Sitting of 1 July 1823

BRITISH MUSEUM.
The report of the committee of supply was brought up. On the resolution, "that 40,000 l. be granted to his majesty, towards defraying the expense of buildings at the British Museum, for the reception of the Royal Library, and for other purposes, and for providing for the officers of the establishment of the said library, for the year 1823," Mr. Bankes moved, as an amendment, "that the same be paid without any fee or other deduction whatsoever." This was agreed to.
Mr. Hobhousesaid, that the hon. member for Corfe Castle had objected to his hint about placing the royal library at Whitehall, that the banquetting-room was unsuitable for such a purpose, from its construction as to windows, and from the impossibility of making reading-rooms near it. Now, the banquetting-room at Whitehall was 115 feet long by 60 broad, and 55 feet high. It was the largest room in England except Westminster-hall, and would contain the whole of the collection in question. He had his information upon this point from a gentleman whose means of knowledge were perfect; and the words in which that information was conveyed were these—"The hon. member for Corfe Castle is as much mistaken as to the banquetting-room at Whitehall, as he was in supposing that marble could be burnt without the aid of a kiln." In fact, it was a little surprising how the hon. member had fallen into that mistake; because there was scarcely an ancient marble now remaining in the world, which had not been dug from some house or situation which had been consumed by fire. For himself, he still thought Whitehall incomparably the better place for the library; and was averse to spending money upon such a piece of patchwork as the British Museum.
Mr. Croker,on rising to move an amendment, expressed his general assent to what had fallen from the hon. member for Westminster. He thought the British Museum a very ill-contrived; inconvenient, insecure building, and wished very much
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to remove the Museum from its present situation. The library now in the Museum he was content to leave there; but, for the models and pictures, which ought to stand in the public eye and aid the public taste, Russell-street was not the proper place of deposit. If the House would build up the open wing of Somerset-house and suffer the models and paintings to be thrown open there, it would do that towards forming a public taste for science, which could never be effected by the mere purchase of the works themselves. The amendment with which he intended to conclude was one to which he imagined there would be no objection. He proposed to place the design and expenditure of the buildings, whatever and wherever they were to be, under the control of the lords of the Treasury. This was meant as no slight to the trustees of the British Museum; nor could it be considered as such. The buildings occurring in the departments of the Ordnance and Admiralty were subject to the control of the Treasury; and even the new London-bridge, towards which the public had only contributed 100,000 l. was to be placed under the same direction. He would move as an addition to the words of the resolution, "but that it is expedient, before any such building shall be undertaken, that a general design, with plans and estimates, be prepared under the direction, and subject to the approbation of the lords of the Treasury, of a suitable edifice for the reception of the several collections of the British Museum; and that the works which may, from time to time, become necessary, shall be erected in conformity with such general design."
Sir C. Longthought the hon. member's amendment quite unnecessary. The trustees of the British Museum would never have thought of building with the public money, without taking the opinion of the Treasury. The right hon. gentleman proceeded td defend the building and arrangements of the British Museum, and declared that the entertainment which the House had derived from the address of the hon. member for Bodmin on a former evening, they owed to the fertility of his invention, rather than to the accuracy of his statements. Room was certainly wanted; for sir George Beaumont had offered his collection to the Museum, and it had been declined, for want of a place to put it in. The gallery of which the hon. gentleman had so bitterly complained, had

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been planned by Mr. Townly himself; and, with all due deference to the taste of the hon. gentleman, it was a matter upon which Mr Townly was likely to be, at least, as well instructed as himself. He should oppose the project for carrying the exhibition to Somerset-house. In the first place, he believed that there would not be space for the undertaking; in the next, it was evident that the cost of a building would be immense; and a further objection still was, that the foundation was a very bad one—so bad, indeed, as to be the reason why Somerset-house had never been completed.
Sir J. Yorkeobserved upon the great sums which had been laid out on the Elgin marbles, and the inconvenience of their present situation. He recommended that Somerset-house should be completed, the unfinished state of which was a disgrace to the capital and the country; and that a gallery should be added, in which these marbles might be deposited, together with what other works of art the money which the House should choose to vote would purchase. At all events, he trusted that no more money would be granted until a regular plan should have been submitted to the House, of the intended alterations.
Mr. A. Ellisvery much objected to sending the late king's library to the Museum, because he thought that two great libraries were not more than the metropolis required. He defended the committee of the Museum, from the reflections cast upon them by the secretary of the Admiralty, whose amendment he should oppose. He praised the noble and patriotic gift of sir G. Beaumont. The collection of Mr. Angerstein would be sold in the course of next year, and if not looked after, would very probably go out of the country. His intention was to move for a grant in the next session, to be applied, under commissioners, to the purchase of this and other collections, for the formation of a national gallery.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerjustified the committee of the British Museum. He happened to be one of them, and was denied that credit for taste by his hon. friend, as a member of the committee which had been abundantly bestowed upon him as a lord of the Treasury. He did not conceive that it was a matter of course, that, because the lords of the Treasury were responsible for the raising and laying out of money, they were the most capable persons in matters of mere taste. For his
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own part, he really dreaded the censures of his hon. friend near him; who, be it known to the House, considered himself, very justly no doubt, to have considerable taste in architecture. He certainly thought that Somerset-house, which was a noble pile of buildings ought to be finished; and at some other time he might, perhaps, move for a grant for that purpose. But as to building, there he must be excused—he was afraid of falling under the criticism of his hon. friend, who would be apt to apply to him the epitaph on sir John Vanbrugh—
"Lie heavy on him, earth, for he
"Laid many a heavy load on thee."
He thought the situation of the Museum not so very objectionable. As to the argument, that the library was not open to all the world, he thought that was rather an advantage than otherwise. The models of antiquity ought to be as open as possible to the examination of artists. Certainly, a national Museum ought to be magnificent, and the present building was not the best calculated for that effect: but, where could they select a situation in which they could command the same space of ground? He entirely disapproved of the proposal of the hon. member for Westminster. He was glad to see the attention of the House directed to this subject, and hoped that early in the next session, they would not only be able to afford the money, but that a plan would be matured which might be thought worthy of the subject.
Mr. Baringsupported the amendment. He considered the mixture of antiquity, books, natural history, and marbles in the Museum, to be a most jumbling and incongruous arrangement. The works of art should be in a gallery by themselves. There were collections now purchasable, which could never again be come at by the public. Vast quantities of valuable works had been thrown into the hands of individuals by the French Revolution, which must in the nature of things return again to the great cabinets and collections. And really, for a country of such inordinate wealth and power as this to be without a gallery of art, was a national reproach. He highly approved of the spirit with which this subject was now taken up, and of most of the projected arrangements; especially that of purchasing the rich collection of the late Mr. Angerstein.
After a few words from Mr. H. Gurney

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and. Mr. W. Smith, the House divided on Mr. Croker's amendment: Ayes 80,; Noes 54.

MR.G.ROWAN—CAMPLAINT AGAINST A MEMBER.
Mr. Broughamrose again to present the petition of George Rowan, complaining of his having been dismissed from his office of collector of excise, and accusing colonel Crosbie (a member of the House) of having received money from several persons for procuring situations for them; having inquired into Mr. Rowan's character, and having found that he was a man of veracity and good reputation, and one whose statement, prima facie, he was bound to consider as entitled to credit. But here he must observe, that on presenting a petition, a member could not be held answerable for the accuracy of its contents. If he believed the party to be entitled to credit, he was bound to present the petition, and could not be held answerable, as if he stood up in his place in parliament and made the same assertions on his own authority. He had done all that he could effect, by cautioning the petitioner, that in making a. charge against any member, he was bound to make good his charge, or be prepared to suffer the punishment which awaited a breach of privilege. He moved that the petition be brought up. Upon I the motion, for laying it upon the table, an opportunity would be afforded for discussing its contents.
Mr. Wynnopposed the bringing up of this petition. It contained charges against an hon. member of that House, which, if true, would expose him to a criminal prosecution, and the constitution had provided a proper tribunal for the investigating, such accusations. If the House should proceed upon the petition now before it, they could only do so by examining, witnesses as to the truth of the allegations, and afterwards directing the attorney-general to prosecute. This they could not do without expressing an opinion upon the subject; and he called upon the House to consider, with how great a prejudice they would afterwards send a person, to his trial by a jury. Another ground of objection was, that his hon. and learned friend had not stated that this charge had been brought before the; notice of the public functionaries, whose duty it would be to prosecute. On the part of the government, he could state, that there existed no disposition to screen
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any person who should commit such an offence as was here charged; but he did think that, at that period of the session, it would be highly unjust to allow charges to be brought against a member, when the House could not investigate them, even if they should be convinced of the propriety of doing so.
Mr. Broughamhoped that he should be allowed to offer a few words. He was fully aware of the difficulty which had been pointed out; namely, that of turning the course of criminal justice, into that House; and as a general principle, he could not but assent to his right hon. friend's observations. But there was another and not a less important difficulty—that the House should avoid the imputation of being too slow in receiving charges against its own members. Here was a distinct charge of the abuse of patronage by a ministerial member of a county. In the case of lord Melville, he had been censured by the House for an indictable offence, and the House had afterwards directed his prosecution by the attorney-general, although that mode of proceeding was afterwards abandoned for that, of impeachment. His right hon. friend would say, that this was in his office of public treasurer; but there was another case—that of Thomas Ridge, a member of the House in 1710, who was a brewer, and a contractor with the Victualling-board; but not, therefore, a public functionary. He contracted to furnish 8,000 tuns of beer, and delivered only 3,000, having received payment for the whole. The House examined into the charges, expelled the member, and followed up that proceeding by an order to the attorney-general to prosecute. So that he was sent upon his trial, not only with the vote of the House about his neck, but under the additional weight of their sentence of expulsion. Of so little importance did he (Mr. B.) consider this, that he thought a man could not go into court with a better chance in his favour, than a prosecution by the attorney-general, in pursuance of a vote of the House. He thought, notwithstanding the difficulty which he admitted, the House could not refuse to receive the petition. When a day should be fixed for its discussion, the attorney-general might be directed to prosecute, and thus the difficulty would be got rid of.
Mr. Wynnsaid, that the House, being the guardians of the public purse, could

