Sitting of 17 April 1821

REFORM OF PARLIAMENT.
After petitions in favour of a Reform of Parliament had been presented from Northampton, Tavistock, Devon, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Suffolk, Cumberland, Southwark, Nottingham, and sundry other places,
Mr. Lambton* rose, and addressed the House as follows:
Mr. Speaker; in pursuance of the notice which I gave, I rise to bring under the consideration of the House, the state of the representation of the people in parliament. If at all times, and upon all subjects, I must be most unwilling to trespass on the attention of this House, on no occasion can 1 be more reluctant than on the present; and I can assure you, that nothing but a deep sense of public duty, and an anxious desire to put end to that spirit of discontent now so generally prevailing, could have induced me to take up a question, the great and important interests of which I feel that I am not competent adequately to protect. In the first place, I know that I have to contend against that disinclination which has invariably been shewn by this House towards its discussion; a disinclination founded possibly on that dislike which is inherent in all men, and bodies of men to hear accusations against themselves, and statements of faults and corruptions openly laid to their charge. If I wanted any evidence in support of this assertion, this well-known truth, I should undoubtedly find it in the present state of the benches opposite to me. Perhaps indeed I should be justified in taking advantage of it, and at once submitting
* From the original edition, printed for Ridgway, Piccadilly.
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my motion to the vote; as the result of that division clearly would be its adoption: for it requires no great discernment to perceive that at this moment the majority is greatly on the side of the friends to reform.
But, Sir, I shall not be tempted into this irregularity, as it would prevent that ample discussion, that calm and deliberate consideration, to which this important subject is justly entitled, and without which it would be a mere mockery to propose it. If this scantiness of attendance is meant as an insult to myself, I treat it with contempt: if it is pointed at the question, I then repel it with feelings of deep indignation, and can only hope that it will not be lost on the people of England, who will not, cannot be insensible to the manner in which a subject so interesting to them, has been treated by his majesty's ministers. Indeed of all the placemen who usually crowd the opposite benches, at this moment I only perceive those right honourable twins, so lovingly united in affection, in principle, and in the representation of the oyster-dredgers of Harwich.*
In addition to this studied neglect, I have also to lament the disadvantage of following those eminent and illustrious characters, who have at different times advocated this question, and who by their virtues and their abilities have conferred as much lustre on the cause, as they received from the sacred and patriotic nature of the trust confided to them. I know, likewise, that I shall have to contend against the weight of the overwhelming eloquence of a right hon. gentleman opposite, (Mr. Canning) who has ever placed himself first and foremost in the ranks of those who oppose any alteration in the state of the representation, and whose hostility is never directed with more zeal, energy, or ability, than against that extended principle of amelioration, which it is my duty this night to press on the consideration of this House. Under these great and manifold disadvantages, therefore, and a deep sense of my own inadequacy to overcome them, I can only hope that the House will extend to me that indulgence, which at no time was more necessary, and that they will
* The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Bathurst, who were then seated side by side, and were the only members on the Treasury bench.

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believe me when I assert, that my motives for undertaking this arduous office are founded solely on an ardent desire to serve my country, and to conciliate large classes of the community, loudly, but steadily complaining of their deprivation of the greatest privilege of our constitution,—and attributing, and justly in my opinion, the distress under which they are at present labouring, to a long system of misrule and mismanagement, which never could have existed, much less continued, if it had not been caused and protected by a gross and notorious system of corruption in the representation of the people.
Sir, I have heard much said lately of the dangerous state of the times—and I think with justice, for they are awful and portentous; sad from the recollection of past, and gloomy from the prospect of future events, before the fulfilment of which, the importance of both past and present difficulties fades into nothing. There is, I am aware, a spirit of discontent daily increasing, which cannot now be lulled or removed by those excuses which formerly passed current—by those promises which a long succession of years has seen as readily and un-blushingly broken, as they were cheaply made in compliance with each temporary cry from the people for reformation and amendment. The increase of national education, and the consequent expansion of the intellects of the middle and lower orders of society, renders it now quite impossible to conceal any longer the causes of our national misfortunes—and this doctrine I find unexpectedly supported by an authority, and in a quarter, from whence I least expected any assistance. Since I came into the House this night, an extract has been placed in my hands from an address to the grand jury of Lancaster, by Mr. Justice Best, which fully confirms the assertion I have just made. The learned judge there says,—" The general diffusion of reading among the lower classes of society, requires the adoption of other measures than were necessary during the prevalence of ignorance; it would be as absurd to adhere to the old custom of acting, under the new circumstances, as it would be, to treat animated beings in the same manner as things inanimate."
I lately, Sir, had an opportunity of ascertaining the habits and opinions of a large portion of those classes in the north
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of England: and I must confess, that I was astonished at their improved intelligence—at their vigilant attention to political subjects. There was hardly a village, however secluded from the world however remote from large cities, however seemingly cut off" by difficulties of access from communication with society, in which I did not observe the most vigilant attention to all the great points of our national policy, and the most scrutinizing observation, not only of measures but of men. Were these symptoms to be discovered even twenty years ago? I think no man will assert that they were, or will deny, that the lower and middle orders were then more remarkable for apathy, and a subserviency to the will of their superiors in rank, than for that independent and intelligent spirit which now animates them, and which only requires the occurrence of a fit opportunity to prove its existence in all parts of the empire.
In further proof of this feeling, I may also instance the numerous petitions that have been presented this night, and at former periods, all containing complaints against the present system, and insisting on the necessity of reform. It is not therefore, a matter of absolute necessity that we, who call ourselves the representatives of the people, should at length undertake that just and salutary work of amelioration and concession, without which we cannot hope they ever will be satisfied? I say without it they never can be satisfied; because we cannot, when we consider the state of the country, deny that their complaints are just. In what a situation are we now! We have a national debt of more than 850,000,000 l.—an annual expenditure of 53,000,000 l.—a taxation the most burthensome and oppressive in the known world, and yearly decreasing in productiveness, in the same proportion that it increases in severity—a Sinking Fund, which is the veriest delusion that ever was attempted to be practised on a country —our commerce in a state of the greatest depression—an agricultural interest petitioning from all quarters, and declaring its inability to exist without a protection which, if afforded, would irritate, perhaps greatly injure, a manufacturing interest already exposed to the greatest difficulties in its higher quarters, and whose working classes are nearly reduced to starvation.

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We have, besides, a standing army of more than 80,000 men, an object Elways of the most constitutional jealousy to our ancestors, although it seems of none to us; the existence of which was even assigned as one of the reasons for deposing James 2nd.—We have a system of corruption in the greatest activity, by which seats in this assembly are publicly advertised for sale, and as publicly and notoriously bought and sold—and, to complete our domestic picture, we are repeatedly alarmed by accounts of treasons and conspiracies; nay, it was but last night that we were told by a noble lord, the secretary at war, that we were only in the first year of domestic peace! Our gaols are overflowing; and our eyes are shocked, and the better sympathies of our nature disgusted, by the mast barbarous aud unnecessary executions—the effect of the impolitic severity of our criminal laws.
If we turn our eyes outwards, we find no accession of national honour or character to make up for our bankrupt and miserable state at home. Repeated violations of public faith and solemn pledges, recorded to our eternal disgrace, in the transfer of Norway,—the base abandonment of Genoa,—the partition of Saxony, —the surrender of Parga—A steady and undeviating support of all those feudal abuses and despotisms, which it is the object of the holy alliance to bolster up if possible; evinced, I say, most unequivocally, by our repeated adoption of an act the most repugnant to the free principles, although not to the present practice, of the British constitution, I mean the Alien Bill—An utter indifference to the struggles of a people contending for constitutional liberty; when a firm remonstrance, breathing the genuine spirit of English freedom, might have arrested the invading arms of Austrian barbarism, and prevented a war which has too unhappily succeeded, for the moment, in its sacrilegious aim, the repression of freedom, and the riveting again of chains which an effort of just and noble resistance had peacefully broken—All these, and many other characteristics of our foreign policy, which I need not now mention, have degraded us in the eyes of the people of the continent, and rendered us with them objects of distrust, suspicion, and hatred.
Under these circumstances, is it not natural that every mind capable of re-
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fleeting should be earnestly employed in endeavouring to ascertain the causes of this consummate degradation of national character? Nor have the people of England, unfortunately, far to look —the origin of all their misfortunes is to be found in the abuses prevailing in that branch of the legislature which was originally designed for their protection—
Hoc fonte derivata clades,
In patriam, populumque fluxit.
Sir, for a long period of time the people of this country had to contend against the tyrannical encroachments of their kings, and the undue exercise of the prerogative; nor did they succeed in establishing their rights for a time, until after the see rest struggles, and the effusion of the jest and noblest blood in the nation. At length, the system of attack was altered: it was discovered to be far more easy to govern by means of a majority in the House of Commons: and infinitely more effectual to employ the arms of corruption, than those of oppression, or of violence. Since that fatal discovery was made, our liberties have been at the mercy of all ministers, to whatever party they may belong; and if we now possess any, we owe it to their forbearance, and not to their being destitute of the power to destroy them entirely.
Let us only look at the means placed at the disposal of the minister of the day:— The management of our enormous revenue and expenditure; in all its minute and innumerable branches—the possession of the force and influence of the Crown, exhibited in legions of tax-gatherers, clerks and officers of all descriptions in the different boards of customs, stamps, and excise—the distribution of 4,000,000 l. and upwards amongst those civil troops, amounting as they do to 10,000; the nomination of which is always vested in the ministerial member, in the town or county which he represents in parliament— the patronage of the army,—the navy,— the church—and the India board.—All these weapons, steadily and invariably directed towards one object, the strengthening the influence of government in this House, form a weight of power which the people, as at present represented, cannot resist. The consequences have been fatal to our happiness and prosperity. That check which the people are constitutionally supposed to have on the power of the Crown, by holding the reins of tax-

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ation in their own hands, and having the power of withholding the supplies, has been rendered null and void, in consequence of the great majority of their representatives being returned by improper influence—by the Crown in some instances, by peers in others,—in many cases the member returning himself—but all possessing interests distinct from those of the people.
Ought it therefore to be a matter of surprise, that the national debt was increased one thousand millions during the late reign? or can we expect the people to be satisfied with a system, through? which they have been plundered of these millions, to provide for the most wild and extravagant wars—the termination of which has always left them in a worse situation, than they were in at the the commencement? I contend, therefore, that it is the paramount duty of every true lover of his country to endeavour to restrain and diminish the influence of the Crown, and prevent it from destroying those constitutional defences of the rights of the people, which are to be found in a state of representation directly and purely emanating from themselves. The theory of the constitution, according to the best authorities, is, that all the parts of it form mutual checks on each other. I think it is Blackstone who has said, that in the legislature the people are a check on the nobility, the nobility upon the Crown, and the Crown upon both. But the practice, according to modern innovations and corruptions, is widely different from this theory. In the enumeration of those checks, we must entirely omit that of the people: for they are not represented in the legislature. When I say this, I mean, that although there may be some few members returned according to the purest spirit of the constitution, yet that the great majority are returned by the most improper means, without even the remotest shadow of popular delegation. In proof of this, I am now ready to adduce in evidence at the bar of this House, that 180 individuals return, by nomination or otherwise 350 members.
Now, Sir, does any man who hears me imagine that those members do not, in the first instance, consult the wishes and political attachments of those to whom they are indebted for their seats? How often do we hear it said, "Why has Mr. A. taken the chiltern hundreds?" The an-
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swer constantly is—? "Because he cannot conscientiously vote with lord B. or Mr. C. who returns him, and therefore he deems it a point of honour to resign his seat"—a point of honour, by the way, which I never hear of, as being acted upon towards the people, however it may towards the patron. But all these facts are too well known, for me even to trouble the House by the mention of them—individually they know them to be true—collectively they know it—for they have often been brought under the consideration of parliament; and one noble lord (Castle-reagh) in particular, accused of having bartered a place for a seat, has no reason, I think, to be delighted by any accession which thereby has accrued to his constitutional fame. The result however, shortly, is this: By direct nomination—by the existence of boroughs, where some 20, 50, or 100 voters are septennially bought and sold like cattle in a fair—by the influence of government, which, owing to the small number of electors, as compared with the population of the empire, can but rarely and partially, and then most expensively, be resisted—a majority is always to be procured for the administration of the day—a majority, forming a body, the most convenient, the most pliable, the most manageable, that the wit of man could invent; sanctioning measures solely on the principle of ministerial recommendation, without any reference to the expressed wishes of the people. Instances of this I need not enumerate, for they are now matters of history, and their records are accessible to all; as a sample of the commodity, I may however mention, that a majority of a House of Commons sanctioned and approved the infamous expedition to Walcheren—as for its pliability, I myself have seen the same members voting for that very question, which they had negatived only one hour before. But I will not weary the House by the detail of the long and black catalogue of offences committed by its predecessors, for of the present House I am prevented from speaking, as I should wish, by the existence of forms which I do not intend to violate.
Now, Sir, to prevent the further continuance of this state of things, the recurrence of such proceedings as I have thus generally described, is the object of my motion. In order that the people may be fairly and adequately represented in the legislature, and the balance of the con-

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stitution thus restored, it is necessary, in my opinion, that there should be an extension of the elective franchise to the unrepresented classes contributing directly to taxation—copyholders, leaseholders, and householders; that all venal, corrupt, and decayed boroughs should be disfranchised; and that there should be a recurrence to Triennial parliaments, accompanied by such restrictions on the expenses of elections, as could easily be accomplished under a reformed system, but which now it is quite impossible to effect, and useless to attempt.
It would indeed be presumptuous in me to attempt to enter into a detailed history of the origin and constitution of the House of Commons. It has been so often and so ably discussed within these walls, that nothing new, in fact, can be adduced on the subject: a short allusion however to its composition, will, perhaps, be permitted me; and I trust the House will not be wearied by a short review of the statutes which have been passed at various times, affecting either its duration or constitution. In the reign of Edward 3rd an act was passed by which parliaments were to be held annually, in consequence of a disinclination both on the part of the sovereign to summon them, and of the representative to attend: arising on the one hand from a too great tendency to arbitrary power, and on the other from a lamentable deficiency in spirit and zeal in the people—the most fatal and ruinous symptom which can exist in a national character: nay, to such a height was this feeling carried, that it was found necessary to pass a law fining members for non-attendance, and fixing the rate of their wages, as a greater inducement. Still, however, parliaments were not held or called either according to the letter or spirit of this enactment, the ill effects of which are apparent in every page of our history. At length, in the 16th of Charles 2nd, c. 1, it was ordained that parliaments should be assembled every three years: and in the 6th of William and Mary, c. 2, the Triennial act was passed, which recites, that by the ancient laws and statutes of the kingdom, frequent parliaments ought to be held, and that frequent and new parliaments tended very much to the happy union and good agreement of the king and people, and enacts that a new parliament should be called once in three years at the least."
The last act relating to this subject,
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and under which the present duration of parliaments exists, is the stat. 1 Geo. 1st, s. 2, c. 38. It recites, that "it had been found by experience that the clause in the act of William and Mary, limiting the duration of parliaments to three years, had been found grievous and burthensome, by occasioning greater expenses at elections, and more violent and lastingheats and animosities, than ever were before known; and there being a restless and popish faction in the kingdom, designing and endeavouring to renew rebellion and an invasion from abroad, and that if continued it might prove destructive to the peace and security of the government; and therefore it ordains, "that all future parliaments shall continue seven years, unless sooner dissolved by the sovereign authority."
This act, commonly called the Septennial act, was not passed without earnest discussion and resistance, as every one conversant in the history of the country well knows; and I find in a protest in the House of Lords, on that occasion, arguments so cogent, and so applicable to the view I entertain of this question that I hope the House will excuse me if I read a short extract from it. After claiming frequent parliaments, as agreeable to the constitution, and the practice of ages, and denying the right of a House of Commons elected for three years, to extend its duration to seven, the protesting lords go on in these words: "We conceive that this bill is so far from preventing expenses and corruptions, that it will rather increase them; for the longer a parliament is to last, the more valuable to be purchased is a station in it, and the greater also is the danger of corrupting the members of it; for if ever there should be a ministry who shall want a parliament to screen them from the just resentment of the people, or from a discovery of their ill practices to the king, who cannot otherwise, or so truly be informed of them, as by a free parliament, it is so much the interest of such a ministry to influence the elections, (which by their authority, and the disposal of the public money, they, of all others, have the best means of doing) that it is to be feared they will be tempted, and not fail to make use of them; and even when the members are chosen, they have a greater opportunity of inducing very many to comply with them, than they could have, if not only the sessions of parliament, but parliament

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the subject, for it was necessary that she should be heard upon the matter. He really begged pardon for detaining the House so long; but there was one more point to be noticed, and he should then have done. It had been stated, that a baron of the exchequer had been absent from the discharge of his duties for three years together. Now he (the lord advocate) would declare, that that baron was never in all his life absent from his duty for more than one year at any time. It had been also said, that he resided the greater part of every year at Hath. True—but he regularly came back to attend his duties as a baron of the exchequer for the term. He presumed that the noble lord had been misinformed upon the case; it was perfectly true that this individual was in a very ill state of health, but that did not prevent him from discharging his duty.
Lord A. Hamilton, in explanation, said, that, the learned lord seemed to have understood him as using the fact of the absence of the baron of the exchequer, as an "argumentum ad hominem:" but it was with quite a contrary intention. All that he meant to say was, that, judging from the absence of this gentleman for two or three years (a term which the leaarned lord had corrected, by substituting one year in its place), it appeared that four barons were sufficient for the business of the court.
The Lord Advocateremarked, that individuals were always liable to indisposition. He had felt it necessary to make the observations which he had made in justice to the character of a distinguished individual now no more.
Sir John Newportcontended, that the House were justified in entertaining a distrust of his majesty's ministers upon this subject. Three cabinet ministers had voted in the first instance against the institution of a commission; but such a distrust, was further reasonable, because his majesty's ministers had done every thing in their power, first to delay, and afterwards to frustrate the objects of that commission. After the address which was voted had been carried to the foot of the throne, seven months elapsed before any thing was done in the business. At last the commission was appointed; but the learned lord had said that commission had travelled out of its jurisdiction in meddling at all with the constitution of the court, as regarded the judges. Now
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it so happened that all the commissioners concurred in the opinion of the propriety of such a proceeding, and he believed the learned lord himself was the only person who thought differently. In Ireland similar commissioners had called the judges before them, and even examined them upon oath as to their fees. But there was nothing extraordinary in the circumstance of this commission's having con ducted itself in a manner and with views just the reverse of those recommended and entertained by the learned lord himself. Upon the learned lord's statement, those who composed it must have been more than incompetent, for they must have misconceived and misunderstood the first sentence of their instructions. But, was this a position to be argued at this time of day? Many hon. members who sat in the former parliament might remember the opinion on the subject of the abuses existing in the court of Chancery entertained by that great man whose name could never be mentioned without a feeling of respect, and who could never be recollected but with emotions of sorrow for his premature death;—he meant sir Samuel Romilly. A question was put to him by an hon. and learned gentleman, then a master in chancery, who was arguing against the commission proposed by sir S. Romilly to inquire into those abuses but who said, that if only a shadow of abuse existed, he would vote for that commission. Sir Samuel Romilly, in reply, said that great abuses did exist; and upon that statement the hon. and learned gentleman, acting with that can dour which he (sir J. Newport) expected from him, did vote for the commission. And what was the conduct of the first law-officer—the first minister of the Crown-—? in consequence? Why, the House would hardly believe it. The question of inquiry having been carried;—of inquiry into the abuses existing in the chancery court too, two masters in chancery were appointed out of a body of five commissioners. The House had this fact before it; that those commissioners drew up a report upon the chancery courts of England, and in no one instance did they enter into an examination of the subject of fees. As to that great abuse, the expedition-fees in the court of chancery, it was declared that though it might be an abuse, yet that the commission saw no means of remedying ft. So again, among the receipts of the secretary to the lord chancellor, there were two

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small substance and no value, whereof every of them pretended a voice equivalent with the most worthy knights, whereby riots, batteries, and so on, among the gentlemen and other people"—(The House will naturally suppose the sentence concluded with "unhappily have occurred:" on the contrary, all we find is— shall very likely rise and be—and therefore provides that knights of the shire shall be chosen by people dwelling and residing in the same counties, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement to the value of 40 s. by the year at least above all charges, and that they which shall be so chosen shall be dwelling and resident within the same counties."— From this period is to be dated the transfer of the elective franchise from all freeholders and all freemen, to freeholders of the amount of 40 s. a year: a period marked also by another most glaring invasion of the liberties of the people.—the adoption of an act compelling labourers and artificers to work for low wages, under severe fines and penalties. As, therefore, all persons denominated liberi-tenentes, and all freemen possessing property, however small its value, from which they contributed to taxation, enjoyed the right of voting until they were most treacherously and tyrannically disqualified by this act of Hen. 6th—so, I say, now, all Englishmen, possessing the same qualifications, ought to resume those rights which were shamefully wrested from their ancestors under the most false pretences; for the preamble of the bill which I have just read, fully exposes the weakness and absurdity of the reasons alleged; and effected also under circumstances, and accompanied by other measures, bearing no other stamp than that of the most arbitrary power.
The stat. 23, Hen. 6, c. 14, recognizes in its recital an act passed in the 1st Hen. 5th, respecting what sort of persons shall be choosers, and who shall be chosen knights and burgesses; and declares that knights of the shire shall not be chosen unless they are resident within the shire, and the choosers also resident, and the same with regard to cities and boroughs. These laws, as to residence, were not repealed until the 14 Geo. 3, c. 58; and the reasons assigned in the preamble to that act are most ludicrous —that the provisions in them had been found by long usage to be unnecessary, and had become obsolete. The fact was,
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that the qualifications there insisted upon as to residence, had long been purposely evaded, or manifestly disregarded, from the most corrupt motives, although the statutes were positive and unrepealed. In these enactments, the principle of a fair and just representation is to be recognized; namely, that no county, city, or borough, should be represented but by persons resident in, or free of them, and consequently acquainted with their various interests and necessities. But is this principle, just as it is, at all applicable to the present state of the borough system? Many of these boroughs, formerly populous and flourishing, and therefore represented, are now decayed and depopulated; consisting, in many instances, only of posts or stones, denoting merely the site of former dwellings. Is it according to the spirit of the constitution? Is it according to the tenor of the statutes I have just cited, that these substances should return members to parliament? And how are they represented? By burgesses "resident in or free of" these boroughs? By no means. I think, if I were to appeal for confirmation to this House, and I were honoured with an answer (which is certainly not very likely), I should be surrounded by members, starting up on all sides, declaring that they had never been blessed with the sight of their inanimate, and, fortunately, insensible constituents; or, if they had seen them, it was when, after travelling post-haste to the Land'send, to undergo the forms and insulting mockery of an election, they had carefully taken them out of their trunks, into which they had recently been transferred from the dignified retirement and security of their, solicitor's office.
I say, therefore, that the right of sending members to parliament, which is now vested in these rotten boroughs, ought to be abolished; because those places need no separate and distinct representation for themselves; and may be, nay notoriously are, the means of introducing a corrupt influence into this House. As to whether the owners of this borough-property ought to receive any compensation or not, as suggested by Mr. Pitt, and I believe lately by a noble lord near me (lord John Russell), I should say, decidedly not, and for this reason—if this right, this white-slave-trading right, was taken away from them, they still would remain in possession of their legal and

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constitutional property, their lands and their houses, the only property the existence of which they dare openly avow to the world. It would not be depriving them of any thing they ought to have, it would be depriving them only of the corrupt and unconstitutional practicability of selling seats in parliament, or bartering them for places, pensions, sinecures, and other appointments in the gift of the minister.
Here, Sir, I may observe, that down to the reign of Henry 8th, possibly later, members of parliament received wages from their constituents, as I have stated before, which were assessed and levied by a public rate. The practice is undoubtedly in one sense discontinued; for the constituents in many places are now paid themselves for performing their functions, and the members in return claim and receive their wages in other quarters. This payment, when effected by constituents, operated as a bond of union, and attached their representatives to them as their employers. The principle of payment still, I believe, prevails: but the employers are changed; and, I fear, the people of England do not consider the change as having operated beneficially for their interests.
But, setting aside the delicate question of payment, both as regards the member and his constituents, surely it cannot be, as Locke has well observed, upon a fair principle of representation, that the members for boroughs possessing no population, or at most only a few burgage-houses, should have an equal right with the representatives of the largest counties in England, to vote away the money of the inhabitants of those counties, with whom they have not the remotest connexion; a right forming the most important privilege of the constitution, and which was vested in it solely for the benefit and protection of the people. I am aware that it is difficult to obtain an exact equality of representation, both as to numbers and property; but I consider it an object which ought to be attended to as much as possible. Property of some degree, no matter how low the value, must be the best basis on which to found the elective franchise. It is that, from which those resources are drawn, which support the state, and whose application its possessor has a right to regulate and control through his representative. It affords the best pledge for his conduct, and readers him independent of that
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commanding and overbearing Influence or temptation, which, if exerted against a poor and dependent man, would prevent the possibility of his bestowing a free and unbiassed suffrage.
I contend also, that owing to various circumstances, the lapse of time, the increase of population in some places, the decrease in others, and the enormous extension of the influence of the Crown, our system of representation has fallen into a degree of decay and imperfection, which imperiously calls for reformation and amendment. The nature and extent of that alteration, I own it to be difficult to determine. I am not presumptuous enough to imagine, that the course I recommend is the only one befitting us to adopt; but I think it fair in introducing this question, for which I contend on the ground both of justice and expediency, to state at once and openly, how far I think a change beneficial, and likely to be effectual in removing those evils of which we complain.
The principle of a change in our representative system is not new, and has been acted upon at different times, as may be seen by a reference to various acts of Parliament. The 27th of Henry 8th, c. 26. regulates the representation of Wales. The 35th of Henry 8th, c. 11. settles the wages of knights and burgesses in Wales, and declares who shall be the choosers of burgesses. The 34th of Henry 8th, c. 13. recites, that "the County Palatine of Chester had hitherto been excluded from sending members to parliament, by reason whereof the inhabitants had sustained many losses and damages as well in their lands and goods and bodies, as in the civil and politick maintenance and governance of the commonwealth of the county; and as a remedy to restore quietness, rest and peace—It is enacted, that the county shall send two knights of the shire, and the city of Chester two burgesses, to parliament. "The next and last statute to which I shall refer, is one in which, I confess, I am peculiarly interested, as without its adoption, I should not have had the honour of now addressing this House. In the 25th of Charles 2nd, c. 9.1 find it asserted, "that the inhabitants of the county or Durham are liable to all payments, rates, and subsidies, granted by parliament, equally with the inhabitants of other counties, and are therefore equally concerned with them to have their knights and

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burgesses to represent the condition of their county, and they are accordingly authorized to send two knights for the county, and two burgesses for the city.'' After citing this last act, I above all others, may be permitted, in the language adopted in reference to the county I represent, to say on behalf of the unrepresented classes of England, that they are "liable to taxation equally" with other subjects, and therefore ought to be represented in parliament. Those unrepresented classes, thus contributing to taxation, are copyholders, leaseholders, and householders. Upon these principles, therefore, and in the words of the Chester act, as a remedy to restore quietness, rest, and peace," I should propose that they should be admitted to the en-joyment of that privilege.
In order to affect this, I have prepared a Bill,* with the assistance of a learned friend of mine, whose valuable and efficient co-operation I beg leave now gratefully to acknowledge; and if the House will allow me, I shall, as shortly as possible, detail its provisions and objects. It is divided into three parts. The 1st part relating to householders, and the division of the county into districts, each returning one representative. The 2nd, adding copyholders and leaseholders to the county representation. And the 3rd, repealing the Septennial Act, and limiting the duration of parliament to three years.
As to the first part—The necessity of dividing the county into districts must be apparent, in order to give effect to the proposition for enabling all householders to vote, as without such an arrangement no householder could vote, unless he resided in a town to which the right of representation was annexed. The effect of a division into districts, would be, to give a representative to every 25,000 inhabitants,—of whom, reckoning one in ten to be a householder, paying rates and taxes, 2,500 would be electors. This calculation is made on the assumption that the population of England and Wales amounts to ten millions and a-half, to be represented by 417 members; the number remaining, after deducting the county members, and those for the two universities, whose representation I do not propose to alter. In 1817 it was calculated that the population of London amounted
* A copy of Mr. Lambton's intended Bill will be found in the Appendix.
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to 1,140,000, the number of houses to 161,882. It would thus appear that one in seven and a-half was a householder: and if this scale were to be applied generally, it would give 3,750 constituents to each member: but considering that great allowance must be made for the number of householders who are not rated, and do not pay taxes, as owners of small cottages, and persons receiving parochial relief, I think the fairest and truest estimate will be, that which reduces the calculation to one in ten.—The right of voting I propose should be given in these districts, to all inhabitant householders, bona fide rated to church or poor, or assessed to or paying direct taxes for six months previous to the first day of election, not having received parochial relief; every such person, except persons now disqualified otherwise than as Catholics, to be entitled to vote.
The next provision I was anxious to make, was for the fitness and impartiality of the returning officer for those districts, on the correct and fair discharge of whose duty so much necessarily depends. I propose, that he should be an acting magistrate within the district, and be chosen annually by the overseers and churchwardens; no magistrate to be eligible two years running, or to be bound to act within three years. His being elected by those who derive their appointment chiefly from the electors of the district, will inspire greater confidence than if the office were held either permanently, or independently of the inhabitants. I propose also to authorize him, to appoint a deputy to attend to the minor details of the duty, which can frequently be better performed by a professional person, whose residence on the spot is always fixed and certain; but that the principal should be bound always to attend at the election. For the purpose of still farther providing for the impartiality of the returning officer, I have inserted a clause, rendering him liable to imprisonment, if he acts corruptly, as is provided in Ireland by the stat. 57 Geo. 3. c. 131. The magistrate, however, may decline acting as returning officer, on payment of a fine of 200/. to the poor of the district. This provision I have thought necessary, as it is possible that a magistrate might be elected, who had intentions of offering himself as a candidate for the representation of the district.
The election I should propose to take

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place in the chief town in the district, to commence before twelve o'clock on the first day. If a poll is demanded, to be opened on the same day, or the next at farthest; and to be kept open on all days, except the day of demanding it, for eight hours at least; not to last longer than six days, including the first day of election; to be closed at three o'clock on the last day, and the return to be made immediately, unless a scrutiny be demanded. The returning officer will be obliged to provide a sufficient number of polling booths, separate, and with good access; the votes to be taken in them alphabetically; the letters, for which each booth is designed, to be affixed on the outside. In districts consisting of more than one parish, where the voters reside more than five miles from the chief place of election, votes may be tendered to the overseers of the parish where those voters reside. The poll there taken to last three days; to be kept open five hours each day: only three days are given, exclusive of the first day, in order that the parish-poll may be received the evening before the sixth and final day of the district poll, and thus enable the gross poll to be declared immediately on its close. The object of this arrangement is, to prevent the great expense of the conveyance of voters, by enabling all those who cannot, or will not, proceed at their own expense to the chief town, to tender their votes at a moderate distance from their places of abode; whilst at the same time it leaves unaltered and untouched that spirit, energy, and interest, which always characterize the proceedings of an election held in a populous town, where the candidate appears personally before large bodies of his countrymen, to answer openly for his past conduct, and give such pledges for his future actions as may publicly be required of him.
I wish also to provide for ample public notices of the election being generally circulated throughout the district: at present, such notices are generally given either by proclamation, or by that much calumniated individual, the bellman, whose announcement of the Suffolk reform petition has been so much objected to in the early part of this evening, by the hon. member for that county (Mr. Gooch.) I propose that the sheriff should issue his precept within three days of the receipt of the writ, to the re-
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turning officer of each district within his jurisdiction; the returning officer to give, public notice within 36 hours of the time and place of election, and to proceed to the election on the Monday next, after two days from the time of giving that notice. Now, by the stat. 7 & 8. Will. 3. the sheriff is to deliver the precept within three days, and the election must be held within eight days; four days notice at least being given. This new arrangement would make little difference in the time of holding the election, after the returning officer received the precept, but would secure the election not breaking into two weeks. Every returning officer on the receipt of the precept, to affix notices on the doors of the churches, and on the market places, of the time and place of election. The overseers to be obliged to make and send alphabetical lists of all persons rated, to the returning officer, within a fortnight after the publication of the rate, as also the collectors of the taxes, after the receipt of their warrants of collection. By this means, the returning officer will be always sure to have the proper rate ready in case of vacancies; as, if it was to be delivered only yearly, it might never be a correct guide. The confusion which arises in taking a poll, would be thereby much diminished, and the opportunities for taking objections lessened.
I propose that all persons now entitled to vote for any borough, or town, or place, now represented in parliament, should be empowered to vote for life (or as long as the right, in respect of which they claim, remains,) at all elections in that district within which the place is situated.
All the expenses of these district elections, that are authorised by the bill, namely, those relating to polling-places, clerks, messengers, and other necessary charges, will be paid out of the poor-rates of the several parishes in each district, by warrant from the returning officer and one other magistrate. This power of issuing a warrant is sanctioned by other instances, somewhat similar. The stat. 27 Eliz. c. 13, s. 5. making the hundred liable for a moiety of the damages received, enacts, that two justices shall rate the different parishes to an equal contribution. The stat. 1 Geo. I. c. 5, s. 6, adopts the same course for recovery of the sums, referring to the 27 Eliz. These statutes are amendedby the 8 Geo. 2nd, c. 26, and the the 22 Geo. 2nd, c. 46, all of which authorize the assessment to be made by two

