Sitting of 8 June 1827

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—PETITION FOR A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.
Mr. Baringrose to present a Petition, signed by the majority of the most respectable residents of the Cape of Good Hope, complaining of the maladministration of the affairs of that colony, for some years past. When the House considered that this colony was gradually growing into

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great importance, he was sure the petition would meet with that attention which it merited. The Cape, it should be remembered, was peculiarly situated with reference to the state of other colonies, where the principles of the British constitution were firmly established. He knew not why a solitary exception should be made with regard to the Cape of Good Hope. It was painful to think that the residents in that colony lived under a system of government, as despotic as that of Turkey. There was no trial by jury; and the lives and property of the colonists were dependant on the arbitrary will and disposal of those who were removable at the pleasure of the governor. Thus circumstanced, the colonists had no other resource than to apply to parliament, for that redress for which they vainly looked elsewhere. Sixteen hundred individuals, composing the respectability and intelligence of the colony, had signed this petition. The petitioners disclaimed any desire to cast any personal imputations on the character of lord C. Somerset; but, whether the malpractices complained of were occasioned by the late governor, or in consequence of orders from home, they, in either case, called for a speedy remedy. For the last fifteen years, a system of mal administration had been pursued in that colony, to an extent which was quite lamentable. The hon. gentleman then referred to the state of the currency at the Cape, and passed some severe strictures on the conduct of those whose duty it was to preside over that department. The simplest clerk in any of the banking establishments of this country would have been utterly ashamed of himself, were he to transact business in the manner which had been practised at the Cape. These were subjects which he had no doubt would be looked into by the noble lord now at the head of the colonial department; but he must say, that no slight or partial measure would remedy the evils of which the petitioners complained. It would be necessary to give to the inhabitants of that colony some authority in the colony to which they could make their complaints, and in which they could place confidence; for hitherto they had no such resource. His opinion was, that the colonists should possess some local popular organ, through which their complaints might be made public. At the present moment, the only answer made to persons making complaints in print was, to send them out of the colony. This course
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was recently adopted towards an individual, whose only offence was publishing some extracts from the London papers. He thought the colonists of the Cape were entitled to have some legislative body which should exercise a power independent of the governor. There should also be made an improvement in the judicial system, by rendering the judges independent of the governor. These changes would have a most salutary effect on the colony, by giving the people an influence in the institutions by which they were governed. He would not take up the time of the House longer, but move that the petition be brought up.
Mr. W. Hortonwas far from thinking that the prayer of the petitioners was undeserving of attention; but he must, in the outset, protest against what seemed to be assumed by the hon. gentleman, that up to the present moment, nothing had been done to ameliorate the condition of the inhabitants at the Cape, and that now, and now only, some steps for that purpose were commenced. This mode of dealing with the question was, he considered, extremely unjust to the late administration of the colonial department. The colony of the Cape was, it should be recollected, ours by conquest, and from the commencement was governed by laws, wholly different from ours; but it had been the endeavour of the colonial department gradually to assimilate them to ours. In 1822, he himself moved in that House for the appointment of a commission (which was now mentioned as if it was heard of only for the first time) to make inquiries into several departments of government at the Cape. That commission was, for a considerable time, in active employment, and much of the result of its labours were already before the House. Was it not, then, most unfair to state, that now for the first time steps were taken by the colonial department to improve the condition of the colony? It had been said by the hon. member, that a kind of legislative assembly or representative government should be given to the inhabitants of the Cape. Were not hon. members aware, that the Mauritius, Ceylon, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, and other British colonies, were without representative governments, though it was well known that some of them were inhabited almost exclusively by Englishmen, or their descendants? But, even to this point the attention of the colonial government had been given. He would

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read to the House an extract of a letter from general Bird to lord Bathurst on this subject. Here the right hon. gentleman read the extract, in which the general, after pointing out many changes in the administration of the colony, observed, that the inhabitants did not possess within themselves the materials for forming a representative body. He did not even think that they were fit to enjoy the benefit of trial by jury, except in criminal cases. It was proposed to establish a council similar to the India council. It was also intended to have a reform in the judicial system of the colony; and with these alterations, he thought it better to wait until the colony was ripe for a more enlarged scale of improvement, than to begin with a system which the colony was not in a condition to receive. Many improvements in the administration of the colony were already in progress, the result of diligent investigation, which had been carrying on for the last four years. It was no valid objection to the administration of the colony, to say that, for some years, its currency had been in an unsettled state. The same might be said of the currency of this country for many years; during which much ignorance prevailed on subjects connected with it, on which, within the last few years, much sounder principles prevailed. The establishment of one general standard for the currency of the colonies would be productive of much benefit, in this respect. He would now advert to a subject of a nature personal to himself. He alluded to a pamphlet which had recently been published by sir Rufane Donkin, reflecting on what he (Mr. W. Horton) was supposed to have said, in that House. This mode of proceeding on a public question was, to say the least of it, very inconvenient; for the gallant officer might have brought the subject before the House by petition. In that pamphlet, he (Mr. W. Horton) was made to say, that sir R. Donkin had offered to make charges, and then withdrew them. Now, he had never said any such thing; but he had read a letter, in which sir Rufane declared, that he had that to disclose, which would cover lord C. Somerset with ruin." A letter was written by lord Bathurst's order, calling on the gallant general to produce his charges; and he then denied that he had any charge to make, or that he had intended to make any. He said, he had no direct charges to bring, but that he would make disclosures.
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Now, in the ordinary acceptation of language, when a man said he had disclosures to make which would cover another with ruin, was it not natural to suppose that he had in his possession matters of charge against the party alluded to? He was not called upon to bring forward a public accusation, or to impeach lord Charles Somerset. He was only required to bring forward his disclosures; and then he stated, that he had no charge to make. But the fact was, he had no disclosures to make, which were not already known to the colonial department through other sources.
Mr. Maberly,in reference to what had fallen from his hon. friend (Mr. Baring) respecting the alleged maladministration of the colony for fifteen years, observed, that such a sweeping charge would unjustly include the government of the colony during the administration of sir R. Donkin. It should be borne in mind, that at the time sir R. Donkin left the Cape, he received the most marked testimonials of the approbation of the colonists. He had also the entire approval of his majesty's government at home. There was no ground, therefore, for including his government in the administration spoken of. He had found the finances of the colony in a very embarrassed situation; but he had so improved them, that at his departure he left 125,000 rix dollars in the treasury. With respect to the pamphlet, he did not advise, or approve of, its publication; for he agreed that it was a very inconvenient mode of discussing the merits of a public question: but he must say, that sir R. Donkin was at all times ready to state his disclosures, provided an opportunity were given to him. This was fair; and all that could be expected from the gallant officer.
Mr. Humesaid, there were great difficulties in the way of sir R. Donkin's bringing forward a public accusation, which, if he were anxious to undertake the task, he would be unable to surmount, without the aid of the colonial department. The heads of that department owed it to the colonists to institute an inquiry, where their interests were concerned, and when important charges were offered to be proved. As it was acknowledged, that the colonial department had long been aware of the disclosures which sir R. Donkin could have made, it reflected strongly on them, that they had not instituted some inquiry on the subject.
Mr. Canningasked whether any department could pursue a course more fair than that which had been taken by lord Bathurst on this occasion? A gallant officer came forward and stated, that he was in possession of information which would be the ruin of the head of one of the colonial governments. What could lord Bathurst imagine from that, but that the individual making the offer was prepared to bring forward his charge? So far from thinking that the noble lord had not gone far enough in giving him the opportunity, he was of opinion that he had gone rather too far. If it were his own case, he would say, that it was not unfair to call on the individual making the offer (approver or informer he would not call him) to bring forward his statement. He would have gone further and asked him to give his information in writing. It would never, for a moment, have entered into his head to have received his disclosures at a private interview, and to leave the question, as to the nature of the information given, to depend afterwards on the veracity of him or his informant. He would never have admitted him to such interview, unless a third party was present, to take down all that was communicated. Instead, therefore, of believing that any ground of complaint existed, on the score of the information having been rejected, he thought a question might arise, that it was too easily admitted. But did the noble lord, then at the head of the colonial department, stop there? On the contrary; he made inquiry at the Cape into the matters which, from other sources, were known to constitute the offered disclosures, and the result of that inquiry would, in a short time, be laid before the House. Now, whether the conduct of sir R. Donkin was too rash at first, he would not say, as that was not the proper time or place for entering into the affair; but he must observe, that as the head of a department, the conduct of the late colonial secretary was throughout unexceptionable.
Mr. Hudson Gurneysaid, that he thought it must be sufficiently difficult, even for the government itself, to appreciate the truth of these conflicting allegations. Those in the employ of government would hardly venture to give very perfect information; whilst it was notorious that, amongst the Dutch inhabitants, there was that terror of the local authorities, that however loud their complaints to indi-
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viduals, they were not found to come forward to substantiate their statements; whilst, on the other hand, those made by disappointed settlers were obnoxious to great suspicion. It was, however, evident, that no time should be lost in framing such institutions as should give to the inhabitants of that colony some sense of individual security; not only with a view to their own well-being, but as creating a greater attachment in so important a possession to the rule of England than probably now subsisted. There was one class of persons, Mr. Gurney added, the creditors of the Orphan Chamber, previously to the capture by the English, whose case he still hoped would not be lost sight of by government; and who appeared to him to be beyond question entitled to redress.
Mr. Baringsaid, that let the colonial department ask any of the inhabitants, not actually in office there, and they would find them unanimous in their opinion of the maladministration by which the colony was so long afflicted. As to the commission which had been sent out, he believed it was agreed on all hands, that its chief results were increased charges and salaries, without any practical benefit to the colony. Was it not well known that there was no such thing in the colony as the liberty of the press—that the judges were removable at the will of the governor? And he would ask the veriest Tory in that, or, what was worse, in the other House of Parliament, was that a state of things under which Englishmen ought to be allowed to continue? It was said, that other English colonies had no representative government. So much the greater disgrace to the government at home, if they were in a condition to receive it. If the right hon. gentleman refused to give a representative government until the colonies were ripe to receive it, he would tell him that they would never be ripe until they got it. If he treated them like children, and never set them on their legs, they would never be able to walk like men. If the right hon. gentleman withheld constitutions from the colonies, until they were fit to receive them, he would tell him that, if he lived ten centuries, he would never see them in a proper state to receive them. He meant to cast no aspersions on the government of sir R. Donkin. He knew nothing of it. As to that of lord Caledon, he believed the noble lord did as much as any man could do to make despotism

