Sitting of 3 May 1837

MINUTES.
Bills. Read a second time:—Hallybury College East India Officers' Salaries.
Petitions presented. By Mr. BYNG and other hon. Members, from various places, for the proposed measure for the Abolition, and by Mr. HARDY and other hon. Members, from various other places, against the proposed measure for the Abolition of Church-rates.—By Mr. TOOKE and other hon. Members, from various places, that a general Bill for the better Observance of the Sabbath may be allowed to go into a Committee of the whole House.—By Mr. JOHN HENRY VIVIAN and other hon. Members, from various places, for repeal or Amendment of the Poor-law Act.—By Mr. WALLACE, and other hon. Members, from various places, that a Direct Mail Conveyance may be established through Fife.—By Mr. WALLACE and Mr. HUME, from various places, for repeal of the Duty on Attorneys Certificates, and for suspending the operation of the Act of Sederunt relative to the Table of Fees.—BY Lord HENNIKIR, from East Suffolk, against alteration of Corn-laws.—By Sir Win. GEARY and other hon. MEMBERS, from various places, for rating the Owners of small Tenements instead of Occupiers.—By Mr. BYNG and other hon. MEMBERS, from various places, for repeal of Window Tax, and for equalization of Land Tax.—By Sir E. CODRINGTON, from Seamen of South Shields, for Merchant Shipping Regulation Bill—By Mr. BROTHERTON, from various places, for a ten hours' Factory Bill.—By several hon. MEMBERS, from various places, complaining of the undue advantage enjoyed by the proprietors of the Shipping Gazette over the proprietors of similar lists who are burthened with postage.—By Mr. WALLACE, from Greenock, for repeal of the Duty on Marine Insurances.—By Mr. WAKLEY, from inhabitants of Holborn, for Metropolis Improvements Bill.—By Lord Viscount CHVE, from various places, for alteration of Highway Act.—By Mr. W. MILES, from Moncton Combe, for the admission of the produce of Antigua and the Leeward Isles at the same rates of Duty as those of the ceded colonies and Bengal; and from Bristol for repeal of Duty on Soap—By Mr. EWART and Mr. HUME, from various places, for House-

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hold Suffrage; and from Edinburgh for investigation into the merits of Pensions and Sinecures.—By Mr. MORGAN JOHN O'CONNELL, from Dunmanway, against any Measures regarding the Court of that manor.—By Mr. EWART, from Liverpool, for Reform of Parliament Act Amendment Bill.—By Mr. HUME, from Edinburgh, for abolition of the Volunteer Corps.—By Mr. WALLACE, from Glasgow, complaining of the exportation of foreign-made biscuit and flour in bond ostensibly as Merchandise, but in reality for the consumption of ships' crews; and from Dunbar, for reduction of Inland Postage Dues.—By Mr. CRAVEN BERKLEY, from Cheltenham, for Recovery of Tenements Bill.—By Captain F. BERKLEY, from Gloucester, for revision of Criminal Code.—By Mr. KIRKE and other hon. MEMBERS, from various places, against the present system of Education (Ireland).

TITHES (IRELAND).
Mr. SharmanCrawford wished to ask the noble Lord when it was intended to bring up the report of the Committee on tithes in Ireland?
Lord John Russellsaid, that perhaps the House would permit him to move that the report be now brought up, upon the understanding that the further discussion be adjourned until his noble Friend (Lord Morpeth) should bring forward his Bill upon the subject.
Mr. Bernalbrought up the report; which was read.
Mr. SharmanCrawford rose to move the resolutions of which he had given notice, by way of amendment.
Debate adjourned.

PUBLIC RECORDS BILL.
Mr. C. Buller Mr. C. Buller moved the second reading of the Public Records Bill, the object of which he explained to be to provide one safe and efficient building for the security of all records, and to appoint one Keeper General of the Records of the kingdom to take care of them.
Lord John Russellcertainly considered that the safe custody of the public records, and the arrangements for their publication, should be placed in different hands. He also thought that it was highly desirable that the public records should be kept in one place, under the custody or general superintendence of some high official person, such, for instance, as the Master of the Rolls. He had had communications with the Master of the Rolls on the subject of this Bill, and if it were the pleasure of the House to go on with the Bill, he would propose many alterations founded on those communications, and comprising the several points he had stated. If it were not the pleasure of the House to proceed with this Bill, he (Lord J. Russell) should be prepared to bring in a new Bill on the subject.
Sir F. Trenchconcurred in the object of the Bill.
Sir R. Inglisobjected to appointing any officer to take care of the records. He thought that they ought to be left in the care of the chief judge. The point of chief importance, however, was to render the public records accessible, and next, to provide a more convenient place to which to transfer them. He thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer should propose to appropriate a large sum yearly for their arrangement.
Sir R. Peelthought, that it would be better to postpone any definite arrangement on this subject until the accommodation was provided which was essential for the satisfactory custody of the records. He certainly agreed with the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) that it would be better to commit the custody of the records to a high judicial officer, who by name and station appeared to be pointed out as the most competent authority. He of course must have the assistance of some subordinate officer, appointed by himself and for whose conduct he should be responsible. He wished to ask a question of the right hon. Gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this subject. It was a general impression that part of the building of the new House of Parliament was to be devoted to the custody of the public records. He wished to ask whether it was the intention of his Majesty's Government to submit any proposition to the House for the purpose of putting in a train of execution the plan of Mr. Barry, and whether it was intended to propose as part of that plan that the large tower should be appropriated to the reception of the public records?
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, that the Government had abstained from taking any steps with respect to the report that had been laid upon the table of the House until every Member of the House should have had a full opportunity of considering the subject. With respect to the other question, he had had frequent communications with the Board of Commissioners of Woods and Forests, and the Record Commissioners as to whether the tower proposed to be erected by Mr. Barry's plan would be an appropriate and convenient depository for the public records. The opinions they had pronounced were favourable to the proposition. They thought that the tower would be sufficient

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to enable them to provide for the safe custody of the public records. If this should be the result, it would lead to the preservation of the most beautiful parts of the design, and would justify them by devoting them to a useful object.
Mr. W. Williams Wynnwas glad this motion had not been mixed up with former controversies. All agreed that it was fit and proper to make some provision for the safe custody of the records; but some provisions of the Bill were premature, and would come time enough when a building was provided. He should be glad if the proposed tower would supply sufficient and convenient accommodation. The most fit person to be keeper was the Master of the Rolls. So far back as the time of Edward 1st, the situation was filled by that officer. It would, perhaps, be the more convenient course to prepare and arrange the records in their present depositories before sending them to the general place of reception. As to fees, he agreed with his hon. Friend that they were no more a question of principle than the stamp duties. After what had fallen from the noble Lord, with respect to his intention of hereafter proposing some additional clauses to the Bill, he did not feel disposed to give any opposition to its being read a second time.
Mr. Wilksconcurred with the right hon. Gentleman who last spoke in thinking, that the subject under consideration would be best provided for if left entirely to the discretion of the Government.
Colonel Sibthorpwished the sense of the House had been taken on the Bill. He should certainly have voted against it, in order to show his repugnance to commissions in any shape.
Mr. Galley Knightthought, that the great object which the House ought to have in view, was to prevent in future that great expenditure which had hitherto been incurred by the unnecessary printing of the records.
Mr. Jervisbegged to remind the gallant Member for Lincoln, that the Record Commission did not originate with the present Government. If the hon. and gallant Member read the Bill attentively, he would find that its tendency was to remove the necessity for any commission.
Bill read a second time.

FOREIGN GRAIN.
Mr. Robinson Mr. Robinson moved the resumption of the adjourned debate
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from March 21st on the motion for a Committee of the whole House to consider the expediency of admitting foreign grain to be ground for re-exportation. He said, it was not his wish that the House should divide on this motion without further discussion; and he warned Gentlemen connected with the agricultural interest, that if they negatived the present motion, their conduct would only tend to increase the opposition to the existing Corn-laws. The principle of those laws was in no degree infringed by the proposition; which, if agreed to, would permit British merchants to share in a very lucrative trade, now wholly engrossed by foreigners.
Mr. Poulett Thomsonhad no objection to the proposed Committee, but till the hon. Gentleman's contemplated resolution was before them, he could not say whether it was objectionable or not. If, upon examination, he considered the plan of the hon. Gentleman practicable and likely to be beneficial, it should have his support: if, on the contrary, he found it to be liable to objections, of course he should state what his objections were.
Mr. O' Connellhad been called on by some very influential individuals in Ireland to support the motion for the Committee, and also to support any measure that might be introduced to allow of the grinding of foreign corn in this country and in Ireland. A few years ago Ireland exported corn almost exclusively—that was to say, grain without being ground. One of the most successful of the manufactures that had been establised in Ireland was the manufacture of grain of home growth, and the millers of that country now sent out flour, and supplied oatmeal, to a great extent; mill-power, too, might be increased in Ireland almost to an infinite degree. It would therefore confer a great benefit on that country to allow them to grind foreign grain, and take the miller's profit on it. He hoped that under these circumstances the House would feel the expediency of encouraging that branch of industry in Ireland.
Sir J. Tyrrell, after remarking that he thought the hon. Member for Worcester had spoken with undue severity of the agricultural interests, proceeded to state that smuggling in malt was carried on to a great extent in Ireland. He believed that gentlemen who drank Guinness's stout were not perhaps aware of the manner in which brewers in that country got their;

