Sitting of 22 May 1845

MINUTES.
Took the Oaths.—The Bishop of Ely.
BILLS. Public.—2a. Charitable Trusts.
Private. — 2°. Hemel Hempstead Small Tenements; Gildart's (or Sherwen's) Estate; Ellison's Estate.
Reported.—Boddam Harbour; Clifton Bridge; Huddersfield Waterworks; Stoke-upon-Trent Market.
3a. and passed—Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company; Edinburgh Life Assurance Company; Middlesex County Rates; Plymouth and Stonehouse Gas; Devonport Gas.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By the Archbishop of Canterbury, Bishops of Gloucester, and Cashel, and by Earls of Eldon, Devon, and Fitzwilliam, from Ewell, and several other places, against Increase of Grant to Maynooth College.—From Stromness, and Loth, against Railway Trains running on the Sabbath.—By Bishop of Winchester, Marquess of Lansdowne, Earl of Devon, and Lords Ashburton, and Brougham, from several Charitable Institutions of the City of London, and others, against the Charitable Trusts Bill, and praying for Exemption.—From Frome Selwood, in favour of Sanatory Regulations.—From Exeter, and from Commissioners of the Loughborough Court of Requests, against the Insolvent Debtors Act Amendment Act.—From Bromsgrove and several other places, for Repeal of the 57th Clause of Insolvent Debtors Act Amendment Act, and in favour of the Establishment
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of Local Courts.—By Earl Fitzwilliam, from Baptists of Welshpool, and from several other places, for the Suppression of Intemperance.—By Marquess of Lansdowne, from Lancaster, Chester, and Launceston, in favour of Increase of Grant to Maynooth College.—From Sutherland, and Caithness, for Improving the Condition of School masters (Scotland).—From Freemen of Nottingham, against the Nottingham Inclosure Bill.—From General Assembly of Newfoundland, for Alteration of Post Office Regulations in that Colony.

THE NORTH AMERICAN MAIL STEAM PACKETS.
Lord Broughampresented a memorial from the General Assembly of Newfoundland, signed by the Speaker, praying that the Royal Mail Steam Packets should, on their way to Halifax, touch at St. John's. By the present arrangement, the mail-bags were taken to Halifax, and then sent back to St. John's, thus losing the time consumed in sending the Newfoundland mails unnecessarily a distance of 1,000 miles, it being about 500 miles to Halifax from St. John's.
Lord Stanleycould not complain of the course which the noble and learned Lord had taken, in stating the substance of the petition, nor did he at all question the very great importance of the subject to which it adverted. It would, however, have been more convenient to their Lordships, and more satisfactory to the petitioners, if the noble and learned Lord had informed him that he was about to present the petitition, and thus have enabled him to ascertain the facts of the case, and to make such a statement as might be satisfactory to the House and to the petitioners. [Lord Brougham: Let it stand over then.] Oh, no; I am not anxious to give my noble and learned Friend the opportunity of making another speech. The noble Lord then stated that he wished their Lordships to bear in mind that it was impossible to make Post Office arrangements for the advantage of one Colony alone, without considering the wants and consulting the benefit of the other Colonies. Besides, the harbour of St. John was only open during certain portions of the year, whereas that of Halifax was open the whole year round. He was aware that frequent official correspondence had taken place on this subject, and that the attention of the Government had been anxiously directed to ascertaining the best mode for the safe and speedy transmission of the mails passing to and from the Colonies.
Lord Brougham: I think that my noble Friend, was exceedingly premature with his

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pleasantry, and to tell the truth, I never heard a piece of pleasantry which had less foundation in fact. Indeed, it is not the nature of pleasantry to be always founded on fact; and it is often the more entertaining and lively from its not being so founded—which latter was the case in the present instance, without its being either entertaining or lively. There was no fact and very little joke in what the noble Lord said; but that is his misfortune, and not his fault. As to the harbour of St. John's being closed during certain portions of the year, that would not preclude an arrangement being made whereby the mails would be sent direct to that harbour when it was accessible. The objection is—at least one objection—that the harbour is not open during the whole year. But the mails are now sent to Halifax, and then a portion of them sent back to St. John's, and I cannot see how the harbour can be more open for the admission of mails, after they have been sent to Halifax, and thus, before they reach St. John's, made to travel an additional 1,000 miles, by being sent the roundabout instead of the direct way. But it may be said, that during a great part of the year the mails are sent overland to Newfoundland from Halifax—a statement only partially true, and one which it is impossible can be wholly true, inasmuch as it cannot be sent all the way by land, from the intervention of the sea. I trust your Lordships will not lose sight of the prayer of this petition.

GREECE.
Lord Beaumontrose, in compliance with the Notice which he had given on Tuesday last, to move for the production of Papers and correspondence relating to recent events in the kingdom of Greece. He thought that their Lordships would require no apology from him for bringing this subject before them. Nor did he anticipate that they would consider him either premature or unreasonable, if while he asked for further information on the subject, he should endeavour to obtain from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs an assurance that he had taken such steps as would tend to prevent the present alarming state of affairs in Greece, assuming a still more serious character. Not only had all the expectations which had been raised by the Greek people, during the time of the Revolution, as it had been called, or rather during the changes which
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had taken place in the former Government of that country, in September, 1843, been blasted; but from that period scenes had taken place in the internal arrangements of Greece, in its elections, in connexion with all the liberties which the Greek people had acquired by their Constitution, which, he was sorry to say, had verified the fears of those persons who then stated that that people were not sufficiently advanced in the knowledge of self-government to enjoy, without danger to their neighbours, if not to themselves, those constitutional rights which they then acquired. Not only had Athens become the scene of the deepest and strangest intrigues—not only had all questions of a purely Greek character been forgotten and altogether overlooked in party quarrels, but even beyond the internal affairs of Greece, beyond the frontiers, had that country already shown a total disrespect, not only for treaties, but for the common laws of nations—for the common practice of international friendship; and set at defiance the common laws of humanity, by establishing on the frontiers of Turkey an absolute system of brigandage. If the information recently received from Greece was correct, if the news which had arrived within the last few days, and had been publicly stated in the papers, was true, Greece had already, on the frontiers of Turkey, assumed an attitude which was well calculated to excite alarm, and which appeared to call for some decided course of action on the part of the guaranteeing powers. He would, before he sat down, quote passages from the despatches of the noble Earl opposite (Lord Aberdeen), which left him (Lord Aberdeen) no choice with regard to this question. He would quote passages which showed that the noble Earl was pledged as to what he would do under such circumstances as now existed in Greece, and passages which bound the noble Earl no longer to remain inactive, but to step forward, and, in his own words, to take "strong and peremptory measures" for the purpose of putting an end to the present state of things on the Greek frontier of Turkey; to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire against the marauders of Greece; and also to protect it from that spirit of propagandism which was now being so rapidly spared throughout its provinces. The Government of Greece was now in the

