Sitting of 13 March 1843

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS ORDERED.—For Ripon in the room of Thomas Pemberton, Esq. Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds.—For Cambridge Borough, in the room of Sir A. C. Grant, Bart. Steward of Poynings.
NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—Charles Newdigate Newdigate, Esq., for Warwick County (Northern Division).—James Matheson, Esq., for Ashburton.
BILLS. Public—l° Mutiny; Marine Mutiny.
2°. Pawnbrokers Trade (Ireland).
Private—1°. Bardney, etc. Drainage; Aberdeen Harbour; St. Helens Waterworks; Eglwysehos, etc. Inclosure; Liverpool Fire Prevention; Glasgow and Three-Mile-House Road; Leeds Gas; Mildenhall Drainage; Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal.
2°. Carmarthen Markets; Glasgow City and Suburban Gas; Grafton Inclosure; Imperial Continental Gas; Cromford and Belper Road; Lady Fleetwood's Naturalization; Samwells name; Sheffield, Ashton-under-Line and Manchester Railway; Brighton and Hove Gas; London and Brighton Railway.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By Mr. Dugdale, Mr. Holmes and Mr. Stuart Wortley, from Birmingham, Salop, Coventry, Weldon Wentnor, Heptonshall, and Northumberland, against the Union of the Sees of St. Asaph and Bangor.—By Colonel Sibthorpe and Mr. Escott, from Portsmouth, Maryport, York, Lincoln, Brecon, Glouces-

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ter, and Lichfield, against the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill, By Sir G. Staunton, from Havant, Bath, Winchester, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, against Dog Carts.—By Sir D. Norreys, and Mr. F. French, from Tybohan, Elphin and Doneraili, for the Repeal of the Irish Poor-law Act—By Mr. S. Crawford, from Felling, Harwich, and Rochdale, for the Total and Immediate Repeal of the Com and Provision Laws.— By Mr. Plumtree, from the Isle of Thanet, Easingwold, Crickhowell and East Ashford, for the Repeal of the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act.—From Artagh, and Pohahan, in favour of the Medical Charities (Ireland) Bill.—From Norwich, against a Part of the American Treaty.—From Wigtown, for Relief to School masters in Scotland.—From Bandon, Brinny, and Desert-more for Inquiry into the working of the New Poor-law. —From John B. Buckstone, for the Repeal of an Act concerning Theatrical Entertainments.—From Coventry, and Abdon, for Church Extension.—From Birmingham, for Provision for Chaplains to Colonial Bishops.

EARTHQUAKE IN THE WEST INDIES.
Mr. Mackinnon,seeing the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies in his place, wished to ask him a question which deeply affected the West Indian interests, and more especially the inhabitants of the island of Antigua. At a large meeting which took place on Saturday last, he was requested to put a question to the noble Lord, in consequence of the very awful calamity which had recently befallen those islands. The question he wished to ask the noble Lord was, whether or not it were the intention of her Majesty's Government to make an advance on a loan to the proprietors of the island of Antigua who had suffered so severely by the late earthquake, and also whether it were the intention of the Government to advance, not as a loan, but as a grant, a sum of money for the purpose of rebuilding the cathedral and all the public buildings of Antigua, which had been levelled to the dust by the late severe visitation?
Lord Stanleysaid, that in answer to the question put to him by the hon. Gentleman, he begged to say that on Thursday last the Government for the first time received information, and that not in a detailed manner, of the dreadful visitation which had come upon the West India colonies. It appeared that the event took place on the 8th of February, and the last accounts which had been received from the West Indies were dated the 10th and 13th of the same month; it must be, therefore quite clear to the House, that the accounts as yet received must be very imperfect as to the extent of the distress and loss occasioned by this calamity. At the same time, he had no reason to believe that the account which his hon. Friend (Mr. Mackinnon) had received of the event was at all exaggerated. By the interpo-
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sition of Providence, the loss of life had been very small, but the House must be prepared to learn that there had been an extremely large amount of damage sustained, both of public and private property. It was satisfactory to know, that throughout the colonies of Antigua, St. Kitt's, Montserrat, and Nevis, from which accounts had been received, the best possible spirit prevailed among all classes of the population, and that in Antigua, where the distress had been most severe and the damage great, all classes were exerting themselves in the most praiseworthy manner, and co-operating, not only for the prevention of riot and disorder, but in providing such temporary remedies as could be applied to a calamity which was peculiarly aggravated, because falling on the machinery of the colony when the crops were about to be manufactured. He felt he ought not to omit this opportunity of adding, that in a despatch he had received from the Governor, Sir C. Fitzroy, and which he had the commands of her Majesty to lay on the Table, testimony was borne highly creditable to the labouring population of the islands, not only with regard to their abstinence from all plunder and riot, but, although material sufferers themselves, all of the most respectable among them had associated together, and bound themselves by a voluntary agreement, notwithstanding the extraordinary demand for labour, not to ask or accept anything above the ordinary average amount of wages in the colony. With regard to the questions which had been asked, he did not know that he could give any definite answer at the present moment. At the same time, he could feel but little doubt that when the details of the calamity should be received in this country it would be his duty to ask the House for some assistance, in the way of loan, in order to enable the colony to sustain the heavy calamity with which it had been visited. Of course, with regard both to the amount and the conditions of that loan it would be premature in him, as it would be impossible now, to make any statement to the House. He would only say, that if any assistance should be asked, it would be not in the shape of a grant but of a loan, to enable the colony to sustain its credit at the present crisis of affairs.

LAW OF NATURALISATION.
Mr. Huttasked the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he should have any objection to appoint a Select Committee to inquire into the state of the law affecting aliens residing in this country?
Sir James Grahamsaid, that with reference to the expediency of such an inquiry, he certainly should have no objection to the appointment of a committee, to be limited to a certain extent. He was not prepared to submit to a Select Committee the constitutional question whether or not it would be expedient to repeal so much of the Act of Settlement as precluded the right of aliens sitting in Parliament or in the Privy Council. Under that limitation he had no objection to submit to a committee the question whether it was expedient to grant the rights of naturalization, by act of Parliament or by letters patent, to be granted by her Majesty, under the responsibility of her Majesty's Privy Council.

COMMERCE WITH SPAIN.
Mr. Hindleyasked whether it were true, that the Portuguese government had offered to allow the introduction of our cotton manufactures at a certain ad valorem duty, provided we admitted their wines at the same ad valorem duty? He also wished to know whether the right hon. Baronet, the First Lord of the treasury, could now give any explanation as to the state of our commercial negotiations with Spain?
Sir R. Peelreplied, that communications had passed between this Government and the Spanish and Portuguese governments, with the view of promoting the in crease of commercial intercourse; but, those communications not having been brought finally to a close, it was not at all consistent with his duty to state the effect of any of the proposals that had been made.

EMIGRATION—BOUNTY NOTES.
Mr. Ewartwished to ask a question of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It had been the custom of some of the colonial governments to issue bounty orders for the encouragement of emigration. These orders had been recently suspended, and he wished to ask whether it was intended, that these orders should be renewed or permanently discontinued?
Lord Stanleywas understood to say,
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that this was a matter more particularly resting with the colonial governments themselves, and that recent experience had led them to doubt, whether they should not introduce some important modifications into the present system. An inquiry had been instituted into the subject, but the result was not yet known.
Mr. Ewarthad understood that some modification of the system was to be introduced.
Lord Stanley; According to the last accounts he understood, that a great difference of opinion existed upon the subject.

BARRACKS AT BOLTON.
Dr. Bowringsaid, before the motion was put for going into committee of supply, he desired, for his own justification, to set himself right with the House and the public generally, with respect to some statement which he made during the debate on the Ordnance estimates. In the discussion on the Bolton Barracks it was stated, that the measure had received the approbation of all parties, and that the Government had, in fact, been requested to station troops and erect barracks in that locality. When the question was entertained, in November, 1841, the right hon. Baronet, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, wrote to the mayor of Bolton a most temperate and appropriate letter upon the subject. The magistrates of Bolton, however, on receiving this communication, called together the principal rate-payers of the town, and resolutions were adopted, which showed that they were decidedly opposed to the erection of barracks. The hot. Member then read the resolutions. The resolutions stated, that the conduct of the inhabitants, under their unexampled privations, had been such as to show, that no military force was necessary; that the rate-payers viewed in the movement an alarming indication of the intention of Government to bring the country under a system of military despotism, having for its object the maintenance of an abuse; and that they were of opinion, that it was not desirable to assist in any arrangements having for their object the making Bolton a military station. He would not intrude any longer upon the House, as he thought he had said enough to show that he was justified in stating what he had done, that public opinion in Bolton was unfriendly to the erection of the barracks.
Mr. Ainsworthwished to make a few remarks in reference to what had fallen from his hon. Friend and Colleague. The meeting to which his hon. Colleague alluded had certainly taken place, but there were only nineteen individuals present, and many of these held extreme opinions. From what took place immediately after the meeting, the House would judge how far it was the opinion of the inhabitants of Bolton that the military should be withdrawn. The mayor of Bolton wrote a letter to Colonel Wells, transmitting him a copy of the resolutions agreed to at the meeting, but stating that he (the mayor), and his brother magistrates, were of opinion, that there was a necessity for the military to remain in Bolton. The mayor and those magistrates were not Tories, but had been appointed by the late Government, and held, many of them, Liberal opinions. The hon. Gentleman read a letter of similar import, addressed to the Secretary of State and Captain Woodward, stating that the shambles had been hired for the use of the military. There was also a subscription among the inhabitants of the borough to provide the expense of that temporary accommodation to the military; and he could acquaint his hon. Colleague, that men of all parties in the borough contributed their mite, and that a sum of 128 l; was received for that accommodation. Last year the borough of Bolton was visited by a lawless mob, who took possession of the town for a whole day, ransacked the provision shops, and turned out the quiet workmen. The mayor exercised a wise discretion in sending for the military, for it would have been impossible to have driven out these disturbers of the public peace without their assistance. A very extraordinary circumstance connected with the meeting to which his hon. Colleague had alluded, was, that one of the individuals who attended that meeting, was one of the first to send for the military when his house was attacked. The communication to which he now alluded, he had received that morning from the town clerk of Bolton, and it fully confirmed what he had stated on Monday last.
Dr. Bowringhad understood his hon. Colleague to say, that he was authorised to express to the Government the concurrence of the borough in the erection of the barracks. He had received a communication from the town clerk, in which he
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stated, that he had never sent any such letter.
Mr. Ainsworthsaid he had also received a communication from the town clerk on the same subject, so that that Gentleman must have forgotten the circumstance. The facts were, that an application was made to the Home Secretary, to allow new bar racks to be built, instead of repairing the old ones. This he refused; but in consequence of the feeling in the borough about retaining the troops, he had no objection to their remaining, provided the authorities would appropriate some money to the repairs of the old barracks.

CHARTIST TRIALS AT LANCASTER.
On the Order of the Day being read, for the House to resolve itself into a committee of Ways and Means,
Mr. Milner Gibsonsaid, he wished to put a question to the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir J. Graham) with respect to certain proceedings which had taken place at the recent Chartist trials at Lancaster. Any one who had read the evidence adduced on those trials must have perceived that numerous attempts were made to drag in the names of parties who had taken an active part in opposition to the Corn-laws, and who had supported the Anti-Corn-law League. Endeavours were made to excite an impression, that these parties were the originators of those disturbances which took place a few months since in the manufacturing districts; but the attempts failed most completely and signally. The attempts to which he referred were of such a remarkable character, that they elicited an observation from the learned judge, who said—
"I have not been able to understand what the introduction, which has been made several times, of the names of parties connected with the Anti-Corn-law League, and of other parties, can have to do with the present question."
A similar feeling was entertained by a great number of persons who were present during the trial; they felt that an attempt was made to inculpate parties who, not being before the court, did not possess the means of refuting the accusation. One of the witnesses who gave evidence of this nature was a person named James Wilcox, who was called for the prosecution by the Attorney-general, and upon his cross-examination by Mr. Feargus O'Connor,

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an attempt was made to draw statements from him.
Mr. B. Escottwished to know whether the hon. Member for Manchester was in order in thus introducing a question arising upon a trial which took place in a distant part of the country?
The Speaker: The hon. Member for Manchester is in order, there being now a question before the House.
Mr. Milner Gibsoncontinued:—The Attorney-general called as a witness for the prosecution a person named James Wilcox, who stated as it appeared to him from a perusal of the trial, some very unimportant facts, but in the cross-examination of this witness by Mr. Feargus O'Connor, an attempt was made to draw from him statements calculated to inculpate the Anti-Corn-law League. This witness stated in the course of his examination, that previously to the trial he had been in correspondence with the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and he (Mr. Gibson), wished to ask that right hon. Gentleman whether he would object to lay on the Table of the House any letlers or correspondence which had passed between himself and Mr. James Wilcox. Although he had no doubt, that all the proceedings connected with the recent trials had been perfectly regular, he must confess he regarded it as extraordinary, that the right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham), who was subpoenaed by Mr. Feargus O'Connor as a witness for the defence, should have been allowed to leave Lancaster on condition that Mr. James Wilcox, a witness for the prosecution, should be called in his stead. He thought it strange that one of the defendants should substitute a witness for the prosecution for a person whom he had subpoenaed in his own defence. He had derived the information which he possessed on this subject from reading the reports of the trial in the newspapers, and if he had misstated any fact he hoped that some hon. Member would correct him. He had no doubt the proceedings had been quite regular; but he wished to know whether the right hon. Baronet would object to the production of the whole correspondence on the subject?
Sir J. Grahamwould endeavour to an- swer the question of the hon. Member as far as the circumstances to which he had referred came within his own knowledge. He had been informed just before he came
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down to the House that the hon. Member for Manchester intended to put a question to him as to his correspondence with a person named Wilcox. He did not remember ever to have heard the name of that person until he was present in the Court-house, at Lancaster, upon a subpoena which he received from one of the defendants, in the recent trial, when the Attorney-general informed him that his presence was no longer necessary, as an arrangement had been made that a person of the name of Wilcox should be called in his place. His hon. and learned Friend (the Attorney-general) would state the circumstances which led to that arrangement. Until the name of James Wilcox was mentioned on that occasion, he (Sir J. Graham) was not aware that he had ever heard of that person, but it was now stated that in the course of the last autumn this individual addressed a letter to him. He (Sir J. Graham) had searched the public records of his office, as well as his private correspondence, and he could discover no trace of the receipt of any such letter, or of any answer having been returned. He could assure the hon. Member that, not only could he find no trace of such correspondence, but that he had not the slightest recollection of the receipt of any letter from a person of the name of Wilcox. At the time of the outbreak he received very numerous communications by letter from the disturbed districts, but he was in the habit of sending all letters bearing upon the transactions to the solicitor who was employed by the Government to institute prosecutions. He had not had an opportunity of communicating with that officer since the hon. Member for Manchester intimated his intention of proposing this question; but he would apply to him, and perhaps he might possess some knowledge of the letter referred to.
The Attorney-generalsaid, as the hon. Member opposite had expressed surprise that a witness for the prosecution should have been accepted by one of the defendants in the place of the right hon. Gentleman, it might be satisfactory for him to state to the House the circumstances under which the arrangement was made. The right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) was subpoenaed by one of the defendants to attend at Lancaster, and he accordingly proceeded there, although his absence from town was attended with great incon-

