Sitting of 12 February 1844

MINUTES.
BILLS. Public.—2o. Factories; Offences at Sea 3o. Metropolis Improvements.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Mr. Walker, from Bury Union, for Alteration of Law of Bastardy.—By. Mr. W. Lascelles, from Canterbury and Wakefield, respecting Window-Tax on Licensed Victuallers.—From Preston, for Inquiry into State of Ircland.—From Ware, against Union of Sees of St. Asaph and Bangor.—By Mr. Hutt, from Gateshead, and Mr. Ord, from Newcastle, against Increase of Dues on Coals Imported into London.—By Mr. Bright, from Reading, against Vote of Thanks to Army in Scinde.

MILITARY OUTRAGE AT BRIGHTON.
Captain Pechellwished to ask the right hon. Baronet at the head of the War Department in that House, whether his attention had been drawn to a statement in the papers, of an outrage committed by some soldiers, in barracks at Brighton, on the persons and property of several of the inhabitants. He wished to know whether any official information had been received, and whether any steps had been taken by the Horse Guards to prevent a recurrence of such conduct?
Sir H. Hardingesaid, from the papers he found the quarrel at Brighton originated from a soldier having been struck and otherwise assaulted by three or four persons. The soldier called his comrades to his assistance, and the civilians ran into the house where the affray complained of took place. There was much violence used; in fact, the violent outrage which took place, it was impossible to defend. But, as the regiment had voluntarily come forward to defray the expense occasioned by the destruction of property which had occurred, and as there were legal proceedings pending against one of the offenders, he thought the House would not require him to enter further into the affair. With respect to the prevention of such occurrences, the Duke of Wellington, as Commander-in-Chief, had taken the strongest steps to prevent the recurrence of such affrays for the future.

MOTHERS AND CHILDREN.
Mr. Ferrandput the following question to the right hon. Baronet:—That as Lord Chief Justice Denman has declared it to be the unanimous opinion of the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench, "that there are some cases in which it is necessary to break in upon the Act of Parliament, and upon that which may have existed from all time;" and has also declared, that "it is the mother who is the proper party

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to have the custody of all her children under seven years of age, and that it is not for the benefit of the mother, but for the protection of the children;" and that he thinks that "the judges ought to crush the first attempt to depart from that principle, and that it is of the highest importance that it should be considered the undoubted law of the land,"—whether the Government intend to insert a clause in the New Poor Law Bill, for the purpose of prohibiting the separation of mother and child, if they should become the inmates of a workhouse?
Sir J. Grahamsaid, the hon. Member had placed the question in such a manner, as to remove all doubts as to the character of the explanation it required. The hon. Gentleman had apparently exercised the utmost care and caution in framing the question, but, undoubtedly, he had been led into a serious mistake somehow. The hon. Member's question referred to matters of fact, which did not exist, and to a dictum of Lord Chief Justice Den-man's, which had never been pronounced. First, he would deal with matters of fact. By a general ordinance, which had received the force of a legal enactment, when the noble Lord opposite filled the office of Home Secretary, it is provided, throughout England and Wales, that no child under the age of seven years should be separated from its mother in the workhouse. He spoke in the presence of the noble Lord, who was then in office when this general order was issued—namely, that children under the age of seven years, were to be placed in the same ward as their mothers, and that parents and children should have access to each other at reasonable hours. To put aside the possibility of doubt as to the construction of the term "reasonable hours," the Poor Law Commissioners had defined it, "that reasonable hours was to be held to be, that, so long as the mother was suckling, she was to have access to her child when wanted; and that the child at no period should be placed beyond the mother's reach." He would now deal with the alleged dictum of the Lord Chief Justice. The hon. Gentleman believed that the dictum of the Lord Chief Justice was as he had stated it to be in his motion; but, so far from this being the dictum of Lord Chief Justice Denman, it is precisely the reverse. From one of the Judges, and from the law reports, he had his authority
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for what he now stated. He would read from the Law Journal report what was really the dictum of Lord Chief Justice Denman. Lord Denman said, cases had arisen, where, in order to give effect to an Act of Parliament, it was necessary to break in upon an established principle. The dictum, therefore, of the Lord Chief Justice, was precisely the contrary of that quoted by the hon. Member. He hoped the answer he had given would be satisfactory.

FISHERIES CONVENTION.
Captain Pechellwished to put a question to Her Majesty's Government relative to the proceedings with France under the late Convention for regulating the Fisheries of the two countries. Last Session this country had performed its part, and had done its best to give force to the regulations of the Convention, but as he had not heard of any proceedings of a like nature on the other side, he thought it was necessary the country should know what was the nature of the laws respecting the Fisheries, and whether the French Government had performed its part by submitting to similar regulations.
Sir R. Peelwas quite willing to give any information in his power. The hon. and gallant officer would recollect, that when the last Convention, in 1843, was agreed upon, the two Governments were in a different position. The Parliament of this country were sitting, while the Legislature of France had closed its proceedings. It was, therefore, impossible for the French Government to take the same effective steps which the British Government had taken, to give force to the law. The French Government had extensive powers to regulate their affairs by ordinance; but this power, he was informed on good authority, was not sufficient to enable the French Government to carry into complete effect the provisions of a convention of this nature. He had no doubt, however, that the French Government would take the proper steps to carry the stipulations of the Convention into effect. Indeed, he believed, that he might state that he had been advised on good authority that a projet de loi had been prepared, which would be shortly submitted to the Legislature of France, for the purpose of carrying these regulations into effect. He had, therefore, reason to hope that no unnecessary delay would

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occur in obtaining the requisite legislative sanction in France to the provisions of the Convention.

LAND TENURE COMMISSION (IRELAND.
Mr. Rossobserved, that the House would recollect the question put the other night to the right hon. Baronet, by the hon. Member for Finsbury, as to whether there would be any objection to place some tenant farmers on the Land Tenure Commission in Ireland, in order to remove the suspicions which, undoubtedly, in some quarters, attached to it. The right hon. Gentleman expressed some doubts on the subject, and asked whether any tenant farmers would serve without pay. He was of opinion that many could be found, and he knew that this was the case, with respect to the tenant farmers in the northern part of Ireland. The next day he was informed, on good authority, that several tenant farmers in the west and south of Ireland, paying rents varying from 2,000 l. to 300 l. or 400 l. a-year, could be found who would be willing to undertake the duty without payment. He thought that the right hon. Baronet seemed rather inclined to yield to the wish expressed by the hon. Member for Finsbury. The question which he wished to put was, whether, as there was no difficulty in finding respectable tenant farmers to act upon the Commission without payment, the right hon. Gentleman would consent to add some of that class to it. Supposing his answer to be in the negative, whether he would consent to associate sonic of the humbler class of tenants with those already named in the Commission, paying them for their time and trouble?
Sir R. Peelreplied, that the hon. Gentleman must have misunderstood the answer which he gave the other evening to the question put by the hon. Member for Finsbury. He meant to have said, and he thought that he had stated on that occasion, that he was not prepared to advise any alteration in the constitution of the Commission. As for the class of tenants paying 2,000 l. a-year rent, they rather might be placed on the footing of landed proprietors, than in the same class with the great mass of the occupying tenants. The Commission had already made great progress in their inquiry, and he had reason to believe that the period would not be very long before some portion of the Report would be laid on the Table;
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he, therefore, was not prepared to sanction any alteration in the constitution of the Commission.
Mr. Rosssaid, he thought, that the right hon. Baronet had not answered the second part of the question put to him, namely, whether he would object to some of the humbler class of tenants being placed on the Commission; and also, whether any of such class were to be examined before the Commission?
Sir R. Peelsaid, that with respect to paying salaries to certain tenants of the humbler class for sitting on this Commission, he conceived, that he had answered the question when he remarked, that he did not think it advisable to alter the constitution of the Commission. He wished to speak with every respect of the humbler class of tenants, and he hoped, that he might say, without offence, that as it was probable that many of the humbler class of tenants would be willing to receive appointments on the Commission, from the prospect of pecuniary reward, he did not think that it would be an improvement of the Commission to adopt any suggestion of that nature. With respect to the evidence of this class of persons, there could be no doubt but that it would be most valuable, and it was most desirable that every inducement should be held out to them to express the iropinions before the Commission.

FACTORIES.
Sir J. Grahammoved the Order of the Day, for the second reading of the Factories Bill.
Mr. Ferrandasked, whether the promise which had been given to a deputation of frame-work knitters from Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, that a commission should issue to inquire into their complaints against their employers, was to be carried into effect?
Sir Grahamsaid, that the commission had already issued. Mr. Muggeridge had been appointed to inquire into the subject.
Mr. Ferrandsaid, that the appointment of Mr. Muggeridge would not give the slightest satisfaction. The result of his appointment on the Handloom-weavers Commission had been highly unsatisfactory, and his appointment on the present occasion would merely have the effect of putting the country to expense. Would the right hon. Baronet have any objection to refer die matter to a Select committee

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of the House, instead of to a commission so constituted?
Sir J. Grahamwas in absolute despair of pleasing the hon. Gentleman. First, nothing would satisfy the hon. Gentleman but a commission; now a commission was given him, he wanted something else. He really could not comply with the hon. Gentleman's second request. From all the inquiries he had made upon the subject, from information he had obtained from the President of the Board of Trade, and from the brother of the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, Mr. Lefevre, who gave the highest testimonies in Mr. Muggeridge's favour, he was convinced that Mr. Muggeridge was in a very eminent degree qualified for the charge which had been entrusted to him.
The bill read a second time.

METROPOLITAN IMPROVEMENTS.
The Earl of Lincolnmoved the third reading of the Metropolitan Improvements Bill.
Mr. Humeobjected to the power which had been given in this bill to the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to borrow from the Bank of England money on mortgage, for the purpose of carrying out these improvements, although he knew the same power had been given to the Commissioners under the provisions of a former similar act of Parliament. The consequence of the Bank of England being permitted thus to lock up its money in securities, which were not readily convertible into cash, might be that the Bank would find itself one day without a guinea to carry on the business of the public.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerthought this was a case to which the objection of the hon. Member for Montrose could not in fairness be applied. The money about to be advanced in this instance was not advanced in the same manner as money advanced upon mortgage. It was to lie out until it would be convenient to repay it by instalments whenever money came to hand as the old buildings were taken down and sold.
Mr. Hawessaid, he had papers in his hands complaining of the great injury done to a large body of individuals who lived or had shops in the immediate neighbourhoods where the various metropolitan improvements were taking place, in consequence of the extraordinary slow progress of the works. In many places,
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rows of houses had been pulled down for the last two years, and no progress made towards rebuilding them, evidently a great inconvenience and injury to the surrounding locality. He understood, too, that in the meantime, the Government was paying a large sum in ground rents for the places thus pulled down; so that the delay was in every way objectionable. The Government should not pull down any House before it was prepared to set about the rebuilding of it.
The Earl of Lincolnassured the House that due diligence had been used by the board, and that they had been careful to collect the best possible advice upon the subject. There was good reason to apprehend that if the whole of the materials of the houses pulled down were to be too hastily pressed on the persons who dealt in those materials, the Commissioners would get nothing for them, and the expense of the improvements would be thereby considerably increased.
Bill read a third time. On the question that the Bill do pass,
Mr. Humewith a view to exclude the Bank of England from engaging in lending money upon the security of these Improvements, for the reasons he had stated, moved as an amendment, that the words, "The Governor and Company of the Bank of England," in the 15th line of the second page of the bill, be omitted.
Mr. Mastermanthought the hon. Member perfectly justified in the objection he had taken to the clause empowering the borrowers of this money to take it from the Bank of England. A body like the Bank of England should not enter into a speculation of this nature, or lock up its money in securities from which the Bank could not withdraw it whenever it became necessary for the public convenience or protection.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, that when a former act for Improving the Metropolis passed, two years ago, the right had been reserved to the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to borrow money for the purposes of the Act, and it had accordingly happened that great competition took place between various capitalists. The terms offered by the Bank, however, were the more favourable terms. Doubts were suggested whether the Commissioners could legally borrow of the Bank; reference was made to counsel, who gave their opinion that they might. Although

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thus fortified in his previous opinion, he thought it better to introduce this clause, empowering the Commissioners to borrow the money of the Bank, which was an enactment merely confirmatory of the Act 4 and 5 of Victoria. This mode of investment had an attraction for the Bank of England, which it had not for private parties, who looked more to permanency when they advanced their money by way of mortgage. Hence the offers of the Bank had been more liberal, and had been accepted.
Mr. Hawescould not view the question in the light the right hon. Gentleman saw it. The bill, if he read it aright, contemplated a clear right to invest the money with the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, without return, for five years, which was a principle he thought it would be injudicious on the part of the House to sanction, with respect to the Bank of England particularly, as they were, he believed, about to accept of assistance on these improvements, from other quarters, and especially from the source of the coal duties levied by the corporation of the city of London.
Mr. M. Philipsdisapproved of the system of allowing the Bank of England to advance money on mortgage. He must say, as a commercial man, he would not open an account with any bank which dealt in securities that could not be realised immediately in cases of emergency. He hoped that the words objected to by his hon. Friend, the Member for Montrose would be omitted.
Mr. C. Woodsaid, that there had been a strongly-expressed opinion on the part of the public against the Bank of England advancing money by way of mortgage; and in consequence of that expression of feeling, the practice had entirely ceased. He must, therefore, object to sanctioning by a parliamentary enactment a practice which had been condemned by the Bank itself. True it was, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated, this money was not permanently locked up as a mortgage would be; but the security on which the money was to be advanced was not a negotiable security, and the repayment of the money was made contingent upon circumstances. If he thought there was an impossibility of obtaining the money from other sources he should waive his objection; but there were Assurance Companies and other large
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bodies of whom money was to be had cheap enough, and there could be no difficulty in getting it from the Exchequer Bill Loan Commissioners, or from any bankers in the country.
Sir R. Peelapprehended, that the course which the House had to pursue was, to prevent the sanctioning of a general principle, that the money of the Bank of England should be laid out on mortgages; there certainly was a great objection to placing funds in such securities as were not available at the shortest notice in case of necessity. But it was hardly possible to say, that this was a violation of that principle. The total amount which was wanted would not exceed 150,000 l. or 200,000 l., and it was merely permissive on the part of the Bank to advance this amount. It might be necessary to borrow various small sums of perhaps 5,000 l., or 10,000 l. at a time; but, on the other hand, it would be necessary to have a security to repay the sums which were wanted. The difficulty was to find Insurance Companies who would make those advances on such terms, that the parties should receive the amounts by small instalments; because if they borrowed more than was required it was a dead loss. Under all the circumstances, he hoped the House would not think this an objectionable arrangement.
Mr. Humedid not object to the arrangement on the score of the amount which was required to be borrowed, but he objected to it on principle. His objection was, that the Bank of England should advance money on mortgage—for there was no doubt they would lend on that security. He objected to pledging the House to the adoption of a bad principle. He would, therefore, beg the right hon. Baronet to postpone the passing of this bill, to see whether there could be any modification made in the plan.
Mr. C. Woodsuggested to the right hon. Baronet, that as several small sums would be required, whether a limit should not be named, in reference to the amount to be borrowed from the Bank.
Mr. Stuart Wortleyobjected also to the power to be given to the Bank of England to lend money on mortgage. He thought, however, this was an exception to the case. The right hon. Baronet had stated the difficulty in obtaining loans of this kind, and he thought, looking to the

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smallness of the sum wanted, this should be regarded as an exception to a general rule.
Dr. Bowringsaid, this was a question of great importance, when the application was made the exception of a Parliamentary sanction. He thought his hon. Friend was quite right in persisting in dividing the House on this question.
Sir R. Peelwas willing to propose a clause limiting the amount to be borrowed of the Bank of England, by way of mortgage, to 250,000 l. The right hon. Baronet moved the insertion of this limitation in the amount to show that the House did not recognize the principle generally.
The House divided on the question, that the words proposed by Mr. Hume to be left out stand part of the question:—Ayes 145; Noes 70: Majority 75.

List of the AYES.

Ackers, J.

Divett, E.

Acland, T. D.

Dodd, G.

Aldam, W.

Douglas, Sir H.

Allix, J. P.

Douglas, Sir C. E.

Archdall, Capt. M.

Eaton, R. J.

Arkwright, G.

Egerton, W. T.

Ashley, Lord

Eliot, Lord

Baillie, H. J.

Escott, B.

Baillie, Col.

Ferrand, W. B.

Baird, W.

Fitzmaurice, hon. W.

Baldwin, B.

Flower, Sir J.

Bankes, G.

Follett, Sir W. W.

Baring, hn. W. B.

Ffolliott, J.

Beckett, W.

Forester, hn. G. C. W.

Bell, M.

Forster, M.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Fox, S. L.

Boldero, H. G.

Fuller, A. E.

Borthwick, P.

Gardner, J. D.

Botfield, B.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Bramston, T. W.

Gisborne, T.

Broadley, H.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Bruce, Lord E.

Gladstone, Capt.

Buckley, E.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Buller, E.

Gore, M.

Burrell, Sir C. M.

Goulburn, rt. hon. H.

Cardwell, E.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.

Charteris, hon. F.

Greene, T.

Chetwode, Sir J.

Gregory, W. H.

Cholmondeley, hn. H.

Hamilton, W. J.

Chute, W. L. W.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Clerk, Sir G.

Harcourt G. G.

Clive, hon. R. H.

Hardinge, rt. hn. Sir H.

Cochrane, A.

Hayes, Sir E.

Colborne, hn. W.N.R.

Heathcote, Sir W.

Collett, W. R.

Henley, J. W.

Compton, H. C.

Hodgson, F.

Conolly, Col.

Hodgson, R.

Corry, rt. hon. H.

Hope, hon. C.

Cripps, W. H.

Hope, G. W.

Davies, D. A. S.

Hornby, J.

Denison, E. B.

Howard, P. H.

Dickinson, F. H.

Irving, J.

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Jermyn, Earl

Peel, J.

Jocelyn, Visct.

Praed, W. T.

Knatchbull, rt. hn. SirE

Pringle, A.

Leslie, C. P.

Protheroe, E.

Lincoln, Earl of

Ramsbottom, J.

Lindsay, H. H.

Reid, Sir J. R.

Lockhart, W.

Repton, G. W. J.

Lyall, G.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Lygon, hon. Gen.

Shaw, rt. hon. F.

M'Geachy, F. A.

Shelborne, Earl of

Mackenzie, W. F.

Shirley, E. P.

Mac Neil, D.

Sibthorp, Col.

Mahon, Visct.

Smythe, hon. G.

Mangles, R. D.

Somerset, Lord G.

Manners, Lord C.

Stanley, Lord

Manners, Lord J.

Staunton, Sir G. T.

Marton, G.

Stewart, J.

Milnes, R. M.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Morgan, O.

Tennent, J. E.

Morris, D.

Thesiger, F.

Murray, A.

Trench, Sir F. W.

Nevill, R.

Turner, E.

Nicholl, rt. hon. J.

Verner, Col.

Northland, Visct.

Vivian, J. H.

O'Brien, A. S.

Waddington, H S.

Oswald, A.

Wood, Col. T.

Packe, C. W.

Wortley, hon. J. S.

Paget, Col.

Weightson, W. B.

Pakington, J. S.

Young, J.

Patten, J. W.

TELLERS.

Pattison, J.

Fremantle, Sir T.

Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

Baring, H.

List of the NOES.

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Heathcoat, J

Hill, Lord M.

Baring, rt. hon. F. T.

Hindley, C.

Barnard, E. G.

Hobhouse, rt. hn. Sir J.

Berkeley, hon. C.

Hollond, R.

Bowring, Dr.

Howick, Visct.

Bright, J.

Hutt, W.

Brotherton, J.

James, Sir W. C.

Busfield, W.

Labouchere, rt. hn. H.

Butler, hon. Col.

Langston, J. H.

Butler, P. S.

Lawson, A.

Byng, rt. hon. G. S.

Macaulay, rt. hn. T. B.

Christie, W. D.

Marsland, H.

Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

Masterman, J.

Collett, J.

Napier, Sir C.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Ord, W.

Curteis, H. B.

Palmerston, Visct.

Dalrymple, Capt.

Pechell, Capt.

Dawson, hon. T. V.

Philips, M.

Dennistoun, J.

Plumridge, Capt.

Duncan, G.

Rawdon, Col.

Dundas, Adm.

Russell, Lord J.

Easthope, Sir J.

Scholefield, J.

Ebrington, Visct.

Smith, B.

Esmonde, Sir T.

Smith, rt. hn. R. V.

Ferguson, Col.

Standish, C.

Ferguson, Sir R. A.

Strickland, Sir G.

Fitzroy, Lord C.

Thorneley, T.

Fox, C. R.

Townely, J.

Gibson, T. M.

Trelawney, J. S.

Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.

Troubridge, Sir E. T.

Halyburton, Lord J. F.

Tuffnell, H.

Hastie, A.

Vane, Lord H.

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Walker, R.

Wyse, T.

Wawn, J. T.

TELLERS.

Wilshire, W.

Hume, J.

Wood, C.

Hawes, B.

Mr. Humesaid, the proviso was a mere evasion; and he was extremely sorry that the right hon. Baronet, whose opinions must regulate the majority of that House for this Session at least,—in respect to bargains with the Bank of England, should in the present case have violated a sound principle. He objected to any limitation, but since the matter was decided against him so strongly, he would say no more.
Proviso moved by Sir It. Peel added.
Bill passed.