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tolerable; but Englishmen should not depend for their prosperity or comfort, on the personal feeling of any governor.
Ordered to lie on the table.

KING'S MESSAGE RESPECTING PORTUGAL.
The House having resolved itself into a committee of Supply,
Mr. Canningrose. He said, that on a former evening, when he had brought forward his statement of the financial condition of the country, he had informed the committee that he should have to ask it for an additional vote of credit of 500,000 l., for the purpose of meeting the contingent expenses of the further continuance of his majesty's forces in Portugal. The grounds on which those forces were sent to Portugal had been so fully explained to the House, and so nearly unanimously approved by it, that he held it unnecessary to refer to them; and he had little further to say at present, than that the same causes which induced his majesty to determine on sending that expedition, though diminished in their operation, still existed in sufficient force to render the continuance of our army in Portugal necessary. On the first occasion, when he mentioned this subject, he had taken the liberty of stating, that it was impossible for him to explain the full extent of the grounds on which his majesty's determination was founded, without entering into an hostile explanation of the conduct of Spain, which it was undesirable to give whilst there were any hopes of adjustment existing. If, in the hope of adjustment at a time when irritation prevailed, and menace was employed, it was prudent to abstain from irritating discussion, much more prudent was such a course now, when the most sanguine expectations were entertained, that all the causes which we had for distrust were coming to a speedy termination. The mere fact of sending our troops to Portugal had met, repelled, and anticipated the danger of ruin which threatened that country. That danger had been repelled—not by any active exertions—but by the mere presence of the British forces on the soil of Portugal. He would not pretend to deny that there had been differences and variations of counsels, on the part of the Spanish government, which had threatened the renewal of the same dangers; but he was now happy to state, that the tendency of the king of Spain's counsels was less dangerous, and
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that the country might look forward to a speedy adjustment of differences between the two nations, and to a removal of the causes of them. He abstained from saying more upon that expectation, as he was not able to say when it might be realized. It would be obvious to every gentleman, that a state of things which might not justify them in sending an army to Portugal, might justify them in not withdrawing it when it was there; and that it might be prudent to keep it there, not only till the danger was repressed, but till the probability of its recurrence was prevented. He had no hesitation in informing the House, that the prolongation of the stay of the British troops in Portugal rested upon the very same grounds as those on which they were sent there, and not upon any new causes, intentions, or dispositions whatever. He should conclude with moving, "That 500,000 l. be granted to his Majesty, to enable him to provide for any additional expense which may arise on account of his Majesty's Forces in Portugal."
Mr. Bankessaid, that, as he had had the misfortune, when the question was formerly before the House, to differ from a large majority of the members, and as nothing had happened since to alter his opinion, he should trouble the committee with a very few words. No further communications had since been made by government to the House, and therefore, individuals like himself knew no more upon these affairs, than what was supplied by the common sources of public information. But from all that had been related, it did appear to him, that the casus fœderis, on which alone the conduct of ministers could be justified, had not been made out by the right hon. gentleman. The country was in the situation consequent upon having taken one wrong and precipitate step. There might be many persons convinced by the reasoning of his right hon. friend, in the speech he had uttered on this subject, upon first bringing it before parliament. It was a most brilliant speech, not soon to be forgotten in the old world, or in the new. Many might think the first effort right in sending troops to Portugal; but was it right to continue them there? Was there any thing unfair, was there any thing like aggression, on the part of Spain? Never had one single Spanish soldier marched across the Portuguese frontier. It had

