Sitting of 26 June 1823

PETITION OF GEORGE ROWAN—COMPLAINT AGAINST A MEMBER.
Mr. Broughampresented a petition, which had been sent to him from Ireland by an individual of the name of George Rowan, of whom he had no knowledge, nor of the facts which he stated in his petition. He had a painful duty to perform in presenting this petition, inasmuch as it reflected upon the conduct and character of a member of the House. He should therefore do nothing more than move, that this petition be brought up.
The petition was accordingly brought up and read:—It stated, that, the, petitioner had been dismissed from a
1254
Situation which he held in the Excise means of a conspiracy which had been formed against him by W. M.E. Twiss and others; that W. M. Twiss had been appointed to the situation which the petitioner had filled, by the interest colonel Crosbie, his father-in-law that in consequence of some defalcation in big, accounts, W. M. Twiss had been dismissed from it, and that he had recently been reappointed to it, though he was confined at the time for debt in the Marshalsea prison at Dublin, and was seeking the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors act. It accused colonel Crosbie of having taken a bribe of, 1,000 l. to secure this appointment to Mr. Twiss, and also charged him with receiving, on several, distinct occasions, money for the patronage at his disposal.
On the motion, that the petition be laid on the table,
Colonel Crosbieaddressed the House in a low tone of voice. He said, it was true that Mr. Twiss, who was his son-in-law, had obtained, through his interest, the appointment of collector of the Excise, but that it was false that he had received for it any sum of money whatever. He likewise denied, in the most positive and unqualified manner, that he had ever received a farthing for the situation to which he had got his nephew appointed. He could only say, that the charges which the petitioner had brought against him were false and unfounded, and that he would adopt every means in his power to compel him to make redress for bringing them so publicly forward.
Mr. Crokersaid, that, to a certain degree, he could corroborate the statement of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down Mr. Twiss, with whom he had become acquainted whilst going the circuit in Ireland, had recently called upon him, and had applied for his good offices in recovering the situation from which he had been removed. He had told Mr. Twise that he would make the requisite inquiries in Ireland, and, if the answer was satisfactory, would employ what interest he had in his behalf. He had made those inquiries. The result of them had been satisfactory; and the consequence was that Mr. Twiss re-appointed to his situation. Mr. Twiss brought him no recommendation from colonel Crosbie no nor indeed, from any other person, He thought it right to add, that he had the slightest communication with colonel Crosbie on this subject.
Mr. Wynnasked, whether it was right that a petition should be laid on the table, which charged a member of the House with an offence for which he was indictable in a court of law. If such a petition were suffered to lie on the table, the House must, for its own credit, as well as for that of the hon. member accused, enter into an investigation of the charges it contained. As the ordinary tribunals of the country were competent to entertain the accusations of the petitioner, he thought that there was no occasion for the House to take them up. He therefore suggested to his hon. and learned friend to withdraw the petition.
Mr. Brovghamsaid, that after the distinct, unequivocal, and unreserved manner, in which the charge had been denied by the hon. member opposite, he was bound by every principle of justice and humanity to believe that the allegations in the petition could not be sustained, and he could have no hesitation in withdrawing the petition, as it would be open to the petitioner, if lie still persisted in the charge, to renew his petition in the next session. In the mean time, an opportunity would be afforded the petitioner of considering the serious responsibility he incurred, if he brought a false charge against a member of that House, and the punishment which would, in that case, await him for a breach of the privileges of parliament.
The petition was then withdrawn.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW IN IRELAND.
Mr. Brougham, having moved, that the petition which he yesterday presented from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, complaining of the Inequality in the Administration of the Law, be entered as read, said, that he had never risen to address the House under feelings of greater anxiety. When he recollected the vast talent, on both sides of the House, which had been employed at various periods on topics connected with the subject of the petition, and the multitude of persons in Ireland earnestly looking at the result of this discussion—when he considered even the strength of the case committed to his charge; and, more than all the present state of the sister kingdom, it might well be supposed that he felt somewhat overawed at the task he had undertaken. The petitioners them selves had rendered the duty incalculably more difficult for, whereas, when the Catholic question was discussed, the affairs
1256
of Ireland, and the intolerant and injudicious scheme of policy long pursued there, had been constant matters of debate, and had been handled, by the ablest men, in every different form in which they could be shaped by talent and ingenuity; and whereas the great desideratum now was, to supply an answer to this question, "What is the practical effect of that system?"—to solve this difficulty, "How do the penal laws operate in Ireland, not merely upon individuals of rank excluded from the higher offices of the state, but upon all classes, from the loftiest to the lowest;" and whereas the petitioners, in the very title of their representation of grievance, complained of "inequality in the administration of the law,"—yet they, who of all others were able to give the best information, to afford the clearest solution, to stop the mouths Of those who maintained that there was no practical evil, by showing that justice was not equally administered by giving facts in detail—the petitioners, intimately acquainted with the merits of their own case deeply feeling the grievances under which they laboured, and having daily arid hourly experience of the consequences of the present system, had nevertheless omitted all statement of particulars, and had con fined themselves merely to general declarations. He made this a ground of complaint, certainly not from himself towards the petitioners, but from himself on their behalf, because they thus sent him into court, as it were, briefless, requiring him to answer all objections, without being furnished by them with the means of doing so. He was thus reduced to one of two alternatives—either he must undertake the hopeless task of again going over the ground repeatedly trodden by the greatest men; or he must attempt, what was perhaps yet more hopeless, to supply the defect in the case that had been intrusted to his hands.
He took the cause for this oversight to be this—the petitioners did not give the House credit for knowing so little of it the present state of Ireland; they assumed of that the House knew what it did not for know—that it was aware of facts than might be proved at the bar, to show that justice was not equally administered to all classes in Ireland. when parties entered a court of justice in this country (for in this country they happily were courts of justice), rich and poor were treated with the same impartiality. The

1257
law, thank God, was administered equally to both. But the petitioners, feeling, and well knowing the existence of the melancholy facts on which they relied, no more thought of introducing them into their statement, than any petitioner in this kingdom would take upon himself to explain and expound the excellence of our own judicial system. A petitioner in this country would never dream of telling the House, that juries were not packed; that judges were decorous, and never sacrificed the rights of parties to a ribald joke; that chancellors held even the balance of justice between Protestants and Catholics, episcopalians and dissenters; that here the keeper of the great seal would never think of striking a gentleman out of the commission of the peace, because he was a sectary, as had been done in Ireland—the keeper of the great seal there, admitting that in so doing he had been guilty of an act of gross injustice, yet eight years afterwards repeating it. In England, in administering the law to a creditor against his debtor, we should never think of inquiring, whether he was or was not able to bribe an under-sheriff. In England, the king's writ ran into all parts of the country. Here there was no detached corner, no land of Goshen, where some little tyrant dared to raise his flag in defiance to the orders of his liege lord. Our courts were open to the poorest suppliant; and however humble or unprotected, he had an equal chance with his titled adversary nay, though he even were addicted to sectarian opinions, instead of paling his devotions in a cathedral. The petitioners were in themselves a most important class, and they represented many thousands; for the petition would have been signed by tens of thousands, had a few more days been allowed. The signatures already obtained were from persons of commanding influence, who spoke the sense of six millions of his majesty's subjects, who were strongly persuaded, that the law in Ireland was not as it was in England—that he would be guilty, not of extravagant flattery merely, but of intolerable mockery, of gross and ridiculous irony, who should attempt to compare the two. They felt that the law was not equally administered to all classes in point of rank; and that it was still more unequal, and still less fair and impartial, in the manner in which it was dealt out among the adherents of conflicting religious sects. From the fulness of the
1258
evidence they possessed, because it was the evidence of their own senses, they had omitted the insertion of all details, giving the House credit for knowing that of which it was ignorant. The consequence was, that the petitioners, and he was sorry to say, the whole people of Ireland, had suppressed the most important facts. In the intensity of their sufferings, they had lost, as it were, the articulate language of remonstrance, and had had recourse rather to exclamations of despair, and those exclamations had been followed, in some instances, by acts of open aggression: for exclamations of despair were the forerunners of such acts, and often at too short a distance [Hear, hear]. Forerunners, he perhaps ought not to say; for while he was speaking, these outrages were going on, and it was impossible for any man to be so little acquainted with these transactions, as not to be aware that he (Mr. B.) was guilty of any thing but exaggeration, when he took upon himself to assert that, for the last thirty years, Ireland had never been in a more alarming state. Of what, in the first instance, did the Roman Catholic petitioners complain? They said, that the laws were in themselves unequal, and that that inequality was aggravated by the incidental circumstance, not perhaps necessarily, but naturally, connected with the inequality of the laws, of a still more grossly partial administration. In his view, a mere representation of this kind, by a large body of the king's subjects, was a sufficient prima facie case. If they demanded inquiry, and called for redress, that alone ought to be enough to induce parliament to lend the petitioners a favourable ear. But the House was not left to this, even in the absence of any detail on the part of the petitioners. It was only needful to consider the state of that law which, though not necessarily, naturally led to an unequal administration, in order to persuade any one that as long as men maintained their natures, the law which created an inequality in religious sects could not be equally administered. The law at present separated the king's subjects into two classes; it severed those who ought to be as brothers under the Hi same paternal government. The law of England viewed the subjects of the of the realm as brothers and the king as their common parent; but the law of Ireland held a language widely different. It marshalled man against man, sect against sect. It

1259
employed religious tenets on the one hand to foment (if it were not. to profane the word) religious animosities on the other. The law of England esteemed all men equal. It was sufficient to be born within the king's allegiance, to be entitled to all the rights the loftiest subject of the land enjoyed. None were disqualified by it; and the only distinction was between natural born subjects and aliens. Such, indeed, was the liberality of our system in times which we called barbarous, but from which, in these enlightened days, it might be well to take a hint, that if a man were even an alien born, he was not deprived of the protection of the law. In Ireland, however, the law held a directly opposite doctrine. The sect to which a man belonged—the cast of his religious opinions—the form in which he worshipped his Creator—were the grounds on which the law separated him from his fellows, and banned him to the endurance of a system of the most cruel injustice. Not only this, but on the very same grounds, and with, if possible, less right—with, if possible, more impolicy—and with, if possible, greater cruelty, it leagued him against all who held opposite notions, as essentially and as implacably, as his enemies were combined against him. He would admit, that great and salutary alterations had taken place. Since the year 1778, but more especially since 1793, important improvements in the code had been effected. The odious distinctions had been, in a great degree, mitigated. What remained was nothing in comparison with what had been taken away. Enough, indeed, was left to make an absurd and ridiculous difference—absurd and ridiculous when viewed by the eye of the philosopher, but melancholy and degrading when contemplated with the eye of the politician. Enough was left for offence and insult, while nothing was accomplished for happiness and security. The right hon. the secretary for foreign affairs, who had so ably, on a former occasion, and before he accepted office, advocated of the Roman Catholics, had well referred to the mark which the fetters, though removed, had left behind them, and to the system of extirpation which a ferocious tyrant of a former age was about to carry into effect. That system would have had, at least, more consistency in it the one which this country had pursued towards Ireland. Chains had no sense and consistency, and
1260
true it was, that the chains had been removed; but the degradation and the insult remained, as long as a link was left, to remind the sufferer of his miserable bondage. But, if the advice of the right hon. gentleman had been followed, and if the last link had been knocked off, still he (Mr. B.) should say, that as long as the gall of the fetter, the mark it inflicted, continued visible, justice could not be impartially administered; because one class was thereby improperly stigmatized; the eyes of judges, witnesses, and jurors would still detect the mark, and as long as human infirmity existed, impartial justice could not be done. Why, then, had the wound, aggravated by the impatience of the prisoner, been allowed to rankle, when it was in the power of the legislature in one moment to heal it of ever? It was powerless as a security, and infinitely prejudicial as a distinction; and as long as that hideous, that odious distinction was preserved, so long would. Ireland continue the scene of discontent and aggression [Hear]. One principle at this moment influenced judges, jurors, magistrates, and almost every witness—the English, the humane, the equitable principle, not invented in a dark age, not imported from a barbarous country—not even adopted in this our day of imitative admiration, from the holy alliance, and supported by their legions of cossacks, but invented in England, and adopted by a body calling itself the English parliament. It originated in the enlightened policy of this enlightened country enlightened age. It remained for the nineteenth century to see the doctrine fully established—that the law in Ireland is a respecter of persons—that it prefers one sect to another—that it will not allow men to worship God according to their consciences, or if they do they must do it at the signal peril of forfeiting all claim to the protection of the law.
The first ground he submitted was, that the petition came from those who both actually and virtually represent the whole body of the Roman Catholics. His second ground was, that they had just reason to complain, and that as long as the odious distinction he had noticed remained, justice could not, in the nature of man, be equally distributed. But he thought that he should leave the case incomplete if he did not go somewhat into details, though he did not trouble the House with more than was absolutely

1261
necessary, Intending rather to give specimens than to enter into any elaborate and systematic examination of the subject, to which he professed himself incompetent. It was fit, however, to mention a few facts which he should be prepared to prove at the bar, should the House adopt the proposition with which he intended to conclude. In all he should now offer, the House was to consider that he was, in truth, tendering evidence; and he should scrupulously abstain from every thing which could not, as he was satisfied, be substantiated by legal testimony, either of witnesses or of records. When the subject was so extensive, it was of little importance where he began; but he would commence with one of the most material parts of it—the state of the magistracy in Ireland, by whose local jurisdictions justice ought, in fact, to be brought home as it were, to every man's door. It was in vain to deny that in England abuses had, from time to time, crept into this branch of the administration of justice; but various salutary acts had been passed on the one hand to protect magistrates acting bona fide, and on the other, to guard the king's subjects from malversation, and misuse of power, sometimes purely discretionary. It was by no means a matter of frequent complaint in this Country, that improper individuals were included in the magistracy. In England, a rule had been laid down by the keeper of the great seal (indeed he had seen it: stated under the hand of the present lord Chancellor), that they never would strike a person out of the commission, whatever private charges might be brought against him unless he had been brought to trial; mid convicted by the verdict of a jury. He had known an instance of a magistrate several time accused, of perjury, with complaints against him by a vast majority or his fellows in the commission, whom the lord Chancellor peremptorily refused acquitted because he had been tried and acquitted. He recollected another case in Durham, about ten years ago, where the bishop, as custos rotulorum, had been obliged to reinstate a certain magistrate because, though accused, he had not been brought to trial. He did not mean that this rule was applicable to Ireland. A much greater latitude of discretion was required there. Not only the present but former chancellors, lord Redesdale and the late Mr. Ponsonby had agreed upon this point. Upon that, indeed,
1262
he (Mr. B) founder his first observation because, if a principle were established in England, the propriety of which no man disputed, was it not very extraordinary that by as common consent it was allowed that it was impossible to extend it to Ireland? This fact was worth a thousand matters of mere detail. As to particular facts, a man might be misled of mistaken; but here was something that' could not deceive—a principle acted upon invariably on one side of the water was met by a diametrically opposite principle on the other; and the difference could only arise from the fact, that the stuff of which justice was composed in England was of much happier material than in Ireland. But he was not without particular facts and authorities; and he would just call the attention of the House few instances out of a great variety. The late lord Gosford, governor of the county of Armagh, on a memorable occasion had said, that "justice had been suffered to disappear, and the supineness of the magistracy to become the common topic of conversation in every corner of the kingdom." Before he proceeded furthest; he would just mention that the word "Supineness" would often occur in what he should read, and that it was to, be understood as a delicate mode of expressing a disinclination to suppress violence in. ninety-nine cases out of a hundred—the Orange violence against the Catholics. [Hear, hear!] The late Mr. Grattan was certainly a party man. In the highest, truest, and most honourable sense he performed what he justly considered the important duties of party; but of all members on the opposition side of the House, h is authority was the most unexceptionable; because he had undeviatingly observed the strictest accuracy in his details, and was, little liable to the imputation of being carried away by enthusiasm. He was a man of singular candour and of moderation and from his entrance into public life to the close of his illustrious career, had given signal proofs of his moderation, of his extreme forbearance nay, of his gentleness. He had observed on one occasion, that the government "trifled, with the northern weaver, when it sent him to grand jury;" and he had added, that "the supinenes and partiality of the magistracy had been the occasion of his suffering and his losses" Mr. Ponsonby, who had filled the office of lord Chancellor in Ireland and was