VOTE OF THANKS To SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND THE ARMY IN. SCINDE.
Sir Robert Peelsaid, Sir, I rise for the purpose of moving, that the Thanks of the House be given to a portion of the British army, and to its gallant Commander, for services recently performed under very critical circumstances, and during very important operations on the banks of the Indus, which army has, under these circumstances, and during these operations, exhibited proofs of discipline, of constancy and of valour which have sustained and even exalted the high character of the British army, and have entitled that army and its commander to the public expression of our thanks. With the policy of the measures in the execution of which, that army has been employed I have upon this occasion, nothing to do. Whether it were justifiable and politic to exact from the Ameers of Scinde penalties on account of the violation of their engagements—whether it were politic to demand the cession of territory in lieu of the tribute to which the Ameers were subject, are questions which, in my opinion, ought to be reserved altogether for separate consideration. I have now to call the attention of the House to the conduct and merits of gallant men performing the first duty of a soldier—namely, obedience to lawful authority, and by the mode in which they performed it, entitling themselves, in my opinion, to the public acknowledgement which I shall propose. Sir, others I consider to be responsible for the measures, the execution of which was committed to Sir Charles Napier. He was employed by the Governor-general. He received
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instructions from the Governor-general. He had authority, within certain limits, from the Governor-general; but for the employment, the instructions, the authority, the Civil Power in India, and not Sir Charles Napier, is, in my opinion, altogether responsible. I shall be prepared on the proper occasion, if need be, to vindicate the instructions and authority, but upon the present occasion, I shall altogether abstain from entering into any discussion on the policy of the measures themselves. Sir, the information which has recently been laid on the Table of the House, and the degree of public attention which has been directed to the operations in Scinde, relieve me from the necessity of entering into any detail with regard to the measures which led to the employment of the British army on that occasion. I take it for granted, that every Gentleman has read the papers laid on the Table of the House, relating to the subject, and I shall not, therefore, enter into any unnecessary detail of the circumstances which led to the British army being placed under the command of Sir Charles Napier. The House would recollect, that about the month of September, 1842, Sir Charles Napier was directed to take the command of the British army in Scinde and Beloochistan. The active operations in which he was engaged extended for a period which is included between January 1843, and the latter end of March, in the same year. That period of three months, included the advance upon Emaum Ghur, the battle of Meeanee, and the battle of Hyderabad. These two battles, the most prominent objects to any one contemplating the subject, were fought under very peculiar circumstances. According to the first report of Sir Charles Napier, the force opposed to him in the battle of Meeanee amounted to somewhere about 23,000 men, while his own force did not exceed 2,800. I have, however, reason to believe, that he overrated the amount of the force under his command, and underrated that of the force opposed to him. I believe it would be more consistent with the truth, were I to say, that the number of the British troops under his command at the battle of Meeanee, did not exceed 2,000, and that the force opposed to him did not fall short of 25,000, the number originally given. Sir, the force of the Ameers consisted of men accustomed to war, of

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great natural courage, and of desperate resolution, to which full credit is given in the admirable despatch of Sir Charles Napier. That force, originally estimated at 25,000 men, occupied a very formidable position. They were posted in the dried bed of a water-course, which during the inundations of the Indus becomes filled. The enemy were flanked by a village, and by a wooded country, almost impervious to troops. Their position, I believe, was defended by fifteen pieces of artillery; and against this force of 25,000 men so postal, Sir Charles Napier and his army marched, for the purpose of defending their lives, and supporting the honour and credit of their country. At the battle of Hyderabad, the force of Sir Charles Napier had received the addition of two or three regiments; and the British force in that battle amounted to 5,000 men. The force opposed to him, consisted of about 20,000. Of the courage and resolution of the army of the Ameers no greater proof can be given than one adduced from the despatch of Sir charles Napier,—
"That on the approach of the British army the Beloochees did what, as an exhibition of courage, corresponds in European warfare with the actual conflict of the bayonet, the proof of European courage which is the most decisive, that after discharging their firelocks at the troops of Sir Charles Napier, they rushed from the watercourse in which they had taken up their position and attacked the British soldiers with their shields and swords, which they took as substitutes for their firelocks."
Nothing can be more decisive than the testimony of Sir C. Napier to the valour of those who were opposed to him; at the same time, any one who considers the circumstances of the action, the nature of the position, the valour of the enemy, and the disparity of the forces, will admit that, the valour of the enemy was rendered vain by the eminent military skill on the part of Sir C. Napier. Sir, in those two battles also, although there was such an immense disparity of force, the valour of the British soldiers fully maintained the character of their country. In the first battle, where the disparity was the greatest, the British force consisted, I think, of only one regiment of Europeans, three regiments of Sepoys, if I remember rightly, the 25th, the 12th, and the 1st, and some native cavalry; and it is, I think, most gratifying to know that there was no distinction an the exhibition of valour, between the
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Sepoy and the European; animated by the example of their officers, both Sepoy and European were exposed to the common danger, and showed an equal degree of courage and resolution. Sir, to the officers and men employed on that occasion it would be impossible to attribute too high praise; but, at the same time, justice requires that we should not overlook the great cause of the victory. It is in my opinion, mainly to be ascribed, both at Meeanee and Hyderabad, to the example set by the gallant Officer, who was responsible for the British army on those occasions. It is most fortunate that at such a crisis, and under circumstances of such difficulty, the command of the British army was committed to a man, one of three brothers, who have engrafted on the stem of an ancient and honourable lineage that personal nobility which is derived from unblemished private character, from the highest sense of personal honour, and from repeated proofs of valour in the field, which have made their name conspicuous in the records of their country. Sir, each of these three brothers learnt the art of war under an illustrious commander, during the whole of those memorable campaigns of which one of them has been the faithful, impartial, and eloquent historian—and the exploits of those three brothers during the whole of those campaigns entitle them to the gratitude of their country. In almost every action of the Peninsular war they gave proofs of great military skill and personal valour. In the actions of Corunna, of Busaco, of Ciudad Rodrigo, and during the operations of the Pyrenees, they proved that there was no British officer more prodigal of his blood in the cause of his country than was each of those brothers. Sir, the officer who commanded in the actions to which this notice refers, bears a name than which there is none more conspicuous in the bright pages which contain the records, whether in the military or the naval annals of this country, for desperate and successful valour. For if we read the account of some naval action, in which, in the course of five minutes, with a force wholly unable, unless directed with the utmost skill and valour, to compete with the enemy—if in the course of five minutes we find a signal victory achieved, by which the glories of St. Vincent are revived—a victory by the moral effect of which a dynasty is changed,—if we read

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the records of such an action, we find the name of the commander there is Napier. Even in a more limited and circumscribed sphere of operation, when, in the course of last year, it became of the utmost importance to impress on a misguided multitude the inherent strength of the law and the civil power directed by a consciousness of right, and by consummate skill, the man who, accompanied by only six constables, attacked hundreds of people, and captured more of those opposed to him than the number of the men he commanded—I remark, with satisfaction, that the person who achieved that comparatively speaking, humble and yet most useful exploit, also bore the name of Napier. I am justified then in saying, that in the records of gallant exploits, whether civil, military, or naval, there is not one name which stands out more conspicuously than the name borne by the gallant Officer who commanded at Meeanee and Hyderabad. And, Sir, I believe that those who bear that name, stimulated by the examples of their predecessors, will continue to exhibit the same courage and resolution in great actions, and that the motto which they bear on their shields, "Ready, ay, ready," will be as it is, their motto, so also the characteristic of their conduct. Let the House recollect that when Sir Charles Napier was called on to take the command of the forces in Scinde he had attained the age of 62, and that his body had been shattered in the service of his country; and yet it is to his spirit—to the example which he set the troops—inspiring an unparalleled confidence in their commander, that we must mainly attribute the success of the actions of Meeanee and Hyderabad. The quality of actions, Sir, chiefly depends on the character of those who superintend them. The actions which have been performed by the members of the Napier family may appear foolhardy to the pusillanimous—they may appear the mere result of a lucky chance to the superficial; but however desperate they may appear when they are undertaken and superintended by ordinary minds, they are, nevertheless, reconcileable with the soberest calculations of prudence when directed by such men as Sir Charles Napier. Sir, there is one point I am desirous of adverting to, because I know if rashness could be imputed to Sir Charles Napier—if it could be imputed to him that he had needlessly led the British army into the
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conflict—no praise which we could bestow on his valour would compensate him for the painful reflections which such an imputation would give birth to in his mind. I think it is impossible for any one to peruse the papers relating to this question without coming to the conclusion that not only was that the wisest course which Sir Charles Napier could take—namely, that of at once encountering the enemy, but that if he had pursued any other course, the safety of the army would have been compromised. It is difficult to speculate as to what might have been the results if a different course had been taken; but if any man could entertain a doubt as to the policy of the course which Sir Charles Napier took in not suspending his march, in not permitting the Ameers to congregate, and in determining at once to bring his force of two thousand five hundred men into conflict with a force eight times the number, he would only ask such a man to read the account of what passed in the year 1839, at the time when Sir John Keane arrived from Bomb y at the mouth of the Indus. Do not speculate on what the Ameers would have done in 1843, if Sir Charles Napier had delayed his march or withdrawn his troops, but read the testimonies of what their conduct was in 1839, and I think you will say that Sir Charles Napier had no alternative but at once to front the danger which menaced him. In 1839, Lord Auckland having determined on advancing into Affghanistan, he sent a force from Bombay, under the command of Sir John Keane, for the purpose of entering upon some negotiations with the Ameers, and of making Scinde the basis of his military operations. Lord Auckland, in describing the operations of Sir John Keane, gave this account of the conduct and intentions of the Ameers:—The Bombay division, under the command of Sir John Keane, landed at the Hujamsee mouth of the Indus in the early days of December, and Lord Auckland, writing in March, 1839, says:—
"No resistance was offered to its disembarkation, but from the date of its arrival every artifice was resorted to to thwart and impede its movements, notwithstanding the most fulsome professions of friendship and devotion."
They (the Ameers), says Lord Auckland, professed the utmost devotion, yet he says that they were at the same moment "making every preparation for hostilities, and that they endeavoured to see

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what good they could derive from a system of feigned confidence and violent menace." The Ameers then took with respect to Sir John Keane the same course which they afterwards took with respect to Sir Charles Napier:—
"Communications, Lord Auckland continues, were cut off—letters seized—boatmen and other workpeople threatened—and every appearance of intended open hostility exhibited,"
On the 24th January, 1839, Sir John Keane writes:—
"I have in former communications stated to you that Scinde has all along been considered a light affair, as it might be called a secondary consideration; as relating to the campaign, so near as I can judge at this hour, it assumes a different aspect, and takes a first place in the operations of the army."
Again, immediately after he writes:—
"Things have come to a crisis in Lower Scinde; the gentlemen of the residency have been obliged to leave Hyderabad, and are now in my camp."
I ask you also, continued the right bon. Baronet to read the account which Lieut. Eastwick gives of the menaces directed against him. There is no saying what the consequences might have been if he had remained at Hyderabad. He retired, and if he had not been prudent enough to retire, he would have been exposed to the same attacks as that gallant officer Major Outram was afterwards subjected to. Lieutenant Eastwick, in his account of the negotiations states, that
"On the 20th January, the treaty was given to the Ameers; on the 21st January, the Ameers desired the meeting should be postponed to the 22nd. On the 22nd the Ameers said they could not on that day give an explicit answer; they would not say whether they would accept the treaty or not. On the 23rd hordes of troops surrounded the city, and the reply of the Ameers was that the treaty should be sent back, for that they would not sign."
The proceedings of the Ameers, in 1839, were exactly similar to those of 1843. They made fulsome professions of friendship and devotion—they asked you to postpone the negotiations from day to day—they pretended to wish for further time for consideration, but every hour they were collecting their forces. At their request four days were allowed to elapse. When their preparations were completed what was their answer?
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"The treaty could not now be signed—the embassy might go or stay as they pleased, but they (the Ameers) could give them no pledge of safety, having no control over the Beloochees."
So Sir John Keane says:—
"The whole country in front and in rear of us is now aroused and under arms to exterminate us if they can. Troops are flocking in from all directions to the capital. Let a brigade of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery be sent down as soon as possible."
Why did not the Ameers attack the British army?
"Because Sir Willoughby Cotton having received authentic intelligence of the imminent hazard of a rupture in Lower Scinde, marched two brigades of infantry, one brigade of cavalry, and a large force of artillery down the east bank of the Indus in the direction of Hyderabad. The troops of Shah Shoojah had been sent to occupy Sukanna, a town from which the Beloochee soldiery had been drafted to support the Ameers of Hyderabad."
Sir John Keane, who was on the opposite bank, wished to take that course which Sir Charles Napier afterwards took, of making an attack at once. On the 30th of January Sir Henry Pottinger, finding himself supported by such a force, told the Ameers he could now make no abatement in the terms which had been proffered; but if they still refused, if a gun or a matchlock were fired, their whole country would be seized, and that they themselves would be dispossessed of power. When the Ameers found that four or five brigades of British troops were close upon them they signified, on the 1st of February, their readiness to submit to the terms. If, however, there had then been only a force of 2,000 or 2500 men, depend upon it the Ameers, notwithstanding their professions of friendship, would have attacked our troops. Sir Charles Napier was not in the condition in which Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton were. He had not 8000 or 10,000 men under his command, but only a limited force of 2,500 men to oppose to the forces of the Ameers. My opinion is, that if he had delayed one day longer; if he had attempted to retreat; if he had not taken that course which his wisdom combined with his skill had dictated him to take, not one day would have passed without his army being attacked and cut off; and though the glory of the British arms would not have been

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tarnished by such a result, still, following upon the disaster which occurred to us at Cabul, it would have produced the most serious consequences. In estimating the conduct of Sir Charles Napier, I do not think the chief praise is due to his military skill—I do not think it is due even to his personal valour; but I do think it is due to him for the course which he took, and his opposition to those who advised a postponement of hostilities, in at once engaging the enemy. Having pondered on the consequences of retreat—knowing the shock which our Indian empire would sustain by a repetition of a disaster like that of Cabul—he, on his own responsibility, with less local knowledge than was possessed by many around him, had the moral courage to act in opposition to the advice he received, and committed that army and his own reputation to the fate of doubtful war. It is chiefly for that exhibition of moral courage that I think him entitled to the Thanks of the House. In detailing the action of Meeanee Sir Charles Napier writes as follows:—
"At one time, my lord, the courage and numbers of the enemy against the 22nd, 25th, and 12th regiments bore heavily in that part of the battle. There was no time to be lost, and I sent orders to the cavalry to force the right of the enemy's line. This order was very gallantly executed by the 9th Bengal Cavalry and the Scinde Horse; the details shall be afterwards stated, for the struggle on our right and centre was at that time so fierce that I could not go to the left."
That is the modest and becoming account of the reasons which prevented him from going to the left. He remained at the post of danger, feeling that the time was come when, whatever might be the consequences of his fall, the necessity for an example of personal devotion upon his part, by coming and sharing in the common danger, was so great that he could not retire from his position, and he was thus obliged to collect from others an account which he himself could not give. And there did that gallant man stand, I believe within ten or fifteen yards of the water-course where lay the whole force of the enemy, cheering on his troops by an example of personal valour, which made it impossible for any man in that army to resist its contagious influence, but compelled them all, like their gallant commander, to devote their lives to the service of their country. Sir, I think it is unnecessary for me to trouble the House with
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further details. I am asking them to place upon record their sense of the military services of the Army in Scinde and of its commander. I call upon them for no expression of opinion upon any other point connected with the operations in that country. But looking to what was achieved by them, looking to what was done by every man in that army on those two days, I think the House will be disposed to come to a unanimous resolution that for such exploits the Thanks of this House are justly due. With respect to some who were engaged in those battles, we must mingle with the expression of our gratitude to them an expression of deep sympathy with their relatives and friends. The dispatches of Sir C. Napier wifely and justly ascribe to individuals who fell on those occasions much of the merit of the victories that have been gained. He has left, I believe, an imperishable record of the exploits which they performed. It is almost impossible to lament deaths so glorious as some which took place in the course of those engagements. He speaks of one gallant officer in a manner which must, I think, if anything can, give consolation, to his family and friends, and prove to them the highest consolation that could be offered to them under their affliction and distress. He says:—
"I have deeply to regret the loss of the brave and excellent Captain Garrett, of the 9th Light Cavalry, who fell honourably in the battle; and also the fall of Lieutenant Smith of the Bombay Artillery; with unsurpassed and desperate valour he galloped in front of his battery, and rode up upon the top of the nullah (filled with enemies) to see where his guns could bear with the greatest effect. Here the hero fell."
Sir, there can be no nobler inscription upon the tomb of that gallant officer than the words in which his commander has thus commemorated his services. Sir, with regard to these gallant men, I trust we shall now proceed to bestow upon them that highest reward which a grateful country can confer—that reward, of which it has with truth been said—
"The Senate's thanks, the Gazette's pompous tale,
With force resistless o'er the brave prevail."
That we shall allow you, Sir, as the organ of the nation's voice, to express to Sir Charles Napier, and to the Officers and the Men who served under his command—to the European and to the Sepoy—to the man of the highest and of the lowest

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rank who shared in those days a common fate and are invested with a common glory—that to them all we shall convey through you, Sir, as our organ, the acknowledgment of the public gratitude. The right hon. Baronet concluded by moving
"That the Thanks of this House he given to Major-general Sir Charles Napier, Knight Grand Cross of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, for the eminent skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by him in the recent Military Operations in Scinde, particularly in the two decisive battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad."
Lord J. Russell: After the eloquent terms in which the right hon. Baronet has moved the Thanks of this House to Sir C. Napier and the gallant army under his command, I shall content myself with merely seconding that motion. I took occasion the other day, to state my opinion of the moral courage with which Sir C. Napier extricated himself from the perilous position in which he was placed. I need not now repeat that opinion. I cannot, however, help saying that, even those who may disapprove of a portion of his conduct, but with whom I do not agree—I cannot help saying, that even those hon. Members may, in my opinion, fitly render a tribute to the military skill, to the exalted courage, and to the persevering conduct of Sir C. Napier, and of the army under his command. It is eminently fortunate for this country, that at the age which Sir C. Napier has attained, he should have retained all the vigour and the energy of a young man; and there are few men, perhaps at the age of twenty or thirty, who would have shown so much energy as Sir C. Napier, united with his great military skill.
Viscount Howickcould assure the House that it was with the most unfeigned regret he felt himself under the absolute necessity of interfering with that unanimity which the right hon. Baronet had called for from the House; but, painful as it might be to him to take that course, a sense of imperious duty compelled him to adopt it, and he was bound to state to the House the grounds upon which, in his opinion, they ought to withhold from Sir C. Napier the high honour which the right hon. Baronet had proposed that they should bestow upon him. It was, he repeated, most painful to him to take that course, because he could truly say, that the right hon. Baronet himself could not more ad-
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mire than he did the military skill displayed by Sir C. Napier. He thought that in the short and decisive campaign in Scinde he had had an opportunity of showing some of the greatest qualities which could distinguish a military commander—prompt decision, energy, undaunted bravery, consummate military skill, and, above all, that power which particularly distinguished f superior minds—the power of inspiring into all who served under his command a portion of the same spirit by which he was himself animated. All these praises he most cheerfully and most cordially concurred with the right hon. Baronet in attributing to Sir C. Napier; but it was utterly impossible for him to forget that, upon that occasion, Sir C. Napier had not been merely a general. The right hon. Baronet had said, that they had then nothing to do with the policy pursued. Now that might be truly said, if the Governor-general were responsible for all the measures that had been adopted, and if Sir C. Napier had merely been called upon to carry into effect a course of policy decided on by others. But the House would remember that such a statement was not quite consistent with the opinion which the right hon. Baronet himself had avowed, when he turned round and told them that it was not the great military skill which he most admired in Sir C. Napier. He maintained that on that occasion they had to do with a question of policy—that Sir C. Napier was not merely a general in Scinde—that he had powers given to him, and with those powers responsibility of a very peculiar kind. On looking to the papers, he perceived a letter to Sir C. Napier from the Governor-general, dated August 26, 1842, saying—
"Within the limits of your military command you will exercise entire authority over all political and civil officers."
And Major Outram was directed to lay before him, with "judicial accuracy," the case against the Ameers; and, on the case so admitted to him, Sir Charles Napier was to exercise his own judgment; he was informed, that the Governor-general was determined signally to punish the treachery of any ally, but at the same time this most proper caution was added, that—
"The Governor-general would not proceed in this course without the most ample and convincing evidence of the guilt of the persons accused. The Governor-general entirely relies on your sense of justice, and is convinced, that whatever report you may make

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on the subject (after full investigation), will be such as he may safely act upon."
Accordingly, if we read through the papers, we should find that every step that was taken against the Ameers was virtually taken and determined on by Sir C. Napier. In most instances he acted at once on the discretionary authority given to him by the Governor-general, and even when he referred to the Governor-general, it was quite clear that the latter, being at a distance from the scene of action, saw only through the eyes of Sir C. Napier and supported him throughout. He therefore contended that Sir C. Napier stood in a different position from many military officers who had been thanked by that House. In the case, for instance, of Lord Keane, it had been perfectly consistent for those who disapproved of the Affghan expedition to join in the Vote of Thanks to his Lordship, because in that case there had been no discretion, no power whatever in Lord Keane to alter the course that had been adopted. The military operations had been resolved upon by the Governor-general; and Lord Keane had merely been called upon to give effect to that resolution. But with Sir C. Napier the case was far otherwise. He had been placed at the head of a large force; he had been desired to effect certain objects peaceably, if possible, and if not by force; having been placed in this situation, the policy which had been pursued was his policy, and he was equally responsible with the Governor-general for all that had taken place in Scinde. Now, such being the case, he was bound to say it appeared to him that it was utterly impossible that Sir C. Napier's military conduct should be judged of alone and apart from his conduct as a statesman and negotiator; his conduct should be regarded as a whole; and, taking it in that light, he was bound to say, that for one, he could not approve of it. He was, however, far from meaning to contend that Sir C. Napier ought, during the few days which preceded the battle of Meeanee, to have acted upon the advice of Major Outram. He entertained no such opinion; on the contrary, he confessed that he concurred in the opinion which the right hon. Baronet had again stated on that evening, and which had, on a former occasion, been expressed by hon. Members upon both sides of the House, that if at that time Sir Charles Napier had acted upon the opinion of Major Outram—if he had hesitated to advance and fight that battle; and if he had allowed the ne-
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gotiations to be continued—if he had so done, it was his persuasion also, that in the situation in which Sir C. Napier was then placed, a great disaster would have been the consequence. So far he entirely concurred with the right hon. Baronet. But the question was, how had affairs been brought to that situation which rendered the battle necessary. He must say, that on reading over these papers, and giving to them a calm and impartial consideration, it was impossible for him to come to any other conclusion than that it was the arbitrary violence with which those unhappy princes had been treated which had brought affairs to that condition in which the battle became necessary. That was the conclusion at which he had arrived after calmly reviewing the whole series of transactions in that country from the time Sir C. Napier had assumed the direction of them; for he should observe in passing, that Lord Ellen borough's instructions had at first been marked by a fairness and moderation which they had not subsequently displayed. He was far from meaning to exempt the Ameers from all blame. He knew that they had behaved like all barbarous people, and especially like all barbarous people in the east. No doubt they had been guilty of treachery, of deceit, and of plotting against us. But he asked any dispassionate and impartial man, after having calmly read over all the papers that had been laid before them—he asked any such man to lay his hand on his heart, and then to deny that we had given them the first example of setting at nought, under frivolous pretences, the solemn engagements of treaties deliberately contracted, and that it was only when they found their interests most seriously threatened—when they believed they had no other mode of escaping, probably from ruin, or at all events from a summary and arbitrary confiscation of their property, that it was only then that collection of their troops against us had commenced. He confessed that that was the impression which the reading of those papers had made upon his mind after giving to them the calmest and most deliberate consideration in his power. And undoubtedly, he was greatly strengthened in that opinion by finding that those persons who had the best means of judging of the state of that country, concurred with him in the view which he had taken. When he found his opinion supported by Sir Henry Pottinger, by Major Outram, and by Lieutenant Eastwick, he could not doubt but that there must be good grounds for

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entertaining that opinion. He found Lieutenant Eastwick in the speech which he had lately published—a speech which he thought equally creditable to him for the ability it displayed, and for the high tone of moral sentiment which was embodied in it—he said he found in that speech the following words in confirmation of his view of the question:—
"As an independent man, giving an independent opinion to the best of my humble judgment, I am bound to say that I consider his (meaning Sir C. Napier's) ignorance of the language, the manners, and the habits of the people with whom he had to deal—his want of experience in native character and political life in India, and, above all, his total want of sympathy with the unfortunate Am0eers, were the main causes of the fatal result of these negotiations."
Such was the opinion of Lieutenant Eastwick, and he (Lord Howick) confessed that it was an opinion in which he entirely participated. At the same time, he was well aware, that the difficulty of forming a correct judgment upon questions of that kind was so great, especially to those who could not boast of being very conversant, as he confessed he was not, with eastern affairs—so much depended upon the degree of credit to be given to conflicting testimony, which he had no means of estimating—so much did he feel his incompetence to pronounce a decision upon a case like the one then before the House, that strengthened as his own opinion was—much as he condemned the course of proceeding in Scinde, still he should have hesitated to call upon the House to refuse the Vote of Thanks which had been proposed, if he thought that by doing so they would necessarily pronounce a judgment against Sir C. Napier, and against the course of policy which he had pursued. But he denied that such would be the result of their withholding the Vote of Thanks which the right hon. Baronet had proposed, because he was prepared to contend, that whatever might be their opinion on these transactions, they could not agree to a Vote of Thanks in the circumstances of the case, without violating an important and long recognised rule of policy. He maintained, that even if it were much clearer than he could admit it to be, that in all his dealings with these unhappy princes Sir C. Napier had respected the great principles of justice—if his policy were much less open to doubt, than it actually was, he maintained that even then there would be a valid objection to their agreeing to that vote under the circumstances of the
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case. Hon. Gentlemen might perhaps be surprised at the opinion he had thus expressed; but he thought he should render much more clear the nature of the objection which he took to the Vote under the circumstances under which it was asked, by referring to what had actually occurred upon another occasion. He believed it would be very generally admitted, that the battle of Navarino, considered merely as a feat of arms, was highly honourable to the British name—that the skill of the officers and of the men engaged upon that occasion had been most conspicuously displayed; and yet the Administration which held the reins of power, when Parliament met after that celebrated action, had not thought it fit, under the circumstances under which it had taken place, to propose any Vote of Thanks from that House. Their determination not to do so had been met with much disapprobation in various quarters; and amongst others, his right hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, then Member for Westminster, had come forward and proposed that the House should vote its Thanks to Sir Edward Codrington and to his gallant companions in arms. The Government, however, opposed the motion, and Mr. Huskisson, then Secretary of State for the Colonial and War Departments, moved the previous question. After a lengthened debate, the motion of his right hon. Friend was withdrawn without a division. Now there was, he was aware, many distinctions to be drawn between that case and the present; but that which it was important to consider was, the grounds upon which the Vote of Thanks proposed by his right hon. Friend had been at that time opposed by the Government, and refused without a division by the House. The arguments against agreeing to that Vote, had been stated by Mr. Huskisson in a speech, the whole of which would be well worthy of the consideration of the House; but he would trouble the House only with two short extracts from it. Mr. Huskisson had said—
"That That there never existed on the part of Government the smallest intention to propose the thanks of Parliament to the officers and men engaged in that affair. He would tell the hon. Member why such a thought could not enter into the mind of a prudent and sensible Minister. It was this:—we voted the thanks of Parliament for triumphs over our enemies—we voted them to mark our satisfaction, that in a conflict which we had foreseen and dircted with a power against which we had declared war—the skill, and gallantry,