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hands of a person totally incapable of performing the duties appertaining to the position which he held, and who, from his former career in life, the country and Europe at large might well have supposed would have been the very last person selected for the performance of the important duties devolving upon the chief Minister of the State. He did not think it necessary to enter, at that time, into the minute and disgusting intrigues by which such a deplorable state of things was effected; yet he must still remind their Lordships how parties did at present stand in Greece. What were these parties, and what their object and their character? There were at present three great parties in Greece, widely distinguished from each other even by their respective denominations; and the hopes expressed in September, 1843, that these parties would, if not immediately, at least speedily, coalesce into one for the good of Greece, had totally failed, and intrigues, instead, were still continuing, and as much in force now as they were three years ago. The three great parties which at present divided the Greek kingdom between them were commonly called, as their Lordships were well aware, the English, the Russian, and the French parties. Each of these was supposed to have at its head one of the Greek leaders; and thus these leaders were supposed to represent the three different interests adverted to. It was well known that Mavrocordato was supposed to be at the head of the English party. From his previous habits, and from his education at and residence in Constantinople, he, perhaps, had, of all the others, the greatest knowledge of European policy; and he might say, that if any individual could have been selected in Greece to direct the affairs of that country, in whom Europe could repose its confidence, Mavrocordato was the man. But the party which he was supposed to represent was anything but in the ascendant at present in Greece. Not only had he no voice in the guidance of affairs at present, but the election of Mavrocordato had actually been four different times set aside; and he (Lord Beaumont) believed that he had not yet succeeded in obtaining a seat in Congress. The second party to which he alluded was the Russian party. That party was well known and familiar to their Lordships as the Nappist party, and was sup-
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posed to be represented by Metaxa. This party was noted for the depth and persevering character of its intrigues, as well as for the pliability and address with which it adapted itself and made court to every discontented body that rose in the State. It had allied itself with the Phil-orthodox Society, who sought to sever the Church of Greece from the Church of Constantinople, by declaring its independent of the Patriarch; and thus enabling the friends of Russian ambition to propose a union of the Greek and Russian Churches, which would have secured to the Emperor an unlimited influence in Greece. Metaxa, the man who was the supposed head of the Russian party at this moment, had been constantly changing from side to side, being now with the English, and now acting with the Russian party; which gave to his conduct an appearance of inconsistency which could only be explained by the ultimate but secret objects of his party. The third party in Greece was the French party; but why it was designated the French party, he was utterly at a loss to understand; because, certainly, the policy which it seemed to adopt could be no more for the interests of France than for those of England; being, in his opinion, equally inimical to both. But that party had, somehow or other, obtained great favour in the eyes of France, and also in the eyes of all those who were anxious for the disturbance of the East—who were anxious to sow the seeds of difficulty there, so that in the confusion which might ensue, they might have the opportunity of carving out and obtaining for themselves a portion of the advantages which an unscrupulous aggression might secure to them. At the head of this party was Coletti. This man was long known as the head of the Palikars. The Palikars were originally the militia of Turkey. A portion of them were regulars, and kept in strict discipline; but the rest had long sunk to the condition of brigands. It was as the representative of the latter portion of the Palikars that Coletti had always been known in Greece. Without going far back into the recent events in Greece—to the time when the Three Powers offered their intervention, or subsequently, when by Treaty they acknowledged the independence of Greece, or again, when by conference, still later, they extended the limits of that kingdom—without going

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back to these events at present, he would merely allude to the Papers which were in their Lordships' House, and which were placed on their Lordships' Table subsequently to the revolution of September, 1843, already alluded to. Their Lordships were aware that, in 1841, the Government of this country, and also M. Guizot, were of opinion that as yet a complete constitutional Government should not be given to Greece. The Russian party, however, did not give in its adherence to that opinion; and it was then that Metaxa, who formerly entertained very different sentiments, coalesced with the ultra-Liberal party, and arranged with that party to upset, by a coup d'etat, the then existing state of affairs, and to substitute a constitution in the place of the form of government which then obtained in Greece. It was well known that they met before the palace of the King; it was well known that they were successful. Kalergis was the leader of this movement; but Kalergis was also the first to restrain the violence of the successful party, and interfered between the King and the people when the latter sought the expulsion of the former, and the former hesitated to acknowledge the constitution proclaimed by the latter. Metaxa was a party to this movement, and Catakasy, the Russian Minister, was supposed to be both cognizant and approving of it. The Russian Government subsequently disavowed the connivance of its agents; but it is acknowledged that Metaxa and the Nappists were the chief supporters of Kalergis and the movement party. These events were now well known both here and on the Continent; and it was also well known that, at the advice of England and France, the King, after refusing, acceded to their proposals, adopted the constitution proposed by them; and from that period it was hoped that the three contending parties, by coalescing to support the new state of things, would put an end to the pitiful intrigues which had theretofore existed. Such a consummation, however, was not, it seemed, to be achieved. Intrigues still followed; but before he alluded to these, their Lordships would allow him to remind the noble Earl of some passages to be found in the Papers at that time laid on the Table of the House, and in which were the passages to which he alluded, when he said that the noble Earl had no choice left as to the conduct which
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he was bound to pursue in view of the present state of affairs in Greece. In a letter (No. 5, from Lord Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons), dated October 25, occurred this passage. The noble Lord here read the passage, which was to the effect, that it might be necessary for the three guaranteeing Powers to exert themselves to moderate the projects of the Greek parties, since, however temperate and cautious they might hitherto have been, exaggerated propositions might be brought forward at the next meeting of the National Assembly. The despatch then proceeded in these words:—
"Any indication, should such appear, of an intention to interfere in the affairs of the Turkish Empire, and to introduce political changes in the condition of any of its provinces, would at once be firmly and peremptorily repressed."
In another despatch he found the following:—
"Any extension of the franchise to subjects of the Porte, would afford just cause of umbrage to the Turkish Government, and would lead to the most serious consequences. It may not be superfluous at the present moment, when excited feelings prevail to add a warning against any interference in the affairs of neighbouring States. Her Majesty's Government would not view with indifference, or indeed tolerate, any attempts to produce disaffection and create disorder in the provinces of the Turkish Empire."
At the same period Sir Stratford Canning wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen, and stated that Reschid Pacha had called on him, and had spoken of the affairs of Greece, stating that precautions had been taken on the part of the Turkish Government, and which appeared to Sir S. Canning to be extremely moderate. Sir S. Canning further stated, that the Turkish Minister had told him that the Council had determined to abide by the precautionary measures already adopted, and that they would watch the course of events, and rely, in the meanwhile, upon the three guaranteeing Powers. In reply, the noble Earl stated that he was perfectly satisfied with the part taken by the Turkish Government as regarded the events then passing in Greece; and further, that the Porte might rest assured that the Allied Powers would not tolerate any projects of encroachment or ambition on the part of the Greek State. The noble Earl was well aware that the whole tenor of the correspondence just referred to tended to

