Sitting of 15 July 1845

MINUTES.
BILLS. Public.—1°. Highways; Fees Criminal Courts); Real Property (No. 2); Stamp Duties, etc.
Reported.—Coal Trade (Port of London); Geological Survey; Church Building Acts Amendment; Unclaimed Stock and Dividends; Criminal Jurisdiction of Assistant Barristers (Ireland); Bail in Error; Lunatic Asylums (Ireland).
3°. and passed:—Borough and Watch Rates; Art Unions (No. 2).
Private.—2°. Darby Court (Westminster).
Reported.—Epping Railway (No. 2).
3°. Shrewsbury and Holyhead Road.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Mr. Pringle, from Presbyteries of Selkirk, and Forres, against the Universities (Scotland) Bill.—From Inhabitants of Burnley, for Inquiry into the Anatomy Act.—By Mr. T. Duncombe, from John Miller, late of Clerkenwell, but now of Brighton, against Lunatics' Bill. — By the Lord Advocate, from Alexander Bryce, Senior Magistrate of Canongate, in favour of Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Bill.—By Mr. O. Morgan, from Inhabitants of Aberdare, residing near the Aberdare Iron Works, for exempting Iron Works from Operation of the Smoke Prohibition Bill.—By Mr. Pringle, from Presbytery of Lauder, in favour of Turnpike Roads (Scotland) Bill.
The Honse met at twelve o'clock.

LUNATICS.
House in Committee on the Lunatics Bill.
On Clause 3, relative to the appointment of the Commissioners,
Mr. T. Duncombesaid, that this clause had better be postponed until they had got the returns from the Inspectors in Lunacy of the cost of visiting the several houses, and their state; but this was a part of the plan of keeping the House in the dark.
Lord Ashleysaid, that the only return
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not before the House was that of the amount paid to each Commissioner.
Sir C. Napiersaid, that before he received his half-pay he was obliged to make a declaration; and he did not see why these gentlemen should not be subjected to the same test before they received their salaries.
Mr. Warburtonsaw no use in the declaration.
Lord Ashleysaid, that the treasurer's accounts were a sufficient guarantee of the rectitude of the payments, and for the travelling expenses there was also sufficient evidence.
Mr. T. Duncombesaid, that they ought to have paid Commissioners, responsible to the Government and the country, and not men who were part amateurs, and part professional, and who were responsible to nobody. Before they passed this clause, which made the Commission permanent, they ought to have evidence that the Commissioners had hitherto done their duty. He asserted that they had not. He thought they ought to see if they could not have a better Commission formed than at present existed. He would not press his Motion for the postponement of the clause, but would call upon the Chairman to read the clause at length.
Mr. V. Smithdefended the conduct of the Commissioners generally, and especially with respect to the case of Mr. Percival.
Mr. Christietrusted the noble Lord would not only be induced to reconsider the present clause, but the effect of the Bill altogether. He was sorry that his hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury did not mean to press his Motion for postponing the clause.
Mr. Wakleyfelt convinced that the present Commission would never work well. He objected even to three Commissioners, believing that one Commissioner, who should be responsible to the Home Office for his actions, would do more good than three or even eleven Commissioners, of which the present Commission was composed. He thought that amateur Commissioners could never do that good for the public that one properly paid Commissioner could do. It had been asserted that insanity was a purely mental malady; now he asserted that in nine cases out of ten it arose from disease. There was no case of insanity without structural derangement. He trusted that

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the noble Lord would reconsider the clause with reference to the Commissioners, as he thought it might be framed in a manner that would operate far more beneficially to the public.
Sir C. Napierhoped the noble Lord would reconsider the clause. He considered that an unpaid board was not so good as a paid one.
Lord Ashleydenied that unpaid Commissioners were not so competent to perform their duties as paid ones. For himself, he would say that when he entered the Commission he did so with a determination to do his duty; and he considered himself as responsible for the performance of those duties as if he had been paid a hundred guineas a visit. As to the statement of the hon. Member for Finsbury, that one Commissioner would be sufficient, he asserted, without fear of contradiction, that it would be impossible for one individual to perform such onerous duties.
Mr. Warburtonagreed with the hon. Member for Finsbury, that paid Commissioners were better than unpaid ones; but, at the same time, he thought there should be unpaid gentlemen connected with the Commission, who would represent persons of moderate fortunes who were afflicted with insanity.
Mr. Hawespreferred a mixed board to one constituted of paid or of unpaid Commissioners alone.
Sir J. Grahamwas anxious that the Commissioners named in the clause should be continued in the Commission.
The Chairmanthen proceeded to read the clause, when
Mr. T. Duncombeagain objected to the appointment of any unpaid Commissioners. He could see no advantage in having one of the Commissioners in the House; it would not make the Board more responsible. He wished to see them responsible to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State. He would beg leave to move the omission of the names of the amateur Commissioners. The hon. Member moved to omit all the words mentioning the unpaid Commissioner.
Mr. Vernon Smithdefended the appointment of the unpaid Commissioners. His duties as a Commissioner were so onerous that he was sure that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to induce the same number of gentlemen to supply their place if they were now to resign those offices.
Sir J. Grahamcontended that the appointment of unpaid Commissioners was desirable, because they were generally men without any professional bias—men of the world, and under the control of public opinion.
Sir R. Inglissaid, there would always be found men in this country willing to undertake any sort of duties, however invidious, merely for the sake of the public good. He was sure, therefore, that there would always be a sufficient number of amateurs to undertake the office of Commissioners of Lunacy.
Mr. Duncombehad no idea of degrading any of the Commissoners by calling them amateurs. He was sure that paid Commissioners would be found to discharge their duties better and more fully. The present Board had visited various lunatic asylums about three or four times during the last eighteen months, and then always at an hour when he was sure that everything was prepared for their reception. They ought to go when they were not expected. He would beg to ask how many asylums the noble Lord, or any member of the Board, had visited lately?
Lord Ashleybore testimony to the zeal and activity of the unpaid Commissioners. He himself had, during the last year, taken the chair at the meetings of the Board thirty-four times, and each time the Board had sat no less than four hours.
The Committee divided on the Question, that the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question: — Ayes 45; Noes 6: Majority 39.
Clause again put.
Lord Ashleysaid, the appointments were all made without reference to any other feeling than that of completing the efficiency of the Board.
Mr. Christieprotested against granting retiring pensions to individuals who had held the office of Commissioner, and while in that position had received very large salaries.
Mr. Wakleytook the same view of the case, and contended, that after what the House had done last night, when it had openly declared that under no circumstances should relief be given to the able-bodied poor in Scotland, and that as soon as a poor roan was deprived of employment, he was to support himself how he could, or starve along with his destitute family—after such a vote, to propose now large retiring pensions to men who had

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long held large salaries was preposterous.
Mr. T. Duncombewished to hear from Lord Ashley the age of Dr. Turner, and the period of his service as a Commissioner. He might have been appointed fourteen and a-half years ago, and he was now, in six months, under this new Act, to receive a pension of 750 l. When Dr. Turner first entered upon that office, he had no expectation of receiving any pension at all.
Lord Ashleycould not tell the hon. Member for Finsbury the age of Dr. Turner; he should, at a guess, say he was about sixty-five; but he (Dr. Turner) was very well able to fulfil the duties of his office.
Sir J. Grahamwould take upon himself all the responsibility of having recommended these appointments to the Lord Chancellor.
Mr. Duncombewished to know whether any arrangement had been made between the noble Lord (Lord Ashley) and those parties who had been put in nomination for those offices?
Lord Ashleysaid, that he had entered into no arrangements whatever.
Mr. Duncombedid not object to the payment of 1,500 l. a year to the medical members of the Board; but he was strongly opposed to a similar sum being given annually to the legal members, who would be amply remunerated by a salary of 1,000 l. a year. Police magistrates received a salary of 1,000 l. a year, and had, into the bargain, to submit to a deduction of five per cent. for the purpose of forming a superannuation fund. He would, therefore, move, as an Amendment, "That the medical members of the Board do receive a salary of 1,500 l., and the legal members 1,000 l. a year."
Mr. Hindleythought that 1,000 l. a year would be enough for either class of Commissioners, and he would submit an Amendment to that effect. If the noble Lord would put an advertisement in The Times for a person competent to judge of cases of insanity, and offer 1,000 l. a year, he would have so many applications that he would find it difficult to make the selection.
Lord Ashleysaid, that the sum of 1,500 l. a year was mentioned, that they might be enabled to select the most talented and efficient persons to fill the offices of Commissioners.
Mr. Warburtonsuggested the adoption of a sliding scale of salary according to seniority.
Mr. Wakleydiffered from his hon. Colleague (Mr. Duncombe) as to the propriety of awarding a higher salary to the medical, than to the legal Commissioners. Such an arrangement would, in his opinion, be decidedly unjust. He would recommend that barristers should be appointed after five years standing at the Bar, and not after ten years.
Sir C. Napiercontended that 1,000 l. a year was quite sufficient for the services of the Commissioners, as the Lords of the Admiralty or the Treasury had no more.
Mr. Brothertonwould give his vote for the larger salary, because it would provide men of greater efficiency.
Mr. Duncombemoved, as an Amendment to leave out the words "five hundred," so that the salaries should all be reduced to 1,000 l.
The Committee divided on the Question, that the words "five hundred" stand part of the clause:—Ayes 31; Noes 7: Majority 24.
The Committee again divided on the Question, that the clause stand part of the Bill:—Ayes 31; Noes 10: Majority 21.
Clause agreed to.
The House resumed. Committee to sit again.

SPANISH COLONIAL SUGAR.
Viscount Palmerstonrose to bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice. He said: The subject I am about to bring under the notice of the House is one of much importance both to the honour and the interests of the kingdom. It is of importance to its honour, inasmuch as it relates to the question whether Treaties and engagements entered into by the Crown, have or have not been faithfully fulfilled; and it bears upon the interests of the country, because it raises the question, whether commercial privileges and advantages which were secured to this country by ancient Treaties have or have not been want only rejected, and heedlessly thrown away. The question arises in consequence of the correspondence between the Spanish Minister at this Court and the British Government, copies of which were recently laid on the Table by command of Her Majesty. That correspondence

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relates to a claim made by the Government of Spain, that the sugars of Cuba and Porto Rico, the produce of slave labour, shall be admitted into this country at the same duties which are levied upon the sugars of other countries the produce of free labour, and upon the sugars of Venezuela and of the United States, the produce, like that of Cuba, of slave labour. This claim has been refused by Her Majesty's Government, and upon that refusal I think it necessary to make this Motion, because it is my opinion that the engagements of the Crown have not in this case been fulfilled; and being also of opinion that a great and unnecessary injury has been thereby done to the commercial interests of the country, I feel it my duty to ask the House, if it should concur with me in the views I have taken of this matter, to address the Crown, praying that a different course on this question may be pursued. Now, in order to bring the question in the clearest and most distinct manner under the attention of the House, I will shortly recapitulate the circumstances which have preceded and have led to this correspondence. It is fresh in the memory of everybody whom I have now the honour of addressing, that in 1841 Her Majesty's late Government thought it their duty to propose an alteration in the then existing scale of the Sugar Duties, believing that the change which they proposed to Parliament would tend to increase the Revenue—to give additional development to our commerce — and, by the increased supply, to reduce the price of what has become almost a necessary of life, and, consequently, to add to the comforts of the poorer classes of the people. The party then in opposition deemed that proposal of ours to be a fit occasion on which to make with us a trial of strength. They were confident in their increasing numbers in this House, and they believed that if they could raise a cry throughout the country in support of what they considered to be their majority in Parliament, they might succeed in driving us from power, and in occupying our places. Well, then, in order to raise this cry, they endeavoured to stigmatize our measure as calculated to give an additional encouragement to slavery and the Slave Trade. They said that, by opening a larger door for the admission of sugar produced by slave labour in the Colonies of foreign countries, we should
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raise the price of slave-labour sugar in the general market of the world, and that we should thereby give additional encouragement to the employment of slaves, and consequently to the Slave Trade. They succeeded in their attempt; we were defeated, and ultimately resigned our offices; and those who sat on the other side of the House succeeded to power. But they had not been long in power, before they came to the same conclusion at which we had arrived, namely, that a change in the Sugar Duties was expedient—that it would be for the interests of England to increase the quantity of sugar brought into this country for consumption by the people; and I am quite satisfied that if they had been free agents—if they had been fettered by no pledges either expressed or understood, towards those classes of men whom they had enlisted in their support in the battle they gave us on the Sugar Duties — if they had been embarrassed by no assertions made in debates as to the effect of a change of the Sugar Duties on slavery and the Slave Trade, I am convinced, in my own mind, judging from the very liberal free-trade doctrines which have lately been put forth by Members of the Government, whenever this question and other commercial matters have been discussed in this House—I am persuaded, I say, that if they had been entirely free agents, they would have proposed some measure very similar indeed in principle to that which we failed in recommending for the adoption of Parliament. But they were fettered by engagements—embarrassed by the doctrines they had laid down, and they were, therefore, obliged to tax their ingenuity to discover some measure which should, on the one hand, afford some relief to the consumer, by increasing the supply of foreign sugar; while, on the other hand, it should not too greatly alarm their West India supporters, and should not be too manifestly at variance with the principles they had laid down in objecting to the plan that we had proposed. They bethought themselves of a most notable expedient; they did not produce any measure which even pretended to have the effect of increasing the revenue, which ours would have done; but they proposed a measure which, while it should add a little to the supply of foreign sugar, should not add so much as to give just cause of alarm to the

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West Indian monopolists, or much encouragement to slavery and the Slave Trade. Their plan was to admit at a very low duty foreign sugar the produce of free labour, and to place a very high, and practically a prohibitory, duty on sugar the produce of slave labour; and they seemed to think this measure would accomplish every object which they professed, as a Government, to have in view. They were told that their measure would fail; and that it was founded on erroneous principles — on a total mistake. They were told that it was ridiculous to suppose that if we took, say 40,000 or 50,000 tons of sugar annually out of the general market of the world, where hitherto it had been consumed, we should not raise the price of the sugar which remained in the market, just the same whether the sugar so taken out by us was produced by free labour or by slave labour, and that as the measure thus tended to increase the price of sugar in the general market of the world, it was open to just the same objection—(as far as that objection was good for anything)—which they had made to our measure, namely, that, pro tanto, it would afford encouragement to the additional employment of slave labour. They were told that it would be just as absurd to maintain the contrary, as to assert that by taking out water from one end of a pond, you would not lower the level of the water at the other end of the pond. They were told that their measure was founded on a childish absurdity, and that it could not be practically executed. They were told that slave sugar would be brought into consumption here under the character of free-labour sugar, and that all their regulations and certificates would utterly fail to enforce the distinction which they wished to establish, and to prevent the evasion of their law. But they were told, moreover, that their measure would inevitably break down from another cause, the effects of which could not be avoided. They were warned that there were Foreign Powers which had with this country Treaties of commerce, whereby the subjects of those Powers were entitled, in their commercial dealings with this country, to enjoy all the privileges with respect to goods and duties which we might grant to the most favoured nation; and that if the sugar of any country was to be admitted at a lower rate of duty on account of its being
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produced by free labour, those Treaties would compel us to admit the slave-labour sugar of other countries on a footing equally advantageous. I remember pressing this point upon their consideration generally; and my right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Exchequer more especially brought it under their attention in reference to the Treaty between this country and Denmark. The point, however, was treated very lightly by hon. Gentlemen opposite; and I remember especially that one of them, answered what I had said with arguments and statements which seemed quite satisfactory to him, but which, as far as I could understand them—which I cannot say I was able to do very clearly, did not seem to me at all to meet the case. In spite of all these objections, they passed their measure. What followed? Soon after their measure was passed, the State of Venezuela, having a Treaty with us by which it was entitled to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nation in its trade with this country, demanded that the sugar of Venezuela should be admitted to consumption in this country on the same footing as the sugars of Manilla, Java, and other free-labour countries. The Government took that claim into consideration; they found, on looking into the Treaty, that the claim was irresistible; it was accordingly admitted, and the slave-labour sugar of Venezuela was placed on the same footing of advantage as the free-labour sugars of Java and Manilla. Next came the United States. The United States have a Treaty with us, by which they are entitled, in their commerce with England, to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nation. They claimed similar privileges for the admission of their sugars. That claim was taken into consideration. The Treaties were examined: the claim was found to be unanswerable; and the slave-labour sugars of the United States were admitted into the market of this country on the same footing with the sugars of Venezuela, Java, and Manilla. Here were two great holes made in the system of the Government.
"Look! in this place ran Cassius' dagger through;
See what a rent the envious Casca made."
But at that time the "well-beloved Brutus" had not "dealt his deadly stab;" but the well-beloved Brutus did not long delay his fatal blow; and speedily

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after the concession to the United States, the well-beloved Brutus, in the person of General Narvaez, came with a demand that Spanish Colonial sugar, the slave-grown sugar of Cuba and Porto Rico, should be placed on the same footing, and should have the same advantages conceded to it in this country, as the sugar of the most favoured nations. This demand was made in a note from the Duke of Sotomayor, which cannot, I think, receive any sufficient and satisfactory answer. But some answer it was necessary to give; and as it would have been too ludicrous for the Government to have their whole measure torn to tatters, rag by rag, they determined to find some pretence or other for refusing this claim. Accordingly, not the Foreign Office—for I acquit the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office of having invented the note which was sent in reply: I differ from that noble Lord on most points of foreign policy, but I respect him individually too highly to believe that he could have invented the arguments contained in the note to which he has put his name; and I only regret that the over-easiness of disposition which I find fault with in his transactions with Foreign Powers, should have led him in this case to put his name to arguments which his better judgment must repudiate. Accordingly, I say, from Her Majesty's Government there came an answer rejecting the demand of the Duke de Sotomayor. I think that answer full of fallacies—I will not say palpable fallacies, because, that fallacies should be palpable, the arguments on which they rest should be plain and easy to be understood; whereas I defy any man to comprehend the drift, and scope, and meaning of the arguments in this note, without reading it over and over again three or four times with the utmost intensity of attention. I have myself done so, and having thus arrived at what I consider to be an understanding of the document, I am prepared to state that it is not only full of fallacies, but that it is a curious and remarkable illustration of what has been called by some legerdemain logic, which consists in this—that in the course of an argument one of the parties, arguing skilfully, slips in some new word, some new phrase or expression, nearly, to all outward appearance, resembling that from which the argument started, but which, nevertheless, differs from it in some point essential to
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the right solution of the original question; and, making this exchange while his adversary's attention is engaged by the chain of argument, founds his superstructure on the substituted expression, and comes thereby to a conclusion at which he could not possibly have arrived by means of the premises from which he set out. I shall be able, I think, to convince the House that this is strictly the character of the document of which I am speaking. First, let us look at the note of the Duke of Sotomayor. The Duke of Sotomayor demands that the sugars of Cuba and Porto Rico, though the produce of slave labour, shall be admitted into this country at the same duty as that paid by the sugar of the most favoured nation. He founds that demand on ancient Treaties, formally contracted between the two countries, and especially on the Treaties of 1667 and 1713. The terms of the Treaties to which he thus more particularly alludes, are certainly as strong as well can be; and though it is tedious to the House to hear documents of this kind read, yet I must ask permission to read those portions of the Treaties on which the Duke de Sotomayor founds his demand. It is essential to the case that I should do so. And, first, let me refer to the Treaty of 1667. The Thirty-eighth Article of that Treaty runs thus:—
"It is agreed and concluded, that the people and subjects of the King of Great Britain and of the King of Spain, shall have and enjoy in the respective lands, seas, ports, havens, roads, and territories of the one or the other, and in all places whatsoever, the same privileges, securities, liberties, and immunities, whether they concern their persons or trade, with all the beneficial clauses and circumstances which have been granted, or shall be hereafter granted, by either of the said Kings, to the Most Christian King, the States-General of the United Provinces, the Hanse Towns, or any other Kingdom or State whatsoever, in as full, ample, and beneficial a manner as if the same were particularly mentioned and inserted in his Treaty."
Thus far the Treaty of 1667. Next comes the Treaty of 1713, which the Duke relies upon in making out his claim. There were two Treaties with Spain in 1713, both signed at Utrecht, the first in July, and the second in December; and both of these distinctly sanction, beyond, as it seems to me, a possibility of doubt, the demand made by the Spanish Minister. The Ninth Article of the first of these Treaties is in these terms:—

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"It is further agreed and concluded as a general rule, that all and singular the subjects of each kingdom shall, in all countries and places on both sides, have and enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities as to all duties, impositions, or customs whatsoever, relating to persons, goods, and merchandises, ships, freight, seamen, navigation, and commerce, and shall have the like favour in all things as the subjects of France or any other foreign nation the most favoured have, possess, and enjoy, or at any time hereafter may have, possess, or enjoy."
By the Treaty of December following, the Treaty of peace, commerce, and alliance concluded with Spain is ratified and confirmed; and "for the greater strengthening and confirmation of the same," that Article was inserted word for word. But, as if that were not enough, the Second Article of the Treaty is in these words:—
"The subjects of their Majesties, trading respectively in the dominions of their said Majesties, shall not be bound to pay greater duties or other imposts whatsoever, for their imports or exports, than shall be exacted of, and paid by, the subjects of the most favoured nation; and if it shall happen in time to come that any diminution of duties, or other advantages, shall be granted by either side to any foreign nation, the subjects of each Crown shall reciprocally and fully enjoy the same. And as it has been agreed, as is above-mentioned, concerning the rates of duties, so it is ordained as a general rule between their Majesties, that all and every one of their subjects shall, in all lands and places subject to the command of their respective Majesties, use and enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities, concerning all imposts or duties whatsoever, which relate to persons, wares, merchandise, ships, freighting, mariners, navigation, and commerce, and enjoy the same favour in all things (as well in the courts of justice as in all those things which relate to trade, or any other right whatsoever) as the most favoured nation uses and enjoys, or may use and enjoy for the future, as is explained more at large in the Thirty-eighth Article of the Treaty of 1667, which is specially inserted in the foregoing Article."
Now, I must own, that if I had been set to draw up Articles which were in the most full and comprehensive manner possible to secure to the subjects of two countries, in their trade with each other, the privileges and advantages of the most favoured nation, I should have been at a loss to have devised words more full and more comprehensive than those which I have quoted—more clear, more distinct, more unmistakable. Proceeding in his argument,
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the Duke anticipates two objections which might be offered by the Government of Great Britain. And, first, he foresees the possibility that some distinction might be set up between the Colonies of Spain and the mother country, and this possible distinction he meets thus:—
"You cannot make use of that objection, because you have admitted on the terms set forth the produce of our Colonies of the Philippine Islands, by exempting the sugars of those islands specifically from the high duties which are the object of the present application, and therefore it is not because Cuba is a Colony that you can resist my demand."
The other objection contemplated by the Duke is this:—
"You may, perhaps, tell us, that your recent laws make a distinction between sugar manufactured by slaves, and sugar the produce of free labour. But," replies the Duke, "on the part of my Government I deny that a difference in the mode of manufacture constitutes any valid ground on which you can take your stand in maintaining a difference of duty. The Treaty admits of no such difference on any such ground."
I think the Duke's reply to the anticipated objection quite unanswerable, while it is borne out by the practices of this country. The Duke says—
"You cannot set aside the provisions of long-established Treaties made by both countries by an enactment unilateral, made by one party without the consent of the other; you cannot thus establish a practice which is fatal to a claim founded on Treaties made by mutual consent."
But the practice of England itself affords an answer to the supposed argument thus met by the Duke; for I ask, have not we ourselves, over and over again, maintained the same principle as that asserted in the Duke's note? We have contended that the process by which an article is manufactured is not a just ground for making a distinction with respect to duties to be levied upon it. We have maintained this frequently. We have said that the perfection or imperfection of an article is a fair and just ground of making such a distinction; but that the particular process of manufacture was not. In 1816, for example, when the United States of America imposed a heavier duty upon bars and bolts of iron manufactured by the process of rolling, than that which was imposed upon bars and bolts manufactured by hammering, we instructed Sir Charles Bagot, then our Minister at Washington,

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to object to that duty, and to say that bars and bolts of iron were, to all intents and purposes, like articles, whether hammered or rolled, and that they ought to be taxed in a like degree, and that the distinction which the United States sought to make was at variance with their Treaties with this country. The result of this representation was, that the United States did not persist in maintaining a heavier duty on iron bars and bolts which were rolled, than on those which were subjected to the process of hammering; and consequently, made the duties which were paid on the bars and bolts of iron manufactured in this country, the same as upon the same articles exported from Sweden and Russia. The argument by which the Government now defend their differential duly is, indeed, palpably erroneous. But if it were otherwise—if it were well founded, then I ask, why was it not used when the Government was regulating the Sugar Duties with the United States and Venezuela? Why did they not then say, that there ought to be a higher duty on sugar manufactured in one way, than on that which was manufactured in another way, but which was of the same quality? If there be any force in the argument, it ought to have been urged when the United States were pressing their claims; and the Government of this country should then have said that the slave-grown sugar of the United States was not a like commodity with the free-grown sugar of other countries, and, therefore, their claim must be rejected. The Government of this country did not, however, at that period, treat the subject in so off-hand a manner as they do now with respect to Spain; and accordingly they admitted sugar which was the produce of slave labour, as a like article to that which, being of the same quality, was the produce of free labour. This decision, in reference to the sugar of the United States and Venezuela, has been urged on the part of Spain. She has quoted the Treaties that we formerly made with her—and of which I have read extracts, and she has demanded that her sugar should be admitted on the same favourable terms as the sugar of other countries. Then comes the answer of the Government; and, in adverting to it, I must admit that they are placed in a very embarrassing situation; for it cannot be denied that if they are to admit the
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claim of Spain, and allow her sugar to come in upon the same terms as the sugar of the United States, their doctrines and distinctions would be blown to shivers, and there would be an end of their vaunted measure with respect to sugar and the Slave Trade. The only peg would be gone upon which they can hang the last remnant of their political consistency: they would then be, perhaps, exposed to a little laughter—to a joke—or a taunt across the Table—to a newspaper skit—to a taunt on the hustings—things painful enough, I admit, to the feelings of public men, but which ought not for a moment to stand in the way when the honour or the interest of the country is concerned. To such things they must submit, rather than sacrifice the character of the country. These are my views of the course which they ought to have taken; and I do not hesitate to say, that if I were in their place it would be the course which I should take. There is a point, however, beyond which the most elastic vapour cannot be condensed, and there is also a point beyond which even this Government cannot go in concession. They said, "We have been foiled by Venezuela and by the United States, but we must take our stand on the case of Spain, and refuse her the rights we have acknowledged to belong to the others." They accordingly gave an answer and a refusal; and who they called to their aid on that occasion Heaven only knows! but I do not envy them their adviser. I admit, however, that there was some ingenuity in their answer, as I shall presently show. The first point on which that answer was founded was an admission of the full effect, in commercial matters, of the Treaties of 1667 and 1713 (which they dispute in a subsequent part of their statement, apparently for the sake of argument), and an admission of the full effect which Spain claimed for the Treaties of 1667 and 1713; but they follow up that admission by a statement that a Treaty between this country and Spain, which was made in 1670—a Treaty intermediate between those of 1667 and 1713, and confirmed by subsequent Treaties, even by that of 1814—prevented the application of the two Treaties of which Spain claims the fulfilment; and in the manner in which this portion of the question is treated in their answer, we have a very ingenious instance of that species of legerdemain in argument which I have already described.