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and zeal of our officers, had triumphed over the skill, and gallantry, and zeal of our enemies, and that they had maintained by that skill, gallantry, and zeal, the ancient superiority of our country above all others."
Again, Mr. Huskisson had thus expressed himself in another part of his speech on that occasion:—
"He did not doubt the gallantry nor dispute the discretion of Sir Edward Codrington, but he must say to the House, be cautious before you create a precedent of thanks for an event which grew out of an accident, lest officers, looking at the signal benefit conferred on them by receiving such thanks, should cherish too easy a disposition to create a precedent, and lest such accidents so created should lead to consequences which the country might long have reason to regret."*
Such was the opinion of Mr. Huskisson. The right hon. Baronet opposite followed him later in the debate, and urged very much the same line of argument, but dwelt more particularly on the importance of adhering rigidly to the rule of limiting these Votes to cases where war bad formally been declared, and quoted several precedents in support of this opinion, amongst others, the case of the battle of Toulouse, in which the Thanks of the House were withheld from the Duke of Wellington, on the ground, that when the action was fought, the war had actually terminated, although the hostile commanders could not have been aware of that fact; and, therefore, as the war was no longer going on, the battle must be considered a misfortune, and not a subject demanding a Vote of Thanks on the part of the House to the commander in the action, and of the troops serving under him. The right hon. Baronet protested most strongly, and he had no doubt most sincerely, against the idea of being actuated by any party motive, or of intending to cast any reflection on the policy of the Cabinet which had preceded that to which he then belonged. The course taken by the Government had been imputed to their wish to cast a slur on the policy of Mr. Canning, and on the Treaty, which, in fact, led to the battle, the right hon. Baronet protested against this as a most unfounded imputation. He had no wish, he said, to question the brilliancy of the action in which Sir E. Codrington commanded, neither did he desire to cast any imputation on his discretion, or the manner in which he had fought the battle, nor did he say that
*See Hansard, New Series, p. 392 & 397, Vol. xviii.
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he ought to have avoided the accident. He resisted the Vote simply on the importance of adhering to the general rule, that when war had not been declared, the Thanks of the House ought not to be given. He gave the right hon. Baronet the fullest credit for sincerity in making that statement, but he must be allowed to ask him whether that general rule was of less importance now than then? How was it, then, that he now came forward to propose this Vote of Thanks, when he found Sir C. Napier, in his dispatch of the 27th of December, stating,—
"War has not been declared, nor do I think it necessary to declare it."
When, on looking over these papers, he could find no trace of war having been declared, it did appear to him, that the present case fell most fitly and most completely within the rule laid down by the right hon. Baronet. [Sir R. Peel: the rule has been disregarded since the period referred to by the noble Lord.] He had no doubt, that the right hon. Baronet would be able to prove that the wholesome technical rule to which he had alluded had unfortunately been broken in upon of late years. But what be wished to show was, that an acquiescence in this Vote of Thanks would involve a violation, not merely of the technical rule, but of the salutary and important principle on which that technical rule was founded—a principle of policy, in his opinion, most wise and most becoming. What was the ground taken by Mr. Huskisson?
"Beware," he said, "how you give to officers in command of your fleets and armies the temptation of high honours for successes in cases of accidental encounters. Beware bow you give them an expectation of high professional honours, lest you should bias their minds and render those encounters less unfrequent than they would otherwise be."
Such was the real substance of the argument of Mr. Huskisson, in which he entirely concurred. Not that he believed for a moment that any officer would deliberately engage in what he knew to be an unnecessary action, thus incurring the guilt of wanton bloodshed, merely for the purpose of obtaining honours for himself; but he knew that men's minds were so strangely constituted that, in doubtful and difficult cases, the best and wisest men were liable to be unconsciously biased and influenced by the promptings of self-interest and ambition—a fact borne out by all history and all experience. If, then, this principle was

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applicable to the case referred to by Mr. Huskisson, why was it not equally applicable to the present occasion? It was Sir Charles Napier who had to determine whether military operations should be undertaken or not. It depended on his conduct towards the Ameers whether a collision should happen. He had great military means at his disposal, with instructions if possible to obtain what was necessary for the honour and safety of the country without having recourse to arms. He trusted none of them were so enamoured of military glory—so intoxicated with success, as not deeply to regret that Sir C. Napier failed to accomplish his object by peaceable means. He trusted that all deplored, as a great calamity, even the brilliant victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad—brilliant as they were—when they thought upon the frightful bloodshed by which they were purchased, and that they all united in the wish, that what was really necessary could have been obtained without having this price to pay for it. But if so—if this were really the view they took of what had happened, let them so act on the present occasion as to render the recurrence of such calamities less probable. Let them look at the state of circumstances in India, and reflect that it had frequently in times past been found necessary, and that it was probable it often would be so in future in that part of our dominions, to entrust the conduct of negotiations to generals commanding large armies, instructed to obtain by pacific means, if possible, if not by force, objects considered essential for our safety or our interest. Could it be doubted, that a brave and enterprising general, conscious of high military talents, which he panted for an opportunity to display, surrounded by officers all animated by the same spirit, commanding a gallant and eager army, in which he placed implicit confidence; was it in human nature that such a man, placed in such circumstances, treating with oriental rulers with whom treachery, deceit, and procrastination were habitual, finding negotiations drawing out to an apparently interminable length—was it possible that such a man so circumstanced, should not feel a strong disposition to cut the Gordian knot of such interminable negotiations with the sword, rather than to await their disentanglement by patience and forbearance? Knowing the strong passion for military glory which burned in the breast of the soldier, could it be doubted that the position of a
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general so placed must be one of great difficulty and temptation, and that he must have a strong bias towards a recourse to arms. That bias it would be most unwise to encrease, by departing from the salutary rule hitherto adhered to, and holding out to a general placed in so trying a situation, the prospect of one of the highest professional honours, if failing in negotiations, he should prove successful in arms. The principle involved was precisely that maintained by Mr. Huskisson, he would, therefore, adopt his language, merely substituting the words "unsuccessful negotiations" for the word "accident," and say, be cautious how you create a precedent of thanking commanders in events growing out of unsuccessful negotiations, lest officers, looking at the signal benefit conferred on them by receiving such a Vote of Thanks, should cherish too easy a disposition to create such failures in negotiations, and thus lead to consequences which the country may long have to regret. He maintained, that the argument applied with increased force to the case under discussion; because the occurrence of such cases in Europe between the fleets of civilised powers was comparatively rare, while in India, where it was constantly necessary to intrust the conduct of negotiations to generals in the command of armies, such cases were, and were likely to continue, of frequent occurrence. He must confess, that this question derived additional importance from what passed on a former evening. The words which fell from, the right hon. Baronet in the course of the debate which took place last week, t made it peculiarly imperative on the House to beware how they did anything which I would tend in the remotest degree to enourage for the future in India a system of unscrupulous aggrandisement. He alluded to the declaration of the right hon. Baronet opposite, which he had heard with no less concern than was at the time expressed by his noble Friend near him (Lord J. Russel), a declaration which the right hon. Baronet's explanation seemed to him to have left substantially unaltered, that there t existed "an uncontrollable principle," the effect of which was the absorption by civilized states of their more barbarous neighbours; and that the laws of nations, such as they were in Europe, which, in his opinion, as in that of his noble Friend, were at least sufficiently lax, could not in practice be strictly observed in India. That was a doctrine against which he felt called upon most a decidedly to protest. He certainly was not

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before aware that the eternal rules of right and wrong depended on place and varied with latitude and longitude. He for one could not think that this "uncontrollable principle," as it was called, ought to be regarded with favour; nor did he find that they were in the habit of so regarding it, when appealed to by other nations as an excuse for their aggressions. He doubted whether this "uncontrollable principle" would be considered in this country a sufficient justification of the encroachments of Russia on her semi-barbarous neighbours, or of French conquest in Africa. He was inclined to think, that if the latter power, urged by this 'uncontrollable principle," should proceed by degrees to extend French dominion over the whole northern coast of Africa, the Cabinet of which the right hon. Baronet was at the head, would think themselves warranted in interfering. He repeated, therefore, that he protested against this doctrine which the right hon. Baronet had so incautiously promulgated—for he attributed it to nothing but want of caution on the part of the right hon. Baronet—a want of caution undoubtedly most unpardonable in his situation, and which, in his opinion, made it still more incumbent on the House, than it otherwise would have been, to beware how they departed from the old and recognised practice of Parliament in such cases, lest they should encourage a repetition of such scenes as those which had lately occurred in Scinde. He believed that by giving this Vote of Thanks, they would be teaching military and naval officers that when they are engaged in negotiations, if by their own conduct these negotiations should fail, and conflicts unfortunately result, they had only to succeed—they had only to display valour when the contest actually came, and that House and the country would not scrutinise with very close eyes the justice of the means by which that conflict was produced. He, for one, looked with feelings of anything but satisfaction even on those brilliant battles of Meanee and Hyderabad, brilliant as undoubtedly they were in a military point of view. He could not help fearing that in the eyes of the Almighty they were stained with the guilt of unnecessary and wanton bloodshed, and he believed that, if they thanked those by whom these battles were fought, a portion of that guilt would fall on their heads. At all events, even admitting that the past was beyond their power, the future, at least, was in some degree within their control. By withholding
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this Vote of Thanks, he believed, they had it in their power to read a great and useful moral lesson to those who in future might be entrusted with the command of our fleets and armies, and to those in whose hands were placed the destinies of India. These were the views and sentiments which be assured the House he had not lightly adopted, nor willingly obtruded on the House; for he had felt it a most painful task to state the reasons which had brought him to the conclusion that the present proposition ought not to receive the assent of the House. He must confess that it was not without great hesitation that he had made up his mind to abstain from taking that course which, following the precedent of Mr. Huskisson, he had originally proposed to himself—namely, to move the previous question, and take the sense of the House. Such was the course which he had in the first instance been inclined to adopt; and had he entertained the remotest hope of securing the concurrence of the House, he undoubtedly would have moved that amendment. Such, however, he knew was not the feeling of the majority; and, although he should not allow such a consideration to deter him from doing what he regarded as his duty, still he did not wish to provoke division upon a question on which it would be invidious to divide. He trusted, that by stating thus fully his sentiments, he had sufficiently discharged his own conscience; and, having done so, he left the matter in their hands without proposing any amendment.
Mr. V. Smithfully participated in the admiration which had been expressed at the valour and skill which had been displayed in the recent military achievements in Scinde. Those achievements could be best appreciated from the fact that our brave troops had fought one against ten, odds which were proverbial as a test of extraordinary prowess. Entertaining these sentiments in regard to the military exploits of our officers and soldiers, however, he felt bound to say that he agreed in the spirit of the principle laid down by his noble Friend who had just spoken. At the same time, he was glad that his noble Friend had not moved any amendment. The fact was, he believed that the blaze of martial glory which had attended the arms of Sir C. Napier and his gallant band had blinded the reason of many Gentlemen to the essential points in the diplomatic conduct of that gallant commander. If the political conduct of Sir C. Napier had been

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mixed up in the Vote, he should certainly have felt it his duty to vote against it. This had not been done, however; although the right hon. Baronet had felt obliged to allude indirectly to the subject, which was so united with the military conduct, in the course of his speech. He was the more anxious on this subject on account of the dangerous and detestable principles laid down by the right hon. Baronet the other evening when an army of exercise was stationed at Gwalior, and the policy which seemed to be plotting there, threatened our Indian dominion with new events of the same kind. With regard to the subject immediately before the House, he must say that there was a public servant connected with these transactions to whom he thought justice had not been done by the House or the country. He alluded to Major Outram, and he was sorry the right hon. Baronet, who made this motion, and who, he was certain, must have admired the conduct of that gallant officer, had not, in the course of his speech, taken any opportunity of expressing such a sentiment. Looking at the papers, too, which had been laid before the House, he regretted to be obliged to observe that Major Outram had not been fairly dealt with in them. There were three grounds, generally, upon which he complained of the manner in which Major Outram had been treated in these papers. The first complaint he had was against the foot notes, very racy and familiar in their style, being produced appended to the reports of an inferior officer, that officer being a commissioner; and he believed that the Government greatly mistook the character of Sir Charles Napier if they thought he would have wished for their production. The second complaint was with regard to an important letter, inclosed in another, and which the writer wished should not be published without alteration; yet this letter had been published in its original form. The third was, that there were found in the letter of Sir C. Napier extracts, purporting to be from a letter of Major Outram, which did not appear when the letter itself was produced, but were, for reasons best known to the Government, excluded from that document when it was laid before the House in the first series of papers on the subject of these transactions. These three instances he charged as specific cases of interference, to the prejudice of Major Outram, in the production of the papers. And this injustice formed the ground which had induced him to express his feelings as to
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the conduct of that gallant officer, and his regret that his name had not somehow been introduced. He was aware that if Major Outram was to be regarded simply as a civil or a diplomatic agent, it would be, in point of form, improper to introduce as his name in a Vote like the present. Still he thought a circumstance had occurred which the Government might have seized, as affording them an opportunity to express its sense to the House of the services performed by that gallant individual—he alluded to an exploit than which nothing more chivalrous or gallant had marked the services of the army in India, at Meanee, Hyderabad, or anywhere—viz., the defence by Major Outram, of the residency. The very high sense in which Sir C. Napier held that exploit was shown by one of his letters, in which he stated that it was his intention to write a book on the defence of outworks, and that he should deduce his at evidence from the circumstances of the defence of the Hyderabad residency by Major Outram. No greater proof of the ability s, and skill displayed by that officer could be required. He thought that there was an opening for some deviation from the usual course in the present case. Far was it from his intention to undervalue the important services which had been performed n by Sir C. Napier, or to detract from the consummate skill and ability which he had displayed throughout; but it must be remembered that Sir C. Napier had risked his life, and the lives of his soldiers, as soldiers ought to do, in war; but Major Outram risked his life in endeavouring to preserve peace, and by determining to act within the spirit of the instructions he had received; for if Major Outram had given notice that Roostum Khan was likely to be restored, he knew that the Ameers would have endeavoured to prevent the Beloochees, and war would have followed. Major Outram having his instructions, narrowed and limited as they were—much more so he must say then they ought to have been—properly refused to exceed them in the slightest degree, and by doing so, he incurred the greatest danger to himself. He thought, therefore, that Major Outram was entitled to the highest praise for having, in the execution of his orders, and in his desire to maintain peace, risked his own life in behalf of his country.
Sir H. Hardingesaid, as it was not the intention of the noble Lord to divide the House, he should not interpose between what he hoped would be the unanimous

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Vote of the House more than a few moments; but he could not avoid referring to some observations of the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, in which, in speaking of Major Outram's brilliant action in defending the residency, he had, he thought, furnished a complete answer to the assertion of the noble Lord the Member for Sunderland, that there had been no declaration of war to justify Sir Chas. Napier in the attack he made on the Ameers at Meanee. The attack on the residency was in itself a declaration of war, and not only a declaration of war, but the commencement of hostilities by the enemy. And, again, had not that battle resulted from the fact that several of the Ameers had combined to take part against Sir Charles Napier? As to there having been no actual declaration of war, he might refer to numerous cases in which hostilities had been commenced without any previous declaration of war, but in which the hostile acts of the enemy were so apparent, that there could be no doubt that war was intended; and could any man contend that Sir C. Napier, under the circumstances in which he found himself placed in regard to the force opposed to him, was not fully justified in the attack he made? The noble Lord had admitted, that the advice given by Major Outram previous to the battle of Meanee was wrong, and that Sir C. Napier had acted rightly in not following it, and agreeing in so much of what the noble Lord had stated, he must say, that Sir C. Napier had shown great moral courage and decision of character in determining, contrary to the advice of the political agent, to attack the Ameers. He was glad to hear that the noble Lord did not intend to divide the House against the Vote, and he was sure the noble Lord was sincere when he said it was with great pain he made the observations he had addressed to them; and believing this, he must say, that he had never heard a speech of the noble Lord's with greater pain, for if there was one man more than another who was distinguished for his humanity and generosity of spirit, that man was his friend Sir C. Napier. For several years of his life it had been his great pleasure and happiness to serve with that brave and gallant officer. A braver man did not exist—his courage was proverbial in the army—courage was the characteristic of his race, and in every action in which he had been engaged, he had come out of the field with honour. And as to the case which was
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now more especially under notice of the House, viz., the military exploits of Sir C. Napier in Scinde, it was that consummate ability with which he had devised his plan of operations, the skill with which his troops were brought into action, and the irresistible ardour and gallantry with which he carried out his plans, were points peculiarly deserving their attention; and as to those points, let them look to the opinions of the army he commanded, and they would find that there was not a man in it who did not attribute the success which had attended their arms to the master mind of their general. It was the feeling of every one, that but for him the battle would have been lost, and throughout the whole of these transactions Sir C. Napier had shown the very highest qualifications, both as a general and a soldier, sharing all the privations and all the dangers of the field and of the march; on the day of battle he was the first man in the saddle and the last man out of it; and though he was upwards of sixty-two years of age, it was mainly owing to the great skill, the indefatigable zeal, and the untiring courage of that extraordinary man, that he had been able to accomplish and bring to a successful and brilliant result a series of operations which might have been found too difficult for many a younger man. When at Emaum Ghur after a forced march, he himself placed two pieces of artillery in a position to act against the fortress, an act which would require the exertions of a young man of great physical strength. It showed, that he was capable of almost any effort. Sir Charles Napier knew from experience that he failed to deprive the enemy of that resource the Ameers might have gone into the Desert, when they could have defied the British power, and if he had delayed many hours longer in his attack, he knew also, that he should not be able to accomplish it at all. The conduct, therefore, of Sir C. Napier, in every instance in which it could be brought before the public, reflected upon that gallant officer, the highest credit in a military point of view. Then the humane and generous feelings with which he was actuated, were sufficiently apparent in his despatches.
"It gives me great satisfaction, (said Sir C. Napier), to say that some prisoners have been taken; and, though the number is small, it is still some advance towards a civilised mode of warfare; for I cannot help thinking that the desperate resistance generally made by wounded Beloochees has arisen from their own sys-

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tem of warfare, which admits of no quarter being given in action. We are at present employed in collecting the wounded Beloochees within our reach, in order to give them medical assistance."
This was the way in which Sir Charles Napier, combined with great courage and consummate military skill, all the attributes of a Christian general. With reference to the attack at Meanee, he thought that officer, having the safety and honour of the entire army to maintain, his deciding to attack the enemy against the advice of Major Outram, was one of the brightest features in the whole transaction. Had he delayed the attack but a few hours, it is probable he would have been surrounded by a force twice as great as that he had then to contend with; and there was also this distinction between the two actions—that of Meanee and that of Hyderabad—as showing that in respect to the first not an hour was to be lost—viz., that in that Sir C. Napier had not 2,800, as had been stated, but scarcely 2,300 men under his command; while at Hyderabad he was strengthened by reinforcements from Bombay and from Sukkur, and knowing that he had 5,000 men in the field, he could afford to wait and encourage the enemy to approach almost to his encampment, for he knew that by that means he would draw them from their position, and, by making the victory more complete, in all probability at once terminate the war. Under all the circumstances—looking at the brilliant manner in which Sir Charles Napier had distinguished himself on every occasion—whether acting as general officer in Scinde, or in earlier life in a subordinate capacity—he would say that there was no man who more richly deserved the approbation and thanks of that House and of his country. It was impossible to say what new fortune might attend that distinguished and gallant officer, or what new services he might be called on to perform, surrounded as he was by great difficulties, from the nature of the country in which he was engaged, and more especially from the nature of the climate; but possessing the confidence of Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-general, the confidence of his army, and animated by the unanimous Vote of Thanks which that House was about to confer upon him, he was sure that the honour and safety of the army could not be placed in more able or better hands.
Mr. Mangles, in the few observations which he felt it to be his duty to address
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to the House, should confine himself to those points in Sir Charles Napier's conduct which, looking at the papers on the table, seemed to require some explanation. It had been stated, in the course of the debate on Thursday last, that Sir Charles Napier had acted in strict accordance with the instructions he had received from the Governor-general; that he had been merely the instrument of Lord Ellenborough; and if this had been so, the Vote of Thanks being confined to the military conduct of the General,—he should certainly not have opposed that Vote. But that could not be considered as the true state of the case; for the papers on the table—from which alone the House could judge—showed, as it appeared to him, that the line of policy taken by Sir C. Napier in one most important particular, had not received the previous sanction of the Governor-general, and had, in fact, nothing to do with British interests; and to that line of policy was to be attributed the war which had taken place, and what he feared. would be its fatal consequences. The hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of the Board of Control, had said, during the recent debate, that there had been no remonstrance made by the Ameers against the terms of the Treaty between them and the Government of India, and that they had not protested against any demand made by the Governor-general under that Treaty to protect British interests. And this was true. Then, what had occasioned the war and the battles for which the House had now to give Thanks? It was the policy which had been undertaken by Sir C. Napier without previous authority from Lord Ellenborongh, though that policy was afterwards confirmed by Lord Ellenborough's approbation. It was easy to prove that the war did not result from any of the demands embodied in the Treaty. In page 503 of the first Blue Book, they found Major Outram's account of the conference that took place, and there it appeared
"That the Ameers denied the charges on which the new Treaty was imposed, but still (said they) we will subscribe it and the Ameers of Upper Scinde will also subscribe to it, on one condition—i. e., that Meer Roostum be restored to his rights."
And on the following day, a long discussion took place between Major Outram and the Ameers, not as to the terms of the Treaty, but on the subject of Meer Roostum's restoration (the Beloochees having in

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the meantime assumed a threatening attitude.) The Ameers on that occasiob urcred—
"At least give us some pledge that justice shall be done, by which the Ameers may endeavour to allay the excitement of the people, and persuade them to disperse—we fear it will be impossible, but their Highnesses will try once more, if you will authorize them to hold out hopes of the ultimate restoration of their lands which have been made over to Ali Moorad."
And then they asked that the Khyrpore Ameers might be allowed to settle their own affairs with Ali Moorad, without the interference of the British resident. It was shown clearly by the papers, that the outbreak eventually took place because the Ameers had not been able to satisfy their troops upon this point; and he could prove, that Sir C. Napier had no previous authority from Lord Ellenborough to urge that point, and that he had done so on his own responsibility. The war resulted solely on account of the transfer of the turban, or chiefship among the chiefs of Upper Scinde from Meer Roostum to Ali Moorad. This was Sir C. Napier's doing. In No. 409, page 478, Sir Charles writes—
"I had a secret message from Meer Roostum. The bearer had an open letter in the usual unmeaning style of the Durbar; but the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown that Roostum could do nothing, and would escape to my camp. I did not like this, as it would have embarrassed me very much how to act; but the idea struck me at once that he might go to Ali Moorad, who might induce him as (a family arrangement) to resign the turban to him (Ali Moorad), especially as Roostum has long been desirous of getting rid of this charge of the Talpoors. I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Moorad, and about one o'clock this morning I had an express from Ali Moorad, to say that his brother is safe with him."
He was, however, at a loss to see how it could have embarrassed the gallant Genneral that this principal chief of his opponents should fly to his camp, provided the gallant officer wished to avoid war. In page 483, in writing to the Governor-general he said further:—
"This conviction opened upon me a system, which appears the only one to follow—making the chief powerful, and holding him under the power of the Government. This made me venture to promise Ali Moorad your Lordship's support in having the turban, which your Lordship has approved of. The next step was to secure him the exercise of its power now, even during his brother's life.
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This I was so fortunate to succeed in, by persuading Meer Roostum to place himself in Ali Moorad's hands."
From these passages, and others which he might quote, (the House would mark the word "persuading" in the last extract), it was quite apparent that it was by the advice of Sir Charles Napier himself that Meer Roostum had placed himself in his brother's hands. There was also another series of declarations, equally clear, made by the gallant General, in which he denied that he had advised the old man, as he called him, to place himself in his brother's hands, and the discrepancy between the two statements he was most anxious to have cleared up; for until it was so he did not see how he could consent to this Vote of Thanks. In page 32 of the Blue book, Sir C. Napier, in writing to Major outram, said—
"Roostum's plea of being sent to Ali Moorad by me is a shallow affair. He went contrary to my advice, and now wants to make out that he acted by it."
And in page 29 of the same book, in a note to a letter of Major Outram's in reference to the transfer of the province of Upper Scinde, Sir C. Napier remarked—
"It was the positive act of Meer Roostum, without my connivance or even knowledge till it was done," though be bad actually, as stated in other papers, advised him to surrender the turban. Again, in page 20, they would find the following note—
"1. The giving lands to the turban was an act of the Talpoor family's own doing; we had no hand in this division, or in the transfer of the turban."
These statements the House would see were directly opposite to the former extracts he had quoted from the correspondence of the same gallant officer in reference to the transfer of the turban. Then as to the flight of Meer Roostum, there were equal inconsistencies in Sir C. Napier's despatches. In page 485 of the old book, in communicating to the Governor-general that Meer Roostum had fled, it was stated—
"And now, my Lord, I have to tell you that Meer Roostum has decamped yesterday morning. I met Ali Moorad the night before, and desired him to say that I would pay my respects to his highness the next day, and the next day I heard of his flight, I can only account for this in one of two ways.

"1. Meer Roostum, who is a timid man, and has all along fancied that I want to make him prisoner, believed that the time for this

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step had arrived, and that his brother and I were about to execute our conspiracy against him, or,

"2. That Ali Moorad drove his brother to this step. Meer Roostum had resigned the turban to his brother Ali in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran."

