Baronet gave me in reply to a question put by me in 1844; and as he deemed it a necessary complement, I will so take it on his authority.
SIR R. PEEL: Did not the hon. Gentleman say that the repeal of the Act of 1844 alone would he merely delusive; and that any attempt to enforce the standard imposed by the Act of 1819 was utterly impossible? Did he not say that the country could not bear the standard of 1819, and that some new one was necessary?
MR. NEWDEGATE: I said that the proposition of the hon. Member for Montrose, for a strictly convertible paper currency, was incompatible with the standard at present adopted.
SIR R. PEEL: Does the hon. Gentleman then admit that the standard of 1819 can be maintained? Did he not say that he had often heard that it was now too late to redress the injury done in 1819? And did he not ask whether the adoption of the standard of 1819 had not added to the public burdens—whether the children
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at least of those who suffered m 1819 did not remain—whether it was too late to bring consolation to them; and that for that purpose we must revise the standard of 1819?
MR. NEWDEGATE: I stated that I had heard it said that the injury inflicted upon the sufferers of 1819 was merely temporary, and that it fell with them; but I said I did not believe it.
SIR R. PEEL: I think we are approaching much nearer to an understanding of each other. I must observe, that when arguments which fall upon the car are brought forth again without the rhetorical advantage given to them by the speakers, but are simply presented to them bare of such ornament, the speakers themselves often regard them with repugnance. In such cases, the arguments are no longer obscured by rhetorical artifice. I rejoice that the hon. Gentleman is in favour of the standard of 1819—at least that the hon. Gentleman occupies an intermediate position between an unwillingness to adhere to the standard of 1819, and a readiness to alter it. The last proposal was made by the noble Lord (Lord G. Bentinck), and supported by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, and it is one for a repeal or modification of the Act of 1844, as they think that the evils which we undergo would be remedied by a repeal, or at least a material alteration, of that Act. But, before determining that the repeal or modification of the Act of 1844 will provide a remedy, let us well consider what is the nature of the evil under which this country is at present suffering; let us well consider whether or no, in our desire to attain some immediate present relief, we are not incurring the risk of subsequent aggravation of that evil by an alteration of the principle and practice of our currency. Now, I do not want any better description of the present condition of this country, and of the real nature of the pressure under which we labour, than that which I find in the able and unexceptionable statement of the hon. Member for Huntingdon. I will take his own facts. He says this country is suffering from an unparalelled scarcity of food. A calamity upon which none of us calculated has afflicted us. It has been alleged, on official authority, that the loss of capital in consequence of the total loss of the potato crop, and the partial failure of other crops and articles of subsistence for man in this country and in Ireland, has not been less than

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16,000,000 l. Why, it is difficult to estimate what must be the effect of an abstraction of capital in one year to the amount of 16,000,000 l.; but, above all, when that abstraction of capital is caused by such a calamity as a scarcity of food. This calamity of a loss of food has come unawares on every country in the northern part of Europe. How it is that so little calculation should have been made at an early period of the last autumn, I know not. Whether or no the same atmospheric influence—if atmospheric influence it be—that caused the failure of the potato, has affected other vegetable substances, we cannot tell; what we know is, that in this country and in other countries of Europe, even after harvest had been carried, there appeared to be no foreboding of the extent of the calamity. Those countries from which in ordinary years we draw supplies, are themselves suffering from extreme scarcity of food. France, and Holland, and Belgium, and the countries on the banks of the Rhine, are sustaining extreme pressure on this account. Even in the northern parts of Europe, wherein, tempted by extravagant prices, they parted with their food, the pressure is becoming exceedingly great. They find that the contributions they made towards the supply of this country and France have caused a severe pressure upon themselves; and we are, therefore, in this condition, that, not only are we suffering by a loss of food leading to a destruction of capital to the amount of 16,000,000 l., but, concurrently with that misfortune, a similar misfortune has visited every country in Northern Europe; and all are looking to the United States as the only source whence food can be derived. What effect must not that have had in paralysing our trade, in deranging our commercial speculations, and depriving us of the ordinary markets for our exports? Do not tell us of the failure of free trade. Has free trade had its fair trial in such a condition of Europe? Is it not clear that the capability of this country and of other countries to consume superfluities has been materially contracted by the superior necessity of devoting their resources to the supply of bread? Customers here and in the other countries of Europe have been compelled to devote their surplus revenue to the necessity of procuring food. But then, says the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Baring), there never was a year in which speculation was so rife as in 1845. Well, but if men will speculate and run riot, depend
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upon it that whatever legislative measure you may pass respecting the currency, they will inevitably suffer the consequence of running riot. He says, "I do not deny the great importance of railways—I admit that railways may be the foundation of future prosperity; but this I say, that if the capital of the country ordinarily applied to commerce is, to an extraordinary amount, locked up in railways, then the country will suffer great pressure in consequence." Thus, in addition to the failure in food, you have had speculation running riot, and such an investment in railways that in the course of last year applications were made to Parliament, which, if all acceded to, would have required 340,000,000 l. to meet the engagements. But there is another cause concurrent with these—there has been a failure in that most important material of manufacture, cotton. The cotton crop has fallen short beyond calculation, and the consequence has been an enormous increase in the price of that raw material, which enters so largely as an element of our manufactures. We are suffering then, according to the hon. Gentleman—for I am taking his facts—from a deficient supply of food; from very rife speculation; from an extravagant application of capital to railways; and from a decrease in the quantity and an increase in the price of cotton—an article of the first importance to our manufactures. How absurd to throw the blame of these things on the Bill of 1844? If you had an inconvertible paper currency or a purely metallic currency, or any modification of paper and metal that you can fancy, depend upon it no commercial country can be exposed to the triple operation of three such calamities without feeling the utmost pressure—one for which an increase of bank notes will be no remedy. Therefore, Sir, while I assure the noble Lord that I adhere to the sentiment he heard me express, namely, that I should think it utterly unworthy of a public man to be swayed by considerations of mere personal consistency on such a question— though I should think it unworthy of me to throw any impediment on that account in the way of the Government if it think right to propose a modification of the Act of 1844—though I should claim the same privilege as I exercised with respect to the Corn Bill, and, if experience convinced me that the interests of the country required a modification of laws I myself had proposed, I should willingly set the example of

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proposing that modification; yet I must first be satisfied such modification is a remedy for the evil endured. Let us consider the circumstances under which this Act was passed in 1844. The Bank Charter was about to expire, and it became necessary to make some new regulations in consequence. The regulations proposed by me were not adopted without five years of continued inquiries before Committees. First, there was the Committee on Joint Stock Banks in 1838 and 1839; then there was the Committee which, without making any distinct report, gave evidence of the highest authority, on which the Act of 1844 was founded. And was that Act of 1844 a mere speculative improvement of the currency, without any experience of past evils? The hon. Member for Warwickshire says, in 1819 I gave a flourishing account of the state of the country; that I dwelt on the triumphs of our arms; that I recommended, under all our difficulties, a strict adherence to good faith. Why did I do that? As an inducement to Parliament, which had contracted debts with the public creditor under an engagement that on the return of peace cash payments should be resumed, according to the ancient standard, to fulfil that engagement with a scrupulous, though inconvenient, adherence to public faith. But has not the hon. Gentleman, in the ardour of the attack he has directed against this Bill, forgotten some of the events in the history of the currency prior to the period of its passing? Has he read the history of the years 1814, 1815, and 1816? Is he aware that during that period, when we had an inconvertible paper currency, 240 private banks failed in this country? And why did they fail? Because, on a return to peace, nay, the prospect of that peace, there was the collapse which was sure to occur after we had had possession of the trade of the world, and had been indulging in all the luxury of an inconvertible paper currency. Without any intervention on my part, owing to the altered position of trade, there had occurred a state of things to which the present calamity, great as it is, is not to be compared. It is proposed to repeal this Act of 1844. Are we to restore the law to what it was before the passing of that Bill? There will then be an unlimited right of issue on the part of country banks; there will be a power on the part of the Bank of England to issue notes at its own discretion. Is that to be the state of the law for the future? The hon. Gentleman has told
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us what took place in 1837 and 1838; he said the country was then brought to the verge of ruin. But repeal the Act of 1844, and you will restore the state of the law as it existed at that very period. It gave no security. The Bank had the power of issuing paper without reference to the exchanges; the bullion was reduced to l,600,000 l. in gold, and there was every prospect of the Bank not being able to fulfil its engagements. Always bear in mind, if you do consent to repeal the Act of 1844, you restore the old order of things, and have not the slightest security against a recurrence of the disorders that took place in 1838 and 1839. But the object of the Act of 1844 has been greatly misunderstood. The main object of that Act was to insure the convertibility of paper into gold, and to prevent, in times of difficulty and distress, the temptation to which it is so easy to yield, of giving accommodation, of issuing paper without reference to the exchanges, of purchasing temporary ease, and afterwards aggravating the commercial pressure by a panic which leads to a demand of gold in exchange for paper. It is of the utmost importance that in these periods of commercial difficulty we should not be exposed to that other difficulty which aggravates the first—a demand on the Bank for gold, in consequence of doubts of its ability to pay its notes in gold. It cannot be denied that, by the Act of 1844, this object has been attained. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring) says, there is now not the least panic—there is no doubt whatever of the solvency of the Bank—no wish to have gold in exchange for paper—and that the pressure is caused by undue apprehension. But what would be the state of things now if a panic, in consequence of doubts as to the solvency of the Bank, were superinduced upon the pressure the hon. Gentleman describes? What would have been the state of things if that Act of 1844 had not been passed? Suppose there had been on the part of every country bank, while this riotous speculation in railways prevailed, a power of fostering it by uncontrolled issues of paper? Would the state of affairs be as advantageous as it is? Severe as I admit the pressure to be, and deeply as I regret it, yet can any man deny that the Act of 1844, controlling the issues by country banks in a time of rash speculation, affords security for ultimate solvency? Is it not highly probable that without that check, speculation, even now admitted to have run riot, would

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have nearly precipitated us to the verge of ruin? It is said that the object of the Act of 1844 was to supply a machine that would work by itself, and require no discretion whatever in those who had to deal with its operation. That is perfectly true with respect to the issue department of the Bank. The issue department of the Bank is a machine that acts of itself. I almost regret that it was not separated altogether from the Bank, and trusted to other hands. Then the supposed confusion between two departments would have deceived no one. It was perfectly open to have established a Government board, by which the issue of notes might have been conducted; in that case the issue of notes would precisely correspond with the deposit of gold. There would be a machine perfectly simple in its operation, requiring no intellect or discretion in the management of it. As it is, the Bank of England has the issue as well as the banking department. It was thought advisable not to incur the additional expense necessary for the support of a separate issue department under the control of the Government. The hon. Member for Shrewsbury says, we have no right to criticise the conduct of the Bank of England. How can the House of Commons maintain such a doctrine with regard to such an institution? Who can deny the influence which the Bank of England must exercise over the circulation and currency of the country? The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Baring) does not agree with the hon. Member for Shrewsbury. He draws a totally different conclusion from the Member for Shrewsbury with respect to the conduct of the Bank of England in August last. The Member for Huntingdon, who, I apprehend, is a higher authority on questions of this kind than the Member for Shrewsbury, quite disapproves of the conduct of the Bank in lowering the rate of interest in August last. As to the right of criticism on the conduct of the Bank at that period, I leave the hon. Gentleman to settle the question with the Member for Shrewsbury. I never complained of the conduct of the Bank in August. What I said was, that for three months, from the 1st of January, 1847, there had been a continuous drain of gold; and I ventured to express a serious doubt whether a great part of the subsequent pressure might not have been obviated if the Bank had not continued to discount at 4 per cent during those three months, when a full knowledge of the extent of the cala-
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mity in Ireland must have become known, and when a continuous drain of gold was taking place. The hon. Gentleman told us what the Bank had done in 1837, 1838, and 1839; and he ventured to utter—not, indeed, a prophecy—but to give us an assurance that, if the Act of 1844 had been in force in the years 1838 and 1839, not one of the difficulties of those times would have been obviated; for that the Bank would have had unlimited authority to issue a greater number of notes than they did issue at that time. It is exceedingly difficult to say what would have been the conduct of the Bank under an Act which passed five or six years afterwards; but there is one material circumstance which the hon. Gentleman altogether omitted from his notice— that is, the state of the country circulation at former periods of commercial pressure and hazard to the Bank. I will briefly refer to the state of the country circulation at those periods. I will begin with November, 1823. In November, 1823, the bullion in the possession of the Bank was 13,760,00 l.; in November, 1825, it was reduced to 3,012,000 l.; but it is estimated that between November 1823, and November 1825, the whole bullion having been reduced from thirteen millions to three, the amount of the country bank circulation was increased from four millions to eight. Again, on the 1st of January, 1834, the bullion in the Bank amounted to 9,948,000 l.; but between that day and the 1st of January, 1837, a diminution in the amount had taken place, which brought it to 4,000,000 l., whilst the country bank circulation, instead of undergoing any corresponding reduction, had increased from ten millions in 1834, to eleven millions in 1837. In the middle of August, 1836, when you were upon the verge of a crisis, the country bank circulation was actually twelve millions. In January, 1838, the bullion in the Bank amounted to 9,722,0002 l.; in June, 1839, it had been reduced to 4,344,000 l.; and the country bank circulation, instead of being diminished, had again increased. It amounted to 11,740,000 l., when the Bank had ten millions of bullion, and it was increased to 12,725,000 l. when the Bank had only 4,300,000 l. The Act of 1844 was expressly intended to prevent the evils of an increase in the country bank circulation, concurrently with a diminution in the amount of the precious metals. And what was the purpose of this? Why, no other than to give to the Bank of England a greater control over the paper