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They state that the Treaties of 1667 and 1713 do not apply to the West India trade. Here is a convenient generality of expression, which conceals from the eyes of the observer the inapplicability of the Treaty of 1670 to the question; and this affords another instance to show how parties can in such arguments arrive, by making changes in succession of terms, at a higher point of assertion than that with which they began. They first say that the Treaty of 1670 "excepts" the West India Colonies of both countries from the privileges which are secured by the Treaty of 1667 for the mother countries—Spain and Great Britain. They then go further in their assertion as they proceed, and say, the Treaty (1670) "expressly excludes" the West India Colonies; and lower down they go further still, and say, that the Treaty (1670) contains a "special exclusion" of the West India Colonies of both countries. Now, I say, that this is an entirely false assertion, and wholly at variance with the intention and the words of the Treaty of 1670. What is the claim of Spain? Spain claims that Spanish subjects residing in Cuba may be allowed to bring their sugars into the United Kingdom, and that those sugars may be admitted at as low a rate of duty as the sugars of the most favoured nation. Is there a single word in the Treaty of 1670, on which the answer which has been given to Spain so strongly relies, which goes to prevent Spain from enjoying that advantage which she claims from this country? [[Mr. Gladstone: Read the 8th Article of the Treaty.] I am going to read it, but before I do so I will ask, is that Treaty of 1670 a Commercial Treaty? No such thing. It is a Political Treaty, entered into for the purpose of putting an end to the hostilities which then prevailed between the Colonies of Spain and Great Britain in the West Indies and America, whilst the mother countries were at peace. What was the title of the Treaty. Was it—
"a Treaty between the kingdom of Spain and Great Britain, for the purpose of excluding the Colonies of the two countries from the commercial advantages which were secured to the Mother Countries under the Treaty of 1667?"
No such thing. The Treaty recites the depredations which had taken place in the West Indies and America, and it proceeds to establish peace in America between
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the two nations. What is the preamble of the Treaty? Let me remark, that preambles to Treaties explain, in a great measure, the intention and object of the Treaties; and therefore, if the object of the Treaty was that which the Government, in their answer to Spain, imply, its preamble ought to be: "That whereas, according to the Treaty of 1667, between Spain and Great Britain, each nation was to give to the other the privileges of the most favoured nation, and whereas it has become necessary to exclude the West Indian and American possessions of both countries from these benefits, be it declared so and so." But what is the preamble? The preamble sets forth that—
"Inasmuch as the good feeling between Great Britain and Spain had been interrupted in America, this Treaty was intended to reestablish the good understanding which before existed between Spain and Great Britain," &c.
The First Article in the Treaty confirms the Treaty of 1667, so far as it does not conflict with the Articles of the Treaty of 1670; and then we come to the Second Article, which is of considerable importance, it is to this effect:—
"That there shall be a universal peace, true and sincere amity in America, as in the other parts of the world, between the Most Serene Kings of Great Britain and Spain, their heirs and successors, and between the kingdoms, states, plantations, colonies, forts, cities, islands, and dominions, without any distinction of place, belonging unto either of them; and between the people and inhabitants, under their respective obedience, which shall endure from this day for ever, and be observed inviolably, as well by land as by sea and fresh waters, so as to promote each the welfare and advantage of the other, and favour and assist one another with mutual love; and that everywhere, as well in those remoter countries as in those that are nearer, the faithful offices of good neighbourhood and friendship may be exercised and increased between them."
This Article shows that the object of the Treaty was the termination of hostilities, and not restrictions of commerce. Then comes the Eighth Article, on which the Government so much rely, and it declares that—
"The subjects and inhabitants, captains, masters of ships, mariners of the kingdoms, provinces, and dominions of each confederate respectively, shall abstain and forbear to sail and trade in the ports and havens which have fortifications, castles, magazines or warehouses, and in all other places whatsoever,

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possessed by the other party in the West Indies; to wit, natives of Great Britain shall not sail unto, and trade in, the havens and places which the Catholic King holdeth in the said Indies; nor in like manner shall the subjects of the King of Spain sail unto, or trade in, those places which are possessed there by the King of Great Britain."
What does that Article mean? It means plainly this, and only this, that British subjects were not to traffic and navigate to the Colonial possessions of Spain, and that, in like manner, Spanish subjects were not to traffic with or navigate to the Colonial possessions of Great Britain; but there is not a word in any of these Articles which says that the inhabitants of the Colonial possessions of Spain may not navigate to the ports of the United Kingdom, or that the inhabitants of the Colonial possessions of Great Britain may not navigate to the ports of Spain, without obstacle. There is not a word in that Treaty which goes to prevent the inhabitants of the Colonial possessions of either country from sailing or navigating to the European territory of the other; and so clearly was this understood on both sides, that for a long time there has been an extensive and direct trade with Spain in fish and other articles, from our Colonies in North America. There is nothing in the Treaty of 1670 which, if it were now in full force, would militate against the demands of Spain—those demands being, not that British subjects should trade to the Colonies of Spain, but that the Colonies of Spain should be permitted to trade with the United Kingdom. It has been contended, forsooth, as a proof of the restrictive effect of the Treaty, that this traffic has not existed. True; but why? Was it prevented by the Treaty of 1670? No, the navigation of inhabitants of the Spanish Colonists to this country was not prevented by that Treaty. It was prevented by our own navigation laws, and by the Colonial laws of Spain—it was prevented by laws of the two countries which were not founded on commercial doctrines, but on other principles—laws, the object of which, on our side, was to preserve a nursery for British seamen; and, on the part of Spain, by political jealousies and other causes; but the Treaty of 1670 did not, and could not, prevent, if it were now in force, the inhabitants of Spanish Colonial possessions from trading to the United Kingdom. I admit, at once, that if our old navigation law were still in force, that might be given
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as an answer to Spain, if she demanded what she could not demand under the Treaty of 1670—if she demanded to send the produce in question from Spanish ports to the ports of the United Kingdom. ["No, no."] Then, I am to understand that, if she demanded to send her Colonial sugars from Corunna and Bilbao, she might import them hither. [Mr. Gladstone: She could not make such a claim.] That is the ground upon which I base this argument. I say, that if Spain claimed that right, the answer to which I have adverted, founded on our navigation laws, might be given to her. But it is contended by the Government, that the Treaty of 1670 prevented any traffic from the West Indian possessions of Spain to Great Britain; and I say, that it is impossible the Treaty could have any such interpretation. But even if there were anything in the Treaty of 1670 to prevent such a traffic, is that Treaty still in force? I say it is not, for this reason, namely, that the two parties reserved to themselves the right to make any change which they might feel necessary with respect to the commercial interests of both countries; and there was a short Treaty made in 1809, or, I believe, in 1810, establishing peace between the two countries of Spain and England, to which Treaty there was an additional Article, stating that if a greater latitude of commercial freedom were, after that Treaty to be given by Spain to any foreign country, the same latitude should be extended to England. What did the King of Spain do in 1822? In 1822, he issued a Decree on the subject of the commerce of foreign countries with his American dominions, and the First Article of that Decree stated—
"A direct commerce shall be maintained in my American dominions with the subjects of countries who are the friends of Spain, and they shall be admitted to trade there in the same manner as in the ports of Spain."
Now, from that time the Treaty of 1670 was annulled, so far as this Decree places the trade of foreign nations with the Colonies of Spain on the same footing as in Spain itself. Then we issued the Orders in Council, which have been so much discussed in the Government note; and here I do not profess to understand the argument of the Government, but it either says this, that the Order in Council of 1828 did not give Spain, in regard to

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the trade with our West Indian Colonies, all that Spain had given us with regard to her American Colonies — that is one interpretation; and if the Government adhere to that interpretation, then I say, their argument is no argument against the claim of Spain; for the fooling of the most favoured nation is not the footing of reciprocity between contracting parties. Those two conditions of intercourse are quite different things; and Spain claims, in this case, the footing of the most favoured nation, and not the footing of reciprocity. But, secondly, the Government argument may mean that the Order in Council did not give all the advantages to Spain that we gave to any other country. That is the other interpretation; and that, I think, is not a well-founded asssertion, because I am not aware that we had given to any other countries more than we gave to Spain; but I take the argument of the Government to be, that because Spain has acquiesced in being placed, by that Order in Council, in a less advantageous position than some other conntries, she is, therefore, bound by her own acquiescence, and cannot now demand the footing of the most favoured nation. But this is an argument which cannot be maintained; for there have often been circumstances in which nations have submitted to put up with a less advantageous state of things than they were strictly entitled to insist upon, owing to temporary causes; but that cannot divest them of their rights, according to the faith that prevails among nations. It may happen that a Government, by inadvertence, may for a time submit to receive less advantage from a Treaty than she ought to get, but that inadvertence could not be considered as permanently binding; and if afterwards she took advantage of the Treaty, and, for the maintenance of her rights, claimed a more favourable construction of the Treaty, it would not be just to bind her by an occasional acquiescence in the less favourable construction, in order to deprive her of the advantage to which she might, by the true letter of the Treaty, be entitled. If any British Government, for instance, in the weakness of the moment, had foregone rights to which this country was entitled with relation to a foreign country, Parliament would not listen for an instant to the suggestion that we were to be deprived of our Treaty rights by that temporary acquiescence.
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Then I say, that the argument founded on the assumed acquiescence of Spain in our Order of Council utterly fails. I have already shown that the argument founded on the assumption that the Treaty of 1670 deprived the West Indian possessions of Spain of the advantages which Spain claims for them under the Treaties of 1667 and 1713, is totally at variance with the object and terms of that Treaty. It did not exclude the Colonies of Spain or England from trading to the mother country of the other coneracting party; it deprived England of the advantage of trading in her own vessels to the Spanish Colonies directly, and Spain of the advantage of trading directly to the British Colonies in her own vessels; but it did not prevent the inhabitants of the Colonies from trading directly to the mother country on either side. That is the answer to the first objection put forward by the Government; and I now come to another example of the dexterous substitution of one word for another in the course of the argument. By the Treaty of 1814, an engagement was entered into that bound the King of Spain to prevent his subjects from carrying on the Slave Trade, except for the purpose of supplying slaves to be employed in his own Colonies; and by the same Treaty the King of Great Britain was bound to take the most effectual measures to prevent his subjects from supplying arms, ammunition, or warlike stores to the revolted subjects of Spain in America; and in reference to that Treaty the note of our Government says, that—
"The engagement in the Treaty of 1814 was concluded in the expectation that the troubles and disturbances which then prevailed in the Spanish-American provinces would cease, and that the subjects of those provinces would return to their allegiance to the lawful Sovereign;"
and the note says that His Britannic Majesty engaged, under that expectation, to take
—"the most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article, to the revolted States in America."
Now, it is right, when words are quoted, that they should be quoted correctly; and therefore I must state that there is no such word as "expectation" mentioned, on the part of His Britannic Majesty, in 1814, with respect to the termination

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of the disturbances in Spanish America. The Treaty states that His Britannic Majesty was "anxious" that the subjects of the King of Spain should return to their allegiance; but there was no expression of expectation that such a result would take place. It is a very different thing to say that His Britannic Majesty was "anxious" that the subjects of the King of Spain in South America should return to their allegiance, and to say that he "expected" that result. The distinction is very important; for the word "expectation" would lead to the idea that Spain had taken us in by holding out to us at that time the expectation that she could keep all her Colonial possessions, whereas, in fact, she had been able only to keep Cuba. I deny, then, that the Treaty of 1670 is a bar to the claim of Spain; and I now come to the argument which the Government applies to the Treaties of 1667 and 1713, namely, that they give the advantage claimed by Spain for the produce of her West Indian possessions, to "persons" only, and do not confer them on Spain as regards her "productions." This argument has been the subject of much animadversion; and every man with whom I have talked upon the subject, has expressed his astonishment that an argument so like the shift of a pettifogging village attorney should have been introduced into an official document of the British Government. But the first argument founded on the Treaty of 1670 was so weak that it was indefensible; and, therefore, the Government was obliged to seek another argument on which they might rest their case; and as their first argument was rotten and unsound, this pettifogging quibble, about "persons," and "productions," was really essential to their case; and from the offhand way in which it is played off, people not accustomed to consider the meaning of the language of Treaties, might think there was something in it. Why, certainly, the word "productions" is not to be found in the Treaties of 1667 and 1713; but will any man of candour and plain sense read the Articles of those Treaties, and say their meaning is not perfectly clear and palpable? The Treaties give to each of the two countries the advantages which are to be given to the most favoured nation in matters of trade and commerce, in regard to duties, wares, commodities, and all other things; and I ask any man to read those words, and say, if in plain and honest dealing between nation and
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nation, between man and man, there exists the least ground for the assertion, that not productions, but persons only, are meant to be included in the advantages agreed to be given by each nation to the other. What is the construction which the Government put upon these words? They say that Spain has Treaties with this country by which we agreed that she should not pay higher duties on her imports into this country than those which shall be paid by the most favoured nation, but that those Treaties do not state what imports we were to permit Spain so to send. That argument reminds me of what happened to a friend of mine at an election. He canvassed an elector, and the man promised him his vote, but when the day of election came, the elector voted against him. He was astonished at this conduct, and he said to the man—"You voted against me." "Yes, I did," said the elector. "But you promised that you would vote for me." "Yes," answered the elector, "I did; but I did not say when." That is the argument which the Government use towards Spain. They admit that, according to Treaties, Spain has a right to claim that her imports into this country should be placed in regard to duty on the same footing as the imports of the most favoured nation; but, say they, the Treaties do not specify what those imports are to consist of, and therefore the right is to be of no use to Spain. They say that the Treaties do not specify the productions of Spain. Do they, then, mean to say that it applies to the produce of other countries to be imported by Spain into this country? Their language, then, to Spain is, "Your Treaties entitle you to pay upon your imports those duties only which are paid by the most favoured nation on their imports; but your Treaties do not say what your imports are to be. We are at liberty to decide that, and we therefore tell you that you may import the sugars of Venezuela and of the United States on the same terms on which those nations import their own sugar; but there is nothing in your bond which enables you to import your own sugar on those terms." Such an argument is a disgrace to us, and a mockery of the meaning of those Treaties. When Spain says she is entitled to the same favours as other nations, the answer is, that we did not give these advantages to the United States as a favour, but as a right. That answer cannot be sufficient, for we promised the same rights as the most favoured nation in all

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things whatever regarding duties, wares, merchandises; and yet, in the face of all this, in defiance of words which are as plain as language can be, you turn round and say that the terms apply to persons, and not to productions. I think I have shown that the answer which was given by the Government to this demand on the part of the Government of Spain, is at variance with the plain and simple meaning which any man of common sense would attach to the terms of the Treaty; and if I am told that this matter has been referred to the Crown lawyers, I say that their opinion upon such a question is not of greater value than the opinion of any other man. It is not a question of law, but a question of honesty. It does not turn on the equivocal construction of a point of law, or on the value of a precedent—it turns on the ordinary meaning of the plain words in which the Treaties are framed. We are, however, to understand from the answer of the Government to Spain, that the Treaties between Spain and England, in virtue of which Spain claims those rights, apply to persons and not to productions; and that it would be consistent with those Treaties to impose heavier duties on sugar which was a Spanish production, than on sugar which was the produce of other countries. It is contended that, under the Treaties with Spain, we are entitled to impose heavier duties on produce imported from the possessions of Spain, than upon the like articles the produce of other countries. Does the Government and does this House see the full bearing of that interpretation? The Spanish Government, in a note to this Government, demands at our hands the proper fulfilment of our engagement, that neither country will tax the imports of the other any higher than the imports of the most favoured nation. We reject that claim. We say that each party is at liberty, under the Treaties of 1667 and 1713, to impose what duties it pleases on the imports of the other. If that doctrine had been laid down by Spain, and we had been unable to gainsay it according to the fair construction of Treaties, the Spanish Government might have inflicted a great injury on our commerce; but, as it was the result of a Treaty, we should have been bound to submit to it. But that this Government, which affects to be so favourable to commerce, should, of its own accord, put forward
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such a doctrine, is strange indeed. That it should come from those who were always attacking me in my office for not being sufficiently attentive to and watchful of the interests of British commerce—that they should deliberately force upon Spain a construction so pregnant with evil to British commerce on these Treaties, is indeed a matter of astonishment. You have by this doctrine untied the hands of Spain. You have torn to pieces the Treaties of 1667, and of 1713. Is there no danger in that? Why, Sir, these very Papers, which have been delivered to us only at three o'clock in the afternoon of this day, and which one has scarcely had time to read through, shows that there is a question now pending between this country and Spain, arising from an attempt on the part of Spain to levy heavier duties on the commerce of Great Britain than on that of other nations; that she has attempted to levy a heavier duty on the linens of Great Britain than on the linens of Belgium, and on our ships than on the ships of France. I lay my life, that if the Government interpretation of these Treaties stands good, we shall have the influence of other countries exerted in Spain to put our trade under ban as far as they can exert it; and we shall lose our trade with Spain, as we are now losing it with Brazil, in consequence of the absurd tariff and mischievous policy of our Government. There has always been much difficulty in our commercial relations with Spain. There has been a constant struggle going on there between English commerce and the commerce of France and of other countries. But we have always stood upon our right to equality, and that was our security. Already do we labour under disadvantages with regard to Spain, incident to our geographical position; for, from the numerous prohibitions which enter into the commercial policy of Spain, smuggling is carried on to a large extent, and the nations nearest to Spain are the best able to smuggle across her frontier. In addition to this, we shall now have prohibitions placed upon our goods, whilst lower duties will be put upon the goods of other countries. Whatever may be the value of the trade of Spain—and I hold it to be extremely valuable, and susceptible of a great increase under a good understanding between the two countries—whatever may be the value of that trade, it may be

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truly affirmed that, as far as our interpretation of diplomatic engagement goes, we have materially crippled, if not destroyed it. My objection to the course which the Government has thought fit to pursue, rests upon these considerations. We have broken faith with Spain, and broken faith, too, without even that poor but too common excuse, which may sometimes be pleaded with effect in popular assemblies, namely, that it was the interest of the country to do so. We have broken faith for the mere pleasure of so doing. We have, besides, set an example which will assuredly be productive of evil to us, even beyond our relations with Spain. Hitherto, England has preached to all other countries freedom of commerce and equality of privilege. "All we want," we have said, "is a fair stage and no favour. Put us on only a footing of equality. We ask for no peculiar privileges; all we require is, that you will not distinguish between us and others to our disadvantage; and that you will put us on the footing of the most favoured nation." Here we are now actually rejecting the footing of the most favoured nation; and with what face can we now go to any other country which puts us on a footing of inferiority, and propose to them that they should, with reference to us, pursue a course the very reverse of that which we ourselves have followed? The right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) stated, I think, a short time after he came into office, that the great motive which animated himself and his Colleagues in going through the labours they had to perform, was the hope of posthumous fame. Posthumous fame they will assuredly have; but it will not be the fame of the early Cæsars, who carried to the confines of the habitable portion of the globe the arms, and arts, and civilization of the Roman empire—but the less enviable fame of their degenerate successors, under whose feeble and impotent sway the god Terminus was driven back, step by step, till he took refuge under the walls of the imperial city. They might have secured to themselves the honourable fame of having extended the comforts and increased the prosperity of the people whom they have been appointed to govern. But what have they been doing during the four years they have been in office? Why, they have been busily employed
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in sacrificing more great national interests than, I think, it has ever yet fallen to the lot of any Government to abandon during an equal period of the administration of the affairs of this country. They began by sacrificing the territorial rights of the country in North America. They surrendered, in that quarter of the world, territories, our right to which had been successfully maintained in argument by all former Governments, and which had, I venture to say, been practically proved by their immediate predecessors, by a survey of the country itself. By this sacrifice they commenced their career of inglorious and mischievous concession; and they made it upon impressions utterly unfounded, and impelled by fears utterly unworthy of a British Government. They have sacrificed the commercial interests of the country in the Brazilian trade, in the Spanish trade, and, I fear, also in other quarters about to follow, and all for the purpose of maintaining a favourite crotchet, based upon hypocritical pretences. They have sacrificed, too, that mutual Right of Search with France, for the suppression of the Slave Trade, which former Governments had laboured in vain to accomplish; and which had at last been obtained by their immediate predecessors as the best reward and acknowledgment which England asked for services of some value, which she had been able to render to France. They have sacrificed that natural right merely to give to a Ministry in France a temporary prop, which is no longer wanted; and it was a right which they might so well have maintained, for it was not liable to the invidious imputation, that it was a pretence for securing any advantage, military or commercial, to this country. There was no interest but the interest of humanity, which led us to attach the slightest value to that right. That right is now surrendered; and the interests of humanity, the dictates of justice, the laws of God, and the duties of man, have been forgotten, because it was convenient to the British Government, and to the French Ministry. But the Government has reserved for the last a sacrifice of interests purely English; and on the present occasion they have sacrificed the good name, the faith, and character of this country—that good name, that faith, and that character which had

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hitherto outlived all the storms through which England has had to pass, and all the difficulties which she has had to encounter; for whether her arms were defeated or triumphant—whether her diplomatists, at the termination of hostilities, were, as some have alleged, in the habit of losing by the pen what had previously been gained by the sword—or whether they were successful in maintaining the advantages which had been acquired in war, the good faith and high honour of England have never before been justly called in question. I remember that Mr. Wilberforce, in discussing our relations with Foreign Powers, stated that the reason why, in his opinion, we did not come successfully out of our negotiations with them was this, that we were too honest to deal with the Governments of the Continent. If Mr. Wilberforce had lived until this day, he would, in the first place, have retracted the imputation which that saying cast upon the Governments of Europe; but if he had read this note, he would most assuredly have looked for some other reason than that assigned by him to account for any disadvantage under which we might labour in our diplomatic intercourse wish foreign Governments. In this instance, the Government have given a bad reason for a bad course. They have broken those Treaties, and the relations consequent thereupon, which it was the country's interest and their own duty to have maintained. They have set an example which, if followed up by other countries, will be productive of incalculable injury to England. They have given up the securities which, for nearly two centuries, the trade and commerce of this country enjoyed in its relations with Spain; and they have done this for no purpose on earth except to afford to the Government a hollow pretence for maintaining a distinction founded on no intelligible ground, not even successful for the purpose for which it was established. They would have done far better if they had abandoned this distinction, even though they by so doing might have exposed themselves to temporary difficulties; because, by giving it up, they would have maintained the good faith of the country, and have upheld its commercial interests; and whatever might have been the sneers to which, for a moment, they might have been exposed, the satisfaction of their own
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consciences, and the approbation of the country, would have been their sufficient reward. Thinking, then, that the answer given to the demand of the Spanish Minister, and that the decision come to by the Government, are not founded on the true interpretation of the Treaties which bear upon the question, and being of opinion that the course which the Government have taken, is one which is highly detrimental to the commercial interests of this country, I call upon the House to concur with me in addressing the Crown to take, in this matter, an opposite and a different course. The noble Lord concluded by submitting the following Motion:—
"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, stating that this House have taken into their consideration the Papers which, by Her Majesty's gracious Command, have lately been laid before them, containing Copies of a Correspondence which has recently taken place between the Spanish Minister at Her Majesty's Court and Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of a claim made by the Spanish Government, in virtue of the Treaties subsisting between the Crowns of Great Britain and of Spain; and praying Her Majesty to direct that the subjects of the Queen of Spain should be permitted to import into the United Kingdom all the productions of the Territories or Possessions of the Spanish Crown, paying thereupon no higher Duties of Customs than are paid by the subjects or citizens of the most favoured Nations, on the importation of like articles being the production of the Territories or Possessions of such Nations."
Mr. Gladstonehoped the House would not consider him guilty of officious presumption in rising at that period of the debate to state those arguments which appeared to him conclusive against the Motion of the noble Lord (Palmerston); for although the House would properly look to the Government for a defence against the serious charges which the noble Lord had preferred against them, and although he had not now the honour of being a Member of the Government, yet he was conscious of his share of the responsibility which attached to the measure of the Government with respect to the Sugar Duties; and he freely and at once admitted that the responsibility of having joined in their recommendation involved him in a share of the responsibility which now attached to the refusal on the part of the Government of the demand of Spain.