This communication was dated December 29; and again on the 17th of January Sir C. Napier, writing to the Governor-general, stated—
"That the old man, Meer Roostum, (who it seems had been persuaded by Ali Moorad that I meant to imprison him for life, and who was perfectly exhausted by his flight), might return to Khyrpore, and live anywhere he pleased as a simple Ameer."
In both those communications it was asserted, as no doubt, was the case, that Meer Roostum had fled, from the fear of the treatment he might experience from Sir C. Napier, whose disposition and intentions towards him had been misrepresented by his brother Ali Moored, where all aim was to terrify him out of his privileges and power as the principal chief of Upper Scinde. He would now turn the attention of the House to Sir C. Napier's proclamation on the flight of the old man, which would be found in pages 6 and 7 of the new book; and it was to be remarked that that proclamation was issued on the 1st of January, between the dates of the two letters from which he had quoted.
"Camp, near Khyrpore, Jan. 1, 1843.
"Ameers, and People of Scinde,
"His Highness the Ameer Roostum Khan sent a secret messenger to me to say, that he was in the hands of his family, and could not act as his feelings of friendship for the English nation prompted him to do, and that if I would receive him he would escape and come to my camp. I answered his highness that I would cettainly receive him, but that my advice was for him to consult with his brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad Khan. He took my advice; he went to the fort of Dejee to his brother. When I heard of this I was glad, for I thought that Scinde would be tranquil; that his highness would spend his last days in honour and in peace. I moved with my troops towards Khyrpore to force his violent family to disperse the wild bands that they had collected. I sent his highness word that I should visit him; I wanted to ask his advice as to the arrangements for the new treaty. I thought that he had again become the friend of the Government that I serve. That night I heard that he had solemnly conferred upon his brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad, the turban of command over the Talpoor family, which brother is their heir to that honour. I thought this a very wise proceeding,
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and it added to my desire to meet his highness that I might hear from his own lips all these things, and report the same to the Governor-general, being assured that these acts of his highness would recover for him the good opinion and friendship of the Governor-general of India. My feelings towards his highness were those of friendship, honour, and peace. I even advised his highness's brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad, not to accept the turban; but to assist his brother, the chief, in the care of government. I laboured for the honour of the Talpoor family. What then was my astonishment to find that, when I expected to meet the Ameer Roostum Khan, I heard that his highness had departed from the roof of his brother; thus insulting and defying the Governor-general, whose commander I am. But my surprise is greatly increased by hearing that his highness has joined his family with their armed bands, who have cut off our communications, and stopped our mails. These things have surprised me, but my course is plain, and thus I publish it to the country that all may know it, and conduct themselves accordingly. I will, according to the existing treaty, protect the chief, Ameer Ali Moorad, in his rights, as the justly constituted chieftain of the Talpoor family. God willing, I mean to march into the Desert. I will disperse the armed bands that have stopped our mails. I will place the killadars of the chief, Ali Moorad, in command of every fort, and I will act towards the Ameers of Hyderabad as I shall find their conduct may deserve."
It was his (Mr. Mangles's) opinion that without resorting to war the Ameers would—not willingly perhaps—but that under the fear of the approach of our superior force they would have submitted to the whole of our demands; and, therefore, that the war might have been avoided. It was his opinion also that it was the conduct of Sir Charles Napier that brought matters to that crisis at which war was inevitable, to that crisis from which his genius and valour extricated himself and his troops; and, therefore, unless it could be shown that I that officer had not done this, and that the negotiations on the points of difference could not have been brought to a successful issue, except by cutting the Gordian knot with the sword, he should feel it to be his duty to vote against the motion of the right hon. Baronet.
Sir H. Douglasthought that the speech of the right hoe. Baronet, and the response of the noble Lord, the Member for London, ought to have induced the passing of this Vote of Thanks unanimously, and by acclamation, in which case, he (Sir H. Douglas) would not have trespassed on the time of the House. Sir C. Napier

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and himself were old comrades. They had been long connected by professional relations as well as private friendship, and although be regretted, that the noble Lord, the Member for Sunderland, did not intend a division, he should have thought it his duty to throw out observations to depreciate the value of the Vote in the estimation of the gallant officer for whom it was designed. He wished to make a few remarks on the speech of the noble Lord, as well as that of the hon. Gentlemen who spoke last. The House should remember, that Sir Charles Napier did not take charge of the army in Scinde until the 17th of October, and that when his position was considered, it would be most unfair to entangle him with any transactions which had previously taken place. It was not for him (Sir C. Napier) to discuss the policy of the Treaty of 1839, when his duty was of a different nature, but at all events, it was clear, that by the Treaty of 1839 the confederacy of the Ameers was virtually dissolved. That Treaty divided the great drama which was before the House into two periods, one period including the operations before the Treaty, and the other embracing those operations which took place subsequently to it. Sir Charles Napier was sent at the head of the troops into Scinde, to carry into effect, and if necessary, to enforce that Treaty. He had accordingly a conference with the Ameers on assuming the command of the army, and reported after that conference, that the Ameers were not acting loyally—that they had been guilty of several violations of the Articles of the Treaty. The duty of enforcing the observance of the Treaty, if such a course were found to be necessary, was the justification of the line of conduct which he (Sir C. Napier) subsequently adopted; and in fact, he would, in the discharge of that duty, have been justified by the mere circumstance of the Ameers having confederated in violation and defiance of the Treaty to attack and disperse them. Having shown that Sir Charles Napier was justified in the line of conduct which he had adopted by the Treaty of 1839, he (Sir H. Douglas) should add his testimony, as a military man, to the gallant achievements of Sir Charles Napier. If that gallant officer had acted upon the advice of Major Outram, and delayed his operations for a longer time, the result must have been most disastrous. He had al-
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ready delayed his operations for three days—he saw that the object of the Ameers was to gain time, and add to their military force, and he accordingly refused to agree to the repeated solicitations of Major Outram for any further delay. So plainly did Sir Charles Napier see the designs of the Ameers, and so well did he understand the difficulties in which Major Outram himself would be placed by those designs, that although Major Outram continued to assure Sir Charles Napier that he (Major Outran) was in no danger, yet the gallant officer furnished him with men, a company of the gallant 22nd, to defend the British residency. Subsequent events proved how correct the views of Sir Charles Napier were, for Major Outram, in a few days after, wrote a letter on board the Phoenix steamer, stating, that notwithstanding his former opinions of the Ameers, their highnesses had commenced hostilities by attacking and driving him out of his residency. He (Sir H. Douglas) was of opinion, that Major Outram deserved the highest character for the bravery and skill with which he defended himself when he was attacked—Major Outram made a splendid defence of the residency; but passing from the military to the civil conduct of those proceedings, he should repeat, that grateful and thankful should we be that Sir Charles Napier had the moral courage of not acting upon the advice of Major Outram. If Sir Charles Napier had taken a different course, there might have been, instead of that brilliant victory, a repetition of those calamities which had befallen another of our armies. He (Sir H. Douglas) hoped he might be permitted to bear this testimony as a military man to the character of the gallant General, of whom he had been an old associate, and in whom he had long since perceived those high qualities which justified him in anticipating, that whenever the fitting opportunity occurred, his career would be one of no ordinary description. At the first of those actions to which reference had been so often made, the gallant General had no means of securing a reserve, for every bayonet he had was required for the action, so that he could not make that provision of a reserve for any disaster, and under those circumstances the formation of his force was such as to secure for them all the advantages which could be derived from the most enlightened mili-

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tary skill. The mode in which he formed his force and gained that victory was most scientific—the combinations perfect; he opened with a destructive fire of artillery, bringing up his infantry immediately into a desperate conflict, and then supporting those movements with his cavalry. Such was the valour of his enemies, and such their numbers, that if Sir Charles Napier had adopted any system of operations which would have enabled the barbarians in his front to stand against him for any time—if he had not shaken them at first by his artillery, and followed it up with a charge of cavalry, the results might have been very different indeed. Meeanee and Hyderabad were most brilliant victories, such as were not exceeded in the valour or skill displayed by the actions of the gallant Clive, when he laid the foundation of our political and military power in India. The services of Sir Charles Napier would not be outshone by the Cornwallises the Moiras, the Wellesleys—nay, they would bear comparison with the achievements of the "hero of a hundred fights" himself. In three-quarters of a century the military prowess of England raised up and secured that empire which now contains 100,000,000 of inhabitants, of an extent as great as from Sicily to Smolensko, and which, in breadth, forms a considerable portion of the quadrant of the earth. That mighty empire has been raised within a hundred years by military prowess. He forbore to go into the policy in which these proceedings originated, but he should remark that neither the enterprise nor the industry of England could have secured that empire if it had not been for British force and valour. Thus has the British empire been raised, thus only can it be maintained. The recent brilliant achievements of Sir Charles Napier secured our power in that part of the world, and in the manner in which those operations were conducted, they would bear comparison even with the achievements of the "hero of the hundred fights" in that country.
Mr. Haweswithout entering into the question of the general policy pursued respecting Scinde, would follow the example of his noble Friend near him, in not shrinking from expressing to the House and to the country his feelings with respect to the motion for a Vote of Thanks to Sir Charles Napier. He undertook to say, that for this Vote of Thanks there
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was no precedent. At the time that Scinde was invaded we were not at war. There had been no declaration of war. We committed the first aggression. Our attack upon a fort in Scinde was the first act of open aggression. In disapproving of these actions he did not wish to detract from the military merit of Sir Chas Napier; and if he thought that he was called upon merely to agree in a Vote of is Thanks to him as an officer for purely military exploits, he would have no hesitation in agreeing to such a Vote. But; it must be recollected, that Sir Charles Napier had been invested with supreme id authority in Scinde. The country had been placed entirely under military control, and Sir C. Napier made responsible for any act committed under his orders. The diplomatic agents, whose opinions and advice usually had some influence with military men, had been all removed? and Major Outram was placed entirelyy under the command of Sir Charles Napier. He thought, that upon looking at the course pursued by Major Outram, if advice had been acted upon, the battles of Hyderabad and Meeanee would never have been fought. It was no defence for Sir Charles Napier to say, that when he was placed in a certain position, it was necessary to fight. The question was, how he came into that situation. Under all the circumstances of the case, he considered that Sir Charles Napier must be measured in reference to his political as well as to his military policy; and he thought it would be a dangerous precedent were the House to pass a Vote of Thanks to a military man, who, having under him the entire civil as well as military command, might place his troops it in such a situation that fighting became inevitable, and who, in doing so, could not but feel that he was placed in this position—that he would receive no Vote of Thanks for pursuing a peaceful policy; if, however, he commenced a war, and it brought it to a successful termination he would receive the highest honour that House could confer on him. He thought the House was becoming too prone to confer Thanks for military services. Formerly it was usual only to confer that honour upon the conductor of a series of operations extending over many years, but more latterly it had been the custom to vote the Thanks of the House to the achievers of single exploits—a practice, as

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he thought, in some measure tending to diminish the value of the honour. He repeated, that in Sir C. Napier's case, his military could not be separated from his civil policy. From the correspondence before the House, he believed, that it had been the intention of Sir C. Napier to carry on the negotiations by force. On the 17th of October, 1842, he found him writing to the Governor-general in the following terms:—
"Several Ameers have broken the Treaty in various instances stated in the accompanying return of complaints' against them. I have maintained that we want only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers, and I think the various acts recorded in the return give abundant reason," &c.
Here, then, it was assumed, that because the Ameers had violated a Treaty (which we had been the first to break) we were justified in looking for a pretext to coerce them. If the House of Commons sanctioned a Vote of Thanks upon these grounds, he thought they would be sanctioning a very dangerous principle—that of a commander-in-chief setting aside the ordinary means of diplomacy, and resorting to the sword, and would be giving a dangerous pre-eminence to ideas of war and blood in preference to those of a more mild and peaceful policy. He found it also stated in the instructions drawn up for the guidance of Major Outram by Sir Charles Napier, that the question he was to urge to the Ameers was whether or not they would accept of the Treaty; as in case they did not assent, the army would immediately advance. Was not this a rather unusual course in diplomacy—this entering the country of an ally who had committed no aggression against us—this placing our negotiator in the shape of a general officer, and telling him to say, "Accept or not: if you refuse, our army shall advance?" Was any exploit, however brilliant in a military point of view, to sanction such a course of procedure, a course which would enable any future Governor-general of India to set aside every political agent and make every question turn on the power of our arms? Under the impression, therefore, that Sir Charles Napier had forced on the war which had occasioned the actions for which they were called upon to thank him, and that any such Vote would be a dangerous precedent to sanction, he would conclude by expressing his concurrence in the views of
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the noble Lord (Viscount Howick) near him.
Sir C. Napiersaid, he rose under no ordinary feelings to return his thanks to the right hon. Baronet for the very eloquent manner in which he had brought forward the services of his gallant relative, and for the honour he had also done him, in having spoken of him in terms which he had no right to expect. The right hon. Baronet had mentioned the services of his gallant relative, beginning at the battle of Corunna, and following up the whole with his services in Scinde; but he was ignorant of some other services which his gallant relative had also performed, and he hoped the House would permit him to mention them, as they were to the honour and credit of that gallant officer. At the battle of Corunna it was perfectly notorious, that whilst leading on the 50th regiment in the front of the battle, the great general under whom he was brought up, Sir John Moore, said to Napier and his friend Major Stanhope, "Well done, my majors!" The very expression of "my majors" would have stamped them as heroes at once. At the head of his regiment Napier advanced—it was the first time he had seen an action, or heard the fire of an enemy in his life—he advanced at the head of his men, leading them on with the greatest possible coolness. Something occurred to impede them—he was surrounded by French troops—received a cut on the head with a saber—was stabbed in the back with a bayonet—a bullet went through his leg, and two of his ribs were broken by a cannon-ball. "I think (said the gallant Officer) that was a dose enough to settle any man." He was taken to the quarters of those distinguished officers, Marshals Ney and Soult, and nursed, and afterwards they restored him to his family, even without an exchange, and he was sure, that no man in England or France would rejoice more than Marshal Soult, when he heard of the glorious conduct of Major Napier. When he returned to England, his regiment was in Spain under the Duke of Wellington, he obtained permission to go out as an amateur, and was present at the battle of the Passage of the Coa. At the battle of Busaco he was present—he himself was also there as an amateur, and he could not do better than follow the steps of that great man; and his relative in that engagement was shot through the nose, and the ball fell

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into his jaw—he sank back into his (Sir C. Napier's) arms, and he carried him off the field. He was as brave a man and possessed of as heroic courage as any man that existed in the present day. He remembered, that at the battle of Busaco, Napier was dressed in the red uniform of his regiment—the coat of his staff was blue—he was with the staff—and he (Commodore Napier) cautioned him that he was in a bad position. "Either you or I shall be shot; put on your cloak," he said. "No," was the answer, "I am in the uniform of my regiment, and in it I will stand or fall." He had hardly uttered these words before he was struck. When going off the field, he met the Duke of Wellington; and, though the body was weak, the soldier's mind was firm. He took off his hat, cheered the Duke as he passed, and said, "I cannot die at a better moment." He held him whilst the ball was extracted from his jaw, and though he kicked, he uttered not a word. [Laughter] That might set the House in a laugh, but it had not that effect upon him. After his gallant friend recovered from his wound, the next battle he was in was that of Fuentes d'Onor; then he escaped for once. He then appeared at Cordova—his two brothers were wounded, but he escaped; he received promotion; and his next services were under that great admiral, Sir George Cockburn, off the coast of Spain, when, though there was no regular fighting, as in the rest of Spain, yet very extraordinary and gallant actions were performed. As a civil officer, his services in Cephalonia were a proof; and he fancied that no man had done more for the improvement of the island than Sir C. Napier did, during the time he was there. He did almost more than it was possible for any man to do in so short a time. In the next year he was commanding a district in the north of England, and he thought the noble Lord, who was then Secretary of State for the Home Department, would say, that Radical as his gallant relative was, and he acknowledged himself to be so to a very considerable extent, no man better conducted an army in any district of England, or kept that district more perfectly quiet, at that moment when difficulties were going on—difficulties that might have embarrassed the Government—than his gallant relative. Had he been on the side of the Government, his district could
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not have been kept more peaceable. They next found him in India, and the right hon. Baronet had so well described his conduct from the time he took the command, that it was necessary for him to say, very little upon the subject. Still he hoped the House would excuse him for dwelling with pleasure and complacency upon the services his gallant relative had performed there, and the manner in which he had executed them. He believed that if any hon. Member read the blue-book then before the House, and looked into the whole of his relative's plans for seizing or surprising Emaum Ghur, he must admit, that the man who could plan all that and execute such an enterprise in a desert, with the loss, he believed, of only six camels, must be a man possessed of very great qualities indeed. They were not entering into the policy of Sir C. Napier and his operations then, he had nothing to do with that policy, but only with his conduct as a general officer commanding an army. If his policy were bad, try him for it, and punish him, if they pleased: but let his conduct as a general officer and that of every man in his army be thanked by every man in that House. He thought it petty, and was sorry the noble Lord had taken the opportunity, not indeed to throw blame upon his gallant relative, but to stir a question against any officer who had performed his duty. The right hon. Baronet said, and said truly, that when the first account of Meeanee came home, Sir C. Napier stated that he had 2,800 men, and the enemy 20,000. The right hon. Baronet also said, that upon reflection and examination into the state of his army, Sir C. Napier found he had only 2,000 men; that might imply 2,000 bayonets, but he had it from his gallant relative himself, that he had 1,700 bayonets only, and that the whole of his army, with officers, amouuted only to 2,000 men. The army of the enemy was stated by him at 22,000 men. Since then another report had come from him stating it at 25,000, but he knew it was not less than 30,000. Whether they looked to ancient or modern times, was there a single instance in which an officer with such a small force had been able to overcome an army of such enormous magnitude as that he had described? and he was sure, that the right hon. Baronet would bear him out when he said, that an officer commanding

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an army of 20,000 or 30,000 men, and' overpowering a rabble of 200,000 or 300,000, would not be so extraordinary; but under the circumstances he was astonished that the 30,000 had not overcome Sir C. Napier's force, and driven them to—into the Indus. It was one of the most extraordinary things in history; he could not account for it. His gallant relative must himself have shown the most exemplary courage ever shown by man, and when he sent hone, speaking of the Sepoys' behaviour in that gallant manner, and recommending a larger number of officers, and saying that the officers rallied their men, he said nothing of himself—he never said that he was the man who rallied the Sepoys when their ranks were broken. As an old naval officer, a friend of his, used to say, "Where the battle raged there was the chief." At Hyderabad he gained a victory with more facility—then he had 5,000 men, and the enemy 20,000. He had seen a letter from an officer, in which he spoke of his ascending one of the nullahs. The nullah he was in was forty feet broad and seventeen feet deep. His gallant friend rode his horse "Red Rover," and was the second who ascended; but he could not conceive how it was possible that should have been done. The excitement in the men carried even their horses through, and their exertions were even beyond hunting in Leicestershire. Had his gallant friend waited twenty hours longer to have made the attack, he would have been surrounded by 50,000 or 60,000 men. In the correspondence one of the Ameers admitted, that the same evening after the battle, there were 12,000 fresh troops in Hyderabad. That was a sufficient apology, he thought, for his friend in having fought when he did. He most unwillingly must make some observations upon what had fallen from the noble Lord on that side of the House; and he would commence by saying, that he entirely disagreed from him in the position he had taken. The noble Lord said, that the right hon. Baronet, in speaking of the services of Sir C. Napier, had turned off at once and said, that he must have been a diplomatist, because it appeared he corresponded with Major Outram, although he had not followed his advice. He approved as much of his relation's policy as he did of his fighting propensities. He believed it was perfectly clear that his gallant relative went to Scinde by orders
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from Lord Ellenborough, who gave him certain instructions. If he had not followed out those instructions properly, he presumed that Lord Ellenborough would have found fault with him; but from the blue-book it appeared that Lord Ellenborough entirely approved of his conduct. If, therefore, he was wrong, the blame must go upon Lord Ellenborough, certainly not upon his gallant relation. He believed the right hon. Baronet brought forward his motion to thank his gallant relative and his army for their fighting qualities—in fact, for having gained a great victory; and, whether right or not in his policy, he did not think the House of Commons at that moment had anything to do with it. It would have been wiser on the part of the noble Lord, had he restricted himself entirely to thanking his gallant friend and his army for their military qualities, reserving to himself, when any motion was brought forward on the policy of our conduct to the Ameers of Scinde, the opportunity of entering upon that subject. That was the proper course for the noble Lord, and he should have been happy had the noble Lord taken it. The noble Lord said, the Ameers plotted against us; but to what extent was plotting to go before an officer was to interfere? It was extremely difficult to define the line to which plotting might go without such interference. Were they to plot to cut throats before the troops were assembled? Where was the line to begin for punishment? The noble Lord brought forward Mr. Eastwick. Had that gentleman any command in Scinde, or any responsibility there? It was very easy, when the whole thing was over, to write a letter and say, "If Napier bad done this, things would have been very different." if the whole of their throats had been cut, Mr. Eastwick might still have written a pamphlet, but would be have been brought to a Court-martial? Then the noble Lord spoke of the climate. He should like to know whether any general commanding an army could trust himself, for a single moment, knowing that in three or four days the climate would become so hot as to destroy an entire army? The noble Lord then stepped out of those arguments, and made a comparison between the battles of Hyderabad and Meeanee and that of Navarino, though he should like to know, in the name of God, what comparison there was between them? The noble

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Lord referred to Navarino, and said there was no Vote of Thanks, because it was accidental. So it was. Sir E. Codrington went into Navarino, thinking he was doing perfectly right. There were ships of four or five different flags; the men were half disciplined, almost barbarians; an accident occurred; a musket was fired, and a general blaze took place. It was perfectly right, therefore, to say it was accidental, but where was the accident at Hyderabad or Meeanee? Was it on our side? Not at all. The Ameers attacked our residency, there was the accident—they came forward to sign the Treaty, and a number of Beloochees not under their control attacked the residency with a very strong force. Major Outram was obliged to retreat after defending himself in the most gallant manner, and arrived at the camp of Sir C. Napier. What was the gallant officer to do? Was he to stand still and look on? The only thing he had to do was to fight, and if he had not done so he ought to have been hanged. The noble Lord said there was no declaration of war; that was the fashion now—they had not declared war with China, and yet they had been fighting there for four or five years. Why was it? Perhaps the Chancellor of the Exchequer could tell—it was to get money into the Exchequer. But when the Beloochees attacked the residency was not that a declaration of war? If there had been a negotiation with France, and she had sent twenty or thirty steamers to Ireland, would that be a declaration of war or peace? He should think the hon. Gentleman would consider that a declaration of war, or something like it. He had no doubt, that if the noble Lord had been in that residency when it was attacked, he, as a political man, and understanding those things well, would have written to Sir C. Napier saying, "It's high time you should come here to defend me. I am attacked by 8,000 men, and eight pieces of artillery, having only 100 men; the shots are flying about my ears as thick as possible, and I really think its high time you should come and put an end to this business." The noble Lord said, that also great military means were in the power of the general. Great military means! 2,000 men, English and Sepoys, to do what?—to defend themselves against no less than 30,000 men; Great encouragement that for military amateurs! Could any man for a single moment believe that refusing a
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Vote of Thanks in the House of Commons to an officer who fought 30,000 men with 2,000 would get many amateurs?—after running the risk, too, of getting the whole of their throats cut? The noble Lord said, the general fought to disentangle a great Gordian knot of diplomacy, for that would have been the result of continuing the diplomacy. He said it was much more, likely that it was to prevent getting their throats cut. The noble Lord, who urged the interposition of political agents, then said the thing could have been done well. Let, them see how those things had been done for a great number of years. He had a right to go into that. He had been many years in Her Majesty's service, and he would just go back to Constantinople. They had a diplomatic agent there. A fleet was sent there, but it soon came away with its tail between its legs. Had we not had enough of them in Spain? Let the House read Sir J. Moore's account of the diplomatic agents. What was his opinion of them? Why, he said, "that they knew nothing, and that they I did nothing but get the country into constant scrapes." They were half military men who had forgotten the use of the sword and taken up the pen, and did not know how to wield it. Look at the diplomatic agents in China and Affghanistan, and then in Scinde? What had they done in Scinde? Any man who took, up the blue-book must say that the political agent was to blame,—that he was blinded by the ambition of the pen as by that of the sword. He (Sir C. Napier) said, it was a dangerous thing to mix the two together. He thought too the officers were of the same opinion. They trusted, only to courage and valour, and they put an end to the war at once, sooner than the agents could by diplomacy. Those were his sentiments. He gave his vote conscientiously, and he should give a similar vote if the officer, for whom the Thanks of the House were asked, had not been in any way connected with him.
Mr. W. Bingham Baringsaid, it was a bold thing in him to rise after the gallant Officer, who had just addressed the House. He rose, however, to vindicate the Board to which he belonged. A charge had been made against the Board of Control—and a serious one too. It was no less than this—that a disposition had been shown to favouritism, by which one party had been protected at the expense of