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currency of the country. The Bank of England not subject to criticism! I can bear testimony to the high honour and strict integrity which have influenced the directors; but the Bank is a national institution. It holds great privileges and monopolies. It has an exclusive circulation within sixty-five miles of London. The circulation of country bankers is expressly excluded from that district. They are prevented from entering into competition with the Bank of England. Why? In order that the Bank might have more complete control over the circulation. To hold, then, that the Bank of England has a perfect right to issue what it pleases, without reference to the state of the exchanges, and to be exempt from all questions in Parliament, appears to me a dangerous error. The Bank itself will tell you it has material influence, and will acknowledge that confidence was placed in its discretion and judgment by the Act of 1844—that it cannot regulate its concerns with reference to the temporary interest of the proprietors. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon took a more correct view when he held that the Bank of England had the power to influence the circulation, and to affect the trading concerns of the country. Although the issue department provides for the variations of the issue of notes, in conformity with the efflux or influx of gold, and although the law imposes no rule upon the Bank in respect to the banking department to which it must necessarily conform, yet Parliament trusted that the Bank, without compulsion, would adopt right principles—would not derange the monetary system of the country by improvident issues. This was the object of the Bank Act of 1844. The memorial of the London bankers which has been referred to, was fully before Parliament in the year 1844. The hon. Member asks why did we not act upon that memorial, and give to the Government the power of authorizing, under special circumstances, increased issues by the Bank? We considered that the main object of the Act of 1844 would have been defeated by knowledge on the part of the public that the Government possessed the discretionary power of interference. Suppose the First Lord of the Treasury, the Master of the Mint, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, possessed the power of directing that the Bank should issue 3,000,000 l. of additional paper money, the moment the least pressure was felt, ap-
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plication would be made for the exercise of that power; the precautions which individuals ought to take, would be neglected; and every mere temporary pressure would be declared irremediable otherwise than by an exercise of the power so possessed by the Government. We declined to accept that power, not from any unwillingness to undertake the responsibility, but because we thought that Parliament— and Parliament alone—ought to exercise the authority to relax that which Parliament had enacted. After the fullest consideration we felt that it was a power which Government ought not to assume. When the Act of 1844 was passed, Parliament was more alive, in the absence of all control, than it now is, after control has been established, to the evils of unrestricted competition in banking. They had before them the consequences of such competition both in this country and in the United States, and gave a ready assent to the restraints imposed by the Act of 1844.
On the whole, I approve of the course that the Government is now taking; at the same time, I cannot help feeling some apprehension—the rise in the price of corn which has this day been announced, is, in every point of view, most painful. Do not suppose that I am not alive to the pressure, which, I regret to say, is not confined to this country. I greatly fear the effect of the increased pressure, though I am glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer that there is a prospect of improvement; at the same time, I regret to learn from other quarters that some money transactions have occasioned considerable embarrassment. I admit it to be a subject for deep and serious reflection. I further admit that no pedantic and rigid adherence to any principle ought to prevent us from considering the subject fully in all its bearings. If I myself thought that any relaxation of this Bill would be a cure for the evils which press upon us, I repeat that I would not oppose its relaxation on account of the part which I took in introducing that measure to Parliament; but it is my firm belief—founded upon the information at present in my possession— that a temporary issue of some 2,000,000 l. of paper would not increase that capital which, in point of fact, is the source from which you can command the produce of other countries. My great apprehension is, that by any such relaxation of the Bill by issuing notes on Exchequer-bills—by

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permitting the Bank to issue notes on paper security—we should purchase temporary relief from pressure at the risk of aggravating the very evils from which we are endeavouring to escape. The European exchanges are slightly in our favour; the gradual, I believe I may say, the daily, influx of gold, is tending to give security and confidence to the Bank. It will enable it to give further accommodation to the public, which I trust it will, under the circumstances, extend to the very verge of the power it possesses. But diminish that confidence—turn the exchanges against you—let the Bank feel that its own position is in danger—that the convertibility of its notes is doubtful— then the Bank will have to consult, not only its own security—for that would be a subordinate consideration—but the permanent welfare of the country, by securing at any hazard that great object, the convertibility of paper into gold. You think it would be easy for the Bank to part with the gold which it has in its possession at present, and which amounts to about 10,000,000 l. There is, most fortunately, though it may be an expense to the country—great expense—to maintain it, a gold circulation to the amount of some thirty or forty millions. This gold circulation, diffused throughout this part of the empire at least, is, I believe, the foundation of the security of the Scotch and Irish banks. Gold is an expensive circulating medium, I admit; gold is capital, and in that respect differs from inconvertible Bank paper. If you choose, under the apprehension of a temporary pressure, to part with your gold, you may, no doubt, command the produce of foreign countries in return; but if that system be good for you, it is good for every other country. The hon. Member for Huntingdon has said that France has not suffered in the same proportion as we have. The metallic circulation of France compared with the paper is said to be as 80 to 30. Suppose the case reversed— suppose the paper circulation of France to be to the circulation of coin as 80 to 30 —do you think that the Minister of that country would have felt the same confidence in maintaining the public credit and the monetary system of France as he has recently exhibited? Expensive, therefore, though a gold circulation be, it yet gives security against that greatest of evils—the demand for gold on account of internal panic. My humble advice to you is, that you will not, in aiming
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to secure some temporary pecuniary advantage, issue 1l. notes in place of sovereigns. I hope that we shall be enabled to pass through our present difficulties; and that, without some overwhelming proof of a paramount necessity which would deprive you of all discretion, you will not consent to tamper with the principle which we had the greatest difficulty in re-establishing, after our long experience of the evils resulting from its abandonment between 1797 and 1819. Depend upon it, if you attempt to purchase present relief by endangering the convertibility of paper, you will inflict a severe blow on the prosperity of this country; you will shake all confidence in the medium of exchange; and depreciate the value of property. It will be an act utterly inconsistent with past experience, and altogether unworthy of the character you have hitherto maintained, if, in order to escape from a temporary pressure, you relinquish an advantage which is essential to the welfare of all classes of the community, and, above all, of that class which, by the certainty and fixedness of the circulating medium, is assured of a command over the necessaries of life, proportionate to the wages of labour.
The MARQUESS of GRANBY The MARQUESS of GRANBY moved that the debate be adjourned.
LORD J. RUSSELLhoped the noble Lord would not press his Motion. There were several stages of the measure in which the discussion might be renewed; but he feared that, if the resolution were not agreed to that night, the measure could not be carried through before the Whitsuntide holidays.
LORD G. BENTINCKsaid, that the country took the greatest interest in the discussion, and attached more importance to it than they did to the vote itself. It was perfectly understood that the measure involved in the resolution would be adopted; and his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer might almost act as if the resolution was passed. He knew that many Members wished to take part in the discussion; and, under these circumstances, he could not consent to the withdrawal of the Motion.
LORD J. RUSSELLsaid, that his hon. Colleague, the Member for the city of London, objected to the Bank being called upon for a loan on account of deficiency bills. That event was much less likely to occur if the measure should pass before Whitsuntide; and, therefore, he hoped his

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hon. Colleague would use his influence with the noble Lord to induce him to withdraw his Motion.
Resolutions agreed to.
House resumed.

HEALTH OF TOWNS BILL.
On the Order of the Day for the Second Reading of the Health of Towns Bill,
VISCOUNT MORPETHsaid, that he would take that opportunity of stating what the intentions of Her Majesty's Government were with respect to this Bill. He should say that every communication which he received convinced him more and more, not only of the propriety but of the necessity of this measure; and nothing could be more acceptable to him than to think that the House could devote sufficient time for the consideration and adoption of the entire measure. However, other subjects—he would not say of greater importance, for nothing could be of greater importance than the efficient maintenance of the public health in the towns of this country; but other subjects of more immediate pressure, owing to their sudden emergency—had occupied a great portion of the time of the House during this Session, and promised to occupy still more of it. Under these circumstances he had received a communication from the Health of Towns Association—a body composed of gentlemen who devoted all their time and their efforts to the promotion of the public health; and in it they represented to him how desirable it was that something should be done—that some beginning should be made this Session towards carrying out the desirable object which they had in view, and also that it would be a pity to risk the danger of not doing anything by trying to bind the House to give its attention to the more complicated and controverted parts of the measure. In accordance with that opinion, and concurring as it did in his own views on the matter, he was disposed to ask the House to agree in the course of the present occasion in the following parts of the Bill. He would propose to confine the positive application of the Bill to the county corporate towns of England and Wales—to those towns that were made subject to the Municipal Reform Act, and that already possessed regularly constituted bodies, to which the new powers and functions created under this Bill could be applied. They would allow other towns to obtain the benefit of a participation in the Act on petition to the Privy Council; and here he
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might add, that the Government were willing to drop that part of the measure which reserved to the Crown the nomination of one-third of the commissioners. They would not include the metropolis in the Bill, not that it did not want improvement, but because, acting on the warning which he had received from the noble Lord opposite, the Member for Falkirk (the Earl of Lincoln), he thought it was complicated and difficult enough to warrant them in proceeding, with regard to it, by a separate Bill. With regard to gas works, they would propose in the Bill to give power to the commissioners to construct gas works; but only in towns where such works did not exist before; and also to contract with existing gas companies. They proposed, also, giving the commissioners power to construct water works, and to lease existing water works. It was proposed to value property under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act; and they would reserve to a future Session the right of addressing themselves to the remaining parts of the subject when they should have more leisure to devote to it. Under these circumstances, perhaps, the House would allow the Bill to be now read a second time for the purpose of having it committed pro formâ and reprinted, and he should not afterwards propose to take any other step with regard to it until after the Whitsuntide holidays.
Second reading deferred.
House adjourned at a quarter past One o'clock.

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Threatening Letters, &c.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. From Dissenters of Buckingham and other places, against the proposed Government Plan of Education—From Monaghan, that Assessments for the Relief of the Poor in Ireland may be charged on the Unions at large.—From Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Winchester, for the Enactment of Sanitory Regulations.— From Drogheda, against the Reduction of Duty on Colonial Spirits.—From Geashill, King's County, for the Restoration of the Bishoprick of Kildare.—From Clergy of the Diocese of Ardagh, complaining of certain Provisions in the Poor Relief (Ireland) Bill, and praying for the Introduction of a Clause for their Relief.—From Waddesden and Buckingham, for Alteration of the Law of Settlement.—From Guardians of the Carrickmacross Union, against the Clauses in the Poor Relief (Ireland) Bill constituting Justices of the Peace ex-officio Guardians.—From Beverley and Tickton, against Sunday Travelling on Railways.—From Bolton-le-Moors, for the Better Observance of the Sabbath, and for the closing of Public Houses on that day.—From Liverpool, in favour of the Government Plan of Education.

