Sitting of 22 February 1839

MINUTES.
Bill. Read a second time:—Bankrupts Estates (Scotland).
Petitions presented. By Mr. H. GRATTAN, from Meath, against the present Tithe System.—By Sir EDWARD CODRINGTON, from the Seamen of North Shields, for redress.—By Mr. BRUGES, from Bath, for a system of National Education founded on the Scriptures.—By Lord DUNGANNON, from Bedford, against Maynooth college.—By Mr. PENDARVES, from Redruth, against the Beer Act; and for a Rural Police.—By Sir JAMES GRAHAM, from Glasgow, for Church Extension in Scotland,—By

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Sir G. CLERK, from the Orkneys, to the same effect.—By Messrs. R. STUART, O'CONNELL, and VILLIERS, from a number of places, for the Repeal of the Corn-laws.—By Messrs. W. DUNCOMBE, HEATHCOTE, and Lords DUNGANNON, and HENNIKER, against the Repeal of the Corn-laws.

INSULT TO THE BRITISH FLAG.
Viscount Ingestriewished to ask whether there would be any objection to produce the correspondence between the lieutenant commanding the Express packet and Commodore Douglas, and between Commodore Douglas and the British Government, upon the subject of the insult committed by a French officer upon the British flag at Vera Cruz. The noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty had not given any very precise answer to the questions put to him upon the subject; he (Lord Ingestrie) should therefore be glad if the Government would produce the correspondence which had taken place upon it.
Mr. Charles Wooddid not know that there would be any objection to produce the correspondence moved for by the noble Lord, if any such correspondence existed; but, in point of fact, no correspondence whatever (as far as the Government knew) had taken place between the lieutenant and Commodore Douglas upon the subject. Having been informed by the noble Lord of his intention to put the question, he had brought down with him an extract from the only communication which the Government had yet received—an extract from a letter written by Commodore Douglas, in which that gallant officer said—"I have also received a satisfactory explanation from the French admiral upon the subject of the pilot taken out of the Express, which was entirely a mistake on the part of his Royal Highness the Prince de Joinville, and the Rear Admiral has informed his Government of it." That was the only explanation the Government had received. It had been their intention upon the first report of the transaction to have made a representation upon the subject to the French government; but having reason to expect a full account of it from Commodore Douglas, they had thought it better to defer taking any further step till that account had been received.
Viscount Ingestriewas not prepared to say that what might be satisfactory to Commodore Douglas would be satisfactory to the House of Commons. When so great an insult had been committed upon the flag of England it was only right that the House should be placed in possession
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of the fullest and most complete information on the subject. He should wish to know whether there were any British ship of war upon the station at the time, and whether the pilot, upon the fact being known that he was improperly seized, had been immediately released? No greater cruelty could be inflicted upon a man than that of compelling him to guide a hostile force to the attack of his own countrymen.
Mr. Charles Woodreplied, that there certainly was a ship of war at Vera Cruz at the time, the Satellite commanded by an officer of higher rank than the lieutenant of the packet It was not in his power to say what had become of the pilot, because the Government had received no information upon the subject.
Subject dropped.

PRISONS (SCOTLAND).
Mr. Fox Maule Mr. Fox Maule moved the Order of the Day, for the second reading of the Prisons (Scotland) Bill.
Captain Gordondid not rise for the purpose of opposing the motion; although there were many alterations in it, they were by no means all improvements upon the Bill of last Session. All parties were agreed on the propriety and necessity of having good and sufficient prisons in all parts of Scotland. There were, however, several parts of the bill which he did not approve of. He did not like the separate system; and he thought it hard that Scotland should be made the scene of experiments on this subject. He objected therefore to all that part of the bill which went to provide three general prisons for carrying the separate system into effect. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would consent to have the bill divided into two parts, and bring that part of it which referred to the separate system as a bill by itself and on its own merits.
Mr. Fox Maulehad considered the proposition made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but he did not think he should consent to it. The case of Scotland was totally different from that of England. In England the country gentlemen had devoted themselves to the state of the prisons, and had spared no expense in bringing these establishments to perfection. The system of visiting justices was one of the best that could be adopted, in order to place those prisons on a proper and correct footing. In Scotland they had done nothing of the kind; they had a system

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which was confessedly and notoriously a disgrace to that country. When the hon. Gentleman said it was hard that Scotland should be made the scene of experiments with respect to the silent system, he should recollect that the Central Board in Scotland would have a power of discretion, and that they would remain subject to the control of the Secretary of State, which control would be subject to the revision of that House. He could not consent to divide the bill into two parts.
Mr. Pringleprotested against the statements of the hon. Member for Elgin, that the counties of Scotland had done nothing for the improvement of prisons, and that great strides had been made in England to effect that object. Great sums had been laid out by the counties of Scotland, and all of them, more or less, had made great exertions. He would refer to the report of Mr. Hill, to show, that large sums had been laid out in the improvement of prisons, and that the prisons were in good order. If the hon. Member for Elgin would consent to divide his Bill into two parts, there was no doubt but that it would be carried through both Houses of Parliament, to the great satisfaction of Scotland; and he wished to see this question settled at the earliest possible period.
Sir George Clerkwas sorry that the hon. Member for Elgin was not disposed to adopt the suggestions that had been thrown out. He wished to see some important improvements made in the state of the Scotch prisons, but he did not think the hon. Member was warranted in stating that nothing had been done by the county gentlemen of Scotland. By the former state of the law the whole expense of building prisons was thrown upon Municipal Corporations. He was ready to support that part of the bill which made it compulsory on the counties to contribute their fair proportion of the expense of building prisons in Scotland. He thought however that it was unnecessary that the building of penitentiaries and large prisons should form any part of the bill. The noble Lord opposite had stated, that it was the intention of the Government to call upon Parliament for a vote of money to erect penitentiaries in England, and if such a course were necessary for England he could not see why it should not be adopted for Scotland. If such experiments were necessary they ought to be made at the public expense.
Mr. Hawessaid, the object of the right hon. Baronet was to saddle on the general taxation of the country, the expense of erecting those prisons which the Scotch land-owners had for so many years neglected to build. The object of this bill, undoubtedly was, to erect certain prisons at the expense of the land-owners of Scotland, with the view of amending the system of prison discipline, This had been constantly opposed by hon. Gentlemen opposite—He recollected their opposing this bill last year, and he recollected that the great landowners threw out the bill in the House of Lords. It was proposed by the hon. Gentleman near him, and advocated by many on the same side of the House, and the only opposition made was by hon. Gentlemen opposite, on account of the little paltry assessment on their property." He wished it to go forth to the public, that the object sought was to assess Scotland to the amount of 30,000 l. in one year, which would not be a 1d. in the pound, and on that account an opposition was made to one of the most useful measures ever brought forward.—The report of Mr. Hill had been referred to in order to show how much had been done by Scotland, but that report showed exactly the reverse, for it stated that the different recommendations which had been given had been wholly neglected, and when this bill was brought forward it was met with decided opposition by the hon. Gentlemen opposite; every delay was thrown in the way of the bill, and when it got into the Lords how was it treated? Did the Lords meet the hill on its merits? No. It was referred to a Select Committee, and there the whole inquiry was cushioned.—The Report on the table of this House contained the most flagrant instances of injustice. The county of Aberdeen had been referred to as a kind of pattern county, but what said the inspector? The gaol was built in a very substantial manner, bu not with a view either to the employment or the separation of the prisoners. It was built in the middle of the town, and there were no means of inspecting the prisoners without their being cognizant of the fact. [An hon. Member—it was not worse than Newgate.] He was not one of those who defended Newgate, for he had always denounced it as a disgrace to the corporation of London, but he suspected it would be found to be an excellent prison compared to many of the Scotch prisons. In

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many of them every species of irregularity was carried on, and the prisoners could even communicate with persons outside the walls. He hoped the Under-Secretary would press this bill, and that the Scotch counties would be obliged to build and support their prisons. They were not asked to do more than what was done in the English counties—The present assessment in Scotland was far less than in the English counties. In many of the latter it was not less than 3d. or 4d. in the pound, whilst there it was not more than 1d. He earnestly hoped that the Under-Secretary would not be intimidated by the opposition which was now offered, and that the country would perfectly understand that this was neither more nor less than a refusal on the part of the Scottish land-owners to do that justice which had been done in every other part of the country.
Viscount Stormontthought the hon. Member opposite could not have paid any attention whatever to the Act: for if he had, he could not have been so totally ignorant of all its provisions. All parties were agreed as to the defective state of the prisons; there was nothing which the landowners wished so much for as a good and substantial system of prison discipline. The landed interests of Scotland were not opposed to the objects of this bill, as far as the improvement of prison discipline went; but they were opposed to being charged with the expenses of experimental prisons.
Mr. G. W. Hopesaid, that the landed gentlemen of Scotland considered it was injudicious that the general prison system and the local prisons—objects which were quite distinct, and which would work better separately, should be united. The aspersions which had been cast upon the landed interest of Scotland on this subject were undeserved. The bill which had been introduced last Session on the question did not reach the. Lords till August, and their Lordships felt, that it was a bill of too much importance, and requiring too much consideration to be passed then. The bill which was now before the House was varied from the bill as it came from the Lords in several important respects—and on all these points the bill ought to be opposed.
The Lord Advocateobserved, that the large general prisons, so far from leading to an increase of expense to the country, would, in his opinion, greatly diminish the
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expense. It was alleged, that crime had increased in Scotland; but he denied the fact, unless so far as that increase was occasioned by the shameful state of the prisons. In every other respect crime had decreased. Convictions of the same individuals often occurred, because no system of moral correction had been adopted in the gaols. There might certainly be a greater number of convictions than formerly in some parts of Scotland, but that was no evidence of an increase of crime. It was in consequence of a better system of police that a greater number of prosecutions and convictions had taken place. Many crimes, which formerly passed unnoticed, were now prosecuted. He knew, that in many parts of the country, where there was not a good police, the number of persons apprehended was diminished, while in those places where the police had been improved, the number of persons apprehended and convicted was increased, although crime had actually diminished. Nothing, therefore, could be more fallacious than to argue, that because there was an increased number of convictions, there must necessarily be a great increase of crime. He was prepared to show, that even in Edinburgh, crime had greatly diminished; and he believed, that if a better police were introduced throughout Scotland, crime would be still further diminished in that country. There could be no doubt, that the present imperfect state of the police, together with the defective system of prison discipline, very materially contributed to keep up the number of criminals in Scotland. He would not inquire as to what might be the cause of this unsatisfactory state of things; all he would say was, that if the people of Scotland, and their Representatives in Parliament, were prepared to remove this disgrace from the country, it behoved them to contribute, as far as they could, towards carrying this measure forward, which he was convinced was calculated to promote the safety, the character, and he would add, the economy of the country.
Mr. Gillonthought the objection to the bill on the ground of expense, came with a very bad grace from the country gentlemen of Scotland, when the fact was, that the prisons were kept up at the expense of the boroughs of Scotland. It appeared to him very extraordinary, that the Conservatives, who had been in power for many years without feeling it to be their duty to

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apply a remedy to the evils existing in Scotland, should now, when a Liberal Government was attempting to introduce an improved system there, try to throw every obstacle in their way.
Bill read a second time.

GENERAL AFFIRMATIONS BILL.
On the motion for the House to go into Committee on the General Affirmations Bill,
Mr. Goulburnsaid, that when the second reading of this bill was proposed, he forbore to state his objections to it, which were of a nature that, in his opinion, ought to make the House pause before assenting to the further progress of this measure. If anything could add strength to his original objection to this bill, it arose from the observations which fell from an hon. Friend of his (Mr. Gibson), on a former occasion. His hon. Friend declared, that he considered this bill to be as much for the benefit of those members of the Church of England who entertained conscientious scruples against taking oaths, as for persons of any other religious persuasion. He heard that assertion with very considerable surprise. It was only an additional confirmation to him that the bill was not understood, and that its tendency ought to have been fully explained to the House when it was first introduced. He knew, that it had been a fashionable doctrine among some persons of late, that oaths were altogether unnecessary, and that it would be expedient for the general purposes of justice, to remove the necessity of an oath being taken to fortify a statement of facts made by the persons examined in any particular case. He would not then enter into an argument upon that question, because that was not the precise occasion when such a discussion could properly arise. But he would say this, that however objectionable it might he to make a legislative enactment of that description, he conceived that an enactment would be much more objectionable which gave a power to every individual to determine for himself, whether he would or would not be sworn in a court of justice. But that was the actual provision of the bill then before the House. He considered that such a bill was not only at variance with the precedents to which the hon. Member for Lambeth on a former occasion referred, but that the bill had a tendency to create a system of hypocrisy and fraud, and other practices
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very dangerous to the due administration of the law. It was true, that for a long period past, indulgence had been granted to Quakers and Moravians; and subsequently to Separatists: and it was equally true, that in the course of the last Session, that privilege had extended to all persons who had at any time been members of those communities, but who had since seceded from them. There, however, the Legislature stopped. But these enactments did not furnish a precedent to the present bill. In those former acts, power was given to persons belonging to recognised sects whose doctrines were known and capable of proof, and whose conscientious scruples, therefore, could be received as a ground for their testimony being accepted upon an affirmation instead of an oath; but by those bills no power was given to other persons, not belonging to other sects, by merely making a declaration, to bring themselves within the privilege of those enactments, and to have the power of saying whether, in any particular case, they would consent to be examined on oath or on affirmation only. The bill now before the House afforded no clue by which the grounds of any man's objection to take an oath could be ascertained. If a man was a Quaker, a Moravian, or a Separatist, the ground of his objection could be known; but there was nothing by which it could be found out whether a man seeking to avail himself of the benefit of the present measure was acting bonâ fide, or for the purposes of fraud. So far with respect to precedent. This bill gave, he would repeat, an opening to hypocrisy or fraud. If any man had an object to promote, either by having his testimony believed or discredited, he could effect his purpose in one case by taking an oath, or in the other by making a declaration only. If, however, after having given his testimony on an affirmation only, under the plea that he felt conscientious scruples about taking an oath, and thus having weakened the credit of others in his evidence, he should wish to change the character of that evidence, it was in his power at any subsequent period to strengthen the credibility of his testimony by consenting to give it under the solemn sanction of an oath. But what would be the effect of this lax system on the whole course of proceeding in our courts of justice? It was impossible for any man who had ever acted in the capacity of a juryman or a

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magistrate, or who had been even a common observer of the proceedings in courts of justice, not to know that in the opinion of the public, there was attached to the taking of a false oath a degree of horror which was not felt with respect to any false statement made under the sanction of a declaration merely. This feeling operated also with the witness himself; and how much must it operate with those who had to deliver a verdict on the testimony of that witness? In every case in which it was necessary to examine witnesses, the court and jury were subject to have called before them willing and unwilling witnesses. Sometimes a witness would do everything in his power to discredit his own testimony; and a hat greater means for effecting this could be afforded him than that he should have the power to determine, when he came before the court, whether he would he sworn or would make an affirmation only? He might say, if he wished to injure the party who had called him as a witness, "I am entitled to give my evidence on a declaration merely, without being sworn, and I will do so, because I know it will so far weaken the force of my testimony." Thus a witness, by availing himself of the powers of this bill might, in many instances, most seriously affect the rights, character, and property of individuals, either by weakening his testimony in refusing to take an oath, or by strengthening it by consenting to give his evidence under the solemn obligation which an oath imposed. But the option which this bill would give to witnesses, would not only have a tendency to prevent due weight being given to their testimony by those before whom it was delivered, and by whom the cause was to be tried; it would operate very prejudicially with respect to the confidence of the public and of the parties in the decisions of the jurors themselves, because, he supposed, it would be competent, under this bill, for any juryman to select whether he would be sworn, or would make a declaration or affirmation only. This would be a most serious innovation indeed, for the oath of a juror was, in fact, the only security the public had for the impartial discharge of his duty. It afforded protection to the innocent who were unjustly or groundlessly accused; while it was a pledge even to the guilty that his trial would proceed with fairness and justice. But, if they permitted a
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juryman to come into the box who was not subject to be challenged on this account, be it observed, and to state that he had some time or other recorded a declaration that he objected to take an oath, and that he would, therefore, as he would he at liberty to do, make a declaration that he would act justly; if such an option were given, what, he asked, would be the opinion of the party who was to take his trial before that juror? It might be asserted by others, that a solemn declaration was equivalent to an oath, but the individual to be tried might feel most strongly that an oath was more binding upon the conscience than any declaration could possibly be, and the individual, whose life, property, or character, was at stake, would certainly consider himself less safe before a tribunal whose integrity, in his opinion, was greatly deteriorated by an oath being dispensed with, than before a tribunal who were under that solemn obligation. But could there be a more ready way of defeating justice than to get any man upon a jury who should declare that he would not be sworn, and then, after the trial had been completed, and he should be accused as having given an unjust verdict, he should be able to screen himself from the ignominy that would attach to the crime of perjury, by alleging that he had not been sworn? But he did not rest his objection to the bill upon these grounds merely; he objected to the principle of the bill. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hawes) had said, that it would be a great hardship on those persons summoned to act as jurors who objected to taking an oath if they were not allowed the liberty of making a declaration. But he would say, that there was no hardship in the case at all. The Legislature was bound to consult the feelings and rights of those who were to be subjected to a judicial tribunal, as well as of those who were to compose that tribunal; and so long as the feelings of the public were, as he knew them to be, adverse to the principle of this bill, and in favour of the evidence of witnesses, and the verdicts of juries being received under the sanction of an oath, so long should he be opposed to the adoption of any such measure. He might be told, that this was a bill which was absolutely necessary to maintain freedom or conscience, and that those who would not consent to it were the enemies of all freedom of conscience, and were indeed