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malt. He had it as an undoubted fact that brewers went into the market, and too often asked no questions as to whether the duty upon it was paid or not.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerthought the proper mode of answering all the objections thrown out upon this subject would be to go into a Committee. He was sure, that his excellent friend Mr. Guinness ought to feel extremely obliged to the hon. Member opposite for the puff he had given to his porter; but at the same time he thought it due to that gentleman to do all in his power to remove from him the imputation which the hon. Member's observations seemed to convey. Whilst he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not deny that frauds upon the revenue were carried on to a considerable extent in Ireland, he thought he could assert that it was not on the part of establishments like that of Mr. Guinness, but by the smaller dealers in the country. In fact, Mr. Guinness was one of the deputation who waited upon him some time back on this very subject.
Sir J. Tyrrellexplained that he did not mean to cast any personal imputation against Mr. Guinness in this matter, whom he did not know from Adam.
Mr. Heathcotewas opposed to the proposition of the hon. Member for Worcester, as one very likely to increase the frauds and evasions which were already carried on against the revenue by means of the bonded system. He thought that before the hon. Member asked the House to agree to his motion, he should be a little more clear in his statement of his intentions on the subject.
Sir C. Broke Verethought it best to have the Corn-laws as they were. They had worked as well as any laws of the kind could be expected to work He was therefore opposed to the present motion, as the first step towards a repeal or alteration of those laws, but as he did not see any likelihood of successfully opposing it he should not go to a division. He only hoped that if the House did any thing in the matter they would use necessary caution to prevent frauds upon the revenue, or injury to the agriculturist. He hoped that foreign corn intended for manufacture for exportation would be kept under lock and key, and not allowed to be mixed up in the general stores of the exporter.
Motion agreed to. House in Committee.
Mr. Robinsonsaid, that he would take
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the course usual on all occasions like the present, and submit for the consideration of the House a general resolution, declaratory of the expediency of bringing in a Bill to carry into effect the object which he had in view. He would best consult the convenience of the Committee by reading his resolution, which was, "That it is expedient to permit the manufacture of foreign grain and flour for exportation, only, without the payment of the duty, under such provisions and regulations as may effectually secure the public revenue from fraud and the interest of British agriculturists from loss or injury." He could not be expected to enter into any explanation with respect to the nature of the provisions of a measure of this kind, or by which the fraud and evasion of which the agriculturists complained were to be prevented. When the Bill was brought in, it would be time enough to enter into these explanations, but at present all that they were called on to do was to affirm the resolution which he had read. He should wish to throw the responsibility of bringing in that Bill on the Government, but if they declined to do so then he, of course, should be bound to introduce it himself. He should now only state a few general observations in support of his resolution. The object of his proposition was, to secure to this country a valuable branch of foreign and colonial trade, which they had lost by reason of the existing laws; but while he wished these restrictions to be removed he was willing that all due protection should be afforded to the landed interest. The hon. Member, in conclusion, moved the resolution for adoption which he had previously read.
Mr. Poulett Thomsonsaid, there was one inconvenience which attended the hon. Gentleman's proposition, and which ought to convince him of the necessity of pursuing some other course. That might be regarded as a committee on trade, and before they affirmed the hon. Gentleman's resolution he thought the hon. Gentleman ought to be required to state the nature of the proposition which he meant to embody in the Bill to be founded upon it. If the resolution were to be passed what would be the consequence? Why, that they would be obliged to direct the Chairman to bring in a Bill in accordance with it. This rendered it essential that they should know what the Bill was to be before they proceeded to the discussion of the re-

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solution. His Conduct, therefore, with regard to the measure must depend on the nature of the Bill, and the extent to which the hon. Gentleman proposed to carry his resolutions. If his sole object was to allow corn to be ground under lock, then he (Mr. P. Thomson) could have no objection to it; but if it was his object to take corn out of bond to be ground, and have that corn exchanged for English corn, involving the whole proposition of a Bill passed in 1824, which was to be in operation for only one year—if that was the hon. Member's object then he was prepared to oppose it. He thought the more simple way was for the hon. Member to state his intentions before the Committee came to any decision on the motion before them.
Mr. Robinsonsaid, if the intention of the Government was to allow corn to be ground Only under lock, that was a course of proceeding which he considered so restricted, and of so little advantage to trade and commerce, that he would be no party to it. But if the Government would allow him to bring in a Bill to take a certain quantity of foreign corn out of bond for grinding on condition that an equal quantity of English flour or biscuit were exported, or if the right hon. Gentleman would bring in a Bill and allow him to move clauses in Committee in accordance with his view, he should be perfectly satisfied. He trusted, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman would either take his Bill, or introduce one of his own.
Mr. Hawessaid, that as a Bill, embracing the object which the hon. Member for Worcester had in view would have no chance of being carried, the better way would be for the Government to accede to the hon. Gentleman's proposition for bringing in a Bill themselves and allowing him to improve it in the Committee. That was the only way to proceed without losing time unnecessarily.
Sir E. Knatchbullthought the hon. Member for Worcester had placed the House in a most extraordinary position. The hon. Gentleman called on them to affirm a resolution without saying a word about the Bill which he was desirous of introducing. This was not the way to proceed, but, having placed his resolution on the table, it would seem that the hon. Gentleman was quite indifferent as to whether the Bill should be brought in or not. Now he, (Sir E. Knatchbull) considered this motion as nothing more nor less
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than an indirect attack against the Corn-laws. If that were the object he would prefer that the attack should be made boldly and openly at once, and not in an indirect or covert way. He had been much misunderstood on the subject of the Corn-laws; but the fact was, that, however anxious he might be to protect the agricultural interest, he was not one of those who was prepared to support that interest against right and justice. If corn could be taken out of bond without prejudice to the farmers of this country he would not oppose it; but as he had no statement before him to guide his judgment with respect to this resolution he must confess that he was not in a condition to legislate on the subject. He thought, however, that the better course for the hon. Gentleman to take would be to withdraw his resolution, and introduce his Bill at once.
Mr. Prymewas friendly to the agricultural interest, but still he was not anxious to continue restrictions which tended unfairly to fetter the commerce of the country.
Mr. George F. Youngwas favourable to the principle of the motion. This principle had been tried in 1824 by Mr. Huskisson, when he brought forward the Grinding Act. That Bill, as an experimental Bill, had been in operation for a year, and during that time there was no single instance of fraud having occurred under it. He had recently ascertained that foreign ship biscuit was introduced by shipowners into this country on payment of 20 l. per cent. and the shipowner had an advantage in the importation of foreign biscuit, as he was enabled to purchase it at a price considerably under that paid for that which was produced in this country. This was a proof how little the Corn-laws were understood. Though he was connected with a particular interest he nevertheless repudiated all idea of setting up one interest against another, and he thought the principle on which they should act was to afford the best protection they could to all the interests in the country.
Mr. W. Rochehad no objection to the proposition of the hon. Member for Worcester, provided they were afforded sufficient security against the occurrence of frauds.
Mr. Humeregretted to see the House of Commons take up their time in discussing the question whether a few pounds of flour

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should be exported at a lower price than the monopolists desired. When he saw the landlords in that House anxious to keep up the price of corn to a famishing amount, and opposing themselves to a proposal such as the present, he could not help saying, that such a proceeding was derogatory to their characters. It was, he repeated, both derogatory and discreditable. He thought that the hon. Member who had brought forward this motion ought to have been prepared with some plan If he was not prepared with some plan no one else could be. It was a reproach to any class in that House that they should stand in the way of other interests for the sake of preventing the exportation of a few pounds of cheap flour. Since the last debate on this subject had taken place, he had been informed that in some of the southern ports of France, in Bordeaux and Marseilles, it was customary to import foreign corn, which was manufactured into flour and imported in large quantities into Spain with great advantage to every branch of industry. The hon. Member for Worcester ought to make up his mind with respect to some specific plan, and should be prepared to take the sense of the House upon it. He certainly would support the motion of the hon. Member. He entreated the Government to take into consideration the present state of the country, and to press upon the House the adoption of some enlarged plan to carry the object of the present motion into effect.
Mr. Wallacemaintained, that the landed interest was opposed to the general interests of the country, and regretted that the right hon. the President of the Board of Trade joined with the landed interest. He should decidedly vote for the motion of the hon. Member for Worcester.
Mr. Clayrecommended the hon. Member for Worcester to close with the proposal of the right hon. the President of the Board of Trade. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for Middlesex, that it was discreditable to the advocates of the agricultural interest in that House to oppose a measure advantageous to the commercial and shipping interests of the country, not because that there was any danger that the monopoly enjoyed by the agricultural interest would be destroyed, but that they feared it would lead even remotely to the invasion of that monopoly. The agricultural interest at present possessed a most grinding monopoly, and it was not decent
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in the advocates of that interest to come forward to oppose a proposition like the present. If they wished to oppose the motion let them do so with argument. He had heard no argument used by the opponents of the measure, and he considered it highly discreditable that they should oppose a proposition which involved so much advantage to important interests as that now before the House.
Sir C. Broke Verewas sorry to hear the observations that had fallen from the hon. Member who had just sat down, because he did not think that the subject Under discussion by any means called for them. The hon. Member claimed the credit of just motives for the party with whom he acted, and he ought not to refuse to others that credit which he claimed for himself. He did not think that any advantage could arise from using harsh terms or casting imputations. He did not think that such a course was at all calculated to promote that good temper and good understanding which it was desirable should pervade the debates in that House.
Sir J. Tyrrelldid not approve of that battledore and shuttlecock work of legislation, by which a Bill was tossed from a Member at one side of the House to a Member at another. The hon. Member for Worcester appeared opposed to the proposition that corn should be ground under lock. The hon. Member had stated no plan. It was desirous that the hon. Member should state one, for it might be a proposition to which he could accede. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets had complained of the want of argument at that side of the House. However, the complaint came badly from the hon. Member, for there was so little argument in what he had himself said that he was inclined to consider him the representative of the heavy clays.
Mr. Poulett Thomsonsaid, there was a general resolution before the House, and if it was affirmed it would then become the duty of the hon. Member for Worcester to introduce a Bill to carry the objects of that resolution into effect. Now, he had an objection to one plan that had been suggested, and how was he to know but that the very plan to which he was opposed would be brought forward by the hon. Gentleman? He was, therefore, before concurring in this resolution, anxious to know what plan the hon. Member intended to bring for-