POOR RELIEF (IRELAND) BILL.
House again in Committee.
On Clause 20 being read,
LORD STANLEYasked whether the Government would object to give power to the Poor Law Commissioners to alter the boundaries of electoral divisions as well as of unions?
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEdoubted whether Clause 18 of the 1st & 2nd of Victoria did not give sufficient power to alter electoral divisions; and he doubted the expediency of the re-enactment of that clause in another shape, or giving fresh powers.
LORD BROUGHAMcalled the attention of the House to the original Settlement Act of the 13th & 14th of Charles II., to show how much the present state of Ireland resembled the state of England at that time, and the mischief then experienced from the great extent of parishes.
The EARL of WICKLOWthen moved as an Amendment, to insert the words—
"That it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners, when they shall see fit, to form into separate electoral divisions towns with a population of 3,000 and upwards."
One of the greatest of injustices would be to throw upon the towns the burden of the surrounding districts. He did not insist upon the exercise of the power; he only gave it.
LORD MONTEAGLEhad a prior Amendment, to introduce words showing for what purposes alone the electoral districts should be altered.
LORD CAMPBELLobjected to any words which would appear to limit the Act, as a preamble often did, mischievously.
EARL GREYsaid, that the Poor Law Commissioners already had the power to alter and extend or diminish the electoral divisions, as they might think fit; and he thought it a wise rule not to renew the power in other terms, lest it might lead to ambiguity and misconstruction.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEwas of opinion that the Amendment would have no effect at all; but that, if it did, it would be restrictive of the power which the Commissioners already possessed; and he certainly was opposed to any such restriction.
EARL PITZWILLIAMdid not believe that the Commissioners would exercise their power in the mode proposed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Wicklow). Why should the support of the poor fall upon the electoral division, and not upon the union at large? Nay, why not upon the whole kingdom? This was a most important question, and it was one which made him think that their Lordships would have acted most unwisely if they had made the Bill permanent.
The MARQUESS of CLANRICARDEsaid, the clause, as it stood, left to the

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Commissioners the power which they already possessed, of altering the size of the electoral unions as they should think fit; Tout the Amendment pointed out to them certain cases in which that power ought to be exercised. If the Legislature, after having given a discretion to the Commissioners to act as they thought fit, were to attempt to point out in detail the cases in which that discretion should he exercised, then, instead of the introduction of a few words like those in the Amendment of the noble Earl being sufficient, it would he necessary for them to insert a complete schedule. For this reason, he considered it better to leave the whole matter to the discretion of the Commissioners.
Amendment negatived.
The EARL of WICKLOWsaid, he had another Amendment to propose, and which he wished to be inserted at the end of the clause, to this effect:—
"Provided, nevertheless, that nothing herein contained shall empower the Poor Law Commissioners to alter any union of electoral divisions without the consent and approval of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland."
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsuggested that the noble Earl should postpone the Amendment to a subsequent period of the debate, or to the bringing up of the report.
Amendment withdrawn.
Clause agreed to.
Clauses 21, 22, and 23, agreed to.
On Clause 24, which enacts that schools shall be established for the North and South Dublin Unions,
LORD MONTEAGLEmade a proposition that the Poor Law Commissioners should combine or make a union of unions for the purposes of education, and should establish school houses in which the children might be provided for; and that an education of industry should be superadded to the ordinary branches of education.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEwas understood to say, that he had not the least hesitation in acknowledging the value of the suggestion made by the noble Lord, and would promise that the subject should be taken into immediate consideration.
Clause agreed to.
The other clauses having been agreed to, and the Bill having passed through Committee,
LORD STANLEY: My Lords, I think this is the most convenient time at which I can place before your Lordships for consideration the important Amendments of
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which I have given notice. I am quite sure that in proceeding to the consideration and discussion of this most momentous subject, your Lordships will approach it without partiality and without any bias of mind, or any reference whatever to those misapprehensions and misrepresentations which have been industriously circulated, with regard to the effects which this clause will have, and also with respect to the motives which led to its introduction—that you will not pause to consider whether the vote which I ask you to give is a vote which will confer upon you a momentary popularity or the reverse—that you will not be influenced by those insinuations which have been very liberally thrown out with regard to the probable political consequences of your Lordships' adoption of this course—but that you will deal fairly, manfully, and independently with the propositions which I have the honour to submit to your notice. It has been said that this Amendment I propose is a landlord's Amendment. I deny that altogether. I should be ashamed of myself if, connected as I am with Irish property, I submitted for your Lordships' consideration a clause intended for, or calculated exclusively, or even primarily, to benefit that class to which I myself belong. I should be yet more ashamed of myself if that advantage was to be purchased by any corresponding disadvantage to any other class in society. But, my Lords, my firm conviction is, that so far from being a landlord's Amendment, if it be for the profit of one section above another, it is a labourer's and not a landlord's Amendment. The object which I have in view, and which I am sure your Lordships will have in view, is, not the promotion of the interests of any particular class, but how best to conduct this perilous experiment on which we are now called upon to enter—how best we can steer clear of those difficulties and dangers attending a measure which we are asked to enter upon, and upon which you have decided—and, notwithstanding all the objections, and difficulties, and dangers, I think wisely decided—to enter; and this can be only done by calmly, deliberately, and impartially considering how best we can make the property of Ireland able to bear the heavy burden we are about to throw upon it, by enabling it to maintain those labourers whom we desire to rescue from their present distress. I am not deterred, therefore, by any of the considerations to which I have referred from sub-

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mitting this Amendment to your Lordships, which in my conscience I believe is necessary for the safe working of this great measure. I am not even deterred from submitting this question to your consideration by the rather unusual announcement— by that extraordinary message—from the House of Commons which was conveyed to you this evening by my noble Friend on the cross benches, who, in order to influence and regulate your Lordships' decision upon this question, thought it necessary to state that the Earl of Lincoln had changed his mind. My Lords, undoubtedly recent events have made it particularly convenient that when there is any general change of opinion in the House of Commons—a change en masse—an intimation of the same should be forthwith conveyed to your Lordships; but I confess that, with the most unfeigned respect for my noble Friend on the cross benches, and for my noble Friend to whom the allusion is made, I am not in the least affected by that announcement, nor am I at all scrupulous, notwithstanding its importance, to call upon your Lordships to throw out of consideration altogether the fact that the Earl of Lincoln, who voted for a similar clause on a previous occasion, is prepared to give a different vote if the subject again be submitted to his notice. Nor am I deterred from bringing this subject forward by that which has much greater weight on my mind, the objection of my noble and learned Friend, who is not now in his place (Lord Brougham), and also the decided objection of the noble Marquess opposite. I am not deterred, because I think my noble and learned Friend upon this side of the House argued against the clauses upon that which I think rather an objection to the measure itself, than to the clauses; nor by the noble Marquess, because, I think, that, in stating the grounds of his objection to this clause, he propounded a principle most dangerous in an assembly of public men—namely, that we must legislate, not upon principles, but upon "impressions;" and that the "impression" which would be produced by the adoption of this clause would be inimical to its satisfactory operation. I think the noble Marquess was very unwise in that declaration; for, my Lords, I need hardly tell you, that it is not "impressions" we are to look to, but we must consider effects and consequences. We must, in our legislation, have in view, not a momentary popularity—not the gratification
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of "impressions," but that which will be best and safest for the country. I feel convinced that unless you adopt the principle of this Amendment which I submit to your Lordships, you cannot hope that this experiment will terminate but in disastrous and ruinous results. I ask of your Lordships to deal with Irish property as you would deem it safe to deal with English. I know the great body of your Lordships are unconnected by property with Ireland; but you will, nevertheless, do your duty by that country; and I ask you with confidence, whether you would dare to propose or attempt to carry into effect a Poor Law for England based upon the principles of this Poor Law, although there would be so many safeguards in England against its abuse which it is universally admitted do not exist in Ireland? If you cannot, then, with what reason—with what hope—can you anticipate success, or, in short, anything but miscarriage, for a law which you could not and would not venture to impose upon England? Before you sanction such a Bill as this, you must, at all events, show me that this experiment, which would be dangerous in England, will be safe in Ireland. Point out to me the particular circumstances which make a law that would be liable to gross abuse even in England, not so in Ireland; and you must do so before you can withhold your consent from my proposition. On you lies the onus of proof, not on me. You ask me to extend the English system of relief to Ireland; and I, on the other side, demand that you show me that that system will be protected by the safeguards which you find to be, not expedient only, but essential in this country. Now, the measure which your Lordships propose to adopt, must, by the confession of every one, necessarily operate a great and vast change, social and economical, in Ireland; and the object which I profess to have in view— the main object of this Amendment—is to relieve them from the great pressure of the poor rates—not by any stingy niggardliless of bounty—not by withdrawing relief from those who are really destitute—not by driving to despair those who are really in distress; but by superseding the necessity of pauperism, by furnishing the means of independent labour. Let me recall to your Lordships' consideration the principle on which the burden is now distributed between the landlord and tenant. According to the law, as it at present stands, the rate is, in the first instance,

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levied exclusively upon the tenant; but the tenant is entitled to deduct from his landlord, not half the amount of the rate charged upon him, but a poundage upon his rent, equal to one-half the poundage of the rated value on which he has been charged. Now, let me point out practically how this works. You would suppose, naturally—and, indeed, I have heard many of your Lordships say—that the burden is thus equally distributed between landlord and tenant. But, my Lords, it is no such thing. It is notorious that the rated value of the land is infinitely, on an average, below the fair rentable value of the land; and I believe I am not far wrong in stating that the land which is rated at 20 l., would, without being at all over-rented, pay a rent of 30 l. Now, observe how the law works with a shilling a pound rated upon the tenant. He pays, in the first instance, 1s. a pound upon his rate of 20 l.; and then, being entitled to deduct from his landlord half the poundage of his rent, he deducts from his landlord not twenty, but thirty sixpences, or 15 s. out of the 20 s. which he is called upon to pay to the rate; and the result is, that one-fourth only of the rate is borne by the occupying tenant, and the other three-fourths by the landlord. I don't think that this is at all an exaggerated statement; but, suppose that the tenant pays less than this, still the result would be that the tenant pays one-third of the rate, while the landlord pays two-thirds. My Lords, the relation between landlord and tenant is better understood here than in Ireland. The condition of the tenantry is infinitely superior here; the farms are much larger than they are in Ireland; and yet I ask those of your Lordships—and I shall be content to rest the whole grounds of my argument on this point—I ask those of your Lordships who have been in the habit of attending to the working of the Poor Law in England, what would be the economical, financial, and moral condition of this country, if the farmers had the power of levying rates, two-thirds or three-fourths of which rates were to be paid by their landlords? I ask what you think would be the effect on the landed property of the parish? That is an important consideration; but it is not the only and it is not the most important consideration. I ask what you think would be its effect on the employment of labour? I ask what you think would be its effects on the multiplication or diminution of pauperism in the parish? I ask what you think would be
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the inducement on the part of the farmer to employ additional hands and improve his holding, if the alternative should be— not as it now is in England, that unless you employ them as labourers you must pay them as paupers—but if the alternative should be, that unless you employ them as labourers they must be supported as paupers by the landlords? I am certain that England would sink under such a system—it would lead infallibly to the complete demoralisation of the condition of the parish—it would destroy the independence of the labourers — it would increase, not only the amount of the rates, but also the number of paupers — it would annihilate and deaden all exertions, all efforts, and that parish would be overwhelmed with the mass of pauperism. I ask, is there a man among your Lordships who will deny that this would be the more than probable consequences if such a measure were passed with regard to England? Is there a man among your Lordships who is prepared to follow up this measure of legislation for Ireland by assenting to a similar measure for England? And on what grounds would you hesitate? If the farmers of England were to say, "This is what the farmers of Ireland have obtained—this is a burden which you, the English landlords, say ought to rest upon the landlords—the imposition of which you say is wise, politic, just, and safe," let me ask you, my Lords, with what face, with what arguments, on what grounds you could resist the demand for vesting the same power, without the safeguards which you now have, in the farmers of England? Well, then, if none of your Lordships will deny the dangers of this state of things as applied to England—if none of your Lordships can suggest an argument by which a similar claim could be resisted in England—then tell me what are the safeguards on which in Ireland you peculiarly rely? Are the tenantry there more wealthy? are their means of employing labour greater? are their relations with their landlords more close and confidential? are they more thrifty? are they more likely to be so far-seeing as to see the advantage of employing the labourer rather than supporting the pauper? Why, my Lords, it is notorious that all this is not so—that it is the reverse. If there is any security from character—if there is any security from station—if there is any security from a friendly relation between landlord and tenant, that security exists in England—that security is lost in Ireland.

