Sitting of 20 March 1821

PETITION OF CAPTAIN ROMEO, COMPLAINING OF ILL-TREATMENT.
Mr. Humerose to present a Petition from captain Romeo, a Neapolitan subject, now in this country. He stated, that in 1806, he had become a partizan of the British
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government, that he had assisted in a military capacity in Calabria, and that he had remained in the service of the British government until 1815. This gentleman had experienced great reverses. After his faithful services to the British in Calabria, he had been arrested by the French government, and sentenced by a military tribunal to be shot. Fortunately, he escaped to Sicily, when he was immediately employed in a Calabrese regiment, and again exerted himself with the greatest effect in the British service. He had seen letters and certificates and testimonials from almost every officer under whom captain Romeo had served, expressive of their decided approbation of his conduct. What he had to complain of was, that when in 1815, after the peace, this officer left Sicily for Naples, with a British passport, on his arrival at Naples he was arrested and thrown into prison, where he remained five or six months, and when he applied to sir W. A'Court, he was refused that protection to which he was justly entitled. He had no hesitation in saying, that sir W. A'Court had been exceedingly to blame; not only in this affair, but in having joined with the Neapolitan ministry to repress and crush the liberties of Naples, until that revolution had been brought about which such measures were so well calculated to occasion. Sir W. A'Court was in strict union with that ministry, which had done all in their power to overturn the good which the English government had attempted to accomplish, and which had persecuted every one who had served the English in that attempt. On captain Romeo's arrival in England in 1817, he made application to his majesty's government for the means of support. For nine months be received no answer. At last, by the interference (highly to his honour) of the duke of York, a pension of 50 l. a year was settled on him. Such an allowance was, however, perfectly ridiculous, considered with reference to the service which he had performed. General Campbell had certified, that captain Romeo's personal losses in the British service amounted to. 13,000 dollars. The petitioner, unable to obtain from government the protection which he sought for, applied to the Foreign office. He requested that, as the government would not grant him remuneration for the loss which he sustained in. their service, at least they would give him a passport, to

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enable him to return to his native country. A gallant general now in the House applied for the passport, and it was promised. Captain Romeo also applied to commute the pension of 50 l. a year for a certain sum: his proposition was acceded to, and he received 300 l. in lieu of his pension. After receiving that sum, and when he was ready to set out for his native country, the promised passport was refused him. The noble lord opposite, in the interim, received some accounts from the Neapolitan government hostile to captain Romeo; from that government who had in fact persecuted him for the assistance which he had rendered to the English; The intimacy which was known to have existed between Sir W. A'Court and the minister of Naples induced sir William to make against captain llomeo an unfair and unfavourable report. It was quite clear that the British government should not have acted on that report, until at least they received the answer of captain Romeo. He repeated, that captain Romeo had done nothing that could militate against him, save his having assisted the British; he was so satisfied of the fact, that he was willing to give up his claim if the contrary were shown. By a memorial which that individual had presented, he requested to be made acquainted with the charges, if any, that were to be brought against him; no distinct charges were exhibited, and, indeed, so long as the year 1816, it appeared that captain Romeo was deported by order of the king of Naples. The passport of the British government was refused, but a French passport was offered in its stead; that passport would only enable captain Romeo to travel as far as Sicily, where, no doubt, he would have been refused a passport, and would thus be prevented from reaching Naples. The petitioner prayed the House to take into consideration the circumstances of his case, and that the House would grant him relief for the loss he had sustained in consequence of the services, he had rendered to the British army. And farther, that the House would order that an English passport should be granted to the petitioner to enable him to return to his now regenerated country.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that the present case did not properly belong to the department for which he was responsible. He understood, that in 1817, captain Romeo came to this country, and preferred
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a claim at lord Bathurst's office, for alleged services rendered to the British army. The sum which he had claimed, not for I113 services, but as the amount of his expenditure, was no less than 2,550 l. lord Bathurst was surprised to find such a claim brought by a captain in the array, for services performed, and for money expended, so long ago as the year 1808 and 1809. They naturally asked, if this money was supplied for the British service, how it happened that the accounts were not duly returned to the head of the army at the time, and liquidated in due course. All that the British government could do under such circumstances was, to institute an inquiry into the particulars of the claim through their minister abroad. They had done so; and if he were called upon to enter into the particulars of the answer communicated by sir W. A'Court, he must say it was not creditable to captain Romeo. If pressed to do so, he must disclose the answer which had been received respecting this transaction. It did certainly appear a little extraordinary that a captain in a Calabrian corps should for nine years have been silent upon a claim to such an amount as this. Some of the items of the account presented by captain Romeo at lord Bathurst's office were rather extraordinary. One of them was a sum of 1,400 l. in payments made to the mistress of the French general in chief to secure his confidence. The pay of a captain in the Calabrian corps was about 50 dollars a month; and next to the generosity of laying out such a sum to procure the good offices of a French general through his mistress, was the forbearance of not presenting the claim for nine years after it was represented to have been incurred. There were also charges for endeavouring to corrupt the then judges. He admitted that captain Romeo's certificates of military service amounted to a claim for such a pension as he had received, and which, by his desire, had been commuted for a sum of money at the usual rate. With respect to the alleged confiscation of the captain's property, the answer from Naples was, that he had sold that property before he had left the country. It was clearly and distinctly stated, that the reason for the steps taken against captain Romeo, had no connexion with, or reference to, any acts of his white connected with the British service, but for conduct after he returned from Sicily to Naples. The answers received upon all

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these inquiries were unfavourable to captain Romeo; and he was ready, if required, to submit sir W. A'Court's report to that House. The reason a British passport was refused the captain, was, because it was not customary to grant such to foreigners, except they were of the first consideration and distinction. A British passport was, in fact, given more as a letter of recommendation than a mere passport to travel. Lord Bathurst had offered captain Romeo a passage free of expense to Malta; and to enable him to obtain one from thence to Sicily; but this offer was declined.
Lord W. Bentincksaid, that captain Romeo had performed considerable services to the British army, and that those services were of a nature to draw down upon him the dislike and revenge of the Neapolitan, government. The noble lord opposite had said, that he had stipulated with the government of Naples, that persons who had distinguished themselves in the service of Great Britain, should not be punished or injured; and that the people of Sicily should not be deprived of the rights which they had enjoyed under the constitution which England gave to them, as well as the rights which they had previously possessed. But the British authorities had scarcely taken their departure from Sicily, when the king of Naples tore from the people, not only the new constitution, but deprived them of all their rights and privileges. Since he had left Sicily, he had had little communication with that country, but from something which had fallen from the noble lord the other night, he was induced to make inquiries, and was made acquainted with the extraordinary fact, that in 1818, by a public edict, the king of Naples, in compliance with the recommendation of the Congress of Vienna, had united the government of Sicily and Naples.
Lord Castlereagh, in explanation, declared he had never heard of any such document as that quoted by the noble lord. He hoped the noble lord would produce the document, if in existence. When applied to on the subject, he had refused to give the king of Naples any advice as to his conduct with regard to Sicily. The noble lord knew very well that he (lord C.) had endeavoured in ain to administer that system to which he alluded. The parliament not being able to reform itself, threw itself into the arms of the king.
Sir J. Mackintoshsaid, that the statement of the noble lord was of importance, not merely as it related to the case of the individual, but to the general affairs of Europe. The noble lord opposite imagined that there was a contradiction between him and the noble lord behind him. There was; but it was merely as to words. It was asserted that the king abrogated the constitution of Sicily, in consequence of the act of the Congress of Vienna. The noble lord denied the fact; but did not the noble, lord recollect the secret treaty between. Naples and Austria, dated the 12th of June? That flagitious treaty had produced the effect of which the noble lord behind him complained. It was a treaty conceived in the true spirit of foreign tyranny—it bound the king of Naples not to introduce any regulation in the affairs of its internal government, without the sanction of Austria. It certainly struck him as not a little singular, that ministers should have referred the case of capt. Romeo to the Neapolitan government. He could not help observing, that the conduct pursued towards captain Romeo—a foreigner—a man in reduced circumstances—a brave man—a man who was nearly ignorant of the English language—who was friendless in a country to which he had rendered important services—was not very creditable to the English government.
Lord W. Bentinckthen read the document in question.
Lord Castlereaghexpressed his doubts of the authenticity of this document.
Mr. Humesaid, that the noble lord had mis-stated the fact when he said, that captain Romeo had escaped from prison, whereas on that occasion he had been transported by an order from the king of Naples, countersigned by the English consul, Mr. Lee, in a Swedish vessel to Egypt. With regard to the 1,400 l. it had been paid as a bribe to the mistress of the French general, to procure his escape. With respect to the length of time of his claim, how could it be otherwise, when he was two years and a half in getting to England, and was then ten months before he could get an answer?
Ordered to lie on the table.