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another; in fact, that Major Outram's despatches had been presented in such a manner as to place him in an inferior position to that which he ought to occupy. The case was this:—Major Outram had been employed in Scinde to superintend the carrying on of negotiations. In the performance of his duty he justly and wisely placed before the general his opinions, argued for the policy which he thought ought to be adopted, and stated his facts and arguments for that course. Sir Napier, in receiving those statements, gave, no doubt, his best consideration to the arguments, as he was bound to do, recollecting the judgment Major Outram had shown in the management of affairs connected with that country. But Sir C. Napier was not responsible to Major Outran. He therefore merely confined himself to giving instructions how to act. The consequences t would be, that if merely the instructions of Sir C. Napier were alone presented to the House, it would be impossible to make out the state of the case. Sir C. Napier, when he sent Major Outram's dispatches to the Governor-general, to whom he was responsible, thought it his duty, and he (Mr. Baring) was of opinion, that Sir C. Napier had acted correctly, to allude to those letters, and to show why it was he did not follow the advice he received from Major Outram. Some portion of those explanations was contained in diplomatic letters, and other parts of them—from the overwhelming business thrown upon him, of organising the Government, consulting different interests, bringing parties to act together who were different in race, language, and habits, he could not put into the regular despatches but appended them as foot-notes. Because, however, he could not give them in despatches, would it have been just not to have given them? There was nothing in those footnotes disrespectful to Major Outram; Sir C. Napier merely stated, that he was of a different opinion from the gallant Major. Such was the explanation he had to give. He was satisfied in his own mind, that he was doing his duty, and he took upon himself the responsibility of having advised that those notes should be kept, and he thought great injustice would have been committed if they had not been retained in the correspondence. The right hon. Gentleman who had spoken in the course of the evening had referred to the omission of two passages in a despatch from Major Outram to the Governor-general, in April, 1842. Now, the
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rule that had been adopted, in drawing up that correspondence was this, so long as Major Outram agreed with Sir C. Napier, such parts of the despatches only were given as were necessary for the understanding the negotiations; but, at the same time, taking care not to strike out anything that could be urged in favour of the cause of the Ameers of Scinde. All their case was there, and nothing was omitted that could in the slightest degree be urged in favour of them. But, as regarded the correspondence in which Major Outram differed from Lord Ellenborough, every line and letter was presented to the House, and in an unmutilated form. It will be oberved, that the despatch from which the passages had been omitted, was dated the 21st of April, when Major Outram counselled Lord Ellenborough to take severe measures against the Ameers, and when be proposed to him to consider the subsisting treaties as forfeited. He had been anxious to make this explanation to the House, for he felt that, for any department of the Government to injure in the slightest degree the fair fame of any man under them, was disgraceful on their part, injurious to the service, and must be eventually injurious to the country.
Mr. C. Woodsaid, he should have been content to sit still after the protest of his noble Friend near him (Lord Howick), but he could not do so, after the speech of the gallant Member near him. No doubt his noble Friend had discharged a painful and invidious duty, but the hon. And gallant Member had completely mistaken his noble Friend's views. Not a word fell from his noble Friend calling in question the high military character and achievements of Sir C. Napier. His noble Friend from first to last approved of the military skill, the gallantry, and the moral and political courage, which Sir C. Napier had shown throughout the whole of his military operations in Scinde, and in fighting the battle of Meeanee. He (Mr. Wood) certainly thought his noble Friend did, and he was sure it was his intention to, pay a tribute to the whole of Sir C. Napier's military conduct from beginning to end, in which he (Mr. Wood) entirely concurred Nor did his noble Friend enter into the question of the policy of Lord Ellenborough. The position his noble Friend took was, that according to Parliamentary precedent, according to the principles laid down by Parliament in

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voting Thanks to military and naval officers, this Vote of Thanks ought not to have been proposed; and, if hon. Gentlemen would refer to the debate on the motion for a Vote of Thanks to Sir E. Codrington, they would find the principles laid down by Mr. Huskisson, and by the right hon. Gentleman opposite as clearly as it was possible, and, consistently with those principles, he contended that the Vote on the present occasion ought not to be moved. He was far from saying that the House might not depart from those principles; this he maintained, that those principles so laid down were departed from in the present. instance. Those principles, as laid down by Mr. Huskisson and the right hon. Baronet were, that for mere hostilities and acts of aggression, however necessary, however signal the success, however brilliant the achievement, an officer could not be entitled to a Vote of Thanks. They said there must be a state of formal recognised war between the two countries before he could be so entitled. Instances were quoted similar to the present. The right hon. Baronet quoted Sir G. Byng's action on the coast of Sicily. Sir G. Byng went to Spain and told the Spanish government that he had instructions to prevent any aggression against Sicily. Spain refused to desist from making the aggression. Sir G. Byng demanded an armistice. The Spanish admiral would not agree to it. He then attacked and gained a complete victory over their fleet, but a Vote of Thanks was refused to him; and why? Because war had not been declared. The right hon Baronet said,
"That his conduct had been entirely approved by his Sovereign, that the policy of his conduct had not been questioned in Parliament; nevertheless Thanks were not voted, because there had been no declaration of war."
Sir James Mackintosh, argued in favour of a Vote of Thanks for Navarino. He said, as it might be said with reference to the affairs of Scinde,
"What were the admirals to do? Were they to negotiate? If they were, they were to negotiate as admirals usually did, with their great guns. That was the only representation that could have any effect on the understandings of our ancient allies the Turks."
The same arguments as those of Sir J. Mackintosh with reference to Navarino might be used with reference to the operations of Sir C. Napier. Nobody then dis-
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puted the gallantry of Sir E. Codrington, nor did any one dispute that of Sir Charles. But as there was no war, the former was not entitled to Thanks, and the same principle applied to the latter. Reference was made in that debate to the case of Copenhagen. A fleet and army were sent to demand the surrender of the Danish fleet. The Danes refused to give it up. Hostilities commenced, and complete success attended our forces, Thanks were voted by Parliament. Sir James Mackintosh quoted this case: He said,
"The only question that arose respecting Copenhagen was, whether the danger actually existed Then danger existed, war was justified and began, Upon this principle hostilities were commenced against Denmark."
But according to the views of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that did not entitle the army and the fleet to a Vote of Thanks. He said in answering Sir James Mackintosh,
"In the case of Copenhagen that very fact existed, the non-existence of which was the reason of forbearance from voting Parliamentary thanks in the cases of Admiral Byng, and the battle of Toulouse—there was a declaration of war issued by Denmark against Great Britain. At the time of the military occupation of the Danish arsenals, Denmark had declared hersslf at war with England."
Now the battle of Toulouse had been referred to. This was a remarkable case. We were engaged in a war, in the strictest sense of the term, in a recognised war. The Duke of Wellington had no reason to suppose that the war was stopped. He fought and gained a signal victory. Honours were granted for the action, but the Thanks of the House were refused on the ground that something had occurred elsewhere which had put an end to the war. Now, what was the principle on which this declaration of war, this state of recognised war, was always insisted on as entitling officers to a Vote of Thanks? Why, it was laid down by Mr. Huskisson, that it was inexpedient to pass a Vote of Thanks to an officer with whom the power rested of fighting the battle, for fear there should be any temptation to commence an engagement. He (Mr. Wood) did not say that that was so in this case. The right hon. Gentleman did not say it was so in the case of Sir E. Codrington, but he said the House ought to be cautious before making a precedent, of voting Thanks on such occasions.

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"For an event which grew out of an accident; lest officers, looking at the signal benefit conferred on them by receiving such thanks, should cherish too easy a disposition to create such accidents."
These were Mr. Huskisson's words: this was the principle laid down by him, and confirmed by the right hon. Baronet opposite, and it was strictly applicable to the present case. The hon. and gallant officer said that there were Votes of Thanks for the exploits in China and Affghanistan, without a declaration of war. In the case of Affghanistan, there was a declaration of war. In the case of China there was not. But then there was this distinction, and one on which the precedent rested, that, in the case of China, the power of peace and war was not vested in the military officer. The principles on which the precedents rested were, that the person in whom the option of peace or war was vested, was not entitled to a Vote of Thanks, as a military officer, in the event of success. His noble Friend said, that Sir C. Napier was put in that position in which, according to the principles and the precedents which had been acted on by the House, he could not receive the vote. He (Mr. C. Wood) must say, that so far as the precedent went, so far as the principles went, he believed his noble Friend was in the right, and was therefore justified in bringing the question before the attention of Parliament. If the House chose to disregard precedents they might do so; but was it right that the House should do so, knowing to what extent precedents had been enforced before, that they were acting contrary to those precedents? and he thought with strange inconsistency, on the part of the right hon. Baronet who proposed the present Vote of Thanks. He (Mr. C. Wood) admitted the glory of the victory, and that Sir C. Napier well merited the Vote for his gallantry and his ability, but at the same time he thought there were precedents relating to similar cases, and founded on wholesome principles, which were altogether opposed to such a Vote.
Mr. Sharman Crawfordsaid, it was with no small surprise, after the speech of the noble Lord, the Member for Sutherland, and those of the other hon. Gentlemen, that he heard no hon. Member express an intention of taking the sense of the House by bringing the question to a division. He was one of those who felt
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strongly the force of the arguments that had been used. He felt that the House, by a Vote of Thanks, was identifying itself with, and approved of the origin and conduct of, those wars. He did not wish by any act of his to identify himself with such wars as those which had been carried on in India. He thought that a stand should be made against those wars, and that the House should limit its expression of approving them; but, at the same time, he felt that the officers were compelled, as machines, to work on occasions where they could not approve of the objects for which they worked. He, for those reasons protested against the Vote. He protested against the bloody, unjust, and unnecessary wars that had taken place in India, and he should therefore move the previous question.
Mr. Brotherton.—I second the motion.
Mr. B. Escottsaid, this was a most important question. Those brave and noble-minded men who had hazarded their lives in the cause of their country well deserved the Thanks of that House and of the nation; but it seemed to be the wish of some hon. Gentlemen on the other side to depreciate the value of their services, by imputing motives and indulging in insinuations against at least one of the officers engaged in those operations, whose conduct they did not dare to impugn by a direct motion in that House. The hon. Member for Halifax, although he did not oppose this Vote of Thanks, had sought to depreciate the credit due to the gallant Officer who had directed the operations in Scinde, and had objected to the motion on the ground of precedent. He was not, however, disposed to argue such a question as this upon precedent. Sir C. Napier had gained an unprecedented victory; and in awarding to that gallant Officer their meed of praise and gratitude for his unprecedented successes, they were not to be guided or influenced by the conduct of Parliament on other occasions, when the actions under consideration were of a widely different nature from those in which Sir C. Napier had been engaged. The noble Lord who had addressed the House had made two admissions to which he would call their attention. The noble Lord had stated that the conduct of Sir C. Napier, in a military point of view, had been beyond all praise. The hon. Member for Halifax had repeated this sentiment, and had said that he considered the gal-

575
lant officer was entitled to the unbounded gratitude of the country. What was the nature of the motion now before the House? It was a motion for a Vote of Thanks to Major-general Sir C. Napier, and to the officers and men for military operations in Scinde. If, then, the conduct of that gallant officer with respect to these military operations was beyond all praise, and if, as had been admitted by the noble Lord and by the hon. Member for Halifax, they had only the subject of military operations under their consideration in this debate,—on what ground did they rest their attacks upon Sir C. Napier? The noble Lord had also made another admission. He had said that he, like many others, had very little knowledge of the affairs in Scinde—that it was a most difficult thing to form a correct opinion with reference to transactions which took place at such a distance—and that we ought to be exceedingly cautious in condemning the acts of persons of the propriety of whose conduct we had comparatively slight means of judging. But, although the noble Lord possessed so little knowledge of these affairs, two hon. and gallant Members who had spoken in the course of the debate possessed considerable knowledge on the subject; and what were the opinions of the hon. and gallant Member for Liverpool (Sir H. Douglas) and the hon. and gallant Member for Marylebone (Sir C. Napier)? Did not those hon. Members and his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir H. Hardinge) distinctly state, that General Sir C. Napier would have acted a most treacherous part towards the men under his command, most prejudicially to the interests of his country, and that he would have done dishonour to his own high military character, if he had delayed any longer to attack the force arrayed against him? He hoped that the hon. Member opposite (Mr. S. Crawford), pursuing that straightforward course which always characterized his conduct in that House, would press his motion to a division. He sincerely trusted that the hon. Member would divide the House upon the question, in order that it might be seen how many Members of a British House of Commons would act upon the 'suggestions of the noble Lord, and deprive future commanders of that stimulus to similar exertions under similar difficulties which was afforded by an anticipation of the applause and approba-
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tion of the British Parliament. A noble Lord (Lord Auckland) who possessed a deep and intimate acquaintance with this subject, and who had to-night spoken upon the question in another place, had not deemed that it became him to be niggard in the meed of approbation he had awarded to Sir C. Napier and the gallant army under his command. Whether or not that noble Lord had been mistaken, he had at least been unfortunate on a former occasion; but his misfortune, or his ill-policy—if, indeed, it was his ill-policy—ought to be considerately regarded by a generous nation. That noble Lord had not, however, thought it right or becoming to make any attack to-night upon his successor, Lord Ellenborough, or upon the gallant officer, Sir C. Napier, who had reaped laurels on a field where the noble Lord had not been equally fortunate. The noble Lord had left it to others—and he hoped their numbers would be seen on a division to-night—to rise in the House of Commons, safe from danger, removed from difficulty, and, under the pretence of maintaining, that incitements ought not to be held out to military men to engage in hostilities unnecessarily, to seek to withhold the highest reward a military man could receive—the approbation of the representatives of the people—from those who had most richly deserved it. He would only add, that it was now their duty to watch narrowly the future course of events in the country which their gallant army had conquered, with a view to the dissemination of the arts of peace and the introduction of English institutions.
Dr. Bowringfelt it necessary to justify the vote he was about to give on this question. He had no feeling whatever against General Sir Charles Napier, whom he knew, and whose high and noble qualities he admitted and admired; but he disapproved all aggressive war, and he would therefore vote for the motion of his hon. Friend (Mr. S. Crawford).
Viscount Palmerstonwished to state, in a very few words, the grounds upon which it was his intention to give the motion of the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) his warm and cordial support. He could not allow himself to consider this motion as involving, in any degree whatever, any political considerations. He regarded it as a simple proposal to confer upon most distinguished military merit the Thanks of that House—one of the highest rewards

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that could be conferred upon those who fought and bled in defence of their country. He wholly discarded from his consideration all topics which involved any question as to whether the treatment of the Ameers were justifiable or not—whether the policy pursued by Lord Ellenborough were wise or the contrary. He would not even permit himself to look at that portion of the political transactions in India in which Sir C. Napier might be considered to have been involved in his political capacity. He saw a most brilliant exploit performed by British troops—an exploit almost without example, with reference to the disparity of forces and the completeness of the success; and he thought, following what he considered the just precedent of former periods, that this was an occasion upon which it was becoming that the House should join in commendation of the valour and skill which had been displayed. He said the skill, as well as the valour, because he thought the sagacity which Sir C. Napier had exhibited in the course of these military operations was not less conspicuous than the bravery he had displayed in the actions in which he had been engaged. His noble Friend and some hon. Members on that side of the House conceived that the proceedings which took place in Parliament with regard to the battle of Navarino presented an obstacle to their agreeing to the motion now under consideration. He could not perceive any identity between the two cases. What was the battle of Navarino? An accidental conflict which took place between our fleet, forming a portion of a combined fleet, which was the instrument of mediation on the part of the Allied Powers between two contending parties, and the fleet of a Power with which we were not at war, and with which we did not afterwards find ourselves at war. We remained on terms of peace with the Sultan after that battle; and for Parliament to have voted Thanks for a victory gained in an unintentional and accidental conflict with the fleet of a friendly Power, and which did not disturb the peaceful relations between this country and the sovereign whose fleet we defeated, would have been exceedingly discourteous towards the Sultan; and he thought the Government of that day acted with just consideration when they declined to agree to such a Vote. But no man would say that we had not been at war with these Ameers. If that was not war which, beginning in battle, ended in dethronement, he was at a
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loss to know what war was. He was sure that the Ameers would not be disposed to acquiesce in the peaceful interpretation which his noble Friend had given of the transaction. He gave this Vote his most warm and cordial support, reserving himself entirely free as to any opinion he might entertain with regard to any political questions connected with the transactions in Scinde.
Mr. W. O. Stanleysaid, it had not been his intention to offer any remarks to the House, but he rose in consequence of an observation which had been used by the hon. Member for Winchester. That hon. Gentleman had said, that hon. Members who had expressed their opinions freely on this question, "dared" not impugn the conduct of the gallant officer to whom it was now proposed to pass a Vote of Thanks. The hon. Members who had spoken on that side of the House, had given free expression to their opinions, because many of them felt that though Sir C. Napier had acted in a most creditable manner, and had deserved the Thanks of the House for his military services, there were circumstances connected with his transactions in India, of which they could not approve. This was the feeling which he entertained; but he should be sorry to divide the House on this question, or to give his vote against the motion. He believed, that the conduct exhibited by Sir C. Napier, could have been rivalled by few persons. He was willing to give that gallant officer his full weed of praise; but, at the same time, he could not read the correspondence which had been submitted to the House, without regretting some portions of the conduct of the gallant officer. He considered that the laurels which Sir C. Napier had won, were tarnished by the letter which he had written to the Ameers of Scinde. If the motion were pressed to a division, he certainly would not vote upon it.
The House then divided on the Question; that the Question be put: Ayes 164; Noes 9—Majority 155.

List of the AYES.

Ackers, J.

Baillie, H. J.

Arland, T. D.

Baird, W.

Allix, J. P.

Baldwin, B.

Arkwright, G.

Baring, hon. W. B

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Baring, rt. hon. F. T.

Barnard, E. G.

Ashley, Lord

Bentinck, Lord G.

Baillie, Col. U

Berkeley, hon. C.

579

Bernal, R.

Hamilton, W. J.

Blakemore, R.

Hamilton, Lord C.

Boldero, H. G.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Borthwick, P.

Hardinge, rt. hn. SirH.

Botfield, B.

Hatton, Capt. V.

Bowes, J.

Henley, J. W.

Bramston, T. W.

Herbert, hon. S.

Broadley, H.

Hobhouse, rt. hn. SirJ.

Bruce, Lord E.

Hodgson, F.

Buckley, E.

Hodgson, R.

Busfield, W.

Hope, G. W.

Butler, P. S.

Hornby, J.

Byng, rt. hon. G. S.

Howard, Lord

Chetwode, Sir J.

Howard, P. H.

Childers, J. W.

Hume, J.

Christie, W. D.

Humphery, Mr. Ald.

Clerk, Sir G.

Hutt, W.

Clive, Visct.

Jermyn, Earl

Clive, hon. R. H.

Jocelyn, Visct.

Colborne, hn. W.N.R.

Jones, Capt.

Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

Knatchbull, rt. hn. Sir E

Collett, W. R.

Langston, J. H.

Collett, J.

Lascelles, hon. W. S.

Connolly, Col.

Law, hon. C. E.

Coote, Sir C. H.

Lawson, A.

Corry, rt. hon. H.

Leveson, Lord

Craig, W. G.

Lincoln, Earl of

Cripps, W.

Lindsay, H. H.

Curteis, H. B.

Lockhart, W.

Dalrymple, Capt.

Lowther, hon. Col.

Damer, hon. Col.

Lygon, hon. Gen.

Dawson, hon. T. V.

Mc Geachy, F. A.

Denison, E. B.

Mackenzie, W. F

Dickinson, F. H.

Maclean, D.

Douglas, Sir H.

M'Neill, D.

Douglas, Sir C. E.

Mahon, Visct.

Douro, Marquis of

Manners, Lord C. S.

Drummond, H. Home

Manners, Lord J.

Duke, Sir J.

Marsland, H.

Duncan, G.

Masterman, J.

Duncombe, T.

Maxwell, hon. J. P.

Easthope, Sir J.

Mitchell, T. A.

Egerton, W. T.

Morris, D.

Eliot, Lord

Murray, A.

Escott, B.

Napier, Sir C.

Ferguson, Col.

Nicholl, rt. hon. J.

Fitzroy, Lord C

Northland, Visct.

Flower, Sir J.

O'Brien, A. S.

Ffolliott, J

Packe, C. W.

Forster, M.

Paget, Col.

Fox, C. R.

Pakington, J. S.

Fox, S. L.

Palmerston, Visct.

Fuller, A. E.

Pechell, Capt.

Gardner, J. D.

Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

Gaskell, J. Milnes.

Peel, J.

Gill, T.

Plumridge, Capt.

Gisborne, T.

Praed, W. T.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Pringle, A.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Rashleigh, W.

Goring, C

Rawdon, Col.

Goulburn, rt. hon. H.

Repton, G. W. J.

Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.

Roebuck, J. A.

Greene, T.

Shaw, rt. hon. F.

Gregory, W. H.

Sibthorp, Col.

Hallyburton, Lord J. F.

Somerset, Lord G.

Hamilton, J. H.

Standish, C.

Hamilton, G. A.

Stanley, Lord

580

Staunton, Sir G. T.

Verner Col.

Stewart, J.

Wood, Col.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Wood, Col. T.

Tancred, H. W.

Wortley, hon. J. S.

Tennent, J. E.

Wortley, hon. J. S.

Thesiger, F.

Young, J.

Trench, Sir F. W.

TELLERS.

Turner, E.

Freemantle, Sir T.

Vane, Lord H.

Baring, H.

List of the NOES.

Bowring, Dr.

Wawn, J. T.

Granger, T. C.

Williams, W.

Hawes, B.

Wood, C.

Howick, Visct.

TELLERS.

Mangles, R. D.

Brotherton, J.

Strickland, Sir G.

Crawford, S.

It was accordingly
Resolved, That the Thanks of this House be given to Major General Sir Charles Napier, Knight Grand Cross of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, for the eminent skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by him in the recent Military Operations in Scinde; particularly in the two decisive Battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.—And also
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, serving under Major General Sir Charles Napier, for their unwearied zeal and conspicuous gallantry.
Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the brave and meritorious conduct displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, both European and Native, engaged in the operations in Scinde; and that this Resolution be signified to them by the Commanders of the several corps.
Ordered, That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to the Governor General in India, and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein.