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nothing less than persecutors. What, he would ask, was the freedom of conscience which this bill professed to give? The bill went to say, that the man who could pay 3s. 6d. might have a conscience, but that the man who was not able to pay that amount could not have any. The hon. Gentleman said, that all objection would be removed by the imposition of the penalty of perjury for making a false affirmation, but he would ask, how were they to achieve the punishment for perjury? It was an idle remedy, and would lead only to frauds. How were they to hunt the records of every petty and general session in the country and every court to see whether a declaration had been made? and, without doing this, how were they, in the case of jurors, for instance, to prove that a man had acted corruptly? Thus the remedy proposed to be given was, in fact, no remedy, the evil would be unmitigated, and he thought that the House ought not, in a matter interfering with property and affecting the lives of her Majesty's subjects, to pass such a bill. The hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Gibson) had supported the bill the other evening on the ground that it would give relief to the members of the Established Church; but with respect to the Established Church, it had nothing to gain unless by the improved administration of justice which this bill would not effect. The declaration subscribed by the members of the Established Church in the articles was, that though oaths were not to be vainly taken, yet that they might be taken for the sake of justice or truth; how, then, could a member of the Established Church make the declaration required by this bill, that he entertained conscientious scruples with respect to taking an oath? Feeling, therefore, that no relief would be afforded to them, but that the bill would defeat the ends of justice, he moved as an amendment, that it be committed that day six months.
Mr. Hawesbelieved, that many Members of the Church of England felt great doubt upon some of those articles, and it was the first time he had heard that it was absolutely necessary for the Members of the Church of England to consent to the taking of oaths. The right hon. Member said, that this bill would defeat the ends of justice; but he thought that when the House knew that the Chief Justice of England sanctioned this bill, that more than one of the judges also approved of it, and
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that many Members of that House, who were of high standing at the bar also agreed in its justice, they would see that the right hon. Gentleman's fears were unfounded? What was the state of the law at present? The Quaker could claim exemption, the Moravian could claim exemption, the Separarist could claim exemption—nay, more, any one who declared that he had been of the persuasion of the Quakers, the Moravians, or the Separaists, could claim exemption. All that had been already done by the Legislature, and he believed that they had never heard an instance of any mischief having arisen. What was their present condition? that the man who was dishonest would be equally unscrupulous about taking an oath; whilst the testimony of the honest but conscientious man could not be received; and what he proposed by this bill was, that this honest and scrupulous man might go before the same party, in whose presence he could make a declaration of allegiance or supremacy, and make a declaration of his objection to take an oath. The right hon. Gentleman said, that the bill was far from satisfactory, because, there was a fee of 3s. 6d. imposed for this oath, whilst there was no provision for the poor man; but would the right hon. Gentleman help him if he struck out this fee? The fact was only one of those ad captandum arguments, which hon. Gentlemen employed who objected altogether to the principle of bills to fritter them away. He was quite willing to strike out that clause, so that all persons who required relief might be enabled to avail themselves of this bill, and would thus get rid of the declamation of the right hon. Gentleman about the injustice to the poor man's conscience, which had been so much cheered by the other side of the House. He would also leave the question of fraud and hypocrisy to the House, for the House must be perfectly aware that an oath was not always a preventive against hypocrisy. It was not always that juries, though sworn, gave this verdicts in accordance with the evidence, particularly in political cases; for instance, had it not been lately asserted, that the verdicts of Canadian juries was not given according to the evidence, and yet they were sworn. In fact, so far from all verdicts being in accordance with the evidence, nothing was more notorious, that many circumstances acted upon the mind of the jurors, and

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the oath was no security. The hon. Gentleman opposite, the Recorder said the other evening, that persons who affirmed were not so likely to be believed by jurors as those who were examined upon oath: but the affirmations had been for some time in use by Quakers, and could the hon. Gentleman state one instance in which a Quaker, a Moravian, or a Separatist, had come before a jury, and had not been believed as well as if he had been upon oath? He called upon the hon. Gentleman to state any case in which an affirmation had been discredited; he believed that there was not one to be found. If, however, the course of justice was likely to be interfered with, or that fraud would be attempted because of affirmation, the hon. Gentleman ought to move for the repeal of the former bills. If this were not done, he could not see the reason why the members of the Church of England should not have the same privilege as members of other sects. Why, would they not pay any attention to the sufferings of those parties who objected to taking an oath? What was the law before Quakers were allowed to make affirmation? There were the most stringent penalties against those who refused to take an oath, or even persuaded others to refuse; such parties were liable to transportation, and yet these penalties all failed, and they were obliged instead of severity to introduce leniency; and if there were any classes now requiring relief, ought they not to extend the principle already adopted? Let him take the case of a recent murder in Ireland I suppose the facts were known only to one witness, who had conscientious scruples against taking an oath, would not this House have had a special bill introduced, to enable this person to give his evidence. But there were one hundred cases in which parties were subject to much personal self-denial, but these cases were never heard of in that House. If a man entertained a conscious objection to taking an oath, he was shut out of all professions—the whole of that class were excluded from civil rights, because the House chose not to relax the law in their favour, which they had relaxed in favour of others. He wished to call the attention of the House to some alterations which he proposed to make in the bill, in order to render it more unobjectionable. The principal alteration was in the second clause, and
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made it a positive misdemeanour for a person to affirm falsely, which should imprisonment render him liable to an imprisonment for six months. He wished to introduce another clause, that any person making such affirmation or declaration wilfully, might be convicted of perjury. He hoped the House would see that this bill did not deserve the character given to it by the right hon. Gentleman, and that it was nothing more than a pledge to extend to others the same indulgence which had been recently granted to certain sects.
Sir R. Inglissaid, that the hon. Member's fallacy was, in thinking, that a man who was capable of acting dishonestly would not shrink from the commission of perjury; but, swearing falsely was a crime in the minds of many a most profligate man, who would not care what falsehood he stated in simple speech, or almost what act of crime he would commit. Nor was this feeling confined to what were sometimes called the inferior or uneducated classes. Many men would state what they would not swear to—several instances happened in which men stated before Committees of that House what they would not swear to before Committees of the other House; and, where they found this difference in the conduct of men of education, what must they expect from less informed persons? A gentleman of much consideration in the country had given evidence before a Committee of that House which differed from what he had stated upon oath in the other, and when the difference was pointed out he replied, "one was only a conversation, the other was upon oath." This was the case of an intelligent, well-educated man. He could state also upon the authority of one of the Judges, but who was not at that time upon the Bench, that in a case of appeal, in which he was himself present, before the Commissioners for the Property-tax, a gentleman had stated, "that he had no return to make, he had no property;" he was subjected to much examination by the Commissioners; and his memory was assisted by a reference to a mortgage; he was asked if he had no mortgage, and he replied, "none" but when after all this he was asked, "will you take your oath of this," his reply was, "If it comes to that, I will make a return;" and that was a return of property worth 4,000 l. a-year. In fact it was always found, that an oath was more binding than a declaration. In the courts of justice did they not continually hear it said, "that witness is not sworn," or,

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"recollect, Sir, you are upon your oath?" and were not these conventional expressions grounded upon that distinction, that many would speak falsely even in a court of law, but that they would not swear to it? In fact, if this Bill passed, a year would not pass over without an attempt to get rid of oaths altogether. He did not pretend to measure the degree of moral quiet between a false assertion and a false oath. But the House was legislating for men as they are; and if it be found that men will hold themselves bound by the one, while they will lightly regard the other, it was most unwise to encourage a system, by which the sanction of judicial oaths would be superseded. No civilised society had ever been kept together without these solemn appeals to God: and, in fact, the belief in his Being had in some less civilised countries, been kept alive by them. He felt it necessary, therefore, to oppose the Bill in its present stage; and he regretted, that he had not been able to do so in that stage in which the principle was more immediately recognised. For private considerations he regretted the course which he felt bound to take, but in the discharge of his public duty he had cast aside all private feelings.
Mr. Gibsonwished only to say a few words in answer to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford. The first right hon. Gentleman had attacked his (Mr. Gibson's) proposition that this bill extended relief to the members of the Church of England, who were as much entitled to relief as any other part of the community. The right hon. Gentleman had attacked that proposition because, as he said, it was impossible for a person to remain a member of the Church of England, and yet object to take an oath; but he knew members of the Church of England who were admitted to her sacrament, and who participated in her services, and yet who did say that the taking of an oath was inconsistent with their conscience. He believed that there was not one Bishop who deemed it essential for a mere layman to adhere to the strict letter of the articles. Why, one Archbishop differed from another in the explanation of some of those articles, who then was to act as the infallible explainer of those articles. And did they think that to the member of the Church of England the same assistance should not be extended as was afforded to
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other sects, As to the objection of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford, that some persons were opposed to oaths altogether, he admitted that some did so object; but he did not? for he thought that in some cases they were of efficacy in obtaining the truth. He looked upon them as a mode of strengthening the conscience, and of preventing the influence of temptation; but in order to produce effect, it was necessary that the oath should be in accordance with the party's conscience. If the oath were against conscience, it failed to be binding, and served only to maintain hypocrisy. If it were apprehended that a man would affirm falsely who would not speak falsely on his oath, it would show that such a person was only acted upon by the oath through superstitious feelings, and from no principle of morality. They were bound to take no notice of those superstitious feelings if a man were called upon to take an oath against his conscience; and if they did so for the purpose of taking advantage of a pernicious influence in the shape of superstition, they would be repressing conscience and doing a great evil. He had not heard any argument against the principle of the bill which would induce him to alter the determination he had formed of giving to it his support.
Mr. O'Connellfollowed the hon. Gentleman with great reluctance, feeling that he might weaken the admirable speech that he had made, and he would not have risen had not one view of the case been omitted by that hon. Member. The bill was introduced not only to relieve the conscientious scruples of the witness, but to benefit the ends of justice by giving his testimony to the party requiring it. It was not solely for the benefit of the Quaker, that he was allowed to make his affirmation, but for the benefit of the public, of the prosecutor, and of the prisoner. He had known cases in which the greatest evil had arisen from the want of such a bill. Thirty years ago, in the city of Cork, he defended an attorney's clerk, who was indicted for forgery, and whose defence was, that he had authority to sign the prosecutor's name. In his defence he produced a Quaker, a most respectable man, a party in the respectable house of Deacon, and Co, from whose evidence the jury would have inferred the fact of authority. When he got upon the table the Quaker refused to take the oath; the prisoner was

827
convicted, and the Quaker went before the judge, Mr. Justice Day, out of court, and affirmed his knowledge and the man's life was saved; but if the Quaker's evidence had been received he would have been acquitted. There was another case in which he was concerned of great consequence to a literary gentleman whom he would not name in public, though he had no objection to mention his name in private; that gentleman was indicted in the city of Cork for a horrible crime imputed to him by a vile woman. At the time the crime was imputed to him he was at dinner with a Quaker gentleman in his own house. On the trial he produced the Quaker, who overcame his scruples and took the oath, saying, that as the honour and character of the gentleman was at stake he would take the oath. On the following day the gentleman prosecuted the prosecutrix against himself, and produced the Quaker who refused to be sworn, saying, that "yesterday he took the oath to prevent a great evil undergoing the lesser, but he would not do so again." [Hear! Hear!] Hon. Gentlemen cheered: but what had happened? Why, that one of the most abominable perjurers had entirely escaped. They would have prevented that highly respectable individual from having his character cleared, only that the Quaker had sacrificed his scruples to clear his friend's character and save his life. This bill was but the payment of an additional tribute to freedom of conscience, and it was therefore—no, he would not say therefore—but it happened to be opposed by those who were opposed to all liberty of conscience. Hon. Gentlemen forgot that in our courts of justice it was only a particular class of witnesses which was examined under the sanctity of an oath. The Chinese who was examined first broke a saucer; there did not seem much sanctity in breaking a saucer but it was done. The Mahometan was examined on his own faith; the Jew was sworn on the Old Testament; but the Moravian, the Quaker, and the Separatist were not sworn at all. To bear the hon. Gentleman opposite talking of an oath being preserved in every social state of society was most extraordinary. The hon. Gentleman had told them that there was no state of society in which it did not exist. Had the hon. Gentleman never beard of the State of Pennsylvania? there was not a State which was more moral or more re-
828
ligious, and yet they did not believe, that it was necessary to have a single oath. The House was told, that persons were inclined to respect their oaths and to abide by them, because their examination took place in public. But he could name one of the most respectable assemblies in the world, composed of men of property and talent, whose members, however, came to the table to be sworn, every one of them being careless as to the oath which they took, but looking to the side which they advocated, and the main inquiry being whether they were seven to four, or on which side was the majority. Why, it was impossible to say, that there was any respect for oaths when these scenes took place, and when the decisions which were given were upon the number of the party on either side. But with regard to this bill, he thought no possible mischief could be done by it, but on the contrary the greatest good. Juries were not now obliged to believe the evidence of witnesses called before them, but they judged upon their characters, whether that testimony could be received, and there was nothing in the provisions of this measure which would alter the law in this respect, and no greater discredit could be thrown upon a man's character, than by its being said, that he had never paid any attention to religion or morality during his life, and that he came forward being callous to every tie upon his conscience. He thought, then, that there would be a greater reverence of oaths if that bond upon men's consciences were not too frequently used, and that if any distinction now existed between the oath and the word of a man it was a false distinction, founded upon false morality. Had there been any instances given in which the oath of a Protestant and the affirmation of a Quaker had been contrasted? There had not, and he thought, that when men were to be found who construed the direct command given them to "swear not at all," as forbidding them to take an oath, the scruples which they possessed should be respected, at all events by the Protestant part of that House.
Mr. Lawsaid, that the hon. Member for Lambeth had particularly called upon him to state whether he had witnessed any difference between an affirmation and on oath in a court of justice. He had not come down with any particular case, but he begged to offer to the hon. Member and to the House the experience of

829
more than twenty years in different courts of justice, both for the administration of ordinary and the criminal law. He could safely say, that up to the present hour, that tribunal upon which the liberties of this country mainly depended—that the safety of the country depended upon which the property, life, and liberty of the country depended—he alluded to the juries of the country—up to the present hour the juries of England had preserved the greatest respect and veneration for an oath, and had acted under its influence. He was quite satisfied that whatever desire of popularity might influence those out of the House to support such a measure as the present, he was sure that the good sense of the country, and the feelings of those who administered justice, would be opposed to the present Bill. He had been perpetually reminded by juries in matters of difficulty and uncertainty, that a particular witness on coming into the box, had manifested a disinclination to observe the formalities attendant upon taking an oath. He had always found, too, that the administration of an oath, both to the witnesses and to the jury, was always attended with the best effects; and, such being the case, he, for one, was not prepared to diminish those sanctions under which justice was administered. It had been said, what value could be attached to the evidence of the man who had ventured to state that, when he was not sworn, which he would shrink from when he was? Now he had known several instances where a witness had been reminded that he was upon his oath, although he had stated exactly the contrary before; he had known many instances where, upon being so reminded, he had admitted that what he had stated was false. Every day his experience convinced him that, however painful it might be to extract testimony from a party which would be hostile to his interests, yet the influence of an oath was such, that parties, when bound by it, unhesitatingly gave evidence against themselves, which they would not have done had it not been for the oath. In his opinion, the exceptions from taking oaths had been carried too far, with respect to those who had what he would call elastic consciences, and who professed a disinclination to submit themselves to an oath in courts of justice. Such being the case, was the House, by its measures, to attempt to per-
830
suade men to feel conscientious scruples? Was the House to say to them they were men of no great religious scruples, but could they not find out something or other which they felt disinclined to swear to? If the House introduced bills to meet cases like that, they might find ragged recruits among those whose statements were not to be believed upon oath; but they might depend upon it they would not meet with support from the respectable part of the community. He did not believe that the hon. Member for Lambeth had the feelings of the conscientious part of the community in his favour. Holiest men in this country did not desire such ease to their consciences. There had been too many of such "liberal" measures—miscalled liberal, which were more mischievous than tyrannical measures. This measure would change the whole system upon which the administration of justice had hitherto proceeded. So far from saying it was a matter of hypocrisy to act under the obligation of an oath in a court of justice, he considered that all the solemnity of an oath was barely sufficient to carry out the objects of public justice. An experience of more than twenty years convinced him that the impression on the minds of honest and intelligent juries, derived from the middling classes of society, was not affected by these liberal sentiments of irreligion. They did not desire such a measure as this. He was persuaded that juries would attach upon questions of life, of property, or what was more valuable than all, of reputation—that juries would attach much more credit to testimony given on oath than to evidence given without that obligation. He could not but think, however, that these scruples had been carried quite far enough already. The Quaker had long been considered, and justly, as a rare exception to the rule, for their objection to taking the oath was in fact the key of their creed; but the indulgence which had been extended to the Quakers had been carried rather too far in regard to other sects, and this bill extended it to cases in which no real objection existed. He should be dishonest in the discharge of those judicial duties which he was called upon to fulfil elsewhere, if he did not declare his conviction that this bill would undermine the foundations of society, by injuring the administration of justice, and he was satisfied he was speak-