NAPLES.
Sir R. Wilsonsaid that having seen a letter purporting to have been written by his majesty's minister at Naples, which he had good reason to believe to be authentic, containing princi-

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ples the most objectionable in every point of view, be had thought it his duty to bring it before the House. The House would bear in mind the circular letter of the noble lord opposite—that it declared the intention of the British government to maintain the strictest neutrality; they would remember also, that when the British army evacuated Sicily, a declaration had been made, that the British government would not interfere in the affairs of the two Sicilies, except in two cases:—1. If an attempt was made to wrest from Sicily its rights, which had been established under British protection; and 2. If any persons who were employed as agents of the British government, were persecuted for what they had done in that capacity. It was, therefore, with much surprise that he had read the letter of sir W. A'Court to the minister of foreign affairs at Naples, who had requested to know the intentions of the British government, particularly with respect to the British fleet stationed in the Bay of Naples. In this letter, sir W. A'Court, after stating that the British government had no intention to interfere in the affairs of Naples, adds this remarkable exception: "It will interfere in no way with the affairs of this Country, unless such interference should be rendered indispensable by any personal insults or danger to which the royal family may be exposed." That this could bear he other construction than that of a possible attack upon Naples, was evident by what followed:—"Not foreseeing the possibility of such a case, the undersigned flatters himself that nothing will alter the peaceable attitude in which Great Britain is placed." There could be no misconstruction in this it appeared that sir W. A'Court thus claimed a right for the British government to attack Naples if the royal family were exposed to danger or insult—to telegraph the British fleet to bombard Naples while the Austrians were attacking it by land. The laying down of such a principle as this was detrimental to the independence of all nations, and therefore injurious to ourselves; for we could create no principle of national law which might not one time or other be applied to this country. He could state, on information which enabled him to pledge his authority for its correctness, that at Troppau, when the conversation turned on the probable changes of ministry in England, and the possibility of some members of that House coming
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into power, the directing minister of the alliance being present, said, that if such a change should take place, the allies were determined to treat England as they were now treating Naples. When in reply to this it was observed that Napoleon had found great difficulty, in spite of all his power, in getting to London, the same minister said, we may find the same obstacles for a time, but we can treat England as an infected or tainted nation. This conversation was not loose talk. It was intended to prove the extensive, comprehensive nature of the confederacy. If the principle laid down by sir W. A'Court could be maintained—if it were to go forth to Europe that such was to be the ground on which a war might be commenced—he put it to the noble lord whether pretexts would be wanting to involve Great Britain in hostilities. Did he think that the machinations that had disturbed other nations—that had agitated Spain, that had distressed France, that had suspended the Habeas Corpus act in England—would be wanting in Naples to compel this country to take part in the war already commenced? Did he imagine that the adversaries of the new constitutional system in Sicily would be deficient in their mischievous activity? Might not even the allies themselves use effectual exertions to drag the British government into this most impious crusade? Dismissing this, however, he would ask whether this menacing neutrality was not calculated to alienate the feelings of the in habitants of Naples—holding out, as it did, that their king was the property of the foreigner, not of the native? Would it not rather urge them to, than restrain them—from the very acts sir W. A'Court deprecated? Such was not his language only. In 1792, a communication was made from the Crown to parliament, and in the discussion Mr. Pitt conjured the House not to employ such language as in the furious state of the French people might serve as a pretext for the commission of that crime which all must be desirous to avert. The instructions sent to lord Gower were in the same spirit: he was instructed to declare, that the strictest neutrality should be preserved, but to add, that it was not inconsistent with this neutrality to express his majesty's solicitude for the personal safety of the royal family of France. That was the language of true neutrality; and, that neutrality was then meant was evident, from the

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fact, that even after the execution of the Icing, war was not immediately declared. Mr. Pitt then declared, that whatever might be their indignation at the event, it formed no ground of hostility, nor should he recommend a war of vengeance; and though M. Chauvelin was ordered to quit this country, a door was left open for accommodation, and war was ultimately declared by the French government. How was it possible, indeed, that with any show of reason we could regard a violence done to the person of a monarch as a ground of hostility—we, who had adjudged one king to die in a manner which few were now prepared to say was not lawful, however they might condemn the execution? We who had tried and sentenced the sovereign of another country by a regular tribunal, and who, by another act, had deposed a third sovereign. He did not pretend that the king of Naples had regarded the invitation to repair to Laybach as a blessing of Providence, nor would he assert that that monarch, having sworn to maintain the constitution, rejoiced in the opportunity of violating his oath. He left it to the allies to cast such a foul imputation on their brother monarch. But he would suppose that the king of Spain or Sweden had sworn to maintain a constitution, and had afterwards leagued with foreigners to destroy it; he would ask, was it possible that we should interfere and say, whatever the guilt of the sovereign, we would protect him, and if the axe of the law should fall, that we would unsheath the sword of vengeance? It was impossible to say this without violating the rights of independent nations. It was the more necessary to ascertain the nature of our neutrality, as, in spite of the noble lord's circular, the allies, in their declaration, had asserted, that though the British government, from particular motives, could not join with them, there was "a perfect unanimity of principles and views" between the allies and this government. It became the more necessary to know the nature of our neutrality, because we knew the whole extent of the charges against the Neapolitans, which consisted in their having assembled a parliament, and accepted the Spanish constitution, of which the king and the people were said to be ignorant. Now, was the noble lord prepared to say that the king of Naples had not previously signed the Spanish constitution, to secure Iris succession to the Spanish throne?—
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But where was the crime of the Spanish constitution? Had it not been in action in Spain? Had it there caused destruction to persons or property? Had it even raised the sword of retributive vengeance? It was said, too, in the manifesto of the allies, that the Neapolitan people were now discontented with the new order of things. Was there any proof of this in their present enthusiasm? There was also the old burthen of the Carbonari, who were sometimes said to be contemptible for their paucity, sometimes formidable for their extent, and who were alleged to have cast off all respect for morals and order. In the same spirit a noble lord in another place had asserted, that the Carbonari had taken an oath, not only to disobey the laws of man, but of God. This, however, had been a charge of old standing; it had been made against all reformers, even against the primitive Christians. He would not quote Julian the apostate, but one of the greatest historians of the world, who had termed the Christian religion "exitiabilis super-stitio;" and, in reference to the accusation against the Christians, that they had attempted to burn Rome, added, "haud perinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani gen eris convicti sunt." He was acquainted with the secrets of the Carbonari, and he could say of them, as was said of the Stoics, "nulla secta benignior, nulla amantior hominum." The noble lord would answer, no doubt, that they had been guilty of assassination: it was true, and all history proved, that assassination was the weapon employed by the oppressed. The emperor of Austria had desired him on one occasion to lose no opportunity of declaring that nothing should induce him to trespass on the independence of Lombardy; but, no sooner had prince Eugene signed his unfortunate treaty, than the lust of dominion returned; and it was demanded, in the first instance, that the kingdom of Italy should be annexed as a province to the Austrian empire. With regard to the occupation of Naples, he could give the noble lord some information. The military occupation, and even vassalage of Naples, and of the country north and west of the Mincio, was an inalienable part of the plan of the allies. Another part of their project was to take and keep possession of Ancona as a tête de pont, for the lodgment of stores Without danger of interruption to the line of communication.