STRANGERS—PUBLICATION OF THE DEBATES.
Mr. Christie: I wish first to say that I feel I ought to apologize for bringing forward a question so closely relating to the privileges of this House, and also of very considerable constitutional importance. The only excuse I can offer is, that, having been connected in the last Session with the Bill for the amendment of the Law of Libel, which originally contained a clause giving protection to publishers of faithful Parliamentary reports from actions or prosecutions for libel arising out of any matter in these reports, and which was deprived of that clause in the other House, chiefly for the reason that all such reports were

581
strictly breaches of the privilege of Parliament, I have had my attention directed to a practical consequence of the present anomalous state of things, and have hoped that I might be allowed to submit, for the better consideration of the House, the propriety of getting rid of forms that have fallen into complete disuse, and are indeed so contradictory to our practice, that they can only excite ridicule, and are attended with some practical inconveniences, and of substituting regulations conformable to our practice, and which, while they recognize what is now daily not only permitted but encouraged by the House, shall retain for the House all the control over both the admission of strangers and the publication of debates, which it can be necessary or proper for the House to exercise. Now, if this were a mere question of obsolete regulations, which have lost all practical influence, I will not say there would be no justification, but there would be little inducement to trouble the House with a formal motion for rescinding them. I have already adverted to one instance of the practical operation of these regulations. There is another which has been probably presented to the mind of every Member of the House, however short his Parliamentary experience. Old Resolutions of this House declare, that any publication by newspapers of what is said in it, is a breach of its privileges, and that the House will proceed with the utmost severity against all offenders. But the House never seeks to exercise the power so declared, except in cases where a published report involves gross and apparently wilful misrepresentations. Now the power of the House to prevent these misrepresentations, which, in order to prevent their recurrence, no one will say that it ought not to possess and to exercise, is greatly weakened by a theory as to all publications at complete variance with practice. The House cannot notice any such misrepresentation without declaring the report to be in itself a breach of privilege. This at once lays bare the inconsistency of the House: it so far gives an advantage to the offender; it places punishment on a wrong ground, or at any rate, not solely on the right one; it is at best a clumsy circuitous mode of punishing the offence you wish to punish, instead of proceeding straight to the object; and the consequence of the present state of things is, as every one knows, first,
582
that the House is rendered slow to act, in cases where for the sake of the public, to whom faithful reports of Parliamentary Debates are all-important, it is desirable that it should act, and secondly, that, when it does act, it acts with diminished efficiency. I will mention an instance in illustration. In the year 1819, a reporter of the Times newspaper was brought to the bar of the House on the complaint of Mr. Canning, for a misreport of a speech of Mr. Hume's, which, as misreported and so grossly misreported, that the House could not believe the misreport to be unintentional, was roost offensive to the feelings of Mr. Canning, and calculated to injure him seriously in the public estimation. Any one who reads the debate which arose, and the proceedings in that case, will see how the House was hampered by the theory, that publication is a breach of privilege. I find that Mr. Wynn, who directed the course taken by the House, said,
"The breach of privilege was, in the present instance, of a complicated nature; the first breach of privilege be need not mention, as it was well known to every Member of the House, and had now been overlooked for many years; the next breach of privilege was against the right hon. Gentleman opposite, whose character had been calumniated; and the third breach against the hon. Gentleman to whom foul language had been attributed."
Mr. Wynn afterwards moved a resolution, which is remarkable for the pains taken to place the theoretical offence of publication,—the sole offence for the House to consider if it acted in the spirit of the Resolutions on which it professes to act—as much as possible in the background. The Resolution was—
"That the said paragraph is a scandalous misrepresentation of the debates and proceedings of this House, a calumnious libel on the character of one of its Members, and an aggravated breach of its privileges."
Now, the breach of its privileges was the publication—the calumny and the misrepresentation, which are put foremost were the aggravating circumstances. The reporter was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the next day, having presented a petition to the House he was ordered to be reprimanded by the Speaker and discharged. I have extracted a sentence from the reprimand delivered on that occasion by the Speaker, the present Lord Canterbury,

583
which seems to me a very happy and forcible illustration of the difficulties in which the House is now placed with regard to reports of debates. After speaking of the lenity with which the House was disposed to treat the offence, he says,
"Let not, however, that lenity be misunderstood—let it not be forgotten that it is alone from the indulgence of this Rouse that there is room for the commission of any such offence, and that the abuse of such indulgence aggravates the offence."
That is, "we allow you to commit an offence, and make ourselves parties to its commission; but if you infringe the terms on which we allow you to violate our privileges, we consider that you break faith with us, and that we are entitled to assume a higher tone of moral indignation towards you." Now I cannot but think, that the dignity of this House would have been better asserted, its high functions as a representative assembly more worthily vindicated, and, I will add, the Speaker placed in a juster position, if he had been able to say to the person whom he was required to reprimand, "We allow you to report our debates and give you facilities for reporting them, for the public good which requires that those for whom this House legislates, and by whom this House is elected, should see the speeches of its Members: you must remember that, in pursuing your own profit, you exercise important public functions: we who permit you to perform these functions retain in our hands a control over you in order to secure their being performed justly and accurately; and the same public good which calls upon us to allow you to report, requires us to punish you if you misrepresent." And this is the principle which I hope the House may ultimately be induced to adopt: to sanction reports, and to confine punishment to misrepresentations. I hope the House will think that I am doing only what the importance of this subject and its delicate character in connexion with privilege require, if I go into a short history of the proceedings of the House of Commons from the commencement, both for excluding strangers and prohibiting the publication of debates. The two questions are distinct; for though in later times the Standing Order for the exclusion of Strangers was made the means of preventing publication, and I believe I may say
584
also was made the ground for treating publication as an offence, its original enactment was altogether irrespective of the question of publication, and the House sought to prevent publication by distinct specific resolutions. The first Resolutions to be found in our Journals, prohibiting publication of speeches, occur at the commencement of the Long Parliament. In that crisis of the great struggle between Charles I. and the Parliament, when every possible expedient was resorted to for the purpose of protecting the privilege of freedom of speech, two Resolutions prohibiting publication were passed, which had for their object to prevent what was said by Members from coming to the knowledge of the Crown. The first of these Resolutions, forbad any Member to publish his speech without the leave of the House. The second passed on the 22nd March, 1642, was directed generally against publication, and is in these terms:—
"Resolved, that whatsoever person shall print any act or passages of this House, under the name of Diurnal or otherwise, without the particular licence of this House, shall be reputed a high contemner and breaker of the privileges of Parliament, and be punished accordingly."
The spirit of the Resolutions of the Long Parliament was upheld in all the irregular Parliaments of the Protectorate, which contained always a large number of Members as jealous of Cromwell and afterwards of his son, as the Long Parliament had been jealous of Charles I. Mr. Burton mentions in his Diary, an attempt made on one occasion by a republican Member, Luke Robinson, to stop his taking notes. After the Restoration, there is an early instance of two printers being punished for printing some of the proceedings of the House. But the King and Parliament were now entirely in accord; and the spirit of this proceeding was no longer that which had dictated the Resolutions of the Long Parliament. Ii was not, however, till the middle of the reign of William and Mary, that a series of systematic attempts was commenced, to use Resolutions originally passed to protect the House of Commons, in the performance of its duty to the people, from the Crown, for the purpose of screening it from the view of the people. On the 20th of December, 1694, the House passed a Resolution,—

585
"That no news-letter writers do, in their letters or other papers that they disperse, presume to intermeddle with the debates, or any other proceedings of this House."
This Resolution was renewed in 1695, 1697, and 1703; and fresh Resolutions more stringent in character, were passed in 1722 and 1728. These Resolutions were one after another disregarded; and accounts of the proceedings of Parliament went on, in spite of them, increasing in number and value, constantly becoming more cared for by the public, and more difficult to be prevented. There was, however, in those times, an argument that might be urged with much plausibility for preventing accounts of debates from being published, which can no longer be urged now, that the speeches of Members, if published, would be published inaccurately. Thus, in 1738, when a more vigorous attempt was made than had ever been made before to stop publication, this was made the chief ground for the desired prohibition. An account of the debate on this occasion has been preserved, and is to be found in the "Parliamentary History." The subject was introduced by the Speaker, who informed the House—
"That it was with some concern he saw a practice prevailing which a little reflected on the dignity of that House. What he meant was the inserting an account of their proceedings in the printed newspapers, by which means the proceedings of the House were liable to very great misrepresentation."
In the debate which took place, Sir Wm. Yonge, Sir Wm. Windham, Mr. Pulteney, and Sir Robt. Walpole took part. All agreed as to the necessity of taking some step for the prevention of the practice complained of by the Speaker, and all, with the single exception of Mr. Pulteney, who was more adventurous in his argument, relied chiefly on the liability to misrepresentation. Mr. Pulteney, alone, denied the right of the public to know what was said in the House. He said—
"I think no appeals should be made to the public with regard to what is said in this assembly; and to print or publish the speeches of Gentlemen in this House, even though they were not misrepresented, looks very like making them accountable without doors for what they say within."
The following extract from Sir Robert Walpole's speech shows that general inaccuracy and wilful misrepresentations of party virulence were the real grievance;—
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"I have read some debates of this House, Sir, in which I have been made to speak the very reverse of what I meant. I have read others of them, wherein all the wit, the learning, and the argument, have been thrown into one side, and on the other nothing but what was low, mean, and ridiculous; and yet when it comes to the question, the division has gone against the side which, upon the face of the debate, had reason and justice to support it. So that, Sir, had I been a stranger to the proceedings, and to the nature of the arguments themselves, I must have thought this to have been one of the most contemptible assemblies on the face of the earth. What notion, then, Sir, can the public, who have no other means of being informed of the debates of this House than what they learn from these papers, entertain of the wisdom and abilities of an assembly, who are represented therein to carry almost every point against the strongest and the plainest arguments and appearances?"
The result was, that a Resolution was unanimously passed, which differed only from the Resolution of 1728 by specifically naming the recess, as well as the time of sitting, of Parliament, and is as follows:—
"That it is an high indignity to, and notorious breach of the privileges of, this House, for any news writer, in letters or other papers (as minutes, or under any other denomination), or for any printer or publisher of any printed newspaper of any denomination, in Great Britain, Ireland, or any other part of His Majesty's dominions, to presume to insert in the said letters or papers, or to give therein any account of the debates or other proceedings of this House, or any committee thereof, as well during the recess as the sitting of Parliament; and that this House will proceed with the utmost severity against such offenders."
This Resolution did not succeed in preventing accounts of the debates from being published. The accounts were published henceforward with a fictitious name for the House of Commons, and fictitious names for the Members. The London Magazine published The Proceedings of the Political Club. The St. James's Chronicle, The Debates of the Representatives of Utopia—and The Gentleman's Magazine, whose reports have acquired a greater celebrity, as having commanded, for some years, in their service, all the resources of the genius of Johnson, published its reports under the name of Debates of the Senate of Lilliput. All this while, the Standing Order for excluding Strangers was never used for carrying into effect the desire of the

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House to prevent publication of its proceedings. The first Order for excluding Strangers was passed in 1662, and had no other object, than to prevent strangers from coming in to mix with Members, and obstruct business. It was an Order to shut the back door of the Speaker's chamber when the House began to sit, and to keep it shut as long as the House sat. An Order to this effect was renewed sessionally till 1833, long after anything was known about the back door of the Speaker's chamber; and was dropped in that year from a general conviction of its absurdity. An Order similar to the present Sessional Order was first passed on the 31st of October 1705. It differed in no way essentially from the present Sessional Strangers' Order, but was not expressed so fully. Every one knows the Order in its present form. It was in the commencement of the reign of George 3rd, on the establishment, after a long term of exclusion, of the Tory party in power, that this Order was first used for the purpose of preventing publication of debates. The Gallery was now constantly closed against strangers. But even this was not effectual. Members sent reports of the debates to the magazines and papers. In 1771, a bolder step was taken, and Colonel Onslow moved, to bring the printer and publisher of every reporting newspaper, to the Bar of the House. These motions were met with a determined opposition from a small minority, in which Mr. Burke, then young in Parliamentary life, bore a conspicuous part, and which vexed the House in one night with twenty-three divisions. The opposition was fruitless at the time, but the moral effect which it produced led the Tories in the next Parliament to give up the point, and from that time, reports of debates have been unmolested and virtually permitted. In a recent valuable publication, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, a full report of the debates on Colonel Onslow's motions has been given to the world: and there are other interesting debates reported in that work which bear on this subject. In those debates, Mr. Burke, Mr. Dunning, Mr. Fox, and others, unequivocally declared, that the exclusion of strangers was at variance with the constitution. I will read a part of a short debate which took place on February 7th 1771, and which tends to prove the origin of the exclusion, by showing, that at this
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time, want of room was always made the pretext. Sir John Turner, who was a Lord of the Treasury under Lord North, and who moved the enforcement of the Standing Order for the exclusion of Strangers, and said:—
"As there were so many Members at the call of the House on Tuesday, I conclude they are still in town, and that we shall be crowded. I am not so cold as I was; I desire, that the Standing Order for the exclusion of Strangers may be read."
Sir Joseph Mawbey, a Member of the Opposition said, after strangers had left the House:—
"From the appearance of the House, I begin to suspect that many Members are gone out of town. Several Gentlemen complain of cold. The hon. Baronet (Sir J. Turner) has got his great-coat on."
Colonel Onslow said, (and this again shows, that misrepresentation was the evil sought to be avoided)—
"Nobody wishes to permit strangers to be in the House more than myself; but there is one objection which I mentioned the other day. No Member would misrepresent the speeches made in this House, It must proceed from strangers."
Mr. Wm. Burke replied:—
"With regard to misrepresentation it is more likely to take place from strangers being kept out. If they are not permitted freely to report the speeches of Members, they will set about inventing them. The hon. Gentleman need not be discontented. Many very good speeches of his and of other Members have been printed."
I conclude then from this historical sketch that the publication of debates in this House was originally prohibited for the purpose of protection against the Crown, and afterwards when the House of Commons had ceased to fear the Crown, was long attempted to be maintained against a constantly growing interest in public matters on the part of the community generally, and a growing desire to make the Government responsible to the governed, by some few political zealots in order to screen Parliament from accountability to the public, but chiefly and by all moderate men in order to prevent inaccurate and unjust accounts of what passed in the House from going forth to the public, and because it was then thought there was no other alternative but secrecy of debates, or misrepresentation of them. The Standing Order for the exclusion of Strangers from

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the House, was originally resorted to for the purpose of preventing interruption of the proceedings of the House, and inconvenience and discomfort to Members from the want of sufficient accommodation for strangers. During the time which has elapsed since the House of Commons gave up the contest with newspapers, and there has been practically permission of newspaper reports, the art of reporting has been carried to such a state of excellence, and the newspapers have become so universally recognised as the full and faithful media of communication between this House and those whom it represents, that I think no one will any longer regard inaccuracy and misrepresentation as necessary dangers. The perfection to which short hand writing has been carried, the large capitals embarked in newspapers, and the rivalry between them, if aided by the more effectual control that this House could exercise if it only emancipated itself from the shackles of its present nominal prohibition of all publication, would ensure reports free from general inaccuracy which the public would discountenance, free from wilful misrepresentations which this House would punish, and free also, under the control of the public and of the House from the exercise of any political partiality or personal caprice over those who execute the duties of reporting. It is under these circumstances then, that I ask the House to grant the appointment of a Committee to consider the expediency of recognising the presence of strangers at debates, and the publication of debates under the pleasure of the House, and to consider and report what regulations may be necessary. I will explain what I mean by the words "under the pleasure of the House." I do not propose to take away the power which any individual Member now has of having the House cleared of strangers, without any debate arising on his demand for their exclusion. But I wish their presence here to be recognised as the general rule. There may arise occasions when state policy would require the Legislature to debate with closed doors. The best possible check upon a Member to prevent his excluding strangers without a good reason, would be public opinion; and with regard to the publication of debates, the power must be reserved to the House to forbid publication, if on any occasion secrecy is required. The regulations ne-
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cessary for thus modifying the general right of admission of strangers and of publication, it will, of course, be for the Committee to consider; and if the Committee is granted, I trust that I may be able to secure the efficient aid of experienced Members of the House; for I say sincerely, that I only look upon myself as having been accidentally led to make a suggestion to the House for other Members of more weight and experience to act upon, and conduct if they will, to a practical result. With regard to authorising the publication of debates, there is one point which I wish very briefly to anticipate, which however would be urged probably not so much as an objection, as suggesting a consequence which may tend to give a little more difficulty to this question. I mean, it may be said, that if this House recognizes reports of debates, it must go a step further, and have reporters of its own. After all, it is but a mockery to say that this House does not now practically recognize reports. But I believe, that the appointment of special reporters is neither a necessary nor a desirable consequence. The competition of newspapers and the control exercised by the public through the encouragement of the best reports, will secure justice and general accuracy; and the desired result may be confidently expected to be attained by the application of the enterprise and capital and talent of individuals, without expense to the public. Besides, if special reporters were appointed by the House, unless you excluded reporters from newspapers, the) would anticipate your reporters with the public, and the newspaper reports would after all be then generally read. The recognition by Parliament of reports of its debates, would pave the way for an alteration of the law of libel, as regards publishers of these reports, which the highest authorities have declared to be desirable. Every newspaper that reports a speech which any individual may complain of as containing a libel on his character is now liable to action or prosecution for libel by that individual, the Member himself who made the speech being protected by his privilege. But if a Member publishes his own speech, or revises a manuscript report of it, or sends notes to the newspaper, he becomes liable for the publication. Mr. Creevey's case is well known. He was indicted in 1813 for a libel contained in a speech of which he had sent

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a corrected report to a country newspaper, and was found guilty. It seems to me most unjust and inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution that those who do the public the great service of reporting debates in Parliament, should do so with the terrors of the law of libel before their eyes, and that Members of Parliament who assist to make reports accurate, should be subjected to the same peril. I will not trouble the House with reading the strong opinions given by Lords Denman and Campbell before the Lords' Committee on the law of Defamation and Libel which any Member may see on referring to the Report of that Committee. But I cannot, before I sit down, forbear from mentioning one striking instance, which a recent act of the Executive Government has supplied, of the inconvenience of retaining forms that have fallen into such complete disuse, that even the Lord Chancellor of Ireland could forget their existence, and embarrass himself and the Government by grounding his dismissal of Irish magistrates, on a letter deliberately written to explain it, on ministerial declarations in the two Houses of Parliament, of Her Majesty's sentiments on the subject of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, which if known to the Chancellor himself, in any other way (and that is doubtful) were known to the public only by the newspaper reports. I move for a Select Committee to consider the expediency of recognizing the presence of strangers at debates, and the publication of debates, under the pleasure of the House, and to consider and report what regulations may be necessary.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerhad given the best attention in his power to the speech which had just been delivered by the hon. and learned Member, and he confessed he had not been able to discover the object which the hon. Member had in view. The hon. and learned Gentleman appeared to wish that accurate accounts of debates should be published, and he paid a just tribute to the skill, correctness, and impartiality of the press in the publication of debates. He admitted, that the existing accounts were free from misrepresentation. He admitted, that the sentiments of Members were given under the existing system with an accuracy highly commendable. In the same way, with respect to the exclusion of strangers, the hon. and learned Member
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would have the House retain the powers which they at present possessed; and therefore he would ask what result could possibly arise from the appointment of the committee for which the hon. and learned Member moved? The practical advantage from it was too small to be discovered. The motion appeared to him to be founded on the Sessional Order, which directed the Sergeant-at-Arms to take all persons into custody whom he found within the House; hut that Standing Order had no practical effect upon that portion of the strangers present who were engaged in reporting the debates. That resolution applied only thus far, that if strangers were found in any part of the House in which Members sat, then the Sergeant-at-Arms was to exercise the power given to him, and take them into custody. Surely this was a power which, whatever might be their feelings as to the admission of strangers to hear their debates, could not be objected to. Therefore, whatever might be their opinions with respect to the publication of their debates, he thought the objection of the hon. Gentleman to the Standing Order of the House not one to which the House could attend without having, as a consequence, persons intruding themselves into the House who were not Members. The hon. Member wished the House to recognise the publication of the debates. There was no concealment on the part of the House under the present system; and the inquiry of the committee moved for would be this—whether the public received as much information at present as they could under the recommendation of the hon. Member, if acceded to? They did not recognise the publication of their debates, nor could they, unless they did so through some authorised channel responsible to the House. This rule of the House did not rest on an Order passed from Session to Session; it was an inherent privilege of the House, which did not depend on any Standing Order, or any Sessional Order. The principle was this, that it was contrary to the independence of the House to publish or to advert to any debates which took place there. What would be one of the consequences of an opposite course if the House recognised the publication of any debates? One of the first consequences would be this,—they would have petitions without end, complaining of the speeches of this Member and that,

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as containing misstatements of facts, and they would be compelled, if they authorised the publication of their debates, to listen to the voice of their constituents, and have the debates re-debated, in order to ascertain whether what had before been stated was correct or not. In the present state of the House, and of the business before the House, such a course would be highly inconvenient. If they recognised the publication of their debates, they could not get over the difficulty of recognising the right of the public to comment on them, and to bring them under their notice. Against the motion they had this fact, that the public had every information respecting the debates that passed in that House reported to them accurately, faithfully, and impartially, and what more could be required? If at any future period a time should arrive when it might be necessary to resort to any prohibition of the publication of the debates (which he did not anticipate), then such an attempt as this to interfere with an established privilege of the House would be more properly made. The only ground on which the hon. Member had supported his argument, had been the effect which this Standing Order had on the Law of Libel; and he said, that it ought not to be a libel to publish whatever might have been stated in that House by individual Members. In this he confessed he differed from the hon. Member, because he conceived, that it was perfectly possible for it to be necessary for a Member in his place in Parliament to make statements greatly affecting the character of other individuals, and yet he thought it would be most unjust that the mere fact of such a statement having been made in Parliament should authorise it to be published throughout the country to the prejudice of the individual. In many cases of inquiry, it was essentially necessary that things should be stated regarding individuals which were sometimes stated with exaggeration, and he thought it was but fair that the individual should not have things published without remedy. He did not agree in the principle, that it was justifiable to publish any matter, however libellous in itself, if stated to that House. He, therefore, thought it essential, that the House should retain its power, and that Members should be enabled to state what they thought necessary without the danger of their statements being used for
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the injury of individuals. He would not further detain the House. He objected to the motion, because every advantage anticipated by the hon. Member was at presented enjoyed by the House, and he thought it unnecessary to enter into an inquiry the result of which could not produce any material change.
Mr. T. Duncombesaid the right hon. Gentleman had stated, that he could not understand the object of his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Christie) in introducing this motion. Having listened to the speech of his hon. Friend, he must say that he never heard a proposition made more distinctly or intelligibly than his had been. His motion had not been to rescind the Order which authorised the Sergeantat-Arms to take into custody any stranger who intruded himself into the House; and for all those circumstances in which it might be necessary to review any individual's conduct on a subject which ought to be kept secret, his hon. Friend proposed to retain the power which the House possessed to exclude strangers. All his hon. Friend asked the House now to do was, to appoint a committee to inquire into the expediency of rescinding a resolution which compelled the exclusion of strangers, and which made it a breach of privilege for the reporters in their gallery to report a debate in that House. It was, in fact, a breach of privilege in those gentlemen now present (if they did him the honour) to report his present observations. His hon. Friend wished to save the House from these continual breaches of privilege going on and from the anomaly of their proceedings. His hon. Friend had alluded to a letter and certain proceedings of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland last year. That letter had been founded on the report of a speech of the right hon. Baronet opposite, and on the report of a speech of the Duke of Wellington made in the other House of Parliament. How had the Lord Chancellor of Ireland acquired a knowledge of those speeches except through the public press? Suppose the individuals to whom that letter had been addressed had denied that those speeches were ever made, how would the Lord Chancellor have proved them? He could not have called on the right hon. Baronet to prove that he had made the speech he was reported to have made, nor could he have invented any mode to show that those magistrates were cognizant of those speeches. In the state trials just concluded, the speeches of Members of that

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House had been given in evidence. A speech of Lord Althorp had been quoted and argued upon by the Attorney-general for Ireland and other counsel, as evidence of the intention of the parties they were trying to commit a breach of the peace, and to throw the whole country into confusion. Suppose those individuals had denied any of those speeches, they could only have proved them by the reporters of the newspapers, or by calling the individuals who made them. If the reporters of the newspapers had proved that those speeches were made, they would be guilty of a breach of the privileges of that House. Now, if they took advantage of speeches so made, they ought certainly to do away with this anomalous Resolution, which made a report of such speeches a breach of the privileges of the House. Had his hon. Friend proposed to rescind this Resolution which said that a correct report of the debates which took place in that House was a breach of privilege, he, for one, should have been quite prepared to vote for rescinding that Resolution; but he did not do that; he asked them only to inquire into the expediency of rescinding that Resolution, and to consider whether it would not be advisable to make some alterations in this regulation as to privilege. He could not understand what danger the right hon. Gentleman anticipated from the appointment of this committee. The proposed alteration could do no harm, if it did no good, and it would, at all events, save the House from the anomalous and absurd position which it now was in, its Members daily giving orders of admission to strangers to the House, their presence being a breach of the privileges of the House, and it would save them from the anomaly of permitting reporters to go every day into the Gallery and report their proceedings, against one of their Standing Orders. If his hon. Friend pressed his motion, as he hoped his hon. Friend would, he should have great plea, sure in supporting it.
Mr. W. Williamshad on former occasions felt it to be his duty to point out the anomalous position in which the House was occasionally placed by its own Orders. Some of their Orders were, indeed, never attended to, and were not of the slightest use. What, for example, was to be made of the following Order?—
"Ordered that no Member of this House do presume to bring any stranger or strangers to the House or the Gallery while the House is sitting."
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The fact was, that any hon. Member and Mr. Speaker, were at perfect liberty to introduce strangers when they pleased. There was another Order of no more avail,
"Ordered, that the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this house do, from time to time, take into his custody any stranger or strangers that he shall see, or be informed of to be in the House or Gallery, while the House or a Committee of the whole House is sitting."
The reporters' gallery was always in the view of the Sergeant-at-Arms, and yet the Order was violated every night; and the strangers' gallery was directly opposite the Speaker, who took no means for their exclusion. Nothing could be more inconsistent than thus constantly acting in open violation of their own rules. For his own part, he felt some desire to see the House act upon high principles of consistency, especially in the regulations which it had laid down for its own guidance; and he thought the hon. Member (Mr. Christie) would have pursued a more consistent course, if he had proposed the rescinding of the Orders altogether to which he objected with respect to the presence of reporters. He would ask what was the object of making speeches in that House? and he would appeal to the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir It. Peel), whether he ever hoped by the eloquent and occasionally long speeches which he addressed to that House to gain a convert from the other side? He (Mr. Williams) believed, that the most eloquent speeches in that House had never converted a single Member. He feared they were all too much like the Member from the north, who always voted along with Ministers, but being asked once, if he were never induced to alter his opinion by the argumentative speeches of the other side, replied "My opinions sometimes, but never my votes." He would ask, were not the speeches made in that House spoken rather with the view of exhibiting to the public the course which they were taking in that House, than with the hope of converting any hon. Member to their own opinions? And who gave those speeches to the public but the gentlemen who represented the newspaper press? He thought the Members of that House should be very much obliged to those gentlemen for the very clear, and he must say, generally very correct reports, which they gave to the country of the proceedings of that House, at the cost of great study and wonderful application and labour to themselves; but affording thereby a fund of information to