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not discharge that duty without proceeding as they had dope in the case quoted by his learned friend.
Mr. Maurice Fitzgeraldsaid, he rose with great pain to speak of the conduct of an hon. gentleman who was his own colleague. He was compelled to do so, in consequence of an allusion which had been made to him in the speech of his learned friend on Friday last, and which had been made public. He had been applied to by his learned friend as to the character of the petitioner: and, feeling that he had no right to refuse the information required, he had communicated it in the terms which his learned friend had read to the House. He had added, however, that as there had been election jealousies between his friend and those of colonel Crosbie, he wished to avoid any interference in the business, and particularly requested that his name might not be mentioned. Whether this did or did not preclude his learned friend from mentioning his name, the House would decide; but he must now state that it was his intention he should not do so. Not that he wished to conceal his having given the petitioner a character, but he wished not to lend any corroboration to the charges which had been made. In this spirit he had written the letter which had been quoted. He was satisfied that his explanation would be sufficient to gentlemen who heard him, on whatever side of the House they sat; because he knew that personal feelings, in matters so delicate as that of which he was speaking, were held by them paramount to all political inclinations. It had been hinted to him, that it might elsewhere be believed that the petition had originated with him. To those who knew him, it was enough to say that such an imputation must be, of its nature, false. If he had thought it necessary to make any charge, he should not have disgraced himself by adopting indirect means. So far from encouraging the charge, he had abstained from all correspondence with the petitioner, whom he ad not seen for some years; and he had not replied to his letter, because although he knew that, in the county in which they both resided, any correspondence would be construed into an encouragement; and he had written confidentially to a friend of his, desiring he would have it understood that he was no party to the affair. He concluded by saying, that
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the charge had given greater pain to no individual (his hon. colleague excepted) than himself. He trusted that he had now removed the impression which the partial quotation of his letter had occasioned.
Mr. Broughamwas sure that what Iris right hon. friend had just said, would establish the futility and groundlessness of the suspicions which he had felt himself under the painful necessity of repelling. He could confirm every statement which his right hon. friend had made. He regretted, however, that he had not known that his right hon. friend wished the whole of his letter to have been suppressed, or he would not have read the extract from it. As to reading the whole of it, his right hon. friend would see that he could not have done that, without distinctly disclosing who was the writer. As to the petition, he was merely actuated by a sense of duty in presenting it for he had never been more plagued about any thing in the whole of his parliamentary experience. The House was, however, bound to protect its purity. It was bound to guard against the abuse of the influence which the members of it might have with his majesty's government. He did not think, therefore, that the House would do its duty, unless it received the petition. What it should do with it when it had it, was another question.
Colonel Crosbieembraced that opportunity of saying, that the impression on his mind originally was, that the hon. and learned gentleman had received the information he possessed from his colleague. He now, however, felt satisfied that such was not the case.
Mr. M. Fitzgeraldsaid, that there was a phrase in the petition, relative to the dismissal of the petitioner, which he would be glad to explain, in order to prevent any misapprehension to which it might otherwise be liable. It was stated that, whatever were the merits of the trial, the means employed against the petitioner were base and treacherous. This did not apply in any manner to his (Mr. F's) colleague, nor to the parties concerned, and least of all to the government. It referred to a former petition presented by the petitioner, when he was dismissed from office in 1817, in which he complained, that his dismissal took place in consequence of a conspiracy among persons in his own employment, at the head of whom was a clerk he had dismissed for pecula-

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tion. So far from the government having used any undue rigour towards, the petitioner, he (Mr. F.) believed that the then Secretary for Ireland had stretched his authority in his favour.
Mr. Peelsaid, that although he did not recollect the particular facts of the case, he was certain the object of government in dismissing the petitioner was not to provide for any other individual.
On the motion that the petition do lie on the table,
Mr. Wynnobserved, that he could not perceive the propriety of allowing the petition to he on the table, unless it was intended to follow it up by some further measure. He, however, did not see what measure could now be adopted, and therefore thought it useless to place the petition before the public.
Upon the question that the petition do he on the table, the House divided: Ayes 26. Noes 51.

List of the Minority.

Brougham, H.

Money, W. T.

Bennet. hon. G.

Palmer, C. F.

Calcraft, J.

Price, R.

Forbes, C.

Parnell, sir H.

Farrand, R.

Rice, T. S.

Grattan, J.

Robinson, sir G.

Gurney, H.

Smith, Robt.

Gaskell, B.

Smith, Wm.

Hobhouse, J. C.

Tierney, right hon. G.

Hume, J.

Western, C. C.

Leycester, R.

Wood, alderman.

Lamb, hon.G.

TELLERS.

Leader, I.

Buxton, T. F.

Martin, J.

Nugent, lord.

Monck, J. B.

RELIGIOUS OPINIONS—PETITION OF MINISTERS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION FOR FREE DISCUSSION.
Mr. Humerose for the purpose of presenting a petition which he considered of great importance. But before he did so, he begged to correct an error which had got abroad respecting what he had said last night. He had been made to say in one publication, that he disapproved of dissenters altogether; when, in fact, he had only expressed his disapprobation of that sect to which an hon. member belonged. His acquaintance lying very much among dissenters, many of whom he knew to be most intelligent and virtuous men, he should have belied his own experience if he had said so. He was of opinion, that general censures were always wrong; and, as his feelings had been excited on the occasion to which he alluded; by the in-
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tolerance displayed by that sect of which alone he spoke, he took the opportunity of this cooler moment to explain what he had said. Having done so, he would add, that he regretted that any person should have presumed to arraign his conduct, and to have designated him as the advocate of a person whose opinions he was so far from advocating, that if that person had listened to his advice, he would long ago have abstained from publishing them. He was well convinced that to attack prejudices in the way Mr. Carlile had attacked what he considered prejudices, was the best means of diffusing and strengthening them. He did hope that, in future, no person would take the liberty of endeavouring to represent him as the advocate of such opinions. The petition to which he now called the attention of the House was signed by 2,047 persons, members of Christian congregations, of whom 98 were ministers, among the latter were names which the House would agree were entitled to considerable respect, such as those of Dr. Evans, Dr. Jones, Dr. Rees, Dr. Clarke, Mr. Barclay, Mr. Roscoe, and others. A more sensible petition, and one more consistent with the spirit of Christianity, had, perhaps, never been presented to the House. He could not conceive that any sincere believer in the doctrines of the Christian religion could' doubt, that any thing, which tended to stamp the character of persecution upon that religion, was more calculated to bring it into contempt, than all the scoffs and the arguments of its worst enemies. He proposed to follow up the reading of the petition with a motion which he should submit from a sense of duty; and which, if adopted by the House, as he anxiously hoped it would be, would tend to check the mischief which had been caused by recent proceedings.
The petition was then brought up and read; and was as follows:
"The humble Petition of the undersigned Ministers and Members of Christian Congregations,
"Sheweth; That your petitioners are sincere believers in the Christian Revelation from personal conviction on examination of the evidences on its behalf; and are thankful to Almighty God for the unspeakable blessing of the Gospel, which they regard as the most sacred sanction, the best safeguard, and the most power-

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ful motive, of morality, as the firmest support and most effectual relief amidst the afflictions and troubles of this state of humanity, and as the surest foundation of the hope of a life to come, which hope they consider to be in the highest degree conducive to the dignity, purity, and happiness of society.
"That with these views and feelings, your petitioners beg leave to state to your honourable House, that they behold with sorrow and shame the prosecutions against persons who have printed or published books which are, or are presumed to be, hostile to the Christian religion, from the full persuasion that such prosecutions are inconsistent with, and contrary to, both the spirit and the letter of the Gospel, and, moreover, that they are more favourable to the spread of infidelity, which they are intended to check, than to the support of the Christian faith, which they are professedly undertaken to uphold.
"Your petitioners cannot but consider all Christians bound by their religious profession to bow with reverence and submission to the precepts of the Great Founder of our Faith; and nothing appears to them plainer in the Gospel than that it forbids all violent measures for its propagation, and all vindictive measures for its justification and defence. The Author and Finisher of Christianity has declared, that his kingdom is not of this world; and, as in his own example he showed a perfect pattern of compassion towards them that are ignorant and out of the way of truth, of forbearance towards objectors, and of forgiveness of wilful enemies; so in his moral laws he has prohibited the spirit that would attempt to root up speculative error with the arm of flesh, or that would call down fire from heaven to consume the unbelieving, and has commanded the exercise of meekness, tenderness, and brotherly love, towards all mankind, as the best and only means of promoting his cause upon earth, and the most acceptable way of glorifying the Great Father of mercies, who is kind even to the unthankful and the evil.
"By these reasonable, charitable, and peaceful means, the Christian religion was not only established originally, but also supported for the three first centuries of the Christian era, during which it triumphed over the most fierce and potent opposition, unaided by temporal power; and your petitioners humbly submit to your honourable House, that herein con-
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sists one of the brightest evidences of the truth of the Christian religion; and that they are utterly at a loss to conceive, how that which is universally accounted to have been the glory of the Gospel in its beginnings, should now cease to be accounted its glory, or how it should at this day be less the maxim of Christianity, and less the rule of the conduct of Christians, than in the days of those that are usually denominated the fathers of the church—that it is no part of religion to compel religion, which must be received, not by force, but of free choice.
"Your petitioners would earnestly represent to your honourable House, that our holy religion has borne uninjured every test that reason and learning have applied to it, and that its divine origin, its purity, its excellence, and its title to universal acceptation, have been made more manifest by every new examination and discussion of its nature, pretensions, and claims. Left to itself, under the divine blessing, the reasonableness and innate excellence of Christianity will infallibly promote its influence over the understandings and hearts of mankind; but when the angry passions are suffered to rise in its professed defence, these provoke the like passions in hostility to it, and the question is no longer one of pure truth, but of power on the one side, and of the capacity of endurance on the other.
"It appears to your petitioners that it is altogether unnecessary and impolitic to recur to penal laws in aid of Christianity. The judgment and feelings of human nature, testified by the history of man in all ages and nations, incline mankind to religion; and it is only when they erringly associate religion with fraud and injustice, that they can be brought in any large number to bear the evils of scepticism and unbelief. Your petitioners acknowledge and lament the wide diffusion, amongst the people of sentiments unfriendly to the Christian faith; but they cannot refrain from stating to your honourable House their conviction that this unexampled state of the public mind is mainly owing to the prosecution of the holders and propagators of infidel opinions. Objections to Christianity have thus become familiar to the readers of the weekly and daily journals—curiosity has been stimulated with regard to the publications prohibited—an adventitious, unnatural, and dangerous importance has been given