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The noble lord was probably ignorant of this part of the scheme; and he did not seem to be aware that Naples had annually paid no less than 5 millions sterling to Austria. Of course the emperor would not be very willing to relinquish so large a tribute. These considerations should have induced the noble lord to interpose, and say that this country would wot suffer the military occupation of Naples. Did he know that Sicily also was to be occupied by means of a Russian armament? And did he apprehend nothing from another rival? It was well known that the Americans had long been endeavouring to obtain possession of a port in the Mediterranean, and it was not improbable that the Russians would allow them to take possession of Syracuse. But, thank God! all these were now past danger. The question now rather was, whether the Austrian frontier should be thrown back to the Tagliamento? He would now tell the noble lord, when the event could no longer be retarded by publicity, that he would soon see the beacon of liberty flaming on every height, and shedding light into every vale that had been obscured by the darkness of slavery. The knell of despotism had been rung, and God be thanked, by the hands of the despots themselves. The moment pf the union of the partitioners of Poland against the south of Europe was the commencement of the destruction of ignominious oppression. The allies were engaged with the power which Napoleon could not resist. He sinned against the spirit pf the age and fell, and the same event would always follow the same atrocious attempt. The prince regent of Naples had already done himself immortal honour, and he would need no other protection than the loyalty and courage which his own bravery and fidelity would inspire. He concluded by moving for "A Copy of a Letter, dated 11th of February 1821, from sir W. A'Court to the Neapolitan Minister for Foreign Affairs; together with Copies of any Instructions from His Majesty's Ministers on which the same was grounded."
Lord Castfereagh,in rising to offer such explanations as he felt it to be his duty to supply on a question of this nature being brought before the House, would principally confine himself to the motion immediately under consideration. He should hot think it necessary to enter into the discussion of all the topics which the
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hon. officer had touched upon, connected with the enthusiasm of the people of Naples. He should not inquire into the correctness of his information, nor say any thing on the subject of the rich repast which had been afforded by his details of conversations at Troppau, though he could assure the House that they had entertained him from their perfect novelty, as much as they could possibly entertain any one. Neither should he think it necessary to enter into the question as to the alarm which this country ought to feel on account of the efforts of America to gain a footing in the Mediterranean—neither should he follow the gallant officer through any of the prophetic visions in which he had indulged with so much satisfaction: he should content himself with saying that for his part, he should tranquilly wait for their fulfilment, without taking all the predictions of the gallant officer for gospel in the first instance. He apprehended, that to induce the House to give the document called for by the hon. officer, they must have some understanding that he meant to submit some practical motion on the subject to their consideration; because, if his object was merely to ascertain whether or not the document which had been published was genuine, he was ready to admit at once, that the note, such as it had appeared in the newspapers, was perfectly correct. It could not therefore be necessary to call for the paper to ascertain what was the language which our minister had held to the Neapolitan minister, nor could it be necessary to call for the production of a copy of the letter to prove that that which had been published was correct. He should judge that the hon. general, if he had any proposition to offer, must intend to show that the House ought to censure the conduct of ministers for issuing such a document, or that if the document was unexceptionable in itself, that he must propose to show that the principles which it set forth were inapplicable to Naples. No person, he apprehended, could mean to deny all right to interfere on our part in the event of the royal family of Naples being in danger. He must protest against the assumption that the language held respecting the royal, family, could in fairness be construed into any thing like a departure from neutrality, to any thing like a threat of interference on the part of this, country with the internal affairs of Naples. The inter-

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ference mentioned in the note was merely in the event of personal violence being offered to any members of the royal family, and being merely an interference in a personal cause, it was distinct from political interference. The House could not be unaware of the discretion which government must necessarily grant to its ambassadors or agents in foreign states; and from official experience he could say, that such discretion could never be more safely granted to any officers than to sir W. A'Court and sir Graham Moore. The gallant officer had somehow contrived to entangle his argument with an allusion to the language of Mr. Pitt at the outset of the French Revolution, with regard to any parliamentary interference for the protection of the royal family. But although the conduct of Mr. Pitt was highly prudent, under all the circumstances of the case, it did not follow that the course pursued by sir W. A'Court, under different circumstances, was not perfectly right. In the case, however, of Mr. Pitt, which the gallant general had dwelt upon, so far from the principle of non-interference with regard to that family having been recognised, both sides of the House were equally anxious to deprecate any personal violence against the king or his family. To the honour of Mr. Fox, it could be said, that that distinguished statesman was quite as forward as Mr. Pitt, in reprobating the foul and impious deed which had stained the character of France, and fixed the brand of infamy upon its revolution. That deed had, in fact, placed France in a state of moral warfare with all the civilised world. Sir W. A'Court, in his letter, had threatened no interference with the internal concerns of Naples, but on the contrary, had laid down in the broadest manner, the principles of strict neutrality by which the conduct of his government would be regulated, and had declared that nothing could induce England to interfere with their affairs at all, but the circumstance of violence being offered to the royal family. Unless the House were disposed to adopt a principle directly opposite to that which had been sanctioned by them in 1792, they could not now resolve that the letter of sir W. A'Court at all deserved to be made the subject of suspicion. Though he (lord C.) denied the right of this government to interfere with the internal affairs of Naples, he would insist that a-state of things which so endanger-
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ed the royal family of that country would go to extinguish all the amicable relations of the two nations, and all the treaties at present subsisting between that country and this, and tend directly to place them in a state of hostility towards each other. The hon. general, wishing to goad and to drive this country into a contest in the cause of the Carbonari, had defended that sect. He had said that which would lead to a belief that he was in their secrets; he had represented them to be most virtuous, and their assassinations he had traced to the former system of government there established, while he called on the House to behold in them the fruits of despotism. But did the gallant officer forget that assassinations had been committed in this country? Such things had been known, and when the gallant officer described such crimes to result from despotism, he might be allowed to retort, and declare them to have grown out of secret conspiracies. He would therefore protest against the Carbonari and their assassinations, and against that principle which sanctioned the conduct of subjects who had been induced to bring their sovereigns before what had been called a regular tribunal. He apprehended the House would not, at this moment be disposed to relieve the executive government from the responsibility of persevering in the course which they had adopted. It was not now for them to consider what ought to be done, if unfortunately this government should interfere in the contest. When this should happen, then would be the time to call them to an account for departing from the principles which they had avowed at the outset. He would assure the gallant officer that those considerations had not escaped the notice of his majesty's ministers which he had been anxious to press on their attention. While they avoided committing this country to a new contest, they had taken that course which was likely most effectually to protect British interests, and even the cause of liberty itself (in the most enlightened view of the subject) from, the dangers which were to be apprehended. Their conduct was calculated to guard Naples against placing itself in a situation which might make it almost impossible for the other governments of Europe to reconcile themselves with the party that might prevail. He believed the people of Naples to be more enlightened than the gallant offi-