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ward. If the hon. Member would say that his proposition would not go further than simply the power to grind under lock, he was prepared to consent to that plan. It could not be expected that if the hon. Member was not prepared with a Bill the Government should take up the subject. The Government had quite enough to do. There were different Bills which he himself was anxious to bring forward, and was not able. He wished the hon. Member would state specifically what his proposition was.
Mr. Robinsonsaid, that, of course, if the resolution should be affirmed it would be necessary to introduce a Bill. He would much rather that the Bill should be brought in under the auspices of the President of the Board of Trade, because it would then come forward under advantages which could not be expected if the measure rested in the hands of any private individual. But if the Government would not bring forward a Bill he would. His proposition would be this, that a power should be given to take any quantity of corn out of bond, and that the party should export an equivalent quantity of flour and biscuit, under such restrictions as would afford a sufficient protection against frauds. As a commercial man he could not consent to bring forward a measure upon the plan of the President of the Board of Trade. He did not say if by a vote of the House his measure was reduced to the limits of that plan he would not accept it, but he would much rather have his own, and he would not voluntarily take the other.
Mr. Poulett Thomsonnow understood the proposition of the hon. Member, and felt bound to oppose it; for his experience of a former Bill, enabled him to say, that such a Bill as the hon. Member proposed was calculated to open the door to extensive frauds. The Bill of 1824 had been in operation for only twelve months, and yet extensive frauds had been committed under it. That Bill provided that for a certain quantity of corn taken out of bond a certain quantity of flour should be exported. Now, corn varied in its quality, and it was the practice to take out the finest corn, which was capable of producing the greatest quantity of flour, which flour was brought into consumption in this country, whilst from inferior corn an inferior description of flour was produced for exportation, and which was further deteriorated by being mixed with chalk and other matters. He contended that such a Bill
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was calculated to lead to great and extensive frauds, which, as they could not establish an average, there would be no possibility of preventing. With respect to a change in the Corn laws his opinions were well known. He considered the Corn laws, as they existed at present, injurious to the interests of every class in the country, and would vote for their alteration. But, when he said this, he thought that any change in the Corn laws ought to be effected by a general vote of the House, and not by a side wind. He had not been able to consent to the Bill of 1824—because like the resolution now proposed to the House, it gave an opening for fraud. He really could not perceive any material difference between the two measures. The hon. Gentleman opposite had denied that any good could arise from permission being given to grind corn under lock, and from the flour thus produced being exported. He must deny that any benefit would flow from the plan now proposed. If real advantages were to spring from the plan why did not the hon. Member introduce a Bill on the subject? The hon. Member assigned as a reason for not pursuing that course that he should lose his character as a commercial man. He (Mr. P. Thomson) thought, that his character would also be in danger were he to comply with the wishes now expressed by the hon. Gentleman. He thought that, if the resolution now before the House was entertained, the revenue must be the loser, and on that account he felt himself called on to oppose it.
Mr. Estcourtwas glad that the hon. Gentleman opposite had expressed his intention of not supporting the resolution. He was however, sorry that the hon. Member who had brought the matter before the House had thought it necessary in the performance of his duty to speak so strongly against the agricultural interest. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets had pursued a similar line of conduct in bringing the subject of the Corn-laws before the House, and had been checked by a sensible and temperate reproof from his hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk. That reproof had double force from the good temper with which it had been made, and might have served as a warning on the present occasion. He should certainly oppose the resolution.
Mr. Humewas anxious that the House should perfectly understand what the right hon. the President for the Board of Trade

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meant by his declaration? He should like to know what the right hon. Gentleman meant by the term fraud? Would the right hon. Gentleman lay on the table the number of convictions which had taken place? What could the fraud which was so much spoken of really amount to? At the utmost to a few pounds of flour—not five per cent. on any quantity which might be ground. And still the right hon. Gentleman, professing himself a friend of free trade, brought this forward as a reason why the resolution should be opposed. He was quite ashamed of him. The House should look carefully into this question of fraud, and consider if the good to be produced would not much overbalance the evil which was so much spoken of. The right hon. Gentleman did not seem to attach any value to the additional hands which must be employed, the increased quantity of shipping to be used, the capital to be laid out, and the machinery which the plan now proposed must of necessity call into existence. He (Mr. Hume) could scarcely believe had he not heard the right hon. Gentleman speak that evening that such narrow views could be entertained by any Minister in his situation.
Mr. Poulett Thomsondenied, that he did not fully estimate the advantages likely to accrue from an increased employment of ships, men, add capital. He was fully alive to their full value, and if his hon. Friend opposite would bring in a Bill on the present subject, which would give him the means of calling into activity an additional number of men and ships he would willingly support it; but he could not consent to any measure which, like the present, would only be a cloak for smuggling.
Mr. George F. Youngthought, that the light hon. the President of the Board of Trade had been rather unfortunate in one of the arguments which he had used. He said, that a better description of corn might be taken out of bond, and an inferior sort sent out of the country in its place. He also asserted that, to prevent this fraud, it was impossible to strike an average accurately, in consequence of the quality of corn varying considerably. Now, in place of an average let him take the maximum quality of flour, and make it the description to be exported, and the supporters of the measure would be content. He did not think that the sending a bad description of corn out of the country, and giving to the community here in its place
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a better description for their own consumption could be considered a matter of much regret. The hon. Gentleman did not seem to consider that any attempt at restriction could not render the grinding corn in bond as favourable a speculation for home consumption as when no restraint was imposed. It would not be worth while, in fact, to engage in the business at all unless for foreign consumption. Fraud, in his opinion, could have little to do with the question.
Mr. O'Connellsaid, that the Bill desired by the right hon. the President of the Board of Trade, would only have the effect of bringing the excise officers into the private concerns of those desirous of grinding corn in bond; and who, he would ask, could act with an excise officer watching every motion? What was the meaning of fraud, of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke? Nothing more than the addition of another slice of bread to a starving family. The Corn-law monopolists, however, were not willing to grant even that poor boon. They hailed with triumph the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman, and thanked him to the skies for acting on their side. The present discussion would, however, more injure the Corn-law system than any speech which could be made against it.
The House divided. Ayes 43; Noes 108:—Majority 65.

List of the AYES.

Aglionby, H, A.

Hutt, Wm.

Barclay, David

Ingham, R.

Bewes, T.

Lambton, Hedworth

Blake, M. J.

Lister, E. C.

Brady, Denis C.

Marsland, Henry

Brotherton, J.

Morrison, J.

Browne, R. D.

Musgrave, Sir R.

Chalmers, P.

O'Brien Cornelius

Clay, W.

O'Connell, D.

Codrington, Sir E.

O'Connell, J.

Collier, John

Ord, W. H.

Crawford, W. S.

Philips, M.

Denistoun, A.

Pryme, George

Ewart, W.

Stewart, P. M.

Fielden, J.

Strutt, E.

Fergus, John

Thornley, T.

Harvey, D. W.

Wakley, T.

Hastie, A.

Walker, R.

Hawes, B.

Wallace, R.

Hawkins, J. H.

Wood, Alderman

Hindley, C.

TELLERS.

Hume, J.

Robinson, G. R.

Humphery, John

Young, G. F.

List of the NOES.

Adam, Sir C.

Arbuthnot, hon. H.

477

Astley, Sir J.

Knightley, Sir C.

Baring, F. T.

Lawson, Andrew

Barnard, Edward G.

Lennard, Thomas B.

Bell, M.

Lennox, Lord G.

Bish, T.

Lennox, Lord A.

Blackburne, John I.

Long, W.

Bonham, R. F.

Longfield, R.

Bowles, G. R.

Lygon, Hn. Gen.

Bramston, T. W.

M'Leod, R.

Campbell, Sir J.

Macnamara, Major

Campbell, W. F.

Martin, J.

Cayley, E. S.

Martin, T.

Chichester, A.

Nagles, Sir R.

Cooper, E.

Neeld, John

Coote, Sir C. C.

O'Conor, Don

Copeland, W. T.

O'Neill, General

Dalbiac, Sir C.

Ossulston, Lord

Denison, J.

Packe, C.W.

Dillwyn, L. W.

Palmer, George

Donkin, Sir R.

Palmerston, Visct.

Eastnor, Viscount

Parker, John

Eaton, Richard J.