831
ing the language of the enlightened, of the educated, and of the conscientious middle classes in this country, when he affirmed that this bill was as much opposed to their feelings as to honesty, and that it was, in fact, a measure of unadulterated mischief.
Dr. Lushingtonhad listened to the speech of the hon. and learned Recorder with very great regret. It was not in that manner that measures affecting the consciences of large classes of her Majesty's subjects ought to be discussed—and this was the first time in his political experience that he had heard the Quakers, the Moravians and the Separatists, spoken of as persons of elastic consciences. Those sects might be mistaken in their theological opinions, but in their moral conduct—in their obedience to every obligation, to honesty and good faith, they were most exemplary—and when it was attributed to them by the hon. and learned Recorder that they were persons of elastic consciences—which meant a disregard of sacred obligation, which meant not being bound by moral duties and opinions of right or wrong—he knowing their sacrifices—knowing their sufferings—knowing their long endurance for conscience-sake, was bound to appeal to the House, and to the country, whether the statement of the hon. and learned Recorder was not calumnious? Now, with regard to the question before the House. How stood the law at present? A person refuses to take the oath. What is to be done? Commit him. For what? For having a conscientious scruple, which various Acts of Parliament had decided to be just and laudable in other classes of persons—scruples which might indeed be erroneous, but which he would not decide upon, as he would not, like the hon. and learned Recorder whom he could not accuse of tolerance—make himself a judge over the consciences of others. Well, the party was punished. But was the object attained? That object was to procure his evidence in the Court of Justice, and it was altogether frustrated by his refusal to take the oath. But, supposing that after having been committed, the person was to come back and express his willingness to take the oath, what would be thought of the conscientiousness of a person who first came into court saying that he had a conscientious objection to take the oath, and shortly after said, "There is such wonder-
832
ful virtue in the authority of the tip-staff, that now I am willing to take the oath." Why such a person would be taking the oath under duresse.—Even at the present time, a person might take the oath in what form he liked; and he remembered an instance of a person of the Methodist persuasion, who required to take the oath upon the Old Testament only, and was allowed to do so. And at the Queen's trial, when the question as to the form of taking the oath was mooted, Lord Tenterden said that a witness might be sworn in the manner most binding on his own conscience, and that it was impossible to go further. But the noble and learned Lord added one further observation which had struck him very forcibly at the time, and had made a deep impression upon thousands since—that when a man was sworn, in whatever form he imprecated Divine vengence on his head. This was felt so strongly in Scotland, that about fourteen years ago when the form of the oath was that the person knelt down and taking the Bible in his hands prayed God, that if he swore falsely, all the curses in that Book might fall upon him—it was represented to the then Lord Advocate, and he declared that he thought the objections reasonable, and altered the form. It would be the grossest impolicy, and most perfect injustice, to suppose that individuals might not remain good members of the Church of of England, because they dissented from some of its articles.—A more dangerous doctrine never could be promulgated respecting that Church, than that every man who partook in her communion—that every man who professed her doctrine, because he did not happen to coincide in one opinion, ought to be excluded from the pale of that Church; it would in his opinion, go in direct violation of the opinion of all the most celebrated divines since the times of the Reformation. The policy of the Church of England was not to thrust out of her pale, individuals who conformed to all her main points; but to make allowances for those differences which constantly would occur among honest and enlightened minds. There were persons not belonging to those sects who seriously suffered from their conscientious feelings. He would give one instance, that of a gentleman residing in one of the midland counties, who having lost his sister, became entitled to 4,000 l. He, however, would not take the oath, and paid the debts

833
out of his own pocket, and the property went to decay. There would be such cases—and was no remedy to be offered? Independently of the question of the jurors' obligation, to take an oath in fulfilling many of the offices of life, was a great and serious objection. It was stated, that jurors had a conscientious regard for oaths, or, in other words, that they gave conscientious verdicts according to their belief; but then it did not follow, that a change in this respect would prevent them from being honest men. He was aware that in the administration of justice they frequently met with an utter disregard to truth. But he further believed, that the main-stay with respect to the lower class of witnesses was not so much the oath they took, as the fear of the consequences if they were proved guilty of being forsworn.
Mr. Shawwould shortly state his reasons for voting against the bill. With respect to juries, in cases of doubtful evidence they would be disposed to lean to that party whose evidence had been given upon oath against that party whose evidence had been given without that sanction. He had heard jurors express great objections to persons who had not taken an oath. Suppose the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite to be engaged as counsel in a cause, and that he had to cross-examine a witness, and it was put to him whether he would have the witness sworn, or let him give evidence on his bare assertion, how would he act? He had no doubt, that, looking to mankind in general, and particularly to the Irish people, he would say, let him be sworn by all means. Hon. Gentlemen opposite said, that evidence might be lost, because they could not constrain a person to take an oath; but the question was, were they to endure that, rather than submit to a greater evil? They could not meet every possible conscientious objection. Then it was said, let every person be sworn according to the form most binding on his conscience. To that he agreed, but the question was, not about the form of the oath, but whether it should be dispensed with altogether. There might be a few who had these conscientious scruples, which cases might be met by such legislation, but it was of the abuse of such a law that he was apprehensive; and if they were to legislate to meet these scruples, they would open a door to more unscrupulous persons.
Viscount Morpethsaid, it must be ad-
834
mitted, that it would be desirable to relieve conscientious scruples, and prevent the possibility of such a striking and affecting case as that which had been mentioned by the hon. and learned Member near him. The question was, whether there were stronger countervailing objections on the other side. He so far agreed with the opponents of the bill as to admit, that there were cases in which the dishonest would shrink from perjury, but could they not attach the same penalty to the making a false affirmation as to perjury. He did not see, that the statement made by the learned Recorder, respecting the observation of juries, that certain witnesses had not taken an oath, was much in point. They naturally took notice, that a positive injunction of the law was not attended to, and they considered the neglect to be an evasion indicative of a desire to deceive. The same observation would apply, in not making a solemn affirmation, as it did now in not taking a solemn oath. Then they had the additional security which was provided by the preliminary formal assurance which the person was to give of his conscientious repugnance to take an oath, and it would turn out, that such a formal assurance would not be given by any persons whose general conduct and known opinions did not correspond. He was not prepared to say, that some of the details of the bill might not require modification; and the whole effect of it, he admitted, could not be contemplated without some slight misgivings; but when a discussion was raised on the principle of the bill, he felt constrained to give his vote in a way in which it would afford ease to consciences. It might suit the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite to call them elastic, but he contemplated conscientious scruples in a far different light, whether expressed by Quakers, Moravians, or Separatists, or any one else, who attached a more literal meaning than he did to a positive precept of the New Testament.
Sir Robert Peelsaid, though he might come to a very different conclusion from that of the noble Lord, yet he could not come to it without the same misgivings and doubts which the noble Lord experienced, but he was bound to decide between the conflicting advantages and dangers of this measure, and he found the balance to be against the further progress of the bill. He thought his hon. and

835
learned Friend had been misunderstood when it was supposed he had applied the term "elastic conscience" to the Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists. If he were correctly understood, he (Sir R. Peel) must disclaim all participation in that remark. So far as he had any connexion with them, either in a public or private capacity, he never found men more disposed to act upon the principle of Christian and moral obligation than the classes to which his hon. Friend had alluded. But it had been assumed in the course of the debate, that they were about to place the members of the Church of England on precisely the same footing as the classes referred to. He contended they were not going to place the members of the Church of England on the same footing. The presumption was, that an individual who belonged to the sect either of the Quakers, Separatists, or Moravians, belonging to a sect, one of whose fundamental principles was an objection to an oath; but that was not the case with the members of the Church of England, and therefore it could not be said, that they were about to extend to the members of the Church of England the same privileges as they would confer on other bodies. What was done in the case of the Separatist? They exempted him from the obligation of taking an oath, but on what grounds? They required from him this declaration—"In the presence of Almighty God I solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm and declare, that I am a member of the sect called Separatists, and that the taking of any oath is contrary to my religious belief." Did it stop there? No. The words were superadded—"as well as essentially opposed to the tenets of that sect." They would not require that from a member of the Church of England, and therefore this bill was not placing the members of the Church of England on the same footing as the sects whose religious principles were fundamentally opposed to it. His (Sir R. Peel's) chief objection to the bill was this, that they could not stand on the foundation they were building. A great part of the argument against the existing system was founded on this, that there was no difference between the obligation of an assertion and the obligation of an oath. Why, then, did they require a solemn affirmation? What did they mean by a solemn affirmation? Did they mean to super-add a religious sanction to an assertion?
836
If they did not, where was the distinction? What was the nature of the religious sanction which they sought to apply to the word solemn? Suppose, as the hon. and learned Gentleman had said, there should be a party who, referring to the word of God, found a prohibition against swearing at all why not respect that man? Why should you visit him with punishment because he acted according to his conscience? Suppose another man said, I find also in scripture an injunction, that my conversation shall be "Yea, yea, nay, nay," and that is all the declaration I shall make, and you object to it as the condition of relieving me from an oath, while in the word "solemn" you imply a distinction between the assertions I am to make in court, and those I am to make in ordinary transactions, I think you ought not to draw a distinction between degrees of veracity and credibility, and you ought not, by the use of the words "solemn affirmation," to make it appear more binding than the bare assertion of a man. I claim, therefore, to be relieved from your solemn affirmation. I ask you to trust to my word—to permit me to quote the text which I think favours my construction. What would they do with that man? Would they undertake to tell that man that his religious scruples were absurd and without foundation? If so, on what pretence? Who were to be the judges how far the scruples of a man were to go? Would they, in case of his refusal to submit to that form of affirmation, have him committed to the tipstaff? Had he not as much right to have his scruples, such as they were, regarded, as the man who conscientiously objected to an oath? If this bill were passed, they could not avoid going much further—to the extent that every man should give his evidence in a court of justice, or perform his duties as a juryman, under that species of sanction which he declared to be binding on his principles, or, perhaps, according to his caprice. The bill required, before evidence was given, that there should be a declaration in lieu of an oath. Suppose this declaration was omitted, what would be the effect where, perhaps, murder might be the subject of the trial? I can understand how, where a privilege is in question, under such circumstances such evidence could do no harm. But suppose a case in which the subject matter is crime, where the giving the evidence is a duty,

837
the omission would then become serious. I am afraid that at last the measure, if agreed to, must come to this, that, no man need make any declaration whatever, except what he himself recognizes as binding. Feeling, as I do on the one hand, the desire to relieve conscientious scruples, yet, on the other, weighing the balance of evil, the unwillingness there is to be accessary to the taking away human life on the one hand, and the fear on the part of juries to give verdicts against the accused in such cases on the mere assertion of witnesses on the other, he felt compelled, though he admitted reluctantly, to give his vote against this bill.
Mr. Lawexplained, that he did not suppose, that the noble Lord opposite had imputed to him that application of the term "elastic conscience" seriously, or in any other spirit than that of the amusement of debate. If, however, the noble Lord had so misunderstood him, or if the House generally believed that he had so applied the expression, he begged at once to withdraw it, and to say that he had not used it in any disrespect to any sect whatever.
The Solicitor-Generalcould not complain of the tone in which the right hon. Baronet had discussed this question, for he had stated it to be a question of the balance of convenience and inconvenience, of which he conceived the inconvenience to preponderate. In order to arrive at that conclusion, the House must consider that he was driven to the necessity of pushing the question to the extreme—a limit which he (the Solicitor-general) did not shrink from putting to the test. He was ready to admit, in the progress of society that there should be classes of persons who had a conscientious scruple in saying—"I solemnly affirm so and so," exactly the same principle which induced him now to say, he would not put the individual to his oath, would lead him to say, he would not put him to his affirmation. [Cheers.] He supposed hon. Gentlemen opposite who cheered, meant to say that was absurd, but he saw nothing absurd in it. Why require an oath at all? Some people said, it was the only test of the truth of what a party had to say. Let him call the attention of the House to one circumstance connected with this case, which would throw a great doubt on their sincerity who trusted so much to an oath. It frequently happened that a witness had
838
stated something which he afterwards denied on oath. If this importance of an oath had any weight, they ought to say, "Never mind, he only said it when not under the sanction of an oath;" yet everybody knew the case was established against him when they could get him to contradict on oath an assertion which he had previously made. Of what value, then, was the oath in this case? It was not the oath that gave the sanction, but the solemnity of the manner in which it was administered, and the circumstances under which it was taken. He would ask whether the present alteration was novel? Certainly not. Hon. Gentlemen must be aware of the great alteration that was made in 1829, when a declaration was substituted for an oath on taking office. He did not think the House would gain much by saying that exemption should be given to Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists, but not to individuals of other denominations. He thought the objection of the right hon. Baronet was a most cogent reason why the bill should go before a Committee. He felt the strongest conviction that the time would shortly arrive when it would be considered a complete mockery to think more of an oath than a statement. He considered the prejudice in favour of an oath would be removed by time and education.
Mr. Prymedid not see why, because the Quakers adopted a peculiar phraseology, and held exclusive observances, they should be entitled to a privilege from which the members of the Church, who only differed from the Church on the subject of oath taking, was debarred.
The House divided, on the question that the Speaker do leave the chair:—Ayes 93; Noes 125—Majority 32.

List of the AYES.

Aglionby, H. A.

Briscoe, J. I.

Aglionby, Major

Brotherton, J.

Archbold, R.

Browne, R. D.

Baines, E.

Bryan, G.

Bannerman, A.

Buller, Charles

Baring, F. T.

Bustield, W.

Barnard, E. G.

Butler, hon. Col.

Barron, H. W.

Cavendish, hon. G. H.

Barry, G. S.

Cayley, E. S.

Beamish, F. B.

Chalmers, P.

Bewes, T.

Clay, W.

Blake, M. J.

Collier, J.

Blake, W. J.

Cowper, hon. W. F.

Blewitt, R. J.

D'Eyncourt, rt. hn. C. T.

Bodkin, J. J.

Divett, E.

Bridgeman, H.

Duckworth, S.

839

Duke, Sir J.

O'Connell, D.

Dundas, C. W. D.

O'Connell, M.

Elliot, hon. J. E.

Pattison, J.

Evans, G.

Pechell, Capt.

Evans, W.

Philips, M.

Fielden, J.

Phillpotts, J.

Fenton, J.

Pinney, W.

Finch, F.

Power, J.

Fort, J.

Pryme, G.

Gibson, T.

Rice, E. R.

Grattan, H.

Roche, E. B.

Greenaway, C.

Rolfe, Sir R. M.

Hill, Lord A.

Salwey, Colonel

Hindley, C.

Scholefield, J.

Hobhouse, T. B.

Smith, B.

Horsman, E.

Stock, Dr.

Howard, P. H.

Strickland, Sir G.

Humphery, J.

Strutt, E.

Hutton, R.

Style, Sir C.

Ingham, R.

Tancred, H. W.

Johnson, General

Thornley, T.

Langdale, hon. C.

Vigors, N. A.

Leader, J. T.

Wallace, R.

Lister, E. C.

Warburton, H.

Lushington, C.

White, A.

Lushington, rt. hn. S.

Williams, W.

Marsland, H.

Wood, G. W.

Martin, J.

Wyse, T.

Melgund, Lord

Yates, J. A.

Morpeth, Lord

TELLERS.

Murray, rt. hon. J. A.

Hawes, B.

O'Brien, C.

Parker, J.

List of the NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.

Davenport, J.

A'Court, Captain

Dunbar, G.

Adare, Lord

Dungannon, Lord

Arbuthnott, hon. H.

Du Pre, G.

Ashley, Lord

Eastnor, Lord

Bailey, J.

Egerton, W. T.

Bailey, J. jun.

Estcourt, T.

Baillie, Colonel

Farnham, E. B.

Baker, E.

Feilden, W.

Barrington, Lord

Fitzroy, hon. H.

Bateson, Sir R.

Fitzimon, N.

Bentinck, Lord G.

Gladstone, W. E.

Berkeley, hon. C.

Godson, R.

Blair, J.

Goulburn, rt. hon. H.

Blakemore, R.

Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.

Blennerhassett, A.

Grant, hon. Colonel

Bolling, W.

Grimsditch, T.

Bradshaw, J.

Halford, H.

Broadley, H.

Handley, H.

Bruce, Lord E.

Hawkes, T.

Bruges, W. H.

Hepburn, Sir T. B.

Buller, Sir J. Y.

Hodgson, R.

Burroughs, H. N.

Hope, hon. Chas.

Calcraft, J. H.

Hope, G. W.

Canning, rt. hn. Sir S.

Hotham, Lord

Cantilupe, Lord

Houstoun, G.

Chapman, A.

Hughes, W. B.

Clerk, Sir G.

Hutt, W.

Clive, Viscount

Ingestrie, Lord

Cole, hon. A. H.

Inglis, Sir R. H.

Compton, H. C.

Irton, S.

Copeland, Alderman

James, Sir W.

Darby, G.

Jones, J.

840

Kirk, P.

Rickford, W.

Knightley, Sir C.

Round, C. G.

Law, hon. C. E.

Round, J.

Lefroy, right hon. T.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Liddel, hon. H. T.

Rushout, G.

Lockhart, A. M.

Sharpe, General

Lowther, J. H.

Shaw, right hon. F.

Mackenzie, T.

Sheppard, T.

Maclean, D.

Sibthorp, Colonel

Marsland, T.

Somerset, Lord G.

Maxwell, hon. S. R.

Stanley, E.

Miles, P. W. S.