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Conscious as he was of that responsibility, he had no disposition whatever to shrink from it. He assented freely to the doctrine of the noble Lord, when he declared that the engagements of this country should be construed in an honourable spirit, and that advantage should not be taken of mere verbal accidents to escape the plain and obvious effect of Treaties. He would not now follow the noble Lord in much that he had addressed to the House. While he professed he was surprised at the paucity of the facts adduced by the noble Lord, compared with the immense field which he had to traverse, he found that although the noble Lord had not had time to examine many matters which threw great light upon this subject, the noble Lord had found time to collect and discuss matter on which he founded two attacks upon the Government; one an historical record of all that had taken place in respect of these matters since the present Government came into office, and the other a dissertation upon the subject of the Right of Search, upon the Ashburton Treaty, and upon a variety of other matters totally unconnected with the merits of this question, except in the mind of the noble Lord, who, urged by his tenacious animosity against the Government, against the sense of even those around him, could not help advancing again and again these often refuted charges. He thought the noble Lord would have approached the present subject under circumstances of greater advantage had the noble Lord for once been content (though it would have been a severe sacrifice for the noble Lord to make) to abstain from these party discussions, and confine himself to the great question before the House. The noble Lord said that Her Majesty's Government had broken faith with the Crown of Spain, and broken faith without even the wretched apology which a breach of faith might receive from the circumstance that it seemed to secure some great commercial advantage; that they had broken faith, in fact, in opposition to the palpable and obvious interests of their own country. These measures had never been defended on the ground of convenience to the commercial interests of the country; but the noble Lord, in insisting on the injurious or inconvenient effects of them upon commerce, left it to be collected that they were advocated on the ground of their tending to
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promote commerce, and not upon the ground of different and higher obligations. The noble Lord might have assumed that the very obviousness of some of the inconveniences he complained of, must have led to a more searching examination of them than he chose to give Ministers credit for, had they been founded on commercial principles. But the House had to examine a subject which was affected by no less than twelve separate commercial Treaties—Treaties which were illustrative of our commercial history, practice, and law for a period extending over 200 years. After stating this, he should endeavour, without one word, if he could avoid it, of party bitterness or retort on the noble Lord, to toil patiently through all the circumstances with which he was acquainted, and which appeared to throw any light upon the subject. Before laying down his propositions, however, he ought to state that he himself was alone responsible for them—that he manifestly could not be authorized to state the case of the Government—that he presented his arguments, simply as arguments drawn according to his own personal view and judgment, from materials and documents which were before the House, or accessible to it. In that light he hoped they would be received and judged of by the House, and by them as arguments, he for one, at least, was ready to abide. He should undertake to prove to the House three propositions: propositions quite independent of one another. He believed that he should prove each and all of them incontestably: but even if his argument failed in any one, it would in no degree weaken either of the other two conclusions. He would prove, firstly, that the Treaties on which the claim of Spain was founded, were not in absolute and unqualified operation. Secondly, that if they were, still they did not bind either country to admit the produce of the other upon the terms of the most favoured nation. Thirdly, that whether they did or did not contain this stipulation generally, it did not extend to the Colonial possessions to which the present discussion related. The first of his propositions, then, was this: he was ready to contend that it certainly was unwarrantable, perhaps extravagant, to state that the Treaties on which the noble Lord had founded the case of Spain, were, at this moment, fully and unconditionally in operation. He would not undertake to

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say—very far from it—that they were altogether annulled; he would not undertake to state to what precise degree they still had force or a binding effect; but he would show certain circumstances which made it plain that whatever these Treaties might be, they were distinguished in very important respects, as regarded the universality and stringency of their application, from the generality of the Treaties which stood upon the list of our national engagements. The noble Lord had stated the case of those Treaties very clearly. He had gone to the authentic source, and read from he Treaties themselves the most important of the Articles upon which the claim of Spain was founded. He would not so far trouble the House as to particularize each and every one of the Treaties by which the earlier Treaties were confirmed; but he believed that, for one cause or another, he should be obliged to refer to most of them in the course of his argument; for the present it was enough for him to say, that, up to 1763, they stood as a complete code, each Treaty confirming, generally, the provisions of former ones, and likewise adding, more or less, of new matter to them. They were confirmed afresh in 1763 in the most absolute form—namely, by the recital in extenso of the Treaty of 1687, which was the most important of them all. Then he came to 1783; and the Treaty of that year contained a new confirmation, which, although it was much less formal and precise than the confirmation of 1763—for it did not recite the instrument, nor refer to all the details and particulars, yet it did state that the former Treaties were to be taken as the basis of that Treaty, and that they were to be "religiously (he believed that was the expression) observed." But now he came to the commencement of the circumstances that began to establish the difference for which he contended. In the Treaty of 1783, there was an engagement between the two parties that they should forthwith name commissaries of note to treat concerning their interests; and the Ninth Article of the Treaty of Versailles, in which this engagement was embodied, was founded upon the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience. If that were taken alone, it had but little effect upon the obligatory character of the previous Treaties, because they were confirmed; but accompanying this Treaty
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were two simultaneous declarations of the negotiators of the two parties. Now to these two declarations the noble Lord made no allusion whatever. He did not pretend to be learned in the law of nations; but he thought that the terms and tenor of the declarations, the circumstance that they proceeded not from one but both parties, and that they were simultaneous with the conclusion of the Treaty itself, would show to the House that they were documents of considerable importance, and had a bearing upon the force to be assigned to the main instruments themselves. For instance, with regard to the British declaration, that drew a clear distinction between the different classes of provisions contained in all the former Treaties. It divided them into the classes, first, of personal privileges, secondly, of commercial regulations, and declared expressly, that, whilst the personal privileges ought to be unalterable, the commercial regulations ought to be subject to alteration from time to time, and that it was only with regard to commercial regulations that the then Sovereign of Great Britain would consent to an alteration of the Treaties. He now turned to the Spanish declaration, and he found that that was evidently meant to cover a state of things in which those old Treaties were habitually set aside—and set aside according to both their spirit and their letter. He would not say universally, but "set aside" both in spirit and letter, with regard to the great commercial regulations which the noble Lord had brought under the consideration of the House to-night, if their letter or their spirit in any degree possessed the character which the noble Lord had assigned to them, on which he should have more to say presently, or, indeed, according to any reasonable construction of them. The Spanish declaration stated—
"The intention of His Catholic Majesty is not in any manner to cancel all the stipulations contained in the above-mentioned Treaties. He declares, on the contrary, from henceforth, that he is disposed to maintain all the privileges, facilities, and advantages expressed in the old Treaties, as far as they shall be reciprocal, or compensated by equivalent advantages."
The Spanish negotiator pointed to reciprocal advantages, as the basis of the commercial part of the Treaties. The noble Lord had justly stated, that what

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was called the most favoured nation clause, was something essentially distinct from the reciprocity Treaties. The old Treaties with Spain were not treaties of reciprocity. There was no reference whatever in them to the question of equality of imposts, as between the subjects of the one country, and those of the other. What was stipulated for was, that the subjects of each country should be treated by the other in a manner as favourable as the subjects of any other Power. Spain, however, proposed in 1783 to negotiate no longer upon the old footing of the most favoured nation, but upon the footing of reciprocity, by which she evidently meant to establish in form an existing and recognised practice. Spain had referred to previous negotiation; and he was perfectly right in saying, that she had at the same moment also referred to the existing and established practice between the two countries. The established practice, was not the practice of one or two years, nor that which might be attempted to be imposed by a powerful upon a weak State; nor was it one of those questionable examples which, he would add with the noble Lord, it was unjust and improper to draw into precedents. It was a practice on her side of at least twenty-two years' duration, agreed upon between equal and independent Powers. In 1761 the Family Compact was formed; and in that year, Spain, France, and Naples agreed to place one another mutually upon the same footing, not of the most favoured nation out of that circle, but on a footing of absolute equality, each with the other two. The practice of Spain for twenty-two years previously, had been upon this basis of reciprocity with France and Naples, while it was perfectly plain that, according to the most favoured nation clause, she was bound to have admitted us also to that equality. The intentions of Spain in 1783 were, that at length she should legalize what had been her practice for twenty-two years, by embodying it in the provisions of the Treaty. He had now shown what was the practice of Spain; and he would proceed to show the House something like an acknowledgment of it on the part of England. In 1786, this country framed an admirable Commercial Treaty with France; and in that Treaty there was the most favoured nation clause.
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But the most favoured nation clause contained an exception. On the side of England, France permitted England to introduce an exception in favour of the Methuen Treaty; and, on the side of France, England permitted France to introduce an exception in favour of the Family Compact with Spain. He, therefore, insisted that Mr. Pitt, when he permitted France to fulfil, in regard to Spain, the conditions of the Family Compact, recognised, by the most formal, public, and solemn act, the validity of that compact; and that compact which, as he had shown the House, had established an exclusive equality in Spain between French, and Neapolitan, and Spanish subjects; and that, too, in the face of Treaties with this country which placed us, according to the apparent meaning, on the footing of the most favoured nation. When they came down to 1809, they found that the first thing done was to make an engagement between the two Powers to negotiate a new Treaty; and it was clear that those who signed this instrument could not well have been of opinion that the whole of the provisions of the old Treaties were in force at that time. True, the war put an end to these arrangements; but, in 1814, he found several provisions introduced that were very material to be considered. The engagement of 1809, to proceed forthwith to negotiate, was then renewed. And what was the provision then made? He would not now refer to the provision then agreed upon as to the Colonies; but would point out that the persuasion of those who then negotiated was, that they had not, in the old Treaties, a security for the treatment of their respective countries, upon the footing of the most favoured nations, or they would have been satisfied with the existing engagements; and in the interim—and this was most important, because it was, in point of fact, the provision under which our present relations with Spain were governed—it was agreed by an additional Article, signed at Madrid on the 28th of August, 1824, that, pending the negotiation of the new Treaty, Great Britain should be admitted to trade with Spain on the same conditions which existed previous to the year 1796. Great Britain was to be allowed to trade with Spain according to the terms under which she traded with Spain antecedent to 1796.

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He had already shown them, that on the part of Spain, the terms on which trade was carried on antecedent to that period admitted of the Family Compact, allowed Spain to grant to France and to Naples exclusive privileges, and admitted also of Mr. Pitt's recognising the right of Spain to grant the exemptions which she had exclusively granted to France and Naples. That was the state of things prior to 1796, and that was the state of things which was re-established in 1814, and under which our relations with Spain still existed. He would quote the declaration of the Spanish Minister on this subject, which he found in Sir Henry Wellesley's despatch of April 21, 1817. The Spanish Minister asserted to Sir H. Wellesley that—
"Although the Treaty of 1814 re-enacted the Treaties which existed prior to 1796, it did not expressly specify which Treaties, nor what Articles of them, which were necessary, there being great contradiction in the stipulations of those Treaties, some of them had provided for a reciprocity which did not exist; and that the Treaty of 1814 could therefore be understood only as renewing good understanding, harmony, and mercantile relations in general between the two countries."
The Spanish Minister also said that the Articles of the Treaty of 1783, which stipulated that commercial arrangements should be entered into between the two Powers on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, was as much in force then as any Article of the new Treaty; thus intending to set off that Article as relaxing and qualifying the obligation of the old Treaties. What he had quoted was a reply to the question whether these ancient Treaties retained their obligatory power, even if affected by any subsequent transaction. He would now quote some other works, which he granted were susceptible of a double interpretation, but either way was sufficient for his purpose. The first was a document of 1786, and was a Report of the Board of Trade in answer to a reference made to it by Mr. Pitt, with the draft of the Treaty of Commerce with France, requesting its opinion. The Board of Trade appeared to have had its attention called to the question, whether, if low and favourable duties were established with France, as Mr. Pitt proposed, we were likely in consequence to be subjected to differential duties in Spain.
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The Report of the Board of Trade showed that in the opinion of that Department, there was no doubt as to the right of Spain to impose those differential duties on British merchants. That Report, in point of fact, argued principally, if not entirely, the question whether or not it were probable that we should be subjected to differential duties in Spain, in consequence of the low duties imposed by us in regard to France, and by way of retaliation on the part of Spain; but it never insinuated the slightest doubt of the right of Spain to establish such differential duties. He admitted there were two ways of explaining this; it might be said that the Board of Trade had so reported, either because they considered the old Treaties abrogated, or because the old Treaties did not meet the case. If they were abrogated at that time, there was an end of any claim founded on them; and if the old Treaties did not meet the case, the argument on that ground was equally fatal to the noble Lord's Motion; for if they did not meet the case contended for by the noble Lord at the time they were entered into, they could not since that time have acquired any new or more extended construction. He would now proceed to draw the noble Lord's attention to several facts in connexion with those Treaties, which the noble Lord would find capable of explanation, either by supposing that the Treaties themselves were null, or by the pettifogging attorney's argument he spoke of; but which could not be explained away upon any sound reasoning nor any intelligible supposition. In the debates upon the French Treaty, Mr. Fox, in arguing against it, contended that Spain would claim the benefit of the relaxations therein stipulated in favour of France; and Mr. Sheridan, who followed him in the debate, used the same argument, that Spain had the right to demand to be placed upon the same footing; but Mr. Pitt did not agree to that argument, and refused to admit the right advanced as regarded Spain. Mr. Pitt said (though he gave no opinion as to the constructions of those Treaties) that the rights accruing to Spain out of the Treaties between her and Great Britain were under discussion. He thought, therefore, that he was justified in saying that if those rights were then under discussion, they were not so clearly defined by the Treaties in the opinion of

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either party as the noble Lord opposite seemed to suppose. He had reminded the House of the Family Compact between Spain, France, and Naples; and he would now tell them of something equivalent on the part of England. Now, Mr. Pitt's Treaty with France established a low tariff of duties in favour of France, but Spain never had the benefit of that low tariff. The Treaty establishing that low tariff was in force from the period of agreeing to it till the commencement of the war; yet Spain never until now claimed to be placed on the same footing, on the ground that the Treaties with Great Britain gave her the right to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nations. He thought, therefore, that in this instance the low pettifogging attorney's argument adverted to by the noble Lord might, perhaps, have found favour with both Powers, and that even Mr. Pitt might fall within the scope of the noble Lord's condemnation. The Treaties with Spain stipulated for certain advantages to the subjects of Spain, to Spanish merchants; but Mr. Pitt's Treaty with France referred to the merchandise of the country, however brought, and not to the merchandise of any particular merchants. Though he could understand, therefore, how Mr. Pitt became liable to the animadversions of the noble Lord, for according to France a lower rate of duties than to Spain, he could not see how Spain had acquired the right now to call upon this country to give her produce the benefit of the present low rate of duties. Perhaps the noble Lord who said that the faith of this country had been kept untainted until it was sacrificed by the present Government, would explain that Treaty with France, and would show that Spain had had the benefit of the low rate of duties—that she had considered herself entitled to them—or that she had complained of being excluded from them. He referred to these matters to show not that the two contracting Powers had all along violated the Treaties, but that they had understood the object and force of the Treaties, and understood them in a sense different from that for which the noble Lord now contended. He now came to what was called the Colonial Clause of the Treaty of 1814. How did the noble Lord, upon the principle of which he was now the advocate, account for the introduction
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of that clause? In that Treaty there was this somewhat one-sided stipulation:—
"In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being open to foreign nations, His Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nations."
But according to the noble Lord's argument, we had all these advantages before the ancient Treaties; and any who differed from him in that respect were set down by the noble Lord as men who used the arguments of low pettifogging village attorneys. But if all these advantages were secured to us by the ancient Treaties, which he admitted remained, as to their extent, the same after the Treaty of 1814 as they were before 1796; how did the noble Lord account for the introduction of this provision? According to the noble Lord's argument it must be worse than surplusage, for it gave us nothing that we had not already, and by giving it us in a particular quarter, led to the inference that we did not possess it universally. He contended that this clause, which opened to Great Britain the trade of the Spanish American Colonies, when other nations should be permitted to carry on trade with those Colonies, proved that we were not entitled, before that Article was written, to claim from Spain that advantage which that Treaty secured to us. But this Article did not purport to be intended to clear up doubts that might have arisen, or to be a declaratory Article; but it stipulated de novo that certain privileges should be conceded to Great Britain which, according to the noble Lord opposite, she already possessed; but which it appeared to him much more rational to suppose she was not thought by her own statesmen to possess. But the noble Lord was in office in the year 1822, and unless he recanted some of his present opinions he would have to answer for a serious catalogue of his own misdeeds. In 1819, the reciprocity principle was introduced into our Treaties; and for seventeen or eighteen years after that period we placed other countries, with which we had Treaties of reciprocity, in the same position as our own with regard to ships and goods in our ports. Spain, however, did not obtain the benefit of these reciprocity Treaties; she continued to pay

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differential duties; and while ships of other nations were admitted, and had been for nearly thirty years admitted, into English ports on payment of the lowest dues, the highest dues had been exacted from Spanish vessels. It was an easy thing for the noble Lord to declaim against the policy of Her Majesty's Government; but he must remind the noble Lord that, during nearly the whole period to which he referred, the noble Lord had been in office, and for a considerable period was Secretary of State for the Foreign Department. He called upon the noble Lord to dispose of this argument, and to explain how it was, if Spain was, as he now said, entitled unconditionally to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nations, the ships of Spain had, during the space of twenty-five or thirty years, paid dues in British ports from which one nation after another had been exempt, and from which almost every other nation now was exempt. But the noble Lord would say, perhaps, this was the result of reciprocity Treaties concluded with other nations. [Viscount Palmerston: Hear!] But was that the only answer? He should be happy to hear that it was. The noble Lord knew well that these old Treaties with Spain had nothing to do with reciprocity. In our reciprocating Treaties, the reciprocity stipulation was distinctly set forth. In the Treaty with America, America said, your subjects the subjects of Great Britain, shall pay in our ports only the same dues as are paid by the subjects of the most favoured nations, provided our subjects pay the same dues in your ports as are paid by the subjects of the most favoured nations. But these old Spanish Treaties made no exception with regard to favours granted by either Power to third countries on the score of reciprocity—they merely contracted, that let Great Britain contract what it might with the subjects of another Power, the subjects of Spain should be entitled to the same privileges as were conceded to the subjects of that third Power. If, therefore, there had been a stipulation for the reciprocal admission of the general produce of the two countries, and for the terms of the most favoured nation, in the sense which the noble Lord maintained, we could not have declined extending the advantages of the reciprocity Treaties to Spain upon the ground that the privileges which they granted were given in exchange for equivalents. Under the clause of the most
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favoured nation, equivalents have nothing to do with the matter. What did we say to America last year, in regard to the Treaty between the United States and the States of the Zollverein—or rather, what were we prepared to say if the call had arisen? The States of the Zollverein were prepared to make a Treaty with the United States, providing for certain remissions of duty on the productions of the United States entering the ports of the Zollverein, in return for certain reductions in the duties charged on the products of the Zollverein in the ports of the United States; but everybody said here, "let America grant these reductions to the Zollverein, and we shall have the benefit of them." Was there any doubt of that? Did the noble Lord doubt it—or did anybody doubt it? That was, we had a contract with America which stipulated that the produce of Great Britain should be admitted into the ports of the United States on the same terms upon which the produce of the most favoured nations was admitted; and also that Great Britain should extend the same advantages to the produce of America. No man, therefore, could doubt that we had a right to demand from America that she should admit our produce on the same terms as she received the produce of the Zollverein, though the Zollverein gave an equivalent, and we gave no equivalent. This was what was called an unconditional reciprocity; but nothing of the kind was to be found in our Treaties with Spain. Then, if the noble Lord's construction of those Treaties was the correct one—if, as he said, the good name of the country had been sacrificed by the present Government in regard to these Treaties, he must recollect that it was not the first time that that sacrifice had been made. That good name, if sacrificed at all, had been equally sacrificed by former Governments, of which the noble Lord was himself a member, inasmuch as, from the year 1819 onwards until now, Spain paid a higher rate of duties upon vessels, and in some instances upon produce coming into this country, than the produce and vessels of other nations paid, and never before demanded any relaxation of those higher duties, though it was known that those other nations had their products admitted at the lower rate of duty under reciprocity Treaties. It appeared to him, also, that the noble Lord had himself, when in office, acted in direct contradiction to the doctrine he now laid down.

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Let the House not forget the instructions sent out to Spain by the noble Lord himself when he held the seals of the Foreign Department. The noble Lord addressed a despatch to Lord Clarendon, then the British Ambassador at the Court of Madrid, authorizing and desiring him to negotiate a Treaty, the object of which would be to place this country in its intercourse with Spain upon the footing of the most favoured nation. He was entitled to say then, that in 1835, the noble Lord himself was not of opinion that the produce of Spain or her Colonies was entitled to come into this country upon the footing of that of the most favoured nation, or that we had a right to demand the introduction of our produce into Spain on those terms; for he in that year urged upon Spain the justice and expediency of agreeing to a new Treaty with us as the most favoured nation; while he and his Government, in the mean time, very properly withheld the same advantages from Spain, and while the ships of Spain were paying the higher rate of duties in our ports. He said, then, that it was never before supposed that Spain had the right which was now contended for. And although last year a new claim was started in regard to the ships of Denmark, up to that time, and long after, no question had arisen in reference to the ships of Spain. The noble Lord told them that the successive Governments to which he belonged had struggled hard; had maintained a constant struggle with Spain for the commercial rights of England. The noble Lord assured the House that the rights of Great Britain had been during his Administration at all times maintained, with great ingenuity of argument: still the country made no advance, we never got further. Possibly once a year or so a letter was written, or a remonstrance made, or a formal visit paid; but every one knew that no real progress was effected, and the merchants of this country had still to suffer their grievance, while the noble Lord was making from year to year most ingenious arguments in their favour. In 1841, the noble Lord instructed Mr. Aston to claim of Spain, on behalf of our goods, that they should be received in her ports on the footing of the products of the most favoured nations. The noble Lord said, there had been a constant struggle between the two countries on this subject. He was aware that there had been a constant passing of
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diplomatic notes and negotiations; but there had never been any recognition on the part of Spain of this equality. They never had led to any practical benefits. The noble Lord had demanded, amongst other things, that the linen of Great Britain should be admitted into Spain on the footing of that of the most favoured nations. But was it done? No such thing. It was done afterwards to all nations at once; but certainly it could not have been the object of the noble Lord to obtain that privilege for Belgium. [Viscount Palmerston: It was done by Treaty.] He begged pardon of the noble Lord. It was done by Treaty for Belgium, but it was not done by Treaty for us; but Spain then granted to us that advantage, at the same time that she gave it all other nations, and not till then. Mr. Bulwer, he was well aware, had demanded under the present Administration, that the ships of Great Britain should be admitted into Spanish ports, especially into the port of Barcelona, upon the same footing as French ships were admitted. But had that demand been conceded? No it had not been granted even up to this very hour. So that, in point of fact, during the whole time that the noble Lord was himself in power, England had continued to levy a differential duty on Spanish ships, while Spain pursued the same practice in reference to British ships; and when Great Britain demanded to be placed on the footing of the most favoured nations, those demands were refused, if not in word, yet in act, by Spain. He did not refer to this to show that both parties had failed to comply with their engagements to each other, but to show that those engagements were not what the noble Lord now stated them to be; and even if they bore the interpretation of the noble Lord, his accusations ought not to be made exclusively against the present Government. He had now done with that portion of the argument which went to show that the Treaties were not in full force. He conceived it had appeared clearly, both from the language and documents, as well as from the acts of the two Powers, that the ancient Treaties which continued in their full force to the year 1763, were not in full force after the war of the French Revolution, and were not in full force now, as the Treaty of 1814 only revived them to the full extent, and for the same purposes, as they existed previous to the Revolutionary

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War. He said, those old Treaties were not now in full force; but supposing that they were now in as full force as they were in 1763, when they received confirmation as to their objects and intentions; still, he contended, they did not stipulate for a minimum rate of duty on the produce of Spain imported into Great Britain, but merely placed the subjects of Spain, and all that belonged to those subjects, on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nations; and in speaking of subjects, of course it would be understood that those who were specifically meant were merchants—those engaged in trade. He would proceed to demonstrate—first, by the plain ostensible meaning of the words of the Treaties themselves; secondly, by the evidence of facts; and, lastly, by the absurd consequence which would follow an opposite construction — that the construction which he put upon those Treaties was the correct one. First, as to the plain meaning of the words, he objected to the principle of admitting any departure from the letter of a Treaty, for the purpose of carrying out what any particular person might understand to be its spirit, unless under particular circumstances, and upon the strongest evidence. As a general principle, it was dangerous to invoke the spirit of a Treaty against its letter. He did not mean to say that such a course was never to be justified; but what he said was, it could only be justified by the strongest evidence. For what was the object of a Treaty? It was to put the stipulations contracted for between two or more Powers beyond any doubt, and not to leave it in the power of any one of the parties at a future period to put upon the Treaty a different meaning from that intended. The words of the Treaty spoke for themselves, and in estimating the intention of the contracting parties, it was to those words they were to look. The feeling in the mind of the noble Lord, as to those Treaties, had, no doubt, arisen from the fact, that he measured the circumstances of the time when those Treaties were entered into, two hundred years ago, by a reference to the totally altered circumstances of the course of trade in the present day, to which they had no legitimate reference, and with which they had no connexion. Now, as to the letter of the Treaty there was no doubt—it stipulated for nothing but in reference to that which belonged
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to the subjects of Spain—not in reference to the produce of Spain generally. It might be said by the noble Lord, that that was absurd or unfair, and that to interpret those stipulations literally, would be to put too narrow a construction upon them—that you must put a gloss upon them, to make them more in accordance with justice and common sense. But he was prepared to show, from the circumstances of the time, that the literal meaning was the true meaning, and, at the same time, the rational meaning, and that the noble Lord's construction was neither the true one nor the rational one. On this point he was sure the House would agree with him, that it was a most unsafe doctrine to affirm generally that Treaties must change according to the circumstances of the time. If circumstances changed, the discretion of the parties revived, and though they were, no doubt, bound to carry out the spirit of the earlier Treaties, they were not entitled to make any inference from the circumstances of those earlier times, as compared with the present, and apply them as of compulsory obligation against the obvious meaning of the instruments themselves. He doubted not he could show that the rational meaning of the Treaty was opposed to the doctrine of the noble Lord; and the first step he should take for that purpose would be to refer them to what was called the Great Statute, which was well known in commercial law, as they would find it in "Foster's Digest," edition of 1727. In that Statute, the 12th Charles II., cap. 4, it would be found that two descriptions of customs' duties were granted by the Commons to the Crown; and the Statute proceeded to point out (that which had obviously escaped the notice of the noble Lord) that the mode then was to tax the same articles in a variety of different ways: sometimes they were taxed as particular commodities raised in particular countries—sometimes as particular commodities imported from particular countries—sometimes as particular commodities brought into particular ports—and sometimes they were taxed, and most commonly so, according to the country of the ships in which, and the parties by whom, they were imported. Now he wished the noble Lord to look well to these facts; for they were most important, as bearing upon his argument. The Great Statute of Charles II., which

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remained in force for a long series of years, and formed the basis of our customs' laws until a recent period, granted tonnage duties upon French wines imported into the port of London by British subjects of 4l. 10 s., and of 6l., if imported by aliens; upon the like wines at our out ports of 3l., if imported by British subjects, and of 4l. 10 s. by aliens; upon Spanish wines imported into London by British subjects, 2l. 5s.; by aliens, 3l.; Spanish wines imported into any out port by British subjects, 2l. 5s.; by aliens 3l.; upon Rhenish wine, into whatever port, if imported by British subjects, 1l.; if by aliens, 1l. 5s. There was also another tax imposed by the same measure upon exports, called poundage, which differed in like manner according as the exports were made by aliens or British subjects, between whom the House could not fail to observe there was throughout a desire to establish a distinction. Now, be felt convinced, that the interpretation he put upon the Treaties with Spain, viz., that they were intended only to secure, the interests of the subjects of the two countries respectively, was the correct one, and that the noble Lord's interpretation, which extended it to the produce of the two countries generally, was not the correct one. It was stipulated by England, that the goods of Spanish subjects should be treated in all respects the same as goods belonging to the subjects of the most favoured nation; but if the noble Lord's construction were the correct one, foreigners, who were the subjects of neither country, might import Spanish produce into England upon the same terms as could be imported by the subjects of Spain. The spirit of commercial legislation of that age generally, was to keep a monopoly of the trade of each country in the hands of its own subjects; therefore it was not likely that the King of Spain would stipulate that Spanish produce should be received by Great Britain from foreigners of whatsoever country, upon the footing of the most favoured nation; but what he stipulated for, no doubt, was, that Spanish produce belonging to Spanish subjects should be received on the footing of the most favoured nation. The spirit as well as the letter of the Treaty was in favour of that construction which the noble Lord treated so contemptuously. The noble Lord might urge that if his construction of the Treaty were too wide, it were better to err on the liberal side, and rather to
572
put a construction too wide than too narrow upon any Treaty; but he would meet this argument by proceeding to show that if the noble Lord's construction of the Treaty was too wide as to imports, it was too narrow as to exports. How, for example, could it answer the purpose of the Spanish exporter of woollen cloth, that there should be a relaxation of the duties on the import of Spanish goods? Such a Treaty as we had with Venezuela would not be sufficient to answer the conditions under which trade was formerly carried on. It would not have met the enactment of the law by which the alien was taxed; and if the stipulations were interpreted in the sense of the noble Lord, they would, so far, be useless for Spanish subjects residing in England. He contended, then, that the rational construction of the Treaty was as much in favour of his views, and against that of the noble Lord, as was the literal one. Again, he would show that the distinction he had attempted to draw between the subjects of a country and its produce was not a mere fanciful one, but was supported by history. It was well known, he believed, that the Treaty with Portugal — the Methuen Treaty, had never been made the subject of evasion, and had never failed to cover those cases in regard to Portugal which it was now alleged the Spanish Treaties did not cover in reference to Spain. It had been effective for all its purposes. That Treaty provided that the wine of Portugal should pay a less customs' duty than was charged upon the wine of France. If this Methuen Treaty had been framed in the same terms as the Spanish Treaty, he admitted that would be a strong point in the noble Lord's favour; but if he could show that in that Treaty a form of expression altogether different was adopted, that was a strong though a negative argument in favour of the interpretation for which he (Mr. Gladstone) contended. By the second Methuen Treaty we were bound to admit the wines of Portugal—not of the subjects of Portugal, be it observed, into Great Britain at a rate of duty one-third below that which was charged upon French wines; and the Treaty further stipulated, that at no time and under no circumstances, whether there were peace or war between the kingdoms of Great Britain and France, should a higher rate of duty be demanded upon such wines, (not from such subjects, remember,) either