Pease, J.

Elwes, J.

Pigot, Robert

Estcourt, T. G.

Pollock, Sir F.

Fergusson, R. C.

Poulter, John Sayer

Ferguson, G.

Power, James

Fitzroy, H.

Price, S. G.

Folkes, Sir W.

Pusey, P.

Forbes, Wm.

Roche, D.

Forster, C. S.

Rushbrooke, Col.

Fort, J.

Russell, Lord John

Fremantle, Sir T.

Sibthorp, Col.

Freshfield, J. W.

Spry, Sir S.

Gordon, hon. W.

Stewart, John

Goulburn, Sergeant

Stuart, V.

Grimston, Viscount

Talfourd, Sergeant

Hale, Robert B.

Thomson, C. P.

Halse, James

Townley, R. G.

Hammer, Henry

Turner, W.

Hanmer, Sir J.

Twiss, H.

Hardy, J.

Tyrrell, Sir J.

Hawkes, T.

Vere, Sir C. B.

Heathcote, Gilbert

Vernon, Granville H.

Hector, C. J.

Vesey, hon. Thomas

Hobhouse, Sir. J. C.

Vivian, J. E.

Hogg, James Weir

Wemyss, Capt.

Hoskins, K.

West, J. B.

Houston, G.

Wilson, Henry

Howard, R.

Winnington, H. J.

Howard, P. H.

Worsley, Lord

Hoy, James Barlow

Young, Sir W.

Irton, Samuel

Jackson, Sergeant

TELLERS.

Jones, Wilson

Labouchere, H.

Knatchbull, Sir E.

Steuart, R.

LAW OF LIBEL BILL.
Mr. O'Connell Mr. O'Connell moved the second reading of the Law of Libel Bill. He felt it his duty to state the circumstances under which the measure came under the consideration of the House as well as the objects and principles of the measure. It was the same Bill that had already been three times before the House, but as yet had never been read a second
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time. It was in the year 1833 that he first proposed a measure of this description, and at that time Lord Althorp requested him not to press it forward, but to abandon it for that Session, upon the understanding that it was the intention of the Government to have a Committee upon the subject of the law of libel. It happened, however, that the Session was at that time so far advanced as to render it inconvenient then to appoint the Committee, and the subject, as a matter of necessity, stood over till the next year. In 1834 the then Attorney-General (now the Lord Chancellor) brought the question under the consideration of the House, and proposed a Committee to consider the law of libel and to suggest remedies for its improvement. The Committee appointed upon that occasion went fully into the subject, and not only admitted the defects of the law as it then stood, bat fully demonstrated the extraordinary anomalies to which it gave rise. That hon. and learned Gentleman, the Attorney-General in 1834, now the noble and learned Lord, displayed upon that occasion that solid good sense, that true knowledge of the subject, which had made him, he believed, one of the most useful Lord Chancellors this country ever saw. He believed it was unanimously admitted by the profession that no man ever, filled the high office of Lord Chancellor with more credit to himself or greater advantage to the public than Lord Cottenham. It was strange, indeed, that this fact had never before been noticed in that House, but out of the House he believed there was but one opinion upon the subject, that he not only exceeded his predecessors in the duty of hearing original causes for the first time, but that none had ever been distinguished by a sounder knowledge of the law, or a stronger or more manly mind. A great deal of evidence was given before the Committee appointed in 1834, but, unfortunately, no Report had been brought before the House, and the evidence was not printed. The Committee, in fact, proved to be a perfect abortion—no record even of its proceedings remained— all the evidence given before it was lost. Yet there was no person examined, no person who spoke upon the subject, who did not admit that the law of libel was in a most defective, nay, a most indefensible, state. The first question that naturally suggested itself upon the subject

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was —what is libel? As the law at present stood he defied any man to limit the definition of a libel. Any thing was a libel. On one occasion Lord Ellenborough held that the calling Lord Hardwick a sheep-feeder from Lincolnshire was a libel, yet in the case of Mr. Perry, the then proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, the same Lord Ellenborough insisted very strongly that saying George the 3rd was not a popular king was not libellous. So that in point of fact the matter held to constitute a libel was just what the judge chose to determine, or a partisan jury to insist. The only fixed rule upon the subject was this: that anything was a libel that hurt the feelings of the person against whom it was directed. Ought there in England to be such a law as that? Observe the inconsistency of it. Scandalous words were used viva voce—the same words were written or printed; the one was slander, the other libel. How did the law deal with these? As regarded scandal there really was something definite and distinct in the law, because nothing was held to be scandalous but that which imputed crime, or incapacity, or unfitness to a man in his trade or occupation. The law of slander, therefore, had its limits. But if the same words were written or put into print there was no limit whatever. No anomaly, he thought, could be greater than that; because, if the words used were criminal in themselves, they must be equally criminal whether they were spoken or written. The nature of the offence must be in the words themselves. It was a singular absurdity that a set of words which, if merely spoken, would be held by the judge to be perfectly harmless, should, if written or printed, be declared by the same judge to constitute a crime. There was another anomaly in the law. There were two modes of proceeding against persons accused of libel—one to prosecute criminally, the other by civil action for damages. The mode of proceeding criminally divided itself into three distinct branches: first, by filing a bill ex officio—that was by an indictment instituted by the Attorney-General himself; second, by criminal information; third, by common indictment. Thus there were three modes of proceeding against a libel as a crime; and one mode of proceeding for compensation. The moment the criminal proceedings were instituted, all the circumstances of the publication were
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taken into consideration by the jury, to determine whether or not the publication were criminal—all except one. And what was that? The trifling circumstance of whether the allegations contained in the publication were true or not. One would think that the first thing to be inquired into should be whether the allegations were true or false. If false, it ought no doubt to be deemed criminal; but if true, ought it always to be held a fit subject for punishment? But, as the law at present stood, it mattered not how perfectly true the publication might be. Its truth was the only immaterial circumstance connected with it. It might be perfectly true in every particular, and yet conviction and punishment would follow. Such was the state of the law as regarded criminal prosecutions for libel. How did it stand with respect to civil actions where the party aggrieved sought redress in damages? In civil actions, if the truth of the publication could be proved, it was a complete and perfect defence, no matter how malicious or injurious the publication might have been. He proposed to change the law in these respects; he proposed to make the law definite and precise; and, if it were not entering too much into detail, he would explain the means by which he proposed to do so. It was his intention, if the House allowed the Bill to be read a second time, to propose that it be referred to a Select Committee up stairs to consider its provisions. He proposed, in the first place, to make that definite which was at present indefinite. He proposed, to reduce actions of libel to the same limits as actions of slander. He proposed also to define distinctly what should be held to be libel; he proposed that no language should be held to be criminal which was not in itself an incitement to crime. Any publication accessorial to crime he would leave to be punished by the criminal law; but any publication uncomfortable to the feelings of private or public men, unless it imputed criminality to them, he would leave to be met by argument, or to be rebutted by the same means as that by which it was advanced. These were the two first principles of his Bill. In the next place he proposed to deal with the criminal modes of proceeding in cases of libel. These, as he had already stated, were three. The first, the ex officio proceeding by the Attorney-General, he proposed to do away with altogether. At present

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the Attorney-General could, at his own caprice, indict any person for libel. Public opinion, it was true, was a great protection in London against an arbitrary or improper use of that power; but he doubted whether it would prove the same protection in more distant parts of the kingdom. He did not think public opinion so good a protection in Edinburgh as in London, nor in Dublin as in Edinburgh. He thought that the Attorney-General ought not to possess this privilege. The only argument in its favour was, that in some cases it might be necessary to proceed with great quickness and dispatch in matters of libel. But proceedings ex officio were not necessary to the attainment of that end, because where would be the difficulty of sending up indictments to the Central Criminal Court, to the Quarter Sessions, or to the other criminal courts which are almost perpetually sitting. If expedition were required, it would be easy at any time to issue a special commission, and in forty-eight hours a special jury might be summoned, and the indictment laid before them. In the next place he proposed to take away from the Court of King's Bench the power of granting criminal informations. He knew that that was a favourite power with the profession, and he had more than once quarrelled with his professional brethren in opposing it; but it always appeared to him to be a most unsatisfactory as well as a most expensive mode of proceeding. In the first place, an affidavit must be made by the party complaining; if the affidavit were false it must be contradicted by a counter affidavit. There could not be a worse system than that of proceeding by affidavit. The last swearer had always a considerable advantage; the hardy swearer had a much greater advantage. A striking instance of that fact had occurred within the last fifteen months. Instead of these informations, therefore, he proposed for the future that all criminal proceedings in cases of libel should be by indictment. He should wish a Committee up stairs to discuss the details of this measure. Next, with respect to criminal prosecutions, and allowing truth to be given in evidence, he thought it better not to allow the parties to go out of court free of expenses, because they had proved the truth. Then he took up another point of the law of libel that related to costs. At present, in actions for slander, when the damages were under 40 s. the parties recovered no costs. In
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spoken libel, or slander, 40 s. did not carry damages; but in cases of written libel, if the damages were laid at only one farthing-, that carried costs. Thus, in the one case no costs were allowed, whilst in the other enormous costs were imposed. He had heard of several cases where 400 l. had been the amount of costs of the plaintiff and defendant, when only one farthing damages had been returned. There had been cases in Liverpool and Devonshire where one farthing damages had been awarded, but where 400 l. had been the actual amount of costs. Was this a state of the law which ought to be allowed to continue? It was matter of speculation to many attorneys in respect to certain libellous paragraphs being copied from one paper into another. Many instances occurred where attorneys speculated upon there being no more than one farthing damages, and brought fifteen actions afterwards against each paper into which the libel might have been copied. He might be told that the judge might certify; but who ever heard of a judge certifying under these circumstances? If a judge so certified, it might be said it would deprive the parties of costs. His opinion was, that no man who should recover no more than 20 l. damages should be entitled to costs; or, that if the plaintiff obtained 50 l. damages he should not recover more than that amount of costs. If the damages exceeded 50 l., the plaintiff to be entitled to full costs, as between attorney and client. By this measure he introduced two principles—the one giving the power of retractation in criminal cases; and, secondly, that the prosecutor must serve notice on the party to retract. The jury, moreover, were to be the judges whether bonâ fide this retractation was sufficient in criminal cases. This clause did not go to interfere with actions in civil cases. In the case of criminal prosecutions he had given the power to the parties publishing the libel to give up the author. If he gave up the name of the author, then no action for damages would lie; but if such person refused to do this, then an action would lie. But in the case of authorship not being proved, the publisher of the libel was to pay all costs. This Bill also provided that in criminal proceedings the parties should be allowed to prove that the libel was promulgated without his assent; though this was not to be admitted as complete evidence to the jury, but as mi-