Stanley, Lord

Mordaunt, Sir J.

Stuart, V.

Morris, D.

Stormont, Lord

Noel, W. M.

Teignmouth, Lord

Norreys, Lord

Tennent, J. E.

O'Neill, hon. J. B. R.

Thomas, Colonel H.

Parker, M.

Tyrell, Sir J. T.

Peel, right hon. Sir R.

Vere, Sir C. B.

Perceval, Colonel

Villiers, Lord

Perceval, hon. G. J.

Vivian, J. E.

Planta, right hon. J.

Waddington, H. S.

Plumptre, J. P.

Walker, R.

Polhill, F.

Whitmore, T. C.

Powerscourt, Lord

Wilbraham, hon. B.

Praed, W. M.

Williams, R.

Pringle, A.

Wood, T.

Protheroe, E.

Young, J.

Pusey, P.

TELLERS.

Reid, Sir J. R.

Fremantle, Sir T.

Richards, R.

Holmes, W.

Bill lost.

MINUTES.
Bill. Read a first time:—Poor Relief (Ireland).
Petitions presented. By Lord LYNDHURST, from Shepton Mallet, against the Grant to Maynooth College.—By the Marquess of LANSDOWNE, from Landowners in Wiltshire, against any Alteration in the Corn-laws.—By Lord CLONCURRY, from a Parish in Ireland, against Tithes.—By Lord DURHAM, from Hull, and a number of other places, for the Repeal of the Corn-laws.—By the Earl of RIPON, the Earl of HARDWICKE, and Lord YARBOROUGH, from divers places, against the Repeal of the Corn-laws.

OUTRAGES ON THE BRITISH FLAG.
The Earl of Mintosaid, that with reference to the seizure of a pilot on board a British packet at Vera Cruz, a despatch, as he last night stated, had been received from Commodore Douglas, an extract from which, with the permission of the House, he would read. The despatch was dated the 21st of December, and the gallant officer said—"I have received a satisfactory explanation from the Rear-Admiral on the subject of the pilot taken out of a British packet. It was entirely a mistake on the part of the Prince de Joinville, and the Rear-Admiral had made a communication on the subject to the French Government."
Lord Colchesterinquired whether the explanation or apology was a verbal or a written one?
The Earl of Mintosaid, he had no means of answering that question. The only communication which he had received relative to this transaction, he had read to the House.
Lord Colchestersaid, so far as the statement went, it was satisfactory; but he should be glad to know in what shape the explanation was given.
The Earl of Mintosaid, if the apology were satisfactory to Commodore Douglas, as that gallant officer declared it to be, it surely must also be satisfactory to their Lordships. The Government willingly confided in the discretion of the gallant officer, and he did not think, under these circumstances, that it was the temper of their Lordships to suppose that any thing had been done inconsistent with the honour of the country.
Subject dropped.

ASSASSINATION OF LORD NORBURY.
The Earl of Rodenwas perfectly aware of the great importance of the subject to be brought under the consideration of their Lordships this evening by his noble Friend near him. He, therefore, assured
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their Lordships, that be did not mean to claim their attention for more than five minutes; but he felt it to be his imperative duty to trespass on the noble Marquess opposite, while he requested an answer to certain questions which he should presently state. He thought, it was unnecessary to go at any length into observations on the state of Ireland, the more especially as it was his intention in a short time, to bring the state of that most unhappy country formally before their Lordships. But he owed it to himself—he owed it to those amongst whom he lived and whom he loved—he owed it to all classes of his fellow subjects in Ireland, to make some inquiries concerning a most interesting and melancholy subject as early as possible. He felt, that he should be guilty of a very great dereliction of his duty were he to allow even one day to pass, after seeing the noble Marquess take his place in that House, without putting a question to him on the subject of the awful circumstance which had lately happened in Ireland, then under the government of the noble Marquess. He should divide his subject into three queries; and he hoped the noble Marquess would feel it to be his duty to give an answer to each of them, and that his answers would be satisfactory to the House. He wished, then, to know, whether any information had been given to her Majesty's Government in Ireland likely to lead to the detection of the murderer of the Earl of Norbury; whether any persons were in custody charged with that crime; and whether the noble Marquess had any reason to expect, that that alarming conspiracy against life and property in Ireland, from which this tragic event, as well as many others similar to it, had emanated, was likely to be discovered and suppressed? Ale asked these questions of the noble Marquess, because he knew the deep interest which was taken in this country, as well as in Ireland with reference to the state of that part of her Majesty's dominions; and he sincerely hoped, that the noble Marquess would be able to give a satisfactory reply to all of them; because it was no small satisfaction to him, to know, that in all parts of England a very large portion of the community felt most deeply for the unhappy state of his country, and for the cruel persecution which was set on foot against her Majesty's Protestant subjects there, He now asked

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the noble Marquess those questions, and he trusted, that the noble Marquess would be kind enough to answer him.
The Marquess of Normanbysaid, the noble Earl opposite, when he last night gave notice of his intention to put a question to him, intimated, that he was anxious in doing so, to manifest all courtesy towards him. Undoubtedly on all occasions when Irish affairs had been mentioned in that House, the noble Earl had never, in the slightest degree, given him any occasion to complain of want of courtesy, or of not having given the fullest intimation of his intention. He understood now, that the noble Earl was looking forward to the day when he should be able to bring before their Lordships the motion of which the noble Earl had given notice—which he hoped would not be far distant—and in the interim the noble Earl felt it to be his duty to ask these questions. As to the second question of the noble Earl, he was ready, but only so far as his own information went, to give an answer in the affirmative. At the time he left Ireland there were three persons in custody—two from that part of the country, and another who had been arrested in a very remote district, upon suspicion of having been concerned in the murder. He had not heard what progress had been made in the investigation with respect to the share which those persons might have had in that lamentable and mysterious event. He was sure, that the noble Earl and the House would see, that it was impossible, that be should answer the first question—namely, what information there was, or how far it was likely, that means would be supplied for arriving at a just conclusion. With regard to the third question, which he understood to relate to a conspiracy, he had formerly had an opportunity of stating to then oble Earl, that the Government, at the head of which he had lately been, had always been ready to receive, and were most anxious to examine, any evidence tendered to them of the existence of any conspiracy. He was, however, far from admitting, that this deplorable murder had originated in any such conspiracy. [Hear, hear, from a noble Lord.] The noble Lord opposite cried hear, hear, but he was only answering, to the best of his ability, the question of the noble Earl. He could assure their Lordships that he looked forward with great anxiety to the time when
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he should be able to meet the noble Lord opposite with reference to a resolution which had been passed at a meeting at which the noble Lord was present. He should, on this occasion, only say, that any charge contained in that resolution he indignantly repudiated. He challenged a discussion of the subject, and looked forward anxiously to the period when the subject should be regularly introduced.
The Earl of Rodendid not think that his first query was satisfactorily answered.
The Marquess of Normanbysaid, if the noble Earl had previously stated to him the nature of his question, he might have been able to make further inquiry on the subject. His information at present only extended to the time when he left Ireland. At that period three persons were in custody, but he did not know how the investigation proceeded. He had strong hopes however, that it would be successful in detecting the offenders.
The Earl of Rodenwas extremely sorry to feel himself called on to make one or two observations on what had fallen from the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess said, he did not believe that there existed any such conspiracy. Now, he would ask the noble Marquess whether he had not received information from his own people that a conspiracy, on the riband system, or some other system, or under some other name, had spread itself through Ireland to a very large extent? Whatsoever might be the opinion of the noble Marquess on the subject, or whatsoever he might state with respect to it, he placed greater reliance on the judgment of others. He would, for instance, mention a venerable judge, who was called the other day to preside at the special commission. He had stated positively, that many of the crimes likely to be brought before that special commission were crimes connected with conspiracy. He should also advert to the resolutions sent to the noble Marquess by twenty one magistrates of the county of Westmeath—resolutions which were worthy of the magistrates, and worthy of the serious attention of their Lordships. In those resolutions the magistrates stated their conviction that a conspiracy existed (which included a great part of that county) against Her Majesty's loyal subjects.
The Marquess of Normanby: If the noble Earl desired it, he was ready, however inconvenient it might be, to go into

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the subject then. He was in the hands of the House; but the noble Earl, it should be observed, had only given notice of his intention to ask certain questions.
Lord Broughamwas of opinion, that a question of so much interest ought not to be introduced in this manner. It was for this reason—it was on account of the paramount importance of the subject—it, was because this was a question from which Parliament could not shrink, that the noble Earl opposite, whose motives he respected, should see the propriety of not bringing it forward in this way. It was not fair to his noble Friend near him—it was not fair to the noble Earl himself—to bring such a question forward for consideration in this accidental and incidental manner. Let it be brought forward in a regular and formal shape, and their Lordships would apply to it their grave and serious attention.
The Marquess of Londonderry; My noble Friend gave a regular notice yesterday.
Lord Brougham: the noble Earl stated that he would ask certain questions, which he has asked, and he has, moreover, spoken twice on this occasion.
The Earl of Charlevillerose in consequence of the personal allusion that had been made to him by the noble Marquess; and he would tell the noble Marquess that he was happy to meet him face to face, and he received the challenge of the noble Marquess in the same manner in which the noble Marquess had thrown it to him. He should be ready, on the receipt of petitions from his county, to justify the course which he took as a magistrate, and also to justify the resolution which he proposed at the meeting alluded to. He must further say, that he felt greatly surprised when a Minister of the Crown rose upon that bench and brought a charge against him for exercising his right as a British subject to petition the throne.
The Marquess of Normanbydid not make any charge against the noble Earl, but the noble Earl had made a serious charge against him. All he meant to say was, that he believed the noble Earl had not any well-founded reason for the opinion he entertained on this subject.
The Earl of Charlevillesaid, at the proper time he should be prepared to defend his conduct, and to maintain his right to give the advice he had given.
Subject dropped.

THE STATE OF THE NAVY.
Lord Colcheatersaid, that in rising pursuant to the notice which he had given to move for certain returns respecting the force of the navy, he must claim from their Lordships more than an usual share of indulgence. The subject was one of vital importance, inasmuch as it referred to the state of our naval defence. His noble Friend (the Earl of Hardwicke), who had originally given notice on this subject, had discharged his notice, and as nobody else had taken it up, he felt it his duty to bring the subject before the House. It would probably be in the recollection of their Lordships, that before the close of the last Session, on the 14th of August, in a discussion that arose as to the commercial relations of this country, a noble Duke (the Duke of Wellington), whom he did not then see in his place, made some remarks, in speaking of the blockade of Mexico, as to the state of the navy, and said, that, in his opinion, it had been reduced too low, and was not sufficient for the protection of her Majesty's subjects. To this the noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty was then reported to have said as follows:—
"If it, the navy, were not sufficient for the public service, he must take some blame to himself, because he certainly did not feel that there would have been any difficulty in obtaining from the country an increased force if it were necessary. But he had not received information from any one of our naval stations that the force placed there was not perfectly adequate to all the exigencies of the public service; and he could say with entire confidence that no call upon us could be so sudden, that it could not be met with ease, in the equipment of a large and powerful fleet."*
That was the reply of the noble Earl, but such contradictory opinions from such distinguished authorities made a great impression on the public, and particularly on persons connected with the navy. On this subject, accordingly, speeches had been made, letters had appeared in the newspapers, and pamphlets had been published. It had been said, that those who opposed the present system were influenced by party spirit. There had, however, lately appeared two publications from distinguished officers, signed by both, and who were both supporters of her Majesty's Government, in fact, one was a Member of the Government. The first was a letter addressed to a noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign
*Hansard, third series, vol. xliv, p. 1203.

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Affairs, by a most distinguished officer, long known in his profession, both for his skill as a seaman and his resolution and daring as an officer—known, too, as entertaining the most liberal opinions, as they were now denominated, and who had shown his devotion to those principles by his entering into the service of the Queen of Portugal, where he had gained a signal victory over the fleet of Don Miguel. He need not more distinctly specify Captain Charles Napier. That officer addressed a letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he pointed out what he considered to be the very inadequate state of the defences of the country as compared with the naval force which other powers maintained. It showed, that our ships were few, that they were ill manned, and that he considered, that the fleet of Russia was in such a state of preparation, that it might come down to our coasts and destroy our arsenals, and sweep our commerce from the face of the seas. These were not his opinions, but the opinions of the officer from whose letter he quoted. Captain Napier concluded by saying:—
"Whether you take this in good part or not I cannot tell. I can assure you that I am friendly to the present Ministry, and that I wish to remain so, but being a naval officer, and seeing the danger, I think it my duty to point it out."
Captain Napier also stated, that he addressed his letter to the noble Lord, because he was the Foreign Minister, because he had the honour of his acquaintance, and because he was the best judge on the subject. These opinions from a most distinguished officer, and one friendly to her Majesty's Government, were not published till after they had been addressed privately to the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department. With regard to the other question, whether our ships were sufficiently armed and manned, he would refer to the opinions of an officer, who was, at the time he wrote, a Member of the Board of Admiralty. He, however, did not know whether he continued to be so. This gallant officer had thought proper to write an answer to the letter of Sir John Barrow. Sir John Barrow had lately published a work which was probably known to their Lordships, but which, though it was not an official defence of the Government, was compiled from official documents, and dated from the Admiralty. In answer to Sir John Barrow's appendix, in which he vindicated the
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Admiralty, this gallant officer, the hon. Captain Berkeley, said—
"I avow myself the leader of this clamour. I say leader merely from the situation I hold as one of the Board of Admiralty; and thoroughly am I convinced that my opinions have the support of a very large majority of the very best practical men of every grade in the service."
He then proceeded to say—
"That there is a scarcity of seamen, and a difficulty to procure men for our peace-established ships, no one who has been employed afloat since the war, or who has really inquired into the subject will deny."
He next said—
"Men will not enter for ships having masts and yards, anchors and cables, nearly the size of a ship of the line, to be worked by the reduced complement of a small frigate. Men will not go where 275, a large proportion boys, are required to do the work of 350.
"The men call the frigates line-of-battle ships in disguise; nor will the knowing ones enter for them whilst there is another ship to be had."
Having stated the evil that existed, the gallant officer then went on to say how it might be remedied:—
"How are these evils to be remedied? Complete your ships to what is called their war or proper complements; see that you have sufficient men in every ship of every class to fight her and work her under every possible emergency; make the work properly light; and you will remove the dislike of the service by removing the cause."
Captain Berkeley next proceeded to state the reasons why a great class of seamen, who were most valuable and important men to the service, refused to serve in Her Majesty's ships. It was this,
"There is an absurd regulation now existing by which from 300 to 400 of the very best men are annually lost to the service. You will not allow men who receive a pension for twenty-one years' good service, to serve in the navy. You force them out of it, by refusing the enjoyment of the pensions whilst they continue to serve."
What was the consequence of this? These men would serve anywhere else—in merchant ships—even in foreign merchant ships—rather than in the Queen's ships. This was no real economy, for the places of these men must be filled by persons of an inferior description. This false economy, therefore deprived us of the services of 300 or 400 good men, and rendered them dissatisfied, for no earthly purpose whatever,

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He trusted that the noble Earl would consider this subject, for he could not fail to see that the cause of this dissatisfaction ought to be removed. He would only trouble their Lordships with one more extract from Captain Berkeley's pamphlet. It was as follows:—
"If we are to have a navy, which the world may respect, now is the time to make it perfect. Now is the time to give that conscious superiority to officers and men which will carry them through the hour of trial. Other nations are doing their utmost to improve—have improved—are improving. We cannot improve as long as we continue the system of half-manning and half-arming our ships"
Their Lordships had heard the opinions of two distinguished officers, who had commanded ships in her Majesty's service, and also were friends of the present Government. The one had spoken as to the insufficiency of the number of vessels, and the other as to the manner in which they were armed, and their complements, and surely these two officers were witnesses whose testimony could not be impeached. He might, perhaps, have rested his motion for the returns he intended to move for on this subject, but he must beg the indulgence of their Lordships whilst he made a few further observations. He would, however, at once state what were the returns which he wished to be laid on the table of the House. They were a return of the number of seamen and marines voted by Parliament for the years 1818, 1823, 1828, 1833, and subsequently up to the present time; also the number of ships that were in commission in the same years; also the number of ships stationed on the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland in the same years, and of the seamen and marines employed in that service; of the marines employed on shore; and lastly of the number of seamen engaged in the service of the coast blockade. When those returns were laid before their Lordships, they would be able to judge of the comparative force of our navy in different years: they would then see the difference between the present state of our navy and what it had been, and what it ought to be with reference to the naval establishments of foreign powers. He would then refer back to the state of the navy in former years; and first he would refer to the year 1792, because that period was so far removed from the present time that his remarks would not involve anything personal as to the Members of the present Government. The number of
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men voted for the service of the navy for that year, was 16,000, and was the smallest number that had been voted since the year of the declaration of the independence of America; and although that was a year of profound peace, yet it was the year antecedent to the most terrible war that this country was ever engaged in; so that the argument of this being a time of peace also was not of any great consideration for neglecting our navy. In the year 1792 the vessels in the home service consisted of eleven guard-ships of the line, four fifth-rate vessels, three sixth-rate vessels, fourteen sloops, and fifteen cutters; and by the same return it appeared that the eleven guard-ships were manned with 3,679 men; and according to the same calculation, the complements of the smaller vessels would be about the same number; so that the whole number employed was about 7,000. Now, by the official navy list for last year, it appeared, that for the same service at present, there were only four guard-ships, one of which only was an efficient ship, two brigs with ten guns, and two cutters, all manned with less than 2,000 men; and, if he added another ship, which was now employed on a foreign station, the number of men might be considered to amount to about 2,500, which was the full extent of the force disposable at present for the home service; but in 1792, when the whole naval force of the country only amounted to 16,000 men, it was thought necessary to have for our home defence 7,000 men; whereas last year, our whole naval force being 35,000, the force on the home station was only 2,500. In 1818, when the war establishment was reduced, and the country had returned to a state of peace, the number of seamen and marines amounted to 23,000 but that was soon after the close of a war in which we had gained many colonies requiring protection, on account of which it was thought necessary to increase the number from what it had been in 1792. We had then about nine vessels of the line as guard-ships, besides many vessels of smaller classes. In 1823, the number was about the same, and so in 1828, although in that year there were one or two attached to particular services. He should have stated, however, that in the year 1818, three vessels of the line were considered sufficient for the foreign service. One was stationed in the Mediterranean, another in the East Indies, and a third at St. Helena. In the year 1828, the establishment was consider-