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to sceptical arguments—a suspicion has been excited in the minds of the multitude that the Christian religion can be upheld only by pains and penalties, and sympathy has been raised on behalf of the sufferers, whom the uninformed and unwise regard with the reverence and confidence that belong to the character of martyrs to the truth.
"Your petitioners would remind your honourable House, that all history testifies the futility of all prosecutions for mere opinions, unless such prosecutions proceed the length of exterminating the holders of the opinions prosecuted—an extreme from which the liberal spirit and the humanity of the present times revolt.
"The very same maxims and principles that are pleaded to justify the punishment of unbelievers would authorize Christians of different denominations to vex and harass each other on the alleged ground of want of faith, and likewise form an apology for heathen persecutions against Christians, whether the persecutions that were anciently carried on against the divinely-taught preachers of our religion, or those that may now be instituted by the ruling party in Pagan countries, where Christian missionaries are so laudably employed, in endeavouring to expose the absurdity, folly, and mischievous influence of idolatry.
"Your petitioners would entreat your honourable House to consider, that belief does not in all cases depend upon the will, and that inquiry into the truth of Christianity will be wholly prevented, if persons are rendered punishable for any given result of inquiry;; Firmly attached as your petitioners are to the religion of the Bible, they cannot but consider the liberty of rejecting, to be implied in that of embracing it. The unbeliever may, indeed, be silenced by his fears, but it is scarcely conceivable that any real friend to Christianity, or any one who is solicitous for the improvement of the human mind, the diffusion of knowledge, and the establishment of truth, should wish to reduce any portion of mankind to the necessity of concealing their honest judgment upon moral and theological questions, and of making an outward profession that shall be inconsistent with their inward persuasion.
Your petitioners are not ignorant that a distinction is commonly made: between those unbelievers that argue the question of the truth of Christianity calmly and dispassionately, and those that treat the
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sacred subject with levity and ridicule; but although they feel the strongest disgust at every mode of discussion which approaches to indecency and profaneness, they cannot help thinking that it is neither wise nor safe to constitute the manner and temper of writing an object of legal visitation; inasmuch as it is impossible to define where argument ends and evil speaking begins. The reviler of Christianity appears to your petitioners to be the least formidable of its enemies; because his scoffs can rarely fail of arousing against him public opinion, than which nothing more is wanted to defeat his end. Between freedom of discussion and absolute persecution there is no assignable medium; and nothing seems to your petitioners more impolitic than to single out the intemperate publications of modern unbelievers for legal reprobation, and thus by implication to give a licence to the grave reasonings of those that preceded them in the course of open hostility to the Christian religion, which reasonings are much more likely to make a dangerous impression upon the minds of their readers. But independently of considerations of expediency and policy, your petitioners cannot forbear recording their humble protest against the principle implied in the prosecutions alluded to, that a religion proceeding from Infinite Wisdom and protected by Almighty Power depends upon human patronage for its perpetuity and influence. Wherefore they pray your honourable House to take into consideration the prosecutions carrying on, and the punishments already inflicted upon unbelievers, in order to exonerate Christianity from the opprobrium and scandal so unjustly cast upon it, of being a system that countenances intolerance and persecution.
"And your petitioners will ever pray, &c."
On the motion that the petition be printed,
Mr. Butterworthasked, by how many ministers of the Church of England it was signed, and of what class of dissenters the other petitioners consisted.
Mr. Humereplied, that it was signed by dissenters of all classes.
Mr. W. Smithcould not see the pertinency of the hon. member's question. The petition was, however, signed, he could assure him, by persons whose religious opinions were as perfectly opposed to each other as possible.
Ordered to be printed.
Mr. Humethen rose for the purpose of making the motion of which he had given notice. His object was, to obtain the admission of that principle, which he had always thought to be part of the law of this country, namely, that every individual was entitled to freedom of discussion on all subjects. At Edinburgh, where he was brought up, it was held, that any man might entertain and express his opinions, unless they became a nuisance to society, when, perhaps, they might be brought under the operation of the common law. Since the year 1817, however, a disposition had been manifested to prosecute persons for the publication of did as well as new works, the object of which was, to impugn the authenticity of the Christian faith. He was aware that since the period to which he had referred the number of such publications had increased; but he thought, also, that the progress which had been made in knowledge, and the extension of education to all classes of persons, had brought with it a remedy for this evil. Looking at the advantages which resulted from the freedom of discussion, and the part which able men were always ready to take in behalf of true religion, he thought it would be doing equal injustice to that religion and to the community, to adopt any other means of arriving at the truth than by fair discussion. He had always been led to believe, that the greatest blessing which Englishmen enjoyed was the complete freedom with which they were permitted to express their religious opinions, and to follow whatever sect or persuasion their own opinions coincided with. Recollecting, too, that we enjoyed the blessings of a religion which had been established by means of discussion, and by differing from those which had preceded it, he thought the House would act unjustly, and with bad policy, if it should now turn round upon those who differed from us, as we differed from those who had preceded us, and exercise a rigour which, in our own case, we had been the first to deprecate. Such a course, he was convinced, was more likely to generate doubts and ignorance than to give any stability to the religion. It was quite evident, that persons who wished to investigate religious subjects must meet with a great variety of opinions. Some of these might confirm their belief; while others might give rise to doubts. Now,
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he wished to ask, whether it was not proper that they should be allowed to state those doubts, for the purpose of having them refuted, if erroneous? In Christian charity, such an indulgence ought not to be refused to any individual. When he observed thirty or forty sects in this country differing from the Church of England, and differing equally from each other, he thought it was not at all surprising that amongst those who engaged in what might be termed periodical discussion on the subject of religion, many were found who dissented entirely from the great body of sectarians of every description. There was nothing wonderful in such a circumstance; but it was indeed wonderful, that they should be prosecuted and punished for promulgating their opinions in the way of controversy. What right had any set of individuals to set themselves up as following exclusively the true religion Religion very different from ours was preached and adopted in other countries; and those who pursued such religion proclaimed it to be the true one. Where there was such a diversity of opinion, they, taking the Scriptures as the rule of their conduct and actions, ought to extend to all persons that merciful toleration which the New Testament so forcibly inculcated in every page. They ought not to proceed, in the manner which was now too common, against individuals who differed conscientiously from them on points of religious belief. The perpetration of acts of a physical nature might be prevented by force; but no power, however harshly applied, could control opinions, or make a man receive doctrines which he did not believe to be correct. The government of this country had been tolerant to the Jews. To that race of people who denied altogether the Christian religion, who disbelieved in the divinity of its Great Founder, the most complete toleration was extended. No one atempted to interfere with their opinions. The quakers, who differed on many essential points from the established church, were also tolerated; and the whole body of dissenters, various as were their doctrines, were suffered to preach them without molestation. This was highly to the honour of the country; and he wished, most sincerely, that every species of disability, whether in the nature of a test or otherwise, which applied to the dissenters, should be Wholly removed. He should be happy to see every human

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being placed in that situation in which he would be enabled, without any fear of the civil magistrate, to entertain whatever religious opinions he pleased; and to endeavour to obtain, by fair and candid discussion, information on those points which might not appear sufficiently clear and satisfactory to him. That was the only way by which any man could arrive at a fair conviction. Religion must be implanted in the mind; and nothing but plain argument—nothing but the free discussion of points which an individual conceived to be doubtful—could either alter his mind with respect to any new doctrine, or confirm him in the truth of that which he had been accustomed to uphold. Physical force could have no effect whatever, either in eradicating new, or establishing old opinions. If there had been any thing unreasonable in his proposition, he would not have brought it forward; but, looking over the pages of the Holy Scriptures, he could not find a single sentence that authorized punishment on account of difference of opinion, or that called on the civil magistrate to interfere. The conduct of the Divine Founder of the Christian religion was entirely at variance with this prosecuting spirit. When he was pursued with bitter hate, because he preached new opinions, his prayer was, "Father! forgive them; for they know not what they do." It was in consequence of this mild spirit of forbearance, that the Christian religion had spread and flourished. It was not propagated by the great and the powerful. No; the meek, the lowly, and the humble, were its advocates; and its mild tenets made their way, where force and violence must have failed. That religion had advanced in spite of the efforts of power, in defiance of every species of persecution; and, with that great example before their eyes, ought they now to renew those scenes of persecution and oppression, which the earlier Christians had suffered with so much fortitude? Ought they to immure individuals in dungeons, for doing that which their own ancestors had done—for adopting new opinions? He might be told, "Those persons may express their opinions; but it must be done in a proper way." Now, for his own part, he knew not where the line of distinction was to be drawn, at which ribaldry began and sound discretion ceased. Will respect to blasphemy, he would ask any one who referred to the act of James 1st, whether
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on that subject a great change had not taken place in the public mind? That act sets forth—"That any stage-player, performer at May-games, or at any pageant, who shall use the name of God, of Jesus Christ, or of the Trinity, shall be adjudged guilty of blasphemy, and shall be subjected to all the penalties by this statute made and provided." Would any man say, after reading this, that a great difference of opinion had not taken place on this point? Was it possible that the provisions of that statute could now be carried into effect, even if it were attempted by the most rigid sectarian? Again, by the 9th and 10th of William, it was provided, that "any person denying the doctrine of the Trinity or contending that there are more gods than one, or impugning the truth of the Christian religion, shall be adjudged guilty of blasphemy." But, they had themselves done this provision away by an act of the legislature. When this was the case—when such an alteration had been effected in public opinion—he was prevented from seeing clearly what was to be considered blasphemous ribaldry, indecent discussion, or calm and dispassionate reasoning. He knew not what line of discussion was to be tolerated, and what ought to be allowed, unless the legislature would define what blasphemy really was. Where there was no definition of that kind, how could any man who reasoned on a religious subject be satisfied that in his argument he avoided blasphemy? How could he tell, let his intentions be ever so pure, that be did not expose himself to the visitation of the civil magistrate? He therefore submitted, that the uncertainty which prevailed with respect to what was and what was not blasphemy, ought to put an end to accusations of that nature, and to the punishment arising from them. Doubtless it would be said, that individuals had no right to express opinions which were different from those held by the great mass of the community. But, if this principle had been always acted on, Christianity never could have made the progress which fortunately it had done. All the missionaries they had employed in foreign parts, all the preachers they had sent out to Hindostan, contradicted the correctness of this position. Those persons were sent abroad to expose the follies and absurdities of religious creeds which were reverenced by millions. They declared their dissent from those supersti-

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tious doctrines; and were, therefore, doing the same thing which certain individuals were doing in this country, who could not believe all the tenets of Christianity. He thought in this the legislature were holding out two very different measures of justice. On the one hand, they were sending out persons to various quarters of the globe, for the express purpose of calling on the natives to inquire, to investigate, and to ascertain the truth of the doctrines they professed; while, on the other, a similar inquiry was treated at home as an offence of very great magnitude. It was only by such inquiry that they could hope to benefit either their Hindoo or Mahometan subjects in India. If they invited the Hindoos to enter into every kind of discussion the most extensive that could be imagined, why should they, because a few persons in England differed from the general feeling and opinion, withhold from those individuals the benefit of that principle which was so liberally adopted elsewhere? He thought that Christianity had stood too long and too scrupulous an inquiry to be shaken in the present day. When men of the very first I abilities had attempted to impugn it and had failed, he entertained no apprehension from the attacks of men who possessed neither talent nor education. Christianity had marched on with rapid strides, notwitstanding the efforts of men of powerful minds. When this was so, why should they dread the assaults of a few ignorant persons, who, of late years, had excited public attention? It was impossible that they could state any arguments, or adduce any facts, which could endanger the tenets of the Christian religion, when assailants infinitely more powerful had formerly attempted the same thing without effect. The end of discussion was the attainment of truth; and he agreed with those who believed, that the more the Christian religion was examined, the more firmly it would be fixed, and the more seriously it would be followed. Those who prosecuted persons for promulgating opinions hostile to that religion, did not check, but aggravated the evil.
He would quote the opinions of some of the most learned and pious men that this country ever produced in support of freedom of discussion. Tillotson, Taylor, Lowth, Warburton, Lardner, Campbell, Chillingworth, and many others, had placed their opinions on record with re-
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spect to the propriety of allowing the freest investigation of the Christian religion. Before he quoted a passage of Tillotson, which more immediately affected the present question, he begged to observe, that that reverend divine directed his observations, not against mere ribaldry and gross language, which must ever counteract the object for which it was used; but against those calm and dispassionate reasonings, which were by far of a more formidable nature. The language of Tillotson was as follows:—Our religion has this mighty advantage, that it doth not decline trial and examination, which to any man of ingenuity, must needs appear a very good sign of an honest cause; but, if any church be shy of having her religion examined, and her doctrines and practices brought into the open light, this gives just ground of suspicion, that she hath some distrust of them; for truth doth not seek corners nor shun the light. Our Saviour hath told us who they are that love darkness rather than light, viz.: they whose deeds are evil; for every one, saith he, that doth evil, hateth the light; neither cometh he to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved and made manifest. There needs no more to render a religion suspected to a wise man, than to see those who profess it, and make such proud boasts of the truth and goodness of it, so fearful that it should be examined and looked into, and that their people should take the liberty to hear and read what can be said against it." In another place he says—"We persuade men to our religion by human and christian ways, such as our Saviour and his apostles used, by urging men with the authority of God, and with arguments fetcht from another world, the promise of eternal life and happiness, and the threatening of eternal death and misery, which are the proper arguments of religion, and which alone are fitted to work upon the minds and consciences of men." And again, "But these methods of conversion are a certain sign that they either distrust the truth and goodness of their cause, or else that they think truth and the arguments of it are of no force, when dragoons are their ratio ultima, the last reason which their cause relies upon, and the best and most effectual it can afford." Now, he concurred most fully in the admirable doctrines here laid down by the reverend prelate. He would next call the attention of the House to what had been