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justices; and, lastty, the 57 Geo.8rd,c. 19, adopts the same course, taking as a precedent the 1 Geo. 1st, c. 5.
And now, as to county elections—I do not propose to alter the mode in which they now exist, further than by adding, as electors, copyholders, and leaseholders, and making the same regulations as to the prevention of expense in the conveyance of voters from distant parts, as I have detailed before in that part of the bill which relates to districts. I conceive copyhold property, whatever it might have been in feudal times, to be now as good as freehold, because the possessor of it cannot be deprived of it, as formerly, at the will of the lord. I propose also, to grant the elective franchise to leaseholders for terms of years renewable at the will of the lessee, and for terms of which 21 years are unexpired. (I should here observe, that even now a lease for life is a freehold, and gives a right to vote.) This will enable proprietors under college or other ecclesiastical leases, or under long leases for small and nominal rents, such as building leases, to vote at county elections; in which privilege I would also join freeholders of 40 s. in towns which are counties within themselves, in order to avoid the anomaly which now exists, of there being freeholders in some places who have no right to vote either for the county or town in which their property is situated.
The polling for counties I propose to be on the same principle as in district elections, for the reasons I have before stated, the votes to be tendered in hundreds or wards to the high constable; but the election to take place in the county town, as now; the duration of the county poll to be 10 days, that of the hundred poll 5 days; the high constable, his deputies and messengers, to receive a certain remuneration. There is no provision of this kind intended for the overseers in districts, because they are numerous, and will not have to go out of their parish. But the office of high constable is generally executed by an individual, who will have some distance to go from home. The sheriff to have the power of appointing as many booths as may be deemed necessary to facilitate the taking the poll. Under the present Jaw, 18 Geo. 2nd, c. 18. s. 7, he can only appoint as many booths as there are hundreds, from which much inconvenience frequently lesults. There is no one who has witnessed a contested county election, but must be aware, that it often happens
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that one booth, for the most populous hundred, is crowded from the first to the last day of the election, to the great hindrance and inconvenience of the voters, whilst others are constantly empty, and the clerks unoccupied.
I propose that the same oaths should be taken by the electors, under this bill, as at present, with the exception of the Catholic oaths and declarations (provided by the 30 Chas. 2nd, and 1 Geo. 1st.) Those acts which are now mere instruments of illiberal and impolitic intolerance, of course I shall not embody in a measure of enfranchisement. In addition, however, to the present oaths, are added some to be taken by copyholders, leaseholders, and householders; as also an oath to be taken by every candidate before his return, and on his taking his seat, that he has not, and will not give or offer any bribe of any description to any voter, or any person in trust for him. This oath to be administered by the returning officer, under a penalty of 500 l for omission; and all laws now in force against bribery are to be applied to those convicted, on the evidence of two witnesses, of having offered any inducement to an elector to give his vote.
Finally, all ambassadors, and persons accepting offices under his majesty, the duties of which are to be executed abroad will be deemed ineligible; and if previously elected, their seats will be vacated on such acceptance; as, under those circumstances, it would be morally impossible for them properly to discharge their duties to the constituents. I have not made any provision disabling other placemen or pensioners from sitting in parliament; because, however much such a measure may be desirable and necessary in an unreformed, I do not think it required in a reformed House of Commons. An individual accepting a place or pension, will be immediately amenable to the judgment of his constituents; who, if they disapprove of his conduct, will have the opportunity of expressing that opinion in the most efficacious mode, by ceasing to return him as their representative. On the other hand, if, after mature deliberation, they do not consider his acceptance of such situations or appointments incompatible with the due performance of his duties to them, it would be hard to deprive them of the benefit of those services which they desire and are willing to accept, with the full knowledge of the circumstances under

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which he again presents himself to their notice. I know that this principle is supposed to be acted upon, even now—but the effect produced is materially and essentially different. Under the present system, the placemen or pensioner who vacates, appeals, in nine cases out of ten, to the judgment of nominal or mock constituents. Under the operation of this bill, the elective body will be so numerous, and so independent, that their decision will always be formed on a consideration of what is most conducive to the general interests of the country; without any reference to those selfish and corrupt views, which now unhappily influence the proceedings of those select bodies, in whose hands the borough representation is vested.—I have not extended the provisions of this act beyond England and Wales, because a noble friend of mine (lord A. Hamilton) has already given notice of a motion on the subject of the representation of Scotland, which he wished should be kept separate; and it would be easy, if the bill was carried, to include in it both that country and Ireland.
I have now gone through the principal and most important details of this bill. It is not my intention now to move for leave to bring it in. I shall pursue the course adopted by the learned member for the University of Dublin, with regard to the Catholic claims, and shall conclude this day, by moving that this House will resolve itself into a committee of the whole House, to consider of the state of the representation. If that committee is granted me, I shall move in it resolutions embodying the principle on which this bill is founded, recommending its introduction, and asserting the expediency of thus far extending the elective franchise, as founded on a recurrence to the first principles of the constitution, which declare, according to lord Chatham, that to be taxed without being represented, is contrary to the maxims of law and reason, and strengthened by the evident tendency of many acts of the legislature, which prove that defects in our representative system have been amended when the exigencies of the state required.—It will be but fair here to state, that I consider no one who votes for going into the committee, as at all pledged to the principle of the bill: I consider such a vote as merely sanctioning the assertion that the state of the representative system is such as to require consideration in this House, with a view to its amendment.
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I well know, that in advocating the propriety of an extended change, I shall be opposed by the misrepresentations of some the sophistries of others, and the fears of many—fears which it has been the object of a certain class of politicians to excite upon all occasions, and through them to carry on the government of this country—a system which has never been considered as auspicious to the existence of liberty in any country, or at any period-It was first commenced at the French revolution, by Mr. Pitt, to cover his abandonment of his early principles, and his adoption of that very system under which he had declared no minister could act honestly. This mode has been carried on to the present day, and our minds, it seems, are still to be alarmed by visions of anarchy and confusion, to be realized whenever the people are put in possession of those elective privileges which their ancestors once peaceably enjoyed. I should have thought that a participation in acknowledged rights and benefits, was not the surest incentive to treason and disaffection—but rather a security for submission and tranquillity-It was on the latter principle, I imagine, that our ancestors acted, when they granted the solicitations of the inhabitants of Wales, Chester, and Durham, and recorded in the most solemn manner on the Statute book, their conviction that affording large classes of the community an interest in the constitution, was the best, and wisest, and safest mode of providing for its well-being and permanency.
The system pursued by the gentlemen opposite is widely different. They obstinately exclude the petitioners of the present day; heap on them every term of reproach which the ingenuity of wit, or the bitterness of sarcasm, as administered by the right hon. member for Liverpool (Mr. Canning) can supply, and then express astonishment and alarm at the feelings which they hear repeated and reechoed on all sides. To repress these, innumerable acts of restraint and coercion have been proposed by them, and of course adopted by parliament. The right of publicly meeting to discuss public affairs has been fatally abridged, and the result of this is an awful—sullen silence; still they are not satisfied: nor can it be a matter of surprise—the debate of last night* sufficiently shews that they do not
* On yeomanry corps, in the Army Estimates, see p. 275.

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forget the insecurity of power founded on force, and force alone. Hence is to be traced the course of all their proceedings, tending manifestly to one object—the repression of that voice of public complaint; which, I will tell them, may yield to conciliation, but never will to severity.
Yet, in the midst of all their alterations of the laws in order to smother these complaints, they at the same time talk loudly of the dangers of innovation! Who, I should be glad to ask, are the greatest innovators? They who seek to restore the purity of the constitution? or they who suspend the Habeas Corpus Act—pass Indemnity Bills—suspend the right of publicly meeting—who attack the liberty of the press by taxation and banishment?—These, and many other atrocities have been perpetrated by the ministers opposite, and yet they have the effrontery to charge others with that very crime, of which they, above all men, are most guilty. On my part, I deny the charge of innovation: I ask no privileges which have not already been enjoyed by our ancestors, and to which I do not consider their posterity as entitled on every ground both of justice and expediency.
Before I conclude, I must notice two arguments which have greatly been insisted upon as fatal to reform. The one is, that the present system, however faulty in theory, works well in practice; the other, that were it not for rotten boroughs, men of talent, without property, would be excluded from seats in this House. That this system works well in practice for the hon. gentlemen opposite, their friends, their relations, and their families, I cannot deny: the fact is unquestionably proved by a reference to the place lists and pension lists; but that it works ill for the country, is as surely demonstrated by a view of its present state and condition. If any man will prove to me that the country is rich, flourishing, and contented —happy at home, and respected abroad— I will then own to him that the system works as well for the people, as it evidently does for the gentlemen opposite. As for the other assertion,—I deny that the effect of a reform would be, to exclude men of talent, without property from the House of Commons. History has always proved, that characters of such a description have much sooner found their level under a free and constitutionally representative government, than under a corrupt or a despotic one. But even if that
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were the case, I hold it to be no argument against reform. For, was this House originally intended as a theatre for the display of talents and abilities? Or was it provided as an institution, forming a check on the power of the Crown? in which honesty and independence would be infinitely more valuable, especially in the exercise of its most important function, the management of the public revenue, than all the rhetorical exhibitions which could be held up to popular admiration. If this latter be the correct view of the question, then I submit that I am entitled to make the talents of the members secondary to the purity of the House. To take the case into private life, I must confess, that in my own establishment, I would much rather be served by a man of plain, downright, even stupid honesty, than by the most eminently-gifted rascal that ever wore a livery.
I fear that I have detained the House too long; but the question is so extensive and complicated, that even now I feel conscious that I must have omitted many arguments and statements which bear strongly on the case. All I beg is, that its merits may not be affected by my demerits; and that the House will consider its real and serious claims on their attention, without any reference to its advocate. This is not a time at which public opinion can be trifled with; it is making rapid and mighty progress throughout the world. Wherever it is resisted, as in Italy, the results are deplorable, and all tend to some great convulsion. Where its power and justice are acknowledged, as in Spain, the prospect is most cheering. We see disaffection instantaneously quelled—venerable and rotten abuses reformed—superstition eradicated—and the monarch and the people united under a constitution, which alike secures the privileges of the one, and the liberties of the other. May I not then consistently hail the rising of this star, in what was once the most gloomy portion of the European horizon, as a light to shew us the way through all our dangers and difficulties—as a splendid memorial of the all-conquering power of public opinion? If there be any, who deny the existence of that feeling in this country, steadily directed towards a reformation of all public abuses, I am not one of those. If there be any who shrink from advocating this great and vital question in this House, and ! thus attempting to stem the torrent of cor-

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ruption, on account of the obloquy or calumny by which they may be assailed, again I say, I am not one of those.—
—Though perils did
Abound as thick as thought could make them, and
Appear in forms more horrid—yet my duty,
As doth a rock against the chiding flood,
Should the approach of this wild river break,
And stand unshaken."
Sir, I move you, "That this House do resolve itself into a committee of the whole House, to consider the State of the Representation of the people in Parliament."
Mr. S. Whitbreadbegan by saying, that he was perfectly convinced that a reform in the Commons House of Parliament was essential to the existence of the rights and even the property of the people of these kingdoms. He had given this important subject his most full and earnest consideration; and he hoped that the House would give him credit, in rising as he did to second a motion which had been so ably stated and illustrated by the eloquence of his hon. friend for a desire only to perform that which he Conceived to be an imperative duty to his constituents. He spoke the opinion of his constituents when he said, that, as the House was at present constituted, it was nearly the reverse of what it was intended to be by the theory of the constitution. It was too notorious a fact to be denied, that a great number obtained their seats in violation of the principle of election, and in contempt of the standing orders of that House. The hon. gentleman then remarked, that without the least disposition, on a topic of such vital interest to the country, to manifest any thing like unbecoming levity, he hoped he might be permitted to make one remark which forcibly suggested itself to him. With respect to the tenacious regard for its forms and its character which that House always manifested whenever its character was called in question. The existence of rotten boroughs was notorious; the existence of corruption in the returns made of members to serve in parliament was acknowledged; the charge of selling seats in that House had been gravely laid against, and openly admitted by noble and hon. members, and yet it was not orderly to speak of these practices in plain terms, as they deserved. Really, it appeared to him, after this, that the House was much in the situation of a woman of bad charac-
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ter, with whom you might take any liberty, but that of telling her of her frailty. The condition to which the country was reduced afforded the strongest argument in favour of reform, for although petitions poured in from all parts of the country, they were treated with indifference, and produced neither a correction of abuses nor any substantial inquiry. This could not be the case if the House of Commons really represented the people. The nation was oppressed with taxes, while its representatives were only thinking of enjoying the pleasures and profits of patronage. The hon. member then expressed his approbation of the plan of reform proposed by his hon. friend, particularly that part which went to shorten the duration of parliaments; and concluded by entreating members not to be wanting in their duty as trustees of the people, and guardians of their liberties,
Mr. Wilmotspoke as follows:—If, Sir, the hon. mover has thought it necessary to offer apologies to the House for the execution of the task which he has undertaken to perform, how much more incumbent is it upon me to press such apologies, and even to throw myself upon the mercy of those from whom I am compelled to differ upon this important question; for I perceive that the benches around me are nearly deserted, while the hon. gentleman is surrounded by a great proportion of his political friends; however, I cannot allow that this thin attendance is owing to any feelings of disrespect towards the hon. member, But to the interest excited by another more vital question in another place, the success of which I trust is far less problematical than that of the measure which we have just heard proposed. I will not stop to compliment the hon. gentleman upon the talents which he has just evinced; he will receive such compliments from others whose praise he will be more disposed to value. He says, that he shall be opposed by the misrepresentations of some, the sophistry of others, and the fears of many. He will not receive any misrepresentation intentional, at least from me; he has nothing to dread from any sophistries of mine, and as for fears, I cannot allow myself to feel the slightest, that this House will consent to a measure so dangerous, so unavailing, and so subversive of the real and tried constitution of this great country.
The hon. gentleman proposes to refer

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the resolutions on which his bill is founded to a committee, in adoption of the method lately pursued by the eloquent member for the university of Dublin; but, however convenient such a plan may be, I must protest against any sort of analogy. The measures proposed in the bill of the right hon. and learned gentleman, were in perfect unison with the general opinions of those who supported the motion for a committee; but the proposed measures of reform, contained in the bill which the hon. gentleman has had the can dour in this first stage to produce, are directly at variance with the known and recorded opinions of many of those who sit around him, and who will not be more justified in giving their vote for this committee, than they would have been in voting for a committee on the Catholic question with a determination to oppose all the principal points of concession for the express accomplishment of which the right hon. gentleman had introduced the measure.
The hon. member commented at length, in the commencement of his speech, upon the state of the times, and upon the general cry for reformation and amendment; but that cry is mainly founded upon the pecuniary difficulties under which the country now labours, and which have been the necessary and unavoidable result of the arduous contest in which we have been engaged—a contest, be it remembered where the feelings of the people went entirely with the government, and consequently which would not have been prevented by any form of representation of those feelings presumed to be more complete than the existing one. And, Sir, it must not be forgotten, that but for those unparalleled exertions—exertions which I am prepared to admit were greater than the country could sustain in a pecuniary point of view—we should long before now have fallen victims to a despotism the most oppressive and unrelenting in the annals of Europe. There may be those who argue, that we ought to have husbanded our resources; but if the ministers of the Crown who directed the national strength at that awful crisis, instead of stimulating the energies of the country, had deemed it expedient to "husband its resources," they would only have served as a fund to decorate the grave of the liberties of the people of England.
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The hon. gentleman has urged, that our standing army is too great, and that in a reformed state so expensive an establishment would not be necessary. Now, Sir, I contend that from the moment the principle of Jacobinism was fully developed, it has been necessary to support standing armies as an auxiliary to the police of the country—that principle which Mr. Windham (the friend of the hon. gentleman opposite) desired to be the embodying the inevitable discontents and misfortunes of mankind, and of attributing them to the errors of civil government for the purpose of overthrowing it. The hon. member has asked,—Will it be possible much longer to resist the general cry for reform which is heard in every part of the country, coupled as it is with the general diffusion of education? For my part, I confidently hope that the spreading education will teach the people to attend less to the suggestions of those who flatter but to betray them, and whose sole object is to> delude them with visionary and pernicious theories. I do not mean to charge such conduct upon the hon. member, or upon any members of this House, but it is matter of undisputed notoriety that such tempters to mischief both exist and prosper. They work upon the natural and justifiable passions of the people. They assure them that they have been despoiled of their inalienable privileges, and invite them to regain them; and among these they have the audacity to record "Annual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage." Such assertions are capable of mathematical confutation, and have not a shade of plausibility, and they have been too often destroyed to require any comment from me, especially as the hon. member has not made them any part of his case. But I shall merely advert to the monstrous imposture of inviting the regrets of the lower classes to the glorious days of the liberty of their ancestors, when a great proportion of those very classes were in a state of positive slavery, and when the very phrase in Magna Charta of "Nullus liber homo" records for ever the degradation of the unprivileged classes, who were not then deemed worthy to be admitted to an equality of law or to a capacity of privilege. But these are two points which appear to me to be the very key-stones of the argument of the hon. member, on which I will beg permission of the House to say a few words. I mean the universality of the

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suffrage of freeholders, and the right of the people to triennial parliaments.
He has called our attention to a reply which Edward the 3rd made to a petition from the House of Commons for the annual holding (not election) of parliaments, and on other points, from which he infers the extent of popular rights at that period: but when I quote an address from the House of Commons to the Crown in the same reign, I will leave the House to conjecture the degree of importance to which that branch of the three estates had arrived at that period: "Most dreaded lord" (they say) "as to your war and the equipment necessary for it, we are so ignorant and simple, that we know not how, nor have the power to advise. Therefore we pray your grace to excuse us in this matter, and that it please you with the advice of the great and wise persons of your counsel to ordain what seems best to you and your lords and we shall readily assent to and hold it firmly established."
The hon. gentleman asserts, that until the reign of Henry 6th all English freemen were entitled to vote, and he refers to the 7th Henry 4th, which enacted, that 'all they who be present at the county court, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause as others, shall proceed to elect." It appears to me unquestionable that the words "all they" referred to suitors only as explained in the succeeding paragraph. Of these there were two sorts, those who were duly summoned, and others who though qualified had not been summoned, and who, from the imperfect degree of communication belonging to that early stage of society, might not have received the summons to which they were entitled. But when the hon. gentleman argues that the statute of the 8th Henry 6th which raised the qualification of the freeholder to 405.—"in consequence of elections having been made by outrageous and excessive numbers of people" did in fact deprive the freeholders of their undoubted rights, I would invite his attention to the consideration how far the state of foreign and domestic politics at that period may appear to favour such an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the people. He will remember that that was a period of foreign discomfiture and intestine disturbance. Mr. Hallam, in his admirable chapter upon the English constitution, an authority which I am persuaded no member of this House will impeach, has this
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remarkable passage, which appears to me to bear most strikingly upon this important point. He is alluding to the consultation of parliament upon public affairs and he adds. "Those precedents conspired with the weakness of the executive government in the minority of Henry 6th to fling an increase of influence into the scale of the Commons; they made their concurrence necessary to all important business both of a foreign and domestic nature And yet this is the precise period when the hon. gentleman contends, that a gross violation was effected of the rights of the people.
And now, Sir, with respect to the right of the people to triennial parliaments; and I think this point too clear to involve the possibility of mistake. At the period of the Revolution of 1688, a committee was appointed seven days after the meeting of the convention to bring in general heads of such things as were absolutely necessary for the better securing our religion, liberties, and laws, and for remedying several defects and inconveniences in the constitution. This committee suggested, among other points, the propriety of providing by new laws against the too long continuance of the same parliament. But if the old laws had provided against this danger, why have enacted new ones? Why not have passed a declaratory law? But, above all, why was not this recognition of what the hon. gentleman, I think most erroneously, implies to have been the ancient law. Why was it not inserted in the Declaration of Rights, which was presented to, and accepted by the prince and princess of Orange together with the Crown of England, In the preamble of the triennial act itself, the frequent holding of parliament is declared to be conformable to the ancient laws j but the frequent election of parliament is, on the contrary, described as a measure highly expedient. The triennial bill was passed in 1694s it failed in 1693, and in 1692, king William, who had accepted the Declaration of Rights, refused the royal assent to it. I assert, then, that the question of the duration of parliaments, whether for seven or three years, or any intermediate or longer period, must be decided upon the grounds of "high expediency," to employ the phrase in the preamble which I have just quoted, and not upon the basis of rights which notoriously have never existed. In fact, in a very powerful article in the last Edinburgh Re-

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view declaratory of pure Whig doctrines, upon the subject of reform, the writer says,—" Till the passing of the Triennial bill, parliament, unless dissolved by the king, might legally have continued till the demise of the Crown—its only natural and necessary termination. "The honourable gentleman has referred to the extension of the Elective franchise to Wales and Chester and Durham, but that reference if it establishes the fact of additions having been made to the system, it also proves, that the extension of the elective franchise to individuals never could have been a part of the constitution. The right of suffrage for which the inhabitants petitioned was not a right to be given to all the inhabitants, or to all the taxable inhabitants; but to the recognised bodies of electors, the freeholders of counties, and freemen of cities—a right securing to those classes a direct, and to others a virtual representation.
But then we are again told, that in the lapse of ages certain boroughs have fallen into decay, and that consequently a reform is necessary, but the antagonist results, if I may use the expression, are wholly overlooked—on the one hand, the great increase of freehold voters, from the progressive diminution of real qualification, arising from the extreme depreciation of money, and on the other, the extended right of voting in boroughs that have risen into prosperity; both of which effects have increased the relative proportion of the electors to the population in a very great degree, and have given the representation in general a much more popular character. I must not forget to add, the very creation of public opinion by means of the press in its present improved state, and the necessity of the ministers of the Crown, consulting and assaying that opinion, previous to their adoption of any measures of importance. The hon. gentleman has enlarged upon the flagrant injustice of withholding the elective fran-chise from the copyholder and leaseholder. I can by no means enter into his feelings; and I am reminded of what occurred in this House on a former occasion, when a right hon. gentleman argued how unfair it was to make the possession of 240 l. in notes the lowest qualification for obtaining gold from the Bank of England, and it was asked why is it not permitted to a comparatively poor man with only 10 l. to exchange his notes for gold at the Bank? The hon. member for Portarlington, an-
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swered "Let him take his notes to a goldsmith and purchase 10 pounds' worth of gold—he may make the purchase upon equally good terms with his more opulent neighbour who goes directly to the Bank." So I say, Sir, with respect to the injured copyholder and leaseholder;—let them purchase a 40 s. freehold; and let us hear no more of these mock complaints of pretended injustice. The hon. gentleman implies that one effect of his plan of reform would be, to lessen the weight of taxation; but I challenge him to point out any practicable degree of retrenchment which would alleviate the burthens of the people in any material degree; unless you are disposed to break faith with the public creditor; and in that case it does not require a reformed parliament to effect the object. Upon the specific plan proposed I shall say very little. The motion is for a committee, though the hon. gentleman has candidly produced his plan with all its cumbrous accessories of unconstitutional machinery, and all the multiplied inconvenieneies of a perpetual canvass. But allow me to inquire, would any set of men be found in this House to undertake the administration of government with such a plan of Reform in operation as that suggested by the hon. member? and I beg again to quote my former Whig authority upon this point:—" No reform can ever be peaceably carried, otherwise than by a friendly administration; all plans which will not bear the test of this condition are either delusions or instruments of revolution." I will leave the hon. gentleman to reconcile his own opinion with that of his friends. He has alluded to the disposition shown by some of the great European powers to violate the rights of nations—a disposition which as it has not been countenanced by any members of this House, I do not quite understand how it can be connected with the state of the representation; but if any additional lesson were wanting to show how impossible it is that liberty can thrive where the soil is utterly unprepared to receive it, and how vain and impotent are the boastings of a nation professing itself desirous of emerging from slavery to freedom, but unwilling to face the difficulties of the change, let the fate of Naples point this additional moral. I use the words of one of the most celebrated of modern poets,—
"In vain may Liberty invoke,
"The spirit to its bondage broke,
"And ease the neck that courts the yoke."

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We have also heard, Sir, a great deal on the present as on former occasions of the advantages of the restoration of that pure system of our ancestors, which they are presumed to have established; but let me inquire where are the seven years at any period of our history, more especially since the Revolution, when the complaints of the increasing influence of the Crown, and of the corruption of parliament and of public men have not been uttered even to nausea? Nor even were these complaints wanting soon after the period of the Revolution itself. If the House will permit me, I will read an extract from a pamphlet published in 1698, which I happened to meet with this morning in an Appendix to a volume of the Parliamentary History. It is entitled, "Considerations on the nature of parliament and on our present Elections." The writer states, u that corruption is come to such a height, that a wise prince must consent to doing it away." He then talks "of our low and corrupted state, when patriots must be hired to serve their country, when whigs go resty without pension or place, and begin with untimely barking against the government in war, to conclude with prostitute bawling for it in time of peace."At last, in common with the hon. gentleman comes his grand panacea, though of a different nature. "Choose Rich Men; let no character of party recommend or prejudice: poor Whigs, poor tories, want equally places, and will act alike to get and keep them. Avoid the younger sons of lords, who full of pride, with empty pockets, will endeavour, at the nation's cost, to become rich commoners." He then sums up— "such a parliament would secure us from religious lewdness, protestant arbitrariness and parliamentary slavery."
I have merely quoted this passage to shew that there were those who considered the very period of the Revolution, as one of marked degeneracy. I am not disposed, taking human nature as it is, to attach much value to such complaints, or to suppose that the reformation of public morals can precede that of private ones. I think with the late sir Philip Francis, at one period, at least, of his life, that the representation is good enough, and fully answers its purpose, that the milk throws up the cream, "and that it is impossible to build up a Grecian temple with brickbats and rubbish." I am deliberately convinced that a comparison of sound and practical liberty, with former periods of
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our own history is decidedly in our present favour; and it is especially so with respect to other countries, whether we look to the past or the present. In America, to whose institutions some gentlemen look with such parental fondness, there exists slavery, in the proportion of 19 per cent upon the whole population; in particular provinces the ratio is higher; in Georgia, for example, it is estimated at 71; in Louisiana at 80 per cent: I have found this estimate in the valuable and accurate work of Mr. Sibert. I do not state this in dispraise of America, in whose prosperity I am not ashamed to say I feel the warmest interest. This state of things has been unavoidable in that country, and I trust that she has the disposition to remove this stain; but I do state it to shew that no country enjoys that extension of freedom which it is our singular lot to experience and yet to vilify. I will only offer one observation more, that if the plan of the hon. member was to pass into a law, it would place each representative so directly and immediately under the influence of his constituents, that in attending to their voice he would often be at variance with the interests of the nation, considered as a whole. I might quote the opinion of Algernon Sidney as illustrative of this point, but I shall prefer reading one additional extract from the last Edinburgh Review, so often referred to by me, and which as an acknowledged code of Whig reform, tallying with the plans proposed by my noble friend (lord John Russell) I consider as an important document to be cited on this occasion. The writer says, The members of a legislative assembly ought not to consider themselves as delegates from districts" (the very plan of the hon. member for Durham) "bound by the instructions of their own constituents;" then in a subsequent passage he speaks of "the convenience of so framing the election of a certain portion of the members, as to render them less susceptible of local influence, more impartial, more in fact, what all are in law, the representatives of the whole people." To such doctrines I must fully and unequivocally assent; and I cannot forget, that one of the most eloquent authors of modern times, has stated the opinion, that a deliberative assembly, however elected, where freedom of discussion and debate was completely permitted would be more likely to preserve and to transmit to posterity the sacred

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flame of freedom, than an assembly elected upon the purest principles of representation, where such a degree of freedom of debate was not practically enjoyed. I have endeavoured to explain my conscientious opinion, that the plan of the hon. member is neither constitutional nor expedient; at the same time I do not mean to impeach in the slightest degree the sacred feelings of public duty which induced him to bring it forward. I have to apologize for having so long trespassed on the time of the House, and whatever may be the issue of this debate, I will conclude, Sir, in the words of one of your most distinguished predecessors in that chair—" My daily prayer will be for the continuance of the constitution in general; and that the freedom, the dignity, and the authority of this House may be perpetual."
Mr. Hobhousesaid — Mr. Speaker; If, Sir, my friend, the hon. mover, thought it necessary to make an excuse to this House for the details into which he judged it necessary for him to enter, how much the more must I feel an apology requisite for a person who has not his experience in parliament, and who has besides, on this occasion, the disadvantage of following his very able exposition of the great question now before us. I trust, however, that the House will have the goodness to recollect, that there are some members amongst them whose constituents sent them here principally to advocate the cause of parliamentary reform; and who, however unwilling or incompetent they may be, must therefore, upon these occasions, trespass on the attention of the House. Standing as I do in this predicament, I shall venture to enter somewhat at detail into the examination of the momentous subject now under discussion.
In the first place, I would remark upon what has fallen from the hon. gentleman who has just sat down. He has warned us against any decisive experiments with parliament, and has held out to us the example of those unfortunate states, who have lately made an attempt to "emerge from slavery to freedom." Those were his words, and I own I heard them with surprise, as coming from one of those who are in the habit of eulogizing things as they are. For, supposing that the Italians have found how difficult it is to "emerge from slavery to freedom," what lesson does their example teach us? Does the hon. gentleman mean to say that
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we are endeavouring "to emerge from slavery?"—Does he mean that we are in slavery, and therefore should not attempt to be free?—I think not. Sir, we are not in slavery as yet, nor is it from slavery that it is the project of reformers to attempt to emerge, but we know not how soon we may be in slavery if our present system continues; and it is to present such a consummation that we strive to reform this House—it is to retain what freedom we have, as well as to recover what we have lost, that my hon. friend, the member for the county of Durham, has made his proposition on this night.
I would also remark upon another observation of the hon. member for New-castle-under-Lyne. He tells us that public opinion is a sufficient corrective for the abuses of government, and would therefore apply no other remedy to these abuses'—this is a favourite argument with the enemies of Reform. But in the first place, with all my respect for popular opinion, I do not think public opinion is inevitably right, or always does discover the errors or vices of government. Supposing, however, that it was always right, and always applied a future remedy to a past evil, I would ask, whether the scheme upon which a great nation is to be ruled, should be only so contrived as to find a remedy for a disease when and where it may occur? Surely the wiser plan would be, to manage so as to give a tendency towards what is good, rather than to provide for the correction of evil. Surely to allow of that evil when the causes of it may be removed, merely because we think we have a method of counteracting the effects of that evil, is a strange mode of providing for the happiness and well-being of mankind. It is a scheme by which we must encourage a perpetual struggle between the governors and the governed, instead of uniting the whole community in one bond of interest by a system which secures, upon incontrovertible principles, a general tendency towards good government. Public opinion, when it does come, comes often too late—indeed it is often charged by the hon. gentleman opposite with being too late; and we hear of the people having supported wars at the beginning, and calling out against them only when the clamour was of no use. Sir, I own I am surprised at hearing the hon. member on this occasion, as I have been at others on other occasions, assert that we have no right to this or that change in

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our representative svstem.—As if our system, as it now stands, were the fabric of ages, unchanged, and unchangeable; as if it had always been such as we now see it; and as if immutability were the most certain principle of our constitution. Let us look at this assertion.—Mr. Hume tells us, that the history of our country is a history of perpetual change; and Mr. Fox, in a speech made in this House on the 30th of April 1792, made use of this expression:—that "the greatest innovation that could be introduced into the constitution would be, to come to a vote that there should be no innovation at all."* If this be true of the history of the country, it is more peculiarly true of the history of parliament.
We do not know much of the origin of the House of Commons. Probably sir Robert Cotton and others, who assign the date of the 49th of Henry 3rd to the first formation of the House of Commons, have no good grounds for their conjectures; for there seems always to have been some way of collecting the opinions and wishes of the commonalty in the earliest periods of our history. This, however, we may safely say, that the House of Commons, since it has been known, has been perpetually varying. This is true, of the number of representatives—of the elective franchise—and of the duration of parliaments. In the first parliament of Henry 8th, the number of representatives was only 298. In that reign 31 members were added to the representation; numerous additions were made in the successive reigns of Edward 6th, Mary, Elizabeth, James 1st, and Charles 1st. At the Restoration 36 boroughs, and towns, and cities, were restored to their privilege of sending members; and in the same reign of Charles 2nd, occurred the enfranchisement of Newark by charter, and of Durham, town and county, by act of parliament, a circumstance to which the member for Durham has so forcibly alluded. Yet there are, I believe, still sixty-nine towns, boroughs, and cities, that formerly sent members to parliament, and that now send none.—As far then as the number of members are concerned, and the places; sending members, we shall, I trust, conclude that nothing can have been more variable than the constitution of this I House.
* See New Parliamentary History, vol.; 29, p. 1315.
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The elective franchise has been so changeable, that, to say nothing of the many sorts of franchise, there are several places in England where the right of voting has varied according to the decision of election committees; and where, indeed, that right is not decisively known at this day.—Such is the case of the great city of Westminster: an election committee, after the examination of many months declared that it had come to no determination on that right, and that parliament would probably end before it could come to any resolution. As to the duration of parliaments, every novice knows that they were at first sessional by practice, then annual, at the very least, by act of parliament, then triennial, and lastly, septennial.
The general character of parliament has been much subject to change. Who will say that it was the same in the days of the Plantagenets as in those of the Tudors—or that the House of Commons, in the reigns of the Stuarts resembled that of the Plantagenets or Tudors—or that the House since the Revolution has been at all like the parliaments previously to that great event. The change since the latter period is remarkably striking; notwithstanding the hon. member (Mr. Wilmot) would persuade us there has been none at all. It appears that, in the same proportion as the public revenue has increased, so the corruption of parliament has augmented. This may be deduced, as I find it from a table drawn out by the society of the friends of the people. At the Revolution the public revenue amounted to 2,100,000 l. The statutes against bribery and corruption amounted to 14. In 1792 the revenue was 16,000,000 l., and the statutes to protect free elections were 65. The deduction is incontestable, namely, that as the means of corruption increase, the body to be corrupted must necessarily lose some of its original character and constitution. But the great change, I think, must have taken place during the last forty or fifty years. Since 1792, the gross produce of public revenue has increased from 16 to 64,500,000 l., and the collection of the taxes at the present day is greater than the annual interest of the national debt, and other charges payable for the same, at the beginning of the reign of George 3rd. The collecting of the taxes costs the United Kingdoms more than four millions annually. Now, though the Crown