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been stated, that Portugese rebels had been received into Spain; that they had been suffered to remain there; and that they had made a simultaneous effort. If this were true, it was clear that a Spanish soldier had never crossed the line. Had they done so since? No: never was this hostile aggression committed. But Eng gland having taken the wrong and precipitate step, and having sent her army into Portugal upon unjust pretences, she now had not the means, or it might not be competent to the country to bring them back. Even if an address were to be proposed to the Crown to recall them, he did not know whether he could now agree to it. The country might eventually be involved in a war, by the steps that ministers had pursued; for she was placed in that awkward situation in which troops could not be kept in Portugal with justice, or re-called with safety. His right hon. friend had held out hopes, that affairs were coming to an adjustment. He hoped it might be so; but he looked with surprise, when large sums of money were called for, after the troops had been already provided for in the vote of supply. The right hon. gentleman asked for a contingent sum, which amounted to no less than 100 l. per man, for every British soldier in Portugal. In what way could the expenses be made to amount so high? Was it possible that five thousand men, already provided for in the estimates, should cost an additional 100 l. per man? It was stated, that there was a treaty with Portugal, by which she was bound to subsist these troops. Had that treaty been carried into execution? If it had, how could this large sum be required from the English people, unless it was intended to send more men to Portugal? This did not look like coming to a speedy conclusion. The extraordinary vote could not be called for by the necessity of the case, if what the right hon. gentleman said was correct. This country it seemed, was not obliged for its state of peace to the wisdom of her own councils, but to the moderation of those of France.
Colonel Davieswas astonished at many of the statements and arguments of the hon. member. He was surprised that he could maintain the present not to be a casus fœderis. Could any man believe that the disturbances and rebellion in Portugal had not been fomented by Spain? Language of an irritating nature ought, in
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the present posture of affairs, to be avoided; but he could not hear it asserted that the government of Spain had acted with good faith and moderation, without entering his protest against it. If Spain had not sent troops across the frontier, the Portuguese refugees had been armed, clothed, and paid in Spain, and enabled to carry war and bloodshed into their country. If there ever was a time in which England was called upon, by a regard to treaties and her honour, to take a part in the affairs of Portugal, it was when the British forces were sent to that country. The Spanish army was upon the Portuguese frontier; and, if the British troops were withdrawn, they would march to Lisbon. Unless the House was prepared to say that Portugal, as well as Spain, should become a province of France, ministers could not have acted differently. If, in 1822 and 1823, they had stood in their proper attitude, they would not now have been under the necessity of incurring the present expense. They might have saved Spain from invasion, and saved the honour of England.
Colonel Lindsaysaid, that the declaration which Mr. Canning had made, that, if the Portuguese constitution were attacked, he could let loose all the passions of Europe in support of it, had caused it to be viewed with great jealousy by foreign powers. He condemned the sending of our troops to Portugal; which had placed the peace of the country in a very precarious situation. All the despotic governments of Europe looked upon us with fear and distrust, in consequence of that measure. He wished the right hon. gentleman would inform him whether our troops were kept in Portugal to repel foreign invasion or to support the present constitution. That constitution was unpopular among all classes of Portuguese, and ought not to be thrust down their throats by British bayonets.
Sir James Mackintoshsaid, he did not altogether feel himself called upon to address the House, after so long a silence, by what had fallen from the gentleman opposite. He was, however, desirous of taking an opportunity, which he regretted he had not had on a former occasion, of declaring his opinion to the House, or to such at least as thought his opinions worthy of attention. He considered the prompt and vigorous succour given to our old ally Portugal, at the moment of

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her extreme danger, as fit to be recorded in one of the brightest pages of the history of this country. This prompt and liberal succour was not the merely cold performance of an imperative obligation and inevitable duty. Were this all, he should deem it unworthy of any commendation. God forbid that he should ever be so regardless of the honour of his country, of the reputation of the former, and of the character of the present, ministers, as to suppose that the mere fulfilment of a treaty on our part required commendation! He confined his approbation to the prompt and vigorous measures which had been taken to render the performance of our duty effectual—measures which reflected the highest honour upon the government that had planned and executed them, and which, if they had not been sanctioned by all the individuals who composed the British parliament, had been sanctioned at least by all the parties into which it was divided. With regard to the speech just made by the hon. member for Dorsetshire, he must begin by observing, that the principal part of his argument was historical and retrospective. It was an inquiry into the result of the measures taken by the government in the December of last year, and had no reference to the vote of that night. Indeed, he did not see how the hon. member for Dorsetshire could oppose the present grant, unless he was prepared to show that government ought to retract all the declarations it had already made, and to acknowledge the injustice of every measure it had hitherto approved. The hon. member must have satisfied the committee, that what he had just said had no reference to the present vote; for he had boldly avowed, that if an address were proposed to his majesty, calling on him to withdraw his forces from Portugal, he could not agree to it. In a parliamentary sense, then, the hon. member had no opposition to this vote; in a parliamentary sense he must be considered as giving it the benefit of his assent. With respect to the considerations which the hon. member had offered to the House, on the amount of the vote, and on its distribution, man by man, among the soldiery in Portugal, he was not so good a calculator as to be able to decide off-hand upon its accuracy. It was most unfair and unreasonable, to say that this vote of credit was given to meet the expense of the army. It was not in the contemplation either of government or
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parliament, that all of it should be expended; it was merely asked, to meet any unforeseen exigency which might suddenly arise. A vote of credit, which armed government with large and extensive power, was calculated to lessen its expenses. By voting a large sum, the House was taking the best means to prevent a larger sum from being expended. Foreign powers might be influenced, by seeing that the British parliament continued their support of these measures with the same liberality which they displayed at the outset. The hon. member had not taken into his arithmetical calculations the expense of the transports which would be wanted to bring our forces back from Portugal. He believed it would amount to a large sum; and though it might not swallow up all the vote now asked for, it would swallow up a large proportion of it. Another hon. gentleman had said, that, in a moment of intoxication, the House had voted succours to our ally in performance of the obligations of treaties. He confessed that he deeply partook of the intoxication, if intoxication it were, which the hon. member so loudly condemned: and was afraid that he was now, after the lapse of several months, still in the same unfortunate state. He rejoiced greatly when he contemplated the skill with which that measure of assistance had been devised, and the promptitude and vigour with which it had been executed. He should have been ashamed of his country—he should have considered it overwhelmed with unprecedented disgrace, if it had hesitated for one moment in taking that part which the hon. member contended it had taken in a moment of intoxication. He would not stoop to argue the question, whether our troops had been sent to Portugal to support the constitution. That question had been long since anticipated and answered; and a reply to it at present was quite superfluous. It had been stated by his right hon. friend, in the most precise terms the English language could afford, that the troops now remained in Portugal to secure the very object they had been sent to accomplish. Now, the House had been informed, not once or twice, but repeatedly, that the British forces were sent to Portugal with express injunctions to repel foreign invasion from it, and not to interfere in its internal affairs. They were sent to Portugal for that purpose. His right hon. friend declared, that they stayed there for that purpose; and

