Sitting of 7 July 1828

ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.
The House having resolved itself into a Committee of Supply, Sir H. Hardinge moved, "that 18,900 l. be granted for defraying the Salaries of the several Civil Establishments of the Ordnance, for the year 1828."
Mr. Humesaid, the gallant officer had declared, that the military part of the service was brought as low as the circumstances of the country admitted. There he was at issue with him. He would not dwell on the question, whether we ought to have
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artillery-men in the proportion of one to nine, or one to fourteen of our other force, or whether the number of guns should be one to five hundred. The proportion in which States on the Continent kept up their military establishments, was not a matter to which that House should give much attention, in considering what force was necessary for us in time of peace. This country should take advantage of its insular situation, and diminish its military establishments to as low a scale as circumstances would admit. Now, instead of diminishing, our force had been increased to an enormous extent, as compared with 1792, and even with 1822. The artillery force had also been increased much more than was necessary; and though the Committee of Finance seemed to be of that opinion, they felt a delicacy as to any interference with respect to the numbers of men to be kept up in that department; leaving it rather to the judgment of government, or to the consideration of the House. Now he felt no delicacy of the kind, and therefore it was his intention to propose a reduction of the number of men. The hon. member then went into a detailed statement, in order to show the increase that had taken place; and, in conclusion, observed, that when the vote respecting the numbers to be kept up in the artillery was proposed, lie would move as an amendment, that they be reduced by one thousand men.
After a short conversation, the resolution was agreed to.
Sir H. Hardinge, next moved, "That 30,000 l. be granted towards defraying the expense of Military Works at Kingston in Upper Canada, and Halifax in Nova Scotia, for the year 1828; upon an Estimate not exceeding 330,644 l."The works were of great importance, as constituting the new works for the defence of our North American colonies. In 1819, the duke of Wellington was desired, by the Colonial Secretary, to report upon the military defence of Canada; more particularly with the view of arranging the line of defence and communication from Montreal to Kingston, the navigation of the river St. Lawrence as connected with it, and the completion of the Rideau Canal. He spoke of these works now in a military point of view, and not as connected with important commercial considerations. The great point, in that sense was, to secure a safe and

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rapid line of communication, for troops acting on the defensive upon the Canadian frontier. In 1824, the duke of Wellington sent a military commission to report on this line of fortifications, and from their information it was found, that, except Quebec, there was no safe point where a single gun, or the smallest portion of military stores, could be lodged in the whole line, between Montreal and Kingston, so as to ensure their safety. To fortify Kingston was of great importance, because it not only supplied a place of security for stores, but it gave protection to vessels, and formed a fortified harbour on Lake Ontario. It was the only fortification on the lake. It would also be necessary to defend other points. The Ordnance department was unwilling to leave any-thing undone; because it had generally been reproached with having neglected to take precautions of defence in time. The fortifications proposed were divided into three classes; the first was the most necessary; the second and third might be postponed for a term of years. The present plan embraced only the first class of works, which would require 900,000 l., if they could be executed; but the present vote was to apply only to works at Kingston and at Halifax. The propriety of fortifying Kingston and Halifax could not be doubted. At present, an enterprising enemy might land in the neighbourhood of Halifax, get in the rear of the town, and destroy it with the dock-yard and all the stores.
Mr. Stanleycomplimented the gallant general on the ingenuity with which he had brought forward the measure. The vote was now for 30,000 l., but behind it there was another for 900,000 l., and when this was gained, there would come a vote for 1,900,000 l. exclusive of the vote of 500,000 l. for the Rideau Canal; 30,000 l. was the sum now demanded, but 2,300,000 l. was the sum the House, by that vote, was called on to pledge itself for. If he wanted any proof of the animus which actuated this half-military, half-civil government, what stronger evidence could he have than their conduct on this occasion? For the first time on the 4th July, the House heard of a supplementary estimate of 30,000 l. and were called upon to vote that sum on the next day. This vote pledged the House to a further expenditure of 2,000,000 l., and that at a time when the Finance Committee was ap-
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pointed, on account of the desperate state of the finances. By the lowest showing, the expenditure would be 2,500,000 l.; and this was to be spent upon a country which they were told it would be so difficult to retain. Had the Treasury Bench forgot that another committee was then sitting upon the government, or rather mis-government, of Canada—to ascertain how far ministers had alienated the affections of the people, the only fortifications which the mother country could; depend upon, for the preservation of the colony? It was said, that they were required as a defence against an enterprising enemy. Why, all these works would afford no defence against such an enemy and under such circumstances. What were the Americans doing at Sackett's Harbour, on the opposite side? They had dismantled all the works, and they husbanded their resources, until they should be required. He contended, that these fortifications were perfectly unnecessary; seeing that these colonies in the last war, had been able to defend themselves against any invasion. For his part, he did not think that an invasion on the part of the United States, was at all to be dreaded. He should oppose this vote, as the House, by agreeing to it, would give its sanction to a further expenditure of 2,500,000 l. in the erection of works which were, in his opinion, perfectly unnecessary.