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has the appointment to these collector-ships, I need not say, that, in fact, the patronage is applied to parliament. We heard the other night, an hon. member (Mr. S. Wortley) complain of the eagerness with which some of those collector-ships are solicited, as being notoriously attached to county representation. But add to this the enormous India patronage, which since 1784, has been turned into the same channel—add the new board of control, since 1794—add the droits of Admiralty—add the Bank of England interest—add 156,000 l. divided annually between seventy-six parliamentary pensioners—add the Leeward island duties fund—add other streams of wealth pouring into the lap of parliament, professedly for the purposes of influence, and for the support of the minister of the day; and we shall be obliged to confess that the nature of an assembly subject to such new modes of attack, and to such new influences, must of necessity have taken a new character. It cannot be the same as before it was subject to such perpetual temptations against the purity of its members. In fact, we may safely declare, that this House, instead of being that venerable plant which has required the lapse of ages to mature, is nothing but a mere mushroom, the growth almost of a single night of corruption.—I know that since the Revolution, as well as a little before that period, complaints were made, and with justice, against the venality of some members in this House. But was that venality so diffused? Can it be at all compared to the notorious profligacy of the present day? We often hear of the purity of the public men of the present It is true a man does not now sell his vote for 1,000 l. in the lobby, as in Walpole's days. —No—no—things are better managed now: we are not such bunglers—we want something less showy and more stable:—50 l. per annum would tempt no one now. Let us see how many members were commanded by the court in the pensioned parliament. I mentioned the other night how comparatively few they were. In 1679, a rigorous inquiry was made of their number, which was found to amount only to thirty two; so, at least, we are told by Mr. Echard.
The speeches against the septennial bill, particularly Mr. Hutcheson's, put down ministerial influence at thirty or forty. By Mr. Henry Fox's accounts, it appeared that only thirty or forty were in the
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habit of being on the regular parliamentary place, pension, and gift-list. What the number of those members is, who in our present House of Commons receive fee or reward, either in esse or posse, for their votes, need not be stated. Array them against the thirty and forty of former days, and the corruption of our ancestors will appear like virtue. It is enough to assert the undeniable fact, that the most saleable of all articles—the most profitable of all commodities is a parliamentary vote. To that recommendation the navy, the army, the church, the treasury, in short, the temple of promotion itself, opens all its doors. The consequence has been that which was foretold by Mr. Hutcheson at the passing of the septennial act. This House has "set up a third estate entirely independent of the people." I defy any man, here or out of doors, to deny this fact. We are still called the House of Commons; but all our countrymen, all Europe, sees, that what Mr. Fox said is too true:—we have a House of Commons, in which the power of the people is nothing." It would, indeed, be strange to deny this, seeing that for the most part this House conducts itself, as it were, systematically against public opinion. It makes a boast of so doing;—and some of our most flourishing young orators found their fame upon despising the great body of their fellow countrymen. The more moderate are contented with saying, that they would bow to public opinion did they but find it. How to find it, I confess I do not know.—If a million of people petition for any object, we are told that a million and a half ought to have petitioned —or that there are two millions the other way of thinking:—some how or the other, the "sound part of the public," as they are called, are always somewhere beyond the petitioners against any alleged grievance. Advance, far as we please, this public opinion still recedes before us, like the imaginary pole: —
"Ask where's the north—at York, 'tis on the Tweed;
In Scotland, at the Orcades—and there
At Greenland, Zembla, or the Lord knows where."
We always admit its existence, but never admit its presence; and this, by the way, is an unanswerable argument in favour of agreeing to some system by which we may be certain of collecting the wants and wishes of the people, by which we may be sure we are acting in conformity to their

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sentiments and interests, without waiting for that expression of opinion which is either not recognised, or is interpreted according to the humours and inclinations of the prevailing party in the state.
We say that a reform in parliament would secure such a system. A parliament emanating from the body of the people must necessarily do so. This seems to me as inevitable as that a parliament emanating from a few proprietors must necessarily speak the wishes and provide for the wants only of those proprietors; at least, its first and chief object must be to do this; and if public interest be consulted, it is consulted only accidentally or incidentally.
My honorable friend, the member for Durham, has told us what the petition of the friends of the people offered to prove at the bar of the House—that 154 patrons return a majority of the members of this House.—The anti-reformers are bold men, but they will not venture to affirm that 154 individuals are the people of England. Or that for any of the purposes of government or legislation, they can possibly be identified with the people of England. The admirers of that virtual representation, which sir William Jones called "actual folly," must, at least, allow that the commons of England do not return the House of Commons of England. They must, I think, also allow that the government, whether good or bad, is in the hands of an oligarchy; and (when compared with the wealth, the numbers, and the intelligence of the remainder of this great nation)—of a very insignificant oligarchy. The object of the reformers is confessedly to give to the commons their share in legislation—that share which the very name of this House shows they were meant to possess. The reformers, in pursuing this great object, are taunted with the differences existing amongst themselves—so were the religious reformers of other days; they were ridiculed, with an appearance of justice, on account of their feuds. With their feuds and differences were triumphantly contrasted the uniformity and simplicity of the Roman Catholic faith; and the English heretics were asked, to which of the fifteen or sixteen confessions which distracted the reformed church, even in one town, Stras-burgh, they finally intended to conform? But did those feuds, unfortunate as they were, prevent the triumph of the new faith? Did they prevent the overthrow
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of the ancient superstition in this and other countries? By no means; they rather sharpened the wits and invigorated the zeal of the proselytes, and, perhaps, contributed to the glorious issue which crowned their labours.
Such, I trust,—I believe will be the case with the reformers now, who, whatever shades of difference may exist between them,—whatever may be their various plans,—have, let it be recollected, only one subject, namely, that which was stated by Mr. Pitt, in 1785, as being his end and aim "to make the popular branch of the legislature an assembly freely elected, between whom and the mass of the people there should be the closest union and the most perfect sympathy."* This is the sole object of all the reformers—we wish for nothing more—we ought to be content with nothing less. This is the object of my hon. friend, the member for Durham; and I may truly say, differing from him, as I venture to do, on some parts of his plan, this alone is my object, namely, to procure an effectual representation of the people, in place of that representation of certain proprietors, which now composes the majority of this House, and can at any time carry any measure.
Of the three forms government:—by one—by the few—and by the many, almost all politicians have given up that of the few as being the most prejudicial to general happiness. A monarch governing despotically, often has been and may be, the delight and the happiness of his subjects; and he may be also their virtual representative, as Mr. Burke has observed, to the full as much as this House is virtual representative of the people of England. The advantages resulting from a democratic form of government, have also been acknowledged on all hands, but the oligarchy has been left without defenders. Yet I would remark, that an oligarchy, composed of individuals of great estates, and of illustrious names, may find their interest in good government, and may therefore act conformably to that conviction. But our oligarchy is not an oligarchy of the legitimate sort. Their power and character are not founded on great estates, nor on great names, but on the possession of certain commodities for which, having either bought them, or being obliged to preserve them at great
* Parl. Hist. Vol. 25, p. 435.

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expense, they are obliged to reimburse themselves. These commodities are the boroughs, and also the properties influencing elections for members of parliament. The reimbursement which they seek is from the minister of the day; the fund from which they are indemnified is the public purse. It is, therefore, impossible, that the oligarchy should not, as borough-holders, have an interest directly opposite to that of the nation.
The English oligarchy are, in fact, holders of a monopoly, which as it is constructed, enables them to get more by taxation than by good government. Human nature operates with them as she does with others. The plan is systematically vicious and ruinous. The private interest of the few is incompatible with the public interest of the many. I need not enter at large into the detail, but merely repeat what I have before said, of the notorious value of a vote in parliament. Those who have bought that vote think they have a right to sell it. I know there are exceptions; I know that some few gentlemen purchase their seats, with a view to forward the public interest, or with the hope of indulging an honourable ambition: but this is not the way that the system works generally, and it is only of the general working of the System that we now have to inquire. Those who lay out large sums in coming into parliament, whether for boroughs, or in order to preserve interests, as they are called, for the most part, do so in order either now, or one day or the other, to be partners in the monopoly—to share in the government and the good things of government. Many of them are not without their attachment to the people, and to the soil and to the glory of their country; but this attachment is so far from their ruling passion, that their first duty directs them to themselves, to their family, and to their friends. If any feeling is left for their country, after these cravings are satisfied, so much the better; but this feeling is not a necessary consequence of their having a place in this assembly; no one will dare to say that it is—no one will dare to say that it ought not to be.
We have, then, nothing to do but to follow the example of the illustrious author of modern science, and going at once to the basis of the vicious system, resolve to reconstruct the fabric upon principles conformable to the recognised experience
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of mankind, rejecting as spurious all those systems which suppose men will act otherwise than as their interests guide them.* Let us own, at last, that we can only be saved by a House of Commons so chosen as to give each of its members the least possible interest in misgovernment. This can only be done by connecting the legislative body wholly and fully with the people at large. Nor can this object be attained but by the frequent recurrence of the representative to his constituent; by the diffusion of the elective franchise amongst so large a body as shall be a fair sample of the community; and by securing the complete independence of the vote given at elections.
I must say, I think the honourable mover has been very reasonable in his demands. He is more than borne out by ancient usage, when he asks for triennial parliaments. If ancient practice can give a right, he might undoubtedly have asked for annual parliaments. Although this is notorious, it may be repeated on this occasion. Our ancient parliaments assembled usually at the three great feasts. They then met twice a year. And Andrew Home, editing that very ancient book, I "The Mirror of Justices," in the reign of Edward 1st or, Edward 2nd, calls the omission in that respect "an abuse of the law, and a main one too." Then came the enactment of the 4th and 36th of Edward 3rd, securing annual parliaments, and the positive right to annual parliaments was claimed in the famous Remonstrance of the Commons in the 10th year of Richard 2nd. I am aware that there has been at I all times a dispute, whether annual parliaments meant annual new parliaments; but Mr. Prynne, in his Brief Register, Part I. p. 334, seems to prove, that parliaments were newly chosen every time they were held, a fact deducible from the list of Speakers, the county histories, and the names of the members of the Commons' House, notwithstanding the celebrated Whitelocke thought otherwise. There were adjournments and prorogations, but I believe that the first parliament that lasted longer than a year was
* See this and other important points elucidated in a reform pamphlet, published by Messrs. Baldwin, Cradock, & Joy, Paternoster Row, intituled, "Statement of the question of parliamentary Reform, with a reply to the objections of the Edinburgh Review, No. LXI."

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the 23rd of Henry 6th. The civil wars of the Roses entirely destroyed the old English constitution, and the parliaments of Henry 8th, were quite deranged from the ancient model.
I scarcely know to what to attribute the strange mistake made by sir William Blackstone on this subject, unless, perhaps, it may be ascribed to some hardy assertions made by the supporters of the Septennial bill; for there is no point more clearly proved from records, than the frequent recurrence of new parliaments in the early periods of our history. I repeat, we had no parliaments longer than a year before Henry 6th. Henry 8th, kept his parliaments together beyond the constitutional period, and for the best of reasons—he was afraid to trust his people with choosing their deputies immediately subsequent to his violent acts, and having once got a House of Commons to his mind, resolved to keep it as long as he could. This shows the elective body were not under the control of the Crown; for, had it been so, an annual parliament would have served the turn of this tyrant as well as a longer parliament. In the days of the Stuarts, the patriots were not so solicitous about new parliaments as they were about having a House of Commons in session. The fear was, that the king would contrive to govern and tax without parliaments. This will account for the provisions of the bill, the 16th of Charles 1st, which turns upon frequent parliaments being holden. The same consideration applies to the Triennial bill of the 16th of Charles 2nd. which commands a parliament to be called at the least within three years. I must be permitted to repeat the remark before applied to the reign of Henry 8th, namely, that the anxiety only for frequent parliaments, shows, that in those days the people thought themselves secure if they had a parliament sitting, a certain proof, that a majority of the elective body was not then as now, the mere tool of the minister—an oligarchy separate from and independent of the people at large.
About the period of the Revolution, however, the friends of freedom had begun to discover that frequent new parliaments were essential to the interests of the country. The duke of Monmouth, who may be supposed to have known what-was popular, in his declaration promised to give the people "parliaments annually chosen, and held, not prorogued, dissolved, or discontinued." The Triennial
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bill of king William 3rd provided frequent new parliaments; but even this did not satisfy the best and wisest lovers of their country: for we have it decisively asserted, that "at the Revolution assurances were given which led the nation to think that the ancient course of annually chosen parliaments would have been restored." My lord Bolingbroke in the 19th letter of his dissertation on parties, quotes this as a well-known fact, and cites a pamphlet of Mr. Hampden, written in 1692. We know the difficulty with which king William was brought to consent even to the Triennial bill. We know that at last he yielded only to the intercessions of sir William Temple, and to the reasoning of Swift. Of the last-mentioned great man no one can mistake the opinions on this subject. He has left them on record. It is in a letter to Pope that he writes thus of parliaments: "I adored the wisdom of that Gothic institution which made her annual. I was confident our liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation till that ancient law was restored among us."
The same fact may be collected from another distinguished person who wrote and suffered for the cause of freedom, and who was able to make the glorious boast that he had laid the bridge, over which the prince of Orange came to England. I mean Samuel Johnson, who wrote the famous address to the army on Hounslow Heath, for which address he was sentenced to be whipped from Tyburn to Newgate b' the judges of king James, and afterwards pensioned by king William, at the request of his parliament. We have a right to listen to and to believe such a man. His "Parliaments at a Certainty," shows what he and his brother patriots thought of the right to annual elections.
It is certain that the patriots and stales-men of those days perfectly well understood the true value of frequent elections. The supporters of prerogative did not hesitate to declare for long parliaments as useful to royal power. Mr. Lyddal, who moved the Septennial act in the Commons, openly confessed, that "it would restore the prerogative to that part of its power which had been cramped by the Triennial act." On the other hand, some of the greatest authorities of the day declared as openly not for triennial, but annual parliaments. Lord Raymond said, that we had never departed from annual parliaments without detriment to the con-

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stitution. Mr. Hutcheson took the same line of argument; and not only on that occasion, but for many years afterwards the recurrence to annual parliaments was the favourite project of the Reformers. Mr. Bromley moved to shorten the duration of parliaments in 1734. Mr. Carew moved for annual parliaments in 1745; and here I would beg to call the attention of lion, gentlemen who are so terrified at the very sound of annual parliaments— to the time chosen for Mr. Carew's motions—to the persons opposing it, and to the numbers who voted for it. There was then a pretender to the throne— almost in arms, and menacing an immediate descent. The two great parties of the state had just been reconciled, and the friends of Walpole and Pulteney composed a formidable phalanx on the Treasury-bench; yet, in the face of the danger, and the inopportunity of the time—in spite of the coalition of the most powerful statesmen of the day, Mr. Carew proposed his restoration of annual parliaments, calling it "a test of patriotism;" and lost his motion not by the overwhelming numbers, which will, I fear, defeat my hon. friend's motion to-night:—No—hon. gentlemen will be surprised to hear, that in 1745, in this House—against party— against prejudice, 113 members voted for annual parliaments, and were beaten only by 32 voices. Sir I. Glynn moved for shorter parliaments in 1757 and 1758. Mr. Alderman Sawbridge made a similar motion on several occasions; and in 1772, he had 82 supporters, although he had explicitly declared for annual parliaments. The blind fear of annual parliaments is quite new. I need scarcely say, that the duke of Richmond declared for them. Many who now hear me, well know that the great body of the aristocracy and "Whig gentry in 1793, solemnly recommended, that parliaments might be "triennial, biennial, or annual, as they had been in former times."
I hope, that what I have said, has made out my position, that the hon. mover is completely justified, as far as precedent and authority go, in laying claim to triennial parliaments. I am aware that the question of the extension of the suffrage is more difficult. I think, however, that enough has been and even on this point, to show that the House, as it now stands, is entitled to no veneration on the score of antiquity. I think enough has been said, to show that the elective
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body must have been very different from what it now is, when all the Reformers whom I have alluded to, thought a frequent recurrence to that elective body was, together with place bills, a sufficient security for the independence of parliaments. I am aware, that the expedient of altering the frame of parliament was tried by Cromwell, who, though he fixed the elective franchise at so high a standard, secured such a fair body of electors, that he found his House of Commons too faithful a representative of the people for his purposes. I am aware, that lord Shaftsbury prepared a scheme which was addressed afterwards to the Convention parliament; and which went the length of house-keeper suffrage, and secret suffrage, and prepared, to use his own words, "to raze the old building." There was a pamphlet written in 1702, which exposed the inequality of representation allotted to the metropolis; and proposed, that London and Westminster might send eighteen members to parliament. But, generally speaking, the earlier reformers contented themselves with the frequent recurrence of elections as the best cure for corruption.
The hon. mover, however, is perfectly justified in demanding the elective franchise for the great body of the people, or for such a portion of that body as shall be a fair representative of the whole—for without presuming exactly to define who were the voters in very ancient days, there can be little boldness in asserting, that by the spirit of the old English constitution, the commonalty were the basis of one branch of the legislature. What was the early coronation oath twice taken by Richard 2nd? that the sovereign would maintain the laws, "quas vulgus elegerit," a phrase, which, in spite of all the disputes about tenses which occurred in the reign of Charles 1st, must still show, that the Commons had the great share in making the laws. The best writers, both ancient and modern, point to the same conclusion. Bracton, who lived in the reign of Henry 3rd, in the 1st chapter of his 1st book, on the laws of England, has these words: that which is justly defined and approved by the counsel and consent of the lords, and the common agreement of the commonwealth, under the authority of the king or prince, hath the force of law Fortescue, in hid 9th chapter, on the laws of England, says, "the statutes are not made at the

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will of the prince, but by the consent of the whole realm. "St. German, a writer of Henry the 8th's time, tells, that the "statutes are made by the king and his predecessors, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commonalty of the whole realm." The learned sir Thomas Smith, writing in the early part of Elizabeth's reign on the commonwealth of England (for our government was then called a commonwealth,) in his 2nd book, 2nd chapter, has these remarkable words:" The parliament of England representeth, and hath the power of the whole realm, both the body and the head. For every Englishman is intended to there be present either in person or by procuration and attorney; of what pre-eminence, state, dignity, or quality soever he be, from the prince to the least person of England."
The great names of Coke, Hardwicke, and Camden, may be enlisted on the same side. The principle is acknowledged by almost every great writer. Dr. Robertson says, "It is fundamental in the feudal constitution, that no man can be taxed or governed except by his own consent." To the same end Blackstone declares, "that in a free state, every man who is a free agent, ought to be supposed in some measure his own governor; and therefore, a branch at least of the legislature should reside in the whole body of the people." Sir William Jones, in his speech to the three counties, declares "the spirit of our constitution requires a representation nearly equal and nearly universal."
The hon. mover has told us what the statutes say to the same purport. He has quoted the preamble to the parliamentary writ issued in the 23rd year of Edward 1st, which says, "what concerns all, should be approved by all." He might have added, "that this writ was directed to the prelates and clergy, telling them to meet at Westminster, to consult with the lords and other inhabitants of the realm," upon the common danger. The great charters of John and Henry 3rd; the 25th of Ed. 1st, chap. 1, 5, 6; the 34th of Ed. 1st, stat. 4, chap. 1,4; the 14th Ed. 3rd, stat. 2: all these statutes show, that right of taxation was founded upon the common consent of the nation. The hon. mover has recited the answer of the Commons in the 10th of Richard 2nd. What can be more decisive? "The Commons would keep their old customs,
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which will that the knights be appointed by the Commons." The rolls of the first of Henry 4th inform us, that the 18th charge against Richard 2nd was his packing of parliaments, "whereas, his people ought to be free to choose and depute knights." "His people" must have meant the people at large, not the great men—against whom the statute of Westminster the 1st was made: a statute on which lord Coke's comment in his fourth Inst. speaks volumes. He says, "of old this was the answer of the Commons when any new device is moved on the king's behalf, that they dare not agree without conference with their counties."
I am not ignorant of the debated question respecting the real "liber homo" of early times; but after the best attention I can give to the subject, I think I may assert with Mr. Flood in 1790, that" in ancient times the liberi tenentes, including in effect the whole property of the country, and extending to the mass of the people, were the electors." What else can be deduced from the statute 7 Henry 4th, c. 15, quoted by the member for Durham, which defines voters to be "all they that be there present [at the county court] as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause, as others?" What else can be deduced from the other statute quoted by the hon. mover, the 8th of Henry 6th (an. 1429), which confined the franchise to forty-shilling freeholders? an act called by sir W. Jones "basely aristocratical and highly unconstitutional."
These acts allude, I know, to county representation, and I also know that the question relative to the boroughs, towns, and cities, is somewhat more involved and liable to dispute. The boroughs and cities were enfranchised, I believe, by our kings, first, in order to form an equipoise to the influence which the great lords might illegally exercise in county elections; and, secondly, that the sovereigns might actually knew the wishes of the great communities, and be enabled to raise taxes from them by their own consent; and there seems reason to believe that every free man, who was not entitled to a vote by his residence being neither in a city nor in a borough, might vote in the county court J until the Disfranchising act, the 8th Henry 6th. For ages the representatives were faithful representatives in this respect at least; and those who ignorantly declaim against the servility of ancient parliaments, should recollect that

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Henry 8th, with all his mad tyranny, was unable to threaten his parliaments into taxation. It was not until the 27th of his reign that he prevailed upon them to pass the Statute of Uses, by which he recovered what was really belonging to the Crown. Queen Mary could not persuade her parliament to restore the conventual property, then in the hands of laymen.
In fact, the kings of England thought the borough and city representation a great protection and a great resource, because it was a bona fide representation of large bodies of their subjects. That the boroughs fell into decay or into private hands, is true enough, but that such was their original condition seems to me absurd, when we recollect the purpose for which they were first enfranchised. I do not mean to say but that in a very few instances the case might have been otherwise—for instance, Saltash is said to have been enfranchised by a private individual. James the 1st shows what he thought of the matter, in his famous recommendation to the sheriffs not to return members for decayed places. He thought his parliament ought to be a place "where all the whole body of the realm, and. ever particular member thereof, either in person or by representation, upon their own free elections, are, by the laws of this realm, deemed to be personally present." The parliaments also held a similar doctrine. By Glanville's Reports of Election Cases, in the 21st and 22nd of James 1st, we find a committee on the Cirencester case, resolving, that "there being no certain custom or prescription who should be electors and who not, we must have recourse to common right, which to this purpose was held to be, that more than the freeholders only ought to have voices in the election, namely, all men inhabitant householders, resiant within the borough." In the Pontefract case it was determined by a committee of the same House of Commons, "that of common right all the inhabitant householders and residents within the borough, ought to have a voice in the election, and not the freeholders there only, as was pretended." So we see what the notion of the common right of Englishmen was in the reign of James 1st. I may remark that there is a word in the Pontefract case which looks something like a recognition of the right of universal suffrage—at any rate, the member for Durham is perfectly upheld by precedent in asking far an. extension of the suffrage to ail taxed householders.
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The hon. member who preceded me has dwelt upon the fact of a reform of parliament not having formed part of the changes at the Revolution. This is a very common objection. I think I have shown that a change as to the duration of parliaments was thought of at the Revolution, and that even certain schemes for altering the frame of this House were laid before the public. I forgot to mention that Henry lord Clarendon told Mr. Pollexfen, the great lawyer, when king James 2nd. ran away, that king William' had nothing to do but to call a parliament on Cromwell's model, and declare himself king. Surely, however, hon. members cannot forget that the 16th, 19th, and 20th, articles of the prince of Orange's declaration, all have reference to a free parliament. They do not forget that the eighth article of the Bill of Rights declares that elections shall be free. They do not forget that the parliament which elected king William was a popular parliament, upon quite a new model, in which fifty common councilmen, in fact fifty representatives, sat for the metropolis.
It is indeed but too true, that the great men of the Revolution contented themselves with mere declarations instead of enactments. It is too true that, as Blackstone says, the providing against arbitrary power, not by prerogative but influence, was most unaccountably overlooked at the Revolution. This made Samuel Johnson say, that he wished all the Bill of Rights had been reduced to one line— The right to have a parliament "every kalends of May.'' This made Mr. Hampden, in 1692, say, that "it was a jest to talk of a settlement until the time and manner of calling parliaments were determined." This made lord Bolingroke afterwards declare, that "by the neglect of securing the frequency, integrity, and independency of parliaments, the essentials of British liberty were almost wholly overlooked at the Revolution, so that the nation soon discovered, that without the necessary provisions in favour of free parliaments, the foundations were laid of establishing universal corruption."
It is quite idle to quote the Revolution of 1688 as an example from which nothing is to persuade us to depart. Though much was done, much was left undone. This was soon discovered by the greatest statesmen of subsequent

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times—although, as I before stated, the usual palliative, which they proposed to apply to the corruption of parliament, was "frequent elections and place-"bills," because, probably, neither was the elective body ever so thoroughly corrupt nor the power of the corrupter so great as to make an alteration of the frame of parliament visibly indispensable.
This alteration had, I say, before been a matter of private speculation; but the first practical statesman who seems to have been inclined to reform the mode of election in latter times was lord Chatham. From the first proposition of that great man to infuse a new spirit into the constitution, it has been thought no crime to project a mode of remodelling the frame and constitution of this House. It has been the darling scheme even of ministers. Mr. Fox was minister when he supported Reform in 1782. The duke of Richmond carried with him his annual parliaments and universal suffrage into the cabinet. Lord Shelburne, so we are told by Dr. Watson, made parliamentary reform a part of the condition of his accepting office. Of Mr. Pitt's three propositions in 1782, 1783, and 1785, one was lost only by 20 votes, and the last was supported by 174 votes. Mr. Pitt is now called a moderate reformer; but, as I before said, his principle was the same as that of all reformers. He said, in 1782, that he wished to cure a radical error. His last scheme was a sweeping disfranchisement of thirty-six boroughs, and the transfer of their members to copyholders in counties. Had he been true to his promises and his principles, how great would have been his fame—how great the benefit to his country! Then, instead of living to become a splendid exemplification of his own saying, that in the present system no honest man can be a minister. Then would his talents have added lustre to his own name, rather than have hung like a garland on the bier of the liberties of England. Then should we have beheld the monuments of his genius and virtue in the glory, the happiness, the freedom of his country; instead of finding his memory embalmed only in a ballad, and the great name of Pitt good for nothing but the chorus of a club.
I scarcely need do more than allude to the great men who, in our times, have advocated this cause upon the broadest principle. The friends of the people de-
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clared "the right of voting to be common and personal;" and Mr. Fox, who did not begin as a radical reformer, certainly' ended as one. Were I not too prudent' to attempt to draw the bow of Ulysses, I might follow the example of the right hon. gentleman, who the other day arrayed the great men of past times, who have struggled for the enfranchisement of their Catholic fellow-countrymen. Sir, you know that the reformers may boast of names not less illustrious—nay, they may boast of many of the same name as adorn the pages which record the efforts made for religious liberty. We also may show our Pitt, and our Fox, and our Grattan, and even our Burke, such as he was in his earlier and better days. A Swift and a Bolingbroke belong to us—the great Chatham is all our own—a Savile and a Jones, he who was hailed the most enlightened of the sons of men, he fights with us; and whatever may be the event of this day's contest, we may perhaps do well to follow the example of the Romans at Regillum, who animated their countrymen to the fight by pointing where the shades of their departed heroes mingled in the combat, and led them on to victory.
Sir, it is not very difficult to anticipate the objections which will be made to this measure. Indeed, we have already heard those of the hon. gentleman opposite, who, as was said by the present member for Bramber (Mr. Wilberforce), in 1785, seems "so afraid of innovation, that he will not try even a new argument." What has been before urged against all attempts at amelioration in this respect, we must make up our minds to hear again. The watchword of the corruptionists have ever been, and ever will be, the "constitution." When the Lords threw out the Bribery bill, in 1722, they said, they would not touch the constitution. When Walpole opposed the Place bill, in 1734, he said he would not innovate on the constitution. Sir W. Yonge, opposing Mr. Carew's motion, in 1745, said, he would not lay a finger on the constitution. Lord North and Mr. Burke, on each of Mr. Pitt's three motions, said, they declared for the constitution. When Mr. Pitt opposed Mr. Grey's reform, he called himself the defender of the constitution; and we have lately heard a right hon. gentleman declare, that he will stand by the constitution. The word is a good word; but whether or not it is misapplied to the decayed

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boroughs and to the perpetual dominion of 154 proprietors of old houses and of rotten parchment bonds, is a question which must, I think, by this time, be hardly matter of inquiry.
The passion chiefly applied to by our antagonists is fear, base fear. Our ancestors were frightened into the Septennial bill, as appears by the very preamble of that act of monstrous usurpation. They have been repeatedly frightened into not repealing it; sometimes on-pretext of foreign war, sometimes on pretext of domestic discontents. When Mr. Pitt brought forward his plan, in 1783, Mr. Powys, for lack of other arguments, proclaimed, that though Mr. Pitt might be moderate, other reformers were dangerous; and, to prove his assertion, read the duke of Richmond's letter to the York committee. Mr. Pitt, in his turn, frightened the House with the phantoms of French daggers; and his humble imitators have terrified their audiences with the Agrarian laws of the Spenceans. In looking over the debates of former periods, I find exactly the same modes of refutation applied to the parliamentary reformers—all ridiculous, many of them incompatible with each other. The character of the people is bad, therefore they shall not have free parliaments. This was said in 1716, in 1745, and at many other times. The character of the people is good; therefore they do not want reform. This was said by lord North, who told Mr. Pitt, that there were only 20,000 signatures to the petitions for the measure. When the number of petitioners increased in after-times, Mr. Burke told the House, that the people were in themselves indifferent, but were excited to the complaint. Exactly the same thing was said in 1817, when more than a million of people petitioned for reform.
But the great objection is, the danger which would inevitably accrue to all men of property, if the mass of the people should be allowed to vote at elections. This, though the most common, seems to me the most ill-founded, and it may be said the roost absurd, of all the objections urged against reform of parliament. What proof have we that the people, properly so called, are enemies to proprietary rights? We are in the habit of talking as if the great mass of our population were the natural enemies of the few above them; as if they were roaming about without any thing they could call their own, greedy for plunder, and waiting for the first mo-
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ment which should deliver the goods of their privileged fellow-citizens into their hands. But, supposing this to be the case, would the giving of votes to this unarmed populace be equivalent to giving them clubs I Would it furnish them with arms against their fellow-citizens I Would it not much more probably reconcile them to the happier part of the nation, by giving them common rights, and affording them a consciousness of possessing that equal protection from the government, of which no man can be sure, unless he has some share in making those laws by which his conduct is to be regulated.
The poor are to the full as much interested in the preservation of the laws of property as the rich. They are more so: a wealthy man may protect himself either in anarchy, or under a despotism, by the power of his purse and of his previous influence; a poor man has no friend but the laws. The position of Mr. Burke is incontrovertible" The people have no interest in disorder; "and yet the anti-reformers actually profess to believe, that the first orders given to the real and bona fide representatives of the people of England, would be, to vote away the property of those who have great wealth into the pockets of those who have little wealth. Now we have places where the election is in the hands of the poorer classes, and yet did we ever hear of these instructions being given to the members for those places, or being proposed as a test to the can ditates for those places? Indeed, I may ask, whether in places where the most popular species of elections prevails, there has ever appeared a preference to the sort of man who might be expected to be a fit tool for the accomplishment of such spoliatory projects?
The enemies of reform always attempt to answer every claim, by pointing to the French revolution. I trust we shall live to see the times when that argument will be as obsolete as it is senseless. But, let me ask, did the French national assemblies vote away private property? I say, they did not. They did vote away the property of the church, as Henry the 8th's parliament voted away the property of the church; they did vote away the property of the nobles who were in arms with foreigners against the nation, or chose to take part against the new order of things by emigration. But, I say, they did not violate private property in the sense of the

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phrase as applied by the enemies of reform. Had they, however, been guilty of this enormity, as they were of other and greater horrors; it would not be to a free system of representation that such evils would be justly attributable; but to the monsters who forced them at the dagger's point to be the accomplices of all their villanies. Nor was a thirst for private plunder one of the vices even of those monsters themselves.
Let us turn to our own revolt against Charles. I have never heard that private property was invaded, or that any sytematic spoliation of the rich formed part of the sins of the Long Parliament. But our opponents tell us, that if property would not be invaded, the other branches of the legislature would inevitably be destroyed; and they point to the parliament of Charles. The exceeding ignorance displayed in making such an allusion must surprise even those who are used to the hardy assertion of the anti-reformers. We are contending for a full, fair, and equal representation of the people; and they say, see what such a representation did with the king and lords in the time of Charles. Strange!!—it was not such a representation. Fifty members of the Long Parliament were excluded by the ordinance of the 22nd January, 1643. Two hundred more by the ordinance of 21st June, 1644, and one hundred and forty-three by colonel Pride's purge in 1648. The House of Commons, which in 1649, voted the king and lords unnecessary, was composed of sixteen county members, six members for cities, and sixty-seven members for boroughs—in all eighty-nine persons. So that, in fact, if the House of Commons of that day be a warning against any one sort of senate more than another; it is against a borough parliament. When Cromwell called together his uniformly-chosen House of Commons, it was soon seen what stuff a truly representative assembly would be made of. The first thing they did—very injudiciously I think, was to pull to pieces the," instrument of government. The next step would have been to dethrone the usurper.
The lovers of hereditary monarchy have nothing to fear from the people of England. Certainly the friends of the present family on the throne have nothing to fear from the exercise of popular rights, and from giving full scope to the wishes of the people. I am not sure that so much can be said for the aristocracy. At least one
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thing we know for certain, that when the Pretender came to England in 1745, he was induced to do so by the expectations held out to him by very many of the nobles and higher gentry of the land. This fact is ascertained beyond all doubt from authentic documents. It is true the same worthy personages behaved as basely to prince Charles as they had done to king George; but that they actually encouraged the treason is equally true. What did the people do? Why, in the whole march from Carlisle to Derby, the prince, flushed as he was with victory, and apparently marching to mount a scarcely-disputed throne, the prince was joined only by three hundred of the people—of that portion of the king's subjects, whom, under the name of rabble, we are accustomed to revile, and whom we are now willing to exclude for ever from the privileges inseparable from freemen.
I can assure the House, Sir, that I have omitted no pains, and lost no opportunity of examining the objections urged against the reformers; and for this purpose, I have naturally gone to the strong hold of our opponents, rather than to the position occupied only by our weaker antagonists. Indeed, I have brought down to the House, and now hold in my hand, a pamphlet containing a speech which has been pronounced here by the member for Bodmin, to be unanswered and unanswerable. It is the speech of a right hon. gentleman now opposite (Mr. Canning), upon his re-election for Liverpool. As it is considered, then, as a sort of ministerial manual, as a kind of vade mecum of corruption, I have looked into it, with the hope of seeing something new against those doctrines which I advocate, or at least something old presented in a new light. I own, I have been disappointed. The principal position occupied by the right hon. orator, is, that all is well, and that we should let well alone. If this be so, I can only say to our political Pang loss, that notwithstanding this may be the best possible of all possible parliaments, there is something unfortunate in the condition of those who smart and groan under the diseases of the state; and who are obliged, like poor Candide, "passer par les baguettes des Bulgares."
The right hon. gentleman must not, however, take to himself the credit of this fine discovery. If it be true, it is no ben trovato of his. His great prototype is

