Sitting of 2 December 1847

MINUTES.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Viscount Ebrington, from Plymouth, for Abolition of Freedom from Arrest.—By Mr. Tufnell, from Devonport, complaining of Want of Religious Instruction.—By Lord Brackley, from Blythemarsh (Stafford), against the Grant to Maynooth College.—By Mr. G. Hamilton, from Llanhenoch (Monmouth), against Legalising a Roman Ambassador, and the Admission of Jews into Parliament.—By Dr. Bowring, from Alphonse de Normandy, respecting the Use of Sulphate of Soda in the Manufacture of Soap.—By Mr. G. Craig, from Merchants of the City of Edinburgh, for Repeal of the Banks of Issue, and Banking (Scotland) Act.—By Mr. Hindley, from Ashton-under-Lyne, and Colonel Thompson, from York, against Coercion, and for Measures of Amelioration (Ireland).—By Mr. James Clay, from Members of the Hull Chamber of Commerce, for Inquiry respecting the Currency.—From James Walkinshaw, of the Isle of Wight, for the Production of certain Papers relative to the Manchester and Southampton Railway Bill (1846).—From Joseph Gibbs, Civil Engineer, of Portland-place, London, for the Production of Papers relating to the Northern and Southern Connecting Railway Bill (1846).—From Board of Guardians of the Hereford Union, against Union Settlement.—From William Frogatt Robson, of No. 10, Lancaster-place, Strand, for the Production of certain Documents relative to the Slave Trade (Gallinas).

TAXATION OF SUITORS.
MR. ROMILLY MR. ROMILLY moved for the appointment of a Select Committee—
"To inquire into and report to the House on the Taxation of Suitors in the Courts of Law and Equity by the collection of Fees, and the amount

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thereof, and the mode of collection, and the appropriation of Fees in the Courts of Law and Equity, and in all inferior Courts, and in the Courts of Special and General Sessions in England and Wales, and in the Ecclesiastical Courts and Courts of Admiralty; and as to the Salaries and Fees received by the officers of those Courts, and whether any and what means could be adopted with a view of superintending and regulating the collection and appropriation thereof."
His object was not to inquire into the propriety of the amount of compensation given to any officers, but to ascertain whether the fees might not be better appropriated for the administration of justice. He considered that the fees ought to be put into one fund, and ought to be applied solely to purposes connected with the administration of justice, with a view to render that administration as cheap and economical as possible. Under the present system more than 100,000 l. a year was paid over from the fees received in the courts of common law to the Consolidated Fund. In the county courts lately established the amount of fees far exceeded what was required for the salaries of the officers; and, therefore, the Government proposed that the salaries should be fixed, and that the fees should be carried over to a general fund. He hoped that the Government would take care that no portion of the fund arising from fees was carried to the general expenditure of the country, but that it was applied to the reduction of fees from suitors.
SIR G. GREYunderstood the object of the hon. and learned Gentleman's Motion was simply to reappoint a Committee with the same powers and objects as the Committee appointed last Session on the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman who lately represented Kinsale (Mr. Watson); and to such a Motion he was perfectly ready to assent. He might, however, say, with reference to the observations of the hon. Gentleman as to the county courts, that what he stated the other night was, that the Government were collecting information as to the amount of fees received in those courts, in order to see whether it might be possible and expedient, at an early period, to reduce the amount of those fees. His own impression was, that such a course would be possible.
Motion agreed to.

POOR LAW ADMINISTRATION ACT.
MR. BANKESrose to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Poor Law Administration Act, by reducing the amount of charge to which the public are liable un-
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der the existing provisions of that Act. He considered that the subject to which his Bill referred was one of no little importance, and he had felt it right to take the earliest opportunity of bringing the matter under the notice of the House. As many hon. Members had not occupied seats in that House during the last Parliament, and might not be acquainted with the transactions which led to the passing of the Act for amending the laws relating to the relief of the poor last Session, he might state that a Committee of Inquiry had sat for several months, and after a protracted inquiry they reported that, with regard to the existing Commissioners, on a review of the proceedings of those Commissioners, they were of opinion that such proceedings had been irregular and arbitrary—that they were not in accordance with the statutes under which the Commissioners exercised their functions—and that they were such as to shake public confidence in the administration of the law. He (Mr. Bankes) was not entitled to say that that was the ground upon which the Government brought in a Bill for altering the administration of the poor-law; but certainly it was the opinion entertained by a very large proportion of the hon. Members who supported that new enactment. A notice was given with a view to a further inquiry with respect to the conduct of the Commissioners; but it was from time to time postponed and ultimately abandoned because of the passing of the new Bill, which was to provide for a new administration of that branch of the law. That Bill passed last June. It occasioned considerable discussion; and he, in common with other hon. Members, considered that perhaps the course finally adopted was not the best, holding, with other objections, that an unnecessary expense was incurred, and that a greater number of paid officers was to be appointed than was necessary. The House however, adopted the Bill; out from that time to this, it had never been carried into effect. The Government was bound to explain these circumstances, which assumed rather an extraordinary complexion. The existing Commission had received the censure of a Parliamentary Committee—a censure carried by eight to four; and the Government had themselves admitted the expediency of an alteration in the administration of the law by introducing the new Bill themselves, although possibly it might be on other grounds than those which actuated the Andover Committee. And then,

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what, too, had become of the old Commissioners? As he was informed, one of them being now a Member of the House, a second was otherwise provided for by being placed (it was said) in a high foreign appointment, and there remained but one; and, in the opinions of many lawyers, if not all, the old Commission could not now be carried into execution, because a board could not be formed. If the Government were prepared to say that they were satisfied with the services of the one Commissioner who remained, they ought to abandon the expensive system proposed by the measure of last Session. If one Commissioner were sufficient, why have a paid President in the House of Lords, a paid Secretary in this House, another paid Secretary out of it, and an unlimited number of clerks and inspectors, whose salaries were not yet fixed, for the Government had all along refused to state what was to be the amount, and required to have it left to their decision? If, considering subsequently the distressed state of the country, the Government felt that a cheaper system might be adopted with safety, and that they could place confidence in the one Commissioner who remained, let it be so—but then let that system be embodied in a Bill; let us, not have a law which said we were to have all this expensive machinery, while in reality we were content with a much cheaper establishment. It seemed very unnecessary to have a paid President in the House of Lords, because the new board was to include some high officers of State who had really very little to do—the President of the Council, and Lord Privy Seal, for instance; and hon. Members who thought the addition of such a President unnecessary when we were a prosperous nation, might reasonably feel it improper now, when we were so much the reverse. He had no desire to detain the House needlessly from the adjourned debate: he only wished that the business to come on after the Motions was the Bill relating to Ireland. He trusted that the Government did not mean to follow the unhappy precedent set by the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel), of mixing up a Coercion Bill with other business; it might lead to the like result as in the former instance. If it were so, and if the Bill should be postponed for weeks and weeks, he (Mr. Bankes) should follow the course he took before—doubt their sincerity, and vote against their Coercion Bill. The hon. and learned Gentle-
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man concluded by moving for leave to bring in the Bill.
LORD J. RUSSELLthought that when the House should be informed of the general facts relating to the subject, they would see that there was no reason for taking the hasty step which the hon. and learned Gentleman proposed. There had been three Commissioners intrusted, since the Act passed, with the administration of the poor-law, and each of them received 2,000 l. a year, making a total of 6,000 l.. What the Government proposed last Session, and which the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to think such a great aggravation of the public burdens, was, that instead of those three Commissioners there should be one President, with a salary of 2,000 l., and two Secretaries with 1,500 l., making a total expense of 1,000 l. a year less than the former establishment. With regard to the arrangements which had been under consideration for carrying into effect the new Act, of course it was not possible for him (Lord J. Russell) to detail the communications he had had with individuals, or to refer to the unwillingness any persons might have shown to undertake so very responsible and laborious offices as those under the new Commission. But the hon. and learned Gentleman was entirely mistaken in his statement that one Commissioner had been doing all the business of the department. The hon. Member for Herefordshire (Mr. G. C. Lewis), when he became a candidate for a seat in Parliament, resigned his seat at the board, as he had agreed to do; but there remained Mr. Nicholls and Sir B. Head, who continued to carry on the business of the Commission to the present time; but, though they might be willing to do so for a certain time, and to make an unusual exertion for that purpose, that was a state of things which it was not desirable to continue. He was happy to be able to say, that he had now nearly completed the necessary arrangements; and he trusted within a week or ten days they would be finally completed, and a President and two Secretaries appointed. With regard to the censure passed by a majority of the Andover Committee, he had stated formerly the reasons why he did not concur in that censure; and he supposed, as no hon. Member had ever ventured to ask the House to confirm the report of that Committee, or agree in the resolution, that it was generally considered that it was not acquiesced in by the House. With respect to another statement of the

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hon. and learned Gentleman, he was entirely mistaken as to what he supposed would be the course of Government; the Bill for the better prevention of crime and outrage in certain parts of Ireland had not been delivered to Members until Wednesday morning, and it would have been unfair to push on the second reading on this day. Monday next had been fixed, in order that they might have time to consider the provisions of the Bill; but the Government had no intention of postponing any stage of that Bill. On the contrary, thinking it necessary for the preservation of peace and order in Ireland, the Government would proceed with it on Monday, and every day on which they should be allowed by the House. He presumed the hon. and learned Member would not persist in his Motion.
MR. DISRAELIdid not think the present was exactly the Government that should take the earliest opportunity of depreciating the labours of a Parliamentary Committee. The House could now form an idea what would be the course taken by the Government with respect to the Committee on the commercial distress, and the influence of the Bank Charter Act in bringing it about, if the report should be adverse to the opinion of the Government. It ought to be stated to the House that the hon. Gentleman who was the proper party to take such a step, seeing that he represented Andover, gave notice of a Motion to bring the subject of the decision of that Andover Committee before the House; and the noble Lord, however lightly he might now treat that decision, could not deny that upon that decision he virtually acted. After the report of that Committee was made, he came forward and immediately proposed a great revolution in the means of administering the Poor Law; and the hon. Member for Andover, and those who thought with him, might well be satisfied with the result which had been achieved, and think it unnecessary to pursue it further. But it so happened that, in consequence of the delay of the Government in fulfilling their intention, the same hon. Member last Session gave another notice, that if that delay should not be terminated he must appeal to the House; and his notice was for some time upon the Paper. Hon. Members who were new to the House would not sit there long without knowing how difficult it was for any one not in an official position to bring forward a question of this sort; and it was interfered
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with by the illness of the hon. Member for Andover, and afterwards by the impending dissolution of Parliament; but, on the one hand, the noble Lord did act upon the decision of the Committee, and on the other, the Members who voted in favour of it did not shrink from vindicating it. As an individual Member of the Committee, he might also express his own opinion, that after the inquiry before that Committee, and after the Government had acted upon their report, it really would have had rather an air of a vindictive character, than have led to any result to the advantage of the public, to pursue the subject any further.
MR. FRENCHthought, that whatever cause of complaint the hon. and learned Member might have against the Government for not filling up the vacant places in England, Irish Members had greater cause of complaint that the offices in the poor-law department for Ireland were not filled by Irishmen acquainted with that country.
SIR G. GREYreminded the hon. Member that Mr. Twisleton's was not a new appointment; he had been for some years in office in Ireland executing the poor-law, and had acquired great knowledge and experience, and discharged his duties with great ability. Two other Members of the board in Dublin were the Chief Secretary and the Under-Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, and both of them were residents in Ireland.
CAPTAIN PECHELLsaid, that the noble Lord, by not filling up the Commission, had shown that the censure of the Committee on the Andover union on the poor-law was justified and appreciated by the country. What did these Commissioners say when asked, "Did you ever visit the board of guardians?" They said it was not possible to leave their boards to visit the boards of guardians, to examine into these unions, and see if the assistant commissioners did did their duty. If the business had been conducted during the last three months by only one Poor Law Commissioner, it showed that the Andover union report was founded upon good evidence. He was astonished that the noble Lord should casst a censure on the late hon. Member for Andover, who had devoted himself to the cause, and whose state of health was brought on entirely by his labour in the Committee. The hon. Member for Dorsetshire had placed the case in a fair position, and so had the hon. Member for Buckingham-

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shire; and the House was very much indebted to the former hon. Member for having started this question. It was now known that three Poor Law Commissioners declared it was not possible to attend the boards of guardians without leaving the work undone at. Somerset House, which they considered far more important than going to look after these boards of guardians. He should support the Motion of the hon. Member for Dorsetshire, believing that they should obtain certain good by this discussion.
MR. BANKESpresumed that the Government did not object to his second Motion. He would wait to see what they did, whether they took any further proceedings after the recess.
Motion withdrawn.

IRISH ESTATES IN CHANCERY.
MR. B. OSBORNErose to move—
"That there be laid before this House, a Return from the Registrar's Office of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, of the number of causes, description of property, rental of estates, arrears of rent, when receiver was appointed, and when receiver last accounted; gross amount of costs paid by receiver since his appointment, as allowed in his account, in each county in Ireland, during the years 1844, 1845, and 1846, and up to 1st December 1847; together with a statement of the amount expended on improvements during the same years, since such properties came under the management of a receiver:—Also, a Copy of any General Rules or Instructions given since 1843, for the guidance of receivers in reference to allowances for improvements, or the management of estates, or the letting of lands, by the Lord Chancellor or Master:—And, a similar Return from the Chief Remembrancer's Office, in reference to estates under the Court of Exchequer in Ireland,"
The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERthought that was not quite in the same shape as the return in Lord Devon's report, and, if so, he should not like to agree to it. Perhaps the hon. Member would either alter the Motion accordingly, or withdraw it and prepare a new one?
MR. B. OSBORNEmust press for the account of money laid out in improvements, and also for a copy of the general instructions given on that subject. He considered that the abuses in the Irish Court of Chancery with regard to the management of property under receivers were fraught with the most serious consequences.
The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERdid not know that he should object to the return, but the hon. Member had now introduced fresh words beyond his notice, and asked for "a copy of any general rules or instructions given since 1843 for the guidance of receivers in refer-
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ence to allowances," and so forth. It was not quite fair to move this as an unopposed return, without notice.
MR. B. OSBORNE: I gave notice a week ago.
MR. G. A. HAMILTONrecommended the hon. Member to postpone the Motion at present.
MR. GUINNESStrusted his hon. Friend would not withdraw his Motion, because there was no subject whatsoever which could come under the consideration of the House of so much consequence as that to which the hon. Member for Middlesex had adverted. He was one of that unfortunate class called receivers under the Court of Chancery in Ireland. He had for 25 years earned his bread as a receiver under that court; there was, therefore, no Gentleman in the House, perhaps, who had had the same opportunity of observing the working of the system, or of knowing the abuses that prevailed in it. Anxious as the House must be to ameliorate the condition of persons occupying property in Ireland, he felt it easy to convince the House that there was no class of property in that country which required their protection so much as that which was placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Such were the evils of the present system, that it was absolutely necessary either to remove the property altogether from the jurisdiction of that court, or greatly to enlarge the powers of the court in regard to its management. He would mention three cases that came within his own personal experience. He was the receiver of an estate in the counties of Cork and Tipperary, of a rental exceeding 2,000 l. a year. That estate had been under his care twenty-one years; and in that twenty-one years not one single shilling had been expended to improve the condition of the tenantry. The second case was that of a property in the county of Mayo, the rental of which was 4,500 l. That had been nine years under his care; and in the course of those nine years 168 l. was all that had been expended to improve the estate. The third case was that of property producing a rental of 10,600 l. It was principally situated in the county of Westmeath. Out of that property, which had been ten years under the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, he, as the servant of that court, and obeying its orders, had expended, during those ten years, for improvements, a sum not amounting to 600 l. He humbly submitted to the House that these three cases, which were but a minor

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part of the cases that came under his own knowledge, constituted good ground for the Motion of his hon. Friend, and for his hon. Friend bringing the subject under the consideration of the House. He trusted that when the House authorised a transfer of the management of the property of Ireland into the hands of the Court of Chancery, they would also oblige or enable the court to exercise not merely the rights of a landlord, but also his duties. He felt this subject strongly; and he trusted his hon. Friend would press his Motion. Not one hour was to be lost; because those very properties were universally throughout Ireland the seats of factious sedition and disorganisation. He would just point out to the House what were the effects of the expenditure, small as that expenditure was. Out of the estate returning 10,600 l. a year, he had received, during the ten years, more than 100,000 l., upon which, as he had stated, only 600 l. had been expended, and that during the last three years, being an expenditure of about 200 l. a year. And what had been the consequence, even of that petty outlay? Why, in the year 1845 he received 1,000 l. more than the year's rent, being 1,000 l. on account of former arrears; in 1846 he received another 1,000 l. over the year's rent; and in 1847, during all the distress which had pervaded the whole country, he received 600 l. more than the year's rent. This he considered a most remarkable fact, and worthy the attention of the House.
SIR G. GREYhad no intention of disputing the importance of the subject to which the Motion of the hon. Member for Middlesex referred. The statement which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Guinness) had just made, would have been sufficient to remove all doubt upon that point; but he thought the hon. Member for Middlesex laboured under some misapprehension as to what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His right hon. Friend did not object to the substance of the return; he only wished to have its precise terms placed before him, previously to its being agreed to. For this reason he (Sir G. Grey) would suggest that the Motion should for the present be withdrawn, and brought on again in an amended form.
Motion withdrawn.

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL.
MR. EWARTrose to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether it was the intention of Government to institute a court of criminal appeal, or adopt
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any similar remedial measures in cases where persons have been convicted and sentenced, and afterwards discovered to be innocent? A case had recently occurred where a young woman named Mary Ann Turford had been found guilty of stealing a watch, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and afterwards her innocence was clearly established, and another person was convicted on his own confession of the felony. A person of the name of Thomas Whalley was sentenced at the Stafford assizes to transportation for fifteen years, and after suffering eight months' imprisonment he was proved to be innocent, and was forthwith discharged. These and similar cases clearly showed that some tribunal of appeal ought to be instituted, where the suffering parties might obtain redress. The late Sir S. Romilly brought in a Bill upon the subject, and one of its provisions was to give compensation to the persons injured. That measure, however, did not become law. In civil cases there were courts of appeal. It was true that an error in the indictment might be made the subject of argument before the Judges; but where the evidence as to the offence was alone in question, there no appeal lay, and the verdict of the jury was conclusive. About twelve years ago he endeavoured to legislate upon this subject, but he did not meet with sufficient support to encourage him to proceed. Since then Sir Fitzroy Kelly brought in a Bill on the same subject; but circumstances prevented his going on with it, and he was now, unfortunately, not a Member of the House. In his opinion, no one could undertake the measure so satisfactorily as the Government; he, therefore, begged to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the Government intended to introduce a Bill upon the subject?
SIR G. GREYdid not consider it a very convenient mode to bring such an important subject forward in the shape of a question. Were he to enter upon its discussion, a very considerable portion of time would necessarily be occupied. With regard to all the cases mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, his opinion was, that if the measure of Sir Fitzroy Kelly had been passed, it would not have afforded a remedy in any of those cases more speedily than had been rendered by the system that was at present practised. The hon. Gentleman, however, very much underrated the difficulties attending the establishment of a criminal court of appeal. Sir Fitzroy Kelly brought in his Bill in the early part of the

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Session of 1844; he afterwards became Solicitor General, and from that time up to the summer of 1847 he did not attempt to revive the measure. With regard to the case of Mary Ann Turford, who was convicted of stealing a watch, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment—if there had been a criminal court of appeal, the proceedings necessary to be taken before she could have obtained the benefit of that appeal, would have occupied nearly the whole period over which her term of imprisonment ran. But what was it that actually took place? The Recorder wrote to him (Sir G. Grey) stating that a man named Ward had been convicted of the very same offence, and that in his opinion Mary Ann Turford was innocent. On that very day an order for her discharge was issued. Now, it would have been impossible for so speedy a remedy to have been obtained from a criminal court of appeal. In the case of Thomas Whalley, who had been tried at the Stafford assizes, great negligence had been imputed to him. It was alleged that Whalley's was a clear case of innocence; and yet he had suffered eight months' imprisonment under an unjust sentence. What was the fact? He was convicted in March; and, for three months after, his case never came under his (Sir G. Grey's) notice. On the 11th of June a petition was addressed to him (Sir G. Grey), calling his attention to the case. It contained statements of a very important character, and numerous documents accompanied the petition. The usual course was taken in this case by the Home Office as in all others. He read the papers, and having received them on the 11th he returned them on the 16th to Mr. Serjeant Gaselee, who tried the prisoner. In taking this course he did that which had always been done by his predecessors in the same department; not relying simply on the statement on the part of the prisoner, the documents were first forwarded to the judge who presided at the trial, and who was therefore enabled to form a much more satisfactory opinion upon the case than any one else. A very considerable time elapsed before Mr. Serjeant Gaselee made his report. In August he was reminded of the circumstance, and in reply he stated that he had been requested by the prisoner's counsel to delay sending in his report, as further documents would be furnished. Until those documents were furnished, Mr. Serjeant Gaselee expressed his entire concurrence in the verdict of the jury. Other documents were, however,
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produced, and some evidence as to the previous character of the husband of the prosecutrix having been brought forward, he (Sir G. Grey) then felt it his duty to send the papers to one of the Barons of the Court of Exchequer, who had some cognisance of the case, and request his opinion. He (Sir G. Grey), at length, on the 9th of October, received from the learned Baron and from Mr. Serjeant Gaselee a report, in which they stated, that after a careful consideration of the case, they were satisfied that the verdict was an erroneous one, and that the prisoner ought to be discharged, and he was immediately discharged accordingly. Some remarks had been made with reference to the case of Charles Butler, who was discharged after undergoing a portion of his sentence. That person was discharged solely on a medical certificate stating that further confinement would endanger his life. He was convicted of what was supposed to be a criminal offence, but which turned out to be a civil one. With regard to affording compensation to persons under these circumstances, it was quite true that three persons were sent out to Van Diemen's Land under sentence of transportation for a crime which it was afterwards proved they did not commit, and that they were brought home free of expense, and had 10 l. each given to them. As to the general question, he did not say that there were not cases in which such a court of appeal might exorcise a useful jurisdiction. He could assure his hon. Friend that he should be very thankful to get rid of such a duty as his office now devolved upon him.
Subject at an end.

PAUPER LUNATIC ASYLUM.
MR. DEERINGasked of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, "whether it be his intention to enforce the discretionary power vested in him by the Act 7th and 8th of Victoria, c. 126, where an asylum for pauper lunatics shall not have been begun upon before August next in any county of England, the funds for defraying the expense of the same being forbidden by the same statute, as well as by the Act 9th and 10th of Victoria, c. 84, to be raised at a higher rate of interest than 5 per cent; or whether he means to re-serve such exercise of his intervention until moved to do so through the medium of presentment by the local authorities?"
SIR G. GREYsaid, in answer to the hon. Gentleman, he had to state that the Act placed a discretionary power in the

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hands of the Secretary of State to take measures for compelling justices to do their duty; and that when the Act came into operation he trusted he should be found exercising that discretion in such a manner as would be beneficial to the public.