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venience to the public service. Some communication took place between him (the Attorney-general) and the hon. Member for Sutherlandshire (Mr. D. Dundas), who appeared for one of the prisoners; and he was informed that as the presence of the right hon. Baronet was required in London, it was intended by the defendant to call in his place a person named Wilcox, who, it was supposed, was in attendance as a witness for the prosecution. A communication was made to him (the Attorney-general) that if it was intended to call Wilcox, Mr. Feargus O'Connor was willing that the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) should return to London, as he expected to get from Wilcox all the information he wished to obtain from the right hon. Baronet. His (the Attorney-general's) intention was, from a regard to the interests of the country, to have examined Wilcox, irrespective of any such arrangement as that to which he had alluded. The hon. and learned Member for Sutherlandshire also conceived that the further attendance of the right hon. Baronet would be unnecessary; and he (the Attorney-general), therefore, publicly informed the learned judge of this arrangement. He could not recollect, at this moment, for what precise object Wilcox was called on behalf of the prosecution; but he did remember that his evidence was necessary for the identification of some of the defendants with certain transactions which occurred during the outbreak in Lancashire. Wilcox was examined for the prosecution, and he was then cross-examined by Mr. O'Connor with reference altogether to certain communications made by him to the Home Department. He had objected at the time to this line of examination, stating that although he did not wish to place Mr. O'Connor in a worse position than he would have been in had his right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) been examined, he must put it to the Court whether, if that right hon. Gentleman had been under examination, he could have been called upon to produce the communications to which reference was made; and the learned judge decided that if those communications were made to the right hon. Gentleman in his official capacity, he could not be required to produce them. He could assure the House that, throughout the proceedings, he had objected to all questions which could tend to inculpate
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parties who were not before the Court. Any hon. Member who had read the proceedings attentively, must have observed that he (the Attorney-general) had, while he endeavoured to bring distinctly before the Court the proceedings of the defendants of which he complained, cautiously and religiously prevented, as far as he could, the utterance of any reflection upon absent persons, and the moment an attempt was made to elicit evidence reflecting on absent persons, with regard to whom such evidence would have been a calumny, he interposed all the authority which he possessed in order to confine the investigation to the single judicial purpose for which it was instituted.
Mr. M. Gibsonhad not imputed to the hon. and learned Attorney-general, as the prosecutor in the cases to which he had alluded, any desire to inculpate absent parties. Having read the evidence throughout he was willing to admit that the hon and learned Member did, on many occasions, prevent witnesses from making statements which would have tended to criminate persons who were not present; but he adhered to his former statement, that in the course of the trial attempts were made of so marked a character [cries of "order,"] to drag in the names of absent individuals [renewed shouts of "order"], that the learned judge——
The Speakersaid, the hon. Member must be aware that he could not again address the House on the subject on which he had before spoken.
Mr. T. Duncombethought it right to state that he had received several communications with reference to the trials to which allusion had been made, and he was bound to say that the conduct of the Attorney-general had given universal satisfaction to men of all parties

THE HALIFAX BOARD OF GUARDIANS.
Mr. Ferrandrose to move, as an amendment, for
"A list of the guardians of the Halifax Union who assembled at the Board on Wednesday, the 1st day of March instant, specifying the ex officio guardians from the elected guardians; also a list of the guardians who were not present, specifying the ex officio guardians from the elected guardians; also the name of the Assistant Poor Law Commissioner who attended the board: also a copy of their minutes and proceedings as well as of the resolutions adopted by the board; also a copy of all notices given at any preceding meeting

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of the board relating to any proceeding or resolution adopted by the board of the 1st day of March."
He felt that in bringing forward this motion he owed some apology to the House and to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had, a few days ago, requested the production of certain papers relative to the proceedings of the Halifax Board of Guardians, and if the right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham) had acceded to that request it would not have been necessary for him to adopt his present course. In the discharge of his parliamentary duties he (Mr. Ferrand) had deemed it necessary to allude to the conduct of Mr. Clements, an Assistant-Poor Law Commissioner. He stated that, from information he had received from private sources, and from public papers, he considered that Mr. Clements had conducted himself in an insolent and overbearing manner in attempting to enforce the Poor Law in all its rigour. Mr. Clements, while acting at the Halifax Board of Guardians had thought proper to assist in passing a vote of censure upon his (Mr. Ferrand's) conduct for having alluded to him in the House. He understood that there was reason to believe that that meeting, at which eighteen guardians attended, was not convened by a proper notice issued by the clerk to the whole body of guardians. At that meeting the board of guardians resolved that a strong athletic man should be appointed, at a weekly salary, to act in the capacity of taskmaster, for the purpose of applying a more severe test to the out-door labourers. It would be found that the board of guardians having, with the sanction of Mr. Clements decided upon adoping a more severe test in respect of out-door labour, had also decided upon adopting a more severe test within the workhouse. The question was brought before the board how that test could be most advantageously enforced, and different plans having been proposed, that of a treadwheel was discussed, and how many men it would employ. This treadwheel the board of guardians directed to be erected, and a member of the board undertook to see it erected. He had stated that some time ago, when he last addressed the House on this subject. The right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) stated that it was not so, and that instead of a tread wheel to be applied to a rack machine, there was only to be erected a hand-mill
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for corn. He next day received more information from another person. The right hon. Baronet, however, again said that the mill was only a corn-mill, and that he was told that by the Poor Law Commissioners. The board of guardians of the Halifax Union had passed a resolution reflecting on words used by him in the discharge of his duty to his constituents and to the country—a resolution which had been brought to the board from his own house by one of the ex officio guardians, and this was passed by the board of guardians, Mr. Clements, the Assistant Poor Law Commissioner, assisting at the meeting. The same day an order was passed with the sanction and approbation of Mr. Clements, for excluding the reporters of the public press from the board room during the meetings of the board. But what sort of a corn-mill had been erected, did the House think? Why, none at all; but, instead, a rag machine had been erected, for the purpose of grinding rags obtained from the poor of the towns on the continent, and impregnated with all manner of contagion and filth, and he was told that the stench was so great, and the dust arising from the grinding so oppressing, that they had the greatest difficulty in parts of Yorkshire, where rags of this kind were ground for purposes of fraud by the cloth manufacturers, to get persons to undertake the work. But, in order to make this more of an infliction on the poor pauper, the wheel was to be worked by capstans, which were to be turned by the poor like horses. These capstans were to be worked at not only by the feet, but by the hands and breasts. According to the opinion of a medical gentleman whom he had seen, it was highly injurious to the health to labour in this way, and was likely to end in apoplexy. This was the sort of mill which was about to be erected in the Halifax union workhouse for the employment of the poor there, either with or without the knowledge of the Poor Law Commissioners; if they knew of it, then they had deceived the House in the statement which they had authorized the right hon. Baronet to make in his place; if they, did not know of it, then they had neglected their duty. But he would call the attention of the House to a corn-mill within a stone's throw of the place where they were sitting. In the Lambeth union workhouse a corn-mill had been erected, for the purpose of more severely testing

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the labour of the poor; and he asked the House to decide, that night, whether such things were to be suffered in this country or not. At this corn-mill, in the Lambeth union workhouse, he found it was intended that sixty-four persons were to work at once; sixteen at indoor labour, and forty-eight at outdoor. The mill was worked by one crank, which was so large that every time these poor wretches worked they must bend with their hands to the ground. The mill was under a shed. And what was the object of this contrivance? Why, whenever a poor person came to the workhouse to ask for a loaf of bread, he was to be shown these poor wretches working at the crank under a shed. But another exposure had taken place. In a leading article of the Times newspaper of that day it was stated, that within the last seven years 9,315 persons had been committed to prison in England and Wales for offences against the rules and regulations of union workhouses, and that in the year 1842 no fewer than 2,299 persons had been imprisoned in her Majesty's gaols for breaches of those rules and regulations. Sir J. Graham had insinuated that he had stated in the House what was not true, and the right hon. Baronet called on the House not to place too much confidence in what he said. Now, whatever he might think of the right hon. Baronet's conduct to him, a supporter of her Majesty's Government, as he had been, whenever he conscientiously could be, he had to tell the right hon. Baronet that the question was between the right hon. Baronet and himself which of their statements coincided with truth. If the right hon. Baronet could induce the House to agree to refuse these resolutions, still he (Mr. Ferrand), it must be remembered, was courting every inquiry. He desired nothing more than that the matter should be sifted fully, and that the right hon. Baronet and himself should be placed fairly before the country. If the right hon. Baronet succeeded in refusing the papers, the country would conclude that he was convinced that the production of the papers would show not only so much cruelty, and such ill-treatment of the poor that it would not be expedient to produce them, but also that if the poor did not like to enter an union workhouse, they had nothing left to look forward to but the right hon. Baronet's corn-mill.
Sir J. Grahamhoped the House would
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agree with him that on the present occasion it would not be expedient that he should follow the hon. Member for Knaresborough into any of the new matter that he had adduced. The hon. Member had raised the question for the first time of the Lambeth Union workhouse. He did not intend to follow the hon. Member into that subject. He had had no opportunity of testing the accuracy of the hon. Member's information. Much less did he intend to follow the hon. Member to the leading article of The Times newspaper, or into anything which might have been stated there that morning. It would be much better, in his opinion, to confine himself to the motion before the House. The hon. Member had charged him with saying, that he (Mr. Ferrand) had made an untrue statement to the House. His respect for the House—he had almost said for himself—would have prevented him, he trusted, from doing any such thing; but he did say, that from the zeal of the hon. Member he adopted such exaggerated statements, that without the hon. Gentleman's meaning it, if the House were to affix any credit to those statements they would infallibly be mistaken. The real question upon the present occasion was, not as to the intended erection of a rag-mill in the Halifax Union work house; it was not whether the mill was to be turned by a capstan or any other power; but the House would remember that the statement of the hon. Member was that a treadmill was erected there. [Mr. Ferrand: I said a treadwheel.] He understood it to be a treadmill, according to the hon. Member's statement, and the hon. Gentleman went so far as to say that the workhouses were to be made prisons of; and he, taking the usual acceptance of the term "treadmill," positively denied, as far as he was informed, that any treadmill was to be erected in the workhouse in question. The hon. Gentleman had that evening wandered away to a rag-mill; but this was not much to the purpose, because he did not say that no mill had been erected; he did say that the mill in question was to be worked by hand. He believed that it was to be applied to the grinding of corn. He was mistaken. The mill was not to be applied to grind corn, but rags; with that exception he was satisfied that his first statement to the House was not in the least incorrect. The right hon. Gentleman then

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read a letter from Mr. Clements, in which he stated that the guardians of the Halifax Union had taken steps for the erection of a handmill for the purpose of giving work to the paupers who had no objection to remain in the workhouse. He was glad, the right hon. Gentleman continued, to see the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. C. Wood) in his place, because he (Sir J. Graham had received a letter from a gentleman who appeared to be a member of the Halifax board of guardians, and who referred him to the Member for Halifax for his respectability. The Gentleman's name was Holston, and he said, that having observed it stated that the board of guardians of the Halifax Union proposed to erect a treadwheel in the workhouse, and that Mr. Clements had not prevented it, he could only say that no such thing had taken place, and that, if there had, every member of the board would have scouted it. It was true a rag-mill had been erected. With the exception, therefore, that the mill was intended for grinding rags instead of corn, he appealed to the House whether his original statement were not correct, and whether the hon. Gentleman had not failed in making out his case? In fact, he considered that this motion was the same substantially as that which the hon. Gentleman brought forward the other day, and which the House rejected by so large a majority; and, although, strictly speaking, there might have been some breach of privilege involved in the conduct of the board of guardians of the Halifax Union, he thought it highly inexpedient that they should embark on a voyage of discovery for a breach of the privileges of the House under the auspices of the hon. Member for Knaresborough. He repeated, that, although there might have been some irregularity in the board of guardians entering into the consideration of the speech of a Member of that House, the utmost charge was that Mr. Clements was present at the board during the discussion, though he was no party whatever to the vote; and with respect to the charge that Mr. Clements had shown an insolent demeanor and oppressive conduct at the board, he did think, if such a statement fell from an hon. Member in that House, that should the guardians have noticed the injustice and inaccuracy of the statement, whatever technical error they had committed by naming it, they had not
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morally committed any great offence when they came to a resolution negativing the charge. He hoped the House would come to the same resolution as it did on a former evening. He would be unwilling to meet the motion by a direct negative; but that was not necessary; the House had only to persist in the motion, that the Speaker leave the Chair, and that would be the easiest and safest course to escape the difficulty in which the hon. Member sought to involve them.
Mr. C. Woodrose only to state, that Mr. James Holston was one of the guardians of the Halifax union, upon whose opinion and testimony the utmost reliance could be placed. The board of guardians were unanimously of opinion, that the conduct of Mr. Clements was in no way whatever liable to the imputations made against him. They were the only persons competent to judge of his conduct, and this was their opinion.
Mr. Rosshad stated the other night, that Mr. Clements attended the board in consequence of some sort of complaint; he was in error, as there had not been a complaint against him. It was his duty to attend the board, and when there the resolution was moved, but he was no party to it. When the hon. Member for Knaresborough had first brought forward this matter, he had stated he was convinced, that Mr. Clements would be anxious for every inquiry. He spoke this in his zeal to preserve Mr. Clements' character; but after the right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham) had spoken, he had felt he was in error, and had sacrificed his consistency to his sense of propriety by voting against the motion for inquiry, and he regretted that he had misled some hon. Members into being caught voting with the hon. Member for Knaresborough. Mr. Clements was now in town, and he would only offer to the hon. Member to be the medium of introducing him, and then let them settle the matter.
Mr. R. Yorkedid not find that there had been any positive contradiction given to what the hon. Member for Knaresbo rough had asserted. It seemed there had been a meeting—a packed meeting as he called it, from not having been regularly summoned, of the board of guardians, at which was passed the resolution in question, which the hon. Member said had been brought ready cut and dried from his own house by one of the ex officio guar-