573
as customs' duties or otherwise, and whether imported in pipes, hogsheads, bottles, or in any other way. The House would observe, then, that when the object was to secure a minimum duty on the produce of a country, a form of expression was adopted differing from that which was to be found in the Spanish Treaties. Again, the Treaty entered into in 1787, by Mr. Pitt with France; that was a Treaty for the benefit of the subjects of Great Britain and France as to the duties charged in respect to their goods, on the produce of either country, and the form of expression varied accordingly. He was going to quote another authority, to which he begged to call the attention of the noble Lord, because he was going to quote the noble Lord himself. He would show as plainly as possible, that in the Treaties concluded by the noble Lord, he recognised the distinction which he had called on the House that night to repudiate. He would take the Treaty which the noble Lord had concluded with the Netherlands in 1837, and which was to be found in the 5th volume of Hertslet. In this Treaty it was provided that "in matters of commerce and navigation," (and he had observed the triumph of the noble Lord when he noticed the word "commerce" in Spanish Treaties; that term, the noble Lord said, was so large, it covered every thing,) there should be hereafter granted to the subjects of the respective Sovereigns the same privileges which were granted to the subjects of the most favoured nations. The following was the Article:—
"There shall be reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation between and amongst the subjects of the two high contracting parties; and the subjects of the two Sovereigns respectively, shall not pay in the ports, harbours, roads, cities, towns, or places whatsoever in either kingdom, any other or higher duties, taxes, or imposts, under whatsoever names designated or included, than those which are there paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation; and the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, liberties, favours, immunities, and exemptions, in matters of commerce and navigation, that are granted, or may hereafter be granted, in either kingdom, to the subjects of the most favoured nation."
If that Article had stood alone, no doubt some plausible and able ex-Minister, 200 years hence, might argue that all articles the produce of that country, ought to be
574
admitted into Great Britain on equal terms with those of the most favoured nation, and would be supported by the noble Lord's argument of to-night. But was that the view of the noble Lord in 1837? No such thing. Another clause was inserted with regard to produce. The noble Lord, wishing to provide for the produce of the two countries, did it by a distinct stipulation properly framed for the purpose, which he would proceed to quote:—
"No duty of customs or other impost shall be charged upon any goods the produce of one country, upon importation, by sea or by land, from such country into the other, higher than the duty or impost charged upon goods of the same kind the produce of or imported from any other country; and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, do hereby bind and engage themselves, not to grant any favour, privilege, or immunity, in matters of commerce and navigation, to the subjects of any other State, which shall not be also, and at the same time, extended to the subjects of the other high contracting party, gratuitously, if the concession in favour of the other State shall have been gratuitous; and on giving as nearly as possible the same compensation or equivalent, in case the concession shall have been conditional."
The First Clause was intended only to protect the persons of those subjects against demands; but not to protect the produce irrespective of ownership. He (Mr. Gladstone) had shown, therefore, that after the noble Lord had provided in 1837, in the largest terms, for the privileges of subjects, so sensible was he then that this provision would not cover the produce of the country, that he inserted another clause, having that end in view. The "village attorney" distinction was also recognised in the Treaty of Turkey of 1838. The First Article of the Treaty differed from the Article of the Treaty of the Netherlands in this respect, that it gave the privileges of the most favoured nation, not only to subjects, but to ships:—
"All rights, privileges, and immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of Great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties, are confirmed now and for ever, except in as far as they may be specifically altered by the present Convention; and it is moreover expressly stipulated, that all rights, privileges, or immunities which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power, or which it may suffer the

575
ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power to enjoy, shall be equally granted to, and exercised and enjoyed by, the subjects and ships of Great Britain."
The very pointing out of "ships" made it clear what was the object of the contracting parties. The Articles also contained a stipulation that if hereafter better terms were granted to any other countries, Great Britain should have the benefit of them. But, notwithstanding that, although the Treaty was signed, he found a separate document added to the Treaty, under the name of "Additional Articles." There was an Article providing that the produce of Great Britain should be admitted at the lowest duty of the most favoured nation. Its being appended to the Treaty in a separate instrument, showed more distinctly that the necessity for it was felt, and that it could not be treated as surplusage. Now the lowest duty paid by other nations was 3 per cent.; and on referring to the fifth volume of Hertslet, it would be seen that the Article provided that—
"All articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and its dependencies, and all merchandise, of whatsoever description, embarked in British vessels, and being the properly of British subjects, or being brought overland, or by sea, from other countries by the same, shall be admitted, as heretofore, into all parts of the Ottoman dominions, without exception, on the payment of 3 per cent. duty, calculated upon the value of such articles."
They would observe that the Article stipulated not only for the produce of British subjects, but also for all produce owned by British subjects; therefore the object of the negotiators must have been to prevent its being supposed that the former Article was sufficient to carry all the stipulations in favour of "commerce." He had now illustrated the broad distinction of phraseology, which corresponded with the not less broad distinction of rights which the phraseology conveyed. He must now go to the evidence of facts; and again he entreated the attention of those who might be disposed, at first sight, to adopt the view of the noble Lord. He did not know how the noble Lord was to get over the facts he should adduce. He hoped they should have specific answers to them, and not generalities. The first of the Acts to which he would refer, was framed before 1667, and it gave a privilege to the wines of Madeira and of particular countries, which was not extended to Spain. That
576
exceptional privilege was in force when the Treaty of 1667 was made, and they who put the construction of the noble Lord on that Treaty must show that that privilege was abrogated. In 1668, the very first year after the formation of the Treaty with Spain, they would find in Anderson's History of Commerce, that a differential duty was laid on Spanish wine, as compared with French wine. Anderson said, that—
"A duty of 4d. was imposed on every quart of French wine retailed, and of 6d. on every quart of Spanish or other wine."
That might be intended to operate as a discouragement upon Spanish wine, and to tax it according to its strength. It might be said that it was a duty of excise; but in its bearing upon the Treaty, he wanted to know how they could reconcile it with their construction, if the stipulations extended to Spanish wines. That Treaty, made in 1667, was, according to the noble Lord, broken in 1668. That breach, if such it were, was not remonstrated against, and the Treaty was renewed very quietly in 1670. He had another example, and with respect to examples there might be hundreds of them. He had picked out such as he could find by very limited inquiry; they must not suppose it probable that these constituted the whole. In the first year of James II.—he had given a case before the Treaty, and he had given a case a year after the Treaty; he would now give one fifteen years after the Treaty—in the first of James II., in 1685, when we came into the most dishonourably close relations with France, there was a disposition to form a differential taxation in her favour; and a duty was imposed upon French wine of 8l. a tun, whilst upon all other wines, Spanish wines included, a duty of 12 l. a tun was imposed. How did the noble Lord get over that circumstance? He wished that the noble Lord had read the history and the facts of the case, before he had made his ingenious speech. It was not a small differential duty. Here was a distinction of 4l. a tun on the wine; 8l. a tun on French wine at the time when these Treaties of the noble Lord were in full vigour, and 12 l. a tun imposed on Spanish wine, and that without the smallest intention of going against the Treaty on our part, or the smallest complaint on the part of Spain. He would now take the case of Snuff. By the 12th George I.—
"Snuff, if imported in British ships, is

577
rated to pay 2s. 6d. in the pound from the plantations in America and the Spanish West Indies, and 5s. if imported from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and all other parts, except France."
This as it stood appeared to give a favour to France not enjoyed by other countries; but as he was not certain that he was in possession of the whole case, he would not greatly rely on it, and only quoted it as an apparent instance in his favour. In 1784 Spanish wines paid a small sum more duty than Portuguese wines. According to M'Culloch, Spanish wine paid 4s. 10 d. per gallon, and Portuguese 4s. 8¾d., Spanish wine paying 1¼d. more. In 1787, they came to Mr. Pitt's tariff, which imposed a number of differential duties, operating, of course, against Spain, as compared with France. He would show them that after America had become independent, and while these Treaties were in full vigour, Spanish tobacco was liable to pay, and did pay, a higher duty than American tobacco. In a table which he held in his hand the following duties appeared:—

Duty on American Tobacco.

Duty on Spanish or Portuguese Tobacco.

s.

d.

s.

d.

1789

1

3

3

0

1790

1

3

3

6

1796

1

7

4

6

1806

2

2

13–20ths.

5

4

19–20ths

1815

3

2

5

5½

1819

4

0

6

0

1825

3

0

5

0

They would observe that he had now shown them an immense number of differential duties and privileges, reaching from 1663 to 1825. It might be said that was a good arrangement for us to act upon with the United States; but what came of the construction of the noble Lord with respect to tobacco? He had shown them that in many things, from a long continued stream of precedents to this hour, we laid on particular articles of Spanish produce a very much higher duty than we placed on the same articles coming from other dominions, which were, therefore, mere favoured nations with respect to this produce. [Mr. Ward: Was the tobacco in the same state?] In the same state. He had wearied the House with these instances; because he had shown a series of laws embodying from time to time provisions that perhaps could only be justified by what the noble Lord called "the village attorney's argument." He had told them that at this day they were charging differential duties on the ships
578
of Spain, and that they were also at this day charging differential duties on certain goods. With regard to the differential duties on Spanish ships in different ports, at seventy-one ports in Great Britain there were charges made on Spanish vessels over and above those made on British vessels. They were most unequal at different ports; but at Belfast, for instance, on a ship of 600 tons and upwards, the charge on a Spanish vessel was 6l.; on a British vessel, or on a French or a Swedish vessel, not a steamer, 2l. 10 s. At Hull, again, the difference of duty was as great as at Belfast. And, again, as respected goods, we had in exports all that distinction which attached on the nationality of the vessel. While a Turkish ship was allowed, not by Treaty, but by discretion, to carry coals free, a Spanish ship paid 4s. a ton, and no Power had questioned our right to levy that sum. There was also a trifling difference with respect to refined sugar. The bounty on the exportation of refined loaf sugar in British ships was 1l. 4s. per cwt.; in a Spanish ship, it was 1s. less. Therefore he had shown, with respect both to ships and to produce, proof that restrictive Acts were constantly passed by the Legislature in the case of Spain, with the perfect consent of Spain, and without the smallest taint on our honour. The produce of Spain, and even the ships of Spain, were taxed from time to time, according to the good will and pleasure of the British Parliament, which was not limited by any stipulations of Treaties, which were clearly shown to be irrelevant with reference to this subject. It might be said that the precedents he had shown were more on the side of England than of Spain. It might be said, that for a period of 200 years they had misconstrued the Treaty on the side of England. But he had already reminded the House of the Family Compact which had been entered into, by which Spain put the same construction on the Treaty that they had. They would admit that these Treaties had bound Spain to give to England the same footing as that of the most favoured nations; but the Family Compact said "no," France and Naples would be entitled to protest against it; and of the Family Compact he must observe, that it was undoubtedly at variance with the Treaties. The personal privileges which, as he contended, they guaranteed upon the footing of the most favoured nation, were the very privileges in which it granted peculiar and exclusive favour to Naples and to France.

579
With regard, then, to those privileges, there was considerable reason to think that the Family Compact was at complete variance with the noble Lord's construction of those Treaties. By the consent of both parties, these Treaties were allowed to go out of force; and if so, it could not now be contended that they could bring them into force again without the consent of both parties; and even if it were so argued, he had shown that they would be utterly worthless, so far as supporting the noble Lord's position—namely, equality of taxation. There was one Article of these Treaties that was remarkable, by reason of the solemn and peculiar language by which it was characterized in respect to its being made a provision for all times to come, by which it declared that the subjects of Great Britain should not be liable to pay any higher duties in Spain, than those they were liable to pay in the reign of Charles II. of Spain. In the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, there was this singular expression—"His Catholic Majesty ordains now and in future, as an inviolable law," &c. In the Treaty of Madrid, in 1750, the same expressions were used as to the inviolability of the law. With regard, however, to this so-called inviolable law, these duties of Charles II. of Spain ceased to be in force long before the war commenced between Great Britain and France, or France and Spain. These Treaties were incompatible with the construction put upon them by the noble Lord. In one place, this Treaty seemed to be equivalent to a limit of 10 per cent. duty on the imports and exports of Spain. He was amused when he heard the noble Lord say, "Don't force a construction of the Treaty like this upon Spain;" as if the noble Lord's construction could be enforced! Did the noble Lord think that the construction which he put upon the Treaties, granted that minimum duty which he argued in favour of, in respect to British produce in Spain? Now, he asked him, did he think that this country would be justified in forcing the observance of his construction at the point of the sword, and in the face of these Acts? [Lord J. Russell: Spain seeks for it.] Yes; Spain seeks for it from us, but refuses it to us. It was only lately that, in consequence of events which had passed in this country, Spain thought that there was a point to be raised—an opening for her to take advantage of—and she immediately propounded a doctrine diametrically in opposition, not only to her own law and practice as
580
it had subsisted for 200 years, but as it stood at the present day. Let it be remembered that Spain was levying duties upon English ships which she did not impose upon the vessels of France, even at the moment when her Envoy had presented the letter then upon the Table of the House. He should certainly shrink from the responsibility of trying to force upon Spain such a construction of those Treaties as that for which the noble Lord had contended, in opposition to the continued acts and the innumerable declarations of the organs of Government of both countries. He should now proceed to examine what the results of the noble Lord's views would lead to; and he thought he should be able to show that the arguments urged by the noble Lord involved so much absurdity that they were actually fatal to his own interpretation of the Treaties. It was a rule in international law, long laid down, and always acted upon, that if a peculiar construction of a Treaty involved an absurdity, that the very fact militated against the justice of such construction. Now, he was prepared to show two consequences which must of necessity follow, if the interpretation put by the noble Lord upon the Treaties with Spain were to be adopted and acted upon. The first of these results was the undoubted one, that every reciprocity Treaty subsisting between England and any other country would be immediately cancelled and rendered needless, or else there must be a change made in the fundamental rules upon which reciprocity Treaties were at present based. The rule heretofore adopted as the basis of reciprocity had been, that inasmuch as a British shipowner could not employ his ships under the heavy fines to which they were liable on entering foreign ports, it was therefore absolutely essential, in order that he might so employ them, that a reciprocal Treaty should be entered into with those Foreign Powers, whereby those double duties were withdrawn. In all cases, therefore, when reciprocity Treaties were entered into, Great Britain granted to the ships of the Powers so treating, the same privileges in her ports as were enjoyed by her own ships, and received in return equal advantages. But under the noble Lord's construction of the Treaty with Spain, Denmark, which had Treaties corresponding, as he inclined to think, in substance with those of Spain, would obtain all the advantages of these reciprocity Treaties on her side, without granting any in return, as he would show. Supposing the

581
doctrine of the noble Lord held good, namely, that Spain, and therefore, Denmark, was entitled to be placed in all respects upon the same footing as the most favoured nations, would not the immediate consequence have been that it would have been utterly impossible to enter into a reciprocity Treaty with Denmark? For would not Denmark be in a condition to say that she was entitled to send her ships into the ports of England upon an equality with English ships, immediately that we had granted the privilege of equality to Prussia or any other power? Whereas she was under no necessity whatever of granting any exemptions in favour of English merchant bottoms, which she would accordingly retain the right of placing under double or any other charges; and Denmark having the cheapest and most economical mercantile navy in Europe, she would be enabled to sail to all the English ports with her ships at half the cost of the ships of this country. Spain would stand in precisely the same situation; and, the duties on English vessels in Spanish ports being extremely heavy, the whole of the carrying trade must of necessity be diverted into another channel. Now, if the principle upon which Mr. Huskisson proceeded in entering into reciprocity Treaties with Foreign States was looked at, it would be found to consist simply in the determination on his part to grant to those countries precisely the same advantages that they accorded to England; and therefore it was that he asserted it to be impossible to admit the noble Lord's construction of the Spanish Treaties to be correct, seeing that if adopted, it would take it out of the power of this country to exclude Denmark from the benefit arising from those reciprocity Treaties, without herself being under any obligation to grant any such advantages as her ships enjoyed to the vessels of Great Britain. The noble Lord appeared to feel the force of the argument he (Mr. Gladstone) was then urging, and to have framed the prayer of his Address to the Crown accordingly; for he did not pray that the Crown would be pleased to give directions to admit the sugars of Cuba at the same rate of duty as those from Java; but he prayed that—
"The subjects of the Queen of Spain should be permuted to import into the United Kingdom all the productions of the territories or possessions of the Spanish Crown, paying thereupon no higher duties of customs than are paid by the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nations on the importation of like
582
articles, being the production of the territories or possessions of such nations."
If such a regulation were to be adopted and enforced, what would necessarily follow? Whenever a cask of Havana sugar was imported, they would be obliged to inquire into its ownership. When they had ascertained who was the owner, they would have to ascertain his nationality, and then his denizenship — they would have to do all this—for all that the noble Lord could contend was, that the Treaties were absolute with regard to produce in the hands of Spanish subjects, and that they could not lay higher duties upon it in the hands of Spanish subjects, than they could impose upon the same produce imported from other countries. Such a course of proceeding would require a system so glaringly at variance with the whole course and tendency of the present commercial legislation of this country as to amount to an absurdity, springing, of course always, from the noble Lord's construction of the Treaties. He would soon approach the consideration of that part of the case which, he was quite ready to admit, was the weakest and least satisfactory portion of it. He (Mr. Gladstone) had endeavoured to show that the construction put upon the Treaties with Spain by the noble Lord, was contradicted and refuted by the practices of both countries, during a period extending over nearly 200 years; he (Mr. Gladstone) was ready to grant so much to the noble Lord as to admit that, according to the then course of trade, the Articles of the Treaties referred to were intended to have an effect nearly analogous to that which, under present circumstances, would be sought for through a most favoured nation clause, for the produce of the two countries. ["Hear, hear," from the Opposition.] He repeated, an effect analogous, but yet very far from being the same—so far from being the same, as to be quite incapable of being transferred, bodily as it were, in the way the noble Lord proposed, to circumstances and a course of legislation so materially different—even without any reference to the proof he had given, that the force of the Treaties in question was not the same as it originally was. But, adverting in part, to the true construction of the Treaties as he had explained it—in part to the fact, that in some degree those Treaties had been set aside by both parties,

583
their effect was—as he had in a preceding part of his observations contended—to assert generally, the principles of amity and of fair and equitable dealing between the two countries, and to impose upon both, as he thought, an honourable obligation to proceed to the formation of a new engagement, founded upon principles of reciprocity and equality in all points; unless when there might be urgent cause for introducing any special exception. He would not enter upon the question of policy. He would deal simply with the arguments affecting the construction and the vitality of the Treaties, leaving it to others to enter upon the policy of the question. Besides what he had already conceded, he would grant also, (and this he regarded as the weakest part of the case,) that it was true, that upon several occasions this country had demanded of Spain the recognition of our right to be treated on the footing of the most favoured nation. Such a demand was made by Mr. Bulwer perhaps, certainly by Mr. Aston. Mr. Bulwer made a demand on the Court of Spain that British ships should be placed on an equality with the vessels of France. But be considered with reference to the present question, precisely in the same light as produce. There could be no British ships which were the property of other than British subjects. The law required that such should be the condition of being admitted to British registry. But when it was attempted to demand the equality of British ships with those of the most favoured nations in Spanish ports, it was quite clear to him that such a demand could not be enforced under any existing Treaty with Spain; and he must say, he thought the instructions given by the noble Lord in this respect were most extraordinary to be issued by a Foreign Secretary, who must, of necessity, have known that there were differential duties established in England, and at that moment levied on the vessels of Spain, and on all foreign vessels which did not enjoy some peculiar exemption, by Treaty or otherwise. But neither the demand made by Mr. Aston, nor that put forward by Mr. Bulwer, was granted by the Spanish Court, nor had it ever been conceded since; indeed, he might say, it had never since been repeated. But, because the British Government thought proper in the
584
year 1837, or 1840, to deviate from its own invariable line of conduct, adhered to during a period of nearly 200 years, and made a claim which ought not to have been made, and which could not be justified under the existing Treaties—was that circumstance to overrule and to render null such facts and such arguments as he had advanced? Was it, he asked, to be said, that one party to a Treaty was to be permitted to refuse everything stipulated for under that Treaty up to the year 1845, and then to be at liberty to enforce those stipulations in a sense quite opposed to the construction which they had always previously held? It was true, Mr. Bulwer did not peremptorily claim to have his demands conceded. He simply made a request to have British ships put upon the same footing with French vessels; but what he (Mr. Gladstone) contended for was, that whatever his recent demand might have been, and however erroneously made, if made upon the supposed ground of a right under Treaty, it was utterly impossible to set aside the facts to which he had referred; whereby it was clearly and completely shown that both parties had acted upon the same construction of the Treaties in third proposition, that the produce of the Spanish Colonies could not fall within the scope of the Treaties for the purposes of this Motion. The noble Lord had argued, that the policy of Spain had been to secure for her colonists a privilege, or, at least, to exempt them from a prohibition, affecting the subjects of Spain in the mother country; that the Treaty did not prevent the subjects of Spain from sailing from Cuba to England. [Viscount Palmerston: I said they were included in the general admission of the Treaty of 1667, and not excluded by that of 1670.] Now, if the noble Lord referred to the Eighth Article of the Treaty, he would find that the West Indian Colonies were excluded, though rather in an indirect way. As to the Treaty of 1670, the noble Lord quoted an Article from it as to the exclusion of the West Indian Colonies. Now, he confessed that he was not prepared, in his own individual judgment to maintain Lord Aberdeen's position, precisely as he found it in the letter to the Duke of Sotomayor. The noble Lord said—
"While, therefore, the Treaty of 1667 gave generally to the subjects of Great Britain and Spain, respectively, the privileges of the most

585
favoured nation, the trade belonging to the West Indian Colonies of the two countries was expressly excluded from the enjoyment of the privileges so conferred. Subsequently to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1670, all trade with the West Indian Colonies of Great Britain was prohibited to the subjects of Spain, nor could the produce of Cuba and Porto Rico have found admission into English ports, inasmuch as the Navigation Law then in force would have prevented its importation in any other than British ships; while the Treaty of 1670 prevented its conveyance from Cuba by those British ships which alone could legally import it. Hence it follows that, admitting that the Treaty of 1667 conferred upon the subjects of Spain the position of the most favoured nation in British ports, yet that privilege could not, subsequently to 1670, have belonged to Spanish West India trade, because, under the terms of the Treaty of 1670, such trade could not have been carried on with British ports."
He confessed that, when Lord Aberdeen argued that that was conclusive, it did not quite satisfy him; because, supposing there was no dispute as to the question of "subject or produce," and supposing, for argument' sake, our navigation laws were abolished in favour of Holland, and that Java sugar came to us from Amsterdam, it was very questionable whether Spain would not be entitled to ask that her Cuba produce should be admissible from Cadiz. But with regard to the noble Lord's interpretation, it tilled him with astonishment; for surely nothing could be more distinct than the Eighth Article of the Treaty:—
"The subjects and inhabitants, captains, masters of ships, mariners of the kingdoms, provinces and dominions of each confederate respectively, shall abstain and forbear to sail and trade in the ports and havens which have fortifications, castles, magazines, or warehouses; and in all other places whatsoever possessed by the other party in the West Indies, to wit, the King of Great Britain shall not sail unto, and trade in, the havens and places which the Catholic King holdeth in the said Indies; nor in like manner shall the subjects of the King of Spain sail unto, or trade in, those places which are possessed there by the King of Great Britain."
The noble Lord's argument was, that the inhabitants of the Spanish West Indies had the power, under the Treaty, of coming here. Did he mean to contend that the inhabitants of Cuba should enjoy an advantage not possessed by the mother country? But his argument was, that however they disposed of the questions of subjects and commerce, and whether it were true or not that Spain had a fair
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claim to ask for the admission of Cuba sugar through Cadiz, supposing we admitted Java sugar through Amsterdam, still an absolute and unfettered control over the trade and commerce between England and the Spanish West Indies was reserved by the Treaty of 1670, which the noble Lord forgot or omitted to refer to. By the Ninth Article of the Treaty of 1670 it was provided—
"That if at any time thereafter, either King should think fit to grant to the subjects of the other any general or particular license or privileges of navigating to, and trading in, any places under his obedience, the said navigation and trade should be exercised and maintained according to the form, tenour, and effect of the said permissions or privileges to be allowed and given."
Giving any construction to the question of "subjects," and allowing "subjects" to involve "produce," it was impossible to deny that the control of the trade between Cuba and England included that produce of Cuba which formed the whole subject-matter of the trade. Here was an absolute control with respect to the conditions on which each Power might think fit to grant to the other a right to trade with its Colonies: and we had it in our discretion alone to grant to Spain just as much and as little of that Colonial trade as we pleased, and to fix any duties we pleased. The noble Lord must have overlooked this Article; otherwise it was so material that he would have seen it was not perfectly straightforward to omit it. The Eighth Article was not left to stand alone; but, to obviate mistake, it was followed by another which added, with respect to the Colonial trade—which was interdicted for the present—that if at any time it should be given, it should be under such laws as each Power in its free discretion should think fit to assign. The sugars brought from Cuba to England could not be separated from the trade between Cuba and England; and the power to regulate the trade between them must enable us to determine what duty should be paid. But the noble Lord said, that the navigation laws prevented all trade with Cuba at that time: that, however, was not the case; the produce might have come in British ships. The plain language, however, defied misconstruction, either at the hands of a pettifogging village attorney, or (which was much more formidable) an ex-Foreign