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ably increased; a great revolution had broken out, and the battle of Navarino had taken place; and we had then six sail of the line in the Mediterranean; still seven sail of the line were retained on the borne station. In 1831, there was some reduction; and in 1833 the force was very materially reduced in every respect; we had then three ships of the line as guard-ships; two engaged in particular service; and the Mediterranean squadron was reduced to three sail of the line. The reduction which had taken place in our home force, was not only in the number of ships, but the complements of each individual ship were likewise reduced. In 1818, the guard-ships of the line were kept in a condition fit to put to sea at the shortest notice; and in the summer of that year, six ships of the line left Portsmouth for a cruise with all their officers and men, so that they might be exercised in naval tactics, and gain such practical readiness, as to be prepared to engage with an enemy at a moment's warning. In the year 1819, it was considered necessary to raise a force, commonly known as the coast blockade, for the purpose of preventing the smuggling which had been carried on to a great extent on the coast of Kent and Sussex; and in order that the country might not be put to expense, it was resolved, and in his opinion most unfortunately so, to reduce the complements of the guard-ships of the line, so that they were no longer kept in a state of readiness for sea; however, they had everything on board, all their officers, and a skeleton crew, which could in a few days be filled up with men from the service that was so raised, in case it was required. But in 1831, that resource was lost by the coast-blockade being abolished. In that year (1831) another squadron had put to sea, under Sir E. Codrington, but it was soon after broken up; and the ships sent to foreign stations, and in the year 1833, we had only three first-rate ships, having on board about 250 to 300 men each, although their complement was, in time of war, 900. He now came to the state of our home force in the present year, and he begged their Lordships to recollect, that the whole naval force voted by Parliament amounted to 35,000 men. The ships at present stationed on the home service, were the Howe, 120 guns—he did not state the number of men officially, but the returns for which he should move would show whether he was accurate or not—the Howe, 120 guns aid 285 men;
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the Britannia, 120 guns and 285 men; and the Royal Adelaide, 104 guns and 225 men. The total of the force employed on that service, then, consisted of three ships first-rate, with less than 900 men, which was not more than the proper complement for a single ship of that class—one ship of the line of 74 guns and 550 men—one frigate of 36 guns, two brigs of 10 guns, and two cutters—the whole force amounting to something less than 2,000 men, and only one vessel, efficiently manned. He understood that the three-decked ships were not fit to go to sea without being docked; and from their great size, that could only be done at Portsmouth and Plymouth, on two days in each month, because it was necessary that they should take advantage of the highest spring tides; so that it was possible that fourteen days at least might elapse before those two ships could be taken into dock and made ready for sea. With regard to our foreign service, he had already read so many extracts from the evidence of Captain Berkeley, that it was hardly necessary for him to trouble the House further on that subject, except to state, that the particular ships which carried the Admirals' flags at the East Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and North America, were only 74-gun ships, without anything approaching to their proper complement of men; and yet those three ships had been put forward among the 21 sail of efficient line-of-battle ships with which, as they were told in a publication in defence of the system of the noble Lord opposite, our navy was at present furnished. As to the Cornwallis, that vessel had certainly been put on a better footing; but with respect to the Melville at the Cape of Good Hope, and the Wellesley in the East-Indies, they had put to sea with the complement of fourth-rate vessels, having only about 432 men on board, whilst their due complement was 600 men in the time of war. In that inefficient state they had been sent to sea, and not to any place within reach, but to a distant part of the world. So strictly had that economy been carried out, that the officers who sailed in that vessel had been paid, not according to the rate of the vessel if she had her proper complement, but according to the number of her crew; so that, instead of being paid as officers of a first-rate line-of-battle ship, amongst which number it had been attempted to class her, they were only paid as officers of a fourth-rate ship. Upon whom did this principally fall? Not on

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the captain only, but upon the petty officers. Their Lordships would not think, that that was holding out any very great encouragement to those persons to enter that service. Now, he wished particularly to see the motives of that economy, because when they found, that the fleet in the Mediterranean was so large and efficient as he believed it to be, it was somewhat surprising, that it was so inefficient elsewhere. He had already shown, that in 1818 and 1819, one ship of the line, two sloops, and one frigate, had been considered sufficient to protect our interests in the Mediterranean; but now we had there nine sail of the line, three frigates, and a large steam-ship But out of the 35,000 men at present voted, there were employed on the north coast of Spain, one vessel of twenty-eight guns, two sloops of war, and a battalion of marines, about 1,000 strong, which did not much look like a time of peace, although that was the reason given for the present condition of the navy. He had compared the present state of our naval force with what it had been in former times of peace. He would now compare it with the force of other powers in the same periods. In the work of Sir J. Barrow, to which he had before alluded, there was a comparative statement of the naval armament of Russia, France, and England. In giving this Sir J. Barrow took occasion to blame the young officer (Captain Craufurd) for being too hasty in his conclusions as to the comparative forces of the three Powers, and blamed him for not having read the work of Captain Jones on the subject. From Sir J. Barrow's account compared with that of Captain Jones, it appeared, that in the year 1823 Russia had forty-two sail of the line and eighteen frigates, and that in 1838 she had fifty sail of the line and twenty-five frigates. There was a positive increase of eight; but the comparative increase was much greater. In 1823 France had fifty-two sail of the line and thirty-two frigates; in 1838, forty-nine sail of the line and sixty frigates. In 1823, England had 138 sail of the line and 146 frigates; and in 1838, ninety sail of the line and ninety-three frigates. In the same interval, therefore, in which Russia had increased eight sail of the line we had decreased forty-eight sail of the line. Besides, the English vessels were much smaller than the French or Russian, all theirs being built for eighty guns, whereas many of ours remained at seventy-four. What he had now stated to their Lordships
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applied to all the vessels belonging to those countries, and he would next proceed to give a comparative statement of the number of vessels which each of those countries had in commission. England had in commission twenty-one sail of the line, nine frigates, and five steam-ships; and of these twenty-one, three, which were guard-ships, had only about one-third of their proper crew; and three others, permanently stationed abroad, had little more than two thirds of their complement of guns and crew. France had in commission ten sail of the line and sixteen frigates, many of them carrying sixty guns; and these vessels were so distributed near her own coast, that her force might easily in any sudden emergency be concentrated. France had moreover a considerable force, twenty-two, he believed, of armed steam vessels. Russia had in commission forty sail of the line and twenty-four frigates. Moreover, France and Russia, by their mode of manning their navies, could at any hour increase their naval force; because, Russia kept her men constantly embodied, and France, besides the men employed on board the vessels in commission, kept what might be called battalions of men, raised partly from the military conscription, and partly seamen from the "Inscription Maritime," who were ready to man their vessels as soon as they were wanted, having been trained, not only to all the duties of soldiers but of seamen in small vessels kept in the ports for that purpose; we, on the contrary, when a ship was to be put in commission, proceeded at first by voluntary enlistment, and consequently a space of about three months might be lost; and he understood, that recently a case had occurred in which seventy-seven days had elapsed between the time when a shin had been put into commission and she was reported ready for sea. Their Lordships would also see, from what he had stated, that the ships which we had in commission were all scattered over the world, and that only four ships of the line had been left to protect our shores at home—very much less than one quarter of the force kept by Russia on her home station. Russia, having twenty-seven sail of the line and some frigates in the Baltic, and thirteen sail of the line in the Black Sea. Such was the statement of the efficiency of our naval force as compared with that of other countries. He must now call the attention of their Lordships to what was likely to happen if there arose any sudden call upon us to enlarge our fleet. He had no desire

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to say anything derogatory to the policy of any foreign country; and he was willing to give full credit to the Emperor of Russia for prudence and discretion, and to believe, that he would not needlessly give or seek cause of war with us or any other nation; but he only alluded to Russia because that country had a large fleet ready for service within fourteen days sail of our shores: whilst we had to protect them only four sail of the line and one frigate, they being stationed at three different distant ports, and that, therefore, if any sudden cause of war arose, we were not in a situation to meet any attack even from a force much smaller than that of Russia, a situation in which we were placed, not only from the small number of our ships, but the length of time which we required to increase that number. We had, no doubt, other vessels in commission, but they were so scattered up and down as not to be available for immediate service in an emergency. If, then, a sudden call were made for an increase of our naval force, we must, as our complement of men was short, trust to voluntary enlistment or resort to the plan of raising them by impressment, which he was sure their Lordships would not wish to see again adopted, if it were possible to avoid it. But it might be said, that a war could not come on so suddenly as to give no time for preparation; that war was usually preceded by manifestoes and declarations, and that these would afford time for preparation; but if those who took this 'view of the case would consult history, they would find, that manifestoes and declarations were sometimes accompanied by large fleets, and had been found most effectual when so accompanied, and that war was sometimes commenced without any previous declaration. In the year 1718 the Spanish fleet was destroyed by Sir George Byng in the straits of Messina before a declaration of war. In 1741 Commodore Martin sailed with a fleet into the bay of Naples, and threatened to bombard the city within one hour, if the Neapolitans did not forego their intention of joining their force to that of Spain. The government of Naples remonstrated against so unceremonious a proceeding, but the commodore was resolute and would allow no longer time for deliberation than the hour, and within that time the treaty was signed, by which the Neapolitans agreed to the terms of the British officer. In the year 1801 Sir H. Parker and Nelson passed the sound with a large fleet, before any formal declaration of
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war, and in a few days destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen. In 1807 that city was again bombarded by a British force before a declaration, and other similar instances might be cited. These would show, that the time for "preparation" was not always given in case of an invasion. One memorable instance of that kind had occurred in this country and at no great distance from our metropolis. In the year 1667 a Dutch fleet sailed up our river, took Sheerness, and burnt our ships in the Medway. It was true, that we were then at war, but negotiations were going on, and a treaty was pending, and the British Government thought, that things were settled, and the Sovereign had not thought it necessary to prepare a fleet for the defence of our shores. That was thought the less necessary, as in the preceding summer, our fleet had beaten that of the Dutch, and captured or destroyed 120 sail of their merchantmen in their own harbours. The historian of that event remarked, "that Charles the 2nd, by an ill-timed frugality, had exposed the country to one of the greatest affronts that it had ever received." But other and more recent instances might be cited in which hostilities had been commenced without any declaration of war. Within the last seven years, a French fleet entered the Tagus, and took possession of the Portuguese fleet there stationed, in order to resent an insult offered to some of the subjects of France; and lately, on a ground similar in some respects, a French fleet attacked and took the fortress of San Juan D'Ulloa. There had been no declaration of war with the Mexicans, and yet those hostilities had been practised; and so it might happen to us if we did not provide a more efficient naval force for the protection of our coast. Without going the length of supposing, that a Russian fleet might attack and burn Sheerness, it could not be denied, that with the fleet which she possessed in the Baltic, she might blockade our coasts. If she did, it would take at the least a month before, with all our exertions, we could get a fleet ready to meet hers; but let their Lordships consider what would be the effect of even one month's blockade of our shores. One would be, that all our homeward-bound merchantmen to these shores would be at the mercy of the blockading force, and besides the loss of property to our merchants, and the capture of those seamen who would be wanted to man our own

777
ships, the expected imports of that month would be lost. The loss which the country would thus sustain might be easily ascertained. From returns made to Parliament, it appeared that the amount of duties on imports in the last year was 23,000,000 l., or nearly 2,000,000 l. per month. Here, then, would a blockading force occasion a loss to us of nearly 2,000,000 l. of revenue in that time. Our exports in the last year were estimated at 43,000,000 l., or about 3,600,000 l. per month. Here, then, would be a most serious loss to our manufacturers, who would have goods to that amount thrown on their hands, and when they called out so vehemently against the Corn-laws, as depriving them of a vent for their manufactures, how much more loudly ought they to raise their cry against a state of the navy of the country which might lead to such ruinous losses? But it might be said, that in any sudden emergency we might call home the aid of our Mediterranean fleet. Let it be observed, however, that that course would lead to delay, and that it would be several weeks before a fleet at Malta could be recalled to our shores. But, it had been said, "There will be no occasion for ships of war; you may go into the city, and hire at any moment as many steamers as will be sufficient to defend your coasts." Would this be economical? Would you obtain vessels which were to be immediately brought into collision with the enemy, much under their full value? and if they could be so obtained, has it been ascertained whether they are built with timbers of sufficiently strong scantling to bear such guns as it would be necessary to use in steam-boat warfare. He did not think he exceeded the fact when he said, that there could not be found in the port of London ten steam-boats with timbers strong enough for naval warfare. What course ought the Government under the circumstances to pursue? He would say let them recur at least to the system of 1792 and 1818, let them have a home force of ten or eleven sail-of-the-line, let them be armed and equipped with their full complement of guns and men, so as to be fit for service in any emergency. This would, it was true, require an addition of some 6,000 men to our naval force, at a cost of about 400,000 l. a-year; but though he new the country would not relish additional taxation, yet when the loss by a possible blockade was taken into consideration, he was sure the country would think the 400,000 l. or
778
500,000 l. well bestowed which would guard us against the possibility of such a calamity. Let him suppose, that such a force as eleven sail of the line should not be required for home service, they would give this advantage—that they would always have a ready supply for any deficiency that might be felt on foreign stations. They would also enable the Government to send a fleet on a summer cruise, and thus make officers and men familiar with those evolutions which they could not learn in the cruise of a single ship, and which very many of our captains and lieutenants never saw, and might otherwise have to execute for the first time in the presence of an enemy. Besides this, the appearance of a well-appointed fleet would keep alive the feelings of the country in favour of a naval force. The sailing in a large fleet would also give a great excitement to sailors themselves. He remembered the excitement created by the sailing of a squadron under the command of Admiral Codrington on a summer cruise. Many of their Lordships went down from London to see the fleet, and thousands of the country people came from the adjoining districts to witness the cheering sight of the sailing of a British fleet. It afforded a strong contrast to the now every-day sight of our outports, from which we saw, instead of a ship-of-war, only the departure of some ship laden with convicts for some of our colonies. He had now gone through the chief points which he had intended to press on the attention of their Lordships. He had shown them that our naval force was deficient in the number of vessels and in the complement of men and guns. There were other points—such as those relating to promotion, to retirement, and to particular appointments; but these, though not unworthy of consideration, were unimportant compared with those which he had already noticed. Leaving those to the due consideration of their Lordships, he would conclude by moving for the returns he had before described.
The Earl of Mintosaid, he could assure their Lordships, that he felt great satisfaction in finding at last, that they were to have this matter publicly discussed in the presence of their Lordships, when he should' have an opportunity of answering whatever-charges had been alleged against the present administration of the navy. From the whole tenor of the noble Lord's address, one would really have imagined, that he (the Earl of Minto) had stood there guilty

779
of having greatly reduced and impaired the naval resources of this country, that the state of our fleet at this moment, instead of being more powerful and more numerous than it had ever been known to be at any former period of peace, had been reduced so low as really to render us unable to provide for the ordinary service of the country. The noble Lord, on a former evening, disclaimed all party motives in this proceeding. He did entirely give him credit for believing, that such was the case; but he must say, that nothing was so difficult as to ascertain what the true motives for one's own conduct were. It was very difficult to trace the workings of one's own mind; but really he would ask noble Lords whether they were quite sure, that no party motive was, unknown to themselves, lurking at the bottom of their acts, when he found, that at a time when we had, he would not say twenty-one sail of the line, because the noble Lord had very justly stated, that two out of that number only ranked as fourth rates; but when with nineteen sail of the line in commission they were told of the weakness of our force, and the danger to which our coasts were exposed, and of the want of due protection against impending invasion from all quarters. In 1835, when our navy was in an extremely different state in point of numbers, he was not aware, that the noble Lord had made those complaints to their Lordships. They heard nothing at that period, of our weakness—a period during which we had the smallest naval force for many years. Before he went into the general statement of the noble Lord he must beg leave to observe, that the whole of the noble Lord's argument seemed to be founded on the great error, that we were to maintain a war establishment in time of peace, that there was to be no distinction between peace and war. The noble Lord commented all along upon our want of preparation against invasion. It was perfectly true, that we were not prepared against invasion. We did not profess to be prepared against invasion; nor did he know a time when this country had, during a state of the most profound peace, thought it necessary to be so prepared. However, the noble Lord seemed to think, that he was too parsimonious, and, that
780
he might have applied to Parliament, which he seemed to think ought to have been done, as in case of need. He confessed that this was not a complaint fur which he was prepared—he owned that after all he had heard, the complaint preferred against him was of an opposite nature to that which he had expected. Before, however, he proceeded with the noble Lord's statements, it might, he thought, make the subject more intelligible if he were to mention briefly to their Lordships what was the force which they had now, and how disposed of, and then compare it with the force and the disposition of that force at other times. They had in Commission 19 sail of the line—of these nine were now in the Mediterranean, there being one more than he thought necessary for that station at present detained there on special service. Of the remaining ten ships, one, the Cornwallis, bore the flag of the Commander in Chief in the West Indies, and was not therefore to be included in our disposeable force, but they had nine sail of the line disposeable for the home or any other service where their presence might be required. He admitted they were not now all at home, nor did he see the advantage of having ships disposeable if no use was ever to be made of them. That they were in fact so disposeable, was sufficiently proved last year, when no less than seven British ships of the line were seen upon the coasts of America. These ships were employed in transporting troops from this country to our North American possessions to and from the West Indies, and from one part of our colonies to another. During the time that the ships were so occupied, they formed no part of the home service; that is, if any great Power were at the moment disposed to attack this country, it had no ships for defence, there being, however, at the time, no danger of being attacked by a hostile power. But then the ships having completed that duty, the greater number of them returned to England. Some were at present employed in temporary service on the coast of America, or in the West Indies, and at Lisbon. They had, he repeated, nine sail of the line available for home or other service, besides those permanently stationed abroad, as would appear by the following return,

781
Shewing the Ships of the Line in the Home Ports, at Lisbon, &c., employed as experimental squadron, or otherwise on the Home Stations.