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the public. With regard to the exclusion of strangers, he certainly thought it was an anomaly to give so much power to one Member in ordering the withdrawal of strangers. He could imagine the necessity for that House to debate with closed doors, but the case must be very extraordinary to call for the exercise of such a power. If such a circumstance should occur, however, it ought, in his opinion, to be upon the vote of the whole House, and not at the caprice of one individual Member, that strangers should be compelled to withdraw. The right hon. Gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said the Order for the expulsion of Strangers by the Sergeant-at-Arms related only to strangers found in the body of the House, and not to strangers in the Gallery; but the order distinctly said "in the House or the Gallery of the House." [The Chancellor of the Exchequer: The Members' gallery.] The Order did not limit itself to the Members' gallery. If the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair would confirm the opinion expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he (Mr. Williams) should not object to such a Standing Order, but he was of opinion that it applied to all the galleries of the House. Instead of excluding strangers from their own gallery, he (Mr. Williams) thought that more accommodation might be given to them, and he could not see the slightest utility in ordering their withdrawal during a division, for they could not interfere with the Members if they were allowed to remain in the House. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would either confirm the view taken of the Order by the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or that he would cause the Order to be altered, so as to make it in accordance with the views of the right hon. Gentleman.
Sir G. Clerkthought there could be no doubt that the meaning of the Sessional Order, authorizing the Sergeant-at-Arms to take persons into custody found in the House, was limited to that part of the House to which his right hon. Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had referred. No doubt that House had the power, the inherent power, upon the notice of any hon. Member, to cause the withdrawal of strangers from any part of the House. This power had not of late years been exercised in any instance to which reasonable objection could be taken, and previous to a division, he (Sir G. Clerk) conceived that it was a power which it was necessary for the House to have; nor did he imagine
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that it was one of which the hon. Member for Weymouth (Mr. Christie) wished to deprive the House, He believed the only occasion when a debate in which great interest was felt was coming on, and the exclusion of strangers was enforced, was by Mr. Charles Yorke on moving for a Committee of Inquiry into the expedition to Walcheren, on the ground that the House was going into a very long investigation, and if the proceedings were reported from day to day, it might cause great prejudice to individuals: but the hon. Member (Mr. Christie) had brought forward a much more important question than that of authorizing the presence of strangers; he wished the House to authorize the publication of their debates, on the ground that be thought it unfair to impose upon individuals so severe a task, as that of reporting the debates of the House contrary to the Orders of the House, a task which he quite agreed with the hon. Member was performed with wonderful accuracy and truth, and with a rapidity that made it quite extraordinary how so much could be done so accurately in the time. The hon. Member said, he wished to put it out of the power of any one to proceed against a newspaper for a libel, on the ground of a report of words spoken in the House, for that the party injured could proceed only against the proprietor of the newspaper, and not against the Member; but he did not sec how the hon. Member proposed to get out of the difficulty. If an action was brought, he apprehended the answer would be, that the report was a faithful report of words spoken in the House of Commons, but how was this to be proved? Was the MembeI to be called before any tribunal to state whether he had made such a statement or not. The hon. Member said, that a reporter of The Times had been brought to the Bar of the House on account of a report which he had given of a speech of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), but there the hon. Member said, he had not used the words. The truth was, the House would do well to recollect the awkward situation in which only three years ago they placed themselves by attempting to enforce the publication of the reports of their Committees, when at last an Act of Parliament was obliged to be passed, to the effect, that no person should be liable to action for libel upon the production of a certificate from the Speaker, or the authorities of the House, that the libel was contained in a report published by the order of the House. Now, if any such

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certificate was to be given in the case of words spoken in the House, the House must make themselves responsible for the truth of the reports, and after that it would be impossible, he thought, that any other publication could be allowed; they must be confined to the authorized debates, which instead of appearing next morning as at present, would not be out for two or three days. The committee on printed papers had recommended that, on committees, members should abstain as much as possible from questions that might be injurious to the feelings of individuals; and now, when there was anything of that nature took place, it was omitted in the report, and petitions containing libellous matter, were printed for the use of Members only; but if the publication of debates was authorized by the House, it would not be possible, he thought, for a Member to shelter himself against an action for libel for words spoken in the House. The consequence would be, to cramp the freedom of debate. Knowing, then, that no practical grievance was inflicted, and that the debates were given fully to the public, he thought there would be no practical advantage in going into committee, and that, on the other hand, if they assented to the proposal they would find themselves involved in a question of very great intricacy, and, instead of adding to the freedom of debate, they would be cramping it, without giving any additional security to shew who now conveyed to the public, reports of what took place in the House.
Dr. Bowringsaid, the real question was, that the House had Orders on the Book which they constantly violated. He thought it was absurd to be consulting on giving additional accommodation to strangers, and yet to maintain an Order on the Book that the Sergeant should take into custody any stranger who appeared in the House.
Mr. Christieappealed to the Speaker to give an interpretation of the Standing Order.
The Speakersaid, that Standing Order was to be interpreted in connexion with the usage and practice of the House. The rule of the House was to exclude strangers. The practice was, that a Member on observing a stranger present, mentions the matter, and the Speaker, without debate, orders his exclusion. But that did not depend on the Sessional Order, but was a right inherent in the House. If not, it
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would not be possible on many occasions at the beginning of a Session to clear the Gallery for a division on the Sessional Order, because the Sessional Order for that purpose was frequently not passed for two or three days after the commencement of the Session. According to his conviction, this Sessional Order related to the part of the House appropriated to Members.
Mr. Christiesaid, he should leave out of his motion all the words relating to authorizing the presence of strangers, and only retain those which referred to the publication of the debates.
The House divided:—Ayes 37; Noes 84: Majority 47.

List of the AYES.

Aldam, W.

Marshall, W.

Baring, rt. hn. F. T.

Marsland, H.

Berkeley, hon. C.

Mitchell, T. A.

Bowes, J.

Morris, D.

Bowring, Dr.

Muntz, G. F.

Brotherton, J

Napier, Sir C.

Crawford, W. S.

Pechell, Capt.

Duncan, G.

Philips, M.

Easthope, Sir J.

Plumridge, Capt.

Forster, M.

Strutt, E.

Gibson, T. M.

Tancred, H. W.

Gill, T.

Thornely, T.

Granger, T. C.

Tufnell, H.

Hawes, B.

Turner, E.

Hume, J.

Wallace, R.

Humphery, Ald.

Wawn, J. T.

Hutt, W.

Williams, W.

Jervis, J.

TELLERS.

Leveson, Lord

Duncombe, T.

Mangles, R. D.

Christie, W. B.

List of the NOES.

Allix, J. P.

Douglas, Sir C. E.

Antrobus, E.

Duke, Sir J.

Arkwright, G.

Egerton, W. T.

Arundel and Surrey, Earl of

Eliot, Lord

Escott, B.

Bagot, hon. W.

Flower, Sir J.

Baillie, Col.

Ffolliott, J.

Baring, hon. W. B.

Forester, hn. G. C. W.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Fox, S. L.

Boldero, H. G.

Gardner, J. D.

Borthwick, P.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Botfield, B.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Bramston, T. W.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Broadley, H.

Goulburn, rt. hn. H.

Bruce, Lord E.

Greene, T.

Buckley, E.

Hamilton, W. J.

Clerk, Sir G.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Clive, Visct.

Hardinge, rt. hn. Sir H.

Colborne, hn. W. N. R.

Henley, J. W.

Corry, rt. hon. H.

Herbert, hon. S.

Cripps, W.

Hodgson, R.

Damer, hon. Col,

Hope, G. W.

Denison, E. B.

Howard, P. H.

Dickinson, F. H.

Jermyn, Earl

601

Knatchbull, rt. hn. Sir E.

Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

Lawson, A.

Peel, J.

Lincoln, Earl of

Pringle, A.

Lockhart, W.

Rashleigh, W.

Lowther, hon. Col.

Repton, G. W. J.

Lygon, hon. Gen.

Rushbrooke, Col.

McGeachy, F. A.

Scott, hon. F.

Mackenzie, W. F.

Shaw, rt. hon. F.

McNeill, D.

Sibthorp, Col.

Manners, Lord C. S.

Somerset, Lord G.

Manners, Lord J.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Masterman, J.

Tennent, J. E.

Maxwell, hon. J. P.

Thesiger, F.

Neville, R.

Trench, Sir F. W.

Nicholl, rt. hon. J.

Wortley, hon. J. S.

Northland, Visct.

Wortley, hon. J. S.

O'Brien, A. S.

Young, J.

Oswald, J. G.

TELLERS.

Packe, C. W.

Fremantle, Sir T.

Pakington, J. S.

Baring, H.

CUSTOM-HOUSE FRAUDS.
Mr. Wallacemoved that the evidence taken in the last Session of Parliament respecting the frauds which have been practised on the Custom-house department in London be laid on the Table.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, he had been desirous of communicating to the House all possible information upon the subject, but he had felt the difficulty of making any satisfactory selection, and the danger of injustice which might be involved in publishing the names of parties at present. He proposed, however, when the papers should be produced to the House, to move that they be referred to a select committee, to determine what portions it would be proper to publish.
Mr. F. T. Baringsaid, undoubtedly there might be good grounds for omitting some portions of the evidence. At the same time he would have been satisfied had the right hon. Baronet come down with that part of the evidence which could be properly produced, with blanks for names where advisable. He wished, however, to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman. The House were aware that for some time grave accusations had been made against the Commissioners of Customs—accusations, not of negligence merely, but of a character so serious, as to render it imperatively necessary, for the sake not less of the public than of the public service, to endeavour to do away with such imputations, under which it was quite impossible that any department of that service could creditably or beneficially proceed. He wished them to be informed at what period it was probable
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that information would be communicated to the House with respect to these serious charges, and the decision of the Treasury as to any inquiry into their truth.
Lord Granville Somersetsaid, the whole subject, including, among a great variety and extent of matte's, the charges alluded to, had been referred to a commission, of which he was a Member; and which had been prosecuting its inquiries with diligence and at a very considerable length. Such was the difficulty and the delicacy of the investigation, that he did not deem it necessary to apologise to the House for the time which had been occupied in preparing the report. He still hoped, however, that in a short time it would be concluded; nor did he doubt that as soon as possible afterwards preparations would be made for laying the result before Parliament.
Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at a quarter to one o'clock.

MINUTES.
Sat first.—Lord Oriel.
BILLS. Public.—1a. Administration of Justice; Ecclesiastical Courts.
3a. and passed:—Teachers of Schools.
Private.—2a. Sang's Naturalization.

SCINDE—VOTE OF THANKS TO THE ARMY.
The Earl of Riponsaid: In rising to move the Thanks of the House to Major-general Sir Charles Napier, and the Officers and Men under his command employed in the operations in Scinde, I will take especial care to abstain from saying anything which may lead to any difference of opinion. It is your Lordships' practice on occasions of this kind to pursue that course, and it seems to me to be recommended by prudence and justice. I may, however, be permitted, before I make the motion, to state to 'our Lordships, as briefly as I can, and in a general way, the grounds upon which I think the conduct of that gallant officer, and the army under his command, are most deserving of your Lordships' gratitude; and I would take the liberty very shortly of detailing to your Lordships the course of those operations which have shed so much lustre on the character of that distinguished man. It appears that in the early part of last year,

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Major-general Sir C. Napier, who was in command of Her Majesty's forces in Scinde, was called upon by the Governor-general to engage in certain negotiations with the Ameers of Scinde, and in the course of those proceedings he received information upon which he thought he was justified in relying (I pass no opinion whatever upon that), but he received information which led him to believe that those princes with whom he was negotiating, were not acting in good faith, but were collecting troops and resorting to means of resistance, from which he inferred that it might become impossible to bring those negotiations to a satisfactory issue without at least having at hand a military force to support his proceedings. Accordingly he felt it to be his duty, under the circumstances I have stated, to move from the immediate position he had taken up on the Indus, at Sukkur, and to march to the town of Khyrpore, in order to cause the dispersion of those forces which the representations on his part to the Ameers had failed in producing. When he arrived there the Ameers and their forces had retired from the town; but he was led to believe, from the information which reached him, that the dispersion of their forces had not taken place, and he therefore felt that a necessity might arise for some further demonstration of force. The Ameers who had retired from Khyrpore appeared to have taken the direction of the Desert, and Sir Charles Napier, feeling the necessity of securing his line of operations, whether he should have to advance towards Hyderabad, or to retire upon Sukkur, if that should be the step to which he should be obliged to have recourse, felt it indispensable to show to the Ameers that in the Desert they were not secure from his operations, and that they could not from thence embarrass his future movements. He accordingly determined to move on to the fort of Emaum Ghur. The probability of a want of supplies in this retreat through the Desert was obvious, and there was great reason to apprehend that there might also be a deficiency of water. Nevertheless, being of a spirit not to be daunted by difficulties, determined to effect that march; but being at the same time a man of great sagacity, prudence, and foresight in his profession, and seeing something mysterious in the proceedings of the Ameers with respect to their forces, and feeling that it was necessary to guard against any consequences that might follow, he placed the main portion of the force under his com-
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mand in an advanced position on the road towards Hyderabad, the capital of Scinde, from whence he might advance in that direction or retire upon Sukkur, or support his detached operation upon Emaum Ghur. These measures he undertook with all that spirit and energy that seemed characteristic of his family. He succeeded in capturing the fort of Emaum Ghur, and effected every object that he had in view by this decisive movement; thus proving to the Ameers that the Desert might be traversed by our troops; whilst at the same time he secured by his movement his left flank, and gave protection to his front and rear; and I believe I am not saying too much when I state that that operation was one of the most brilliant of the kind ever performed. He felt, however, that the state of things rendered it imperative on him to advance still further towards the capital, Hyderabad, which was a difficult operation, and not easy to be effected by the small force under his command, particularly as he had information which satisfied him that the Ameers had collected in considerable force, which might possibly place his advance in sonic jeopardy. However, he advanced to a place called Sukhurunda, at some distance from Hyderabad, where he halted a few days, and in the meantime learnt at length, after the negotiations had been conducted to a point which gave reason to hope for an amicable termination, that on the 15th of February an attack had been made by a large body of Beloochees upon the residence of Major Outram, which was within a short distance of Hyderabad, between that city and the left bank of the Indus. I cannot proceed to enter upon that without calling your Lordships' attention to the circumstances of that attack—not the circumstances that produced it—that is quite another question—as to the conduct of Major Outram, and those gallant men who were posted within that residence, and had to defend it against a most vigorous well-conducted attack by a large body of troops. The force under Major Outram consisted of a single company. The residence was a building surrounded by a wall, but accessible on all sides. The attack was made by 8,000 Beloochees, who were deficient certainly in discipline and military tactics, but not in spirit or courage, and they made a most vigorous attack, supported by cannon. Major Outram had a very small force with which to resist that attack, and unfortunately it happened that he had not

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received a supply of ammunition which he expected; nevertheless, he was not a man to yield; he was well known as a bold and resolute soldier, and Sir C. Napier speaks of his conduct in defence of that position in terms of well merited eulogy, which justly applied not only to him, but to all those who served under him in resisting that attack. Notwithstanding the difficulty under which Major Outram and his little garrison laboured from the want of ammunition, nothing could exceed the cool courage with which they managed the little that was at their disposal; the consequence of which was, that their loss was comparatively trifling, although the enemy came close to them under cover of houses, gardens, and plantations, so as to be able to make an attack on three sides of the building; but they defended it successfully till their ammunition was exhausted, and although they were compelled to abandon the building from their incapacity of maintaining it, they succeeded in effecting their retreat to the river, and their loss was not above ten or a dozen men. The defence of that building was a remarkable proof of what skill and resolution can do in defending a post against very superior numbers, and I believe that history nowhere shows a more remarkable instance of how that work may effectually be done. When Sir C. Napier heard what had taken place, and that Major Outram had been compelled to retire from the residency, he felt a necessity imposed upon him of taking further military steps—he felt that it was incumbent upon him to move forward and attack the enemy in the position which they had occupied. He accordingly advanced with his comparatively trifling force of 2,800 men, but whose discipline and courage he well knew and understood, and knew and understood also how much he could rely upon it. He moved forward to attack them. He found them in a position of great strength, evidently showing that they knew very well how to use the means of defence at their disposal, and that they were not ignorant of the first principles of military strategy and skill in the position they took up, for it was defended in front by a deep ditch or water course, and both flanks were protected by jungle, and on their right flank they had the additional protection given by a village. This most formidable position was defended by twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men, and a force of not less than 10,000 men was collecting in his rear. Sir C.
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Napier had to attack it in front; he could not commence the attack in any other way; the jungle rendered that mode of attack necessary. The moment he saw their position, he also saw, with that acuteness of military eye-sight—if I may use the expression—which was characteristic of him, how the attack was to be conducted. He placed his troops en echellon, and advanced from his right to storm the ditch and breast-works. The enemy received him with stout resistance; they evidently knew how to use the arms they had; but he tells you that their very resistance proved the inferiority of the sword and shield and matchlock to the musket and bayonet; and, after a severe struggle, the enemy was completely routed with considerable loss, and their ammunition, guns, and baggage of every description fell into the conqueror's hands. I will not trouble your Lordships by going any further into the details of this battle, but it was distinguished, on the part of all who were engaged in it, by that coolness, discipline, courage, and energy which have been so frequently displayed, not only by Her Majesty's European troops, but by the native troops of the East India Company, on the well-fought fields of Asia; the success of that glorious action proved what unbounded confidence might be placed in every emergency, on the boldness and devoted valour of those troops. This battle, decisive as it was in its immediate effect, was, however, not so decisive as to cause the dispersion of the whole of the enemy's forces; and that is rather a remarkable circumstance, for it rarely happens in Indian warfare that an army once defeated is able again to bring itself together—a native army I mean, not the native troops in our service; but, generally speaking, a native army, if once defeated, is seldom able to bring itself together to fight a second battle. But in this instance, it happened that one of the Ameers had a body of troops untouched under his command, and he was joined by a number of fugitives who had escaped from the battle of Meeanee; and the Ameer showed by his movements a determination to continue hostilities. Sir Charles Napier, therefore, found it necessary to proceed to the attack of the Ameer of Meerpore; and for that purpose he advanced, two or three weeks after the battle of Meeanee, towards the Ameer's position, near Hyderabad. The Ameer had under his command 20,000 men; the force of Sir C. Napier had been

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increased to 5,000. Had the Ameer's force joined the army that assembled at Meeanee, Sir C. Napier would have bad a force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men opposed to him; but this junction he prevented by the promptitude and decision of his movements. The Ameer's troops were admirably placed. In front there were two nullahs, or wide ditches; of which the rear was defended by ramparts or breastworks. Sir C. Napier, in his despatches, stated that he found it difficult to arrange his plan of attack on this position, because the left flank was not accurately defined. He therefore determined to make his attack on their right, and to make it in the first instance by a portion of his cavalry and artillery, supported by Her Majesty's 22nd Infantry, and coming up in the face of their position, the left of his line appears to have outflanked the right of the Ameer's army; finding which, they proceeded to draw troops from their left, in order to meet the attack which had turned their right. Sir Charles therefore concluded, with his usual acuteness, that their right flank was their weakest point, and that they were defended more thoroughly by artificial means on their left than on their right; and, consequently, he determined to make his great attack on their right flank. He advanced with most perfect order, the troops behaving with the greatest steadiness, not returning the fire till they came within a distance when it was likely to tell most effectually on the enemy. He ordered his cavalry to get round the right flank, which they did by a brilliant and successful manœuvre; and then the enemy being thrown into confusion, he pushed his right flank forward and forced the nullah, and the consequence was the defeat of the enemy with great loss. That is a summary, I fear very imperfectly given—and as I cannot pretend to any knowledge on such subjects, I hope I shall be excused if it is so—of the two actions in which Sir Charles Napier gave such decisive proofs of his bravery and skill. It cannot be said, however, that they were not attended with considerable loss; for although there were but 2,800 of our troops engaged in one, and about 5,000 in another, our total loss was not less than 500 killed and wounded, which shows the desperate resistance of the enemy; and many of those who fell were officers of the greatest distinction, whose loss every one must lament, though they would be ready, if living, to render to them
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the meed of approbation which we shall, I trust, readily give to those who survive them. It is not necessary for me to trouble your Lordships with details of the individual gallantry of the officers. Their services are inscribed by Sir C. Napier in his despatches, and his notice of their services is worth all the eloquence, if I had any, that it would be possible for me to bestow upon them. They require not the fugitive words of praise that could fall from me, for their merits are best set forth in the despatches of Major-general Sir C. Napier, which will form part of the military history of this country. I may, however, say a word or two with respect to the other portions of the army, which will be last mentioned in the vote I am about to propose, and that is the non-commissioned officers and privates. It is needless for me indeed to say anything with reference to that portion of the army which is composed of Her Majesty's European troops. There are some of your Lordships, perhaps, present, who know what they are as soldiers, and can readily believe and understand the spirit with which they fight, and the discipline which they maintain in action. But other portions, namely the native troops belonging to the East India Company, must, I think, upon occasions of this kind, be looked upon in a peculiar light. They are not mercenaries, but voluntary soldiers; they are not Englishmen, though they are British subjects, but they have, in many respects, the hearts of Englishmen. They are as brave as any troops in the world, and are capable of admirable discipline; they are patient of fatigue, they are willing to sacrifice, and do sacrifice, over and over again, their natural habits and their prejudices, to move from their own country to places of which they know nothing, beyond the seas; and show as much courage and spirit, and discipline, when fighting in another climate, as if they were fighting in their own homes, on the continent of India. I say, they have the same qualities that constitute a great army in any part of the world; and they have manifested upon occasions without number, that which is one of the finest qualifications which can distinguish a soldier—namely, unvaried fidelity. But for the fidelity of that noble army we might not unfrequently have been placed in difficulties from which the exertions of our own troops would hardly have relieved us; and your Lordships, if you agree with me, as I am sure you will, in tendering the Thanks of this House to that body of

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men, will be doing but justice to those who have a claim on your gratitude. These men may not know accurately what passes in Europe—they may not accurately know what position your Lordships occupy in the eyes of Europe and the world, or what your functions are in the Government of England; still they will respect and appreciate your thanks; and you may depend upon it when they look at their standards, on which may be inscribed the names of the victories they have achieved, and when they feel on their breasts the medals which Her Majesty and the East India Company have bestowed, they will appreciate with equal gratitude and thanks the honour which your Lordships will confer on them by agreeing to the motion which I am about to propose to your Lordships—
"That the Thanks of this House be given to Major-general Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., for the remarkable skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by him in the recent military operations in Scinde, particularly in the two decisive battles of Meanee and Hyderabad."
My next Resolution is—
"That the Thanks of this House be given to the several Officers of the Army, both European and Native, serving under Major-general Sir Charles Napier, for their unwearied zeal and conspicuous gallantry."
The next Resolution is—
"That this House doth highly approve and acknowledge the brave and meritorious conduct displayed by the Non-commissioned Officers and Private soldiers, both European and Native, engaged in the operations in Scinde; and that this Resolution be signified to them by the commanders of the several corps."
And lastly—
"That the said Resolutions be transmitted by the Lord Chancellor to the Governor-general of India; and that his Lordship be requested to communicate the same to the several Officers referred to therein."
Lord Aucklandsaid: He trusted he should stand excused before their Lordships if he rose for the purpose of seconding the Resolutions of his noble Friend. He could add but little to what had fallen from him, but it would be a gratification to him to be allowed to say that he cordially, and without qualification, concurred in the Vote of Thanks which he had proposed. No man could be more alive than he was to the excellence of which our Indian army under the direction of its British officers had attained. Thus organised, there was no army that possessed more of the
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best qualities of soldiers than that army. He would not dilate upon the encomiums which his noble Friend had passed on the British soldiers and the native troops. He should but idly detain their Lordships if he were to follow his noble Friend in the details which he had given. He would but say, that manifold as had been the instances in the history of India, in which by discipline, and under good direction, a small British force had vanquished numbers infinitely greater than itself, he firmly believed that, not even excepting the battles of Plassy or Assaye, or any of the great contests of India, had the difficulties been greater, nor had they been met, in any one instance, by more conspicuous decision and judgment and energy than by Sir Charles Napier and the troops under his command. [Cheers.] He felt that the gratitude of his country was due to that distinguished officer. He felt that England might well be proud of possessing such an officer. [The Duke of Wellington: "Hear, hear!"] He thought India might well be proud of having brought forward in the service of the country (in succession to many others first distinguished in Indian warfare) such a general. He would not further detain their Lordships. He could only say he entirely concurred with his noble Friend in the view he had taken of this question, and he was glad he had confined his motion entirely to the military part of these operations, and that in a vote which it was most desirable should be unanimous in grace and gratitude, nothing should arise to give cause to any difference of opinion.
The Duke of Wellington: I can assure your Lordships, that it is not my intention, in addressing your Lordships for a few moments, to say anything which may occasion any difference of opinion. And I hope I may congratulate my noble Friend upon having proposed a motion to your Lordships which will be unanimously agreed to. But, my Lords, I cannot listen to such a motion as this, impressed as I am with a strong sense of the importance and the merits of the services which have been brought under your Lordships' attention, without expressing my cordial assent in the expressions of approbation stated by my noble Friends, and in the motion submitted by the noble Earl to your Lordships. My Lords, I must say, that after giving the fullest consideration to these operations, I have never known any instance of an officer who has shown in a higher degree, that he

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possessess all the qualities and qualifications to enable him to conduct great operations. He has maintained the utmost discretion and prudence in the formation of his plans, the utmost activity in all the preparations to ensure his success, and finally the utmost zeal and gallantry and science in carrying them into execution. My Lords, my noble Friend has alluded to Emaun Ghur, which was one of the most glorious feats of which I have ever perused the despatches, and it was completely successful. The march was commenced at the very beginning of the hot season, through the desert, with heavy guns—with heavy artillery, which were transported in a most extraordinary manner, and which enabled him to take possession of the place, and deprive his enemy of that retreat, in case they should ever again attempt to get possession of it. After his return from the operations which he had effected, he collected all the troops which he had immediately at his command, and made all the preparations which he could make for the future events which might occur which might render it necessary for him to engage his enemy. My Lords, it proved that he had collected but few troops; but, however, he had confidence in them and in himself, and they felt confidence in him, and he made a most extraordinary attack, which completely succeeded, and gained a complete victory, having obtained possession of all the enemy's guns, their ammunition, and their baggage. Having gained one victory, he again found himself in a position likely to be attacked by a greatly superior force. He secured for himself not only the fortress of Hyderabad, but also a fortress on the Indus behind him. He then brought up the reinforcements from Sukkur, and he had a stronger army than that with which he fought and won the battle of Meeanee. My Lords, I must do him the justice to say, that the movements to effect a junction with his reinforcements manifested all the discretion and all the abilities of an officer to be entrusted with the highest description of operations. When he was joined by his reinforcements, he immediately advanced on the enemy, and, as had been stated by his noble Friend, he attacked them, and the result was another most brilliant victory. After an action in which he displayed all the qualities of an excellent general officer, and
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showed to the troops under his command all the qualities of the bravest soldier—my Lords, after this victory, he pursued the enemy to his capital of Meerpoore, on the borders of the desert, of which he took possession; and he afterwards entered the desert, with the view of taking possession of another post there, which might have been likely to have afforded an asylum to some enemy thereafter—a post called Omercote. I mention the fact, because in the course of these operations, a circumstance occurred which manifested the confidence which the officers and men hail in their commander, and which showed the reason of his successes. Having determined to make an attack upon Omercote, he found that the river Indus was rising in his rear, and that he might experience a difficulty to keep up a communication with Hyderabad; yet he determined, and actually sent an order, that the operations should be stopped; he countermanded the operations, and directed the troops to fall back upon Meerpoor. At this juncture it was thought necessary to apply to him for further orders; and an officer there, one of his aides-de-camp, rode through the desert, in that hot season of the year, a distance of not less than forty miles, to let him know in what state the operations of the siege were, and to take his fresh orders upon the subject. Having received those orders, which enabled the operations of the siege to be continued, this officer rode back the forty miles, making eighty miles in one day in that climate. The operations of the siege were renewed, and the place was taken. I mention this circumstance, because it shows the remarkable fact of the confidence reposed in Sir C. Napier by those who served under his command, and the zealous desire of those with whom he was connected to carry out his views. My Lords, I cannot state a more simple fact to show the spirit which animated all under his command. I hope that I have said nothing to interrupt the unanimity of your Lordships. [Cheers.] There is only one other fact I will mention, to induce your Lordships to pronounce your approbation of this service. It happens to me to know that Sir Chas. Napier, on the morning of the second battle, received from the Governor-general his approbation of the conduct of the troops at the battle of Meeanee, and the announcement that the rewards for their

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services would follow; and this was, I believe, a great inducement to the exertions of the troops, which were afterwards crowned with such success. With these few remarks, my Lords, I cordially support the resolutions of my noble Friend.
Resolutions agreed to nem con.