1263
therefore so competent to judge on the question, looking back to the time when he had held the great seal, had said with becoming reserve, that "The magistrates too often had been anything but what they ought to have been." Mr. Justice Day, in au address to the grand jury, had charged them with "negligence, corruption, and partiality," and the late lord Kingston complained of some men as "a disgrace to the magistracy, deserving rather to be hanged than to be included in the commission." The charge of Judge Fletcher, in the year 1814, was well known. It was an able and elaborate production, and next to delivering no political charge at all, the greatest merit was, to deliver one so sound in its doctrines that they were liable to no exception. Talking of the Orange societies, he said, that "they poisoned the very fountains of justice," and that "even some magistrates, under their influence, had, in mo many instances, violated their duty and their oaths." Thence he proceeded to say, that such associations were most pernicious, whether consisting of Orange or Riband men, and adding, that under their influence petty juries had declined to do their duty: it was sufficient to say such a man displayed such a colour, to produce an utter disbelief of his testimony; and when another has stood with his hand at the bar, the display of his party badge has mitigated the murder into manslaughter. These sentiments, coming from a man discharging judicial duties, were of the highest importance. Thence he proceeded to condemn all those associations bound together by unlawful oaths, remarking, "with these Orange associations cannot all commemorations and processions producing embittering recollections and inflicting wounds upon the feelings of others. I do emphatically state it as my Settled opinion, that until those associations are put down, and the arms taken from their hands, in vain will the north of Ireland express tranquillity or peace." The learned judge went on to censure the unlawful oaths (such as had been treated with so much respect in this House on a recent occasion) taken by the members of the associations; and of the magistrates, he said, that "some were over zealous, and some, on the contrary, were supine," and he complained that "jobbers of absentees" and "traders in false loyalty," among others, were too often put into the commission. Eight years
1264
afterwards, the same learned judge did not appear to have found any material amendment in the magistracy; and in one of his last charges he had asserted, that the conduct of the magistracy "might ultimately drive thousands to rebellion." A great deal had been said of late respecting a reform in the commission of the peace of Ireland, and twelve counties had undergone the operation. If the scheme had been executed with the same honest and zealous intention for improvement with which it was undertaken, much good might have been the result; but if he (Mr. B.) had been rightly informed, little or no advantage had been the consequence, the measure having been treated as one rather of form than of substance. He had been told (and to this point he could produce evidence at the bar) that in six counties 152 magistrates had been displaced. The number looked as if a great sweeping and radical change had been effected; but, in truth, the vast majority of the 152 consisted of absentees, English and Irish militia, officers, and others incapacitated from age, sickness, and not a few by death. How many did the House think, out of the whole 152, had been really removed for reasons such as those to which the charge was originally intended to apply? Only fourteen. Twenty-five had been removed in one county, and in another fifteen; all of whom were incapacitated for the various causes he had named. [Mr. Goulburn asked, across the table, to what county the learned gentleman referred?] The county of Monaghan; and since the question had been put, he would just add, that among those removed for being sick, or dead, or absent, or an English militia officer, or an Irish militia officer, was not sir Harcourt Lees. He was continued in the commission [Hear hear!]. In the county and city of Dublin, major Sir had not been removed; and he (Mr. B.) thought there was just ground to complain, that he was still in the commission. It was an insult to the people of Ireland, over whom he exercised all the nameless tyrannies of the last rebellion. Even on the rule of the lord Chancellor of England, his name ought to be instantly struck out. Nevertheless, he was allowed to be at the head of the police of Dublin; and he had told, the House at the bar, that he there daily and nightly acted as one of the magistrates. Yet, in the city of Dub-

1265
lin itself; a jury of his country had given a verdict against him, for one of the grossest and foulest oppressions—so gross and foul, that the oldest practitioner of our courts could find no parallel. The charge included in it the most base and perfidious fraud; for to eke out the measure of his injustice, and to overwhelm his victim, it was proved at the trial, that an order had been fabricated, the fabrication of which was vouched by his friend, his accomplice, his tool; the very man, in short, who had perpetrated the instrument. It was to that man that the victim had been delivered—to major Sandys; and when Mr. Curran exclaimed, There sits major Sandys; if my witnesses deceive you, let major Sirr put his friend, and associate in cruelty, in the box to deny it if he can," major Sirr dared not do it; and all who had ears to hear, or eyes to see, were convinced, with the jury, that major Sirr stood self-convicted. Still he had been kept in his office—still he was employed; and two and twenty years afterwards, when he had grown grey in the service, he had been heard to declare at the bar of the House, "I am still on the bench of justice!" Look at the effect of these arrangements in the commitments in Ireland—commitments made and signed by such magistrates as ho had described! Melancholy to relate, there were more commitments in Ireland, taking the average of the last four years, than in England and Wales together. But how did the average stand, as to the number of convictions? Why, in those countries where law and justice were equally administered, in England and Wales, there had been 43,000 commitments and 29,000 convictions; but in Ireland, with a list of commitments exceeding 45,000, the number of convictions had not exceeded 16,000. To the recorded opinions of men of talent and experience, to facts in proof before the House, an argument still more powerful, to these evidences in favour of the proposition which he was supporting, he would add the memorable declaration of lord Redesdale in the House of Peers—a declaration which admitted the utmost point he could contend for,. What had lord Redesdale, once the high Chancellor of Ireland, said of the state of-the administration of justice in that country? Lord Redesdale was not a man incautiously liberal of opinion. He was not likely to be the friend of
1266
hasty innovation. He could not be suspected for the patron of unfounded complaints. He was rather one of those who would shut his eyes to any little irregularities in a system of which, in the main, he approved—who probably would only speak out when he found abuses growing so enormous, that no man could continue to hold his peace under them; and so impudent, at the same time, that but from open denunciation, no redress could be expected or even be hoped from them. And what, in spite of habit, or possible lurking prejudice, what was the opinion of lord Redesdale delivered only in July last, as to the state of the law in Ireland? His lordship had said this—"I have been intimately connected with that ill-fated country for the last twenty years; and I am sorry to say, that there exists in it two sorts of justice—the one for the rich, the other for the poor—both equally ill-administered." And this was the effect of twenty years' experience upon the mind of the highest law officer (an Englishman too) in Ireland. That fact, standing by itself, was really worthy of deep consideration. He felt himself bound by it, indeed, in some measure, to proceed in his exposure. So, lest it should be supposed that lord Redesdale had suffered from his long intimacy with Ireland, that from living in that country, he had become infected with the spirit of complaint which pervaded it, that communication had, as it were, tainted him with that disposition to remonstrate which, somehow or other, seemed to have become epidemic among the whole people of Ireland; he would adduce a few examples in support of that noble lord's declaration; and he would show, and beyond the possibility of quibble, that the fact was distinctly as lord Redesdale had stated it.
In a country which enjoyed the blessings of trial by jury, the manner in which juries were selected was a point of no slight importance. Now, excepting in the counties where the sheriffs were elected by the judges, in all corporations, (these corporations being formed of men full of prejudice against the Catholics, open to Papists certainly by law, but shut against them with all the obstinacy of bigotry by practice), in all corporation towns, the sheriff who chose the juries was himself the selected creature of that select and prejudiced body. He was not about to enter into the late affair of the

1267
sheriff of Dublin, but be would remind file House of an incident not relating to five present sheriff. A gentleman of the name of Dillon M'Namara, an attorney of many years standing, had been summoned upon the late inquiry; and, by way of discrediting his evidence, the following questions had been put to him,—"Did you not some years ago offer a bribe to a sub-sheriff of Dublin if he would pack a jury to get off a client of yours, who was going to be tried for forgery?"—Answer, "Yes, I did." "Did he pack the jury?—Answer. "No, he could not, because the panel was up at the Castle. Did not the sub-sheriff, it would be asked, perhaps, indignantly reject the bribe? Did he not treat the offer as every sub-sheriff in every county in England would treat it, and get no thanks nor credit for so treating it neither? Mr. M'Namara's answer as to that point made no mention of indignation; he simply stated the conduct of the sheriff. The sub-sheriff said, that if he wished to do the thing, "it was not in his power, because the panel was gone up to the Castle." But the thing, good as it was, became better still, as the questions went on. Question. "Did not the sub-sheriff reject the bribe? Answer. "He did not get the bribe." Mr. M'Namara would not say he rejected it. Question, "Why did he not get the bribe?"—Answer, "Because he did not do what I wanted him to do." This was hot, he (Mr. B.) submitted, exactly the kind of dialogue which would have taken place between an attorney and a sub-sheriff in England, upon the subject of packing a jury. He would not say, that the man who would pack one jury to acquit a prisoner of felony, would as readily pack another to convict a prisoner of high treason, or of libel; but it would not be too much to suggest, that there was a point in money matters, to which, if, the briber could manage to go, he might possibly find access to the ear of the sup-sheriff, even although he should wish secure a conviction for an offence of that character. Again, he would say gibing against the sub-sheriff in question. That individual had not, it appeared received the bribe. But, there was the fact before the House, that such a bargain had been openly talked of. There stood a respectable solicitor at the bar of the House, from whose answers he was entitled to conclude and, in his science he did believe the fact to be so,
1268
that, in the eyes of the persons who filled those relative situations in Ireland, the idea of an attorney's offering to bribe a sub-sheriff, or of a sub-sheriff being bribed to pack a convenient jury, did not excite that horror and surprise which the bare mention of such a project could not fail to produce in England. But he would go further upon the point, for it would allow him to go further. Suppose it possible for such a proposition to be listened to in this country. Suppose the possibility of such an offer being made, and even accepted. Suppose there were attornies in England who would put such arts in practice if they dared, either with a view to their own advantage, or to the safety of their clients; still, this possibility admitted, left another impossibility behind, no English attorney would ever talk of such a matter as it had been talked of by the gentlemen lately examined at their bar; such a man, although himself destitute of honest or honourable feelings, would be aware of the existence of those feelings in the hearts of those among whom he moved, and would have prudence enough to perceive, that if his interests had been aided by the transaction, his character was not at all likely to be assisted by its publicity.
But this example, though it showed much, showed nothing like the whole. What would the House say to another practice, which he could prove by competent witnesses to exist in Dublin universally, of the sub-sheriff, whose duty it was to summon the juries, being in the habit of receiving from persons liable to serve, a fee of a guinea a-year, to refrain from calling on them to perform that duty? So that those men to whom it was convenient to pay a guinea a-year, did not serve on juries at all; while those who could not afford to pay the guinea, were compelled to do double duty, and those who wished to serve, might, by not paying the guinea, serve more frequently than came to their turn. And this precious practice was not peculiar to Dublin; the provinces had the benefit of it as well as the capital. But the fee in country places certainly was less—it being half a guinea a year, not a guinea. So that the superior classes, who were best calculated to act as jurymen, gave up, unless where they chose to act the duty altogether; and it fell into the hangs of persons who, whatever the claims, were probably less competent and en-

1269
lightened, and, from their situations, more open to be influenced. To say the least of this practice, it was improper, indecent, and such a practice as in England could not be tolerated for an hour.—But this point became insignificant, when compared with that which he should next bring forward. He had already said, that the king's writ did not run equally through Ireland. Of this fact—that it did not reach equally to all classes of persons, he was ready to give evidence at the bar. He could show, that where a man had money for the purpose, he regularly bribed the sub-sheriff, as soon as that officer came into place, and agreed to pay him all fees upon writs out against him for debt, as though such writs were formally served, provided the sheriff would give him timely notice of the issuing of such writs; no doubt, that he might be enabled at once to appear and do justice to his creditor! To the poor man, of course, this indulgence did not extend: he was taken with all the rigour of the law, and full justice was. Executed upon him. He (Mr. B.) said, that he could prove this at the bar; but, in fact, it had been proved within the last three days, before a committee above stairs. He would read a note to the House of the evidence upon the subject; and he could venture to say, that but for the painful truths which it established, the document would be amusing. It was an attorney of respectability who now spoke, giving his evidence on the 23d of the present month. Question. "Do you regard the difficulty of obtaining money in Ireland after judgment, as one of the obstacles to English capital being carried to that country?" Answer, "Certainly I do; and it is one of the greatest evils we have to contend with." Question. "How does it arise?" Answer. "In the management of the office of Sheriff—there is no such thing as executing a writ as you do it in England. I mean to confine this to executing it upon persons having the rank and means of gentlemen, and the city of Dublin and the county of Cork are exceptions to the rule. In other places it is the habit, upon the appointment of a sub-sheriff, that he gets notice that he will be paid his fees upon writs delivered, if he gives notice to the party that the writ is about to issue." Question. "Does this practice prevail generally?" Answer. "I understand it to prevail every where except in Cork county and Dublin
1270
city but I dare say there are places even in Cork where an arrangement might be made with the sheriff." Question. "Is the committee to understand, that a different practice prevails with respect to poor debtors?" Answer. "I suppose that the sheriff, not being paid for any favour to them, does not show any." [Hear, and a laugh.] Why yes, this was sport to the House; but it was ruin to the poor creditors of Ireland. Let hon. members just look what this "favour" went to produce. A man might have 20,000 l. in the English funds, or in any investment which the law did not reach; he might be living in Ireland in the midst of luxury and. magnificence; a hundred writs might be out against his person: but, so long as he could bribe the sheriff to give him notice in time, he might defy his creditor, and suffer him to starve. And the evidence which he was quoting did not stop at this point. It asserted, perhaps, no more in fact than had ahead been slated; but gave certain assertions in rather stronger For instance;—Question. "Do you mean to say, then, that there is one practice for the higher orders in Ireland, and another for the lower?" Answer "Yes." This was pretty plain. Question. "Stricter in the one case than in the other?" Answer. "Certainly." Was not this what lord Redesdale had had in Ins eye when he bad said, "There is one law for the rich, and another for the poor—both equally ill-executed?" The evidence given by this man of practical knowledge and habits bore out, to the very letter, that which lord Redesdale had asserted.
It was to be hoped that the same abuses which were here detected at every step did not reach to the higher branches of the administration of justice; but it was fit to remember, that so long as the present disabilities existed, so long the judge who tried the question between the Catholic and Protestant must himself be a member of the Protestant establishment; so long; in despite of individual talent or populalarity, all rank at the bar and all advantages attendant upon rank—such as weight with the court and general influence in. society—all this must belong to a favoured class, and to a class which was looking up for favours in future. It was from this favoured class still that the sheriff was chosen. It was the sheriff who had the summoning, by his office, of the juries And when it stood proved, that a sub-sheriff might be hired to pack a jury, and