COMMERCIAL DISTRESS—ADJOURNED DEBATE.
The Order of the Day for the Adjourned Debate upon Commercial Distress was then read, and the debate thereon resumed.
MR. URQUHART: Sir, the unfortunate occasion of the premature assemblage of Parliament appears to me to have been very inadequately represented in the discussion which took place in this House on Tuesday evening. We have been assembled for the avowed purpose of granting a Bill of Indemnity to Ministers for infraction of the law; and we find them intent and engaged only for its defence. The Government proposed to us a Committee of Inquiry; by the proposal public alarm is to be allayed, and this system is to be upheld. Committees of Inquiry are proposed with the view of getting rid of an obnoxious law. The Chancellor of the Exchequer maintains the system, and proposes inquiry—to modify a defect in the parlour of the Bank. Upon this there is an Amendment, and the speech of the proposer is an argument that the currency laws have nothing to do with the present distress. Now, it appears to me that the question before us is one of far greater gravity as to its causes, its circumstances, and its effects. We have here to deal with a system carried out in a series of legislative measures which had their origin at the Peace. That system has had its advocates and its enemies. Each, while expounding their reasons for opposing or supporting it, have prophesied the consequences that it would bring. We are now arrived at a period when there remains no further necessity of investigating into the causes; for we have before us results so often repeated, that by them alone we can judge of the value of the one or of the other. These results have totally falsified the hopes and prognostications of its supporters, and have confirmed the fears and predictions of those who are opposed to it. Sir, it appears to me that the currency system is at once the most difficult and the most easy of questions; the most difficult when approached in one way—the most easy when approached in another; and the reason of the difference is this, that the difficulties that surround us are not natu-
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ral, but artificial. In like manner, I believe that the remedy is either most difficult or most easy—most difficult when attempted by the enacting of laws, and most easy when attempted by their repeal. In fact, the distress of the country is the work of this House, and the only remedy is the abrogation of the laws that we have made. But it would now appear that these measures are most popular—that it is most agreeable to the House to defend them—and that to quote the present commercial distress, except as proving the efficiency of the system in averting, not producing, panics and catastrophes, is unseemly and improper. The question was, however, differently dealt with by the hon. Member for Huntingdon, who, though merely exposing the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon his commercial view of the case, declared, in a speech that redeemed the debate, that the country had already decided upon the Charter—that it had already sat in Committee upon the Bill, and thrown it out; he further announced his conviction of danger—not prospective, theoretic, or remote, but practical and inevitable—so long as this system was maintained; yet he himself had voted for this very Bill. I have different grounds; and I may in some degree relieve myself from the reproach of presumption in daring to touch upon this subject, by stating that at the time that this Charter was passed, I entertained respecting it the same opinion that I do now. When the right hon. Baronet introduced the Bill, he avowed it to be a measure which affected society to its very foundation. No subject, he said, of greater importance could be presented for the consideration of Parliament. How was the country to be affected? It was to be affected for good or for evil. He did not say that it would be for good; and in the nature of things it could not be so. Prosperity can be created by no laws, no more than health can be introduced by medicine. The only effect that could be produced by laws upon commerce was therefore necessarily bad, as the results have shown. The declaration of the introducer of the measure was bold, if ambiguous, and fairly challenged the Parliament and the country to investigate before they adopted a system of which each individual might be the victim. It required a case of clear advantage and of imperative necessity before such a measure could be adopted; and no such were shown by him, or sought by them. This system not only convulses our material condition; it abro-

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gates the laws of our constitution; it treats with defiance the dictates of wisdom and philosophy, and leaves us in the midst of chaos. The power of this House consists in voting the supplies—what signifies our control over supplies when property can he cast down or raised up, and money transferred from one hand to another? What signifies our right to impose customs and other duties when the rate of interest can be swept up or down by an instrument over which we have no control, called the screw of the Bank? It has been admitted by the highest authorities that the emancipation of industry and the creation of the middle classes of society have in a great measure depended upon the progressive depreciation of coin through the influx of the precious metals from the mines of America. The tide has now turned—the precious metals are becoming more scarce, and therefore more dear; and this is the moment that we seize not to counteract this tendency, but to aggravate and increase it. The reduction of the rate of interest has been recognised by the most practical men, as well as by theorists, as the test and means of an improved condition of trade and of society. In proportion as that interest has been reduced, has value been given to all things except mere capital in money; in exact proportion to its reduction has risen the value of land, and the facilities of manufacture; and now in this so-called period of progress and civilisation we suddenly carry back the rate of interest to what it was two centuries ago. Again, in all admirably constituted Governments—in those great systems that have flourished for many ages—one undeviating rule has been to impose taxes so that they should fall upon large accumulations of property, to prevent those largo additions to the power which wealth gives for its own further increase. We, reversing these maxims, and subverting our own constitution, not only spare wealth in taxation, but convert the public burdens into inexhaustible mines for the avarice of a few. And, in addition, you have an increased necessity of taxation, further to augment each of those causes out of which it has sprung. In regard to the most essential purposes of Government, there is a balance between the privilege of this House and the prerogative of the Crown. To the one is confided the control of the expenditure, to the other the making of peace and war; and the system which destroys the one, extinguishes the
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other. In what condition is one country in respect to others, which is at every moment upon the verge of internal bankruptcy and confusion, and the means of producing which in its own breast is, as I hope to be able to show before I sit down, placed by this system at the disposal of a foreign Power? Thus is it, as it was truly said by the proposer of this measure; and I refer not only to the Act of 1844, but to that of 1819—that it is one which deeply affects every member of the community, the Queen Victoria upon the Throne, to the humblest individual in his meanest occupations, and affects them for evil and not for good. I feel that I am, perhaps, unduly trespassing upon the indulgence of the House; but I am satisfied that this question cannot be approached except by an effort to place the system as such in contrast with other systems and with other times; and that therefore these preliminary matters are not less requisite than the minutest details. On Tuesday night we heard of every thing but the Bank Charter—circumstances, potatoes, human nature, all came in for their share. There was every reason but the reason—the Bill which had been introduced to render that which has happened impossible. The first cause assigned for this distress was the railways—by converting floating into fixed capital. What is a railway if not an association to spend money and employ labour? Where does the money go, but for sugar and for tea, for meat, for bread, and for beer? Is it not laid out in wood, in iron, as soon or nearly as soon as it is received; and the difference only is, that in the meantime you have created a fixed and real capital. There may be cases of injurious speculation and false investments; but still how could these be an absorption of capital or of money? And if there really were 160,000,000 l. so spent, as was stated to us on the first evening of the Session, no more could it be brought in to account for the monetary crisis than if you were to assign as such cause the sums total of the butchers' and bakers' bills throughout the country. Besides, if railways had caused the distress, what would the argument avail? Who were those who most sedulously promoted railways? The next pretext is the drain for corn. What! a nation with 5,000,000,000 l. of capital, and 500,000,000 l. of yearly returns, convulsed and impoverished because 10,000,000 l.have been paid out for value received? Be-

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cause 10,000,000 l., or say 20,000,000 l. go abroad, is property to the amount of some hundreds of millions to be sacrificed at home, and your whole fortune to be deteriorated 25 per cent? When, Sir, so preposterous a reason as this is urged, I do say it is a still greater public calamity than even the disasters which are thus accounted for. We who in our last war with half our present population, and with half our means of production, supported a yearly drain of above 100,000,000 l., are now in the midst of peace to be ruined by 20,000,000 l. of produce purchased from abroad. We have an abundant harvest, we are in the midst of peace: what natural cause could have produced a panic that has only stopped short of bankruptcy? But if the proposition is absurd as an argument, the argument is dangerous to those by whom it is used. By whom is this argument used? By those very men who have hitherto told us that the relaxation of our duties upon grain would lead to a large export of our manufactures. Was not this that upon which they built their hopes? Was not this that which those who opposed them apprehended? I recollect the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for the Home Department, in the year 1838, anticipating the changes to be effected in the condition of the people of England, by the opening of our ports to foreign grain, pathetically describing the dismal tinkle of the factory bell superseding
"The breezy call of incense-breathing morn."
Rural life was to be utterly driven forth from the vales of once merry England by this enormous drain of traffic, and as land after land was open for the supply of grain, so would market after market be opened for the export of our goods. How is it then that this demand for foreign grain has not carried away British manufactures instead of Mexican gold? How is it, that instead of the occasion which was hoped for by the friend, or feared by the foe of free trade, we have results that justify neither? It is because you have a fixed price for gold. How was it that in war time, with the price of grain as high as the point it has attained to in the course of this year, namely, 120 s., we could manage to endure and even to prosper? For this reason, that you had then no fixed price of gold, and consequently you paid your 120 s. with one-third less gold than you do now. Supposing that on the restoration of peace, you had not thought fit to break down the
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system that had carried you through the war; supposing that you had not thought fit to confide yourselves to the hands of a Currency Committee—if you had not trusted yourselves to the guidance of the right hon. Baronet—-then would you have paid in the present emergency no more than you paid during the war, that is, one-third less. But what would have been the effect of paying less by one-third? Why, it is that you would have paid none at all. Had the gold which you exported been purchased here at 5l. instead of 3l. 17 s. 10½d., you would not have given to the foreign merchant a bonus upon gold, and you would not have placed for the British manufacturer an embargo upon his goods. This is the cause of that drain of gold—that drain of four or five millions—which by its reaction in some circuitous and incomprehensible manner has depreciated your whole fortune to one quarter of its amount. Another argument in support of the Amendment, which as far as I can see has no ways amended the original Motion, was the strange proposition," that in this country the price of gold was not fixed. "When I heard those words I thought that I must have been mistaken; but they were repeated and enforced. But great as was my astonishment at hearing such a proposition, how much greater was it to observe that it was cheered by the right hon. Baronet near me, and the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell). I know not how I am to deal with such a proposition. The price of gold in this country not fixed! What was the Bill of 1819? What is your standard of value? Why, an Act of Parliament upon the subject! How was it that the money sent out during the war to pay for foreign grain should have been paid for at 5l., and that to-day the same gold goes forth at 3l. 17 s. 10½d.? The statement is not true. It is ludicrously false. But how can such a misstatement be made in the presence of this assembly, and at such a moment? How is it announced with the emphasis of a discovery, and assented to as an undoubted or an unquestionable truth? How is it cheered from the Treasury bench, and the Opposition one? The reason is that it was a sophism, with which not indeed to answer, but perhaps to puzzle those who might be surprised that free traders in grain were not free traders in gold. ["Hear, hear!"] I thank the hon. Gentleman for the observation, and the right hon. Baronet for the cheer. He objects, then, to a fixed

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price of gold, and only supports the present system, because he has falsely reasoned from true premises. If it can be made to appear to him that the price of gold is really fixed, and that its being so fixed constitutes the whole system, then must he be opposed to that system; because it is opposed to his own principle. His principle is, that the price of gold shall not be fixed. Such is mine; either then let him show that the present system does not fix it, or let him abandon it. The hon. Gentleman has not given any proof that the price of gold was not fixed in this country: immediately afterwards he says that he is an advocate of convertibility. What do they mean by convertibility save the exchange of paper for gold at the Mint rate, instead of as during the war at the market price? But as his "no fixed price" is a misstatement, so is his "convertibility" a phantom. The right hon. Baronet has said, that when the laws of Parliament controvert the laws of nature, the laws of nature will ultimately prevail. But still it is not without a struggle; and we are now undergoing that struggle both in our opinions and in our circumstances? Convertibility at a fixed rate is yours by law, but it is not so in fact. Your 5l.. note is to be exchanged for five sovereigns; but you can carry that law into effect only when not more than a quarter of the community desires this exchange; should a third part ask for sovereigns you are ruined. This law of convertibility is only maintained by its own infraction; when the necessity comes, you either abrogate it, or you evade it, or you struggle through it at enormous sacrifices; and whenever it is brought into operation, you are placed in the alternative of being ruined or abandoning it; and then hon. Gentlemen say I am for the system of convertibility. ["Hear, hear!"] I consider the assertion, cheered as it has been, that there is no fixed standard for gold in this country as the most important feature of this debate; for it carries the question entirely away from all the matters of detail in which we have been absorbed, and under which it might have been buried—we are met by a direct denial. On a matter of fact the question is reduced to this—is there, or is there not, a fixed price of gold? In his celebrated speech of the 6th of May, 1844, the right hon. Baronet comments on "the absurdity of being charged with monstrous injustice and folly, when he ties down the Bank to issue gold at the low price of 3l. 17 s. 10½d. per ounce." The
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author of the Bill has no hesitation in using the words, "price of gold;" and the object of his Bill of 1819—after that of 1816 had reduced us to a single metal—was to fix that price by law. Sir, I know no predicament in which I should less choose to stand, than in that of the free-traders; they have proclaimed a maxim of justice, a principle of policy, a condition for England of greatness, a remedy for her evils, a hope for her future prosperity. That principle, maxim, remedy, and hope, is one—the abrogation of restriction on the material articles of commerce. They have not one maxim, or principle, or word, with respect to restrictions upon that which is the representative of all articles of commerce—they will quarrel with a penny in the pound of cotton, they will resist a shilling on the quarter of wheat; but as for gold, the Bank, or the Bank Charter, may raise to double in one day, and reduce to one-half the next the price of all the cotton and all the grain in the country, and of everything else. On the other hand, I observe with extreme and equal surprise a body, if I may be pardoned the use of the word, called "Protectionists," holding to the last remnants of protection for grain, and entirely forgetting that there was a restriction, nay, proscription against them which they might have broken through at any hour; and giving up protection on grain, without stipulating for a relaxation which would have achieved for them much more than all the advantages which could possibly accrue from the restrictions which they were forced to abandon. They forget that when the restrictive measures were adjusted in 1819, there was a compact. The landlords were to be secured against the currency laws by the protection of agriculture. How was it that in the recent measure of free trade, they did not resume what they then gave up? How was it that they did not then say—Here we take our stand; if we cannot resist the abrogation of the laws that have protected agriculture, at all events we insist on having free that gold in which is measured the currency—in which alike manufactures and agriculture must adjust themselves? Thus has this question been carried by an absolute resignation on the one side of principle, and on the other of interest. It has been a matter of congratulation that this is no party question. Seeing the results, Sir, I deplore that it has not been so. Had it been a party question, the interests of the country might have found

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support in the motives of this House; but as it was not a matter that interested any-party, it became to this House a matter of indifference: the interest of the Stock Exchange prevailed; and the usurers having found means to gain the heads, secured both the parties. But while it has to be deplored that it was not a party consideration in its inception, it certainly is or may be fortunate that the ties of party are broken or loosened at the time of this discussion. The discussions in this House have been conducted hitherto with reference to the existence of a Ministry; but those who sit behind the Ministry know that in regard to this question their hold of power is endangered by no vote that may be given. On the other side there is no project or design, or purpose of unseating them; and, therefore, we have obtained a truce for the moment from the customary warfare; and hon. Members may leave their minds free to consider the case upon its merits, and their conscience at liberty to give their verdict accordingly. A significant expression fell from the right hon. Gentleman in reference to the banks of Scotland. The Scottish banks, he said, had to be supported. This statement was cheered. The object of the statement and the cheer was to throw discredit upon the banks of Scotland. It is no new thing to charge upon the victim his own wrong; but never before has a Chancellor of the Exchequer come down to this House, as on this occasion, to speak disparagingly of houses that had failed, or to treat in so harsh and cruel a manner the gentlemen connected with the houses that have suffered in England and the metropolis, several of whom have been Directors of the Bank, and have passed the chair. But why were the banks of Scotland sneered at? The banks of Scotland were sneered at, because they stood an irrefragable argument against the whole banking system of the right hon. Baronet. The banks of Scotland present to you an admirable condition of commerce without those laws. They have shown to you the facility of carrying on banking when subjected to the ordinary rules of commerce; they have shown to you banks in their real and essential character, namely, establishments where large capital could be deposited, thence to be distributed in small portions to spread activity throughout the country. They show you that one pound notes are not dangerous to prosperity; they show you a country prospering under the sys-
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tem that you have denounced, and are using every means to put down. I will venture to refer to my own former opinions upon this subject. I do so in order that what I say may not appear to be the result of evils that I have not foreseen. Before the right hon. Baronet attacked the Scottish banks, I had, as far as in me lay, warned the people of Scotland against such a design. The announcement of the right hon. Baronet's intentions in 1844 aroused fear and alarm throughout the whole of Scotland; the people would not have their one pound notes taken from them; and the resolution of that small portion of this large empire, and who have so weak a voice in this House, showing itself in a thousand ways, and coming forth from numberless channels, paralysed the operations of that powerful Minister; and his hand thus arrested, he promised in this House that he should delay legislation for Scotland till the ensuing year. I beg to quote the words of the right hon. Baronet: "Of Ireland or of Scotland I have hitherto made no mention. I propose to reserve for separate legislation the state of the currency in each of those parts of the United Kingdom. "I ask the House whether this be not a pledge from the right hon. Baronet that he should not legislate for Scotland in the course of the year 1844? And if that be so, I ask what are we to think of this—that without a separate Bill, without a distinct measure, but in the Bill for the Bank Charter of England a word should be changed, insidiously introduced, which made that Act apply to Scotland? The people of Scotland were no more aware than the people of England that the Bank Charter of 1844 legislated for them; they relied with that generous confidence that has always marked the people of this country in its relations with the right hon. Baronet—they relied upon his word. Had they not relied upon his word, had they examined the Act, they would have ascertained that in the 10th Clause there is an enactment which regarded them. The 10th Clause I shall read:—
"And be it enacted, That from and after the passing of this Act, no person, other than a banker who, on the 6th day of May 1844, was lawfully issuing his own bank-notes, shall make or issue bank-notes in any part of the United Kingdom."
Here was the Scottish bank system stabbed in the dark. What I state is not known in Scotland to this day, and probably only to a few Members of this House.

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Anticipating, however, the intention of the right hon. Baronet, I wrote these words, which I will venture to read to the House:—
"Be not deceived—your system is marked for destruction—it is so marked out because of its excellency. It cannot be suffered to co-exist with that of England—you can only save yourselves by rescuing England. The banking system of Scotland stands to that of England, as freedom to neighbouring slavery, which will destroy, if not destroyed: and which therefore inspires the despot with the double motive of lust and fear."
But without reference to the means by which the Scotch system has been impaired, the fact is there before us. There is the Charter of 1844, and the measure of 1845. When, then, the Chancellor of the Exchequer speaks of the Bank of Scotland being under the necessity of receiving accommodation, I answer, here is the best proof of the valuelessness of the one system, and the excellence of the other. When did the banks of Scotland ever require assistance before? It is because of the insidious Clause of 1844; it is because of your patent Act of 1845. Convertibility is the word upon which the matter is now brought to issue. We have passed a law to ensure convertibility. We had attempted it by former measures: these having failed, we made one more experiment in 1844. This too has failed. This crisis has come upon us as the result of a measure which would be infatuation as an argument, but which is terrible as a law. Your system amounts to this—you will use a small number of measures to meet an enormous amount of produce. Suppose that the farmer from a neighbourhood brought in grain, and that the people from the town came starving to obtain it; and that the Government passed a law that grain should not pass into the people's hands until it had been measured in certain standard pints and bushels that could suffice for a tenth only of the grain in the market; what would be the consequence? And if those measures had intrinsic value, and being of a precious metal, were taken away to be used up as metal—would not the people be left on the road-side to starve, and the grain on the other to rot? The Charter of 1844 was but a patching up of a measure that had already failed. In 1844, the right hon. Baronet, in introducing his now Bill, assigned this reason for its introduction, that it was to prevent fluctuation. He said—
"The object of the measure is to prevent, so far as legislation can prevent, the recurrence of
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those evils from which we suffered in 182S, 1836, and 1839. It is better to prevent the paroxysm than to excite it, and trust to desperate remedies for the means of recovery. I now commit these measures to the consideration and judgment of the House."
And he congratulated himself upon the great and glorious name he would obtain in future times, by the great benefit he should have conferred on the community, in preventing those alternations of value which excite undue prosperity at one time, and lead to drenching misery at another. Here is the promise; look at the performance. Confidence was given to the man—not assent to the measures. The measures no one understood. The measure, at least, you ought now to understand. Gold is now our idol. Nothing is of value to us but gold; we may have an abundance of grain, of timber, of wool, of cotton, of all that constitutes real wealth; and because you have not gold, none of these are of any value. It would seem as if man had been made for gold, and not gold for man; and gold proves amongst us more terrible than iron or steel. Well, then, when your gold has gone forth, you must call it back'—and by what do you call it back? You call it back by what is called the screw of the Bank. What is that screw? The screw of the Bank is a metaphorical expression; but no metaphor is required. It is in this House that has been fabricated that screw; and that screw is nothing save the auctioneer's hammer. By it you have driven down the value of all your produce—the cotton that has come from America, or the tea from China, is selling in the city at less than its cost of production; by it these are exported again because of that reduction of price: and thus are the enormous resources of this country expended for the profit of strangers? England ought to be in possession of the greatest prosperity and the greatest power. There is nothing in her circumstances or in nature—there is nothing in our relations with foreign Powers—there is no diminution of the means of production, of our mines, our industry, our machinery; we are able to supply the world. We have got accumulated capital from our past gains, and if only left to the exercise of our own energies, we would at this moment be as much above the rest of the world in prosperity as we are above the rest of the world in the means of producing wealth. Sometime ago the French Government sent two gentlemen to this country to ask, "How a

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country which possesses the means of commanding more of the precious metals than all the rest of the world, is periodically upon the verge of ruin by the want of a small surplus? "The question is easily answered. The law which makes gold exchangeable for paper at a fixed price, and the other law which makes so much paper be cancelled when you have parted with so much gold. These two regulations, so absurd that no one can admit them except by not comprehending them, have rendered you an enigma to yourselves and to the world. Thus have you made for yourselves a condition of misery in the midst of wealth, and now you have recourse to idleness to restore trade. Your means and resources are scattered to the four winds of heaven. And you lavish your means on the nations of the earth to place yourselves in entire dependence on their Governments? In the last crisis we turned in all directions for relief; we begged the Bank of France to come to our aid. She did so; she generously assisted us, and by her help we were enabled to escape. But what would have been our condition, supposing that this demand had come a year later, or supposing that, in 1839, circumstances had occurred to disturb the relations of the two countries; suppose that it had not been the interest of the French Government to support us; suppose it had been their object to embarrass us, would the Bank of France have advanced that money? Suppose now, again, that at that moment the French Government had had some end to gain in this country, would not the condition of the Stock Exchange have materially advanced it? Who can tell what conditions might have been exacted? who can tell what wrongs may have been submitted to, what dangers incurred? In fact, are not the Government and the country placed in dependence upon a foreign Bank and Government? In former times, England was the money market of the world—when loans were to be effected for Europe, Asia, and America, in London they were raised. It cannot but strike any man as an alarming sign of the times, as one which may well justify the prognostications of our decline that have been advanced by men of high philosophical and political standing in foreign countries, that we are now so changed and so dependent. How, Sir, did we redeem our obligation? When France came, in 1846, to ask the same favour at our hands, you could
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neither do her a favour, nor take advantage of her necessities. You could not (I leave the morality of the question, I speak of the fact) have made secret conditions with her Government, for ours had no more power to act than the Bank. Although you had sixteen millions of gold, you could not give a penny. She got a loan indeed; she got it from a Power that has been looked upon as barbarous, as weak, as ignorant, as one that would never be dangerous to Europe, because it was poor! The French Government, after appealing, in vain, to wealthy England, got what she wanted from poor Russia. Is not this a question which affects England in her most essential interest? And when we consider that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth has by the labour that he has expended on domestic concerns, rendered it, according to his own confession, impossible for him to attend to foreign ones, I ask, has he done himself justice? Has he not established a lever in the heart of England, the handle of which is placed within the reach of any foreign Power who can afford to purchase it. But, Sir, the danger is not merely with respect to France and Russia, or France and England reciprocally, as acting upon one another. We are ourselves indebted to Russia for a similar favour; we are ourselves placed in the same position with respect to the Russian Government as is the French Government. The Russian Government attains this result by a financial system introduced upon the advice of commercial men of this country—which advice we have neglected. The ukase of the Emperor I hold in my hand: it shows that they contemplate drawing the money out rapidly; it places the loss if any, upon the Imperial Treasury; 6,500,000 l. are avowedly consecrated (and 20,000,000 l. are in reserve) for acting in every possible manner upon the Stock Exchange of Europe. He has contracted ostensibly with the Bank of France—the Bank of England is now his agent. Sir, this currency system under which we stagger, supersedes the functions of this House by withdrawing from us the control over taxation; it supersedes the Sovereign of this realm in the exercise of the prerogative in respect to peace and war, which is the basis of the conduct of our foreign relations. A more grave subject never came before this House½one more minute in its application—one more gigantic in its nature—one which affects us not only in the disturbance of our circum-

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stances, but in the very quality of our minds—one which leaves unpolluted no branch of public affairs—which disturbs the relations of society amongst the humblest peasants, as it does amongst the richest bankers of Lombard-street—one which lowers our station by the misery, degradation, and poverty of our people at home—which degrades us as a commercial people by the gambling habits introduced into trade—which endangers our existence as a nation, by the command over us which it places in the hands of foreign Powers. I therefore, Sir, would meet by a direct negative the Motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This House have it this night in their own hands to emancipate England. I have no hesitation in saying that any measure short of the abrogation of the fixed standard will fail in its effects. I further say, that any step that we take, except a resolution to that effect, will only prolong this evil. You have had Committees enough—you had a Committee before you passed the Bill; that Committee, after long inquiry, could come to no conclusion—and are you better prepared now? You brought in your measure without a conclusion. Will you abrogate your measure without a conclusion? The absence of decision allowed you to let in a measure. Will not the absence of decision allow that measure to go on? By the appointment of a Committee you will merely shelve the question; you will lift the Government over its difficulties; the chapter of accidents will thus come to its aid, and, as usual, those inexhaustible resources of the British empire, to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has referred for hope, will prove, as hitherto, a ready fund upon which legislative folly will draw. Our Sovereign is the Monarch of three kingdoms; we are assembled three nations in this place. I should like to know what interest my people has in the currency measure of the right hon. Baronet? I should like to know what interest the representatives of the kingdom of Ireland have in this measure? If this is a system which has brought mighty England upon her knees, is it not fit to prostrate or to keep Ireland in the dust? Ireland is without capital you say; has she not soil and arms? Ireland is not without capital; but you allow no other capital than gold. Ireland has an abundance of capital, almost equal to that of England; but this system paralyses, blights, and withers; and what is more clear than this, that England
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cannot go on with this system? How then is it possible that Ireland should? I appeal then to Irish Members—those who are divided upon almost every question of political import—whether it is not possible for them to come to concurrence for once upon a question of money? If there is no Scotch Member here that can be in doubt or hesitation as to the value of the system of the right hon. Baronet, why should an Irish Member be more in the dark? You do not require to support a Ministry—there is no ministerial crisis at stake—the life of the Ministry is safe—there is no parliamentary necessity to vote black white, or white black. If then there is no such party reason, surely there is every national necessity—take example from us. How have we in Scotland been marked as a people different in industry and character? Why, it has been by our banks. If the system of the right hon. Baronet had been forced on Scotland, it would have met with a resistance which I do not choose to characterise here, but which I know by my own feelings to be such as to equal any resolution that the mind of man is fit to form, or his body to achieve. Consider whether you may not, for yourselves, achieve to-night or to-morrow that same position which our past experience holds out to you as so desirable an end. By leaving what the free-trader ought not to shackle—what the protectionist wishes to set free—by leaving gold to find its own level—you may restore prosperity to yourselves, to us, and to England. I conclude by imploring you to condemn and abrogate these laws, which have introduced amongst us a providence the reverse of that of God—which have enacted by the blindness and the will of man this decree—that to him who hath much more shall be added, and from him who hath little shall be taken away even the little that he hath.
MR. ELLICEsaid, that the constant interest he had taken in this most embarrassing subject, induced him to offer a few observations on the question then before the House, with a view to bring back the discussion within those practical limits to which it would be well for it to be confined. He thought it an extraordinary, and hitherto unaccountable fact, that in this great and powerful country, with means far exceeding those of any other nation, with mines, machinery, and all means of creating wealth, periodical convulsions had occurred, shaking the industry of the coun-