761
dians. Now this looked, he must say, very much as if the resolution had been preconcerted, and if preconcerted, it was not impossible, that it might proceed from personal motives; and that possibility appeared the more striking, when they found that the board of guardians had since refused the reporters of the public press admittance to their proceedings. Consequently, though on the last occasion on which this subject was before the House, he had voted against the hon. Member for Knaresborough, and though it was not his wish to give a wild vote, yet, acting independently, and seeing no inconvenience likely to arise from the production of these papers, he should vote for the amendment of the hon. Member.
Mr. C. Woodwished to say, that he considered the hon. Member for Knaresborough was mistaken as to the resolution.
Mr. B. Escottthought the hon. Member for Knaresborough could answer himself, and overturn his own argument, for as related to the use of the treadwheel, the motion of the hon. Gentleman could not be sustained upon any substantial ground. As to the exclusion of reporters, the board of guardians were authorised to adopt that course by the powers vested in them by Parliament. He could not, therefore, vote for the motion of the hon. Member for Knaresborough, after the substantial ground of the motion was taken away.
Mr. Wallaceconsidered it a matter of great importance, that there should be no concealment in matters relating to the manner in which the poor were treated in the union workhouses. If, as it was calculated, 1,500,000 persons were subjected to the regulations by which the union workhouses were regulated, it was the imperative duty of English Gentlemen to look to the regulations to which they were subjected. He was sorry that the question of privilege should be in any way mixed up with the present motion, and he would, therefore, not address himself to that point, but with respect to the use of a mill—whether the motion was upward or downward, or backward or forward, it did not signify—if labour in that shape was imposed, the matter ought to be inquired into. If it were a mill for grinding rags, or for making what the hon. Member for Knaresborough called last year "the devil's dust," to be used as manure, or for other purposes, nothing could be
762
more unwholesome or destructive to the human frame. The question was of additional importance, inasmuch as it was in contemplation to introduce Poor-laws into Scotland, and it was desirable that the people who were likely to be subject to its operation, should know the manner in which it was intended to employ them. He hoped the noble Lord, the Member for Dorsetshire, who had rendered such service to his country by taking up the questions of factories and mines, would take care to see that the poor people of this country should not be engaged in such an unwholesome employment as grinding rags into dust. With this view of the case, he would support the motion of the hon. Member for Knaresborough.
Mr. John S. Worthyobjected to the motion. If the House wished to obtain information respecting the machinery used for the purposes of labour in the Halifax Union, the proper mode would be to move for any communications on the subject between the Poor-law Commissioners and the board of guardians of Halifax. If such a motion were made, he was sure the right hon. Baronet, at the head of the Home Department, would not object to it.
Mr. Ferrand'sonly object was to let the House and the country know what had taken place. He found, that there was a treadwheel ordered for the Halifax Union, which was to hold from four to forty persons. He did not know what had since occurred, and he would take no steps to bring Mr. Clements to the Bar of the House, if the papers were produced.
Mr. S. Crawfordfelt himself bound to vote for the motion, with a view to obtain information as respected the manner in which the poor were treated in the workhouse; but, in voting for the motion, it was not the wish to go into the privilege question.
Mr. Humewould support the motion of the hon. Member for Knaresborough, on the ground, that when there were any complaints as to abuses, with respect to the labour done in workhouses, no attempt at secrecy should be made by excluding the press. Under such circumstances, inquiry became incumbent, and, therefore, the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) ought not to object to the production of the papers asked for by the hon. Member for Knaresborough.
Sir J. Grahamwould admit, that if abuses were alleged to exist in the prac-

763
tice of any union workhouse, it was fit and proper, that the House should inquire into the subject; and if the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Wortley) wished to move for papers relating to the nature of the wheel used and the work done in the Halifax workhouse, there would be no objection to their production; but the motion of the hon. Member for Knaresborough referred to the production of the resolution of the board of guardians, which he before alleged to be a breach of privilege, and to such a motion he would strenuously object.
Sir R. Peelsaid, that the motion of the hon. Member for Knaresborough pointed to no distinct object. He understood it as a renewal of the question of privilege, and that it was the intention of the hon. Gentleman to enforce the charge against Mr. Clements. Into that question the House, in his opinion, had better not enter. No person had more at heart the privileges of the House than he, but it was because of his regard for them that he would not wish to enforce a debate on them in the present instance. It was very natural if a man's personal character was injured by an erroneous imputation in that House, that he should endeavour to free himself from it, and it would be very hard if he were not at liberty to do so. The House did not enforce its privileges with respect to the publication of the debates, and it was natural if a man were injured by those publications, that he should try and set himself right.
Mr. T. Duncombeunderstood the motion to be, that if the House were put in possession of certain official papers the hon. Member for Knaresborough would exculpate Mr. Clements from any charge of breach of privilege. As the House was about to alter the New Poor-law, it was desirable that it should be put in possession of the character and working of one of the union workhouses, which was looked upon as a pattern one. The hon. Member for Knaresborough only asked for the proceedings and minutes relating to a particular day, and those minutes were refused, on the ground that the motion was mixed up with a question of privilege. These papers had nothing to do with privilege, and it was proper that the House should know what was done by Mr. Clements or by the board under his influence. Why, he should like to
764
know, were copies of the proceedings refused? The resolution did not reflect on Mr. Clements, it merely asked for certain papers, that the House might be put in possession of what occurred on a particular day. They could not legislate fairly on the amendments proposed to be made in the Poor-law if the papers were refused.
Lord J. Russelldid not understand the question in the way in which it appeared to be understsod by the hon. Member for Finsbury, and he would therefore vote the other way. After what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department, he understood that there was no objection to furnish every information respecting the nature of the work done, or the manner of employment in the Halifax Union work house. He could not infer from the course adopted by Government any intention of withholding information either as to that or any other workhouse; but the hon. Member for Knaresborough, amongst other grievances, complained of a breach of privilege on the part of Mr. Clements, an assistant Poor-law commissioner, and grounded the complaint on a resolution adopted by the board of guardians at Halifax. The House did not shut out the reporters from the press, and when it was stated in the papers in the report of a speech that certain things were done by the Poor-law guardians, they came to some resolution to the contrary. He objected then, to that part of the resolution which would bring the House into a contest with the guardians for honestly denying what had been attributed to them. He could not see the use of such contests; but as regarded the other part—namely, the manner in which the union was conducted and the work performed, he thought that every information should be given.
Mr. Gally Knightsaid, he had an account of the matter yesterday from Mr. Clements's own lips, and that Gentleman assured him that he had used no influence with the board of guardians to induce them to pass the resolution, nor had he any hand whatsoever in it. Mr. Clements was present when it passed, but he did not wish it to pass, nor had it his concurrence. Mr. Clements also told him that there was neither a treadmill nor a tread wheel in the union, but there was a hand mill, which had not then been introduced for the first time, but had been

765
there for several years. The labour, as it was by no means severe, and it was found to be the best mode of employing able-bodied paupers, more especially as it was difficult to find labour for them which would not interfere with out-door employment.
Mr. Ferrand obtained leave to withdraw his motion.
Motion withdrawn.
House in committee of Ways and Means,
A vote for 8,000,00 l; payable out of the consolidated fund was agreed to, and the House resumed.

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS BILL.
On the Order of the Day being moved for going into committee on this Bill,
Mr. Liddellasked the right hon. Baronet, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, if he were prepared to give any public assurance, that some provision would be introduced into this bill against the personation of voters? The further consideration of his (Mr. Liddell's) bill stood for Wednesday next; and in the event of the right hon. Baronet being so prepared, he would postpone that bill sine die.
Sir J. Grahamsaid, that since the question was last under discussion, he had given his attention to the subject, and had framed some clauses to prevent the personation of voters. These had been seen by his hon. Friend, who had deemed them satisfactory, and well adapted to effect the purpose which his hon. Friend and the House were desirous of securing. They would be ready for publication to-morrow, and he would move their insertion into the bill on the bringing up of the report.
Mr. Humethought, that the amendments which had been made in the bill only tended to increase and complicate its machinery. They never could have an adequate number of voters, so long as men were liable to be punished for the conscientious exercise of the franchise. This bill would leave the system open to all the complaints which were now urged against it, and which, in his opinion, must continue to be urged against it, until the system of vote by ballot were substituted.
House in Committee.
On the third clause (providing that the clerk of the peace was to issue his precepts
766
with the form of notice, &c, to the overseers of the poor),
Mr. Christiesuggested, that there should be more frequent registrations, in order to prevent the necessity of persons, who had become qualified waiting such a length of time before they could obtain the franchise. If, for instance, a man became qualified on the 1st of August, he could not, under this bill, be put upon the register until the end of October, in the ensuing year, a period of about fifteen months. He thought there ought to be appointed a certain number of registration judges, who would confine themselves to the business of registration; or, in the event of the County Courts Bill being introduced, that the judges under that bill, who would go round the country five or six times a-year, and hold courts in different parts of the country, should be required to add to their county court duties those of registration.
Sir J. Grahamthought it would be better not to discuss points before they arrived at them in the bill. It had been his desire, in the framing of this bill to depart as little as possible from the provisions of the Reform Act, and only to do so where experience had shown that such departure was indispensable and certain to effect some public good. But he totally differed from those Gentlemen who imagined, that registrations more frequent than annual, would effect any public good. He, on the contrary, felt convinced, that a constant recurrence of the turmoil which attended registrations would be the cause of much public evil and inconvenience, and ought to be avoided. It was proposed by the bill brought in by the late Government, that certain officers should be constantly employed throughout the year making circuits in various parts of the kingdom for the purposes of registration; but if this were to be the case, the turmoil would never subside.
Mr. Elphinstonethought it would be more convenient that the precepts should be issued in the first instance to the clerks of the unions than to the overseers of the poor.
Sir J. Grahamcould not agree with the hon. Gentleman. The clerks of the unions did not possess the requisite knowledge for discharging the duty consequent upon the service of the precepts, while overseers, from their great parochial knowledge, could at once secure the most

767
competent persons. The hon. Gentleman's suggestion would, besides, impose a new duty on a party not now conversant with it, whereas it was a duty quite germane to the general duties of an overseer.
Clause agreed to.
On clause 4 being proposed,
Sir E. T. Colebrookebegged to call the attention of the right hon. Baronet to an objection which presented itself on this clause. He alluded to the necessity which was imposed upon voters who changed their residence, even though they retained the same qualification, to re-establish their claim to vote. He asked whether this might not be altered.
Sir J. Grahamthought that no practical difficulty arose upon that part of the clause to which the hon. Baronet alluded.
Clause agreed to.
On clause 5 (overseers to prepare list of claimants and objections),
Mr. T. Duncombesaid, that he thought there was a material point in which this clause was defective. He thought that the overseers should append to the name of every person objected to the cause of such objection. He believed that, in many cases, objections were raised for party purposes merely, and upon no real or sufficient grounds, and that, if such a proposition as that which he made were agreed to, much vexation and expense would be spared.
Sir J. Grahamwhile he concurred in the object of the hon. Member, thought that every means had been taken in this bill against the bringing forward of frivolous objections. He thought, too, that the hon. Member had raised this objection rather prematurely, because it could hardly be said, he thought, that the practices of which the hon. Members complained prevailed with overseers. Their objections were, in the great majority of cases, valid and tenable objections. As the hon. gentleman, however, had raised this point generally with respect to party objections, he begged to refer him to the 45th clause of the bill, whereby power was given to the revising barristers to give costs in the case of frivolous claims or objections. There was also this inconvenience in requiring the specific statement of the ground of every objection—that every possible objection whcih the utmost legal ingenuity could raise would be brought forward.
Mr. T. Duncombefelt that the last observation of the right hon. Baronet would apply to persons making objections merely for the purpose of harassing the voters. The overseers, however, could hardly be supposed to be persons who would make frivolous or vexatious objections. There was no reason, therefore, why they, at all events, should not state the grounds of their objection. The same rule should be adopted in cases of objections by the agents of the parties, for the purpose of bringing them more clearly within the 45th clause.
Mr. Crippsas a revising barrister of ten years' experience, could bear testimony to the carefulness of overseers in avoiding frivolous objections. He believed that to impose upon them this additional duty would be to throw them into great difficulties.
Mr. T. Duncombesaid, he would propose that in the eleventh line, after the word "objected," the words "and with the bona fide ground of objection" be inserted.
The Solicitor-Generalobserved, that it often happened that the overseer was an illiterate man, and they would involve him in all kinds of difficulty by calling upon him to specify the grounds of objection.
Mr. Escottsaid, after what had fallen from the hon. and learned the Solicitor-general, he should not vote for the amendment.
The committee divided Jon the question that the words: proposed by Mr. T. Dun combe be inserted:—Ayes 47; Noes 57: Majority 10.

List of the AYES.

Aldam, W.

Hatton, Capt. V.

Barnard, E. G.

Hay, Sir A. L.

Bernal, R.

Humphery, Mr. Ald.

Bowring, Dr.

Hutt, W.

Brotherton, J.

Langston, J. H.

Burroughes, H. N.

Lawson, A.

Busfeild, W.

Mitchell, T. A.

Butler, hon. Col.

Morris, D.

Cayley, E. S.

Morison, Gen.

Chetwode, Sir J.

Norreys, Sir D, J.

Christie, W. D.

O'Brien, J.

Colbrooke, Sir T. E.

O'Brien, W. S.

Collett, W. R.

O'Conor, Don

Denistoun, J.

Ogle, S. C. H.

Duncan, Visct.

Palmer, G.

Ellis, W.

Scholefield, J.

Elphinstone, H.

Smith, B.

Evans, W.

Strickland, Sir G.

Gibson, T. M.

Strutt, E.

Hall, Sir B.

Tancred, H. W.

769

Thornely, T.

Worsley, Lord

Tufnel, H.

Yorke, H. R.

Vivian, J.H.

TELLERS.

Williams, W.

Hume, J.

Wood, G. W.

Duncombe, T.

List of the NOES.

Acland, T. D.

Hodgson, R.

Arbuthnott, hon. H.

Hope, hon. C.

Arkwright, G.

Hughes, W. B.

Baring, hon. W. B.

Hussey, T.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Irton, S.

Blackstone, W. S.

Jermyn, Earl

Blakemore, R.

Kemble, H.

Boldero, H.G.

Knight, H.G.

Botfield, B.

Lincoln, Earl of

Clive, hon. R. H.

Mackenzie, W. F.

Cripps, W.

Masterman, J.

Darby, G.

Meynell, Capt.

Davies, D. A. S.

Plumptre, J. P.

Dickinson, F.H.

Pollock, Sir F.

Egerton, W. T.

Praed, W. T.

Escott, B.

Richards, R.

Fitzroy, Capt.

Round, J.

Fitzroy, hon. H.

Rous, hon. Capt.

Follett, Sir W. W.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Forbes, W.

Sibthorpe, Col.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Tennent, J. E.

Gore, W. O.

Tollemache, J.

Gore, W. R. O.

Trench, Sir F.

Goulburn, rt. hn. H.

Wilbraham, hon. R.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.

Wood, Col. T.

Hampden, R.

Young, J.

Hardy, J.

TELLERS.

Henley, J. W.

Fremantle, Sir T.

Hepburn, Sir T. B.

Pringle, A.

Clause to stand part of the bill.
On clause 7, any person on the list of voters may object to any other person named in the list or not entitled to be on it.
Mr. Tufnellobjected to that part of the clause which made it sufficient for notices of objection to be sent by post, and moved, as an amendment, that in every case where an objection was made, the overseers should be bound to see that the notice was actually served upon the party objected to.
Mr. Henleysuggested that the latter part of the clause, which enacted that notices sent by post should be sufficient, should be omitted altogether, and the matter be left to be settled in the interpretation clause.
Sir J. Grahamsaid, it was intended that a personal notice should be served on the tenant in every practical case.
The Attorney-Generalsaid, that the serving of notices by post, on the most important matters, was considered sufficient in courts of law, and he thought it
770
would be found to answer every purpose in reference to the service of notices.
The committee divided on the question that the words proposed by Mr. Tufnel inserted: —Ayes 38; Noes 91:—Majority 53.

List of the AYES.

Aldam, W.

James, W.

Barnard, E. G.

Mitchell, T. A.

Bernal, R.

Morris, D.

Bowring, Dr.

Norreys, Sir D. J.

Brotherton, J.

Ogle, S. C. H.

Busfeild, W.

Parker, J.

Cayley, E. S.

Protheroe, E.

Christie, W. D.

Scholefield, J.

Colbrooke, Sir T. E.

Stuart, W. V.

Collett, W. R.

Strickland, Sir G.

Crawford, W.

Strutt, E.

Duncan, Visct.

Tancred, H. W.

Elphinstone, H.

Thornely, T.

Evans, W.

Villiers, hon. C.

Forster, M.

Walker R.

Gibson, T. M.

Williams, W.

Hall, Sir B.

Yorke, H. R.

Hatton, Capt. V.

Hay, Sir A. L.

TELLERS.

Hindley, C.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Hume, J.