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said by Lowth upon this subject. That learned writer had said, that "Christianity itself was published to the world in the most enlightened age; it invited and challenged the examination of the ablest judges, and stood the test of the severest scrutiny; the more it is brought to light, to the greater advantage would it appear. When, on the other hand, the dark ages of barbarism came on, as every art and science was almost extinguished, so was Christianity in proportion oppressed and; overwhelmed by error and superstition. It hath always flourished or decayed, together with learning and liberty; it will ever stand or fall with them. It is there fore of the utmost importance to the cause of true religion, that it be submitted to an open and impartial examination—that every disquisition concerning it be allowed its free course—that even the malice of its enemies should have its full scope, and try its utmost strength of argument against it. Let no man be alarmed at the attempts of atheists or in fidels; let them produce their cause, let them, bring forth their strong reasons to their own confusion; afford them not the advantage of restraint, the only advantage their cause admits of; let them not boast the false credit of supposed arguments and pretended demonstrations which they are forced to suppress." This was the true ground upon which Christianity should be defended. This was the best mode of meeting and defeating those who doubted or disbelieved its doctrines. 35ishop Warburton, in treating on the same subject says, addressing the Free Thinkers—"Mistake me not; here are no insinuations intended against liberty; for surely, whatever be the cause of this folly (Free Thinking), it would be unjust to ascribe it to the freedom of the press, which wise men will ever hold one of the most precious branches of civil liberty. Nor less friendly is this liberty to the generous advocate of religion; for how could such a one, when in earnest convinced of the strength of evidence in his cause, desire an adversary whom the laws had before disarmed, or value a victory where the magistrate must triumph with him? Even I, the meanest in this controversy, should have been ashamed of projecting the defence of the great Jewish legislator, did not I know that his assailants and defenders skirmished all under one equal law of liberty this liberty then may you long possess!" Here
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then his (Mr. Hume's) objections were maintained in their fullest force. He maintained that prosecutions had been instituted to prevent a free discussion, and punishments inflicted in order at once to crush all inquiry. In his view of the case, no man would venture to publish his religious opinions, unless he felt conscientiously convinced of their truth, and was anxious to impress that conviction upon others; and yet, for the exercise of such a freedom—a freedom, be it observed, openly claimed and exercised by ourselves, the severest visitations of the civil law were inflicted upon the persons who had dared to exercise a similar liberty. What said Dr. Lardner upon the prosecution and punishment of Woolston, who was convicted in 1729? That learned divine coincided fully in the doctrines which he (Mr. Hume) now advanced, as appeared from the following opinions delivered by him in his letter to the bishop of Chester upon that subject. "The proper punishment of a low, mean, indecent, scurrilous way of writing seems to be neglect, contempt, scorn, and general indignation. This punishment he (Woolston) has already had in part, and will probably have more and more, if he should go on in his rude and brutal way of writing; and if we leave all further punishment to him to whom vengeance belongs, I have thought it might be much for the honour of ourselves and of our religion. But if he should be punished further, the stream of resentment and indignation will turn; especially if the punishment should be severe; and it is likely that a small punishment will not suffice to engage to silence, nor to an alteration of the manner of writing."
In this way, continued Mr. Hume, the writings of Carlile ought to have been treated. He believed that these writings were low and scurrilous in a very high degree. He had never read one of his publications until he had presented his petition, and he had then perused a few numbers of the "Republican," in order to judge. He there found some calm argumentative writing, and some articles so exceedingly coarse and offensive, that if Carlile had the smallest idea of the feelings of mankind, he would not have published any thing so revolting. He had, however, been most severely dealt with, and the consequence was, that the stream of public feeling: had been changed; resentment-had been kindled against the

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prosecutor, and compassion had been excited in favour of the prisoner. But for those prosecutions, few people would have known the thousandth part of his writings. The attorney and solicitor-general had seen the thing in its proper colours. They had not proceeded against Carlile; because they felt that such a course would be to spread abroad the very poison which they wished to eradicate. But the Society for the Suppression of Vice and the Bridge-street Association took the matter up, and became parties to the charge of disseminating those publications. They brought forward prosecution after prosecution; until the individuals who were the objects of punishment left the court of justice, after being sentenced to fine and imprisonment, with the characters of martyrs to the cause which they had espoused. So much was this the fact, that if fifty persons more were in dungeons on account of these opinions, twice that number would be ready to come forward for the same purpose. Carlile, with all his efforts of advertising and puffing, never could have sold Paine's works to the extent he had been enabled to do in consequence of these prosecutions. When Hone was prosecuted for his parodies, 20,000 copies were sold; which never would have been the case, if they had not been brought into notoriety by legal proceedings against the publisher. In the same way the poem of "Wat Tyler," which was written by Mr. Southey, the poet laureat, in early life, and which Mr. Southey, wishing to suppress, had applied for an injunction to restrain its publication, became in consequence of that step most widely disseminated, no less than 30,000 copies of it having been sold immediately after the application. Of lord Byron's "Cain," 10,000 copies had been sold in this way, There was only one instance more which he would mention, and that was, that in the course of one week after the prosecutions the sale of works in Carlile's shop increased from 2,000 to 15,000 copies.
He would now call the attention of the House to opinions delivered by an eminent divine, bishop Watson, whose writings were so well known to the public. His observations were as follow:—"The freedom of inquiry which has subsisted in this country during the present century, has eventually been of great service to the cause of Christianity. It must be acknowledged that the works of our deis-
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tical writers have made some converts to infidelity. But at the same time we must needs allow, that these works have stimulated some distinguished characters amongst the laity, and many amongst the clergy, to exert their talents in removing such difficulties in the Christian system as would otherwise be likely to perplex the unlearned, to shipwreck the faith of the unstable, and to induce a reluctant scepticism into the minds of the most serious and best-intentioned. The Christian religion has nothing to fear from the strictest investigation of the most learned of its adversaries."—Doctor Taylor had expressed the same opinion. Dr. Campbell, in his Dissertation on Miracles, thus delivered his opinion:—"So far am I from being afraid of exposing Christianity by submitting it to the test of reason; so far am I from judging this a trial which it is by no means fitted to endure, that I think, on the contrary, the most violent attacks that have been made on the faith of Jesus have been of service to it. Yes, I do not hesitate to affirm, that our religion hath been indebted to the attempts, though not to the intentions of its bitterest enemies. They have tried its strength, indeed, and by trying they have displayed its strength—and that in so clear a light as we could never have hoped, without such a trial, to have viewed it in. Let them therefore unite—let them argue—and when arguments fail, even let them cavil against religion as much as they please. I should be heartily sorry that ever in this island, the asylum of liberty, where the spirit of Christianity is better understood (however defective its inhabitants are in the observance of its precepts) than in any other part of the Christian world; I should, I say, be sorry that in this island so great a disservice were done to religion as to check its adversaries in any other way than by returning a candid answer to their objections. I must, at the same time, acknowledge, that I am both ashamed and grieved, when I observe any friends of religion betray so great a diffidence in the goodness of their cause (for to this diffidence it can only be imputed), as to Shew an inclination for recurring to more forcible methods." The hon. member proceeded to state, that he could not conceive why the Bridge-street Association should interfere in the unconstitutional manner they had done. They had found a stock-purse to prosecute individuals, and had taken upon themselves that duty

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which really belonged to the magistrate. They had a great deal to answer for in taking such a course. He regretted to see such respectable persons amongst them. He was sorry that they had allowed themselves to be misled by interested individuals, secretaries and others, who had only their own emoluments in view, and cared very little about the objects which had been contemplated by the persons who subscribed the funds—The hon. gentleman here again referred to the doctrines of archbishop Tillotson, whom he quoted as follows:—"Surely that Church is not to be heard, which will not hear reason; nor that religion to be much admired, which will not allow those that have once embraced it, to hear it ever after debated and examined. This is a suspicious business, and argues that either they have not truth on their side; or that truth is a weak and pitiful and sneaking thing, and not able to make its party good against error. A free and impartial inquiry, into the grounds and reasons of our religion, and a thorough trial and examination of them, is one of the best means to confirm and establish us in the profession of it.'' The archbishop not only maintains the innocuousness of the perusal of infidel publications, but makes the reading of them almost a duty. "If it be said," he argues, "that the allowing of this liberty is the way to make people perpetually doubting and unsettled, I do Utterly deny this, and do, on the contrary, with good reason affirm, that it is apt to have the contrary effect; there being no better way to establish any man in the belief of any thing, than to let him see that there are very good grounds and reasons for what he believes; which no man can ever see, that is not permitted to examine whether there be such reasons or not. So that besides the reasonableness of the thing, it is of great benefit and advantage to us; and that upon these accounts:—to arm us against seducers. He that hath examined his religion, and tried the grounds of it, is most able to maintain them, and make them good against all assaults that may be made upon us to move us from our stedfastness; whereas, he that hath not examined, and consequently does not understand the reasons of his religion, is liable to be tossed to and fro and to be carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and the cunning craftiness of those that lie in wait to deceive. For when he is at-
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tempted he will cither defend his religion or not; if he undertake the defence of it before he hath examined the grounds of it, he makes himself an easy prey to every crafty man that will set upon him; he exposeth at once himself to danger, and his religion to disgrace. The holding fast the profession of our faith without wavering, doth not imply that men should obstinately refuse to hear any reason against that religion which they have embraced, and think to be the true religion; As men should examine before they choose; so after they have chosen, they should be ready to be better informed if better reason can be offered. No man ought to think himself so infallible as to be privileged from hearing reason, and from having his doctrines and dictates tried by that test. Our blessed Saviour himself, the most infallible person that ever was in the world, and who declared the truth which he had heard of God, yet he offered himself and his doctrine to this trial—John, viii. 46;"Which of you convinceth me of sin? that is of falsehood and error?" and "If I speak the truth, why do ye not believe me?" He was sure he spoke the truth, and yet for all that, if they could convince him of error and mistake, he was ready to hear any reason they could bring to that purpose."
He would next give to the House the authority of a very high and learned personage, the present Bishop of London; That reverend prelate, in his charge to his Clergy, last year, had thus expressed himself:—"I am, indeed, fully persuaded, that the extravagances of frantic infidelity are means in the order of Providence for the promotion of virtue and truth, by provoking discussions which lead to the dispersion of error, by disposing the careless to reflection, by determining the irresolute to inquiry, by awakening energies which might otherwise have slumbered in inaction, and rousing the horror and indignation which vice and impiety, when they throw off the mask, will never fail to inspire in generous and honest minds.—Such on all former occasions has been the uniform result of the violence; directed by infidels against our holy religion, in this country; and when I consider the general expression of disgust at the blasphemous libels which were lately put in circulation; when I recollect the number and excellence of the popular tracts in defence of the religion so basely traduced, and the reception which they