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try to its centre, and consigning masses of men to ruin. If he could think that the remedy proposed by the hon. Gentleman was one that could release us from that continually-recurring distress, he should be more willing to enter into the arguments the hon. Gentleman had opened to the House; but he thought that at this day he might search in vain to find any considerable number of persons who would think that a remedy could be found for the difficulties under which the country suffered in a fluctuating standard. By what means were the transactions of this great country to be carried on? There must be some standard of value—some invariable measure, by which all transactions might be directed. If the hon. Gentleman had told them in what way he was to use his fluctuating standard, how it was to be made applicable to our condition—he should have been more willing to have followed the hon. Gentleman in his arguments; but he was sure they would lead the House very far from the question before it. But he did think, and he had always expressed that opinion in that House, that one of the most unfortunate determinations come to in this country—he would not question its justice, although he believed there was as much injustice as justice involved in it, after they had incurred enormous debts, and after the relations of debtor and creditor in all the fixed property of this country had been so entirely changed—was the resolution come to at the Peace that they should return to cash payments at the old standard. He thought at the time that resolution was taken that it was one which they would find great difficulty in accomplishing. He had not changed that opinion. When the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth brought in his Bill in 1819—for his measure of 1819 was not to be saddled with the merits or demerits of that resolution—the right hon. Baronet found the currency of the country deranged. He was bound by a resolution, passed by the House at the termination of the war, and he proposed that measure of 1819 merely to carry into effect in good faith that which Parliament had determined upon. The right hon. Gentleman had stated his opinion to the House, that the burden to be imposed on the country by the return to cash payments, was to be estimated by the difference between 41. 2s. the price of gold at the time, and 31. 17 s. 10 d., the old standard. He had moved an Amendment, to return at once
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to the old standard, instead of by the gradual steps proposed in the Bill, in order that he might be no party to the delusion thus practised, as he thought, on the public. That was his sole reason for interfering on that occasion, and not because he wished either a fluctuating standard or a return to the former system of inconvertible paper, the source of all the difficulties and evils from which we were now suffering. The question, however, of standard and currency had little to with the matter now before the House. The right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) would admit that the Bill of 1819 having been carried, he (Mr. Ellice) had since done all in his power to maintain it in its integrity. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) behind him, exclaimed that they could not maintain it. That might be his (Mr. Ellice's) opinion also, seeing that during thirty years of peace, this main difficulty of eight hundred millions of debt had not been diminished; but until the very last emergency they were bound to maintain it. It was not unimportant, however, to refer to the former history of their monetary system. In 1815, at the close of the war, came the renewed resolution to return to old cash payments. The measures then taken led to the first crisis in 1816. Then followed a new flood of inconvertible paper, which depreciated the exchanges, and drained the Bank of the gold brought in by the previous contraction. This state of things continued till the correction applied by the Bill of 1819. Two years of the working of that Bill produced the next crisis of 1822. Everybody recollected the scene of that year. Lord Bexley, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, scarcely knew how to account for the distress of that period, but thought it might be remedied, to use his own expression, if he could place an additional sovereign in the pocket of every man in the country. For that purpose he borrowed and issued thirteen millions of additional notes from the Bank. Prosperity, as it was called, immediately followed. The South American mining mania was only one symptom of the general speculation pervading every branch of our trade. As Lord Bexley was at some loss to understand the distress in 1822, Lord Ripon, his successor, scarcely knew where to find terms in which to vaunt the flourishing condition of our resources in 1825. Before the end of that year, however, a change came over the vision of our dream. In the scene that

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followed, some parallel might be found to the present time. The Bank, with thirty millions of paper in circulation, with scarcely a hundred thousand pounds of treasure in its coffers, was so near stopping payment, that the Governor sat watching the minutes of the clock, in the anxious hope that the usual hour of closing its daily payments might arrive before the last sovereign was exhausted. He would not follow the details of the subsequent crises in 1837 and 1839. They were less severe, but always characterised by the same difficulties and inconsistencies in the management of our currency. The right hon. Gentleman did not interfere till it was necessary, or till ample experience had proved the urgency of some control on the issuing of paper money on credit, both at the Bank of England, and the country banks, by his Bill of 1844. He (Mr. Ellice) supported that Bill. He did not suppose it would be as efficient as the right hon. Baronet expected, because he doubted the possibility of any sufficient control over a currency so mainly dependent on the fluctuating condition of public and private credit. And further experience had confirmed these apprehensions. He doubted whether they could long maintain the existing convertibility, and prevent these revulsions, without further restrictions. His right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the able speech with which he had introduced this subject, wished the House to be satisfied with the present state of things. The right hon. Gentleman could conceive no better security than the Bill of 1844, or no better footing on which to place our monetary system. Why, then, the late majority for abrogating its provisions? He (Mr. Ellice) agreed to the appointment of the Committee, as far as the connexion of our credit, money, and banking management, with the existing distress, was involved in the inquiry, for the especial reason, that examination should be made into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the Act of 1844 to effect the purposes for which it was intended—one main purpose, as insisted upon by the right hon. Baronet, on its introduction, being to check the alternate periods of excitement and depression from which we had suffered on previous occasions; but on no occasion so much as in the present case, during the period of its operation. We might take useful lessons on this question of a convertible currency, founded chiefly on credit, by comparing the operation of similar
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causes on the monetary condition of countries having wholly, or nearly so, a metallic currency. The wants of France and England for a large importation of corn to supply the deficiencies of the last harvest may have been nearly the same. The balance paid by both countries in specie beyond the exchange of other commodities, and the conversion of foreign funds or securities, might for the sake of the argument be taken as similar. In France, the money required for the payment of the balance was taken proportionately from each district and department in which the imported corn was consumed; and although the subtraction of so much from the general stock of money might have caused temporary pressure, it was only to the extent of the actual amount of money withdrawn, and produced no greater derangement. In England, on the other hand, the consequence had been very different. The whole money required was taken from the central depot in the Bank of England, the sole basis of a circulation of three times its amount. The Bank necessarily took precautions, contracted its transactions and circulation—the country was infested with the alarm, and our whole system of credit was convulsed and paralysed. What remedy did his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer suppose the Act of 1844 would provide against the recurrence of this difficulty? He had made a very able defence of the policy of the Government to avert the panic on the late occasion. So far from finding fault with it, his (Mr. Ellice's) only complaint with their interference was, that it was not adopted at an earlier period, and that wider measures of relief had not been considered. When he said this, he knew his right hon. Friend could neither add to the money or the capital of the country; but when these panics, the result of an overstrained system of credit, for which our traders were not alone to blame, were clearly foreseen, it was wise to anticipate their effects, and to take measures to palliate and mitigate them. Neither money nor capital were so much required as confidence. It was unnecessary to explain to his right hon. Friend that the restoration of confidence, or even the mitigation of alarm and apprehension, produced capital and money which he could not otherwise supply. The present was a peculiar case. Beyond the drain for corn, they had been oppressed with an enormous demand of capital for railroads. He concurred in the view taken by his right hon. Friend

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of that part of the subject. He (Mr. Ellice) had long foreseen the consequence of this drain on the productive interests of the country. But, again, the railroad mania was only a symptom of the general spirit and spread of speculation, engendered by an exaggerated system of credit, similar to that of the South American mining transactions in 1823 and 1824, and the North American transactions in 1837 and 1839. His right hon. Friend ascribed the mischief to over-speculation of the merchants who had failed. Similar cases, if not to an equal extent, at least to an extent proportional to the prevailing pressure, had always occurred. The banks went in 1825—the merchants now. Those always became the first victims to the storm who had spread most canvass to the gale; but did his right hon. Friend think that the houses which had been compelled to suspend their payments were the only sufferers? It was said no merchant at Newcastle or Hull had failed. They might have been more watchful and prudent men, but the loss from depreciation of goods and securities had been fearful and universal, and had fallen with the greatest severity on the most solvent. He spoke feelingly on these subjects, from old associations. To return to one cause of their difficulties, the railroads. On this subject he begged the right hon. Member for York (Mr. Hudson) would not misunderstand him. So far from being an enemy or opponent of railroads, he knew no men to whom the country was more indebted than to the able and energetic men who had engaged in and managed these undertakings; or no discovery or modern improvement likely to confer so many important and lasting advantages on the country. All he had in vain endeavoured to impress on directors, and on the last and the present Government, was caution and prudence, in not attempting too much at once, and in imposing some restrictions on a competition which threatened—and which had, at last, been permitted to produce—a large share in our present embarrassment. He had implored the last Government, as well as the present, only to take the precaution of limiting the powers of issuing debentures and paying interest out of capital granted without scruple or hesitation to everybody who applied for them. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir Robert Peel) was especially responsible for setting the example in this respect—rather an inconsistent policy to that of his Bill of 1844. It was im-
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possible to conceive a policy more calculated to defeat the success of that Bill. However, it was too late to look back to the past, except for wisdom with respect to the future. There was at all events the consolation that the money expended in these undertakings was not thrown away, as in the previous cases of South American mines and North American adventures and loans. There were other important considerations connected with this subject on which he would trouble the House with some observations. These were the connexion of the Bank with the Government, the state of provincial banks, and the general condition of our finances. His right hon. Friend had ascribed a large share of the earlier derangement to the indiscretion of the Bank Directors—their over-issues at one time, their sudden contractions at another, and a general misunderstanding and neglect of the provisions of the Act of 1844. That might or might not be so. But what did that prove? The Bank Directors had infringed none of the provisions of the law. His right hon. Friend had been in constant and weekly—almost daily—communication with them. He might have advised them to avoid the error of which he now accused them. But according to his (Mr. Ellice's) opinion, neither the Bank nor the right hon. Gentleman were to blame. It was the system, and the inefficiency of the Act of 1844 to accomplish any of the objects for which it was intended. It was the same thing on former occasions. The Bank had always been to blame. It would be so to the end of the chapter, unless the Committee to be appointed could devise a better system to check the anomalies and inconsistencies of our administration of the currency. The Committee would do well especially to inquire what effects resulted from a perpetual appeal from the Government to the Bank for deficiency bills, and other accommodation; and how far the absorption of their whole capital by the Government rendered them less able to support trade on emergencies, in proportion to their nominal capital, than the smaller banking establishments in Scotland and England. There was also the internal management of the Bank, and their dealings in their new character of stock-jobbers. In former times the Bank did not deal in stock or Exchequer-bills: what they bought they held. Now, if he was to believe the representations in the public papers, they bought, and sold, and even borrowed on stock, like

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other individuals. It was even said, that after having been consulted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer with reference to the last loan, and after the contract had been taken in circumstances of a somewhat precarious character, they threw a million of stock on the market, to the great injury of the gentlemen who took the loan. These things were probably not so; but they were reported, and such reports had an injurious tendency on the character of the Directors. See what a power would be possessed by individuals sitting at the board, aware of the intentions of the Directors to buy and sell stock. He was certain from his knowledge of the Directors, that they never had and never would avail themselves of the knowledge; but it was important both to themselves and to the public, that they should not be open to such imputations. The inconsistent duties of the Directors were likewise to be considered. How could men satisfy both the appetite of stockholders for dividends, only to be maintained by making the most of their notes and deposits, and the expectations of the public, that they should regulate their dealings only with reference to the exchanges? Their capital was fourteen millions; their rest between three and four; their loans to the Government, eleven; their permanent investment in unconvertible dead weight between seven and eight. These not very tangible investments absorbed more than their whole capital, and produced a rate of profit not much exceeding 3 per cent. How were they to make up the difference between that and the dividend paid to the proprietors, except by taking every safe opportunity of employing their notes and deposits? And opportunities very safe, as far as their interest and security were alone concerned, might be very inconvenient with reference to a due regulation of their issues. It had been proved by experience, that the Bill of 1844 produced no influence, or supplied no correction on this important point. So far the Bank. Then consider our financial history and present condition. Prom the year 1819 to the present period, our Chancellors of the Exchequer had generally preceded and constantly outran our speculators in their reliance on and abuse of credit. Whenever it suited the convenience of their Exchequer, either to blow the bubble for the sake of a forcible reduction of the interest on portions of our debt, or to supply their deficit by means of deficiency bills, excesses in the issues of the Bank were their
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resource. He had already alluded to the first instance in 1822. He would not follow up the details of subsequent transactions. Turn to every page of their debates on successive budgets, and they would generally find the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day taking credit on all opportunities for a fictitious prosperity, and encouraging speculation in times of an artificially excited state of trade, and of money dealing, instead of cautioning the public on the hollow foundation on which everything rested. In this way they had neglected funding their Exchequer-bills, when the stocks were nearly at par, looking to some happy occasion of reducing our 3 per cents. But it was said, Exchequer-bills were so convenient a security, that banks and bankers could not manage their concerns without them; and thus again the public were sacrificed to this connexion, which complicated our whole system. If Exchequer-bills were to be maintained in time of peace, at least it would seem expedient not to encourage the competition of railroad debentures to discredit them. These questions of finance were intimately connected with the present subject, but were conveniently kept out of the discussion. In which of the branches of his administration was his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer less embarrassed than the traders; with greater abundance of means and capital in proportion to his wants; or less dependent on credit, and the assistance of the Bank? He had supplied his wants of last year by a loan, because it would have been inconvenient to have raised the money by taxation; but he had been obliged to pay heavily for the accommodation of prompt payment, in order that he might not incur the risk of adding to the pressure on the Bank, or of raising a question as to the means of facing his October dividends. The reaction in trade, the contraction of mercantile transactions, and the prostration of private credit, would now force money back to the Bank; and so far from there being difficulty of providing means for the January dividends, it might become difficult to find other means than public securities for the employment of the Bank deposits. But was his right hon. Friend so certain that no absorption of this money might take place between January and April, and that his wants at that time might not again drive him to have recourse to deficiency bills to pay his April dividends? Was that eternal cause of disturbance in Bank

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arrangements to go on without remedy? What were his right hon. Friend's prospects? he could scarcely ask him what were his intentions with respect to further financial arrangements. It was evident there would be a large deficiency. How was that to be supplied? By direct or indirect taxation? The free-traders were consistently demanding reductions in indirect taxation for the relief of manufacturing industry. The landed proprietor, waiting for more experience of the effects of free trade on his interests, after the disturbing consequences of the potato failure had passed away, objected to any alteration in the present proportion of direct and indirect taxation. Necessity would of course cut this knot, and, in fact, the difficulty arose more from a conflict of interests than from any inability of the country to hear fresh burdens. He (Mr. Ellice) always thought that we were the great nation in the civilised world, least taxed in proportion to our means. But his right hon. Friend must set his house in order, as he desired the merchants and traders to set theirs; and he would probably contribute more in this way than in any other to the restoration of general credit and confidence. We had been engaged for one quarter of a century in rearing a vast artificial system on the falsest principles of paper credit and protection. For another quarter of a century we had been maintaining it in a state of transition to better and wiser principles; and, notwithstanding the vicious expedients that had been resorted to, and the checks which our industry had experienced in these revulsions, the national means and prosperity had constantly increased. The whole system was now to be exposed to the trial of the experiment of the natural and sounder principles—a vast undertaking—the success of which depended mainly on a sound and healthy system of finance. That would be a better security against a recurrence of these evils than many others that had been brought into more prominent importance in the present debate. Among other subjects referred to by his right hon. Friend in his able speech, he had alluded to the pressure on the Bank of England by provincial, and especially by Scotch banks. Certainly there had been ample proof both now and formerly of the danger and inconvenience of ill-conducted establishments of this description. They aggravated the danger always arising from competition in our extensive system of dealing with de-
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posits. But surely there were some means of controlling and correcting excesses in all cases of banks of issue. If publication of transactions was rightly required from the Bank of England as the condition of exceptional privileges granted to her, why not impose the same conditions on all banks to which the privilege of issuing notes was given? It was reported in the streets, that one Scotch bank applying for aid, had six or seven millions of liabilities, four or five millions of deposits, and scarcely money or convertible securities, without re-discounting bills, to pay its engagements for a couple of days. Suppose this bank had been obliged to publish monthly, or even quarterly, the amount of its liabilities, public and private securities, and money, could this state of things have arisen without producing a check from its depositors, and jealous neighbours? And in referring to this part of the subject, he wished to be understood as not casting the least imputation on Scotch banks generally. Their success, and the entire confidence which the more considerable ones justly enjoyed in the country, was the result rather of admirable management by judicious, able, and sagacious men, than of the principles on which they were established. They had, however, large capitals, and understood the value of credit too well to abuse it. These banks were in similar difficulties to that of the Bank of England, under recent circumstances. They had ample means of accommodation for all their dependants, although it suited their convenience, or possibly their sense of the necessity of some check to irregular transactions, to throw their indiscreet neighbours on us for assistance. The only other point he wished to revert to with reference to past transactions, was the letter of his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank. He had already said he approved of the interference of the Government, and only regretted it had not been at an earlier period. It was also essential that the interference should not be to an extent involving a reaction on the exchanges, or the least risk to the convertibility of bank notes. But he could not approve of the condition required by the letter of raising the rate of interest to 8 per cent. When he said that, he did not mean that the Government ought not to have cautioned the Bank in the use of the discretion and latitude that had been given to them, or that

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they should not have imposed on the Directors the responsibility of not making money sufficiently cheap to create an unfavourable exchange, nor should he have complained of the Bank imposing their own rate of interest for their purposes; but he thought there was much ground for the grievance felt in the country, and more especially by the smaller traders, with the additional tax thrown upon them by money lenders under the justification of what was called the Government rate of interest. The landed proprietor felt his share of the grievance. It was true the infliction had not been general. In the manufacturing town which he represented, for instance, the banks had not raised the interest to their usual customers beyond 5 per cent; but these exceptions made other people feel the rule more heavily. The rate of 8 per cent could only be a temporary rate for a temporary purpose, and therefore it would have been better left to the discretion of the Bank. His right hon. Friend, in his animadversions on incautious speculators caught in the gale, had observed, that there was so much the less excuse for them, as every body had foreseen the coming storm. That might be true in some instances, with great merchants, bankers, and money dealers—although it was not quite true with respect to his right hon. Friend himself, judging from his transactions with regard to the loan: but what did the little trader, following his ordinary occupation, and accustomed to the usual accommodation of his banker, know of the causes and premonitory symptoms of these revulsions in the money market? Care ought to be taken to shield him as much as was consistent with safety from the pressure of them. The present state of things could not continue without the most ruinous consequences. [Lord J. RUSSELL: It is over.] His noble Friend was sanguine in the anticipation. [Lord J. RUSSELL: I said only the 8 per cent was over.] He (Mr. Ellice) was sorry he had misunderstood his noble Friend. He was aware the Bank had reduced the rate of interest, and that it was to be reduced to-day to 6 per cent. That was still too high a rate for the ordinary transactions of the country. If they could not sift the causes of these fits of fever and ague, these rapid changes in the relative value of money and commodities, and devise means of mitigating, if they could not altogether prevent, these sudden revulsions in the mercantile transactions of the country, they might
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seriously endanger the existence of the Government that laid the golden eggs. He had thorough confidence in the power and energy of the country, that it would pass through this trial, as it had passed through former ones, and that our losses and difficulties would be easily repaired. But we must relieve the springs of industry, and keep them free, by every effort in our power. He was the more inclined to doubt the soundness of the principle of a convertible paper currency, founded on a proportional basis of bullion in a central depot, that basis liable to be acted upon in the violent manner of which they had so much experience in the rapid flow and ebb of coin in the Bank on so many occasions since 1819—both from the reasons he had before stated, and from the fact that extensive monetary revulsions during that period, and indeed in antecedent periods, had been confined to England and America, the only two countries in which the system had been established. In other countries, in Europe, in France, Germany, Holland, and Russia, there had been the usual alternations of trade, dependent principally on good and bad harvests, but in no instance characterised by the violent revulsions which had been felt in England. Of course he did not intend to compare the mercantile transactions of these countries with ours; but there was something peculiar in our relative monetary condition, which required careful reconsideration. He wished to be understood as throwing out these observations rather to suggest inquiry, than as proposing to ground any new theory on them, or more especially to propose any nostrum as a remedy. He saw all the difficulty of the dilemma. The country was much more disposed to adopt expedients for extending paper money, even at the risk of its convertibility, than prepared to resort to probably the only complete security—a paper currency—the actual representative of marcs banco. He admitted the advantages of our present system, both with respect to economy and facility. He only hoped the Committee might be able to devise better guarantees and securities than now existed against constant derangement. It was in the hope of such a result that he supported the proposition of his right hon. Friend. He (Mr. Ellice) regretted that he could not agree in his right hon. Friend's opinion that the present condition of our monetary and banking system, even with the check provided by the Bill of 1844, was either safe or satis-

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factory. It could not be so, while any part of such difficulties as the present could be justly imputed to it; and the whole subject, including the other considerations connected with the present crisis, ought to undergo a most careful revision, with a view to efficient amendment of our existing legislation. Whether that should be applied to the connexion between the Government and the Bank of England; to the regulation of the dealings of the Bank in stock and Exchequer-bills, as distinguished from the great object of their establishment and exclusive privileges, the credit and support of the trade of the country; to further publicity of the transactions of provincial, and Scotch and Irish Banks, so as to bring public watchfulness and opinion to bear upon them, as upon the operations of the Bank of England, or to any more disinterested superintendence of the general management of our credit money, than that of the Directors of the Bank, he would not pretend to say. Much more light had been thrown on the whole subject by our recent unfortunate experience; and he hoped that might guide the deliberations of the Committee to some practical measures to prevent the recurrence of the monstrous evils under which the country was now labouring, and which the Bill of 1844 had been confessedly inefficient to counteract or to remedy.
MR. NEWDEGATEcordially rejoiced at the very able speech which had just fallen from the right hon. Member for Coventry. It appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman was only pursuing the consistent course which had ever marked his conduct on this subject. He had bowed to the decision of Parliament in favour of the Bill of 1819, after resisting that measure and the system founded upon it as long as he could; and he (Mr. Newdegate) believed that the right hon. Member would end by bowing it out. In the course of his speech the right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the conduct of the Directors in throwing a quantity of stock on the market almost immediately after the contraction of the loan of last year. The right hon. Gentleman said, that reports were prevalent that the Bank had, immediately after the loan was contracted, gone into the market to sell securities; and he severely censured the Directors for having done so. Now he (Mr. Newdegate) thought that, in dealing with this subject, we ought to be just to those who administered the affairs of the Bank,
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and to recollect that the Act of 1844 placed the Bank Directors in a position, in order to maintain which, they must sell securities. For the purpose of proving the truth of what he now stated, he would quote the evidence of Mr. S. J. Loyd. It applied to the state of the Bank in April, 1838. The evidence was given before the Bank Committee in July, 1840:—
"Then, to the Bank, what difference does it make whether bullion was extracted by notes out in circulation, or by notes taken from within their walls by deposits?
"The difference appears to me to be this, if bullion is drawn out of the Bank by means of bank notes paid into the Bank, the simple duty of the Bank is to cancel the notes so paid in. If the bullion is drawn out of the Bank by the demands of depositors, the duty of the Bank is to sell securities against those demands, and to cancel the notes which she obtains by such sale of securities.
"Does it not, however, appear that 6,283,000 1. of the deposits were equally active in extracting bullion to that amount, as any portion of the circulation which was applied to that purpose?
"There is no doubt of this feet, that whilst the union of banking and issue exists with regard to the Bank of England, she is in possession of a power which enables her to meet the demand of her depositors by a diminution of her bullion, unaccompanied by a corresponding contraction of her circulation. I can only say that when she does so, if it is to an extent beyond the amount of bullion which she holds as a reserve in her Banking Bill, she does so improperly; in consequence of the union of the two functions, an abuse in the management of the circulation takes place."
This was the prescription of the author of the Act of 1844, and the foundation of the present fictitious division of the departments of the Bank; and he need not refer to the debates on the introduction of the measure itself to prove that this prescription was enforced by the Act of 1844. He, therefore, trusted they would not throw undue blame on the Bank Directors, who had merely complied with the provisions of an enactment which had been forced upon them, for they were compelled to sell securities in order to support the Act of 1844 at a time of difficulty. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had alluded to the amount which had been expended in railways, and stated that for the year ending October 10, 1846, the expenditure amounted to 21,336,000 l. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I said 26,000,000 l. for the last half of 1846, and 25,000,000 l. for the first half of 1847.] To which was to be added 33,000,000 l. expenditure for corn, making in all about 70,000,000 l.; but the