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I don't know whether I would venture to entrust such a power into the hands of Scotch proprietors and tenants; I believe that the habits of that country, the intelligence of the farmers, the extent of the farms, the knowledge of their respective duties and rights, are such that, if such a measure would be safe anywhere, it would be safe in Scotland. I should be still more sorry to trust to the operation of that measure in England; but I am certain that in Ireland it would be absolute and entire ruin—absolute and entire ruin, not to the landlords only, nor even to the landlords primarily, but absolute and entire ruin to those hopes which you entertain, and which I yet trust to see realized, of introducing a better state of things, of creating an independent body of labourers, of separating the labourers from the farmers, and of employing the labourers on the land. My Lords, if you hope to effect these objects— and without effecting these objects there can be no hope for the social regeneration of Ireland—if you hope to bring about this change, it can only be by making it the interest of the occupier to increase the amount of labour on the land in his occupation; and that cannot be done in any other manner, or by any other means, than by holding out to the tenant this penalty, that if you refuse to employ the labourer it will be necessary and incumbent on you to support him. But if you hope that the tenantry will employ the labourer, and that they will exert themselves for the purpose of increasing employment, because they know that if they do not their landlords must support the labourer in idleness, then you are proceeding upon a supposition too Utopian, too monstrous, too absurd, to be entertained by such an assembly as I have now the honour to address. Well, then, if this principle cannot be safely attempted in England, I call upon you to show how it can be safely attempted in Ireland. I throw upon you the burden of proof—I call upon you to show why you propose to introduce into Ireland a principle with regard to relief which you would not introduce into England even with the safeguards that now accompany it; that demand I have a right to make, and I hope that your Lordships, before you agree to reject my Amendment, will expect to hear a satisfactory answer to it from Her Majesty's Government. But I may be told, "Oh, the circumstances are so different between England and Ireland, that though the law as it stands may be perfectly adapted to England, yet it is
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not adapted to Ireland." Why? I want to know what are the circumstances which make that wise and safe when applied to Ireland, that would be unsafe and absurd when applied to England. Perhaps you may tell me that you cannot trust the Irish landlords in making arrangements with their Irish tenantry. This, indeed, is the only objection which bears on the face of it the shadow of an argument against the principle for which I contend. Let me, then, for a moment, examine this argument. You cannot trust the Irish landlords in making agreements with their Irish tenants. My Lords, if I proposed by this Amendment to remove an existing burden from the shoulders of one class to place it on those of another, while the other circumstances remained unaltered, I should be the foremost to denounce such a measure as a gross injustice and a flagrant act of iniquity. If the landlords were at present charged with the payment of the poor rates, and I were to say, remove the burden from them to the occupying tenant, that would be the height of injustice to the occupying tenant. But, my Lords, I seek no such thing. I ask you to affirm in this Bill—and unless you affirm it now you never will affirm it—I ask you to affirm a wise and sound principle—I ask you to lay down right principles at the time of imposing the burden—I ask you to lay down a rule which will make the burden bearable. Do I ask you to make the transfer now? By no means. I ask you to interfere with no existing agreements—I ask you to violate no present leases—I ask you to interfere with no existing contract or agreement between landlord and tenant as it at present stands. But this I ask you to say—that whereas the principle is sound and just that where the occupier alone has the means of giving employment, he should be induced to give it by the consciousness that if he does not the burden will fall upon his own shoulders, and not upon those of another man. I ask you to say that in the case of all future leases the principle should be affirmed as it is in England; and that the burden shall fall upon the tenant, and not upon the landlord. In the case of tenants at will—and there are many such cases in Ireland—I do not propose at once that the tenant at will, in accordance with this principle, should be made liable to pay; but I propose in my Amendment that on the 1st of January, 1850, the tenant at will should be liable to the game conditions as a tenant on a lease.

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If the principle, then, be sound, the question is, is my mode of applying it a safe one? I do not apply it at once, I apply it prospectively. I save all existing leases, I apply it only to future leases. I save the tenants at will for two years and a half; and in the mean time I leave it to the landlords and tenants to enter into new agreements upon the subject under the altered circumstances of the case. I know, my Lords, that there is a popular argument used. I know that there is much popular declamation abroad respecting the hard hearts and the griping hands of the Irish landlords. I know that there is too much of an indiscriminately sweeping condemnation abroad at the present moment in this country at the cost of the Irish landlord—and I know how ready people are to say, "We can't stop to pick two grains of wheat from the bushel of chaff, and we can't separate the good landlords from those who are regardless of their duties and indifferent to everything but how they may collect with the utmost rapacity whatever they may wring from the hard earnings of their tenants. 'I know that these imputations are unjust in general. That they are well founded in many instances I admit with pain and regret; but they are unjust as applied to the whole. Yet you legislate for the whole. And let me remind you, my Lords, if that be the character of the Irish landlords—if it be the fact that there are instances of such rapacity and of such cruelty—such shortsighted rapacity and such blind cruelty— do you think that you can protect your tenantry by your legislation from the rapacity and cruelty of their landlords? Do you think that the same landlords who have now the power and the will, according to you, to exact the uttermost farthing from their tenantry—to screw every shilling and every penny which they can drag from them by any means in their power—do you believe that these landlords will not protect themselves against your legislation by demanding from their tenants an increased rent to cover the increased rate? But perhaps you think—indeed I have heard it alleged—that the tenantry cannot pay the rates. The fact is, my Lords, that the tenantry do now pay the rate. It is from the tenantry that the rate is collected—it is by the tenantry that the rate is paid, and all they do afterwards is to produce the receipt for the rate as part payment of their rental. Can you believe, if, as you say, there be a returning spirit among the Irish peasantry to give for land its full
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price—if there he that spirit among the Irish landlords to exact every additional shilling that can be got, and to agree to every additional farthing that may be offered—can you entertain the vain delusion that by merely causing the landlord to pay the rate, you will relieve the tenant? If the landlord already exacts for rent as much as the tenant can be induced to offer, the landlord will be able to collect nothing more than the tenant has; and if he now collects all that he has, the result will be, that he will be able to collect less rent in exact proportion to the amount the tenant has already paid in the shape of rate; and so the proposition will also hold true in the converse, that he will be able to collect more rent in exact proportion as you relieve the tenant in the shape of rates. I have not heard an argument against this proposition, unless it be that it will be impossible to collect the rates, owing to the organized resistance of the tenants. But, my Lords, that is a confession which no Government can make with any regard to self-respect. That is a confession which is fatal to all law and all order; and I trust that in your Lordships' House, at least, it will not be brought forward as an argument against this clause. If the principle of my proposition be right—if it be sound —if the application of it prospectively be safe—then I hope that I shall not suffer what I must consider the degradation of hearing in the House of Lords this argument, that in adopting a principle just and sound in itself, and necessary for the welfare of Ireland, you will be met by an organized system of passive resistance, which you dare not encounter in support of the law. I know not that I need trespass further upon your Lordships' attention in advocating the Amendment of which I have given notice. I have stated shortly what I conceive to be its recommendations—the encouragement of labour. I have stated also what will be the fatal consequences of its rejection—that it will take away all stimulus to improvement—that it will bring all labourers down to one dead level of pauperism. As you have an amount of pauperism already hanging over Ireland, that threatens to absorb the whole of its available revenue, your only hope of encountering that pauperism is by the establishment of a different class of tenantry, the breaking up of those small farms which prevail in Ireland, and the diminution of that tenacity which the tenants of Ireland exhibit for the occupation of wretched plots

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of land, and to establish a body of independent labourers. These are the grounds on which you can alone rest for the diminution of that flood of pauperism which threatens to overwhelm you; and if you reject this Amendment, you reject all those safeguards with which a measure like the present ought to be surrounded; and, in all sincerity I say it, you will render the future improvement of the social state of Ireland a matter of impossibility. Do not dream that by your legislation, legislate as you will, you can prevent that which I know is acting strongly on the public mind now, and which is kindling a flame in this country against Ireland and every thing Irish; do not hope that you can prevent the influx of a large body of labourers from among the poorest classes of Ireland into this country. So long as your rate of wages here is higher than the rate in Ireland, so long will that influx take place. The more you keep down the rate of wages in Ireland, the more you will add to this evil; the more you encourage pauperism, the more you discourage the occupiers of land from giving employment to the labourers for the purpose of keeping them off the poor rate; the more you reduce, in short, the amount of labour in Ireland, the more you will have of that influx of pauperism which is threatening to overwhelm this country. Do not let these considerations be without weight in deciding upon this question; do not hope that this legislation, which will throw on Ireland the burden of their own pauperism, regardless of the consequences that may happen to Ireland, will be without its effects upon yourselves. Believe me, that you soon will find out that your selfish legislation will be visited on your own shoulders—that the injury to Ireland will recoil upon yourselves and fall with recriminate justice on this country, while it will aggravate the evils which you unwisely think by your legislation to obviate. I entreat you to consider this question as judges deciding upon a question of right, and prudence, and justice; and I ask you to do no more for the landlords of Ireland—I ask you to do no more for the tenants of Ireland—I ask you to do no more for the labourers of Ireland, than to give them the same rights which you have given the same classes in England, accompanied with those safeguards which you have found to a certain extent to be effectual in this country; but without which, I again put it to your Lordships' knowledge and to your Lordships'
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experience, without which you cannot safely carry into effect this law. The noble Lord concluded by proposing his Amendment as follows:—
"That, save as hereinafter provided, it shall not be lawful for any occupier of rateable property holding under any lease or agreement to be made or entered into after the passing of this Act, nor for any tenant at will, or from year to year, after the 1st day of January, 1849, to deduct from the rent to which he may be liable in respect of such property any amount whatever in respect of any rate which may be imposed at any period subsequent to the date of such lease or agreement, or subsequent to such 1st day of January, as the case may be. That all the provisions of the Act 6th and 7th Victoria, c. 92, intituled 'An Act for the further Amendment of an Act for the more effectual Relief of the destitute Poor in Ireland,' for the charge and recovery of rates upon property rated to a net annual value not exceeding 4l., shall be deemed and taken to apply to the like property rated to a net annual value not exceeding 5l.; provided nevertheless, and be it enacted, that no immediate lesson holding under any lease or agreement to be made or entered into after the passing of this Act, shall be authorized to deduct from any rent by him payable under such lease or agreement to his superior landlord, any amount whatever in respect of any rate which may be imposed at any period subsequent to the date of such lease or agreement."
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE, who was nearly inaudible during a great part of his speech, said, that he had on a former evening adverted to this Amendment as being by far the most important that would come before their Lordships on this Bill. He would make no reference to that particular consideration adverted to in the outset of his speech by the noble Lord, and arising out of an observation made on a previous evening by a noble Earl on the cross benches, because, though he was far from thinking that, as matters of convenience, those considerations which arise out of the privileges of the two Houses of Parliament, ought to be entirely disregarded, he would leave that, as a subject for subsequent deliberation, to meet the noble Lord fairly, and to discuss his Amendment on its own merits, exclusively of all other considerations. Taking the most calm and deliberate view of that Amendment that it was in his power to form, he had no hesitation in adopting the noble Lord's own expression, and as the noble Lord had said that the retention of this clause would prove in its consequences disastrous to Ireland, and disastrous to the present measure, so in like manner would he confidently assert that the adoption of the noble Lord's Amendment to the clause would prove disastrous to Ireland—disas-

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trous to the peace of Ireland, and disastrous to the success of a measure which he was justified in stating the great majority of their Lordships were desirous of seeing passed into a law. He would repeat, a great majority of their Lordships were desirous to pass this measure, because they had now gone through the most important clauses; and yet, with regard to the most important of the principles contained in them— namely, the extension of relief—they had seen that neither the noble Lord on the bench below him (Lord Monteagle), nor the most reverend Prelate above him (the Archbishop of Dublin), who were most opposed to the principle of the Bill, nor any other noble Lord, had up to that moment thought fit to take the sense of the House against that extension of the principle of relief. Even that evening they had heard the noble Lord himself say, that he was desirous the Bill should pass into a law. He thought he had therefore a right to take all this as a test that the Bill was considered by their Lordships to be necessary, and that it was a Bill which they were desirous to see adopted, though at the same time they should all admit that it was not without its difficulties, and not without the probability of circumstances arising which would beget opposition to it. He would beg their Lordships to consider what was the character of the measure. It was a Bill, the operation of which would require in Ireland new and extensive machinery—it was a Bill which would require a great extension of the powers of boards of guardians, and which would also require great efforts both on the part of the landlords and of the farmers to keep up and stimulate the industry of the country, in order to prevent the cost of relief to be given under this Bill from running into excess. Now he would say that the efficiency of this Bill to secure these objects depended on its fitness to give to all classes —but above all to the two great classes, who were the most important in the country, the classes of landlord and tenant—an equal interest in the administration of the law on the soundest, most careful, and most direct principles. But how was this great object to be carried into effect? Was it by any new principle? No. It was to be effected by equalising the burdens on the landlord and on the tenant. Was this anything new? Did not their Lordships adopt it five or six years ago, when the Irish Poor Law was first carried? And had it worked ill or well since then? Had
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it not admittedly worked in the best manner? And yet now, when they were about materially to extend the law, and extend the burdens imposed under it, they were asked by the noble Lord to depart from the system which had worked well, and to adopt an experiment which, if he knew anything of the people, or of the tenantry of Ireland, would, he could answer for it, ensure its working ill. He would say it was most essential for them to carry with them the feelings of the country in adopting a measure of this kind; and yet at the very moment of introducing by Act of Parliament a greatly aggravated and new burden upon the country, their Lordships were desired to choose that moment in order to endeavour to throw the whole of that burden on the tenant and to take it off the landlord. Was that the enunciation —was that the herald of peace which the noble Lord had chosen to send forth from his ark in order to conciliate the people? Was this the proper occasion to adopt a provision, which up to this moment had not been executed, and which he would say could not be executed? The noble Lord had thrown out that Her Majesty's Government were extremely careful of securing popularity in Ireland—that they were extremely afraid of all rumours of opposition from that country, which might be directed against any of their measures, and more particularly against the Bill now before their Lordships. If they were about doing anything unjust in order to court popularity, he should most readily agree in the truth of the noble Lord's charge. But were they doing so in the present instance? Was it courting popularity to impose a heavy burden on the country; or was there anything unjust in making that burden press equally on all classes, in accordance with the principle of the law already in force there? But he would ask the noble Lord to reflect before he repeated that in imposing burdens of that sort they ought to be quite regardless of the "impressions" which their acts would produce in the country, or that there were any acts of the Legislature which ought to be adopted without a previous careful weighing of the impression which these acts would produce on the public mind, more especially when they were, as in the present instance, of a severe and pressing character. But what, he would ask, was likely to be the impression created abroad if the Amendment of the noble Lord were carried? By carrying the clause as it now stood, he did not think