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Secretary. In the Treaty of 1814, the two Powers again came in contact; and Spain yielded to England, then her liberator, he apprehended, on account of the peculiar relative position of the two countries, a valuable privilege without an equivalent. She undertook, that if at any time the American Colonies should be opened to other countries, England should have as great benefit therefrom as any other Power. That was perfectly a one-sided engagement. And here he must say he could not concur in the optimising views of the noble Lord as to England's rejection of any exclusive advantages. He could not take credit for the moderation of England, when he often saw she engrossed great advantages. But it was impossible to think that she preferred a request which, according to the noble Lord's argument, was mere surplusage. Now he maintained that, according to every rational supposition, and according to the Treaty of 1670, Great Britain was not, as to her Colonial trade, put on the footing of the most favoured nation until 1814; and it followed that Spain had no claim to have her Colonies so treated up to the present moment. Now he came to one of the last proofs which he should adduce. The noble Lord said, it devolved on his side to prove that Spain was now treated on the footing of the most favoured nations. In the first place, the privilege as to Colonies was granted to us in 1824; we did not give similar privileges until 1828. Did they suppose it took four years to determine whether we should allow Spanish ships to trade to our Colonies? No; we granted the privilege, not as an obligation imposed by Treaty, but as an independent act of our own discretion, as an act of fairness and equity. By the Order in Council it was apparent that this privilege was not granted to Spain alone, but to her in common with other nations; for in the recital it was said that our Colonies should be opened to those countries which had opened theirs to our traders. The Order in Council, dated April the 28th, 1828, ran as follows:—
"Whereas the conditions mentioned and referred to in the said Acts of Parliament have not in all respects been fulfilled by the Government of His Most Catholic Majesty the King of Spain; and, therefore, the privileges so granted as aforesaid by the Law of Navigation of foreign ships cannot lawfully be exercised
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or enjoyed by the ships of Spain, unless His Majesty, by his Order in Council, shall grant the whole or any of such privileges to such Spanish ships. And whereas His Majesty, by and with the advice, &c., doth deem it expedient to grant the privileges aforesaid, in certain cases, to ships of the dominions of His Most Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, His Majesty doth therefore, by the advice aforesaid, and in pursuance, &c., declare and grant that it shall and may be lawful for Spanish ships to import into any of the British possessions abroad, from the Colonies and foreign plantations of His Most Catholic Majesty, goods, the produce of those Colonies and possessions, and to export goods from such British possessions abroad, to be carried to any foreign country whatever."
This had no reference to obligation or Treaties; and the privilege conceded was not a general privilege to Spanish ships to sail to British Colonies, but only from the Colonies and foreign possessions of Spain. But at that time there were in existence Orders in Council, granting to other European Powers the privilege of sailing from Europe to the British Colonies, and carrying on the European trade with them. There was such an order in the case of Prussia, issued in 1826; and orders had been issued since, even under the noble Lord's Administration, granting to other countries greater privileges with regard to the Colonial trade than Spain ever had, or now possessed: for instance, to Hamburgh, to Denmark, to Sweden, to Austria, was granted the privilege of trading with our Colonies from Europe. Upon the whole, here was a mass of circumstantial evidence which must remove any primâ facie impression to the contrary, which might arise, and which, he was free to confess, in his mind had arisen upon his first cursory examination of the Treaties. The obligation of these Treaties—and he wished that obligation to be estimated, not as it might stand with a political party, for its own purposes, but as it would stand before a solemn tribunal of jurists—could no longer be deemed so fresh and so entire as to justify the one Power in making absolute demands upon the other, in respect of each and every provision that they contained; and though demands had been made by ourselves (and he thought improperly), they had not been granted by Spain, nor had we enforced them, But even if they were as much alive as on the day when they were reduced to writing, they did not contain what the noble Lord supposed; and he had shown by laws and Treaties of

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every form and age, spreading over the whole stream of history, and applicable to both Powers, that the noble Lord's construction was contradicted by practice, while it would also have been irrational with reference to the course of legislation and of trade. And, lastly, notwithstanding the disadvantage occasioned by the demand made by the noble Lord (which the acts of his Government were all the time contradicting), the stipulations could not be shown to have the smallest reference to the trade which might be carried on between Great Britain and the West Indian possessions of the Spanish Crown, because over that trade an entire discretion was preserved; and though it was a good rule to resolve against ourselves any doubt which might arise, and if, consequently the foregoing arguments should be waved, the question of the trade with the Colonies, and of the produce when it went to constitute that trade, was clearly and entirely under our control. He had not knowingly passed by any fact bearing upon the case; and he now commended that case to the judgment of the House, with confidence that whatever might be the first appearance of this matter to those who were content to look at some passage quoted in the public journals, yet if he could only secure a deliberate attention to all the particulars which entered into the material of a just judgment, there was not the slightest cause to fear the issue at which the judgment of the British House of Commons would arrive; and that national faith, for which the noble Lord was so tenderly considerate, would be seen to be as safe, with reference to the question now before that House, in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, as it had been at any former period of our history.
Mr. Labouchere: When the right hon. Gentleman promised to speak at length on such a subject as that, it was impossible, from his known character, not to anticipate a speech of ingenuity and ability; but he must be permitted to say, that if the right hon. Gentleman had had greater confidence in the strength of his case, he would have considerably shortened his speech. At all events, he should illustrate the soundness of his views, by making a much shorter speech. And he could not believe that to come to a just decision on a question of this kind, it was necessary to dwell on the nice and intricate points which the right hon. Gentleman had discussed.
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He must remind the right hon. Gentleman of the declaration which he made towards the close of his speech, that any plain man reading the terms of those Treaties (which Lord Aberdeen and his Colleagues admitted to be valid once, and as regulating the commerce of Spain), must say, that the claim of Spain was founded in justice. [Mr. Gladstone: I said a plain man might in ignorance so construe it.] It certainly took you a long time to combat the "plain man's" conclusion. It would, indeed, be an unfortunate thing for nations if their meaning could not be interpreted from their communications with each other, unless distilled through the mass of historical references through which the right hon. Gentleman had waded. But the right hon. Gentleman said, if they consulted history, the meaning of these Treaties would be found very different from what it appeared. He should not go back even to Mr. Pitt's time; but he asked, what was the nature of the Treaties approved of by the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman held the office of President of the Board of Trade? He referred to the demand made in July, 1842, by this country, founded on the Treaty of 1667, to be put on the footing of the most favoured nation in the ports of Spain. He would read the letter of Mr. Aston to the Spanish Minister on the subject, and the expression of approval by the Earl of Aberdeen, and the House might then judge what construction had been put by Her Majesty's Government on this very Treaty, so late as the year 1842, and how it was to be reconciled with the interpretation they at present advocated. On the 3rd of July, in that year, Mr. Aston addressed the following despatch to Count Almodovar, the Spanish Minister:—
"Madrid, July 3, 1842.
"Sir—In pursuance of instructions from my Government, I addressed two representations to the Spanish Government, the first on the 29th of April, 1841, the second on the 2nd of January, 1842, respecting the injurious effect produced upon the British linen trade by the high rate of duties imposed upon that article in the Spanish Tariff, which amount almost to a prohibition of the importation of British linen into Spain. To these representations I have not, hitherto, received a definitive answer.
"I consider it the more necessary to call your Excellency's attention to this subject, since it appears probable that the Spanish Government

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will shortly obtain from the Cortes the necessary authority for the revision of the existing Tariff; and it is my duty to state to your Excellency, that in any reduction which may be in contemplation of the actual duties upon foreign linens, Her Majesty's Government will justly expect that British linen shall be treated as favourably as the same article, the manufacture of any other country.—I have, &c.
(Signed) "ARTHUR ASTON."
Mr. Gladstone: I did not say that that demand was made under the Treaty, but that the demand which the noble Lord made through Mr. Aston on the Spanish Government was made under the Treaty.
Mr. Laboucherescarcely supposed the right hon. Gentleman would resort to an unworthy ambiguity. When the British Minister at Madrid was instructed to press this demand on the Spanish Government, it must have been founded on the existing Commercial Treaty between the two Governments. Lord Aberdeen's letter was as follows:—
"Foreign Office, Aug. 15, 1842.
"Sir—With reference to your despatch of the 16th ult., I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government have approved the note which you addressed to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that if the Spanish Government should reduce the duty upon any foreign linens, Her Majesty's Government will expect that the same reduction shall apply to British linens.—I am, &c.
(Signed) "ABERDEEN."
He thought these despatches offered sufficient proof to the House that when it was convenient, and suited the purposes of the Government of this country, to put a more strict interpretation on these Treaties, they were not considered to be so confused, so obsolete, such a mass of rubbish, that there was no making anything of them; but Government found in them a distinct principle, importing that England had a right to be treated, with respect to duties on goods, on the footing of the most favoured nation. The right hon. Gentleman, in the course of his speech, made an admission which he (Mr. Labouchere) thought was one of great importance, that if you looked not to the strict letter of those Treaties, nor to particular infractions of them which had taken place since they were formed, but to the analogy of the case, and the spirit of the contracting parties when the Treaties were made, and applied it to the present state of things, this was more hard to defend than
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any other part of the subject. That was exactly what he contended for; that we ought to look at those Treaties, not in a spirit of cavil, but with a view to see what was their true spirit and intention. If they were to be carried into effect at the present day in the same spirit in which they were framed, we must give to Spain those advantages which we concede to every other foreign country, as far as could be practically effected. Doubtless these Treaties were full of confusion as applied to the circumstances of the day; the whole trade of the world had been changed in its course—but still the principle held good. There were some facts, notorious to all the world, which the right hon. Gentleman had omitted to mention, which showed that the two Governments had been inclined to carry that principle into effect. Spain was long anxious to exclude all nations from her Colonies—it was a capital principle of the old Spanish policy, which had such fatal effects on her prosperity and greatness—but there was one exception, that of the Asiento Contract, which opened to England a direct trade in slaves to the Spanish Colonies; and, indirectly, a large smuggling trade. By the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, this Assiento, which before had only been enjoyed, he believed, by the subjects of France, was granted to the subjects of England. The right hon. Gentleman had fallen into the fallacy which he thought too much pervaded the letter of Lord Aberdeen, of treating those rights too much as if they were specific and absolute rights given to the subjects of each country, and not relative rights of being placed on a footing of equality with any other foreign nation whatever. There was one part of the subject, to his mind, infinitely more important than the whole technical construction of those Treaties, of which the right hon. Gentleman had deprecated the discussion, but which the House would ill discharge its duty to the public, if they were not to consider on the present occasion; he meant, not merely the strict technical right which Government might or might not have had to refuse the claims of Spain, on which he admitted there might possibly be a difference of opinion; but that on which he thought there could be no difference of opinion, the policy and propriety of the part Government had acted in this matter. On this view of the subject he must say that he had never

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listened to any speech in that House with such painful feelings as to that of the right hon. Gentleman. The feeling which rose in his mind was, what an opportunity you have thrown away. There was Spain, not urging you at the point of the sword, as the right hon. Gentleman supposed, but by diplomatic and friendly methods, to form those very commercial engagements with you to which you should have been anxious to urge her. Spain asked you to convert those commercial stipulations which you complained of as difficult and unintelligible, into clear and advantageous commercial compacts, by which both countries might profit. Then as to the sacrifices we were making to carry out this policy of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said, do not discuss this subject; but discussed it would be in that House so long as the monstrous policy of the Government was continued. Self-imposed sacrifices for great objects were respectable things; but to make great sacrifices for no object, or one so flimsy that the boldest of the supporters of Ministers, who would swell their majority to-night, could not think of the pretence without a smile, was ridiculous. With what object were we to make the sacrifice consequent on a disturbed state of our commercial relations with Spain? As his noble Friend had remarked, by this interpretation they had completely untied the hands of Spain. What right had we to complain if she tomorrow imposed discriminating duties adverse to our manufactures, and favourable to those of France or any other country? Do not let us deceive ourselves with the idea that Spain will not have it in her power to inflict a very heavy blow. He admitted that foreign trade with that country was almost entirely a smuggling trade, and that the duties were merely nominal; but Spain might adopt a system of reasonable duties, and if she accompanied that by discriminating duties unfavourable to us, we could not complain of the retaliation. He would not dwell on the consequences produced by a similar policy in Brazil. Not a post which did not bring accounts of the position in which our merchants were placed, in consequence of the all but stoppage of our commercial relations with that country, of the vexations to which they were exposed, of the hostility generated in the Legislature and people of that country by our conduct. By the last accounts it was
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daily expected — if the thing had not already happened — that the Brazilian Chambers would actually adopt differential duties against British manufactures. We were told that these sacrifices were made for an object dear to the British people—for the sake of discouraging slavery and the Slave Trade. He would defy any man who had looked into the subject, to say that the consequence of the policy Ministers pursued, was to prevent a single slave the less from being carried across the Atlantic, or to discourage, even in the slightest degree, slavery, as contrasted with free labour, in the cultivation of foreign sugar. When the Ministerial measure of last Session was proposed, they (the Opposition) had foretold that it would be vain for the purpose Ministers professed to have in view; and these predictions had been fulfilled. They were then told, that as the price of free-labour sugar must rise, from the increased demand for it, the sugars of Cuba and Brazil would be brought concurrently into the Continental markets, and supply the vacuum caused by the increased consumption of free-labour sugar. If they had at all succeeded in their object of encouraging free-labour sugar, of course this would be shown by the price. What had been the fact? He asserted that there never had been, since that Act passed, any appreciable difference between the prices of certificated foreign and free-labour sugar in bond in this country; and the price of sugar, the produce of Brazil or Cuba, of the same quality equally in bond in this country. If that were so, really the bubble had burst. The man who would contend, that by their present policy they were, even in the slightest degree, discouraging slavery, or encouraging free labour, must be prepared to contend that Euclid was a book replete with fallacies and falsehoods. It was most mortifying to witness the spectacle of a British Ministry, and one, too, who plumed themselves on the encouragement of commerce, calling on the merchants of this country to submit to the greatest sacrifices; first, from the suspension and loss of the Brazilian trade; next, from the contingencies of the commercial warfare into which we were entering with Spain, and all for no object in the world. He said for no object; but he was afraid there was one: he had lately met with a paragraph in one of the leading Colonial journals, the Jamaica

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Morning Journal, which proved that the colonists were beginning to see through this transparent delusion. It was as follows:—
"A law is passed, which, although it affects to confine the competition to the produce of free labour, merely alters the destination of slave-grown sugar in some cases, and in others brings it into immediate competition with the free-grown sugar from the Colonies. After the admission of American slave-grown sugar into the home market, we can perceive no valid reason why that of Spain or the Brazils should be excluded. Indeed, it is manifest that having thrown principle overboard, the Government only exclude these sugars for the purpose of securing all the advantages they can from those countries in a commercial point of view. It is not from any desire to serve the Colonies that Brazilian sugar is not now admitted in the same manner and on the like terms as the sugar of Louisiana."
He believed the motive assigned in this passage paid infinitely too high a compliment to the wisdom of Her Majesty's Government; the truth was, that all those difficulties and embarrassments were the price they were called upon to pay for the course which the present Ministers, when in opposition, found it convenient to pursue with a view to their own party ends. He thought it most unfortunate that a Government which had shown no very great inflexibility of purpose with respect to most subjects, and discarded, one after another, most of the instruments they had made use of to obtain the seats of power, should have selected this one, the most feeble of all the weapons they employed, and certainly the most indefensible in argument of all the courses they had pursued, and have clung to it with such desperate fidelity. Although agreeing generally with his noble Friend, that the spirit of the Treaty would require us to accede to the demand of the Spanish Government; yet, at the same time, he had no earnest desire to rest his vote on that view. Even if he entertained a doubt on that subject, he should still think that, in the present state of affairs, it was the duty of that House to interfere; and, after the experience they had had of the consequences which the Ministerial policy had produced on our commerce with Brazil and Spain, to insist on the necessity of their adopting a course more in consonance with the commercial interests of this country, and with the principles of justice and common sense. He could not help thinking
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highly enough of the patriotic principles of the right hon. Gentlemen opposite to believe that they would not be unwilling to have a little gentle compulsion put upon them by the House, and to be told that the policy they had recommended having proved a complete and palpable failure as to the discouragement of slavery and the Slave Trade, it was time to restore us to our former footing in our relations with Brazil, and especially to embrace the opportunity now thrown out of placing our commercial relations with Spain on a sound and intelligible footing.
The Attorney Generalsaid, when the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, had risen after the right hon. Member for Newark, he supposed he was proceeding to discuss the matter under consideration of the House. He understood that they had been invited by the noble Lord who opened this debate to consider the interpretation of the Treaties existing between this country and Spain, on which it was said this claim was put forward. The right hon. Member for Newark had discussed the questions arising out of the Treaty point by point; but the right hon. Gentleman opposite entirely abandoned this ground, and, flying off from the true issue, endeavoured to divert the attention of the House to questions of policy and expediency. He must be permitted to assume that the arguments of the right hon. Member for Newark were unanswerable; because if any answer could have been given, it would have been afforded by the right hon. Gentleman who had just addressed the House. They were not there to inquire into the questions opened by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, but to inquire as to the construction of Treaties and the interpretation of compacts between this country and Spain. The latter country, it had been shown, had not regarded those Treaties in the light contended for on the other side. She only sought now, by this peculiar mode of interpretation, to secure the admission of sugar from her own Colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico, on the footing of the most favoured nation. He should confine himself strictly to the question before the House, whether the Foreign Office had put the correct construction on the Treaties with Spain. There were no rules of interpretation applicable to a private agreement between individuals, which did not also apply to the case before them. The only difference was, that

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in the case of a private agreement, they could not pray in aid other agreement, for the purpose of establishing the interpretation, but most construe it by itself. With respect to Treaties, however, which were matters of public notoriety, and were frequently made the basis of new Conventions, other agreements might be referred to, in order to arrive at the true interpretation. In explaining the Treaties of 1667 and 1713, it would not do to look only to the words, and to overlook all that had occurred in the intervening period. He admitted, with his right hon. Friend, that if any well-meaning ignorant man were to look only at the words, he might be disposed to put on them the interpretation contended for by Gentlemen opposite; but they must look at the circumstances under which the Treaties were made, the state of commerce at that day, the conduct of the parties after the Treaty was made, in order to be in a proper condition to come at a true interpretation. The distinction between persons and produce was clear and intelligible; it was made the ground of the construction for which he contended; it was founded on the state of trade and commerce as explained by his right hon. Friend; it was a construction on which the parties themselves had acted. The Second Article of the Treaty of Utrecht referred to persons, subjects of any of the two States, resorting or trading to th ports of the other, not to persons residing within the dominions of either Power, and being producers or manufacturers there. It referred to the persons, not to their produce. He said this was not a narrow and technical construction, but a legitimate one, accommodated to the circumstances of the time, and borne out by Treaties contemporaneous or subsequent in date. Provisions affecting subjects, but not extending to produce, had been inserted, for example, in the Treaty of Munster between the Netherlands and Spain, to which reference was made in the Treaty of 1667. He would beg to call the attention of the House to the Treaty between the Netherlands and Spain, executed in June 1740. They would find that the words of that Treaty were precisely identical with the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, made in 1713, on which the question which had been brought before the House arose. The argument of the noble Lord was, that that Treaty of Utrecht referred to produce as well as to subjects. Now, he begged to deny the accuracy of
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that construction altogether; and he would rely on the Treaty of 1740, to which he had just alluded, as a proof that these Powers, namely, the Netherlands and Spain, regarded the Treaty in the light in which he viewed it, although, as he had already mentioned, it contained the very terms of the Treaty of 1713. If the argument of the noble Lord were well founded, the subjects of the Netherlands could not be liable to pay greater duties in respect to their goods imported into Spain, than the Spanish merchant paid for the goods which he imported; but that would evidently imply an absurdity. The object of the Treaty, as he apprehended, was, that the subjects of both these States should not be liable to pay higher duties within the particular countries, than the subjects of those countries. But he would show them that in a Treaty, almost contemporaneous with the one which they were called upon to construe, a distinction was made between subjects and goods. By the Tenth Article of the Treaty with France, it was provided that the duties on tobacco imported into France shall be reduced to the same moderate rate as the duty on the said tobacco which would be paid on importation to any other country in America or Europe. He alluded to this fact to show, that even at that time the distinction between persons and goods or merchandise was fully understood. He might be permitted to add to these instances the Treaty with Portugal of 1810, which had been quoted by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone), by the Third Article of which the same rights, immunities, and privileges were secured to the subjects of each nation, that were or might be hereafter granted to the subjects of the most favoured nations. Any one comparing that Article with the corresponding Treaty of Utrecht would find that the terms were just as large in the one as in the other; and yet, in the Treaty of 1810, were the words considered to be sufficient to cover produce of these States? Certainly not. The House would find that by the Nineteenth Article of the Treaty, express provision was distinctly made with respect to the duties to be paid on the produce of the two countries reciprocally, irrespective of the provisions of the Third Article; which were meant to refer to persons only. That Article said—
"His Britannic Majesty does, on his part, and in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, promise and engage that all

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goods, merchandise, and articles whatsoever, of the produce, manufacture, industry, or invention of the dominions or subjects of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall be received and admitted into all and singular the ports and dominions of His Britannic Majesty, on paying generally and only the same duties that are paid upon similar articles by the subjects of the most favoured nation."
This would show the legitimate interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht, when a separate Article was considered necessary in favour of the produce of the countries, after a very strong clause had been previously inserted in favour of the subjects. All these facts went to prove most strongly, according to his judgment, that there was a distinction perfectly well understood and recognised between States as to the separate interests of subjects and of goods. But it was said that they were inconsistent in their conduct as regarded the construction of these Treaties with Spain—that they admitted the slave-grown sugars of the United States and of Venezuela, while they refused to admit the produce of the Spanish Colonies, though the latter were entitled to be placed upon the same footing as the most favoured nations, according to the same construction of the Treaties. He entirely denied that the Treaties with Spain were to be regarded in the same light as those between this country and the United States and Venezuela, and also as the Treaties with Columbia and Mexico. These four Treaties were all in precisely the same terms, and were very different in their provisions from the Spanish Treaties. If the House would permit him, he would wish to call their attention to the Treaties between Great Britain and the United States, which had been made the model for the other Treaties to which he had alluded. By the Second Article of the Treaty of 1815, it was provided that—
"No higher duty or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the territories of His Britannic Majesty in Europe of any articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of His Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe, than are, or shall be, payable on the like articles, being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other country; nor shall any higher or other duties or charges be imposed in either of the two countries on the exportation of any articles to His Britannic Majesty's territories
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in Europe, or to the United States, respectively, than such as are payable on the exportation of the like articles to any other foreign country; nor shall any prohibition be imposed upon the exportation or importation of any articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or of His Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe, to or from the said territories of His Britannic Majesty in Europe, or to or from the said United States, which shall not equally extend to all other nations."
Now, if the House would permit him, he would take leave to refer back for a moment to the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. The Article of that Treaty was as follows:—
"The subjects of their Majesties, trading respectively in the dominions of their said Majesties, shall not be bound to pay greater duties, or other imposts whatsoever, for their imports or exports, than shall be exacted of, and paid by, the subjects of the most favoured nation; and if it shall happen in time to come, that any diminution of duties or other advantages shall be granted by either side to any foreign nation, the subjects of each Crown shall reciprocally and fully enjoy the same. And it has been agreed, as is above-mentioned, concerning the rates of duties, so it is ordained as a general rule between their Majesties, that all and every one of their subjects shall, in all lands and places subject to the command of their respective Majesties, use and enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities, concerning all imposts or duties whatsoever, which relate to persons, wares, merchandise, ships, freighting, mariners, navigation, and commerce, and enjoy the same favour in all things, as well in the courts of justice as in all those things which relate to trade, or any other trade whatsoever as the most favoured nation uses and enjoys, or may use and enjoy for the future, as is explained more at large in the Thirty-eighth Article of the Treaty of 1667, which is specially inserted in the foregoing Article."
He had no hesitation in saying that if he were to look only to the construction that was to be put upon the words of these two Treaties, he would come to precisely the same conclusion to which the Foreign Office had arrived, and that, too, without reference to the conduct of the parties, or to any other circumstances whatever. But without going that length, he would maintain that having regard to the conduct of the parties, it was not at any time understood that the produce of those countries was to be put upon the same footing as that of the most favoured nation under these Treaties. He wished incidentally to allude to what his right hon. Friend had stated of the Treaties being

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probably not now on the same footing as they had formerly been. Whether they regarded the conduct of the countries, the construction that might have been put upon the Treaties, or some violation of their integrity, it was quite possible that the Treaties might net now be considered as subsisting in their full force. He made this allusion out of deference to the argument of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone); but at the same time he did not think it it all necessary to rely upon that point on coming to a decision on the question before the House. The Treaties of 1667 and 1670 were confirmed by the Treaty of 1713, and these were all confirmed by the Treaties of 1763 and 1783. In the Treaty of 1814 the commercial relations between the two countries were to be established; and in reference to it, the previous Treaties might fairly, he thought, be considered as still existing, and might be properly looked to in interpreting the nature of these relations. He would endeavour to deal, very shortly indeed, with the question of the Colonies; and here he had to express his regret, that his right hon. Friend had not taken the same view which he was disposed to adopt. In his opinion the Colonial trade was entirely struck out of the Treaty of Utrecht. He considered the object of the Eighth Article of the Treaty of 1670 to be to prohibit entirely the trade with the Colonies. That trade was excluded, not only by the Eighth, but also by the Ninth Article of the Treaty, and was, in his opinion, thus intended to be kept entirely in the hands of the Sovereigns of the two States. In the Treaty of Peace of 1713 there was an express prohibition of any guarantee to France to trade with the Colonies. Therefore, taking all the Articles of all the Treaties together, the construction which he was disposed to place on them was, that the Colonial trade was, as it were, struck out of the Treaties, and was intended to remain entirely and exclusively attached to the mother country. Now, by the Fourth Article of the Treaty of 1814, it was provided that in the event of the commerce of the Spanish Colonies being opened, the subjects of His Britannic Majesty were to be permitted to trade to them on the terms of the most favoured nation. He would admit that there was no reciprocity in that arrangement, as it conferred a benefit only on one side; but on that very ground he considered it as strengthening his construction of the prior Treaties. In construing Treaties, they should have regard to the conduct of
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the parties; and in this view also his argument was borne out by the fact. In the year 1824, when the trade with the Spanish Colonies was opened, the advantage was not conferred on Great Britain alone, but on all nations indiscriminately, and without reference to any particular Treaty; though, according to the argument of the noble Lord, Great Britain would have had a right to challenge the opening of that trade to her commerce by virtue of existing Treaties. He had endeavoured to compress his arguments within the narrowest possible compass; and he trusted he had not trespassed too far upon the indulgence of the House. He would admit, that in construing Treaties with other countries, they should have regard to good faith, and should observe a true and just interpretation of their provisions; but it appeared to him that they would violate all the fair rules of construction, if they came to the decision for which the noble Lord contended.
Mr. F. T. Baringsaid, he felt strongly the inconvenience of trespassing upon the House at that late hour; but he could not so far forget his character as to appear to be influenced in the vote which he was about to give by mere party purposes. He agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, that no question of policy should persuade them to give up the real and just construction of the Treaty. But he also thought that when Spain called upon them to adopt her construction of the Treaties, it was worth their while to consider whether that construction was a fair one towards themselves. He thought that when the subject became a question for a long State Paper, it should become a consideration whether Spain was not offering to them what they should be of all things in the world most anxious to receive from her. He admitted the talent of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, who indeed never spoke without manifesting great ability; but he set aside entirely the whole argument of Lord Aberdeen. The argument of the right hon. Gentleman was altogether contrary to the argument of Lord Aberdeen. The right hon. Gentleman indeed said, that he did not adopt the argument as put in Lord Aberdeen's letter; and the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down differed from the right hon. Gentleman, and he also did not adopt the argument of Lord Aberdeen. The right hon. Gentleman wished to show that the ancient Treaties with Spain had ceased to exist. If they

603
did not exist, what then was the use of inquiry about them? Now, Lord Aberbeen said that they did exist. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that there was a severe strain on his argument by these Treaties; he therefore denied that they now existed. He subsequently added that they did not exist to the extent of the terms, and therefore they were entitled to this interpretation of them. The only limit to this, then, was the law of the strong man, who said that he would fix his own interpretation on them. The right hon. Gentleman, when he came to the conclusion of his speech, said that the Treaties did not exist entirely. He added that he did not know what had been done away with, and what had not; it therefore was hardly possible to meet him on the point. It was very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say that they did not exist; but the matter, as between nations, must be determined by Lord Aberdeen's letter. Lord Aberdeen admitted that the Treaties existed, and did not venture to say that they had been abrogated; therefore the whole language of the right hon. Gentleman, on this point, was immaterial. In the main question, Lord Aberdeen said, that there were two grounds involved in the question—the Colonial ground, the argument with respect to which was well known; and the next ground was the difference between persons and produce. And upon this point, he was surprised to find that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just spoken, and who had been the organ of the Government in this debate, had taken a different ground from that adopted by Lord Aberdeen. Lord Aberdeen made the admission, that the Treaty of 1667, was a general Treaty; this the hon. and learned Member did not admit, or that it involved anything respecting the most favoured nation clause. He would now read the words of the letter:—
"Admitting that the Treaty of 1667 conferred upon the subjects of Spain, the position of the most favoured nation in British ports, yet that privilege could not, subsequently to 1670, have belonged to Spanish West India trade, because, under the terms of the Treaty of 1670, such trade could not have been carried on with British ports."
Again, Lord Aberdeen stated—
"While, therefore, the Treaty of 1667 gave generally to the subjects of Great Britain and Spain respectively the privileges of the most favoured nation, the trade belonging to the West Indian Colonies of the two countries
604
was expressly excluded from the enjoyment of the privileges so conferred."
Lord Aberdeen, therefore, admitted that the Treaty contained a full and general clause; but that the effect of the Treaty of 1670 was to draw both countries from mutual Colonial trade. Therefore, he started with the proposition that all depended on the legal interpretation of the Treaties; and as to how far the Treaty of 1670 affected that of 1667, the subsequent passage read—
"As far as not repugnant with the Articles in the latter Treaty."
The prohibitory clause prevented all trade with the West Indies, and gave powers for the purpose of future regulations. This was perfectly consistent with the principle that this negotiation should be subordinate to the principle of the most favoured nation. There was nothing repugnant in giving this power to Spain, or inconsistent with the clause in the former Treaty. By the most favoured nation clause they did not say a nation must create a trade; but if it did, the trade should be put in the construction of the clause. It was consistent with this that the whole of the West Indies might be excluded. So far, then, as they kept up the prohibition in the Colonies from trading with all foreign countries, they persisted in adhering to the most favoured nation clause. It gave the power to England and Spain reciprocally to regulate the trade, always subservient to this principle. He would show, however, that the Government admitted the most favoured nation clause. They did so by the Treaty of 1814, by which they admitted that—
"In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being opened to foreign nations, His Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation."
Now, within a month afterwards, it appeared that the old Treaties were not in force, although Lord Aberdeen seemed to think that they were. Within two months of the former Treaty, additional Articles were agreed to, by which all the old Treaties were renewed, by which Spain admitted that we should be put on the same footing as the most favoured nation. The whole question depended upon the fact, as to whether the regulating power was opposed to, and inconsistent with the principle of the most favoured nation clause.