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Chancellor of the Exchequer had not deducted the one-fifth from the expenditure on railways, although he subsequently admitted that proportion was not taken out of circulation, being merely a transfer of money from hand to hand in payment for the land taken and legal expenses incurred by railway companies. This would reduce the sum expended on railways and for corn to something more than 60,000,0000 l.; but he (Mr. Newdegate) was prepared to dispute altogether the analogous effect upon the resources of the country, produced by the expenditure on railways and the payment for foreign corn. The expenditure of railways was purely domestic; the money so spent did not diminish the capital of the country, but was merely employed in labour, transferred through the hands of the manufacturers, the artisans, the labourers, and the shopkeepers of this country, back to the banks, and there remained. The expenditure in payment for foreign corn was totally different: that was a positive abstraction of money from this country; and he admitted that the pressure was produced by the payment of 33,000,000 l. for that purpose, since it caused a grievous and inevitable abstraction of money and capital from this country. He did not mean to deny that this large expenditure upon railways and in the purchase of corn was a grievous strain upon the energies of this country; but what he denied was, that the expenditure upon railways was at all comparable in the amount of injury it inflicted, to the evils produced by other causes. Of the money invested in railways, far the greater part was employed in productive labour. The country was not by it deprived of capital. They did not bury their gold under the railways. Why, good God, Sir (said the hon. Gentleman), we might as well say, of the expense incurred in building this House—that the sovereigns would be found among the mortar, which went into the pockets of labourers, artisans, and manufacturers. In the whole statement of the right hon. Gentleman, there was, he thought, too much stress laid upon this expenditure, which, at the most, did not amount to more than 60,000,000 l. in a year, half of that sum being for a purely domestic purpose, and caused no positive abstraction of capital. He could not help comparing this expenditure with that which occurred at the period of the war. Let it be borne in mind that the population at that time was one-third less than at present. The reve-
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nue then amounted to 72,000,000 l., from which deducting nearly 20 per cent for the depreciation in paper money which occured during the last three years of the war, gave 57,500,000 l. Then deduct 20 percent from the average of the annual loan of 50,000,000 l., and they had 40,000,000 l. in our money. The population then was 18,000,000; it was now 28,000,000. The trade and commerce were not half so great as it was now; and yet, with all these disadvantages, the country triumphed, and sprung up during the severest trials whilst at present she almost sunk under an expenditure of 60,000,000 l., nearly half of which was for purposes purely domestic, and caused no absolute abstraction of capital. Allusion had been made to the period of 1815 and 1816, and the financial embarrassments which had then occurred, by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, in his speech on this subject last May; and he argued that these embarrassments occurred under the currency system existing previous to 1819. But was this a fair argument? That period was not marked by the continuance of the old system, but was the commencement of our present system; that was the period at which our free trade and restrictive monetary policy had, according to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, commenced. It was then that the trade of the world opened to us. By this change more than 200 banks were broken; and the banks which remained had contracted their issues by one half, according to the evidence of Mr. Loyd, senior, in order to prepare for the system of 1819. He did not mean to say that the condition of the country during the war was a sound one. He would not wish to see the country return to such a system; but when they compared this period with that, let them not attribute the failure of 1815 and 1816 to the mode of currency which had previously prevailed. Let them consider how far far free trade had relation to the present depression. He knew hon. Gentlemen opposite would say free trade had nothing to do with this crisis. Those Gentlemen said, "You bigoted Protectionists conceive all the evils of the country to arise from free trade, and you do not take into account the large railway expenditure, and the large sums sent abroad for the purchase of corn." He had never argued that the large importations of corn during the late scarcity were to be attributed to free trade, because under any system they must

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have imported largely; but what he wished to call their attention to was the large exportation of bullion, and the evils which it produced. They supported the present free-trade system because they expected that, by the purchase of foreign corn, our manufacturers would advantageously dispose of their goods in exchange, so that, after all, the money would be kept at home. Those people said, the manufacturers of the United States would buy our goods; but he wished to see a calculation made, showing the proportion between the goods exported and the corn imported; and he would also like to know upon what terms the Americans had consented to make such purchase. Why, the fact was, those people had bought a certain, comparatively small, quantity of goods at a ruinously low price; and we could hardly congratulate ourselves upon selling at a loss, whilst they had taken a very great amount of our bullion. Our total exports were, in declared value, for the first nine months of 1845,41,700,000 l.; inl846,40,000,000 l.; in 1847, 39,000,000 l.; thus showing a falling off of more than 2,500,000 l. between 1845 and 1847. Those figures had been quoted by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. But did they furnish a picture of the state of things at the present moment? No such thing; for the state of the exports within the last few months was even worse than previously:—
"As far as the transactions of the month are concerned, they exhibit a very unfavourable comparison with those of the corresponding month of last year, showing a reduction of upwards of 800,000 l., which arises chiefly on cotton manufactures and yarn, linen manufactures and yarn, and woollen manufactures. This reduction upon the export trade of the month has reduced the aggregate amount of the exports, during the nine months under review in the present year, somewhat below that of 1846, and considerably below that of 1845. The exports of the nine months ending the 10th of October thus compare with the two preceding years:—
"Declared Value of Exports of British and Irish Produce for the nine months ending 10th October 1845, 1846, and 1847:—

1845.

1846.

1847.

41,732,148 l.

40,008,874 l.

39,975,207 l."

For the last month, ending October the 10th, as compared with the similar periods in the two preceding years, the comparison is as follows:—
"Exports—September 5 to October 10:—

1845.

1846.

1847.

5,323,553 l.

5,477,389 l.

4,665,409 l.

Was not this clear evidence that the balance of trade not only was against
564
England, but that it was become more so? He (Mr. Newdegate) would now say a few words with respect to imports. They had enormously increased, not solely in consequence of the necessity for the staple of life, corn, but the importation of articles of secondary necessity, which must be attributed to the operation of free-trade measures, had enormously increased. He alluded particularly to the articles of butter, cheese, cocoa, and coffee, of which the returns were as follows:—

1845.

1846.

1847.

Butter, cwt.

189,056

177,165

243,140

Cheese, cwt.

183,891

216,191

243,601

Cocoa lb.

3,016,301

1,938,669

3,764,353

Coffee lb.

32,166,932

35,099,814

35,769,747

Less in 1846 than 1845.

Increase in 1847 over 1845.

Butter, cwt.

11,891

53,984

Cheese, cwt.

32,300

incr.

59,710

Cocoa lb.

1,077,632

748,052

Coffee lb.

2,932,882

incr.

3,602,815

He would next allude to sugar and tea, of which the following were the returns:—

1845.

1846.

1847.

Sugar, cwt.

4,413,969

4,469,772

6,510,693

Tea lb.

36,825,461

41,432,794

44,912,880

Now, the statement he had made with respect to these imports, referred to the quantities only; but he would give the value at the present current prices of the increase upon the two last articles:—

Inc. of 1846 over 1845.

Inc. of 1847 over 1845.

Sugar, cwt.

55,803

2,096,724

£4,193,448

Tea lb.

4,607,278

8,087,419

803,741

£4,997,189

So that the value of these articles alone showed that we had expended nearly 5,000,000 l. more upon them in the nine months ending October, 1847, than in the nine months ending October, 1845; but had we succeeded in increasing the importation of all articles alike? No; the decrease in some articles of luxury, such as wine, showed that it was in vain to calculate upon forming a taste for luxuries with a view to increased revenue, by the diminution of duty:—

1845.

1846.

1847.

Wine, gallons

5,839,679

5,410,863

5,599,322

Decrease in

Decrease in

1846 to 1845

1847 to 1845.

Wine, gallons

428,816

240,347

In this case it was plain that, although the duty was decreased, they failed to increase the quantity imported, and, therefore, it was nothing more or leas than a sacrifice

565
of revenue. So much for free trade. He did not wish to weary the House with detoils, but thought it best to state facts and figures. It appeared, then, that under tibia boasted free-trade system the sober reality was, that the exports had fallen off 1,500,000 l. in the last nine months, as compared with 1845, and nearly 1,000,000 l. within the last month; and would they, with such evidence before them, continue to support so restrictive a currency? The country was, he regretted to say, daily becoming worse in many respects; for thousands of men who had, up to this time, obtained employment upon railways, had been lately disbanded, and would be a burden upon the rates. But, then, how did our monetary system stand as regarded foreign States? The Russian Government, taking advantage of our depression, had sent to purchase stock, and expended 300,000 l. or 400,000 l. worth of bullion; but was not this rather a delicate affair? this was only one instalment of a larger sum. He asked the House to consider the position in which this country might be placed, supposing the Russian Government to have purchased 2,000,000 l. or 3,000,000 l. of our securities, now that it was provided by the Act of 1844, that the Bank of England must, under certain contingencies, throw securities into the market? Russia bought up at a low price and afterwards, being anxious, perhaps, to embarrass us in our monetary concerns, forced the securities purchased by her into the market, also at the very moment, perhaps, when the Government and the Bank were themselves obliged to sell. Why, such a stroke of policy would more effectually control us than any foreign war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the returns which he read to the House, had not seemed much disposed to enlighten the House as to what the amount of circulation generally in the country was, but fixed our attention almost altogether on the Bank of England. He said little of the banks of Scotland, or Ireland. He did not give the circulation of the United Kingdom. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER was understood to say that he had stated the amount of circulation in England, Scotland, and Ireland, at a certain period.] He (Mr. Newdegate) would, however, read a few figures to the House, showing the comparative statement of the circulation of the Bank of England and the United Kingdom for four months ending November 7, 1847, and the same periods in 1846:—
566

BANK OF ENGLAND.

Aug. 14.

Sept. 11.

Oct. 9.

Nov. 6.

1846

£20,603,010

20,280,558

20,282,897

21,239,674

1847

18,784,890

18,102,589

18,340,832

20,286,714

Decrease

£1,818,120

2,177,969

1,942,065

1,012,960

But let him now show to the House the contraction which the circulation of this country really experienced. These were the figures:—

UNITED KINGDOM.

Aug. 14.

Sept. 11.

Oct. 9.

Nov. 6.

1846

£37,879,788

37,817,416

39,155,523

40,954,591

1847

34,587,487

33,778,482

34,705,245

36,736,205

Decrease

£3,292,30

4,038,934

4,450,278

4,218,386

Now, this showed that the circulation of the Bank of England was about one-seventh more than the circulation of the other banks in the United Kingdom, and that the contraction of two millions of the Bank of England's circulation produced a contraction of more than two millions in the circulation of the other banks, and that the action of the Bills of 1844–5, in producing contraction of circulation, was greater upon the provincial circulation than upon the circulation of the Bank of England. But he would beg the attention of the House to another fact. Under the Act of 1844, the Bank was empowered to trade in discount with their reserves, arising from Government and other deposits. With the capital which appeared in the Bank returns under the head 'Notes,' the Bank went into the money market, not with their own capital, but a free gift made to them, under the operation of the Bill of 1844. This cost the Bank nothing, and, therefore, of course, the Bank could afford to undersell other discount houses. The other securities, as they were called, showed to what extent the Bank could afford to reduce its rate of discount, and had increased its discount business. In the month of September, 1844, these amounted to 8,645,214 l.; in 1845, they amounted to 12,951,080 l.; in 1846, they amounted to 12,982,631 l.; and in 1847, they amounted to 18,514,805 l.. The House would immediately see the important bearing of these facts, and that the framers of the Act of 1844 had, by its provisions, secured that there should be a contraction of credit previous to, or at least simultaneously with, a contraction of the circulation. He should be surprised indeed if the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to deny that this was the case, or that the amount of accommodation thus afforded by the Bank must necessarily vary with the amount of notes kept in re-

567
serve, after what occurred last spring; or that this was according to the intention of the Act of 1844. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I do deny it.] Perhaps that might not be the intention of the framers of the Bill of 1844, but it could not be denied that that was the effect. He was glad to find, however, that the right hon. Gentleman was not prepared to carry out the Bill at all hazards, and that in that respect he was at variance with the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, who said in the course of last spring—such was then his confidence in the operation of this Act: he said—
"Let the Bank feel that its own position is in danger, and the convertibility of its notes is doubtful, then the Bank will have to consult not alone its own security, for that would be a subordinate consideration, but the permanent welfare of the country by securing at any hazard the great object of the convertibility of paper into gold."
But perhaps they might be told that this convertibility was never in danger under the Act of 1844. Then let the country understand that it is to retain double the amount of bullion required previous to 1844, in order to satisfy the fears of the bullionists that convertibility, which had never failed sincel819, might be further secured. However, he was glad to find that there was that point of difference between the two right hon. Baronets. He would now advert to another circumstance which, he thought, had been much undervalued. It was this—that on the 23rd of October last, there was imminent danger, either that the Bank of England should violate its charter, or that it must stop payment altogether. What were the circumstances of the case? The notes kept in reserve in the Bank amounted to 1,176,000 l., and, unless rumour were very much mistaken, which he had reason to know it was not, such was the pressure on the money market that various influential bankers waited upon the Government, and intimated that unless some relief were given, they must withdraw their deposits. These private deposits amounted to 8,000,000 l. sterling; and if even 3,000,000 l. had been withdrawn, he would ask what alternative was there for the Bank between the violation of the Act of 1844 or stopping payment? He might be told that they could obtain money by selling their securities; but, under the circumstances that had then arisen, he need scarcely ask what their value would be, or whether during a panic it was possible to sell them. In fine, all he had to urge
568
upon the Government was this, that the present condition of the country should be considered—that, with the prospect of a long investigation before them, they should not tamper with the best interests of the country, by maintaining a law by which it was certain that the commercial pressure was increased, so long as the balance of trade was against us, and there was every reason to believe that it would not be immediately favourable. A law which had endangered the solvency of the Bank of England—a law which had already most unjustly made merchants sacrifice their property. He was told—and he had high authority for stating it—that the commercial losses in Liverpool this year alone amounted to 2,000,000 sterling. This law had produced unnatural cheapness. It had reduced the price of cotton 1d. per 1b. less than it was at this time last year, in spite of a vastly diminished supply owing to a bad crop; and with such facts staring them in the face, could they congratulate the country on the pressure which had been produced? He had stated to the House the other night the number of failures which had taken place in the country. They then amounted to 117 first-rate houses which had stopped payment, and now they amounted to 143. Then look at the number of bankruptcies. The bankruptcies during the last four months amounted to 557, while the number in the corresponding months of last year amounted only to 406—thus showing an increase of 171. He trusted, in the face of these facts, that no dogmatic adherence to a principle which had already proved impracticable, would prevent the Government from agreeing to a relaxation of this offensive and restrictive law. The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in 1846, that no power of relaxation ought to be left in the hands of the Government; but it appeared that they were now obliged to depart from its regulations; and he would ask whether it was not more respectful to the Legislature that it should relax the laws which itself had made, rather than that the circumstances of the country should drive the Government to relax them? What was the opinion of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth on the question whether the Government ought by the law to be permitted to exercise such a power? He said—
"We declined to accept that power, not from any unwillingness to undertake the responsibility, but because we thought that Parliament, and Par-

569
liament alone, ought to exercise the authority to relax that which Parliament had enacted. After the fullest consideration, we felt that it was a power which Government ought not to assume."
He believed the majority of the House had confidence in Her Majesty's Government; but did they mean to leave practically in their hands such a power as this? For be it observed that during the recess the power rested solely with the Government; and through the exercise of it the Government possessed the power of altering the monetary laws of the country: thereby they had the power of changing the value of every man's property in the kingdom. He was not jealous of any legitimate power being placed in the hands of the Government; but he must say that this was a power which was unfit, and, more, which was unprecedented. It had been contended that, as no actual violation of the law had taken place in consequence of the letter of the 25th of October, no indemnity was needed. But as the letter was contrary to the law, and as it was impossible that the letter and the law could have both been in force at the same time, he must say that the argument, that, because no increase of the circulation had taken place, therefore the law had not been violated, was a pretence too flimsy to impose upon any one. The letter of the Government was declared both by the Government and the Bank to have been in force till it was cancelled: we had experienced relief from it; and it was directly contrary to the Act of 1844—therefore, whilst the letter of the Government was in force, the law had been of no effect. He, for one, must say, that the House would show little regard to its own privileges if it did not require Her Majesty's Government to receive what they were willing to offer freely—an Act of Indemnity for having contravened the law and the decisions of Parliament. He trusted that they would assert this right, and that they would further insist that this weight should be taken from the springs of industry, as had been wisely suggested by the right hon. Member for Coventry.
MR. MITCHELLsaid, the hon. Member who had just sat down had argued that the pressure in the country was in no degree owing to the expenditure on railways, which, he said, was retained within the country; and yet soon afterwards he went on to quote the great increase in the imports of butter, cheese, &c, as one element in the distress, because they had
570
been paid for in bullion and not in manufactures. Now, the argument of the hon. Gentleman made against his own position, because these increased imports of secondary articles of food had been caused by the demand for them by railway labourers and others, who had been paid an increased rate of wages; so that whatever derangement of the currency could be traced to these importations might be directly attributed to the railways. This was still further proved by the hon. Gentleman's quotation, that, while the articles consumed by the labouring classes had so enormously increased, the importation of wine, which was used by the rich, had not increased at all. He, for one, was not disposed to attribute much of the present distress to the railways; he attributed it rather to the enormous losses sustained by this country in the bad harvests, aggravated, he must say, by the unwise policy of the Government at the beginning of last Session. He did not wish to speak lightly of such a calamity as befell them last year; but he must say that the archiepiscopal letter, the proclamation of a day of fasting, the notice that the royal household were to use coarser bread—all these were, as it were, advertising our wants to the whole world, who accordingly raised their prices upon us, and the consequence was that we were called upon to pay 10 per cent for the corn more than we needed to have done. He did not mean to say that we had bought too much corn, but that we had paid too high a price for it. With regard to the complaint that we had had to pay for this corn in gold instead of in manufactures, it ought to be remembered that there were only two parts of the world from which corn could be procured, the extreme east of Russia and the United States; and it was not to be expected that in such a sudden emergency either the Cossacks and Calmucks of the one country, or the backwoodsmen of the other, could all at once increase their consumption of our manufactures. With regard to the railway speculation, there was one circumstance that had always appeared extraordinary to him—he alluded to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth on turning the first sod of the Trent Valley line. At a time of excessive speculation, it had the effect of exciting speculation still further, and directing it to one of the worst features of the railway system, the making of straight lines. At the same time, he admitted

571
that if Government had attempted to restrict the railway speculation in 1846, they would only have driven the capital of the country into foreign speculations. But he was not so clear that the same effect would have followed in 1847. The tide of speculation was then on the turn, and any check on the part of Government would have done much good. The hon. Member for Stafford had referred to the monetary system of Russia as being a paper one. But he thought there was some mistake in this; for though there no doubt was a paper circulation in Russia, yet it was notorious that it was supported on an enormous substratum of bullion, which was lying in the Government cellars of St. Petersburgh. He thought the hon. Member for Warwickshire was also mistaken in his impressions regarding the investments of the Emperor of Russia in our funds. It was notorious that the Emperor had long invested capital in English securities, and since his agent here failed, which took place two years ago, he had chosen the Bank of England as his depositary. But the idea of the withdrawal of his investments deranging the affairs of this country, was too weak to impose upon any man. With reference to the Bill of 1844, there was one circumstance which he did not think had been sufficiently alluded to—he meant the enormous check which it had imposed upon the circulation of country hanks. If they had been allowed to issue their notes without the restrictions of this Bill, the country would have been inundated with them on the security of railways. From that evil they had been preserved by the operation of this Bill. He must say he did not see the use of the appointment of a Government officer to the Bank. If there was such a necessity, he thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself ought to be so appointed, as no Government officer could give better advice to the Bank than the Financial Minister of the country. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) that every class of the mercantile community had been guilty of over-trading within the last few years, and he did not know what provision of legislation could correct that; but it must be left to the operation of such severe checks as they had suffered during the present season.
MR. HENRY DRUMMONDwas surprised that a person of such intelligence and ability as the right hon. Gentleman who spoke in the early part of the debate,
572
should conceive it possible that any one act or the whole of the acts of any one man, could have produced that complication of things in which they now found themselves. Truly, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth must be a most wonderful man, and his Bill a most wonderful Bill, if he or it could have done one-twentieth part of the things which had been attributed to both. It was admitted on all hands that they were in the midst of a complication of misfortunes. He did not know what the meaning of the word "panic" was if it did not mean that people were become alarmed at the consequences of their own folly. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry had showed most clearly that many things had contributed to produce that panic. Unquestionably the famine in Ireland had created a large demand for corn, and so far as that demand was extra the demand in former years, and not paid for in manufactures, it was paid for in bullion. If that gold were lying in our coffers, then it went away without affecting prices; but if it was not, but was in circulation, or had to be obtained, then of course the importation of corn contracted the currency, and caused prices to fall. With respect to the repeal of the corn laws, he was as much a dissentient from that measure as anybody; but he would oppose it in a fair stand-up fight, and not take advantage of a popular clamour to raise a cry against it that it did not deserve. He, however, did not believe that it had anything whatsoever to do with their present circumstances. With regard to railways, he confessed he considered Government was much to blame; not the present Government only, but the last Government also. Because, when they were warned by their own Board—when Lord Dalhousie had made his report upon the subject, and called their attention to the magnitude of these undertakings—unquestionably they ought to have done something to check the railway mania that was then raging in the country. But private gentlemen, as well as the Government, were to blame for sanctioning the speculations that came before them. It was evident that many of the schemes were got up by attorneys, surveyors, and engineers, merely as the means of making money. They obtained the sanction of gentlemen to those schemes, who allowed their names to be used as directors, without any inquiry into the merits of the plans proposed. This induced tradesmen and

573
men of small capital, who put confidence in those names, to subscribe to undertakings they knew nothing about. The way in which those men were injured was by their taking the money which they obtained out of the profits of their business, and which, in ordinary times, would be invested in such business, and purchasing shares in railways for the sake of a greater amount of interest. One great evil resulting from this had been, the raising the interest on mortgages throughout the country; and he did believe that it would not end until they had witnessed a great sacrifice of landed property. Railroads were a description of work which could not stop. Railroads must be finished. Supposing a manufacturer had a mill burnt down, and he spent 100,000 l. in rebuilding the mill, but found that it required 20,000 l. more to finish the work, this 20,000 l. he must have, for the 100,000 l. he had already spent, was useless until the mill was finished. The railroads were in the same condition. They must be finished. They could not make any return for the capital already expended until they were. The only difference between a mill and a railroad was, that a mill belonged to a private individual, or to a few individuals, whereas a railroad was the property equally of every interest in the country. With respect to the right hon. Baronet's Bill of 1844, he remembered that when it was first brought forward, he supposed it was to be the great precursor of a measure for putting an end to that connexion between the Government and the Bank which he thought had subsisted already too long. One provision, however, of that measure he had always considered exceedingly objectionable—he meant the weekly publication of the Bank balances. He was quite sure that no persons but the Bank Directors themselves were judges whether these balances were favourable or not. But everybody who saw the weekly publication thought they were judges, and judged accordingly, and generally judged wrong. He might observe that although he was for many years conected with a well-known banking establishment in London, yet for the last fifteen years he had ceased to have direction of it; therefore any information he might possess on this subject was no more than what any other gentleman might obtain. But it was quite obvious that the mode of conducting the business of the Bank now was quite different from what it was some years ago. The right
574
hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry had gone into that subject; and he would not on this occasion pursue the point any further. I come now (said the hon. Gentleman) to the question of over-trading; and it is not for the sake of blaming any party, either those who have failed, or those who have stood, but it is for the sake of pointing out to the House what is the real basis of this boasted modern system of trading. In olden times, when the argosies went out from Venice and Genoa, they carried goods to exchange for bullion, or, vice versâ, they carried out bullion to pay for goods. There was no such thing as trading by means of paper, nor was that system adopted until this nation chose to discard their legitimate kings, and bring over a Dutchman. It was then that you entered upon the mischievous course which has brought you to your present pass. The individual the most judicious, most experienced, and most cautious in all matters connected with mercantile concerns, is reported to have lately made a statement which sets forth the nature of this paper system. I allude to Lord Ashburton. That noble Lord is reported to have said, that—
"Capital is a connexion of capital and credit, and when some wise people talk of solid capital apart from credit, they have no knowledge of the commerce either of this country or of any other part of the world. If a man has a capital of 10,000 l. or 20,000 l., he may legitimately be doing business to three times that amount. All the manufactures, and the whole trade of the country, from one end to the other, are carried on upon that plan."
If this be a true exposition of the system, then all I have to say is, that two-thirds of the trade of the country is perfectly rotten. I beg to ask what is credit? Credit is belief. You believe somebody. What do you believe? Do you believe that this merchant or that man has got 30,000 l No, you do not, because you know that he has only got 10,000 l. Do you believe that another merchant or another man has got 100,000 l.? No, you do not, because you know he has only got 30,000 l. It appears to me that what you call panic, or want of credit, is only a symptom that men are coming to their senses, and that they have determined no longer to give a man credit for what they know he does not possess. Your system of credit is one which can never stand long. It is utterly impossible that it can be a sound principle, or one that is based in truth. This fallacious system of trade, which, after all, is nothing more than a

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man trying to make others believe that he is three times richer than he really is, runs through the whole system of modern society. As in trade, so in his private affairs, a man, to keep up a false reputation, lives at a rate three times beyond his means. It does not become me to read a homily to this House; but I must say, that so much respect as the possession of money commands in this country is most discreditable to the age in which we live. It is perfectly astonishing to know that a man is not esteemed so much for his moral worth as he is according to the wealth which he possesses. So long as this morbid feeling shall exist in the country, so long will this system of false credit continue. But I will turn from that subject, and consider the case of the manufactures, and the manner in which they are affected by the great mechanical skill that pervades the country. Should any mill be burnt down to-day, it will be replaced by one so far superior that the manufactured article will become much cheaper. Now, observe the consequence. Your whole system is to make things cheap; the consequence is, that a piece of goods which is sold on the 1st of December, 1847, at a certain price, will be sold on the 1st of December, 1848, at a much lower price. Is it not quite obvious, then, that any man who bought goods this year, must sell them at a much lower price next year; and that he must be a loser unless he sells the goods instantly? This process runs through every branch of manufactures. I often see handbills placarded in shops, stating that the goods are selling below prime cost. It is supposed that these bills are a mere trap to take in the unwary; but I know them to be no such things. I know the articles are selling under prime cost, for I have many times witnessed it. It has been said that there always have been seasons of depression followed by seasons of prosperity; that there has always been a succession of gloom and sunshine in the commercial world—in short, that it is in the nature of things that it should be so. But how comes it to pass that these seasons of gloom and depression increase both in frequency and intensity? It is because you have changed the whole relative condition of society. In former times land was everything, and manufactures nothing, or comparatively so. A distinction is found in your common law between that property which is real and that which is personal, because your common law is common sense. That which is
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permanent has an advantage over and beyond that which is transitory and ephemeral. But what has been your system of late years? To cry down the real, and exalt the personal; to put down wool, and elevate cotton; to depress the land-lord, and raise up the cotton-lord. You have cheapened your goods, and taken from your customers the means of buying them. You have made the towns rule the land; and at length you have found a man fitted for the purpose—a manufacturer of consummate eloquence, prudence, and judgment, who knows how to make his words tell, and who knows how to act as well as to talk, and he has come forward and said the towns shall rule the country. The towns do rule the country; and much good may it do them! No longer shall the Chancellor of the Exchequer be able to repose on a bed of roses. You have repealed the corn laws, and now you shall witness alternations of glut and scarcity. Your new commercial system shall lead to the amassing of colossal fortunes amidst starving millions. You shall have operatives lording it over you; at one time burning mills, and at another sacking palaces. The enlightened constituencies in towns have found out that this House is precisely the place, of all others, in which Ministers have no business to be. True, you may point to London, and ask, "Have they not returned the First Lord of the Treasury?" Yes! but they have detracted somewhat from the grace of the boon by coupling him to a Jew. And the constituency par excellence—the citizens of enlightened modern Athens—found out that their modern Demosthenes was not worthy of a seat in the House, and they discarded the man most fitted to adorn this assembly, and sent in his place a Gentleman to teach us how to make paper.
MR. MACGREGORsaid, that he would have abstained from obtruding himself on the attention of the House, were it not that, as the representative of a great commercial constitnency, he felt called upon, when the subject of commercial distress was under consideration, to address a few observations to the House. His right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated with great ability the causes of the commercial distress which had visited the country, and although he agreed with his right hon. Friend in attributing the distress to those causes, he differed from him as to the degree to which some of the causes had operated. He conceived that