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Mr. Arthur Young, who, in his "Example of France, a Warning to Britain," has laid, down this law-—"an unequal representation—rotten boroughs—extravagant cpurts—selfish ministers, and corrupt majorities, are so intimately interwoven with our political freedom, that it would require better political anatomists than our modern reformers, to show that we did not in fact owe our liberty to the identical evils which they want to expunge." Sir, this is the whole sum, and the best sample of all that is advanced by the right hon. and, of these speech; but, as it looks more like a good joke, than a serious assertion, I will to take up the time of the House, by a reply to that, which if it be said in sad earnest, has, I trust, been answered before. It is curious, at the same time, to observe how naturally these anti-reformers fell into phrases which can become none but real representatives of the people, and which suppose the existence of the Very representative system against which they so loudly declaim. For example, the right hon. gentleman here tells his. Liverpool constituents, as an excuse for coming amongst them, that he held it. to be of the very essence of our free and popular constitution, that an unreserved interchange of sentiment should take place between the representative and his constituents." Now, Sir, I ask you— I ask the House—does the wildest reformer ask for more than this? Does his "very essence of the constitution" differ from what the right hon. gentleman holds to be "the very essence of the constitution?" But, what sort of "unreserved interchange of sentiment" can take place between some representatives in this House and their constituents? What sort of intercourse can these gentlemen hold with the summer-house of Gatton, the stones of Midhurst, and the mounds of Old Sarum? Perhaps we may send our honourable brother members to the woods and wilds to consult the nymph Egeria; they may be silently inspired by the goddess of legislation, but they will interchange no sentiment with a single constituent.
Before I close "the unanswered, unanswerable speech," I would direct the attention of the House to that part of it which expresses surprise that the reformers should complain of the little influence possessed by the House of Commons, whereas "the House, like Aaron's rod, has almost swallowed up the other
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branches of the legislature." Sir, the reformers make no such complaint. Their complaint is the very complaint of the right hon. gentleman, namely, that this House has swallowed up the prerogatives of the Crown and the privileges of the people. That it has absorbed into itself all the power which ought to belong to the executive, and has rendered the other assembly little more than a chamber, in which those who exercise all their real power in this House meet for formal rather than for real purposes. It is surprising that the right hon. author should not have known something more of the doctrines and complaints of those whom he professes to oppose. If he complains of the exorbitant power of the House, so do we; and there is an end of our principal difference.
I have before noticed an argument, which is also adduced in this pamphlet, from the conduct of the parliament in 1649. I repeat that argument is no argument against those who contend for a free parliament and a true representation of the people of England. The parliament of 1649 was no more a free parliament than we are a free parliament. The parliament of 1649 no more represented the people of England than we represent the people of England. The great question, the triumphant question put by the unanswerable pamphlet, to the reformers is this: "when was the composition of the House different? When had wealth not as direct an influence, and the recommendation of candidates was not equally efficient?" If this posing, this puzzling question has not been answered before in the course of what I have addressed to the House, I would venture to say as a sufficient reply to it, that as at no previous time were the means of corrupting this body so great, so at no previous time was this body so corrupt as at present. And When I say this body, I mean not only the elected, but the electors, amongst whom corruption is poured through all her thousand channels, and who, in fact, are the only people that are able to withstand, in some degree, the pressure of enormous taxation; because the fruits of that taxation are, in, some degree, divided amongst themselves. Show roe a single parliament before the Revolution that consented to tax, the people without remonstrance, almost without inquiry, and I will give up the point. But I contend such parliament

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cannot be shown, and I come to the inevitable conclusion, that the object for which members seek a seat in this House is totally different from that for which they were formerly deputed to this assembly.
Not that I am ignorant that bad practices have prevailed, perhaps at all times, and that undue efforts have been made in procuring returns to the House of Commons. These instances must have, of necessity, been very rare in times when the sending members hither was a burthen to the constituents, and sometimes a service of danger to the representative. But still they did occur. We learn that one Thomas Long gave the mayor of Westbury four pounds (a good bargain one might think) to be elected burgess for Westbury, lord Coke in his 4th institute (§ 23.) mentions this, but in what terms? He says, "this matter was examined and adjudged in the House of Commons, secundum consuetudinem parliamenti, and the mayor fined and imprisoned, and Long removed. For this corrupt dealing was to poison the very fountain itself. It is worth remark that Mr. Locke in his Essay on Civil Government has used the same metaphor in speaking of parliamentary corruption. So thought these great men, but our sages have discovered that it is this poison which makes the fountain salubrious, and that without it the streams of the constitution would yield neither health, nor strength, nor life.
I am told that we have made near a hundred statutes against bribery and corruption, and undue influence in elections. But it seems these statutes were made not to be kept but broken; not to be the law of the land, but merely a sort of pretext to be employed by all, and to deceive none—a mere gross delusion— a ridiculous contradiction of every-day practice. The very great majority of this House are notoriously returned to parliament in defiance of all these statutes; so that to become makers of the law it appears the first qualification is to be breakers of the law. To what vices, to what lies, to what perjuries, to what frauds, to what debaucheries, to what brutalities of every kind does the present system give rise! What insults, alas too well merited, has this assembly to bear without retort, without refutation I Did not sir Charles Turner tell this House that they were a set of thieves Who had stolen an estate,
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and refused to let anyone look into the title deeds?" Did not bishop Horsley say in the House of Lords, that the reason why clergymen should not have a seat in this House was, because "the means of procuring one were notoriously immoral?" Did not Mr. Speaker Abbot tell us we were in the daily practice of conduct at which our ancestors would have blushed with indignation? (It seems be disagreed with the "unanswerable pamphlet" as to the history of this House.) And lastly, did not the noble secretary at war tell us the other evening, that gentlemen in this House were "obliged to bear language which no man of honour would tolerate in private society?" And why obliged to bear it? Because it is true. Because to attempt a refutation would be absurd. And yet all this monstrous immorality, this law-breaking, this delusion, this infamy, this disgrace is to be borne! and why? Our great statesmen give the answer; because it has existed lortg—because it does exist. To this I say, with the member for Bramber in 1785, "that to desire to continue a known and an acknowledged evil, merely because some good may result, is an argument such as no human being should urge."
We hear daily praises of this assembly—from ourselves it must be owned — which might deceive an inexperienced man, or one totally ignorant of the real construction of this House and the deplorable condition of the country. It seems we are a good specimen of the gentry of the country. So would a deputation from the clubs of St. James' s-street be, but no representation of the people—no real representation of those who are obliged to pay taxes and to obey laws, solely because we are said to be their real representatives —Then we represent the various interests in the country. Another opportunity may be found of exposing this fallacy—or rather this folly, of dividing a nation into interests, and leaving a great mass of neglected population apart, under the name of the multitude—or the people—or some other indefinite term. At present it will be sufficient to ask whether we do represent these interests.—Do not these interests petition us daily, and tell us we neglect them? And when something was said the other day, of the affection of parliament or of the minister, which is the something, for the landed interest, Was not the declaration received with a horse-laugh?

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—Afrtfflrer eulogy bestowed upon parliament is, that it introduces clever men to public notice The hon. mover has very properly Exposed that most absurd of all pretences to merit. As if the object of a representative assembly were the same as that of a school or college—to provide a perpetual crop of theme writers and de-claimers; instead of forming a true and faithful mirror, in which the sovereign may see the character and condition, the wants and wishes of his people.
Sir; it is extreme folly to be pleased with and to encourage the talents of those who are enabled by those very talents to play a more distinguished part against ourselves. We should examine which side these clever men take before we put them into a situation to foster and improve those abilities which are likely to be directed against the public interest. In the words of a well-written pamphlet just published on this great question, which I have before quoted. "To inspect the lock and trigger of your fowling-piece, and to measure out the proportion of powder and shot with a proper adjustment of capacity, is doubtless of importance: but it is incomparably more important to ascertain the direction in which the muzzle is pointed—for all your other precautions will merely terminate in a dreadful aggravation of your own danger and misery if it be turned against yourself It appears to me that the muzzle is turned against ourselves, and, for my part, I would rather the lock should be rusty and the charge wet, than see them both so accurately prepared as to be sure never to miss fire or fail of their aim.
I would, at the same time, observe, that there is a gross fallacy in stating that men of-abilities would not be returned to parliament; if the elections were in the hands of the people; such a supposition arises only from the complete ignorance of our modern statesmen as to the real character of the people, who are, in fact, not so degraded and blind as they think, or as they wish. The instinct which makes every man do the most for his own interest prevents any great mistake in this matter; and the same good sense which gives the most practice to the best physician or the ablest lawyer, would, I think, secure the requisite share of abilities for legislation in those chosen in a fair competition by a popular body of electors. I have yet to learn that the members of this House, who are sent hither by large
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communities, according to that system of election which the hon. mover could wish to make universal throughout the country, are peculiarly distinguished for their stupidity, or ignorance, or incapacity for the purposes for which they were chosen.
But, amongst the many other excellent qualifications attributed to the House of Commons as now constituted, should not be forgotten that which has been lately assigned to it,* namely, that "the demagogue finds his level and shrinks, to his proper dimensions in six months when once admitted to this assembly:" to this was added, that in case parliament should be reformed, it would be expedient to retain a nest of close boroughs, for insuring the introduction of the said demagogue into the senate at all times. Now, as to the latter recommendation, it arose, I imagine, from the confusion of ideas to which the eagerness to say a smart thing at all hazards will expose even the most experienced debater; for it is the great complaint of the anti-reformers, that in a reformed parliament there would be an inundation, as it were, of mere popular orators, and that none but such characters would compose this House under the new form of construction. However, let us not, as I before said, suppose that this hint as to the nest of boroughs arose from any thing more than the wantonness of the moment. But to turn to the eulogy passed on this House.—If it be true that it is framed so happily as to afford a touchstone to the pretensions of public men; to strip the tinsel off a coxcomb who would otherwise remain undetected, then indeed it performs a service to the community. If it shows the value of sounding words, and big promises, and displays the treachery of pretended patriotism, it is also of much use. I suspect, however, that all that can be fairly collected from this eulogy is, that the demagogue has but one vote in this House, and that he is not gifted with the extraordinary quality of inducing men to decide against their own interest, and make a voluntary resignation of their own power. If, however, the demagogue is but six months in finding his level, in shrinking to his proper dimensions, there is a description of per-sons that do not in six months, no, nor in thirty years, find their level, and shrink
* By Mr. Canning, on the second reading of the Roman Catholic Disabilities Removal bill.

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to their proper dimensions here. These are the regular adventurers, the downright trading politicians: The House will easily suggest to itself the sort of being to which I allude; but to prevent mistakes, I would presume to attempt a portrait, hot finished, but not exaggerated. A smart sixth-form boy, the little hero of a little world, matures his precocious parts at college, and sends before him his fame to the metropolis: a minister or some borough, holder of the day thinks him worth saving from his democratic associates, and from the unprofitable principles which the thoughtless enthusiasm of youth may have inclined him hitherto to adopt. The hopeful youth yields at once; and, placed in the true line of promotion, he takes his beat with the more veteran prostitutes of parliament. There he rounds his periods; there he balances his antitheses; there he adjusts his alliterations; and plastering up the interstices of his piebald patchwork rhetoric with froth and foam—this master of pompous nothings becomes first favourite of the great council of the nation. His very want of sincerity and virtue qualifies him for a corrupted audience, who look upon his parts as an excuse for their degeneracy, and regard him, not only as the partner, but as the apologist of their common degradation. Such a man may have notoriously spurned at every principle of public morality and public honor; he may have by turns insulted, derided, betrayed, and crouched to every party, or at least every politician, in the state. Sometimes he may have shown all the arrogance of success—at other times have displayed the true tame-ness of an underling, and have submitted to serve under those in public whom he has conspired in private to ruin and destroy. Yet this man—with
"Beauty that shocks you, parts that none can trust,
"Wit that can creep, and pride that licks the dust"—
this man, I say, shall be courted and caressed in parliament; and be shall never be so much admired, never so much applauded, as when playing of his buffoonery at the expense of public virtue—as when depreciating the understandings or mocking the sufferings of the people. Such a man does not find his level, he does not shrink to his proper dimensions in the un-reformed House; on the contrary, he is the true House of Commons hero. Despised and detected as he may be without
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doors, he finds a shelter in the bosom of the senate. Sunk as he may be in public opinion, he there attains to an eminence which raises him, for the time, above, the scorn of his fellow-countrymen. True, his fame is not lasting, but for the moment lie is the glory and the shame of parliament: no one equals him en that stage—
"Him, thus exalted, for a wit we own,
"And court him as top-fiddle of the town.
Such a man, I say, Sir, would have no place in a reformed parliament; and if he be either useful or ornamental in a deliberative assembly, it is for him that should he reserved that nest of boroughs which it has been proposed to keep solely for the demagogues. Talents without character would be banished from such an assembly, and the honest discharge of a sacred trust would be the first instead of the last requisite of a public man.
Mr. Horace Twisssaid, it was not desirable that this House should be a representation of the people in the sense required by the hon. member who had spoken last; The opinions of the people, though trustworthy guides from age to age, were not to be safely followed from month to month; and it was better, in most cases, for the House to be a little behind public opinion, than a little before it. It was a mistake, however, to suppose, as some appeared to do on the authority of the petition presented by lord Grey in 1793, that 157 individuals returned a majority of the House. Among those 157 were reckoned rather unfairly, not only the proprietors of close boroughs, but all men whose property or whose character gave them a leading power in popular elections: beside which error, it was also to be remembered, that 100 Irish members had, since that petition, been introduced by the Union, of whom at least 80 were returned upon popular principles. Nor was the body returned by individual patrons, a united body, pulling together against the people; but a body split into parties; parties, which, in spite of the objection to the principle of party, must always exist, while mankind should continue to differ upon great political measures. The lateness of the hour would withhold him from entering at large into the details of the subject; but he could not help observing upon the misapprehension which seemed to exist as to the probable effect of triennial parliaments. For reasons of caution, not less beneficial to the people than to the Crown, parliament

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was usually dissolved a twelvemonth before the period of its natural death. He was not aware that this caution would be less necessary in a triennial than in a septennial parliament. This would reduce the Regular duration to two years. If to this consideration were added that of the probability of casualties, such as the demises of the Crown, the changes of administration, and so forth, the two years would become little more than one; and thus, under the name of triennial ejections, annual elections would be our actual constitution. The inconveniences of our present system—for some there were—we willingly bore as the price of our freedom; but to multiply those inconveniences would be to add nothing to our freedom at home, but to detract materially from our strength and safety abroad: for the result of these perpetual appeals to the people would throw the executive as well as all other power into their hands, and leave the nation in time of war but an unequal match for the vigorous, single-minded despotisms of the continental states.—These were a few among the many considerations which would induce him to oppose the present motion.
Sir Robert Wilsonsaid, he rose to support the motion of his hon. friend from his conviction of its necessity and propriety and in compliance with the wishes of 2,000 of his constituents. Before he proceeded to state his reasons for voting for the motion, he begged, in the name of the friends of reform, to offer his acknowledgments to his hon. friend who had brought it forward, not for the talent he had displayed in support of the motion—for that was the natural fruit of his genius and application—but for the industry he had bestowed on the subject. The opinions and views of the great body of the reformers were now embodied. It would now be seen whether the reformers could show, not poison, but balm, for a sickening state. Even the enemies of reform admitted that the reformers were theoretically right in demanding a free, full, and fair representation. He could say, from his intercourse with the people this country, that if reform were a mere theory, it would not have interested them. Many might contend for the victory of truth over fallacy; because fallacy must prove remotely pernicious; but the people would not take a deep interest in abstract theory. In other countries
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tumults, violence, and massacres had been seen in consequence of the attachment of the people to abstract principles It was not so in England. The questions of reform had taken such deep root, because the people were persuaded that it was necessary for the general happiness and prosperity of the country—because they; were persuaded that it was the regulating principle of power and life; of liberty, person, and property. He agreed with the hon. member for Newcastle that it derived great energy from taxations. There were two causes why it did so; first, the people felt themselves oppressed by intolerable taxes upon their industry, to such an extent that 240 days in the year were occupied in earning what they paid in taxes. In the next place they felt this burden more galling because the greatest part of it was for paying the interest of the public debt. The member for Newcastle had argued that the people had considered the war just, necessary, and proper. But a great many had, from the first, been persuaded that the war had been founded in injustice.—that it had not been waged for the liberties but against the independence of the people. Great part of the money had been spent to induce persons to become supporters of the war, and to engage the independence of others on the same side. Certainly, a great proportion had been expended to animate industry in order to dispose the people to approve of the war. The very interest had been paid by loans during the war; and the people were content to enjoy the temporary prosperity in the hope of not seeing the evil day; like Louis 14th., who had said that he cared not if a deluge should take place after he was gone. Any people could have been so corrupted, but it was the duty of their representatives to have foreseen the calamities, and to have prevented them. The people now saw that no remedy could be applied by the House without reform. If the House had the will to apply a remedy, they had not the power; because they were without the confidence of the people. The people asked not spoliation; but a remedy that would give them their due proportion of the fruits of their own labour. It was true that they had the liberty of expressing their opinions, and that there was still—thanks to the exertions of hon. gentlemen in and out of parliament—some practical liberty left to the country. The

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right hon. member for Liverpool had indeed compared the liberty enjoyed in England with that enjoyed in America; and, after saying that nine tenths of the inhabitants of the United States were in a state of actual slavery, had inferred, that the degree of practical liberty existing in America was less than that which existed in England. He (sir R. Wilson) had never stood forward as the eulogist of the form of government adopted in the United States. He allowed that a large proportion of the population of those states consisted of slaves; but those who urged that circumstance as a matter of charge against America, ought not to forget, that slavery was made a part of its constitution whilst it was under English domination, and that it had recently refused to admit into the union a state which had refused to abolish slavery. But was slavery unknown in every part of the British empire? Or were not slaves a kind of property acknowledged by the law in Jamaica, Guadaloupe, and other of the West-India Islands? Before the right hon. member for Liverpool took credit to England upon that score, he ought to bring in a bill for the abolition of slavery in the West-India colonies. The question of reform did not depend upon mere precedents. The people of England had a right to every improvement in their government which the increased intelligence of the age, the growing knowledge of society, the change in the position of property and the altered temper of the population, rendered desirable; if that improvement was compatible with the safety of the country. Reform was a question which whether it was or was not connected with principles and precedents recognised in the reigns of the Edwards and the Henries, must, at no distant period, be fully recognised by the House of Commons. He should indeed despair of its success were it to depend upon nothing else than its justice: it depended, however, upon other causes—upon the knowledge, the temper, and the courage of the community; and he was convinced that if the reformers persevered with the same quiet and determined spirit which they had recently exhibited, many of the gentlemen whom he saw around him would not sink into their graves without beholding the House of Commons a full, fair, and equal representation of the people.
Mr. Abercrombysaid, that as he had
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voted in favour of reform in the year 1807, he should have been sorry hot to have voted in favour of it on the present;' occasion—if from no other reason, at least from a desire of avoiding the charge of inconsistency. It was unnecessary for; him to refer to the arguments which had been already used regarding what the constitution had been in ancient times;, for he was sure that, at present, the existing constitution was thoroughly understood. Changes had been formerly made in the duration of parliament, in the qualifications of its members, and also in the modes of election. This circumstance proved, that the power of making changes in the representative system was not unknown to the constitution; and that such changes might therefore be made in it without any violation of principle, provided that they were at once safe and expedient. Now, there were two modes of reform for the country to adopt—one of them calculated to introduce into the government so many important alterations, that he could never consider it in any other light than that of a revolution; the other, of such a nature as would repair and improve, without demolishing the fabric of the constitution. Of this latter reform he professed himself a warm and steady advocate; at the same time, he felt it necessary to state, that he never could, under any circumstances, give his assent to the plan of reform proposed by his hon. friend the member for Durham. If carried into effect, he could view it in no other light than as tending to a complete revolution. It appeared to him to go too far; whilst that which had been proposed by his noble friend, the member for Huntingdonshire, and pursued in the case of Grampound, appeared to him, on the other hand, not to go far enough. With regard to what; had been said in the course of the evening respecting the influence of the Crown he could not help observing that, hot withstanding the force with which public, opinion operated upon the House of Commons, that influence had increased within it to a degree perfectly inconsistent with its integrity and independence. Nobody could entertain a doubt upon that subject who looked to the great increase of the army, the navy, and the establishments for the collection of the revenue which had taken place during the last reign. He should, therefore, defend a considerable modification in the preterit system; indeed he thought that such a

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modification was absolutely necessary to prolong ltd existence. Referring to the duration of parliaments, he said that he conceived septennial parliaments, to be the longest, and triennial the shortest parliaments, which any rational man would wish to adopt. Though he thought septennial parliaments too long, he could not agree to a bill for limiting their duration to three years, unless some measure wag introduced at the same time to restrict the expenses consequent upon elections: for without such a measure, he was Convinced that triennial parliaments would throw additional weight, influence, and importance, not into the hands of the people, but into the hands of the Crown, With respect to a place-bill, he felt the same difficulty as he felt regarding the limitation of the duration of parliaments. There could be no doubt that stabillity could not be given to any administration in a country full of active, intelligent, and enterprising spirits like England, without the existence of some solid and permanent body to support it; and, therefore, Considerable deliberation ought to be employed before a resolution was adopted to exclude from parliament every individual who held a place under the Crown. Besides, he had himself sat many years in parliament; and his experience did not lead him to think that wisdom had always been on the side of the people, and never on the side of parliament. If, on some occasions, the people had instructed their representative, on others the representatives had instructed the people. The measure which had recently passed through that House, and which was then under discussion in another place, was an instance in which parliament had instructed the people, and in which the people had not turned a deaf ear to the advice of parliament. If an opinion were to gain ground among the people, that the majority of that House was determined to oppose every species of reform, he should prophesy—and expect his prophesy to meet with a speedy fulfilment—that a conflict would soon take place between the House and the people, which would not terminate without inflicting injury upon both. He had thought it necessary to say thus much to the House, lest he should be supposed to have joined those who received every proposition for reform with the most determined and unrelenting hostility. In giving his vote on this occasion, he wished to be distinctly
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understood as giving no sanction to the plan which had been introduced by his hon. friend.
Mr. Fyshe Palmerintreated the House to enter into a dispassionate investigation of the state of the representation, and assured them that, if they did so, conciliation would take place between themselves and the people; but that, if they did not, a tremendous convulsion would ensue, of which no man could anticipate the consequences.
Mr. Stuart Wortleysaid, he gave the highest credit to the lion, member for the county of Durham for the motives which had led him to bring this question before parliament. That hon. member had introduced it with a gentlemanly temper and feeling, to which even those who could not give him their votes were compelled to give their admiration. Though he agreed with that hon. member in thinking that many gentlemen were returned to that House by the power and under the influence of other persons; and though he believed that there was a strong and general feeling in the country that some reform was necessary in the Constitution of it, he would still contend that the House, even as constituted at present, was the only assembly for successfully carrying on the business of the nation. In arguing that point, he must beg leave to inform hon. members, that when they called upon him to look back to distant times for the constitution, he should not look back to the reigns of the Henries, but to those periods in our history in which the great struggles for liberty took place between the sovereign and the people. At those periods he would contend that the rotten boroughs were exactly in the same state of decay as they were at present. He would take Corfe-castle and Old Sarum as his instances, and would challenge the hon. members to point out any time at which they were not under the same species of domination as now existed. They knew both when and how the right of representation had been bestowed on those boroughs, and that knowledge was sufficient to prove the correctness of his assertion. He likewise agreed with the hon. member for Calne, that if the mode of election for members to serve in that House were to be made too popular, the effect of it would be to do away with the House of Lords; and that argument might be considered as of some weight in showing that the influence exercised by peers

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in that House was of essential use to the constitution. Honourable gentlemen, on, the other side of the House, had said, in addressing themselves to those who sat on his side, "You talk of our making innovations in the constitution by our propositions for reform—and yet the constitution is full of innovations of your making—what, therefore, prevents us from pro-£osing some innovations on our side himself said, that there was nothing to prevent them: if their innovations were safe and expedient, no person could blame them for proposing them; but they, in return, ought not to inveigh against those who thought that the constitution did not stand in need of them. He was glad that the hon. member for the county of Durham had brought forward the discussion of parliamentary reform in that House, because it was a subject that could not be fairly discussed out of it, in such meetings as his hon. friend, the member for Sussex, had been blamed for not attending. He was sure that if the people out of doors should be correctly informed of what was then passing within, the question of parliamentary reform would be viewed by them in a very different light than that in which, for some time past, they had been accustomed to contemplate it: for whenever an important question had agitated the public mind, he had always found that the decision to which the House came upon it tended to soothe and tranquillize that agitation. This had been made more evident than ever by the events of the last three months; for what man amongst them could have divined that the subject which at that time so powerfully distracted the country, and the House itself, should have descended in so short a period into such comparative insignificance? The hon. member concluded by stating, that if the wild visions of reform entertained by some individuals should ever be realized, the limited monarchy of England would be converted into a republic, and an end would be made of our glorious constitution.
Lord Burystated, that the importance of the present question demanded the serious attention of every member of the House, and he trusted that would be his apology for offering his sentiments in support of the present motion. It had been for some time broadly stated, that the representation of the people required reform, and it would be but an idle waste of the time of the House to enumerate
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those instances in which this statement had been corroborated by facts—by such glaring facts as the boldest supporter of the present system would not venture, to explain. But they had been so-long and so unblushingly practised, and they were now so interwoven with the administration of affairs, that it would seen an interference on the part of the people to correct the causes which had produced these melancholy facts, was considered an innovation, and those who seek reform were branded as being disaffected, and as seeking to overturn that, which, in the language of the ministry, "works well for the country." This was the important point; and it would not be amiss to inquire in what respect the present system did "work well for the country." He would ask, did the country present an appearance of universal content—of general thriving industry? Was there any one part of this empire where such would be a true statement? Had not the petitions oh the table of the House told a melancholy and heart-breaking story of universal discontent—of ruined trade—of one wide scene of desolation and distress? Had the petitions which contained these distressing facts been answered? No; they had been worse than disregarded. When the people complained—when they petitioned for relief-bills for the restriction of their liberties had been passed. It could hardly have been thought possible that such things could have been accomplished in the Commons of England. But the power of corruption had prevailed, and the voice of the people had been unheeded. A faction had possessed itself of the powers of the House, into which it had also dragged the powers of the Crown. It had perverted these combined influences to preserve its own political influence, and to destroy the constitutional interference of the people. This faction had so long and so banefully exercised these unwarrantable powers, that the sovereign himself had been continually mixed up with party questions, and identified as a partisan in the measures of administration. This faction, arrogating to itself an exclusive connexion with the throne, connecting itself with the powers of foreign despots, had dared to tell this country, that meetings of the people were farces, and that limits ought to be put to the troublesome applications of those who sought to alter the present well-working order of things. That parliaments were

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called for the purpose, not of maintaining the political pre-eminence of England on the Sound principles of civil and religious liberty—not to attend to the prayers and petitions of the people—not to preserve the liberties of tins country—not to reduce enormous establishments—not to relieve the burthen which five and twenty years of war had inflicted upon a generous people r but were convened to ratify treaties with foreign powers leagued in one common principle of despotism—to suspend those statutes which stand in the way of arbitrary power—to enact laws which shut our ports against the unhappy fugitive from foreign persecution—to increase enormous establishments—to impose takes. Such were the purposes for which parliament met; and, unhappily for the greatness and prosperity of this country, such affairs were transacted and carried by majorities of the House. The people in vain required that parliament should represent them, their feelings, their wants, their necessities. To such petitions of the people, ministers, by virtue of the present "well-working system,'' were enabled to turn a deaf ear; but he trusted that a remedy was at hand, in an amended state of the representation; and that the time was fast approaching when the people's Voice would be heard, and this faction be taught, that thirty years of impunity and bad government would have a dreadful retribution. It was under such a system of misrule, that all constituted authority was brought into hatred and contempt. When ministers complained of the increasing prevalence of sedition—when they branded others with disaffection, they should have recollected, that it Was their misrule which had excited it; they had made the times—they had created discontent, and they must answer it. It was the notorious corruption which had long existed, and had been so successfully exercised as to produce these majorities, and which had made this faction triumphant over the Crown and the independence of the people. It was this baneful influence which had left the people discontented, degraded, and at present helpless. The root of this destructive evil flourished in the present state of the representation of that House of Parliament. It was there where the remedy must be applied—it was there where the unbribed representatives of the people must honestly, steadily, and manfully repair the mischief. Until a reform took
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place there, all that might otherwise be said or done was an idle mockery and insult upon the understanding of the country, which might be inflicted, but could not be long endured. Reform must Come, and would come, to teach parliaments for what purpose they were delegated.
Mr. Martin, of Galway, complimented the hon. mover on the moderation he had shown; at the same time, he could not support his proposition. The class of resident householders proposed by the hon. member was objectionable as voters. Reform might be carried to an extent that would be not only dangerous, but criminal. During the French revolution, one of the members of the convention told the assembly that they had destroyed the aristocracy of the nobles, the aristocracy of tradesmen and shop-keepers, but still they had another class more dangerous to destroy, namely the aristocracy of talent and genius.—Danton was the monster who made such a proposition. It was an instance, proving that the spirit of reform might lead, if followed, to the most extravagant actions. Besides, scarcely any two persons were agreed as to the precise plan that should be adopted. He would pledge himself that if all the gentlemen on the government side of the House would make their obeisance to the Chair and withdraw, and leave the question to be decided by the gentlemen opposite, the motion would be negatived by the hon. members opposite by an immense majority.
Lord Miltonconfessed that he had always approached this subject with considerable alarm; not that he thought it to be of itself attended with danger, but that he conceived the theories of some of those who pretended to discuss it likely to produce a complete and radical change in the country. Indeed, it had appeared to him, upon all former occasions, that the House of Commons did virtually represent the people; and, entertaining that Opinion, he could not conceive how those who called for reform could maintain the attack, which in so doing they made upon the ancient constitution of parliament. On those occasions he had looked with the warmest enthusiasm upon the constitution, and had imagined that upon every point it worked well for the community. A better acquaintance with the practices of parliament—a closer investigation of some of its leading peculiarities, and perhaps a

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greater maturity of judgment, had induced him to alter the opinions which he had entertained at his outset in public life. He had seen the House of Commons acting in complete and avowed opposition to the sense and wishes of the people; and, having seen them acting in such a manner, he should have been guilty of the greatest inconsistency had he applied his old opinion to it. The only way in which he could preserve his consistency was, as the House appeared changed to him, to change his opinion, and to avow his change of opinion regarding it. Referring to what had fallen from an hon. member in the course of the debate, the noble lord remarked, hat he had not yet gained such an acquaintance with the constitution as to discover that the House ought to stamp the impression of its mind on the people, and not to take its own impressions from the people. Much had also been said with regard to the need that the House had of clever men being admitted into it through close boroughs as legislators. This need he totally denied. The House might be more pure than the Areopagus of Athens or the senate of Rome; but if it did not represent the wishes and feelings of the people, it was not a House of Commons in any constitutional meaning of the word. That the people were fully capable of judging whether the House of Commons did, or did not, do its duty upon sound and constitutional principles, was a tenet backed by the opinion of Mr. Burke; and higher authority the House would scarcely desire. Speaking of the general constitutional conduct of parliament, Mr. Burke said of all these things, they (the people) are perfect judges, and judges without appeal; but as to the detail of a particular measure or scheme of policy, they have not sufficient of speculation in the closet, nor of experience in business, to decide upon it. They can very well see, however, whether we (the House of Commons) are tools of the court, or their true and honest servants; of all that they can well judge, and I could well wish that upon such points they should always exercise their judgment." The noble lord said, that from all the inquiries he had been able to make, he could state, that the great mass of the middle classes of society were in favour of reform. Referring to a late county meeting, he could assert, that the great majority of the yeomanry thought that reform was necessary. It was one of the alarming signs of the
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times that persons of the most peaceable habits expressed their opinions, that there was nothing to be hoped for from that House. In recapitulating the different interests which were represented in that House, he feared he must say that there, was a court interest greater than all the others; and this, he contended, was a state of things which they must remedy, or it would be remedied for them. He believed that the opinion of the great mass of the people was, that there ought not only to be a change of men, but of measures also. He nevertheless could not agree to the motion, which however beautiful in theory, would be productive of as many difficulties as it would tend to remedy. The House ought to be the representation and not the delegation of the people. In support of the necessity for reform, the noble lord stated, that on a division in that House, upon a popular question of the county members, 86 had voted on one side, and 84 on the other, while, of borough members, there had voted 173 on one side, and 75 on the, other; thus clearly evincing that influence could be exerted over the latter class. The noble lord then reviewed the state of representation in Scotland, which, he contended, was neither a representation of the people, nor of property. Although he was far from approving the plan which his hon. friend had developed, and deemed it pregnant with danger to the constitution, he still thought the House, ought to go into a committee on the state of the representation, with a view of infusing; into that representation a more popular spirit than it at present possessed.
Mr. W. Williamssaid, that from his, earliest days he had given his support to parliamentary reform, convinced as he was that nothing but reform could secure the constitution from ruin. He was desirous of tearing from the British constitution all its imperfections. He was ready to admit that parliament did much good. Indeed, the proceedings of 600 gentlemen of talent and education when reported, must do much good when circulated over the country; but the question wag, did they do enough? He was persuaded that parliament would continue under a stigma, until some regulation was adopted with respect to small boroughs, which had been found a powerful and dangerous instrument in the hands of ministers. He held in his hand an account of various divisions that had taken

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place in that House, but at that late hour would only quote two, to prove the necessity of reform, and both occurred within this present session. The first was on the motion of the marquis of Tavistock, when the numbers were 179 against 324; of the former, 99 were returned for counties or populous places; while of the 324, only 78 were of the latter description. The malt tax would have been repealed if the county members had alone possessed votes on the late divisions. The majority of the county members on a late division on the army estimates, were 32 to 22 against that wasteful expenditure of the public money. The House of Commons ought to have a control over his majesty's ministers. With the same sincerity as the right hon. member for Liverpool had declared, that he would always oppose reform, he also would declare, that he would always support reform, for he thought that it alone could save the country.
Mr. Honywoodsaid, that although he was convinced of the necessity of a reform in parliament, yet he was not prepared to go the length of his hon. friend's proposition.
The debate was then, on the motion of the chancellor of the exchequer, adjourned till to-morrow.