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what further answer could the hon. member seek to obtain from the chancellor of the Exchequer? The hon. member for Dorsetshire must excuse him for expressing his surprise at the simplicity with which he had asked whether any Spanish soldier had been sent across the Portuguese frontier. He admitted it: but was not the assembling of a large Spanish army on the frontier, at a time when rebellion, excited by the intrigues and gold of a Spanish party, was desolating the interior of Portugal, a proceeding of a most alarming nature? Did not the hon. member know, that the assembling of an army by one power on the frontier of another was always considered just ground of demanding explanation in the first instance; and, if explanation were refused, of taking further measures to enforce it? He should like to hear any prudent statesman deny, that the assembling of a great military force on the frontier of a power whose deserters it supported, and even provided with munitions of war, was not a menace to that power, seriously affecting its internal security, and giving it the right, if it chose to exercise it, of appealing at once to arms. If no man could deny the principle of national jurisprudence which he had just laid down, it settled the question of our duty to our ally. The duty of England rested on the right of Portugal. If Portugal had a right to demand explanation from Spain, on account of the military force which the latter government had assembled on its frontier, and if the refusal of all satisfactory explanation by Spain were a sufficient justification of Portugal going to war—which no man would deny that it was—then was England bound in duty to afford the same assistance to Portugal as if she had been openly and directly attacked. The duty of the ally to give assistance rested, he maintained, on the right of the principal to go to war. It had been said, however, by the other side, that in case our troops continued in Portugal, they must, if we adhered to our doctrine of not interfering in the internal arrangements of independent states, confine their hostility to Spaniards alone. Now, from this doctrine, he must beg leave, under certain limitations, to dissent. Supposing Spain were to invade Portugal, partly with Spanish soldiers, and partly with Portuguese deserters, whom she had taken into her pay, would any man contend, that our cannons and our bayonets should make
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any distinction between the real Spanish soldier and the rebellious Portuguese, whom he had taken into his pay? No: the rebellious Portuguese must be considered as the allies of the foreign invaders; and as such our troops must treat them. He admitted of no interference between the two contending parties in Portugal. If no menace had been made by a foreign power against the existing government of Portugal, we should not merely have had no duty to meddle in the struggle—we should also have had no right. As soon, however, as a foreign partisan appeared on the stage, and dealt in menaces which endangered the security of the existing government, we were compelled by the obligation of treaties, to become the domestic partisan of that government against all foreign invaders, no matter how they were supported by its discontented subjects. If it had not been for the very extraordinary doctrines which had been held on this subject, he should have been very brief on this part of the question; but, as it was, he should beg leave to illustrate it a little more at length. If a foreign army were to land in England as auxiliaries to a party in rebellion against the government, the government would immediately obtain the right of calling upon all its foreign allies to bring their forces to its aid. He did not allude to Holland merely, which was bound to support the Protestant succession to the throne of these realms, whenever it was endangered, but to all our foreign allies, who would be bound, in such a case, to send over their contingents, not merely to attack the foreign invader, but also his domestic partisans. Thus it would be with our own forces in Portugal. The invader, with all his aiders and abettors, would be the legitimate object of the hostility which we were bound to wage there for the benefit of our ally.—He had already answered the question which the hon. gentleman opposite had put, as to whether our troops were in Portugal to support the constitution, by reference to the declarations of his right hon. friend both in December last and upon the present evening. He would now carry his reply a little further. He would point out a circumstance which had occurred in 1823, and which proved decisively, that it was not in support of the constitution of Portugal, but of Portugal itself, that we now gave to the government of that country our assistance. He would beg honourable members to recollect what

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the condition of parliament was at that particular time. Many gentlemen would recollect, that among the papers which were laid on the table of the House in that year, relative to the negotiations to prevent the aggression on Spain, there was a letter of Mr. Canning to sir C. Stuart, in which he desired him to inform the French government explicitly, that any act of hostility committed by France upon Portugal would bring England with all her forces immediately into the field. Was it in behalf of the present constitution, that we threatened to interfere? No such thing. Portugal was at that time under a democratical form of government; which, it was well known, the British government by no means approved, and which constituted a subject of regret to all the real lovers of liberty in England, however hostile they were to its amendment by foreign interference; and yet, in favour of that Portugal, then so democratically revolutionized, England declared to France, that any attack upon its territory would bring her with all her forces into the field. Could there be a more conclusive demonstration, that we were not now in arms to support the constitution of Portugal, but only the right of Portugal to give itself a free constitution, uncontrolled by the interference of foreign powers? He would ask any gentleman, whether, because we were bound to support the government of Portugal, we were therefore bound to approve of its constitution. He himself should be afraid to pass any judgment upon it, for he knew very little about it. The gallant member, who had addressed the House for the first time that evening with so much promise, would discover, before he became so old a member of the House as he (sir J. M.) was, that it was a difficult matter to learn what was the real opinion of a foreign people—what was their real condition—and how far they were, or were not, fit for liberal institutions. These were often difficult questions, God knew, with respect to our own countrymen; but were so much more difficult with regard to the people of foreign countries, that a wise man would be reluctant to answer them.—There was, however, another point in the speech of the gallant member that surprised him exceedingly. The main objection which he urged against the conduct of the present administration with respect to Portugal was, that in maintaining the faith of treaties with our ancient
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ally, we were offending those great powers of Europe who exercised despotic sway over their respective countries. If this were true—if this great nation, so long renowned for its good faith, and strict observance of treaties, dared no longer perform the sacred obligations which its treaties imposed upon it, lest it should thereby displease the great despots of Europe—then he must say, that not only Portugal, but England too, was unfit for the enjoyment of liberty. If England had so far lost her ancient pride and spirit, as to be influenced by a bare fear, lest the performance of her duty should cause displeasure to any prince, power, or potentate, whatsoever—if she allowed such an unmanly and dastardly consideration to be present to her mind, when she was consulted on the destinies of nations—she might be sure that the day of her glory had departed; that the sceptre of power was passing from her grasp, and that she herself was "cito peritura." Whenever that sordid fear shall come over her, she will have lost all power to preserve her liberty at home, and to make her independence respected abroad.—He would imitate the example which had been set him by his right hon. friend, and would abstain from entering into any observations which might provoke a discussion on the conduct of the great states of Europe. He valued the existence of peace as much as any man. He would perform the duties of amity to every other power in Europe, as well as he would perform them to Portugal. The duties of courtesy, which were included in those of amity, he would perform to every government, no matter what opinion he entertained either of their form or of their conduct; but he would not be discouraged, by a fear of their resentment, from advising his country to perform that duty, which was required of her by the faith of ancient treaties. He would not, at this time of day, go over the contents of those treaties. Every body must know what they were—and he would venture to affirm, that if there was any one proposition in the law of nations more demonstrative than another, it was the obligation of Great Britain to give her support to her ancient ally Portugal, when she was required to do so in December last. The law of the case was clear; the facts of the case were clear; and the application of the law to the facts was, he might almost say, self-evident, He was therefore as

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tonished—nay, he was more than astonished—he was pained—at hearing the doctrines which were propounded on this subject, when the House appeared to be representing the general feeling of the country, by his hon. friend the member for Aberdeen, for whose extremely useful and most honest labours in behalf of the public, he should ever entertain a grateful esteem. His hon. friend had called on the House to deliberate carefully and cautiously, before it ventured to the arduous and complicated question, whether it should violate the ancient good faith of the country or not. He had never heard that his hon. friend had attempted to show that the obligation of treaties did not blind us to assist Portugal; on the contrary, he believed that his hon. friend jumped at once to this conclusion—that if we did assist Portugal, we should be guilty of a wanton interference in the internal affairs of another country. He did not know whether he ought to admire the boldness with which his hon. friend overleaped, or the discretion with which he overlooked, all the obstacles which, stood between him and his conclusion. He rather thought that he ought to applaud his discretion; because it would require greater talents than even his hon. friend possessed, to produce any effect upon the House, whilst he attempted to show either that we were not bound by the faith of treaties to assist Portugal, or that if we were bound, we ought to seek the means of evading them.—In justifying the measures which the present administration had taken upon this subject, so much to their honour, he did not mean to justify them, on the ground that the force we sent out was sent out to maintain either liberal or any other kind of institutions. He would ask no more, under these treaties, than if they had been entered into with the emperor of Morocco: he would demand no more under them, than if they had been entered into with a power which was endeavouring to destroy a free government, instead of one that was aiming at the establishment of a liberal system. If he were asked, why he rejoiced in the interposition of the country, he would frankly avow that he did so, because that interposition must have the effect of checking a system by which it was attempted to prevent the establishment of free institutions in Europe. The only plausible topic urged against this
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proceeding was one that would hardly be used on any other occasion; and which, he conceived, was advanced with a peculiar ill grace on this. What was that topic? Why, that England was interfering to give liberty to a country, that was not prepared to receive it, and that did not require it. But the fact was, that this attempt to introduce a liberal system was the work of the king and people of Portugal, and our interference was called for by the government of Portugal, under the faith of treaties. The effect of such an argument as that which he had quoted was, that they were scrupulously to observe the stipulations of all treaties that required the most odious and revolting interference—an interference that might lead, in its operation, to the most unfortunate consequences; and the only treaties, with respect to which some few gentlemen were willing to relax this strict principle, appeared to be those under which the interference of England might be called for, to prevent an ally from being over-ruled by a hostile power, when that ally was making an attempt to give to his country a just and free government. Was such a doctrine as this agreeable to the ears of the committee? Was it in unison with the generous feelings of this country? He approved in the highest degree of the step which the government had taken in sending troops to Portugal to prevent the aggression of Spain. If those troops were suffered to remain there one moment after the object of their mission was accomplished, ministers would be guilty of a flagrant wrong; and if they were recalled one moment sooner than that object was effected, they would be guilty of gross perfidy. Such an act might leave Portugal in a far worse situation than that in which they found it. The presence of the British troops might have incited thousands of individuals to exert themselves to save their country from a despotism; and, if the protecting force were prematurely withdrawn, those persons would be left at the mercy of their most implacable enemies. He trusted, therefore, that the feelings of a generous, manly, and honourable fidelity, which had produced these measures, would never suffer ministers to listen to the plea of retrenchment, or of the propriety of non-interference with the affairs of another nation, or to any other doctrine, however plausibly it might he advanced, for the purpose of inducing