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the deficient harvest and the loss of the potato crop was the principal cause of the distress which prevailed. With respect to railways, although Parliament had passed a much greater number of Railway Bills than he thought it was wise to do, he did not attribute much of the distress to investments in railways; for, during the period of unparalleled scarcity which had recently prevailed, he believed that the employment afforded by railways had, to a great extent, relieved the distress of the country. Nor did he attribute the distress to the Bank Charter Act of 1844, although he thought that Act was defective, and believed that it would be productive of so much inconvenience that Parliament would be obliged to remedy its defects. It was his opinion that we should never have a currency not convertible into gold; but, at the same time, he conceived that the restrictions imposed by the Bank Charter Act of 1844 constituted, particularly as regarded Scotland, a grievance, and must necessarily cause much inconvenience, and some commercial distress. It was a matter of regret to him that his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the Scotch banking system, or rather the joint-stock banks of that country, in terms which were calculated to create an erroneous impression respecting those establishments. He believed that to the system of Scotch banking, coupled with the economy and industry of the people, the general prosperity of that country, and the great improvements made in manufactures and agriculture, must be attributed. The best test of the merits of the Scotch banks was to be found in the small number of failures which had taken place, and also in the fact that of the establishments which had failed nearly all had paid in full their obligations to the public. He begged leave to read a passage from Mr. M'Culloch's Statistics of the British Empire, on the subject of Scotch banks:—
"Owing partly to the superior stability derived from their extensive proprietary, but more perhaps to the less risk attending the business of banking in Scotland, bankruptcies have been very rare among Scotch banks. They have long enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the public, and from their receiving small sums (10 l.) as deposits, and paying interest upon them at about 1 per cent below the market rate, they have contributed much to diffuse a spirit of economy, and to increase accumulation. One pound notes were issued by the Bank of Scotland in 1704, and their issue has been thence continued to the present day; the Act prohibiting their circulation in England not having been extended to Scotland. For
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many years past very little gold coin has been seen in Scotland. The Scotch banks make their advances partly by discount of bills, and partly by what are called cash credits. The latter is a very convenient method of issue. A cash account is a credit given by the bank to an individual drawing for it, wholly or partially, as he pleases, replacing it in the same way—being charged interest only only on the portion he withdraws."
A little pamphlet written in 1734 by Patrick Lindsay, then Lord Provost of Edinburgh, gives an account of the condition of Scotland previously to the establishment of banks in that country. Mr. Lindsay says—
"We were then strangers to trade. War was our trade, and military discipline our profession and sole study. When we had peace at home our gentlemen and persons of quality went abroad in quest of foreign adventures, and carried with them numbers of the common people as soldiers and troops for foreign service. Many of them were engaged on both sides in these wars in the Low Countries."
No country had ever developed its resources so extensively and so advantageously as Scotland had since the Royal Bank was established, in 1727. No country of equal population had made greater improvements in agriculture and manufactures. It would be unjust, in referring to the progress which Scotland had made, to withhold all allusion to the excellence which she had attained in naval architecture, particularly in the department of steam vessels. The admirable steamers which run between Liverpool and Boston and New York were all built in the Clyde; and it was not going too far to assert, that better vessels than those constructed in Scotland, whether for the purpose of war or commerce, never ware launched from the dockyards of this country. All this had taken place under the Scotch system of banking; and therefore he trusted that no attempt would be made to interfere rashly with a system which had produced such beneficial results. Let it be understood that he did not wish to see a system of currency in Scotland which should not be convertible into gold; all he maintained was, that the Scotch banks were adapted to the wants of the country in which they were established, and answered every purpose which was required from them.
MR. SANDARS: Sir, nothing but a paramount sense of duty to my constituents, and to that order of British merchants to which I belong, would have induced me to have risen on the present occasion to address the House. Sir. I claim the indulgence of the House, not only as a new Member, but still more as having just

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passed through the fiery furnace of affliction from a severe domestic bereavement. Sir, I have heard during the present debate, a variety of opinions given as to the cause of the mercantile distress, and the monetary difficulties under which we have been and still are suffering; also almost as many remedies proposed as there are hon. Gentlemen who have spoken on the subject; and perhaps, Sir, before I sit down, I may add another to that number. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry attributed much of the distress to the transition state through which we were passing, from protection to free trade, aggravated by railways and the Currency Bill of 1844. The hon. Member for Stafford attributed it entirely to the Currency Bill of 1844; whilst my hon. Friend the Mover of the Address laid nearly all the blame on railway expenditure. The right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer, though he did not go quite so far, yet he attributed much of our monetary difficulties to the same cause; other hon. Gentlemen had blamed free trade exclusively for all our disasters. Sir, I differ from all these opinions, and will shortly give my reasons. I shall first take the negative side of the question, and state to the House what I believe are not the causes of this distress. The right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer enumerates in the last seven years some 110,000,000 l. which have been expended in railways, leaving some 130,000,000 l. to be raised the next three years. Sir, I do not attempt to justify Parliament in granting so many railways in three years. I think hon. Members who passed these Bills have incurred a deep responsibility in granting powers to make lines in some five years, which ought to have extended over at least twenty years—and in turning a deaf ear to the able reports and judicious advice of the Board of Trade. But, Sir, what I wish to show is this—that railways are not the chief cause, but a mere rivulet in comparison with the mighty stream of commercial embarrassment which has well nigh overwhelmed us. I wish also to show, Sir, that railways do not impoverish the country—they do not take gold out of the country—they do not force the exchanges against us, nor do they make "floating capital fixed," nationally speaking, though they may individually. For instance, suppose I sink 50,000 l. in constructing railways, one portion of that goes for land; another for iron; another, and by no means a small
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sum, to the lawyers and Parliament for procuring the Bill; and a still larger sum to the contractor, who deals it out again to the labourer, or for the purchase of materials for the line. So there is only that portion of it goes out of the country, and becomes lost as it were to the country, which is paid as extra wages to the labourer over what he would otherwise procure. For instance, supposing that there are 250,000 "navvies" employed at 20 s. per week, these men, had they not been so employed, would have had to live. Suppose their wages would have been 12 s. per week, then, Sir, the difference would be about five millions; and presuming they spent half their extra wages in food which had to be imported, that would make two and a half millions as a drain on the country: the rest circulates through our commercial system in like manner as the blood does through the human body, revivifying the whole. But, Sir, there is one important feature connected with railways, and which, I believe, no hon. Gentleman has yet alluded to, and that is the large sums sent from this country to be invested in foreign railways. I know not the amount, but this I do know, the sum is considerable, and has far more influence on our money matters than all the English railways put together; and it is a subject for grave consideration, if we suspend railways in this country, whether we shall not drive our capitalists abroad, to invest in foreign railways; which will be a real subtraction of capital from the country. Sir, some hon. Members have attributed our distress to the Monetary Bill of 1844. I am not going to defend that measure. My opinion of it is not recently formed. I always said, in good times and times of prosperity it was an inoperative or useless measure; and that in times of difficulty it would not work; that it would prove too stringent in its nature, and would produce ruin and destruction if fully acted upon. Sir, this I need not attempt to prove; the fact is too visible to us all, and the integrity of that measure cannot now be maintained. I am not going to censure the Government for their letter of October 25th, only that I think they delayed it too long; had they interfered a month earlier, much mischief and ruin would have been prevented; but I do blame them for fixing the minimum rate of interest at 8 per cent. It has inflicted a severe blow on the mercantile interests of the country. Previous to this

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notice, discounts were to be had in the country for 5 or 6 per cent; even in Yorkshire 6 per cent was the current rate; but afterwards the rate was generally raised to 8 per cent. The relief came at a time when it was least needed—when the panic was subsiding, when the exchanges were turning in our favour, and every week gold was flowing back to the country. Being satisfied that the Bill of 1844 cannot be allowed to remain, I am disposed to join in the appointment of a Committee to examine into the cause of our commercial distress, particularly as respects the Bill of 1844. The only objection I have is as regards the time. I fear the labours of the Committee, for so comprehensive an object as the Motion of the right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will not be terminated during the present Session. If so, Parliament ought not to separate without passing a temporary measure investing the Government and the Bank with a relaxing power in case of need. Sir, the next cause of the distress is, according to the opinions of some hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, the free-trade policy of the Government. Sir, in this opinion I must beg to differ from them; and, in doing so, let me tell the House I was never an advocate of the principles of the free-trade policy of the Anti-Corn-law League. I happened to be a director of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce at the period when the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire and the hon. Member for Stirling Burghs were directors; and when they first brought forward their plans for a total repeal of the corn laws, I, Sir, did my utmost to oppose what I considered was most hazardous and dangerous policy. But, Sir, I and those with whom I acted were defeated; they triumphed in that Chamber—they have since triumphed in this House. We as a country are committed to free trade, or what they call free trade; and, as far as I am concerned, it shall have a full and a fair trial; and I sincerely hope, for the good of the country, they may prove right and I may prove wrong. At any rate, as yet it has had no trial. We should have had free trade in corn, at least 1s. duty, under the old law; and though under that law the imports might have been less, yet, I contend, and am prepared to prove, we have not imported one bushel of grain too much. It is not fair to attribute our present difficulties to free trade, though no doubt as regards sugar, and various provi-
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sions, the free-trade measures have increased our difficulties. I now come, Sir, to the point, to the chief and great cause of our commercial and manufacturing distress. It is, Sir, owing to the large imports of grain consequent upon the deficient harvests of 1845 and 1846, particularly as regards the potato disease in the sister country, depriving some six millions of people of their accustomed food. The right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer has told you that from June, 1846, to January, 1847, 5,000,000 l. were paid for foreign corn; from January to July, 14,000,000 l. more; and in the three next months, from July to October, a further 14,000,000 l..; making in all the enormous sum of 33,000,000 l. of dead loss to the country. Pray, Sir, is not this sufficient to account for our difficulties, leaving railways out of the question? How has this large sum been met, when only some seven millions of gold have left the country? Why, Sir, by withdrawing all foreign balances due to this country; by the sale of foreign securities held in this country; by the forcing off our manufactures at any price, regardless of the cost; and by keeping low stocks of the raw article. Sir, I consider this the base of the pyramid of our difficulties, railways the column, and the Currency Bill of 1844 the apex. Sir, having found fault with the Currency Bill of 1844, it is but fair that I should state more fully my views as a remedy for that evil. If the sum of fourteen millions issued on securities were extended, it would be a great improvement. Still, Sir, in times of pressure and dearness, the currency might be inadequate. When wheat is ruling at 5l. per quarter, it stands to common sense that the circulation of the country banks should be greater than when wheat is at 50s. per quarter. The Bill of 1844 restricts this, and confines the circulation to the average of the five preceding years. Sir, I would allow the country banks to issue any amount of paper they required, giving ample security to the Government for such issue. Self-interest would be a sufficient protection against the abuse of this power. I would also, Sir, issue at once fourteen millions of Government notes, and pay off the Bank's debt; these, Sir, to be inconvertible as regards the public so long as the Bank Charter lasts. And further, to allow the Bank to issue what further amount of notes they may deem prudent for the wants of the country. We should thus get rid of the

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dreadful screw which inflicts so much ruin and disorder on the trading community. Sir, before I sit down, I shall, with the permission of the House, allude to a subject personal to myself as a corn merchant and an importer of grain. When I had not the honour of a seat in this House, I well remember the charges brought against the importers of grain. A noble Lord designated them as "gambling speculators, regrators, and forestallers." Sir, I stand here to deny these charges, and to state to the House and the country there is not in the kingdom a more honourable class of merchants than the corn merchants, and those engaged in importing foreign grain. Sir, if any justification of their proceedings were necessary, we have the fact of the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government coming down to this House in January last, asking for a suspension of the corn and navigation laws, to encourage the importation of grain; and again in July, repeating that application, and stating to this House it was necessary for the wants of the country to encourage the bringing in of every bushel of grain that could be procured. I think, Sir, these facts, to say nothing of the daily publication in the leading newspapers of the alarming accounts of want and famine in prospective, were a sufficient justification for the exertions made by the corn importers to bring it to our shores from all parts of the world. Sir, these large imports, together with the fine weather, did bring prices down in the months of July and August, from 110 s. per quarter for wheat to 55 s.; from 50 s. per barrel for flour to 25 s. and even less. Sir, was this no boon to the country? Was this no relief to our labouring population? Sir, the corn importers deserve rather the thanks of Parliament and the country than their censure. They entered into those speculations at the suggestion of the Government, yet, no doubt, with a view to their own profit, as all mercantile business is based on profit. The speculation failed. It proved their ruin, but was the salvation of the country. Sir, I am prepared to prove that had it not been for the favourable weather in the three months preceding and during harvest, prices would still have advanced, and that we should not have imported enough for our wants, and the corn merchants would not have been ruined. As it is, Sir, not one bushel of grain or one barrel of flour have been imported more than the wants of the country re-
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quire. What has become of the immense importation of grain, 10,000,000 quarters, from January to November 10 this year? Where are the stocks? Why, Sir, in Liverpool, where the imports of flour have been 2,400,000 barrels for the year ending September 30, it is calculated not more than 200,000 barrels are left, and this includes sour and above one-half that which is unfit for human food. Sir, I do not wish to be a prognosticator of evil; but I would warn the House against that tone of confidence assumed by the right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of returning prosperity. I tell the House it is probable a further import of corn, to the extent of probably some eight millions of value, will be required to carry us on to another harvest. And, Sir, I ask the right hon. Baronet what position we are in to meet this drain—no surplus of gold, of stocks of goods, or securities—foreign balances all withdrawn. I fear, therefore, Sir, we must look forward yet to great difficulties; perhaps during the next year as great or even greater than we have already passed through. I have, Sir, endeavoured to prove that our commercial distress is not owing to railways, to the Currency Bill, or to free trade. All, no doubt, have aggravated our difficulties; but the one great cause which has led to our difficulties is the deficiency of the harvests of 1845 and 1846, particularly as regards the potato crop in Ireland.
SIR W. CLAYconcurred in the feeling which he thought was general in the House, to assent to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, although he could have wished that the instruction to the Commitee had been somewhat less large. Assuming, therefore, that the good sense of the Members of the Committee, if not the instruction itself, would induce them to limit their inquiries within a manageable compass, he was satisfied that great good was likely to result from the appointment of the Committee. There could be no doubt that, in the important subject to which their inquiries would be mainly directed, great diversity of opinion might exist: and it would be satisfactory, therefore, to the House and to the country, that the facts and reasonings of the question that would be submitted to the Committee should be fairly elucidated; and that if there should be any fresh measures, those measures should be grounded on the experience of the last twelve months, and the judgment of those best competent to turn that expe-

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rience to account. In assenting to the appointment of the Committee, he wished to guard himself against being supposed to expect much as the immediate result of their labours. The utmost that legislation could effect with reference to the monetary condition of the country, rather consisted in averting evil than in originating good. When, therefore, he heard a Gentleman so well entitled to respectful attention as the hon. Member for Huntingdon use the language he did, he wished to guard himself against being supposed to participate in such expectations, or to acknowledge any such power to exist. The rate of interest, and the cheapness of money, must depend upon the supply and demand of capital. It seemed to him that it was utterly beyond the power of the Legislature to add one single pound to the capital of the country. The utmost that it could do was to take care that the circulation, consisting partly of money and partly of paper, should not exceed the proper amount. The currency of this, as of every country, meant the convertibility of its paper into money; but experience had shown that where the issue of paper money had been entrusted to those who profited by the issue, they issued to a greater extent than the metallic money. To obviate these evils was the sole object of the Act of 1844. It had been said that the immediate authors of that Act claimed for it a much higher power—that it would render a monetary crisis impossible. He certainly did not himself recollect that the right hon. Member for Tamworth used any such language. Although an humble and zealous supporter of the Bill of 1844, he never indulged in any such anticipations. The only question worth the consideration of the House was whether the object of the Act of 1844 was desirable, and whether that object was obtained. The object of the Act of 1844 was, as he had stated, to secure that our paper currency should fluctuate only as metallic currency, and thereby secure at all times the convertibility of our paper. This object was of incalculable importance, and under circumstances of the greatest difficulty had been fully and completely attained. He would not advert to those circumstances: they had been fully and ably stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but there could be no doubt that those circumstances had a tendency to press on the resources of the country, and to create a monetary disturbance to an extent without a parallel in
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the history of this or perhaps of any other country. Was the country better prepared by the Act of 1844 to meet the coming storm? What were the facts? On all previous occasions of a drain of gold, the limitation of banking accommodation was much longer delayed than during this last panic. It was on record that there had been no limitation of the issue of country bank notes, or of notes of the Bank of England. To what did we owe our present safety? To what did we owe that we were in a better condition now, than we were six weeks back? Was it owing to the letter of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the noble Lord? The noble Lord and his right hon. Friend would be the very last to make that assertion—they would admit that it was not owing to the effect of relaxation, but to the operation of the Act of 1844 that we owed the influx of bullion. It was not without considerable hesitation that he expressed an opinion on the policy of the letter of the 25th of October: but he believed that his right hon. Friend would not hesitate to avow that the relief which alone could have been afforded by the relaxation, would have been contrary to sound principles, and pregnant with dangerous consequences. Although his right hon. Friend had failed to convince him that the step taken by the Government was inevitable, yet he was bound to say that he hesitated before he ventured to condemn the step then taken by the Government, or to pronounce that the responsible advisers of the Crown were not justified, under the circumstances, in acting as they had done. Of this he was certain, that the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord deplored as much as he could the necessity for the step they felt themselves compelled to take. He believed also they were aware of the unjust consequences to which that step might by possibility lead. This also he was bound to add, that if the step was inevitable, in his opinion it was judiciously taken at the right time. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had deplored the step not being taken earlier. In his opinion the best justification of its being taken at all was, that it was taken so late. If the letter had been written whilst the exchanges were adverse, he believed the result must have been most distressing to the country. He believed the result would have been, that seven millions of paper would have been issued by the Bank; that the exchanges would have been more and

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more adverse; and to remedy that state of affairs, the Bank would have resorted to more stringent measures, or, if not, we should have had to witness a suspension of cash payments. It was only on such occasions that the interference of Government could be justifiable. But there could be no doubt that this measure of the responsible Minister of the Crown did, in point of fact, raise the question whether the Act of 1844 could be permitted to remain in its present state. He remembered that at the time of the passing of the Act, it was a question whether the power possessed by the Government should have been vested by the Queen in Council. He could only hope, that if in the Committee it were necessary to adopt any such proposition, that the Act would be rigidly and firmly maintained. The events of the last three years tested the value of the measure; and he was satisfied that in that measure a large proportion of those most competent to judge concurred. He utterly denied that the Act of 1844 was restrictive of the currency of the country. Under that Act the currency was made to expand to its utmost extent. All that was done was to prevent an unhealthy and fictitious expansion. It was perfectly idle to think of excluding the consideration of the contract with the Bank of England from any discussion upon the working of the Act of 1844; and he would remind the House of the vast powers wielded by that establishment. The Bank of England was, first, the Bank of the State; next, it had the exclusive issue of notes in the metropolis, and within a radius of sixty miles. The Bank of England issued more than one-half of the entire paper currency of the country. In its private province its capital for banking purposes was between thirty and forty millions. With these facts before the House, it was idle to think of stopping discussion upon the contract of the Bank with the public, especially as the results of its working for the last twelve months, showed that some interference was necessary. He was of opinion that much of that period of difficulty was attributable to the mismanagement of the resources of the Bank of England. He gave the Directors full credit for the best intentions; but they had made considerable mistakes in their management; and in his opinion, first between January and April, and next between August and October, they had highly aggravated, if not wholly produced the pressure of those
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periods. He implored, however, individual Members of that House not to encourage by unguarded language hopes and expectations on the part of the public which could never be fulfilled. To do so, would have a tendency to induce a belief among the mercantile and manufacturing classes that it was in the power of the House to add to the available capital of the country, whilst it was only by the exercise of industry and care that it could be obtained. In conclusion, he had only to say, it was impossible to avoid thinking that the monetary system of the country must be unsound in some essential particulars, when it permitted the continued existence of houses which for years had not been in a solvent condition.
MR. MASTERMANsaid, it was not his intention to occupy time by entering into the various details which might be given of the existence of commercial distress. Many reasons might be stated, which in some measure had contributed to that distress; but as it would be the duty of the Committee to take that subject into consideration, the proper time for discussing it would be when the Committee had made their report. He should not, indeed, have risen, if he had not noticed with considerable regret the remarks which had fallen from the hon. Baronet the Member for the Tower Hamlets, who had so underrated the act of the Government in their letter of the 25th of October, that he was anxious to bear his testimony to the credit the Government deserved for interfering at that moment to prevent the fatal calamities which must otherwise have occurred. He believed the country never was in a more painful position than it was previously to that letter. It was his duty, along with some other Gentlemen, to have an interview with the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and they recommended strongly—he hoped properly too—to the consideration of the Government the situation of the Bank. There was an apprehension that no money was to be found there, yet that the panic existed without a real cause. There was plenty of money out from the Bank, and the noble Lord at the head of the Government put this question—"Have you not a large amount of notes out in circulation?" His answer was, that there was a large amount of notes out, but they were not in useful circulation; that the panic was such, that notes were locked up in all directions, not available to those who required them. He as-

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sured the House, that in advocating the expansion of the Bill of 1844, he had no desire or intention to encourage speculation, or to support those houses which had no right to support; but because it had been his lot to observe with deep regret so many men having securities, upon which at any other time they could command money, completely paralysed. After what had fallen from the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets, he felt anxious to pay his tribute of respect and thanks to the Government for the manner in which they had acted on that consideration. He would say but little more, though he was not giving his reasons for the present commercial distress, except that it was pretty well known he had never been in favour of the Bill of 1844. The Bill might be very good, or it might not; of that he was no judge: whether it was sufficient or not, he was not able to say; but he was certain no man was bold enough to say that fourteen millions was the exact amount required for the circulation of this country. He would ask his right hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth, whether he would not be inclined now to support an expansion of the Act of 1844 in case of necessity? Let the Bank have power to issue a greater sum than fourteen millions with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government. He had ever maintained that opinion, and he was convinced that the Bill could no longer work of itself. The alarm in the public mind had been allayed to a considerable degree by the letter of the 25th of October; that letter was now withdrawn, and a Committee of Inquiry was to be appointed. No person could tell how long that Committee would sit; therefore he hoped that in the meantime some resolution would be adopted by the House, whereby the public would know that the Bank might issue more notes, provided they had the sanction of the Government.
MR. BLEWITTsaid, he had given a notice with a view to introduce such an Amendment, and he hoped that the hon. Member for the city of London would support it. With regard to the discussion before the House, he considered himself entitled to offer an opinion, as he had considerable experience in commercial matters; and he believed it to be one of the most wicked and mischievous Acts that had ever passed that House. It was a piece of banking mechanism, invented by Mr. Jones Loyd, which adjusted itself, and which might be called a money-meter. Never did so pom-
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pous a scheme end in so miserable a failure. This wonderful invention had produced such dreadful effects, that he might with great truth call it the infernal machine, which, by its explosion, had mangled trade, prostrated commerce, annihilated credit, and spread through the length and breadth of the land universal terror, misery, and confusion. He wished to call attention to a speech delivered in 1819 by the right hon. Member for Tamworth, which bore materially on the question before the House. The right hon. Baronet, in introducing the resolutions which were the foundation of his Bill in 1819, said—
"It is impossible to prescribe any limitation to the issue to be brought into operation at any period, however remote. The quantity of circulation varies so materially in periods of depression and of prosperity, that the House must be aware of the impossibility of fixing on any prescribed limits."
Now, this reasoning appeared to him (Mr. Blewitt) quite as conclusive in 1844 as in 1819; yet, in 1844, the right hon. Baronet introduced a limitation at variance with the arguments, so consistent with reason and common sense, that he used in 1819. In 1844, the right hon. Baronet assumed as an admitted principle that the Bank regulated its issues by the price of gold and the rate of foreign exchanges—an idea which, it was stated before the Bullion Committee in 1810, had never been heard of, and which excited general astonishment among the witnesses when the question was proposed to them. The Bank then acted on a principle which had been handed down from their predecessors for more than a century—a principle under which legitimate commercial bills, drawn on the merchants of London, were always discounted, and which they never dreamt of refusing because foreign exchanges were adverse or the price of gold was high. This foreign exchange principle, on which the right hon. Member for Tamworth founded his Bill of 1844, was never heard of before it was introduced in 1810 by Mr. Horner. The merchants of the city of London were happy under the paternal fostering influences of the Bank of England; but since the Bank had fallen under the management of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth and that House, he could only say—
"Fortunati nimium sua si bona norint."
He could not conceal the disgust he felt at seeing the Bank compelled to rule its con-