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cer, if he might judge from what had fallen from him that night. He did not anticipate that those excesses would occur which had been contemplated. The effect produced by the letter of which the hon. officer complained, was very different from that which he might suppose. Instead of its calling forth indignation, sir W. A'Court had received the congratulations of all classes on the occasion, it having been regarded as a protecting document, well calculated to prevent the occurrences of those violences, which, in times of popular revolution were but too justly to be apprehended. It was, in fact, considered as a guaranty of that neutrality which Great Britain had all along professed. This country had not received congratulations more cordial for any part of its conduct, with reference to its neutrality, than it had done on this very point. If the gallant officer supposed that this proceeding arose out of any community of feeling with other powers, or that it was likely to involve us in any thing that might grow out of that community of feeling among other powers, he entertained an apprehension that had no foundation. Before the congress of Troppau had broken up, the order of this government was issued; and our officers abroad were instructed to preserve the strictest neutrality. The terms used were those adopted by sir W. A'Court, and the position could not be laid down more strongly. Before the orders were officially issued, our officer abroad was vested with a complete authority and discretion to make them public, in any manner most conducive to the object which the government had in view; namely, to prevent a stain being fixed on the Neapolitan people by any insulting treatment of the royal family, and to show, by our conduct to that family, the strict neutrality which this country wished to preserve. Though circumstances did not admit sir W. A'Court to make the statement public immediately, or to let the government know that such were his instructions; still no remonstrance was directed to him, on the subject of our fleet. On the 5th February, our minister thought that circumstances rendered it necessary to state in what aspect the British government viewed the affairs of Naples; and, at that time, he furnished to the then minister, a statement of the intentions of this court, in order that the minister might, if he thought fit, make it known
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to the Neapolitan parliament. At that time, the Neapolitan cabinet did not deem it necessary to go into the subject; but afterwards, when the war broke out, the minister called for a further explanation, and sir W. A'Court furnished him with the document. It was therefore a declaration issued without the knowledge of the powers at Troppau. The act was done before they knew any thing about it. This was not an instruction issued merely on an abstract view of the possibility of such a danger, because, when sir Graham Moore sailed in August, after the revolution had taken place, it was thought that, under peculiar circumstances, the royal family might have occasion to be removed from Naples; and, in consequence, a general order was given to him to afford every facility if the occasion occurred. But when separate information of special danger was received by government, as was afterwards the case, ministers would not have acted rightly if they had not furnished his majesty's officer with a special order, founded on that separate information. They, however, guarded the terms of that order, so as to prevent this country from being involved in any difficulty, or the royal family from being subjected to any danger on account of it. In the instructions directed to the officers, they were ordered to take especial care that those general instructions were not perverted, to purposes which were not contemplated at home. Whatever might grow out of the interference of this government, nothing connected with it could involve the tranquillity of this country. The instruction had no connexion in its origin, or in the object to which it led, with any thing that could bind us to a community of interest with the allied powers in their present proceedings. And, however delightful it might be to the gallant general to heap taunts on those sovereigns, whom he would ever consider the saviours of the world from the greatest calamity that could befall it, he thought it was not the sort of recompense which they deserved from any member of that House. But, though he viewed their character and conduct in a very different light from the gallant officer, he must observe, that this country was not a party, in any degree, to the course of policy they were now pursuing. This country separated from the principles which they laid down at Troppau and Laybach. The ministers of this country denied the prin-

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ciple which those sovereigns had laid down with respect to other states; and, in the present instance, resting on their own principles, and proceeding on their own grounds, they had sent forth the instructions to our minister at Naples. The doctrine of the gallant officer with respect to Austria was really of an extraordinary character; for, according to that gallant officer, Austria was proceeding to Naples, for the purpose of taking permanent military occupation of that country, which the gallant officer maintained had long been a desirable object with that government. Now, among all the flights to which his (lord C.'s) countrymen were liable, he could imagine nothing more extraordinary than that of supposing a government, long desiring the military occupation of a country, would give up the possession of that country as soon as it was obtained. Yet, what was the conduct of Austria upon conquering Naples, and especially Murat? Why, instead of betraying the least desire to retain military possession of that country, it immediately withdrew half its army, and the emperor dispatched a letter to the king of Naples, which he (lord C.) had seen, stating to the king that he had employed his forces in Naples, only for the purpose of restoring him to the throne; and that the remainder of the Austrian army should be promptly withdrawn, if the king felt that he could rely upon the native troops which were then marshalled in Naples. Well, the emperor of Austria did withdraw all his troops, and Naples, was left to that army, which appeared from recent events, to be so much under the influence of the Carbonari. When this was the case, he thought the gallant general was not justified in making those statements, which must necessarily produce inflammation. The gallant general had on this occasion stood forward as a sort of evidence in favour of the Carbonari; he had acted as a kind of amicus curies, to defend them from all attacks. He seemed to wish us to adopt their system, which was so perfect that it must purify the political and moral atmosphere. His argument seemed to be, if their principles produce so many blessings, why should we not have Carbonari here? He could never listen to such a project, until he found that benefits were rather to be expected from secret sects and combinations, than from open and avowed governments; He looked upon secret
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sects to be opposed to all good government. He had never known any thing but evil to spring from them; and notwithstanding all the gallant general had said, he should ever feel it his duty to oppose them. The principles of the British constitution justified him in denouncing such associations as ruinous to every order of society. The object of the Carbonari evidently was, to subvert all the governments of Italy, as recognized by the treaties on their table; and to have some general system, by which all the governments of Italy should be consolidated into one mass, contrary to the system which now existed. If gentlemen opposite were favourable to this general system, it was fair in them to give the country notice. It did not shake his opinion of those gentlemen; but it was fit that the government and the parliament should beware of taking advice, which was mixed up with such a dose of noxious ingredients. He could not feel the gallant general's enthusiasm;—he could not credit his prophecies; and he would repeat what he had said the other night, that Austria had no idea of breaking the treaties by which she was bound, or of making inroads on the territories of other states. This being the fact, when he heard the gallant officer endeavouring to mislead the House, on so important a point, he must enter his caveat against such statements, and declare, as an honest man, that he believed them to be unfounded.
Mr. A'Courtvindicated the conduct of his relation, observing, that the reception which the reading of his note met with in the Neapolitan parliament furnished a complete answer to the objections which had been urged by the gallant officer.
Mr. Hutchinsonsupported the motion, and reprobated the proceedings of Austria, and the other members of the holy alliance, towards the independent people of Naples, who, from the vigour of their struggles against such a formidable conspiracy of despots, had proved that they deserved to enjoy the blessings of liberty.
The Hon. J. W. Wardsaid, he considered neutrality on the part of this government towards Naples, as a sound general principle. At the same time, he could not but regret that our conduct had not been of a more decided aspect, and that we had not a little, sooner exerted that influence which belonged to our character. There might, he would, admit, be good reasons against this line of con-