1271
that it was every day's practice for a sub-sheriff to be bribed for permitting the debtor to escape from his creditor, was it unfair to insinuate, that possibly a Protestant sub-sheriff might be found, as accessible to political prejudices, or feelings of religious conformity, as to the meaner motive of a paltry present advantage arising from a bribe in the shape of ready money? With respect to the bench of Ireland, he had little to say. Different countries had different usages; and circumstances might happen, as matters of course, in one, which might beheld highly indecent and reprehensible in another. He should, however, freely avail himself of his privilege as a member of parliament, to express his disapprobation of any judge's conduct, when he considered that conduct to be unbecoming his situation. If a judge was bound at all times to maintain the dignity of his high office—if impartiality was the essence of the performance of judicial duty, and without which no judge could be worthy of the name;—surely, any mixture in party dissentions, any partisanship in religious or in political disputes, anything like entering into the detail of class differences and arrangements, anything approaching, however distantly, to becoming the tool of a particular faction, would be that sort of stain from which, above all others, the ermine ought most immediately to be cleared. For, first, such interference touched a judge's dignity; secondly, it rendered his impartiality suspicious; and thirdly, it went to shake that respect which was due to every just and dignified magistrate—that respect, which if any magistrate forfeited by his misconduct, the sooner he vacated his office the better; the sooner that balance was seized from him which he could no longer be expected to hold fairly—the sooner he dropped that sword which none would give him credit for wielding usefully, when once he had rendered it impossible for the public to view him with respect, he could not too soon lay down an authority the mere insignia of which was entitled to veneration. He considered lord Norbury, whom he named in right of his privilege as a member of parliament—that privilege which entitled him to speak his opinion upon judges as freely and unreservedly, as upon sheriffs or sub-sheriffs, upon attorneys, or upon the meanest of his majesty's subjects;—just judge ought, in right, to object to such a proceeding—judge would be
1272
found just long after the privilege so to proceed was abolished. Our judges in England were just, because they dared not perpetrate injustice; and as long as judges were men, they would dare to perpetrate injustice the moment the power of taxing them with it was lost. More than a year had elapsed since he had laid before the House a letter addressed by Mr. Saurin, the late attorney-general for Ireland, to lord Norbury, the chief justice of the court of Common Fleas in that country—a letter containing such a proposition as no judge who sat in England would allow his most intimate, his dearest bosom friend, to make to him. He would venture to affirm, that if a letter like that of which he was speaking, had reached any one of the learned judges of England, if it had come from any individual of high situation, the more sudden, the more instant, would have been the flash of that honourable person's indignation; if it had come from a near friend, the task to perform would have been harder, but the name of friend would have ceased to belong to the writer from that moment. But here, a year had elapsed since the letter in question had been brought forward, and yet Mr. Saurin had not denied it, nor had lord Norbury produced his answer. What would have been the answer of an English judge to such a letter? "I return you your proposition; you know not the man whom you have dared to insult." But lord Norbury had given no answer, or he had produced none. He (Mr. B.) trusted that the answer had not been an answer of assent; but certainly it had not been such an answer as would have been given to such a proposal in England, or England and Ireland too would long since have been made acquainted with it. Good God! Let the House consider what that letter called upon lord Norbury to do. To job—to intrigue—for political purposes, upon his circuit! Carrying the ermine upon his robe, and the sword of justice in his hand, he was called upon, by the first law-officer of the Crown, to prostitute the authority those emblems gave him to the purposes of a political faction [Much cheering]. He was told—"it is the custom"—a custom more honoured in the, breach than in the observance—"it is the custom for you on the circuit to receive the country gentlemen in your private room, and to talk to them familiarly upon political subject" and this was to furnish his lordship

1273
with an opportunity of doing good to; "the cause." It appeared that he was in the habit of talking thus to the gentlemen of Philipstown: and, if he could impress upon them the consequences of granting the Catholic Emancipation, they would certainly elect Catholic members of parliament—a consequence, by the way, most absurdly predicted; for there was scarcely a man in England could believe; that, if Catholic Emancipation were granted on the instant, all the Irish members returned would be Catholics; but, if he could impress upon the country gentlemen, that all the members returned would be Catholics, "and that those members would have the nomination of the sheriffs, and in many instances perhaps of the judges," he (Mr. B.) did not see how he would satisfy them that, "they could scarce live in the country if the measure were passed." So, here was a judge desired to take the opportunity of his circuit to deliver this lecture at place after place as he went on; and to throw in suggestions, moreover, of such corruption in the general legislation, as would enable the Catholic members returned by the Catholic voters to go up to the Treasury, and say, "make such and such men judges." The people of Ireland were to be told, and told by a judge, that judges might be appointed by political intrigue. Here was lord Norbury instructed openly to decry the purity of that justice, of which he himself ought to have been the ornament. He was to say; first, that the judges were secretly appointed; and next, that they acted corruptly after they were appointed. The information contained in the remaining portion of the letter ran thus:—"If Protestant gentlemen, who have votes and influence and interest, would give these venal members to understand that, by betraying their country and its constitution, they will infallibly lose theirs, it would alter their conduct, though it could neither make them honest nor respectable." Honest nor respectable! "If," concluded the attorney-general for Ireland, "you will judiciously administer a little of this medicine to the King's county, or any other member of parliament that may fall in your way, you will deserve well." [Hear, hear]. As some vindication, however, of Mr. Saurin, for having presumed to write such a letter as this, he (Mr. B.) had now to read a story to the House which he had found in a Dublin newspaper
1274
under the head of "lord Norbury's newest joke;" and, from this story, it would appear that his lordship—sitting on the bench—had reflected upon a right hon. gentleman, a member of the House, and; also, that, for the sake of getting at his joke—so much dearer was jest than justice to the noble lord—he had actually refused a rule which ought to have been granted as a matter of course, and which no man could have asked for in England without getting. The circumstance out of which the joke arose was this:—A barrister moved for a criminal information against a half-pay officer who insulted him in court. The officer was offended at something which the counsel had said of him in court, and he used language which, in England, would have made a criminal information a matter of routine. Lord Norbury, however, had refused the rule, and, had refused it in the following terms:—The motion having been made, and the offensive words stated, he said—"I remember when, if the words had been used to me, I should not have been at a loss in supplying an innuendo. The phrase has certainly a somewhat gladiatorial sound. No man respects or loves the bar more than I do; but great allowance is to be made for the chivalrous propensities of men of the sword. They do not, as Hamlet says in the play, "set their lives at a pin's fee. What was this, from a judge on the bench, but saying "you are a paltry fellow for coming here to me for protection; you know what the man wants: he wants you to go out and fight with him; and why don't you do it?" "On the other hand," his lordship continued, "the gentlemen of the bar have a repugnance to the arrest of that fell sergeant, Death." Why, was it not clear that the rule was refused just for the opportunity to introduce this wretched ribaldry? "From which profession the immortal bard drew his illustration, I shall leave to the commentators. Cedant urma togœ is good Latin and good law; but I am a friend to conciliation, and shall give it triumph to neither party. I mean no allusion. [Loud laughter]." Ay, "Loud laughter" were the very words which followed the conclusion of this jest; and for the sake of the "loud laughter," no doubt it was, that the poor lawyer was refused his rule. He venerated the bench. He had a professional regard for it. He believed that no lawyer had ever shown a greater disinclination than himself to

1275
countenance reflections upon the conduct of judges, either in the course of legal practice or in the transactions of parliament. But, he revered the bench only so long as the bench respected itself; and when he met with intrigue where he was entitled to expect purity—low ribaldry and flightiness where there ought to be dignity—and duty sacrificed, in the course of a legal proceeding, for the silly vanity of uttering a trumpery jest—when he found a judge conducting himself in this manner; and when he found manifest proof, moreover, that that judge was not above being tampered with by a Crown lawyer for party—he might say for corrupt—purposes; when he saw this, his veneration for the individual was gone, and even his patience was not proof against the contemplation of such impropriety. He declared that, for himself, he knew of but one opinion upon this subject. He had talked with different members of the legal profession; he had discussed the matter with men of all ages, of all ranks, of all standings; and and he had found in the profession, as well as out of it, but one opinion upon the point—but one sentiment of disgust at the attempted intrigue of Mr. Saurin; an attempt which lord Norbury, if he had not lent assistance to it, had certainly not treated in the way in which an English judge would have found himself compelled to treat it.
Upon a variety of other topics connected with the ill-administration of justice in Ireland, he would detain the House but a very short time. In general, it was sufficient to state the practice as it existed, and each particular case furnished sufficiently its own comment. In this condition stood the three systems of the civil bills, the revenue boards, and the assistant barristers. For the civil-bill system it was scarce necessary to go beyond the records of the House. Act after act had been passed upon the subject, each admitting the faults or abuses let in by that which went before it. For the revenue boards, their whole construction carried abuse and mischief upon the face of it; the same individual adjudging forfeiture one moment, and claiming the benefit of it for his own advantage the next: and control over the liberties and properties of the king's subjects committed to the hands of men without a qualification which should fit them to exercise it. But, though he had not exhausted the subject,
1276
yet the subject had exhausted him. He could only go so much further as to beg the House to remember, that matters in Ireland could not rest as they were for ever. One day or other—the time must come—the House would have to give an account of its stewardship of that country. England, possessing Ireland, was in the possession of that which ought to be her security in peace and her sinew in war; and yet, in war, what had Ireland been but a strength to our enemies; what in peace but an eternal source of revolt and rebellion? Ireland, with a territory of immense extent, with a soil of almost unrivalled fertility, with a climate more genial than the climate of England, with an immense population of strong-built hardy labourers—men suited alike to fill up the ranks of our armies in war, or for employment at home in the works of agriculture or manufactures;—Ireland, with all these blessings which Providence had so profusely showered upon her—we had been stewards over her now for the last hundred and twenty years; but our solicitude for her had appeared only in those hours of danger, when we apprehended the possibility of her joining our enemies, or when, having no enemy abroad to contend with, she raised her standard, perhaps in despair, and we trembled for ourselves. [Cheers.] It could not be denied that the sole object of England had been to render Ireland a safe position. We had been stewards over Ireland for this long period of time. He repeated, that we should one day have to give an account of our stewardship—a black account it would be, but it must be forthcoming. What had we done for the country which we were bound to aid and to protect? In our hands, her population seemed a curse to her rather than a blessing. They were a wretched, suffering, degraded race—without motive for exertion—starving in the midst of plenty. But, wretched as they were, they would not be content to remain so. They now demanded justice. They called for the attention of the House; and they were ready to prove the grievance. In fact, they had proved already the scandalous and unequal administration of their laws. In England, justice was delayed; but, thank Heaven, it could never be sold. In Ireland, it was sold to the rich, refused to the poor, and delayed to all parties. It was in vain to disguise the fact: it was in vain to shun the disclosure of the truth. We stood, as regarded Ire-

1277
land, upon the brink of a precipice. Things could not remain as they were. They must either get better or get worse. He hoped—he trusted—that such an interval might yet be granted, as would allow time for measures—and they must be sweeping ones—of reformation; but, if, that interval was neglected, fearful indeed would be the consequences which would ensue. [Cheers.] He might be wrong in this prediction. But, if he was wrong, he did not stand alone. He was backed in what he said by the spirit of the wisest laws—by the opinions of the most famous men of former ages. If he erred, he erred in company with the best judgments of our own time; he erred with the common sense of the whole world, with the very decrees of Providence to support him. We were driving six millions of people to madness, to despair. What results could reasonably be expected from such blind obstinacy and injustice? It would not do for hon. gentlemen to meet this case with their old flimsy defences and evasions. Excuse after excuse we had had, for refusing to do justice to Ireland; but the old excuses would not do—they would even apply no longer. At one period, we could net listen to the Catholics, from an apprehension of Buonaparte; at another period, the question was abandoned for fear of breaking down a strong administration; on a third occasion, the claimants were met with "the scruples of the monarch." Buonaparte had since died upon the rock of St. Helena, under solitary confinement and unnecessary torture. [Hear, hear!] The monarch, too, was gone to his great account. There were no scruples in the present king's breast which weighed against the interests of Ireland. Two objections, therefore, to the claims of the Catholics, were, by the mere lapse of time, completely got rid of; and for the third—the danger of breaking down a strong administration—it would be admitted, on all hands, that we ran very little hazard just now of doing any thing of that kind, [A laugh.] To attempt any course with Ireland short of a complete redress of grievances, would be a mockery of the evils under which she was suffering; but the greatest mockery of all—the most intolerable insult—the course of peculiar exasperation—ragainst which he cautioned the Blouse, was the undertaking to cure the distress under, which she laboured, by any thing in the shape of new penal enactments. It was
1278
in these enactments alone that we had so far shown our liberality to Ireland. She had received penal laws from the hands of England, almost as plentifully as she had received blessings and advantages from the hands of Providence. What had these laws done? Checked her turbulence, but not stifled it. The grievance remaining perpetual, the complaint could only be postponed. We might load her with chains; but, in doing so, we should not better her condition. By coercion, we might goad her on to fury; but by coercion we should never break her spirit. If the government was desirous to restore tranquillity to Ireland, it must learn to prefer the hearts of the Irish people to the applauses of the Orange lodges. The warm-hearted disposition of that people—their desire for the maintenance of cordiality and good feeling—had been sufficiently evinced during his majesty's recent visit to Ireland. What would not be the reception which they would give to, then: representatives for benefits actually conferred? But he was afraid to trust him-self with the idea of a prospect, which he feared it would never be his good fortune, in reality to behold; and believed that he must come back to his sad original demand—those rights, of common justice, that equal administration of law, from which Ireland was the only portion of Great Britain that was excluded. To do wrong to their subjects in some instances, at least, was the common frailty of governments. To deny the wrong upon corn-plaint being tendered, was not uncommon; but, to deny the fact, and therefore, to refuse justice; and upon a reassertion, of the matter of complaint to say—"I deny the fact; I refuse redress; I know that you offer to prove them, but I did not do the wrong, and will not consent to any inquiry"—what was this but adding to injury and violence, mockery and by suit? But, whatever the, House might do, he had performed his duty. He had released himself from his share of the responsibility, as to the sufferings of Ireland. If the inquiry which he asked for should be refused, he should most deeply deplore it. But, the satisfaction would, remain to him, that he had urged the House, to then duty, and had omitted no arguments which he thought available, to in duce; them to the adoption of those, measures, without which, on his conscience, he believed there could neither be peace for Ireland, nor safety for the empire.

1279
[Loud cheers.] He would now move, "That the petition of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, complaining of Inequality in the administration of the Law, be referred to the Grand Committee for Courts of Justice."
Mr. Goulburnobserved, that on a subject so deeply involving the best interests of Ireland, the House could not be surprised at his feeling some anxiety to address them. The learned gentleman had stated, that in bringing forward this motion, he had discharged his duty, and relieved his conscience. He (Mr. G.) stood there to discharge his; to state the grounds upon which he considered it incumbent upon the House to resist the motion, and refuse acceding to the prayer of the petition. He was conscious that he laboured under great difficulties in replying to the hon. and learned gentleman. In the first place, he had not the same claim to the attention of the House. In the next, the question was brought forward at a period of the session, when those individuals who were most competent to give information, because most conversant with the administration of justice in Ireland (he meant the Irish members), were, for the most part, necessarily absent; and he was therefore deprived, by their absence, of the valuable testimony which he was confident they would, if present, have afforded to the purity of that administration. Under these circumstances, he had to throw himself upon the indulgence of the House, while he endeavoured to reply to the hon. and learned gentleman; to oppose to his eloquent statement, facts and the result of experience.
The hon. and learned gentleman talked of the petition on the table, as if it were the petition of the people of Ireland. That it was so, he (Mr. G) altogether denied. He would not admit that the petition spoke the opinion of the people of Ireland. He would not be a party to so libellous a charge upon the people of Ireland. He was convinced that the sentiments which it expressed were abhorrent, not only from the people of Ireland, but from the majority of the class of individuals from whom it professed to proceed. The hon. and learned gentleman urged it on the House, as a duty, not to neglect what he termed the prayers of the people of Ireland. The people of Ireland? Why the petition only professed to be the petition of cer-
1280
tain Roman Catholics in Ireland; and when he looked at the signatures, he could not see the names of a great number of persons, professing the Catholic faith, who had on other occasions stood foremost in maintaining Roman Catholic interests. He looked in vain for those titled, respectable, loyal, and gifted individuals, whose local experience and talents qualified them for being at least as good judges of the subject, as those persons were from whom the petition actually proceeded. He would not, therefore, allow that it was a petition even from the Catholic body, or expressive of their sentiments and wishes. He could view it only as the petition of the persons by whom it had been signed. It was the petition of a number of individuals against the established institutions of their country, unaccompanied by any statement of facts (which would have rendered the petition of the humblest member of the community deserving of attention), but founded on the general impression which they entertained, that the administration of justice was unequal and corrupt. But if the petition was deficient in importance, as it regarded the persons from whom it proceeded, it was not the less deserving of consideration with reference to those against whom it was directed. It was, in fact, a petition against all the Protestants of Ireland. Now, if the hon. and learned gentleman were in his place, he would ask him, what would be his feelings, if a petition of a similar kind were presented from a body of Protestants against all the Catholics of Ireland. If a petition were to state, that the Catholics of a certain part of Ireland, of Cork for instance, exercised an undue influence in the formation of juries, if proof were offered that they had succeeded, by a continued system of intimidation, to defeat the operation of the law, to ensure the acquittal of the guilty, if not the conviction of the innocent; and if it had on that allegation charged the whole Catholic community with injustice and corruption, would not the hon. and learned gentleman call on the House to interfere, and resist such an attack? Would he not more especially do so, if he found that petition proceeded not from the higher and more respectable classes of the Protestants, from persons whose stations and character entitled their opinions to weight with the legislature, but from some asso-