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duct by such a principle. The hon. Member read extracts from the evidence taken in 1841, by which scarcity of money, scarcity of food, commercial failures, merchants and manufacturers being compelled to reduce their transactions, workmen out of employ, were attributable to the effects of the Jones Loyd system. Did they want to know more than that? Was not that proof positive that the present commercial distress was the result of the Bank Charter Act? Indeed, it was the object of the Act to produce it. It was quite clear that, from whatever causes it might be produced, the panic was considerably increased by the refusal of the Bank to discount legitimate commercial bills; and that it was afterwards allayed by a letter written by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governors of the Bank. When that letter was written, had the potatoes emerged from their rottenness to supply the deficiency of that article of food in 1845 and 1846? Had the money expended on railroads unfixed itself, and returned into the ordinary channels of floating capital? Had the mercantile houses which had failed arisen from their ashes, and were proceeding as if nothing had happened to their credit? Had the 33,000,000 l. exported for corn come tripping back to the magic dictation of Wood the Enchanter? No; nothing of the kind had taken place. The Act was suspended, and from that moment confidence was restored; and if all did not now go "merry as a marriage bell," the bell of commerce had at all events ceased to toll its funereal note. He had intended to go into other parts of the question; but he really felt that he had no right to trespass further on their attention, unpretending as he was in talent, and unaccustomed as he was to speaking in that House. [Interruption.] He did feel that he was trespassing on their attention at too much length, and he therefore had better—["Go on, go on!"] He had intended stating to them what were his views with regard to convertibility—and he was afraid that if he attempted to do so, then he should require more time than they might be disposed to grant to him. He apprehended that by the ancient common law of this realm every man who contracted an obligation was bound to pay the obligation in the legal coin of the realm. A Bank of England note was of course such an obligation, and the meaning of "convertibility" was, he apprehended, the payment of such a note or obligation according to the re-
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quirements of the law. When the Bank of England was established in 1694, it issued notes for 20 l., which at that day represented four hundred shillings. In 1715, the guinea coin in gold, which represented twenty-one shillings, was issued. In 1744, a law was passed, which legalized the payment of an obligation in silver. In 1817, the sovereign was issued, and declared to be a legal representative of twenty shillings. It would be seen by this short history of the matter, that the system for which the right hon. Member for Tamworth took so much credit, had been in operation for the last 150 years. The right hon. Baronet had no ground for saying that his Bill of 1819 restored the ancient value of the standard; for it appeared clear that up to 1774 all the obligations of the kingdom, including Bank of England notes, could have been paid either in gold or silver. From 1774 to 1797, any obligations which did not exceed 25 l. might be paid in silver; and it was not until 1819 that gold became the exclusive standard. Many writers on political economy—Locke, he believed, particularly—recommended that gold pieces should be issued of a certain weight and fineness, and that those pieces should be allowed to find their level in the money market. Now, he believed that that was a system which had been adopted in several countries on the Continent, and that it had been found to answer remarkably well. In this country we talked very much about gold; but, for his own part, he did not see why silver should not be as good as gold; at all events, he did not see why silver, which was a metal more easily procured than gold, should not be our standard of value, leaving gold to find its level in the market. However, he did not suppose that it was possible by anything that the most eloquent man could say in that House, to convince a large portion of its Members that any alteration ought to be made in what they called the gold standard. It appeared from the Bill of 1819, that the right hon. Baronet not only would not accept silver as a standard, but that he had positively an aversion to it. He would not have it at any price. The right hon. Baronet had laid that down as a principle; he said that the Bank of England should not hold more than one-fourth part of its reserve bullion in silver. Supposing the gold in the Bank of England in the first instance to be 10,000,000 l., and supposing that afterwards to be reduced to 5,000,000 l. 2,500,000 l. was the fourth of 10,000,000 l.,

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and that would be in silver. Well, now, he would rather have silver for his notes than have a return of nulla bona. But there was another very remarkable provision in this Act of 1844—this very perfect measure of the Legislature. It stated that all persons should be entitled to demand from the issue department of the Bank of England Bank of England notes in exchange for gold bullion at the rate of 3l. 17 s.. 10½d per ounce standard gold. Now, he could conceive no reason for that. Why should it be compelled to purchase gold bullion to carry on the speculations of a bullion broker? They had been told that night, he believed, by the hon. Member for Bridport, of the immense amount of gold bullion belonging to the Emperor of Russia. Now, supposing the Emperor of Russia should take away his bullion, and exchange it for iron rails, or any other article produced in this country, he did not know of what service the gold bullion would be in the vaults of the Bank of England, except to minister to the diseased fancies of the bullionist. He could not conceive, for the life of him, whence arose that extraordinary dread and alarm that existed in this country with regard to the exportation of gold. They all knew that gold must be bought before it could be sold; it must be imported before it could be exported; and he imagined that, in the ordinary course of commerce, there was as much profit in purchasing and selling gold, as there was in any other commodity, and that the nation would be just as much enriched by purchasing gold as by any other commodity. He could not, therefore, understand the cause of the public alarm on that point. Certainly a bad harvest was a serious calamity; and the deficiency in the food must be restored by a diminished expenditure and increased industry. A bad harvest caused so much to be taken from our previously accumulated wealth as was required to purchase the deficiency in the crops. That, of course, was a subject of regret; but what was the course which they should pursue in order to regain their former position? By bewailing their condition, and crippling their industry? No: on the contrary, they should immediately set about repairing the loss, and giving as much encouragement as possible to the industry of the country. He believed that that was the true principle to act upon, and that the man who departed from it was guilty of egregious folly. When they considered what convertibility was, it turned
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out that it implied the ability of the Bank of England at all times to pay coin for its notes on demand. And what did that amount to? Why, the Bank of England was told to put into their banking department a sufficient reserve of coin to meet all their liabilities, to the amount of 38,000,000 l. And what did they do? Why, they put by 858,000 l., and that had been found amply sufficient to meet every obligation. They never wanted any more; and he believed that, on the average, during the last few years, they did not keep more than 617,000 l. in their coffers. He wished a provision to be introduced into a Bill which might be introduced hereafter on this subject, which should authorise the Bank to increase its issues on securities deposited at the Bank. He sincerely trusted that the House would sanction such a provision. He was sure that it would be satisfactory to every person out of doors; and as regarded the proceedings of the Committee, he could only hope that they would suggest such alterations in the banking laws as should enable the merchants and manufacturers of this country to enjoy the credit which they had hitherto been accustomed to enjoy, and which had, in such an eminent degree, made Great Britain the emporium of the commercial world.
Debate adjourned.
House adjourned at Twelve o'clock.

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—Several Lords.

MURDERS IN IRELAND.
LORD FARNHAMpresented a petition from the undersigned merchants of the borough of Southwark, on the subject of systematic murder in Ireland. The petitioners stated that they had heard with horror of the assassinations which were taking place in Ireland; that they conceived there could be no possible connexion between cold-blooded and deliberate murder and remedial measures; and they prayed their Lordships to pass such measures as would tend to put a stop to crimes of such harrowing atrocity. That until full security was given to human life in Ireland, no benefit whatever could possibly result to the social system. That nothing short of the most prompt and vigorous measures could encourage the introduction of capital into Ireland, to the benefit of its poor, and to the relief of the great body of the people in England from large and pecuniary contributions, which petitioners had hoped would have led to the suppression of crime, and a general good feeling throughout the country, but which had been followed by a (succession of crimes unparalleled in atro-

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city, and to a systematic detail of outrages unknown in any other part of the world. The noble Lord stated that the petitioners were men of the highest respectability and wealth. He would direct their Lordships' attention in particular to that part of the petition which would separate the consideration of systematic murder from that of remedial measures and the introduction of capital into Ireland. The noble Lord then laid before their Lordships the real state of Ireland as to crime. He felt that it would be very improper in him to allude to any specific measure then in progress elsewhere, but which had not come up to their Lordships' House; but this he would say, that the most uncivilised country on the face of the globe could not present a picture of greater atrocities than Ireland exhibited. He was as much attached to his country as any one could be, and as much opposed to measures of unnecessary severity; but he felt that no measures could be sufficiently stringent, and (however unconstitutional under ordinary circumstances) no measures could be too unconstitutional, to be applied at the present moment, without delay and with energy and perseverance, with the hope of crushing the murderous system which was desolating the country, and rendering the name of Ireland a curse and a reproach to all the rest of the world. It was his firm conviction that any measures, however strong or however unconstitutional in themselves, might with perfect safety be entrusted to the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government in Ireland; whose admirable conduct had earned for him the confidence and esteem of every loyal person. And he would take that opportunity of tendering his thanks to Her Majesty's Ministers for even such a measure as they had introduced; for he felt that, however weak or ineffectual it might prove, they had still taken a step in the right direction. One of the worst features in the state of Ireland, was the sympathy which existed with the murderer, and the invariable practice of concealing him from the hands of justice. He was too fond of his fellow countrymen to attribute this to any innate badness of disposition; and he really did hope that it proceeded from fear and the spirit of intimidation which prevailed; for in Ireland a poor man must be morally certain that if he were to inform against the murderer whom he had seen to commit the deed, or were to refuse to harbour and conceal him afterwards, the in-
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evitable consequence would be the forfeiture of his own life. He would also point out to their Lordships this fact—that no reliance could be placed upon the apparent freedom of any one part of the country from atrocious crime. In those parts supposed to be as safe and as free from murder as the most prosperous and happy districts in England, in one moment the murderer's arm might be raised, hired and employed from perhaps a distance of 100 miles—against an unsuspecting individual, whom he had never seen before, and of whom he had never heard, until he was sent forth (at the peril of his own life in case of refusal) to do the bloody behest of a secret and assassinating committee. He would now inform their Lordships who were the individuals thus marked out for slaughter, and he need not add, that this sentence of death was almost invariably followed with its execution. They were not the hardhearted, grasping, avaricious landlords, who took advantage of times of unprecedented distress to wring from a wretched starving tenantry prompt payment in the full measure of that rent, which, without any kindly assistance from him, their natural protector, was absolutely required to save them from starvation, and who in default of payment, expelled them from their homes and turned them loose upon the world. This was not the class of victims who fell beneath the bullet of the assassin. Their victim was of a far different stamp. Take the man who, by his example, his residence among his tenants, the constant and abundant employment which he gave to the labourer, the extensive relief which he afforded to the poor, his means, even beyond their limits, expended in works of charity and utility—take the man who acted upon the principle that all that he possessed was held in trust for the benefit of those over whom he was placed, and among whom he lived; and who not only supplied the wants of those over whom he was providentially placed, but of those in his neighbourhood, whose landlords either would not, or could not, discharge their duties—the man who ought to be generally beloved, because he deserved to be so, and who did not guard against the murderer's aim, because his conscience had not told him that he had aught to fear, or aught with which to reproach himself—such a man, he told their Lordships, was the victim generally selected. It was not his intention to enter into a detail of the various murders which had fixed upon his country

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an indelible stain of blood. He would merely refer briefly to the case of the Rev. Mr. Lloyd. If he was called upon to select, out of the whole of Ireland, one person who, during the past and the present year, had been more exemplary in his conduct, and more eminently useful than another, that individual was Mr. Lloyd. As a clergyman, his character was above praise, and in his capacity as a resident gentleman, all his exertions and all his means were devoted to the welfare of those around him. And yet the Rev. Mr. Lloyd, that excellent and benevolent man, was shot dead upon the public road, on Sunday last, on his return home from his own parish church, where he had been performing divine service. If there was one circumstance more harrowing to the feelings than another connected with this infamous and atrocious murder, it was this: A few weeks since, Mr. Lloyd's brother, to whom he was greatly attached, died of fever, caught in the discharge of his humane and professional duties as physician to the Roscommon county hospital. He left a widow with a large family. The late lamented Mr. Lloyd took upon himself the maintenance and support of the widow and her children; and this poor widow was now become doubly a widow, having lost within a few weeks, not only her own husband, but that kind relative who she had justly expected would have proved a father to her children. He felt that he had too long trespassed upon their Lordships' time. He must plead as his excuse the urgency of the subject; and he should conclude his remarks by stating that it was utterly impossible for their Lordships to form the most remote conception of the dreadful state of brutal crime which prevailed in Ireland; and though he had lived himself, two years since, under "the Reign of Terror," he would boldly assert, that the English language could not furnish words sufficiently strong to convey even a faint idea of its guilt and atrocity, or of the disgust, indignation, abhorrence, and detestation with which he viewed it.

THE CURRENCY—COMMERCIAL DISTRESS.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE, pursuant to notice, rose to move—
"That a Secret Committee of this House be appointed to inquire into the Causes of the Distress which has for some time prevailed among the Commercial Classes, and how far it has been affected by the Laws for regulating the Issue of Bank-notes payable on demand."
The noble Marquess said, that no Motion
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could come before their Lordships of a nature more calculated than that was to command their most serious and anxious attention. The subject also was one with which the greater number of their Lordships were probably well acquainted; and if he were merely governed by that consideration, he should on the present occasion occupy their time with only a very few words. But under the present circumstances of the Parliament and the country, considering the vast importance of the subject—considering also the great attention that had been given to it in the other House of Parliament—he thought it would be disrespectful to their Lordships if he did not preface the Motion that he intended to make with some general remarks as to the necessity for the Committee that he meant to propose, and the probable tendency of its inquiries. He believed that the events of the last two years were of a nature that demanded from him not a great deal of comment—they constituted a period during which great masses of the community underwent much suffering, and there could be no doubt that the events of that period were, on the whole, extremely prejudicial to the general interests of the nation, there was one great subject which, of course, attracted universal attention, he referred to that distressing dispensation of Providence which withheld from them a large portion of the ordinary produce of the soil. It was obvious that such a calamity could not have been averted by any human precaution; it was obviously not in the power of Parliament to repair an injury of that description, or to replace completely any deficiency which the operations of nature had occasioned; yet it had been found extremely difficult to impress upon the minds of the large mass of the community, that it was not within the scope and power of Parliament to do more than this, in alleviation of the calamity, viz., in some degree to regulate the distribution of the amount of produce that remained. So with respect to that other source of our distress, which did not arise from any visitation of Providence, but which proceeded, more or less, from the rash, ill-advised, and ill-imagined speculation of men: that source of our difficulty was nearly as much beyond the reach of legislative enactment as were the causes which had so greatly diminished our supply of food. Those speculations, as he need scarcely remind their Lordships, had produced a great demand upon the capital

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of the country—a greater demand than that capital was capable of supplying. To assist the capitalists of the country, under such a pressure, by anything partaking of the nature of that false and ill-advised policy which would create fictitious resources, would be a course which he, for one, could not be induced to propose, and which he fully believed that their Lordships could not be induced to sanction. It was perfectly obvious that no amount of capital which partook of a fictitious character could be made to add to the real resources of the country; and, whatever inquiry their Lordships might be pleased to go into, he entertained scarcely a doubt that strong evidence would be brought before them, founded even upon the events of the last few weeks, which would show that the positions he had just laid down rested upon a solid foundation. When he, in common with other Members of Her Majesty's Government, had been asked whether they thought that the Bill of 1844 had been followed by the effects which it was intended to produce—when he was asked whether or not it ought to be continued—neither on his own behalf nor on behalf of Her Majesty's Government was he prepared to say that that Act ought to be repealed. While, on the other hand, when he was asked whether, under all circumstances, and at all events, and at all hazards, he was prepared to maintain that Act unchanged, he declined then, and he now declined, to answer any such question. After the events that had taken place, he was no more prepared to say that that measure had been the cause of our safety or our suffering, than he should be prepared to affirm that the construction of a particular vessel had enabled her to escape a sweeping tornado, and sail safe and unharmed into port. He might be told, as he had been told, that such a construction was not fitted to enable the vessel to grapple with such a series of events as those to which she had been exposed; so he was not prepared to say that the existing state of the laws which regulated our currency had or had not been sufficient to enable the country to bear up against its present difficulties; but this he was fully prepared to say, that he had no intention to propose the appointment of a Committee for the purpose of going into inquiries with a view to the revision of the currency as it now existed, subject to convertibility into the precious metals—that he had no intention to propose from that basis to depart. He had
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said thus much to prevent any misapprehension on the subject. He now came to the question their Lordships were invited to consider. It was simply this—Whether an Act passed in the course of the last three years, for certain defined objects, had answered its purpose, or whether it had been attended with any mischievous effects under circumstances entirely unexpected and new. He thought it right he should here indicate shortly the objects which, in his opinion, would come within the sphere of the proposed inquiry: these were, first, what were the provisions of the Act of 1844, to which their Lordships had given, if not an unanimous, at least a very general concurrence; second, what had been the peculiar circumstances of the last three or four years in which the Act had been in operation; and, third, such being the peculiar circumstances, what effect had the existence of the Act had upon those circumstances and upon that distress. The Act of 1844 had been passed too recently for any important part of its provisions to have escaped their Lordships' recollection. It was proposed for the avowed purpose of giving greater solidity and certainty to the operations of the Bank, by confining within certain limits its issue of notes, in proportion to the amount of gold in its coffers. Before that the convertibility of the paper of the Bank had been the fundamental law of the country; but notwithstanding this, occasions had arisen when the Bank of England, the mainspring and hinge of all the commercial affairs of the country, had been on the verge of a situation in which it would not have been able to comply with the law, and might have been compelled to resort to foreign aid from positive disability to meet its engagements. The object of the Act of 1844 was to introduce a greater degree of safety into the existing system, preserving enough of it to induce the greatest degree of economy in the use of gold. It was intended to leave as great a portion of paper to perform the office of gold as could be left with safety to the system and to the public. The Bank was allowed to issue 14,0000,000 l. in notes on securities; but for every note issued beyond that sum there must be in the Bank an equal amount of sovereigns. He now came to the circumstances under which this Bill had been subjected to the severe trials of the last autumn; and he thought it his duty to point out to their Lordships, although it would be a subject for inquiry by

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the Committee, that the commercial and financial crisis of that period was one, unfortunately, exceeding in its intensity any that had heretofore occurred. He would state what had been the demand for railway expenditure during the last few years, and the rate at which that demand had increased—being a demand for the employment of capital, not for circulation, but for fixed purposes; not for increased floating capital, which could be tranferred from one object to another, but for capital to be invested in such a manner that it could not be extricated and carried to other objects where its use was desirable. In the years 1841, 1842, and 1843, the demand for capital for railway expenditure was on the average 4,500,000 l. In 1844, it increased to 6,000,000 l.; in 1845, it was 14,000,000 l.; in the first half of 1846, it was 9,800,000 l.; and in the second half of the same year it increased to no less than 26,000,000 l., making nearly 36,000,000 l. for that one year. In 1847, up to the 3rd of June, the demand was 25,770,000 l.; up to the 4th of December, 38,000,000 l.; making a total of 63,770,000 l., thus doubling the sum of 36,000,000 l.demanded in the previous year. It was impossible even for a child to hear such an account read without asking the question whence was all this capital to come? How was all this money to be created from month to month, and year to year? There were no visible means of supplying it. He did not know whether he should be told it existed somewhere in some boundless mine, from which the Bill of 1844 cut off the supply; but he believed no such thing. He did not believe that that Bill or any other Bill prevented any person from having access to such funds if they existed; but he believed they existed nowhere, save in the imaginations of speculators. No sound legitimate means of providing such an expenditure, so to be locked up, could be provided; but the matter was one for their Lordships to inquire into and ascertain. But this immense demand came in concurrence with another—one of infinite importance—one that could be less attributed to any fault or misconduct on the part of any individuals or body of individuals, for it arose from a calamity inflicted by the hand of Divine Providence. Nevertheless, that demand came at the same time with the other, and added to the difficulty; it increased the commercial embarrassment the country had had to struggle with in the course of the last few months. It neces-
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sitated a large importation of corn, the demand of money for the payment of which was from Juno, 1846, to January, 1847, 5,139,000 l.; and here he begged to express his gratification that this drain was not likely to be required during the ensuing year. The amount paid for corn imported from abroad in 1847 was still greater. From January to July, 1847, there was paid for foreign corn 14,184,000 l. and from the 5th of July to the 18th of October, no less than 14,240,000 l. Whether the disorder thus caused by the concurrence of the pressure from these two different sources was aggravated by the operation of the Bank Charter Act, or any other statute, it would be for the Committee of their Lordships' House to consider and inquire. He did not himself believe that that measure had any share in producing a state of disorder which must ultimately have been produced under the circumstances of the country. He believed the pressure which had arisen must have existed with or without that Bill; and he would go further, and say, that if the effect of the Bill had been—what he was not prepared to deny—to cause the pressure to be felt and foreseen somewhat earlier than it otherwise would have been, then it had effected a great good. He believed, that the operation of the Act of Parliament, acting compulsorily on the Bank, compelled the commercial public in this country to perceive that it was outstripping its means, and was endeavouring to accomplish that which it was unable to perform, and that thus a valuable service had been done to the country by applying to all parties that lever which was the only one that could be safely had recourse to on the occasion, and forcing them, not suddenly but gradually, to draw in the extent of their operations. Now, the state of the country was such, that the perception which had been brought upon the public faculties would appear like a glare of light, illumiminating, it is true, that which had been in darkness before, but illuminating it only to show the precipice on which the public were standing, and thus increasing the terror which the danger of their position must inspire. The effect had been to alarm all persons in the country, and thus to create something like a general panic. He was not prepared to say to what degree the panic might have been so occasioned, or so increased by this Act; but he was prepared to say, that when that pressure went beyond that which he might call a

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legitimate pressure, beyond that degree of pressure which must exist from time to time for the purpose of compelling those engaged in speculations to keep within solid, discreet, and sufferable bounds—when money had been called up from every quarter, and taken out of the usual course, or usual means of investment, and withdrawn from channels in which it should legitimately be employed—then he would not deny that the panic was in itself a great calamity, and one which called, as in the present instance it did call, for the immediate attention of Parliament. With respect to the pressure, he believed no means could have been taken by which it could have been averted; but with regard to the panic, there were undoubtedly occasions in which the Government could act for its alleviation. He believed, that when there had been created in the country, almost universally, a disposition not only to obtain money by speculative means, but to draw money out of every place and every channel in which it had been invested—a disposition to diminish all balances at the banker's, and in short to create that which did not exist usually in this country—a desire on the part of every person to keep a quantity of money in his own possession, and under his own immediate control, beyond what under ordinary circumstances they would require, that then Government was bound to step in, and endeavour to restore the circulation to a proper and regular channel. He considered that the time for such interference on the part of Government had recently arrived; and he did not think it would be denied that the interference of the Government had been satisfactory. He said so, because, not many days—hardly many hours—had elapsed after such interference, before the confidence which had been suspended was restored, and that, without any additional demand being made on the Bank; and, above all, without that proportion which in 1844 Parliament imposed on the Bank between the amount of its gold and of its currency being deranged, the panic at once subsided, and every man felt that he had, under certain circumstances at least, the means of realising what he wanted; and that if he were entitled to have his l,000 l. or his 10,000 l., that 1,000 l. or 10,000 l. was secured to him. He was not now going to argue the question of the Bank Charter Act; but he would say, that that Act might exist for twenty years without any such occasion again arising. He was
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not prepared to say, that no circumstances could again arise in which it might be necessary for the Government or for Parliament to interfere with the stringent provisions of the statute. It would be for their Lordships to consider whether, under any circumstances, they might not retain the operation of the Act itself, but at the same time, whether some overruling power might not be with advantage entrusted to the Government of the day. That point, he thought, might be left to the careful consideration of their Lordships; but at the same time he felt bound to say for the Government and for himself, that they had nothing to regret in the course that had been pursued, and that the suspension of the provisions of the Act, or the authority which had been given for that suspension, had been attended with the most beneficial results. It was not to be expected that upon such a difficult subject perfect unanimity could prevail among their Lordships; but he anticipated much good, and the acquisition of much valuable information, from the appointment of Committees of Inquiry by this and the other House of Parliament, and from the evidence which would be given before them by those individuals who had most deeply thought upon the subject. He trusted that the view taken of the subject by Her Majesty's Government would be confirmed by the Committee which he proposed. The inquiry which he now proposed was not one calculated to lead to party discussions, for the Act of 1844 was not made at the time a question of party politics; sitting as he did on the benches opposite at the time it was first brought forward, he voted for it. He did so because he felt convinced of the great danger of allowing the inconvenience which had so often been felt from the former mode of conducting the affairs of the Bank to continue; and when the Government of the day came forward with a measure to prevent the recurrence of the disorders which had before been experienced, he felt disposed to accept of their proposal, and to give the measure a full and fair trial. He was sure the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley), himself a Member of the Government by which the measure had been introduced, could not but feel some parental yearning towards his own offspring, and that notwithstanding all that had passed since that time, he would not now be found anxious to attack a measure which he had himself contributed to bring to life. Having thus briefly vindicated the course taken by Her Majesty's Govern-