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experienced from the public, I cannot but think that the evidences of the Christian Revelation, and the nature and grounds of the Christian faith, are in consequence more generally understood, and the people on the whole more firmly attached to the creed of their fathers, than if it had never been called in question. When I behold, on the other hand, the continued exertions of piety, in the distribution of the scriptures and scriptural tracts—in the enlarging of churches, in the erection of schools at home and abroad, in founding extensive establishments, with a view to the conversion of the heathen, I am compelled to infer from this active munificence, that the breath of impiety has neither quenched the flame of religion among us, nor sullied its purity, nor abated the intensity of its power."
He had, however, strong legal authority to produce in addition to the mass of ecclesiastical evidence which he had adduced in support of his opinions. Judge Blackstone, in his Commentaries, said—"It seems necessary for the support of the national religion, that the officers of the Church have power to censure heretics, yet not to harass them with temporal penalties, much less to exterminate or destroy them. All persecution for diversity of opinions, however ridiculous and absurd they may be, is contrary to sound policy and civil freedom." This was also his opinion. By endeavouring injudiciously to punish, they made martyrs, and turned the minds of thousands to the consideration of matters which otherwise would never have come under their notice. Mr. Locke, in his first letter on Toleration, had said—"I esteem toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true church; everyone is orthodox to himself." If such were the sentiments of the pious, wise, and learned men whom he had quoted, how would gentlemen reconcile them with the prosecutions now going on? Of what use were those prosecutions, when individuals gloried in their punishment, as an act of martyrdom? Discussion ought to be allowed in the most full and unrestrained degree; and the power of the magistrate ought only to be resorted to when the safety of the state demanded it. He had not touched upon the question of Atheism lately made against Carlile, for this simple reason—because he had never seen any man pretending to be atheist who
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could maintain those opinions in argument for one half hour; and he even doubted whether any person existed, who really doubted the being of a Great Creator of the universe. He did not mean to defend any attacks on the Christian religion, or any of the publications which had been complained of. They ought to be put down; but put down in the way they deserved—by complete neglect and utter contempt. The hon. member concluded by moving "That it is the opinion of this House, that Free Discussion has been attended with more benefit than injury to the community, and it is unjust and inexpedient to expose any person to legal penalties on account of the expression of opinions on matters of religion."
Mr. Wilberforceproceeded to address the House, hut in a tone so low, as to be for a considerable time inaudible in the gallery. We at length understood the hon. member to defend the Constitutional Society and the Society for the Suppression of Vice in the course they had taken, and to maintain, that both those bodies were not only fully justified, but much to be applauded, for having exerted themselves for the suppression of offences, which, in every sense, was contra bonos mores. The hon. mover had observed; that he believed there was no such a thing as Atheism; but in one of those offensive publications there was a passage, in which it was stated, that atheism was the only ground on which a man could find a sound and secure footing. It was exceedingly unpleasant to quote from any of those works; but in another number, it was declared, that Christianity could be proved to demonstration to be a gross imposture; and, as it was supported for the purpose of upholding a bad system of government, the author wondered why it had not long since been removed; and he went on to ask, whether the inquiring mind of man could find any sound footing except in atheism. The hon. mover had quoted from bishop Warburton, the bishop of London, and several other eminent divines, with whose sentiments he; (Mr. W.) entirely concurred: for no man held more strongly the opinion that it was proper to investigate the established religion of the country fairly. But, none of those pious and learned men had argued, that gross and vulgar abuse of the religion of the state ought to be tolerated. Dr. Paley's opinion was clear and decisive on

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this point. He had said, "that persecution could produce no sincere conviction; and under the head, of religious toleration, he included toleration of all serious argument, but he did not think it would be right to suffer ridicule, invective, and mockery to be resorted to with impunity. They applied Solely to the passions, weakened the understanding, and misled the judgment. They did not assist the search for truth, and instead of supporting any particular religion, destroyed the influence of all." With respect to Carlile, he had not been harshly treated. No prosecution" was instituted against him, until he had placed over his door "The Temple of Reason;" and the dissemination of irreligious works became too notorious to be overlooked. He thought the country owed much to those private individuals (seconded by the state) who had endeavoured to disseminate such works, and to support such a moral education, as would enable the people to combat those principles. He entirely denied the truth of the argument which the hon. member had drawn from the employment of missionaries abroad. Those individuals never proceeded to insult the prejudices of the natives of other countries by any gross and indecent reflections. They adduced nothing but fair and sober argument to effect their purpose. The hon. member said, that there was no drawing a precise line in arguments on this subject. His answer was, that it was not intended to draw a precise line. Let truth go to its fullest and fairest extent; but let ribaldry and indecency be avoided. Did Christianity ever insult the country where it was attempted to be planted? No. It was distinguished by decorum, respect, and obedience to the powers that be. Even the government of the emperor Nero, one of the most cruel tyrants that ever lived, was not abused by the Christians. With respect to those who had voluntarily taken upon them to prosecute publications of this nature, he must observe, that there were many wrongs by which society in general suffered, but which were likewise so offensive to individuals, that they hesitated not to visit; them with the penalties of the law. There were also, it should, be observed, certain other crimes, more injurious to society than even robbery or murder, but which as they did not affect, the particular interests pf private individuals, they
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did not stand forward to punish. Therefore, the formation of societies for they purpose of visiting such crimes with severity, was a praiseworthy act. It had been stated over and over again by the judges, that persons who associated together to carry the law into execution, where offences of this kind, which were mischievous to society, were perpetrate, were acting in a perfectly legal manner. The introduction of obscene pictures and improper books into schools had been effectually checked by that means. When individuals combined together for this purpose, and were only actuated by public principles, and where the over-zealous disposition of some was tempered by the moderation and prudence of others, it could not be doubted that great good was likely to be the result.
Mr. Ricardosaid, he had heard with pleasure a great part of the speech of his hon. friend who had just sat down, and the remainder certainly with no inconsiderable concern. The greater part of that speech had been in support, of the opinion which he (Mr. Ricardo) held^ in common with his hon. friend who had introduced the motion; namely, that no man had a right to dictate his opinions, upon abstract opinions to another, upon, peril of punishment for a refusal to adopt them; and his hon. friend had further admitted, that so long as the controversy upon such topics was conducted with decency, it ought not to be prevented by force of law. Now, he lamented that when his hon. friend had thought proper to quote the sentiments of Dr. Paley, he had not given them more at length, for he would, in the writings of that eminent individual, find a more large and liberal spirit of toleration, than he was disposed to admit practically in other parts of his speech.
Mr. Wilberforce.—Dr. Paley distinctly excepts to the treatment of such subjects with levity und ribaldry.
Mr. Ricardo.—That, certainly, was Dr. Paley's only exception; and lie, as well as the other chief ornaments of the church, for instance, Dr Tillotson and Dr. Porteus, had asserted, in the largest sense, the right of unfettered opinion. If the validity of such opinions were admitted, who could approve of the operation of the Jaw of this country in such matters? Who could sustain those impolitic and unjust prosecutions? What was the prosecution of Carlile for republishing the "age of

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Reason?" That was not a work written in a style of levity and ribaldry, but a sevious argument upon publishing the truth of the Christian religion. Look again at the impending prosecution for eighteen weeks of the same man for publishing Mr. Hone's parodies, which was not abandoned; until Hone had himself secured an acquittal on the charge. But, said his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce), in justification of these public prosecutions, there were some offences which did not directly affect private interest, although they injured the community, and which might go unpunished, were it not for general associations which took cognizance of such matters; and he had talked of obscene; writings in illustration of his opinion. But, was there really any comparison between such writings and those upon speculative points of religion, which were the only topics to which this motion applied? They were all agreed that obscene writings ought to be punished. And why?—because they were obviously pernicious to the moral interests of society, and constituted a general and disgusting species of offence. But not so with respect to abstract religious subjects, upon which it was quite impossible to obtain universal assent. No man had a right to say to another, "My opinion upon religion is right, and yours is not only wrong when you differ from me, but I am entitled to punish you for that difference." Such an arrogant assumption of will was intolerable, and was an outrage upon the benignant influence of religion. They might talk of ribaldry and levity, but there was nothing more intolerable than the proposition which be had just stated, and which was nothing less than the power contended for by the advocates of these prosecutions for mere opinions upon points of faith. Then, what an absurd and immoral mode did the law provide for estimating the credit of a man's faith before his testimony was legally admissible? When the question was put to a witness, "Do you believe in a future state?" If he were a conscientious man, entertaining seriously such an opinion, his answer must be in the negative, and the law said he should not be heard; but if he were an immoral man, and disregarded truth, and said, "I do believe in a future state," although in his conscience he disbelieved in it, then his evidence was admissible, and his hypocrisy and falsehood secured him credibility. Now, there would be some sense in the law, if it de-
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clined tempting the hypocrisy of the individual, or his fear of the world's hostility or prejudice, and let in other evidence, to establish, from previous knowledge of the individual; whether or not he ought not to be admitted as a witness; but as it stood, it was absurd and ridiculous; and when he (Mr. R.) was charged upon this ground with a desire to do away with the sanctity of an oath, his reply was, "I do not desire to diminish the sacredness of the obligation; but I do desire to get rid of the hypocrisy by which that oath may be evaded." But then, again, was it possible for a man not to believe in a future state, and yet be strictly moral, and impressed with the necessity of upholding credibility in the common obligations of society? For his part, he firmly believed in the possibility of a man's being very honest for all the social purposes and essential obligations of the community in which he lived, and still not assenting to the belief of a future state. He fully admitted that religion was a powerful obligation; but he denied it to be the only obligation. It was, in fact, one which was superadded to the general force of moral impressions—it were a libel upon human nature to say otherwise. Tillotson was of that opinion in the following quotation from his works:—"As for most of those restraints which Christianity lays upon us, they are so much both for our private and public advantage, that, setting aside all considerations of religion, and of the rewards and punishments of another life, they are really good for us; and if God had not laid them upon us, we ought in reason, in order to our temporal benefit and advantage to have laid them upon ourselves. If there were no religion, I know men would not have such strong and forcible obligations to these duties; but yet, I say, though there were no religion, it were good for men, in order to temporal ends, to their health and quiet, and reputation, and safety, and, in a word, to the private and public prosperity of mankind, that men should be temperate, and chaste, and just, and peaceable, and charitable, and kind, and obliging to one another, rather than the contrary. So that religion does not create those restraints arbitrarily, but requires those things of us, which our reason, and a regard to our advantage, which the necessity and conveniency of the things themselves, without any consideration of religion, would in most cases urge us to." He read this passage for the