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duct on our part; but what he meant to contend now was, that though acting upon moderate principles, we ought to have taken the important station which belonged to us, and that instead of being found skulking in the rear of the allied powers, we should have taken the lead. He did not mean that we should have resorted to arms, but that we should have exerted the influence which properly belonged to us, to have averted, if possible, the calamities which were now about to befall Naples. We could not for a moment, as men, as gentlemen, or as Englishmen, sanction the principle of such an interference in the internal administration of a country as was now acted upon with respect to Naples. If the principle were to be sanctioned, that Naples was to be interfered with for limiting her monarchy, what right had our ancestors to complain of the interference of foreign powers when we had changed our dynasty? He must contend against the monstrous principle of interference on the part of the despotic monarchs of Europe, to put down any principle of liberty which the increasing information and wisdom of other nations might think necessary for their own better government. He adverted to the impolicy of this country sanctioning, in the slightest degree, any such interference. The principle, he observed, which the allied sovereigns termed legitimacy, was high treason with us. The king of England could be no fit associate for such monarchs: he was of a different order of beings: incumbered as he was with a free constitution, they would be ashamed of him; and glorying in all the blessings of that constitution, he would be ashamed of them. But, who were those who joined in this crusade against the dawning liberties of Naples? Who were those who were afraid that her success would give an example for a military despotism? Why, among them was the emperor of all the Russias—a monarch who governed by a ukase; who possessed absolute power over the lives and property of the inhabitants, not merely of a great part of Europe, but, he might say, of a great part of the world; who reigned despotic from the great wall of China to the ocean;—a sovereign whose power, was so absolute, that, according to the opinions of Russian jurists, he could leave the empire by will to whomsoever he pleased;—a monarch, whose peace establishment was greater than, the war es-
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tablishment of the Romans in the height of power. Was this the sovereign who was so anxious to preserve the kingdoms of Europe from any danger of a military despotism? Why, the whole system of Russia was military. All the honours and distinctions conferred in that country were of a military character. If she had occasion to send for any learned man from another country—for she had no great men of her own—the honours she held out to him were military. On one occasion, when a celebrated algebraist was sent for, he was immediately made a colonel of a regiment; and, if a man were there to discover the longitude, no doubt his reward would be to have a pair of epaulets placed on his shoulders, and the cross of some fighting order on his breast. And yet the sovereign of such a country was the man who was now so tenderly afraid, lest a military despotism should be established at Naples! And how did he propose to prevent such a disaster? By giving military occupation of it to the troops of his brother of Austria, and, if need should be, of his own; and all this to prevent the lawyers, or the lazzaroni at Naples, from having any share in the constitution! He begged of the House to consider to what dangers we ourselves had been exposed, before we had attained our present degree of constitutional liberty; through what difficulties, errors, and, he would add, crimes, we had passed to secure its possessions; and, after all, there was no one who would say that we had purchased it too dearly. But the revolution in Naples had not cost the life or property of a single individual. If we could say that it had been the work of Jacobins, or compare it to the barbarous massacre which had produced a revolution in another country, we might view it differently; but the question here was, were the Neapolitans to have no change in their internal government but what should be sanctioned by the despots of Europe? Were such attempts to be put down by the sovereign who, having established despotism in his own county, considered himself bound to crusade against liberty in those of his neighbours—by the monarch who, having established himself as a task-master at Milan, now wished to become the dictator at Naples? It was said, that there were Carbonari concerned in the revolution at Naples. Admit it; but did that strengthen the ground for attracking Naples? He knew that there were

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many great and good men among them: he knew that Prussia owed a great deal to such secret associations. But suppose that all such secret societies were put down did Austria flatter herself that the hatred in which she was held existed only in secret societies? If she did, she would find, herself fearfully mistaken. Not a plant in the fertile vales of Lombardy flourished so fruitfully as did the hatred with which her rule was received. Wherever the feelings of men remained—wherever a spark of the love of liberty was cherished in Italy—there existed this un sworn conspiracy against the destroyers of that liberty. This had existed, and would continue to exist, as long as the hatred to Austria lasted—which would be for ever. The only ground that Austria could have for a war with Naples, would be, if it had been proved that the government there had tampered with the Carbonari at Milan; that might be a ground, first of remonstrance, and afterwards of war; but no such thing had been proved. The real ground was that Carbonari existed at Naples, and that the emperor was troubled with the same description of persons in some parts of his dominions. We were now in the possession of all the benefits of a free constitution. The Neapolitans had not yet reached that state of perfection; but he trusted he should never see them deterred from pursuing their object by the failure of their present attempt, but that they would continue the struggle until they arrived at perfect freedom. There was nothing in the present state of Europe which did not show a wish, on the part of the people, for a better and more mitigated form of government. The wisest thing which those governments could do would be to comply with that wish: if they sought to extinguish the feeling, it might remain smothered for a time; but it would at length explode; and whenever it did, it would terminate in their ruin.
Mr. Canningsaid, he was unwilling to protract the debate; but, considering the situation in which he stood with regard to his majesty's ministers, he felt it to be due to them as well as to himself, to express his sentiments upon the question now before the House. Having held an official situation at the time when that policy which the motion of the hon. and gallant general had brought into discussion was adopted, it would be most un-candid in; him if he did not avow and even claim his share of the responsibility
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which could attach to the measure which was now called in question; arid he had no hesitation in avowing, that the order-upon which the note of sir William A'Court was founded, was an order for which he was responsible, and for the justification of which, he was content to appeal to the House, to the world, and to posterity. At that period he entirely agreed with his colleagues, that the principle to be acted upon was one of decided and strict neutrality—neutrality not in word only, but in deed. Anxious, however, as the government were, to preserve such a line of conduct, still he should have held them to be the basest of mankind, if they had not provided for one probable case—if they had not qualified that system of neutrality with one condition—if they had failed to provide, as far as instructions could provide, for the perfect security of the royal family of Naples. To fling herself into that vortex of political agitation which must evidently remain after the withdrawal of the royal family should be effected, was neither the duty of England nor the intention of government; but to effect that withdrawal, if necessary, was the policy which had distinctly been avowed from the commencement of the contest. The gallant general who had brought forward the present motion, had thought proper to allude to the' conduct of this government at the commencement of the war with France. He had stated, and had truly stated, that the instructions then given were of a different character from those which we had in this case given to our minister at Naples, and that a proposition made by the other side of the House, for direct interference, when the safety of the royal family of France was menaced, was received by his majesty's then government, not only with caution and distrust, but with an admission of the danger and impolicy of interference, as being calculated to produce the very danger against which it purported to provide. Surely the circumstances under which that proposition was then made, were extremely different from the present-But if Paris had stood upon the ocean instead of standing as it did: upon: the Seine, could there be any doubt that we should then have given instructions to secure the safety of the royal family of France, and that those instructions would have been unanimously approved, as well by the side of the House which approved, as by that, which now discouraged a