ROMAN CATHOLIC DISABILITY REMOVAL BILL.
The order of the day being read, for resuming the adjourned debate, on the motion, "That this bill be now read a second time,"
The Bishop of St. David'ssaid:—my lords; though I am wholly unable to do justice either to the great importance of the subject before the House, or to my own convictions, yet I am unwilling to give the vote which I shall do this night against the second reading of the bill, without endeavouring at least to state the grounds of my objections to it. But, before I state those grounds, I wish to make a single observation on what fell from the noble earl, whose eloquent speech closed the debate of last night. The noble earl observed, that the constitution of this country is "essentially Protestant, but not exclusively so." My lords, the history of the constitution, if I mistake not, requires both terms. From the Constitutions of Clarendon downwards, its Protestant character was forming. It was forming by the variety of checks which were given to the intrusive authority of the pope by the laws of Edward 1st and 3rd, Richard 2nd and others. It was formed, and in great measure completed by the laws of Henry 8th. It was finally completed by the statute of the 30th of Charles 2nd. It was completed, my lords, by the active exclusion of the pope and his jurisdiction from the constitution. I object to the bill, because it appears to me contrary to the very end for which your lordships are here assembled. The writ of summons convened parliament expressly to consult for the defence of the church of England; super rebus quibusdem arduis defensionem regni Angliæ et Ecclesiæ Anglicanse concerventibus. But the church of England never can be defended by giving political power to her greatest enemy, the church of Rome. I object to the bill, because it appears to me contrary to the oath which I took at the commencement of the present parliament. The bill recognizes the foreign jurisdiction, which I then swore does not exist, and ought not to exist within this realm. The oath expressed my real sentiments. I took it
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without the smallest mental reservation whatsoever; and at the time I was resolved to fulfil the tenor of the oath. It seems to me therefore, if I were to vote for the bill, I should falsify my oath and my declaration. I object to the bill, because it appears to me contrary to one of the highest prerogatives of the Crown. The king is head of the church of England by common law, as well as by statute. But if this bill were to pass into a law, it would be a great encouragement to the papal power; that power which the Roman Catholics hold to be superior to the sovereignty of the realm. Every encouragement therefore, of the papal power is a diminution of the authority of the, Crown.—My lords, there are many other objections to the bill. I object to it because it appears to me a most pernicious anomaly to permit the members of a foreign church, and subjects of a foreign sovereign, to sit in either House of parliament without renouncing their foreign allegiance; and especially to legislate for the church of England, against which they are united by principles of conscientious hostility. I object to the bill, because it offers to the church of England false securities. It proposes, by way of security to the church, an oath to be taken by the Roman Catholic clergy, which no conscientious Roman Catholic clergyman can take, or can keep. It is contrary to their religion, or what they call their religion, to swear that they will enter into no communications with the pope for the disturbance or the overthrow of the church of England; their creeds and oaths, their preaching, writing, and ministering, having all a tendency directly or indirectly to the overthrow of the Protestant church, as every body knows, who knows any thing of the decrees of the council of Trent, and as we have been lately informed by a Roman Catholic Bishop, who stated it as his objection to the oath proposed by the bill. I object to the oath, because it is contrary to the act of union, by which the Protestant religion was declared to be inviolable. But this bill abrogates the securities which were intended to preserve it inviolate, and has provided no equivalent. My lords, the objections to the bill are endless. They may, perhaps, be described in a few words: its utter inconsistency even with the religion of that foreign church which it was intended to serve; its ruinous neglect of the church

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of England which it ought to have taken care of; and the consequences which may be expected to follow from so great a change in our laws by the loss of many, perhaps indescribable properties, of the English constitution, which have given to this country its present transcendent power, dignity, and character in the world. My lords, the opponents of the bill are often called upon for a proof of the danger of admitting Roman Catholics into parliament and offices of state. Can there be greater danger than that of granting political power to persons, who, have views and interests foreign and hostile to the church of England—who tell you beforehand that it is contrary to their religion to swear that they will not employ that power for the overthrow of the established church; whose religion also may compel them to betray the counsels of the king.
The Duke of Yorkrose, he said, with the utmost reluctance to oppose the second reading of the bill; but there were occasions on which it became an individual not to step aside, but to come forward and boldly avow the sentiments which he entertained. The present he considered to be one of those occasions; for, were not their lordships called upon to sanction a measure, which it was admitted, even by its advocates, would effect a great change in the constitution as established at the revolution of 1688, and in the system which had seated his majesty's family on the throne? When measures similar to the present had been proposed by a statesman, who had rendered the most eminent services to his country, his royal highness said, he had strenuously opposed them, on a thorough conviction of their dangerous tendency. The more he had since heard the subject discussed, the more he had been confirmed in the opinion which he had then expressed. He had always understood that the Church of England was an integral part of the constitution. Long might it remain so! But let not their lordships imagine that he was an enemy to toleration. He should always be happy that every sect should have the full exercise of its religion, as long as it did not affect the security of the established church, and as long as its members remained loyal subjects. But, there was a great difference between allowing the free exercise of religion and granting political power. As he felt, himself inadequate to
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the task of entering into the details of the question, and wished not to detain those noble lords who were better qualified to take an expansive view of the subject, he should only repeat, that his opposition to the bill arose from principles which he had embraced ever since he had been able to judge for himself, and which he hoped he should cherish to the last day of his life.
The Earl of Darnleysaid, that no one could feel more respect than he did for the illustrious personage who had just sat down, but it was with regret that he heard the sentiments just uttered, though he was confident, that they sprung from the purest conviction, and the most conscientious regard to truth and honour. He regretted to hear the deliberate opinion of the heir to the Crown delivered in opposition to such a measure as the present. He had himself for many years attended to the discussions on the subject, and his opinion had been formed by the same honest conviction for which he gave credit to the illustrious personage. The more he read, and heard, and saw, the more he was confirmed in the opinion which was diametrically opposite to that which had been just expressed. He had for the most part abstained from taking any share in the debates which had arisen upon the subject, leaving it to abler hands to advocate its merits; but the measure now came recommended by the Commons of England; the prejudices against it had in a great degree given way, both in this country and in Ireland, and he was anxious to avail himself of the present opportunity to state why he differed from the illustrious personage and the noble lords who supported the same side. He would confess that he was much surprised at the tone and manner in which the question had been taken up. He was surprised at the arguments of the noble earl (of Mansfield) who had spoken second in the debate of the preceding night. The speech was certainly a good speech with reference to other times—it was a good speech, but it ought to have been delivered a century and a half ago. The era to which it was adapted was that in which a noble lord was known to have declared, that he would not have in his establishment "a Popish man or a Popish woman—a Popish dog or a Popish cat." At that period the speech of the noble lord would have received due honour; but at this time of

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day, after the Catholics had disclaimed upon oath the whole of the pernicious doctrines ascribed to them, it was too much to revive those refuted accusations. He was also much surprised to hear a right reverend prelate last night ascribe to them the doctrine, that no faith was to be kept with heretics. That imputation among the rest they had denied upon oath; and it was but justice that they should receive credit for the denial thus solemnly given. Christian charity believeth no evil. There were some noble lords for whose talents he entertained the greatest respect, who unfortunately differed from him upon this subject; but when he reflected on the constellation of talent by which he was borne out, he could not surrender his opinion to the opposite authority. When he remembered the names of Burke, of Fox, of Pitt, Windham, Sheridan, Dundas, and though last not least, of that illustrious patriot whose name would live for ever in the annals of Ireland, and who now reposed among the ashes of the distinguished dead in this country—he felt confident in the justice of his opinions. To turn from the dead to the living, he would refer to the right hon. member by whom the bill was introduced into the other House of Parliament, and by whose eloquence they were persuaded to adopt it. Mere accident could not account for this general agreement among such authorities; the laws of gravitation might as well be ascribed to accident. In his opinion the judgment of many of the opponents of the present measure, though individuals of great intellect, was warped by long continued prejudices and professional habits. This was the only way of accounting for that feeling of dread and alarm which many noble lords entertained of the bill. In his opinion no real cause of danger existed; but if it did, it was greatly exaggerated. There was a passage in Burke in which he said that a man might in his own mind, entertain a confused idea of danger; but if the grounds of his apprehension were clearly brought before the world, they would meet with nothing but scorn and derision. He believed that the apprehensions of danger from this measure were of the nature alluded to in this passage. What danger could be apprehended from the admission of the duke of Norfolk, the earl of Shrewsbury, and the representatives of four or five of the most ancient families
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in this kingdom to the enjoyment of their birthright, a seat in that House; for that would be the immediate effect of the passing of the bill? Would any man lay his hand on his heart and say that any danger to the Protestant church or the throne was likely to result from the admission of the Catholic peers into that House? The right of peers to sit in that House formed part of the constitution: it was coeval with Magna Charta and the institution of the trial by jury; and it was disgraceful to behold the duke of Norfolk year after year sitting above the bar, when he was entitled to walk into the body of the House. It had been stated by a noble marquis who spoke last night, that the opponents of the measure argued, as if it was a new privilege for which the friends of the measure were contending. But did they remember, that in the time of queen Elizabeth, when the Protestant religion was as anxiously protected as at present, that sovereign had not excluded Catholic peers from the House; and that it was not until the passing of the test and other acts, in the time of Charles 2nd that object was accomplished? Another ground of alarm with the opponents of the bill was, that it would lead to a Popish House of Commons. It was said, that a great majority of the Irish members would, in the first instance, be Catholics; but those who knew any thing of elections in the counties of Ireland, must be aware that they were of all things most unlike popular elections—that they were aristocratical more than any thing else. For his own part, the only consequence he could anticipate with respect to the county of Meath, with which he was more connected than with any other part of Ireland, was, that the son of lord Fingal might be returned instead of lord Bective, which would be no great misfortune; and his firm persuasion was, from what he knew of the country, that ten Catholic members would not be returned for Ireland. If, however, any attempt should be made to subvert the Protestant constitution, they could still retrace their steps, and prevent such fears from being realised. The next point insisted on was, that his majesty would be surrounded with Protestant councillors; but no Catholics could arrive at offices of high trust without the recommendation of Protestants in power, and if they discovered talents to authorise such a choice, he did not see what injury would result from it.

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A reverend prelate had said, that the Catholics owed allegiance to a foreign power; but that they had denied upon oath. They had professed allegiance to his majesty alone, acknowledging him as their lawful sovereign, though not the head of their church. It was impossible to have better proof than this, except it was, the review of their conduct for a long series of years, which would establish their claim to be considered as loyal and faithful subjects. Another reverend prelate had expressed a hope that the question would be set at rest by a final rejection, and that it would never be brought forward again. He could not agree with the reverend prelate either in the wish or the opinion. It was impossible that this great measure of humanity and policy, of Christian charity and substantial justice, should not sooner, or later, be carried into effect; and he should sit down with the conviction in his mind, that if the Catholics continued to conduct themselves with the temper and moderation which they had lately observed, whatever the result of the present discussion might be, their success could not be long delayed.
The Lord Chancellorrose.* He apologised for taking so early an opportunity of expressing his sentiments. Upon a question so important, he could not be altogether silent; and he was unwilling to postpone asking for their lordships attention, till that period when fatigue might disable him from giving his own attention sufficiently to the subject of debate. The question upon which the House was to decide, was, whether the bill should be read a second time. He was ready to say that it ought to be read a second time if the House approved its principle, and if the imperfections in its enactments were such as, admitting of amendments and modifications, the bill amended and modified might, after all, in some sense be considered as a bill somewhat alike to that which the Commons had sent up. But, making this admission, he could not bring himself to consent to the second reading of this bill.
He had heard with regret the observations of the noble earl, with respect to his conduct, and that of another noble lord, when the first reading of this bill was proposed. Disrespect to the mover of this bill he altogether disclaimed. It
*From the original edition, printed for Hatchard and Son, Piccadilly.
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was also a mistake on the part of the noble mover to suppose that the bill had been represented by him, or the other noble lord, as altogether unworthy of any consideration. What the bill had for its general object had been under consideration for nearly twenty years. What the particular provisions of this bill were, had, by rumour and report, and the votes upon the table, been so thoroughly understood before it was read a first time, that it was difficult to suppose, that in the progress of such a bill, if it was to proceed further, any new light could be thrown upon the subject of it. With respect to himself also, he trusted that he might stand in some measure excused for an early and prompt interposition against a measure, which, whilst it seemed to impose upon a lord chancellor, who under the bill might be the only lay-servant of the Crown in Great Britain necessarily a Protestant, the peculiar duty of watching over Protestant interests, appeared to him necessarily and obviously to bring all those interests into extreme peril. The noble earl who spoke last, had declared his conviction, that this measure, or one of the same character, must, sooner or later, be carried. It might, be so: but he should, nevertheless, feel it to be his duty, as attached to civil liberty and to religious liberty (best protected by the Protestant establishment in this country, connecting its Church establishment with an enlightened and liberal toleration), to oppose the introduction and progress of every such measure as the present, through evil report and good report, as long as opposition to it could be offered. If the majority of the House should at any time finally determine that his opinions had been founded in error, he should at least enjoy the satisfaction, which would result from a conviction that he had not willingly erred, and that he had most anxiously endeavoured to avoid error.
He now came to the question,—Could they pass this bill? Was this bill fit to be adopted? Were the enactments of this bill such as the House could approve of? He thought he might assert that the House could not pass this bill. It was, however, he admitted, a different question, whether the House should read the bill a second time, and resolve itself into a committee, and in that committee, modify, alter, and amend it? To commining the bill he objected, not only be-

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cause he was averse to the principle of the bill, but because he could not admit that they were in a committee, under colour of modifying, amending and altering, to propose and enact (for such must be the case) some measure, in effect, entirely new: this he thought in all cases objectionable,—and, with reference to the present important subject, peculiarly objectionable, upon the principles upon which he had always voted against going into committees respecting it, before specific measures were proposed as those which were to be adopted. If it could be supposed that this bill, if the House went into a committee, could be reported upon, without very material variation, destroying, in a great measure, if he might so express himself, its identity, the Roman Catholic would know what he had to hope for, and the Protestant what he had to dread. But, in his judgment, any bill or measure, which could come out of a committee, must be altogether different from that which the House, if it read this bill a second time, would propose to commit; and therefore, the further proceeding on this bill appeared to him as objectionable as former motions, always rejected by this House, were, when, without the introduction of bills, the House was moved to form committees to consider generally what measures might be introduced;—motions, which, if adopted, would probably have raised expectations in the minds of the Roman Catholics, which could not be gratified, and have created alarms in the minds of the Protestants, which the legislature ought not to excite.
The noble lord, who spoke last, had enumerated the names of many illustrious men, existing in our time, though now no more, who had been advocates for some measures of emancipation, and, amongst others, the illustrious name of Pitt:—and the noble lord who has moved the second reading of the bill, has been pleased to represent those who have opposed these measures, as constantly changing their ground;—a change, which may, with much justice, be stated as clearly observable in the conduct of those, who have advocated the measures. No man living had had a more affectionate regard for Mr. Pitt, or ever held in higher veneration the virtues, the talents, and wisdom of that great man, whose name will be held in everlasting remembrance. In common with his country, he owed to
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that great statesman the highest obligations;—the debt of gratitude, which he individually owed to him was also large. He felt it, however, to be his unbending duty not to surrender his own opinions, unless he could be satisfied that that surrender could be safely made. If, after the Union with Ireland, that great man had been able to satisfy him that ample securities could be obtained for the Protestants, whilst concessions were made to the Roman Catholics, he would have seconded all his purposes respecting concessions. That securities were necessary Mr. Pitt had always admitted;—that they were necessary to secure the Protestant interest, and to quiet also the fears of the Protestant mind,—but it had never yet been stated, and he presumed, therefore, that no man had learnt from that great statesman—for his own part he never could learn—what securities were to be proposed,—and how the Roman Catholic mind was to be conciliated and the Protestant mind at the same time divested of its apprehensions. That great man now lay buried in the sepulchres of mortality. But there was spared to us and the country a noble baron (lord Grenville) sitting near him, a friend to concessions to the Roman Catholics,—he sincerely believed a friend to the established Church; a noble baron, to whom, notwithstanding all differences of opinions between them, he had ever looked up, and now regarded, with the highest respect and reverence, and who also, he had always understood, had considered securities as essential and necessary, if concessions were to be made.
We knew not now what securities it was the purpose of Mr. Pitt to require. We did know that, in the course of the many years which had now elapsed since what was called Roman Catholic emancipation had been contemplated, no man had yet found out what securities he could propose on the part of the Protestants, which the Roman Catholics would give, as the price of what they were to receive. And what was the state of matters now? That the House had before it a bill, proposing concessions almost unlimited; but with securities, the only securities, he presumed, which the wisdom of those who have introduced this bill, could, after meditation for twenty years, suggest, quite inefficacious, if enacted; which the Roman Catholics will not only withhold, but which they deem it matter of gross

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insult to have had it proposed to them to give. The bill, in its preamble, represents the Protestant succession to the Crown, by the act for the further limitation of it, to be established permanently and inviolably: and the united Church of England and Ireland, and that of Scotland, to be severally established permanently and inviolably. That after due consideration—(when had, does not appear) of the situation, dispositions, and conduct of his majesty's Roman Catholic subjects (i. e. his majest's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion), it appears fitting to extend to them the enjoyment of the established constitution, thereby putting an end to religious jealousies, consolidating the union, and uniting and knitting together the hearts of all his majesty's subjects in one and the same interest. And then it recites that, by divers acts of parliament, the oaths of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, therein provided, are required to be taken for certain purposes therein mentioned.
It then states the terms of the oaths of supremacy,—that the Roman Catholics are ready to take the oaths of allegiance and abjuration, in common with his majesty's other subjects: but, that they entertain scruples, with respect to the oath of supremacy, inasmuch as they apprehend that the same might be construed to import a disclaimer of the spiritual authority, which they ascribe to the Pope or Church of Rome, in matters of religious belief. And then it enacts, that it shall be lawful for them in all cases, where the oath of supremacy is now by the law required to be taken as a qualification for the holding or enjoying any civil right, office, or franchise, in lieu and place thereof, to make, take, and subscribe, the oath therein following. This oath contains a declaration against foreign jurisdiction, "that in any manner conflicts or interferes with the duty of full and undivided allegiance, due to his majesty, from all his subjects, or with the civil duty and obedience, which is due to his courts ecclesiastical and civil, in all matters concerning the legal rights of his subjects, or any of them." The act then proceeds to repeal all the acts, requiring the declaration against transubstantiation, as relating solely to matters of spiritual and religious belief, which do not in any wise affect or interfere with the allegiance or civil duty of his majesty's subjects."
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The act then contains a proviso, that it shall not alter the laws relative to the succession of the Crown in the Protestant line, or respecting the marriages of the royal family, or the Act of Uniformity. It then proceeds to enumerate excepted cases; to regulate presentations to churches; and to make it unlawful for Roman Catholics to advise as to offices or preferments in the Church of England and Ireland, or that of Scotland. It requires the persons holding the great seals of Great Britain and Ireland respectively, and the lord lieutenant and chief governor of Ireland, to be Protestants—disables Roman Catholics to vote at parish vestries—and provides in what courts the oaths of allegiance, abjuration, and the oath ordained by this statute, shall be taken.
Such were the provisions of the bill, or rather of that part of it which did not immediately apply to what was to be required of persons exercising ecclesiastical functions, professing the Roman Catholic religion, and to what was to be enacted as to bulls, dispensations, or other instruments coming from the See of Rome. With respect to such parts of the bill, as did so apply, little had been said in debate. Whether the Roman Catholics did or did not object to them, much of objection to them most reasonably might be urged; but probably the whole of this part of the bill had been found so unpalateable to the Roman Catholics, that little had been stated in debate respecting them—little but general expressions—or that they might be altered in the committee—with no very slight intimation that, at last, we might safely act as to the Protestant interests, without any securities at all to be given by the Roman Catholics. And here he stated that he was ready to admit that securities ought not to be required, if there was a well-founded opinion that concessions could be made without danger;—an opinion, to which he could not agree, and which, until this period, seemed not to have been avowed, if entertained, by any body.
In all the debates upon this subject, it had been considered as wandering out of our line of duty to consider these measures in what is called the religious view of them. Concession had, as to this, been too largely made. A right rev. prelate, in the preceding evening, had stated principles respecting the Church of Christ, upon which the legislature could

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not act with respect to any church, which, as a church of this world, was an established Church. He had always felt that it was one of his first duties to maintain the established religion of the country. Fortunately for the country, it had adopted the purest system of Christian faith in its established religion; by connecting with the laws, which established its Church, laws securing a liberal and enlightened toleration, as to those who dissented from its Church, it had probably placed upon the best and surest foundations, the civil and religious liberties of all who lived in the kingdom. But they were told that all this was wrong; and that they should allow every body of Christians to take its chance in the world. He was of a different opinion. He should ever assert, that an established religion was a great benefit to a people—that the object of such an establishment was not to make the Church political, but to make the state religious. Such was his firm persuasion—a persuasion so strongly entertained, that he would much rather see a Jess pure system of Christian faith established, with a liberal and enlightened toleration of those who differed from it, under which toleration we who adhere to the doctrines of our present established Church might enjoy shelter and security without power, political power, than to see this country without any established Church. Such, he said must also have been the sentiments of all those great men who had concurred in establishing, and in repeatedly refusing to shake, the provisions of the Corporation and Test acts, which, according to Blackstone, "secure both our civil and religious liberties:" among the latter of whom were to be numbered Mr. Pitt and others, who had at different times meditated and proposed the repeal of the laws respecting Roman Catholics.
It appears at first sight unaccountable how it should have happened that those who had brought forward the present measure, a measure which they had announced "as putting an end to all jealousies, as uniting and knitting together the hearts of all his majesty's subjects in one and the same interest," had not bestowed the benefit of one single enactment upon their Protestant dissenting brethren. When the constitution was settled at the time of the Revolution—a settlement now about to be shaken—the Church Establishment was secured: the Toleration
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act passed at the same time in favour of those Protestants who could not adhere to that Church Establishment—the members of both were thought to have contributed to the overthrow of Popery and tyranny. The present measure relieves the Roman Catholics from disabilities, from which it aims not, in any manner or degree, to relieve our Protestant brethren. Can this be right? Can the legislature think of doing this? No — nor can it be so intended. If you agree to this bill, those who bring it before you for adoption well know—cannot but know—that you must repeal—that you cannot refuse to; repeal, the Corporation and Test nets of I England. They know this—it behoves the House not to forget it, for the sake of the established Church. If it is fitting and just to communicate to the Roman Catholics, in the measure and extent proposed by this bill, the benefits and advantages of the constitution and government happily established in this kingdom," according to the preamble, it must be equally fitting and just with respect to our Protestant brethren. It should not, however, be forgotten, that our constitution and government, as established, is a constitution and government, which does not consider political power, as one of "the benefits and advantages" I to which all subjects are equally entitled.
As it is fashionable in this House, to refer to Blackstone as an author, their lordships might, in his works, find the grounds and principles, upon which the distinction, as to the grant of political power, or the withholding political power, rests; and the grounds, upon which, however friendly that writer was to the relaxation or abolition of the penal laws against Roman Catholics in given events, he holds that "whilst they acknowledge a foreign power superior to the sovereignty of this kingdom, they cannot complain, if the laws of the kingdom will not extend to them what it has done for Protestant dissenters, or complain, if the laws of the kingdom will not acknowledge them upon the footing of good subjects." A doctrine equally held by Selden, Locke, Clarendon, Somers, and others of the greatest name in our history. It is said, however, that they do not now acknowledge such a foreign power, or, at least, if they have heretofore acknowledged such a power, they will utterly, or, as far as reason can require of them, disavow all jurisdiction now, that is foreign,

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if they, according to this proposed act, take the oaths of allegiance and abjuration, and the oath specified in the proposed act. And we are told that the Protestant succession to the Crown, and the Church of England and Ireland, and the Church of Scotland, are already, by the acts mentioned in this bill, permanently and inviolably secured:—an acknowledgment this, that they ought to be so secured; that they are by the effect of these acts permanently and inviolably established and secured, if the means and provisions adopted by these acts are continued in force permanently and inviolably, may be granted. But, if the means and provisions, ordained by these acts, are destroyed by your proposed legislation, and nothing is to remain of these acts but declarations that your constitution in Church and State is Protestant, you have nothing better than what has been called a paper or parchment constitution.
To ascertain the effect of what we are doing, it is necessary to see what we are undoing, and to trace, therefore, in some measure through our history, what the supremacy of the Crown, and the allegiance of the subject, mean. With respect to the oath of allegiance, this bill proposes no modification of it. There are many statutes respecting the oath of allegiance: but the common law not only recognises what is called virtual or implied allegiance, but also expressed allegiance —that is, allegiance expressed by oath — the common law oath of fidelity and allegiance. Allegiance is undivided allegiance. The common law and the statute law look to undivided allegiance. The supremacy of the Crown is an indivisible supremacy; the allegiance due to the Crown is an indivisible allegiance. Passing over that long and eventful period of our history previous to the Reformation, in which the Crown and its subjects were so often involved in contests with the pope and the See of Home, often working the degradation of the Crown and kingdom by abject submission, sometimes asserting in those struggles the honour of both, and exhibiting a display of the most ardent love of liberty;—it is from the commencement of the Reformation down to the present time that we must look more especially to the course of events, and the nature of our laws, with reference to the present rights, liberties, and duties of the Crown, and the subjects, in matters civil, ecclesiastical, and spiritual. It is,
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therefore unnecessary to trouble the; House with the history of all that passed in this kingdom from about the time of Edward 3rd, and before, to the period of the Reformation, respecting Papal provisions of benefices, the purchasing of benefices, the appeals to Rome, pensions, Peterpence, dispensations, bills, rescripts, &c. and other Papal usurpations. The supremacy of the Crown had been most solemnly asserted and re-asserted by Henry 8th and Edward 6th. The acts passed in the reigns of those sovereigns it would be worthy of those whom he addressed, accurately to acquaint themselves with. Not that those acts were the foundations of the Crown's supremacy in. ecclesiastical matters, or of this doctrine of the Church of England respecting it: they asserted a supremacy inherent in the Crown according to the constitution— they did not create it; and he was mistaken if we had not an Ecclesia Anglicana, with the king its supreme head, before the pope of Rome could be said to have endeavoured to obtain any footing in this island.
To determine what was the supremacy, which the pope did claim in this country it may be important to see what was the supremacy which was claimed for and on behalf of the pope. He wished their lordships to read the statute of the 1st Philip and Mary, cap. 8. Few had read it: — but a more humiliating, a more degrading, a more debasing national record, he believed, did not exist in the annals of the world. No man who would read it, could fail to feel alive and tremble lest we should ever again open a door for the entrance of that lion, which had nearly devoured us. Observe there, how many acts of parliament touching temporal rights are repealed, as contrary to the pope's supremacy acting in ordine ad spiritualia; and then let it be determined by the old rules of construction of statutes, by looking at others in pari materiá —by the contemporanea exposilio;—by seeing what was the mischief contemplated, and the remedy proposed—what was claimed by the pope as belonging to his supremacy—and what Elizabeth in her oath of supremacy, and James I. in his oath of obedience, meant to deny to the pope, and to assert as inherent in their crowns—Let it be so determined what the pope of Rome claimed, if represented as claiming only a spiritual supremacy. These are, what lord Hale calls

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the two eminent oaths of supremacy and obedience, observing, "that the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown is a most unquestionable right of it,—that the pope had made great usurpations upon it,—that the statutes rejoined and restored it to the Crown,—that the Papal incroachments, yea, even in matters civil, under the loose pretence in or dine ad spiritualia, had obtained a great strength, notwithstanding the security the Crown had by the oaths of fealty and allegiance. So that there was a necessity to unrivet these usurpations by substituting, by authority of parliament, a recognition by oath of the king's supremacy, as well in causes ecclesiastical as civil."
When parliament to the oath of allegiance added this oath of supremacy, there could be no necessity of further explaining the common law oath of allegiance: and if the present oath of supremacy remains unaltered, the oath of allegiance will require no alteration now. But, if allegiance means undivided allegiance to a sovereign supreme head in church and state, it might not perhaps be otherwise than open to much doubt, whether if, for the sake of Roman Catholics, the oath of supremacy is explained by statute, the oath of allegiance may not also require, for them, explanation. It seemed to him that Locke, writing on Toleration, thought, if his meaning was such as it may be supposed to have been, that the church of Rome could have no right even to be tolerated by the magistrate—"as constituted on such a bottom, that all those, who enter into it, deliver themselves up to the service and protection of another prince, who has power to persuade the members of his church to do whatever he lists, either as purely religious, or in ordine ad spiritualia." It is most singular that our oaths of supremacy were adopted for the express purpose of unrivetting those errors, which, notwithstanding our oaths of allegiance, had crept in, in consequence of the Roman Catholics deeming to be spiritual whatever they thought proper to consider as spiritual, and that it is proposed to us to reform the oath of supremacy by substituting another, which will leave it open to the Roman Catholic to introduce the very evils, which the oath of supremacy was intended to guard against.—In the votes on the table it appears that it was at first meditated to explain the oath of supremacy by references to queen Eliza-
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beth's injunctions, to the statute of the fifth year of her reign, and to the 37th article of the church of England. Either he, or those, who thought of so construing the oath of supremacy, did not understand the English language. Neither the admonition, nor the statute, nor the article admitted of this,—an article, which expressly asserts that the bishop of Rome has no jurisdiction in this realm.
The preamble of this proposed act states scruples inasmuch as the Roman Catholies apprehend that "the oath of supremacy might in part import a disclaimer of the pope's spiritual authority in matters of religious belief;"—and what in matters of religious belief that authority might require from them has not been ascertained by inquiry here made, or information here given, and seems not to be very easily ascertainable. The proposed oath does not, however, assert that he has no other spiritual authority, "than in matters of religious belief:" but that he has not any "authority, which, in any manner, conflicts or interferes with the duty of full and undivided allegiance, which, by the laws of this realm, is due to his majesty, or with the civil duty and obedience which is due to his courts civil and ecclesiastical, in all matters concerning the legal rights of his subjects, or any of them." It is quite obvious that this leaves it entirely with the party taking the oath to determine for himself what does or does not so conflict or interfere with such allegiance, duty, and obedience. And of how many errors may the removal, or, as lord Hale expresses it, the unrivetting become the parent when the Roman Catholic shall (as he heretofore determined for himself what was spiritual —and what portion of spiritual obedience he could withhold, though he owed full and undivided allegiance)—when he shall determine hereafter for himself, what authority of the pope does or does not conflict or interfere with the duty of such full and undivided allegiance, and such civil duty and obedience, as is mentioned in this proposed act.
That it is peculiarly necessary to consider alterations of this kind in oaths with jealousy is a proposition, which experience might sanction. In the oath permitted by the Irish Act of the 13th and 14th of George III., the Irish Roman Catholic swears to maintain the succession of the Crown, not in the heirs of the body of the princess Sophia, being Pro-

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testants, but in his majesty's royal family —and not in that family, being Protestants. If this oath was the oath regulating the conduct of the Irish Roman Catholic, its effects would be to be estimated, if there should be in that family, upon the demise of the Crown, an individual not Protestant. It at least demonstrates how carefully the effect of every word in a prescribed oath should be considered.
After the English Act for the relief of the Roman Catholics passed in 1791,—in 1793 that act passed in Ireland, from which a noble marquis last night read the oath which it prescribes. That noble lord observed that, after renouncing and repudiating certain principles and supposed articles of faith, and disavowing any intention to subvert the present church establishment, for the purpose of a Roman Catholic establishment in its stead, the concluding part of the oath was thus expressed:—"I do solemnly swear, that I will not exercise any privilege, to which I am or may become entitled, to disturb or weaken the Protestant religion and Protestant government in this kingdom." He now held in his hand a print of that act of parliament: he had also looked into the printed Statute book, and he found that the words were not "weaken or disturb," but "weaken and disturb;" and it was observable that the print of the statute, which he held in his hand, was peculiarly calculated to draw attention to this distinction,—the conjunctive and being printed in large characters, and made the subject of the following comment. The printer appears to be Mr. Coglan. The Irish Roman Catholic will probably have no difficulty in finding the commentator in a member of his own church. The comment is thus expressed:—"All are here agreed that, to violate the above clause, it is necessary to disturb and weaken not only the Protestant religion, but likewise the Protestant government. They are connected evidently by the conjunctive and, without any comma after religion. Both must be disturbed and weakened, not in any manner, but, precisely by the exercise of the privileges now granted. In other respects, we are in our former situation, as to preaching, teaching, writing, &c. Weaken after disturb appears rather an expletive than a word conveying a distinct meaning, for it is implied in disturb; as whoever intends to disturb, a fortiori, intends to weaken. Hence, the expres-
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sion is generally understood, and so it has been explained by every one consulted on it, to weaken by disturbance. Indeed, if or was between the word disturb and the word weaken, as it was proposed to be, the signification would be changed and inadmissible." Surely this sort of reasoning upon the terms of an oath should teach us to use great caution when we are prescribing in what terms we shall require oaths of security to be taken.
In those two Irish statutes, and in the English statute of 1791, much, very much is prescribed in the oaths therein respectively required, of which no mention whatever is contained in the oath required by the proposed bill. But that is not all that is necessary to be pressed upon the attention of the House. If the Bill of 1813, introduced into the House of Commons, and which had nearly passed that House is looked into, it will be seen that in 1813, an oath as comprehensive was thought necessary to be taken by Roman Catholics to entitle them to relief, as the oaths required by the statutes of 1791 and 1793: nay, more comprehensive. The preamble of the proposed bill asserts, that parliament has had due consideration of this matter. Has that consideration enabled us to learn upon what grounds it was thought necessary in 1791 and in 1793, and even so lately as in 1813, to require in the securities of oaths so much more from the Roman Catholics than this bill proposes in that species of security to require? Has this been in any manner explained to the House? It might be material to know what number of Roman Catholics have taken the oaths prescribed by the statutes of 1791 and 1793. Upon a former occasion, we learnt that a very few had taken the oaths prescribed by these statutes of 1791 and 1793. Of those individuals of the Roman Catholics, who have taken the oaths prescribed by these statutes it might not be necessary now to require an oath in the same terms. But the House ought either to know why the proposed oath is so different from that, which was deemed necessary even in 1813, or to be informed how far the Roman Catholics have or have not taken the oaths prescribed by former statutes.
There is another very material observation to be made upon a comparison of the proposed bill and these former statutes of 1791 and 1793. If they are read, and their numerous provisoes attended to, many of those provisoes, it