1281
ciation founded on narrow and exclusive principles, from some Orange lodge for instance? But where was the distinction between the two cases? He (Mr. G.) could see none. He could see none in the character of the two classes of petitioners; he could see none in their objects, each bore the character of an exclusively religious association, each had for its object the inculpation of the administration of justice. In the commencement of his speech, the hon. and learned gentleman appeared to feel, what, indeed, must have struck every one who had read the petition, that the House were called upon to enter into an examination into the administration of justice in Ireland, on a petition which did not state a single fact, but which merely contained a general, and almost an inflammatory statement as to the whole of that administration. The hon. and learned gentleman had allowed, that the omission might appear extraordinary, but he had, with an ingenuity peculiar to himself, endeavoured to assign a reason why facts were omitted. It was, forsooth, because the corruption of the administration of justice was so notorious to the petitioners, that it had never entered into their innocent imaginations to suppose, that Englishmen could be ignorant of it. Was this a principle upon which to condemn the whole administration of the law? What public institution, what private character, could be safe, if such a principle were admitted; if we were content to assume the absence of all ground for accusation as proof of notorious corruption. Nothing could be more fallacious than such an argument; but its fallacy was not equal to its injustice. He readily admitted that the purity of the administration of justice was a subject of the utmost importance. It was a subject to which the attention of the legislature could not be too strongly directed, and it was a subject on which both Houses of Parliament were very properly anxious. It was impossible to value the purity of the administration of justice too highly. But he put it to the hon. and learned gentleman, whether another duty was not imposed on Parliament, not less imperative than that of preserving the purity of the administration of justice. If they were bound on the one hand, to guard against partiality or corruption, they were bound on the other hand, to guard against exposing the administration of justice to unmerited suspicion [Hear,
1282
hear!]. They were bound not to hold up the tribunals of justice to undeserved obloquy. But could there be a more ready mode of doing so, than to be induced by the eloquence of the hon. and learned gentleman exhibited in broad assertions, unsupported by any statement of facts, to take a step, which would imply that the whole administration of justice in Ireland, from top to bottom, was defective? The very petitioners, themselves, used with reference to another subject, an expression, which he would use with respect to this—namely, that suspicion frequently worked all the ills that natural impurity could effect. The hon. and learned gentleman said, forsooth, that all the petitioners required, was inquiry. There were but few cases in which, parliamentarily speaking, a distinction could be drawn between a readiness to inquire, and a readiness to condemn? Would any one, who knew any thing of parliamentary proceedings, say, that to refer such a petition, not to an ordinary committee, but to a committee which had not been resorted to for a hundred years, which was styled the Grand Committee of Justice, and appeared therefore to be reserved for the examination of grave cases of delinquency, could fail to produce an impression, that the House admitted the existence of the alleged evil? Would not that cast a great suspicion and imputation on the administration of justice in Ireland; and would that imputation be diminished by the learned gentleman's declaration, that the notoriety of the corruption was such as to supersede, on the part of the petitioners, the necessity of fact or proof.
The petition, and the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman, advanced two separate grounds of complaint; the one, that the law, as affecting Protestant and Roman Catholic, was unequal; the other, that that unequal law was corruptly administered. In considering the first of these questions, he would beg to ask, was the inequality of the law, a grievance of which the Roman Catholics in Ireland had alone a right to complain, or was not that inequality more severe as it affected the Roman Catholics in England? It was notorious that many exclusions and restrictions were applicable to English Catholics, from which the Irish were exempted; hut if proof were wanting of this, the bill of a noble lord, not then in his place, afforded it, which had been ex-

1283
pressly introduced for the purpose of conferring on the English those superior privileges which the Irish enjoyed. Why, therefore, was a distinction made by the learned gentleman? Why was so much sympathy lavished on the sufferings of Ireland, under an inequality which pressed with, greater severity on other pants of the United Kingdom? And why was mot the; case of the Catholics, both of England that Ireland, to be referred to the committee? With the inequality of the law however as affecting Protestant and Catholic, the government of Ireland had nothing to do. If in the opinion of parliament the law ought to be altered, that was another question. The subject had undergone long and repeated deliberations and parliament had over and over again decided, that they would not render the laws equal. It was a question, however which rested not with the government, but with the legislature. But he (Mr. G) declined pursuing this branch of the argument; more especially as he felt it incumbent upon him to enter more at large into, the other branch of the question, which applied to the manner in which, under the existing laws, justich was administered in Ireland. As the petitioners brought only a general charge, it might be enough for him to meet it With a general denial. The learned gentleman had, however, professed to supply facts, and upon those facts he must offer some observations. His first fact was with respect to the magistracy of Ireland: and upon this he argued, that, because the mode of appointing and removing magistrates in England was different from that which had prevailed in Ireland, the magistracy of Ireland was partial and corrupt. He (Mr. G.) was ready to admit what every body knew, that the rule adopted by the lord chancellor of England, in the appointment of the magistrates of England, was very different, from the rule adopted by the lord chancellor of Ireland, in the appointments of the magistrates of Ireland The lord chancellor of England declined to interfere in the removal of any magistrate, unless the case of that magistrate had been heard before a legal tribunal, and a jury had determined against him. But that was not the practice in Ireland. The circumstances of the two countries were extremely different, and upon this, as upon other questions connected with Ireland if gentlemen imagined that what
1284
was the rule in England, could be uniformly applied to Ireland, or that the difference of the habits and situation of the people did not require a separate mode of conducting the affairs of each, they would grievously err. In Ireland, it was true that individuals had been removed from the magistracy, not because they' were partial or corrupt, but because they were persons whose rank and situation did not entitle them to hold the office their appointment to which in times of peril and emergency had been an act of indispensable necessity. Their removal did not sanction the learned gentleman inference, that the magistracy were gene rally corrupt. Instances, indeed, had occurred, and in what country would they not be found, where magistrates had been supine, where they had been over zealous, where they had been ignorant, and in some few cases where they had been corrupt but he maintained, that taking the magistracy of Ireland as a body, though not exactly on the same footing as the magistracy of England (would to God it were possible to make them so), yet they were honest zealous, and able, and as judiciously selected as the materials from which the selection was to made admitted.
The hon. and learned gentleman next criticised the manner in which the recent reform of the magistracy had been conducted. If, in his observations on the subject, he meant, as his expression would imply, to impute to the lord chancellor of Ireland any undue political motive in the appointment or removal of the magistracy, he stated what was at variance with fact, and did that noble and learned lord great injustice; The removal of any magistrate from the commission was an invidious duty, and the persons so removed naturally ascribed their removal to improper motives. Of course appeals without end bad been made to the Irish government on the subject of the late removals; and he could most honestly and sincerely say, that having been admitted by the noble lord to the consideration of several cases of imputed inadequacy of persons holding the office of magistrates, he had never known one dismissed from the commission, whose character, conduct, and station entitled him to remain in it. If the hon. and learned gentleman himself could look into the details of this subject, he would be perfectly satisfied that the lord chan-

1285
cellor of Ireland could not have been actuated by any motives of partiality or corruption. [Mr. Brougham denied having imputed corrupt motives to the noble and learned lord.] Attributing the removal of individuals from the commission, to their differing in political opinion from the noble and learned lord, and to their being sectaries, was supposing the existence of an improper motive. By no such motive was the lord chancellor of Ireland actuated. He took the recommendation of gentlemen of all political parties, and indifferently, whether Catholics or Protestants. He inquired into the facts of the case, and acted accordingly. But the hon. and learned gentleman was evidently little informed of the circumstances of the case. He had said, that in twelve counties alone the commission had been reformed. The fact was, that there was not a single county in Ireland in which a reformation had not taken place, more, or less complete, as circumstances and information permitted. In counties where no interruption had taken place of the general tranquillity, the conduct of magistrates had been rarely under the cognizance of government; and in those cases it was not to be expected that the removals should be numerous, or the reformation complete. But in other counties less fortunate, where the government were of necessity in habits of constant communication with the magistrates, and had frequent opportunities of observing their conduct, the reformation had been most effectual. If, indeed, the hon. and learned gentleman had upon this subject addressed himself for information to the hon. member for Limerick, who sat near him, he would, as he (Mr. G.) believed, have learnt from him, that in that county at least there was no ground to complain of the manner in which the commission of the peace had been revised: that in that county at least, where many causes of delicacy and difficulty had arisen, the decision had not been influenced by any of those religious or political considerations which he had imputed to the lord chancellor. But there was a grave charge against the lord chancellor of Ireland, on the part of the learned gentleman, and it was more deserving of attention, because it was the only one which professed to rest upon a fact. It was, that sir Harcourt Lees was in the commission of the peace in Ireland. On the propriety and discretion of sir Har-
1286
court Lee's conduct, he (Mr. G.) would now say nothing: he would not express an opinion on the conduct of any man who could not be present to defend himself. But he was sure the hon. and learned gentleman would feel the injustice of his attack, and would lament having made a statement, a charge against an individual, when he was told that sir Harcourt Lees was not in the commission in any county in Ireland. If such facts as these were the only ones on which the hon. and learned gentleman proposed to refer the petition to the grand committee on courts of justice, he (Mr. G.) put it to the House whether they would be warranted in pursuing such a course?
As to the appointment of sheriffs, which was the learned gentleman's next head of charge, the learned gentleman admitted, that whatever of evil had existed in it, had been obviated by preceding governments; of which governments, let it be remembered, that the present lord chancellor of Ireland formed a constituent part. The learned gentleman contended, however, that the appointment of sheriffs in corporate towns in Ireland, was as corrupt as ever. Let a case be brought forward, and let the House decide upon that case. He (Mr. G.) had been anxious, ever since he went to Ireland, to discover any such case of corruption if it existed, but, upon his honour, he had been unable to meet with one. Was a general accusation, therefore, to be listened to, in the absence of all statement of facts? But the learned gentleman contended, that, though the high sheriffs might be pure, the under-sheriffs were corrupt; and, in support of that opinion, read the evidence of a witness before the committee above stairs, employed in examining the condition of the poor. The government of Ireland wished for nothing more than to have such a case proved to them. They would visit it with every possible severity. He had declared, over and over again, in Ireland, that if he were once satisfied of the existence of the crime, he would bring the criminal to condign punishment. But he could not proceed on the loose declaration of a nameless witness in a committee above stairs, not substantiated on oath, and not directed against any particular individual. He had been hither to prevented from any attending the committee, not from any disinclination, but from the great pressure of public business upon him throughout

1287
the session. But from the moment be had heard of that evidence, he had formed a determination to sift the grounds on which it was given, in order that the government of Ireland might act accordingly. If the hon. and learned gentleman possessed any information on the subject, and would put it into his (Mr. G.'s) hands, he would pledge himself that no under-sheriff, proved guilty of corruption, should keep his office. But he could not consent to proceed on general statements, and on idle rumours, more prevalent perhaps in Dublin, than in any other place in the world* The hon. and learned gentleman talked of the composition of juries being influenced by these under-sheriffs. Where were the facts upon which this charge rested? In the imagination of the petitioners, and of the hon. and learned gentleman. If a case had been stated, in which a particular under-sheriff had improperly formed a jury, and due notice off the charge had been given, it might have been possible, by the production of the panel, to have established or refuted the charge; but never having been before cognisant of such a circumstance, he could not be expected to be prepared immediately to make a complete answer to the hon. and learned gentleman. But there was, as it happened, before the House documentary evidence, from which the injustice of this accusation might fairly be inferred. The House had had occasion to call for the panels returned in the city of Dublin, on several occasions. Here, then, was to be found the evidence of the corrupt or partial conduct of sheriffs in a corporate city if such corruption and partiality existed. If the hon. and learned gentleman's charge were true, we should here find only the names of the worthless and corrupt of those attached to a particular line of politics, or to particular religious opinions. Was this the fact? Take the first panel which came to hand, on opening the paper on the table. What were the names that stood at the head of it? Those of Latouche, Newcomen, Hutchinson, Blackwood and Beresford, persons professing and known to feel the greatest difference of opinion on political subjects, and only associated as being in the opinion of persons of all ranks and denominations persons of the highest integrity and respectability; nor, if the remainder of the panel was considered, did it present names of less respectability, though not so well
1288
known to members of this House, who were not conversant with the local interests of Dublin. So far, then, as these were the means before the House, the charge of the hon. and learned gentleman had received a refutation: and if the reputation did not extend to other cases, might it not be fairly presumed that it only arose from not having, with respect; to those other cases, the same means of examination and inquiry. Let the House allow much for the exaggerations, of rumour—let them allow much for the peculiar character of the society from which the hon. gentleman received his information—a society composed of persons excluded from the very offices filled by those whom they arraigned, and judge what reliance ought to be placed on the allegations of the petition.
Another tribunal, which the hon. and learned gentleman had thought proper to arraign, and from which he argued the general corruption of the judicial administration, was that formed specially for the trial of revenue cases. And h was a little singular, that having argued so warmly and so much at length against the corruption of juries, he should argue with equal warmth against a tribunal which acted without the intervention of a jury. He (Mr. G.) would not now enter into the policy which dictated the formation of this court. The object was, to secure the revenue; and he might safely add, that all the arrangements were made with a view to that end only. A change, however, had recently taken place in the constitution of the boards of Customs and Excise, which would necessarily produce a change in the judicial administration of the revenue laws. He knew; indeed, that another description of tribunal was to be established, not liable to the objections urged against the former one [Hear, hear!].; and was it, when they were on the eve of abolishing a tribunal, that an inquiry ought to be instituted into its proceedings?
Having gone over the points in the petition which had been particularly dwelt on by the hon. and learned gentleman, the House would, perhaps, allow him (Mr. Goulburn) to state some other reasons, which showed that the administration of the laws in Ireland was not a just subject of charge. The hon. and learned gentleman had laid great stress upon the charge delivered by a judge (Mr. Justice Fletcher) in 1814, to a grand jury, while