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similar proposition under different circumstances? God be thanked, there had been no occasion to act upon the instructions given with reference to the royal family of Naples, and that the prudence arid discretion of our two public functionaries had not been tasked on this occasion. He must say, however, that if those instructions had not been given, and circumstances had arisen under which they might have been rendered necessary, it would have been an indelible stain upon the counsels of this country. With this single exception, as stated in the note of sir W. A'Court, it was the opinion of his majesty's government, when he (Mr. C.) was a member of it, and he had no doubt that that opinion remained unchanged (though his own responsibility had ceased, and he of course possessed no means of knowing the fact), that a perfect neutrality should be observed—an entire absence from any participation in the policy or counsels of the allies.
It was impossible for anyone who had heard the debate of that night, and who had listened to the speech of the hon. and gallant general, to doubt that the line of policy intended to be recommended to this country was war [No, no! from the Opposition benches]. The House was much fuller at the present moment than it was when the hon. and gallant general had made his motion, and many gentlemen therefore, who swelled the cry of No! no! could have no personal means of estimating the value of his assertion: but he would appeal to the candid opinion of any gentleman, who had had the advantage of hearing the hon. general, whether the hon. and gallant general had not, in terms, advised, if not a war, at least an armed negotiation; and whether he had not declared, that in the event of the failure of such an armed negotiation, this country would be proud to incur the burthens of war in such a cause? He would submit to the House whether he had exaggerated the hon. and gallant general's statement. When an hon. member brought forward a motion for the production of a paper, the consents of which were known to all mankind, he would ask, what was the meaning of a perseverance in debate, and a division {if it was intended to divide,) but to take the sense of the House, not upon the production, of the paper, which for all practical purposes was in the possession of the House, but upon the sentiments
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and opinions with which the production of the paper had been supported or denied? The division of this night was in effect, a division for peace or war. His (Mr. C's.) voice was for peace, and for the true means of preserving peace, namely, neutrality [Hear, hear!]. What was the difference, in effect, between a declaration in favour of war, and of an armed and menacing negotiation? Did the hon. and gallant general propose such a negotiation without intending to push it to a war, in the event of its failure? Much had been said of the change of character which this country had undergone from former times; but he believed it never yet presented such a picture of degradation as it would present, if, after assuming a menacing tone, it retracted its pretensions and shrunk back into tame acquiescence as soon as that menace had failed. In truth, then, it was proposed to enter into war with all the great powers of Europe—into war with all the powers to which at present we were allied—and for what purpose? If he knew himself, there sat not that man within the walls of the House of Commons—no, not even those in whose mouths the words were most familiar—who was disposed to view with less distrust an extension of the principles of freedom and good government throughout the continent of Europe than the was. He was not of the niggardly opinion of some persons in this country who congratulated themselves on their own freedom, less from the positive blessings which they enjoyed, than from their contrast with less happy nations. He did not measure his own happiness by the misery of his neighbours, nor did he grudge that other nations should participate in that constitution which formed the blessing and the glory of his own. He saw that the principles of liberty were in operation, and should be one of the last individuals who Would attempt to restrain them; but there was a difference between excusing an action when done, and using such means as should incite to that action: and England might incline to be satisfied with a result, yet scarcely approve the measures by which such result was brought about. He trusted that he never should arrive at that state of calm contemplation in which the gallant general opposite had talked of the murder of Charles 1st as a lawful proceeding. He hoped that no liberality of principle which might imbue his mind, would ever induce

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him to look at that transaction with any other feelings than those of the horror and disgust which its atrocity was calculated to excite. But even if he could bring himself in his closet to doubt of the enormity of the crime, certainly he never would, in public, give vent to such an opinion. Quite sure he was, that he would never speak such a sentiment in that House; and still less would he proclaim it aloud to a nation in the act of struggling for the attainment of independence.
Excidat illa dies ævo: nec postera credant
Sæcula; nos certe taceamus &c obruta multa
Nocte tegi nostræ; patiamur crimina gentis.
The time might come when other nations would have to claim that candour and indulgence which the gallant general so liberally extended to the history of his own. Ia God's name, let not England be foremost to vaunt her own shame, and to hold up her fault as an example to other countries: let her excuse herself if she could; if not, let her remain silent. Whether she gave her aid to the Neapolitans or denied it, let her at least withhold that aid which consisted only in the suggestion of crime.
In stating once more that he was the advocate of an unqualified neutrality, the right hon. gentleman said, he would advert for a moment to another course which had been hinted at. It was said, that there were means by which this country might aid the Neapolitans without committing itself to the issue of their struggle; that it might at least give the sanction of its opinion to the cause of freedom. Now it was upon that point more than upon any other, that he was at issue with the hon. gentlemen opposite. If it was right that, with a view to favour the progress of liberty, we should declare our alliances broken, and make war against those powers who were now called the oppressors of the earth, in God's name let that course be decidedly taken. Let the House sit day after day, and night after night, until their minds were made up; but let them then declare their determination when taken plainly and openly. Let there be no mistake about it. Let the country be told, "although you are already heavily burthened, there is yet a great work to perform, and you must prepare for new exertions and new sacrifices. True, England is saved; but that is not enough: Europe must be regenerated, and at your expense." If
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this was to be done at all, it must be done openly and avowedly; but, to adopt such a policy, and to follow it secretly and by by-ways, would only prolong the struggle, aggravate the difficulty, and probably defeat the end. Of all modes of support which England could extend to other countries, a constructive support was the most unfair. Direct support was capable of definition; it might be stated in precise terms, and recorded in stipulations which could not be mistaken: the country made an engagement, performed it, and there was an end. But constructive support, by which the receiving party usually understood all that they were entitled to expect, all that they might want, and the bestowing party that they were to be expected to furnish only what they might find it convenient to give, would only leave the deluded victim to finish with her single means, that which she had undertaken in the confidence of continued assistance. Had England no warning of the effect of such conduct? Let the House look at the case of Parga, so loudly and pertinaciously deplored and misrepresented by those who are now for countenancing and stimulating Naples, in which case the accidental expression of a British officer had been construed into a promise on the part of Great Britain, which must necessarily embroil her with a considerable portion of the globe. Suppose such a constructive promise to have been given to Naples, and suppose Naples, upon the faith of it, to have embarked herself in a contest, which otherwise she would not have undertaken—what disgrace, what eternal infamy, would be cast upon England, should she fail to fight the cause as her own; nay, as if contending for her own existence, with all the strength and means which exertion could command!
Then away with the distinction between war and an armed negotiation! Unless it was proposed to go even to the last extremity, and to involve the existence of England with that of her ally, all mention of support was but a fraud. And was it not romantic to talk of embarking the country, not on account of duty, alliance, or obligation, but merely as matter of sympathy and feeling, in a war in which she had neither interest nor concern? What instance was to be found in English history in which the country had embarked in a war of such extent, on any thing like such a principle, and come out of it with honour? Yes, one instance