RECENT AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.
The Earl of Clarendonsaid, that in rising to put to my noble Friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the questions of which I gave him notice, I must, in the first place, assure him, that I am not influenced by party motives, nor by any desire of causing the slightest embarrassment to the Government; but the events which have recently occurred in Spain, and still more those which are impending, are to my mind of a character too serious to be permitted to pass unobserved, and in silence. I am convinced that they received the anxious attention of my noble Friend, and that the House and the public will be desirous of receiving any information upon them, which he may not think it inconsistent with his public duty to communicate, for Spain must always occupy an important place in the general policy of Europe, and the prosperity, and, above all, the independence of that country must always be deeply interesting to the people of England. In fact, the British Statesman would greatly fail in his duty, who neglected every means in his power to secure the independence of Spain, and to resist all attacks upon it, be they open, or be they insidious, and come from what quarter they may. These are, I know, the principles of my noble Friend, which, upon more than one occasion, I have had the satisfaction of hearing him declare in this House, and I trust he may prove to your Lordships, that by them he has been guided, and that we are in no way responsible for, but on the contrary have done what was possible to avert the deplorable state of anarchy into which Spain has now fallen. A state of things, which must be equally alarming to those who wish well to liberal institutions, or who are anxious to maintain the dignity and security of thrones, for the throne and the constitutions of Spain are now in equal danger; both have been alike degraded, and in fact set aside, and in their place has existed a military despotism of the worst and most ferocious description, which, under a reign of terror, has for months past been rioting in acts of violence and illegality, and have trampled upon the laws, and outraged the
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feelings of the Spanish people. The present state of things cannot last; no nation will long submit to such tyranny as now exists in Spain; a fierce re-action will come, but leading as that must do to a chronic state of civil war, with all its evil consequences and dangerous example, other Governments may think themselves justified in interfering to put a stop to it, an intimation indeed of such a design under certain contingencies has been already given—this, on the other hand, may give rise to serious discussions among the powers of Europe; and it is therefore essential, not only as regards Spain, but the present peace of Europe, as well as the peculiar interests of Great Britain, that tranquillity and regular government should be restored; and if I know any thing of Spain, I can affirm that that can only be effected, through the institutions which the Spanish people have for the last ten years been struggling to obtain, but which are now in the utmost danger of being abolished. I will not go the length of saying, that any interference on the part of this country could have prevented the lamentable state of things which now exists in Spain, but, at the same time, I unhesitatingly affirm, that foreign interference, not the less effectual for being disguised, has caused it, and for this the Spaniards themselves are mainly to blame, for there are among them certain classes who unfortunately do not scruple to accept any assistance from any quarter against their political rivals, however dangerous that assistance may be to the national interests. It is to this readiness to place themselves under the yoke of foreign influence; that many of the disasters which have befallen Spain are to be attributed, and among them the overthrow of the Regency. I will very briefly recapitulate the occurrences which preceded that event, as it is necessary, in order to render the present state of things intelligible. No sooner was General Espartero raised to the highest dignity of the State, and it was seen that his government would be conducted upon principles strictly constitutional and national, than the destruction of his power was resolved upon by those classes of persons to whom I have just alluded, the plots and intrigues for that object, originated and were matured at Paris; they were known to, and not discountenanced by the French Government, the insurrection in the Basque Provinces; in the name of the Ex-Queen Regent, and the attack on the palace, for the purpose of

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carrying off the Queen were known of in Paris long before they occurred in Spain—then came the studied insults offered to the person and authority of the Regent by the French ambassador, M. de Salvandy; these were followed by the revolt at Barcelona, and the reward conferred upon the French consul, M. Lesseps, by return of telegraph, when the mere fact of the revolt, and nothing of the conduct of the consul could be known at Paris. I must also remind your Lordships of the official apology insisted upon by the French Government from that of Spain for having wrongfully accused the consul, or rather for not having accused him rightly, and the obstinate refusal of the French Government to withdraw the consul, although repeatedly and respectfully informed that his residence at Barcelona, after the part he was known to have taken in the insurrection, was most injurious to the authority of the Spanish Government—these facts are notorious, and they establish beyond all doubt the hostility of the French Government to General Espartero; but the enemies of the Regent finding that their objects could not be effected by insurrection or violence, had recourse to parliamentary manœuvres, and by well-directed intrigues in the Cortes, the action of the Government was at length paralysed, and the formation of a Ministry that could command a majority, was rendered impracticable. When the Regent was thus deprived of constitutional power, a fresh revolt was determined upon, the leaders of this then quitted Paris, with the knowledge and sanction of the French Government, and they received every assistance from the French authorities on their journey to the frontier. The Regent's generals were inactive or unskilful; his soldiers were ill-paid, and seduced by the money and the promises offered them by his rival—the moment for striking a decisive blow was lost—reverse ensued, and the cry against the Regent spread like an epidemic over the land, thus without an attempt to found any charge against him; without an accusation against his honour or his devoted attachment to the Sovereign and the institutions of Spain; and without a thought or a care by what individual or what system he should be replaced—never, I believe, in the annals of history, was there a more wicked and objectless Revolution. General Espartero fell, and your Lordships will remember that the news of his overthrow was received here by people of all parties with un-
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mingled regret, but at Paris with marks of the liveliest satisfaction. I am convinced, however, that the French Government, in the course they pursued towards General Espartero, committed a great error—an error which, to my humble judgment, is quite incomprehensible, considering the profound sagacity that directs the policy of France, for the smallest degree of foresight, the smallest amount of knowledge of the Spanish character, and of the state of things in Spain, would have sufficed to show the danger of overthrowing the Regency. I will go even further and affirm, that there was no sovereign or government in Europe, desirous of upholding the monarchical principle, and preventing the degradation of crowned heads, that was not directly interested in the maintenance of General Espartero's power; the furious elements of discord, that his absence has let loose, abundantly prove what must have been the difficulties of his position, and entitle him to the highest credit, to that credit in short, which was so warmly, though not more warmly than justly, bestowed upon him by my noble Friend, and the right hon. Baronet at the head of Her Majesty's Government, for having so long, and in despite of foreign and domestic intrigues, governed the country in peace, and without one single infraction of the constitution or the laws. Most difficult also would have been the position of the Queen, even under the most favourable circumstances, of the country being handed over to her in a state of repose at the age fixed by the law for attaining her majority, but how immeasurably have all her difficulties been increased by her being forced prematurely to ascend the throne amidst bloodshed and civil war? The victim of the selfish band of conspirators into whose hands she has fallen, and already the unconscious instrument of violating the institutions and the laws, as well as the customs and the prejudices of the people, she nominally governs to an extent which her father in all the plenitude of his despotism would hardly have dared to contemplate. Such, however, are the auspices under which the reign of this youthful Sovereign has; yet nothing has occurred which might not easily have been foreseen, and quite as easily have been prevented. I know full well how much it is the practice in Spain unduly to blame foreign governments, and upon what light evidence disasters are directly attributed to their intervention. I know it has bean said and believed in

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Spain as well as here, that agents were sent from France to promote this senseless revolution; that the ample funds which he tinsurrectionists had at their command were supplied by France, and that arms in large quantities were furnished from the French arsenals on the frontier, but I disbelieve these stories—I am convinced that they are without foundation—I am equally convinced, however, that if the French Government had wished well to General Espartero, he would at this moment be Regent of Spain—if the French Government had announced their good-will towards him to the conspirators at Paris—if they had applied in his favour those principles upon which they united in Switzerland against Louis Buonaparte, and declared that all those Spaniards who were receiving hospitality in France should not be permitted to abuse it by conspiring against their own Government and country—if they had called into action but the smallest portion of those enormous powers of police which, when occasion requires, can be so rigorously exercised, rely upon it no revolution would have taken place in Spain. Unfortunately none of this occurred, and the result, if I am not mistaken, is rather embarrassing; the success has been too great; it has far outstripped the expectations or the intentions of those who merely desired the downfall of the Regent, but wished to reflect upon the consequences it might entail; they have seen with alarm the army officered and recruited by the adherents of Don Carlos; the Cortes prorogued without any cause being assigned, the most unpopular laws inflicted upon the country by ordinances, and the constitution as completely set at nought as if it was not the foundation and the strength of the Queen's cause. I say these things must be seen at Paris with alarm; because they cannot last beyond the fleeting popularity of the soldier at whose bidding they have been brought about; reaction must come, and with it worse confusion and greater anarchy, and shocks against which the Spanish throne must not be expected to stand. In the midst of all this disorder, however, brought about in the manner I have attempted to describe, the world is informed from the mouth of the King of the French, that a cordial understanding exists between France and England with respect to Spain, not as to general policy, but specially with respect to Spain. This announcement, however satisfactory it might have been, however much matter for rejoicing it might have afforded a
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twelvemonth since, is at the present moment somewhat ominous. I fear it portends only, that the objects of the one Government havin gbeen more than fully accomplished, the sanction of the other Government has been required and its assistance called in for the purpose of preventing those objects from being hereafter defeated. When General Espartero was Regent—when Spain was tranquil—when there was a prospect of the Queen's ascending the throne at the age prescribed by law, and by the advice of a strong Government, and with the consent of a united Cortes, uninfluenced by foreign dictation, proceeding to select for her consort the prince best suited to the difficulties he would necessarily have to encounter, we heard nothing of this cordial understanding between the two Governments, which seems to have been reserved for times when every thing good has been marred, and every thing mischievous has been achieved. It is upon this point I would wish to ask for information from my noble Friend, if, consistently with his duty, he can afford it; namely, upon what basis this good understanding rests, and what course will henceforward be pursued with regard to Spain under this new and united policy. I heard with the sincerest satisfaction in Her Majesty's Speech, that this cordial understanding was not limited to Spain,—so in the speech of the king of the French,—and I trust my noble Friend may be able to inform their Lordships that its beneficial influence will be extended to all the various transactions in which the two countries are concerned. I am convinced that no intelligence would be more gratifying to the people of England, for they would justly regard it as the best guarantee for maintaining the peace of the world, and I believe it would not be less gratifying to the great majority of the enlightened people of France, notwithstanding the efforts of a portion of their press, and of some public men, to envenom the relations between the two countries for their own selfish purposes, and because they think they can better, and more safely exhibit their patriotism, by injurious attacks upon England, than by directing the reluctant attention of the public to matters of domestic, and therefore of less exciting interest. Whether my noble Friend will give me the information I seek or not, I must be permitted to say, that the understanding now come to between France and England is of the utmost importance, first, because

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it may be the means of saving or destroying exist on the subject, that the individual is the institutions of Spain; and secondly, because it must involve, indeed, it probably relates chiefly to the Marriage of the Queen, and upon that I have no hesitation in affirming, depends the last remaining hope of prosperity for Spain; upon the selection of the Queen's husband depends the possibility of maintaining the internal peace, and establishing regular government. This brings me to the next question which I am desirous of putting to my noble Friend, it is respecting the right claimed by the French Government to place a Prince of the House of Bourbon upon the Spanish throne, and their determination to prevent by force, if necessary, any other than a member of that family being selected by the Spanish nation as the husband of their Queen; for the mission of the French Envoy, M. Pageot to announce this determination to Her Majesty's Government as well as to the courts of Austria and Prussia, is no more a secret than the declaration of M. Guizot to the same effect in the Chamber last year. Now if the French Government had restricted their claim to the exclusion of any individual who might be obnoxious or dangerous to France, neither Spain nor any other country would have had a right to object. A marriage, between the Queen of Spain, for instance, and the Due de Bordeaux or a member of the Buonaparte family, would have been so manifestly obnoxious that they would have been justified in preventing it; but the French Government go further; they have not only said the Queen shall not marry certain individuals, but have declared that out of one family alone—that family too, whose advent in Spain has been productive of small benefit to that unfortunate country—she shall be permitted to select a husband, but upon what right this extraordinary claim is founded or upon what pretence it is sought to defend this open denial to Spain of the character and attributes of an independent nation, I am wholly at a loss to imagine; for it seems to me that beyond that jurisdiction which the powerful may at all times exercise against the feeble, France has no more right to interfere in this matter, her own immediate interests being guarded, than in the marriage of any other sovereign of Europe. The general belief, however, is, that this claim, if not openly recognized, is at least no longer disputed by my noble Friend; indeed, so cordial an understanding is said to
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exist on the subject that the individual is actually agreed upon between the two Governments, whom the Queen of Spain, whether she or the Cortes choose it or not, shall be compelled to accept, and that this individual is the Count Trapani, a brother of the King of Naples, a prince now but sixteen years old, brought up by the Jesuits at Rome, and destined for holy orders. But I must beg their Lordships to remember, that the court of Naples has never ceased to conspire against the cause of liberty in Spain in favour of Don Carlos, whose agents were publicly received at Naples. That the court of Naples was the only one in Europe which formally protested against the restoration by King Ferdinand of the ancient order of Succession, and that so great was the irritation of the King of Naples upon this subject, that in 1840, after the termination of the civil war, he absolutely refused to allow his own sister, Queen Maria Christina to cross his frontier when she was desirous of returning to Naples, and yet it is from a royal family, the most hostile to Spanish liberty, and the cause of the Queen, that the husband of that Queen is to be selected, at the age of sixteen, and fresh from a Jesuit college, is to be called to a position where all the advantages of a liberal education, and the utmost tact and prudence would hardly suffice for overcoming the difficulties by which he must be surrounded. Until I hear it from my noble Friend himself, I will not believe that we have come to a good understanding with France merely for the furtherance of such a design as this—a design, however, which still may, and I trust will be defeated by the Spanish people, by their proper sense of their own dignity, independence, and interests; but should this not be so, should their representatives be so far unmindful of their duty, and so far influenced by fear, or by motives even yet more unworthy, as to make a choice for the consort of their Queen, which will revive all that kingly and priestly despotism by which Spain has for centuries been enslaved, I do at least hope it will be impossible for them hereafter to plead the advice or concurrence of England in a step which must destroy the small remnant of hope still left to their suffering country. If my noble Friend admits, as I am sure he readily will, that we are interested in the wellbeing, and good government of Spain, in the developement of her resources, and above all, in her Independence; then I

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trust he will declare, that he has been no party to a project which will prove an effectual barrier to them all. The questions which I would wish to ask my noble Friend are, whether any new line of policy has, in conjunction with France, been adopted by Her Majesty's Government with reference to Spain, and if so, in what manner it will be brought to bear upon the present state of things in that country; and secondly, whether Her Majesty's Government has recognised the right claimed by France, to insist that the choice of a husband for the Queen shall be restricted to the Princes of the House of Bourbon, and whether, in consequence of such recognition Her Majesty's Government has agreed to recommend that this choice should fall on Count Trapani, a brother of the King of Naples.
The Earl of Aberdeensaid, My noble Friend has introduced his question with observations on the state of Spain, and of our relations with that country, in a manner which would better have justified a motion rather than the question with which he concluded, because it imposes upon me the necessity of making more general observations than may be altogether convenient to the House, or useful to the country in which the noble Earl professes so great an interest. I rejoice that my noble Friend has expressed his satisfaction at the establishment of a good understanding between France and this country, and that even those who have war in their hearts—and there may be such in this country—are still obliged to confess that they concur in that satisfaction. My noble Friend has entered at considerable length into the events which have taken place in Spain in the attempts to establish a constitutional system of government in that country, and he has described the various impediments which have occurred to the success of that establishment. No one knows better than the noble Earl the history of Spanish affairs; and if he cannot, I do not think that any one, looking back to the various revolutions, and revolts, and changes, which have taken place during the last ten years, since the death of Ferdinand, can give any intelligible or consistent account of the motives of any one of them. I know that when these events take place great credit is given to foreign influence. This is plotted in Spain—the other is contrived in London. The noble Lord knows that if the overthrow of the Regent was contrived in Paris; his elevation was said to be con-
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trived in London. The existence of Espartero and of his government was as much maintained to be the effect of English interference as the downfall, according to the noble Earl, was the effect of French intrigue and of the French government. I believe both the one and the other statement to be equally true—or rather to have no truth. I am satisfied that the English Government had nothing to do with the elevation of Espartero any more than the French government had with his overthrow. It is truly preposterous to imagine that this was so effected. I do not say that it was a most senseless and objectless revolution, but to say that it was not national, is to maintain what is contrary to the common observation of mankind. In the course of six weeks there was not a single village in Spain which did not rise in opposition to the Regent. From one part of the country to the other, including his own army, the most devoted of his followers, all were united in their desire to overthrow him, and to expel him from the government. If this were produced by a few thousand francs and a few French intriguers, it was ridiculous to suppose that all this could have been done, although I know that in Spain they are believed to be a numerous party. If it had not been general, it would have been senseless to resist the Regent: but if it were not a national revolution, let me ask how it was, when he had escaped from the troops that pursued him, and found himself safe in Cadiz, with maritime means at his disposal, Spain having thirty or forty strong places along the coast, that not to one could he go, but was obliged to embark and set sail in an English ship? He is a gallant and a brave man; if every party in the country had not abandoned him, so long as he had any hope he would have remained; but he found, whether rightly or wrongly, that the country had decided against him, and he therefore abandoned all his prospects. It is utterly impossible that this could have been effected in the manner which has been suggested. My noble Friend was himself believed by a large party in Spain, to be the author of the revolution of La Granja; and no doubt he will go down in the history of Spain as its author. I have, my Lords, long been of opinion, that we have meddled a great deal too much in the affairs of Spain. The mischief may have been little which my noble Friend did in that affair, but we have been too meddling in the course of affairs in that country. If any-

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thing, we may have too much influence in Spain. I attribute the downfall of Espartero to the supposition, perfectly unfounded, but still believed, that he was elevated under English influence. If there is anything more strongly marked in the determination of the people of Spain, it is their spirit of resistance to foreign influence; and, though they may for a time submit, there is no doubt that they will rise against it, and resist it, and that it will ultimately be completely destroyed. My noble Friend has adverted to the cordial understanding which exists, with respect to Spain, between the English and the French Governments, referred to in the Speech of the King of the French. I can assure him that the cordial understanding has no particular reference to Spain, although in the Speech of the King of the French, Greece and Spain were mentioned as two countries with respect to which the greatest anxiety prevailed, and on which a good understanding was most immediately desirable. This good understanding was not founded upon any specific agreement or alliance, but upon a belief that the essential interests of the two countries are involved, and it depends upon mutual trust in the honour and integrity of the two Governments of England and France. I can have no difficulty in explaining to the noble Earl the basis of that understanding: it rests upon a desire to maintain Spanish independence—upon an anxiety to support the establishments and constitutional system in Spain—upon a wish, by all proper means to check every species of violence and reaction, and to develope the great national resources of that country, and to extend her prosperity and secure her happiness. Those are the objects of our good understanding with France; I know no other, and, what is more, I believe that no other exists. My noble Friend has also alluded to a subject which I think is scarcely fit for parliamentary discussion; I mean the marriage of the Queen of Spain. Upon that question also I can have no difficulty in repeating a declaration I have often made before—it is completely and exclusively a Spanish question and a Spanish interest. No doubt it may happen that the Spanish marriage is such as to engage the attention of the other powers of Europe; indeed, it cannot well take place without being a subject of some solicitude to other states; but it is a matter for the Spanish government and Spanish people to decide. And I can assure the noble Earl that this
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country has entered into no engagement, and has come to no understanding of any description which can interfere with the complete independence of the Spanish government and nation upon the subject. I may entertain an opinion of preference for one prince over another, but I give no opinion respecting the illustrious prince adverted to by my noble Friend. I am not to choose who is a fit husband for the Queen of Spain; but I leave that to the proper authorities in the Spanish nation. Whether the Spanish authorities will prefer a prince of the House of Bourbon or not is entirely for them and not for me to consider. I believe I have now answered both the questions of the noble Earl.
The Earl of Clarendon: Does the French government mean to exclude any prince from the throne of Spain, but one of the House of Bourbon?
The Earl of Aberdeen: I have no reason to think that any recommendation of the kind has been given. The French government may propose whom it thinks proper, but I am no party to anything in the shape of exclusion. It is very likely that the French government may think that the Spanish nation would do well to select a prince of the House of Bourbon. I may be of that opinion too; and a great deal may be said upon the subject. I believe that if the Spanish nation were to vote upon the question, such might be their choice; but I do not enter into a matter which is to be left to the fair choice of the Spanish government. I think that my noble Friend was wrong in what he said of the mission of M. Pageot last year; but it is not for me to enter into that subject: it is not before the House, and it has no practical bearing upon the question which is before it. My persuasion however is, that the noble Earl is mistaken upon the subject of that mission. I think I have now answered my noble Friend's questions, and I hope to his satisfaction, though I do not agree with his description of recent events, or of the nature of those events, yet I entirely concur with him that our greatest endeavour ought to be by every means in our power to secure the independence and the prosperity of Spain. I give him full credit for an absence of all party and personal feeling. I do full justice to the motives by which he is actuated, knowing, as I do, the great interest he has always taken in the affairs of Spain.
The Earl of Clarendon: I am bound in justice to say, that I think the answers of

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the noble Earl entirely satisfactory; and I may be allowed to express my gratification at having been the means of obtaining them. I have heard him before state the principles he has this night avowed, and I rejoice to find that he still entertains them, and is determined to uphold the independence of Spain. It is most important that we should induce that country to do what she can to develope her own resources. I rejoice to learn that there is a mutual good understanding between the Governments of England and France upon these subjects, and above all, that they intend to maintain the constitutional and representative system in Spain. That was most satisfactory. As to the part taken by the French government, I will not enter into that question now. I am ready to admit my noble Friend's version of it, and will not, on the present occasion, adduce the proofs which at the present time I think I could do, as well as give reasons for my belief in the accuracy of what I have advanced. I will not allude to it farther than to say one word on what fell from him regarding the part he has supposed I took in that detestable revolution of La Granja. He intimates, that in fact I participated in it myself; but, if I ant to be handed down, as he says, in Spanish history as a conspirator in that affair, I can only observe, that, like many other statements in the Spanish chronicles, it will be utterly without foundation. I heartily agree with him in what he remarked as to our meddling too much with the affairs of other countries, and I am glad to hear that my noble Friend means to avoid it in future.
Lord Howdenstated, that having been a good deal in France and Spain, he was able to assert that what his noble Friend had mentioned about proofs, which he did not think fit to bring forward, might be attended with injurious consequences. It was one of the worst things that could have been said in reference to the alliance which all must be anxious to preserve. The effect of what had fallen from his noble Friend might not be overcome in two or three years, and might materially counteract what had been so well stated by the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Department.
House adjourned.