1289
on circuit. He (Mr. G.) was unwilling to say any thing of that grave and learned person which could aggravate the feelings of his friends, or which was not compatible with the respect due to his character. But the hon. and learned gentleman had alluded to another charge delivered by judge Fletcher, at a subsequent period, which in his opinion also went to substantiate the statements in the petition. Now he (Mr. G.) knew, that on judge Fletcher's return to Dublin, on being questioned, whether this latter charge was faithfully reported in the newspapers, he explicitly stated, that so far from being correct, it was at variance with the truth. Might it not then be presumed, that the former charge was published by persons of the same disposition, and having the same object as those from whom the latter emanated? But there were other grounds for believing that the administration of justice in Ireland had been misrepresented. He yesterday had occasion to state, that one of the most necessary duties of the Irish government was, to superintend the administration of the laws. About one-third of all the criminal cases which were tried, not only in the superior, but in the inferior courts in Ireland, came before the lord lieutenant by petition, and were thus actually retried. In investigating these petitions, it became the duty of government to refer to the judge who presided, to know whether the petitioner was entitled to the mercy of the Crown, or whether the verdict of the jury accorded with the evidence adduced. This took place, not only in cases of capital, but also of minor charges; and he could say, that since his connexion with the government of Ireland, no instance had occurred in which the judge imputed corruption or partiality to a jury. If then judge Fletcher knew of improper conduct on the part of juries, such as the charge of 1814 now imputed to him stated to exist; if it could be supposed that he should not have officially of his own mere motion, represented them to the government, yet the practice now mentioned gave him not an opportunity only, of making them known to the lord lieutenant, but called imperiously for a full development of his opinions, and the ground of them. As no such representations had been made by the learned judge, either with or without this invitation, he (Mr. G.) thought that he had good grounds for doubting
1290
the correctness of the charge of the and the more when it was admitted that the subsequent charge was grossly falsified. But what, applied to this particular judge went much further. It not only applied to cases tried before judge Fletcher, but to those tried before the other judges; and if no imputation was to be found in any of their reports upon the conduct of juries, the charge of the hon. and learned gentleman against the administration of justice in Ireland could not be correct; it could not be deserving of censure—nor was there any ground for calling upon that House to enter upon the proposed inquiry. But is might be said that the judges were themselves Protestants, and were therefore willing to screen Protestant juries for violating their duty. If it were found in the greater number of petitions presented to the lord lieutenant, that the petitioners pleaded the partiality of the juries, though that fact would not be conclusive evidence that the judges had acted in the above manner, it would at least afford ground for declamation. This plea, however, had not been advanced, as far as his recollection served him, except in two instances; and such a circumstance, in his opinion, proved that the charge of corruption and partiality against jurors were gratuitous, and that the judges were above this suspicion. But the hon. and learned gentleman said, that partiality existed not only in criminal but in civil cases. In refuting this part of the accusation, he (Mr. G.) thought he could adduce the most satisfactory evidence. In order to meet the general assertion, it was necessary to ascertain what remedy was open to those suitors who considered themselves injured, and whether they appealed to that resort, or not. If there was a general practice of appealing against the decisions of juries in civil cases, it might be argued that there was at least a general opinion that those decisions were incorrect. Hence there might be ground for inferring corruption or partiality. But if he (Mr. G.) could show that the appeal, which was open to parties in such cases, was not more frequently resorted to in Ireland than in England, he had an irrefragable argument to show, that the decision of the juries were generally satisfactory, and that there was not even a suspicion of corruption. Every one knew that the erroneous decision of a jury in a civil case was subject to revision, through

1291
the medium of an application to the court for a new trial, upon cause, shown: And could stronger ground for a new trial be urged, than that of a, Protestant jury haying made the religion, and not the merits of the party, the ground of their decision? Those who have signed the petition, tell us, that though they complain of Protestant jurors, they have a great veneration and perfect confidence in the judges of the land. Upon this subject he (Mr. G.) should quote the opinion of Mr. O'Connell, the gentleman who had signed present petition, whose experience the courts in Dublin enabled him to form a correct estimate of the character of the judges, and whose testimony on this point could not be suspected of undue partiality. He should on this occasion quote from the Dublin Evening Post, which was at least as valid authority against the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, as in his favour. The right hon. gentleman here referred to a late speech of Mr. O'Connell, in which that gentleman characterised most of the judges in Ireland as persons of tried sincerity and honesty, and some of whom, he said, he had a proud satisfaction in holding up to the world, as bright examples of learning and integrity. The entire of the present judge's in the court of King's-bench, Mr. O'Connell considered of this description, and such as he had never expected to see at the head of that court. Some judges in the other courts were also entitled to the same praise. If, then, resumed Mr. Goulburn, the Catholics were treated with injustice by juries, there was, on the admission of Mr. O'Connell, a court open to them, where they might be certain of redress. Compare, then, the number of motions for new trials in the court of King's bench in Dublin during the last year, with the number of similar motions in the court of King's-bench, in England during the same period. In the former, there had been 32, in the latter 114. In the other courts the proportions were very nearly the same; so there was at least evidence to prove, that the disposition to question the decision of juries, in the only manner in which their merits could be discussed, was not stronger in Ireland than it was in England. He (Mr. G.) therefore begged to be allowed to plead Mr. O' Connell's speech, which he had fairly quoted, and Mr. O'Connell's practice as a lawyer, in not advising a more frequent resort to the legitimate test of
1292
conduct of juries, as a refutation of Mr. O'Connell's arguments, as stated in the petition.
He had thus gone through the several topics in the hon. and learned gentleman's speech, to which it appeared to him in any degree necessary to advert. He had not indeed, attempted to compete in eloquence with the hon. and learned gentleman; he had no wish to mislead the judgment of the House; he had not misrepresented; his statements, but had contented himself with stating facts, and facts only, in opposition to general assertion. He would detain the House no further than by a recapitulation of the state of the question. The House had on the one hand, before them, the direct assertion (unsupported however by any testimony whatever) that the administration of justice in Ireland was corrupt. They would never forget that that assertion proceeded from those who were mainly interested in representing every Catholic disability as a grievance, in the most glaring and exaggerated terms. The Catholic association had no other claim to public attention, than that which they derived from an attack on Protestant establishments. Their importance, such as it was, depended on the case which they could advance against existing laws, and institutions, and it was therefore too much to suppose them exempted from the natural error under such circumstances, of drawing pictures more conformable to their wishes than, to reality. The hon. gentleman had added to these assertions much of eloquent invective, and something of general argument, but his argument proved too much. If the state of the laws in Ireland, as regarded Catholic and Protestant, rendered an impartial administration of justice impossible, the same grievance must exist, the same inquiry must be necessary in England, where the legal privileges of the two classes are even more contra-distinguished. Such was the case made out by the hon. and learned gentleman. To this case he (Mr. G.) testimony of the judges of the land, admitted even by the petitioners to be men of intelligence and integrity; the testimony of all who composed the Irish government; of lord Wellesley, of the attorney-general, of the solicitor-general and of himself. The two latter, perhaps, might be suspected of some prejudices upon a question between Protestants and

1293
Catholics; but it should be recollected, that as members of the government, they were above all others interested in securing to the country, the benefits of an impartial administration of justice. It was for the House to judge between the hon. and learned gentleman and himself, or rather between the hon. and learned gentleman and this mass of competent testimony. For his own part, ha should decidedly vote against the inquiry; and he trusted the House would never sanction by their vote, the dangerous principle, that ancient and venerable institutions were to be disparaged and destroyed, because individuals were to be found capable of abusing or maligning them. If that were once established (and what could more establish it than an acquiescence in a motion such as that before them), the House might rely, that the administration of justice would not be the only subject of complaint, but that those who now railed with so little reason against the judicial system of the country, would proceed with redoubled confidence and increased violence, to arraign every institution, every establishment, and every practice of the constitution, which opposed a barrier to the bad passions of the multitude, or to their own ill-regulated and dangerous ambition.
Sir H. Parnellsaid, he rose to state some facts relating to sheriffs in Ireland which had come within his own knowledge. But, before he alluded to that, he wished to say, that he thought his hon. and learned friend had been misrepresented by the right hon. gentleman. The evidence upon which his hon. and learned friend relied, was not that of an isolated individual before a committee, but had been confirmed by others. He (sir H. P.) had been upon the committee on the Usury laws, and it was there stated by a very respectable Irish attorney, and a secretary of a principal Insurance office, that the difficulty of having the process of the law carried into execution in Ireland, was the principal reason why English capital was not carried over to that country. The people of this country has no objection to the Irish law courts, but they had many objections to the mode in which the law was executed. Lord Redesdale, whose authority on this subject was invaluable, had said, that in Ireland lord Coke's maxim, "that the execution was the ending of the suit," was reversed; for in that country it seemed
1294
to be but the beginning of it. For, so many were the applications for attachments against sheriffs for not doing their duty, and executions were so often renewed, that the suit seemed to have but begun where it ought to have ended. He had reason to know, that the charge of judge Fletcher, as published in 1814, was corrected by himself, and that therefore it was, in every respect, an authentic document; though, as he himself acknowledges, a moderate version of that which was spoken.—The right hon. gentleman had said, that the charge of the petitioners was wild and rambling. He could say from his own experience, that there where great abuses practised amongst the subordinate officers in the administration of justice. It was the common practice for sub-sheriffs to give a number of summonses for juries to their officers, with a blank for the name; in order that the officer might fill it up with the name of him who refused to pay five shillings. There was no general reflection on all the institutions of Ireland in the petition, as the right hon. gentleman appeared to think. The judges were generally approved of; as was also the nomination of sheriffs of counties. The complaint was against the appointments by corporations, especially in Dublin; and in such places it was notorious, that in political trials the Catholic could not expect an impartial jury. The want of complaints against convictions did not bear on the case; for the evil that existed in the north of Ireland was the impossibility of getting a conviction by an Orange jury; and thus the greatest outrages and crimes, if committed against Catholics, went unpunished. He considered the late revision of the magistrates as likely to prove beneficial to Ireland; but its value arose rather from the intimidation which it excited amongst the magistrates, than from any alterations of the old system. It was only an imitative measure, and to make it complete, a vast deal more must he done.
Colonel Barryrose to oppose the motion, and said, if no better arguments could be urged in its favour, than those to be drawn from the instances mentioned by the hon. baronet, the House would have little hesitation in deciding upon it. The Catholic Association, from which this petition originated, was one which ought not to exist in any well-constituted state. It was suffered to sit in the imme-

1295
diate neighbourhood op the Castle of Dublin, issuing resolutions, and keeping up all the forms of a parliament, except that it had not a mace upon the table, nor a Sergeant at Arras at the door. If the government of Ireland suffered such an assembly to sit in its vicinity, he hoped it would be obliged to abandon the reins of government, with the disgrace which belonged to it, for having tolerated this focus of sedition. The debates which took place in that association went constantly forth to the public, and were evidently calculated to set one part of the population against the other. Amongst other observations it was averred, that 20,000 Orange-men intended to massacre the whole Catholic population. If that association were not put down, government would be either obliged to yield entirely to the tumults raised by them, or else to abandon the task which they had undertaken—that of ruling the country according to law. The right hon. gentleman here read an extract from one of the speeches recently delivered at a meeting of the Catholic Association, in which the orator pointed out to his Catholic fellow-countrymen the propriety of carrying arms for their defence. He knew that the individual to whom he alluded, afterwards denied having used the expressions imputed to him: but he also knew, that the note-taker, by whom the speech was reported, was ready to declare, on oath, that these expressions did fall from the gentleman in question. Another statement was, that 20,000 Orange-men would exterminate the Roman Catholics of Ireland. This was absurd. What proportion, he would ask, did the whole body of Orange-men bear to the vast numbers who were acting, in every county, under the directions of Captain Rock? The learned gentleman admitted, that those who had intrusted him with the petition had not supplied him with facts; and the reason he gave for their not having done so, was the notoriety of the grievances set forth in the petition. If they were so notorious, why did not the learned gentleman fill up the blank by some statements of his own? He, however, could account in a more natural way for this extraordinary absence of facts. He believed that the petitioners had no facts to state. If they were in possession of facts, would they have kept them back out of mere forbearance? The whole tenour and construction of the petition was a gross
1296
libel on the gentlemen of Ireland. It contained a good deal of bombastic eloquence; but in sense and reasoning it was wholly deficient. There was one passage in the petition to which he wished particularly to advert. It ran thus:—"The passions which arise from sectarian hatred, inflamed by the fears of endangered avarice, are of the fiercest kind, and naturally lead to a frightful excess. The sacred writings are tortured into a profane instrumentality—the Bible is resorted to for the suggestions of massacre—and the injunctions of murder are drawn out of the very word of God: conscious of the guilt of their sanguinary affiliations, they fly from the light, their league against their country is veiled in a sacrilegious darkness, and their impious fidelity secured by a blasphemous appeal to the sanction of an oath." These ideas were founded, he supposed, on a pamphlet, entitled "The Orange System Unmasked," and printed by Mr. Millikin, of Dublin; from which also a right hon. baronet (sir J. Newport) had, he believed, examined some of the witnesses, during the late inquiry. He would only say, that he never recollected to have met with such a mass of exaggerated and absurd falsehoods as were contained in that publication.—A great part of the statement contained in the petition rested on the charge of Mr. Justice Fletcher in 1814. He had the honour of knowing that learned person, and he had often argued with him on this very subject. A report of the charge had appeared in the newspapers, which was wholly different from what the learned judge really delivered. He happened to be foreman of the grand jury to which the charge was addressed, and he felt it to be his duty to speak to the learned judge about that which had been published. Mr. Justice Fletcher then declared, "that there was scarcely a word which he had uttered in the printed charge." One expression in the charge was, "that the violence of the magistrates drove thousands into rebel hon." Now, such an assertion could not stand. It was not, for instance, applicable to the county which he had the honour to represent. It was the pride of that county that there was never any disturbance in it. At least there was never any serious disturbance. There were of course, fightings at fairs and petty riots of that description, but nothing more. Mr. Justice Fletcher had, at a period sub-

1297
sequent to his change, told him most un-equivocally, that he never saw any thing improper in the conduct of the magistrates, and that his opinions had been very considerably altered since 1814. He begged leave, in support of his opinion, to quote the sentiments of another learned judge, Mr. Baron Smith, who in passing sentence on two persons who were tried at the Londonderry assizes, for murder and arson, made use of these words:—"The case is made out against you, by men whom I suspect to be Orange-men; but more fair and candid testimony I never heard in a court of justice. What I stated to the jury as favourable to you, was founded on the evidence of those witnesses. The jury, who are exclusively Protestant, have gone beyond what I recommended. They have acquitted you of the murder altogether, and they have recommended you to mercy for the other offence; thus showing the baseness of those calumnious reports and falsehoods which have been so industriously propagated, to render individuals of different persuasions hostile to each other. I will say, that' in the administration of justice, a uniform regard is had to the interests of the Roman Catholics; and a degree of indulgence is granted to them much greater than we extend to ourselves. This arises from a spirit of pure liberality." Such were the sentiments uttered by Mr. Baron Smith about a year after the celebrated charge of Mr. Justice Fletcher; and indeed the Roman Catholics themselves did not complain of the manner in which the business of the courts of justice was conducted.—There was one part of the statement of the learned gentleman, which, he confessed, gave him very considerable pain. He alluded to a letter said to have been written by a late attorney-general for Ireland. He was extremely sorry that the learned gentleman should have recurred to a subject which he thought had been set at rest for ever; particularly when the base and infamous manner in which the letter had been procured was recollected.—He should now bear testimony to the pure state of the administration of justice in Ireland. He had not had the experience which other gentlemen possessed, of the proceedings that were adopted in the disturbed counties. His county was fortunately exempted from those scenes of outrage and disgrace which were too common in other parts of the country. The
1298
population lived in a state of peace and amity with each other. Until he had heard it stated in the petition, that the sources of justice were polluted through out Ireland, he had never known such ah assertion to be hazarded. Some abuses might, perhaps, exist; and where these were pointed out, they ought to be remedied. If the learned gentleman could bring forward any abuses, he would cheer fully lend his aid in inquiring into, and removing them. But, when complaints were made with respect to the administration of the law in Ireland, it ought never to be forgotten, that where great excitement prevailed, much odium would be thrown on those by whom the laws were administered, however faultless their conduct might be. He admitted that Ireland was in a state which must make every reflecting man tremble; and if decisive measures were not taken, great mischiefs must be the result. He would be a bad legislator who resorted to alterative measures for the purpose of getting rid of so virulent a complaint. In the very first instance, such measures should be taken as would effectually prevent the patient from injuring himself or others. They ought to put down that which was, if not open rebellion, a state very little removed from it. Measures of conciliation, as they were called, would produce no adequate effect. Could any one imagine that such measures would remove the mischief at once? There was, he allowed, great party spirit on both sides—there were infamous publications on both sides—and he wished to see them all put down. Without being less a friend to freedom than any gentleman in that House, he must say, that a state of things prevailed in Ireland which ought to be put down by the strong hand of power. Then, and then only, ought they to apply remedies to prevent the recurrence of the evil. The mischiefs which arose from heated discussion, and from the extremely vitiated state of the public press, were most appalling. Nothing could have so good an effect as putting down, by the strong hand of power, all irritating harangues, and all inflammatory publications. For that purpose he would intrust the government of Ireland with even stronger powers than those which they had demanded.
Mr. Hutchinsonagreed perfectly with the right hon. gentleman in his concluding sentiment, namely, that things could not