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there was; glorious instance, that of Spain. If there was any part of his political life in which he (Mr. C.) gloried, it was, that in the face of every difficulty, of every discouragement and prophesy of failure, his had been the hand which had committed England to an alliance with Spain—to an alliance with a country robbed of her government, and writhing, for the time, under the fangs of the conqueror. But could it be said, that he had ever named or argued that alliance as other than an alliance for better for worse? as an alliance which knit together the fates of the two nations so closely that neither could break from it with honour? He had viewed it as an alliance for life or for death; England furnishing the necessary supplies; Spain, the theatre upon which British means, British valour, and British money could most effectually arid most successfully be exerted against a common enemy. Had he ever been seen to flinch from the contest? Had he ever consented to that compromise which had been spoken of—the going a little Way arid seeing what could be done, and then, if convenient, giving up the cause? Had he not constantly declared, that he would never have become a party to that alliance, unless he had considered the countries as already leagued by the multiplied injuries of a common enemy? Had he not maintained that England was bound to maintain the war even to exhaustion, unless, freeing herself, she freed her ally along with her? Therefore it was, that peace had been refused, unless what the enemy pleased to call the "insurgents" of Spain were comprehended in the treaty. And was it to the government that had done this, that the gentlemen opposite now imputed a fear of the word "insurgent"—a determination to ally itself with none but despots, and to fight in association with none but slaves? Perhaps there were those connected with the government who felt as warmly, and whose hearts beat as high in the cause of liberty as the hon. member on the opposite side of the House; but it was the duty of a government not to indulge their personal feelings at the hazard of casting an indelible shame upon the country; for he maintained, that it was a delusion, a mockery, to attempt to draw a distinction between an armed negotiation arid an actual declaration of war; and to hold out a little aid, a little counsel a little counsel, a little instigation, were a reservation, that
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more should not be expected, and that case of failure even that little should be withdrawn.
The House had been told, that we had arrived at a great crisis in which the monarchical and the democratic principle were at war throughout the world, and that England must make up her mind which side she would espouse. He admitted that we had arrived at such a crisis; and that the monarchical and the democratic principle were now opposed to each other, as the old opinions and the new opinions had been at the time of the Reformation. And did not the gallant virgin, queen Elizabeth, side, it was asked, with the reformed opinions of Europe? Doubtless it would be little short of heresy to presume to break the spell which encircled the name of that illustrious heroine; and, while she was merely praised, he would abstain from objection; but, when beyond being merely praised, she came to be held out as an example, then her conduct must be subjected to examination. The character of queen Elizabeth might be found in history, and—a little perhaps to the shame of England—it would be found best given by a writer of another nation, Rapin had fully characterised Elizabeth; and certainly that historian had every reason to speak with partiality of a princess, the bulwark of the Reformed religion—being himself a Protestant, who had fled to England from his own country, upon the revocation of the edict of Nantes. But what, under all these favourable circumstances, did Rapin say of Elizabeth? Did he accuse her that, overlooking the wants of her own country, she plunged into wars of which she could see no end? No: Rapin said, that Elizabeth followed those wars as long "as they served her own interest." Now, was that the kind of assistance which it was intended that England should afford to Naples? What would be said of England, if after encouraging Naples to try extremities, which she might otherwise avoid, England in those extremities deserted her? What would be said if, after contracting an alliance with Naples in June, and after a massacre taking place in that country in August, the king of England were, in September, to stand godfather to the infant child of the conqueror? And yet, such was precisely the conduct of Elizabeth: for, at the very time when the treaty of Blois was in agitation, she. was busy in stirring up the

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Huguenots; and, but a few months after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, she stood godmother to the child of Charles 9th.
He now came to the question—had England any duty, obligation, or national interest for entering into the present contest? Statesmen would not plunge the country into war unless its interests coincided with its sympathies: and the House would act most unjustly, if they first encouraged the Neapolitans to continue the war, and then abandoned them in the midst of their difficulties. Whatever the House, therefore, might think of the paper put forth by the allied powers—and no man abjured its principles more fully than he did;—whatever the House might think of the condition of Naples, he did believe that, in taking either one side or the other of that great quarrel, in which the allies were one party, and in which Naples represented, rather than was, the other—he did believe, that in engaging in such a, war, the country embarked in no short or trifling contest. If it was to be a contest resembling that which took place at the Reformation, let the House remember what the duration and extent of the contest originating with the Reformation had been. He would call them visionary statesmen:—he would say that they were an unwise parliament—if they suffered their feelings to run away with them, and to urge them to acts in contradiction to the interests of the nation. He felt that he should be hurrying to a precipice, over which it must inevitably fall, the nascent cause of liberty, if he should undertake to fight its battles with means so scanty as should compel him to furl his banner before the battle should be ended. The House was sitting to do the business of the country—to look to the practical interests of the country—and it would be a poor excuse in those who were responsible for the advice which they gave to the country, to say hereafter, in imposing fresh burthens upon the people—"in truth we were misled by the enthusiasm of the moment; we were so angry at the foolish and pedantic state-papers of the allies, and all that was said concerning Naples was so moving, that we were induced to vote for war, and now we come to you with afresh taxes to enable us to carry it on."
Let the House, therefore, reflect on the probable result, before they allowed themselves to be led away by such motives of
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action. There might, indeed, be some temptation, if, as he said before, this sacrifice, this exhaustion of ourselves, were to promote the cause of general freedom. But could hon. gentlemen imagine that any exertion on the part of this country,—that even the devotion of its whole strength and resources to the cause of Naples—would increase the mass of national happiness and national gratitude?. Look at the constitutions which were at present framing throughout the world. Before we set out in a war to propagate opinions, we should be sure that the opinions for which we contended were such as we highly approved and thought worthy of being propagated at the expense of the vitals of the country: we had a right to know that we were contributing to the happiness of the human race before we engaged in such a war. It was, however, remarkable, that those who wished to go to war for the purpose of: conferring on Naples the blessings of the British constitution, were very busy in whispering at home that the British constitution was good for very little. The language held by these gentlemen was, "The English constitution is not good for much, but come, my merry men all, let us fight for the establishment of the British constitution in Naples." Would to God that the British constitution were capable of being transplanted into other countries, and of taking root in their soil! But the idea of establishing it in other countries by the force of the sword, was too chimerical to be entertained. Let us not suppose, highly blessed as we were in the enjoyment of our envied constitution, that there was no salvation without its pale. Whatever might be the result of the present portentous, struggle, it was not in our power to lead the parties to the point we wished, either by persuasion, remonstrance, or force. Let those who did not enjoy the happiness which we derived from a stable constitution, and who had grievances to redress, seek that happiness and that redress with our best good-will; but Jet us not, in the foolish spirit of romance, suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe. Let us not forget that we were, rather likely to mar the experiment by our interference; let us recollect that the interference of strangers was always sure to become, either sooner or later, an object of Jealousy. Show him the duty that called for the interference of Great Britain, and