605
This was the argument, and yet they had signed a Treaty in which both co-existed. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Colonies were taken out of the operation of the Treaty. But to consider this, they should look to the practical effect of the trade carried on in that time. Formerly, there was no trade there; for, as far as the West Indies were concerned, they might be considered out of the map. They renewed the old Treaties at the Peace of 1814, and when the right hon. Gentleman admitted that they were in force; and by this Act, at that time, the most favoured nation clause was renewed, and part of that Treaty contemplated that at some future time the trade to the whole Spanish West Indies might be opened to this country. There was no doubt, however, that from 1810 to the time of the Treaty, in the return of the Bourbons, the trade between the Spanish Colonies and England had been opened. The right hon. Gentleman could hardly doubt this. He held in his hand a passage from a despatch of Mr. Canning, of the date of 1823, in which he stated that the trade had been opened, and the prohibitory clause had been practically repealed. This had occurred in consequence of an English vessel having been seized under the prohibitory law. In 1814, the old Treaties had been renewed, containing the most favoured nation clause, with the full knowledge that the Colonies must be opened; and they could not now pretend to say that the trade was not to be opened. But supposing that the case of the Government was admitted, and the argument was allowed; suppose, also, that the navigation laws continued still in force, and that on the part of Spain the most strict laws were still in force, still it was perfectly clear that it was in the power of a Spaniard, as far as the laws of this country were concerned, to import Spanish sugar in a British vessel. He therefore said, that at the time of the attempt to do what they now did, a Spaniard might have introduced sugar through Spain, provided it was brought in a British vessel, and he might call upon you to give him the full benefit of the most favoured nation clause. But what was Lord Aberdeen's argument? He stated that some things existed which were inconsistent with this trade, and he confessed that he was somewhat puzzled at the argument used. The Article alluded to was not signed at the time, but was an additional Article to the Treaty of 1814. The right hon. Gentleman would
606
find that the object of this Treaty was a separate Article, and not a secret Article to prevent the renewal of the Family Compact between France and Spain. Subsequently they renewed all the former Treaties, and with a larger construction. The next argument of Lord Aberdeen was, that in 1824, when a reciprocity power was granted to other nations, and when Spain opened her Colonies to foreign nations, it was in 1828 only that such power was given to Spain in return. He would not attempt to conceal a difficulty he had always felt on this subject. He felt the greatest doubt whether, under the reciprocity Treaties with the most favoured nations, they always gave the reciprocity to England. He knew that the strongest doubts remained on this point; and as far as the argument went in this case, the Government did not admit this to be the case. The right hon. Gentleman upset Lord Aberdeen's argument in his letter, and the hon. and learned Gentleman upset the law of the right hon. Gentleman. In the earlier part of our commercial negotiations, we did through persons what we now did through things, and certainly the latter was much more effective in manner than the former. According to the strict Article of the Treaty, Spanish subjects might introduce Cuba sugar into this country the same as sugar from Venezuela. If this was the case, there was little difficulty in the objection. The right hon. Gentleman threw overboard entirely the arguments of his noble Friend on this part of the subject, as if they had never been uttered. In the Treaty of 1715, the Treaty of 1667 was regarded, not merely as a Treaty giving personal rights, but as a Treaty for two nations, and that the commerce between the subjects of each should be carried on on an equal footing. In the 5th Clause it stated—
"And the said subjects shall be used in Spain in the same manner as the most favoured nation, and consequently all nations shall pay the same duties on wool and other merchandise, which shall be brought into or carried out of these kingdoms by land, as the said subjects pay on the same goods which they shall import or export by sea."
The object of this was to prevent the goods of France getting into Spain at a lower duty than when imported by sea. He should be glad to hear how this consequence of the Treaty of 1667 followed, unless it had in view, not the interest of parties, but of the general commerce of both

607
countries. He would not trouble the House further than to observe, that the personal question as regarded a Spaniard was on the same footing as regarded a Swede or any other foreigner. Now, how did the case work, and how did the Government fulfil the Treaty in dealing with Spain as with the most favoured nation? A Venezuelan could bring his slave-grown sugar into England in a Venezuelan ship. A Spaniard proposed to bring his slave-grown sugar into England. He carried his sugar to Venezuela, and changed it for Venezuelan sugar; and brought it to England. The reply then was, that this was not Spanish sugar; the objection, in the first place, was not to the produce but to the person; but when it was taken to Venezuela, the objection was to the produce and not to the person.
Sir G. Clerkrose amidst loud cries of "Divide," which continued throughout the whole of the right hon. Gentleman's address to the House. He denied that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Labouchere) was justified in charging the Government with not having kept faith with Spain. What construction had the Parliament of England in 1668 put upon the Treaty of 1667? It was obvious what the construction was which they put upon it, from the fact that they imposed a differential duty on Spanish wine. Though that was done so recently after the Treaty, Spain made no remonstrance. In 1686 again, a differential duty of 50 per cent. was laid upon Spanish wine. It was not until 1828 that we opened our Colonies to Spanish vessels. Did Spain, during all that time, even think of the Treaty of 1713? No, nor did she act upon it herself. In 1814, Spain levied upon American ships entering the port of Havana, a duty of one dollar; while upon British vessels she imposed a duty of a dollar and a half. Mr. Canning, on our part, remonstrated, and threatened to resort to retaliatory measures. The answer of Spain was, that she was acting on a principle of reciprocity with America. She made no allusion to the Treaty of 1713. Nothing could be so absurd as the supposition that Great Britain could enter into any such Treaty as that assumed by the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman. There were abundant authorities in favour of the course adopted on this occasion by the Government, from Mr. Pitt down to the right hon. Gentleman opposite, whose attempted Commercial Treaty with France was a distinct proof that
608
Spain was not considered as one of the most favoured nations. The noble Lord and his Colleagues, in 1841, were quite ready to conclude that Treaty with France on this basis. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by opposing the Motion.
Mr. Barclaymoved the adjournment of the debate.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerthought the subject had been sufficiently debated, and that adjournment was not necessary. ["Divide," "Go on."]
Mr. Barclayresumed. He differed from the Attorney General in his view of the case. It presented two points. One, the conduct of the Spanish Government; the other, the policy of Her Majesty's Government on the Sugar question. The noble Lord attacked one point as a feint to cover his assault on the other. Whatever were the correct interpretation of the Treaties with Spain, it was clear by that of 1670 that the Colonies of that country had no claim on Great Britain. At the same time, he thought it would be better to concede the same right to Spain as was granted to other countries. It was absurd to talk of the honour of Spain, a country which had violated all her obligations to this country on the subject of the Slave Trade—all her officers being engaged in that traffic. If the sugars of Cuba and Porto Rico were to be admitted, they should be admitted on the ground of self-interest, not on the ground of right or of honour. He maintained the inexpediency of allowing slave-grown sugar in the British market, on the ground of religion and humanity, though he admitted the discriminating clause was an innovation on the commercial code of this country. It was no argument to urge that coffee and cotton were slave-grown in favour of sugar; but they were not so destructive of human life. There was no inconsistency greater than that of the noble Lord in the course of that night in respect to the Slave Trade. It would be impossible to suppress that trade while the demand for slave-grown sugar was promoted by such notions as that of the noble Lord. [Cries of "Divide."] He did not attach such importance to the discriminatory principle as regarded sugar, as did the West Indian interest; but he considered that it checked very much the cultivation of slave-grown sugar.
Viscount Palmerston: Sir, after the able speeches of my two right hon. Friends, it would be presumptuous on my

609
part to attempt to add anything to the answers which they had given to the speeches of the hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House on this subject on the other side. The right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Trade, as he has always done, in an able and ingenious speech, showing deep research and great knowledge, addressed himself to the question; but I must say that it is not always the best symptom of the goodness of a cause, that such a long and ingenious defence is required to support it. A great portion of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman I shall dispense with any reference to, as it went to show that the old Treaties with Spain were no longer in existence; for I will take my stand, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth has done, on the allegation of Lord Aberdeen, which shows that he considers them distinctly in force at the present moment. The point, then, for us to consider, is, what the meaning of those Treaties is? The Treaties give to Spain the advantages, with regard to imports into this country, which would be conceded to the most favoured nation; it is said, however, by hon. Gentlemen opposite, that these advantages did not apply to the productions of Spain, but to persons. The right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Trade, however, gave up that argument; and I must remark that what between his admissions and the difference between his opinions and those of the Attorney General, if the plus and minus were set against each other, very little would remain in favour of the hon. Gentlemen opposite, who deny that these Treaties give to Spain the privileges of the most favoured nation. If it is said that the advantages apply to persons, I ask what does that mean? If a Spanish subject comes from Cuba to England with the produce of Cuba, he is entitled to the introduction of that produce according to the terms which would be granted to the most favoured nation. The right hon. Gentleman, however, states that such a construction would lead to an absurdity, as that a Spanish subject might bring in Cuba sugar at a low duty; whereas the same sugar brought in by an English merchant, or the property of an English merchant, would be liable to the higher duty. If that be the interpretation, then can you not take measures to escape the absurdity of your own law? If you admit that such is the interpretation of the Treaty, you ought to alter the law which produces such
610
an absurdity. If, by the Treaties, a Spanish subject is entitled to the privileges of the most favoured nation, but that you are not bound to extend it to others bringing in the same produce, and that you would thus have conflicting duties, then alter those conflicting duties, and get rid of the absurdity by changing the law. With respect to the Article of the Treaty with Spain in 1814, I will remind the right hon. Gentleman opposite of what he seemed to forget, and what seemed to have been forgotten by the writer of the note also, namely, that at the time, in July, when the Article was signed, the ancient Treaties had not been re-established; and it was not until the following month of August that the ancient Treaties were re-established. I was about to refer to the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman (the Attorney General) namely, that those who had taken upon themselves the defence of the Government on this occasion—none of them, however, having the responsibility of a Cabinet Minister, for we have not heard from a Cabinet Minister himself any defence of this measure—but none of those who have spoken on the part of the Government, had anything at all to do with the policy of the question. It was simply a question of Treaties. I must beg leave to say that, even if the point as to the construction of the Treaties were given up, and if it were admitted that there was a doubt in regard to these Treaties, I still think it was incumbent on the Government to show that in point of policy the measure was right. I do not admit that the defence of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, and who certainly has shown great courage and perseverance in advancing his opinions—I do not admit that his defence of the policy ought to satisfy the House. He spoke with strong feeling in defence of the West Indian interest, and naturally enough defended the measure as being one beneficial to the West Indians. But the defence of the measure which I require is one having reference to the country at large, to the whole commercial interests of this united Empire; and I contend that in that respect the observations of the hon. Gentleman, however, able they may have been, do not apply to the general policy of the measure; by which I mean the policy of rejecting the overture made on the part of a Power like Spain, for giving you a great mercantile advantage which you have not possessed before in relation to that country, by

611
placing her and her Colonies on the footing of, and conferring on her and them the privileges enjoyed by, the most favoured nation.
The House divided; Ayes 87; Noes 175; Majority 88.

List of the AYES.

Aglionby, H. A.

Horsman, E.

Ainsworth, P.

Howick, Visct.

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Hume, J.

Hutt, W.

Baine, W.

Labouchere, rt. hn. H.

Baring, rt. hn. F. T.

Lemon, Sir C.

Barnard, E. G.

Leveson, Lord

Berkeley, hon. C.

Macaulay, rt. hn. T. B.

Berkeley, hon. Capt.

Marjoribanks, S.

Bouverie, hon. E. P.

Marshall, W.

Bowes, J.

Martin, J.

Bowring, Dr.

Mitcalfe, H.

Bright, J.

Mitchell, T. A.

Brotherton, J.

Moffat, G.

Browne, hon. W.

Morris, D.

Clay, Sir W.

O'Connell, M. J.

Colborne, hn. W. N. R.

Ogle, S. C. H.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Oswald, J.

Craig, W. G.

Palmerston, Visct.

Dalmeny, Lord

Pattison, J.

Denison, W. J.

Pechell, Capt.

Dennistoun, J.

Plumridge, Capt.

Duff, J.

Ponsonby, hn. C. F. C.

Duke, Sir J.

Protheroe, E.

Duncan, Visct.

Pulsford, R.

Dundas, Adm.

Ross, D. R.

Dundas, F.

Russell, Lord J.

Ebrington, Visct.

Sheridan, R. B.

Ellice, rt. hon. E.

Smith, J. A.

Evans, W.

Smith, rt. hn. R. V.

Ewart, W.

Somerville, Sir W. M.

Ferguson, Sir R. A.

Stuart, Lord J.

Fitzroy, Lord C.

Strutt, E.

Fitzwilliam, hn. G. W.

Towneley, J.

Forster, M.

Vane, Lord H.

Gibson, T. M.

Villiers, hon. C.

Gill, T.

Walker, R.

Gore, hon. R.

Warburton, H.

Grosvenor, Lord R.

Wawn, J. T.

Hallyburton, Ld. J. G.

Williams, W.

Hastie, A.

Wilshere, W.

Hawes, B.

Yorke, H. R.

Hayter, W. G.

Heathcoat, J.

TELLERS.

Hindley, C.

Hill, Lord M.

Holland, R.

Tufnell, H.

List of the NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Baillie, Col.

A'Court, Capt.

Baillie, H. J.

Acton, Col.

Baird, W.

Alford, Visct.

Baldwin, B.

Allix, J. P.

Barkly, H.

Antrobus, E.

Baring, T.

Arbuthnott, hon. H.

Baring, rt. hon. W. B.

Arkwright, G.

Barrington, Visct.

Ashley, Lord

Benbow, J.

Astell, W.

Bennett, P.

612

Beresford, Major

Hampden, R.

Bernard, Visct.

Harcourt, G. G.

Blackburne, J. I.

Henley, J. W.

Boldero, H. G.

Hervey, Lord A.

Borthwick, P.

Hodgson, F.

Botfield, B.

Hogg, J. W.

Bowles, Adm.

Hope, hon. C.

Bramston, T. W.

Hope, G. W.

Brisco, M.

Hotham, Lord

Broadley, H.

Houldsworth, T.

Broadwood, H.

Hughes, W. B.

Bruce, Lord E.

Hussey, A.

Buck, L. W.

Hussey, T.

Buckley, E.

Irton, S.

Buller, Sir J. Y.

James, Sir W. C.

Bunbury, T.

Jermyn, Earl

Cardwell, E.

Jocelyn, Visct.

Chelsea, Visct.

Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.

Cholmondeley, hn. H.

Jones, Capt.

Chute, W. L. W.

Kemble, H.

Clayton, R. R.

Lennox, Lord A.

Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G.

Lincoln, Earl of

Clifton, J. T.

Lockhart, W.

Cockburn, rt. hn. Sir G.

Loftus, Visct.

Codrington, Sir W.

Lopes, Sir R.

Cole, hon. H. A.

Lowther, Sir J. H.

Collett, W. R.

Lowther, hon. Col.

Compton, H. C.

Lygon, hon. Gen.

Corry, rt. hn. H.

Mackenzie, T.

Cripps, W.

Mackenzie, W. F.

Damer, hon. Col.

Maclean, D.

Dickinson, F. H.

McNeill, D.

Douglas, Sir H.

Manners, Lord C. S.

Douglas, J. D. S.

Martin, C. W.

Duncombe, hon. A.

Masterman, J.

Duncombe, hon. O.

Meynell, Capt.

Eastnor, Visct.

Morgan, O.

Egerton, W. T.

Mundy, E. M.

Entwisle, W.

Neeld, J.

Escott, B.

Neeld, J.

Farnham, E. B.

Newdegate, C. N.

Feilden, W.

Nicholl, rt. hn. J.

Fellowes, E.

Norreys, Lord

Filmer, Sir E.

Ossulston, Lord

Fitzroy, hon. H.

Packe, C. W.

Flower, Sir J.

Pakington, J. S.

Forman, T. S.

Palmer, R.

Fox, S. L.

Palmer, G.

Fremantle, rt. hn. Sir T.

Peel, rt. hn. Sir R.

Fuller, A. E.

Peel, J.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Pennant, hon. Col.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Pringle, A.

Gladstone, Capt.

Rashleigh, W.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Repton, G. W. J.

Gore, M.

Richards, R.

Goulburn, rt. hn. H.

Rolleston, Col.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.

Round, C. G.

Granby, Marq. of

Round, J.

Greenall, P.

Rous, hon. Capt.

Greene, T.

Russell, C.

Grogan, E.

Ryder, hon. G. D.

Hale, R. B.

Sandon, Visct.

Halford, Sir H.

Scott, hon. F.

Hamilton, C. J. B.

Seymour, Sir H. B.

Hamilton, J. H.

Sibthorp, Col.

Hamilton, G. A.

Smith, A.

Hamilton, Lord C.

Smith, rt. hn. T. B. C.

613

Smollett, A.

Tollemache, J.

Sotheron, T. H. S.

Trench, Sir F. W.

Spooner, R.

Trevor, hon. G. R.

Spry, Sir S. T.

Waddington, H. S.

Stewart, J.

Wellesley, Lord C.

Stuart, H.

Wodehouse, E.

Sturt, H. C.

Wood, Col.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Wood, Col. T.

Tennent, J. E.

Yorke, hon. E. T.

Thesiger, Sir F.

TELLERS.

Thornhill, G.

Young, J.

Tollemache, hn. F. J.

Baring, H.

Paired Off.

AGAINST.

FOR.

Archdall, Capt. M.

French, F.

Bateson, Capt.

Rawdon, Col.

Balfour, J. M.

Ellice, E. jun.

Berkeley, hon. G.

Howard, Capt.

Bell, M.

Standish, C.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Etwall, R.

Blakemore, R.

Phillpotts, J.

Burroughes, H. N.

Ord, W.

Brownrigg, J. S.

Elphinstone, H.

Bruges, W. L.

Hobhouse, Sir J.

Carew, W. H. P.

Clements, Lord

Charteris, F.

Worsley, Lord

Chapman, A.

Humphery, J.

Copeland, Ald.

Matheson, J.

Campbell, Sir H.

Bannerman, A.

Cochrane, A. B.

O'Brien, C.

Coote, Sir C.

Redington, T. N.

Courtenay, Lord

Seymour, Lord

Cole, hon. H.

Hallyburton, Ld. F. G.

Darby, G.

Curteis, H.

Douro, Marq.

Byng, G.

Denison, E. B.

Fox, Col.

Drummond, H.

Traill, G.

Dodd, G.

Clive, E. B.

Emlyn, Lord

Muntz, G. F.

Estcourt, T. G.

Ward, H. J.

Grimsditch, T.

Philips, M.

Grimston, Lord

Duncombe, T.

Gore, O. jun.

Bellew, R. M.

Harris, Capt.

Troubridge, Sir T.

Heathcote, Sir W.

Ramsbottom, J.

Hamilton, W.

Buller, C.

Hepburn, Sir T.

Gisborne, T.

Houldsworth, T.

Collett, J.

Henniker, Lord

Morrison, Gen.

Holmes, hn. W. A.

Rice, E. R.

Hodgson, R.

White, S.

Hope, Sir J.

Napier, Sir C.

Hornby, J.

Ferguson, Col.

Irving, J.

Pendarves, E. W.

Knight, F. W.

Busfeild, W.

Knight, H. G.

Cayley, E. S.

Knightley, Sir C.

Archbold, R.

Lyall, G.

Philips, G. R.

Lefroy, A.

Blake, M.

Lindsay, H. H.

Bell, J.

Maxwell, hon. J.

Loch, J.

Maunsell, T. P.

Cavendish, hon. G.

Marton, G.

Milnes, R. M.

Listowel, Lord

Mackinnon, W. H.

Crawford, W. S.

Morgan, C.

Dundas, W.

614

AGAINST.

FOR.

Northland, Visct.

Ricardo, L.

Oswald, A.

Dalrymple, J.

Patten, J. W.

Stewart, P. M.

Sanderson, R.

Scrope, P.

Somerton, Lord

Anson, Col.

Stanley, E.

Murray, A.

Thompson, Ald.

O'Conor Don

Trotter, J.

Christie, W. D.

Vesey, hon. T.

Wall, C. B.

Vivian, J. E.

Grey, Sir G.

Villiers, Lord

Byng, G. S.

House adjourned at half-past two o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat first.—The Lord Harris, after the Death of his Father.
BILLS. Public. — Reported. — Administration of Justice (Court of Chancery) Acts Amendment; Law of Defamation and Libel Act Amendment: Constables, Public Works (Ireland); Statute Labour (Scotland).
3a. and passed:—Unions (Ireland).
Reported.—Sampson's Estate (Ward's); Preston and Wyre Railway Wear Valley Railway; Liverpool and Bury Railway (Bolton, Wigan, and Liverpool Railway and Bury Extension); Erewash Valley Railway; Direct London and Portsmouth Railway; Harwell and Streatley Road; Saint Matthew's (Bethnal Green) Rectory.
3a. and passed:—Sir Robert Keith Dick's Estate.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Bishop of London, from Lerwick, and Old Meldrum, for the Suppression of Intemperance, especially on the Sabbath.—By the Marquess of Breadalbane, from Free Church at Holytown, and from Inhabitants of Stanley, against the Running of Railway Trains on the Sabbath.—By Lord Campbell, from General Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, for the Adoption of a Measure to abolish Exclusive Privileges in Trade.—By Marquess of Breadalbane, from Presbytery of Inverary, and of Lorn, for Improving the Condition of Schoolmasters (Scotland).—From Congregation of Free Church of Bridge of Allan, for the Adoption of a Measure to change the present System of Parochial Schools (Scotland).

TENANTS' COMPENSATION (IRELAND) BILL.
Lord Stanleysaid, that he would hope to be excused for the irregularity of referring to anything that took place in a Select Committee; but at its last meeting he stated, on the part of the Government, that seeing the strong feeling manifested both in Committee and in the House, it was the intention of the Government to propose various and not unimportant modifications in the measure. From the pressure of business upon the Attorney General for Ireland, and from various circumstances, there had been great difficulty in engrafting such Amendments on the Bill; and though he (Lord Stanley) did not give up the hope of presenting the Bill in the present Session, as amended by the Committee, yet looking to the state of the Session, and the opposition to be expected, he thought it fair to noble Lords concerned upon the subject to say, that he did not intend, upon that Bill, in the course of the present Session, to take the opinion of the House as to any further step.

PRIVILEGE.
Lord Broughampresented a petition from John Harlow, now in cus-
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tody, stating that since the publication of the Report of the Committee before which Mr. Baker gave evidence, the petitioner had suffered in his trade and character by the circulation of that Report; that proceedings in a criminal court were at that time pending in relation to the matter to which Mr. Baker's testimony referred, and Mr. Baker was afterwards examined as a witness in those proceedings, but never attempted to prove what he had stated before the Committee; that the statement was false and untrue; and the petitioner trusted the House would be graciously pleased to make some allowance for his feelings being so wounded; that he would not have taken the present proceedings, if he had been aware of their being a breach of privilege, and he had accordingly instructed his solicitor to withdraw the action; and the petitioner humbly expressed his extreme regret at having committed a breach of privilege, and hoped the House would be graciously pleased to pardon the offence he had so unintentionally committed. The noble and learned Lord added, that it was impossible to express greater contrition for the grave and inexpiable offence of having resorted to the law of the land. It was not known by the petitioner to be a crime; it was known only to Parliament; it had never been promulgated in any law. He moved that John Harlow be discharged out of custody on payment of his fees; for so, he was sorry to say, it must be.
The Lord Chancellor, on the facts stated in the petition, was willing to accede to the Motion. As the noble and learned Lord was not acting as counsel for this person, the latter must not be held answerable for what he had said.
Lord Campbellthought it would not be exactly fair to the petitioner to make him answerable for the sarcasms of his noble and learned Friend, and he should, therefore, concur in the Motion.
The said John Harlow was then brought to the bar, and reprimanded in the following terms by
The Lord Chancellor: You have been taken into custody for a breach of the acknowledged privileges of this House, in bringing an action against Thomas Baker, for words which he spoke in the course of giving evidence before one of the Committees of this House. For that offence you have been committed to custody. You have presented a petition in which you have expressed your contrition, and you have also stated that you have given orders

495
to discontinue the action. Their Lordships are disposed to deal leniently with you, and have, therefore, ordered that you be discharged out of custody on paying your fees.
Then he was taken from the bar.
Lord Broughamsaid, that, after the rebuke which he had received from his noble and learned Friend the junior law Lord, and almost the junior Peer in that House, he should take care not to fall into the same error again; for he might, peradventure, be committed himself for a breach of those privileges which were so notorious to-night, but which were stated to be unknown yesterday. He begged now to present a petition from Peter Taite Harbin, the attorney who had brought the action, stating that he had submitted the case to a gentleman of great legal acquirements, and by his advice had commenced the action; that he was not aware that he had committed a breach of privilege; that he regretted the course which he had taken, and had now abandoned the proceedings; he hoped, therefore, that their Lordships would pardon the offence which he had unintentionally committed, and order his discharge out of custody. He (Lord Brougham) begged, therefore, to move that the petitioner be discharged upon payment of his fees. He did not move that they should take the learned counsel into custody who was accessory before the fact, and who had certainly been guilty of as great a breach of privilege as the petitioner; but their Lordships would consult their interests by leaving him alone.
Lord Campbellthought enough had been done for the public good; and he had no doubt his noble and learned Friend (Lord Brougham), who felt so warmly on the subject, would pay the fees both of the attorney and the tobacconist.
Lord Brougham: I think I have done quite enough for the privileges of this House, in keeping my gravity during the operation which has lately been performed.
The said Peter Taite Harbin was then brought to the bar, and reprimanded in the following terms by
The Lord Chancellor: You have been taken into custody for a breach of the acknowledged privileges of this House. There are circumstances which would have led me to suppose that you had advisedly committed this offence. I will not, however, take upon myself to say that you have done so, for you have stated yourself that you did it in ignorance,
496
and have expressed your contrition for the offence. You have also stated that you will discontinue the action, and their Lordships are of opinion that you ought to be discharged on paying your fees.
Then he was taken from the bar.
Lord Campbellgave notice that he would, early next Session, unless the Government or some Peer entitled to more weight than himself—being the junior law Lord and junior Peer in the House—did it before, introduce a Bill to enable their Lordships, and the other House of Parliament, when an action was brought in violation of their privileges, to stay such action in the same manner as actions were now stayed when they were brought for publishing Papers under the orders of their Lordships' House. Such a measure would give them the power which the Court of Chancery now had to stay proceedings.