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the impression likely to prevail was that either Her Majesty's Government or their Lordships were disposed to act unjustly, or partially, or improperly towards the landlords. That was not, he thought, a charge which they were deserving of having brought against them, and it was not the argument which the noble Lord used. But what would be the impression abroad if the Amendment were carried into operation? Take the case of a peasant about taking a lease of some ground. The noble Lord said that the peasant so acting would proceed with a knowledge of the burden that was to be imposed upon him, and would be on his guard against offering too much rent. He was, however, a person likely to take land on any terms. That was the character which the noble Lord assigned to him, and yet the noble Lord thought he ought to calculate at such a time the amount of the burdens that were in future times likely to come upon him. Suppose the case of a tenant who had taken a lease, and who, from a sudden increase in the distress of the country—from a sudden alteration in the system of agriculture pursued, or from a sudden deficiency in the crops of the country—found that the poor rate imposed upon him for in-door relief and out-door relief came upon him with a doubly aggravated charge—take the case of such a man, with the rent and tax collectors at the door, and he thought that the noble Lord, with all his ingenuity— with all his powers of making the clearest possible statement—would not, if brought into contact with him, be able to satisfy him that he ought to pay the whole of the rates, and that the Legislature had acted wisely and justly in taking care that the entire burden should fall on him, and not a penny of it on the landlord. With all his respect for the powers of the noble Lord, he thought the noble Lord would be likely in such a case to find himself defeated in argument; and it was probable that among all the peasantry in Ireland he would not get a single convert to his doctrine. The tenants would say, "We did not calculate on these circumstances arising." "Oh but," the noble Lord would answer, "you ought to have calculated upon them. We, the Legislature, in passing this Act, avowed that we did not know what the consequences would be; we did not venture, with all our knowledge of the principles that might act in raising or diminishing the amount of poor-rates, with all our proficiency in the details of political
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economy, we did not foresee any of these things; but you, sitting in your cabin and in the midst of your mountains, you were bound before you took your lease to take them into your consideration. You have made a mistake, and though that mistake is fatal to you, you must abide by it." The Irish landlords might in many instances concur with the noble Lord in his doctrine, and might be disposed to take the same view of charity as a very eminent and acute philosopher and moralist—Sancho Panza—did of honour. His view was, "There is nothing so noble or so fine as honour—there is nothing so deserving of merit; and so whenever I get into a fray or a battle, I endeavour to leave the whole of it to my master." But the noble Lord seemed to view with perfect indifference the idea of whether a tax, when once adopted and sanctioned by Parliament, could be collected or not. He would ask the noble Lord, however, whether this was the first time such a consideration was raised? Did the noble Lord remember anything that passed in the debates concerning tithes? Did he not remember that the Church of Ireland had been induced to abandon a portion of its just rights on no other ground but that the collection of that peculiar rate or tax—call it what they would—was attended with circumstances which rendered it impossible that it could be got in? The Church, much to its honour, concurred with the Government of the day, and consented to forego a portion of its rights, in order to ensure what had since taken place, the easy and certain collection of the remainder. But it was not in that case only, but in a great many other instances, that the Legislature was compelled to take into consideration, when imposing any burden on the country, what the facility would be of collecting it. It was, he would say, therefore, clear that the farmer would feel that he had an interest in not having the whole burden of the rate thrown upon him. The noble Lord had spoken as if it was only by the employment given by the farmer the amount of poor-rate was to be kept down. He agreed with the noble Lord that the farmer would, when the Act passed, have a considerable interest in keeping down the rates by the employment of the labourers; but the landlord ought also to have an interest in effecting the same object. It was not in the smaller class of improvements alone that labour was to be employed; and their Lordships had already

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admitted such to be the fact in sanctioning advances of the public money to the landlord, in order that he might effect improvements on his property. If they wished to give him an interest in making those improvements, why should they place the whole burden of the rates upon the tenants? He would say that the Legislature acted far more wisely in adopting the course it had taken, than in following that suggested by the noble Lord. The adoption of the principle of placing half the burden on the landlord and half on the tenant, was originally sanctioned, without any material opposition, by their Lordships' House. But then the noble Lord said, "Why not take the example of the English law?" He would beg leave to ask another question of the noble Lord, and that was, "Why not follow the example of the Scotch law?" The Scotch Act, which he had before him, equally divided the burden between the landlord and the tenant; and what was most remarkable was, that that Act had received the sanction of the noble Lord himself two years ago, when the Bill was introduced. Every one of the noble Lord's arguments would have applied against the Scotch Bill, but not one of them was then thought worthy of being urged against it by the noble Lord. Seeing, therefore, that this principle was in operation now in Scotland, and that it had been working, and working well, in Ireland, for the last five or six years, he could not concur in the demand made upon their Lordships to disturb it now, when they were about to try what many called a perilous, and what he was free to admit was a somewhat adventurous experiment with regard to the state of Ireland. He begged not to be misunderstood on this subject. He thought it most material that the tenant should bear half the burden. The noble Lord said there were many instances in which the tenant did not bear half the burden; but he would remind their Lordships that a remedy was provided by law for any injustice that might be done to the landlord in consequence of the property being valued too low to the poor rates, and that remedy was now in course of operation. The landlord had power to require a revaluation of the property where he thought the former valuation too low, and that revaluation could not but ultimately bring the valuation of the country to a proper standard. If there was an imperfection in a law of which the principle was good, he would ask their Lordships not to let the
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imperfection in one of the details weigh with them as a reason for departing from a good principle, and that for the purpose of adopting not only a vicious principle, but one which would raise a feeling—and that not without reason—in the country against the execution of the law altogether. On these grounds he would ask their Lordships to give their dissent to the Amendment of the noble Lord.
LORD WALSINGHAMsaid, that he wished in a very few words to state his reasons for voting against the Amendment of the noble Lord. He agreed with the noble Marquess opposite that it was highly necessary that there should be a Poor Law, and an efficient Poor Law, in Ireland; and he thought that the Government were entitled to credit for the manner in which they had discharged the very difficult duty of preparing and conducting this measure through Parliament. Unquestionably the subject was one of great difficulty; but if the Amendment of the noble Lord were carried, the difficulty of putting this measure in force in Ireland would be incalculably increased; increased to such an extent, he believed, that it would be impossible to levy the rates. The noble Lord had asked whether any one would dare to propose the principle of this mea-sure as to the division of the burden for the Poor Law of England? Why, he knew that there were many persons who were exceedingly desirous of introducing into the English law the provision that, with respect to small tenements, the whole burden should be thrown on the landlords. He dissented also from the position of the noble Lord that if the farmer did not employ the labourer he must maintain him in idleness; he thought that the employment of the labourer should depend upon the real value of his labour to the employer, not upon such considerations as those suggested by the noble Lord, and he hoped that they should soon get rid of that principle which was now in operation in the English Poor Law. He would not further trouble their Lordships, but he had felt anxious to state that the noble Lord's reference to the English law did not appear to him to have the force attributed to it.
LORD MONTEAGLEpaid, he felt it due to himself, as well as to his noble Friend (Lord Stanley), to state why it was his misfortune to differ with him on the present occasion. He thought their Lordships, as well as the public at large, were frequently led astray by the supposed good

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which was anticipated from assimilating the laws of England and Ireland into a supposing that a measure which worked well in England must necessarily work well in Ireland. This might he the case if the circumstances of the two countries were the same; but they obviously were not so; and he could not give his support to the Amendment of the noble Lord without feeling that he was throwing difficulties almost insurmountable in the way of the possible success of this experiment. Now, he begged to say that when once this Bill became the law of the land, he should do his utmost, as far as he was individually concerned, and as far as his influence went in his own vicinity, in concurrence and in competition with its strongest supporters, to give it every fair play. He could not, therefore, in common candour, become a party to a clause which, in his judgment, would be fatal to its working, or which at least would diminish its chance of success. He did not say that he was one who entertained very sanguine hopes of its success; but whatever its chances of success were, he believed that the adoption of this clause would greatly diminish them. In the case of England the tenants, if not reconciled to the burden, had at least been long accustomed and familiarized with it, and had taken it into account in all their transactions. But he begged the House to remember, that in Ireland the introduction of a Poor Law was a novelty altogether. When the Legislature proceeded to pass a Poor Law in Ireland, they found all property alike exempt from the burden, and it became necessary to decide on what description of property it should be imposed. They accordingly made a selection; and he thought on the whole it was the wisest and best. They endeavoured to reconcile both landlord and tenant to the burden by extending it over both, subject to defined objections. If he remembered rightly, there was in the original Bill no exemption of the smaller tenants; but when they came to apply the measure in Ireland, they found themselves compelled to retreat from the principle of an equal division in all cases. In Ireland it would be most unwise to call on the smaller occupiers to contribute for such purposes; and even if it were prudent, under more favourable circumstances, to place the burden directly on the tenant, it became most inexpedient to do so at a time when their Lordships and everybody connected with Ireland knew that the amount of the distress, and also of the tax
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now about to be imposed, was as compared with that hitherto collected, as the weight of a mountain to that of a molehill. Yet, concurrently with this increase in the amount of the burden, his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) proposed to cast it on the class least able to bear it. If the burden were diminishing, if the rate were falling from 10 s. in the pound to 1s., then the lesser rate might be cast on the occupier; but, when the amount of the rate was rising from 1s. to 10 s., it was entirely impracticable to take the step which was recommended to them. At best, he was not very sanguine as to the successful working of this measure in some parts of Ireland. In certain districts, where the population was not in excess, it might possibly succeed; but in the province of Connaught, in the county of Mayo, for instance, in Sligo, and in other parts, it was impossible to think there was a chance of the measure being carried into effect, should the Amendment be adopted; and he was not willing to make himself responsible for this consequence. Besides, they should look to the peculiar position in which Her Majesty's Ministers then stood. If the Bill with those clauses were sent, contrary to their wishes, to the country, and that it should not be found to work as had been expected, the Ministers might turn round upon their Lordships and say, that those who differed from them, like himself, had persisted in carrying an Amendment which had destroyed the very essence of the Bill, and but for the interpolation of which the measure might have succeeded. But his opposition to the clause did not extend to the general principles laid down by his noble Friend opposite. From those general principles laid down as matters of economical science by his noble Friend, he would not differ; and if they had in Ireland a better state of society—if they had a better social system, and a long habitude in favour of the payment of a tax like this— then the proposition might perhaps be safely adopted; but in the present state of Ireland it was impracticable—the introduction of the clause would make the collection of the rates impossible. He believed that the determination of the proprietors to bear their share in the burden of the rates, had produced a good effect in the trying circumstances in which they had been placed; and he had never yet heard any individual proprietor complain of that portion of the Bill which subjected him, as a landlord, to bear his own share of the rate.