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purpose of showing, and from a great authority in the church, that the obligation of religion was not alone considered as the influential test of moral truth, and that a man might be very sceptical upon doctrinal points, and yet very positive in the control of moral impressions distinct from religious faith. For instance, there was Mr. Owen of Lanark, a great benefactor to society, and yet a man not believing (judging from some opinions of his) in a future state. Would any man, with the demonstrating experience of the contrary before his eyes, say that Mr. Owen was less susceptible of moral feeling, because he was incredulous upon matters of religion? Would any man, pretending to honour or candour, say that Mr. Owen, after a life spent in improving the condition of others, had a mind less pure, a heart less sincere, or a less conviction of the restraint and control of moral rectitude, than if he were more imbued with the precepts of religious obligation? Why, then, was such a man (for so by the law he was) to be excluded from the pale of legal credibility—why was he, if he promulgated his opinions, to be liable to spend his days immured in a prison? Will respect to the exception provided according to his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce), for treating such subjects with levity and ribaldry, he must confess, that he thought it a very singular reservation: for what was it, but to say—"You may discuss, if you please, in the most solemn, most serious, and therefore most influential manner, any topic of religion you please; but, the moment you discuss it with levity or ribaldry, that is, in such a manner as to be sure to offend the common sense of mankind, and therefore deprive you of really acquiring any serious proselytes, then the law takes cognizance of your conduct, and makes your imbecility penal. Was not this a glaring inconsistency? The law allowed the greater evil, the serious and substantial principle of discussion; and it denounced the lesser, which after admitting the first, it ought to have tolerated; and yet his hon. friend had, by his argument, justified and supported so singular a course. There was one passage of this petition which was very forcible, and to which he called the attention of his hon. friend. It was this:—"The reviler of Christianity appears to your petitioners to be the least formidable of its enemies; because his scoffs can rarely fail of arousing against him public
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opinion, than which nothing more is wanted to defeat his end. Between freedom of discussion and absolute persecution there is no assignable medium." When this subject was last before the House, unless his memory deceived him, he had heard singular opinions propounded by gentlemen who took a different view of this subject from himself. He thought he had heard it avowed, that the religion which ought to be established in a state, was not that which the majority said they believed, but that the doctrines of which were true. He had heard an observation like that fall from a very respectable quarter. It was difficult to argue with any body entertaining such an opinion; for where was the test by which such an argument could be tried? There was not in polemics, as in astronomy, one unerring criterion to which the common credence of mankind bowed: it was not like the rising sun, or any of the other phenomena of nature, which were bound by indissoluble and indisputable laws; but, on the contrary, a subject open to conflicting opinions. Who, then, was to decide upon the truth—who was authorized to say, "My opinion is right, yours is wrong?" If this was impossible, how was the test to be decided? How, for instance, in such a country as Ireland try the question of the truth of what ought to be the religion of the state, against the the opinions of the majority of the people? How would, upon that test, the stability of the Protestant religion in, Ireland be secured? Or, if it was secured there, merely because the minority thought it the true religion, the same reason and the came duty, would authorize the extension of the principle to India; and why not supplant Muhometanism to establish the doctrines of the Reformation." Into this wide field did the gentleman enter who embarked in such fanciful notions. He begged to be understood as having argued this question, from beginning to end, as the friend of free discussion. He knew the delicacy of the subject, and was anxious to guard himself against being supposed to entertain opinions obnoxious to the bulk of mankind. He repeated, that he only contended for the general right of self-opinion, and for the unfettered liberty of discussion, and hoped that while he was doing so, he should not have, as his hon. friend (Mr. Hume) had had last night, certain opinions fixed upon him which he did not entertain,

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and which it was quite unnecessary for him to countenance, in supporting the line of argument which the subject suggested to him, and which his reason approved.
Mr. Horace Twisssaid, it had been intimated by the hon. member for Montrose, that the greatest enemies to religion were those, who sought to uphold her by the measures, which it was the object of this motion to abolish. If that be the case, Sir, continued the hon. and learned gentleman, I, and those who think as I do, have indeed most miserably deceived ourselves. But the hon. gentleman's argument, though I think it erroneous in regard to religion, is applicable enough to that liberty of the press, whereof he is the strenuous advocate. For if any artful man, who should be as much an enemy to the liberty of the press as the hon. member for Montrose is, I doubt not, its friend, were contriving to obtain the reimposition of that licenser's veto, by which, with the intermission only of two or three years in the reign of Charles 2nd, the press continued to be fettered until some time after the accession of king William,—I can imagine no mode by which he would be so likely to forward that alarming design, and stifle the objections to an antecedent censorship, as by exempting irreligion and blasphemy, when once published, from the animadversion of an English jury, and securing to their authors the impunity which is now proposed [Hear, hear]. For what has been always the argument against the imposition of any previous censorship? Why, that though there are certain opinions, whose public circulation would endanger the peace and well-being of the people, yet that evil is likely but seldom to occur from the unfettered discretion of individuals, so long as they continue responsible to the law, for the excess, or abuse, of that discretion. In other words, we agree, in this particular case, considering the greatness of the good that arises from a free press, to do what, in general, would be somewhat indiscreet, to exchange a preventive for a merely penal control. But what is the doctrine now? It is not, as it once was, that the state, instead of taking the responsibility of licensing the press upon itself, should leave all publishers under a responsibility of their own; but that all responsibility shall be remitted altogether. I apprehend, Sir, that if harsh restraints are apt to lead to popular excesses, popular excesses are apt in their
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turn to lead back to harsh restraints [Cheers].
Sir, I am not about to follow the hon. member for Montrose, through the great variety of authorities, more or less relevant, which he has poured, in such profusion, upon the House. But, there is one counter-sanction which I will venture, in vindication of my own opinions, to cite, not only because it is of a practical kind, but because it comes from a quarter, which gentlemen opposite do sometimes, when it suits their purpose, recognize as carrying some authority:—from William the 3rd, and his parliament. In 1694, the act expired which had subjected the press to the control of the government; and, in three years from that time, the publication of blasphemous libels had come to so great a head, that the House of Commons, in 1697, voted an address to king William, praying, among other things, "That judges and magistrates might be commanded by proclamation, to put in force the laws against profaneness and immorality, and particularly that orders might be given for the suppressing all pernicious books and pamphlets, which contain in them impious doctrines against the Holy Trinity, and other fundamental articles of our faith, tending to the subversion of the Christian Religion: and that the authors and publishers thereof may be discountenanced and punished."—(5 Parl. Hist. 1172–3.)—To this address king William was advised by his ministers, lord Somers being then the keeper of his majesty's conscience, to make this answer:—"I will give immediate directions in the several particulars you desire; but I could wish some more effectual provision were made for the suppressing those pernicious books and pamphlets which your address takes notice of."—[Com. Journ. 18th Feb. 1697.]—The consequence of these communications was a statute [9 & 10 W. 3, ch. 32], by which, among other things, it was enacted, that the denial of the truth of the Christian religion, or of the divine authority of; the Holy Scriptures, should be punished with certain disqualifications, on the first offence; and, on the second, with a total civil incapacity, and a three years' imprisonment. Nor was this any innovation upon the principle of the common law, but only an enforcement of it, by a severer penalty than the courts would have otherwise had the power to inflict. Before the Revolution, lord Hale had laid it

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down, that such offences were not against religion only, but against the laws; as tending to dissolve all those obligations, by which civil societies are preserved.—[Taylor's Case, 3 Keb. 607–1 Vent. 293].
The hon. gentleman, I think, has hardly been aware of the principle thus laid down by lord Hale. Opinions tending to such a disturbance, the state, upon the simple principle of self-defence, is bound to suppress. It is idle to say, that with the mere publication of opinion, a government has no right to concern itself, when you know it is upon opinion alone that any government can depend for its existence. [Hear, hear]. If any published writing have a tendency to inflame particular classes of people against the constitution, and to excite them to subvert it, that publication is properly the subject of prosecution, since, if not treason itself, it is the seed of treason. It is even so of those published opinions which shake the respect of thoughtless readers for the great principles and sanctions of morality, and of that religion upon which all morality, at least all public, general morality, must ever depend. [Hear, hear]. It is not, therefore, by mere construction, but actually and practically, that irreligious opinions, in the language of the indictments upon which they are tried, are "against the peace of the king."
But besides the preservation of public peace, there is something due, likewise, to the private happiness and comfort of individuals; and that comfort, and that happiness, are more seriously endangered by any attempt to undermine the sanctions of religion, than even by the efforts of political incendiaries. For, in religion, the belief is the substance. It is not, as in politics, a mere speculative preference; but it is one of the actual solid comforts of private life. No man, by being persuaded to disapprove the government he lives under, loses the benefits which that government holds out, alike to its contented and its discontented subjects; but he who is persuaded to doubt his religion, is at once a loser of all which, in this world, that religion can bestow. And this, not perhaps by any deliberate choice—not by any voluntary preference—if that were so, you might object to any interference with his free-will:—but, as I find it truly observed in the petition which the hon. mover has quoted, "Be-
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lief does not, in all cases, depend upon the will." On the contrary, he whose belief has been thus undermined, is perhaps one whose doubts are unmingled pain to him—who would sacrifice much to be freed from them—who wishes for nothing with half such anxiety as to be undeceived. But it is not altogether an affair of understanding: the impression is too deep for the reach of argument—like a groundless jealousy, the sufferer feels the evil adhering and rankling, and no refutation you can use, no balm you can prescribe,
Can ever med'cine him to that sweet sleep
He owed but yesternight.
Against these anxieties and fears it was, that the law, with the care of a parent, extended a protection to its weaker subjects; and these anxieties and fears are the "rational boon," which the motion of the hon. gentleman proposes to make legally current among the people?
You say, let the people take care of themselves. I answer, no; it is the duty of their government to take care for them—to keep up a sort of moral police, as well as a civil one. That principle of protection runs through your constitution: if the commonest tradesman deal out foul stores or unwholesome provisions to the public, you protect your people by stopping and punishing the offence: and yet now, because you exert the very same power in suppressing the sale of those moral poisons, as an hon. member has this evening accurately called them, poisons which the venders would circulate as cordials among the poor, you are to be told that the law, by which this power belongs to you, is at variance with the spirit of your constitution!
Every one admits the mischief, and allows that it requires a remedy; but then, says the hon. member for Portarlington (Mr. Ricardo), the proper remedies are controversy of refutation, not the punishments of the law. That argument would have more force than it has, if all who read the allegation were presented also with the proof that refutes it—if one side of the leaf contained the charge, and the other the answer: but, of those who imbibe the original poison we have been speaking of, how many are ever supplied with the antidote? Besides, there are certain publications, such as those of that Carlile, whose petition, I believe, originally suggested this motion, which, from the very lowness of their na-

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ture, are likely to remain unanswered. They do not, like the writings of higher sceptics, excite competent champions to a vindication: the enemy is thought too inglorious to be worth the trouble of an overthrow; so that the weaker these tracts may be in argument and information, the stronger are they in their chance with the uneducated classes they address; and thus their very meanness aggravates their mischief. What boots it then for the hon. member for Portarlington to talk of public opinion as an extinguisher for the flame which the religious incendiary tries to kindle? Public opinion, undoubtedly, is entitled to high respect, when it means the opinion formed upon any subject by those classes of the public by whom that subject happens to be understood. But if it means, as in the language of many who quote it, it does now but too commonly mean, the opinion of people who can know nothing about the matter; then, instead of being called public opinion, the proud designation which it has taken in modern times, its old-fashioned appellation of vulgar error is the much more appropriate title [Hear]. What public opinion can be formed by the readers of Carlile, upon the multifarious questions, historical, biblical, philosophical, and critical, which are necessarily involved in all discussions on the truth and evidence of the Christian faith? We should be treating the people not with respect, but with mockery, to refer such appeals to their tribunal.
It is almost amusing to hear the tone which the liberals take on this subject. One would suppose, from the spirit in which the hon. member for Montrose has been advocating their cause, that the liberals in religion—which term, in plain English, denotes, I believe, all sorts of infidels, from the common sceptic to that atheist whose existence the hon. member disbelieves—were really a persecuted cast: for he has used and dwelt upon the word persecution: as if they were a set of men thrown overboard by society with their opinions fastened to them like a stone about their necks, and sent down to the bottom. Is that the case? Why, Sir, no man ever even interferes with them. We say to them, You may keep your unbelief if you like; it, only keep it to yourselves [Hear, hear]. We do not want to disturb you; but we expect in return that you shall not disturb us. You may do what you please within your own doors;
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but if nothing will serve you but to set up your noisome trade in our streets, and taint the public air, you must not be surprised if we abate you as a nuisance [Hear, hear]. Persecution, Sir! why they do not suffer even exclusion. They have political privileges and franchisee which are denied to millions of their Christian fellow-subjects. Would it bs believed that this proposal for bestowing immunity upon religious libellers, is the motion of the same hon. member, who, when a bill came before this House a few weeks ago for relieving the Catholics from disqualification on account of religious opinions, was among the foremost of those gentlemen who withdrew in a body from their places, and purposely abandoned the freedom of religious opinion to a defeat from which their adherence might have saved it! [Hear, hear].
The hon. member is afraid that in this, as in ancient instances, the persecution he talks of may make martyrs whose martyrdom will recommend their doctrine. No warning can be less applicable. Persecution, no doubt, has been a great maker of martyrs in time past; but then in those days, unhappily, she had a red-hot crucible to work up her manufacture. In our days the furnace has gone out, and her occupation is extinguished with it. Their allusion, therefore, is merely ad invidiam. The blasphemous libellers of the present day know very well that they are safe enough from the faggot and the stake; and it is precisely because they feel the safety that they venture to raise a prejudice by talking about the danger. [Much cheering].
I can understand, though I differ from the man who says, let political discussion be free, even though it work a change in our very constitution; because I can conceive that a perfectly honest Englishman may think, however erroneously, that the constitution of his country might be changed advantageously for some other. But can any honest Englishman deceive himself into the belief, that his country's religion might be advantageously supplanted, not by a religion of some other kind, but by a total irreligion? Because, that is the real question [Hear, hear]. Why is it that you would let impious discussion proceed? Either it is to produce an effect, or it is to produce none. If no effect is to be produced, no advantages are stiffed in its suppression. If there is to be any effect produced, do you think