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ment, he would leave the question in their Lordships' hands. He would himself have perhaps wished that this inquiry had taken place at a somewhat later period, after the immediate tumult of the recent panic had subsided. But at the same time he trusted that the effects of the crisis would not last so long that their Lordships would not be enabled to give the coolest as well as the fullest consideration to the subject of this inquiry. The noble Marquess concluded by moving for the appointment of the Committee in the words of the notice.
LORD STANLEY: My Lords, while there are portions of the noble Marquess's speech in which I am disposed altogether to concur, and while I agree with him that this is not an occasion on which to enter into any extended discussion of the very large and complicated question which is necessarily involved in his Motion, for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the causes of the recent commercial distress, and its connexion with the laws affecting monetary regulations, I wish I could agree in what the noble Marquess appears to anticipate—an almost unanimous feeling on the part of your Lordships in approbation of the course taken by Her Majesty's Government with regard to this matter. My concurrence I undoubtedly give, cheerfully and readily, in the appointment of the Committee. If an inquiry before a Committee is the only course which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to submit to the consideration of your Lordships and of Parliament on this subject, then I think, with all deference for the other House of Parliament, that such an inquiry should not be exclusively carried on before the House of Commons. I think that if an inquiry is to be instituted by Parliament, it is desirable that such an inquiry should be carried on simultaneously by your Lordships' House and by the other House. With this view, and understanding that it had not been the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose to your Lordships the appointment of any Committee of the description which the noble Marquess now moves for, I felt it to be my duty, on a former evening, to give notice of my intention to move for the appointment of this Committee, for the reasons I state. I wish I could say—which I cannot—that this, and this alone, is the course which Her Majesty's Government are in duty bound to pursue. Among the causes which were put prominently forward for the meeting of Parliament—and it was
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a cause which undoubtedly went home to the feelings of every man—I find that of the commercial distress under which the country has been suffering—a distress which I cannot agree with the noble Marquess in calling recent, but which I would rather describe in the words of the Speech from the Throne, "the distress that for some time has prevailed among the commercial classes"—when that cause existed to an extent that, if the Legislature was to interfere at all, not only justified but rendered necessary the calling together of Parliament immediately and without loss of time; and I am sure none of your Lordships could consider that the inconvenience of being called together at this unusual period of the year is more than the weight of a feather in the scale, while any palliation of the sufferings of the country may be effected by our prompt interference—when that distress has, I say, prevailed to a degree of intensity and magnitude which the noble Marquess has very far from overstated (but which I think he has understated in the statement he has just made to your Lordships), and when it has been the cause of Parliament being called together—then I hold we had a right to expect from Her Majesty's Government that they should at least be prepared to come forward with such measures as they think expedient for the purpose, not of removing—for I agree with the noble Marquess that that is beyond the power of any Parliament, or of any legislation—but of palliating that distress, the magnitude of which they put forward as the cause of calling Parliament together at an unusual and inconvenient period of the year. We have sat for fourteen days. It is now precisely fourteen days since Parliament was called together, and yet what does the noble Marquess tell you? He tells you that with regard to the cause of the distress, he is not prepared to give an opinion, and that with regard to the remedy or palliation of that distress, he and Her Majesty's Government have no suggestion to offer—that they are prepared to appoint a Committee to inquire into the causes which have led to the distress, but that as to any opinion of their own they have none whatever. I repeat the noble Marquess's own expression. As to any effect which the Bank Charter Act of 1844 may have had on the distress of the country, the noble Marquess told us distinctly that he did not express, or had not formed, any opinion whatever. On the degree to which that

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Act had affected the general mercantile distress he had no opinion, or Her Majesty's Government had no opinion to offer. [The Marquess of LANSDOWNE explained that his allusion had reference only to the distress which prevailed during the last two or three months.] But the distress of the last two or three months has been the cause of Parliament being called together. It is on account of the magnitude to which that distress has arisen that your Lordships are called together thus inconveniently early; and yet the noble Marquess came down to tell you that on that subject, that most important subject, which we are called upon to inquire into—the effect which the Bank Charter Act had on the recent crisis—he has not expressed or formed an opinion; that he goes into the Committee perfectly uncommitted to any view, and without having formed any opinion on the subject. That such should be the case is to me surprising; for I cannot reconcile the meeting of Parliament at this early period with the mere purpose of appointing a Committee to make inquiry, which inquiry the noble Marquess would infinitely prefer had been postponed until a much later period. Her Majesty's Ministers have nothing to propose, no recommendation to suggest, no opinion to express. They have merely resolved to call Parliament together in order to appoint a Committee, which the noble Marquess tells you had, in his judgment, better not be appointed until some future time. Now, if that Committee is not expected to provide a remedy for the existing evil, I agree with the noble Marquess that it would have been much better to postpone the appointment of it to a future period. If the object is only to inquire into the past, and leave the subject of calm, deliberate legislation for the future, then I say, make the inquiry when the crisis has passed over; and it will thus be distinctly understood that for the mitigation of the existing distress, neither this Committee, nor any other measure that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to suggest, is to have the slightest effect. Your Lordships are called upon to appoint a Committee to consider the causes of the recent commercial distress. Now, let it not be supposed that my opinion is, that the Bank Charter Act, or any single measure, was the cause, or even the prominent cause, in producing that distress. I might say that I could put out of consideration altogether the question whether the Bank Charter Act had any share in
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producing the distress. The question, which I think has been solved by the act of the Government itself, was, whether the Bank Charter Act had aggravated the pre-existing panic, and by doing so had added to the distress. Her Majesty's Government ought to have formed and have expressed to Parliament an opinion whether the Bank Charter Act had so affected the distress. If they thought it had not, it was their duty boldly to state that under all circumstances and at all hazards that Act was to be maintained unimpaired and unaltered. On the other hand, if it were their opinion—as from the course which they adopted one would suppose it must have been—that at the time when the operation of the Bank Charter Act was most relied upon, and when it was most imperative that the Bank should be restricted, the Act broke down, then, notwithstanding the varied similes which the noble Marquess has brought forward, I cannot help thinking that a primâ facie is made out that the Act, when it was most wanted, and when all the maxims of commercial prudence would require the operation of its provisions, became impracticable, and was found to fail in its object. The noble Marquess referred to me as one of the framers or parents of the Act of 1844, because I happened to be a Member of Sir Robert Peel's Ministry when it passed through Parliament; and he called upon me not to disown my own offspring. I am not one who am desirous of avoiding any responsibility which may properly attach to me in my place as a Peer of Parliament, or from my former position in Her Majesty's Government. I think, however, that the noble Marquess must be well aware that in the ordinary business of Government those departments that are particularly charged with any distinct branch of the public business have, I will not say an exclusive, but a preponderating influence in regulating it; and though I admit that as a Member of Sir Robert Peel's Government I am bound to take my due responsibility of supporting the introduction of that Act, yet I think the noble Marquess went a little beyond the limits of fairness when he spoke of that measure as my Bill and my "offspring," and applied to me a charge of inconsistency for the course which I now take. Now, in the first place, let me ask whether, in the first instance, the Bill was not as strenuously supported by the present Members of Her Majesty's Government, at that time sitting on the other side of the House, and especially

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by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had been for two years chairman of the Committee on Banks and Banking, as by any Member of the Government of Sir Robert Peel; and yet those who so supported it, feel themselves compelled, when the crisis comes, to abandon it at the time when it was most required? In the next place, they came forward to inquire what effect that Act had on the distress of the country, thereby implying a manifest doubt—to say the least of it—whether it had not had an injurious effect. But I am ready to assume all the responsibility attaching to the passing of that Act, and I say it is perfectly consistent on the part of any Member, however prominent in the introduction of the measure, and adhering to all the main principles involved in it, to entertain a doubt—a more than doubt—whether subsequent to 1844 the operation of the Act has been such as was anticipated for it by the Government. If you find that a measure, however well designed, fails in its object—if you find by experience that an enactment breaks down in operation, are you not to condemn it because you were yourselves parties to its introduction? If such be the rule, there is an end—not to all consistency—but an end to all statesmanship, and to the value of experience. In 1844 it was truly stated, both by Sir Robert Peel and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that on that subject inquiry had been exhausted. But what was that inquiry? It was an inquiry among the most practical and competent men—among those who had directed their attention most closely to the theoretical part of the subject, and who were examined as to the principles on which the Act of Parliament should be founded. I agree entirely with the noble Marquess in his statement of those principles. They were, first, to adhere to a metallic standard; next, to secure practically the convertibility of your paper currency into gold; and, thirdly, another and very important principle, to give to the Bank of England a controlling power over the circulation of the country, by which they could regulate it more or less in accordance with the state of the foreign exchanges. Now, it is consistent in one who upheld and adheres to every one of these principles, to think that the experience of the operation of the Act from 1844 to 1847, has demonstrated that the restrictions imposed by that Act on the proceedings of the Bank of England, are
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restrictions unnecessary in themselves and injuriously affecting the exercise of the discretion which should rest in the Bank Directors. The main question is, whether, by restricting the Bank to the issue of notes not exceeding by more than fourteen millions the amount of bullion in their coffers, and with one-fifth part only of that bullion being permitted to be kept in silver, we did not unduly fetter the Bank of England, and prevent them from giving the extent of accommodation at a certain time, which the amount of bullion in their coffers, and their knowledge of the influx of bullion from foreign countries, would have safely warranted them in giving, if the restrictions imposed by this Bill had not stood in their way? Now, is not that subject one for legitimate inquiry in reference to the effect of the Bank Act of 1844 on the distress of 1847? And is it not one which the noble Marquess and her Majesty's Ministers, with the information which the Government possess, and with the intense anxiety with which they no doubt watched over the whole progress of that distress, ought to be prepared to offer an opinion upon? On referring to the letter of the 25th of October, it appears that the Government, for the purposes, as they then stated, of restoring confidence and removing that panic by which the commercial embarrassments of the country had been so greatly aggravated, felt it necessary to authorise the Bank to violate the Act of Parliament. Now this is a dilemma that they cannot get out of. If the Act did not create that panic, or aggravate the embarrassments that prevailed, what was it which induced Her Majesty's Government to take so extraordinary a step as to advise the Bank authorities to violate the Act of Parliament? I do not mean to say that authorising the Directors to violate the Act was not a wise measure. I think it would be better if it had been adopted earlier; but it was a measure which, when adopted, violated the Act, and condemned its efficacy at the very time it ought to have been most effective. They acted at all events in a way which showed the feeling of the Government to be condemnatory of it. I well remember that at the period of the passing of the Act, a Member of the other House of Parliament (Mr. Raikes Currie), one of the warmest advocates of the measure, in allusion to the proposal for giving a power to the Government to authorise the Directors to exceed the provisions of the Bank in

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certain contingencies, said how extraordinary it was that they should approve of the structure, that they should admire its beautiful symmetry, and the perfection of the scale on which it was constructed, and yet be willing to demolish all its strength, and destroy all its symmetry, by taking away the keystone of the arch by which all was held together. I said just now, my Lords, that I thought Her Majesty's Ministers had underrated the amount of commercial distress, and I said I thought that an interference at an earlier period would have tended to mitigate that distress. In so saying, I proceeded upon the assumption of the consequences which followed the interference of the Government, as stated by the noble Marquess, who alleged that by permitting the violation of the law, they so far restored confidence that there was an immediate diminution of the panic, and an immediate influx of bullion into the coffers of the Bank. I have had placed before me a nominal list of commercial houses, 106 in number, which have become actually insolvent between the months of July and November; and from that statement are excluded all houses which have entered into private compositions with their creditors, all failures on the Stock Exchange—which have not been few in number—all houses the liquidation of whose engagements is not actually under inspection; and that class involves one house whose liabilities are enormous, amounting to several millions. It, besides, does not include one single house the liabilities of which do not exceed 20,000 l.; and the whole number of houses that failed, with their liabilities, are returned thus:—In July two became insolvent, the joint amount of whose liabilities were 210,000 l.; in August, sixteen gave way, for a total amounting to 2,369,000 l.; in September, twenty-six broke down, for 6,520,000 l.; and in October, thirty-five went, for a total of 6,840,000 l. Making in all, from July to the period at which for the first time Her Majesty's Ministers thought it fit and wise to interfere, failures of seventy-nine houses, involving liabilities to the amount of 15,969,000 l. Now, I concur entirely with the noble Marquess in some of the observations with which he opened his speech. In the first place, I entirely agree with him, that it was impossible for any form of legislation or for any Government to prevent those distresses which occurred from the failure of the agricultural productions of this country, or those which arose
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from rash speculations. But I think it impossible that amongst that list of commercial houses which have failed for such large sums, from July to October and November—I think it impossible, I say, but that amongst them there must have been some, and there may have been many, which an earlier interference by the Bank of England might have saved from ruin; and by saving them might have prevented the ruin also of many more lesser houses that were dependent upon them. I have stated the liabilities of the houses only which have failed; but, my Lords, that is not to be taken as the measure of the whole loss to the commercial houses of the country. It is but a small part of the general loss. You know the amount of the liabilities of those which have fallen, but you know nothing of the losses sustained by those which stand as yet, but in so precarious a condition as to render it doubtful how long they may be able to carry on their business, and certain that they must at all events contract their dealings greatly. The noble Marquess has used the expression (and I trust he will not object to alter the wording of his resolution in that respect) "recent," in speaking of the commercial calamity of this country. That expression, my Lords, conveys the idea that the distress has passed away. By a singular coincidence, on the very first day that Parliament assembled, the Bank reduced its rate of discount from 8 to 7 per cent; and on the very day that the noble Marquess comes down to this House to ask your Lordships to appoint this Committee, that is to say, within these three hours, the rate of discount has been further reduced from 7 to 6 per cent. But, my Lords, although the Bank of England may be in a state of less difficulty than it has been, so far am I from thinking that the distress of the country has passed by, that I fear the worst and severest portion of that distress has yet to come. You have yet to receive accounts from, abroad of the effects of the recent failures in this country. You have as yet received no accounts from India of the consequences there of those failures. But if I am to believe what I have heard, and accounts that I have received from quarters supposed to be well informed upon the subject, three months will not have elapsed before you will hear of the sweeping off of some of the greatest houses in Calcutta. Our merchants in Manchester, Birmingham, and

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elsewhere will, ere many months more have elapsed, be receiving back in payment for the goods which they may have shipped, bills upon those houses which have failed; and the full effect of the pressure which has reduced so many great houses, has yet to be felt, when in its return it shall have fallen upon the smaller houses, upon the tradesmen, the retail dealer, and upon those employed in the production of manufactures. And whether you look to the railway interest, or to any other department of industry in the country, you will find, I fear, that many will be thrown out of employment, and that you will have increasing distress. It is not my intention, undoubtedly, to offer any opposition to the appointment of the Committee which the noble Marquess demands; but I must dissent from one proposition which he put forward in asking for it. The noble Marquess said, that important as was the subject of the inquiry, it was a very narrow one. Narrow, my Lords, narrow!—an investigation into all the causes of the recent commercial distress, one question being as to the effect of a particular Act of Parliament, the consideration of which must occupy much time, and is certain to lead to great difference of opinion? Narrow!—when not only the operation of that Act, but the questions of over-trading, of railways, the conduct of the Bank of England, free trade, and every other matter to which any portion of the distress can be attributed as an effect, are involved in it? Why, my Lords, when the noble Marquess says an inquiry of this importance is narrow, I am utterly confounded; and I can only wish to know what the noble Marquess would consider an extensive one. Long, my Lords, before any results of this inquiry can have taken place—long before the Committee shall have closed its labours and made its report, the crisis will be over. And, so far as we can judge from the opinion which the Government has formed, we may presume that the report of the Committee will be something to the effect that they will be sorry to hear of the distresses; but that nothing could have prevented over-speculation—nothing could have prevented the occurrence of a bad harvest—and however much they regretted the mode in which the Bank Charter Act operated, it had nothing to do with causing the distress. The noble Marquess has said, and I concur with him, that no circumstances, and no legislation, can make up for a loss of supply in the agricultural produce of this country,
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and the consequent necessity of importing a very large amount of foreign corn. Undoubtedly, an importation to the amount of 33,000,000 l. in value, within eighteen months, as stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or of 20,000,000 l. within a twelvemonth, as stated by the noble Marquess to-night, for the purpose of supplying a deficiency which should have been supplied by our own country, is an immense loss of capital, and sufficient to have caused the great embarrassment which has occurred. But the noble Marquess entirely misunderstood me in what I said the other night, if he thought that I attributed to free trade the large importations of foreign corn which have taken place during the last three years. I maintained that whether under a system of free trade or protection, that importation would have taken place. That under the former corn law it would have taken place, as well as under the system which repealed that law. But what I maintained, and am prepared still to maintain, is, that whereas those who advocated free-trade principles predicted as a necessary consequence of that importation of foreign corn a large exportation, in return, of our manufactures, and great national prosperity in consequence; we, on the contrary, maintained that such exportation did not follow as a necessary result. There was one other observation of the noble Marquess to which I wish to refer. He said that nothing could guard against great and unnatural speculation. I do not deny it. But I ask, upon whom ought the blame of those enormous speculations in corn to rest? I say that Her Majesty's Government are not wholly blameless in this matter. You held out inducements to those speculators in corn, and encouraged the vast importation. You came down and asked to have the navigation laws suspended, in order to enable foreign corn to be more freely brought in. I think, after that, it is rather too much for Her Majesty's Government to turn round and say-it is impossible that any Government could guard against the consequences of rash and dangerous speculation? I will not trespass further on your Lordships' time. As I before observed, I have no opposition to give to the Motion of the noble Marquess. But I must hold it as my deliberate judgment, that a question such as this ought not to have been thrown by the Government loosely upon Parliament and the country for a decision. I think it was

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their duty to have expressed some opinion upon it, and that they ought to have proposed any palliation by law which they thought practicable. They have shrunk from that course. I will not give any formal notice at present; but Her Majesty's Government having stated that the appointment of the Committee is the only measure they intend to propose, they must not be surprised if other parties, less bound by the obligations of their position, assume to themselves the task of suggesting measures which they think suited to meet the exigency, and voluntarily assume a responsibility from which Her Majesty's Government appear to shrink.
EARL GREY: My Lords, I should not have thought it necessary to have troubled your Lordships with any observations upon the present occasion, but for some expressions which were used by the noble Lord who has just addressed you. He has attributed it as a matter of blame to Her Majesty's Government, that under the present distressing circumstances of the country they have contented themselves with a Motion for the appointment of a Committee, which the noble Lord says will have no practical effect upon its condition; and he has added that some measure of a more practical nature ought to have been proposed. Now, at the beginning of his speech the noble Lord adverted to the same topic. He said, if you have no measure to propose, why should Parliament have been called together? If the noble Lord had referred to Her Majesty's Speech at the beginning of the Session, he would have seen that, in our opinion, there were good grounds for calling Parliament together, although we did not think it possible for Parliament or Government to aid in palliating the existing distress. My opinion is in accordance with that of the noble Marquess, namely, that the distress under which the country is labouring is easily attributable to causes not only sufficient to account for it, but so powerful, that, great as the sufferings are, I am surprised they are not still greater. I believe that suffering, in part, arises from causes such as neither Government nor Parliament have any power over—from the dispensations of Providence—partly from causes attributable to the imprudence of individuals—and partly, it may be, even arising from the imprudence of the Legislature. Those causes have now been operating some time, and it is utterly impossible now to avert their consequences. But, holding
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these views as to the causes of the distress, there still was an obvious reason for calling Parliament together. We had taken a measure which might very probably have led to a violation of the law. If we had, we should have been obliged to ask for a Bill of Indemnity. We should not, as the noble Lord opposite himself remarked, have taken such a step without giving Parliament the earliest possible opportunity of pronouncing an opinion upon it. We were bound to give Parliament that opportunity. An Act of Indemnity would have been indispensable for the Bank Directors as well as for the Government, had the law been violated, for we have held out encouragement to the Bank Directors to take the course which might have led to that violation of the law; and it was right that Parliament should have had an immediate opportunity of pronouncing an opinion, and either permitting or censuring the act as it should think proper. But, my Lords, if you look to Her Majesty's Speech, you will find that we do not hold out to Parliament or to the country any hope that we were about to propose measures for the relief of the distress. The words are these:—
"Her Majesty has seen with great Concern the Distress which has for some Time prevailed among the Commercial Classes. The Embarrassments of Trade were at one Period aggravated by so general a Feeling of Distrust and of Alarm, that Her Majesty, for the Purpose of restoring Confidence, authorised Her Ministers to recommend to the Directors of the Bank of England a Course of Proceeding suited to such an Emergency. This course might have led to an Infringement of the Law."
Surely, my Lords, there is nothing in these words which could lead to an expectation of certain measures of any description being about to be introduced. But such measures as we thought could tend to alleviate the distress we have already laid before Parliament. It is clear that postponing for some time the demands on account of railways in progress is one of the best possible for such a purpose; and, accordingly, Her Majesty's Ministers have proposed in the other House of Parliament a measure which will, we hope, lead to the postponement for some time of the great outlay which should otherwise take place upon those railways. We have proposed to go as far as possible with a due regard to contracts already entered into, which Parliament would not be justified in setting aside. But my noble Friend opposite has complained a good deal that no opinion has been expressed on the part of Her Ma-

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jesty's Government on the Act of 1844. Now, I must say that that assertion is hardly well deserved. My noble Friend near me did, undoubtedly, state to your Lordships that the causes of the commercial distress were not attributable to the Act of 1844; and my noble Friend opposite agreed in that opinion. He said distinctly that that was not the case; but he said that the operations of that Act had tended to increase the panic, and to prevent relief from being afforded as early as it might have been. Now, when we have been compelled to interfere with the operation of that Act, it would be impossible to say that we are prepared to maintain it to the fullest extent. But I am prepared to maintain that the Act of 1844 did not in any way tend to produce the commercial distress, or the consequences to which my noble Friend opposite has referred. My noble Friend said, that by sanctioning an interference with that Act, we have expressed an opinion against it: but I dissent entirely from such a conclusion. I know that it is an opinion entertained by many persons of the highest experience, and that the opinion was hold by them in 1844 when the Act was passed, that whilst it is impossible and impracticable to define with precision sufficient for the requirements of an Act of Parliament what the currency should be; yet that when circumstances of an extraordinary nature should arise, as they might from time to time, they might be dealt with by the Executive Government. That opinion was entertained by many experienced persons in 1844, and to it many, I believe, still adhere. But in regard to the opinion that the ultimate adoption of a measure of interference implied that something of the same kind ought to have been done earlier, I must dissent entirely from the noble Lord opposite. On the contrary, I maintain that that measure should have been deferred to the last possible moment. No one laments more deeply than I do the extent to which the distress has gone. The calamities are almost unparalleled in amount, and of a most lamentable description. But I believe it is the opinion of those best acquainted with the commercial world, that the houses which have fallen, whether from imprudence or misfortune, or from whatever cause their failures have arisen, were houses which might have been certainly maintained by external assistance for some time longer, but whose continued maintenance could not have been
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effected; whilst, on the other hand, their further support for the short while they could have been kept up might have been productive of far greater mischief than their failure at the time they gave way. But when towards the end of October we received accounts that although up to that time the failures had not extended to solvent houses, yet, if something were not done to maintain credit, the consequences would be serious to houses that were perfectly solvent—that they were becoming unable to meet the demands upon them, the panic amongst merchants, bankers, and traders, being so great, that in order to maintain their credit as far as possible, they were hoarding up and keeping in their own possession all the money they could, and calling in all the debts due to them. Now the whole of our commercial system is based upon the assumption that there will not be a simultaneous demand of all engagements due, but that a fair amount of credit will be afforded; and, undoubtedly, the result of the measure we adopted goes far to prove the correctness of this statement. We were told that if there were an assurance, no matter on what terms money was to be had by persons who could give good security—that if there was an assurance that money could be had, the money hoarded in various quarters would be brought forward abundantly, and that thus the pressure would be at once mitigated. We believed this opinion to be well founded; we acted upon it; and the result proved that we had not been deceived. My noble Friend says that this is a question which we ought not to turn loose upon a Committee of this House, or upon Committees of both Houses of Parliament; and that we ought to have made some definite proposal in respect to the Act of 1844. Now, if we believed that any possible alteration of that Act could have any perceptible effect upon the existing commercial distress, I should entirely concur with my noble Friend opposite. But we think the very reverse. We think that Act may require alteration in some points, but that the main principles of it are correct, and that to teach the commercial classes of this country to look for relief to what is called relaxation of the currency would be most dangerous. We do not mean to say that the Act of 1844 is not capable of improvement in many parts. We know that there are various points in which persons of conflicting opinions contend that improvements may be made.