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one end, an assurance to Turkey that its interests would be respected; and also to Greece that any attempt on its part to interfere with Turkey, or to make any attack on the frontier of the Empire, would be immediately repressed. Having stated thus far, he would now proceed briefly to lay before their Lordships what he believed were the events which had recently transpired on the frontier. The present Greek Government had, in the first place, allowed to be issued pamphlets, proclamations, and written documents, proposing an extension of the Greek frontier, and also appealing to those Greeks who inhabited the Turkish Empire, and who were members of the Empire, to join them in their intention of aggrandizing the State of Greece, and to raise even an insurrection in Turkey. They had debated in the National Assembly of Greece the propriety of extending the franchise to Greeks who did not reside in Greece, and even in that assembly too, if his information were correct, had they openly spoken of the extension of their present frontier. Greece was not in the same position as other independent States: her frontiers were fixed by the Three high Powers of Europe, and guaranteed against all invasion by them. He did not question the right of the Senate to make what alterations they liked in the internal government of the country—nor did he deny them the privilege of seeking commercial advantages in their relations with neighbouring States; but he maintained that they could not avow an aggressive policy without forfeiting the protection of the guaranteeing Powers. The Greek villages and districts bordering on the Ottoman territories were inhabited by a race of robbers; and yet amongst these very borderers they allowed bodies to be organized, whose sole occupation seemed to be the pillage of their more peaceful neighbours. These bands were authorized by the Government itself, and designated by them as part of the forces of the State. They had, moreover, placed this army—if an army it might be called—upon the frontiers of Turkey. Some time since, one of the officers of this army made an invasion of the Turkish territory. The Porte then complained of what had taken place. A mock trial took place at Athens, and this man was acquitted. Since that time he had been appointed to the command of the army on the frontier, and another
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officer under his command had, since that appointment, passed the Turkish frontier. An encounter took place, in which blood was shed. Luckily the Turkish forces seized on those who made this wanton incursion, and, he believed, had punished some of the ringleaders. Such was at present the state of affairs on the frontier. Throughout the whole of Turkey, there were at this moment societies existing for supporting this wild scheme of the Greeks, for the extension of their territory; and the Reis Effendi was constantly complaining to the ambassadors of the Three Powers with regard to the manner in which the pamphlets and other documents to which he had alluded were circulated. Now then he had come to this conclusion, that, the state of affairs alluded to by the noble Earl had actually arrived, and that the noble Earl had now no choiee left, but must act up to his promises to Turkey, and up to his threats to Greece. He (Lord Beaumont) must, before concluding, qualify to some degree a remark which fell from him at the commencement of the statement which he had just made. He had spoken of Greece as not being yet fit for a constitutional Government. He believed that very few countries when they first acquired such government were fit for it; for it was necessary that they should possess it for a short time before they became properly accustomed to its privileges. So far from regretting the events of September in Greece, he was rather glad that they had taken place; but, considering Greece as merely the creation of the Three Allied Powers, they should take care how that constitutional Government was proceeded with in Greece; and take care also that nothing should arise in the early period of its existence which might eventually lead to its destruction, or cause it to become dangerous to surrounding countries. He did not call for any interference in the internal affairs of Greece. He called upon the Government merely to prevent Greece from doing that which might embroil the whole world—from doing that which they would prevent Turkey from doing, should it attempt it—to prevent it, in short, from doing a great injustice to a neighbouring Power. Greece had nothing to fear from foreign invasion on the part of Turkey, and consequently the idea of collecting an army on the frontier of Turkey was an absurdity in itself. A good system of

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police was necessary for Greece; but no army was necessary, since its Turkish frontier had the guarantee for its preservation of the Three Powers. What had Turkey done under recent aggravating circumstances? The Ottoman Government had behaved better in this instance than most European Powers would have done. With a great degree of patience they had borne long and long the attacks made upon them from Athens, and had, in good faith with their Foreign Allies, joined in council with them, listened to their advice, and complied with that advice. They had trusted implicitly to the Foreign Powers; and now if these Powers—which had assured them that their Greek subjects would not be interfered with—deserted them, such desertion would be a monstrous breach of all national faith, a monstrous and cruel injustice inflicted upon Turkey—an injustice which must, sooner or later, bring its punishment along with it. He did not come forward for the purpose of criticising the domestic Government of Greece: he might regret the total abandonment of all principle of justice and wisdom displayed by the present Ministry: he might condemn the means taken to put aside the elections of its opponents as unconstitutional: he might consider the disbanding the regular troops, and substituting in their place the Palikars, as a system of anarchy; but he did not call for any explanations on these grounds. He carefully confined himself to those acts of the Government which affected the foreign relations of the country, and which, therefore, came within the direct province and office of the Allied Powers. It was their duty to maintain peace between the two countries; and the recent proceedings threatened that peace. Having thus stated the extent to which be hoped an explanation by the noble Earl would be given, he would now proceed to move—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for Copy of Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the English Legations at Athens and Constantinople, relating to recent Events in Greece."
The Earl of Aberdeensaid: From the Notice given by the noble Lord of his intention to move for Papers relating to recent events in Greece, it was not very easy for me to know what was the precise object he had in view, or indeed to form any correct opinion of what events he referred to. From the speech of the noble
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Lord, I imagine that he refers to certain incursions on the Turkish frontiers committed by Greek "troops," as he calls them. I beg to assure the noble Lord that in so designating them he is in error, and that he has been misinformed. As far as I have been able to learn, in the month of March last, a band of robbers—of two or three dozen robbers—did pass the Turkish frontier, killed two unhappy people, and robbed a house. This is the invasion which the noble Lord calls on the Three Powers to unite in repressing. I have not the least doubt that those excesses are as much lamented at Athens as they can be at Constantinople. The Greek Government had nothing to do with the lawless acts of the banditti which are too often to be met with in the provinces of that country. The army which the noble Lord states to have been sent to the frontiers has no existence except in his own imagination. The Greek Government has sent no army to the frontier. It is true that the Turkish Government, being provoked by incendiary proclamations and intrigues, have advanced a force to their frontier; and, although I think the measure one of questionable wisdom, I cannot find fault with the Turkish Government for taking measures which they thought necessary for their own protection. But the Greek Government possesses no means of preventing the proclamations to which the noble Lord has referred. Greece has a free press; and the Greek newspapers publish the matters alluded to by the noble Lord, quite independently of their Government; the Turkish Government wishes to prevent the circulation of those publications, but the Greek Government cannot prevent their publication: so much for the invasion of the Turkish territories. The noble Lord has described the state of the Government and Administration of Greece; and he has pretty candidly confessed that his Motion has been made, not for the object of acquiring any information which the Papers he has moved for would furnish, but for the purpose of a due compliance with the Orders of the House. There is no information, except with respect to the insignificant affair I have referred to, which is in the possession of the Government. There is a short account of that; but I should be unwilling to bring before the House the details of a mere act of robbery, unconnected with the Government of Greece. The noble Lord has described at some length the various parties into which Greece is