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then, how great so ever the sacrifice, he should say that duty must be performed; but obligation in this case he saw none. Here the spirit of monarchy was at war to crush every principle of freedom, said the one party; and there, said the other, the spirit of democracy was labouring to destroy alt monarchies. We ourselves had in our constitution enough of democracy to temper monarchy, and enough of monarchy to restrict the caprices of democracy. Where was then the necessity for our incurring those risks which other countries, not possessed of a tempered constitution like our own, might laudably encounter? Why should we bring that which was settled into the same state of fluctuation as that which being at present unsettled must continue so until it should find its way to a settlement;—a way to be found, not so shortly and directly as gentlemen in the sanguineness of their spirit of propagandism assumed,—away not to be taught perhaps by foreign example, much less to be opened by foreign arms. The price at which political liberty is to be valued, and the cost at which it is to be obtained, constitute the nicest balance, and one which only those immediately interested in the calculation are competent to decide. It was impossible to contemplate the struggles now going on in different parts of the world without anticipating struggles between the contending principles, fierce, arduous and of doubtful issue
Long years of havoc urge their destined course
And thro' the kindred squadrons mow their way.
But to those struggles it is not our duty to be parties; and to that havoc we have no moral right to give the stimulus of our exhortations, or the fallacious encouragement of a partial and precarious support. Let us rather maintain a perfect neutrality; where obligations exist, discharging them with strictness and rigorous impartiality, but cautious to contract new ones which it may be neither our duty, not our interest, nor within the scope of our ability to discharge. He knew that it might be a task of difficulty to maintain this perfect equilibrium: the course We had to pursue was on a plank which lay across a roaring stream; attempts might be made to bear us down on the one side or the other. Our duty however, and our interests equally prescribed to us to persevere in an unde-
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viating path, to preserve our resources entire until the period should arrive, if ever, when we might exercise our only legitimate right to interfere, from being called on to quell the raging feuds that threatened to distract the peace of Europe.
Sir J. Mackintoshsaid, he was under the necessity of rising in order to remove the obstacles which his right hon. friend had ingeniously raised to obstruct and confound all clear views of the subject, rather than for the purpose of contesting any of the principles which he had advanced. On the general subject he was not called on to make any declaration of his sentiments, after the unanswerable speech of his hon. friend, the member for Bossiney—a speech, the argument of which he defied the power of man to overthrow—a speech adorned equally with all the charms of wit and eloquence; wit to illustrate reason, and eloquence to enforce argument. It was not his intention to follow his right hon. friend through all the topics which he had thought proper to introduce, without the slightest relation to the subject before the Housed He rose to disclaim those intentions and principles which his right hon. friend had imputed to all who had spoken on his side of the question, and which were entertained by not one of them. He would not follow his right hon. friend in those excursive wanderings into the history of this and other countries, with which he had amused the House; nor would he follow him in his panegyric on that government of which he had recently been a member. It would really seem as if he occasionally retired from the government, in order to have an opportunity of eulogizing its councils with a greater appearance of disinterested impartiality. He had well observed the address and ingenuity with which his right hon. friend had fastened on a parenthesis here and there in the speeches of his opponents, with the view of discovering some insulated proposition to which he might attach obloquy, since he found he opportunity of attacking the argument. Of this nature was the attack on what had been said respecting the propriety of bringing monarchs to trial for their political offences. Now, he conceived that no man should be brought to trial who could not be tried fairly; and as he believed that prejudices must always exist which would deprive kings of a fair trial, he

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would without any superstition towards them, apply to them the same general principle as to other men, and say, that if they could not be tried fairly, they ought not to be tried at all. His right hon. friend perceiving that, among all the parties that more or less divided that assembly, there had been expressed only one opinion of intense abhorrence against the conduct and avowed principles of the holy league, was aware that there was no chord in that House on which his eloquence could operate, but that which vibrated to the love of peace; and there fore he had created an imaginary party, whom, he represented as wishing to plunge the country into the horrors of a war. To this imaginary opponent whom he wished to combat, he had imputed sentiments which bad never been uttered in that House, but which had all along been abjured by every hon. member who had spoken on the subject. If the opposition had recommended remonstrance at the beginning of the atrocious invasion of Italy, his right hon. friend told them that remonstrance must end in war. His hon. friend (Mr. Ward) had said, that as he had loved peace, he wished our government had spoken out sooner; and with that sentiment he cordially agreed. The policy for which they blamed ministers was, the neglecting to take any measures for preventing what had now covered Italy with confusion, and might involve all the nations of Europe in war. Did any man ever hear, till this night, that remonstrance from one nation to another must necessarily be followed by war? Did any statesman ever lay down such a principle? On the contrary, did not the history of Europe abound with instances of amicable remonstrances against war, which had never been followed by hostilities? If France and England had expressed, six months ago, their opinion, against the war with Italy, would that opinion have been despised? Were they sunk so low in the scale of national con sequence, as not to be able to prevent their own allies from engaging in such a war? Was it for this that we were called the protectors of Europe, and boasted of having, set all Europe free? Now, he maintained, in the first place, that the policy of early, remonstrance would have been pacific; and that, by neglecting it, war had been ultimately rendered al most inevitable; and, in the second place, he denied that remonstrance necessarily
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carried the alternative of war.—The hon. and learned gentleman next adverted to the observations made in defence of the instructions given to sir W. A'Court. No man in that House blamed the government for placing a squadron, in the bay of Naples, for the protection of British subjects and British property. As to the other object of the squadron—the removal of the royal family in case of danger—it no doubt was consistent with neutrality, and therefore it was unnecessary to argue this point. The declaration that our shores were likely to afford the best asylum for the royal family, would, however, have come with a better grace from other lips, than those which, for the last seven years, had been advocating a cruel and inhospitable Alien bill. But he would ask one question connected with this topic—Was not the unfortunate king conveyed from Naples in a British ship, when he proceeded to appear before the self-constituted, usurping, tyrannical, and insolent tribunal at Laybach? Had not all Europe read with horror the account given by the duke de Gallo, first, of the interview between him and prince Metternich, and then of that between him and the poor infatuated monarch himself, in the presence of prince Metternich? From this account, it appeared, that the unfortunate monarch had not been allowed to see his old friend and counsellor alone, but had merely been brought, as it were, from his prison, and permitted to hold a conversation with him in the presence of the minister of the allied sovereigns. It was not, therefore, against the violence of the people of Naples, but against that of the monarchs at Laybach, that the royal family required protection. The noble lord (Castlereagh) had said, that be did not agree with the general principles avowed by the allied sovereigns; but that he was not prepared to contend that, they were not justified in the line of conduct which they were pursuing. The declaration of the emperor of Austria, however, was directly at variance with that of the noble lord; for he stated, that the government of England perfectly agreed with the principles on which the alliance were acting, but that, particular circumstances prevented it froth taking an active part in the proceeding. Did these words convey any idea that the Austrian cabinet supposed that the English government did not concur in the principles which regulated the allied sovereigns? If his right

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hon. friend, instead of reading the history of Elizabeth's reign in a book written by a respectable French refugee, bad consulted an English work of standard authority, and written by no less celebrated an author than lord Bacon, be would have found that the zeal with which Elizabeth espoused the cause of the oppressed people of the Netherlands and of the French refugees, was dwelt on as one of the greatest glories of her reign. He had thus defended himself and his hon. friends against an attack, which, with whatever skill and eloquence it had been made, must fall to the ground, and "like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a wreck behind."—His right hon. friend had asked, why they should give their support to those who would not take the English constitution as the basis of their liberty; and seemed to think that by that argument, which was quite inapplicable to the present case, he had found out an inconsistency in their conduct. But, the only opinion which he had ever asserted on this subject was, not that the Neapolitan constitution was a good one, but that the independence of nations had been attacked by the flagitious conduct which the allied powers had exhibited towards the Neapolitans. Indeed, it appeared to him, that the allied powers, by their circulars from Laybach, had been guilty of the same attack upon the independence of nations that the National Convention had been, by its decree of July 1792 of which the overt acts were the seizure of Belgium and Savoy. In the same manner that the convention had attacked the independence of the world, had the members of the holy alliance attacked the independence of every nation in Europe, and thus had left the question of peace and war to them only as a matter of policy and prudence.
Sir R. Wilsonmade a short reply, in the course of which he vindicated the Carbonari from the charge of being the promoters of assassination. He likewise eulogized them for the wisdom with which they, had projected, the bravery with which they had executed, and the glory with which they had consummated, their revolution of Naples, and stated that the principles which they professed were so widely diffused through out Italy that there was scarcely a single Italian who was not a Carbonari: the right hon. gentleman had said, that there was a conflict now waging throughout the world between
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the monarchical and the democratical principle. He denied it; but he would allow that there was a conflict now waging between the principles of an arbitrary and those of a representative form of government; and from the bottom of his heart he hoped that the representative form of government would prove triumphant. As the letter of sir W. A'Court was written merely for the purpose of informing the Neapolitan government that the British fleet would only be employed in case of any personal outrage being offered to the royal family of Naples, he should beg leave to withdraw it.
The motion was accordingly withdrawn.