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If any step could be taken that would give a colour to falsehood and could lend calumny a strength it ought not to possess, it would be the refusal of the landed proprietors of Ireland, at the present moment and under existing circumstances, to bear their share of the burden. For these reasons, he undoubtingly and unhesitatingly—though from personal feelings reluctantly—gave his opposition to the clause.
The EARL of HARDWICKEdid not think that the manner in which the whole subject of the Bill had been introduced to their Lordships had been such as to attach them much to its prospective influence upon the country, nor was it calculated to induce noble Lords upon his side of the House to adopt it without looking maturely into the principles upon which it had been framed, or to prevent them from following a perfectly independent course with regard to its details. It was not surprising that they should look upon it as introducing a principle entirely new in the country, that of out-door relief to the able-bodied; and he suggested that they should imagine a condition of affairs in England similar to that existing in Ireland, in order that they might be enabled to form some judgment as to the propriety of adopting the several branches of the measure. The noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had stated that he was anxious to give the landlords an interest in the well-working of the measure, by placing a certain number of ex-officio guardians upon every board, and by making them liable to pay their proportion of the rates. But he (the Earl of Hardwicke) should tell the noble Marquess that the landlords had other, higher, and more important duties to perform, than looking after the allocation and economising of the rates. If an interest as a ratepayer were given to the ex-officio guardian to economise the rates as much as possible, was he or was he not likely to be careful of their expenditure? What was the position of the landlord in England with regard to the poor? The boards of guardians were formed of ratepayers elected from amongst the body of ratepayers at large, and of ex-officio guardians. The task of looking into the economy of the rate fell upon the rate-paying portion of the board; but the landlord sat at those boards as the poor man's friend, and instead of screening himself from liability to further rating, as he necessarily would do if the body to which he belonged were obliged to pay those rates,
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his duty was to stand between the rate payer and the poor man, and to see that the poor received the care which was their due, and had the proper benefit from the rate. He was the friend of the poor, and it was desirable that such should be his position before the poor of the country, and were he the ratepayer himself he would probably be more rigid as to the expenditure. The effect of the clause too, was prospective, and not immediate, and the prospects of the ensuing three years were such as to make it most probable that the rates would be so heavy that the arrangements to be entered into between the landlords and the tenants, when the clause should come into operation, would be extremely favourable to the tenants themselves, inasmuch as they would necessarily seek for such reduction in the amount of rent as should compensate for the additional pressure of the poor's rates to which they would then be liable. And the rent being fixed and settled, the tenant would be left, when a reduction in the amount of the rates should have taken place, with a certainty of holding his land at a rent infinitely below what it would have been subject to had the landlord continued liable to pay a proportion. It appeared to him (the Earl of Hardwicke), therefore, that he at least had no other course left but to consent to the Amendment of his noble Friend. He knew nothing personally of Ireland whatsoever; but he knew that the state of things which had existed, and did still exist, could not be suffered to continue. A regulation should be made for the support of the poor, and in doing so some great principle should be laid down, by which the humbler classes should be relieved from their present state of misery; their lands should be better cultivated, employment should be obtained for them, and that could not be done unless the ratepayers themselves became the direct employers of labour. To the other powerful arguments which had been adduced by his noble Friend, he could add nothing; and he should therefore conclude by repeating his intention of voting for the clause.
The EARL of ST. GERMANSsaid, that the noble Earl who had just addressed their Lordships had employed an argument to induce the House to accede to the Amendment, in the justice of which he (the Earl of St. Germans) could not altogether acquiesce. The noble Earl said, that if the landlords should be exempted from the payment of rates, or rather

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they should not be called upon to pay them in the first instance, they, being many of them ex-officio guardians, would behave liberally towards the poor. What was that but saying that they would act as benefactors of the poor at the expense of the occupiers of the land? Those noble Lords who opposed the clause then under consideration appeared to assume that the circumstances of the two countries, Ireland and England, were alike. But the fact was, that they were very dissimilar. In England a farmer calculated the amount of the local burdens which he would have to pay in addition to the rent; and if be found the aggregate sum too large to allow of his getting an adequate return for his capital, he carried his capital elsewhere. In Ireland the case was widely different. The holding of land was in that country a matter of necessity. If a farmer in Ireland calculated at all—and very few in that country ever did calculate—all he would look for in return for his capital, or rather his labour, would be a sufficiency to enable him to maintain his family on the most inferior description of food. Throw upon such a man an additional burden, and you then drive him to maintain himself and his family on a smaller quantity of that inferior description of food. That would be the result of the adoption of the Amendment proposed by his noble Friend. His noble Friend had twitted him for having, as he termed it, been the bearer of a message from the House of Commons. He took all that had fallen from his noble Friend in good part; but, at the same time, he must be allowed to disclaim having been the bearer of "a message from the Commons." He had supposed—and it did not appear to him that the supposition was an unreasonable one—that the opinion of a noble Lord who had recently been officially connected with Ireland, and who did not habitually act with the party by which the measure was supported, might have some weight with many of their Lordships, who were unacquainted with the state of Ireland: under these circumstances, he thought himself justified in stating to their Lordships, that he had ascertained from conversation with his noble Friend, who had permitted him to mention the circumstance, that in consequence of information which he had received from Ireland since the present clause was under discussion, he had seen reason to change the opinion which he then entertained respecting it. He would now advert to the
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impression which the adoption of the Amendment was calculated to make upon the minds of the people of Ireland. His noble Friend (Lord Stanley), far from evading that consideration, had, with that courage and disregard for difficulties which so pre-eminently distinguished him, called upon the House to despise and disregard all that they had heard of the impediments which lay in the way of such a proposal as that before them. He had said that their Lordships should not be intimidated from carrying it out, merely because they were told that it would be almost impossible. He seemed to think it more creditable that their Lordships should pass it for the very reason of the difficulties and impediments which surrounded it. It would not, however, be unbecoming in their Lordships to reflect calmly upon the effect which might be produced upon the people of Ireland by altering the clause in the manner proposed by his noble Friend. If, after having largely increased the number of ex-officio guardians, the Legislature were to deprive the occupying tenants of the right of deducting any portion of the rate from the amount of their rent, the guardians would be placed in a very invidious position. It might be that, in England, charges of this nature, though they ultimately came out of the land, would in the first instance be borne by the tenant; but, if a similar course were now to be pursued in Ireland, the occupier would see in it only this—that a burden bad been removed from the landlord and placed upon him; and the result would be, that the hostile feeling which already prevailed in many parts of Ireland against the ex-officio guardians, would be seriously aggravated. His noble Friend dwelt at some length upon the difference between the gross and set annual value for the various poor-law unions paid by the landlords; and it appeared to him (the Earl of St. Germans) that he greatly exaggerated their proportions; for, if noble Lords would take the trouble to look at a Parliamentary return which was laid upon the Table of both Houses in 1843, and headed "Parliamentary Electors," they would find a return from every union by the Poor Law Commissioners, showing the difference between the gross and the net annual value of the property rated, from which it appeared that the average did not exceed 18 per cent. It was not his wish that the difference, whatever might be its amount, should continue; but he begged to remind their Lordships, that if parties represented

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to the Poor Law Commissioners that their property was unfairly valued, a new valuation would take place. It should also be borne in mind that a new general valuation, upon a just principle, was now in progress in Ireland, and would be completed in a few years. The Amendment proposed by his noble Friend was open to this further objection—that it would place the grasping, avaricious landlord on the same footing with the liberal landlord. In anticipation of the present discussion, he had endeavoured to make himself acquainted with the arguments which he supposed had been urged against the principle of the clause now objected to when the Irish Poor Relief Bill was brought up to their Lordships' House in 1841. For that purpose he had looked at the record usually referred to in such cases; but what was his surprise at not being able to find a syllable upon the subject. The measure, as a whole, was vehemently opposed. The strongest denunciations were uttered against it. The very words which, on the present occasion, had rung in their Lordships' ears —"confiscation," "revolution," "rebellion"—these were all lavishly employed on that occasion; but not one syllable was said against the mode of levying the rate which was now deemed so objectionable. The noble Earl (the Earl of Wicklow) had indeed spoken upon the subject of the limitation to 51. valuation; but the assertion of the noble Earl was not that it was too low; on the contrary, he then complained that it was too high, and that the rating ought to commence at a much higher amount of valuation; and the noble Earl had also urged that the rate ought to be paid by the landlord, and not by the tenant. Failing, therefore, to find anything upon the subject of the present assertions and arguments in the Upper House, he had referred to the debates in the other House of Parliament, and there he had been more successful. He found that Mr. O'Connell had moved to omit the clause, and to substitute for it a rate upon the landlords, and not upon the occupier. That hon. Gentleman argued at some length upon the injustice of the proposition, and his views were supported, not by the popular party, but by an hon. Friend of his (the Earl of St. Germans), whose opinions were much respected and looked up to—Mr. Lucas, the Member for Monaghan—who said that he
—"quite agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Dublin, that in a variety of cases the
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working of this clause would be found to be surrounded with difficulties. The first was, that the occupier, who was generally a person very little above a state of destitution himself, was to be called upon to advance the amount of this rate for his landlord. English gentlemen ought not to suppose that they had to do with rich substantial farmers, to whom a trifling outlay was a matter of no consequence. But, even where one-half of the rate was to be paid by the occupier, he would be subject to great hardships, inasmuch as if the county cess collector was also to collect the poor rate, the occupier had to pay the rate long before the period he was usually called on to pay his rent. The hon. Member concluded by stating his intention of moving a proviso to remove the payment from the occupier."
Colonel Conolly, an Irish landlord, whose opinions were entitled to great respect, and could not be charged with being actuated by a desire to sacrifice the interests of his brother landlords, said that
—"he agreed with what had fallen from the hon. Member for Dublin, and considered that the demand ought to be made on the person who was finally liable to the rate. The House by this clause was reversing the principle adopted with respect to tithes, and which was found to work so beneficially for the peace of the country. He agreed with his hon. Friend the Member for Monaghan, that it would he peculiarly hard to call upon the occupier to advance the amount of this rate, when he was excused by the operations of this Bill from contributing anything himself. He thought entering into collision with the pauperism of the country was one of the causes of all the scenes that had unfortunately taken place in Ireland; and he implored the noble Lord the Secretary for Ireland to weigh well the recommendations thrown out by the hon. and learned Member for Dublin and his hon. Friend the Member for Monaghan, and not throw the burden of this rate upon those who had not the means at command to meet it,"
The same view of the subject was taken by Mr. Redington, Mr. Jephson, and Mr. Shaw. Thus, then, it appeared that in one House the question which now occupied their Lordships' consideration was never alluded to, whilst in the other a proposition was made to make the clause apply with greater stringency to the landlord. He might be permitted to refer to the report of the Committee on townland valuation in Ireland, which sat in 1844, and to the evidence given before it by Mr. Gulson, Mr. Muggeridge, and Mr. Senior, the assistant poor law commissioners. That Committee, in its report, begged the House to consider whether the principle of apportioning the burthen of the rate between landlord and occupant, adopted in the Poor Relief Act, should not be extended to county cess and other local taxes? That was an additional authority

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for retaining the clause as it stood. He entertained a very strong opinion as to the impolicy of the Amendment, as he believed that it would deprive the Bill of that prospect of success which would otherwise attend it when it became the law of the land in Ireland. The Bill before their Lordships proposed to make a great and important change in the social condition of Ireland; and he trusted that they would have sufficient wisdom to pass it unclogged by an addition which would deprive it of any reasonable hope of success.
The EARL of MALMESBURYsaid, that although the noble Earl had quoted the opinions of Colonel Conolly and other Members of the House of Commons on this question, he would not take further notice of the arguments used in another place than to state that they had not influenced him. He should now explain as briefly as possible the reasons which induced him to support the Amendment of his noble Friend. He was an English landowner, and had neither an acre of land in Ireland nor any experience of that country, but he felt that the Amendment proposed by his noble Friend involved a direct principle, and was not a point of detail. He, along with the great body of the people of England, was favourable to, and indeed anxious for, the establishment of a Poor Law in Ireland. He was willing to give credit to Her Majesty's Government for the sincerity of their intentions to promote the well-being of Ireland; but he claimed equal credit for himself and those around him. When the present English Poor Law was brought in, it was supported by the most eminent Members of the then Government; and the principle involved in that measure was, that the occupier should pay the rates. The principle which he conceived common sense called for was, that the rates should be taken from the produce of the land; and how could that be better done than by going to the fountain-head, namely, the producer? He believed the farmers of England would be sorry to see the system changed in England: why then adopt a different course with regard to Ireland? No reasonable excuse had been used in that House for this difference, besides the assertion that there would be found great difficulty in making the occupiers in Ireland pay rates. Was it meant to be asserted that the occupiers could not afford to pay them, or that they would not do so?
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He was not to be told that they could not pay the rates, for they would be smaller in amount than the rents they now paid. If he was told that they would not pay them, he could only observe that such a state of things involved consequences of the most serious nature. No enemy of Ireland had ever paid a worse compliment to the people of that country than to say of them that they would resist the payment of rates for the maintenance of their destitute fellow-countrymen; and he might observe, that it by no means followed that because the Catholics of Ireland refused to pay for the support of the Protestant clergymen in that country, their Lordships should refuse to pass a measure which would have the effect of administering relief to their starving fellow-men. He had often expressed his regret at the distinctions and differences which existed between the laws of England and Ireland. If they continued to legislate for the people of the latter country as they had done, they could not expect improvement. If, however, they legislated for them as they ought to do, there would be some chance of the regeneration of that people. If they did not take away the temptation to possess extremely small holdings of land, how could they improve the system of agriculture? As long as they neglected to assimilate as nearly as possible the laws of the two countries, they would, year after year, be falling into the greatest mischiefs. Would they insult the people of Ireland by telling them that the laws under which the people of this country lived with so much comfort were unfit for them, or rather that they were unfit for such laws? As long as they refused to assimilate the laws of the two countries, England and Ireland might be kingdoms ruled over by the same Sovereign, and though they might he born on the same day—though they might continue to be twins, yet they never could be sisters.
The EARL of WICKLOWsaid, that on a former occasion he had urged their Lordships to give to the tenants an equivalent to the poor-law rate, by throwing upon the landlords the whole burden of the tithes; but it was a very different thing to adopt that principle at the time of the first introduction of a Poor Law into Ireland, and to follow it now. In his opinion it would be most inexpedient to do so at the present moment; and if their Lordships did adopt the Amendment proposed by the noble Lord, prejudices would be raised in Ireland against that class, against whom, as their