SPANISH COLONIAL SUGAR.
The Earl of Clarendon: In calling the attention of your Lordships to the correspondence which has recently been laid upon the Table, and in asking your Lordships to agree to the Resolution which I shall have the honour to propose, I trust I need not assure the House that I am actuated by no party motive. Indeed, I am sure that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, will do me the justice to believe that no consideration whatever could induce me to treat of our relations with other countries in the spirit of a partisan; for, with respect to foreign affairs, I hold that our own domestic differences should always be laid aside, because we have all, be our political opinions what they may, a common interest in exhibiting ourselves to the world united, and in an attitude to command respect; and we are all equally concerned in advancing the interests, and, above everything, in upholding the dignity, and maintaining unsullied the honour and good faith of our country. Differences of opinion will of course arise as to the means by which these great national objects may be most effectually secured; but they should always be approached with the caution befitting their importance, and be discussed, not in the spirit of party, but in the spirit of men having a common purpose and a common interest in view. Such being my opinion, and feeling confidence, as I do, in the just and honourable character of my noble Friend, your Lordships will readily believe that a painful sense of duty alone could have induced me to call your attention

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to the correspondence which has lately taken place between my noble Friend and the Spanish Minister; involving, as I think it does, a question of national faith, and requiring, as I am sure it does, some further explanation, not alone for our own satisfaction, but in order to prove to the world that your Lordships, as well as Her Majesty's Government, are scrupulously mindful of the international duties of the country, and that no interested motives nor apprehended sacrifices could, for one moment, make us hesitate to recognise the solemn obligations of a Treaty; for I need not remind your Lordships, that by a Treaty the honour of a country is deliberately pledged, and that, as the engagements of a Treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, so they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a Treaty is, therefore, a violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have contracted, and is as evidently an act of injustice as to rob a man of his property. Treaties are the only means by which we can provide for international objects, and secure protection for the subjects, and advantages for the commerce of our country; and considering our extended relations in every part of the world, it is evident that no country is equally interested with our own—setting aside the duty which honour imposes—in maintaining inviolate the obligations of a Treaty. It may suit other Governments, whose ways are not always those of justice and integrity—and I could name instances—to evade such obligations when they find them onerous, and to defend themselves by sophistry and casuistical arguments, by which they deceive nobody, and least of all themselves; but such a course is not suited to us—our national character is placed on too high an eminence—our honour is too unsullied—our good faith in all our dealings is too universally acknowledged for us to tolerate the suspicion even, that either because we are dealing with a Power from whom we have nothing to fear, or because the consequences may be injurious to ourselves, we are about to evade the performance of a promise which, with reference either to its letter or its spirit, we are in duty bound to fulfil. I will not affirm that such has been our conduct; but I do say that the answer of my noble Friend is, to my mind, neither satisfactory nor conclusive to a claim which, as I read the Treaties, appears to me perfectly unquestionable. The Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish Minister, in a decorous and well-argued
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note, claims, under the existing Treaties between the two countries, that the sugars of Cuba and Puerto Rico should be admitted to the same advantages as the sugars of the United States and Venezuela. The Duke of Sotomayor says—
"These Treaties have not only always been faithfully observed on the part of Spain, but the most favourable construction has always been put upon English claims, reliance being had on just reciprocity, as the necessary condition of the validity and consistency of those claims."
And here I must bear testimony to the perfect correctness of this assertion; for I myself, when at Madrid, had occasion to plead these Treaties in defence of some important British rights, and my claim was unhesitatingly admitted by the Spanish Government. Indeed, as I well considered the Sugar Bill of this year in its relation with foreign countries, and look some part in the debate upon it here, I feel almost ashamed of myself for having neglected to remind your Lordships of these Treaties; but I must say, I think it very little creditable to those by whom a Bill, involving such new and, as I consider, such dangerous principles, was prepared, that they should have been altogether ignorant, as they manifestly were, of the existence even of the numerous Treaties which bore directly upon the subject which it was their duty to investigate. In the early portions of my noble Friend's reply to the Duke of Sotomayor, I entirely agree. I think he is quite justified in saying that the course which her Majesty's Government have adopted in respect of the United States and Venezuela, proves that they have no wish to escape from the obligations of a Treaty, and claim no right to limit the operations of a commercial engagement. I think my noble Friend is quite right in passing over the Duke of Sotomayor's declaration, that his Government is determined to suppress the Slave Trade, not only as irrelevant to the question, but because, notwithstanding the Treaty that has recently been concluded, the Spanish Government cannot be considered to have any sincere desire to suppress the Slave Trade so long as they retain General O'Donnell as Captain General of Cuba. I possess authentic information, with which of course I shall not now trouble your Lordships, proving how largely General O'Donnell not only promotes, but actually participates in the Slave Trade, contrary to the wishes and the interests of the great majority of

499
plantersin that island, but with the full knowledge of the Spanish Government; which is, therefore, indirectly abetting, and not sincerely endeavouring to suppress the Slave Trade. I think also that my noble Friend was quite right in not entertaining the Duke of Sotomayor's argument in support of his claim, founded upon the admission of the produce of the Philippine Islands; for that concession was manifestly made in furtherance of the principle (if principle it can be called) of our Sugar Bill, and, as my noble Friend says, most justly, had no reference whatever to the Treaties in force with Spain; for it is quite clear that Her Majesty's Government never gave them a thought, and were to all appearance ignorant of their existence. From all the rest of my noble Friend's note, I am compelled entirely to dissent; and I regret that his rejection of the Spanish claim should be based upon arguments so untenable, and that his name should be appended to a document which will reflect such discredit upon the country. Now I beg your Lordships' attention to Articles of the Treaties. [Lord Clarendon then read the 38th Article of the Treaty of 1667; the 9th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed 13th of July, 1713; and the subsequent Treaty of Utrecht, signed December 9, 1713, by which it is stipulated that—
"The subjects of the respective Powers shall enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities as to all duties, impositions, or customs whatsoever, relating to persons, goods, and merchandises, &c., and shall have the like favour in all things as the subjects of France, or any other foreign nation the most favoured, have, possess, and enjoy, or at any time hereafter may have, possess, or enjoy; and they shall not be bound to pay greater duties, or other imposts whatsoever for their imports or exports, than shall be exacted of, or paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation," &c.]
I defy any form of words to be more explicit than this; and yet my noble Friend says in his Note, he is satisfied that they are of no effect whatever in establishing a right on the part of Spain to that which she now claims, because by an Article in a Treaty of 1670, it appears that the West India Colonies of both countries are excepted from these general privileges, and the subjects of the two Powers are respectively forbidden to trade with those Colonies. It is perfectly true, that owing to there having been no new Treaty made
500
between England and Spain since 1796, or rather since 1667, except Treaties ratifying and confirming prior stipulations, the words of the Treaty of 1670 remain unchanged; but it is equally true, that by the altered circumstances of the world, and of the relations between the two countries, they have, as I hope to prove to your Lordships, become entirely obsolete. The non-intercourse with the Spanish and British West Indies, and the granting of licenses to trade there by the respective Kings, are as much fallen into desuetude as the prohibition to the subjects, captains, and mariners of each confederate to sell and trade in the ports and havens which have castles, fortifications, and magazines; and the best proof of that is, that the respective subjects and mariners do sail, and have long sailed into ports having magazines and fortifications, and do trade freely, and have long since traded freely, and without any question of license, in the dominions of the respective Powers in the West Indies. To take our stand, therefore, upon the dead letter of a Treaty, which is so manifestly at variance with its spirit, and is so completely falsified by the everyday practice of many years, is, I must contend, a quibble in its worst form, and an evasion of an obligation so palpable, that I think it would not be listened to in any court of equity; and I am sure it would be utterly scouted by men of honour in their individual transactions with each other. It seems to me that in framing this part of his note, my noble Friend must have totally lost sight of the actual as well as the ancient relations of England with Cuba and Porto Rico. He appears to have forgotten that the prohibition which he refers to has never been at any time strictly maintained; for in this, as in all other instances, the wants and the interests of men have proved more powerful than the laws made to restrain them; and accordingly it will be found on reference to a work of great authority—that of Bryan Edwards—that in the early part of last century, so large a trade was carried on between Jamaica and the Spanish Colonies, that it employed 4,000 tons of British shipping, and furnished a market for 1,500,000 l. worth of British goods; and that this commerce has always since been carried on with more or less interruption on the part of the respective Governments. My noble Friend appears not to be aware, that in 1767 the Spanish Government, becoming alarmed at our reaping the exclusive benefit of this trade, permitted

501
English goods to be sent to the West Indian possessions on payment of very moderate duties; that in 1766 the chief ports of Jamaica and Dominica were opened by Act of Parliament to all foreign vessels of a certain description; and that some years later the House of Commons passed a Resolution that the continuance of free ports in Jamaica would be highly beneficial to the trade and manufactures of the kingdom. Sugar and coffee, the produce of foreign Colonies, were then permitted to be imported in British vessels, and to be warehoused in this country, and re-exported free of duty; but if intended for home consumption, they were to pay the duties legally due at the time on the importation of such goods. Sugar and coffee, the produce of foreign plantations, were permitted to be imported in foreign vessels into the Bahama and Bermuda Islands under the Acts 27 and 30 George III.; and such goods, if carried from those islands to any other part of the British dominions, were to pay the duties which at the time were payable on foreign sugar and coffee. Your Lordships will, therefore, see that the intercourse between the Spanish and British West Indies has been clearly legalized by Acts of Parliament, even when our own navigation laws were de jure in full force. But I must also beg the House to bear in mind what are our actual relations with the Spanish West Indies:—That we have Consuls at different places in Cuba and Porto Rico, who have been long established there—that our exports to Cuba exceed 3,000,000 of dollars — that we import from thence to the amount of more than 9,000,000 of dollars, which is nearly double the exports of that island to the United States—that between 400 and 500 British ships trade annually with Cuba—that our commerce with Porto Rico is, in proportion, quite as great as that with Cuba, and that the shipping engaged in it, which, five years ago, amounted to nearly 1,100 tons, is annually increasing—and, lastly, that for upwards of twenty years since the alteration of our navigation laws, it has been legal, not only for an Englishman in English ships, but for a Spaniard in Spanish ships, to import into this country the produce of Cuba and Porto Rico. My noble Friend appears to have forgotten also that we do not hesitate to take annually a vast quantity of the copper of Cuba. Here we levy no differential duties: in this case, the old restriction to trade with Cuba is not thought of, because we want
502
the copper—which is produced in a manner ten times more destructive to the life of the slave than the article, in order to prohibit which, we revive this restriction, and declare that the sugar of Cuba is inadmissible. But inadmissible how? Not for the purposes of exchange, for we take any quantity of it in exchange for our commodities—not for the purposes of manufacturing, for our warehouses are full of it, and our refineries depend upon it — not for the purpose of trade, for we buy the products of Germany and Russia with it; but it is solely inadmissible for the purpose of home consumption; and a dead letter of a restriction is dug up and brought to life, for nothing but the purpose of preventing Her Majesty's subjects from eating this polluted sugar. Yet with all these facts staring us in the face—facts which prove that the letter of the Article quoted by my noble Friend has fallen into complete desuetude, and that, consequently, we should alone be governed by the spirit of the Treaty of 1670, by which all the merchandise of Spanish subjects is placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation; I say, that with all these facts before us, to refer to a Treaty 170 years old, and to argue that under its provisions there is a sort of mare clausum round these islands, which renders them inaccessible to our traders, not as to their general products, but with respect to one commodity only, and one particular use of that commodity—does really exhibit an intrepidity in special pleading, which, as I said before, would be unavailing in any court of equity or honour, and which, I fear, would not have been resorted to in dealing with any Power from whose resentment we had any thing to apprehend; whereas the very weakness of Spain should have been an additional argument in favour of a generous and liberal interpretation of our engagements with her. My noble Friend lays great stress upon the Fourth Article of the Treaty of 1814, by which it is provided that—
"In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being opened to foreign nations, His Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation."
And he argues, first, that it is evident from these words that the Spanish West Indian Colonies were not then open to Great Britain, or to foreign nations, and, consequently, that the general privileges conferred

503
by the ancient Treaties could not apply in reference to the trade of those possessions; and, secondly, that at the negotiation of the Treaty of 1814, the ancient Treaties were not considered by Spain herself to confer the privileges for which she now contends. All this, however, proves nothing beyond the fact, that on both sides certain restrictions had been agreed upon mutually between the two countries, in regard to the trade with their respective Colonies; which restrictions, being applied equally to all nations, had nothing in them the least inconsistent with either the letter or the spirit of the Treaties. There was nothing in them to prevent Spain excluding English ships and commerce altogether from her Colonies; nor any thing to prevent the full exercise of our old navigation laws with respect to Spain, so long as they applied to all foreign countries alike. But the provisions of those Treaties did render it obligatory upon us, if we altered our laws in favour of any other nation, to do so equally towards Spain; and Spain was equally bound to remove her Colonial restrictions in our favour: if she did so for any other country and in 1814, the American Colonies being then in rebellion, and a prospect existing (though the prospect at that time in the eyes of Spain barely amounted to a possibility) of the trade between the other countries being opened, Spain, in perfect good faith, and in order to carry out the spirit of former Treaties, engaged that England should be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation. And yet my hon. Friend now turns this concession, as it was then, against the Spanish Government, and says that, if the ancient Treaties revived by that of 1814, had given to the two nations a mutual and general right to the treatment of the most favoured nation, it would have been unnecessary for Spain to promise, that in the event of the American trade being open to foreign countries, Great Britain should be admitted to trade as the most favoured nation. Now, I do not think there can be a doubt in the mind of any rational man, that the provisions of the former Treaties would have amply sufficed to secure to us all the privileges of the most favoured nation in the West Indian Colonies, if the trade with them had been thrown open; but because, on account of the former restriction, we made security more secure, and probably insisted upon this Article in 1814, at a moment when,
504
after the important services we had rendered to Spain, there was no difficulty in obtaining it, it does appear to me most unjust to draw from it the conclusion that Spain would have withheld from Great Britain the privileges she granted to other nations in respect to her American Colonies, which everybody capable of understanding those Treaties must know we should have considered a direct infraction of them, and should not for one single hour have tolerated. But my noble Friend is determined that whatever may have been the course pursued by Spain, whether she concedes her rights, or is forcibly deprived of them, no interpretation favourable to her shall be admitted. The Duke of Sotomayor contends that Spain has a right to be treated by Great Britain as a most favoured nation in regard to Colonial commerce, because Spain, in 1824, conceded to Great Britain, by Royal Decree, the liberty of trading with her South American Colonies; and he speaks of this Decree as the execution of the engagement taken by Spain in the Treaty of 1814. To this my noble Friend objects, and I agree with him, that the Decree makes no allusion to the Treaty. But it would have been improper, indeed, impossible to do so, because the Decree did not confer upon England alone, but upon all nations in alliance with Spain the privilege to trade with her Colonies; it did, however, concede to us every thing we could expect, or had a right to claim under the Treaty; and although my noble Friend speaks slightingly of the Decree, and treats it (as to a certain extent he is justified in doing) as an ex post facto measure, adopted only after the South American Provinces had passed from the authority of Spain, yet he must remember that it applies equally to Cuba and Puerto Rico, which were in a very different position from the South American Provinces. Cuba and Puerto Rico had not passed from the authority of Spain: they were not even in revolt; and the King of Spain might have withheld from Great Britain and all other nations the liberty of trading with those possessions. But he did grant it; and it is the trade with Cuba and Puerto Rico that is now in question, and not that with the South American Colonies; and with regard to those possessions of Spain, therefore, I contend that the Decree does warrant the construction put upon it by the Duke of Sotomayor. But my noble Friend won't hear of that either — and why?

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Because we had already helped ourselves to what we had agreed should be conceded to us; or, in other words, as my noble Friend more diplomatically expresses it, the British Parliament, in 1822, had passed a law to regulate the trade between Spanish America and the British Colonies; and early in 1824, it was intimated that the recognition of the South American Provinces could not much longer be delayed. I say nothing of the political motives which brought about this recognition, or the new world that was called into existence to redress the balance of the old, and in punishment of the French invasion of Spain; but I do insist upon the fact that we had, long before this period, given a complete go-by to the restriction upon our trade with the Colonies of Spain—that we had embarked a large amount of capital there, and had considered the Treaty of 1670 to be obsolete. And I must beg the particular attention of the House to an extract from a Paper which was laid before Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, in March, 1824. It is the memorandum of a conference between Mr. Canning and the Prince de Polignac, respecting the South American Provinces; and after speaking of the appointment of Consuls in South America, Mr. Canning proceeds to state—
"That such appointments were absolutely necessary for the protection of British trade in those countries.
"That the old pretension of Spain to interdict all trade with those countries, was, in the opinion of the British Government, altogether obsolete; but that, even if attempted to be enforced against others, it was, with regard to Great Britain, clearly inapplicable.
"That permission to trade with the Spanish Colonies had been conceded to Great Britain in the year 1810, when the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her Colonies was asked by Spain, and granted by Great Britain; that this mediation, indeed, was not afterwards employed, because Spain changed her counsel; but that it was not, therefore, practicable for Great Britain to withdraw commercial capital once embarked in Spanish America, and to desist from commercial intercourse once established.
"That it had been ever since distinctly understood that the trade was open to British subjects; and that the ancient coast laws of Spain were, so far as regarded them at least, tacitly repealed.
"That, in virtue of this understanding, redress had been demanded of Spain in 1822, for (among other grievances) seizures of vessels for alleged infringements of those laws; which redress the Spanish Government bound itsel
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by a Convention (now in course of execution) to afford."
Yet, notwithstanding all this—notwithstanding that we first procured the abolition of the restriction in 1810 as the price of our mediation, which mediation we did not carry into effect, though we did not, in consequence, absolve Spain from the conditions upon which we undertook it—notwithstanding that we have taken for ourselves everything we wanted, regulated our own trade, and appointed our own Consuls—that we demanded, and obtained, compensation for the restrictive coast-laws of Spain having been applied for—notwithstanding that the King of Spain confirmed what we had done, as far as circumstances would permit him—for, in the words of his Decree, he confirmed "the state of things which had existed since 1820, and some time before;"—nevertheless, my noble Friend declares that he cannot now, twenty years after all this has taken place, and has been definitively settled, perceive that any obligation whatever, of a reciprocal character, is imposed on the Crown of Great Britain with regard to the trade between either country and the Colonies of the other; and he still claims the benefit of an obsolete restriction imposed 170 years ago. Is this generous? Is it just? Is it wise? Is it the fitting policy for a great and powerful country towards one that is feeble and defenceless? Is it the course which becomes a country that has hitherto justly prided itself upon its unblemished honour, and scrupulous observance of its obligations? Is it a prudent course for a country which is always proclaiming its liberality, and recommending its own example? I feel sure it is not; and upon questions such as these, I do with confidence appeal to the justice and generosity of your Lordships. But my noble Friend next proceeds to strengthen his case by reference to the Order in Council of 1828, which, he says, furnishes another proof, not only that Great Britain held that Spain had no right to be treated as a most-favoured nation in respect of Colonial trade, but that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty acquiesced in that view of the commercial relations of the two countries; and my noble Friend adds, that if Spain had considered that any of her existing Treaties conferred upon her the privileges of the most favoured nation with respect to Colonial trade, she would not have remained satisfied with the limited privileges granted by that Order, but would undoubtedly have demanded that the full

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privileges granted to other nations should also be accorded to her. But, so far from proving that Spain had no right to favour with respect to Colonial trade, I contend it proves the direct contrary; for upon what other ground than that of Spain's right to claim the privileges granted to foreign ships, were they granted to her, and not only granted, but without Spain having fulfilled the conditions required by the Acts of Parliament, and to which other nations had submitted? I suppose it will not be contended that we went about offering these important privileges to different Governments—a portion to some, and a portion to others—some Governments complying with the Acts of Parliament, others refusing. Of course we did no such thing; but, having granted them to some countries for our own accommodation, we could not refuse them to others who, as in the case of Spain, had a right to claim them. But my noble Friend says, that if Spain had considered that any of her existing Treaties conferred upon her the privileges of the most favoured nation, she would not have remained satisfied with the limited privileges granted by the Order in Council (not that I believe these privileges were limited in any respect), but would undoubtedly have demanded that the full privileges which had been accorded to other nations should be extended to her. Why, I have not the least doubt that the Spanish Government had entirely forgotten, or were wholly ignorant of, the old Treaties, distracted as they were by internal dissensions and the difficulties of administering the country after the French army of occupation had been withdrawn: and this is no improbable assumption, seeing that Her Majesty's Government, who have no such cares on their hands—though they are not altogether free from care—have just shown themselves equally forgetful and ignorant of those Treaties. But is this a reason why we should persist in doing wrong to Spain, and in turning to our own advantage her neglect of her interests? Does this bear out my noble Friend in his present objection, that Spain did not require enough? Before, his complaint was that she demanded too much; and I can only compare his course to that adopted by the big boy in the division of the cake among his little schoolfellows — he who asks, shan't have—he who doesn't ask, don't want; and when my noble Friend asserts that Spain quietly acquiesced in the limitation, it is just what the big boy would say when called to account for his injustice and
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selfishness—"Why, the little boys all held their tongues; they acquiesced in the principle I laid down, and thereby furnished strong proof that they were conscious they had no right to be placed on the footing of the most favoured boys—that is to say, the big boys, of whom I am afraid—with regard to the cake." But, seriously, are we prepared, upon reasoning such as this, to sully the national honour, and to deprive another country of its just rights? We must have done one of two things: we either, gratuitously and unasked, proffered these Colonial privileges to Spain, or we yielded them, on her demand, as a just right; and in either case, we committed a gross act of injustice, and violated the spirit of our Treaties, in not placing her on the same footing, in every respect, as the most favoured nation; and yet it is upon this very act of injustice, and the ignorance of Spain concerning her rights, or her impotence to enforce them, which we call her acquiescence, that we now found our claim to repeal the Act, and in a precisely way to slip out of our obligations. I now come to a passage in my noble Friend's note, which, desirous as I am to avoid the use of harsh expressions, I hardly know how to designate; but this I must say, that there is no part of the correspondence which I have read with the same regret, or with the same sense of humiliation; for my noble Friend's note will go forth to the world as a manifesto of English faith and English principle; and in every part of the world there can be but one opinion with respect to it. At the same time, however, I felt convinced that my noble Friend must know how weak a cause he was defending, when he stooped to argue it upon the ground that the Treaty of 1713, although it gives to Spanish subjects the rights of most favoured nations, does not extend to their produce. I cannot call this even casuistry or special pleading—I will not call it misrepresentation, because my noble Friend is perfectly incapable of it; but I must consider it a complete misconstruction of the Treaty. My noble Friend says that we are to treat as the subjects of the most favoured nation the subjects of Spain, but that there is no obligation to treat the produce of Spain as Great Britain is used to treat the produce of the most favoured nation; and we find this assertion contained in the same document in which is quoted the Ninth Act of the Treaty of Utrecht, which declares that Spanish subjects shall have the same privileges and

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immunities as to all duties and customs relating to goods and merchandises, and shall not pay greater duties for their imports or exports in the territory of Great Britain, than shall be exacted of or paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation! But, surely, my noble Friend must perceive that if his argument be good for anything, it is of general application—it is conclusive against Spain, and the produce of Spain, as well as of her Colonies, under every circumstance that we may choose to give this interpretation to the Treaties; for in them there is no limitation to Spanish European produce, and my noble Friend's argument is just as valid against the wines of Spain, as against the sugars of Cuba. This is, however, the first time that such a distinction between persons and produce was ever heard of; and our own practice towards Spain, and that of Spain towards us, would, I should have thought, been sufficient to prevent my noble Friend from establishing a precedent so mischievous and so discreditable. Why, in 1703, when under the Methuen Treaty, we reduced the duties on Portuguese wines, for the purpose of encouraging to the utmost our trade with Portugal, we did not hesitate to place the Spanish wines on the same footing; and not only the Spanish, but the Sicilian wines, as the King of Spain was also at that time King of the Two Sicilics; and to charge those of France, Germany, and all other places at a much higher rate, while English produce of all kinds enjoyed similar privileges in Spain. But now, according to my noble Friend's doctrine, we might reduce the duties on French and German, and all other wines, and refuse to do so on Spanish, but yet plead that we honourably fulfilled the Treaties by permitting Spaniards to bring wine from Bourdeaux or the Rhine to England at the reduced tariff, as their persons are to be protected from paying higher duties than the persons of other nations. And if Spain were now to follow the example we have set her, to adopt the arguments we are using, and henceforward to reduce the duties upon the salt fish of Sweden, the hardwares and cloths of Germany, the silks and cottons of France and Switzerland, as she will be perfectly justified in doing—and so far from blaming her (except as regards her own interests), I shall consider that she only acts with becoming spirit in thus applying our own principle to ourselves, and with perfect fairness reciprocating our policy;—I should like to know whether my
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noble Friend is prepared to tell British merchants, when they came to remonstrate against the Tariff of Spain, levelled as it would be against the productions of this country, that they had no locus standi, nor cause for complaint, as the subjects of Great Britain were in the full enjoyment of every advantage secured to them by the Treaty of Utrecht? I warn the people of Newfoundland, of Birmingham, of Sheffield and Manchester, to look to this; for they may rely upon it, the question is quite as much one of national interest as it is of national honour; and that the mere adoption of a modern form of words, such as those used in the Treaties with the United States and Venezuela, and referred to by my noble Friend, with respect to goods being the growth, produce, and manufacture of the respective countries, instead of the phraseology in use 150 years ago, but which has precisely the same meaning and intention, will not be sufficient to save us from the charge of deliberately violating our engagements, nor, on the other hand, of protecting us from the measures of retaliation which we shall deservedly bring upon ourselves. And having adverted to the United States, I would take leave to ask my noble Friend upon what principle he proceeded technically to apply to them the provisions of our Treaty, with reference to the Sugar Bill. The United States have only a right to be treated as the most favoured nation; and when they demanded that the sugar of Louisiana should be admitted on the same terms as those of Java, Manilla, and China, my noble Friend ought, if he adheres so rigidly to the letter and the technical meaning of Treaties, to have replied that we admitted the free-labour sugar of those countries, and were prepared to do the same for the United States, if they had any such commodity to send us. But my noble Friend at once acquiesced in the demand of the American Government, and we received the slave-grown sugar of Louisiana at the low duty. Now, may we not draw from this an inference that fear rather than justice guides our policy towards other nations, and that if the United States had been in the same powerless condition as Spain, we should not have received the slave-grown sugar of Louisiana; and that if we had been bound to Spain by vast commercial transactions, and by a territory only separated from our own by a nominal frontier, the Duke of Sotomayor might have found the Treaty of 1670 rather less stubborn and unbending than it has proved to him?