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them to change their course of policy. A gallant officer had said, that the governments of Europe, or the nations of Europe, he knew not which—perhaps both—were dissatisfied with the part which England had taken on this occasion. Now, he had heard, only eight and forty hours ago, from the authority of an English gentleman who had recently travelled through Europe, a statement directly the reverse. He had not the permission of that gentleman to disclose his name, and therefore he should withhold it; because he had ever made it a rule not to name an individual without his permission, nor to produce a written document without the writer's leave; but if he had had permission to mention his name, he was quite sure, that there was no quarter in that House, in which the opinion of the individual to whom he had alluded would not have weight. The impression on the mind of that gentleman was very different from that which they had heard that night. He stated, that, in the capital where he resided, every Englishman, twenty-four hours after the news of succour having been afforded to Portugal had arrived, found himself in a different situation, in point of dignity and importance, in every society he entered. And those who had business to transact with the public authorities also perceived that this event created for them additional respect. In short, the just, honourable, and brilliant conduct adopted by this country had raised the national character all over the continent to as high a pitch of honour as it had attained at that glorious period, the Seven years' war, when the great lord Chatham was at the head of the administration. Some individuals might consider those little particulars as of no weight—of no importance; but he contended, that they were of high importance, because they were indicative of the general feeling and the general judgment of the civilized world on this particular measure, however lightly they might be viewed, or however cheaply they might be held, by a few gentlemen in that House. Such marks of respect and esteem tended to exalt the character of the nation, and to strengthen and secure the best interests of the state. They gave a moral estimation, in the highest degree conducive to good government, in the highest degree conducive to the preservation of that tranquillity and peace, which, after honour, should be the chief object
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with every member in that House, and with every English minister. There never was a measure more likely to secure peace than this.—A retrospective view had been dragged into the discussion, in the course of that evening's debate: but what was he to understand from all that had been said against this measure? Why, that by it England had saved her ally, and, instead of being exposed thereby to war, had given herself a tenfold security against it. He would assert, on the honourable and impartial authority to which he had before alluded, that the proceedings of the minister for Foreign Affairs, and of his maty's government supported by that House, were calculated to send an Englishman to the continent more proud of his country, more closely and naturally attached to that country, and more anxious for her fame and honour, than he would have been if those measures had never been adopted.—He had begun by observing, that all the parties in begun House were agreed in the propriety of this act; and he could not entertain a doubt but that the policy of the country would support it, unless some extraordinary and unexpected alteration in the state of affairs justified the government in abandoning it. The House, it was true, had been originally divided on the question; but those who had so divided it immediately saw the utter futility of so feeble an opposition. Much had been recently said on the subject of coalitions. Now, he saw no objection to coalitions in the abstract. If they were mischievous in their nature, then he must say that this was a most unfortunate country; for one third of the administrations that had elapsed since the Revolution had been administrations formed by coalition. He was the less shaken by the frequent use of the watch-word, because he recollected that coalitions had not given to this country the worst administrations. It was not a coalition-ministry that signed the peace of Utrecht, and endeavoured to exclude the House of Hanover, from the throne of these realms—it was not a coalition-ministry that dismembered the British empire, and lost North America by acts of injustice and oppression; but it was a coalition-ministry, composed of the Tories or Jacobites, lord Godolphin and the duke of Malborough, and of the Whigs or Revolutionists, lord Somers and the duke of Devonshire, that achieved all the Rictories of the reign of queen Anne, and planned all

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the measures which secured and established the House of Hanover on the throne of Great Britain. There was another coalition of a more recent date, that of the immortal earl of Chatham. He formed a coalition with those against whom he had long contended in a fierce acrimonious, and personal opposition; and that coalition claimed, and justly claimed, all the glories of the Seven years' war. But he meant not to confine himself to warlike operations or warlike successes; "Peace has her victories as well as war;" and many of those victories might be boasted of within the last few years. The question of coalition to which he had just referred, was deeply interesting to men of generous and independent natures. Were such men, because their opinions did not assimilate on all points of policy, to be continually estranged? Were they to keep up a perpetual political enmity? He knew that, with respect to Whig and Tory, a very great difference was supposed to exist. Extremely aristocratic opinions were assigned to one party, and highly liberal opinions to the other. The question was, whether they might not be blended in one system? Now, he entirely agreed in the opinion given by Dr. Johnson, as stated in a work which was, after all, the greatest monument of his fame,—he meant his "Life," by Boswell, where he said, that "a reasonable Whig and a moderate Tory differ only in degree. The doctrines of an extreme Tory are unintelligible, and those of an extreme Whig render government impracticable." They were both within the pale of the constitution, and both might be useful in preserving it, as was clearly proved by the proceedings of the great coalition in the time of queen Anne. For his own part, he gave his very humble support to the present administration, because he conceived their course of policy to have for its object the honour and the interests of the country. He approved of the foreign and of the domestic policy pursued by ministers. The trade, manufactures, and commerce, of the country, were placed under the superintending vigilance of one of the most deserving public servants, that this kingdom ever possessed (Mr. Huskisson), and, he must also say, one of the most grossly calumniated and ill-requited men that ever filled an important situation in the state [cheers.] He concurred in all that right hon. gentleman's measures;
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and he admired as much the soundnes of his general principles, as his wariness and expertness in applying their details to the complicated system of the trade and commerce of the country. He supported ministers, because they were anxious to do every thing that was favourable for religious liberty; and, whatever circumstances would admit, for the pacification of Ireland. He entirely agreed in the wisdom of their foreign policy. Looking to the recognition of the independence of the South American States—looking to the succours that had been sent to Portugal—considering the good which, he hoped, was silently but surely working for Greece, he came to this conclusion, when he cast his eye over the page of history, that no three preceding years could be compared with the three which had elapsed since the invasion of Spain by France, in point of brilliant, beneficial, and successful, policy. In his opinion there were no three years, not even in the reign of Elizabeth herself, leaving war entirely out of the case, that were so highly distinguished for a liberal and brilliant policy as those three years. The interests of the country, the interests of independence, and the interests of the human race, had, during that time, been supported and improved. He was, therefore, happy to afford to ministers the humble and feeble support of his voice. He had, perhaps, hurried away by the warmth which the contemplation of such principles naturally excited, been induced to intrude too long on the time of the House. But, after so long an absence from parliament, he was very desirous to take an opportunity of plainly and dispassionately stating his opinion on the subject of Portugal, and also with respect to the measures adopted by that government to which he meant to afford his cordial support.
Mr. Humeexpressed a doubt, whether the treaties which had been referred to were binding on this country; and he was sorry that the learned gentleman who had just spoken had left the House. He trusted, however, that the learned gentleman would hereafter state his opinion on that subject. It appeared that a tripartite treaty had been entered into between Holland, Portugal, and England. It was there stipulated on the part of Holland and England that in case the Portuguese territory was invaded, by France or Spain, then, and then only