Sir E. Owenconsidered these fortification necessary to preserve the dépôts and communications between the different points of defence.
Mr. Maberlysaid, the total amount to be expended upon these works, was three millions at least. But was this all? Certainly not; for it was manifest, from the estimate of the duke of Wellington, that they would require a large force for their defence. And then there was no certainty of our being able to hold Canada. When these works were established, the colonists might take it into their heads to say, "We are not satisfied with your government; we wish to govern ourselves." Thus the country would have had the expense of establishing the works to no purpose. But, he would ask, of what benefit was Canada to us, in a commercial point of view? He would say that, instead of a benefit, it was a disadvantage. We could procure timber better and cheaper from Norway.
Mr. Robinson, hearing it admitted, that

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the resolution would certainly involve an expense of 300,000 l. and fearing that it might lead to an indefinite expense, felt it his duty to vote against it.
Lord John Russellsaid, it was hard that the House should be called upon to come to this vote at so late a period of the session; but part of the fault lay with the Finance Committee. Having examined the subject in all its bearings, they left it to the House to decide the question. If that was the result at which they, arrived, it should have been made known to the House some months earlier.
Mr. M. Fitzgeraldcomplained of the practice of treating the question of the colonies as a matter of pounds, shillings and pence. If parliament was determined to have colonies, it was their duty to preserve them. Halifax was one of the finest harbours in the world, and as long as we held it, and had a canal to carry up stores into the interior, the Americans would never again venture to attack us upon Lake Ontario, or disturb that commerce which we carried on with the inhabitants of the distant settlements. Looking, therefore, at the importance of preserving-Canada, and the importance of being provided with a proper defence in the event of war, he felt bound to support the grant.
Mr. Laboucheresaid, that no person was more certain than he was, that it was impossible to keep Canada without possessing the entire and cordial affections of the inhabitants; and while those affections were devoted to this country in the manner they had been, he would be the last man in that House to consent to abandon the country or the people. In the event of a war with America—which, though he did not think probable, he was bound to view as possible—it would be found that they had laid out the money now called for most economically. He wished this country to remain on friendly terms with the United States, and therefore he thought it unwise to hazard that friendship, by leaving Canada a tempting object for invasion. He should support not only the present, but all future votes, of the like nature. This country would not be acting fairly and justly to Canada, if protection were not extended to her; and when he spoke of protection, he meant effectual protection. When he said he would vote for the present and for future grants of the same nature, he gave that pledge with this condition.—that efforts should be made,
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and made immediately, to give to Canada a wise, an efficient, and a conciliatory government; and that a complete change should be made in the system of disorder and misrule which had too long prevailed there.