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One set of persons contend for some authority being entrusted by law to the Executive Government to make such alterations as they may deem necessary in special emergencies, such, for instance, as we have lately seen. Others contend that the Act of 1844 does not carry to its legitimate conclusion the principles on which it was founded; and that too much power has been left to a corporate body—the Directors of the Bank of England—and that the Directors of that institution represent the interests of the Bank rather than those of the public. We thus find views put forward by well-informed persons almost in perfect opposition to each other; and it appears to me that, under such circumstances, it is only fitting that Parliament should appoint Committees for the purpose of considering those various propositions. My noble Friend opposite (Lord Stanley) has intimated an opinion that commercial distress has not yet passed by. I wish I could say I differed from him. But I feel bound to admit that many of the causes which contributed to bring about the late distress are still in operation, and that we have still to look to a further period of depression. But there is nothing in the present state of the country which ought to discourage us—nothing to cause us to fear but that—it may be at an earlier or it may be at a more distant period—shortly this country will emerge from all its difficulties, and rise to a prosperity still greater than before. The causes of the present distress have been already so fully stated, that I will not again go into them. But I will remark that, in addition to the drain upon the resources of the country for the importation of foreign corn, every class in the community, from the highest to the least, has felt the pressure upon its expenditure from the high prices of provisions during the past year or so. The price of homegrown corn during the past year has been almost unprecedentedly high, having risen to 80 s., 100 s., and even for some time having touched the enormous price of 120 s. a quarter. My Lords, when we consider what must have been the effect of these high prices on the expenditure of every family, especially in the families of the middle and working classes of this country; when we consider the enormous drain on the resources of the country, when added to the large demands paid on account of railways and other sources of expenditure—certainly we cannot be surprised at the extent of the difficulties we have experienced.
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But, my Lords, we have just had a good harvest—a bountiful harvest; and if, by the blessing of Providence, we should be favoured with a recurrence of such a plentiful season, that greatest of all drains upon the resources of the country will be at an end. Then, with respect to the railways—undoubtedly, at a moment when a great drain of money from this country was caused by the importation of foreign corn, the amount of capital absorbed in the construction of railways could not fail to produce great temporary inconvenience; still, it must be admitted that these great works of improvement, when completed, will add immensely to the national wealth. Many of these undertakings are beginning to produce wealth, and their benefits will speedily be realised. The pressure made by the efforts on the part of the trading community and others to meet the demand on account of railways, has undoubtedly been very inconvenient. But when I look at the energy and industry of the country—when I take into account the improved prospects of the cotton trade, arising from a cheaper and more plentiful supply of the raw material—I have no reason for doubting that, at no far distant day, this country will again attain her accustomed prosperity. Before I sit down, I cannot help referring to what fell from my noble Friend opposite, at the end of his speech. My noble Friend, referring to what had been stated by him on the first night of the Session, reiterated the opinion that the experience of last year, and the wide-spread distress which unfortunately existed—universally attributed, in the main, to the large importations—went far to corroborate the arguments of those who opposed any alteration in the corn laws. I entertain an opinion exactly the reverse of that stated by my noble Friend. I can hardly conceive a combination of circumstances more powerfully corroborative of all the arguments produced by those who were in favour of a free importation of foreign corn. In the first place, it was of the utmost importance that we should have those importations of grain. If we had not secured these supplies of corn, what would have been the sufferings of the people? In spite of the immense arrivals of grain and flour, no later than the months of June and July in the present year, the prices were so high, and the sufferings of the population of Ireland and of this country had arrived at a height which it was fear-

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ful to contemplate; and what prevented these sufferings proceeding to the extent of starvation? The supplies of foreign corn. Parliament had given unlimited liberty to importations, and British merchants ventured to send to the most distant markets; while, under the old corn law the merchants necessarily confined their operations to the continent of Europe; they went no further for their supplies of grain. The effect of the sliding-scale was such as to prevent any prudent man from proceeding to a distant market; his cargo, when it arrived at Liverpool or London, might be met by low prices and high duties. The sliding-scale was in fact an ingenious contrivance to impose a forfeit upon every merchant who ventured to order cargoes of corn from a distant port. It, however, happened that just at the period when we were on the verge of starvation, neighbouring countries on the continent of Europe were suffering under an equally heavy calamity. Instead of being exporters of corn, they were bidders against us in the market of the world for the small surplus that remained. Our merchants drew their cargoes from the Turkish dominions, from the United States of America, and from distant countries never before visited for such a purpose. But they would not have ventured to do this under the operation of the old sliding-scale. They would have known that a voyage to the Turkish dominions, or to the United States, was a work of time, and they would have declined making the experiment. I say it advisedly, that actual starvation would have been experienced by no small portion of the population. My noble Friend then went on to say that this enormous addition to our imports had not been attended by any increase of exports. It is perfectly true that our exports of manufactured articles have fallen off. But this is easily accounted for. It may be partially accounted for by the diversion of much of the capital of the country to the construction of railways; it may also be partially accounted for by the deficiency in the supply of cotton. But to those countries from whence the largest supplies of com were received, there has been an increase of exports—an increase infinitely greater than had been anticipated. My noble Colleague the First Lord of the Treasury, the other night, in the House of Commons, quoted a document to prove this gratifying-fact. His Lordship showed that the declared value of exports from the port of
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Liverpool alone to the United States had amounted, for the three quarters ending October, 1846, to 4,030,000 l.; for the three quarters ending October, 1847, it amounted to 6,291,000 l., making an increase of British manufactured goods to that country from whence we received the greatest bulk of foreign corn of no less than 2,261,000 l. in nine months. More than that, it is notorious that the effect of the increased demand for corn from America has increased the consumption of British goods in that country. This increased demand has taken place in a degree much greater than was ever anticipated. The fact is, that the farmers of America have been making large profits, and, like their friends and relatives on this side the Atlantic, they have increased their expenditure, and that in a great degree has led to the increased exportation of British manufactures. The same thing has taken place with respect to many other countries. I do not think it worth while to trouble your Lordships with an array of figures, more especially upon a point not exactly before us, or I could show that the same thing holds true with respect to the Turkish dominions, from which we obtained large supplies of corn, and to Brazil, in consequence of the increased importations of sugar. In short, the events of the past year confirmed, in the strongest manner, every argument advanced by the advocates of an alteration in the corn laws. There can be no doubt this extraordinary and unlooked-for increase of imports has caused a great demand for capital—a far greater demand than would be covered by our ordinary imports. Under the pressure of circumstances considerable sums of money have been exported from this country. I believe, however, that if you could ascertain the amount of foreign railway stock held by parties in this country, compared with the amount held by them in the previous year, you would find that this forms a considerable part in the large payments which had, of necessity, to be made. Formerly it was the general practice of the British merchant to be in advance with the foreign merchant; but now, I am afraid, that the foreign merchant is in advance with the British merchant. This naturally arises from the balance of trade being against us. It should also be borne in mind that a large part of our exports were necessarily affected by the distress which prevailed during the last year throughout the continent of Europe. The popula-

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tion of many of the continental nations were as much affected by the scarcity as ourselves. It was utterly impossible, under such circumstances, that they could be large consumers of British manufactured goods. Germany, France, Belgium, and other countries were so situated—they could not consume their accustomed amount of British manufactures—it would be quite irrational to suppose they could have done so. But my noble Friend has rather tauntingly said, "If the corn speculations of the past year were inordinate, who is to blame but Her Majesty's Government?" Now, I am not prepared to say, that these corn speculations were inordinate. I very much doubt whether they were at all less than prudence required. In some individual instances I do not deny that heavy losses may have been incurred; but for the interest of the country I doubt whether the importations were at all in excess. Your Lordships will be pleased to remember that—thanks to an all-wise Providence—we had, some weeks before harvest, an unprecedented succession of fine weather. The harvest which during the spring it was thought would be late, proved to be early—earlier, indeed, than usual. Human foresight could not foresee such an occurrence; it would have been considered the height of folly to have relied upon such a result. Supposing the weather during last July had been wet, and the harvest, instead of being so early, had been a fortnight or three weeks later, and that the consumption of the country had depended upon the foreign supplies; does the noble Lord think there would have been one grain of corn to spare? I must own that I do not consider the speculations in corn to have been carried on to any inordinate or unwarrantable extent. There always was, and always will, when high prices exist, be instances of individual parties holding on too long, and consequently enduring great and ruinous losses. I do not deny that, for the public interest, it is desirable that a certain quantity of corn should be held on; by such means alone might we be preserved from the privations of scarcity. I do, however, deny that there is any ground of complaint against the late mercantile speculations in corn as inordinate. On the contrary, I am of opinion that the corn trade has been conducted with a degree of foresight not less remarkable than the enterprise, energy, and activity employed in it. It has been the only means, under Providence, of saving
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this country from the horrors of famine; it has proved the wisdom and justice of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government, which, in spite of the most urgent advices to the contrary, they steadily acted upon, left the supply of corn to the exertions of private traders, instead of sending fleets to America and elsewhere in order to import corn on Government account. The Government steadily refused to interfere with the corn trade, and the result of so refusing shows that they judged wisely. I say further—taking the noble Lord's version—that if the corn speculations of the past year were inordinate, which I deny, Her Majesty's Government did not encourage those speculations. We asked Parliament to suspend the Bill authorising the collection of duties on foreign corn—we asked Parliament to suspend the navigation laws. And if we were again placed in the same position, does his Lordship doubt—do any of your Lordships doubt—what would be our course of action? If we had hesitated for a moment—if we had failed to afford every facility for securing a full and speedy supply of corn—we should have been utterly unworthy of the places we now hold in Her Majesty's councils. Feeling that the present is a subject which will invite and require much discussion-—one which will have to be much more fully considered—I will not trespass upon the attention of your Lordships further than to say, that, with my noble Friend, I think there do appear good and sufficient reasons for the appointment of this Committee.
LORD BROUGHAMalluded to the circumstance—he did not call it an unfortunate circumstance—of the noble Lord opposite (Earl Grey) having followed his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) and broached the vexed question of the corn laws during the present discussion; but he entreated his noble Friend near him (Lord Ashburton) not to be tempted into a reply. The question was sufficiently wide without that additional subject; and he felt quite sure that his noble Friend (Lord Stanley), who, almost unavoidably, began the discussion, having only just taken it up, would immediately see the necessity of again laying it down. For his own part, he had not the least objection to the subject of the corn laws—he was quite prepared to discuss it with his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) on any future day, and after due notice; but he rested quite satisfied with the argument of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey). He

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entirely subscribed to that argument; and he considered that it completely confuted the statements of his noble Friend. Their Lordships might exclude the corn laws from the present discussion—his noble Friend (Lord Ashburton) kindly yielding to his advice; but their Lordships might rest satisfied that the whole question would, and must, of necessity, come before the Committee. The whole question, also, respecting the railway speculations, which, he did not say, had distracted, but had certainly absorbed, a great deal of the capital of the country, must also come before the Committee. He quite agreed with the noble Lord opposite, that very much of that speculation might be imputed to the imprudence of the people; but he thought that it might be also traced to a higher, a larger, a more important source—the imprudence, not of individuals, but of the Legislature. In the consideration of the subject, he thought it would be far better to look to the present, and provide for the future, rather than waste their time in an inquiry into the past, scanning the merits of measures or of men. Yet he could not help reflecting, that if there was any part of the Legislature whose consciences were free from blame as to the railway speculation, it was the noble and illustrious Duke (the Duke of Wellington) and the individual who then had the honour to address their Lordships, and for naming whom in conjunction with the noble Duke he perhaps owed an apology to the House. Ten years ago they gave that warning, which it would have been well for the nation to have taken. That warning was reckoned a prejudice—he called it an opinion—and if it was a prejudice he wished it had spread to a greater extent throughout the country. The noble Lord had referred to those things as constituting the cause of the present distress; but there was another, and no very unimportant cause, which his Lordship had not referred to—he alluded to the usury laws. The owners of land were placed by those laws in a position of peculiar hardship. They suffered by a partial repeal and a partial retention of the enactments relating to usury. And in addition to the difficulties which had been so well described by the noble Lord opposite, their Lordships must prepare themselves for agricultural distress, or, at least, landowners' embarrassments. Capital would become more difficult to procure every year; the rate of interest
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would rise in proportion as capital became scarce; the landowner alone would be unable to raise the rate of interest upon his incumbrances. He did not object to the appointment of the proposed Committee. He considered their Lordships' House was peculiarly calculated for inquiries of that character. With all deference to the other House, he thought this House better calculated for such inquiries than was the House of Commons. He thought, however, that it would be better for the inquiry to commence in the other House—their Lordships then not only had the benefit of the opinion of the other House, from its report, but they saw the evidence of the witnesses. Those witnesses were not examined on oath, and many things were taken which might not be considered strictly accurate by a court of law; but inquiries commenced and concluded in the other House formed so many guide-posts and helps; and when they came under the more deliberate consideration of their Lordships, while masses of evidence were frequently rejected, a better conclusion was arrived at in consequence of the previous inquiry. He would not inquire whether the panic was over or not; he would merely ask whether their Lordships had a prospect of peace and quietness during the sitting of the Committee. With his noble Friend (the Marquess of Lansdowne), he greatly feared that, during the course of the inquiry, a recurrence of the same calamity from which this country had been suffering might take place. Their Lordships would enter upon the inquiry in a state of constant alarm. They would be receiving evidence abounding with appeals to their feelings. They would be told that things were very awkward—that they were worse and worse—that ruin was staring every merchant in the face—and that their investigations might increase the peril. Upon these grounds he held that it would have been better had the inquiry before their Lordships been longer delayed. If, indeed, there existed any prospect of a speedy and practical result from the inquiry, all objections would be at an end; but no man could dream that such would be the case. In about a fortnight or three weeks, the recess would intervene. Was it at all likely that the inquiry could be completed before the recess? The inquiry would necessarily extend ever a long space of time. Did Her Majesty's Ministers think that the subject of the currency could be kept

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from the Committee? It would be impossible to keep it out. A great number of persons thought that it was not the Bill of 1844 but the Bill of 1819 that had done the mischief. [A Noble LORD: Hear, hear!] There's an instance. And as soon as that subject was broached, away went all hopes of a speedy termination. A determined Member might succeed in dragging any subject forward in Committee, if that subject were not quite foreign to the inquiry; and he could not say that the Bill of 1819 any more than the Bill of 1844 was so absolutely foreign to the inquiry as to justify its discussion being shut out. The noble Lord concluded by stating his intention to vote for the appointment of the Committee, and reiterating his opinion that the inquiry would have been better prosecuted after the complete subsidence of the alarm in the commercial world. He wished he could differ from his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) as to the probability of increased pressure in the monetary world; he greatly feared that further disasters might be looked for in many quarters, and from the embarrassments both of the East Indies and the West.
The DUKE of GRAFTONentirely agreed with the noble Lords who had spoken as to the policy of appointing a Committee. His Grace considered that the commercial distress arose from the want of a sufficient circulating medium—a want of money whereby to carry on the transactions of trade. He considered an extension of the currency would be the best remedy.
LORD ASHBURTONthen rose, but was at first very indistinctly heard in the gallery. The noble Lord was understood to observe, in respect to the proposed Committee, that some parts of the case were too imminent to admit of waiting for a remedy until the close of an inquiry that promised to be of so long a duration. He was sensible that, under every circumstance, this Committee was proper; but whilst he said this, he must be understood as reserving to himself, or to any other noble Lord, full liberty to offer, at any time, should he think fit to do so, some proposition for a direct interference with that Act which had so much to do with the difficulties that had occurred. With regard to the question of the corn laws, no one had said that those laws were the cause of the present distress, though it could scarcely be doubted that the great importation of foreign corn that
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had taken place had much to do with it—by the drain of capital which it had of necessity caused. But the old corn law would have admitted corn just as freely as the present had done; and not much inference could be drawn, perhaps, from what had passed in regard to the general operation of the corn laws. But let him remind their Lordships of one little fact. One of the great objections that were brought against the old sliding-scale was the fluctuation of price; but they had had, under the new law, a greater fluctuation than had ever before been known—a fluctuation, indeed, from 40 s. to 120 s. Another of the objections to the old corn laws was that they encouraged gambling; but the gambling under the new law had been, he feared, far greater than ever had existed during the whole system of the sliding-scale. He should not, however, have touched upon this question on that occasion, had it not been so strongly pressed upon their Lordships' notice by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) who had lately addressed the House. But what was it that was said to have been the cause of the condition in which the country had found itself during the last twelve months? The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) appeared to throw the cause upon Providence, attributing it principally to the visitation of the famine. But that famine did not absorb that extent of capital which had been imagined. No doubt could exist that these great importations of corn did cause a very considerable quantity of specie to leave the county, and this greatly reduced the balance at the Bank; and, certainly, the Act of 1844 did aggravate every difficulty that occurred—indeed, made things difficulties which would not, perhaps, have been so but for the operation of that Act. One of the great difficulties in the case was the railways; but would it be said that Parliament had not been strongly warned on that subject? The noble Earl now the Governor-General of India (the Earl of Dalhousie) had been as strongly impressed with the difficulties of that question as he (Lord Ashburton) was himself. Those ventures had no doubt been, in many points of view, of service to the country; but they had been carried on with insufficient means. The main cause, then, was one which the Legislature, though often warned against permitting it to operate, had, nevertheless, allowed to take place. There was another question, too, which was much connected with what they

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were discussing, and in regard to which the noble Earl (Earl Grey) was more responsible than any one else, but which was too large a subject to enter upon on that occasion—he meant the West India question. It was not true that the misfortunes which had overtaken and struck down the West India interests were to be attributed to the acting of Providence, over which man could exercise no control; a great portion of these misfortunes was to be attributed to legislation. Much stress had been laid upon over-trading as regarded those East India houses which had failed. Their Lordships, however, should bear in mind that these houses conducted their business exactly in the same way that they had been accustomed to do, at all events since he recollected; and although much of the business transacted was carried on on credit, still the parties would have been enabled to go on as they had been accustomed to do, but for the altered state of the money laws, which rendered it impossible for them to go on. Much loss of capital had no doubt been sustained during the present crisis; but it was not the loss of commercial capital alone which had to be deplored—the commercial character of the country had been injured from one part of the world to the other, and the name of a London merchant had become a by-word. With the view of showing the low estimate formed of English credit in a foreign mart, his Lordship read an extract of a letter dated the 6th of November, which stated that the accounts received of continued mercantile disasters in England, and the discredit thrown upon English paper in consequence, had almost suspended bill operations as regarded Great Britain. It was for their Lordships to consider how far this state of things was to be attributed to physical causes, or to causes arising out of past legislation as regarded the money laws. For his own part, he was decidedly of opinion that the monetary derangement was attributable to the restrictions placed upon banking operations by the Act of 1844. Take the case of France. That country suffered greatly from the loss of its crops as well as England; but the Bank of France, although possessed of not more than two millions sterling in its coffers, continued its usual banking accommodation at a reasonable rate of interest, while the Bank of England, with ten millions and a half of bullion in its coffers—in fact its stock never fell below 8,000,000 l.—not only contracted its accommodation, nay,
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almost for a time suspended it, but charged an exorbitant rate of interest. The Bank of France, on the other hand, with its 2,000,000 l., made no alteration in its rate of discount, thus avoiding all disturbance to trade; and he believed that throughout the provinces no difficulty was felt in obtaining the usual amount of accommodation on the usual terms. He thought the Government were very blameable in having stipulated for a minimum rate of 8 per cent, as a condition of its authorising the chance of an infringement of the Bank Charter taking place. The effect was not confined to London, but extended to the country, causing local banks to charge equally high rates for accommodation to their customers. He would give an instance of the consequences as regarded individuals. A most respectable merchant in Birmingham informed him that, having a very valuable order to execute, he applied to his banker for the assistance he had been accustomed to receive under similar circumstances. The banker said, "Certainly; you are one of our customers, and we will give you what you need; but you know that the Bank of England is charging 8 per cent, and our charge must be in proportion. "The merchant informed the banker that his profits would not afford such a charge—that he must decline the accommodation and the order too. In fact, it was impossible that tradesmen could bear up under such exorbitant and capricious charges as had prevailed, not only in London, but throughout England. If the Committee would take the opinion of the best-informed merchants—he did not mean persons—he would not speak in terms of any disrespect of those to whom he alluded, neither would he name them—who were possessed of great wealth and large capital, but who derived great advantage from a high rate of interest, the opinion he had expressed would be confirmed. He did not think that the real interest of that class of capitalists to which he had referred was promoted so much as the parties themselves were inclined to believe by the existing law; still the temptation was so great that they had no objection to the continuance of a law which was occasionally so advantageous to them as capitalists. He thought the Government ought to suspend the restrictive clauses of the Bank Charter, and then wait for the report of the Committee as regarded the modification to be permanently adopted. The sole object of any such restriction as that complained of

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was to prevent the Bank from getting into the predicament of not being able to pay its notes in gold; and, in order to carry out this precaution, the establishment was divided into two departments. And what has been the result? Why, the Bank, with upwards of 8,000,000 l. in its coffers, was at one time in the predicament of acting as though it possessed not more than 1,160,000 l., the amount of its reserve. The noble Lord then proceeded to observe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not quite correct in stating, as he had done in another place, that the Bank had continued to afford accommodation throughout the crisis. Such a statement was not quite consistent with the facts. As he (Lord Ashburton) had already remarked, the stock of bullion in the possession of the Bank was never below 8,000,000 l.; and if reference was made to published documents, it would be found that that institution had gone on satisfactorily with a much less stock than 8,000,000 l. In 1835, the average was 6,500,000 l.; in 1836, 7,000,000 l.; in 1837, not more than 6,000,000 l.; in 1838, 9,000,000 l.; in 1839, not more than 5,000,000 l.; in 1840, 4,000,000 l. In fact, previous to the existing restrictions, the Bank was able to give reasonable accommodation at a reasonable charge with a stock of gold not more than 5,000,000 l. or 6,000,000 l.; but with 8,000,000 l. in its coffers, under the apprehension, not of being unable to redeem its notes, but of infringing on the terms of the charter, the Directors were obliged to act as though they possessed not more than 1,160,000 l. He did not impute any blame to the Directors for entertaining such an apprehension. He objected, however, to their acting as stockbrokers. Such conduct was altogether new to that institution. By their operations the Directors were enabled to produce fluctuations in the stock market, and to take advantage of these fluctuations to make a profit. When the rate of discount was raised, stocks fell; and the Directors were able to produce such a result when they thought it would be advantageous. Such modes of "rigging" the Stock Exchange, he held to be highly objectionable in an institution like the Bank of England. The cast-iron rule which bound down the Bank in its issue of notes ought to be abrogated. A discretionary power ought to be given to the Directors, for it was well known that while an issue of twenty millions might be dangerous at
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one time, twenty-five millions might be perfectly safe at another. He held that the Act of 1844 had been decidedly condemned by the procedure of the Government itself in advising its suspension. In doing so, Ministers had admitted that circumstances might arise in which the restriction placed upon issues should be removed; and the result of the interference had been, as his noble Friend opposite truly said, completely successful. The moment the suspension was authorised, credit was restored, and had continued to operate since. As preliminary, therefore, to the inquiry by the Committee, he would earnestly advise that the suspension of the restrictive clauses should immediately take place.
The EARL of EGLINTONhad no intention of entering into any inquiry as to whether the monetary difficulties were created by the corn laws, or free trade, or anything else. He wished to ask whether the inquiry would embrace the operation of the Bills of 1845 and 1846, which related to the Scotch banks? He asked this question, because in all the speeches which had been delivered, no mention was made of the Scotch banks. In another place it had been stated, that the final incident which caused the Government to authorise the suspension of the Bank of England Charter Act was an application which was made by the Scotch banks for assistance. Now, he felt perfectly convinced that the larger portion of the Scotch banks had not applied for relief; and indeed the general opinion was, that a very small part of them, he believed only two, had applied for any assistance whatever. He would only add, that if the Bill of 1845 had not passed, probably these applications would not have been made.
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsaid, that according to the terms of the Motion no doubt the inquiry included the Scotch banks; but the Committee would exercise their own discretion as to what branches of the inquiry they should entertain.
LORD WHARNCLIFFEsaid, there was one point which had not at all been adverted to; and in reference to which he wished to put a question to the noble Marquess. The question was, on what footing the Legislature stood with regard to the Bank? In 1844 the existing charter was on the point of expiration, or had reached that period, when the Government, by giving notice to the Bank, had the power of examining its charter, and of proposing to Parliament to make a new arrange-

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ment with that establishment. At present it appeared that one of the objects in view was to examine the constitution of the Bank, and ascertain whether it required any new regulations; and if they were to investigate the condition and constitution of the Bank, it was desirable that they should know on what footing the Legislature stood with respect to it. He wished, therefore, to ask, whether, supposing at this period that the result of the investigation should be, that it was thought desirable to alter the constitution of the Bank, or to withdraw any powers which it now possessed, Parliament would find itself in a position to make those alterations, or whether the Bank had given to the Government an express assurance of acquiescence on its part, so as to make the inquiry a really practical one. He would not on that occasion, and in the present state of the House, enter into the general question which had been discussed; but he could not sit down without saying that, in spite of all he had heard, and in spite of the arguments of his noble Friend near him (Lord Ashburton), he still felt disposed to give his confidence to the principle of the Bill of 1844—and to give credit to Her Majesty's Government for the course which they had pursued. He certainly thought that the moment at which they had interfered with their advice to the Bank was well chosen; and the very restriction which they imposed on the power given, and with which his noble Friend found so much fault, was a safe and prudent one. The effect of that step was most fortunate; for it brought the country back into a state of commercial confidence, without any actual violation of the law. He was glad to hear from the Government their determination not to sanction any relaxation of the currency, for he believed that the principles on which the Act of 1844 was founded, were sound, even if any alteration in its details should be required; and that, if they adopted any relaxation of the currency, they would be led into a course beset with dangers and difficulties of a more serious kind than any which they had yet encountered.
In reply to a question from LORD ASHBURTON,
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsaid, that not only was no instruction to be given to the Committee to the effect that the general monetary system of the country should be investigated; but he considered the Committee appointed with a perfect
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understanding that the general question should not be even an admissible branch of the inquiry. In answer to the question of the noble Lord, he could state that at present certainly the charter of the Bank could not be altered without the consent of the Bank; but he had also the satisfaction of adding that, as this matter had been very much discussed at the Bank, the Government had received an expression on the part of the Bank of their readiness—not to acquiesce in any measure which Parliament might choose to adopt—but to consult with the Government upon the subject, and to concur in such alterations as might seem desirable to both of them.
LORD STANLEYsaid, he hoped the noble Marquess would consent to an alteration in the terms of the Motion. He wished to substitute for the words "the recent commercial distress," the words used in Her Majesty's Speech," the distress which has prevailed among the commercial classes."
The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNEsaid, that he had no objection to the alteration—they were both general terms.
Motion then agreed to.
House adjourned.