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should Great Britain and Holland afford assistance to the Portuguese. Now Holland had withdrawn from that treaty, and the question was whether, under these circumstances, England was bound to carry the treaty into execution? In his opinion, the treaty ought to have lapsed when one of the parties withdrew. Besides they had no information that there had been any violation of the Portuguese territory by the Spaniards, and therefore this country was not justified in keeping troops in Portugal any longer. The right hon. gentleman had asserted, that the people of Portugal were in favour of this new constitution. But could he give any proof of that fact? Was there any such thing as a legal and established government in Portugal? In fact, this country was supporting a constitution which the people did not require. It had been forced on them by the king of the Brazils, and our troops were called in to prevent it from falling. No man was more friendly to free governments than he was; but the maintaining a British army in Portugal could have no other effect but to overawe the people, and thus prevent them from forming such a government as they wished. When France invaded Spain, what language had been used with respect to that act? The most severe terms were applied to it. Now, he could not help thinking that the conduct of Great Britain was precisely similar to that of France.
Mr. H. Twisssaid, that the hon. member having put a question to a learned friend of his not now in his place, he was anxious to answer for him. The question put by the hon. member was, whether, in the event of a treaty between two powers to protect a third, their ally, from an invading party, and one of those contracting parties withdrawing from that engagement, the other was not absolved from any obligation to fulfil it? If such were the case, any one party had only to withdraw, in order to absolve the other, and then leave the invaded country open to its opponents. He was anxious to prevent such an opinion from going forth to the prejudice of our national faith.
The Resolution was agreed to.

COVENTRY MAGISTRACY BILL
.The House went into a Committee on this bill. The counsel, Mr. Harrison and Mr. Taunton, were heard against the bill. After they had withdrawn,
Mr. R. Heathcoteopposed the bill, as nothing less than the partial disfranchisement of an ancient and loyal city. The measure was the result of an erroneous impression, unfounded in fact and in direct opposition to the principles of justice. If some of the electors of Coventry had violated the laws, they were amenable to the ordinary tribunals of the country, and might be punished; but it was most unjust to inflict a punishment, such as this bill would inflict, on the whole community of Coventry, and to confound the innocent with the guilty.
Mr. Hudson Gurneysaid, the two questions for the House were—first, whether such a case had been nude out, as justified legislative interference; and secondly, whether the provisions of the present bill were such as went to remedy the evils complained of. Now, he must fairly own, that he thought the degree of rioting which took place at the last election, regarded as an isolated case, presented rather a weak one; whilst the provisions proposed by the present bill had not the slightest tendency towards making better arrangement for the future. They had heard much from the honourable members for Coventry, and from the learned Counsel at the bar, against the projected violation of the ancient chartered rights of that city. They had quoted the charters of Edward 3rd, and Richard 2nd, as if now in operation; but the fact was, that the last charter of James 1st had deprived the citizens of Coventry of their ancient franchises, under the pretext of increasing their privileges—had changed the qualification of the electors, and rendered the corporation a close body—and the measure which he should rather suggest would be, not to infringe on the ancient charters but to restore them—According to Browne Willis, the electors of Coventry, under the charters of Edward the 3rd and Richard the 2nd, were citizens paying scot and lot. Henry 6th, in 1451, granteda new charter; taking in a large district previously in the county of Warwick, and including it in the jurisdiction of the city and county of Coventry, giving the writ to the sheriffs of Coventry, instead of to the sheriff of Warwick, "the Mayor and Bailiffs of the said city to be for ever elected, in the same manner and form, as they had used to be in the reign of king Edward 3rd." By the charter of James 1st

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in 1622, all this appears to have been changed. The mayor, bailiffs, and other officers, were to beyearly elected on their last day, by thirty-one persons nominated of those who have formerly borne the principal offices of the city, and the right of election for members of Parliament became vested in such persons alone as have served seven years apprenticeship within the city to one trade. The civil wars and the Protectorate following, a higher game was playing than who should be members for Coventry; but from the Restoration we have a singular series of documents, shewing how the charter of James 1st has worked.—"In 1660," Dugdale says, "there was great contention about choosing of burgesses." By the Journals of the House there appears to have been petitions; 1678, for partiality of sheriffs; 1701, riots, sheriffs committed; 1706, great riots, election voided; 1707, 1709, 1710, petitions; 1713, riots; 1715, petition; 1722, notorious and outrageous riots, member committed, and eight others; 1737, great riot, election voided; 1780, riots, sheriffs committed; 1802, riots, though no petition; that being the era of the invention of that pleasant dance, of which we have heard from the witnesses, called "Jefferies and Barlow." 1820 and 1826, riots.—Now, M. Gurney said, the only legislative measure, which it appeared to him at all adapted to meet this case, would be, to restore the elective franchise, of which they had been unjustly deprived, to the freeholders of the county and city of Coventry, giving them votes in conjunction with those free by apprenticeship, and to put a check in these outrageous proceedings, by the introduction of a more respectable class of electors, instead of giving concurrent jurisdiction to Warwickshire magistrates, which would be merely adding another, element of dissension and confusion to those which existed already.
Mr. Fyleradmired the impartiality of hon. members, who could shut their eyes to cases of corruption "as clear as the sun at noon-day," and direct their vengeance against Coventry. He was not behind any man, in or out of the House, in his hatred of corruption; but he would never, in a moment of intemperate innovation, lacerate the sound and healthy parts of the system. He contended, that the principle of the bill was unwise, unconstitutional, and unjust. If the House
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waited until the bill, which was now in progress, for the better regulation of taking polls at elections should pass into law, the evils which were said to exist would be removed. The proposed bill, instead of being a remedy for those evils, was calculated to increase them. He hoped never to see the spirit of elections destroyed by legislative interference. Nothing was offered to the electors of Coventry by the bill, in lieu of that of which it was intended to deprive them. They were not to have a quid pro quo. This could not be treating them justly. There was as much independence in Coventry, he insisted, as in any other borough, and as little noise and confusion; which, at an election, might be considered the safety valve of the state, to carry off bad feeling. The bill was proposed by modern reformers, who wished to take away the spirit of elections, and make men with their own materials. Every one of these reformers was a modern Prometheus. The bill was an infringement of the charter of Coventry, and it would punish persons contrary to the spirit of the law. Lord Coke, Judge Blackstone, and Mr. Burke declared, that offences committed by corporate officers should be subject to courts of justice, and that the offences of individuals ought not to affect the vested rights of corporations. The poll at the last election at Coventry was never stopped at any time. More voters were polled than at any other time, in so short a period. There were no serious injuries sustained. Two magistrates were daily sitting, and it was frequently announced, that if any persons had complaints to prefer, they might proceed to the police-office. The hon. member quoted sir Walter Scott's account of the revels of the "good men of Coventry," in the reign of Elizabeth, and the approbation bestowed by that queen upon their pageants. He went on to state, that there was less crime committed in the city of Coventry than in any city of the same size and population in the kingdom; and referred to the address of the learned judge to the grand jury, at the last assizes, in confirmation of that assertion.
Mr. C. Wood,as one of the committee, defended the report, and read extracts from the evidence, to prove the disgraceful scenes of rioting which had taken place, with the countenance of the magistrates. He was convinced that the magistracy of Coventry were not fit to be intrusted with