Tufnel, H.

List of the NOES.

Acland, T. D.

Goulburn, rt. hon. H

Ainsworth, P.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir

Arbuthnott, hon. H.

Greenall, P.

Arkwright, G.

Grogan, E.

Baring, hon. W. B.

Hale, R. B.

Baring, rt. hn. F. T.

Halford, H.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Hampden, R.

Blakemore, R.

Hardinge, rt. hn. Sir H

Boldero, H. G.

Hardy, J.

Botfield, B.

Henley, J. W.

Broadley, H.

Hepburne, Sir T. B

Bruce, Lord E.

Hodgson, R.

Burroughes, H. N.

Holmes, hon. W. A'C.

Cavendish, hon. G. H.

Hope, hon. C.

Chetwode, Sir J.

Hope, G.W.

Clive, hon. R. H.

Hornby, J.

Compton, H. C.

Hughes, W. B.

Cripps, W.

Hussey, T.

Darby, G.

Hutt, W.

Davies, D. A. S.

Irton, S.

Denison, E. B.

Jermyn, Earl

Dugdale, W. S.

Kemble, H.

Egerton, W. T.

Knight, H. G.

Egerton, Sir P.

Langston, J. H.

Escott, B.

Lawson, A.

Ferrand, W. B.

Lincoln, Earl of

Fitzmaurice. hon. W.

Mackenzie, W. F.

Fitzroy, Capt.

Martin, C. W.

Fitzroy, hon. H.

Morgan, O.

Flower, Sir J.

Newdigate, C. N.

Follett, Sir W. W.

Newry, Visct.

Forbes, W.

Nicholl, rt. hn. J.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Northland, Visct.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Palmer, G.

Gore, W. O.

Peel, rt. hn. Sir R.

771

Peel, J.

Seymour, Lord

Plumptre, J. P.

Sibthorp, Col.

Pollhill, F.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Pollock, Sir F.

Tollemache, J.

Praed, W. T.

Trench, Sir F. W.

Pringle, A.

Wilbraham, hon. R. B.

Pusey, P.

Wood, Col. T.

Richards, R.

Wood, G. W.

Rose, rt. hn. Sir G.

Young, J.

Round, J.

TELLERS.

Rous, hon. Capt.

Fremantle, Sir T,

Rushbrooke, Col.

Baring, H.

Clause agreed to.
The clause, with verbal amendments, was agreed to.
On clause 11, the overseers to give public notice as to the necessity of the payment of rates and taxes before the 20th day of June.
Mr. Elphinstoneobjected to the rate-paying clauses altogether, of which this was a part. They caused a great deal of expense to the candidates, and were a great source of bribery. In the city of Westminster the expense, he believed, of paying the rates of persons unable to pay them, was not less than 600 l. Requiring rates did not, as was supposed, ensure a more respectable class of voters, but gave rise to a great deal of bribery, in order to secure the votes of the smaller voters. He should propose that the clause be omitted.
Mr. Fitzroythought, that the period of twelve calendar months for which a man was required to have paid all his rales was too long. It involved a virtual disfranchisement for fifteen months, as the rates were never immediately paid.
Sir James Grahamexplained, that the words "twelve calendar months," in the clause, had been introduced in order to settle a doubt which had been raised by the revising barristers. Some of them had required proofs that the rates had been all paid up for a longer period than twelve months, for all the time, in fact, that a man had been liable for the rates, and this part of the clause was, in fact, a relaxation of what they had interpreted the law to be. With respect to the observation of the hon. Member for Lewes (Mr. Elphinstone), he must observe, that the house-tax having been abolished, a considerable relaxation of the principle of the Reform Bill had already taken place, and this clause, as he had explained, was a still further relaxation of the law, as interpreted by the revising barristers. He must remind the House, as he had before stated, that when the Reform Bill was
772
passed, the authors of that bill would have proposed a higher rate of qualification than 10 l; were it not that the franchise they did propose was accompanied by the restriction of paying rates. They thought that the payment of rates was a test of the respectability and solvency of the parties, and had that condition been refused, the authors of the Reform Bill would not have been satisfied with a franchise so low as 10 l. In practice, however, a considerable relaxation of that restriction had already taken place; and, as he was disposed to adhere to the principles of the Reform Bill, he could not for one moment admit the proposition of the hon. Member, and would divide the committee against him.
Mr. Brothertonwould support the hon. Member for Lewes, because the rate-paying clauses narrowed the franchise and promoted bribery. It was generally understood, when the Reform Bill was passed, that it was intended to enfranchise all the owners and occupiers of premises of 10 l; value. But it was found in practice that the Reform Bill did not enfranchise all the 10 l. householders, and the disfranchisement was caused by the rate-paying clauses. In his own borough the number of persons who at any time voted was very much below the number of persons who occupied 10 l. premises. On these grounds he should vote against the clause.
Mr. Humeobjected, when the Reform Bill was under discussion, to the rate-paying clauses. He had then stated, from the experience of Westminster, that those clauses would cause a great deal of bribery, and what he had foretold had come to pass. The payment of rates had led to a great deal of bribery. They had tended also to narrow the franchise, as he had objected to them when the bill was under discussion. At present there was not 1,000,000 of voters, though there were 5,000,000 of full grown males who ought to have the franchise. At present five out of six of the full grown males, who bore all the burdens of the state—who paid the taxes, and were called on to perform all the duties of subjects to the crown—were denied the franchise. He thought every male of twenty-one years of age should have a vote; but those who were not prepared to go so far as he went, should at least be ready to remove this restriction. If they withdrew the tax-paying clauses they would both lessen bribery and practically

773
extend the franchise. He was reluctant to oppose this clause, as it was an amelioration of the present law; but if there were no better mode of getting rid of the rate-paying clauses he would oppose it. At the present time, when distress was disfranchising the people, and when great dissatisfaction existed amongst them on account of being disfranchised, he thought it would be proper to abolish the rate-paying clauses.
Mr. Escottdid not find it his duty to defend the principles of the Reform Bill, but he must remind the House that to insist on the payment of rates was not an innovation introduced by the measure. Under the old franchise the scot and lot voters were obliged to pay the rates. It had, however, been slated by the right hon. Baronet, that a higher rate of qualification would have been selected had the payment of rates not been adopted. If therefore, they were to abolish the rate-paying clauses, they must raise the qualification. He wished to see both sides keep to their bargain.
Mr. Humehad never agreed to rate-paying clauses, and, therefore, he was no party to any bargain.
Mr. Ewartsaid, the hon. Member for Lewes (Mr. Elphinstone) had shown that these clauses narrowed the franchise and promoted bribery. Those two objections, pointing out the moral evils caused by these clauses, had been left entirely unanswered. Was it worth while to retain such clauses, on the supposition that they insured the respectability of the voters? He thought it was not, and he should support the hon. Member for Lewes.
The Committee divided on the question that the clause stand part of the bill:— Ayes 118; Noes 58; Majority 60.

List of the AYES.

Acland, T. D.

Compton, H. C.

Arkwright, G.

Corry, rt. hon. H.

Baring, hon. W.B.

Cripps, W.

Baring, rt. hon. F. T.

Darby, G.

Beresford, M.

Davies, D. A. S.

Blakemore, R.

Denison, E. B.

Boldero, H. G.

Dickinson, F. H.

Botfield, B.

Douglas, J. D. S.

Broadley, H.

Dowdeswell, W.

Broadwood, H.

Dugdale, W. S.

Bruce, Lord E.

Duncombe, hon, O.

Burroughes, H. N.

Eastnor, Visct.

Chetwode, Sir J.

Egerton, W. T.

Christopher, R. A.

Egerton, Sir P.

Chute, W. L. W.

Escott, B.

Clive, hon. R. H.

Farnham, E. B.

Collett, W. R.

Ferrand, W. B.

774

Fitzmaurice, hon. W.

Martin, C.W.

Fitzroy, Capt.

Marton, G.

Fitzroy, hon. H.

Master, T. W. C.

Flower, Sir J.

Masterman, J.

Follett, Sir W. W.

Maunsell, T. P.

Forbes, W.

Mildmay, H. St. J.

Fox, S. L.

Miles, P. W.S.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Morgan, O.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Newdigate, C. N.

Gordon, hon. Capt.

Newry, Visct.

Gore, M.

Nicholl, rt. hon. J.

Gore, W.O.

Northland, Visct.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.

Pakington, J. S.

Greenall, P.

Palmer, G.

Grey, right hon. Sir G.

Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.

Grogan, E.

Peel, J.

Hale, R. B.

Pennant, hon. Col.

Halford, H.

Philips, G.R.

Hampden, R

Plumptre, J. P.

Hardinge, rt. hn. Sir H

Polhill, F.

Hardy, J.

Pollock, Sir F.

Henley, J. W.

Praed, W. T.

Hepburn, Sir T. B.

Pringle, A.

Hodgson, R

Pusey, P.

Holmes, hon. W. A.

Richards, It.

Hope, hon. C.

Round, J.

Hope, G. W.

Rous, hon. Capt.

Hornby, J.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Hughes, W. B.

Seymour, Lord

Hussey, T.

Sibthorp, Col.

Irton, S.

Smollett, A.

Jermyn, Earl

Somerset, Lord G.

Johnstone, H.

Sutton, hon. H. M.

Jolliffe, Sir W.G.H.

Tollemache, J.

Kemble, H

Trench, Sir F. W.

Knight, H. G.

Turnor, C.

Lawson, A.

Welby, G. E.

Lemon, Sir C.

Wilbraham, hn. R. B.

Lincoln, Earl of

Wood, Col. T.

Lockhart, W.

Young, J.

Lygon, hon. Gen.

Mackenzie, W. F.

TELLERS.

Mackinnon, W.A.

Baring, H.

Mahon, Visct.

Fremantle, Sir T.

List of the NOES.

Ainsworth, P.

Gibson, T. M.

Aldam, W.

Hall, Sir B.

Bannerman, A.

Hastie, A.

Barnard, E. G.

Hatton, Capt. V.

Bernal, R.

Hay, Sir A. L.

Blewitt, R J.

Heathcoat, J.

Bowring, Dr.

Hindley, C.

Brotherton, J.

Hume, J.

Busfeild, W.

Humphery, Ald.

Cavendish, hon. G. H

Hutt, W.

Cayley, E. S.

James, W.

Christie, W. D.

Johnston, A.

Colborne, hn. W. N. R

Langston, J.H

Colebrooke, Sir T. E.

Mitchell, T. A.

Crawford, W.S.

Morris, D.

Dalrymple, Capt.

Norreys, Sir D. J.

Duncan, Visct.

O'Brien, W. S.

Duncan, G.

Ogle, S. C. H.

Ellis, W.

Parker, J.

Evans, W.

Philips, M.

Forster, M.

Plumridge, Capt.

775

Scholefield, J.

Wakley, T.

Stansfield, W. R. C.

Walker, R

Stuart, W. V.

Williams, W.

Stock, Mr. Serj.

Wilshere, W.

Strickland, Sir G.

Winnington, Sir T. E.

Strutt, E.

Yorke, H. R.

Tancred, H. W.

Thornely, T.

TELLERS.

Tufnell, H.

Elphinstone, H.

Villiers, hon. C.

Ewart, W.

Clause to stand part of the bill.
On clause 45, which empowers revising barristers to grant costs, to the amount of 20 s., against frivolous claimants or objectors, being put,
Mr. Charles Woodthought it of too much importance to allow it to pass without remark. In its general principle he agreed. It was as objectionable that bad votes should be retained on the register, as that good votes should be struck off; but Gentlemen practically versed with the subject had led him to believe that the practice of revising barristers being allowed to award costs, would throw very serious difficulties in the way of making up correct registers. It was to the probable practical effects, not the principle of the clause, that he was opposed. He thought that if those who lodged an objection should be compelled to deposit some such sum as 5s. that the precaution would be quite sufficient for the prevention of frivolous objections.
Colonel Sibthorpthought that, instead of no costs being permitted, much larger sums should be awarded as such. He would move, as an amendment, that the utmost amount of costs to be allowed should be 10 l; instead of 20 s.
Mr. Christopherbelieved, from communications which he had had with the revising barristers, that if they had a power of awarding costs, many frivolous cases would never have been entered into. He would move, as an amendment, that 5l; instead of 20 s., be the limit of costs, a proposition to which he hoped that the Committee would agree.
Mr. Charles Woodstated that he was principally opposed to costs being awarded against claimants. He would move that the words "claim or," in the clause be omitted, with the view of limiting the power of revising barristers in granting costs in cases of objection.
Sir James Grahamsaid, that he was in favour of granting costs against both frivolous claimants and objectors. The registration commissioners had come to the
776
conclusion, after a long investigation, that costs should be so allowed by the revising barrister. He quite objected to the motion of the hon. Member for Halifax, and did not see the justice of his distinction between frivolous claimants and objectors of the same class.
Mr. Charles Woodwithdrew his motion.
Colonel Sibthorpalso withdrew his motion, but hoped that the Government would consider its principle.
Sir James Grahamsaid, with respect to the matter before the House, that when a bill of this nature was first brought in by the late Government, costs were proposed to be allowed to the extent of 10 l., but within two years the amount was reduced to 10 s., and, of the two propositions, he certainly liked the latter best. He thought that the power of awarding costs to the amount of 10 l; would prove a serious bar to the claims of many persons to be registered; and that, upon the whole, costs not exceeding 20 s. would be sufficient to answer the purpose they were designed to serve.
Mr. Turnerwould divide the Commit tee against the proposition with respect to costs. He thought that a greater sum than 20 s. should be permitted to be awarded.
Mr. Brothertonthought that 20 s. were sufficient.
Mr. Christopherwould divide the Committee upon his proposition of substituting 5l; for 20 s. in the clause.
The Committee divided—the question being put as follows, Forty-fifth Clause (Power to Barrister to give costs in certain cases to parties claiming or objecting), p. 19, 1. 14:—Provided that the sum so or dered to be paid by way of costs shall not in any case exceed the sum of:—
Proposed to fill the blank with "twenty shillings;" afterwards proposed to fill the blank with "five pounds;" subsequently, proposed to fill the blank with "three pounds:"—Question put, "That the blank be filled with 'twentv shillings:'"—Ayes 154; Noes 34; Majority 120.

List of the AYES.

Acland, T. D.

Bateson, R.

Adare, Visct.

Beckett, W.

Aldam, W.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Antrobus, E.

Bernard, Visct.

Archdall, Capt.

Blake, Sir V.

Baring, hon. W. B.

Boldero, H. G.

Baring, rt. hon. F. T.

Botfield, B.

777

Bramston, T. W.

Hutt, W.

Brotherton, J.

Jermyn, Earl

Bruce, Lord E.

Johnstone, Sir J.

Buller, Sir J. Y.

Langston, J. H

Busfeild, W.

Lemon, Sir C.

Campbell, Sir H.

Lincoln, Earl of

Cavendish, hon. G.H.

Lockhart, W.

Childers, J. W.

Lygon, hn. Gen.

Cholmondeley, hn. H

Mackenzie, W. F.

Chute, W, L. W.

McGeachy, F. A.

Clay, Sir W.

Manners, Lord C. S.

Clive, E. B.

Marjoribanks, S.

Corry, rt. hon. H.

Martin, C. W.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Master, T. W. C

Crawford, W. S.

Masterman, J.

Dalrymple, Capt.

Maxwell, hon. J. P.

Damer, hon. Col.

Meynell, Capt.