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it wise to sanction an effect which you yourselves admit must be a mischievous one?
If you mean to say that, there are many works liable, under the present law in strictness, to public prosecution, which in ordinary circumstances it is most advisable to leave unprosecuted, in that opinion I concur; because I believe there are some irreligious attacks, which do but stimulate the ability of learned vindicators to the clearer assertion and more complete establishment of religious truth. The same thing may be said still more cogently, as to the discussions of contested creeds and points of faith. So far, I agree with the hon. members for Montrose and Portarlington. But the proposal we are now to vote upon is, not that a sparing discretion shall be exercised in prosecuting irreligious libels, but that they shall all be exempt from the very possibility of prosecution. I suspect that the hon. member for Portarlington has here been seduced a little beyond the limit of his usual discrimination, by his fondness for the principles of free trade [a laugh]. The effect of freedom in trade, and that indeed which recommends it, is, that it encourages production; but, as production in this case is the very thing we want to prevent, we can hardly vote for a free trade here, unless the hon. member will unteach us every thing that he has been so long inculcating, and prove that freedom of trade will best stifle supply [Hear, and a laugh]. But if this trade is dangerous in any mode of dealing, it is most dangerous of all in the retail—when infidelity is made up into cheap tracts, and sold among the poor by the hapo'rth.
Sir, if any of the considerations I have mentioned can be supposed to have had any force with our fathers when they made those laws, which, notwithstanding all I have heard to-night, I still think it our happiness to live under, much greater is the force which those considerations have acquired from the circumstances of the present times. Of old there were but few, to whom the disquisitions of infidelity could be addressed; and those who could read, were, for the most part, educated in other respects. But now, you have extended the gift of reading to the mass of your people. It is a good work, and has advantages in it that may overbalance many objections. But I must say,—and having said that, I will trouble the House no further—that if, while we
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qualify our people to read all the doctrines that are published, we remove the whole restraint on the publication of doctrines which ought never to be read; there is but too much ground to fear that we shall be furnishing the enemies of instruction with an argument—a more solid one than any they have yet been able to adduce—by enabling them to insinuate, with a colour of truth, that the education of the people has been the corruption of the state, and the boon which we warranted as a blessing, perverted into a calamity and a curse [Cheers].
Mr. W. Smithsaid, that this was a very grave subject, and except when, as on the present occasion, it was mixed up with certain questions of law, he deprecated its discussion in that House; and, even under such circumstances, it ought not to be frequently agitated. He could not help thinking that these subjects were always better conveyed through the medium of the press than by a debate in that House, where the discussion was necessarily limited, and angry and violent feelings were likely to obtrude. He could assure the House, that no man felt more disgust than he did at the publications for which Carlile had been prosecuted; but, at the same time, he thought that liberty of conscience without the liberty of divulging one's opinions, was a poor and imperfect privilege. The only question raised that night was simply this—whether all manner of treating religious subjects should be allowed in controversy. He had long thought upon this subject; and the result of his reflections was, the conviction that it would be better to leave such matters to the general opinion of society. He then urged the impossibility of establishing a safe test of opinion for the penal guidance of society. What in England they thought moral and just, might not be equally so considered in India. The Brahmin who, from motives of religion, sanctioned the burning of Hindoo widows, might, if left to his decision, consign to the same flames the Englishman who complained against so cruel and irreligious a practice.
Mr. T. Wilsontrusted, that the House would show, by its vote of that night, that its opinion was not in unison with those which had been expressed by the hon. member who spoke last. He thought that the minds of the people had been poisoned by the blasphemous publications which had been spread abroad. The

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lower orders would eagerly imbibe the poison, but would not seed the antidote.
Mr. Moneyopposed the motion. Since parliament and different societies had done all in their power to disseminate the blessings of education, care ought to be taken that those blessings should not be abused. His principal object in rising was to do justice to an individual who had said alluded to during the debate—he meant; Mr. Owen. An hon. member had said that Mr. Owen disbelieved in a future state. He had communicated with Mr. Owen, arid he had great reason to believe that the hon. member had mistaken the opinions of Mr. Owen. He begged the hon. member to state in what part of Mr. Owen's works he found that opinion promulgated.
Mr. Ricardosaid, that the last act he would commit would be to misrepresent the opinions of any individuals. He had gathered Mr. Owen's opinions from the Works which he had published. After reading the speeches which Mr. Owen had delivered in Ireland and other places, he had come to the conclusion, that Mr. Owen did not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments. It was one of the doctrines of Mr. Owen that a man could not form his own character, but that it was formed by the circumstances which surrounded him—that when a man committed an act which the world called vice, it ought to be considered his misfortune merely, and that therefore no man could he a proper object for punishment. This doctrine was interwoven in his system; and he who held it could not impute to the Omnipotent Being a desire to punish those who, in this view, could not be considered responsible for their actions.
Mr. Secretary Peelcomplained, that an hon. member had assumed, that the House was prepared to go a very considerable way in accordance with the views of the hon. member for Aberdeen. He, for one, was not prepared to advance one step along With the hon. member. He objected to his motion altogether. He disliked the form in which the hon. member had brought the question before the House. The practice of proposing resolutions declaratory of the opinion of the House had, he was sorry See, become very prevalent of last. If the hon. member considered the law which subjected individuals to punishment improper or unnecessary why did he not move for its repeal? In the resolution which the member
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had proposed, he first declared that free discussion had been attended with more benefit than injury, and then said that it, was inexpedient to subject individuals to legal punishment on account of the expression of their opinions on religious matters. If the first part of the resolution was true, the second was quite unnecessary. If there had been, as the hon. member assumed in his resolution, free discussion, what more did he desire? To be consistent with himself, the hon. member should have framed the resolution in a prospective sense, and said, that more benefit would arise, &c. With respect to the petition, he must say that he had never read any thing more absurd or sophisticated. It commenced by stating, that the petitioners had a strong sense of the benefits which resulted from a belief in the Christian religion, and afterwards expressed a wish that the laws might be repealed which prevented individuals from attacking and endeavouring to destroy that religion. He was satisfied with the law as it stood, and would not consent to change it. He could conceive that cases might occur, in which it would be impolitic to put the law in force. That was a matter of discretion. But if it could be shown that, in a dozen cases, the discretion had been abused, it would not determine him to put aside the law altogether. He would not consent to allow men, who, from sordid motives, endeavoured to undermine the religion of the country to go unpunished.
Mr. Humesaid, he would not press the House to a division.
The motion was then negatived.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
The adjourned debate on the Resolutions respecting the Appellate Jurisdiction being resumed,
Lord Colchestersaid:—My lords; having been placed in the chair of the committee, whose report is now under your consideration, I wish to offer some observations upon the important subject to which it relates. The subject itself, as your lordships have seen, divides itself necessarily into two parts; first, the prospective measures which it may be fit to adopt, for preventing the future growth of appeals; and secondly, the measures of immediate arrangement which are indispensably necessary for disposing of the appeals now depending before us.
The prospective measures relate separately to Scotland and to England,
As to Scotland, from whence the large majority of appeals has flowed in upon us, and such as creates the whole of our present embarrassment, we have entertained little or no difference of opinion upon the possible benefit to be derived from rendering the forms of proceeding in the Court of Session more concise, and better adapted to separate matters of law from matters of fact; allowing perhaps in some cases an intermediate appeal in Scotland, and in other cases making the decision in Scotland final, but in no case bringing any questions but those of law to this House, as the supreme court of appeal in the last resort.
How far such improvements can be accomplished will, of course, require previous investigation by persons best qualified to judge of their nature and probable effects: and to establish a commission for that purpose is the object of the bill already presented by the noble earl who has taken the lead in calling the attention of your

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lordships to the present state of our appelate jurisdiction.
As to England, prospective measures have also been suggested, respecting the administration of justice in the court of Chancery, from whence the English appeals chiefly proceed, and with a view to the same end, though by means somewhat, different.
The first of these measures, a revision of the practice of the court of Chancery, has, as I understand, already reached the first stage of its progress; and a complete report has been made to the noble lord on the woolsack, of all the regulations established from time to time by those who have heretofore holden the great seal; upon the foundation of which report, that noble and learned lord may, in conjunction with the other two judges of his court, proceed to make great improvements in the administration of justice in that court.
Another measure, more directly bearing upon the object before us, is to make the decisions of the court below final, in certain cases to be limited and specified.
Other measures also, for transferring particular matters to the cognizance of other courts and judges may be of great advantage, and chiefly by allowing to the lord chancellor more disposable time for the service of this House.
Some branches, however, of the lord chancellor's jurisdiction cannot be separated from his office, without great detriment to the public interest; more especially those of lunacy, bankruptcy, and his visitatorial authority; besides other high points of his jurisdiction, for which time must be always sufficiently provided.
But, my lords, whatever benefit may result from these prospective measures, it is manifest that they must be comparatively of slow operation; and we must at once enter upon some immediate arrangements for disposing of the mass of appeals now depending.
A larger allowance of time, for hearing appeals, is the first and most essential requisite; and to this, we doubt not, your lordships will accede readily; we could have wished to propose six days instead of three; but five appear to be quite in dispensable.
With the necessity of a more frequent attendance, comes the necessity of enforcing that attendance; and we have conceived that a rota of three lords for each day, taken by ballot, is perhaps as con-
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venient as any mode, and far better than leaving it to accident, or still worse to solicitation.
Still, however, there remains behind, the last and greatest difficulty;—namely, who shall preside in the house if the lord chancellor be absent; it being assumed that the chancellor's attendance in the Court of Chancery cannot be dispensed with, for the time which the hearing of these appeals would require.
If that be assumed, there remains only to resort to the auxiliary commission which by the custom of parliament always exists; and to take for Speaker in the chancellor's absence, the person who shall be therein named; not as Vice Speaker or as Deputy Speaker, for no such title is given to him in these commissions, or in the Journals of this House: And such person, when called into use for judicial purposes, must, if a commoner, obtain from the House the permission to speak and deliver his opinion upon the case, if he is to become an efficient servant of the House for these purposes.
That such an expedient is practicable, I entirely concur with the committee in thinking; the authority of any person named in such commission to be Speaker is unquestionable; a memorable instance of this sort occurred in 1691, when lord chief baron Atkyns, sitting as Speaker to hear appeals, and a cause being called on in which he was a party, he withdrew; and the lord Halifax was elected by the House Speaker pro tempore, who heard that cause; after which lord chief baron Atkyns resumed his seat, and proceeded with the rest of the appeals. And according to our own standing orders* such a Speaker may, if a judge or privy-counsellor called by writ, be required and admitted by the House to speak and deliver his opinion. I allow that, according to our practice of putting abstract questions to the judges, it may be doubted (although according to the terms of the writ of summons, I think it could not be very reasonably doubted) whether such opinion may not also be given upon the case which actually awaits your decision. But at all events such Speaker will have the same powers in judicature, as have been exercised by all those commoners who have sat on the woolsack as chancellor or lord keeper of the great seal, for so many years, and in so many successive
*Standing Orders, 1660, No. 4.