Mr. Baringwas of opinion, that this was a very important question, not in a pecuniary point of view, but with reference to its consequences hereafter. He did not think that the right hon. gentleman had opened the case quite fairly. Some time ago it was decided by lord Liverpool's cabinet, that the whole extent of the object which government had in view, should be laid before parliament; but instead of coming down, and stating the full extent of what government intended to do, the right hon. gentleman had given a very contracted account of it. It was said 2,300,000 l. would complete all that was necessary. For his part, he should be very sorry to join a company that would undertake to do it for double that sum. Before they proceeded to expend money in this way, they ought to look to the internal state of those colonies. Now, he would contend, that Canada could not be kept as a colony of this country for a permanency, even if there were no hostile nation near it. It might be retained for thirty, forty, or fifty, years; but he repeated, that Canada was a country which could not be permanently attached to au European state. Having spent million after million on this colony, the result would, iii the very nature of things, be, that Canada would be separated from Great Britain. Let them look at what the colony was? It was a large settlement; but not at all like our other settlements, in the East or in the West Indies. In the latter, the employment of slaves and the cultivation of commodities not cultivated at home, rendered an interchange of commerce [with this country beneficial. The same thing might be said of the East Indies. But, in Canada, the people cultivated their farms like ourselves; and their habits and manners were the same as ours. When their numbers increased to eight or ten millions, they would come to this conclusion—that it was neither for their interest, nor for that of this country, that they should continue together. Colonies, he maintained, were a question of national wealth: then, as a question of wealth, what had been the case with respect to the United States, Had not the com-

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merce of this country enormously increased since America had become independent? They had petitions before them from Upper Canada signed by ninety-thousand persons; and from Lower Canada, signed by ten-thousand persons, complaining of the conduct of their governors. These petitioners were not disaffected to the mother country, but their petitions proved what it was for us to persist in forcing our prejudices upon persons of another country. They complained of their governor, saying, 'that he was alike negligent of the public, money, and prodigal in the expenditure of it.' "This was their representation of their governor; and 'yet the House had been told, that lord Dalhousie had given great satisfaction to the government. He did not mean to say that lord Dalhousie had erred intentionally; he thought he had mistaken his road in the government of the colony; but the fact was, that ministers still thought lord Dalhousie the best governor possible, and therefore it was clear, with the best of governors, what the result of a distant government's conduct to a colony would be. The history of all colonies proved the same fact. He did therefore think, that the head of the colonial department ought to consider what benefit would result to this country from this possession. They could not consider this great question at a better time than the present, when they were at peace—when they were threatened by nobody, and when they could therefore adopt any measure upon the subject without compromising their dignity. His decided opinion was, that all the colonies together presented great difficulties, and that it would be wise to consider whether the time was not now come, when, by parting with them, as good friends, they would not be more likely to benefit this country, than by plunging it into an extensive, and perhaps, after all, a useless expense. If, on the contrary, it was thought advisable to continue these fortifications, he could only say that, come the time must, when, in spite of fortifications, the struggle to maintain these possessions would be useless. If they supposed that they had nothing to fear from the Americans but a militia, they were mistaken. If they proceeded on such a view, they proceeded in ignorance. Let them ask their own officers, who had inspected the military schools of America, and they would find that, though America, had no force on foot, it had a great
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force in preparation. On these considerations he objected to the vote.
Sir G. Murraysaid, it had been objected, that this vote was brought on at a late period of the session; but what was the reason of it? It was wished that these estimates should be investigated by the Finance Committee; and the hon. member for Preston complained, at one and the same time; first, that the vote was brought on so late; and next, that it was not postponed until they had received the report of the committee who were inquiring into the state of Canada. He begged the House not to be misled by the supposition, that this was a system of fortification, and that if one part of the works must be performed, all must. The House was not called upon to pledge itself to any thing of the kind. Two of the works which it was now proposed to erect were necessary retreats of security and repair for our gallant navy, which might be injured in engagements or by tempests. It had been said, that we never could maintain our naval superiority on these stations; but certain it was, that we had done so during the last war. He thought that there were sufficient grounds to justify these two works. As to the Rideau Canal, an hon. friend had stated the importance of it in a commercial view; but it was more immediately required on military grounds. The conveyance on the St. Lawrence was difficult enough in time of peace, but almost impracticable in time of war. To give the House an idea of these difficulties, he would mention a few facts which occurred in the late war. The conveyance of a twenty-four pounder from Quebec to Kingston cost from 150 l. to 200 l., and the conveyance of a sheet anchor of seventy-six hundred weight cost 197 l. There were two brigs sent out from this country in frames to Montreal, and the cost of the conveyance of one of them from Montreal to Kingston was 30,000 l. He called upon the House to decide, whether they were ready to abandon these colonies, or preserve them with that high spirit and independent feeling, which this country had hitherto manifested.
Mr. W. Hortondefended the Canadas from the imputations of disloyalty, and expressed a hope that the time was not distant when the question relative to them would be fully discussed. He begged to enter his protest against all that had been said in favour of abandoning these colo-

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nies. The Canadians themselves would scout such a proposal. Let a system of conciliation be extended to them, and all their discontents would vanish.
Mr. Warburtonagreed with what had fallen from the hon. member for Calling-ton, and contended that his arguments had received no answer from the Secretary for the Colonies. He considered the proposed grant a prelude to the expenditure of 2,800,000 l. in the Canadas, and should oppose it. The real way to protect and conciliate our colonies, was not by introducing church establishments and foreign discipline amongst them, but by consulting the wishes and feelings of the people.