Darby, G.

Mildmay, H. St. J.

Denison. E. B.

Miles, T. W. S.

Dickinson. F.H

Mitchell, T. A.

Disraeli, B.

Morgan, O.

Douglas, Sir C. E.

Morris, D.

Duke, Sir J.

Napier, Sir C.

Duncan, Visct.

Newdigate, C. N.

Duncombe, hn. A.

Nicholl, rt. hn. J.

Duncombe, hn. O.

Norreys, Lord

Dundas, Admiral

Norreys, Sir D. J.

Eastnor, Visct.

Northland, Visct.

Egerton, W. T.

O'Brien, W. S.

Eliot, Lord

Patten, J. W.

Elphinstone, H.

Peel, rt. hn. Sir R.

Escott, B.

Peel, J.

Estcourt, T. G. B.

Pennant, hn. Col.

Evans, W.

Philips, G. It.

Farnham, E. B.

Philips, M.

Fitzmaurice, hn. W.

Plumptre, J. P.

Flower, Sir J.

Pollock, Sir F.

Follett, Sir W. W.

Ponsonby, hn. J. G.

Forster, M.

Pringle, A.

Fuller, A. E.

Protheroe, E.

Gaskell, J. Milnes

Repton, G. W. J.

Gill, T.

Ricardo, J. L.

Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.

Rose rt. hn. Sir G.

Gordon, hn. Capt.

Round, J.

Gore, M.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Goulboum, rt. hn. H.

Russell, Lord J.

Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.

Seymour, Lord

Grey, rt. hn. Sir G.

Smythe, hn. G.

Grogan, E.

Somerset, Lord G.

Grosvenor, Lord R.

Stanley, Lord

Hall, Sir B.

Stansfield, W. R. C.

Hamilton, W. J.

Stanton, W. H.

Hamilton, Lord C.

Strutt, E.

Hardinge, rt. hn. Sir H.

Sutton, hn. H. M.

Hardy, J.

Taylor, T. E.

Hastie, A.

Tennent, J. E.

Heathcote, G. J.

Thornley, T.

Henley, J. W.

Tollemache, J.

Herbert hn. S.

Towneley, J.

Hodgson, R

Trench, Sir F. W.

Hollond, R.

Tufnell, H.

Holmes, hn. W. A'C.

Wakley, T.

Hope, A.

Wallace, R

Hope, G. W.

Walsh, Sir J. B.

Horsman, E.

Wellesley, Lord C.

Howard, hn. C. W. G.

Wilbraham, hn. R. B.

Hughes, W. B.

Wilshere, W.

778

Wood, C.

Young, J.

Wood, Col. T.

TELLERS.

Wood, G. W.

Fremantle, Sir T.

Wortley, hn. J. S.

Baring, H.

List of the NOES.

Acton, Col.

Hill, Lord M.

Ark wright, G.

Hornby, J.

Blackstone, W. S.

Irton, S.

Broadley, H

Mainwaring, T.

Broad wood, H

Manners, Lord J,

Chetwode, Sir J.

Mundy, E. M.

Christie, W. D.

Neeld, J.

Collett, W. R

Neville, Ralph

Compton, H. C,

Newry, Visct.

Cripps, W.

Ogle, S. C. H

Davies, D. A. S.

Packe, C. W.

Duncombe, T.

Plumridge, Capt.

Ebrington, Visct.

Ross, D. R

Ferrand, W. B.

Smollett, A.

Fitzroy, hn. H.

Turner, E.

Forbes, W.

Fox, C. R.

TELLERS.

Glynne, Sir S. R.

Christopher, R. A.

Gore, W. R. O.

Sibthorpe, Col.

Clauses up to 48 agreed to.
House resumed.
Committee to sit again.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Lord John Russell Lord John Russell moved for leave to bring in a bill for dissolving certain corporations and amending others. The object was to include certain corporations that had been omitted from the Municipal Bill. He intended to dissolve those corporations, and to place the funds in the hands of the overseers of the poor for general purposes. He had some special clauses to propose with regard to Queenborough, but he should state the provisions fully on the second reading.—Leave given.
The House adjourned at a quarter to one.

MINUTES.
BILLS. Public.—1a. Punishment of Death.
3a. and passed:—Justices of Peace (Ireland).
Private,—1a. Oxnams Estate.
Reported.—Karl of Leicester's Estate; Caswalls Disability Removal.
PETITIONS PRESENTED. By the Bishop of Bangor, Here ford, and Winchester, from Winchester, Salop, Hawkes bury, Llanwellnwyfo, Aberffraw, Llangenynin, and Nevern, against the Union of the Sees of St. Asaph and Bangor; and from the Deanery of South West Stoke, and St. Bees (Cumberland), for Founding a Bishopric of Manchester.— From Chetton, Glazeley, and Deuxhill, for Church Extension.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE FORCES EMPLOYED IN CHINA.
The Lord Chancellorinformed the House that having transmitted to Sir Gordon Bremer the resolution conveying their Lordships' thanks to the officers and men who had served in the Chinese expedition, he had received from Sir Gordon Bremer the following reply:—
"The Priory, Compton, Plymouth,
"March 9, 1843.
"My Lord—I am honoured by your Lordship's letter of the 25th of February, transmitting to me the resolution of the House of Lords of the 14th ult., respecting the late naval and military operations on the coast of China.
"I request that your Lordship will be pleased to convey to the House of Lords the expression of my deepest gratitude and respect for the great and valued honour conferred on me by the testimony of approbation with which their Lordships have marked my humble service.
"With feelings of the greatest gratification I shall immediately obey the commands of the House of Lords, by transmitting to the officers who served under me the resolutions by which their Lordships confer on them the high and distinguished honour of their approbation.
"With sentiments of the highest respect,
"I have the honour to subscribe myself,
"My Lord,
"Your Lordship's most obedient and humble" Servant,
"J. J. GORDON BREMER
"Late Commodore and Commander-in-Chief, of H. M. Ships in China. "
"The right hon. the Lord High Chancellor."
On the motion of the Duke of Welling ton, Sir Gordon Bremer's reply was ordered to be entered upon the minutes.

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
Lord Camp- bellgave notice that on Monday, the 20th of March, he should ask their Lordships to agree to certain resolutions respecting the disputes that at present agitated the Church of Scotland, with the view either of preventing the schism that had unhappily occurred, or of rendering it less calamitous than it might otherwise be. He refrained at present from making any observation upon the subject; but their Lordships need hardly be told that it was one of vital importance to the peace and well being of Scotland. On an early day he would lay on the Table the resolutions which he should feel it his duty to move.
Lord Broughamthought it highly inexpedient that their Lordships should enter into any discussion upon this subject prior to the determination of the Stewarton case, which was now pending.
Lord Campbellcertainly could not think of postponing his resolutions until after the Stewarton case was decided; because if he were to do so, the object that he had in view would be utterly defeated. He very much doubted whether the Stewarton case would be decided before the meeting of the General Assembly, which would be the crisis of the Church of Scotland. But in the resolutions which he proposed to submit to their Lordships he should cautiously avoid any collision between the judicial and legislative functions of that House.

THE NEW HOUSES.
Lord Wharncliffereported from the committee appointed to ascertain the progress of the new Houses of Parliament, that, considering the inconvenience to which their Lordships were at present exposed would be greatly aggravated by the progresss of the new buildings in 1844, it was expedient that no delay should take place in preparing the new House of Lords beyond what was absolutely necessary for the safety of the work; that the architect should be directed so to conduct the works as to complete the new House, and fit it for their Lordships' reception, by the commencement of the Session of 1844; that if the architect apprehended any injurious consequence to the building from the course thus recommended, he should report the same to the House; that it did not appear to the committee to be advisable that any expense should be incurred by an attempt to improve the present House.
Report laid on the Table and ordered to be printed.

INSANITY AND CRIME.
The Lord Chancellor: I have felt anxious, my Lords, at the earliest possible day to call your Lordships' attention to the subject of the notice, which I gave on a former occasion, with reference to a late trial. The circumstances connected with that trial have created a deep sensation amongst your Lordships, and also in the public mind. I am not surprised at this. A gentleman in the prime of life, of a most amiable character, incapable of giving offence or of injuring any individual, was murdered in the streets of this metropolis in open day. The assassin was secured; he was committed for trial; that trial has taken place, and he has escaped with impunity. Your Lordships will not be surprised that these circumstances should have created a deep feeling in the public mind, and that many persons should, upon the first impression, be disposed to think that there is some great defect in the laws of the country with reference to this subject which calls for a revision of those laws, in order that a repetition of such outrages may be prevented. I have felt it my duty, my Lords, in consequence of some suggestions from your Lordships, to consider (in consultation with others) this interesting and important subject, with the view not only of ascertaining correctly what the law is, with reference to it, but for the purpose also of ascertaining (if the law should turn out to be defective) what particular remedy should be applied, and what the nature of that remedy should be. Your Lordships will be aware that this is a most difficult and delicate subject: because all persons who have directed their attention to these inquiries, all persons who are best informed upon it, concur in stating that the subject of insanity is but imperfectly understood. I am not now speaking of general and complete mental alienation. I am speaking of that description of insanity which consists of a delusion directed to one or more subjects, or one or more persons; and those who are acquainted with this subject know how difficult it is to decide to what extent the moral sense and the moral feeling that guide men's actions is influenced by delusions of this description. We all know that persons who labour under mental delusion with respect to one or more objects are entirely, or apparently entirely, rati-

715
onal with respect to others. They are frequently very intelligent, frequently very acute. It is often extremely difficult to discover the existence of this concealed malady, and the persons who labour under it are uncommonly astute in defeating all endeavours to detect its existence. We almost all of us recollect and know the statement made by Mr. Erskine, in his able and eloquent defence of Hatfield, with respect to the acuteness with which persons who labour under infirmities of this description defeat the skill and sagacity, and over-reach the intellect of the most experienced person. Mr. Erskine tells us of the instance of a prosecution having been directed by a person who had been confined in a lunatic asylum against his brother and the keeper of the asylum for false imprisonment and undue restraint. Mr. Erskine was counsel for the defendant. He says he was informed in his brief and in his instructions that the man was un doubtedly insane; that the particular infirmity existing in his mind was not disclosed to him; that the prosecutor himself appeared as a witness in support of the indictment; that he was put into the witness-box and examined, and that his evidence throughout the whole of his examination was clear, distinct, collected, rational. Mr. Erskine adds, that he tried to discover some lurking aberration of mind in the course of a cross-examination, conducted, for nearly an hour, with all the dexterity and skill of which he was capable. All his endeavours were foiled. The man's answers were completely rational, betraying not the slightest appearance of mental alienation. At this moment a gentleman came into court who had been accidentally detained elsewhere, and whispered into Mr. Erskine's ear that the witness thought he was the Saviour of mankind. The moment that Mr. Erskine received that hint, he made a low bow to the witness, addressed him in terms of great reverence, and respectfully begged to apologise for the unceremonious manner in which he had treated a person of his sacred characte. Mr. Erskine called him Christian, the effect of this mode of address, instant as the touch of Ithuriel's spear, elicited the truth, and showed the real infirmity of the man: he immediately answered "Thou hast spoken: I am the Christ." The case immediately terminated. A similar case is stated by a French writer, M. Pinel, in his work on insanity, with respect to a person confined in the
716
Bicetre. A commission was appointed to visit that prison for the purpose of liberating those persons who were confined there as being of unsound mind, but who were not labouring under that calamity. M. Pinel states, that he examined one particular patient repeatedly upon many successive days, and, though he was a person experienced in those inquiries and a man of considerable learning and sagacity, all his endeavours to prove the man insane were frustrated and foiled. The result was, he ordered a certificate to be prepared for his liberation. It was necessary, before the man was liberated, that he should himself sign the certificate. It was placed before him, and he signed "Jesus Christ." Of course the certificate was destroyed, and the man was not liberated. I might mention a vast, variety of instances to show the various shapes and forms that insanity of this description takes—instances collected from the works of the medical writers and jurists of this country, of France, and of Germany, where this subject has been much and deeply investigated. The result would be, that your Lordships would be satisfied that any attempt at a definition or description of the particular disease would be altogether futile, and that the only course we can pursue is to lay down some general and comprehensive rule, and to leave those who administer the laws of the country to apply that rule to the different cases as they may arise. The first question for our con sideration is, what is the actual law of the country with respect to crimes committed by persons labouring under infirmities and disase of this description. I apprehend, when your Lordships' come to consider it, you will find that there is no doubt with respect to the law—that it is clear, distinct, defined; and I think the result upon your Lordships' minds will be, that it will be quite impossible beneficially to alter the law, or to render it better adapted than it is, in the shape in which it now exists, for the purpose for which it is designed. On this subject I wish to be as clear and perspicuous as possible. It is a subject of great importance, and one in which the public take a deep interest. Every thing, therefore, connected with it ought to be laid before the public, through your Lord ships, with the utmost possible precision. I do not think it necessary to quote any text writer on this subject. I shall go at once to the fountain head, and quote for your Lordships what learned judges, in

717
the administration of justice, have said as applicable to this subject, and point to the rules which they have laid down for the guidance of those who have to decide on the criminality or innocence of the parties standing accused before them. The first authority to which I beg to refer is that of a most learned and most accurate judge. I speak in the presence of my noble and learned Friends who recollect that learned judge, and who will concur with me in saying that he never was exceeded by any person administering justice in the accuracy of the view he took of the law. I mean Mr. Justice Le Blanc. I will state to your Lordships how the law was laid down by that learned judge in a case that was tried before him at the Old Bailey, in 1812, six months after the trial of Bellingham. The circumstances of the case, as far as is necessary to mention them in order, to introduce the judgment to your Lordships, are shortly these; the prisoner had entertained a great antipathy against a particular person named Burrowes; there was no foundation in fact for that antipathy; the person obnoxious to the prisoner had never given the slightest cause of offence; the prisoner, with great deliberation, loaded a blunderbus and shot this person. Fortunately, however, the man was not killed. The prisoner was tried under the act for shooting—a capital offence. The defence that was set up was "insanity." The prisoner had had an epileptic fit, which not un frequently does produce infirmity of mind. About a month previous to the act of violence for which he was tried, a commission of lunacy had been issued against him. The jury empanelled upon that occasion returned a verdict of insanity. Mr. Warburton, the keeper of a lunatic asylum, a man of great experience in these matters, stated, that in his opinion the prisoner was insane, and that insanity of such a description as that under which the prisoner was labouring often led to the harbouring and entertaining of the strongest antipathies, without any cause, against particular individuals. This was the substance of the case presented to the jury. The judge, with respect to the main point, summed up in these words:—
"It is for you (the jury) to determine whether the prisoner, when he committed the offence with which he stands charged, was, or was not, incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, or whether he was under the influence of any delusion with respect to the prosecutor
718
which rendered his mind at the moment in sensible of the nature of the act he was about to commit, since, in that case, he would not be legally responsible for his conduct. On the other hand, provided you should be of opinion, that when he committed the offence he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and was not under the influence of such a delusion as disabled him from distinguishing that he was doing a wrong act, in that case he is answerable to the justice of his country, and guilty in the eye of the law."
He was found guilty by the jury, and afterwards, I believe, executed. I apprehend, that that is the law of the land as far as relates to this subject. If a man, labouring under some mental delusion, acts under the influence of that delusion, and the influence of the delusion is so powerful as to render him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, in that case he cannot be considered in law as responsible for his act. I apprehend, that all the decisions will show that that is the law of the country. The next case to which I shall beg to call your Lordships attention upon this subject is the case of Bellingham, tried before Chief Justice Mansfield. 1 have thought it of importance in this case, on account of the different observations that have been made upon it, to request the solicitor to the Treasury to search to see if there were any short-hand writer's minutes of the proceedings at the trial. The short-hand writer's minutes have been sent to me, and this is the substance of the summing-up of the learned judge who presided, as far as relates to the report now before us. It is unnecessary for me to enter into any of the facts of the case, because they must be sufficiently fresh (notwithstanding the interval of time) in your Lordships' recollection. Chief Justice Mansfield, after making some observations upon the case of men labouring under a total absence of reason proceeds thus:—
"There is a species of insanity, where people take particular fancies into their heads who are perfectly sane and sound of mind upon all other subjects; but that is not a species of insanity which can excuse any person who has committed a crime, unless it so affects his mind at the particular period when he commits the crime, as to disable him from distinguishing between good and evil, or to judge of the consequence of his actions."
And afterwards Chief Justice Mansfield put the case to the jury thus:—
"The question is this, whether you are satisfied that he (the prisoner) had a sufficient degree of capacity to distinguish between good