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tigating circumstances. He proposed that this should apply only to cases of criminal proceedings, but should not extend to cases where civil actions were brought. He thought it impossible for any man to say that the present state of the law was such as should continue. After some further observations, the hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by saying, that all he wished was, that this Bill should be read a second time, upon the principle that the existing taw was such as required improvement. If this motion should be agreed to, he should move for a Select Committee tip stairs to inquire into and report upon the question. He hoped that his Majesty's Attorney-General would help in farming such Committee.
The Attorney-General: I feel myself under the necessity of opposing the second reading of this Bill, but by no means on the ground that the existing law does not require improvement. I apprehend, however, that the promoter of the Bill is bound to prove, first that the law requires improvement; secondly, that this Bill would be an improvement of the law. Now the first of these propositions has, I think, been most completely demonstrated by the hon. and learned Member. As to the second, I think, with great respect to him, that he has utterly railed. Now, that the present state of the law of libel is defective and Unsatisfactory, I readily allow. I agree With every word that was said by the hon. and learned Gentleman on that subject in the course of his speech; and I perfectly subscribe to the tribute which he has paid to the great qualifications and important services, as a judge, of the distinguished individual he referred to it is one thing to say, that the law is defective; another, to suggest how it should be remedied. I acknowledge that the present law is defective; and if there were any probability, in the present state of the business of the House, of carrying through Such a Measure, I myself, humble individual as I am, would most eagerly undertake to bring in a Bill to amend the law of libel. But, Sir, so lamentable is the present state of public business in this House, that I, for one, quite despair of Succeeding in Such an attempt. I have, myself, prepared four or five Bills connected with alterations and improvements in the law upon this and other matters. But what encouragement is there to bring in new Bills? On the very first day of the
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present Session, I brought in a Bill for taking away the punishment of imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud. I have done, I think the House will allow, everything in my power to forward that important Bill; but I have failed, hitherto, in getting it even into Committee. And why? Because it pleases some hon. Members, to occupy the time of the House upon such mere speculative questions as whether the convocation should be assembled again (for example), to the great detriment and delay of the real business before this branch of the Legislature. In fine, Sir, until there shall be some signal improvement in our present mode of conducting the business of this House, I totally despair of success in carrying any measure of legal reform or amendment. Now, Sir, as to the measure before us. With all my great respect for his talents and attainments—for his professional character and great experience— I must confess I have been quite astonished to find the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny bringing in such a Bill as this. I speak (I hope) most humbly, but still in all earnestness. I should have expected from a Gentleman of his experience and ability the suggestion of some remedy for the evil which, he tells us, be seeks to put down. But here is nothing of the soft. On the contrary, I should be prepared to anticipate, Were this Bill, in its present shape, to pass into a law, that the law of libel would, thereupon, be reduced to a Condition much worse, and more objectionable, than that even which it is admitted to be in at present. The hon. and learned Member has given us no sort of definition as to what it is that shall henceforward be held to constitute a libel,—nor yet of the limits Within which the truth, in defence to an action for libel, may be given in evidence. In the case of pleading the truth, in justification of a libel, he has, indeed, introduced a variety of provisions, having regard to the tender of such evidence; but I am pre- pared to show, that, were they ever to be- come enactments, they would necessarily lead to the most mischievous and disastrous consequences. He begins, here, by taking away and abolishing the power at present vested in his Majesty's Attorney- General to file, in certain cases, ex officio informations. Now, allow me to say that it would be a much fairer thing for the accused party, in criminal prosecutions, if there were a public prosecutor, who, on his

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own responsibility, in that capacity, would put the accused, at once, upon his trial; for then, the accused would come to his trial without any prejudice to his cause. The hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to what he says would have been done in such a matter in Edinburgh. Why, there is no such tribunal as a grand jury in Scotland! The Lord Advocate, as public prosecutor, puts the accused upon his trial at once; but I do not say, that criminal justice is better administered in the Northern than it is in the Southern parts of the island. I have never, yet, had occasion, since I have had the honour of holding the office of his Majesty's Attorney-General, to file a single ex-officio information. In this respect I consider myself to have been very fortunate; but, most undoubtedly, if I felt it my duty to do so, at any time, I would much rather file an ex officio information against an accused, than I would send him to a grand jury, from which he Would go to his trial at the assizes with this prejudice, at least, created against him,—namely, that on an ex parte trial, before twenty of his countrymen, there was that sort of primâ facie case of guilt against him, that they had found the Bill, Why, Sir, I may mention that an hon. Friend of mine is, at this moment, engaged in preparing a Bill for the abolition of grand juries. But the fact is, that grand juries are so much looked up to and respected, in this country, that I do not think the time is yet come for so sweeping a measure. Still, I do think, that the system of ex parte proceedings before grand juries is inconsistent with the present state and feeling of society; and I must always declare, that I do not like to send a man, thus prejudiced by their finding, to his trial before a petty jury. It is not intended, I believe, by the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny to take away the power of the Attorney-General to proceed by ex officio information in other cases. But why, I ask, should the learned Member except the case of libel only from such informations, filed by the Attorney-General? If the Attorney-General may still file these informations for blasphemous words, seditious acts, and so forth, there seems no reason in depriving him of the power only in the case of libel. If he is not to retain the power in any of those other cases in which, I apprehend, he must originate the proceedings, there
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can be no reason why he should retain it in this. Then, the preamble of the Bill goes on to declare, in the next place, that no such thing as a criminal information shall be filed by order of the Court of King's Bench. The hon. and learned Gentleman told us, in the course of his speech, "that he has not yet been able to find a single member in his own profession, in Ireland," who would concur with him in this proposition. He might safely have gone much further, and added, "nor a single member of that profession out of Ireland." I am at a loss to conceive upon what grounds the hon. and learned Gentleman could have assumed, that this restriction would prove either just or prudent. Why, Sir, the practice which he would put down is a most potent and most salutary protection for all parties. It gives to the party against whom the charge on which the proceeding for libel is brought, an opportunity of purging himself from that charge on oath;—to the party who brings that charge, an opportunity, on the other hand, of substantiating it also upon his oath; and be it observed, that unless the party against whom that charge is brought can make out that he is an innocent man, and has been wronged by the statement of the accused, he is refused the information he prays, and denied the protection which he invokes. I know that two most distinguished men, Lord Erskine and Lord Brougham, have held this power to be a most salutary one; and that Lord Brougham has declared, that the Court of King's Bench is a court of honour, and has a tendency to protect the peace of the country and the honour of individuals. The Bill next proceeds to attempt to tell us in what cases there may be a prosecution for a public libel; and the definition which is given of a public libel, as I take it from clause 22, is this,—"the words public libel' shall be construed to include any matter, written or printed, reflecting upon his Majesty's Government or his Majesty's Ministers, Or upon either or both Houses of Parliament, or upon any constituted authority in the State, or upon the conduct and management of public affairs in any department of the state, whether foreign or domestic, or upon the administration of justice;" and in clause 2, it is declared, that "it shall be necessary in every such indictment to allege and to prove, at the trial that the