Lord Howicksaid, that the hon. member for Callington had most truly stated, that all our foreign colonies would in the lapse of time, become independent of the mother country. That such an event must happen there was no denying; and consequently this country ought in time to prepare for the separation, not by fortifying the Canadas, but by preparing them to become independent. With this view, instead of hurrying the present vote through the House, let ministers come down next session with a statement of such reasonable expenditure as would be required for the furtherance of a measure which sooner or later must take place.
Mr. Huskissonsaid, that although the hon. member for Preston had more than once referred to him, he had refrained from rising, because he wished, before he decided upon the present vote, to hear it defended by some competent authority. He was happy to say, he had found the authority he sought in the speech of the Colonial Secretary, whose explanation had perfectly convinced him of the necessity for this vote. He could not agree that the United States were not ambitious of possessing new territories; and of all the British settlements, he felt assured that the Canadas formed the first object of their ambition. He believed that the ambition which prompted America, in 1812, was ready to be called into action, on the first occasion. The House should recollect, that but for the defenceless state of the Canadas in 1812, that aggression which cost this country so much of its best blood and treasure, would never have taken place. Were we not wise, therefore, to provide against a similar aggression, by adopting those precautions which sound policy dictated? When the enormous expense incurred
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in conveying arms and military stores from one part of Canada to another was considered; it was surely a measure of sound policy to adopt that plan, by which not only those expenses would be lessened, but the country fortified against invasion. The question was this—shall England provide against future aggression in the Canadas, by rendering them capable of defence, or shall we give them up at once, with the loss of national character and honour, and overlooking those sacred duties which, as a parent country, we owed to a tried and faithful people. If we determined, as it became our station in the rank of nations to do, to defend the Canadas, we ought, in the first place, to consider whether that defence should be undertaken with every fair prospect of success, or whether we should, by a niggard vote at present, not only render that success doubtful, but increase the expense which it would cost us at least tenfold? The whole question amounted to this. Were we, if a struggle should again occur, to run the risk of losing the Canadas for ever, or would we at a much less expense secure them? The hon. member for Callington had spoken of the certainty of losing the Canadas, and in fact all our foreign possessions, in the course of time, and in the natural order of events. Without endeavouring to combat a doctrine which was undoubtedly founded on the history of pastages, he might observe, that the question at present appeared to be, not whether the Canadas should be ours in a hundred years, but whether they should continue in our possession, or become part and parcel of that immense and overgrown republic, whose ambition was as unquestionable as the means to accomplish it were formidable. He for one would say distinctly, "retain our possessions at any cost." Indeed, so deeply was he convinced of the necessity of pursuing this course, that, looking to the immense advantages which we were either to gain or to lose for ever, according as we pursued a wise or evil policy, if he could be positive that the amount of the present vote was to be expended with the positive certainty that if in fifty years to come—not to speak of a hundred—the Canadas were to be free and independent, he yet would not hesitate as to the course he should pursue, but would as. heartily give his vote under such circumstances as he was prepared to give it now; and for this reason—that if the Canadas in time were to throw off the control

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of the parent country, their independence ought to be achieved by the growth of national honour, opulence, and population; above all, let their independence be effected rather by the course of natural events, than by any premature and unnatural separation. If they were to become independent by the growth of their own resources, let us learn this lesson of practical wisdom—not to encounter a ruinous war in endeavouring to regain them. If the time for separation should at last arrive, let it be like the severing of the members of the same family, who, long united by the ties of blood and affection, found it at last necessary to part, but with the kindest wishes for each other's welfare. Let it be a separation, which, instead of alienating would strengthen the foundation of those feelings of mutual good will which arise from the considerations of family and blood. Apart, therefore, from all consideration of the duty which interest, or commercial advantages, or power, or the consideration of patronage, he would say, let the Canadas be ours as long as we are in a situation to retain them, and as long as their loyal people shall claim our protection; and if, in the course of time,—as who shall say that our connexion shall be eternal?—a separation shall take place, let the country to which we were once united, and from which we parted with regret, be one to which, in our mutual necessity, we may look forward to each other for support and assistance. Entertaining those views, he should certainly support the present vote. He hoped that the grounds of irritation, which existed in Canada, would soon be satisfactorily explained away. He thought that the Canadians had some cause of complaint, particularly with reference to the allotment of the lands, which too much resembled a draught-board. He thought that after forty years' possession, those millions of acres should be better allotted, and more advantageously cultivated. He felt assured, that any irritation which might exist in Canada was but temporary; and that no wish existed there to shake off the control of England. He trusted that when those works were completed, the peace and security of the Canadas would be placed upon a lasting foundation.