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must be admitted, were either unnecessary in those bills, or they ought to be inserted in this. Take, for example, one out of many; one, which what is said to be passing in the kingdom may make it not unfit to point out, viz. the proviso to prevent the founding of any monastic or religious order. Many other provisoes might be mentioned.
Another very extraordinary effect of this oath, which is proposed in a statute which is to unite the hearts of all his majesty's subjects, is—that no greater security by oath being heretofore required from his majesty's Protestant subjects, than from his subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion, the Protestant is now to be required to take a stronger oath in support of that which his conscience would lead him, without taking any oath, to support, than the Roman Catholic is to take, whose conscience might lead him, if not bound by oath to support it, to disturb or weaken it. The Protestant is to swear, that the foreign prince or prelate has no jurisdiction whatever. The Roman Catholic, that he has all the jurisdiction, which he, the Roman Catholic, thinks does not conflict or interfere with allegiance, civil duty, and obedience, as he understands them. Should this bill pass with the present form of oath, the same parliament would seem to require some of his subjects to swear, that no foreign prince or prelate has any jurisdiction in this country, and others of them to swear, that a foreign prelate has some jurisdiction in this country. The parliament either understands that such is the effect of the oath now to be proposed to the Roman Catholics, or what it understands is to others not altogether intelligible.
Without adverting more, as yet, to what is or is not to be the state of ecclesiastical persons professing the Roman Catholic religion, under what may be called the second part of this bill—originally another, or second bill—how would a Roman Catholic clergyman deal with such a case as the following? Two persons intermarry, being in a state of consanguinity such as does not prevent a marriage between them being valid according to our law—a consanguinity which is said, however, to form what is an impedimentum dirimens. Should a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic feel it to be his duty to refuse the sacrament to the parties, unless they voluntarily separate, it is
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to be supposed that he would act according to that duty. It has been understood that such would be his duty: he discharges that duty; and, by the exercise of it, induces the woman to separate herself from the person, according to our law, her husband. The husband, on the contrary, thinks proper to sue for a restitution of conjugal rights, and compels the wife to return. If such a case as this could happen, no reasoning, no casuistry, no distinction between what is temporal and what is ecclesiastical, between what is civil and what is spiritual, could lead a legislature or a state to the endurance of it, or entitle an ecclesiastic to claim the character of a good subject, or to assert that he was doing nothing which conflicted or interfered with allegiance, civil duty, and obedience, when he was using spiritual means in putting asunder those, who, according to the law of his country, were joined together.
To return to the period when, after what Hale calls the revolutions on the death of Henry the 8th, Edward the 6th, and Mary, revolutions in the struggles between regal and papal supremacy, queen Elizabeth asserted strongly the supremacy of the Crown, the rights of her subjects, and the independence of the national church. The progress of Protestantism and the Reformation had not at that period been such as to enable any sovereign to accomplish for the country what could only be gradually attained, as the necessity of further legislation became, from events, to be evident. It was found necessary from time to time between that period and the Revolution of 1688, and at the period of that Revolution, further to provide, then finally and effectually to provide, for the security of those great objects, between the maintenance of which, and the attempts to weaken and destroy them, the quiet and happiness of the country had been so often, in the mean time, disturbed. Passing over these unquiet times, let us advert to what was settled at the Revolution for the maintenance of a Protestant church and state, by enactments then ordained, and by reference made at that time to the statutes which had before passed in and subsequent to Elizabeth's reign, and the operation of some of which was then anxiously continued.
In the discussions upon such a bill as is now proposed, it cannot, too, be wholly without use to request the House to re-

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member how anxiously during the reign of Charles the 2nd it was sought, on the one hand, to exclude a Popish successor from the throne; and how anxiously, on the other, the struggle was made, but in vain, to convince our ancestors that a Popish king might be so surrounded with counsellors, as to secure a Protestant church and government. It seems, according to modern notions, that both may be safe, if a king is Protestant, and his counsellors in and out of parliament are all Roman Catholics. The statute of the 5th Elizabeth, had required members of the House of Commons to take the oath of Supremacy, but not the members of this House. The Corporation act, 13th Charles 2nd chap. 1, "for the preservation of the public peace in church and state," had required persons admitted into corporations, to take the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and the Sacrament. The statute of Uniformity had made large provisions for the securing of the Established Church, 13th and 14th Charles 2nd chap. 4. The Test act, 25th Charles 2nd chap. 2, "to prevent dangers which might happen from Popish recusants, "had required all persons, peers as well as others, who should bear any office, civil or military, to take the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and the Sacrament, according to the usage of the church of England: and parliament having recorded, "that all those laws had not the desired effect," by the act 30th Charles 2nd chap. 2, required peers, and members of the House of Commons, to take the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and to make the declaration against transubstantiation, the necessity of making which by any body but the king is intended to be abrogated by this act.
James 2nd, the endeavours made to exclude him from the throne having failed, succeeded to the Crown, making his will the law of the land, and claiming that dispensing power, which those, who incline to adopt the act which we are now called upon to pass, seem disposed to commit to the lay and ecclesiastical commissioners, who are to be appointed under its authority. He rendered, as far as in him lay, the laws of the land inoperative; and in his conduct justified the assertion, that Popery and tyranny necessarily exist to pether; and convinced the nation that its liberties cannot be safe, if a Papist sits upon the throne. It had before—let that not be forgotten—been convinced that a
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king must have Protestant advisers only in parliament.
Advert, then, to what took place when James abdicated the government, and when William, acting with Protestant advice, became the glorious instrument, as the Bill of Rights expresses it, of delivering this kingdom from Popery and arbitrary power. The House can never look at the transactions of that memorable era, and degrade this great deliverer, and those who acted with him, as settling the liberties of the kingdom, not under the influence of a rational love and attachment to civil and religious freedom, which cannot co-exist with ecclesiastical tyranny, but under the effect of a panic, created by Titus Oates and his perjuries, and by Popish plots real or imaginary. The king and parliament solemnly continue the declaration against transubstantiation. They re-enact oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and impose upon the subject the duty of swearing that no foreign prince or prelate hath, or ought to have, any authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm;—and this certainly means what, in other statutes is expressed by the word "any manner of authority." And here be it observed, that every member of this House has sworn that a foreign prelate "ought not to have any" authority. But in this act are not we, who have sworn that he ought not to have any authority, proposing to give him all that a Roman Catholic shall think does not conflict or interfere will his allegiance and obedience?—
They then established the Coronation oath, the object of which they declare to be the maintenance of "all the people in their spiritual and civil rights and properties." They require the king to swear, that he will, to the utmost of his power, maintain the Protestant reformed religion established by law. In the same session, they enact the law for exempting the Protestant Dissenters from penalties,— the act of Toleration, "as an effectual means of uniting the Protestant subjects in interest and affection," requiring from them, nevertheless, that they should take the oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and make the declaration against transubstantiation,—extending the benefits of toleration to Protestants,—not to Roman Catholics, to those, whose interests this proposed bill overlooks, and not to those, who, from this proposed bill, are to reap benefits and advantages, which the con-

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stitution has hitherto denied to Dissenters. In the succeeding session, they pass the Bill of Rights; stating, that "by the assistance of evil councillors, judges, and ministers" (our Protestant king, it seems, is now to have Roman Catholic counsellors, judges, and ministers), king James endeavoured to subvert and extirpate, not merely the laws and liberties, but what they ranked in value and estimate as equal to, and necessarily connected with, the laws and liberties of the kingdom,—the Protestant religion,—by the various (his) acts there enumerated. They declare that the Lords spiritual and temporal, being Protestants, and Commons met, "in order to such an establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties, might not again be in danger of being subverted." What religion? The Protestant religion assuredly. They express their confidence that they shall be protected against all other attempts upon the same religion, laws, and liberties. They re-enact oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. And, then prefacing the enactment with the memorable declaration, "that it has been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this 'Protestant kingdom' (a kingdom Protestant with Protestant religion), to be governed by a Popish prince;" they exclude such a prince from the Crown, and absolve the subjects of their allegiance to any such prince. And they require every person, coming to the throne, at his coronation, or coming to parliament, which shall first happen, to make the declaration against transubstantiation, which, in a former act, they had required the subjects to make, and which they considered as the only sure and certain test that a king or a subject was a Protestant. All which are then declared, enacted and established to be the law of this realm for ever.
True it is, that parliament cannot be absolutely bound by such an enactment for all generations:—but, when it is discussing whether such laws as these are to be considered as fundamental and essential, as making the state and the religion of the country fundamentally and essentially Protestant, and the kingdom itself a Protestant kingdom, no man can deny that they are—as far as in the nature of laws they can be, unalterable, i. e. that they are not to be altered without cogent necessity clearly shown; and that it is
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incumbent upon those who propose the changes now meditated, to make out the necessity of so much alteration in the nature of "an establishment, expressly formed in order that our religion, laws, and liberties, which had been subverted, might never again be in danger of being subverted."
The act for the further limitation of the Crown, 12 and 13 William III. states that, after the passing of the bill of rights, his majesty's subjects were restored to the full and free possession and enjoyment of their religion, laws, and liberties; and makes further provision for the succession of the Crown, in the Protestant line, for the happiness of the nation, and the security of, its religion,—requiring every person, who comes to the possession of the Crown, to join in communion with the church of England, as by law established, and confirming all the laws for securing the established religion. At the Union with Scotland, both in England and Scotland respectively, it is made an "essential and fundamental" condition of the Union in all time coming," that the Protestant religion in each should be "effectually and unalterably secured," and, with respect to that of England, that all acts for the establishment of the church thereof should remain and be in full force for ever.
The House has been told, that in Scotland they do not acknowledge, as we do in England, the supremacy of the king as the head of the national church: but it is most material to recollect that they have no intercourse with any foreign prince or prelate, as connected with their religion; that their established religion, the religion of the country—of the great mass of the people—is Protestant; and that Scotland is not, like Ireland, with a national religious establishment unalterably Protestant, and a great body of the community Roman Catholics and in constant intercourse with Rome. The established religion of England, and the established religion of Scotland, differing in some respects, though both Protestant, their established churches are perfectly distinct. The established church of Ireland, on the other hand, is part and parcel of the one established church of England and Ireland; a church affected in both its parts by what affects it in either of its parts; and that part of it, which is in Ireland, is opposed constantly by a religious body, to which there is nothing alike, in num-

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ber or nature, in Scotland, which can enter into controversy with Scotland's established church.*
The fifth article of the act of Union with Ireland, unites into "one Protestant church the churches of England and Ireland," declares that the doctrine, worship, discipline, and the government of that church, are to remain in full force for ever, as now by law established. That the continuance of it as the established church, shall be deemed, and taken to be, an essential and fundamental part of the Union. And if the eighth article can be taken to affect this provision made by the fifth article, it can never be contended that it can be consistent with the intention of parliament to enact laws, endangering that part of the united church which exists in Ireland; and, through that medium, endangering the whole one Protestant church of the United Kingdom.
Not meaning to infer an intention to endanger the church from any thing which
*In the Scotch Act recited in the 5th i Queen Anne, c. 8, (the Act of Union) entitled, "An Act for settling the manner of electing the sixteen Peers and forty-five Members, to represent Scotland in the Parliament of Great Britain;" the Queen, with the advice and consent of the estates of parliament, ordains the manner in which the sixteen peers shall be named, and in which the forty-five members for shires and burghs, shall be chosen. And it is therein expressly declared, that none shall be capable to elect or to be elected, for any of the said estates, but such as are Protestant, excluding all Papists; and, by the Act of Union, this act is declared as valid as if the same had been one of the articles of Union, ratified and approved by the act; every clause, matter and thing in which articles, are, by the Act of Union, for ever ratified, approved, and confirmed.
The act of the 6th of queen Anne, for rendering the Union more complete, and providing that there should be only one privy council in Great Britain, made it necessary to make other provisions in the proceedings as to the election of members of the House of Commons, and the sixteen peers; but the acts making such provisions do not appear to alter the provision, that both electors and elected should be Protestants.
And the act of the 33rd George III. which, as to persons professing the Roman
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has been proposed to parliament since this Union, no man can deny that measures have been proposed, from time to time, which some well-disposed persons and some usually deemed well-judging persons have found it difficult to consider as not endangering the terms of that Union as to the established Protestant church, almost as soon as the Union was made. Let it be observed that acts of parliament regulate, according to the language of them, the discipline, worship, and government in the Protestant church. Will his majesty's subjects, professing the Roman Catholic religion, and, if this bill passes, summoned to both Houses of Parliament to consult concerning the affairs of the church, and therefore joining in acts relative to the discipline, worship, and government of the Protestant church, consent that the Protestant members of these Houses shall so legislate as to the like ecclesiastical matters affecting the Roman Catholic body. If the statutes of 1791
Catholic religion in Scotland, substitutes a new form of oath instead of the formula required by king William's statute, does not appear to affect this provision requiring as to parliament the electors and elected to be Protestants.
The proposed bill had no clause continuing to confine the right to elect and to be elected, to Protestants, with respect to the sixteen peers, and forty-five members of the House of Commons for Scotland.
Was it then intended to alter the articles of Union with Scotland in this respect, and with regard to one of their most fundamental provisions?
Or, was a special clause to be finally inserted in the bill, excepting those peers and members, and their electors, from the operation of this bill, and preserving the aid of Scotch Protestants, representing Scotland in the two Houses of Parliament, in support of the Protestant succession and government in the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, when the doors of both Houses should be opened, as to England and Ireland, to peers and commoners professing the Roman Catholic religion?
Was it intended that a native of Scotland, not a peer, professing the Roman Catholic religion, might be a representative of an English county or city, but that he should not represent a Scotch shire or burgh?

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and 1793 did not sufficiently relieve the Roman Catholics of the United Kingdom from pains and penalties, let them be so relieved. That is not the object of this bill; which is, to give them political power in almost as great a degree, and to as large an extent, as it can possibly be conferred. If there be any thing, not political power, which it may be proposed to enact for them, or any of them, neither is that the object of this bill.
This bill does not propose certainly to change the system established at the Revolution, so far as it ordained that the sovereign should be Protestant, by positive enactment. It does propose that that system shall be changed by such enactment, so as to admit Roman Catholics to offices of the highest trust, and with the exception of almost none. It certainly is not proposed by such enactment to discharge the Crown of its sworn duty to maintain the church of England, as by law established—and, true and strange it is, that it does not propose to repeal the Test act and Corporation act. But whether the bill has not a tendency to weaken the system, which requires the king to be Protestant—to weaken his power of effectually maintaining the Protestant church and religion, and the Protestant throne, and to lead unquestionably to the repeal of the Corporation and Test acts, is a question of great importance, and the solution of which is matter of no very great difficulty. Our ancestors thought there was no sufficient security if the sovereign professed the Roman Catholic religion, though his ministers, councillors, and parliaments were Protestant. Can it rationally be doubted that there is much less security for civil and religious freedom, if the king is Protestant, and his ministers, councillors, parliament, and judges, are Roman Catholics? The House is told, indeed, that there is ample security, if the lord chancellor must be Protestant; and it seems to have been thought that the actual security would be found in the fact that the Crown never would actually appoint those whom the act makes eligible, to those great offices. Those who know the state in which a Protestant chancellor would stand in a cabinet of Roman Catholic ministers, will readily believe that, if he had either sense or honesty, he neither would remain there, nor be permitted to remain there an hour. And look to the effect of rendering the Roman Catholics eligible to
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high offices, but not appointing them to such offices. This is insult towards them, more intolerable than ineligibility. But what would be the effect with reference to the king? Do the Roman Catholics now complain? Does the present state of the disqualifying statutes goad and irritate them? Make them eligible to office, and yet withhold office from them, what is this but acting most unworthily towards them? You are also directing their discontent, hitherto pointed at the laws of their country, against the king upon the throne; it being, too, your duty to render him an object of affection, as far as may be, with all his subjects; and, compelling him to continue Protestant, you are engaging, in a great degree, his conscience to deny to the Roman Catholics the benefits you pretend to enable him to confer upon them.
But it may be said, the king's confidential servants may be partly Protestant, partly Roman Catholic—that such was the case under queen Elizabeth, and other sovereigns. But what did her experience teach her as to this? And what did the experience of those who came after her teach? That experience led to the change of system which was completed at the Revolution. If the king's confidential servants ought not to be Roman Catholics, it is said, nevertheless, his privy councillors may be chosen from among them; provided only they abstain from advising the Crown as to benefices and offices in the Protestant church, and that Roman Catholics may safely be admitted into both Houses of Parliament.
With respect to privy councillors, it seems strange that, if their duties are to be changed, if they are to be restrained by this act from advising in the matters specially mentioned, it had not occurred, to alter, by enactment, the privy councillor's oath when administered to a Roman Catholic. It may be said that the law which required the oath, will qualify the oath; but it is a little difficult to admit the consistency of my submitting to a law to day, requiring me to withhold advice on some matters, and to take an oath tomorrow that I will faithfully give my opinion in all matters moved and debated. In the matter of oaths it is surely satisfactory and necessary to prevent the swearing in terms which are in apparent contradiction according to their obvious meaning, to what is really intended to be

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sworn. The Roman Catholic privy councillor is not to advise the Crown in the disposal of any benefice or office in the Protestant church; but in how many matters of mighty import to the welfare of the community is he left at liberty to advise—and how many respecting even the welfare of that very church? and of much more consequence to its welfare than the disposal of a church preferment?
It has been said, and most reasonably, that if you admit Roman Catholics into parliament, you ought not to exclude them from the privy council: if you admit them into the great council of the nation, that you cannot well exclude them from among the number of those who are to act in inferior councils. In truth, this argument, which points out the extent to which you must go, if you admit Roman Catholics into parliament in a country, whose government and church are essentially and fundamentally Protestant, furnishes very weighty reasons why you should not admit them into parliament.
It has been urged that the repeal of the laws which prohibit Roman Catholics from sitting in either House of Parliament, would, in fact, make little change in the composition of parliament—that it would not introduce more than six or seven peers into the House of Lords, and very few commoners into the other House of Parliament. And it has also been urged that after giving the elective franchise to the Roman Catholics in Ireland, you are, almost of necessity, required to render them capable also of sitting in parliament. With respect to the House of Lords, that reasoning has been enforced by the fact that Roman Catholic peers did sit in that House until the 30th of Charles the 2nd, and that being very few in number, if they should now sit in that House, it cannot be very objectionable; and their pretensions to sit there have been strongly recommended in observations, unquestionably most just, upon the excellence of the characters of the modern Roman Catholic peers. In a question of this nature, the personal merits, however great, of particular individuals, must be laid out of consideration—it must be decided upon general principles. If Roman Catholics are unfit advisers of a Protestant king—in a Protestant state in the House of Commons—unfit there to counsel the king with respect to the worship, discipline, and government of a Pro-
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testant established church, they cannot be fit advisers to give counsel touching such matters in the other House of the Protestant parliament. Previous to the Revolution it was, if not from actual danger, upon principle, determined, that persons professing this religion should sit m neither of the Houses of Parliament.
This exclusion from both, the prince of Orange sanctioned, when as the Bill of Rights states the fact, he addressed his letters only to the, Lords Spiritual and Temporal being Protestants. This exclusion king William sanctioned in the several acts which passed during his reign, which committed to the hands of Protestants, or continued in the hands of Protestants, all offices connected with the government of his "Protestant kingdom." If the government of this kingdom is fundamentally and essentially Protestant,—and Protestant it is fundamentally and essentially,—it is not, in just reasoning, matter of much consequence, whether the passing of this bill would or would not introduce many Roman Catholics into the House of Commons: but it is difficult to assent to what has been stated repeatedly in assertion, that the number introduced would be too small dangerously to influence the decisions of that House. What has been the effect of giving to the Roman Catholics in Ireland the elective franchise? It has operated, as lord Clare foretold in his able, prophetic, and constitutional speech. It may perhaps be reasonably asserted, that though as yet Roman Catholic representatives have not been sent to parliament, such has been the influence of Roman Catholic electors, that to that very act, which gave them the elective franchise it is owing, that the bill now under discussion has passed the House of Commons. He must have been a very inattentive observer of what passes in parliament, who has not remarked that a small band or knot of individuals, acting together upon system, constantly acting together, and watching for opportunities and moments favourable to their views and projects, may achieve great and important changes.
It must be further recollected, that, if this bill passes, the Test and Corporation acts must be repealed, and the members of Roman Catholic corporations entitled to send representatives to parliament, would not be likely, if they had an option, to choose Protestant members; and, considering the other means which

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many Roman Catholics would have of obtaining seats in the Commons House, the calculation of the numbers of them that would become members, seems in argument to have been stated much too low.
It is of little consequence that this bill provides that nothing contained in it shall be construed to alter the laws for establishing the uniformity of public prayers, and administration of the Sacrament, in the uniting episcopal church of England and Ireland. How futile and inefficacious must such an enactment appear to us—when we are enacting by this bill itself—what seems to have a tendency to subvert all we have seen to have been declared by parliament essential, fundamental, and to continue for ever!
This bill excludes from the Ecclesiastical Courts of judicature the Roman Catholics; but it seeks to capacitate them to fill all the benches of the temporal courts, and the highest seats of judicature in such courts, with an exception only in the case of the lord chancellor,—an exception, not founded upon duties in his judicial character, but upon the nature of his other duties. Such, however, is the nature of our temporal and ecclesiastical laws, such the connexion between them, that the assertion may be ventured, that this object of the bill, as to this matter, is unattainable; and, indeed, unless mis-in-formation has been given to the public as to what has passed somewhere, the answer which has been given to those who have objected to this provision of the bill has been, that nobody could conceive, that Roman Catholics would actually be appointed to the judicial seats in Westminster Hall. To enact by law that you may do what is, in fact, never intended to be done, does not seem to be very wise or conciliatory legislation. Suppose it enacted, and Westminster Hall crowded with Roman Catholic judges, and commissions of review of the sentences of the Ecclesiastical Courts to issue, to what class of men are they to be addressed in the place of those temporal Protestant judges, who now form so essential a part of the courts constituted by such commissions?
If Roman Catholics are not to be judges, it is said, that you ought to allow them to have silk gowns, that no policy can justify your prohibitions against their being distinguished by professional rank of this kind. Certainly, as the law stands, they cannot be appointed king's counsel,
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but there is no law to prevent their having the same rank bestowed in patents of precedence—such a patentee has no office, and takes no oath. Mr. Ponsonby's bill did not affect their situation because they had not the situation of office.
It appears then, from what passed at the Revolution, that our ancestors were satisfied that political power in any department of the state, in the hands of papists, was inconsistent with the maintenance of a Protestant establishment. Upon the principle that, in a Protestant kingdom political power should be placed in Protestant hands, the settlement then made, was made. Upon this principle, the settlement then made, has been continued from generation to generation,—and the wisdom of the principle is in itself sufficient to account for the adoption and maintenance of that settlement without reference to the dread of Popish plots, or apprehensions about Popish pretenders.
With respect to the repeal of the laws relative to the declaration against transubstantiation, the House may be referred to what has been before stated, and to its decision upon a similar project in a former session. This is said to relate solely to matters of spiritual and religious belief, not interfering with allegiance or civil duty. The object of it, however, was to ascertain effectually what persons did hold, or were thought to hold opinions interfering with allegiance properly understood. This provision was most industriously preserved at and since the Revolution as a most essential provision of law: not only the subjects, whether members of the chnrch of England, Protestant Dissenters, or Quakers were required, but the sovereign was required to make this declaration—the sovereign to make it in the most solemn manner, upon the most solemn occasion;—from that era to this hour, from reign to reign, the declaration has been continued to be required. And the present king, upon his first entrance into this House as king, solemnly, on the throne, made this declaration. From all his successors, from none of his subjects, it seems to be the purpose of this bill hereafter to require it.
Let us now advert to the other parts of this bill—this bill of conciliation,—which, professing to unite and knit together the hearts of all his majesty's subjects, has unfortunately set them all together by the cars, to use a vulgar phrase. It has, however, been said that you are to legis-

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late; others, satisfied or dissatisfied, are to I take the measure. Be it so—but then, if all are dissatisfied, do not insult them by calling this a bill of conciliation! — by telling them that it is a bill knitting together all their hearts in interest, and love and charity one towards another,—do not remind them of the fact that a person, perceiving one man running after another with a cat of nine tails, and being asked what he was about, declared that he only wanted to make a volunteer of the person he was pursuing.
As to all the remaining parts of this bill, the first objection is, that the Protestant sees no sufficient security in its enactments, and, such as that security is, the Roman Catholic is utterly averse to granting it. But the bill is open in these parts of it to many observations. The House must be aware that this bill is composed of what originally appeared in two bills,—the former confined to the concessions, the latter to the securities. In the former bill, his majesty's Roman Catholic subjects were frequently mentioned as such, but no mention was made in that bill of "the Roman Catholic church within any part of the United Kingdom." The second bill, now forming the latter part of the proposed bill, provides the precautions to be taken in respect of persons in holy orders professing the Roman Catholic religion, who may, at any time hereafter, be elected, nominated, or appointed to the exercise or discharge of episcopal duties or functions in the Roman Catholic church, or to the duties or functions of a dean in the said church within any part of the United Kingdom. And the oath speaks of a Roman Catholic bishop or dean in the Roman Catholic church in the United Kingdom.
Surely, the House would expect, if it thinks proper to acknowledge in statutes a Roman Catholic church as a church in England, that this acknowledgement should have appeared in some other form. Surely the House, before it can pass such a law as this, speaking of bishops and deans in the Roman Catholic church, as a church acknowledged by English law, as existing in England, will expect to be somewhat better informed than it now is, how these bishops and deans are to be elected, nominated, or appointed to the exercise or discharge of their duties and functions. We have often heard of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Ireland,—of its titular
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bishops of particular places in Ireland, its titular deans and chapters; and, if this bill passes, you will have two churches there ready formed,—the Protestant church, and the Roman Catholic church, with all its members ready to take their places. Whether the law of Ireland acknowledges the right of these functionaries to assume the titles of archbishops and bishops of Dublin, Armagh, and the other episcopal sees, the House may satisfy itself by inquiry. But, is it meant that in England we are to see a similar Roman Catholic hierarchy, with its titular archbishops and bishops of Canterbury, York, London, Durham, &c.; its titular deans and chapters, &c.? Can it be possible that the legislature can pass such a bill as this; and that too as a bill of peace and conciliation, without previously settling in some measure how and in what form the Roman Catholic religion is to be exercised in England? Can it be meant, that in England, you are to introduce all the inconveniences and mischiefs, which are experienced in Ireland, by the co-existence of the Protestant hierarchy and the Roman Catholic hierarchy? We do not hear in England of titular archbishops and bishops of places in England.—We admit the episcopal character resides in the Popish bishop; but our law has, at least heretofore, been supposed to prohibit their assuming titles connected with places in England as a misdemeanour. It seems, therefore, to be a great objection to the bill, if you think to give to the Roman Catholics political power, that you make no provision for the peaceable co-existence of the Protestant church and what is termed the Roman Catholic church in the united kingdom, but leave them to jostle against each other, as they may.
Look at the bills of 1791 and 1793;— see the provisions therein as to the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion; among others, even as to the form and structure of their places of worship, to preserve the predominancy of the Church of England. Has it been considered whether any similar provisions will be in force after this law passes? Or, are we to have a Roman Catholic cathedral vying in magnificence with our Protestant cathedral for the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion by its archbishops, its deans, and chapters? Is it meant there shall be this public display of a Roman Catholic church? A mode of worship,

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when set up in opposition to the national worship, and when allowed to be exercised in peace, we have been told, "should be exercised with decency, gratitude, and humility."*
It is unnecessary to trouble the House much as to the enactments relative to the commissioners to be appointed in England and Ireland according to this bill. There has been abundant reason to know, that the Roman Catholic clergy of Ireland will not accept, as a boon, those enactments; —that they will not submit to that interposition of a veto by Protestant authority, which is conceded by other Catholics to temporal sovereigns. This is not the first time in which this sort of conciliation has been attempted, and in vain, and probably some in the House know what has passed in Ireland upon this subject in the course of the last week.
As to that part of the bill, which relates to bulls, dispensations, and other instruments from the see of Rome, in a country in which the exercise of a dispensing power cost a king his crown, this bill proposes in some instances to do what looks as if it authorised some commissioners, in others one commissioner, and that one an ecclesiastical commissioner professing the Roman Catholic religion, to dispense with the laws against receiving such instruments from Rome. How could it be expected, that the Roman Catholic clergy would admit the inspection of these instruments? We have heard that the present Pope has himself declared, that, neither in any intercourse with a Protestant or Roman Catholic power was the ecclesiastical power so subservient to the lay authorities, as to allow the rescripts or other instruments to be submitted to them. It well behoves the legislature to pause before it will give a legal sanction of any kind to foreign intercourse with Rome—if such are the sentiments of the Roman Catholic clergy and the Pope.
Without meaning to impute, and disavowing the intention to impute, to the Roman Catholics of this day some of the tenets, which some in former times were
*Is it meant that Roman Catholic judges upon their circuits, robed in their ermine, and surrrounded by their attendants, shall, before they proceed to the administration of justice, be conducted in the face of all the country to Roman Catholic places of worship, as they now are to Protestant churches.
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said to entertain, their opinions and those of their church are yet such, as make it seem to be altogether inconsistent in a government, settled as essentially Protestant, with a Protestant established church, to grant them political power. The churches of England and Ireland are now one united Protestant church. What endangers the one must endanger the other. If the concessions proposed to be granted by this bill are granted, and without securities, (and what securities that will be given has the wisdom of man yet devised?) is it possible to believe that the Irish Roman Catholics will make this bill of concessions a resting point? Demand has followed from time to time upon demand, and demand will follow from time to time upon demand, till nothing more can be asked, for till toleration of the Roman Catholics in Ireland gives way to Roman Catholic establishment, and Protestant establishment shall be succeeded by such a portion of toleration of Protestants, as the Roman Catholics maybe disposed to allow them, it cannot be rationally expected that the Roman Catholics there will cease their struggles to supplant the Protestant church, if they did not disturb the settlement of property. In fact, the more sincere the Roman Catholics are in their religious belief the more strongly must they be impelled to weaken the Protestant church. The fears of those considerable men, who opposed the grant of the elective franchise in Ireland, were thought to be chimerical; but do they now appear to have been chimerical?
If this bill should pass, the next demand will be to repeal all the securities, which it enacts. And, indeed, rumour has told us that there have not been wanting those who have thought it expedient, on the part of the Roman Catholics, to let the bill pass, such as it is, notwithstanding all their objections to it; thereby establishing the concessions, and trusting confidently to the repeal, in another session, of the securities. It is said, that this bill, if passed, would be a bill of peace and conciliation. Is there not abundant reason to believe that it would in truth introduce confusion, and domestic discord, and eternal struggle for power? We know what has been the effect of our present establishment for many generations. What will be the effect of the proposed changes can at best be but matter of uncertain speculation and conjecture. The Lords and Commons were assembled at West-

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minster, by the prince of Orange, "in order to such an establishment, that religion, laws, and liberties might not again be in danger of being subverted." Is it possible to maintain that by such a total change of what was then established as is now meditated, they may not again be in danger of being subverted? Let us not disturb the happiness of the great mass of Protestants. Let us not mistake the present peaceable demeanor of the Protestant part of the community, produced by the influence of the confidence, with which they hope Parliament will not finally adopt them, for their assent to these measures, or an indifference about them.
The times, it is said, are changed, and the Catholics, it is said, are changed:— be it so; but such change does not affect the soundness of the principles, upon which this kingdom has established itself as a "Protestant kingdom," with the powers of the state in Protestant hands, and with a Protestant church establishment, and toleration,—toleration from time to time enlarged to the utmost extent the public welfare will admit; but toleration only,—for those who dissent from it. It may be that the Church of Home itself has changed some of its tenets. Its Protestant advocates tell us so,—its Roman Catholic defenders deny it. But we are led not to doubt that the present pope has re-established the order of the Jesuits,—that the Inquisition was revived,—we have heard of bulls against Protestant societies distributing the Scriptures, — We have heard of transactions respecting bishops in Belgium. We hear of the establishment at Stonyhurst, —we hear of Jesuits there, though we are told the pope does not consent to their establishment in countries which are not willing to receive them; and we might ask where the person at the head of the Stonyhurst establishment now is, and for what purpose he is where he is said to be?
We have been told that in Ireland, where the Roman Catholic hierarchy exists, they have their synods and consistorial courts; and they are mis-represented, if they do not use their excommunications, and their refusals to give the sacrament, for purposes which it would be difficult to consider as of a purely spiritual nature, or to reconcile to the law of the land.
"Persecution for religious opinions,"
says Blackstone, "however ridiculous
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and absurd, is against sound policy and civil freedom. If men quarrel with the ecclesiastical establishment, the civil magistrate has nothing to do with it, unless their tenets or practice are such as threaten disturbance in the state. He is bound, however, to protect the established church, and if this can be better effected by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust, he is certainly at liberty so to do, the disposal of them being matters of discretion." Men of great name seem to have been influenced by a persuasion, that popery had necessarily a connexion with civil tyranny. Lord Clare held "canonical obedience to the pope, to be inconsistent with the duties of civil allegiance to a Protestant state." Let the words of lord Hardwicke he had in remembrance:—"It well deserves," he says, "the serious attention of the whole nation, of what important consequence it is, to preserve not only the name and outward form of the Protestant religion among us, but the real uniform belief and practice of it. Indifference to all religion prepares man for the external profession of any, and what may that not lead to? Give me leave," added he, speaking in the presence of the Lords and Commons, "give me leave to affirm before this great assembly, that, even abstracted from religious considerations, the Protestant religion ought to be held in the highest reverence, as the surest barrier of our civil constitution. Ecclesiastical usurpation seldom fails to end in civil tyranny, The present happy settlement of the Crown is, in truth, and not in name only, the Protestant succession; —and the inviolable preservation of that wise and fundamental law made since the Revolution, whereby every Papist is absolutely excluded from inheriting the Crown, will be a solid security to our posterity against all who shall watch for the destruction of our liberties." [Hear, hear!]
If the cries of "Hear, hear," mean to intimate that noble lords who are near, deem this as lord Hardwicke's declaration of opinion, that the happy settlement of the Crown, consisted only in excluding a Papist from the throne, and in no manner depended upon the Crown's being surrounded with Protestant councils, and that that exclusion alone, though the Crown should be surrounded in all departments of offices with Roman Catholic advisers (enemies to that Protestant reli-