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libel therein set forth was published to aid or abet, or to counsel or advise, or procure the commission of some crime for which a person may now, by law, be indicted as an accessory before the fact." Now, with respect to the proposition that all criminal informations for libels, unless they incite to or abet crimes, should be done away with, I repeat, that the Bill of the hon. and learned Gentleman would leave the law worse than it is at present. Let me ask the hon. and learned Member whether or not he justifies the late Sir Arthur Piggott for the only ex officio information which he ever directed to be filed while in office? Will the hon. and learned Gentleman tell us that he thinks Sir Arthur Piggott, on that occasion, abused his authority? The case was this — a certain newspaper reported that the Admiralty had sent out troops in transports which were unseaworthy vessels, only in order that they might be lost. Why, according to the learned Member for Kilkenny's definition of a public libel, against this atrocious charge, which, I believe, every body, at the time, thought to be one of the most proper cases for a criminal prosecution that was ever known,—no such information would lie! Even if the newspaper writer had said, that troops had been sent out by the Government with poisoned bread, or that the judges or the bench had been corrupted, I contend that, according to the learned Gentleman's construction, these would not be libels tending "to aid or abet, or to counsel or advise, or procure the commission of some crime for which a person may now, by law, be indictable as an accessory before the fact." I think, therefore, that these provisions of the learned Member for Kilkenny's Bill would be, in practice, extremely injurious, and would mete out impunity to those who would well deserve condign punishment. But, then, this Bill goes on to say, that no action or indictment for libel shall lie for a written or printed libel, unless for words which, if spoken, would be libellous:—
"No civil action shall be maintained for any words,' merely because of the same being printed or written, or for any other words, save for such as would be sufficient to sustain an action when spoken; neither shall any indictment be sustained for any personal libel, save for such words as would sustain an action according to this Act."
I am sure that my hon. and learned
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Friend had not properly considered the effect of such a provision as this, when he finally allowed it to stand as one of the clauses of his Bill; or he must have forgotten, at the time, what the law of England at present is with respect to spoken words. By the law, as it stands, to say of a man that he is a coward, a liar, and a scoundrel, will lay no sufficient ground of action, nor yet of criminal indictment. So, in the case of a woman of the greatest modesty and good conduct; to abuse her with the foulest terms, involving imputations upon her chastity—these words in themselves, and unless special injury be proved to have resulted from them, will sustain neither action nor indictment. They are, in legal phrase, only "words of pique." But will any man contend, that if words of this sort be printed in a newspaper, and circulated to all the world—if a man of honour be accused, in that way, of being a liar and a scoundrel —or a virtuous woman of a breach of chastity—no action should be brought against the publication? And yet, under this clause of the Bill, any one might disseminate the most intolerable calumnies by the public press with perfect impunity—provided, truly, that the party retract the same, through the same channel, before an indictment for them shall have been found against him. If, indeed, the hon. and learned Gentleman had brought the penalty for spoken words up to the same point as that which the law assigns for written words, he might safely have effected some improvement in the existing law. But he does the very reverse of this. He equalises the offence of written words of libel to that of spoken words; so that there shall be no remedy, to the most injured party in the world, for abuse and scandal of the foulest character, though it be promulgated to the utmost possible extent. Then, Sir, we come to the clause empowering the defendant in actions for libel to prove the truth of his allegations. Now I think, that as to this point I must admit the defectiveness of the present law of libel. I think that, in actions of this sort, the truth of the alleged libel should be allowed to be pleaded, not as a necessary justification of the cause of action—not as in itself a good and complete defence to such action—but as matter proper to go to the jury to enable them to judge whether there has been, on the part of the defend-

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ant, malicious intention or not; and then let the jury determine accordingly. Truth, it must always be observed, is not a complete justification in a case of libel. For example, the House may recollect the well-known anecdote of a young woman who happened, in her youth, to have had a child, but who, at a more advanced period of her life, had become a very highly respectable matron, and mother of a family. A charge was cruelly brought against her, that at some previous time she had been deficient in personal chastity. Now, in that instance, every body must perceive that the truth of the statement could be in no respect a justification of the libel; and it must be admitted, that the person who could be guilty of inflicting so enormous an injury on a female, thus circumstanced, was deserving of the most severe punishment. With regard to the clause, "defendant, in actions for libel, may prove the truth of his allegations;" the prosecutor ought to give notice of his proceeding. Then the prosecuted should have the opportunity of producing his witnesses and preparing his defence; and the other party would have to show that the charge against him is unfounded. But all that is provided for here is, that the truth may be given in as evidence. In my opinion, the proper mode of proceeding in such cases would be this—if the defendant rely on the truth, he should be compelled to say, "the charge is true, and therefore I publish it; and then you should let the case go on to trial either on the truth or on the merits. Nothing of that kind, I repeat, is contemplated under this clause. All that is said is, that the truth may be pleaded. Now we arrive at what I cannot but consider a most highly objectionable part of this Bill; namely, the clause providing that on his retractation of the libel there shall be complete impunity to the libeller. [Mr. O'Connell,—No; no.] I say from all criminal proceedings,—complete impunity; because, there shall be no punishment. That there shall, under these circumstances, be no punishment, is gravely proposed in the body of the Bill. It is gravely proposed that "at the trial of any indictment for a personal libel, it shall be necessary for the prosecutor to prove the service on the publisher thereof, either personally or at his place of abode (one week at least, before the indictment found), of a notice, in writing, calling on him to re-
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tract and contradict the libellous matter; and unless such notice be proved, or if the defendant shall prove that he, before the indictment was found, fairly and unequivocally published a retractation and contradiction of such libellous matter, in the same mode in which it was originally published, such publisher shall be acquitted," So that the party aggrieved is to give a week's notice to the libeller, in order that he may have the opportunity of "retracting" his libel before such party shall be entitled to substitute criminal proceedings. So that if an editor of a newspaper publish an article maliciously impugning the conduct and character of any man, however respectable,—an article attributing to him the most crying enormities, the most scandalous motives, the most degrading conduct,—so long as he takes care to publish, in another day's copy of his newspaper, another article or retractation, as the hon. and learned Gentleman calls it, contradictory of that which preceded it,—such publisher or libeller may exempt himself from all the penal consequences that should justly attach to his offence. Having determined to calumniate any members of the community, he may go on repeating his offence, only taking care to publish its "retractation," "totics quoties," for there is no limitation? whatever imposed upon the number of libels which, under these conditions, he shall be allowed to perpetrate. Why, surely, it is quite possible that a newspaper might be set up for the express purpose of libelling. Does not the hon. and learned Gentleman see that this proposed privilege of retractation to the libellers would assure to such an establishment an extensive and totally unrestrained trade in slander? But, here again, in clause 8, it is enacted, that if the author be given up, the publisher cannot be touched. My hon. and learned Friend is aware that, where a libel has been published in a newspaper, the prosecutor will not have much chance of success in vindicating his character, unless he can get at the author. If the conductor of the newspaper has believed the genuineness of an article he has published, but for publishing which he is proceeded against—if he has inserted it bonâ fide, but because imposed upon, the existing law allows that the author should be punished. But here we have a sweeping enactment, that "if publisher discloses name and residence of author of a libel, action against publisher

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to cease." Is it not perfectly within the range of possibility that a roan of straw may be set up as the author; and if he be not actually the proprietor of the journal, he may in effect be put forward as the scapegoat of the concern for all purposes? He may even be in gaol. He may, from interested motives, consider a gaol as his home. And thus the publisher or proprietor of the newspaper, who has given him up, escapes with perfect impunity, if he is only in a condition to say, "the author of this libel is already in Newgate. Go to him." But then, says my hon. and learned Friend, "the party libelled has a civil action." I do not wish to advert to any particular newspaper by name; but is it not quite possible that a man of straw (or woman of straw, for there are women, newspaper proprietors) may be put forward, as the party in whom the property is ostensibly vested? Now, let us suppose that some overruling aristocrat of a magistrate (if such a man there be in the commission), possessed of overwhelming influence in the community, were guilty of libelling some poor patriot, and that the latter sought his redress in an appeal to the legal tribunals. The purse-proud libeller —the Sir Giles Overreach—against whom he might institute a suit, would be allowed the privilege of a special jury by the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny, and would very probably be acquitted, whilst the unoffending poor patriot would be made the victim. The next enactment is important. There is one case of grievance under the existing law, as alluded to by the hon. and learned Gentleman, to which a remedy should clearly be applied. That is, the anomaly which exists in respect of the marked difference between the proceedings in an action of damages for spoken words and an action of libel. In the former case, when the jury finds for the plaintiff damages not exceeding 40 s. he is not entitled to recover costs exceeding that sum. This rule supplies a very proper check upon the plundering system of malicious or pettifogging prosecutors and attorneys. But, on the contrary, it unfortunately happens that if a man brings an action for libel, and gets but one farthing damages, if the judge certifies, the defendant may be subject to enormous costs. This is, undoubtedly, a very crying evil, and ought immediately to be remedied. I know full well that there are, very many cases in which ac-
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tions are entered solely for this purpose of obtaining costs, and for nothing else. A well known prosecution, which mast be fresh within the memory of the House, has recently been instituted, which was most likely a case of this sort. But what is the sort of remedy proposed by this Bill? Why, that in any case where "the jury shall give damages exceeding 40 s. and not exceeding 20 l., neither party shall be entitled to costs from each other." Now this would lead, in many cases, to gross injustice; for example, a little tradesman may bring an action against another tradesman in the same rank of life, for a libel, and the jury upon the trial may think that 18 l. or 19 l., for example, would be a very handsome compensation; but under the provisions of this Bill, though the party may recover 18 l. or 19 l. which would be worth as much to him as 1,000 l. to some individual in a higher class of society, he is debarred from recovering costs; he is saddled with all the expense to which he may have been put by the charges of instituting and prosecuting his action; he will be an absolute loser by this attempt to vindicate his character under the hon. and learned Gentleman's proposed "improvement" of the law of libel. The next enactment is one of a very objectionable character. It is to the effect that there shall be no special jury without consent of defendant; but that defendant may, if he please, have the case tried by a special jury. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had said that there never should be a special jury, there would, at all events, be some appearance of equality so far as the interests of the plaintiff and defendant were concerned. But what says the clause? "that it shall not be lawful for any prosecutor for any libel, either public or personal, to have a special jury, unless with the consent of the defendant; but"—(mark the unequal terms on which these parties are placed)—"the defendant may, if he please, have the cause tried by a special jury." Is there any justice in this? or rather, will not the hon. and learned Gentleman defeat his own object? In that case, your only remedy is to proceed against the party by indictment. It would be idle to prosecute him by civil action; of all your damages you would not recover one single farthing. When I find amendments of this nature proposed in the law of libel by the hon. and learned1 Member, I must say I read