Mr. Humesaid, that the hon. member for Callington had not urged this country to abandon Canada, but had recommended that we should place that country in such
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a situation, that if Canada separated herself from England, she should become a free state, and not be annexed to the United States. The hon. member then went into a statement, to shew that the proposed fortifications were ill-chosen for the purposes of defence. He thought the motion ought to be postponed till next Session, and that the ministers should then declare, what was the policy they intended to pursue towards Canada.
Mr. Secretary Peelsaid, that the hon. gentleman had argued the question, as if the House had only the choice of two alternatives, either to vote this sum for the defence of the Canadas, or to abandon them altogether. It was clear, that if the hon. gentleman was not prepared to abandon the Canadas, his whole argument was conclusive in favour of the vote. The hon. gentleman himself said, "Don't disregard the Americans: they are not inattentive to military science: they are training up their youth to arms, and they have an extended frontier for some thousands of miles adjoining these colonies." If that was true, was it not wise, in time of peace, to make preparation for an effectual defence? The hon. gentleman himself must admit, unless he was prepared to recommend the abandoning of the Canadas that the most economical mode was, to assist the physical strength of the population, by some system of fortification.— But, he would ask, could this country abandon its Colonies? This was not a question to be decided by considerations purely of a general nature. He must say, that while he admired the eloquence and feeling of the hon. member for St. Michael's, he was convinced, that the hon. gentleman's sentiments were perfectly consistent with the soundest policy. His advice was: —"Redress the grievances of the Colonies: attend to their just complaints: if there be defects in the Act of 1791, apply a remedy. But, as they have faithfully stood by you in the hour of danger, do not abandon them now." Though considerations of feeling were not alone to determine this question, they were not to be disregarded. He begged the House to consider what would be the effect produced on the other Colonies, if this country were to abandon the Canadas. If they saw the mighty power of this country shrinking into narrow dimensions, and exerted only for selfish purposes, what conclusion must they form? He had

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often seen with regret a disposition shewn to under-rate the value of our possessions abroad. He should be sorry to see this country, on any course of abstract reasoning or political philosophy, make the experiment of trying the effect the loss of the Colonies would have on the strength of the empire. Besides, in what way would they make the experiment? The hon. member for Callington had never openly proposed to abandon them altogether;— but he had talked of sounding their feelings as to a separation. To any such course he could not consent. If they were prepared to abandon the Colonies, let them notify their resolution; but he would be ashamed that parliament should say to the Colonies, "Do you exercise your discretion as to this question? Do you give your voice, whether, having been united for better and for worse, you should not agree to the divorce we now propose?" It would be infinitely better for this country to make up its mind, than thus to destroy the affectionate union with our colonies. But he did not see on what principle we could abandon the Colonies. We had rescued them from the country to which they originally belonged, and they had been faithful to us. There were dissensions, it was true; but they were, perhaps, inseparable from the connection with the mother country, and from the constitution of all free countries; but in loyalty they had been absolutely incorruptible.— Was it, then, for the honour of Great Britain to signify to her Colonies, that she was about to abandon them as a burdensome connection? Was she to tell them that, on account of the danger of their being attacked, their defence would be too onerous for her, and that therefore she purposed to dissolve the union? But, how were the sentiments of the Colonies to be ascertained? One hon. member suggested, that we should summon all the leading persons of the provinces, and leave the question to their decision. But if there was any one distinct province now able to form an independent government, he much doubted whether it would be strong enough to maintain itself against the American United States. Again, was the proposition to be submitted to all the provinces, or was it to be confined to the Canadas? Were they to propose that the Canadas should become separate and independent States. What chance was there, that they would remain so, with a
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powerful neighbour like the United States by their side? As to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, they had shewn no symptoms of desertion. Why were they to be abandoned? Was the proposition to be made to Newfoundland? Were we to abandon to the North Americans the possession of the fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland, and give to the United States the advantages we now derive from that source? He was ready to concede, that the time might come when this proposition might be carried into execution. But at present, were the population and natural strength of these colonies such as would enable them, in case of a war, to resist the aggressions of the United States? If ever they did form an independent government, God grant the dissolution of the connection might be an amicable one! But he contended that, looking forward to the time when they might amicably separate from us, it was by no means certain, that this money to provide them with adequate means of defence would be ill expended.
The Committee then divided.—For the Amendment 51; Against it 126: Majority 75.