1835

1836

1837

1838

Flag Ships

3

3

3

in Port

2

4

4

Lisbon

1

4

4

2

Experimental Squadron

5

In the spring of 1838, 4 ships of the Line from England and two from the Mediterranean, sailed to America with troops, making with the Cornwallis 7 on the coast of America, early in the summer. 4 returned to England and were available in August; 1 returned to the Mediterranean; 2 remained in North America.
This was a force which had not been exceeded at any former period of time. The noble Lord had said, that when he was at Portsmouth he saw nothing lying at Spit-head. That was very possible. Now, he avowed, that he was not very anxious to

Return shewing the number of Ships of the Line on the Coast of
England on the 1st January and 1st July of each Year, from 1821 to 1839.

YEAR.

On 1st JANUARY.

TOTAL.

On 1st JULY.

TOTAL.

Guard Ships.

Others than Guard Ships.

Guard Ships.

Other than Guard Ships.

1821

8

8

9

9

1822

9

9

9

9

1823

9

1

10

9

2

11

1824

9

9

9

9

1825

10

10

8

1

9

1826

9

1

10

7

1

8

1827

4

1

(1) 5

10

10

1828

9

9

8

8

1829

6

6

7

7

1830

8

8

7

7

1831

9

1

10

7 (2)

7

1832

4

4

2

2

1833

5

5

2

2

1834

3

3

1835

(3)

1836

3

3

3

7

10

1837

3

1

4

3

4

7

1838

3

1

4

3

3

1839

3

3

6

1. The rest taking troops to Lisbon. 2. Complements completed (summer squadron). 3. Guard ships put on present footing, 19th August, 1835.

have ships lying there; but he would tell where they were at present. They had a naval force at Lisbon, and a force upon the northern coasts of Spain, for the last four years. Then there were the three flag ships. In 1836 there were in port two sail of the line; in 1837, four sail of the line; in 1838, seven sail of the line; and at Lisbon, which was considered the home station, two sail of the line—making, in all, nine. In 1836 there was an experimental squadron of five sail of the line. [Lord Colchester—Perhaps the noble Lord would say where the experimental force was.] The noble Lord had complained, that they had but eight or nine guard-ships for protection. He asked their Lordships whether it was better to have eight or nine well-equipped, well-manned, well-disciplined ships, or the same number of half-manned, ill-equipped ships lying in port? The noble Lord seemed to think, that nine guard-ships would be a more effectual protection to their coasts—much more ready for any calls, than nine sail of the line ready to go to sea at one day's notice, and all of them within a week or ten days' call. He could tell the noble Lord how matters on this subject stood on the let of January and the 1st of July in each year from 1828 to 1839.
In 1828 there were nine guard-ships half-manned ships, and no others whatever. To the presence of these ships in fact, he attached no value whatever, except in so far as the noble Lord seemed to lay peculiar stress upon that point. He considered, that ships were much better at sea than in port; and the result of the comparison, that he had made was this, that during the years from 1821 to 1823, there never were more than ten or twelve ships in commission at all. From 1824 to 1826, there were sixteen ships of the line in commission; in 1827 there were seventeen sail of the line in commission; in 1828, fifteen sail of the line in commission; in 1830, eighteen sail of the line in commission; in 1831, fourteen sail of the line in commission; of all the above a large proportion were guard ships; in 1832, eleven sail of the line in commission; in 1833, eleven sail of the line in commission; in 1834, ten sail of the line in commission; in 1835, eleven sail of the line in commission; and they then came to what was called the decline of the naval force; on the 1st of January, 1836, we had twelve sail of the line in commission; seven more were commissioned in the spring, making nineteen sail of the line in commission for that year; in 1837, there were seventeen ships of the line in commission; and now in addition to the flag ships in India, and at the Cape, they had nineteen sail of the line in commission. At this moment they had the largest fleet they ever had in commission in a time of peace; they had nine ships of the line disposable for any service that might be required. It was not, he assured their Lordships, without very great difficulty that he had been able so much to increase the naval force. For many years past the demand for economy had been so great and so urgent, that he believed it to be next to impossible for any government quite fairly, or freely, to exercise its discretion. When he compared this state of things with the great expenses which they were unable to incur, he wished to throw no blame upon those who had gone before him. The comparison that he made was not intended to cast any odium upon them, but was only instituted for the purposes of his own vindication. They had been upon all hands urged to make reductions; and they too, before now, had heard of a great deal of credit being taken for the savings effected. He found no fault with them for this; but he conceived, that it would be impossible for them to continue longer in
784
that course. In turning, then, in an opposite direction he did not feel it prudent to brag, nor that an unnecessary display should be made of the expenditure incurred, which might not be in accordance with the feelings of the country. What he had sought, and what he had endeavoured to do, was to restore the impoverished forces of the country in this respect. There was an extreme desire to lower the estimates, not only as respected the ships, but also in the dock yards. In 1830, a very short time before his noble Friend opposite quitted the Admiralty, it was resolved, prudentially resolved, to effect a considerable reduction in the establishment of the dockyards; the men at that time were employed five days in the week, and it was intended, in effecting the reduction, that six days' work should be given to those employed. The men were also employed by the task or job work, which was, undoubtedly (for he would give no opinion between the two methods,) the one the most likely to have the most work done. It was the much more productive system of the two, if there were no loss in the materials, or if that loss was counterbalanced by what was gained in labour. An order had been issued for the reduction. It was proceeded with, but not in the mode that had been intended by his noble Friend; for the numbers were reduced to 6,000, and the men were kept at work for five days in the week, and paid by day wages. The effect of the reduction was seriously felt, and it became impossible to answer the demands of the navy. He remembered upon one occasion a difficulty being experienced with respect to cordage, and finding that the strength of the establishment was not sufficient to manufacture more than one half year's consumption of rope, he felt that it had then become absolutely necessary to put their dockyards on a snore efficient fooling. Measures were taken to relieve the shipwrights from works that were not proper for them. By thus appropriating works to them most proper for executing them, a great quantity of work was obtained and of stores produced; but the demand also increased; because their Lordships must be perfectly aware that the equipment and maintenance of seven sail of the line must cause a very heavy draught upon their establishment. All this had been done; all this had been supplied, and the stores were in an eminently satisfactory state. In addition to the twenty-one sail of the line, he

785
believed there were thirteen demonstration ships, and twenty-five or twenty-six ships in good condition. For all these there were now complete equipments. He heard a doubt implied upon this point by a noble Lord opposite, and he should, therefore, read for the noble Lord the return he had received. There was then at this moment, in addition to the fleet at sea, in store, masts, topmasts, bowsprits, courses and topsails, for upwards of thirty sail of the line, including the demonstration ships. In addition to which there was a very considerable store of spare masts, topmasts, courses and topsails in imperfect sets for ships of the line. With regard to the coast blockading service, he should trouble their Lordships with a very few words, as it was a subject very likely to be alluded to. In 1838 the guard-ships were suppressed, and there was an introduction of a new system for the protection of the revenue. He believed, that the value of the blockade coast service had been overrated. It had been said, that four or seven and twenty hundred of these were available for the navy. A great portion of them had been rated as able-bodied seamen; but he had heard from Sir James Graham, that when it was proposed to take them into the service of the navy there was not more than 800 of them fit for that service. He did not say that they were an unimportant branch for self-defence, but that their importance had been over-rated. With regard to the coast guard, they did not afford (as we understood the noble Lord) the same materials for supplying the navy in a case of emergency. As regarded the interests of the navy the change was certainly not of advantage; but there was a matter very important to be looked to, which was the revenue. It was obvious that a matter of so much importance as that must be taken into consideration. It was contemplated by the Government to make some change in this respect; they had it under consideration whether it would not be possible to find a neutral ground, so as to form a force which might be a portion of the coast blockade, and also available for the naval service. He did not know whether such a plan would be practicable; but although they had no longer a coast guard from which they would have any resource, yet they had a very effectual and useful resource in another way; he meant by placing the ordinaries in commission. A ship in ordinary was formerly taken care
786
of by officers upon half-pay, and the greater portion of the men were so feeble that they were hardly able to take care of themselves, and others were hired without being bound to the service. It occurred to the present Board of Admiralty that this was a very unfit mode of managing the public service. The old men were superannuated, and their places were supplied by active and vigorous men, who were fully fit for general service, and who could be sent to any place that it was most desirable. At this moment there was a body of 1,400 men who could be so employed. This was a resource—he was not saying that it was all that was desirable—but they had in their ports enough of men to complete each of their first rates. They had already sent drafts of men from their ships in ordinary. He wished to draw their Lordships' attention to the votes for seamen at different periods.

MEN.

1818–1823

13,000 to 15,000

1824–1829

20,000 to 21,000

1830

20,000

1831

21,000

1832–1833

18,000

1834

17,500

boys 1,000

18,500

1835

15,500

boys 2,000

17,500

1836, &c.

20,500

boys 2,000

22,500

besides ordinary

2,200

24,700

He had sufficiently shown that no weight was to be attached to the calculations of a very able and distinguished officer. With regard to its being said that the French had in commission twenty-six ships of the line, he denied it—they had no such number; and, as the noble Lord was understood to say, at the present stage they had only eight. With regard, then, to the Russian fleet, of which a great deal had been said, it must be plain that even the alarmists could have no dread of them at this season of the year. Their Lordships, in the first place, must see that the exercising of the Russian fleet was no new thing; for it had been going on for a long while. It became, however, now the fashion to talk and think of it; but the exhibition was one which had been for many years past,

787
as it was the only means by which Russia was enabled to keep up a fleet. The Russian sailors in winter were under sheds, and there they were drilled. He did not see why, every time that Russia chose to exercise her fleet, England was also to have a large fleet at sea. Was it the business of England to maintain a large war establishment capable of repelling invasion, and, on suspicion of being attacked by Russia, maintain twenty-eight sail of the line? Were they to do this unless there was something between this country and Russia to make them dream that war was likely to ensue? Were they to do this when they had the strongest assurances of the best understanding between the two countries? When, however, instead of disturbance, peace, harmony, and concord prevailed between the two countries, he did not see the ground for this country being called upon to send out eight or ten sail of the line in addition. When the guard-ships were discontinued the system of demonstration ships was very judiciously introduced by Sir James Graham, who, on retiring from office, left a minute recording his opinion, in which I wholly agree with him, that a certain number of ships should always be kept in greater forwardness than the common state of ordinary, and ready to receive their men. These ships had their masts in, the rigging overhead, topmasts pointed, and their whole equipment considerably advanced. That was the manner in which they had them originally; but they were not in that state now, and he should tell them why. It appeared upon the first inspection of these ships, that they were in a much less ready condition than had been expected. The sails were found to be rotten, and the masts unsound; it was, therefore, determined by him, upon having first obtained the best professional opinions on the subject, as the most effectual mode of having them ready for sea, to have the masts taken out and kept stored with the rigging; and he was assured that the utmost delay occasioned by this arrangement would not exceed one week, when it might be necessary to proceed with their equipment. Under the former system, there was more appearance of preparation; but this was fallacious as on the annual visitation by the Board in the autumn of 1835, nearly one-half of the line of-battle ships, lower masts appeared defective and unserviceable, and upon a survey made by order from the Admiralty of the 25th November
788
1835, there were found of these masts, serviceable 51, unserviceable 47. In reply to the charge of the noble Lord opposite, that he (the Earl of Minto) had indulged in a very injudicious parsimony, he would read to their Lordships a statement of the votes for stores since 1831, in which year a very large vote had been taken.

VOTES TAKEN FOR NAVAL STORES.

1831

£879,992

1832–3

523,500

1833–4

492,290

1834–5

465,090

1835–6

383,130

1836–7

424,000

1837–8

420,000

575,000

1837–8

155,000

1838–9

593,160

It thus appeared that the reduction was constant till 1835, when the vote had fallen to 383,000 l., whilst the vote taken for 1838 was for 593,000 l. He did not know that he could give a better answer to the noble Lord's charge of undue parsimony, than the contrast presented in these two years. Reductions had certainly taken place at different periods, but for which he was not responsible, and there was one especially which he had not ceased to regret. He alluded to the great reduction which had been made of our marine artillery. He was not aware of the reasons for this reduction, that what appeared to be good and sufficient reason must have existed, he could not hesitate to believe, because he felt bound to say, that he knew of no case in which any important measure had been adopted by Sir James Graham without full and deliberate consideration. He repeated, however, that he could find no good ground for this reduction which he must regret, affecting as it did perhaps the most valuable branch of our naval service.
Lord Colchesterinquired when these reductions had taken place?
The Earl of Mintoreplied in 1832. The noble Earl went on to observe, that the noble Lord opposite had also complained of under-manning the navy. Now, if he (the Earl of Minto) was not very much mistaken with respect to the manning of the navy, the complements of the ships were very much what they had been during the greater part of the professional service of the noble Lord. [Lord Colchester made some observation to the effect that ships were not the same; the reply to which was inau-

789
dible.] The noble Earl observed, that he was not going into that question, but of late years the complement had been considerably increased: and such as they were, they were established by officers of great skill and experience. But another most important change had taken place, and a change for which he (the Earl of Minto) was responsible, and that was an entire revision of the armament of the ships, and this, he believed, was the most important improvement in the naval force for many years past. An entirely new arrangement of the armament had been devised, not rashly, but with due consideration, and under the direction of an officer with whose merits the noble Lord was probably acquainted. That armament was now complete, and the effect of that armament must necessarily be, to require a considerable addition to the complement of the ships; and along with it a new scheme of complements was devised that would be ready as soon as it was possible to procure the order in council necessary to carry it into effect. On this subject he must observe, that it was not just to say of the greater proportion of ships in commission that their complements were smaller, or rather, that they were not larger than they had been at any preceding period, with the exception of the three years from 1831 to 1834. It had also been made a matter of reproach—he was not sure that the noble Lord opposite had alluded to it—but it had been made a matter of reproach, that there were no new ships built, and he wished to trouble their Lordships with a few words upon the subject [Lord Colchester observed, that he had not referred to it.] Well, it had been frequently alluded to, and he (the Earl of Minto) was anxious to state to their Lordships, that it had been the system, not only of himself but of his predecessors, to avoid as much as possible launching ships, whilst it could be done without. They were much better preserved on the stocks than in the water, and they were in the former condition quite as available. In consequence of the ruinous state of some of the slips, the launch of certain vessels had now become necessary, which he regretted. He had been disposed to adopt the system of the French, and to keep as large a proportion as possible on the stocks. The French system was this, that while they had a nominal establishment of forty sail of the line, one-half were on the stocks and one-half in the water. It would be as well if this country could
790
adopt something of a similar system, but it would no doubt be a work of time and patience. He begged pardon for having trespassed on their Lordships so long. He hoped he had not omitted any of the topics alluded to by the noble Lord. He wished again to repeat to their Lordships, that he should be anxious at all times to meet the utmost scrutiny into every part of the administration of the department over which he had the honour to preside. He would be most happy to give any information to the noble Lord opposite, or to any other noble Lord, which might enable them to detect, and so enable him (the Earl of Minto) to rectify anything wrong in that department. He must again remind their Lordships, that he had been charged for many months with having brought down the fleet to a state of unparalleled weakness and decay, while there never had been seen in this country the same number of ships in commission at a time of profound peace; while, too, the ordinary were in the best condition—while there were thirteen demonstration ships ready for commission on the shortest notice, and where a larger vote of seamen and stores had been taken than for many years preceding. There was one point with respect to the flag-ships to which the noble Lord had alluded. The practice was to send out admirals in frigates, and it would certainly be much more convenient to the Admiralty if that practice were continued. The admirals, however, with one single exception had desired, and always obtained, ships of the line. They requested to have a third-rate allotted to them instead of a frigate, to be rated, however, as a fourth-rate, and the Admiralty had acquiesced in the wish. There were two instances in which flag-ships had been sent to a distance without their lower deck guns or a full complement of mess; but there was no difficulty in supplying either deficiency. The Cornwallis had now her lower-deck guns, and had completed her crew. If the Melville had not done so, there was no reason why she should not. He did not recollect any other topic touched upon by the noble Lord. There would be no objection to the returns which the noble Lord required. There was one point, indeed, with respect to which he felt some reluctance, not for his own sake, but lest it might establish an inconvenient precedent. He trusted, that in giving a return of the disposition of the force at a certain time, as the noble Lord desired, it would be distinctly un-