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the preservation of peace, during the continuance of an election; and he therefore felt bound to give his cordial support to the bill.
Lord Rancliffethought the hill an invasion of the rights of corporations, and expressed his determination to oppose it.
Sir C. Wetherellobserved, that, until the Nottingham case occurred, there was no instance of the interference of the House, in the way in which it was now proposed that it should interfere. In the Nottingham case, Mr. Fox opposed that measure, in a speech of great eloquence, and contended, that that House ought not to interfere where a remedy was provided, by the ordinary process of law in the tribunals of the country. There was no analogy between the Nottingham case and the present. Whoever was of that opinion would find himself greatly mistaken. In short, it would be absurd to adopt the Nottingham case, as a ground of proceeding in the present. His opposition to the bill was an independent and conscientious one. He opposed it, uninfluenced by a knowledge of either the winning or losing candidate, or any local circumstance whatever. The House ought rather to exercise a conservative power, for the preservation of charters, than lend itself to the uncalled-for confiscation of them.
Mr. S. Ricecontended that the bill would, by no means, have the effect of disfranchisement. The case made out against Coventry was much stronger than that of Nottingham; and even if such a measure was not adopted in the case of Nottingham, it ought to be adopted in the present. For the last fifty years, there had not been an election at Coventry at which riots had not taken place.
Mr. Goulburnargued against the principle of the bill, which, he contended, was destructive of chartered rights.
Sir J. Wrottesleywarmly defended the bill.
The committee then divided: Ayes 51; Noes 29.

KING'S MESSAGE RESPECTING PORTUGAL.
The order of the day being read, for taking His Majesty's Speech into consideration,
Viscount Dudley and Wardsaid:—Although I cannot anticipate any difference of opinion with respect to the subject on which I have the honour to address your lordships, I deem it more con-

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venient, and more respectful to your lordships, to trouble you with a few remarks. I do not consider that I am placed under the necessity of saying anything in support of the policy which originally induced your lordships to sanction the sending of British troops to Portugal. The grounds upon which that measure was adopted were explained to the House by a noble earl (Bathurst) whom I regret not to see in his place, because I am sure I should have profited by his weight and authority, in resisting any opposition which may be made to the address which I shall propose to your lordships. The statement of that noble earl had the good fortune to meet with the unanimous concurrence of this House; and the vote for enabling his majesty to send troops to the aid of our ally was passed without a dissentient voice. All the noble lords who spoke on that occasion spoke strongly in favour of the measure. The noble baron (Holland) and the noble marquis (Lansdown) near me, who at that time sat on the other side of the House, did not hesitate to give their assistance to the proposal of his majesty's government. Above all, the measure was supported by that great general and statesman, whose authority is of so much weight in all military and civil questions; and whose opinions are more especially entitled to respect when he speaks of the affairs of a country which he so long guided by his counsels and protected by his arms; a man who, if he will allow me to say so much of him, is the least likely of almost any one with whom I am acquainted, both from his extensive experience, and from the natural soundness and vigour of his understanding, to be led away by any fanciful speculations or enthusiastic projects. Never, perhaps, was a measure proposed to parliament which met with more general concurrence: it was considered, in fact, not as a question of doubtful policy, but as a measure necessarily imposed upon us by the obligations of honour and good faith. I think I may also say, that scarcely ever was a measure adopted which, in a short time, contributed more to raise the already high character of this country in every part of Europe. I feel, my lords, that it would be disrespectful to your lordships to suppose it possible that any alteration can have taken place in your opinions on this subject. I am not aware of anything that has occurred which can have occa-
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sioned any alteration of those sentiments. In this House, not the slightest objection was made to the measure; but I have heard of a sort of apprehension that it might involve the country in the calamities of a war. Now, in point of fact, the effect of this measure has been, to render altogether hopeless and desperate the designs of those Portuguese rebels, which were carried on for some time, if not with the absolute assistance of the Spanish government, at least with the connivance and support of the Spanish authorities. The effect of this measure has been, to frustrate those designs, and thereby prevent a war, which must have been calamitous to Spain herself, and which might have endangered the tranquillity of Europe. In calling upon this House, therefore, to fulfil this promise of assistance, and to maintain the course of policy dictated by good faith, as well as by the interests of this country, I do not feel myself obliged to do more than assure your lordships, that the circumstances which originally called upon us to send aid to Portugal have not entirely ceased to exist. It is a great satisfaction to me, however, to be enabled to inform your lordships, that they exist in a much more mitigated degree; and that a negotiation has been entered into between the governments of Spain and Portugal, which, promoted by the authority and interference both of England and France, is likely to end, at no distant period, in an accommodation of existing differences. Such an accommodation will relieve us from the necessity of maintaining troops in Portugal; but, in the mean time, we ask for the means of maintaining them there, so long as the honour and security of our allies may render it necessary. Of course it is difficult to specify the precise time at which it may be expedient to withdraw them; it is not a thing capable of accurate and precise specification. Your lordships will, I am sure, agree with me, that circumstances which might not be sufficient to induce us to send troops to Portugal, would be sufficient to induce us not to withdraw them. We ought, in prudence, to have a reasonable assurance—and I trust the period is not far distant when we shall have that assurance—that the troops may be withdrawn, without the hazard of a recurrence of those circumstances which originally obliged us to send them thither. How long it may be before we can have that

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reasonable assurance, whether for a longer or a shorter period, it is not possible precisely to determine; but I think it highly desirable, that the principles upon which we maintain the troops in Portugal should not be misunderstood. Those principles, my lords, are no other than those upon which they were originally sent to Portugal. What I now say on this subject, I wish to be considered as said in the face of all Europe; and I am the more desirous, therefore, that it should be distinctly understood. The British troops have not been sent to Portugal for one ostensible reason, with the intention of retaining them there for another and a different reason. It was not to maintain any political institutions, or to impose upon Portugal any particular form of government, that our troops were sent to that country; though it is certainly true, that assistance has been rendered with the greater zeal and alacrity by one free people towards another people, animated by a similar spirit, and appreciating, if not enjoying, the benefit of similar institutions. It was not for the purpose of protecting constitutional Portugal, or of annoying despotic Spain, that our troops were sent to Portugal: it was to defend Portugal, our ancient ally, a country which we were bound to defend by the faith of treaties; and, if not by the faith of treaties, by the strongest ties of political expediency. These were the principles on which the government originally acted in sending troops to Portugal; and, though it is impossible to point out the precise moment at which they can be prudently withdrawn, the period, I hope, is not far distant. I think it right to give this public and distinct assurance, that these are the principles on which they will be kept there.—There is another point on which I wish to make one or two observations. My noble friend opposite (lord Ellenborough) inquired on two former occasions, whether it was the intention of government to lay any papers before the House relative to this subject. On those occasions, I answered my noble friend's question in the negative. To state the reasons why I resist the production of papers, would, in general, be nearly equivalent to producing the papers themselves; and, I believe, I might refer for a justification of my refusal to the general responsibility of the government, and to its right to exercise a discretion on such occasions. As
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I am desirous, however, to give as much satisfaction to this House, and to every individual member of it, as is consistent with my public duty, I will state thus much:—It is obvious that the casus fœderis which called upon us to send troops to Portugal, was a case more or less against Spain. I admit that, if things wore an unfavourable aspect, and there was a tendency to a complete rupture rather than to an accommodation of differences, it might be highly proper to lay papers before the House. But when, fortunately, things have taken a different turn—when the conduct of Spain has been conciliatory, and there are sanguine hopes of an accommodation, this is surely not the moment to lay papers on the table, the tenor of which papers must be, to make out a case against Spain.—The noble viscount concluded by moving an Address to his Majesty, assuring his Majesty of the perfect concurrence of that House, in enabling his Majesty to provide for any additional expenses that might arise on account of the continuance of the British forces in Portugal.
Earl Grey—It is not my intention to offer any opposition to the present motion; but I feel it necessary to state shortly, the terms upon which I assent to it, and to make some reservation as to the opinions which I may consider it my duty to declare, at a period better suited to discussion. In the sentiments expressed by the noble viscount at the conclusion of his speech, I have to declare my unqualified concurrence. I certainly think it would not be right to press ministers for the production of any papers, under the circumstances which he has stated. It is quite sufficient to satisfy the House of the impropriety of any such production, to state that there are negotiations pending, of the amicable termination of which a strong hope is entertained, and which might be interrupted or defeated by producing documents of a hostile character. I am, therefore, not one of those who would press the noble lord for any documents of this description; but I may regret, that after so long a period has elapsed since the adoption of the measure of sending troops to Portugal, no greater progress has been made in the work of pacification, and that ministers are not prepared to state, that this great and salutary object has not been accomplished. If I before felt some degree of disappointment, that