719
and evil, and to know that he was committing a crime when he committed this act; in that case you will find him guilty."
So that although the expressions in some sort vary, the two jugments of these two learned judges are, I apprehend, in substance exactly the same; namely, that if the party at the time that he committed the act was in such a state of mind—in such a state of sanity, as to know that he was doing a wrong thing—in that case, but not otherwise, he was amenable to the law. There was an earlier case, to which I shall also call your Lordships' attention, the case of Hatfield. Mr. Erskine, in his most eloquent and powerful defence of the prisoner upon that occasion, stated what he conceived to be the law in eases of this description.
"When a man," said he, "is labouring under a delusion, if you are satisfied that the delusion existed at the time of the committal of the offence—that the act was done under its influence—then he cannot be considered as guilty of any crime."
That was stated in the most eloquent terms by Mr. Erskine to be the law with respect to cases of this nature. The trial of Hatfield was a trial at bar in the Court of King's Bench, and, of course, all the judges of that court attended. Lord Kenyon presided. Lord Kenyon interrupted the defence before it was closed, and made these observations:—
"Mr. Attorney-general, can you call any witnesses to contradict these facts?—With regard to the law, as it is laid down, there can be no doubt upon earth; to be sure, if a man is in a deranged state of mind at the time, he is not criminally answerable for his acts; but the material part of this case is, whether, at the very time when the act was committed, this man's mind was sane?"
He then went on to make some observations on the evidence, and afterwards added:—
"His sanity must be made out to the satisfaction of a moral man meeting the case with fortitude of mind, knowing he has an arduous duty to discharge, yet, if the scales hang anything like even, throwing in a certain proportion of mercy to the party."
Your Lordships, find, therefore, that, in the case which preceded the two others, that I have brought under your notice, Lord Kenyon, and through him all the other judges of the Court of King's Bench, were of opinion that the law as laid down by Mr. Erskine was correct, and that if the man who committed a
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crime was insane at the time he committed it, that is to say, was labouring under such disease of the mind as not to know whether he were doing right or wrong, in that case he was not a subject for a criminal trial. No departure has been made from the rule of law thus laid down by the three learned judges to whom I have referred. The rule of law so laid down by them was not laid down when those learned judges were sitting alone, but when they were sitting in connection with the other judges of their respective courts, whose opinions, of course, must be taken as having corresponded with theirs. No alteration has taken place in that rule of law, or in the view of it by any of the learned judges who have presided at the late trials. In Oxford's case Lord Chief Justice Denman laid down precisely the same law, and, in order that there might be no mistake with respect to it (being a subject of such deep interest and importance), he consulted the other judges, Mr. Justice Patteson and Mr. Justice Alderson, who were sitting with him, and they concurred with him in a written note as to what was the law upon the subject. The note so agreed upon was read by the Chief Justice to the jury. I take it, therefore, that the law is distinctly settled and distinctly understood upon this subject. If it be so, the next question for your Lordshids' consideration is, whether there is any reason to alter, or I should say any possibility of altering, the law. Can your Lordships say that if a man, when he commits a crime, is under the influence of delusion and insanity, so as not to know right from wrong, so as not to know what he is doing—is it possible that your Lordships can by any legislative provision say, that such a man shall be responsible for his act, and be liable to lose his life for the wrong he has unknowingly committed? It is impossible. Your Lord ships might pass such a law; you have the power to do so; but when you came for the first time to put it into execution, the sense of all, the feeling of all reasonable men, would revolt against it, and your Lordships would be obliged to retrace your steps, and to repeal the law which you had passed in a moment of excited feeling in consequence of recent painful impressions, but which you could not have passed under the influence of sober and steady reason. Lord Coke says, that to execute an insane person is contrary to all law, and pregnant with the greatest danger. If your Lord ships entertain any doubt as to the law,

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you have a course to pursue which is perfectly open to you; it is this—to summon the judges of the land before you, to hear their opinion upon the law; and as the subject is one of great importance to the country, to obtain from them a rule laid down by their united authority, by which to guide the future administration of justice in cases of this description. A rule laid down by the united authority of all the judges might possibly have more influence and more force than the opinion of a single judge conveyed in a charge to a jury. It is for your Lordships to say, whether you think it necessary to resort to such a course. But your Lordships will naturally ask, and with some anxiety and curiosity, what the law of other countries is upon this subject. The law of other countries corresponds, and of necessity must correspond, precisely with our own. The law of Scotland is thus explained by Mr. Alison, a learned writer upon the criminal law of that country:—
"To amount to a complete bar to punishment the issanity at the time of committing the crime must have been of such a kind as completely to deprive the prisoner of reason with respect to the act in question, and the knowledge that he was doing wrong."
And if your Lordships refer to the valuable treatise on criminal law by Baron Hume, although the views of that learned writer are more expansively directed and more loosely expressed upon this particular point, your Lordships will yet deduce from him the same conclusion as to the state of the law upon this subject in Scotland. I will now call the attention to a particular case cited by Mr. Alison on the subject. A man was indicted for the murder of another by shooting him whilst he was going across a moor. The defence set up was insanity, and the delusion the prisoner laboured under was this. He supposed the man whom he had shot to be an evil spirit, whom he was commanded by the Almighty to kill. No one doubted that if the facts necessary to support the defence had been made out to the satisfaction of the jury, the judges (it is clear from the way in which the case was conducted) would have considered it a substantial defence; but the facts were not made out, and the man was found guilty from the defect in the evidence, the jury being of opinion, under the direction of the court, that there was not sufficient evidence to show that at the time the man committed the act he really was labouring under that delusion. My Lords,
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to pass from Scotland to France. In the Code Napoleon (the criminal code not leas of ancient than of modern France) the French law on the subject is thus laid down:—
"With respect to every crime, and every misdemeanour, no man can be made accountable, who, at the time he does the act, is under alienation of mind."
And though, my Lords, I have no particular text writer to quote as to the law of Germany on the subject, I have read many German treatises upon it, in which cases are cited satisfying me that the law of Germany in this respect corresponds with the law of France, the law of Scotland, and our own. The question then is, whether we can, under these circumstances, attempt to vary the law? Is it practicable? Is it possible? and, allowing it to be even practicable, would it be judicious? My Lords, some persons say, "Define precisely what the law is." I say, to attempt to define upon a subject with which we are as yet only partially acquainted would be difficult and dangerous. Let us leave the general law as it stands, and let the judges, before whom prisoners are arraigned and tried, apply the particular facts to the law so laid down. My Lords, I have heard it said (it is an argument I have heard in the streets), "The object of punishment is the prevention of crime; that you do not punish a criminal by way of retribution; not in a spirit of vengeance upon guilt, but to prevent other persons from committing a similar error." Therefore, it may be said, and it has been said, that although a man is under an insane delusion at the time he commits the offence, yet knows what will be the effect of the act he commits—that is, if he knows that if he fire a pistol it will kill a man that that is a sufficient foundation for carrying the criminal law into operation against him, to prevent others from committing the same crime. My Lords, I should have dealt shortly with a position of this kind, if I had not found it supported in the writings of such high an authority as those of a most rev. Prelate —not at this time, I believe, a member of your Lordships' House, but connected with another part of the United Kingdom. [A Peer intimated to the noble and learned Lord that he was mistaken]. I spoke at the moment in uncertainty, whether or not the most rev. Prelate be now a member of your Lordships' House. However, the most rev. Prelate, after stating a position precisely the same as

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that I have put, illustrates his position by the example of a dog accustomed to worry sheep. The animal has no moral sense—no ideas of good and evil; but still you punish that dog—you punish him to correct and prevent him from worrying sheep. That is the illustration of the most rev. Prelate. And now with respect to the position. You punish not in a spirit of vengeance, but as an example to deter others from committing other similar offences. But what is the way you do this? Do you punish persons incapable of committing the crime for which you punish? Or do you punish a person guilty of an offence which is not subject to the punishment you award? No, my Lords. The person must, in the first instance, deserve the punishment, and you then inflict the punishment, not in a spirit of vengeance, but with the object to which the most rev. Prelate alludes. I confess, my Lords, knowing what I do of the sagacity and profound learning of that most rev. Prelate, that I am surprised at his having fallen into what I must, with the utmost deference, consider to be such a logical absurdity. You punish the dog; granted, but not for an example to other dogs. My Lords, if you should be satisfied that I have stated the law correctly, and that no change can take place in that rule of law, the next question' for consideration is this, whether an alteration can be made, or ought to be made, in the form and mode of administering that law. My Lords, as I apprehend, this is equally impracticable. A man accused of the commission of a crime has a right to be charged to a jury, and to have counsel assigned to him for his defence. He has a right to call such witnesses as he may think proper, for the purpose of establishing that defence. His counsel has the right—indeed, it is his duty so to do—to make such observations upon his case, both as to the law and the facts, as he may think most available for the interests of his client; and then the jury is to decide upon the question of the facts. Over the whole of this proceeding, a learned Judge presides, whose duty it is to decide upon the admissibility of evidence, to state the law to the jury, to sum up the facts, and comment upon them with reference to the law; and then to leave the whole, as a question of facts, for the consideration and determination of the jury. That, my Lords, is the form and mode of proceeding in this, as in every other criminal case. Can you change it?
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Is it practicable to do so? No man can entertain a doubt upon that point. If, then, not only the rule of law, but the mode of administering it be right, what room is there for legislation? You may say, that in a particular instance the law has not been well administered—that the jury drew improper conclusions from facts —that theoretical statements were made to them, which were not justified by science, and that, influenced by them, the jury arrived at an improper conclusion. That is a misfortune to which we must submit, because it cannot be remedied by legislation. The prosecution in the particular case which has given rise to this discussion was conducted by a learned Friend of mine, filling a high legal office, and as distinguished for remarkable talents, as a lawyer and an advocate, as any man who ever preceded him in the discharge of the important duties he has undertaken. The learned Judges who presided at the trial, three in number, were among the most eminent and enlightened judges of the empire—the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and two judges of the Court of Queen's Bench, men of admitted learning, exalted talent, and long experience, men most conscientious in character, these were the persons who presided at the trial. What was the law as laid down by the Lord Chief Justice? Precisely the law I have stated. I sent for the short-hand writers' notes of the summing up. I thought it proper to look to this document for the purpose of being sure as to the words made use of by the learned Judge; and I will read it to your Lordships the precise words reported:—
"The point which will be at last submitted to you will be, whether or not, on the whole of the evidence you have heard, you are satisfied that at the time the act was committed for the commission of which the prisoner stands charged, he had not that competent use of his understanding as not to know what he was doing, with respect to the act itself, a wicked and a wrong thing—whether he knew it was a wicked and a wrong thing he had done —or that he was not sensible at the time he committed this act that it was contrary to the laws of God and man. Undoubtedly, if he were not so sensible, he is not a person so responsible."
The learned Judge, towards the close of his summing up, says—
"If, upon balancing the evidence in your minds, you should think the prisoner a person capable of distinguishing right from wrong, with respect to the act with which he stands

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charged, he is then a responsible agent, and liable to the penalties imposed upon those who commit the crime of which he is accused."
No person can quarrel with that statement of the law by the Lord Chief Justice. The only question is, whether the jury, when the law was so laid down, drew a right conclusion from the facts stated in evidence before them. My Lords, it has been said, why did the learned judge not suffer the trial to take its course to the very end? I think, considering all the circumstances that have since occurred, it would have been far better if that course had been taken. But, at the same time, I do not believe for a moment there would have been the slightest alteration in the issue; and my reason for so thinking is this: many medical men, highly experienced on the subject, were examined on the part of the prisoner, and there were two medical gentlemen of great eminence on the part of the Crown, who had themselves examined the prisoner, with a view to arriving at the conclusion whether he were sane or not at the time this act was committed. Those medical men were sitting in court, and they were not called on the part of the prosecution. My Lords, these gentlemen not being called upon the part of the prosecution, what is the inference—the absolutely necessary inference? Why, that instead of opposing the testimony of the other medical men, they would have coincided with and have confirmed it. I know of my own knowledge that such would have been the fact. Is it possible, then, if the case had gone to an issue under these circumstances, that the verdict could have been other than that which the jury actually pronounced? In Hatfield's case, which, as I have said, was a trial at bar before the King's Bench of that time, the learned judge interposed, and asked the Attorney-general, "Can you contradict these facts—can you call wit nesses to answer or disprove them?" The Attorney-general having replied in the negative, Lord Kenyon said it was then impossible to doubt the fact. In that case, therefore, precisely the same course was pursued as in the present. And here, my Lords, give me leave to say, that no person, except those present at the time, and who actually saw what was going on, can form a correct estimate of what was the prudent course to pursue under the circumstances. I have thought it my duty to make these observations to your Lord-
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ships. For myself I have only read the general evidence as reported in the newspapers, and, therefore, I cannot say if the testimony was of a nature to justify the verdict. I say nothing whatever. I express no opinion upon that subject. But knowing as I do the extraordinary talents and powers of the learned counsel for the prosecution, the eminent attainments and high character of the learned judges who presided, I must say that, except upon the strongest, possible testimony from witnesses of the most unimpeachable character— persons who had seen the whole proceedings—I never could bring myself to the supposition that justice had not been fairly and substantially done. My Lords, what then is the conclusion to which we must come? That no alteration can be made, or ought to be made, in the rule of law on the subject—that no alteration can be made, or ought to be made, in the mode of administering the law. The only thing, therefore, left for us to consider is, whether, in the way of legislation, measures of precaution stronger than those now in existence can be taken; and to ascertain the extent to which we can proceed in that direction. In a few days I shall be enabled to lay on the Table of the House a measure which, I trust, may be effective. Taking into consideration the skill exhibited by parties labouring under these delusions, I cannot undertake to say that cases of this kind will not occasionally occur. They have occurred from time to time in this country, in France, indeed in every country of civilized Europe. We may not be able effectually to guard against their recurrence, but still we must by legislation do the utmost in our power for the purpose. My Lords, if with respect to the general law, your Lordships think it necessary to take the opinion of the judges, and to have their united authority on the subject, I will request the attendance of those learned persons. I think such a course will give great authority and great force to the proceedings, and may be attended with practical consequences of good, far better than by interfering by legislation. Let us know from the highest authority, from the voice of the judges, what the law is, let it be laid down by them in precise terms, together with what is to be in future the administration of that law according to their opinion. My Lords, in the course of two or three days, I repeat, I will lay upon the Table of the House the bill of which I have given no-