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derstood that it should not be drawn into a precedent.
Lord Colchesterexplained, that in asking for a return of the distribution of her Majesty's ships, he did not anticipate any objection to giving it for the years 1818, 1823, 1825, 1828, and 1838.
The Earl of Mintosaid, that the year 1838 was that to which he had objected.
Lord Colchestersaid, he had not anticipated there would be any particular objection to that portion of his return. His reason for asking it was, that the noble Earl had consented to the production of a similar return for the year 1792.
Earl De Greytrusted he would be excused, on account of the relation in which he had formerly stood to the naval service, if he now addressed a few words to their Lordships. The noble Earl opposite had remarked, that the amount of men voted for this branch of the military force in 1835 had been the smallest of any year since the peace. He would shortly state the circumstances which had given rise to that proceeding on the part of the Government which then held office. The vote of the preceding year had been one of 26,000 seamen and marines. The noble Earl had remarked, that there had been a great cry in the country for economy in the military establishments, and a reduction of the naval force was then pressed upon Government in every possible way. The noble Earl would admit, that under these circumstances, it was not very likely that a call for an increase of force made by a Government which had just come into office, would have been favourably listened to by the country or granted by Parliament. Whatever course might be most expedient abstractedly considered, it could, not be denied that this was the most practical view of the subject, and that which any Administration would be obliged to take. The reduction of the naval force was not so much real as apparent. When he came to the Admiralty, he found the number of men borne on the books to be about 1,300 less than the number voted. The number fixed upon in preparing the estimate of 1835 was that of men, boys, and marines, actually serving at the time, 25,000. This was the ground on which they had determined to diminish the vote. He would be perfectly frank with the House, and at once say, that that number was a great deal too small, and, short as had been his professional connexion with
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the service, he felt it deeply and sincerely before he quitted office. He would merely add another word relative to a statement made by the noble Lord who had just sat down, that on the 1st of January, 1835, there were no guard-ships in the ports. Now, the Government with which he (Earl De Grey) was connected came in at the end of 1834, and he himself took his seat at the Board of Admiralty on the 31st of December. Whatever fault there might be on this score, none could be attributed to that Administration.
Viscount Melvillesaid, that knowing the importance of the subject, the sensation it had created throughout the country, and the observations made respecting it both within and without the walls of Parliament, he should not be justified in his own mind, if he abstained from stating what occurred to him respecting it. He would commence by saying, that he thought it unjust to blame his noble Friend opposite personally for any deficiency in the present amount of the naval force. In matters of expense, speaking from his own knowledge during the time when he himself had held office, it used to be the Government, rather than the department, that had the power of regulation. With these, the First Lord of the Treasury, rather than the First Lord of the Admiralty, was concerned. If the First Lord of the Admiralty had had it in his power to fix on the amount to be voted in the navy estimates, it would generally have been very different from that which Parliament actually granted. Therefore, it was unfair to blame his noble Friend for undue parsimony, except as a Member of the Administration. There were some points, however, on which he did not think his noble Friend, at the head of the Admiralty, had given a satisfactory explanation. The noble Earl had understood his noble Friend near him as making a charge against him on account of the deficiency of force. His noble Friend made no charge, but he complained that our coasts were not sufficiently protected. In that opinion, he (Viscount Melville) certainly did concur, and he thought, that in deviating from the well-advised course which Government had for a century past pursued, of keeping the sea-coasts of the empire in a secure state of defence, the present Administration had incurred a serious amount of blame. He must say, that at no period for a century past had

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the navy been in so reduced a state as regarded the force maintained on the home station. The noble Earl opposite said, that the amount of the navy was larger at present than it had ever before been in time of peace. That was his proposition, and in that he was fully borne out, but that was not the important question. The question related to the distribution of the forces, and the charge against Government was, that too large a proportion was stationed abroad, while our own shores were wholly unguarded. Now, even if there were no more cogent reason for adhering to the former system, he thought that Government, from a wish to consult the feelings of the people, who had always been accustomed to see the coasts properly guarded, should be very cautious in departing from that policy. He had not exactly followed his noble Friend's account of the distribution of the naval force, nor did he know how it was made out, but, if he rightly understood his noble Friend, there was at present but one disposable and efficient ship in the ports of the kingdom. Now, he would only say, that having been himself called on at the end of the year 1826, at an hour's notice, to provide a sufficient number of ships to convey a considerable body of troops to Portugal, a squadron of line-of-battle ships was instantly in readiness, which transported the infantry to Lisbon in a few days. The cavalry and artillery were conveyed in transports adapted to that particular purpose, and were a few days later. He asked his noble Friend, if he could send out such a force now, in a few days or a few weeks?
The Earl of Minto.Oh, yes!
Viscount Melvilledoubted his noble Friend's ability to do that, except he regarded the Mediterranean squadron as disposable.
The Earl of Minto.No, but I consider that the ships stationed at Lisbon might be available for such a purpose.
Viscount Melvillewas not aware that it would be possible for his noble Friend now to provide a sufficient force in such a short time as had been allowed to himself. His noble Friend seemed to consider that ships on a foreign station rendered more effectual service to her Majesty than if they were lying idle in harbour at home, and he entirely agreed with him; but if, in the present aspect of affairs, Government felt called on to keep a larger force
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than was usual in the Mediterranean, or on any other foreign station, they ought not on that account to diminish the amount retained at home. If they could not distribute their existing force so as to keep an adequate amount at home, while they had squadrons of sufficient magnitude on every foreign station, they ought to apply to Parliament for an augmentation of the vote. He thought, his noble Friend behind him had overrated the number of men, that would be required to man an additional number of guard ships, and the expense of maintaining them. In his opinion, 2,000 more would suffice to man these ships on the scale allowed for guard ships, and 100,000 l. would probably be the outside of the expense. An hon. and gallant Officer, who was, a few days ago, a Member of the Board of Admiralty, had stated in a pamphlet published by him his views as to the system that should be adopted in manning the ships of the navy, and, with one or two exceptions, he entirely concurred in them. He thought, his hon. Friend had made out a case, well deserving the attention of the noble Earl, and the Government, though he might just observe, that he hoped the practice of writing pamphlets in this way would not become universal. On this subject, although one of his most esteemed and respected friends had been a party, he considered, that the observations which had been made would have been better addressed to friends and superiors within the Board, than to persons who were not among its members. Much had been said regarding the Russian fleet. He would not enter into the considerations that might induce Government to keep a large force in the Mediterranean. It might be on account of the fleet maintained by Russia in the Black Sea. That power, as had been remarked by his noble Friend, had kept a large force in the Black Sea for many years, which had disturbed nobody. He was not aware of any political reason now existing why a larger force should be kept up in the Mediterranean than they had been accustomed to maintain there. At the same time, that was a subject for the consideration of Government, on which he would not detain their Lordships. He would dwell on the alarms that had been raised of an attack by a Russian fleet on our seaports. The state of our relations with that empire, and of its navy mast be fully known to Govern-

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ment, and it was impossible, that in the event of there being any such danger as that alluded to they should not take the necessary steps to augment the navy of this country. His noble Friend behind him had adverted to certain statements in the pamphlets he had mentioned as to the decrease of able seamen. They might depend upon it, that it was absolutely incumbent on Government to keep up a much larger force in time of peace than they had formerly been used to do. The hon. and gallant Officer he had alluded to stated, that there was a falling off in the quality of the seamen, that the number of thorough bred seamen in the service was far less than formerly. One cause of this was to be found in the decline of the coasting trade, which was almost entirely gone, considered as a source of the supply of seamen. That was now chiefly carried on by steam-vessels; the only important branch of it from which a supply of seamen could be obtained was the coal trade. This circumstance, therefore, made it still more necessary to keep up a large peace establishment, and both the Parliament which voted, and the people who paid, the money, must recollect, that unless that was done, they could not have a really efficient navy. He did not say, that a navy equal to a war establishment should be maintained during peace, but that a greater number of seamen was required, for, let them be assured, recruiting on any sudden emergency would not be found so easy as it had been. An account of the trade and navigation of the country lately laid before Parliament, which he had looked at to-day, confirmed the views he had taken the liberty of expressing. The first branch of the account stated the number of vessels employed in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom; the next, that of vessels engaged in the coasting trade. In the year ending the 5th of January, 1838, it appeared, that there were entered inwards in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom 18,113 ships giving a total of 3,215,819 tons; in the year ending the 5th of January, 1839, 19,639 ships of 3,501,254 tons. There were cleared outwards last year 15,526 ships of 2,578,918 tons; this year 17,204 ships of 2,916,302 tons. In the coasting trade of the United Kingdom there were entered inwards last year 128,011 ships, of 10,409,370 tons; this year, 128,171 ships, of 10,491,752 tons. There were cleared outwards last year 138,790 ships,
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of 10,901,187 tons; this year, 137,803 ships of 10,825,523 tons. Thus it appeared, that the coasting trade was looking downwards, while on the other hand the foreign trade was increasing. He mentioned this to show, that steam navigation though very much cried up, and a very great convenience in many respects, was productive of most unfortunate effects, as regarded the maintenance of a nursery of seamen in the coasting trade. How far these effects might be counterbalanced by employing a greater number of men in the navy, during peace, he would not pretend to say, but it was clear, that the country must lay its account in keeping up a larger peace establishment. The same pamphlet to which he had alluded stated, that our ships were at present undermanned. It was true, that a difference had hitherto been made between the war complement and peace complement of a ship; but there could be no doubt, that the ships now built required larger complements. The present system, it was said, had caused great discontent among the crews, and diminished their activity and efficiency. He rejoiced to hear from his noble Friend, that this subject was now under revision, and he hoped the complements would be increased on such a scale as would be satisfactory to the navy and their Lordships. There was another point adverted to by the noble Earl and his noble Friend behind him, on which he wished to say a word. He alluded to the regulation passed by the Board of Admiralty, soon after the peace, for preventing seamen from serving, while they received a pension. Soon after the close of the war, a great many men were discharged on pension. The object which the Admiralty proposed by this step was to have as many men as possible, not only on hoard, but available for service at any time when they might be required, It was very obvious that no more expense would be incurred by paying a pensioner than another man; but when the regulation was made, at the close of the war, circumstances were very different from those which now presented themselves. They wished then to secure a large force of able seamen; but it was said that these had now much declined in number, and it might, therefore, be expedient to repeal the regulation. We had thus two good men instead of one, and at no additional expense. It was very probable that the

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number of able seamen whom you would now be able to obtain would be too small. If that were the case, it would be a good reason for rescinding the regulation; but if the same thing were to do over again under the same circumstances, he should have no hesitation whatever in doing it. His noble friend had also alluded to the subject of the coast blockade, and had expressed his regret that it had not been retained on its old footing. He hoped that after that expression of regret, his noble friend would take measures to restore that force once more to the navy. The history of that force was shortly this:—At the close of the war a guard ship had been stationed in the Downs. One reason for its being stationed there was the protection of the revenue in the narrow seas in that quarter. A very able officer, who was in command of it, Captain M'Culloch, thought that, instead of keeping his men night and day in his boats watching for smugglers, it would be better to land them in detachments on the coast. He accordingly did so land them, and stationed them in different parties all along the coast, from Walmer castle up to Sandwich. Severe conflicts took place in consequence between the seamen and the smugglers on the latter attempting to land their cargoes, but the seamen invariably got the better. The system answered so well that it was extended to all the coast of Kent and Sussex, from Sheerness round by the North and South Forelands to Newhaven, in Sussex. Two guard ships were stationed on the coast, one in the Downs and the other at Newhaven. His noble Friend had said, and had said truly, that although all the men in the coast blockade were not able seamen, still there was also an available naval force. You could take 400 or 500 men from it at any time of emergency; and he had himself draughted 500 men from it at the time it was deemed necessary to send an expedition with all despatch to Lisbon. He hoped from what had fallen that evening from his noble Friend, that measures would be taken to restore that branch of the public service, and to give the navy the benefit of it in cases of emergency. The only other topic to which his noble Friend had alluded, and that too incidentally, was one of paramount importance in his opinion. His noble Friend had talked of the system now adopted in our dockyards, and of
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the mode of carrying on the work there. He (Lord Melville) was not standing there either to censure or to praise any person or any government, merely because they had not employed those who were his (Lord Melville's) political Friends or opponents. But he should be wanting in the duty which he owed to himself and to the country, if he refrained from stating his honest conviction on this subject, let the blame fall where it might. The practice years ago had been to employ the men in the dockyards by piece-work. Whilst he (Lord Melville) was at the Admiralty, it was the constant endeavour of both the Admiralty and the Navy Board to keep up that system, and to apply it to every branch of the dockyards. Indeed, the object of the surveyor of the dockyards had been to establish prices for every piece of work which it might become necessary to have performed. There was not a single ship-builder in the country who employed men at a day's wages; all the work of private yards was done by the piece and task work. For some reason or other, which he did not comprehend, that system had been put an end to in the public dockyards about seven or eight years ago. He believed that it had already been found to have been an unprofitable change, and that his noble Friend, unless he restored the system of task and job work, would discover that he would not be able to fit out a fleet immediately in case of emergency. Besides, the men themselves in the dockyards were not at all satisfied with the present system. A most useful and meritorious servant, the present surveyor of the navy, had been appointed to the situation without having been brought up in the dock-yards. He was, therefore, not aware of the system which had long been established there. He could not, therefore properly superintend the financial department of the dockyards, which was, indeed, a most important department. He believed, that he had sufficient authority for saying, that the men would not perform at day's wages the same work in a given time as they did perform when they were paid differently, Besides, the whole system at present established he could not for his life understand. The practice had been to employ so many men for so many days in the week; and he would tell their Lordships why he had established that practice. At the close of the war we had more ship-

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wrights in the dockyards than we could well employ. He was anxious not to dismiss them, because he knew that shipwrights were not, like common joiners or carpenters, to be procured every day. He, therefore, determined to keep them all in employment, and to look for a reduction of them to their dying off, or to their voluntary retirement. He had, therefore, fallen on several devices to keep them all in employment. One of these devices was to employ them only five days a-week, and another was to employ them as common labourers in other departments of the dockyards, and the men readily submitted to these privations rather than relinquish their situations altogether in the yards. He thought that the system of keeping up even more shipwrights than we absolutely wanted, in time of peace, was better than the system of keeping up only such as were wanted at day's wages. He had not kept up any mere joiner or carpenter, for those he knew that he could get from the country at any time that he wanted them. But it was not so with respect to shipwrights, for that was a distinct business. His system, however had been abandoned; the men were put upon day's wages, and the quantity of work now done in a given time was less than it was formerly. He thought that, if the Admiralty were to return to the former practice, they would not only get more work done for the same money, but would also give encouragement, which was much wanted, to the labourers themselves. He begged to apologise to their Lordships for intruding upon their attention at such length, but he hoped that they would excuse him, on account of the interest which he took in every department of the naval service.
The Earl of Mintorose for the purpose of setting his noble Friend right upon a subject on which he had misunderstood him. In speaking of the change of armament, his noble Friend had understood him to say that it was under the consideration of the Admiralty at present. Now, the change had been made already; and it would make an addition to the war complement, and therefore a corresponding addition to the peace complement, necessary. He had also said, that he had a large disposable force at home, and his noble Friend seemed to question that point. He admitted, that whilst vessels were employed on foreign service, they could not be considered as a disposable force at home, any
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more than they could on the occasion when his noble Friend had sent off his disposable force at home to Lisbon. At present, there were, besides the ships at home, two sail of the line at Lisbon, and two others on temporary service, which could be recalled at a very short notice.
The Earl of Hardwickeexpressed his satisfaction, that the noble Lord behind him (Lord Colchester) had taken up the subject in consequence of his having withdrawn the motion of which he had formerly given notice; for he felt convinced, that the noble Lord had executed the task better than he could have executed it. He, therefore, felt no jealousy, that the noble Lord had stolen a march upon him, but was glad, that he had brought the matter before the House with so much temper and ability. He was not one of those who thought it necessary, that because Russia had a fleet of forty sail, and because France had a fleet of such and such an extent at sea, that we were also bound to have an equally large armament ready for sea in our ports. Neither was he one of those who thought it necessary, that our ships should be as fully manned in time of peace, as they were in time of war; but he was one of those who thought, that whatever force we might deem it necessary to send into the Baltic, the Mediterranean, or the Black Sea, it was highly important, that we should have a reserve force at home in our ports, and that such force ought not to be abandoned. The subject had been so fully discussed on the part of his noble Friend behind him, that he felt it to be quite unnecessary, for him to offer any reply to the observations which had fallen from the noble Lord, at the head of the Admiralty, respecting the force which we had at this moment at sea. He would, however, venture to trespass for a very few minutes on the indulgence of the House, whilst he made some remarks on a part of our force to which his noble Friend had made several allusions which still remained without a reply from the noble Earl opposite. He wished, in the first place, to call the attention of their Lordships to the state of our naval equipment in the year 1826—a year which he had selected, because our navy estimates were not then framed upon the turn of an administration, or with any view to party or political purposes—because it was a period before we commenced that reduction of our guard ships, which had arisen from a desire on the part of the country to reduce its establishments, and from what