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divided; and the noble Lord is perfectly free to make any comment which he may think proper; but he can hardly expect me to follow him in a criticism upon the internal government of that or any other country. My business is, as far as I am able, to preserve the relations of friendly intercourse between Her Majesty and the Government of that country. If it be true that King Otho has chosen a very bad Minister, that is his misfortune, and the misfortune of the country; but how we were to interfere in order to prevent it is not very apparent. Perhaps the noble Lord may think that this is a misfortune which has befallen, and may befall, other countries as well as Greece. I do not know how he can expect that we should advise His Hellenic Majesty as to the choice of his Ministry. With respect to the three parties in Greece, to which the noble Lord has referred, I have always regarded it as the greatest misfortune that could befall Greece; but when he says that the English party is at the very lowest abyss of degradation, I am of opinion that the noble Lord is much mistaken—the gentleman he refers to was never otherwise than friendly to this country. The friendship of Greece towards this country not only exists now, but has always existed, quite as much as this country has a right to expect that it should exist. What is it we ought really to desire to see in Greece? What is it upon which English influence there really depends? It is upon the wealth, upon the integrity, upon the enterprise of our merchants, and upon our commercial dealings with that country. That is the real source of our influence, and that is all the influence which it is necessary for this country to possess. Whether the internal administration of Greece might not be better ordered is not for us to inquire; but the noble Lord may be assured that the rights of British subjects will always be protected and attended to, be the Minister who he may, either Colletti or any one else. I assure him also that there is no intention whatever on the part of the Three Powers to tolerate any act of aggression on the part of the Greek Government against the Turkish Empire. But are the Three Powers to be called upon to interfere, because a band of robbers had put to death one or two persons in a village, robbed a house, and then returned to their own country for safety—persons quite unconnected with the Greek Government? The noble Lord can hardly be serious when he
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applies to such a state of things the declaration I refer to. I hope the force which the Turkish Government has sent to the frontiers will act with the prudence and forbearance for which the noble Lord gives them so much credit; and as, at present, no force is opposed to them, their advance is directed entirely against pamphlets and newspapers. Whether the measure will protect the Turkish provinces from the intrigues excited by those publications, I know not; but this is quite independent of any hostile aggression on the part of the Greek Government. I abstain from giving any opinion upon the other points mentioned by the noble Lord; and I will only add, that whatever party be in power, the rights and privileges of British subjects will be properly maintained; and, as far as any hostile aggression on the part of the Greek Government upon the Turkish provinces is concerned, it has been confined to the affair of which I have given the details. There are no Papers I am aware of which can answer the object of the noble Lord, and I must decline to hunt out any that may meet his views. The only subject is the incursion of two or three dozen robbers, which is not, in my opinion, worthy of your Lordships' consideration.
Lord Beaumonthad never doubted that the interests of British subjects would be attended to. His wish was to know what course the Government might think proper to adopt in a case of the aggravated nature which this had been represented to him to be. If the information which he had received was true, there was a body of men equivalent to an army, in respect to the harm it might do, although not in respect to discipline. There was an undisciplined body of Palicars on the frontiers of Greece. If the noble Lord refused the Papers, he could not press the Motion, and should consequently ask leave to withdraw it.
Motion withdrawn.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS BILL.
The Lord Chancellor: I rise, my Lords, for the purpose of moving the Second Reading of the Charitable Trusts Bill, and I shall state to your Lordships, very shortly, what is the nature of this measure, what the object it is intended to accomplish. My only purpose at present is, to make this measure distinctly understood by your Lordships and the public. Your Lordships, no doubt, recollect that in the year 1818, originating in a Motion made by my noble and

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learned Friend (Lord Brougham) in the other House of Parliament, a Commission was appointed for the purpose of inquiring into Charitable Trusts in England and Wales. That Commission was, from time to time, renewed, under the authority of successive Acts of Parliament, until the year 1837. It is due to the gentlemen who were members of that Commission to state—and I am sure I shall be confirmed in the remark by everybody who is able to appreciate their labours—that they discharged their trust with the utmost diligence, zeal, and ability; they have published thirty-seven volumes of Reports, containing a most valuable digest of information relating to all the charities in the kingdom. They had no power to reform abuses, their function was only to inquire; but the mere publication of their Reports has tended to correct abuses in a great variety of instances, and has, I am sure, in many other instances prevented abuses of a similar description. It was always imagined that these Reports would be followed by some legislative measure; and your Lordships will no doubt be aware that in the year 1835, before the last Commission was issued, a Committee of the other House of Parliament, consisting of the most distinguished Members of that House—of whom my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General was one — was appointed for the purpose of considering the propriety of legislating upon the measure, and upon the subjects that had been already presented to them by the former Reports. A Report was made, and it was always expected that that would be followed up by some measure for the purpose of correcting these abuses in future, and for the purpose of providing a more vigilant inspection of the establishments of charities of this description than had hitherto existed. I believe that some attempts at legislation were made, but they were attended with no practical result; and I have felt it my duty as one of Her Majesty's Government, in connexion with the other Ministers, to bring forward a Bill for the purpose of supplying that defect. I submit this measure to your Lordships' consideration, and I will state to you very shortly the grounds upon which it rests. Your Lordships are aware that the only tribunal in this country that has cognizance of breaches of trust and other matters connected with charities is the Court of Chancery. I am ready to admit, from the experience which I have had in
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that Court, that there is no tribunal better calculated to do complete justice in cases of charities than the Court to which I have referred. A series of successive decisions by men of great eminence has established a system — perfect, as it appears to me—for the purpose of doing justice in cases to which the machinery of the Court is applicable. Wherever, therefore, there is an endowment of any great extent, dealing with a sum of any magnitude, no tribunal can be better constituted for the purpose to which I have referred than the Court of Chancery; but, my Lords, unfortunately, from the constitution of the Court—from the nature of the tribunal, it is inapplicable to small charities. To go into the Court of Chancery in the case of a charity of 20 l. a year, would be a practical absurdity. Everybody knows that the mere entry into that Court, the delivery of briefs to counsel, and the proceedings long before the decree or final order, would in all probability, with respect to a charity of that amount, entirely absorb and destroy the fund. A very eminent individual, Sir Samuel Romilly, attempted in some degree to lessen the expense. I think it was in the year 1812 that he introduced his Bill, the object of which is declared in the preamble to be, to give a more summary jurisdiction in cases of breaches of charitable trusts. He provided that instead of proceeding by information in the cases to which the Bill applied, the party might proceed by petition presented to the Chancellor, and the Chancellor might summarily decide the matter upon affidavit. The word "summarily" must not be taken in its ordinary sense; but must be construed according to the glossary of the Court of Chancery, because I can inform your Lordships what the course of proceeding is under the Bill. I admit that, by this Act, great improvement was made, diminishing greatly the expense in the cases to which it is applicable. A petition is presented to the Lord Chancellor; it is served on the opposite party, whose conduct is called in question, it comes on on the appointed day, there is an array of two or three counsel on one side, and two or three counsel on the other. It is argued, perhaps, one, two, three, and four successive days. Questions arise which have to be referred to the Master; it goes into the Master's Office, litigation there continues, the Master makes his report, the report is returned to the Chancellor; exceptions, perhaps, or objections are