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reigns. I should indeed mis-state my own individual opinion, if I stated this mode to be very convenient or very satisfactory; but I cannot doubt that it is practicable and conformable to the law and usage of parliament.
And here, my lords, I might conclude the observations with which I have troubled you; but I feel that I should not discharge my duty to myself or to the House, if I did not proceed; for although I agree that the measure proposed by the committee, in this choice of difficulties, is perfectly regular and practicable, I do not think it the most beneficial or the most suitable which might be adopted.
The noble earl who moved originally for the committee, and who has first brought this report under your consideration, has stated, frankly and fairly, that his personal opinion would have been for sending alt appeals upon Scotch questions of property to a tribunal of Scotch judges in Scotland; and his own high authority, I know, has the support of other authority greatly to be respected (lord Aberdeen); but, my lords, the noble earl also fairly admitted, that the prevailing opinion of those most acquainted with Scotland, had induced him to yield up that opinion, in deference to the alleged wishes of Scotland, that their appeals should be heard in England, and in the House of Lords.
Now, my lords, my opinion goes not only that length but further; and I cannot but think that the mode of hearing appeals most satisfactory to Scotland would be, not only in England, and in the House of Lords, but before the lord chancellor of Great Britain; and that, in the supreme court of appeal, the subjects of every part of the United Kingdom should continue to have their causes adjudged before the highest law authority in the realm.
But how can this, your lordships will naturally ask, how can this be accomplished? Upon what principle, and by what means? My answer is, upon the principle of reserving the highest judicial duties to the highest judicial office, and delegating those duties which are of inferior importance to authorities of inferior rank and degree; and the means for so doing are in the present ease obvious; as the lord chancellor has in all times been accustomed to supply his place when absent from his own court, by the attendance of the Master of the Rolls, or by the standing commission of assistance, which enables
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him to call upon any one of the twelve judges, with the aid of two masters in chancery, to transact the judicial business of that court. No practice has been a more frequent in all times; and most of us re member it for long periods of time, when lord Kenyon as Master of the Rolls, or Mr. Baron Eyre, or Mr. Justice Buller, sat successively in the court of Chancery to supply the lord chancellor's place. And I think it may deserve very serious consideration, whether, by either of these means, or by both combined, the business of the court of Chancery may not be well transacted on those days, during the session of parliament, upon which your lord ships may require the assistance of the lord chancellor here upon appeals; and the business of chancery may be carried on even with less interruption by such judges, who are not liable to be called away to attend cabinets, or by the obligation of their personal attendance upon the sovereign.
Then as to the time of the lord chancellor's absence from his court. In every week during the session of parliament, which in ordinary years seldom extends to five months, he might be present in his court, for one day at the least, to hear those matters of special jurisdiction which require his personal authority; also during every adjournment of the House he would be free to resume his seat there; and for the other half year, during the recess of parliament, even after deducting, the long vacation, he would have nearly half; the juridical year for uninterrupted attendance in his own court.
"Stare vias super antiquas," is a safe principle upon moat cases of policy; but upon none more than those which concern the accustomed forms of administering justice.
My lords, I have to entreat your pardon for troubling you thus at length upon this latter question; and the more so, as, although it is practically the most important of all, it does not come before you for your vote this day. It may, however, be well to weigh these considerations together, between this time and the next meeting of parliament, when the plan, whatever it may be, must at once be put into active operation.
The first and immediate question for your determination is, the number of days which you will think fib to give to appeals, whoever may preside; and I am persuaded that your lordships will agree

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upon the largest number which can be allotted, consistently with practical convenience.
Lord Redesdalesaid, that the accumulation of appeal business was not attributable to any delay which took place, but to the increasing population and wealth of the empire, and the consequent increase of litigation. The due superintendance of justice in that House had been of great importance in preserving the due superintendance of it in the courts below. He was convinced that it was the bad amalgamation of the Scotch feudal law with the forms of the Roman civil law, that had led to so many appeals from Scotland. That unnatural amalgamation had given rise to a protracted form of action, and to a mass of papers that had been well described on a former evening, by his learned friend on the woolsack. Indeed, the lord president of the Court of Session had stated, that he was completely embarrassed by the accumulation of papers which came before him; and had complained that, after hearing cases during the day, he had to read during the evening a mass of documents amounting, in the year to 27,000 closely-written pages. The committee had thought it right to issue a commission, to inquire whether any beneficial change could not be effected in the law of Scotland. He did not believe that the lieges of Scotland were so hostile to the trial by jury, as a noble lord had represented them to be. He was, however, of opinion, that the trial by jury ought to be administered by the Court of Session, and not by a separate court as it was at present. There would have been no arrear of appeals, if only the due proportion had come from Scotland; and therefore, if any method could be devised to prevent Scotch appeals from being brought before their lordships on points of fact, instead of points of law, no arrear would in future take place; The abstracting of the lord chancellor, for three days in the week, from the court of Chancery, must prove highly injurious to the suitors in that court; and it was a debt of justice which the people of Scotland owed to the people of England and Ireland, not to let the accumulation of their business prove a burthen to the suitors in the English and Irish courts of justice. If any of their lordships could find out a better plan than that which was under their consideration, he would willingly embrace it; but
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if they could not, he would advise them to try it; if for no other reason, at least for this—that half a loaf was better than no bread.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that to a man in the vigour of youth and health, an attendance of five days in the week to the hearing of appeals would be a severe duty; but he believed that no one who knew the business, would undertake that duty, along with the heavy business of the other court.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, that the more they heard the opinions of the learned lords, the more difficulties presented themselves. It was said, that, from the impossibility of attending for five days a week to appeal cases, concurrently with attention to other important business, there must be a Deputy Speaker. Now, he would ask, were the Speaker and the deputy to hear cases at the same time, or alternately? If at the same time, then they might have two parties bearing causes, and giving, perhaps, different opinions on the same points, and each as the opinions of the House of Peers. But, the most important point was, was the Deputy Speaker to be a peer? If they were to have a commoner presiding over three peers who might hear one part of a case, and then over three others who might hear the next, and then again over three more, who might have to decide upon what they had only partially heard, great inconvenience would arise to their lordships, great dissatisfaction to the parties, and the character of the House of Peers, as a court of judicature, would be lost.—The noble lord went on to contend, that the compulsory clause would have the effect, not of increasing, but of diminishing, the number of days for hearing appeals. On the first day of the session, the names of all the peers were to be put into a glass, and the days of their attendance were to be fixed, according to the rotation in which they were drawn. Now, it was possible that the names of peers living at the most distant pans of the empire might be drawn for the first attendance. Then, time would be required to send a notice to that effect. So that three weeks would be lost, before the business of appeals could be commenced. Besides, it should be recollected, that many peers might rather prefer paying the fine, than submit to the greater inconvenience of coming at an early period so great a distance. Then,

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what would be the situation of the House? Witnesses and counsel would be in attendance at a vast expense; and even if one of the three peers were absent, no business could be done. He contended, that no advantage would be gained by this compulsory clause. But his chief objection was, to the appointment of a commoner as a Deputy Speaker, by which he contended their lordships' judicial functions would be compromised.
The Earl of Rosslynargued in favour of the right of appeal to their lordships by the people of Scotland, and from thence the necessity of some measure by which the arrears of appeals might be disposed of. As to the objection against the presidency of a commoner, he maintained that it was without foundation, and cited several instances in which commoners had presided in their lordships' House for years. It was not, therefore, contrary to the constitution of their lordships' House, and their frequent practice, that commoners should be in the chair. But, even with the proposed alterations, he did not think their lordships could make any great additional progress in the despatch of the appeals before them. Still, something should be done; and he expected that a great deal might be done by some good alterations in the courts below. With respect to the compulsory clause, and the objection that three peers might have to hear a part of a case upon which three others who had not heard the whole might have to decide, he would observe, that there was nothing to prevent the peers who should hear the first part from remaining till the case was concluded. The objection, therefore, on this head, was without foundation.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that whatever might be done for the future regulation of appeals, it would be necessary to devise some plan to get rid of the arrears. The plan of giving five days a week to the hearing of appeals instead of three, would have that object. He had no objection to let the resolution stand thus:—The compulsory attendance to be temporary, and only until the arrears were reduced to 40 or 50, or any number to be agreed upon. Then, the question would be—if they were to have five days attendance, could the lord chancellor attend consistently with his other important duties? He thought not. Indeed, this was not denied on any side. Then, if the lord chancellor could not at-
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tend, there must be a Deputy Speaker to, preside on these appeals, It was objected, that this Deputy Speaker might be a commoner; but if he were, their lordships would not be in any new situation; for, in the very best times of the constitution, commoners had presided in their lordships' House. Even in the present day, the practice was by no means unfrequent. The noble lord then repeated his former objection to the impolicy of dividing the office of Lord Chancellor, from that of Speaker of the House of Peers. In conclusion, he said, that though the proposed plan was not free from objection, it was the only one by which they could get rid of the load, of business which had arisen from the accumulation of appeals. He then moved the first resolution, with the verbal amendment to which he had alluded.
Lord Ellenboroughproposed, that only the names of the peers present on the first day should be put into the glasses to be drawn for attendance in rotation; by which means the delay which might arise from peers living at a distant part of the country would be avoided.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that after the first three resolutions were decided upon, he would postpone the consideration of the others to a future day, by which time would be given for further consideration.
The Earl of Carnarvonrepeated the objections which he had made on a former; night, against the establishment of a tribunal, where a part of the case only might be heard by those who might have to decide upon the whole.
The first and second resolutions were put, and agreed to without a division. On the third resolution, which went to make the attendance of peers compulsory,
Lord Hollandsaid, he would not oppose the resolution on the ground that the House had not the power to make the regulation. He admitted it was consistent with the constitution of their lordships' House; but he doubted the policy of it. He did not think it would be equally efficient, as if peers were left to their own inclinations. The lords forced to attend might appear in their, places, and answer to their names, and then leave the House, or, if they remained, they might refuse to vote, or to give permission to the Deputy Speaker to give his opinion, and thus the whole object would be defeated. He

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thought it would be better to leave the: attendance to the honour, and sense of; duty, of their lordships.
Their lordships divided: Contents 27 Not-Contents 11.