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tice; and if, in your Lordships' opinion, such a course is necessary, I will request the attendance of her Majesty's judges, with a view to the object I have stated.
Lord Broughamsaid, he had risen thus early, as might be expected, in consequence of having been the first to call the attention of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, and also that of his noble Friend's colleagues, to the subject of the late trial. Although there was, strictly speaking, no question before their Lord ships, he trusted they would bear with him for a while, as they had borne with his noble and learned Friend, whilst he offered a few observations to their attention on a subject of the greatest possible importance, and which, he entirely agreed with his noble and learned Friend, it was necessary to consider with the greatest attention. He cordially and entirely agreed with his noble and learned Friend in the panegyric he had so eloquently, as well as justly pronounced, both upon his hon. and learned Friend, the Solicitor-general, and upon the three learned judges who had presided at the trial in question, and with his noble and learned Friend he had every possible confidence that everything had been done which the exigency required, and which the nature of the case and of the proceedings demanded. But without imputing blame, he might on this occasion feel disposed to express an opinion upon the subject, although without entering upon it further than one single sentence. Although he, for one, had no doubt the course taken had been most properly pursued, he was bound to say he should have infinitely prefered that the case should have been tried to the end — that the case should have reached its natural and appointed conclusion, that the other witnesses had been called, that the reply of the Solicitor-general had been heard, commenting upon the evidence and the doctrine laid down by the counsel for the prisoner, and, above all, that the learned judge had had the opportunity in his summing-up of charging the jury with the prisoner, and of stating explicitly the grounds upon which his Lordship might have thought it was not a case for conviction. With the conduct of the trial, any more than with the result, he had no fault to find. He had no doubt that the accounts of the trial which he had read were incorrect, and that some of the evidence allowed to be given, not objected to by the counsel for the prosecution, and not rejected by the learned judge, must have
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been inaccurately reported in those accounts to which he had had access. And his reason for doubting their accuracy was this —he took upon himself to say, that as those accounts stood, certain evidence was given which ought not to have been given, that questions were put which the law did not permit to be put: and that statements were drawn from the witnesses as served for evidence which by law were not competent or admissible as evidence. It was, therefore, he believed, that the accounts he had seen were extremely erroneous in those respects. If the House would look at what was laid down by Lord Hardwicke, then sitting as Lord High Steward at the trial of Earl Ferrers in 1760, when that very kind of evidence was tendered, when those very questions were put to the witnesses, and when Lord Camden, then Attorney-general Pratt, objected to that evidence and those questions, they would find that Lord Hardwicke said, that the question must not be put, that it was not legal evidence; and his Lordship said, you must not ask a witness whether the facts sworn to by other witnesses preceding them amounted to a proof of insanity; you shall state the facts to the witnesses—men of skill in their profession—and you shall ask if such a fact is an indication of in sanity or not—you shall ask them, upon their experience, what is an indication of insanity—you shall draw from them what amount of symptoms constitutes insanity; but you shall not remove the witness from the witness-box into the jury-box; be he a medical man of the most unquestionable skill—the most practised in that most useful but most painful walk of his vocation; be he the most competent possible to give us the result of his practical observation and experience, still you shall not transfer that witness from the witness-box into the jury-box, but you shall ask him what symptoms his experience indicates to him as a test of insanity, or sanity, and leave it to the judge, or rather the jury, to say whether the man be guilty or not guilty, he being sane or insane. For these reasons, therefore, he had no doubt that he had seen an incorrect account of what had passed on the trial he was now referring to. He agreed with his noble and learned Friend in that luminous view of the authorities which his noble Friend had taken, and which could not have failed to make that impression upon their Lordships which it was so well calculated to effect. Those persons were grievously mistaken who supposed that the law of

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England required change either as to the subject matter or as to the mode of administering it. With respect to the point of a person being an accountable being, that was an accountable being to the law of the land, a great confusion had pervaded the minds of some persons whom he was indisposed to term reasoners, who considered accountability in its moral sense, as mixing itself up with the only kind of accountable-ness with which they, as human legislators, had to do, and of which they could take cognizance. He could conceive a case of a human being, of a weekly-constituted mind, who might, by long brooding over real or fancied wrongs, work up so perverted a feeling of hatred against an individual, that danger might occur. He might not be deluded as to the actual existence of injuries he had received, but he might grievously and grossly exaggerate them, and they might so operate upon a weakly-framed mind and intellect as to produce crime. He could conceive that the Maker of that man, in his infinite mercy, having regard to the object of his creation, might deem him not an object for punishment. But that man was accountable to human tribunals in a totally different sense. Man punished crime for the purpose of practically deterring others from offending by committing a repetition of the like act. It was in that sense only that he had anything to do with the doctrine of accountable and not accountable. He could conceive a person whom the Deity might not deem accountable, but who might be perfectly accountable to human laws. What was the test as laid down by the learned judges? Here he might observe that he could have wished those learned persons had always used the same language, and that they had been pleased to substitute for certain vague indefinite expressions a more specific and precise phraseology. Their Lordships had sometimes said that a man must be "capable of knowing right from wrong." That was the most common definition; but at other times they had said he must be "capable of distinguishing good from evil"—a totally different expression more vague and lax. Why, a man might doubt what was good and what was evil. A man might know right from wrong, and not know good from evil. Then there came in a third expression—"Capable of knowing what was proper." Another expression used was, "What was wicked." So that there were four different tests, in four different forms of language and expression. Every one of
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them more vague, more uncertain, less easily acted upon than the original one of right and wrong. Their Lordships would, perhaps, think him even more than hypercritical, if he avowed that he should not have been satisfied if the expression of "knowing, right from wrong," and no other expression, had been used throughout, because, before applying it, it would have been incumbent upon him to distinctly ascertain what was right and what was wrong. He was not sure that people always judged accurately upon that point. He was not sure that juries always knew right from wrong. He knew, and their Lordships knew perfectly well, what those learned judges meant by "right from wrong," but he was not sure that the public at large did. Above all, he was not sure that men whose understandings were a little affected had a distinct apprehension of what the judge meant when he spoke of right and wrong, and the capacity to distinguish between these being the test of insanity or sanity. First of all, did the unfortunate person know what he was about? Did he actually know he was killing a man? Or did he think, peradventure, he was destroying some evil spirit, or some bird or beast? If he did not know he was killing a human being if he did not know what he was doing at all—if he was so idiotic as to be utterly and entirely ignorant of what he was about —he was no more subject to punishment, no more accountable to a human tribunal than an animal. But the difficulty and the question arose—after you had ascertained that the man knew what he was actually about, that he took the usual precautions which any rational man would take the better to effect an object, that he was cognizant of a purpose framed in his own mind, and takes measures to bring about its accomplishment, then came the question and the difficulty was, he labouring under such a delusion that he could not distinguish what the learned judges called right from wrong? If a man was so placed under the influence of a peculiar notion of right and wrong in the abstract, he might think he had a perfect right to prostrate to the ground a man with regard to whose conduct to himself individually, or to mankind at large, he had thought, in his exaggerated and perverted way, had deserved the fate. Bellingham was tried and executed for the murder of Mr. Perceval, and no man had ever died more deservedly or more justly; yet there were many persons who had said that the refusal of the

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learned judge to give time for the bringing forward evidence to prove the insanity or sanity of the accused man was most deeply to be deplored; and he would go further, and say, that that learned judge was most profoundly to be blamed. He had never known Lord Erskine, with whom he had discussed this subject—he had never seen that illustrious advocate and great criminal lawyer, upon any one of those many subjects which they had so often canvassed together, more moved to indignation than he had been upon the case of the refusal, on the part of the learned judge, to postpone that trial. Affidavits had been made of the prisoner's family having been tainted with insanity. Affidavits had been produced from those who had known him from infancy of his having been insane. Affidavits were offered, showing a primâ facie case of mental alienation. But the evidence was two hundred miles off—at Liverpool—and the learned judge thought fit to refuse a fortnight's delay, that that evidence might be produced. In these observations he merely blamed indiscretion—he did not wish to give that case the appearance of having been unfairly tried. No man doubted that the result of the trial would have been precisely the same had the evidence been adduced. Happily, on the present occasion, time had been granted, and the result was before their Lordships. It appeared that Bellingham's ideas of right and wrong were so perverted that he never could be persuaded by all the pains that were taken with him—although conscious of what he had done—the idea could never be opened into his mind that he had not done an inevitable act, and that, consequently, he was guiltless: Mr. Stephens, a friend of his, and also a most intimate friend of the late Mr. Perceval—a friend so attached that his mind was for some time after the melancholy event almost in a state of mental alienation—made it his business, not from vague curiosity, but from high religious motives, to visit Bellingham several times during the short time that was left to him, and that time was short. On Monday, 1lth May, he committed the act. At the same hour, 5 o'clock, in the afternoon of Monday 18th May, his body was in the dissecting-room. Such was the haste of the proceedings. The party was examined, committed, tried, convicted, and executed, all within the space of seven days. During that time, however, Mr. Stephens and Mr. Wilber force saw him twice. They said Belling ham had no conception that he had done
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anything wrong; he lamented the death of Mr. Perceval; spoke of him with the greatest respect, and even esteem for his character; said that no man could more lament that such a thing should have befallen that gentleman than he (Belling ham) did; that nothing could be more hard, both to his family and to the public and society at large; and that it was greatly to be lamented. Then, he was, asked, "Why did you do the deed?" "Oh, do it," he answered; "that was perfectly inevitable; there was no wrong at all in doing it; he could not help that." Here was a man, to whom the definition of sanity, which required the capacity of distinguishing right from wrong, had only a very narrow application; he knew the learned judges used the phrase with reference to the commands of the law. They could know only one kind of right and wrong; the right is when you act according to law, and the wrong is when you break it. Then why did not the judge say so in so many words? Distinguishing right from wrong, meant a knowledge that the act the person was about to commit was punishable by the law. That was a test that he (Lord Brougham) understood, and he was prepared to say that he differed toto cælo from the most rev. Prelate whom his noble and learned Friend had cited. If the law were not so already, which he averred it was, for it could have no other meaning, since we knew that only to be wrong which the law declared to be wrong—which the law prohibited— if the law were not so, and he misunderstood the learned judges, if they meant by right and wrong whatever any man might choose, upon any theory of morals, or idiosyncracy of his own nature, to fancy to be right and wrong—if that was their doctrine, which he was sure it could not be, then he most cordially agreed with his noble and learned Friend that they should call the judges to their bar, in order that they might give an answer, not merely to the general question, what do you mean by right and wrong, and the capacity of distinguishing between them, but to half a dozen other questions which must succeed it. He thought with his noble and learned Friend that their assistance would be invaluable, but it would be invaluable on no account more than this, that it would lead to more uniformity in the language they used on future occasions in charging and directing juries on this most delicate and important subject. They would then no longer use the words

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wicked, wrong, improper, blameable, proper, right, good, evil; they would no longer indulge in that variety of phrase which only served to perplex others, if it did not also tend to bewilder themselves, as he supposed it sometimes did; but they would use one constant phrase, which the public and all persons concerned would be able to understand. Now that he had mentioned it, he must say, in extenuation, if not in justification of the errors into which the most rev. Prelate fell, in dealing with a subject which was perhaps not quite so congenial to him as to members of the legal profession, that the law as it had been administered, and the opinions and language which had been used from the bench, rather tended to lead into errors of this description. He thought that must, in fairness and candour towards the most reverend prelate, be admitted. Their Lordships must observe that nothing could be more improper than to hold that they had a right to execute a person not strictly accountable to human laws, merely because doing so might have a tendency to deter another from committing a like offence. But how likely a person unlearned in the law was to fall into such an error the most rev. Prelate was an example. His noble and learned Friend had stated most justly that those unfortunate lunatic patients were extremely acute, often on all subjects but one or two. They were often also extremely astute in defeating inquiries into their state of mind, in protecting themselves from observation, and concealing their own insanity, of which a very remarkable instance or two had been cited. But he would venture to say that those very persons, who showed such acuteness in protecting themselves from inquiry, who baffled the ingenuity of all who questioned them on the particular subject of their insanity, and changed their tact so as to bewilder their interrogators, if they had been put on their own trial in defence, would have been ready, nine out of ten of them at least, if if not all, to allow the court to think them insane. Those wretched persons had a knowledge that they were safe; that they were in a predicament in which the law could not touch them. He spoke not only from the experience he had had during a period of four years in the court now presided over by his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor), during which he had had many of those unhappy persons under examination before him, but also from the long knowledge he had had of such cases at the bar, and also as having
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had, like most public men, considerable experience of the manner in which they threatened and beset persons in official situations—almost always with a hint thrown out (and he found that with others the case was the same) that the law did not take any notice of them, and that in that respect they were above the law. They were quite aware of the state of the law on this head. This was the case with a person whom he defended on his trial for burning York Minster, the lunatic Martin. That unhappy man was quite aware that he was safe, and he was not the only person in the same state of mind aware of that. At an asylum in the neighbourhood of York, where the case of Martin was much discussed among the inmates, the majority came to the distinct conclusion that Martin was safe, because, said they, he is like ourselves, a person of whom the law takes no notice. Those persons were in confinement, but there were many men going about with just the same opinions, who were quite aware that that was the law. All this made it necessary to define more clearly what the law was, and to consider, an object to which, he trusted, the measure announced by his noble and learned Friend would be directed, whether there was not a possibility of throwing on other persons the responsibility of allowing men to go about who ought not to be allowed to be at large, to the danger of the community, and the danger of the unhappy persons themselves. It ought to be considered, also, whether some means of detaining them, shorter and more summary than the law at present furnished, might not be provided, for the safety, first, of the community, and next of the parties themselves. The most rev. Prelate had been somewhat misled in the argument he had held on this subject. The most rev. Prelate knew that the object of all human law was not retribution —that no human law had anything to do with—but prevention, and deterring others from crime by example. The most rev. Prelate argued that the life of a lunatic was of extremely little value to himself or to society, and therefore he asked, why should not that life be taken away on the principle of punishment, seeing that madmen might be deterred by example, unless they were idiots or furious. He thought this an exceedingly feeble argument—his noble and learned Friend had justly refuted it—but it was easy to see in what way the most rev. Archbishop had been led into the argument. He (Lord Brougham) had had occasion to consult medical authorities,