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made to the report; possibly the report is confirmed, possibly it is referred back to the Master; and after all, when the final order of the Chancellor is made, it is subject to appeal to your Lordships' House. It is clear, therefore, that although the Bill is advantageous and beneficial to the suitors in cases practically within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, it does not apply to cases such as those which I have described—viz., the infinite number of small charities which exist in the country. I cannot better, perhaps, impress this upon your Lordships' minds than by referring to a few instances. I take them as they happen the Reports of the Commissioners are full of cases of this kind of defective jurisdiction—of cases in which no judicial control can be exercised over the charities, on account of the smallness of the amount and the expense of proceeding in the Court of Chancery. I state one instance, because it is a very common instance—the case of the charity at Battle, in Sussex, mentioned in the appendix to the valuable publication by Mr. Hine, so many years the Secretary of the Commission. It was a part of a house worth 48 l. a year conveyed to trustees for charitable purposes. The trustees thought it would be desirable to sell the house, and invest the proceeds in the public funds. It was impossible to do this without an application to the Court of Chancery. That application was made. A bill was filed. It would be referred to the Master of course, as a matter of form, to ascertain whether the sale would be beneficial to the charity. The Master reported in favour of it, the sale took place, the money was invested in the public funds. Mark what was the cost of the proceeding as stated by the Commissioners. The taxed costs paid out of the charity were upwards of 300 l., six years' income of the charity, merely for the purpose of effecting a trifling arrangement of that sort. I will give your Lordships another instance stated also by the Commissioners, because, as I have before stated, the instances are innumerable. There is the charity at Lawford, in Essex. A small estate was given for charitable purposes; a lease was made of the estate of 60 l. a year; some parties questioned the propriety of that—they thought the rent reserved was not sufficient. An information, therefore, was filed, for the purpose of setting aside the lease, and proceedings went on in the Court of Chancery for a considerable period of time. At length
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both parties became tired of litigation; the result was, the information was abandoned by consent, on the condition that the relators preferring the information should pay their own costs, which was agreed to. What were the costs of the other side? The costs of the trustees and treasurer and churchwardens, directed to be paid out of the funds of a charity of 60 l. year—the costs of these proceedings amounted to 650 l. Your Lordships will see that it is impossible to carry on this description of proceeding, whether amicable or litigated, where the income of the charity is of small amount. It is entirely annihilated in the contest, or so reduced in amount as to render it absolutely necessary to devise some other means for administering a remedy. What is the effect of this? The consequence is, as the Commissioners over and over again say, the charities are actually lost. Parties will not go into Chancery to do that which is one of the securities for the continuance of the charity. The estate is given to trustees. Then there is no power in the instrument to renew the trust, or it might be renewed under certain circumstances. If there is no power to renew the trust, there is an end of it, unless you apply to the Court of Chancery. If there is a power to renew the trust, it constantly happens that through negligence the power is not exercised. What is the result? The estate ultimately vests in the surviving trustee, it goes by descent to his heir, and the trust is continued for some time. At last some party refuses to apply the money. When that takes place, there is no means of obtaining redress. The parties interested cannot apply to the Court of Chancery, because the expense would be more than could be borne. The result is that in hundreds of cases the charities are entirely lost. It is the same with respect to personal property where it is vested in the funds for charitable purposes in the name of certain trustees. The trust is not renewed, there may be no power to renew it; the same circumstance takes place, it goes to the surviving trustee, to his personal representative; the money is misapplied, there is no account of it, there is no practical tribunal that can afford redress, I will mention one instance of a rent charge—a common mode of giving charity. As far back as the year 1641, six almshouses, at Ashby, in Lincolnshire, were given for charitable purposes, to be supported by a rent charge of 30 l. a year. Trustees were appointed in 1641,

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and afterwards renewed in the year 1699. This is the statement of the Commissioners. After that, the trust was never renewed. The trustees all died, and there was an end of the trust. What happened? The landowner paid from time to time the rent charge to the vicar, in order that the vicar might distribute the funds according to the will of the founder of the charity. At last he was told, "You cannot do that safely, because no person can give you a sufficient discharge. I advise you not to pay this money any longer." What took place? In the year 1817, he discontinued the payment. After several years an information was filed against him, the object of which was to make him account for the arrears, and also for the appointment of trustees; and what was the result? The arrears were 370 l.; he had to pay them up. What was the order of the Court? You must first pay the relators the costs out of the fund, and then you must pay the costs of the landowner, and the surplus you will pay over to the new trustees, for the benefit of the charity. The costs of the relators were 290 l.; the costs of the landowner were 110 l.; making in the entire a sum exceeding 400 l., which, being 15 l. more than the sum to be paid up, left a minus quantity to be applied for the benefit of a charity. I mention these cases because they are authenticated, and, therefore, carry with them a greater impression and effect than any general statement which I could make, to satisfy your Lordships as to the actual state of things. Although I admit that the Court of Chancery is admirably well constituted for the administration of justice in cases to which it is practically applicable, yet it must be confessed that it cannot be practically applied with the hope of beneficial results to charities of this description. It may be supposed by some persons that charities of this kind are not of any great amount or of any extent. That impression, however, is a very mistaken one. The individual amount may be very small, but the aggregate amount is very considerable. Your Lordships who have not attended to this subject are not, perhaps, aware that, according to the Report of the Commissioners who were appointed to make inquiry into the matter, there are upwards of 13,000 charities of less than 5l. a year rental. There are 18,000 charities of which the rental does not exceed 10 l. a year each. To these cases, then, it is obvious that the Court of Chancery is totally inapplicable for all beneficial purposes. There are
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21,000 charities which do not exceed in revenue 20 l. a year, to which the Court of Chancery is also practically inapplicable; indeed, I think I may fairly say, that the Court of Chancery cannot practically administer justice where the annual amount of these charities does not exceed 50 l. There are 25,000 charities of that description. Now, what is the actual state of things in reference to them? There is no judicial control which can be exercised over them, nor is there any practical mode of remedying abuses which may exist in respect to them. If there were a property of this description applicable to ordinary purposes, would you not say it was monstrous that no judicial control could be exercised over it, or that there was no tribunal which could take cognizance of it in case of a violation of trust? But when you consider that here is a description of property which is intended to be applied to benevolent and charitable objects, the argument derives a tenfold force. The impression must, therefore, be strongly fixed upon your Lordships' minds, that there is a great necessity of providing some remedy for these evils. What, then, is the course which I recommend to be adopted by this Bill which is before you? I have referred to the Report of the Committee which had been appointed by the House of Commons for the investigation of this subject. The Report of that Committee recommended the establishment of a tribunal, to be composed of three Commissioners, who would hold their office during good behaviour. I have thought it right to take that advice; I have vested the administration of these charities, under certain limits, in the Commissioners thus designated. I do not think it necessary, upon the second reading of this Bill, to say what I think should be the limits of their jurisdiction: it is quite clear that a limitation up to 20 l. a year will be at all events advantageous. I will go farther, and say that, in my opinion, their jurisdiction should be extended to all charities under the sum of 50 l. a year. We are not, however, called upon now to decide that point. The principle of the Bill is to establish a tribunal that will administer justice in all those small cases to which the Court of Chancery is practically inapplicable. That is the principle of the Bill. There is another consideration involved in the measure. It is not merely that there must be a jurisdiction vested in the tribunal of the character I have just described, but there is another essential point with which we shall have to