801
he must call a false spirit of economy, rather than from any fault or deliberate design on the part of the Ministry. The subject was now forced upon the attention of their Lordships; and from this time forward it would be necessary for the First Lord of the Admiralty to set seriously and actively to work to restore matters to a condition really efficient. It had been his intention to introduce this subject last year to the notice of their Lordships; but he had been induced to forego his intention, partly by his knowledge of the wretched and unprovided state of our dockyards at that time, and partly by his knowledge of the negotiations which we were then carrying on with Turkey for the formation of a treaty, of which Russia was not unnaturally jealous. He thought, that if the subject were then brought formally under the consideration of their Lordships, it might influence these negotiations injuriously, and enable Russia to carry matters with a higher hand than she would otherwise venture to do. He believed, that from that period down to the present time, the noble Earl opposite had exerted himself most strenuously to bring back the state of our reserves to an efficient condition. He likewise believed, that after all the noble Earl's efforts, the state of our reserves was at present much lower than he wished it permanently to be. How the noble Earl had got the returns which he had that day read to the House, was to him indeed astonishing. Not that he suspected the noble Earl of having stated anything which he knew to be untrue—far from, it: still, he could not conceal his opinion, that either some magic wand must have suddenly increased the stores in our dock-yards, or else that the noble Earl was grossly and enormously deceived. But to return from this digression. He meant to describe the state of our naval equipments in the year 1826. There were then in ordinary, ships in every one of our ports. At Plymouth, there were twenty sail of the line and eighteen frigates in ordinary. All these vessels had an entire equipment in the storehouse of the dock-yards, an appropriation of perfect equipment for twenty sail of the line, and eighteen frigates having been set aside when they were first taken into ordinary. The same system prevailed at each of our other ports. When any ship was repaired, and in good condition. an appropriation of equipments was made for her. That system by degrees was let down, for no one who knew anything of
802
our ports could help seeing, that the ordinary soon became a dismasted ordinary. The noble Earl had asserted, that he now had thirteen demonstration ships all ready for sea. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) knew, that a similar assertion had been made also by Sir John Barrow in his pamphlet. In defending the system now adopted by the Admiralty, Sir John Barrow said, that we had 21 sail of the line perfectly equipped, and 30 more in complete readiness for sea. I am not going to quote the noble Earl, but a very great authority—an officer of the board, who has had great experience, and who, in addition to his experience, has had the means of consulting every document in possession of the Admiralty. The statement which that officer makes, after inspecting all the official documents is as follows:—"Whenever the necessity for it shall actually exist, of which the Government may be presumed the best judge, let Parliament vote 50,000 men and the Admiralty will find no difficulty in adding 30 sail of the line, of as fine ships as any in the world, to the 21 already in commission; for which additional 30, masts, sails, yards, and every necessary article of gear, are in complete readiness in our (neglected) dockyards; and it can hardly be doubted that those persons, so clamorous for war, will be among the first cheerfully to submit to a war-tax in time of peace." The words were "in complete readiness." Now let their Lordships see how stood the facts. At Portsmouth, on January 28, 1839, no very long time ago, there were four demonstration-ships; and he supposed that they were all demonstrative of very great power. There had been at that port five demonstration-ships. Of these the Ganges was one. He would take the case of that ship first. She was ordered to be put in commission. Of course she was in complete readiness for sea. Was she? First of all it was discovered that the Ganges wanted caulking. That was easily done, but then it was discovered, that it would be necessary to take her into dock to clean her bottom. Then it was found out that she wanted new coppering, but that could not be done in a day; and somehow or other it happened that she was not in readiness to go to sea till two months had elapsed from the time of her being commissioned. She had, however, gone to sea, and therefore four only were then left at Portsmouth, for which of course, a complete equipment was ready. One of these was the Revenge. Now, the Revenge had no foremast. It was not

803
hooped, and the iron for the hooping was not ready. The mainmast also was not finished. That knocked off two ships at once. The other ships were stated to be ready for sea, and for aught he knew they might be so, but if he was to take the Ganges as a sample to judge by, he should very much doubt it. At Plymouth they had fire demonstration ships—the Caledonia, the Impregnable, the Belleisle, the Agincourt, and the Implacable. Would their Lordships believe, that there was not, at this moment, at that port a single line-of-battle ship ready for sea? There was not a suit of sails complete for a ship of the line at that port. Why were not these ships in complete readiness for sea? If asked in what they were not complete, he was prepared with the statement. There was no foretop sail, no maintop sail, and only one mizentop sail, yet these were sails without which no ship could put to sea. You had all the small sails right, but as for the topsails and courses, jibs and drivers, they were all of them missing. But then the masts were ready, a year ago there were none ready. He admitted, that the noble Earl had worked hard during the last year. In that time he had made sixteen masts. Yes, sixteen masts, all new. Passing from the demonstration ships to the thirty sail of the line, which it had been declared were in a perfect state of readiness he could only say, that at Portsmouth there were no topsail yards, no top-gallant yards ready, and a great deficiency of stores. As he stated, there were tops in store for a first-rate complete, and for one-third rate complete; there were in store, rigging for two first-rates, two second-rates, one third-rate, and two frigates at Portsmouth; but there was neither a gun, gear, fitting, nor anything to mount a cannon, except the carriage and guns of the ordnance. There was not a suit of sails for a second-rate beyond the demonstration ships; not a single suit of sails for a frigate, not a single suit of sails for a sloop or a brig in Portsmouth dock-yard. There were two suits of sails for a first-rate, one for a third-rate, and another making for the Dublin. It would be as much as he could do, if the noble Earl could fit out seven sail of the line at those two ports. At Plymouth, there was not a complete suit of sails in store for a sloop or a brig, except the Acorn in commission. He was afraid he had confused their Lordships by going into these details, for his returns were not, unfortunately, very clearly made out. He did not wish
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to go further into the general question at present. He had shown, however, that the state of the case, even with respect to the demonstration ships, was not true. His returns were dated Plymouth, 1st of Feb., and Portsmouth, 28th of Jan.; between those dates and those of the noble Earl's papers it was just possible that alterations might have been made in the state of the dock-yards. Great exertions, no doubt, had been made within the last year, and it was equally certain that what had caused those very great exertions was the notice which the public at last had taken of the matter out of doors. He would not trouble their Lordships with any further observations, because he feared, that a strictly professional subject might be disagreeable to their Lordships. He hoped he had said enough to prove that the noble Lord's force was not so disposed as to be of the least service for the defence of the country in case of any sudden emergency, that his demonstration ships were demonstrative only of weakness, and that the thirty sail of the line, which, it was boasted, were perfectly ready, as to all sorts of equipment, could not be got ready in less than three months.
The Earl of Ripondid not mean to trouble their Lordships with many observations; he should confine his remarks to one single point which had been adverted to; he meant the alteration which, during the last few years, had been made in the system of protecting the revenue by the substitution of the coast guard. The effect of that alteration was certainly to take immediately from the control of the Admiralty a body of seamen whose services were in every respect of the most valuable character: but there were good reasons why his right hon. Friend, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had adopted the measure, and it was but fair to Sir James Graham and his colleagues, who concurred in the change, that he should state the grounds on which it had taken place. In the first place, it certainly was represented by persons exceedingly competent to form an opinion on such a matter, that as an efficient security against the illicit introduction of foreign goods, the former system had by no means worked so satisfactorily as was originally anticipated; and although it was true, that the number of men now under command of the officer at whose disposition the force was placed might have been rendered available in an

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emergency to many ships which were suddenly to be fitted out, yet it was perfectly clear, that whenever such emergency did arise, the protection of the revenue must be sacrificed, and great mischief must be the result. It was accordingly suggested, that it would be better and more economical to adopt the system of what was called the coast-guard. But there were other circumstances at the time of great importance, which, with a view to the good of the naval service, operated on the minds of the Government in inducing them to make the change. It afforded an opportunity, which he thought was very properly taken an advantage of, for offering very great inducements which the service did not before possess, to volunteers to enlist into the navy. It should be recollected, that the important and delicate subject of impressment was at the time attracting a very great deal of attention, and although the Government did then, as he hoped every Government would, feel it indispensable to maintain the right, and if necessary, to exercise the power, of impressment, because if that were abandoned the downfall of the navy must of necessity soon follow; yet every consideration of prudence and policy combined to point out the advantage without resorting to that extreme measure of furnishing inducements to volunteers to enter the navy. The plan proposed therefore was this, that the whole of the persons to be appointed to the coast-guard, instead of being under the Treasury or Board of Customs, should be handed over to the Board of Admiralty, and that every person employed, whether officers or seamen, should be naval men, taken either from the half-pay list of officers or from the seamen on board ship. It was arranged, that each captain on going to sea should note the conduct of every individual in his ship, in order that out of those who had served three years, and whose conduct was most remarkable for steadiness, sobriety, and trustworthy qualities, the coastguard should be composed. The situation, both as regarded officers and men, was very desirable. They had many comforts and conveniences connected likewise, he would admit, with occasionally very arduous duties, and not always free from the casualty of loss of life, but still there were many inducements to make the situation desirable. It was believed, that offering that inducement to young men after a
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limited service, would cause them the more readily to enter. It was well known, that the temptations held out in the merchant service were very great. A large portion of the American Commercial Marine was, composed of British seamen—possibly the same thing had taken place to a certain extent in other countries, but still it was notorious that in their merchant service and in that of America, very great inducements were offered to gallant young sailors in the service of the Crown to quit it and enter into the merchant service. The plan had, therefore, been founded on very good principles. How far it might have induced persons to enter he was not prepared to say. The same principle had been urged over and over again as regarded the army, with the view of inducing a superior class of men to enlist, rather than sweeping the streets and highways. These were the grounds which had induced Sir James Graham to bring forward the proposition. He believed there were about 1,000 persons employed in the coast-guard, who of course were just as available upon any emergency as under the former system. It had been said, that the system was calculated to abstract some of the best men from the service, but after all, the total number in any one year had not exceeded 200, and that could by no means be considered a large number. One great benefit, at all events would be derived from this debate. It had been admitted on all hands, that mere economy would ruin the Navy. This spirit of parsimony, indeed, had operated for many years past, and naturally enough, no person could be surprised at it, but the effects had been most pernicious; for it had forced upon Government the necessity of "paring down" to the very quick. His noble Friend had said, indeed, that he had fallen upon happier times, and that larger aids were granted to him than to preceding Governments. He congratulated his noble Friend on the improvement, but the remarkable thing was, that his noble Friend and those with whom he acted, were opposed by those who always considered it to be their duty to support him whenever the interests of the country required it.
The Earl of Mintowished to explain one or two points, with respect to the Revenge; he said, that ship was among those which had been returned to him as complete—in all respects. It often hap-

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pened, however, that when a mast was wanted, one was taken from a demonstration ship, which was subsequently supplied from the Dock-yards; and as the Revenge was a demonstration ship, this might have caused the temporary absence of a mast in that vessel. Then, as to sails, he could not find in the returns any signs of the deficiency which had been complained of.
The Earl of Hardwicke: there is not in Plymouth Dock-yard, a complete set of sails for a man-of-war.
The Earl of Minto: unless the returns were false (which he could not suppose), that could not be the case. And he must candidly say, that he did not place so much reliance on the statements of noble Lords as on the returns.
The Earl of Hardwickeretained his conviction of the correctness of the statements he had made; he did not know when the returns to which the noble Lord had alluded were dated.
The Earl of Minto—Previously to your information.
The Earl of Hardwicke—The I believe them to be false.
Viscount Melbourne.My Lords, I do not rise to enter into the discussion which has been pursued with so much minuteness. I will, however, say a very few words on the general principles by which the conduct of Government ought to be guided, on questions of this nature—questions of the very highest and deepest importance. My Lords, I think there was perfect truth in what was stated by a noble Lord, who, for so many years, filled the office of First Lord of the Admiralty—that naval affairs were not questions of a mere pecuniary nature—but that they are questions for the Government which upon its responsibility ought to weigh and decide them. And, my Lords, it is on our responsibility that we have proposed the naval estimates, and directed the First Lord of the Admiralty to make that distribution and disposition of the naval force which has been made. My Lords, it is my opinion that during peace it is wise to reduce the establishments of the country as low as is compatible with the safety of the country and the duties which are to be discharged. And I was happy to hear it said by a noble Lord, in the debate, that he did not conceive it wise to look through the ports of Europe, and keep up as strong a force as would be required to
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meet any sudden attack from a foreign fleet. My Lords, what is that but war? It is depriving the country of the adventages of peace, and incurring the evils of war, especially that greatest of all the evils arising from war, the exhaustion of the national resources. But while reducing the naval establishments of a country in time of peace, it is wise in my opinion to take care that the vessels be all ready to be equipped; that foreign vessels gain no superiority over us in seamanship, in machinery, &c., and that we secure the benefit of all new discoveries in the carrying on of warfare. My Lords, it has been said, that we employ our vessels on distant services, at Mexico, for instance, and leave our own shores unguarded. But, my Lords, if we are to have a reduced establishment in peace, we must employ our naval force where our interests require its aid and protection; some places must be left unprovided, but the question is whether it be not for the public interest that they should be left unguarded, whether it be not consistent with the public safety that they be left so unguarded. The noble Lord who brought forward this question made a great many very judicious and unquestionably very able remarks. He stated the difficulty we should have in manning ships on a sudden outbreak, and the difficulty of meeting any emergency. That is nothing new; I am old enough to have conversed with Statesmen of other times, I might almost say, and I never heard of any other doctrine than that this country was always slow in commencing war; that our wars are marked with tardiness and error, and often want of success. I remember the Duke of Richmond, Master-General of the Ordnance telling me that his great reason for being unwilling to try an experiment of peace with the great republic of France was this "If you make peace the form of your constitution and the feelings of the people force you to disarm more rapidly than any other nation in Europe, and you have more difficulties in arming again. The present then is the old difficulty under which this country has always laboured; it is a difficulty illustrated by the whole history of the last century—and I do distinctly admit, that it is a difficulty which requires to be considered, and which we should attempt by every means to meet and obviate. Because we have got over former dangers, it will not do to trust to good fortune at all times,

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which though it may formerly have relieved us from circumstances of very great peril, and very great danger, must be deserved by care and vigilance. The noble Lord has spoken very much of that which has engaged a great deal of the attention of this country during the last year, although, as my noble Friend said, the public attention was excited to it many years before, and that is the Russian fleet in the Baltic, Surely this is not a question for the Admiralty—this is a very great question of policy. I have no doubt whatever of the pacific intentions of Russia—I have no expectation whatever of any hostility from that quarter. I have a perfect reliance on the frank and loyal character of that Sovereign; while at the same time I readily admit, that it is not safe to rely entirely upon the moderation of that or any other power; but it is prudent and necessary to have a sufficient force to provide for our own security. But, my Lords, at the same time the security which the noble Lord proposes is not an effective security. Having 8, 9, or 10 sail of the line, some here, some there, is no security against that fleet, supposing it was actuated by hostile intentions and design. If we were apprehensive of enmity and hostility from that quarter, it would be absolutely necessary that we should put a much larger force in commission—incur a much larger expense—and make a much greater exertion than that which has been stated by the noble Lord. The noble Lord says very truly, that we must not always wait for—that we cannot always expect manifestos—nor always rely on declarations of war being given and the noble Lord cited instances in which hostilities had commenced, and violence been committed without any such declaration of war. Certainly it is true, that we are not to rely on manifestos and declarations of war being always issued, but we are not to expect that war will come upon us like a thunder clap. Hostilities, in the present day, do not come on suddenly. There are disputes, negotiations, complaints, and answers, or something of that kind which gives an opportunity of making preparations against any danger whatever that may come upon us—and the question is, whether the navy is not in such a state as would afford the germ or nucleus of any efficient force if any should be required in consequence of an interruption to peace, I for one beg leave to say, that I do not in the slightest
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degree apprehend any danger of that sort, because I do believe, notwithstanding that some unfortunate differences have taken place which it may be somewhat difficult to explain, that there is no power in Europe more sensible of the great advantages to be derived from friendship with Great Britain, or which is more inclined to friendship than the power which possesses that fleet which has been made the subject of the noble Lord's animadversion. Every noble Lord has admitted, I believe, that the course recently taken by the Admiralty is one entitled to their approbation. My Lords, it is not my intention to enter into the particular parts of this discussion, but I thought it my duty to state the general principles that ought to influence and guide your Lordships in the consideration of this question.
Lord Colchesterwould only make a few observations in reply. He begged to assure the noble Earl opposite (Earl Minto), that he had no personal feeling towards him in bringing forward this question, and he thanked the noble Earl for the courtesy with which he had (as indeed be always did) answered his observations. He could not help thinking however, that we ought to make some more extensive preparations, and if we could not afford to keep up such a force as Russia, we ought at least to ask Russia to reduce her fleet in proportion to ours. There were precedents for such a course—he believed it was such a demand made upon France in 1803 that led to the war. He would not press for a return of the distribution of the ships if the noble Earl opposed it; but he held in his hand a book published under the authority of the noble Earl—at least under the authority of the Admiralty—in which the whole of the stations were named.
The Earl of Mintosaid, the book had no authority from the Admiralty.
Returns ordered.