1299
go on in Ireland as they were at present, and mat decisive measures must be taken to put an end to the evils which distracted that any good object could not agree with him in thinking, that any good object could be attained by shackling the press with regard to all subjects connected with Ireland. The right hon. gentleman commenced by an animated address to government, to put down the Catholic Association in Dublin. Now, what had occasioned the re-assembling of the Catholic committee? It had been occasioned by the opposition given to the king's government; by the opposition of those who, in their insolence, called themselves the only loyal objects in Ireland. They had set up a rebellious opposition to the course of policy adopted by the lord lieutenant, although it was in accordance with the wishes of the king himself. The Catholic Association was compelled to re-assemble, to rescue themselves from the faction which had been permitted, year after year, to be dominant in Ireland—a faction composed of men, who, by their mis-government, created the rebellion of 1798; who wished to perpetuate that rebellion; and who would have accomplished their nefarious project, if it had not been for the marquis Cornwallis. The right hon. gentleman had referred to the speeches of Mr. O' Gorman, a highly respectable gentleman. He did not stand there to defend any address which was likely to excite popular fury, on one side or the other; but, if it were true that Mr. O' Gorman had used the angry expressions imputed to him, was there no reason for it? Had the right hon. gentleman read only what had fallen from Mr. O'Gorman, and other members of the Catholic Association? Did he, never see certain publications which were sent forth to the world by a Protestant clergyman, who had himself sounded the appeal to arms on the part of the Protestants of Ireland? He alluded to the mad appeals of the rev. Harcourt Lees, a man who was perfectly mad on religious, subjects. He had insulted every Catholic and Protestant in the country by his monstrous, disgraceful, ridiculous, and absurd publications—The right hon. gentleman had also referred to the charge of Mr. Justice Fletcher, which he denied to have been delivered by that learned person. Now, if Mr. Justice Fletcher had never delivered that charge, surely he would have taken some pains to convince the Irish public that it was not his. But this
1300
he had never done. With regard to the late attorney-general's letter, his learned. Friend had nothing to do with the manner in which it was found. If his learned friend had sufficient reason to believe that it was not a forged document, and if he viewed it as having an official character, his learned friend was perfectly justified in making use of it for the purpose of convincing that House to what an extent party feeling was carried. He was anxious to do justice to his country; and, far from being dissatisfied with the able and eloquent exertions of his learned friend, he thought Ireland could not be too grateful for them. But, it was an honest object for any gentleman to attempt to put his country right before that House; and if Irish gentlemen were pointed out as being totally unfit for any situation of trust or confidence, it could not be expected that questions connected with Ireland would be well received in parliament, until that error was corrected. If the House were led to believe that Irish gentlemen were unfit to act as senators judges, justices of the peace, grand jurors, or petty jurors, they would turn from that country with disgust, and refuse to listen, to Irish questions. They would indignantly say, "Let these barbarians go home, and herd with their brother savages." He had always endeavoured to place the Irish character where it ought to be—high in the estimation of the House. There was no duty which the Irish had not performed with as much distinction as the proud Britons. There was as much talent, integrity, and legal skill on the bench of Ireland as could be found on the bench in England. With respect to the complaints made by the petitioners, they referred principally to the situation in which they were placed in the city of Dublin, and did not allude to other parts of Ireland. If they had done so, he and many other gentlemen would have contradicted them. The distribution of justice in Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, was perfectly fair, and left the Catholics without cause of complaint. How could it be otherwise, when, in different counties, many of the grand jurors were Catholics? If this petition were understood to convey a complaint against the administration of justice generally—against the integrity of the bench as a body—against grand and petty juries generally throughout the country—he was prepared to negative the imputation; for in the parts of

1301
Ireland with which he was best acquainted, there was no ground for so sweeping a charge; nor did the Catholics there, to his knowledge, ever make or sanction it. In candour and in justice he owed this denial, and he freely made it, in behalf of the character of his countrymen, which must be foully injured if the imputation in a general sense were correct. But he did not think the petition meant to make a general charge. He rather believed its chief force was meant to apply to the local Influence, in empanelling grand and petty juries, of the corporation of Dublin; enough of which had been disclosed in the late proceedings of the House. It was in that sense, and that alone, he wished to have the petition referred to the committee. He earnestly hoped it would be so referred, not as conveying a general reflection, but as applying to a notorious party influence which was most detrimental to the administration of justice.
Mr. Dalycould not assent to the construction of this petition as limited to the corporation of Dublin. On the contrary he saw that it cast a general imputation upon the judges, the magistracy, the grand and petty juries, throughout Ireland. A charge so broad was an attack upon the Protestants of the country, totally unfounded in every respect. Much as he contended for the justice and policy of the Catholic claims, yet he could not sacrifice to mean popularity his sense of the gross injustice of the charge conveyed in this petition. Not; a single fact was stated in this petition, and every insinuation it conveyed was unfounded. He could say, as' the representative of a large catholic county, that he never sat upon a jury-box finding a Catholic in the jury-box; and he had never, in a single instance, heard from any member of that religion a complaint of a mal-administration of justice; he had never heard from one of them even a whisper of corruption. He owed this statement to the character of his protestant fellow-countrymen; and he owed also to the Catholics to deny their general participation in the statements of this petition. Not a single Catholic nobleman, honourable member of a noble family, or baronet, had signed it. There was, according to his recollection of them, no signature of any of the great Catholic landed proprietors; nor even of any of the great Catholic landed proprietors; nor even of any of the great Catholic merchants. Such a petition did not speak the sense of the Catholics of Ireland, nor did it cer-
1302
tain a syllable of fact from beginning to end [Hear!]
Mr. V. Fitzgeraldsaid, that though he had strong feelings in favour of the Catholics, yet he could not lend himself to the calumnies stated in the petition—calumnies against the magistracy and against the people. He had never heard it imputed to the judges, to the grand juries, or the petit juries, that they acted partially in the administration of justice. He regretted that such statements as appeared in the petition should ever have been made. He did not mean to speak of the petitioners with disrespect they were entitled to great latitude of language in pressing their complaints, because they had suffered great disappointment in the destruction of their first hopes. But still he considered the language of the present petition as calculated to impede the success of their great cause. The petition was a libel on the judges of the land, on the magistracy and on the gentry of Ireland.
Mr. Abercrombyremarked, that the hon. gentlemen opposite had, in the course of this debate, severely arraigned the conduct of the Catholics; but, did they recollect the adversaries who had driven these Catholics to complain? Did they remember the recent meeting of avowed Orange delegates in the county court-house of Armagh, with the authority of the sheriff of Tyrone, and sanctioned by the presence of the sheriff of Armagh? Did they recollect the general proclamation put forth by that body on behalf of the Orange lodges of Ireland? This he put forth, not as an answer to the speeches of hon. gentlemen opposite, but as a statement of the case. Here were two great parties whose passions convinced the land—the Orangemen on one side, and the Catholic delegates on the other. The real question was, whether, in such a state of things, it was in human nature that justice could be calmly and equally administered. It was no imputation upon the people of Ireland to say, that the Government were bound to look with a close and vigilant eye to the administration of justice in a country exhibiting these frightful symptoms of civil dissentions. It was said, that the petition contained no facts. He lamented that the parties had been so ill advised as to omit facts, but, were there none in the statement of his learned friend, only one of which had been con-

1303
tradicted, namely, the immaterial one of sir Harcourt Lees not being a magistrate for the county of Monaghan. Was he not a magistrate for the county of Louth?
Mr. Goulburn.—He is not a magistrate for any county in Ireland [Hear!].
Mr. Abercrombysaid, that the fact was immaterial; but why not answer the case of major Sirr, against whom, in 1802, a verdict had been found for an assault and wrongful imprisonment? The case of sir H. Lees was a mere matter of opinion, whether he ought or ought not to be a magistrate; but not so, as to major Sirr; his utter disqualification was established, and yet, for years, he had been permitted to retain a situation of great influence and responsibility.—With respect to the magistracy generally, one observation had been made by the right hon. secretary, which had struck him forcibly: it was his statement, when accounting for the recent removals from the list of the magistracy, that many were found to make a private profit of the administration of justice. It was singular, that on a late occasion, when an hon. friend (Mr. S. Rice) had said that there were magistrates in Ireland who sold justice, it was indignantly denied by gentlemen opposite, amid cheers as loud as he had heard that night; and yet now came the admission, that the fact then denied was indisputably correct. With respect to any reflections which had been cast upon the Irish magistracy, he would acknowledge, that he thought the Government, for what they had effected towards their reformation, entitled to the greatest credit. Since the year 1807, when he had first the honour of a seat in that House, not a session had occurred in which some hon. member had not submitted a motion to parliament, touching the necessity that existed for such a reform. The application, however, had been invariably rejected until 1822, when the attempt had been at last made: but clear it was, that mean-while, the evil for which the remedy had been so long denied, had been suffered to remain unalleviated. Then, as to the case of the sub-sheriffs, what had been said by the hon. member for Galway (Mr. Daly) on that subject, fully confirmed the statement first made by the other hon. gentleman. The right hon. colonel had said, that if a particular case of grievance was made out, he would be willing that a remedy should be expended to it. But this was not the proper way in which to meet such a peti-
1304
tion. The proper way was, to deal with it as members of parliament. As a member of parliament, he (Mr. A.) was bound to take care, to the utmost of his power, that law and justice should be equally administered throughput the kingdom. Now, it had been admitted, that, so far as regarded the sub-sheriffs of Ireland, this was not the case. And that single circumstance was sufficient to induce the House to listen to the prayer of the petition, conceived, though it might be, in general terms. Authorities had been cited to the House, continued from the year 1797 to the year 1822, to prove that circumstance. The authority of lord Redesdale's speech in the House of Lords last year further confirmed it; and now, on all hands, and by men of all parties, the truth and foundation of Mr. Justice Fletcher's first charge was admitted. The pamphlet that contained it had been corrected by the learned judge before its publication; so that its correctness could admit of no doubt. And this again sanctioned the statements that had been made, about the sub-sheriffs. In respect of the observations which had fallen from the member for Cavan, when speaking of judge Fletcher's second charge, the right hon. gentleman was clearly mistaken in one particular: for the fact was, it was not delivered at Cavan, but at Monaghan, There was one part of the case which remained, he grieved to say, quite unanswered; and, until the facts were contradicted, he did trust that his learned friend would not be driven from the position he had taken. A great deal had been said as to the impropriety of the mode by which the letter of Mr. Saurin had been acquired. As to the mode of obtaining it, however, that was a matter with which he had nothing to do. The letter itself or the matter of the letter, was before the House; and the sole question was, whether the House, as he conceived it was clearly bound to do, should use the facts connected with it for the benefit of the, proposed inquiry? He thought much might be said on this; not that the letter had been so used, but that it had been used in no other way. He would go further, and protest, that had such a letter come into his own possession, be should have considered himself guilty of a breach of duty towards the people of Ireland, if he had not relied, in their, behalf, upon, the case it contained—a case which could not be overthrown. For what was it? It

1305
was the case of the king's attorney-general addressing to the Lord Chief Justice going circuit a letter of a most extraordinary nature. And what his learned friend had said in relation to this letter of Mr. Saurin was well worthy of attention. One of the arguments which, in this epistle, the learned judge was recommended to use, was to this effect:—having got the gentlemen of the jury into his own room, he was instructed to bias their minds in this way—"let the gentlemen be admonished, that if they don't take care, the Protestants will be thrown into the back ground, as the Roman Catholics were formerly." What could be the line of argument taken by the judge upon the bench, when the argument he was urged to use in his room was, that grand jurors ought to take care to exclude all Roman Catholics from place or power? It was to be put to those gentlemen, as matter of intimidation, that if they failed to do so, they would be thrown into the back ground, as the Catholics had previously been. Care was to be taken to show that this opposed feeling, as between Protestants and Catholics, was to be encouraged rather than repressed. The chief secretary for Ireland had asked,—"why, if judge Fletcher entertained those opinions which he had promulgated, he did not still more strongly enforce upon government than he had done, the necessity of such reforms as he had suggested? To this it might readily be answered, that Mr. Justice Fletcher had already done every thing in his power, and had determined finally upon die course he adopted, because all private means of obtaining redress had become hopeless. Upon the whole, although it had been truly said, that no particular case of grievance was laid in this petition, he thought it was impossible for the house to withhold its consent from the motion of his hon. and learned friend.
Mr. R. Martinsaid, he was very sure, that if the hon. and learned gentleman had had an opportunity of previously communicating with these petitioners, or if they had sent him a brief, or a case only, without a brief, his advice to them would have been, not to transmit to parliament a petition couched in such inflammatory language. He would have said, in a petition to parliament, you should avoid all flourish, all metaphor, all reasoning [a laugh.]. By reasoning, he meant all argument, for a petition should
1306
merely state the facts and set forth the prayer. The hon. and learned gentleman would have said to them in his emphatic tone and manner "the House is not to be bullied into this or that measure," It was, he contended, impossible to have a better magistracy than the magistracy of Ireland; though he must admit that they were sometimes warped by local prejudices. As to the charge of judge Fletcher, he had himself spoken on the subject to all the judges of Ireland, and their opinion was, that he ought to be removed from the bench. He would say of that learned person, that nothing became him like his death. If the House was determined to investigate the subject, the best way would be, to appoint a committee next session, and to let that committee adjourn to Ireland; but as to this petition, he could not give it his support.
Mr. Secretary Peelsaid, he would confine himself strictly, in what he had to say to the consideration of the matter immediately before the House. When he stated to the House, that out of eighty four days which had been this session devoted to the despatch of public business, no less than forty-nine had been appropriated to the discussion of Irish subjects, it would easily be imagined how disposed he felt to confine himself within the limits he proposed. The question, then, was shortly this—whether the House should have recourse to the very unusual proceeding of referring this petition to a committee, the grand committee for courts of justice—a proceeding that had not been resorted to by parliament for the space of 120 years past? And then, it was adopted upon express allegations of corruption in one of the judges. Now, he wished to to know whether, in the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman, or in the petition itself, any ground for such a proceeding as this had been laid? He had heard it called the petition of the Roman Catholics; but, opposed as he had been to that large and important body of his majesty's subjects, on the question of Emancipation as it was called, he rose to rescue them from the charge of having prepared or transmitted so inflammatory a petition: or of having been privy to, or in any way connected with it, couched as it was in such unbecoming, indeed he had almost said such ferocious, language. It could never be imagined that, the Roman Catholics of Ireland could be parties to representations of this kind—"that the corporation of