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deal in respect to the proper administration of justice in these cases. I am satisfied, my Lords, that nothing but a summary jurisdiction can be properly applicable: unless the jurisdiction be absolutely summary, it is impossible to avoid the evils which we know at present exist. We may, no doubt, lessen these evils, or mitigate them; but they will, nevertheless, still exist unless we adopt this principle. I propose, therefore, to appoint competent persons, on whom we can confidently rely, to discharge those duties which will devolve upon them; that they shall be independent of the Crown, and shall be placed upon the same footing as the Judges of the land. I propose that we shall invest such persons, in these small cases, with a power of deciding summarily upon what they may think right and proper, for the purpose of administering and protecting these charities. The power which I give to them in the first instance, is that of calling to account the trustees, to reform any abuses which may exist in the management of these funds, and to correct any misapplication of them. There is another most important point connected with the question, in respect to the administering part of the duty. I propose to give to them the power of appointing new trustees, the power to direct the sale of charity property when it is necessary, or the exchange of it. I propose that they shall have the power of granting leases, if necessary; and, in fact, to give them all those administrative powers which are now vested in the Court of Chancery. This, my Lords, is the outline of that part of the Bill which relates to small charities. I have now stated what is the principle of the Bill. But if any person can suggest a better mode of securing the due administration of these small charities, by which justice shall be properly administered to the objects of these charities, I shall be most happy to adopt such suggestions, and to abandon my measure. Until, however, I find a better mode of dealing with the evils which are complained of, I must adhere to that which I now suggest, which, as I have before remarked, is founded on the Report of the Committee appointed by the House of Commons. I cannot help thinking that this, after all, is the best system that could be adopted for meeting the evils which have been complained of so long. My Lords, I propose something further than that which I have stated—namely, that the jurisdiction of these Commissioners should not be confined merely to small charities but should also be extended to much
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larger ones. But with respect to this latter point I propose that the powers to be entrusted to these Commissioners shall be of a most limited Kind. I propose to give them the power of calling for an account of the revenues and expenditure of all public charities in the kingdom. I shall not give them any power to correct abuses in respect to these particular charities; but if upon the result of those Returns it be shown that any abuses do exist, I give them a power to have the Attorney General set in motion, and the Court of Chancery will then be called upon to afford redress in the ordinary manner. I am fully satisfied in respect to what I am now proposing, that parties holding public situations as trustees should be compelled to give an account of all monies confided to their care, and of the manner in which they are expended and applied: that, in fact, will afford the best security that can be offered for the proper administration of those funds. Upon this ground, and upon this principle, I venture to make this recommendation. I am very sure that there are no persons holding these public situations, who are not fully impressed with the importance and responsibility of these duties; and, therefore, such persons cannot be affected by the clause to which I now refer. If I were called upon to give an account of monies which I had received for these purposes, and of their application, I should feel that I was bound accurately and readily to do so; for I should then feel that I was relieved from the responsibility that would necessarily attach to me, and I should be also relieved from those insinuations and charges which, in the dark, are thrown out, without perhaps the slightest foundation. Let public transactions where money is concerned be perfectly open; if this be the case, the best security will be given against any abuse of it. I am sure that persons holding such situations cannot do better than to court such inquiry, as privacy in respect to such money is, in my opinion, contrary to that policy which persons ought to adopt who hold such situations. Now this part of the Bill relates to the extended jurisdiction of these Commissioners. There is, however, another part of the Bill which requires some attention from your Lordships. I admit it to be a point which involves party considerations. I allude to municipal charities. Your Lordships may recollect when the Municipal Corporations Bill was passing through your House, much discussion took place in respect to charities—the charities

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of which corporations were trustees, and their officers the administrators. You then adopted this course. The persons who were at that time trustees were permitted to continue in their situations up to a given period, unless in the meantime Parliament thought proper to interfere; and if Parliament did not within this period interfere, then at the termination of it these charities were to be administered under the direction of the Court of Chancery. Parliament did not interfere, and, therefore, at the end of the stated time, application was made to my noble Friend near me, who then presided over the Court of Chancery, to appoint new trustees. My noble Friend did appoint new trustees, as a matter of course, in this way: — he referred the subject to Masters in Chancery, who, having selected the trustees, made their report to the Lord Chancellor, who in almost every instance confirmed those appointments. I think that no better course could be now adopted, were it not for the expense which attended it; but when I give your Lordships instances of what that expense is, you will no doubt say that some more summary jurisdiction is necessary. I will now give you those instances. First, an application was made by the Corporation of Shrewsbury to the Court of Chancery for the appointment of new trustees; those trustees were appointed under the authority which I have stated. The costs of that proceeding were upwards of 540 l., after having been taxed. These costs were paid out of the charity funds for the mere appointment of new trustees. In the case of the Salisbury Corporation application was also made for new trustees, who were appointed in the same manner. The taxed costs of such application amounted to 408 l., which were paid out of the charitable fund. In like manner the Corporation of Exeter applied for the appointment of new trustees, the taxed costs of which application amounted to 600 l. and upwards, which of course also came out of the charity; and if you were to take all these charges arising out of the appointment of new trustees, and add these costs together, the amount would have been enough to establish permanently three or four important and valuable charities. It is necessary also from time to time to renew those trustees. Parties may die, or may remove from the neighbourhood, or might be declared incapable of acting, in any of which cases application must be made to the Lord Chancellor to appoint new trustees. Se-
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veral applications of this kind have been made to me, and several also to my predecessor in office. In Hereford there were six new trustees appointed, the taxed costs attending which amounted to no less a sum than 750 l., which were paid out of the charity funds. In the case of the Warwick charity, in respect to which the new trustees are about being appointed, I have not the least doubt that the taxed costs will considerably exceed that sum. Now, I ask your Lordships whether it is proper that this system shall continue? Why, if two or three respectable men, appointed for such purpose, were to go to the spot and would hear the opinions of the parties themselves on the subject, the appointment might be settled in a few hours, or, at all events, in a day. They could in this way arrange who should be the new trustees, in a manner which I have no doubt would prove much more satisfactory to all parties, than by having recourse to the kind of machinery for the appointment of them to which I have referred. What I propose then in respect to this subject is, that the Commissioners shall be invested with the power of filling up these vacant trusteeships under the Municipal Corporation Act. I know that this feeling is very prevalent; namely, that we wish to have the appointment of these Commissioners who are to be selected by the Crown, that is to say, by the parties who are in office for the time being; that those charities are important in respect to the political influence attached to them, and that in the election for Representatives of boroughs, and other seats in Parliament, they have practically great influence; and the question is asked, will you invest the Ministers for the time being with the power of filling up the vacancies by these Commissioners, who are so far political officers? My Lords, the answer which I make to this complaint is this—in the first instance the Commissioners who are appointed are to hold their offices during good behaviour: they are to take an oath for the due performance of their duties, and they become thereby independent of the Crown. They will hold their offices on the same tenure by which the Judges hold their seats upon the Bench. Every security and guard, therefore, that can be taken, will be taken, to avoid such a charge being substantiated. That is the first answer which I make to this objection. Now by whom are these trustees at present appointed? They are appointed