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It was reserved, in short, for my noble Friend to prove, that, abroad as well as at home, we have one law for the rich and the powerful, and another for the poor and defenceless. My noble Friend must, however, bear in mind, when he draws such nice distinctions between persons and produce—distinctions that may be suited to the theological subtleties of the new Oxford school, but which should find no place in the arrangement of affairs of State—what are the words of the Treaty of 1670 upon which he lays so much stress. He must remember that they have relation only to the trade of the Colonies of the respective countries, but that they have no relation to the trade into the parent countries, carried on by the subjects of either, even though from the respective Colonies. If the Treaty of 1670 had been made last year, or last week, there is nothing in it to affect the present demand of the Spanish Government. True it is that we might not carry the fish of Newfoundland to Cuba, and that the sugar of Cuba could not be imported into Newfoundland; but there would be nothing to prevent the fish of Newfoundland from being sent to Spain, nor the sugar of Cuba to England, now that our old navigation laws have been altered: and at this moment there is nothing except the prohibitory duties imposed upon the sugars of Spain which prevents their being freely brought to this country, either in English or in Spanish ships. But these duties we have lowered in favour of other nations; and the Treaties provide that Spanish subjects shall be entitled to the same privilege as to all duties on their merchandise, as the subjects of the most favoured nations; and that if it shall happen in time to come, that any diminution of duties shall be granted by either side to any foreign nation, the subjects of each shall reciprocally and fully enjoy the same; and that they shall, in all lands and places, subject to the command of their respective Majesties, enjoy the same privileges as to duties which relate to wares and merchandise, as the most favoured nation uses and enjoys, or may use and enjoy for the future. We have granted the reduction of duties to other nations: the Spanish Government claims the same favour; and, I trust your Lordships will be of opinion, that their right to it is clear and unquestionable. Before I conclude, I must once more beg your Lordships to remember, that the Treaty of 1670, upon which my noble Friend mainly relies, is merely a stipulation between the
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two Powers, that their West Indian Colonies should be closed against each other, as they were against all other countries; or, in other words, it was a suspension, by mutual agreement, of those general rights to which the Colonies would otherwise, under the Treaties, have been entitled; and it is quite clear that the moment each party annulled the particular agreement, by which the general rights were held in suspension, those rights reverted to them by the Treaties. And as we ourselves chose to annul that particular agreement, not only for ourselves but for Spain—as the Spanish Decree of 1824 recognised our acts—as the Order in Council, of 1828, admitted the rights of Spain to Colonial privileges—and as the whole course of events for the last twenty years has entirely obliterated every trace and vestige of the limitation of 1670; yet the general Treaties subsisting in full force, it is clear that the Colonies are entitled to the general rights which had been restricted by the special agreement, just as if it had never existed. I have now, as briefly as I could, passed in review the arguments upon which the unfortunate determination of my noble Friend is founded: I know not whether I shall have induced your Lordships to take the same view of them as I do myself; but if not, I can only attribute it to my own want of ability, and not to any defect in the case which I have endeavoured to substantiate; for to my mind, it seems impossible to maintain those arguments, whether we read the Treaties in their strictest and most technical sense—whether we take them separately, or all in relation to each other; but of this, I am sure, that to strain those Treaties from their obvious and natural meaning, is unjust in itself and most impolitic on our part, at a moment when we are striving by every means in our power to liberalize the commercial policy of the world—when we are everywhere condemning differential duties, and the warfare of custom-houses—when we are endeavouring to establish relations favourable to ourselves by commercial Treaties with other nations, and to satisfy the daily increasing wants of our people, by finding fresh markets for their produce. God knows that in this we have obstacles and rivalries enough to contend against, without adding to them mistrust of our good faith, and the example of quibbles and special pleading, in order to support a law by which we propose to reform the social

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system of other countries. I have already trespassed too long upon the time of the House, to permit of my now attempting to show how utterly futile and inoperative for its professed object the Sugar Bill of last year must prove; but in support of which, we are now entangled in this unfortunate controversy with Spain. The results that were predicted of that Bill have already taken place: we have raised the price and increased the exportation of slave-grown sugar, in order to supply the place of the free-labour sugar, which we withdraw from neutral markets, where it meets the slave-grown sugar on equal terms; and it must be of course immaterial to the planters of Cuba and Brazil whether we bring their sugar here for home consumption, or for re exportation to Holland and Germany, in exchange for that description of sugar which, under the Bill of last year, we are now compelled to consume. By that Bill we have set an example of exclusive dealing, which we shall have occasion sorely to repent. In Brazil it has already cost us the loss of one of our best markets, and the withdrawal of all those special rights, political and commercial, which British subjects formerly enjoyed. We must now prepare ourselves for similar results, as regards Spain and her Colonies: that, however, will only affect our interests; but I greatly fear, that the example we are now about to give, of how the obligations of a Treaty may be evaded, will affect us irreparably in that—which is far more precious than all our commercial interests together—the honour and good faith of our country; and it is for the purpose of averting this great evil, as far as lies in the power of your Lordships, that I ask your concurrence in the Resolution which I have now the honour to propose:—
"That in reference not merely to existing Treaties between Great Britain and Spain, but to the Regulations under which, subsequent to those Treaties, Commercial Intercourse has for many years been carried on between Her Majesty's Subjects and the Spanish Colonies, this House is of Opinion, that the Subjects of the Queen of Spain should continue to be permitted to import into the United Kingdom all the Productions of the Territories or Possessions of the Spanish Crown, paying thereupon no higher Duties of Customs than are paid by the Subjects or Citizens of the most favoured Nations upon the Importation of like Articles, being the Productions of the Territories or Possessions of such Nations.
The Earl of Aberdeen: My Lords, my
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noble Friend has strongly impressed on the House the duty and the necessity of strictly adhering to the faith of our Treaties; he has shown the greatest anxiety lest the honour and good faith of this country should be tarnished by any deviation from its engagements. My Lords, in that respect I entirely agree with my noble Friend. No person can be more deeply sensible than I am of the great importance of scrupulously adhering to such views; and perhaps, in the situation I have the honour to hold, it may be peculiarly incumbent on me to be alive to the obligations of the principles which he has stated. But, my Lords, I suspect that had it not been for the general policy of the Government, as connected with the Sugar Question of last year, we should not have heard much of this Spanish claim; I think, if the claim had been put forward in any other matter, it would not have met with the same support on the part of my noble Friend. I don't wish, nor is this the time, to enter into a discussion of the wisdom and propriety of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government on the question of Sugar Duties last year. My noble Friend has already denounced that measure as unjust and impolitic. I believe, on the other hand, it was a just and wise measure, with a view to contribute to the repression of the African Slave Trade; that it was fully justified by such motives; and that its result has not been such as has been represented by my noble Friend. On the contrary, it has succeeded in bringing into this country a large and increasing supply of sugar of free growth; and that there is every prospect of that supply being continually augmented, while the price has been kept down as much as could possibly have been anticipated. My noble Friend, if I understood him, does not deny that the trade with the Spanish Colonies was, until a recent period, under the operation of certain Treaties, practically excluded. A contraband trade, no doubt, more or less, existed; but that the trade was prohibited my noble Friend does not deny. He argues, however, that when the restriction was removed, twenty years ago, under the same Treaties, the right accrued to Spain, as a most favoured nation, to enjoy all those advantages which we have granted to any other nation. Now, when he says these ancient Treaties have been always observed by Spain, and that he has appealed to them, and found that the Spanish Government have listened to his representations,

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I must say I am astonished to hear such a statement; because, in the experience I have had, I have met with nothing but a rejection of the validity of these very ancient Treaties to which he refers, and a denial on the part of Spain that these Treaties were in force, or susceptible of the construction it is now ready to give them. Such has been the conduct of Spain throughout. In the first place, only let me recall to your Lordships' recollection the Family Compact—the Treaty concluded between France and Spain in 1671. Mark the observance that then took place of the Treaties with this country, which placed the two countries, as you say, on the footing of the most favoured nations. Observe the 24th and 25th Articles of the Family Compact. Here is the 24th Article:—
"The subjects of the high contracting parties shall be treated with respect to commerce and duties in each of the two kingdoms in Europe as the proper subjects of the country in which they live or resort to, so that the Spanish flag shall enjoy in France the same rights and prerogatives as the French flag; and in like manner the French flag shall be received with the same favour in Spain as the Spanish flag. The subjects of the two monarchs, in declaring their merchandise, shall pay the same duties which shall be paid by the natives. The importation shall be equally free to them as to the natural-born subjects; neither shall they pay any duty not paid by the natural-born subjects of the Sovereign; it being well understood that no other Foreign Power shall enjoy in Spain, any more than in France, any privilege more advantageous than that of the two nations."
Then, the 25th Article says:—
"If the high contracting parties shall hereafter conclude a Treaty of commerce with other Powers, and grant them, or have already granted them, in their courts or dominions, the treatment granted to the most favoured nation, notice shall be given to the said Powers that the treatment of Spaniards in France and in the Two Sicilies, and of the Neapolitans and Sicilians in France and in Spain, is excepted in that respect, and ought not to be quoted or cited as an example, their Most Christian and Catholic and Sicilian Majesties being unwilling that any other nation should partake of those privileges which they judge convenient for the reciprocal enjoyment of their several subjects."
Now, these are engagements entirely in violation of all the Treaties as interpreted by my noble Friend. And this Family Compact, recollect, was in existence; and, although not supported and readily acquiesced
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in by this country, it did receive an official recognition by the Parliament of this country; for the Seventh Article of Mr. Pitt's Commercial Treaty with France, in the year 1786, is as follows:—
"And it being the intention of the two high contracting parties, that their respective subjects should be, in the dominions of each other, upon a footing as advantageous as those of other European nations, they agree that, in case they shall hereafter grant any additional advantages in navigation or trade to any other European nation, they will reciprocally allow their said subjects to participate therein, without prejudice, however, to the advantages which they reserve, viz., France in favour of Spain, in consequence of the 24th Article of the Family Compact, signed the 10th of May, 1761; and England, according to what she has practised in conformity to, and in consequence of the Convention of 1703, between England and Portugal."
And, at the time, Mr. Fox bitterly reproached Mr. Pitt for having by this Article sanctioned the Family Compact, which had, to a certain degree, been so invalidated by succeeding Treaties. This country had, by this Treaty, recognised the right of France and Spain—for the conditions are reciprocal — we recognised the right of Spain to place France in a more favourable position than we enjoyed ourselves. So much for the observance of these Treaties by Spain in those days. But I maintain that it is to the course of practice by the two countries that we are to look for the true interpretation of these ancient Treaties. It is in vain to refer to the letter of these Treaties, many provisions of which are inconsistent and contradictory; but it is to the constant practice and conduct pursued in the execution of these Treaties by both parties that we are to look for their true interpretation. Now, my Lords, Spain has always resisted the obligation of these Treaties, even where it would appear their provisions were most clear and specific. For example, British merchants, by the very express terms of one of the Treaties—that of the year 1667—are exempted from certain contributions. The contributions are levied on them; we remonstrate; Spain says that these are old conditions—that the times are changed—that they no longer apply to a constitutional government, and that British subjects cannot expect to be better treated than Spanish subjects, notwithstanding the express provisions of the Treaty. They also maintain, that inasmuch as by one of the Treaties—that of 1783—it was stipulated that commercial

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arrangements should be entered into between the two Powers on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, that engagement is as much in force now as at any former time; but that as there is no reciprocity they are not bound by the provisions of the Treaties to which my noble Friend refers. And so throughout we are met with a denial of the validity of any of these existing Treaties; and to the extent to which my noble Friend would press interpretation of them, this country has adopted the same right of construing them as Spain had done;—such has been the case on various occasions. For instance, my noble Friend says, that Spain has the same claim to be treated in British ports as the subjects of the most favoured nation. Very well. We make a reciprocity Treaty with France—we admit French ships into British ports as English ships—would Spain think of making such a demand? According to the argument of my noble Friend, Spain would have a right to demand that Spanish ships should be admitted into British ports upon as favourable terms as French ships are admitted.
The Earl of Clarendon: On the same conditions.
The Earl of Aberdeen: No, it is not on the same conditions. Their claim is to stand on the footing of the most favoured nation, without reference to conditions. That is quite a different subject. But they make no such demand; and for a very good reason. Of course, they could not make such a demand, because they impose heavy discriminating duties on our shipping. But, nevertheless, if the argument of my noble Friend were sound, it would entitle Spanish ships to be received in English ports as favourably as French ships. That would, undoubtedly, be the consequence of his argument if it were sound. I think that this is decisive with respect to the large claim put forward by the Spanish Minister, and supported by my noble Friend. I would beg, however, to ask a question of my noble Friend, who, I believe, had some concern in the transaction to which I am about to refer; at all events, it is perfectly well known that Her Majesty's late Government had proceeded very far in negotiating a Commercial Treaty with France; that Commercial Treaty I myself took up and carried also nearly to the point of conclusion. Well, that Commercial Treaty stipulated for a very large reduction in the duty on French wines; but did my noble Friend, did the late Government, or did
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the present Government ever think that it inferred the necessity of reducing the duty on Spanish wines? Never for one moment. Therefore your Lordships see, that Treaty, which might have been signed, and would have been signed, had it not been for the unfortunate events of the year 1840, which meet us so frequently in our relations with France — that Treaty would have been concluded, the duty on French wines would have been greatly lowered, and the duty on Spanish wines would have been a matter of negotiation with Spain, whether it should be reduced or not. So far advanced was that Treaty, that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House of Commons the loss he expected to the Revenue in consequence of the reduction of the duty on French wines from that Treaty. Still more recently a Treaty was under negotiation with Portugal; that Treaty arrived very nearly to completion; unfortunately, at last, circumstances rendered it impossible to conclude it, but it had advanced very nearly to the point of conclusion; a large reduction of duty on Portugal wines was stipulated in that Treaty; but was it ever imagined for a moment that that could necessarily infer a reduction in the duty on Spanish wines? Never. It is very probable that a Commercial Treaty would have been made with Spain; and I well recollect that the Spanish Minister of that day, a very excellent and enlightened person, used to come to me repeatedly, with the greatest anxiety, to know the progress of our Treaty with Portugal; because, he said, if we succeeded in concluding a Treaty with Portugal, he had no doubt we should compel Spain to enter into a Commercial Treaty with us, which he was most anxious to see effected. But it was only as the result of negotiation and a Commercial Treaty, that he looked to any such a result; he never imagined that because we reduced the duty on Portugal wines, therefore Spain would have a right to claim an equal reduction. Such a thought never entered into his imagination. My Lords, there are various other instances in which this country has acted thus in the interpretation of these Treaties, besides those to which I have adverted. My noble Friend relies on the Treaty of 1667 as giving the Spanish Minister (although he does not refer to it by name, yet it is embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht, word for word, and therefore forms part of it — my noble Friend relies on that Treaty of 1667 as placing Spain on the footing

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of the most favoured nation. Why, only twenty years after the conclusion of that Treaty of 1667, in the first year of the reign of James II., in 1686, when that Treaty must have been supposed to be at least as well understood, so shortly after its conclusion, as it can be now, the Parliament of that day imposed a duty of 8l. a tun on French wine, and 12 l. per tun on Spanish and all other wines. Undoubtedly, this country acted in the full exercise of its discretion in the application of these respective duties. But, still later, until a very recent period, the duty on Spanish tobacco was 6s. per pound, while the duty on United States tobacco was only 4s.; and this continued till 1822, when a general equalization of the duties took place. I may just mention another proof, which applies to Spanish wines as compared with Portugal wines. From the time of the Methuen Treaty down to 1787, there was a duty of 1l. per tun on Spanish wine higher than levied on Portugal wine; and the duties on Spanish and Portugal wines were equalized in 1787, and continued equal to the present time, with the exception of the interval between the 5th of July, 1809, and the 1st of January, 1813, during which period an additional duty of 12 l. per tun was levied on Spanish red wine, which was repealed by the 53rd George III. Therefore, there is no doubt we have repeatedly, constantly, and in every mode, exercised an entire discretion in the relative proportion of duties imposed on Spanish produce. My noble Friend says that still, after the Colonial trade was opened, we were bound to admit the produce of Spain on the footing of the most favoured nation; and my noble Friend has given a representation of the mode in which the condition for admitting England to trade with the Spanish Colonies, was exacted from the Spanish Government. I am not here to say anything about the liberality or generosity of imposing such a condition; at the same time, I must say, that after the great services rendered to Spain previously, I suppose it may have been considered a not very unreasonable return, to stipulate that if the Spanish Colonial trade were opened at all, this country should enjoy equal advantages with other nations; the truth of the matter being, that Spain, on more than one occasion, had offered to this country to admit England to exclusive privileges in the Colonial trade. More than once, in consideration of assistance rendered to Spain for the recovery of her revolted Colonies,
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and for other services, the Spanish Government proposed to admit this country to exclusive privileges in that trade; but these proposals were invariably declined; and all that was stipulated for and exacted, was to be admitted to an equal footing with other countries. But this engagement on the part of Spain, it must be observed, is unilateral. There is no corresponding engagement on our part. You may say that is ungenerous and illiberal; but such is the fact; and I do not see that in the circumstances in which we were placed in relation to Spain at that time, there was anything unreasonable in the demand, even although we did make it in reference to that concession. At the same time, we entered into a stipulation with Spain, which I hope they will also observe, although I have seen some indications of a design elsewhere to defeat it. By a separate Article of the Treaty of 1814, we did exact that the Family Compact should never be renewed, nor any Treaty resembling it. The engagement in 1814 was, that when the Spanish Colonial trade was opened, we should stand on the footing of the most favoured nation. In the year 1824, by a decree of the Spanish Government, the trade with the Spanish Colonies was nominally opened. It is perfectly true, as my noble Friend observed, that before this, England had, although not officially, in the last diplomatic form, yet practically, recognised the independence of the Spanish Colonies. Consuls had been appointed: the Spanish Government were informed that the formal recognition could not be long delayed; and then the Decree of 1824 was issued—but not in compliance with the Treaty of 1814—not at all. The Decree was issued when the Spanish Government thought proper; when they thought it would suit their own convenience or the necessity of the case; and when they had done so, as a matter of course, and in consequence of the stipulation, they were admitted to whatever was granted to others on that occasion. But I must say, that so little did it appear that any obligation was imposed upon Great Britain in consequence of this so-called concession, that until the year 1828, no return whatever was made by this country to the concessions so acquired in 1824; and even in the year 1828, when the Order in Council was issued, it did not confer on Spain the full privileges of Colonial trade, but was couched in terms much less favourable than were applied to several other nations. It merely sanctioned a trade between the Colonies

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of Spain and the Colonial possessions of Great Britain. His noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) said that the Spanish Government did not remonstrate on that occasion, because they were ignorant of their rights. That is a strange reason to allege; it is not very likely to have been the case with Spain. As far as I have always seen, no country is more ready to make large pretensions than the Spanish Government. My noble Friend certainly may call this special pleading; but the question is the correct interpretation of the Treaty; and as this is a compact, of course it must be strictly examined and interpreted. I have shown you how the relations between the two countries have been understood, and the Treaties acted upon by both parties; and I, therefore, see nothing in the present relation of the two countries which can possibly justify Spain in claiming as a right the admission of her produce into British ports, which my noble Friend puts forth. My Lords, I will now say a few words on the last part of my noble Friend's speech, in which he treats with ineffable contempt the distinction which has been drawn between the rights granted to subjects of a State, and the manner in which the produce of that State is regarded. Now, in the first place, I must observe, that the Treaties with Spain to which my noble Friend has referred, and all the Treaties of that day, are framed on a very different basis from what exists at present. These Treaties stipulate in favour of personal privileges, and they have no reference to goods, except as connected with the persons possessing and dealing with those goods. By those Treaties, Spanish subjects were entitled to enjoy all the same privileges as the subjects of any other foreign country; whether in respect of their persons, their ships, or their goods; but with the produce apart from the ownership of it these Treaties have nothing to do. They have no reference to it. For instance, they say that any article whatever owned by a Spaniard, shall pay on coming into this country no more duty than the same article owned by a Frenchman; but they leave it entirely free to us to provide that the wine of Spain, for example, shall pay twice as much as the wine of France, if only it pays no more when in the hands of a Spaniard, than when in the hands of a Frenchman. The modern Treaties show that this distinction is real. Take the Turkish Treaty of 1838, which is one of the most recent. The Sublime Porte grants—
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"All rights, privileges, and immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of Great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties, are confirmed now and for ever, except in as far as they may be specifically altered by the present Convention; and it is moreover expressly stipulated, that all rights, privileges, or immunities which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power, or which it may suffer the ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power to enjoy, shall be equally granted to, and exercised and enjoyed by, the subjects and ships of Great Britain."
And there are various passages to the same effect; and after all, there are additional Articles to the Treaty itself, in which it is provided that all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and its dependencies, and all merchandise brought in British vessels, being the property of British subjects, shall be so admitted. So that there are some large concessions to subjects and their ships and goods; but, they do not include produce without reference to ownership, and that is the reason why, in the Treaty with the United States, there is an Article giving large privileges to subjects and inhabitants of the countries, their ships and goods; yet the Second Article provides that the duties imposed in the ports of Britain in Europe on articles the growth and produce of the United States, shall not be higher than those imposed upon those of other countries, this Article being quite irrespective of the privileges granted to subjects. So with Venezuela: Venezuela at first claimed exemption on the ground of her sugar being free grown; and I hope that in a very short time it will be so; but, upon inquiry, our Government considered that it could not be strictly called free-grown sugar, and the demand of Venezuela was consequently refused. Venezuela then put forward a claim founded upon this particular Article of the Treaty, which provides that no higher duties shall be imposed upon the produce and manufactures of venezuela, than was imposed upon those of the most favoured nations; and their claim was at once conceded; and, I think, if it was not so, it would lead to much confusion and to absurd consequences; because, on what is the claim of my noble Friend founded? It must be founded at least on the relation to the subjects of the King of Spain, who had this right; but this right, under the Treaties, applying to Spanish

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subjects, has no reference to British subjects; because if Spanish subjects in Cuba were to have this right under the Treaty, it is clear that only Spanish subjects were intended to have it, and not British subjects. So that, suppose you admit, under the Treaty, my noble Friend's right of Spanish subjects, at the same time, under the operation of the same Treaty, you exclude the claim on the part of British subjects. Now, that is reducing it to an absurdity; it is impossible that it could be so intended. Therefore, it is clear, that the right was personal in its character, and did not apply to produce separate from ownership. I can only say that the subject has been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the tenor of the Treaties; and my noble Friend would fall into an error if he should suppose that this has been unadvisedly done, and that the Treaties have been newly discovered by us, and the effect and operation of them. As to the wisdom, or policy, or generosity, or liberality, of the proceeding, that is a matter which may be discussed if necessary, at another time; but, I must say, that according to the strict and authorized interpretation of Treaties, we have done nothing which is not just. I do not lay any claim to a liberal or a generous interpretation of the Treaties; but I say it is a justifiable interpretation with reference to the policy which Her Majesty's Government have adopted, and which has been sanctioned by this House and by Parliament. There is nothing in the interpretation of those Treaties which I do not think perfectly justifiable, and borne out by the letter of the Treaties themselves, and by the conduct of both parties for a long series of years; and this being the case, I do not think that we are at all liable to the imputation of my noble Friend, and I must oppose his Motion.
The Earl of Radnorsaid, that the course of the argument of the noble Earl was different from that which he had employed in his correspondence with the Duke of Soto-mayor. With respect to the Treaties, according to the noble Earl's interpretation, the Treaty of 1667 had been set at nought nineteen or twenty years after; and yet he (Lord Radnor) found in the book which had been laid on the Table of the House by command of Her Majesty, that that Treaty had been renewed over and over again till 1783. What was the meaning of Treaties if they were to be held of no avail? It would be better to have no
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Treaty at all. He would ask any person of common sense who read the Treaty, whether on the face of it Spain was not to be entitled to all the advantages of the most favoured nation? He (Lord Radnor) read as a man of common sense, and he found that the Treaties of 1667 and 1713 had been revived up to 1786. But the noble Earl said—that was not his argument today—that the Treaty of 1670 overturned that of 1667. It did so in a particular point, and in that point only. But if their Lordships looked at the Treaty of 1670, it said nothing of the produce of the Spanish Colonies not being brought to the United Kingdom; and it was a curious fact, that in the book laid by Her Majesty's command before their Lordships, the Treaty of 1670 was given in part only, and those parts referred to by the Duke of Sotomayor did not appear. The Treaty said nothing of the produce of the Spanish West India Colonies not coming to the territories of the King of Great Britain; it prevented the sailing of vessels from the mother country to the Colonies, but it did not prevent the bringing of the produce of the Colonies to the mother country. With respect to the latter part of the noble Lord's argument, it justified what appeared to him a great injustice. Could any one of common sense believe that the Treaty did not intend, in speaking of subjects of a State, "their" produce and "their" trade? No man of common sense, in his opinion, in reading the Treaty, would not put a different interpretation from that put upon it by the noble Earl.
The Earl of Clarendon, in reply, said, his noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) had stated that Spain had always denied the right which the Treaty gave us; but he (Lord Clarendon) could show the contrary, from his own personal experience. During the civil war, he had been in Spain, and he had, by means of the Treaty, prevented forced loans being exacted from British subjects resident in Spain. He had in his possession a very magnificent piece of plate which had been presented to him by the British merchants for preventing their being subjected to forced loans, solely on the ground of the Treaty. His noble Friend had said that the duties on Spanish wines had been increased at certain times; but these were the wines of places east of Malaga, in order to defray the expense of resisting the Algerian and Mediterranean pirates. He agreed with the noble Earl behind him, that there was a difference between

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the arguments used by his noble Friend to the Duke of Sotomayor, and in his speech to-night, which was somewhat in the tu quoque style—that the Treaty had been so often set at nought by Spain and by ourselves, that it was no matter how often it was violated. With respect to the fine distinction of his noble Friend about persons and produce, he appealed to their Lordships whether, although his noble Friend had said that the process of reasoning he employed had led his mind to the conclusion, they were not convinced, as he (Lord Clarendon) was, that the conclusion was not his own, by which he had adopted an opinion not very satisfactory in respect to the interpretation of the old Treaties, or to the spirit of the new ones.
Resolved in the Negative.
House adjourned.