1307
Dublin is disgraced by the foulest corruption, and has been convicted of the most flagitious fraud—that the city of Dublin has been robbed of upwards of a million of money by these abandoned peculators." Would the Roman Catholics of Ireland, had they been satisfied even that these statements were well-founded, have disgraced themselves by such language, without at the same time setting forth facts to warrant its use? But on this subject1 some information had been already laid before the House, in the course of the inquiry into the conduct of the sheriff of Dublin. With respect to the civil proceedings arid conduct of the corporation of Dublin and its expenditure, a committee had been appointed to inquire; which committee had pursued its inquiries for three months, and was still sitting up stairs But it was most remarkable, that up his petition; which dealt so largely in general averments no specific fact was stated He called on the House, there-fore suspend its judgment on the subject matter. Even the hon. and learned gentleman himself, like a skilful orator, had taken occasion to complain of this defect; and had endeavoured to account for it, on one of the most whimsical and extraordinary principles that could well be imagined; namely, that the facts imputed by the general averments of the petitioners were so notorious, that the petitioners thought it unnecessary to recapitulate them. In passing, he would observe, that the petition itself was more in the declamatory style of a condemned tragedy, than of a grave representation to the legislature Other reasons might be assigned for the omission of any particular facts; and as to the general assertions, many hon. gentlemen some friendly and others opposed to the Catholic cause, had that evening come forward to Contradict every one of them, and to declare them in Respects unfounded. The hon. member for Cork for instance, a gentleman from whom he generally differed on political subjects, but whom he could never heat without feeling the strongest disposition to do justice to the manliness the candour with which he had denied all these accusations about the bad administration of justice in Ireland, the bad conduct of the judges, or the malpractices of juries he denied them totally in all cases which were within his own observation should know that this petition was, in fact transmitted
1308
from a society called the Catholic Association now sitting in Dublin. Ten years ago, the Catholic Association was also sitting; and, at the instigation of that body, a very able work was composed, on the Penal Laws of Ireland. The author received the thanks and rewards of that Association: and in that book, too, there were many of these general assertions respecting the administration of justice to the Ireland. The right hon. gentleman then read a passage from the book, imputing partiality and denial of justice to the Irish government. There was but one particular instance quoted, and to that the House would do well to attend. It was stated, that at the summer assizes for Kilkenny in the year 1810, a Catholic farmer was tried for a capital offence; that he was found guilty and sentenced; that he was a man of substance, and that between his condemnation and his execution his I innocence was made manifest; but that finally he was hanged, protesting publicly his innocence. There were some very shocking circumstances attending this case (it was added), which the government would find it difficult to explain. Now, for this publication a prosecution was instituted against the printer; to whom it was intimated, however, that no proceedings would be had, provided he would give up the author's name. The prosecution was pursued; and it turned out, that Barry, the individual alluded to had been tried twice—once before lord Norbury, and once before Mr. Baron George. In the first instance, he was indicted on two counts; one being for maliciously firing a pistol With intent to kill a man, the other for being; found with the pistol on his person when seized as the law stood, the judge charged the Jury, that one was a capital, the other a transportable offence he was tried and acquitted but on the others being remitted, by another judge jury he was found guilty, and executed. according to his to his sentence. The right hon. gentleman then cited a passage form the speech of Mr. Solicitor-General Bush, in a libel cause in Ireland, wherein it was shown, that a man who was said to have been acquitted on a charge of murder because he was a protestant, had been so acquitted under the direction of Mr. Justice Osborne and Mr. Born M. Clelland, by reason of his in sanity—a direction which the hon. and learned gentleman opposite, imme-

1309
diately on being informed of the fact, did himself call upon the House to acquiesce in. This was the case of Walter Hall, in 1812—the only other specific grievance of which, amongst all the general imputations that had been so falsely cast on the administration of justice in Ireland, he had ever heard. With respect to the appointment of magistrates, lord Manners must rely upon information; and the rule which he laid down for his own guidance was, not to attend to the recommendation of any man who might be supposed to be biased by political partialities, but to act on the recommendations of privy councillors and governors of counties. It was true that, on the disturbance which had occurred in the north of Ireland, the troops were obliged to withdraw, as they could not act, no magistrate being present. But, why was no magistrate present? Because lord Manners had recently withdrawn an individual from the commission of the peace, who had been accused of acting under strong party feelings. As to major Sirr, he did not think it quite fair to cast reflections on that gentleman, and rely as an authority on the speech of Mr. Curran. If the case against major Sirr had been so strong, why did not Mr. Ponsonby and the duke of Bedford remove him from the commission of the peace? He asked this, not as intending any imputation against the duke of Bedford or Mr. Ponsonby, for not so acting, but as the strongest possible inference, that the trial did not produce such damning proofs against major Sirr, as had been supposed. In the whole of the six years, during which he (Mr. Peel) had been acquainted with major Sirr, he never knew a milder man, or one less disposed to exert authority unduly. With respect to the charges of Mr. Justice Fletcher for very obvious reasons he felt desirous of saying as little as possible. He had the original charge of Mr. Justice Fletcher in his hand, and as it differed very materially, in some important particulars, from that which had been stated, he was at least justified in saying, that the charges of that learned judge were tainted with political partialities. He was rather surprised that the learned gentleman should have referred to the letter of Mr. Saurin, since he had last year, on a very proper feeling, declined to make it the subject of discussion in that House; and thought the learned gentleman had now thought proper to do so he (Mr. P.)
1310
would not refer to that letter; for he never would admit that that document was legitimately before the public, and to make it the subject of discussion in that House, would be destructive of that confidence which ought to exist between master and servant, and would be holding out a bribe to the latter to betray the former. On Mr. Saurin himself the right hon. gentleman then pronounced a warm eulogium. As to the charge made against lord Norbury for what appeared to be a joke, and for which the learned gentleman appeared to have no better authority than a newspaper statement, there was scarcely a joke in Dublin which was not imputed to lord Norbury, and he doubted, if it had been correctly stated, whether much of that improper levity which appeared to attach to it would have had place. The learned gentleman had fairly admitted, that allowances must be made for the customs at manners of the country; and though he (Mr. P.) might approve of the solemnity with which such things were conducted in this country, yet he must regard the difference of character; and he could assure the learned gentleman, that he was as anxious as himself to exclude politics from the bench.—The petition winch the learned gentleman had presented was destitute of facts; but the learned gentleman had himself supplied the deficiency. But, to show what the value of the learned gentleman's statements were, he would recall to the recollection of the House what he had said a few nights ago, on the subject of the court of Chancery. Speaking of lord Manners, the learned gentleman had said, that almost all the judgments of that noble judge, in one particular year, which had been appealed from, had been reversed by the lord chancellor of England. Upon an average of ten years, out of 100 appeals from the judgments of the Irish chancellor, 50 of these sentences had been reversed. So that in pronouncing judgment, the learned lord was wrong about once in two times, That was the learned gentleman's statement. But what was the fact? Why, that in thirteen years there had been 2,700 decrees pronounced by lord Manners, and eleven only of his judgments had been reversed in the whole time. There had been 22 appeals only in the thirteen years, and only eleven had been reversed. So that, if he had correctly understood the learned gentleman he must make a deduction from his accuracy of about 22,000 per cent. In con-

1311
clusion, he never could believe that the petition was intended to induce the House to enter on a calm inquiry, but was convinced that it proceeded from bad party purposes. He therefore never would consent to give currency to the imputations contained in it, by founding any parliamentary proceeding upon it, and still less would he consent to found upon it that extraordinary proceeding, a reference to the Grand Committee on Courts of Justice.
Mr. Broughamrose to reply, amid loud cries of "question." Silence being restored, he said, that unless he troubled the House with a few words by way of reply to what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman, he should place himself and the question committed to his care in a very unfair posture. It would be observed, that when he addressed the House in the early part of the evening, it was to a different audience from that which the right hon. gentleman had addressed, which made a reply the more necessary. For instance, would not any one imagine, from the manner in which the right hon. gentleman had laboured the point, that he (Mr. B.) had made statements from the pamphlet of Mr. Scully But he had made no allusion to it whatever, and had even carefully avoided taking any statement from it, though fully aware of the value and importance of them. He had, however, to give his personal thanks to the hon. member for Galway (Mr. R. Martin), for the exceedingly jocose notice he had been pleased to take of his address. He had never heard a more successful piece of mimickry, if he might be allowed to call it so, "on these or any other boards;" and he could not help congratulating the right hon. secretary, who was generally called the manager of that House, that so eminent a performer had closed his theatrical career this season with so excellent a performance [a laugh]. In answering his statements respecting lord Manners, the right hon. secretary had gone merely against his (Mr. B.'s) credit as a stater of facts. He bad stated the number of decrees reversed to be in proportion to the whole number of appeals as 50 to 100. The right hon. secretary had stated them as 11 to 22, which was exactly the same proportion, being one half of the whole number brought under the review of the superior tribunal. If be seriously inferred from this that, on an application to the court
1312
of Chancery, there was only an even chance whether the decision was right or wrong, he should be guilty of a degree of exaggeration. This was matter of inference, and it had been exposed, as far as it was capable of exposure, by the solicitor-general on a former evening. But, if this was an exaggeration, neither could he admit on the other hand the inference in favour of lord chancellor Manners, from the comparison of the number of reversals with the number of causes decided. "I must own," continued Mr. Brougham, "that I have not that deep respect which the right hon. secretary professes for lord chancellor Manners. I speak the general tone of the bar when I say, that as a lawyer, he was unknown in England before his elevation to the bench. I have heard him since, as a lawyer, a judge, and a politician combined in one; and I must confess, that the reason why I feel towards that learned person Jess respect than I might otherwise have deemed him entitled to, is from his conduct on the Queen's trial—conduct which excited indignation and disgust." He was the only peer who thought proper to call that illustrious personage "that woman," and in a tone, too, which could never be forgotten; and who had followed it up by delivering an opinion as a lawyer which astounded every lawyer who heard him, and drew from the venerable keeper of the seals observations Which were felt by every one present as a rebuke and a correction. On the present occasion, he (Mr. B.) could not omit all mention of the letter of Mr. Saurin, because, at every Catholic meeting, arguments were drawn from it, and particularly at the meeting at which the petition which he had the honour to be intrusted with was agreed to; and1 therefore it did appear to him, that without being unreasonably fastidious, he could not avoid mentioning that letter. And why, he would ask, was he to be blamed, as if he had given publicity to it? He would be the last to sanction the publicity of a document, obtained as he presumed that letter must have been; and he fully concurred with the right hon. gentleman in thinking that the procuring such a document clandestinely, with the object of making it public, and that, too, for a criminal: purpose, was revolting to every honourable feeling. He fully went along with him in saying, that it was in everyway indecent to give encouragement to a practice which was

1313
holding out a bribe to servants to betray the secrets of their masters, ay, and their mistresses too. He said, "and their mistresses too;" and not only bribing them to betray her secrets and steal her papers, but producing them, to bear out a charge founded on the papers which they had obtained by larceny. He would say, that it was every way indecent to carry on, by means drawn from such polluted sources, a prosecution in which they, at once insulted, disgraced, and degraded the country—a prosecution, foul and polluted in its origin and progress, and which made the sun shroud itself in darkness, as if unwilling to lend its light to the perpetration of such wickedness [cheers]. And, by whom was this disgraceful prosecution carried on? By ministers—by the very colleagues of that right hon. gentleman, who was now so marked in his disclaimer of all and every encouragement, by which servants might be bribed to betray their masters and mistresses. If the right hon. gentleman was sincere—and sincere he had no doubt he was, in his disclaimer of such vile practices—what disgust must he not feel at sitting in the cabinet with the very ministers by whom a prosecution so founded was carried on! He did not say nil the ministers, for the right hon. the secretary for Foreign Affairs had shown his disgust and abhorrence of the proceeding, in a very early part of its progress. He must also except the President of the Board of Control (Mr. Wynn), whose upright mind must have revolted at such an atrocious prosecution. But, with these exceptions, the whole of the right hon. gentleman's colleagues—the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer who sat next to him, the right hon. the lord chancellor Eldon, the ancient friend and chancellor of her late majesty, when princess of Wales—all concurred in carrying on a prosecution founded on practices which he now so justly deprecated. He should like to see with what face the right hon. gentleman could come before lord chancellor Eldon after the report of his opinions that night should have reached that noble and learned person [Cheers, and cries of "Question."] "Ay," continued Mr. Brougham, "you may call question; you may try to bring on some other topic, because a charge is made which clings to your consciences, and betrays your feelings. Ay, Sir, we ourselves have been a party to this degradation. We have yet a green hag in our
1314
possession, which We received with open: arms. It was laid upon our table; and, had not some opportune chance occurred to prevent it, we should have entered into the examination of its contents, with all; the malice, the fury, the animosity, which could be felt by any beings above; the condition of a fiend. And that bag was filled with documents, the contents of which had been sought for and procured by means to which, in the comparison, the means adopted to obtain the letter to lord Norbury rose into something respectable. When, then, we condemned such means, as they ought to be condemned, let us, at least, bear in mind how far our own example might have operated in inducing their adoption [Cheers]. Great stress had been laid upon his alleged misinformation with respect to sir H Lees being a magistrate. He had received his information on this point from a gentleman whose authority he considered very good, but the right hon. I gentleman denied that sir H. Lees was at all in the magistracy. Even supposing the fact to be so, it did not alter the case with which he had connected the statement. In fact, that statement had been confirmed in many points. He had stated, that justice was bought and sold in Ireland; and this was admitted by the hon. member for Limerick, the son of one of the chief magistrates of that country, whose hereditary prepossessions would lead him to say the contrary if he so felt it. He did not so much condemn the individuals as the system. He did not mean to say, that Irishmen were more disposed to corruption than others; but he did say, that a set of angels, much less Irishmen, could not be altogether free from corruption under such a system. None of his authorities on this subject had been disputed, except that of Mr. Justice Fletcher. He had been described by the hon. member for Galway, as one of the worst judges—partial, and irritable, and unjust, and that nothing became him so well as his death. This was certainly rather a severe opinion, and no doubt the hon. member Who gave it was very good authority; but still he must say, that it was contrary to every thing which he had before heard, with respect to that learned judge. He had always understood that he was upright, strictly impartial, and sincere in the opinions he expressed. He would not go into the question of the propriety of a judge delivering a political

1315
charge; but he would assert, that, next to the merit of not having delivered a political charge, he was entitled to praise for having given so good a one. It was said, that the opinions of judge Smith were opposed to those of Mr. Justice Fletcher. For judge Smith he had a great respect. He admitted his talents and his character; but if he were to form his opinion from some of his works, which it had been his fortune to read, and to recollect that they were published by a learned-judge on the bench, he could not form the highest opinion of his judgment. With the exceptions he had mentioned, the whole of his (Mr. B.'s) authorities remained uncontradicted. But then came the hon. member for Cork (Mr. Hutchinson), who had got into the most laudatory mood, and praised the whole of the administration of justice. He had eulogised the purity of the twelve judges, the grand arid petit juries; in fact, all the civil authorities connected with his part of Ireland. They were all pure, and wise, and just, and impartial. This general and unqualified praise, on the part of his hon. friend, reminded him of the story told of Mr. Hargrave, who had been appointed recorder of Liverpool, and who was so pleased with the appointment, and with the manner in which he had been received, in the discharge of his judicial functions, by the good people of that town, that on his return he could never cease talking of them, and always in a strain of the highest eulogy. "The magistrates," Mr. Hargrave would say, "oh, they are the kindest, the most humane, and most considerate set of men I ever had the pleasure of meeting. They all seem delighted at every opportunity of making themselves useful. The attornies who practice there are a most upright and deserving set of gentlemen. They are worthy of a much higher rank and better fate, and would do honour to the wig and gown in any part of the country. Then, the juries are so kind, and attentive, and obliging; and their suitors who proceed in that court, they are so civil and so candid, so grateful for the smallest portion of justice, that it is really a satisfaction to administer it to them." "And the criminals?" said a gentleman who was listening to this laudatory statement, "Ah, the poor criminals," contained the learned recorder, "why, really, for poor fellows in their situation, they were the best and the worthiest set of men I ever met" [a
1316
laugh]. It was so with the hon. member for Cork. His praise was so general, that none were exempted—judge?, jurors, grand and petty, recorder and all were all generally pure—all sacred in Cork and its vicinity. To be sure, the hon. member's praise of the judges was well meant, but it was rather Something too little to say that the twelve judges were "generally? pure. In England, we said that all our judges were pure and uncorrupt. What notion would a foreigner have of our administration of justice, if he were to be told that our judges were "generally pure?" He (Mr. B.) had not said, that the judges of Ireland were corrupt, but he did say, that owing to the system pursued in that country, they were more liable to be swayed by prejudices than was consistent with the pure administration of justice. It had been admitted, that the court of King's-bench in Ireland was pure, but this was put forth with so much ostentation, promulged in so triumphant a manner, that one might imagine that the same could not be said of the two other courts.—The hon. and learned gentleman went on to implore the House to consent to the motion. The assent to it could be productive of no injury; but he would maintain, that it would tend to promote conciliation—to avert a discontent, of which they could not foresee the consequences. It was said, that this was not the petition, and did not speak the sentiments, of the Roman Catholics of Ireland. He maintained that it was, and that the sentiments it contained were those of that great body. The body from which it emanated were looked up to with confidence by their constituents, and they would forgive any little excess of zeal, when exerted for an object which they had all so much at heart. There was no surer way of making the sentiments of the petition be echoed from one end of Ireland to the other, than by now saying, that the language of it was indecent—that the parties from whom it came were not respectable. That one sarcasm, of calling it a condemned tragedy, would tend to rouse six millions of people to rally round their two thousand leaders. He would advise the House not to criticise this petition with too nice severity. He called on them, to look at Ireland. It was now in that state which excited the fears of those who never feared before; and even, while he was speaking Ireland might be in serious danger Let

1317
the House, then, open the doors of its grand committee of justice to this petition. The effect would be, to suspend all danger from popular feeling—to excite hope in the minds of all, from the anticipation of what might be done in the next session. He called upon them, then, in the name of six millions of people whose interests were so much concerned—in the name of those whose peace was disturbed—and in the name of the empire at large whose security wa3 threatened, to put an end to all fears of present danger, by holding out an assurance to the petitioners that their case would be considered.
Mr. Hutchinson, in explanation, repeated, that if the petitioners asserted, that justice was not fairly administered to them by the judges of the land because they were Catholics, they stated what was false; that if they stated that grand and petty juries in the South and West of Ireland did not administer justice fairly to them because they were Catholics, they stated what was false; for the greater part of the juries of that part of the country were themselves Catholics. This was what he had said, and he was surprised at the very gross misrepresentation of his sentiments which had been given by the hon. and learned gentleman.
Mr. Broughamsaid, that his hon. friend had used very strong language. He was sure his hon. friend did not mean to quarrel with him; but if he did, he could assure him that he would not quarrel with his hon. friend. He objected to the terms used by his hon. friend, principally because they happened to have no foundation.
The House divided: Ayes 59; Noes 139.