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in effect and practice by the Masters in Chancery. By whom are the Masters in Chancery appointed? By the Ministers of the Crown. They take the oath for the due performance of their duties, and are precisely placed in the same situation as these Commissioners whom I propose to establish. There is no difference between them in their position or independence except this—that the decisions of the Masters in Chancery may be set aside by the Lord Chancellor, who is one of the Ministers of the Crown. I do not suppose that any person holding the Great Seal will be found to abuse that power of appointment for any political purpose; therefore, these appointments are not likely to make any difference in respect of their political influence. But the fact of there being an appeal from the decision of a Master in Chancery strengthens my argument, because the decisions of these Commissioners will be as independent of the Masters in Chancery as mine are; whereas those of the Masters in Chancery are liable to be set aside and reversed by the judgment of the Lord Chancellor, a Minister of the Crown. But for the purpose of avoiding all suspicion upon this subject, that I or my Colleagues are looking to these appointments as an important object for the extension of our political influence, I propose, after the second reading of the Bill, and before the Committee on the Bill, to name to your Lordships the individuals whom we shall suggest to fill these offices. I will not name them now, for until the Bill has been read a second time I cannot have any communication with them; I will, however, pledge myself to name them a sufficient time before you go into Committee on the Bill, to give full opportunity of approving of them; and then, the appointments cannot well be considered those of the Ministers of the Crown, but such as have been made at the recommendation of Parliament, and therefore Parliamentary appointments. But in cases of future vacancies these appointments must, no doubt, be made by the Government for the time being—that may indeed be considered a very prospective advantage. Whether any future appointments of this description may be settled by the now Ministers, or other individuals, it is not for me to anticipate. By the present proposition regarding the original appointments, I feel that I get rid of the objection as to the supposed influence on the part of the Crown, for we leave the question open to
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Parliament to sanction or reject the individuals I propose to nominate. My Lords, this is the outline of the measure which I propose. There is one consideration, and one only, which now remains for me to state to you, viz., in what manner the funds are to be supplied for the support of this tribunal. There are three modes in which this point may be met. They may either be provided out of the Consolidated Fund, or be raised by a small percentage upon the charities, in the same manner as has been done in the Bill for the appointment of visitors in cases of lunacy; and if this latter mode be adopted, one per cent. would form a fund sufficient for the purpose. Or you may provide a sufficient fund by the union of these two principles. What I recommend is, that a percentage of one per cent. should be raised on the charities—which for the purpose of defraying the expenses of this establishment would, I think, be amply sufficient; but if it should turn out otherwise, I propose that the deficiency should be provided out of the Consolidated Fund; that is my suggestion. This question, however, cannot be settled by this House, because the other House of Parliament alone is competent to make this arrangement. I have thought it my duty to throw out this suggestion, but it must depend altogether on the good will and pleasure of the other House of Parliament to take what course they may think proper. I have thus endeavoured to keep faith with your Lordships in detailing as shortly and as intelligibly as I could the objects of this Bill. The principle of the Bill is this—at present there is practically no judicial control over charities of the description to which I have referred. It is, in my opinion, a scandal that such a state of things should any longer exist. The object of my Bill is to establish another tribunal, constituted in the way I have described, with a power to administer the funds, and to protect the administration of these charities, and to avoid the heavy expenses of the present system, which is altogether inconsistent with the objects of these charities. This is the main foundation and principle of the measure. I have, however, grafted on it the power of making an inquiry; but an inquiry only into the amount and application of the funds of all charities; and, in addition to that, in consequence of the great expense attending the present mode of appointing the trustees of municipal charities, I purpose that these Commissioners shall, in the first instance,

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exercise that power of appointment, and thereby avoid that course which involves an enormous expense on those charities, and a continual expense, by the necessity that exists of renewing the trustees from time to time, which has hitherto caused a very sad misapplication of the funds of the charity. My Lords, I now move that this Bill be read a second time.
Lord Broughamsaid, that every one of their Lordships would agree with him in admitting the very great importance of the subject involved in the Bill of his noble and learned Friend, and in the just eulogy which his noble and learned Friend had paid to the eminent and able persons who had at various times conducted inquiries into this subject, and had published such excellent reports of the results of those inquiries. He (Lord Brougham) had had thirty years' experience of the operation of the system, and he was in a condition to form an opinion as to the value of the inquiries which were conducted with reference to it; and he was able to say that not only was the information which had been given by the various Commissioners extremely valuable in an historical point of view, but the publicity which had been given to the proceedings of charitable trustees had produced the good effect of preventing many abuses, and making trustees in charities, where abuses had formerly existed, turn over a new leaf. He also felt, what every one must feel, in common with his noble and learned Friend, that the Court of Chancery was utterly useless as a remedy, in the case of charities of a small amount, and that the idea of expending 700 l. or 800 l. on a charity which amounted to 10 l. a year was too absurd to be defended. There was, therefore, no doubt as to the propriety of establishing a system which would enable them to avoid such an expenditure; and the amount to which they would limit the operation of the Bill, was a question which might be left for future discussion. The Bill which his noble and learned Friend proposed contained many very important provisions, not only to rectify abuses, but to establish a better administration of the funds of the charities. It provided for the appointment of new trustees where vacancies occurred; but he did not understand it to provide for the appointment of trustees in the case of those charities which at present had no trustees, and with respect to which no opportunity could
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therefore occur of filling up vacancies. He had listened with the greatest satisfaction to the concise and luminous statement of his noble and learned Friend in moving the second reading of the Bill, in which he had clearly shown the necessity which existed for the establishment of a more summary mode of dealing with the appointment of trustees; but, with reference to the appointment of the Commissioners under the Bill, he should remark that the Masters in Chancery, to whom his noble and learned Friend had alluded, were men who held a high office, who were of high station in the Court of Chancery, and upon whose minds it could not be supposed that any political influence could have any effect in the discharge of their duties. They were altogether too high in station and character to encourage any such supposition. It might so happen that the persons who were to be selected to fill the office of Commissioner under this Bill would be also men of the same stamp and importance as the Masters in Chancery: he did not know; but even if it were so, he would remind their Lordships that they could not easily appoint a new Board, and on a sudden clothe it with all the confidence which the public reposed in an ancient and honoured institution. Then his noble and learned Friend had not fully stated his intention with respect to the appointment of Inspectors. He said something about the advantage of making inquiries on the spot; but he had not stated whether those inquiries were to be made by Inspectors or by the Commissioners. That was a portion of the subject which would be worthy of the attention of their Lordships when the Bill was before them at a future stage. There were many questions which were matters of detail, and did not affect the principle of the Bill; and to these matters of detail he did not consider himself pledged by the course which he might feel it his duty to take with respect to the question now before them. As regarded the constitution or mode of appointment and payment of the Commissioners, he had no doubt, speaking generally, that with Commissioners appointed by some mode or another, and paid in some economical way or another, a great improvement might be made upon the existing system, which frequently involved a very large expense, where the amount of the charity yearly was very small; and he would, therefore, vote for the second reading of the Bill, approv-