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his Bill with infinite regret. Let us next look at the law with respect to the punishment for this offence; and here the hon. and learned Gentleman adopts what I must be permitted to call a most extraordinary course. It is here enacted, that the penalty for libel shall be fine "or" imprisonment. You cannot visit a party with both these penalties. Very well. But, then, why do you put a limit to the extent of the fine and the amount of the imprisonment? The imprisonment, it seems, is never, in any case, to exceed six months. I allow that there have been very heavy and improper sentences inflicted by the courts,—imprisonments for years,—for libels: but I can conceive cases in which the libels may be so atrocious—so destructive to the tranquillity of society—so ruinous to the peace of families, that it may be utterly impossible to appreciate the full extent of the mischief to which they may tend. They may be such as to be deserving of a much more serious punishment than many felonious offences; yet, under the enactments of this Bill, however enormous the offence may be, no circumstances will allow of your inflicting a greater term of imprisonment than six months. It really seems to me the most capricious thing in the world to attempt to lay down any fixed rule for cases of this sort. But the rule which the Bill lays down, as to fine, is yet more extraordinary than the other. One would have thought that a fine ought always to be imposed with reference to the pecuniary means of the party. Thus, we know, that a penalty of 10 l. may be as much to one individual to pay, as a penalty of 1,000 l. would be to another. Yet the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny proposes that, however great the offence may be, there shall in no case of libel be a fine of greater amount than 100 l.: so that, if some millionnaire choose to libel anybody, he may go into a town, with a bag of money carried before him by one of his servants, and do so in the most outrageous manner, making up his mind to lay out so much money upon such an employment. There is one other point involved in this Bill, in connexion with which I shall always contend for this principle, namely; that where a libel is published in a newspaper, it shall always be competent to the proprietor to show, that such libel was published without his, privity, or consent, or knowledge. Primá
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facie, the proprietor of a newspaper is liable to prosecution for publishing a libel; but I consider it to be clearly the law,—and it has so been held by the highest authorities,—that if the proprietor can show that any agent of his, unauthorised by him, or that any accident, beyond his control at the time,—has caused the publication of such libel; the proprietor, though he may be civilly responsible, cannot be made criminally liable. The law of England never means to visit people, thus unintentionally offending, in this manner. The spirit of our law is quite opposed to such principle. I will not now detain the House, any longer. I think I have said enough to show the House, that, however great and admitted the defects of the existing law of libel may be, there is no hope of the slightest improvement in it being produced by this Bill. I excessively regret that the Bill before the House does not, in any manner, answer the expectations I had formed of it, from the well-known ability of the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny. I did anticipate from him a measure more worthy of his high reputation. I did hope that the name of O'Connell was destined to go down to posterity by the side of those of Mr. Fox and of Lord Erskine, as a reformer of the law of libel. In that expectation I have been most grievously deceived. I cannot indulge a hope that any beneficial effect would be produced by this measure, and therefore I must oppose the second reading.
Mr. Jervissaid, that if the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny had proposed this Bill as a perfect measure on the law of libel, and one which ought to be passed into a law during the present Session, he should have been disposed to agree with the Attorney-General that it was too imperfect to be allowed to pass a Second reading. But inasmuch as it was admitted on all hands that the present law of libel was most defective, and inasmuch as the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny had laid down in the Bill certain general principles as to that defective state of the law, and as to the necessity of its reformation, with a view that the Bill itself should be referred to a Committee up stairs, he (Mr. Jervis) thought that, as a nucleus of a reform of the law: of libel, the Bill ought to be read a second time. It would be the commencement of a reformation, the necessity of which was

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admitted by all. He would submit to the House that the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny had not been very fairly dealt with by the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General, instead of discussing the principle of the Bill, had confined himself to certain clauses of it, which he deemed objectionable—passing over other clauses which he (Mr. Jervis) therefore assumed were not objected to—and then argued that, because some of the clauses were objectionable, the Bill ought to be thrown out altogether. The Attorney-General had even argued against the Bill because the blanks had been filled up in italics with the words six months' imprisonment, and only 100 l. fine; although he must have known that these were matters peculiarly referable to a Committee up stairs. Again, the Attorney-General complained that ex officio informations were proposed to be abolished. But, in his opinion, ex officio informations were bad things altogether, and the Attorney-General well knew that a very strong feeling prevailed against them among the members of the bar. The Attorney-General did not contend for the propriety of that species of process in other criminal cases. Why, then, should he advocate it in cases of libel? If it were a good process in libel cases, it ought to be adopted in every other case. It was his opinion, that the power of prosecuting by ex officio process was calculated to act with great severity against the press. No man who had read the excellent treatises written by Lord Brougham, in reviews and elsewhere, could deny that it was not only an anomaly, but the greatest possible injustice, that in a civil action for slander the truth might be given in evidence, whereas in a criminal proceeding it could not be given. The Attorney-General admitted that some of the clauses of the Bill were good, and that the principle for admitting the truth to be given in evidence in criminal cases —not as a justification per se, but as showing the motive of the defendant—was a sound principle, What, then, was the objection of the Attorney-General to this clause? Why, because there was not added to it a proviso, saying, that in criminal proceedings the defendant should plead specially the truth of the libel. For this reason it was, that the Attorney-General would have the whole Bill rejected. If Bills were to be rejected on
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the second reading for want of provisos, he begged to inform the Attorney-General that very few would ever be read a second time. So much did he (Mr. Jervis) appreciate the clause admitting the truth of the libel to be given in evidence, that he would vote for the second reading of the Bill if it were only for the purpose of preserving that clause. He would take the liberty of controverting another position of the Attorney-General, who had said, that in the case of a male or female being put forth as a proprietor who might be only a man or woman of straw, or if the author of the libel were a mere man of straw, and these parties were in prison, there would be no means of proceeding against any of them with a view to punishment, because they could not pay damages. But could they not be imprisoned? But the Attorney-General had assumed the author of the libel to be already in gaol; even in that case, would it not be in the power of the prosecutor to detain him there, and would not that be a punishment? There was another clause in the Bill of which he highly approved; it was the clause which provided that if the proprietor of a paper should give up the author of the libel, but should not furnish the prosecutor with sufficient evidence to prove the authorship, the proprietor should pay the costs. This was a very salutary provision, and was alone amply sufficient to call upon the House to read the Bill a second time. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by again urging the House to send the Bill to a Committee up stairs.
Mr. Borthwicksaid, that the hon. and learned Attorney-General having made a personal charge against him, and alluded to a motion which he had recently made, as affording an instance of the desire which was assumed to be entertained by hon. Members generally to postpone practical legislation to theoretical disquisition, he begged to inquire of the hon. and learned Gentleman whether, by "practical legislation," he meant the discovery and application of an imaginary surplus, with which the House had been recently occupied for a considerable period, upon the motion of a Minister of the Crown? The hon. Gentleman then expressed himself favourable to the principle of introducing some reform into the law of libel.
Sir Frederick Pollockentirely concurred with all those hon. Gentlemen who had

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preceded him in believing that the present state of the law of libel was unsatisfactory. In the first place, with regard to ex officio informations, it might be a fair subject of discussion how far those informations ought to be permitted to exist in their present state, or whether they should exist at all. For his part, he was inclined to think, that the power which the Attorney-General now possessed of filing an information for libel of his own act, and ex officio merely—a power which was not conferred upon that officer before the year 1810 or 1811—was a power which ought no longer to exist. With respect to the costs of actions of this description, he agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny, that it was quite monstrous, that in cases of slander, a party who was awarded damages of a less amount than 40 s. should not be entitled to receive the costs, although in a case of libel one farthing damages carried full costs. With regard to the discretionary power which was at present vested in the judges, he certainly would say, that they did not interfere so often as he thought they ought to interfere, in deference to public opinion. The sum which was at present limited to 40 s. should, he thought, be increased, but not to so large a sum as 10 l. These, however, were all matters of detail, which would be best decided in Committee. With reference to the question of publication, he thought that the provisions contained in the twenty-first clause of this Bill ought to be made part of the law of the land. Speaking his opinion with perfect freedom in that House, he would state his belief that it was the law of the land at present. It was proper, however, that there should be an explicit statute upon the subject. With reference to the Attorney-General's observation, that a proprietor or publisher was not responsible by law when he could prove that the libellous matter was inserted contrary to his knowledge or consent, he (Sir F. Pollock) was sorry to say, that, although he agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman in believing that this was the law of the land, and ought to be the law of the land, it had not been so decided. On the last occasion upon which this point was discussed in the Court of King's Bench, it was decided that, although the party accused was not aware of the publication, he was criminally responsible, and the circumstances of this case were rather
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remarkable; for the party was absent from his establishment when the sole copy of the libel that was issued, was sold; and the very instant of his return put a stop to the further sale. For the disposal of this single copy, however, he was convicted of the libel, fined, and, if his memory served him rightly, imprisoned for six months. That doctrine had prevailed then, and would be allowed again, and he could not help thinking that some Act of Parliament ought to pass to remove such a disgrace from the administration of the law. If it was the intention of the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny to get this Bill read a second time, and then sent to a Select Committee up stairs, to such a course of proceeding he could not consent, for he foresaw that in such a case the Bill would be allowed to sleep for the rest of the Session, and all that was beneficial in it would be lost in consequence of the discussions on those parts of the Bill which he must say made it a most objectionable measure. Admitting, as he fully did, the advantages of a Select Committee for the arrangement and settlement of matters of detail, he had a further objection to this Bill going to a Committee up stairs, inasmuch as it contained many objectionable clauses which involved not merely details, but principles, of which it would best become the House itself to undertake the discussion. Those principles the House would appear to sanction if it consented to the second reading of this Bill. With an earnest desire that the time of the House should not be wasted in a fruitless discussion, and in the sincere hope that those improvements of the laws which all seemed agreed should be carried into effect, he conceived it would be much better that the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny should withdraw this Bill, and after removing its objectionable provisions, bring in a new Bill, embracing only those topics as to the propriety of which there appeared to exist no doubts. He objected to those provisions of the Bill which brought libel to the lowest point at which slander commences; he objected also to the retractation clause, which provided, that if the publisher of a libel, after notice, retracted the offence in the same publication, he should be exempted from the liability which that publication incurred. Why, there were daily, weekly, monthly, and annual publications; and would it be said that a man libelled in