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gion, which is here said to be the surest barrier of our civil constitution) would be a solid security for our liberties, they impute to him a want of judgment, and contradictions in what he declares, altogether inconsistent with his great character. May the posterity of those noble lords find, in the preservation of our present laws, in those wise and fundamental laws, which require the throne, the government, and the church, to be unalterably and for ever Protestant, that solid security for their liberties, which they can never find in excluding a Papist from the throne, but surrounding a Protestant king with Popish advisers!
Lord Grenvillesaid, that how reluctant soever he was, to intrude upon the House at any time, there was something in the present measure so closely connected with the transactions of his past life, and still more with the future prospects of his country, that he could not reconcile himself to be absent from this discussion, or being present to give a silent vote in behalf of a measure, the principle of which, on so many other occasions, he had so zealously and earnestly advocated. Much as he had considered the subject since the time when he had last the honour of addressing their lordships, he was but the more strengthened in his firm conviction, that there was no way in which it was possible for parliament to convey so great a benefit to the people of this united realm, as by giving effect to the principle of the proposition before them. In offering himself as the advocate of this bill, the importance of which it was impossible for zeal to exaggerate, his first duty was, to hail the altered character in which the proposal for the relief of their Catholic fellow-subjects was now presented to their lordships. It had formerly come before the House, crowned by the sanction of many eminent names, but now it came before them recommended by the weight of the ether House of Parliament. It was not now a question as to the authority of individuals, however respectable; but, after a discussion carried on with a temper and calmness which to him were scarcely less gratifying than the result, the representatives of the Commons of the United Kingdom had determined that the happy moment had arrived for which even the noble lord on the woolsack allowed they ought to pant, when they might safely remove from the Catholics these
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degrading disqualifications by which they were kept out of the pale of the constitution. Such a measure, tending to such a purpose, and brought before them in such a manner, he had never expected to see met by a discussion in which the question of the principle of the bill was evaded by verbal objections to its clauses. The learned lord on the woolsack had endeavoured, by pointing out inaccuracies in language, or some inconsistencies in the clauses, to induce their lordships not to read the bill a second time, which was a necessary preliminary to the committee in which those inaccuracies could be corrected, and those inconsistencies obviated. He had not thought that this was the mode in which the bill could have been met. If it could have been stated, indeed, by any man that it was not desirable to admit four millions of subjects into the pale of the constitution, it would have been right for the person who held such an opinion, to say at once, "I will not enter into the details. I will give my negative to the bill; or I will show by a contemptuous postponement, that it is not worthy of the consideration of the House." He was not disposed to say, that in a question involving the fate of one-fourth of the subjects of the British empire, in which on both sides there was so much feeling excited, the House might not on some grounds refuse to enter into the discussion; but he could affirm, that he had heard no arguments to show him on what principle, either of respect to the other House, or of wisdom to the empire, or of justice to those more particularly concerned, the House could refuse to enter fully, deliberately, and in detail into the consideration of the proposition before them. If he had agreed in every one of the arguments of the learned lord on the wool-sack, he should have come to directly an opposite conclusion from that to which they had led the learned lord; for if he had considered the bill ever so full of defects, he should have been anxious to carry it to a committee, where the objections to it might be discussed. He must, therefore, without any disrespect for the learned lord, take leave of his arguments.
He intended no disrespect to the learned lord; but he must say, that he thought it absolutely necessary, in discussing this measure, to depart from those grounds which the learned lord had laid

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down, and to apply himself to what he considered a more enlarged view of the question. The question before the House was this:—There was, in this united kingdom, a difference in religious tenets; a difference between the religion of the state, and the religion professed by a portion of its subjects. In all that the learned lord had said on the subject of religious belief, in all he had advanced with respect to the importance of religion, in every point of view that could be imagined, on the prosperity and happiness of every nation, he for one, was perfectly prepared to agree. In all that the learned lord had uttered, respecting his attachment to the Protestant religion, as being, according to his conscientious feeling, the purest church in doctrine, and the best in discipline, that ever appeared in the Christian world, he entirely concurred. He admitted the superiority of the doctrines of that church, over what lie considered, with the learned lord to be the gross errors of the church of Rome. No man could be impressed with a more deep and decided conviction of the truth of the grounds on which that belief was built, or of the firmness of the principles on which it rested. Pie was as anxious as the learned lord, or any other individual could be, to preserve the Protestant church in all its purity.—No person could feel more strongly the necessity of upholding the establishment under which that faith was administered to the subjects of this kingdom, and which form of ecclesiastical hierarchy he considered, as the learned lord had done, to be inseparably connected with the civil government of the country. On these points no man living held more decided opinions. And if the question were to be decided, whether it was possible to unite in one faith, and to rule under one ecclesiastical establishment, and that the ecclesiastical establishment of the Church of England, every heart and soul that owed allegiance and duty to the government of this realm—nothing could be more grateful to his mind—nothing could be more in unison with his feelings, than to assist in such an effort. But did reason teach their lordships that a moral revolution of this nature could be effected? Did experience give them any encouragement to hope it? And if not, would they waste, in ineffectual wishes for that which they knew to be unattainable, that time, that labour, and that exertion, which ought to be ap-
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plied to the consideration of the means of rendering the difference which did unfortunately exist, and which it was not possible to remove, less susceptible of evil to the inhabitants of both parts of this united kingdom, than at this hour it was unhappily found to be? It was unhappily the policy of this country for a long course of years, to endeavour, by oppression, by severity, by confiscation, by punishment of every description, either to reduce or to annihilate the religious opinions that prevailed in Ireland; or at all events, to destroy any facilities that existed for disseminating them. To the success of that experiment he need not call the attention or their lordships. So far from accomplishing the intended purpose—so far from putting down opinions—no method could be more successfully employed by those who wished to produce a contrary effect than the method of oppression and persecution.
Their lordships had been told, and it was urged on them as a principal part of the argument by the learned lord, that they had two duties to perform on this subject. Both were stated, both were spoken of, as if they were nearly connected; and yet the two propositions were in direct and complete opposition to each other. In the situation of difficulty in which the interests of the empire were placed by the existence of civil disabilities and religious differences, the learned lord said, "Leave the matter on the footing on which it was placed by king William, as it was settled at the Revolution. Leave it fixed on that foundation; do not attempt to interfere with the principle then established, and which ought not to be departed from. No change, no alteration, no innovation, should be made on the system established by king William." But at the same time, and almost with the same breath, the learned lord told them, and it was also told them by others, that; it is our duty to let the matter rest as it is. "We are now" said the learned lord, "in a happy and contented situation—there is no cause for change—take the thing as it now exists—fix your ground here, and let nothing induce you to depart from it." He would ask to which of these two systems did they mean to adhere? Because no man could be so ignorant—no man who had heard even one discussion on this subject, could be so forgetful—as not to know that the system of policy pursued towards the Catholics of Ireland

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at the Revolution, and for eighty years afterwards, was totally, fundamentally, and diametrically opposite to that which had been pursued, and he would say, happily pursued, since that period. Those, therefore, who said, "Let us rest here," were diametrically opposed to such as boasted of what was called the system of king William: for they admitted, in terms, that, by the privileges which had been extended to the Catholics, the foundation of that system was shaken; and they rejoiced in that alteration; although it seemed to imply that the opinions of Locke and Somers were worth nothing on this subject, when they expressed their anxiety that it should continue. On the other hand, to those who wished to rest the subject on the grounds on which it stood in former times—who wished to revert to the old system, or who did not desire to ameliorate the present—he would say, that that system, of which a fragment only remained, was big with mischief. He thought it was a libel on the Revolution to charge that glorious period, or the great men who flourished at the time, with the concoction of such a system. He felt that it was a libel on the memory of king William to trace to him that system of cruel policy which had existed long before the reign of that great and illustrious monarch. He found it in operation when he ascended the throne, and the necessities of the times compelled him to continue it. But after his death it was aggravated and enforced; it was rendered infinitely more severe and intolerable to the unhappy people who were governed under it. From the reign of Elizabeth—so far back as that period—the first attempt was made to compel the Catholics of Ireland to submit themselves in all things relating to ecclesiastical, spiritual, and religious opinion, to the authority of the English government. A long succession of acts of parliament passed in Ireland, every one of which their lordships would find was calculated for the purpose of aggravating the severity of the system, which was not brought to its height, he blushed to say, in the reign of William, of Anne, or of George 1st. No; not until the reign of George 2nd did it arrive at its highest point. Their lordships had already heard, in detail, the horrors of that unjust system. They had been told how the property of Ireland was in the course of one century—and for the
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correctness of the statement he would refer to that document, with an extract from which the learned lord had concluded his speech—he meant the memorable and most eloquent speech of the late earl of Clare—in the course of one century, the amount of the land confiscated in Ireland, was 700,000 acres more than covered the whole surface of that kingdom. The whole of the land had been confiscated once, and many parts of it twice, and even three times over.
Thus was one portion of the system pursued. He would not ask, by what mutual aggressions, by what crimination and recrimination, so deplorable a system of feudal tyranny was introduced and continued. He sought not to take up the ashes of long-buried animosities—he would not take up their lordships time, nor outrage his own feelings, by opposing cruelties on one side to cruelties on the other. Robbery and massacre, and war, were carried on in a manner more barbarous than was ever heard of before in any place that bore the character of a Christian or civilized country. Every good man must deplore the scenes that were exhibited on both sides; and his detestation would be increased when he knew that the system did not end with the guilt which occasioned it, but that the remembrance of that guilt was made a pretext for its continuation. After the system of confiscation came a more legal mode of oppression—inquisition into titles; and, lastly, came a body of laws, directed to the avowed object of taking from the Catholics of Ireland the little remnant of property of which former spoliations had not bereft them. To provide for the safety of the Protestant church and of the Protestant establishment in Ireland, all means of possessing property, either inherited or acquired, were taken from the Catholic. He was effectually prevented from inheriting property, or from acquiring it, by his own labour, by the bequest of a friend, or by marriage. Laws might be made with a good intention, although they operated badly; and the man would confine his inquiry to a very narrow compass, who contented himself with considering the laws of a country, as they stood, without searching for the causes in which they originated, and what their effects had been. He therefore, would not point out to their lordships what the laws in question were; but what they were intended to produce, and what they

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did produce. It was an essential feature of this case that their lordships could form no just idea of that system, in opposition to which they had been acting for the last forty years, and the last remnant of which they were now called upon to destroy, unless they traced it, not in the words of an enactment, but in the effects which it was intended to produce, and which it had succeeded in producing. To show their lordships the system in all its deformity, he would quote a passage from dean Swift, who detailed in one of his tracts what was the condition of "the Papists," as he called them, in his time. That individual was not pleading for them. He merely introduced their situation incidentally. The purpose of his argument was to prevent the parliament of Ireland from extending to dissenters certain privileges which had since been conferred on them. The doctor prophesied "that the greatest evils would be the consequence if ever Presbyterians were allowed to become judges, or were admitted to seats in the parliament of Ireland." But the measure he so much dreaded had been adopted for a long course of years in Ireland; and he challenged any man to say that any thing except good had resulted from that wise and liberal policy. But, in arguing the question, dean Swift had occasion to describe the condition of the Catholics; and, before he read the passage, he called on the House to bear in mind what the condition of the Catholics was, how it had been made so, and for what purpose the government had resorted to such measures. "We look on the Papists," said Swift, "to be altogether as inconsiderable as the women and children. Their lands are almost entirely taken from them, and they are rendered incapable of purchasing any more." Those persons descended from the hereditary owners of the soil, were, it seemed, almost entirely deprived of that soil which they had inherited from their ancestors; and though in their own country they were governed by laws which treated them as aliens, since they could not acquire any interest in the soil, supposing that they should, under any peculiar circumstances, become wealthy, still the right to purchase land was denied to them. "And," continued Swift, "for the little that remains, provision was made by the late act against popery." Provision for what? To carry away daily from the Catholic inhabitants of that country the little property
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that remained to them in the soil. This was stated, not as the effect of any incidental or extraneous cause, but as part of a settled system, for which provision was made by an act of parliament. "Some of the most considerable Catholics," said the Dean, "to prevent this, have already turned Protestants; and so, in all probability, will many more." What did they find here? Was the property of these people protected? Was provision made by their legislature for the increase of wealth and prosperity amongst them? Not the authors of this system, which had been pursued since the days of queen Elizabeth, until the first dawn of change to a more liberal policy appeared in the late reign, thought fit to provide, not for the safety of the subject, but that his property should be diminished and carried away. But they did not attack his property alone. Swift went on to say, "The Popish priests are all registered, and, without permission, which! hope will not be granted to them, they cannot stay in this country." The purpose, therefore, contemplated was, that those men, thus deprived of their property, should equally be deprived of the administration of that faith in which alone they lived. When the learned lord told them, and told them most truly, that the first essential provision to be made by those to whom the happiness of the community was intrusted, was the establishment and maintenance of religion among them, he would point to the system acted on at that period, the principle of which the learned lord recommended for adoption; that principle being to take from two millions of Christians the consolations of religion. Could any man suppose that such a passage could be written and printed in any country? Could he suppose that any human being would avow the doctrines it contained? And, above all, could it be credited that they were not only tolerated, but supported by this eminent individual? Not only was this system avowed and approved of by dean Swift, but it was absolutely acted on. The hope he expressed was turned into certainty. The register was not renewed; priests were not allowed to officiate under severe penalties; and in some cases it was made a capital crime to return to Ireland. No clergyman could be found in that unhappy country to administer the consolations of religion in that particular form in which alone the religious tenets of the people of that

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country would allow them to be received. Of such a system he need scarcely say any thing more; but he would read one other passage, in which the dean expressed a grave hope that it would be instrumental to the great purpose of conversion. "The clergyman," said he, "will find, perhaps, no great difficulty in bringing over great numbers of Catholics to the Protestant church." It was, however, recollected, that many of those converts would be ignorant of the language of their pastors; but the solution of this difficulty was easy. It was provided by act of parliament, that if the convert did not understand English, and if the clerg3'man could not speak Irish, the service might be celebrated in Latin.
The noble lord proceeded, in a strain of impassioned eloquence, to reprobate this system, which, to use the words of Swift, was intended "to deprive the Catholics of leaders, of discipline, and of natural courage," by which means they would become mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, from whom no mischief could be apprehended. This was to reduce them to the situation of a body of helots, without any interest in the prosperity or happiness of their country. But vain and idle was the persecution of those who imagined that this system could extinguish the native courage of the people of Ireland. It had not that effect; but it led them to exercise that courage, not as they had recently done in supporting the glory of this country—no; they employed it in destroying the peace of that community, the blessings of which they were not permitted to enjoy. Instead of supposing that two millions of men, placed in this situation, were out of all capacity to do mischief, he would contend that they were out of all capacity to do good, and could only perform mischief. This was a lively and faithful picture of the effects of that system which was adopted long before the Revolution, which prevailed at the Revolution, and was enforced and acted on for eighty years afterwards, until that period arrived when, in the reign of his late majesty, liberality triumphed over intolerance. This description of the effects of that system was the more important, because he had heard no argument against the present measure which did not necessarily lead, if acted on, to the indispensable obligation of returning to the whole and every part of it; because, however horrible in its purpose, however
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base in its means, it formed one complete and regular machine, admirably calculated to produce what was intended—namely, to bring down to the lowest state of degradation and wretchedness those against whom it was directed.
The noble and learned lord had alluded to one particular act of king William, which he had not distinctly pointed out, but on which, he asserted, the safety of the constitution depended. But when he referred to the system of king William, as he termed it, he was bound to take the whole system. He had no right to select one statute from the black catalogue; and, if he took it as a whole, however it might be dressed up in mild and conciliatory terms, the result must be this—that it was produced because there was, in the principles of the Roman Catholic religion—that there was, in the faith professed by one-fourth of the subjects of the British empire—something that was incapable of suffering them to discharge with uprightness the duties of faithful and loyal subjects. If this were once admitted, to-what conclusion did it lead? It inevitably led to this, that, doubtful as their success must be, they must unquestionably retrace their steps. A noble friend of his, who bad moved the postponement of the bill, alluded on the preceding evening to an oriental tale, which described the circumstance of a fisherman having drawn up a jar from the sea, broke the seal which closed its mouth, out of which ascended a vapour that soon assumed a gigantic form, and to this giant he compared the Catholic body. But their lordships had not broken the seal: it was broken when the first privilege was granted in 1778 True, the giant appeared to be hourly gaining strength and influence, and he hoped would continue to increase in power: but when his noble friend had quoted this tale, he should have gone further; for he believed that the man who gave the giant liberty, by some happy contrivance induced him to return to his prison again. That was the task which the noble earl declared they ought now to perform; but would the Roman Catholic, after he had enjoyed power and privilege, be easily persuaded to return once more to his shackle and disabilities?
The noble lord then contended, that when, in 1793, large immunities were granted to the Catholic, those who had agreed to the extension of the privilege were not to blame because they had not

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given them the last boon. It was just that a pause should take place before every thing was conceded to them; and it was also proper that the feelings, nay, the prejudices, of the Protestant community should be consulted. If it could have ever entered into his mind to think that the act of 1793 was intended by the framers of it to be final and conclusive, that it was to be subject to no revision under any modification of time or place or circumstance, that upon that point the question must remain and rest for ever, he should then say that, so far from concurring in the mode of that final adjustment, as fixed by the act of 1793, he thought it quite impossible there could be devised a more anomalous principle of adjustment, or one less calculated to conclude so mighty a question. Could it be possible to have devised a more unsound or less durable principle of conclusive settlement, than one which, while it conferred privileges on the ordinary classes of society, degraded the higher ranks, and excluded them from that station which would give them a natural influence over those who moved in an inferior rank of life, and consequently tend to the promotion of peace and good order amongst them? That the higher classes of the Catholics should alone be marked out of the whole body, as those to whom objections were to be finally and irrevocably taken; that they alone should be the permanent objects of exclusion, degradation, depression, and misery, was the most extraordinary proposition that had been ever started in legislation. To call it a final adjustment was monstrous, for as such it never could have been intended; the act was not, he repeated, so intended; it was a mediate, and not a conclusive proceeding on the part of the legislature of 1793. He never could admit that this line of separation, with reference to a capacity to fill office, had ever been recognized by the legislature, throughout the whole of these anomalous proscriptions. He knew not how to draw a line of separation between one class and another as to eligibility to power: he was at a loss to define from which class the privilege ought to be withheld, or to which it should be extended. To admit the practicability of such a distinction, was to countenance a direct and plain violation of the fundamental principle of the constitution.
It was said, that no alteration was called for which could be safely conceded, and
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that no disadvantage arose to the great bulk of the people of Ireland from the exclusions which still remained. That position he must deny. Would any man truly acquainted with the situation of Ireland say, that no disadvantage was felt by the people of that country, by the exclusion from rank and honours of the higher class of Catholics, and the consequent loss of that influence which by a different system they might possess over the other classes of their own body? To permit such a state of things to exist was not only the most inconvenient position in which such a question could be suffered to rest, but it was a direct and manifest violation of the whole principle of conciliation which had governed the relaxation of the old system—of that system which sought the attainment of security by oppressive enactments, but which, at length yielding to the dictates of reason and wisdom and justice, adopted a system of conciliation, and endeavoured to make men worthy of trust, by anticipating that they were worthy of what the legislature was ready to confer, and reposing that confidence which was alone calculated to beget confidence in return.—The learned lord had said, "What a mockery to hold out to Catholics the privy council and the judicial bench, when you do not mean they should be advanced to either!" His noble friend, the mover, had said no such thing, and it was most important on this occasion, that the Catholics should be really understood as dealt candidly with in the bill, and practically and fully entitled to all the eligibilities it opened to them. He would beg leave to re-state the argument of his noble friend; and it was one in which he entirely concurred. What he had said was this—that it was not to be believed that any man would be advanced to offices of such rank and trust, until, after a long course of public conduct, he had given the most entire proofs of his allegiance and duty as a subject, and shown by his acts and the uniform tenor of his conduct, that his belief in transubstantiation had no effect upon the faith and trust of his allegiance.
Having disposed, as he thought he had, of the argument, that the settlement of 1793 was intended to be final, he now called upon the House, in the spirit of that act, to come to the completion of the great work which they had had in progress during the last forty years, relaxing the severity of their code step by step

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during that period, and at every step deriving greater advantage and peace and security by the relaxation. He could not urge too often, that the present bill was do new measure, but a continuance, to its final completion and accomplishment, of an ameliorated and wiser system of legislation—the erasure from their Statute-book of that disgraceful remnant of the penal code, which was still a blot and stain upon its page, and a stigma on the age which suffered its wanton continuance. Whatever were the fate of this bill, he implored their lordships not to reject it on the ground of the imputations which had been cast upon the tenets of the Catholics. It was no light thing that it should go forth to the Catholics on authority, great and venerable from its station, and respectful and powerful for the talents of the person exercising it, that the Catholic subjects of his majesty were necessarily incapacitated by their religion from paying a full and undivided allegiance to their sovereign. If there were time, he felt confident he could remove from the mind of his learned friend, what he had heard with great pain, the ground upon which he felt himself justified in casting such an imputation. The error arose from confounding two things in their nature so distinct that they ought never to be blended together. It was a confusion of the duties of unlimited obedience with those feelings of religious scruples which were never implied in the oath. A civil allegiance to a government was distinct from that obedience to the moral law or revealed will of God, the sense of which must be regulated by the conscientious feelings of the individual. It had no reference to the question of complete allegiance: the Protestants as well as the Catholics never included it in their sense of the oath. Nothing could be more unreasonable or unfair than to deny that the Catholic meant the fullest and most complete allegiance in the oath he was ready to subscribe. And upon what ground, therefore, were these men held forth as the objects of a disgraceful and degrading exclusion?—Not upon the ground of any opinions which they themselves hold or profess, but upon opinions which their opponents deduce as a consequence from what they say Catholics profess. So that it was not from their own principles, but from what their opponents deduced from those principles, that the reason for their exclusion was to be derived. He was
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astonished at any attempt to found an argument injurious to the Catholic upon his construction of an oath, after the years of experience they had had of the validity of such an obligation, and how consistent it was with the feelings and practice of a Catholic to be, at the same moment, a good and useful citizen in a Protestant state, and an adherent to the faith of his own religion.
Should he have the misfortune, however, of finding that their lordships differed from him upon the general principle of this bill, involving concessions to the Catholic body at large, still he should remind their lordships that there was a case connected with this subject of one particular body, who came before them as separate petitioners, to whose application he was utterly at a loss to conceive what argument in resistance could be offered. He had already mentioned that this measure came before them after the most deliberate recommendation of the Commons House of Parliament. That recommendation had not been sent up until after the most mature deliberation upon every part of the bill, and particularly upon that part of it which it was the peculiar province of the House of Commons to judge, as it referred to the composition of its own body. Upon that point, namely, the eligibility of Catholics to sit in the House of Commons, they who were the best qualified to form a just opinion had already pronounced. They had therefore told them in this bill that they were satisfied no danger, but on the contrary an advantage to all the institutions of the state, would result from admitting Catholics to an equal eligibility with Protestants to sit among the representatives of the people. The opinion of the House of Commons upon that point was necessarily entitled to great deference, and so would, he trusted, their lordships opinion upon the peculiar claim which he was now about to submit to them. He approached the subject, however, in a different manner, and for these reasons:—The House of Commons had deliberated upon the capacity of Catholic gentlemen to acquire a right of sitting in that branch of the legislature. But he was about to call upon the House of Lords to deliberate, not upon the propriety of extending any eligibility for seats among them, to a class of persons who: had never occupied them; but to determine in the face of the world, whether it was necessary and just any longer to ex-

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pose to a degrading exclusion six members of their own body—six Catholic peers, holding by the same title of birth and hereditary descent that any who now heard him did, and tracing it to (in some of their cases) a much higher antiquity, a right to sit amongst them in their legitimate capacity as peers of this empire. In the cases of these six or seven peers there could be no possible objection, whatever was the fate of the general provisions of the bill. They had shown every feeling of attachment to the constitution, which ought to invite confidence in their declarations. Upon their characters, high and honourable as they were, he should feel a disposition to dilate, did he not know, that living as they had lived among those whom he had the honour of now addressing, they had long since become known as well in character as in name, and had rendered any exposition of their principles unnecessary. As it would therefore be invidious for him to point to any one of those peers, all of whom must be so well known to many of their lordships, he should be inclined to ask any individual who was disposed to question the truth of the character, to select from the six or seven distinguished personages to whom he alluded, one name, to which by possibility suspicion had ever attached, or to state one reason entitled to the smallest attention, why any thing but honour, advantage, security, and credit could arise from admitting those Catholic peers to the enjoyment of their just and hereditary right of sitting in that House. The question of original right was here in existence—a right of which no man could be legally deprived without the showing of just cause. It was incumbent, therefore, upon those who opposed the rights of these peers, to show that their exclusion was founded upon the commission of some crime, or that they could not be now admitted without imminent danger to the state. With respect to their exclusion on account of any imputation of crime, it was impossible to sustain it by any reference to the acts of their ancestors, who had been excluded owing to the ever memorable and infamous perjury of the execrable Titus Oates. It was to the act of that atrocious wretch, and not to the pure time of the Revolution, that the exclusion of the Catholic peers was to be traced It was not to be imputed to the reign of William, but that of Charles—not to the best and most illustrious monarch who
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had ever swayed the British sceptre, but to the worst monarch that had ever degraded the British throne. Let not, then, the degradation of the Catholic peers be ascribed to the brightest era of the history of the country—an era upon which an Englishman could look back with pride and gratitude, but to one which could not be contemplated without contempt, disgust, and indignation. It would perhaps be well if an Englishman could strike out from the records of his country all traces of a reign so humiliating to his pride, if it were not of greater importance that they should remain, in order to teach public men the dreadful consequences of resorting to violent acts, which not only lead to the perpetration of crimes not contemplated by those whose acts had led to them, but which also armed one class of society against another in a scene of civil strife, where all the original evils inflicted were retaliated with tenfold force. This example should admonish legislators how they embarked in a system of legislation which was founded upon the vilification and calumny of their opponents. There were, however, two principal acts committed at the period of Titus Oates, to which their lordships House had been a party, and which had arisen from the incredible confidence they had shown a disposition to place in his infamous evidence. The first of the acts to which he alluded was the judicial murder of one of their own members, lord Stafford, who had been accused of a crime so absurd that no evidence could be brought which would justify a conviction upon such a charge. When, therefore, the opponents of the Catholics indulged in historical references to the cruelties which were inflicted under their rule at earlier periods, they should recollect with humiliation and self-reproach, what might be urged of still more atrocious acts in the much later period of Charles 2nd. In speaking of that atrocious period of Oates's plot, Mr. Fox had well observed, that it was difficult to say which had incurred the greatest disgrace—the prosecutors, the judges, or the witnesses. But it was not the single murder of a peer that had been inflicted by the dreadful delusion which then prevailed; it was on that monstrous evidence of Oates that the legislature further proceeded to act, and to disqualify the Catholic peers from sitting in parliament, by framing for them a disqualification which it was known at the time they could not pos-

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sibly take. Not even the forms of justice were observed in this latter act. There was no trial, no conviction, no attainder; but the legislature, acting in conformity with the maddened fury of the moment, proceeded at once to act against the Catholic body, as if the imputations alleged against them had been fully proved and substantiated. The question, so far as the Catholic peers were concerned, was then simply this—whether that exclusion, so unjustly carried into effect against their ancestors, who were innocent, should still be maintained against their descendants, whose loyalty was unimpeached and unimpeachable? To continue such a degrading exclusion, so basely enacted at the outset, was, in fact, to participate in the guilt that had been incurred by the framers of it. The ancestors of these peers had committed no crime; their descendants had incurred no penalty. Why, then, were they to be proscribed as unworthy of their birthright? Why were they to be excluded from those seats which they had never disgraced? The humane policy of the country had been of late times prone to a reversal of attainders, where even the justice of the attaint had never been questioned; and yet here were six cases of continued exclusion where nothing but innocence could be traced through the long track of proscription. Here stood the excluded peers who complained of that unjust and unworthy exclusion: they stood before the peers of that House, their equals by birth, and claiming precisely upon the same right the enjoyment of their hereditary privileges. If, then, upon the ground of guilt, there could be no justification of this proscription, was there any reason of policy for adhering to it, on the supposition that the restoration of justice to the innocent could be attended with any imminent danger to the state? What! was the state to be endangered by the appearance in that House of the duke of Norfolk, in the enjoyment of his hereditary honours? Were the liberties of the country and the immunities the church to be endangered by the earl of Shrewsbury's taking his seat within the walls of that House? The danger was idle and visionary.
The noble lord then repeated several of his arguments, showing the injustice of the exclusion of Catholic peers, and the false grounds upon which it had been originally inflicted, and observed, that he hoped, when he urged this pregnant case
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of injustice to a few individuals of exalted rank, no man could imagine he meant to confine the measure of redress to the particular act of injustice borne by the Catholic nobility. He had no such intention; for the conviction of his mind was clear, that until substantial justice was done to the great body of the Catholics at large, the peace of the empire would not be effectually established. It was said, that this bill, so far from uniting the Catholic clergy and laity with the state, would only alarm those who now protested against ecclesiastical restrictions. He did not think that this would ultimately be the effect of such a measure, if all parties seriously desired to meet the adjustment with mutual candour aad fairness. Of this he was convinced, that a wise government and a prudent legislature might improve to its own advantage and the general benefit of the community a measure of conciliation like this. His noble and learned friend had said, that he could never learn either from him (lord Grenville) or the late Mr. Pitt, what were the securities which were intended to be provided for the established church, although, the indispensable necessity of securities! was on all hands admitted. To this observation he would reply, that he had never dissembled the necessity of adequate securities. If they went into a committee upon a bill like that before them, containing so much grace, concession, and conciliation, then they could maturely and deliberately weigh the whole subject of securities, and calmly provide them in such a manner as to secure for all parties what could be reasonably desired. If he were asked what securities ought to be given, he should reply, that the first and greatest security was to be derived from the government itself: the best security to any government was the care it took of the interests of the population; and the best bulwark of the established church was the soundness of its doctrine, the correctness of its discipline, and the learning and virtues of its ministers. If further securities were required, the next was to be found in the great object of the law itself, which was intended to identify in one common interest all classes and all religions. On the subject of the clergy and. ecclesiastical preferments, an attempt had been made to confound two things essentially different—the power of nomination, and the power of exclusion. The distinction was tea obvious to require any laboured