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ing of the principle, but reserving himself from expressing his approval of the details until it came before the House at a future stage. He would propose that the Bill should be now read a second time, and referred to a Select Committee, who would report on the whole matter, and on whose Report there could be no difficulty in acting.
Lord Cottenhamtrusted there would be no objection to the proposition of his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham), believing, as he did, that it was a subject which ought to be referred to a Select Committee. The evils of the present system were acknowledged, and the mode in which the most efficient remedy for those evils could be obtained was a matter which required the most serious investigation; and, therefore, before they agreed to such a measure as this, he thought they ought to refer it to a Select Committee, who could make such inquiries as would enable them to suggest an adequate remedy for the evils which were at present justly complained of.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, as it appeared to be the opinion of the House that the Bill ought to be referred to a Select Committee, he had not the slightest objection to the adoption of that course.
Lord Cottenhamunderstood that, in voting for the second reading of the Bill, in order that it might be referred to a Select Committee, no Member of that House thereby expressed his opinion as to the provisions of the Bill. As the Bill at present stood, it omitted to provide for one of the greatest evils which were complained of. There were a large number of charities to which trustees had not been appointed since the passing of the Municipal Corporation Act; and in fact it was principally only the large charities to which the trustees had been appointed—charities which had funds sufficient to bear the expenses attending that appointment. The number of small charities which had no trustees were not provided for by the Bill as it at present stood. With respect to the statement of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, that charities in which small sums were involved suffered greatly by the very great expense in the Court of Chancery, as compared with the annual amount of the charity, that was to be regretted; but it did not apply in an especial manner to charities of small amount, as it would apply equally to any other small property
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in the Court of Chancery. He believed that very great advantage would be obtained by referring the Bill to a Select Committee.
Lord Ashburtonhad presented several petitions on this Bill, and he was desirous to be informed if they would be referred to the Select Committee?
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that the petitions would be referred to the Select Committee as a matter of course. Since the Bill had been framed, several alterations had occurred to him. He intended the one per cent. to apply to all the small charities.
Lord Campbellsaid, that there was only one part of the Bill to which he would address himself on that occasion; but it was a part which was very important as regarded the principle. He alluded to the powers which it was proposed to give to the Commissioners with respect to the appointment and removal of trustees under the municipal charities. It was a subject of real importance to the individuals who participated in those charities; but it was looked upon as a matter of great importance by others also. His noble and learned Friend was aware that in all the boroughs in England where these charities existed, there was a constant struggle between contending factions as to who was to have the administration of them; and the appointment and removal of the trustees to such charities was given to the Chancellor, who, although a Minister of the Crown, holding his office during pleasure, was the head of the law in England, a man of high station and great eminence, and one in whom the most perfect confidence could be reposed. Then the Masters in Chancery, who might appoint trustees, were men who held their appointment during life, and who were taken from the highest ranks at the Bar; and he (Lord Campbell) had never heard of any charge or suspicion against any appointment of trustees made by a Master in Chancery or the Lord Chancellor. Experience had shown them that there were great evils to be remedied with respect to the expense of appointing trustees under the present system; but it would not be difficult to remedy that by doing away with the exorbitant fees which were now demanded. Under the new Bill there were to be three Commissioners, who were to appoint those trustees instead of the Lord Chancellor or the Masters in Chan-

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cery; and there was no qualification proposed for those Commissioners. His noble and learned Friend had, during a former Session, proposed a Bill, in which it was required that a Commissioner should be a barrister of considerable standing; but there was no such qualification proposed in this Bill. Then the Commissioners were, by the provisions of the Bill before them, to be appointed by the Secretary of State; but it did not say which of the Secretaries was to make the appointment, whether the Secretary for the Colonies, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, or the Secretary for the Home Department; any of them was competent to make the appointment, "any one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State," and that was perfectly right, for they were co-ordinate. There was, however, no qualification for a Commissioner specified; and according to the Bill before them, any one of the Secretaries of State could appoint any individual whatsoever to the office. That was monstrous. These Commissioners might go down to boroughs, and completely revolutionize them, in regard to these trusts, by sweeping away all the trustees, on the Tory side or the Whig side, as it might happen to suit the political views of the Commissioners. [The Lord Chancellor: There is no such power given them under the Bill.] His noble and learned Friend had not read his own Bill, or he must have forgotten it; for that Bill would give an absolute and uncontrolled power to the Commissioners to remove all the trustees of municipal charities. [The Lord Chancellor: The Bill gives no power of removal; it only gives a power to supply vacancies.] The Bill would give the Commissioners an absolute power of adding to the number of the trustees; and they might by that means swamp the Tory trustees by an indefinite addition of Whigs, or swamp the Whig trustees by an indefinite addition of Tories. His noble and learned Friend had said, that those functionaries were to be sworn; and he seemed to think that they could never be suspected of doing a political job after they had been sworn. Now he (Lord Campbell) would take it for granted, that they would be very honourable men; but would they, he would ask, be above suspicion; and could they have the same authority in public estimation which now belonged to the Lord High Chancellor of England, or to the Masters in Chancery, who were his officers, and who acted un-
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der his superintendence? That part of the Bill he should most strenuously oppose. If he should have the honour to be a Member of the Select Committee, he would move that the clauses in question should be omitted. If he were overruled on that Motion, he would move the omission of the clauses when the Bill was in Committee before the House; and if he were again overruled, he would oppose the Bill on the Third Reading; for although he felt that many of its clauses might be and were salutary, it should meet with his most strenuous opposition if it involved the principle that the trustees of the municipal charities all over England might be removed, or that their number might be indefinitely increased, by Commissioners, such as it was proposed by that measure to appoint.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, he wished to inform his noble and learned Friend that he proposed an alteration in the Bill, which would give the appointment of the Commissioners to the Lord Chancellor, and not to the Secretary of State. He also proposed that two at least of the Commissioners should be members of the legal profession, and gentlemen of high standing at the Bar.
After a few words from Lord Abinger,
Bill read 2a.
House adjourned.