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Lordships were aware, very strong prejudices already existed in this country, and the working of the measure would be materially affected. It would create confusion and embarrassment; and, having that opinion, he called upon their Lordships to reject the Amendment.
The ARCHBISHOP of DUBLINsaid, he would not detain their Lordships with any discussion of this question, which had been so well discussed already by abler debaters than himself; but as he did not intend to support the Amendment, he thought it right to state that it was not because he at all dissented from the principles the noble Lord had laid down, for he believed them to be sound and right, but because he doubted the propriety of the application of those principles at the present time to Ireland. It was with great reluctance he should oppose the Amendment; but he really feared that the prejudices—in many points unreasonable prejudices—which by the numerous communications he daily received from Ireland he was informed existed against it were such, that the adoption of that one alteration would defeat altogether the working of the Bill. He was exceedingly unwilling to legislate for groundless prejudices; but he solemnly assured their Lordships, that he was really desirous that this Bill might have a fair trial — that no unnecessary impediment should be thrown in its way, even for the assertion of what he called a sound principle; and he was especially anxious that if there were any defect in the measure as it now stood, the cause of it might be seen and rectified before long — in other words, that the failure of the Bill in some points might not be attributed to this clause, and their views consequently misdirected as to the proper remedy for those defects. With the principle of the Amendment he agreed, because he thought it sound and fair; for ultimately, in the long run, the rate must be paid by the landlord, inasmuch as he took the surplus after the payment of all expenses; part of which consisted of the labour bestowed upon the land, and part of the rates. But supposing that all other difficulties which had been adverted to as to the existing state of leases could be got over, he did not think that the Irish tenantry were in such a state of purse or mind that they could be persuaded that they were not called upon to pay more; or to pay an additional rate over and above what they paid now. If that feeling were so strong, be it ever so unreasonable, they must take care not to urge them into such a state of
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irritable resistance as might impede the working of a Bill that might otherwise work well. If Ireland were in a sound state, and the tenantry possessed more knowledge and more capital, and took a better view of their own interest, he had no doubt that the Amendment would be extremely beneficial; but the tenantry and farmers of Ireland wore different from those of this country. In England they were intelligent, and frequently took better views of a question than others of a higher class. He would just mention an occasion in which he had found that to be the case. In that union in England in which he had taken a large part in the management of the affairs of the poor, he found generally that the farmers took better and sounder views, and were more vigilant observers, and better judges of the real state of the poor, than the gentry and clergy. On one occasion he had brought forward a measure for the better management of the affairs of the union. He set forth his views before the guardians, who were mostly farmers, and they were almost unanimous in favour of it; but the governors, who consisted chiefly of the gentry and clergy, opposed it. It was, however, carried by a majority of one, and the result was a saving of 1,600 l. a year to the parish. He had no doubt that, if they had a tenantry in Ireland such as they had in England, it would be in all respects safest, and wisest, and most beneficial to themselves, if they were the immediate payers of the rates; but such was the state of things there, that he would not venture to add one more peril to what he could not but regard as the very perilous experiment of this Bill.
LORD REDESDALEsaid, he could not understand the ground upon which this Amendment was opposed. They were told that it was right in theory, and the argument used against its adoption was the difficulty of its administration; and that difficulty was, that the people would not quite understand it. His belief was, that the intelligent men of Ireland understood it very well, and that the large body of farmers would readily turn round and say, "We shall be very happy to take leases at reduced rents, with the chance of keeping down the poor rates by finding profitable employment for the poor.'' The noble Marquess said, that they would never be able to make the tenants understand that making them pay the rates was not imposing the burden on them; but if they could not make that calculation, then with so helpless a tenantry it was impossible

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they could expect that anything could be well managed. By the present law, charity was afforded to the sick and infirm, and to those who could not work; but it was now proposed to levy rates for the maintenance of those who could work. If the tenants had directly to pay the rates, they would calculate whether it was not better for them to employ the poor, instead of having them chargeable on the poor rates. It was said, that this measure had been propounded in consequence of the immense influx of Irish paupers into England, and with a view to prevent it; but it was upon that very principle that he supported the Amendment, for he felt persuaded that if they wished to keep Irish labour in Ireland, they must make it the interest of the Irish occupier to do so; and the only way to do that was, by making it his interest to maintain the poor upon the land rather than by the rates. Looking at this measure as a great experiment, which they were going to try for the first time, it was of great importance that they should proceed upon a sound principle; and if they did that, whatever difficulty there might be in the application, it would be found ultimately to be of the greatest possible advantage.
The EARL of ROSEBERYsaid, that although he felt very anxious as to the fate of the Amendment proposed, to which he was extremely hostile, he had not intended to trouble the House with any remarks, till he heard what fell from the noble Lord who spoke last. He had stated so erroneously both what was the law, and what the practice in Scotland in rating for the relief of the poor in that country, and had drawn inferences, and recommended measures, in this respect, so much the reverse of real facts, that an erroneous impression would prevail in the House, if the matter was not correctly explained. The old general law of Scotland in assessing for the poor, directed that half the amount should be levied on the owner, and half On the tenant. The Poor Law Amendment Act passed two years ago, authorized three modes of assessment or rating in Scotland; the first, by an equal division of the rate between landlord and tenant; another, by half being imposed on the owner, and the other half on all the inhabitants of a parish in proportion to the amount of the personal property of each; and a third, differing from either of the others, but still leaving an equal amount to be paid by the proprietor, by establishing an equal per centage on him, and all the other inhabit-
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ants. But there was, also, this provision in the Act, that wherever either by local Act or by usage any other system of rating was followed, it might be continued with the sanction of the new Board of Supervision. Now, in several parishes a practice had prevailed of charging the whole rate on the landlord; and in many instances with which he was personally acquainted, that was still allowed, though he felt confident not a single one could be adduced where the whole charge was cast on the tenant. These facts, which he was sure could not be contradicted by any one acquainted accurately with the Scottish Poor Law, found a complete answer both to the conclusions and the recommendations of the noble Lord (Lord Redesdale). They also bore strongly against many of the arguments of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) who proposed the Amendment, who being a Cabinet Minister when the Scottish Poor Law Amendment Bill was submitted to Parliament, was responsible for enactments, contrary to the principle he was now advocating, and which he held to be essential to the proper or even safe administration of such a law. With regard to the clause moved, he would only say that, in his judgment, it would convert a measure not only beneficent, but wise in the circumstances of Ireland, though he would admit hazardous, into one mischievous, and leading to evils greater than the good sought to be accomplished by it. The throwing of the rate wholly on such a tenantry as the Irish, with their poverty and their habits, would inevitably first induce them to evade and ultimately to remit the payment of it; producing, and in a manner inviting, a recurrence of all the horrors of the former tithe system. Although thinking the Bill by its indirect action, which would convert paupers into labourers, as well as by its primary object in relieving the destitute, would prove a great ultimate good to Ireland, he had rather that it did not become law, than have the benefit crushed and overbalanced by the effects of this Amendment.
The EARL of CLANCARTYsaid, that if the Bill remained as it now was, the noble Lord's Amendment might not be altogether objectionable; but he hoped that other provisions would be made, and that the Amendment of which he had himself given notice, would be adopted, so as to render the noble Lord's unnecessary; and as he did not wish now to prejudge his own Amendment, he would feel it his duty to leave the House unaided by any vote of his

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upon the present question. There were some circumstances which, in his opinion, would militate against the adoption of the proposed clause; for if the Bill, or any material part of it, was to be temporary, it would be objectionable to introduce a new principle of rating. There was another objection to altering the mode of rating, because the boards of guardians, which were now based on the representation of the ratepayers, would, under this Bill, be altered to a board of nomination, and not of representation. He was grateful to the noble Lords who were landlords in England for advocating an union system of rating, and showing that they would not put upon others what they were not ready to bear themselves. The occupiers of land, however, were too small and too unenlightened to see the real consequences of the noble Lord's legislation; they would think that advantage had been taken of them; and he urged their Lordships not to aggravate any circumstances which tended to compromise the peace of the country. It was with great reluctance that he withheld his support from the noble Lord; but he would not anticipate the decision to which their Lordships might come on his own Amendment.
LORD STANLEY: Although there has been much irrelevant matter introduced into this discussion, and much in which I do not concur, yet it would be affectation in me to deny that there has been much at which, as a public man, I must feel gratified—much at which I must feel satisfied as an individual; for although several noble Lords have intimated a determination of recording their votes against the Amendment which I have taken the liberty of suggesting, yet not one of your Lordships has in the course of this discussion spoken a single sentence questioning the soundness of the principles on which these clauses are framed—not one who has taken up the challenge which I respectfully threw out—not one has, in short, attempted to answer the arguments which I adduced in support of my Amendment. The most rev. Prelate whom I see opposite (the Archbishop of Dublin) has borne the strongest testimony to the soundness of my principles and the accuracy of my views; and after that admission, I confess the declaration of the most rev. Prelate came upon me by surprise, that in consequence of the impression which would be produced in Ireland if this Amendment were sanctioned, he must come to the con-
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clusion to refuse his assent to a principle in which he entirely concurred. And my surprise is the greater, when I recollect the very strong speech made by the most rev. Prelate in the course of last year, in which he strongly exhorted your Lordships against being actuated or influenced by public clamour or popular excitement, but declared his determination to be solely guided by the dictates of experience; and when moreover I remember that even in the course of the present Session the most rev. Prelate has placed his veto upon the principle of out-door relief being applied to Ireland in any shape whatever. The noble Marquess who followed me (the Marquess of Lansdowne) did not controvert the soundness of my views; and my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Clancarty) admitted that my arguments in favour of the Bill were convincing, but declined voting for the Amendment, on grounds which seem to me to be of rather a remarkable character, for the noble Earl says that, supposing the Bill to remain as it is, and without further alteration, he conceives my Amendment would be not only wise and desirable, but actually essential — indispensable to the working of the Bill; but yet he declines to support it, upon what seems to me to be a very vague and unfounded expectation, namely, that Parliament will hereafter assent to a modification of the principle of the measure. My Lords, although, from the kindness with which you heard my statement at the commencement of this discussion, I am now unwilling to intrude long upon you, yet there are one or two points to which I wish briefly to allude. It has been objected by some noble Lords that the principle of the Irish Poor Law remains, in respect of rating, as it has done for the last five or six years, and therefore I am not justified in dissenting now from that in which I have heretofore concurred. Now, my Lords, I need hardly remind your Lordships, that this is, in point of fact, overlooking the very basis on which my argument rests. The Irish Poor Law, noble Lords say, has worked well hitherto. Granted, my Lords; but what has been the Irish Poor Law hitherto? Yes, I repeat, what has been the Irish Poor Law hitherto, and what do you now propose to make it? There is just this difference. Hitherto the administration of relief has been strictly within the workhouse, and has been mainly limited to the destitute poor; now it is proposed to extend it to the able-