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whose opinion was of great value on this point, and in particular one who was a very old friend of his, a man who deserved the greatest respect and veneration, as being at the head of so distinguished a profession, whose experience was very large, and his general knowledge and accomplishments very great, and who was pre-eminently well qualified to form an opinion—he meant Sir H. Halford. He had had frequent opportunities of speaking to that eminent man on this subject, and he had put to him the question whether madmen generally, or the greater number of them, were not aware of the situation in which they were, and were not apt to be deterred by the motive of fear, even more, perhaps, than any other persons? The answer was, "Most decidedly so—no doubt about it." He might take occasion to point out that the law was by no means consistent in its treatment of the insane. It did not put them to death, it spared them from capital punishment; but it confined them for life, inflicting a punishment almost as great as that of death. Thus, these beings, incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, or good from evil—who were not to be considered moral agents—who were not to be held guilty, and never committed any crime at all— were visited with the most severe punishment. That was the law as it now stood, or at least as it was administered; but he wished his noble and learned Friend to turn his attention to it. Was it the law, as it was now administered, that we had a right to shut them up for life? Suppose they were cured, and ceased to be insane—that their reason grew clear, and the clouds that obscured it passed away— when they had recovered the knowledge of right and wrong, and become accountable agents. What was done with them then? Some of them were let out, some continued to be confined; the practice was by no means uniform. If it was said that you confined them for life in order to prevent them from doing mischief—"But," said the Archbishop of Dublin, "you should hang them up, not because they have done wrong, but because hanging them will prevent others from doing the same thing." He thought it but right and candid towards the most rev. Prelate to state the circumstances he had mentioned, and also to call the attention of his noble and learned Friend towards them. With respect to the test of the knowledge of right and wrong, he wished to show to their Lord ships what was the rule followed in Lord
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Ferrer's case, in which it was somewhat differently put. It was proved that he was occasionally insane, and incapable, from his insanity, of knowing what he did. That was a great deal more than not knowing right from wrong, or not judging the consequences of the action, for he did not know what he was about occasionally; yet as it was proved that when he committed the offence he had capacity sufficient to form a design and know the consequences, he was found guilty and executed, not because he knew right from wrong, or could distinguish good from ill, but because he knew what he was about and could form a design. There was evidence that his friends were going to take out a commission of lunacy on Lord Ferrers, yet he was executed. In the present case, the accused went four or five times to Sir R. Peel's house for the purpose of ascertaining who Sir R. Peel was. He formed his conclusion that a certain individual was the person in quest of whom he went, because he saw him four or five times come from the house and go to what he knew was Sir R. Peel's office. The man drew the conclusion which any sane man would draw, having taken the steps which any sane man would do to inform himself on the subject. The man, no doubt, was mistaken; but so might any sane man be under the circumstances. The man, then, being determined to kill Sir R. Peel—[Several Peers: No, no; that was not in evidence]—he understood it was proved that he went to this place for this purpose — it was said he meant to kill Sir R. Peel, there was no doubt about that. The man took exactly the same steps to accomplish his purpose of killing another person that a sane man would have taken; he purchased the pistols, and, to make sure, he purchased two; he used powder and ball, charging both the pistols as anybody might do to kill an animal he wanted to dispatch; he then went and waylaid his victim, firing one pistol so near that it hit or grazed his victim. Not satisfied with that, he did just what any person in the possession of his senses would have done who wanted to make sure of his bloody work, and fired again. ["No, no."] He fired the first time, and that took effect; he was going to fire the second pistol from not being certain that he had succeeded at first, but it was utterly indifferent to his argument whether the man fired twice or once. The man's arm was then seized by the policeman and the man arrested. All

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this was so like the conduct of a rational man in full possession of his senses, that many persons thought, and evidently the most rev. the Archbishop of Dublin was one of them, that there ought to be some means taken to deter from similar crimes others who labour under this peculiar malady; since the malady differed so little from reason. The most rev. Prelate thought it would be a proper thing to make it a punishable offence. He thought it his duty to state these matters in defence of the most rev. Archbishop, or at least in extenuation of the charge that might be brought against him of having fallen into very great errors. It was perfectly clear, that what was called partial insanity, and what was called, very incorrectly, monomania (for there might be two points as well as one on which a person was deranged), if it existed at all times, made a person decidedly a lunatic. Whether or not the act committed by a person labouring under this delusion was an act of guilt, or something indifferent, the act of a sane or insane person, must depend on the state of his mind at the time the act was committed—he would not say at the moment of the act, for he thought that was an inaccurate expression. He could hardly bring himself to conceive, that a person having all his senses about him would commit an atrocity so great as had been perpetrated in the late case, but the character of the act would depend on the state of mind immediately before or about the time of its commission. If the perpetrator knew what he was doing, if he had taken his precautions to accomplish his purpose, if he knew at the time of doing the desperate act, that it was forbidden by the law, that was his test of sanity; he cared not what judge gave another test, he should go to his grave in the belief that it was the real, sound, and consistent test. He believed the judges meant nothing else than this; he believed, if called before their Lordships, as he hoped and trusted they would be, that they would be found to mean nothing else. He had troubled their Lordships with these observations, because he had thought it his bounden duty not to avoid a painful subject, when it was important, merely because it was painful.
Lord Cottenhamthought it was impossible to listen to any doctrine which proposed to punish persons labouring under insane delusions. Their Lordships could not mean to say, that the man who was in capable of judging between right and
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wrong, of knowing whether an act were good or bad, ought to be made accountable for his actions. Such a man had not that within him which formed the foundation of accountability, either in a moral or legal point of view. It had been very forcibly stated, and it was no doubt perfectly true, that, alter the law or not, you would not get any jury who would convict, and hand over to punishment, individuals who, they were satisfied, were in such a state of mind as to be incapable of judging what was right and what was wrong. If that were so, it seemed to him to get rid of the only argument, if argument it could be called, for letting the law take its course on persons in that state of mind. It was said lunatics were capable of being deterred by the fear of punishment. That applied only to persons who were so far sane as to be capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and there were many such, although they might have a natural infirmity of mind, or a morbid affection of the understanding. You must take a person who was so far deprived of his reason as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong; on such a person, he apprehended, the motive alluded to would have no influence, or it, could only operate on persons confined in a lunatic asylum, and subjected to its discipline which might constrain them to a certain degree of regularity in conduct; but he thought it could have no effect on persons not under restraint, and moving about in society. It had been said, that persons in a lunatic asylum knew they were safe from the law. Such instances might have occurred, but he believed they were very rare. From his experience, he believed it very rarely happened that a person deranged was at the time aware of his derangement. He knew, and he had been often told, that persons in a state of convalescence, recovering from their insanity, were aware that they had been deranged; but, while labouring under the insanity, they had no conception of its existence. It appeared very strange that any persons should be labouring under a delusion, and yet be aware that it was a delusion; in fact, if they were aware of their state, there could be no delusion. He begged their Lordships to beware how they thought of making the law subject such persons to punishment, unless they could find a mind diseased sensible of the disease under which it was labouring. He did not see how a more accurate definition of insanity could

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be given than that which was at present laid down by the law. All that the Legislature could do was to keep the law in a proper state; the judge would explain its dictates to the jury, and then the jury, in each particular case, must apply them according to the circumstances. He could not help thinking, that if juries had always acted up to the true spirit of the law, and had adhered to the definition which the law fixed, giving their verdicts, accordingly, those difficulties which were so much the subject of discussion would not have arisen. He apprehended, that to the conduct of juries much of the feeling existing on this subject was to be ascribed. But this was a misfortune liable to arise in the execution of all laws, and was not a matter of surprise. He entirely agreed that a consultation with the learned judges would be very desirable, not from any doubt he entertained as to what was the law or what were the opinions of authorities, but because he thought such a step would lead to uniformity of practice, and would be a lesson to judges to take the law from the highest possible authorities, that they might know what the law was and faithfully carry it into effect. His noble and learned Friend had not opened the other part of the subject. Anxious as he should be to take all steps which would be for the public protection, and add to the security of the members of the community, he confessed he should view with the greatest jealousy any measure to facilitate the confinement of individuals on the ground of insanity. This was a subject of very great difficulty, and he should be ready to consider any scheme that might be proposed, but he hoped his noble and learned Friend would bear in mind the latitude of definition which medical men were very apt to attribute to the notion of insanity. There was a well-known story of an eminent medical practitioner who, on surprise being expressed by the examining counsel at the latitude of his definition, answered him by saying, that, in truth, he did not think there were a great many persons who had a mind altogether sound. That was the danger which a very large proportion of medical men were apt to fall into. There was great danger in permitting the liberty of the subject to be infringed on the ground of insanity. After all, it was not to be expected that medical opinions would not have great weight with a court. The statute of George 3rd seemed to him to give powers
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sufficient for the restraint of dangerous lunatics; it did not occur to him how these powers could he extended with due regard to the preservation of the liberty of the subject. [The Lord Chancellor: They may be confined during her Majesty's pleasure.] That law authorised the restraint of persons labouring under derangement, and who there was reason to suppose meditated some unlawful act. They could not be restrained on the ground of derangement solely, for derangement might take a very innocent shape. The law, he apprehended, already gave sufficient power for the confinement and care of such persons. Whether it provided duly for their detention, or for their disposal while in confinement, might be matter for consideration, but in extending its powers they would be treading on very dangerous ground.
Lord Campbellthought it his duty to express shortly the result of a very long experience on this subject, and a very long attention to it. In the first place, he should be very sorry, for the sake of the character of the administration of justice in this country, if any doubt were thrown on the verdict in a late trial at the Central Criminal Court, and he was sure it was not at all intended by his noble and learned Friend, who addressed their Lord ships second on this occasion, to throw any doubt upon it. There could be no doubt at all that M'Naughten was properly acquitted; but, at the same time, he must agree with his noble and learned Friend, that it would have been much more satisfactory if the trial had gone to its natural conclusion—if there had been a reply from the Solicitor-general, and a summing up from the learned judge. His noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had said that the law was very accurately laid down by the learned judge. But what did that signify after he had stopped the trial, and the prisoner was substantially acquitted? The play was over: the judge asked the Solicitor-general if he could rebut the evidence that had been brought forward, because, if he could not, it would be vain to proceed further. The Solicitor-general said, he could not, and that he thought it his duty not to press the case further. He did not wish to throw the slightest reflection on that most distinguished judge, Chief Justice Tindal, who was an ornament to the bench, and a bright example of the

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highest qualities that could adorn it; but at the same time he did regret that that learned judge should have been so much impressed by the evidence given by the individual witnesses that he should have thought it right to take that course on the trial. The impression on the public mind was, that if a certain number of medical witnesses, generally called mad doctors, had come into court and said that in their opinion the prisoner was insane when he committed the act, the trial was to be stopped—cadit questio. He agreed with his noble and learned Friend who spoke second, that the questions as to the prisoner's sanity ought not to have been put to them—that was a question for the jury, and not for the witnesses. It would be most dangerous if it were to go abroad that the mere expression of a medical man's opinion must be taken as conclusive. He knew a very distinguished medical practitioner, Dr. Haslam, who went a great deal further than the other gentleman referred to by his noble and learned Friend who had spoken last. Dr. Haslam said, "not that there were many who were more or less insane, or that all of us had been insane at one period of our lives, bnt that we all were insane. [Lord Brougham: "I have heard him say it."] He had heard him say it repeatedly, and Dr. Haslam would have been ready to prove it. It would be a most dangerous latitude of construction, to allow any person to call himself insane, and plead impunity for a murder committed in open day. The trial to which his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack referred was very different indeed from that of M'Naughten. It was proved on the former occasion that Hatfield had been in the army, had received a severe wound on his head, and been discharged from a military hospital for being insane. Within three days of committing the act for which he was tried, he believed himself to be the Supreme Being, and at other times uttered the most dreadful blasphemies. Within a few hours before, he made an attempt on the life of his own child, only eight months old, whom he most tenderly loved. Lord Kanyon, with the approbation of the whole country, stopped the trial, and the prisoner was from thenceforth an object of compassion, and not of punishment. He entirely concurred in the view taken by his noble and learned Friend who spoke last. He thought the law of England on
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this subject admitted of no alteration. As the law now stood, partial insanity did not give any immunity from punishment, and as this was a subject which excited much interest, he would beg permission to read to their Lordships a short, extract from the treaties of Hale on this subject:
"Partial insanity is no excuse; this is the condition of very many, especially melancholy persons, who, for the most part, discover their defect in excessive fears and griefs, and yet are not wholly destitute of the use of reason; and this partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing any offence, for it is matter capital. It is very difficult to determine the indivisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, or, on the other side, too great an indulgence given to great crimes."
As partial insanity did not excuse from punishment, it was necessary to prove that the person was labouring under a delusion at the time, which led to the commission of the act, and that he was not conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, as to observing the law or violating it. He agreed with what Lord Coke had said, that to execute a madman was a miserable spectacle, contrary to humanity and justice, and, above all, offering no example to others; it would excite the horror of mankind, and would only serve to introduce confusion of right and wrong, and bring the administration of justice into open disgrace. But then he (Lord Campbell) did heartily desire that the law might be laid down in a more authoritative manner, and for that reason he perfectly agreed with the expediency of the suggestion made by his noble and learned Friend of calling the judges together. The public mind was in considerable alarm on this subject. The public had been inundated by medical books calculated very much to mislead juries in the case of future trials of a similar kind. Those books spoke of what they were pleased to call a homicidal propensity, and contended that no man, under the influence of such a homicidal propensity, should be held liable for his acts. Dr. Alison, speaking on the subject, said:—
"Few men are mad about others, or about things in general, but many are mad about themselves; though a man understand the difference between right and wrong in the case

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of others, he may be under a delusion with respect to his own case, and thus be in a state of mental alienation, which makes him not responsible for his own acts."
And, again, the same writer said:—
"For example, a mad person may be aware that murder is a crime, but may believe that a particular homicide is in no way blameable, because he may believe that certain persons have entered into conspiracies against him, or that some one person may be his mortal enemy."
Now, if this view of the case were at all correct, there was no doubt that a man, acting under the influence of unfounded jealousy, might murder the object of his suspicion, and afterwards be acquitted on the ground of insanity. For these reasons he wished that the law might be laid down in an authoritative manner by the judges. He had looked into all the cases that had occurred since Arnold's case, and looking to the directions of the judges in the cases of Arnold, of Lord Ferrers, of Bellingham, of Oxford, of Francis, and of M'Naghten, he must be allowed to say, that there was a wide difference both in meaning and in words in their description of the law. He would repeat, therefore, that an authoritative statement of the law would be highly desirable, and, if necessary, a declaratory act should be passed. There was the case of Wood, mentioned by Lord Erskine. The man was supposed to be insane, and under that belief was confined in a lunatic asylum in London. He indicted those who had taken him into custody, and at the trial he was cross-examined for more than an hour with a view of showing his insanity, but so cautious was he that he completely baffled the counsel who conducted the cross-examination. At last the right spring was touched, and the insanity of the prosecutor clearly disclosed. This was at Westminster; and the prosecutor then laid an indictment at London. He was now on his guard, and no cross-examination was able to betray him into a manifestation of insanity. The only mode of proving the man insane was to call the short-hand writer, who read his notes on the former trial, from which it appeared that the prosecutor had said he was the redeemer of mankind, or some other phrase which implied a delusion of an equally striking kind under which the man was labouring. There was only one more subject to which he was desirous of referring, namely, the
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manner in which these unhappy people were treated who were acquitted on the plea of insanity. The present plan was most mischievous. The person so acquitted was confined in Bedlam, where he became a public character; and not only an object of curiosity, but even of courtesy and respect. He believed, that these cases had multiplied of late from a desire to obtain the comfort, the notoriety, and the indulgences which were supposed to be enjoyed by individuals acquitted on such grounds. A man acquitted on the score of insanity ought to be removed from the public eye, and heard of as little as possible afterwards. With these remarks, he would leave the subject entirely in the hands of his noble and learned Friend, with whose views he entirely concurred.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, there would be no necessity of legislating as to the disposal of persons acquitted on the ground of insanity, as the law already gave her Majesty the power of confining them in such a manner as she might consider most advisable for the safety of the public. The subject had attracted the attention of her Majesty's Government, and they were of opinion that an individual so circumstanced ought not to be made a public spectacle of in his confinement. As it was their Lordships' wish that the judges should be summoned to give their opinion, he would take great care that they should be called.—Their Lordships adjourned.