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disappointment, is increased by the nature of the present message, and by the scanty explanation of it which has been given by the noble viscount. Am I to understand from the address to his majesty in answer to his message, assuring him of our readiness to give him support for the defence of Portugal, in the shape of a vote of credit, for no less than half a million, that this vote is solely for the purpose of maintaining the troops now in Portugal? I am afraid I cannot so understand it.
The number of British troops now in Portugal amounts to about 5,000; and I believe the expense of maintaining such a force would not exceed 160,000 l. or at most 200,000 l. a year. Now, this sum has already been voted in the usual grants for the army; and no additional sum, therefore, would be required, on account of the detachment of this force to Portugal. I am aware it may be said, that additional expenses—such as those for equipment, for the commissariat and foraging departments—are increased in the employment of troops in a foreign country. Against these additional expenses, however, are to be set others of a similar description, which would have been incurred at home; such as marching expenses, expenses for fuel, barracks, &c. In fact, the whole of the extraordinary expenses incurred abroad, might be covered by the provision made under the usual head of army extraordinaries; and your lordships are aware, that the additional sum granted under that head in the other House of parliament was voted on the express ground of the increased expense attending the employment of the troops in Portugal. After the whole expenses of the corps now in Portugal have been provided for by the grant voted in the other House, we are now called upon for a further sum, more than sufficient for the maintenance of a force double the amount of the British troops in that country. These circumstances, I confess, excite in my mind a feeling of uneasiness and alarm. The noble viscount, instead of assuring us that the employment of the British forces has been already effectual for the purpose for which they were sent to Portugal, now calls upon us for a further supply, foreseeing, I suppose, the possibility of further difficulties and dangers, which he has hitherto been unable to avert. Instead of assuring the House, that the
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measures already adopted, in defence of our ally, were likely to render it unnecessary to impose any further burthens on the British public, ministers are unable to hold out any definite prospect for the withdrawal of the troops; on the contrary, they feel it necessary that their hands should be fortified with the means of carrying on preparations for the defence of Portugal to a much greater extent. If I do not press for further information, I abstain solely on the ground of my unwillingness to throw any obstacle in the negotiations said to be pending; on the satisfactory termination of which the peace and security, not only of this country and of Portugal, but of all Europe, may depend. In so doing, I reserve to myself the right of questioning, hereafter, if I find it necessary, the whole conduct of ministers with regard to this measure. The noble viscount observed, that our troops were sent to Portugal, not for the purpose of supporting constitutional Portugal, or of annoying despotic Spain, but solely on the ground of a treaty, which obliged us to defend an ancient and faithful ally. Whether the casus fœderis which called upon us to interfere was clearly made out, I am not prepared to say; however interference might be justified upon the broader ground of policy, which rendered it necessary for us to take measures to prevent France from obtaining that power and preponderance over the whole of the Peninsula, which could not but be prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain. The passage in the speech of the noble viscount to which I have adverted is not quite consistent with another passage, in which he declared, that the measures adopted by the British government have had the effect of rendering desperate the attempts of the Portuguese insurgents to overthrow the constitutional government of Portugal. I think the independence of Portugal a great object; but I do hope, that in pursuing that object we shall not suffer ourselves to be led into the support of a principle which can never be acted upon without detriment to this country. With the constitution of Portugal we have nothing to do. It was not our work. It was not recommended by us. Whether it be good or bad; whether it be more or less consonant to the interests of the people; whether it be more or less accordant to their desires or dispositions; whether the party opposing or supporting it be right or wrong; whether

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Don Pedro, having made his election of the Crown of Brazil, and having resigned the Crown of Portugal, had a right to send a constitution to Portugal, and enforce obedience to it—all these are questions with which we have nothing to do: they are questions for the Portuguese themselves to decide; and any interference with them, on our part, would be a violation of those national rights, and that national independence, which it is our duty, on all occasions, to support. The noble viscount has stated, that our troops have not been sent to Portugal, and that they are not now maintained there, for any such purpose. If this be the case, I trust that, from the moment satisfaction can be obtained from Spain, that no invasion or aggression will be attempted against Portugal, the maintenance of British forces in that country will cease, and that they will not be kept there under the idea of supporting one party against another, or of upholding a constitution with which we have no concern, and with which it is neither consistent with the interests of this country, nor with the faith of treaties, nor with the principles upon which the law and independence of nations are founded, to interfere. In looking to the difficulties with which the government has to contend, it is impossible not to look back also to the causes which produced them. Those difficulties arise from their having originally suffered the French to invade Spain, without regarding what was due to the honour, and still less what accorded with the interests of the country. We were then in a situation to reap advantages from a decisive course of policy, which it is doubtful whether any pending negotiations can secure to us. I shall be satisfied, if by an amicable arrangement we can pro cure the evacuation of Spain by the French at the same time that we evacuate Portugal; and I think we have a right to insist upon this as a necessary condition in our negotiations. The French have now been four years in Spain. Upon what pretext they remain there I know not. They originally went there under the pretence of rescuing the monarch of Spain from the hands of a faction, which, by means of a military force, was said to overpower the real dispositions of the people. Their object has long since been effected. The Cortes have been suppressed: those rebels and traitors, as they are represented by some, but those virtuous and suffering
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patriots, as they are regarded by others, are now dispersed over the face of Europe, the objects of compassion to every generous and feeling mind. The French have now no pretence for remaining in Spain, if it be really true that the dispositions of the people are favourable to the monarch and the government; and if their presence be necessary to support the government, it is a government which ought not to be supported. It has been said, that there is this difference between the situation of Spain and Portugal; that in Spain the general dispositions and feelings of the people are decidedly in favour of an absolute king, and that in Portugal the dispositions of the people are as decidedly in favour of a constitutional government. By some singular fatality, however, it is found necessary by the French to continue an army in Spain for the support of the absolute monarchy to which the people are so much attached; while we are supposed to maintain an army in Portugal, under the apprehension, that if it were withdrawn, the constitutional government, of which the people are so fond, would be immediately overthrown! These are the difficulties in which people and governments are placed, by departing from a liberal and enlightened policy. I earnestly hope, that the government may still return to those principles. Had his majesty's ministers originally acted upon them, I feel persuaded that the object sought by the pending negotiations—a consummation devoutly to be wished for—would have been already accomplished; and that they would not feel themselves obliged, after such a lapse of time, and so large an expenditure, to call upon this House to strengthen their hands, with a view of providing against still existing dangers, and in explanation of the grounds on which I give a qualified assent to the present motion.
The Address was agreed to, nem. dis.