List of the Minority.

Barnard, vise.

Evans, W.

Barren, S. M.

Farrand, R.

Bennet, hon. H. G.

Fergusson, sir R. C.

Benyon, B.

Grattan, J,

Broughton, sir W. E. R.

Griffith, J. W.

Brougham, H.

Hamilton, lord A.

Buxton, T. F.

Hobhouse, J. C.

Calcraft, J. sen.

Honywood, W. P.

Calcraft, J. H.

Hume, J.

Campbell, hon. G. P.

Hurst, R.

Garter, John

Hutchinson, hon. C.H.

Cavendish, ld. G.A.H.

Kennedy, T. F.

Cavendish, lord H.F.C.

Leycester, R.

Chaloner, R.

Leader, W.

Colburne, N. W. R.

Mackintosh, sir J.

Davies, T.

Marjoribanks. S.

Denison, W. J.

Martin, J.

Denman, T.

Milbank, M.

Ebrington, visc.

Moore, P.

1318

Newport, sir J.

Smith, hon. R.

Nugent, lord

Tierney, G.

Palmer, C.

Western, C. C.

Pares, T.

Williams, J.

Parnell, sir H.

Williams, sir R.

Powlett, hon. J. F.

Wood, M.

Poyntz, W. S.

TELLERS.

Ricardo, D.

Abercromby, hon. J.

Ridley, sir M. W.

Duncannon, visc.

Robarts, A. W.

PAIRED OFF.

Robarts, G. J.

Anson, hon.

Robinson, sir G.

Monck, J. B.

Rowley, sir W.

Russell, lord J.

Rumbold, C.

Russell, lord G. W.

Scarlett, J.

Whitbread, S. C.

Smith, J.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
The Earl of Liverpool, in rising to move the order of the day for taking into consideration the report of the committee on the Appellate Jurisdiction, said, it was pot his intention to proceed further than to bring in a bill which had been prepared, founded on the report of the committee, which might be read the first time, be printed, and then stand over for further consideration. In 1813, their lordships had under their consideration the best mode of facilitating the administration of justice in that House, and they had then resolved to sit three days in the week daring the session, for the purpose of hearing appeals. It was satisfactory to their lordships, that whatever might be the difficulties, either in that House or in the courts, the House had nothing to reproach itself with; for it had most steadily adhered to the standing order then made. But, on looking to the returns on the table, it appeared that the House had not been able (if he might use the expression) to overtake the business, and the grievance was as great now as it was in 1813. The noble earl here referred to the report of the committee for the present state of the appeals, from which it appeared, that the appeals from England were annually 5; from Ireland 8 or 9; and from Scotland 40. In, addition to this numerical extent from Scotland, the time which the Scotch appeals occupied was much greater than those from any

1247
other part of the kingdom. The state of the case was this—whatever might be the occasion of it, the whole of the grievance was the appellate jurisdiction from Scotland. If they came only in proportion to the judicial business from other parts of the empire, the business in that House could easily be kept within proper bounds, and the effect would be very great in the other courts, particularly in the court of Chancery, from which the distinguished individual who presided in that court was withdrawn, to attend to the duties which grew out of these appeals. The first question which naturally presented itself to every mind, was this—would it be possible to remove the appellate jurisdiction of Scotch causes? If that were practicable, and conceived to be advisable, it would at once remove all the difficulties which they now laboured under. And he had no hesitation in stating his opinion (not meaning to say that it was the opinion of the committee), that with respect to removing the appeals from Scotland, he saw no objection to the principle, but very strong and forcible reasons in favour of it. [Hear, hear.] What were the cases in which the House was called upon to decide in the dernier resort? They were called upon to decide on the law, of which as English lawyers they knew nothing; the Scotch law being as different from the law of England as that of any foreign country. He knew that his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, with the accumulated experience of thirty years, had administered that law as much to the satisfaction of the people of Scotland, as he did that branch of the English law to the satisfaction of the people of England. But, with the exception of his noble and learned friend, and another noble and learned lord not now present (lord Redesdale), and two or three individuals at the bar who had made it their peculiar study, the whole of the bar and the bench of judges were entirely unacquainted with the law of Scotland. Looking then, at this, he would say, that the most simple remedy would be, to relieve the House from the Scotch appeals, and appoint a special jurisdiction for the purpose. He was fully aware of the difficulties which would stand in the way of such a measure; and on the score of public opinion (so far as the committee could collect) it appeared, that the opinion of the people of Scotland leaned very strongly to
1248
the appeals to the House of Lords; and therefore it might be expected that they would look with disfavour on his suggestion. But there was another objection still more powerful. If there lordships were of opinion that the Scotch appeals should be removed, still, before the House could adopt any such prospective measure, they must get rid of the arrears. It would consequently be a very considerable length of time, before their lordships could adopt any such measure, and the committee had, therefore, looked to other remedies. The greatest advantage resulted from the simplicity of our law and the precision in our pleadings in checking appeals; and it was believed that if a complete revision could take place in the form of proceedings in Scotland, and instead of being in writing, that they should be by oral discussion and argument, it would simplify those proceedings, and the same advantage would result as was felt in this country. Though much might be done in this way, yet all could not be done; but he could see no objection to a trial being made, and the committee had strongly recommended the appointment of a commission thoroughly to investigate the subject, and from whom a report might soon be expected; at least, no time would be lost by the adoption of the measure, and it could do no harm; for the number of appeals to be disposed of was so great (and nothing prospective could be done till they were got rid of), that the House would be in possession of the report before that period arrived. The first proposition, therefore, which he had to submit to the House was, a bill for the appointment of a commission, with reference to the inquiry to which he had alluded. He came now to the more pressing question of what was to be done with the existing arrear. If the House could do away with the Scotch appeals prospectively, he did not see that they could send the arrears to any other tribunal. As far, therefore, as regarded them, the House must deal with them in some way or the other. The House had already made the effort of sitting three days in the week, certainly to the prejudice of the administration of justice elsewhere. He saw, therefore, no way but increasing the number of days during which the House would sit for hearing appeals; and he was at first for proposing to extend it to six days; but those best

1249
acquainted with the extent of the judicial business of that House were of opinion, that five days in the week would be as much as could be devoted to the purpose. The next consideration was, the proper steps to be taken, with a view to enforcing attendance in the House; for though the three days' attendance had not been enforced by any compulsory means, the committee were of opinion, that there would be no objection to resorting to it, and they had suggested, that the same means should be resorted to for that purpose, as took place on the bill of pains and penalties against her late majesty. The result of which would be not more than one day's attendance for each peer during the session; which was not so very appalling, particularly as any other noble lord might attend as a substitute.—There then arose the very important consideration of who was to sit as Speaker of that House to discharge the duties which the lord Chancellor at present discharged? He would at once state, that the whole object he had in view would not be attained, if it extended no further than the relief of the business in that House, and did not also extend to the Court in which the noble and learned lord presided. The benefit which he (lord L.) looked to was, to enable the noble and learned lord to give that portion of his time to the court of Chancery which he at present devoted to the judicial business of that House. He had no new principle introduce to the House, for it had been the invariable practice for his majesty to appoint one or more persons as deputy Speaker of that House, and at she present time the chief Baron of the Exchequer was the first in the commission, and the chief Justice of the King's-bench the second. It was not, therefore, necessary for the deputy Speaker to be a peer, and it might not be unimportant to mention, that it was consistent with the standing orders of the House, to give the deputy Speaker the right (not to vote, for that they could not give) but the right to give his opinion when their lordships required it. He had, perhaps, used the word "right" improperly. He meant, not that the individual had the right, but that their lordships might, for their own purpose, if they thought fit, give the right to the individual. With this view, therefore, there was no difficulty in dealing with that part of the subject, and he did not see what other mode there was
1250
for getting rid of the arrears. If it had been found impossible to draw the lord Chancellor from the court of Chancery for three days, even, without retarding the business of that court, and the House were to make it necessary for him to attend for five days in the week, he would clearly be unable to attend to any part of the business of the court of Chancery. He (lord L.) knew there had been other modes by which it was thought this object might be attained. It had been, supposed, that it might be attained by taking away part of the business which was executed by the lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy and bankruptcy—both very important branches of business; and he should be unwilling to see any part of it withdrawn from the lord Chancellor. The jurisdiction in matters of lunacy was very important, and the decisions in bankruptcy were without appeal; which was a strong reason why their lordships should be averse from withdrawing it from the lord Chancellor. But the more urgent reason was this, that if they did so withdraw them, it would give no sufficient relief; for, supposing that the lord Chancellor was freed from attending to bankruptcies and lunacy cases, the number of additional days on which he might be able to give his attention to the business of appeals in that House, would be comparatively few, and altogether insufficient to discharge the whole of the business which would await their lordships' consideration. He thought, therefore, that that project would be insufficient to remove the present inconvenience. There was another proposition suggested. It was, that the office of lord Chancellor should be revised, and that it should be separated from that of Speaker of their lordships' House. To this he had extremely strong objections. He was, in the first place, unwilling to see that high and ancient office frittered away by regulations for reducing or dividing its duties; but even if that were done, it would, he maintained, still be insufficient: for, as it was said that the appointment of a vice-Chancellor increased the business in one respect, by leaving appeals from him to the Chancellor; so he would contend, that the business before their lordships would rather be increased than diminished, by the separation of the office of Speaker of their lordships' House, and president of the court of Chancery. Appeals would still be made from the court of

1251
Chancery to their lordships, and very probably in greater number, when the same individual did not preside in both. There fore he contended, that this mode, if unobjectionable in other points of view, would insufficient to relieve their lordships from the present inconvenience; and upon the best consideration which he could give the subject, having turned it over in his mind for some time back, he did not see any mode by which they could relieve themselves from their present difficulty, unless, indeed, they withdrew the appellate jurisdiction of Scotch case' altogether, and even then the relief would not extend to the cases which had been already entered for their lordships' decision. He had thus given their lordships a general outline of the intended measure. He would now move, that the bill which had been prepared for this subject be read a first time.
The Earl of Carnarvonsaid, he could not remain silent after the extraordinary proposition which he had just heard from the noble earl opposite. It was not necessary for him to go at that moment into an inquiry into the causes of this vast accumulation of business before their lordships. He admitted that whatever was the cause, the accumulation was a great evil; but when he looked to the extraordinary remedy proposed, he would ask, whether the evil would be half so inconvenient as this extraordinary remedy—a remedy which consisted in the establishment of a tribunal, such as had never before been heard of in their lordships' house. He admitted that the great number of appeals was an inconvenience; but it was an inconvenience which could not be avoided. It was incidental to their lordships' situation, as the highest court of judicature.—The noble lord then contended against the appointment of a Speaker in their lordships' house, who was not a peer. It was stated that part of the new plan for the hearing of Scotch appeals was, that three peers should sit in turn, presided by the now speaker. Now, to this he had the strongest objection. It would, he maintained, be derogating from their lordships' dignity and attended with inconvenience to the suitors. Three peers were to sit me day, and be succeeded by three others on the next. He would suppose an appeal commenced on one day; a part of it would be heard by the three peers who sat on that day; the next day three
1252
others of their would have to hear its continuation, who had not heard a word of the opening; three others would have to hear another part of the case on the ensuing day, and the three peers who might have to decide, after the whole had been gone through, would have to give judgment, on perhaps a most important matter, of which they had only heard the concluding part. How was if possible that strict justice could be done by such a mode of administering it? But then it might be said, that the Speaker, or the individual to fill that office, would be acquainted with the whole of the Circumstances of the case. That might be but he, not being a peer, could only give his opinion, at the desire of the peers pre sent; and then, what would it amount to?—that the decision would not' be that of their lordships, but of the individual who had heard the case. This mode' of proceeding would, he contended, be most unsatisfactory to the public, and highly derogatory from their lordships' character, as constituting the highest court of appeal. It was said, that the attendance of their lordships to these hearings should be compulsory. He could understand the justice of that principle, if the same lords were obliged to hear the whole of one case; but he could not understand it when three lords were to hear one part, and three other lords were to decide upon that which they had not heard. According to this new plan, three of their lordships were to be brought compulsorily from distant parts of the kingdom, from their local duties, to act a part in the most ridiculous farce that ever was thought of. If he had not heard the very solemn manner in which this proposition was introduced by the noble earl at the head of his majesty's government, he should have believed that it was intended to satirize and ridicule their lordships' privileges. As far as the appellants before their lordships were considered, it would, he thought, be doing them more injustice to oblige them to resort to this new tribunal, than if they had left them for their remedy to any other tribunal in the country. For his own part, nothing but compulsion should induce him to be present at any such proceeding.
The Earl of Rosslynsaid, that as a member of the committee, whose report was before their lordships, and at whose recommendation this plan had been submitted, he could not sit silent after what

1253
had fallen from his noble friend. He maintained, that the proposition now before their lordships was in perfect accordance with their practice heretofore. Supposing the lord chancellor to be absent, was it not the practice to have a deputy Speaker, who generally was not a peer of parliament? Or, suppose the king were to exercise his prerogative, and place a commoner on the woolsack, as lord keeper, would it be said that their lordships privileges were thereby annihilated? The lordships had seen the law administered, and well administered, by commoners who sat pro tempore, on the woolsack, and who had been called upon by their lordships to give their opinion. There were also cases in which: the opinions of learned lords had been set aside by the opinions of peers, whose attention bad not been so much given to the study of the law. He would contend that the House would not, by the proposed plan, be in a different situation from that in which they were already placed, with respect to the presidency of a lord keeper, or a deputy Speaker, except that noble lords would have to attend by compulsion, and in rotation; and that, he thought, would be better than leaving it open to noble lords to attend at the solicitation of parties concerned. He contended, that the plan was in perfect accordance with the recognized practice of their lordships; and that, if they declared themselves incompetent to this appellate jurisdiction, there were none of their duties to which they might not make the same objection.
The bill was read a first time.