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the Annual Register, for instance, was to wait a year for the retractation, or that the publisher should bring out a new edition containing it? Why, the retractation in such a case would never reach the knowledge of many who had heard and been influenced, perhaps, by the original libel. He objected also to the relief given to a publisher for the disclosure of the author of the libel complained of; and his objection was, that a man might be found who would be content to remain in prison (the King's Bench, for instance) for life, on being well paid to undertake the responsibility, as general author of all the libels which (he would not say the newspapers) evil-disposed and malicious persons might trade in and send forth to the world. For the reasons he had stated, he should, if the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny persevered in sending the Bill to a Committee up stairs, vote against the second reading. He, however, hoped the hon. and learned Member would adopt his suggestion, and withdraw the Bill for the purpose of introducing a measure of a less objectionable character.
Mr. Poultersaid, that so many changes were required in the existing law of libel, and so few of them were embraced in the measure now before the House, that he could not give his sanction to its second reading, for which, indeed, no sufficient grounds had as yet been laid. The Bill by its 5th Clause, appeared to him to contract and almost annihilate the right of action for libel, and it left private character open to the most calumnious misrepresentations without re-dress. Instead of lowering the law of libel to the level of the law of slander, as the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny did by this Bill, he would reverse the position, and make the utterer of slanders upon private character and public worth in speeches well calculated to excite the passions of the many thousands to whom they might be addressed, deeply responsible. He thought, also, that provisions ought to be made in any measure designed to alter the existing law of libel to exempt from that law substantially accurate reports of the proceedings before courts of law and the legislative assemblies. Upon this much doubt existed, as a recent case, involving a question as to the privileges of that House, had recently exhibited. It was in these times due to the country that fair and substantially
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correct reports of those proceedings should be published and sent forthwith to the world freed from the risk Which even the publication of truth now involved. Another point he would deal with, and which was not met by this Bill, Was this—he would exempt those poor people who sold publications, of the contents of which they were wholly ignorant, from the liabilities to which their trade Under the existing law exposed them. The hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny had endeavoured by his Bill to define what should be libel, but it was a subject too difficult even for the hon. and learned Member to deal with. On the whole, he thought this Bill contained too little to meet the views and wishes of the country to entitle it to the sanction of the Legislature, and, holding these opinions, he should move as an amendment, that the Bill be read a second time this day six months.
Mr. Sergeant Talfourdwould vote against the second reading of this Bill, because, great as were the defects of the present law of libel, it seemed to him to be an attempt to remedy those defects all on one side. Every provision appeared to be designed for the immunity and protection of those who disseminate slander, while not one tittle of protection was afforded to that private character and private reputation which he was sure the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny would feel to be one of the dearest possessions any individual could enjoy. Among many other most objectionable clauses, the Bill provided, that the publisher of a libel was to have his Option of impunity from criminal charge if within a week after notice in writing, he retracted; or he had the option of giving up at his own will and pleasure the author, and then, because the author was surrendered, the publisher was to be held free from guilt. Was the House prepared to say, that trade in libel was no crime? Was it to be said, that the trader in slander, the pander to the worst passions, should escape from guilt by giving up to the parties assailed the author of the calumnies, however impotent he might be as an object for redress? From first to last the provisions of this Bill were framed in favour of the party guilty of slander, who was to have his choice of jury, the advantage of a reply upon the case of the party assailed and seeking redress, and

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indeed every thing that could conduce to his comfort, protection, immunity, and advantage. On the whole the Bill cast a degree of protection around him unequalled in any of the laws of this country. Agreeing that a measure should be brought in to prevent those mean, paltry actions for slander and libel, which were brought merely for the sake of costs, doubting whether even the hon. and learned Member would ever be able to define what should or should not be libel —satisfied also that it was right and fitting; for the Legislature to apply its mind to those remedies which the defects of the law required, he could not agree to go into Committee on a Bill which was not called for by the. present state of the public press, and which afforded no protection to private character from the assaults of malice.
Mr. Macleanconcurred in what had fallen, from the hon. and learned Member for Reading, and rose only to call the attention of the hon. and learned Member for, Kilkenny to an omission in his Bill. The Bill abolished by the 14th section, all ex officio and criminal informations, and provided no remedy for libels on the Crown, on Christianity, or publications of obscenity, and provided no satisfactory substitute either for the Crown or for private individuals.
Mr. O'Connell, in reply, remarked, that the hon. and learned Member for Oxford had misunderstood the meaning of the 14th clause, which excluded in terms the offences he had mentioned from the provisions of the Bill. Every hon. Member who had opposed the Bill had admitted, that the law of libel required to be altered; bat yet no one had brought forward a measure for the purpose. His object was to have the law, which as it stood at present was atrociously bad, defined; and he would therefore divide the House.
The House divided. Ayes 47; Noes 55:—Majority 8.

List of the AYES.

Aglionby, H A.

Fielden, J.

Bish, Thomas

Gordon, R.

Blake, Martin J.

Hardy, J.

Bodkin, J.

Hawes, B.

Brady, D. C.

Hector, C. J.

Brotherton, J.

Hindley, C.

Browne, R. D.

Hume, J.

Bulwer, E. L.

Hutt, W.

Chalmers, P.

King, Edward B.

Collins, W.

Lennard, T. B.

Crawford, W. S.

Lynch, A. H.

502

Maher, John

Talbot, J. Hyacinth

Marsland, Henry

Thompson, Colonel

Musgrave, Sir R. bt.

Thornley T.

O'Brien C.

Wakley, T.

O'Connell, J.

Wallace, Robert

O'Connell, Morgan

Warburton, H.

O'Connor, Don

Wason, R.

O'Ferrall, R. M.

Wilbraham, G.

Parrott, J.

Wilmington, H. J.

Pease, J.

Wood, Alderman

Philips, Mark

Wyse, Thomas

Power, James

TELLERS.

Roch, D.

O'Connell, D.

Rundle, J.

Jervis John

List of the NOES.

Agnew, Sir A.

Lennox, Lord A.

Angerstein, John

Lowther, J. H.

Balfour, T.

Mackenzie, T.

Baring, F. T.

North, Frederick

Bell, Matthew

Parker, John

Bramston, T. W.

Pollock, Sir F.

Burrell, Sir C. M.

Price, S, G.

Campbell, Sir J.

Pringle, A.

Copeland, W. T.

Rolfe, Sir R. M.

Corbett, T.

Rushbrooke, Colonel

Dunbar, George

Ryle, John

Elley, Sir J.

Scott, J. W.

Fector, J. M.

Steuart, R.

Finch, George

Talford, Serjeant

Follett, Sir W.

Tooke, William

Forbes, W.

Trevor, hon. A.

Forster, Charles S.

Twiss, Horace

Freshfield, J.

Vere, Sir C. B.

Goulburn, Sergeant

Verner, Colonel

Halse, James

Vesey, hon. T.

Heathcote, G. J.

West, J. B.

Hobhouse, Sir J.

Wilson, H.

Hogg, J. W.

Wortley, J. S.

Hughes, Hughes

Young, G. F.

Ingham, R.

Young, J.

Inglis, Sir R. H.

Lee, John Lee

TELLERS.

Lefevre, C. S

Maclean,

Lennox, Lord G

Poulter, J. S.

Preamble
MINUTES.] Petitions presented. By the Bishop or HEREFORD and Lord MONTAGU from various places against the abolition of Church-rates—By Lord CLONCURRY from Kilmannon for abolition of Tithes (Ireland), and for Irish Municipal Corporation Bill; and from the Catholics in St. George, Dublin, for exemption from the payment of a Debt contracted for building the Parish Church.—By the Earl of RADNOR and Lord CLONCURRY From various places for the abolition of Church-rates.—By the Earl of FINGALL from Skryme and Rathfeigh for Vote by Ballot.