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bodied. That makes all the difference, my Lords. Do you think, my Lords, that had the operation of the present Bill been confined to the aged, the infirm, and the diseased, I would have brought forward these clauses? No, my Lords, I would have rested satisfied had the relief been confined to the existing distribution, although unjust; but my whole argument is, that under the distribution of the rate as proposed by this Bill, the occupier in Ireland, as the occupier in England, has not an interest in keeping down the rates by the employment of the labouring population; and it is by the employment of the labouring population alone that the rates can be kept down. But I will not dwell further on what must be so obvious. You are now, my Lords, called upon, for the first time, to grant relief to the able-bodied—out-door relief—in Ireland in a most extensive form; and therefore it is that I ask you to apply that which will be essential in the new state of the law, but which was not so requisite in the old. But not a word has been said, not an answer has been given to the question, How can you apply that principle to Ireland, which you could not with safety apply to England? How can that be safe in Ireland, which you will not venture to affirm will be safe in England? Now, these are the true points on which I rested the whole case. These are the true points upon which I have demanded an answer. But from the first to the last of this debate, I will not say that my arguments on these heads have been unanswered; but they have been altogether untouched, and an answer has not been attempted. But I am told that in the course of proceeding which I now oppose, I have acquiesced in the enactment of the Irish Poor Law. On the first introduction of that law, I thought it equitable to divide the rate between the proprietors and the tenants; and if now, as on the proposal of the Irish Poor Law, you were introducing a new law, imposing a burden irrespective of all existing contracts, I should think it fair to throw the burden on all classes. It has been said that the principle was applicable to the present state of Ireland. I deny that proposition. This I said, I repeat it, and I feel most deeply, that now you are about to apply, as a piece of permanent legislation, a dangerous and mischievous principle; I think that, in justice, you should lay down what all admit to be the sound principle. Let its application be as prospective as you please; but when you lay down the law, you should
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say at the same time what the sound principle is, and when it should be practically adopted. The Poor Law of Scotland has been referred to, and a noble Earl has alluded to the part I took on that Bill. Now, in the early part of my speech, in opening my statement, I distinctly declared that if there were any place in which the principle of a division could be applied with safety, it was in Scotland. It is true that I was a member of the Cabinet when the Scotch Bill passed, but I took no active part in it; and there was nothing in the support I gave that measure inconsistent with the course I have taken to-night. But even if I were answerable for every word in the Scotch Poor Law, there is nothing in that which in the least invalidates my arguments. In the Scotch Poor Law, legally I believe, practically I know, outdoor relief is not given to the able-bodied. By the Scotch law, there is nothing whatever to prevent the landlord and tenant from entering into an agreement whereby one or other may bear the whole weight of the poor rate. In Ireland, upon the other hand, the enactment not only does not admit of such an arrangement, but actually renders it illegal to enter into a covenant whereby the tenant is answerable for the whole of the poor rates without a corresponding reduction from the rent. My Lords, I will not much longer trespass on your time. I feel that a great majority of your Lordships will withhold your assent from my Amendment, although I fear your decision will be a most unhappy one for the prosperity and welfare of Ireland. My Lords, I deeply regret this, because the arguments which were used by those who have taken part in this debate in opposition to the course which I have suggested, show that you perceive this measure will be fatal to the improvement of the condition of Ireland—that you acquiesce in her continued humiliation and degradation, and bar the way which is now open to the fairest and best prospects of her continued and advancing prosperity. But, my Lords, if I feel this, I still more deeply feel the language and the tone on which the opposition to this measure is founded. I think that this measure, which you have decided to be sound in principle, just, and equitable— [The Marquess of CLANRICARDE: "No, no!"] Why, my Lords, who at the commencement of the debate disputed this principle? It is easy now for noble Lords at the close of an argument to say "No, no;" but I should have been better pleased

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if, in the course of the debate, the noble Lord had ventured to say that the principle was unsound, and had proved his position by argument, which would have enabled me to meet him by counterarguments. My Lords, I have heard none. Not one of your Lordships has contended that this principle is not sound and wise. I deeply regret that to this at least generally admitted sound principle, the opposition should be vested on grounds so low—pardon me if I call it so cowardly—as the difficulty and the risk of introducing it into Ireland. I think it is a most fatal declaration of the most rev. Prelate, that we ought on this occasion to be guided, not by what is felt to be the dictates of reason and justice, but that we ought to be guided by the prejudices, nay, the most rev. Prelate went so far as to say that he admitted that they were the unfounded prejudices, of the Irish people. I regret to see what I feel is the determination of a majority of your Lordships to reject this clause. I regret it the more deeply because I see from those who have addressed your Lordships, that every Peer who is connected personally with Ireland acquiesces in the view which is taken by what I feel is the majority of your Lordships' House. I remember the time when, with deep regret, I was compelled to differ on some questions from those with whom I had formerly great satisfaction in acting; and even now, if I could hope by any arguments or any inducements in my power to persuade your Lordships to adopt a bolder, and because a bolder, therefore a safer course—no personal considerations, no suggestions, would induce me now to withdraw my opposition. But when I cannot doubt that the majority of your Lordships intend to requiesce in this Bill as it stands—when I see you consider it not expedient to adopt this Amendment, then, my Lords, I bow to the opinion which I cannot doubt to be general. I will not, for the mere purpose of recording votes, give your Lordships the trouble of dividing; and I trust that those of your Lordships who would have done me the honour of supporting me on this occasion—whose sentiments accord with mine with regard to the principle and policy of this measure—I trust you will not think that I am exercising an unwise discretion in declining to give the House the trouble of an unnecessary division, if your Lordships would permit me, with all espect, but, at the same time, with a full and entire conviction of the truth and the soundness of the principle, to withdraw
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this Amendment which I have placed in your Lordships' hands. At the same time, so strongly do I feel as to the soundness of my views—so firmly am I persuaded of the evil consequences which will result from the rejection of this Amendment, that as the present proceedings will not appear on your Lordships' Journals, I beg to state that I shall feel it my duty for the sake of form, and only for the sake of form, to move this Amendment again on the bring-up of the report, though I shall not give your Lordships the trouble either of a division or of discussion; but I wish it to appear on your Lordships' Journals that such an Amendment has been proposed, as I fear that, in future, its soundness will be more and more apparent.
The ARCHBISHOP of DUBLINclaimed the indulgence of their Lordships while he corrected a mistake into which the noble Lord had fallen. The noble Lord had ascribed to him a sentiment the very reverse of that which he had advanced. So far from being the advocate of political expediency, or of having come forward as the champion of it, he had always considered that nothing could be expedient but what was founded in reason and in justice; and he had to the utmost of his power, and according to his judgment, been the advocate of what he considered to be expedient for the general good.
LORD STANLEYsaid, that if he had misunderstood the most rev. Prelate, he was quite ready to acknowledge his error. At all events, he hoped he had not misrepresented or misunderstood that which had fallen from almost every noble Lord tonight.
The MARQUESS of CLANRICARDEwas desirous of expressing his dissent from the statement of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), that his arguments had not been controverted, nor the principle of his Amendment objected to. Most certainly he (the Marquess of Clanricarde) considered that those arguments had been controverted in the course of the debate; and if he had availed himself of an opportunity of addressing their Lordships earlier, he should have directed his arguments against the principles which the noble Lord had laid down. He maintained that those principles were not in any degree sound as applied to Ireland; and he could quote the noble Lord's own eloquent words to show upon what different grounds and principles their Lordships ought to legislate for that country, owing to the difference of the law

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between landlord and tenant in Ireland and in England. The only sound argument advanced in support of the Amendment, was advanced entirely upon a wrong principle. It was contended, that this was a measure for giving employment to the poor of Ireland. He denied that proposition. It was a Poor Law Bill, and that was the whole principle involved in it. Dissenting as he did from the principle laid down by the noble Lord, he had not sought an opportunity to enter into the many points which had been touched upon by the noble Lord, because he (the Marquess of Clanricarde) foresaw, at an earlier period than the noble Lord did, that a great majority of their Lordships were against the Amendment.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Clause 29, respecting accounts of expenditure, was agreed to.
LORD MONTEAGLEthen proposed a Clause enacting that certain clauses (four in number) in the Bill should be in operation for a time thereinafter limited. The noble Lord was understood to suggest that the clause should be inserted in the Bill, and be considered on the bringing up of the report.
LORD CAMPBELLhad never, since he had had the honour of a seat in their Lordships' House, been more astonished than at the course just taken by his noble Friend. His noble Friend proposed the insertion of a clause, declaring that certain portions of the Bill should be enacted for a time thereinafter limited, without stating what that limitation should be. Neither in an English nor in an Irish Parliament was there any precedent for such a proceeding. Considering the Parliamentary experience of his noble Friend, this proposal would certainly not redound to his reputation as a Parliamentary leader. He was a little surprised at his noble Friend having introduced his first clause at the beginning of the Bill, declaring that the Bill should be in operation for a time therein to be limited; but now his noble Friend came forward with a second clause at the end of the Bill, enacting that certain foregoing clauses should be permanent, and others temporary. It reminded him of Sir Walter Scott's description of Melrose Abbey—that it was all "buttress, and buttress of ebon and ivory." Were the Committee to send up such a report, it would stultify itself; he must therefore most earnestly implore his noble Friend to reconsider the course he had adopted. His
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noble Friend appeared to have been muck at a loss to fix upon any particular period. At one time he had proposed a year; but that would have been just one year short of the period fixed by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) for the commencement of the operation of his own Amendment. The noble Lord's Amendment was to begin in 1850, while his noble Friend (Lord Monteagle) proposed that the Bill should expire on the 1st of January, 1849. Such were the proceedings of those who were opposing this Bill! However, it was indispensably necessary that some period should be fixed by his noble Friend.
LORD MONTEAGLEsaid, that what he originally proposed was, that the chairman should report progress, which he thought would have been a convenient course for all parties; but he would now move that the clause be added to the Bill.
The EARL of SHAFTESBURY(Chairman of the Committee) read the clause, which provided that certain clauses in the Bill should be in operation till the 1st of September, 1850, and no longer.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEwished everything to be done regularly. He would not say anything either as assenting or dissenting from the Amendment; but merely assented to its being introduced into the Bill for the information of their Lordships, that it might be discussed on a future occasion.
EARL FITZWILLIAMwas of opinion that any attempt to limit to a definite period certain clauses of the Bill, while they left the remaining clauses unlimited, could only be attended with the most mischievous effects.
EARL GREYwas surprised to hear that declaration from his noble Friend; for on a former evening the vote of his noble Friend had been given in favour of a proposition, the inevitable tendency of which would be to bring about those results now described by his noble Friend as mischievous. Having gone through Committee, and having made some clauses permanent, while others were to cease to operate within a certain period, it would be contrary to common sense if they did not now name the period when these latter clauses should terminate. He would leave it to the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) and his noble Friend (Lord Monteagle) to fight the battle between them, whether the period should be one, two, or three years; no one could suppose that when they had once intro-

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duced the principle of out-door relief in Ireland, they would ever succeed, even if they dared to make the attempt, in putting an end to the system. He trusted, however, they would have the opportunity, before this measure became law, of reconsidering this most important question.
EARL FITZWILLIAMprotested that his only object was, to make the Bill work in a manner as beneficial as possible to the country.
The ARCHBISHOP of DUBLINthought that it was a wise policy to limit the operation of the new principle, that of outdoor relief, which they were about to apply to Ireland; and he did not see anything inconsistent in making permanent those parts of the measure not necessarily connected with this new principle. There could be no objection to their legislating permanently on principles already recognised; while there was the greatest possible objection to adopting, unless they had previously made an experiment, principles but imperfectly understood, and, when carried out, confessedly attended with danger.
The MARQUESS of WESTMEATHconsidered that the limitation of the Bill was due to the feelings of the people and the fears of the landlords.
The EARL of WICKLOWstated, that the principal object he had in view in bringing forward the Motion of which he had given notice, to limit the operation of the whole Bill to three years, was, to insure the attention of Parliament being early called to the effect of such a comprehensive measure on the condition of the people. He had no wish at all to injure the Bill.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsuggested that the Motion should be deferred until the report was brought up.
The EARL of WICKLOWacquiesced in the proposal.
Amendments postponed.
LORD MONTEAGLEthen moved the Amendment which had been the subject of conversation on a former evening, and which he had delayed introducing at the request of the noble Marquess, the object of which was to provide an effectual preventive against rates being made auxiliary to the payment of rents or wages.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsuggested that the noble Lord should allow his clause to be printed, and take the discussion upon it on the bringing up of the report.
LORD MONTEAGLEhad no objection to this proposal, and accordingly withdrew the clause for the present.
House resumed. Bill reported.
House adjourned.