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illustration, and the security against the abuse of the power of exclusion was to be found in the nature of the government, and in the exercise of that power by responsible ministers. But even this question of nomination and exclusion was now to be viewed in a light very different from that which was cast upon it some years ago. Not only was the situation of the clergy changed, but the pope himself, and the influence or authority he might possess, were not to be considered at all in the same manner as when he was under the absolute control of the public enemy of this country. Here again, he could see no ground for suspicion, when that was conceded which had been required, and given in all states whether Catholic or Protestant. After all, these were matters merely subordinate; and if this bill had come up to the House in the form of an absolute and unconditionnal gift of political privilege, he should have given it his concurrence without hesitation, because he thought the concession proper in itself, because it was a measure of wise justice and true policy, and because the benefits it would achieve (though improved by the securities) would be such as to warrant the passing of the bill without them. Beyond the particular enactments there remained this last and strongest security—that all the subjects of the Crown were firmly attached to the constitution in church and state, while the parliament had manifested in the clearest manner, the same absolute determination to support the Protestant ascendancy, the same invariable attachment to the constitution.
He should now draw to a close his observations on this question, by appealing to the House, and asking whether, in a candid, sober, and deliberate view of the whole subject, any man, in the present prospect and condition of affairs, could believe that the final accomplishment of this great measure would actually produce any considerable injury or danger? He asked this with confidence, for he did not think there was any individual, either in or out of parliament, who would prefer to a complete, general, and harmonious system, the present imperfect execution of the law, and partial division of the benefits of the constitution. From all who held that the hour was not yet come, that the times were not yet ripe, for this change, he begged, in the name of the dearest interests of the empire, to know what benefits they expected from delay;
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while he, in his turn, would remind them of the mischiefs that might be produced by postponement. He most earnestly impressed upon the House what had fallen from his noble friend (earl Grey) yesterday, when he asserted that the present was a most favourable opportunity for passing this bill. There never had been but one occasion more favourable, and that it was neglected, he should ever lament; and he feared that Ireland also would long have reason to regret. How different might her situation and that of her inhabitants now have been, had these political rights been conceded at the auspicious period of the union! That happy moment having been allowed to escape, what better opportunity was likely to be afforded than the present? Tranquillity had been restored to Europe: the aid of the Roman Catholics was not required for foreign wars or internal protection; and the bill might go forth as an act of grace and kindness, instead, perhaps, of owing its adoption hereafter to the compulsion of circumstances. Though the storm in Europe had been quelled for a time, who would say how soon a period of disturbance might not return? But, if this bill were passed, the country would be able to meet it with additional strength and new resources. It would attach the population of Ireland not only to the throne and monarchy, but to the person of the Protestant sovereign. Looking at the other side of the picture, the disadvantages of rejection were obvious. If after the measure had received the sanction of the Commons, the cup were dashed from the thirsty lip, and fond expectation disappointed, who would say what discontents might not be the result? Who would say what would be the feelings of the Catholics against this House, composed as it was of laity and clergy, which alone had opposed an obstacle to their hopes? If the decision of that night were contrary to that which bad been come to by the other branch of the legislature, it was obvious that it could not be final. Renewed and continual agitation must follow; and the bill might perhaps at last be forced upon parliament at a less happy moment and under more equivocal circumstances. He conjured their lordships, therefore, to pass the measure now, as by doing so, they would confer the most lasting benefit, not only on the Roman Catholics, but on the country at large.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, he rose with reluctance, and the more so, because he had urged on former occasions all the topics it was possible for him to advance on the present. He was ready to admit, at the outset, that the question came before the House in a new shape: as the noble barcn had remarked, it was not introduced on the recommendation of an individual peer, or by the exertions of a particular party; but it was recommended to peculiar regard as the opinion of the other branch of the legislature. On all accounts, therefore, it ought to receive a full, a temperate, and a candid discussion. It had been asked last night, and this night repeated, why in this new view of the subject, he did not agree that the bill should be read a second time and referred to a committee? He answered, that if he agreed in the general purview and object of the measure, though differing upon clauses and particular provisions, he should have consented to that farther step. He had no difficulty, however, in saying, that after the most thorough consideration—after looking carefully at the two parts of the bill, the one relating to concession and the other to security, he found in it scarcely three lines to which he could in any way give his consent. It was not a fair view of the question, to say that every man who was for curing certain anomalies, or who even thought that some farther concession might be made beyond what was given in 1793, ought to vote for the second reading. He felt that he could not honestly consent to that stage of the bill, as approving generally of the provisions, and then reduce in the committee a measure of this magnitude and extent to any thing so limited and insignificant. What was the bill? Stating it fairly, and upon the principles of its supporters, its object was to remove, with certain exceptions, all civil disabilities from persons professing the Roman Catholic religion. Those exceptions were three:—but if he thought merely that they were too few, he would vote for the second reading, because those exceptions came correctly within the province of a committee. Without prejudging the question whether certain minor points might or might not be granted, his opinion was this—that the great direct influence of the state in parliament, and in the privy council, ought to be kept where it was; and so thinking, the more honest and manly course was; to take his stand upon
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the principle of the bill, and not to disappoint, expectation by suffering it to go into a committee.
The noble baron had commenced by a reference to the penal code, enacted at the beginning of the last century; and he must say, that he had the misfortune to differ upon this very question; and it arose from an entirely different view of the principle on which all the laws upon this subject seemed to rest. The noble baron seemed to consider the exclusion, of Catholics as the remains of that penal code, and had endeavoured to place his learned friend on the woolsack, in a sort of dilemma regarding the precepts and examples of our ancestors. He (lord Liverpool) looked to the precepts and example of our ancestors only, where he could see that those precepts and that example were consistent with justice and sound policy. He felt that at this distance of time, and after all that had passed, he could not estimate the circumstances of the rebellion and the state of feeling it produced; and, without presuming, therefore, to give an opinion on what ought to have been done, he was ready with the noble baron to pronounce that code, in all its parts, one of the most nefarious, oppressive, and abominable systems that had ever disgraced any country. He denied, however, that the existing exclusion of Roman Catholics was any part of that code or was a relic of it. He could draw a clear distinction between the two principles, namely, the right of personal liberty, the right to property, and to the enjoyment and inheritance of property, and the right to political power. He allowed that those rights might run into each other, and be in some degree blended; but the principles were in themselves quite distinct. The question, whether Catholics ought, for any thing but positive crime, to be deprived of their personal liberties or property, and whether the consequences of the transgressions of the ancestor ought to extend to the successor, was altogether different from the question, whether, they should be invested with political privileges and power. It was for the state to determine to whom political privileges and power should be given, and from whom they should be withheld; and that determination must always be governed by considerations of necessity and even of convenience. For this reason he held that the whole argument of the noble

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baron derived from the penal code, was inapplicable to the question before the House.
He trusted that he came to the consideration of this great question with as few personal prejudices against those who professed the Catholic faith as any noble lord who heard him. Some individuals of that persuasion he had the pleasure of knowing; with others he had been in the habit of living on terms of intimacy: and he was convinced that in the body of Catholics were to be found as many honest, virtuous, conscientious, and useful men, as in any other sect of the community. It was not to be disputed that the House was bound by every duty to religion, good faith, and justice, to support the Protestant throne and the Protestant establishment; but he had no difficulty in saying, that if the policy of our ancestors at the period of the Revolution had been different, or if from some unforeseen contingency the Roman Catholic religion had been the established religion of Ireland, J his firm belief was, that what might be called, for brevity's sake, foreign allegiance, would not have prevented the Catholics from being as beneficial supporters of the government as the members of any other establishment. A noble friend last night (the earl of Harrowby) had referred to the union with Scotland, where the Presbyterian religion was established. But surely it would not be argued, that that was the condition in which the Roman Catholic religion stood in Ireland. The situation of the king of Prussia with regard to Silesia, of the emperor of Russia with regard to Poland, or of the king of the Netherlands with regard to Belgium, was not at all analogous to the situation of this country with regard to Ireland; for in all those cases the Roman Catholic faith was the religion of the country. He admitted, therefore, that there was nothing absurd or inconsistent in the idea of an establishment with a monarch of a different persuasion. Such was not the state of Ireland—the short difference being, that Catholicism was not the establishment. Was it possible or probable, being what they are, that the Catholics, if they had the means, would not always look forward to the time when they could make the Roman Catholic the esiablished religion? The question was, whether it was the duty of parliament to defend the established church from the danger that might arise
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to it, if the Roman Catholics obtained political power.
Before he proceeded to discuss the bill in its two important branches, he wished to call the attention of the House immediately to what he conceived ought to be the foundation of all considerations of this subject, and a departure from which he thought had been the origin of all the difficulties that had arisen in the discussion, and the source of many of the arguments in support of the bill. He here referred to the period of the Revolution, not merely because in his judgment there was then consummated what had proved essential to the peace and prosperity of the country—he meant the alliance between church and state. That he took to be the foundation of our constitution. He maintained that if the opinion of their lordships was, that there was by law, and ought to continue to be, that alliance between church and state, they could not adopt the bill upon the table; for the principle of it was to dissolve the connexion between church and state, and consequently to endanger the establishment. His opinion on this point had not been at all weakened by what had been said on the other side. And here he might particularly refer to what had been urged last night by a right reverend prelate, that the summons of every peer required his attendance in parliament to consider of affairs for the safety of the kingdom and church, so that his political functions were connected with the establishment in the very instrument that required him to exercise those functions. The noble baron had referred particularly to the works of a great authority, whom he never read without admiration, nor, he trusted, without improvement—he meant Mr. Burke; and it was not immaterial or uninstructive to direct the attention of the House to the letter written by him to sir Hercules Langriche, when the question of concession was limited to the elective franchise. There it would be seen that Mr. Burke urged the grant on the ground, that it was not necessary that it should lead to the acquisition of more extensive privileges, drawing a distinction between power directing and instrumental. Yet, a very short time afterwards, the very same distinguished orator became the advocate of a more extensive grant, in the face of his own previous doctrine; The first question, therefore, he would put was, if this bill, now on the table, was

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passed into a law, could concession stop there? What security had he that it might not be extended to dissenters? that the Test and Corporation acts might not be repealed? for such seemed the inevitable result of acquiescing in what was now required. This would bring the country to an equality of political privileges; and Quakers, nay Jews, and every description of non-conformists, would be put on the same footing as members of the establishment—the doors of parliament and of the privy council would be open to all. The next step to be urged would be, that no man was bound to contribute to a church of which he was not a member. Dr. Priestley had avowed that the repeal of the Test and Corporation acts was his object; and after the Irish rebellion in 1798, the Catholics maintained precisely the same doctrine; Dr. Macnevin contending that no man ought to be compelled to pay to any but to his own clergyman. This doctrine had received support, at a later date, from a zealous Catholic, sir John Throckmorton, who published a pamphlet, in the course of which he anticipated the time when there would be a sort of common establishment between the Catholics and Protestants, and when they should alternately, and for stated periods, have the appointment to ecclesiastical benefices. He asked then, with confidence, whether any man believed that, by making these concessions, the Roman Catholics would continue satisfied? Was it not far more likely that they would pursue their great ulterior object? For there was not a Catholic who paid fees to his priest, and tithes to the church, who was not interested in procuring that Catholic establishment to which assuredly, this bill would lead. When people asked, "Do you really believe that the Catholics would subvert the established religion?" he answered, that undoubtedly he did believe that every zealous and sincere Catholic would make the attempt, because he must feel it his duty to do so. Nothing could be more incontrovertible on this point than the reasoning of Dr. Milner, who spoke the natural sentiments of a conscientious individual. He left the House to consider whether, when it had passed this bill, it had done all that would be demanded of its easy liberality. He contended that this would be only the first step of a system, and that parliament could not stand upon better ground of re-
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sistance hereafter than it occupied at present. Concession would increase demand; and it was far better to fight for the frontier than for the capital. At present the House held the vantage ground; and it could resist now with better success than when it might hereafter have to oppose the formation of a Catholic establishment, and to resist the claim that no man should pay tithes but to his own priest.
Such was the fair and practical view of the subject. A noble friend of his had last night referred to the history of the various laws upon the subject, from the Reformation to the Revolution; and it had been shown, that soon after the former of these two events the enactments had varied from year to year; so that it was difficult to state precisely on what footing the church establishment stood. The consequence of this uncertainty was, that in the earlier part of the seventeenth century it was overturned by the Puritans, and in the latter part of the same century again nearly destroyed by the Catholics. These great evils led to the subsequent provision at the Revolution, that the king must be a Protestant at the head of a Protestant establishment. A system was thus settled which had not since been disturbed, under which the nation had enjoyed the utmost prosperity and acquired the greatest glory, and which he hoped would never again be abandoned for a vacillating policy, that had twice so severely afflicted the country, with the execution of one sovereign and the abdication of another. The noble earl here took a brief view of the course pursued by James 2nd, to accomplish his project of a Catholic establishment, repeating, that to consent to any change was to resign the advantageous position in which the country now stood. He was decidedly of opinion, that if any alteration were now made, their lordships were only changing the ground of contest, and not changing it for the better; and he doubted much whether it would have the effect of harmonising the sentiments of those to whose relief it was more particularly directed. When toleration was first extended to the Roman Catholics of Ireland, forty-nine-fiftieths of the land were in the hands of the Protestants, though four-fifths of the population were Catholics; but at present', though the numbers of Catholics were nearly in the same proportion, yet the accession of property had greatly increased;

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and the question now to be considered was, whether such property would not introduce into parliament such a number as would be capable of creating a contention, of the result of which no man could entertain an opinion.
After the fullest consideration of these bills, he had no hesitation in declaring, that he did not think them bottomed in sound policy; and that, though they set out with a declaration to maintain the established church and the Protestant succession, he was satisfied, if they should pass, that the principle of a Protestant succession could not be maintained in this country. If the presumptive heir to the throne should be of the Catholic religion, might he not say, "Am I to be the only man in the kingdom, with the exception of the lord chancellor, who is to be prohibited from worshipping his God according to the dictates of his conscience? You have the president of the council a Catholic, you have the secretary of state a Roman Catholic, and the judges of the King's-bench Roman Catholics; and I am not more hostile than they are to the support of the established church." "What answer could be given, and what, on the other hand, would be the feeling of those of the same religion with the heir to the Crown, if a punishment were inflicted for that belief? What would be more dear to them than the placing of such a sovereign on the throne? The moment the House declared that there was no inconsistency between the Roman Catholic religion and political power, it by inference allowed that there was no inconsistency between the Roman Catholic religion and the Protestantism of the head of the state. He begged the House to look the question fairly in the face: let it neither conceal what the old law was, nor what the new law was intended to be; and let it not forget that the old law connected church and state, while the new law dissolved that union, and effected a total change in the constitution of the country.
The noble earl then came to an examination of the second part of the bill—the securities it afforded; observing, that if the bill passed, and the securities were refused or rejected by the Catholics, the country might hereafter be exposed to all the dangers of religious persecution. This bill, which was called a measure of grace and favour, how was it received—how was it looked at in Ireland? Was there more than one opinion respecting it
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among the clergy of that country? Their lordships were reduced by this measure to the extremity of attempting an impracticability: they were giving unlimited power to the Roman Catholics, and at the same time endeavouring to build up new securities against that power. The more he reflected on the subject, the more he was convinced that by this measure they were sapping the foundation of all the great establishments of the country, both church and state. It was said, that the dangers lie had pointed out were visionary. They might be so; but if they were not provided against, who could say that the safety of the state was secured? The legislature had therefore done wisely in providing a general law for the security of the constitution; and from that law he could see no reason for departing. If, indeed, he could believe that this measure would do any practical good, and give satisfaction to the Catholics in general, he might then consider what practical risk he would undergo for the attainment of so desirable an object; but he could see no such effect likely to result from it. With the great mass of the population of Ireland he believed this measure would have no effect at all; and therefore to them he conceived it would be insignificant. A few respectable individuals might be gainers by it; but to the great body of the Catholic population it would produce no advantage whatever. He was therefore disposed to adhere to the fundamental law, which said, not only that the King should be Protestant, but that he should have a Protestant parliament, a. Protestant council, and Protestant judges. Their lordships had a duty to perform to the Catholics of Ireland; and in discharge of that duty, ought to confer upon them any benefits which could be conferred without danger to the established church; but their lordships had also a duty to perform to the Protestants of Ireland and of the empire at large; and as he did not think the good that would be conferred upon the Catholics overweighed the evil which would be done to the Protestants, he should recommend to their lordships to keep every body of men in their proper places, to give them the advantages of the laws under which they were born, and not to take away those securities which had for so long a period preserved the constitution. These were" his feelings upon this measure, and he should therefore vote against the bill.
The Marquis of Lansdownsaid, he desired it might be distinctly understood, that how gratifying soever it might be to his feelings to give his vote for the admission of any description of his majesty's subjects to those constitutional privileges and blessings which they had a right to enjoy, the ground on which he rested his support of the present bill was, not the "advantage of the Roman Catholics, or of any description of men whatever; but the advantage of the state and the church, the strength and stability of which must depend on the unanimity of all the subjects of the realm. He was glad to hear it conceded by the noble earl who spoke last, that the period was gone by when attempts were to be made to exterminate the religion professed by a great portion of the subjects of this kingdom, and that their lordships were now arrived at that state of feeling, in which it only remained for them to consider whether they ought to admit the professors of that faith to the privileges enjoyed by other subjects. The noble earl had stated, that this measure of favour, even if extended, as proposed, to the Roman Catholics of Ireland, might prove a boon which after all would not be acceptable. What might be the result of some of the provisions of this bill he was not prepared distinctly to say; but this he would confidently state, that the main part of it would be received with gratitude by the great body of the Catholics. The noble earl had next stated, that the effect of the measure would not be so great or so beneficial as was expected. He knew not by what advocates the noble earl had heard it stated that Catholic emancipation in Ireland would have the immediate effect of quieting and dissipating all the discontent and dissatisfaction which a long continued system of misgovernment had created in that country: but he was still more at a loss to conceive where the noble earl had found that the privileges granted by this bill would not give satisfaction to the great body of the population, because the immediate benefits of it would be experienced by only a small number of individuals. Did the noble earl mean to say—and did the sentiment tome with a good grace from him—that the privileges of the superior orders were not held for the public good? Were the privileges of their lordships held for their own sakes solely? Could it be reasonably supposed that the eligibility of the superior orders to offices of honour and
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distinction would not be gratifying to persons of inferior station? Such a supposition was contrary to human nature, and particularly contrary to the feelings of the Irish nation; and he was therefore well assured that the present measure could not fail to be productive, in time, of the most beneficial effects on the minds of the population of Ireland. They had been told by the learned lord on the woolsack, and after him by the noble earl, that the fundamental laws of the constitution would be affected by this bill; but let their lordships look at the Bill of Rights and the act of settlement, and they would see that neither of these was in the slightest manner affected by the present, measure. None of the laws affected by this bill were fundamental: on that assertion he was willing to stake any credit that he might have with their lordships. The laws which it was proposed to alter were not a part of the constitution as established at the Revolution. They were laws enacted to protect the Protestant establishment from particular dangers, such as the infamous plot of Titus Oates. And here he might observe, that he had heard with astonishment that night for the first time in his life, and that too from the Speaker of their lordships' House, that their lordships were daily in the habit of praying for deliverance from the plot of Titus Oates. Were it not for the high authority from which this information had proceeded, he should have been led to believe that the plot from which their lordships prayed for deliverance was the gunpowder plot. But the learned lord had also inculcated, that it would be an outrage upon the memory of king William, as well as a vital attack upon the security of the constitution, to accede to the proposed repeal of the penal laws. Many of the professed admirers of the Revolution, of whom king William was the idol, were but too apt, as most persons devoted to an idol were, to attribute to that idol all their own prejudices and partialities. Hence some such persons ascribed to that great and glorious monarch, opinions, or rather prejudices, which he never entertained. But that king William never entertained such prejudice or intolerance as some of his sudden admirers ascribed, was obvious, from a paper addressed on the part of his majesty to the congress at Ryswick, which paper was drawn up by lord Somers. In this paper king William stated, that he saw no ground why Catholics should not enjoy

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complete toleration, or why they should not be admitted to offices of state, under a Protestant sovereign. But for the purpose of repelling the idea that the laws to which the bill referred were radical propositions, connected with the principles of the Revolution, as the learned lord on the woolsack and others had maintained; he quoted the Journals of that House to show that riders had been proposed to the 31st of Charles 2nd, and also to the act of William and Mary, to prevent the lords justices from giving the royal assent to any bill for the repeal of those acts, which riders had been negatived. A similar attempt was made at the union of Scotland, by proposing that the act for the security of the church might never be repealed, and it also was negatived. This showed in the most satisfactory manner that these laws had not been considered fundamental, as was contended by the learned lord. He had heard with regret from a right reverend prelate, that the Roman Catholics enjoyed already complete toleration. That right reverend prelate might have been expected, on the subject of toleration, to have referred to the authority of Dr. Paley. Had he done so, he would have found it stated by Dr. Paley, that the toleration of dissenters was only partial; that admission to offices was necessary to make it complete; and that, while that privilege was denied, there could not be said to be complete toleration. The noble earl had stated his apprehensions that great danger would arise to property in Ireland, if the disabilities were removed from the Catholics, since a great part of the property in that country was held under forfeited titles. It should be recollected, however, that a very great proportion of the property possessed by the Catholics in Ireland was under these forfeited titles; and therefore it was chimerical to expect that they should labour to set aside their own titles. He challenged the learned lord, or the noble earl, to adduce a single instance in which the Catholics had not shown themselves the promoters, of the good fortunes of the country, and participators in its bad fortunes. To the tried fidelity of the Catholics the learned lord owed his seat at present on the woolsack, and the learned prelates their mitred dignity. But for the Catholic population of the kingdom, whose faith their lordships had laboured to exterminate, they would never have come with safety out of that struggle through
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which they had passed, and in the course of which, during a period of twenty years, there had been no instance of Catholic treason, Catholic cowardice, or Catholic infidelity. It had been said by an eminent divine that the Catholics had a leaning to arbitrary power, and the Presbyterians to republicanism. Both assertions were perhaps equally unfounded; and for a contradiction of one of them, he might appeal to the conduct of the peers of Scotland, who had sat in that House since the Union, of whom it could be said that the breath of calumny durst not accuse them of advocating republican principles. The other charge was sufficiently refuted by the constitution recently adopted in various Catholic countries. The truth was, that when the services of the Catholics were required, no suspicions were entertained of their loyalty, no danger was apprehended from their religion. When the mutiny took place at the Nore, Catholic priests had been gladly sent down to bring the seamen back to their duty. When the government had an object to gain, they were glad to rely on the fidelity of the Catholics, and to avail themselves of their services; but when that object was attained, they were treated as enemies, and told that their oaths were distrusted. Of all the provisions of this bill he attached the greatest importance to what some noble lords viewed with the greatest suspicion—the admission of Catholics to seats in parliament. Those persons took a narrow view of the functions of parliament who measured them by the votes it passed and the ordinances it enacted. He conceived that from the manner in which opinions were brought into conflict and examined in a legislative assembly, unanimity of sentiment was promoted, erroneous impressions corrected, and much public good resulted. Seeing that this was the effect produced on others, were they to suppose that Catholics were so constituted by nature as to be incapable of deriving the same advantage from the same cause, and of approximating in sentiment to those whose opinions they were in the habit of hearing?—Here he should have concluded, if allusion had not been made to the persons who composed the establishment at Stoney-hurst, in Lancashire. The existence of the order of Jesuits was unquestionably contrary to the law of this country; and into the propriety of that law it was not for him to inquire. This he was able to

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state—that the Jesuits could not be established by the pope in any country, without the sanction of the government of that country, and the individuals of that order who were at present in England had received an intimation to this effect. The present bill, therefore, would not affect their situation in any respect. This measure would not give the Catholics power to disturb any sacred institution of the country: it was not the admission of one or two Catholics, whom a Protestant king might be pleased to call into the privy council, that could endanger the Protestant establishment. It was rather from a great population, discontented and irritated at being deprived of their constitutional rights, that danger was to be apprehended; and from that danger, he wished their lordships to guard themselves and the country, by reading this bill a second time.
Viscount Sidmouthbegan by observing, that it was with the most painful feelings he felt himself called upon to oppose the measure before the House. Nothing was more revolting to his mind than to declare it necessary to withhold from so large a portion of his fellow subjects, as the body of Roman Catholics, the privileges enjoyed by the other classes of the community. The measure came before their lordships now under different circumstances than on former occasions; for it had already obtained the sanction of one branch of the legislature. Could he believe that all the beneficial consequences would result from the measure which the noble marquis who spoke last, and other noble lords anticipated, he should consider it the greatest blessing ever conferred on the country by the wisdom of parliament. It had been said, that the bill would put an end to religious differences and cement the union of all classes of his majesty's subjects; but he was sorry to say that he thought no such effects would result from the passing of the bill. He objected to the first part of the bill on grounds which would be offensive to many of the most ardent supporters of the measure; he objected to it, not on the ground of individual distrust of the Roman Catholics, but because of the nature of the tenets and principles inherent in their religion. He objected to it for the reasons assigned by a noble earl; namely, that the Catholic religion was hostile to civil and religious liberty. He was ready to admit that many of the obnoxious tenets
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of the Catholic religion had been abandoned by its professors; but many also still remained, and particularly the doctrines of exclusive salvation and infallibility. The Catholic archbishop of Dublin, in a letter which he had addressed to the individuals under his immediate influence, had stated, that the church of Rome was infallible in its decisions, not only in points of faith, but also of morality. These doctrines were also embodied in the resolutions of the Roman Catholic clergy of Drogheda, and the professors of the college of Maynooth. It had been represented that a very inconsiderable number of Catholic members would be returned to the House of Commons; but he was at a loss to conceive upon what grounds this argument was founded. The constitution had declared that no foreign influence should exist in this country, but the effect of the bill would be to give spiritual authority to the head of the Roman Catholic church. In referring to the second part of the bill, the noble viscount was of opinion that the securities therein proposed were insufficient. With respect to the oath intended to be substituted for that which now legally existed, which if the bill passed would be taken by all members of parliament, and persons holding offices under the government, being Catholics, he maintained that it could not be subscribed consistently with the principles of the Catholic religion. He knew that this opinion was entertained by many most respectable individuals of that persuasion. There had been numerous meetings of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastics of Ireland, at all of which there had been but one unanimous feeling of hostility towards the clauses contained in the second part of the bill. Besides the meetings to which he alluded in different districts of Ireland, there had been a general meeting of the Roman Catholic clergy in the city of Dublin, at which, resolutions were unanimously passed against the clauses in the second part of the bill. He understood that a petition, founded on these resolutions, had been sent to the metroplis in order to be presented to that House, and he did not understand why that presentation had not taken place. No measure had ever been brought under the consideration of parliament which was calculated to produce more disunion among different classes of the community than the present bill. It had not only effected a division between the Catholics and the Protestants,

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but had introduced disunion among the Catholics themselves. The noble viscount contended, that the great body of the Protestants in this country, as well as in Ireland, were decidedly averse to the measure, and concluded by calling upon their lordships to reject it if they wished to preserve the existing constitution.
Viscount Melvillesaid, that under the very particular circumstances in which he was placed, he felt it to be his duty to state to their lordships the reasons which induced him to give his vote for the second reading of this bill. That vote he intended to give from a strong conviction of the utility and necessity of the measure. In giving his decided opinion that the bill should be read a second time, he had to regret that it was his misfortune to differ from many noble friends with whom he was usually in the habit of agreeing. Notwithstanding the ability with which the debate had been conducted, and the number of noble lords who had delivered their sentiments, he had not been so fortunate as to hear one main point sufficiently touched upon, to which, above all others, he thought their lordships' attention ought to be directed—he meant the consequences of rejecting the bill. They had heard a great deal of the danger, which he thought magnified—he would not say entirely visionary—of carrying this bill into effect; but little or nothing had been said of the danger which was to be expected if it should not be carried. Under any government, particularly under one like our own, the exclusion of a considerable proportion of the population from rights and privileges enjoyed by others must be attended with risk. The population of the colonies and of India, though under the same government, was placed in circumstances which rendered it necessary that a different rule should be applied. The population he referred to was one like that of which their lordships were a part, having the same kind of education and the same feelings as themselves, and engaged, as far as they would allow them to be engaged, in the service and the defence of the country. It had been said, that the passing of this bill would not make the population to which he had referred either better or worse. But if any people were told, that such as they were they must remain—that whatever talents, what ever industry they might exert, it was all in vain, for a boundary was put to their rank in society—surely it was not
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in human nature but that such language must produce irritation in a high degree. Surely their lordships must see that such a state of things could not be suffered much longer to exist without incurring considerable risk. They had been told that danger was to be apprehended from the insufficiency of the securities, should the bill pass. Perhaps there might by some ground for this observation; but the whole question resolved itself into a balance of dangers. Their lordships ought to be satisfied that the danger of passing the bill was paramount to every other, before they refused to give it a second reading. He was convinced that the danger on the other side was infinitely more formidable: that it existed and would exist until some remedy of the kind now under consideration should be applied. There the real danger was to be found; and he was of opinion that their lordships ought to remove the disabilities under which the Catholics laboured as speedily as possible. It had been argued that the admission of a few Catholic peers to that House, and some Catholic members in the House of Commons, would have the effect of making parliament act as if all the members were no longer Protestants. It was also argued that the admission of one or two Catholics to the privy council would have the effect of changing the whole institutions of the country. The entire of this reasoning he thought founded in fallacy, and was convinced that after the passing of this bill the two Houses of Parliament and the executive government would remain as before, essentially Protestant. With regard to the provisions of the bill, he was not one of those who thought that they might not be advantageously altered if their lordships agreed to go into a committee. He approved of most of the alterations suggested by the noble earl who moved the second reading. But there were other alterations he should propose, if the bill were committed, for the purpose of rendering it more applicable to Scotland, where the laws respecting Roman Catholics were not the same as in England. The opinions of that part of the united kingdom he was certain would form no obstacle to the execution of the present measure. Of the spirit of liberality which prevailed there on this subject, he could speak not only from particular information, but from facts which were public and equally accessible to all their lord-

355
ships. About seven years ago the general assembly of the church of Scotland had addressed a petition to that House on the subject of toleration, from which, though the Catholic disabilities were not expressly mentioned, it was evident that the assembly had no objection to their removal. On the contrary, the words of the petition implied the desire of that object; for the petitioners recommended to their lordships, in any measure they might adopt, to proceed with caution, and to take care to secure the constitutional establishments of both countries, and at the same time extend the privileges of the constitution to all the subjects of the united kingdom. The noble lord, after explaining the nature of the laws respecting Roman Catholics in Scotland, the reference to the subject in the Scotch claim of rights, and the articles of the union, again strongly urged the reading of the bill. He observed, that rapid improvement in education in Ireland increased the danger of withholding this conciliatory measure; for the more a people advanced in civilization, the more stongly they must feel the injustice of depriving them of their civil rights.
Lord Ashburton, in looking at the immunities enjoyed by Protestant dissenters, found it difficult to perceive why similar advantanges should be denied to the solicitations of the Catholics. It did appear to him that in its political qualities and effects the Catholic faith approached more nearly to the established religion of the country than did the Protestant sects so especially favoured. The Catholics certainly did acknowledge—just so far as they could acknowledge it without failure in their allegiance to their sovereign—a foreign spiritual supremacy; but what there was about foreign spiritual supremacy for people to be afraid of, he had yet to learn. The country, as he thought, might as reasonably suspect sir Humphrey Davy of treason, because he was a member of foreign scientific associations; or the illustrious duke opposite a dangerous man because he had received titles or orders of knighthood from foreign states. Those who doubted the loyalty of the Catholics had perhaps forgotten that Catholics in the reign of Charles 1st fought and fell for their king—for that king who was deposed and murdered by Protestant dissenters. Their lordships had been told that the grant of the requested rights would little benefit the
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great mass of Catholics; that very few individuals indeed would find their way into parliament. No matter how few did make their way, if all were qualified to make their way. He had no prospect of an earldom; he had done nothing to deserve such a title, nor had he any hope of receiving it; but still, if a bill were passed providing that no baron whose name began with the letter A should be capable of becoming an earl, it would give him serious uneasiness.
Lord Somershad no difficulty in voting for the second reading of the bill. Had his noble ancestor, to whom allusion had been made, been living, he would assuredly have been friendly to this measure. The circumstances of the country were changed, and what the greatest patriot might in a former age have thought necessary, was now no longer so. He did not apprehend any danger from the admission of a few Catholics into the House of Commons. That House was intended to represent all the interests of the country; but as things now stood, that intention was not carried into effect. The admission of a few Catholics would repair the deficiency, and cause another interest which had hitherto enjoyed no representation, to be duly represented. He had no doubt that if the measure passed, and if the Catholics at any future period had an opportunity of establishing their own religion, they would avail themselves of it; and so would the dissenters, of whatever class or description. There was, however, no prospect of the occurrence of any such opportunity; and the apprehension of that which might be treated almost as an impossibility would not justify the House in refusing a course of justice and of conciliation.
The House then divided:
List of the Contents and also of the Not Contents.

CONTENTS.—Present.

Duke of Sussex

Grafton

Lord President

Argyll

Harrowby

Leinster

Dukes Devonshire

Marq. Buckingham

357

Lansdown

Melville

Headfort

Granville

Camden

Duncan

Anglesea

Hood

Conyngham

Bishop Norwich

Earls Thanet

Lords Clinton

Jersey

Dacre

Elgin

Saye and Sele

Cassilis

Howard of Effingham

Galloway

Stair

Howard of Walden

Roseberry

Aberdeen

Colville

Cowper

King

Harrington

Grantham

Warwick

Holland

Fitzwilliam

Hawke

De la Warr

Foley

Spencer

Ashburton

Fortescue

Somers

Carnarvon

Amherst

Charlemont

Grenville

Darnley

Auckland

Besborough

Dundas

Donoughmore

Calthorpe

Belmore

De Dunstanville

Limerick

Rosslyn

Wellesley

Grey

Lilford

Minto

Abercrombie

Morley

Lauderdale

St. Germains

Crewe

Blesington.

Ellenborough

Viscounts Torrington

Hill

Proxies.

Duke Somerset

Earls Hutchinson

Bedford

Melbourne

Marq. Stafford

Berwick

Bute

Clancarty

Queensberry

Sherborne

Earls Mulgrave

Dartmouth

Breadalbane

Mount Cashel

Lynedoch

Kingston

Hillsborough

Cawdor

Yarborough

Darlington

Sondes

Oxford

Essex

Grosvenor

Mendip

Gwydir

Monteagle

Bolingbroke

Carysfort

Braybrooke

Ducie

Suffolk

Carlisle

Albemarle

Hardwicke

Waldegrave

Granard

Alvanley

Keith

Hereford

Anson

Derby

Belhaven

Carrington

Glastonbury

Lord Erskine

Tweedale

Bishop of Rochester

NOT-CONTENTS.—Present.

Duke of York

Earl Westmoreland (L. P. S.)

Archb. Canterbury

Lord Chancellor

Dukes Beaufort

Archb. York

Newcastle

358

Northumberland

Sydney

Sidmouth

Wellington

Lake

Marq. Winchester

Exmouth

Lothian

Curzon

Cornwallis

Bishop London

Northampton

Winchester

Donegal

Lincoln

Earl Pembroke

St. Asaph

Bridgewater

Bangor

Winchelsea

Exeter

Cardigan

St. David's

Shaftesbury

Salisbury

Kinnoul

Ely

Glasgow

Chester

Plymouth

Peterborough

Coventry

Oxford

Macclesfield

Gloucester

Pomfret

Landaff

Harcourt

Clogher

Bathurst

Killaloe

Aylesbury

Kilmore

Chatham

Worcester

Abergavenny

Lords Dynevor

Mount Edgecumbe

Saltoun

Napier

Digby

Boston

Mansfield

Bagot

Liverpool

Kenyon

Mayo

Selsey

Enniskillen

Rolle

O'Neill

Bayning

Romney

Bolton

Powis

Northwick

Chichester

St. Helen's

Lonsdale

Redesdale

Cathcart

Dufferin

Verulam

Arden

Whitworth

Gambier

Brownlow

Harris

Longford

Beresford

Abingdon

Walsingham

Visct. Hampden

Proxies.

Duke of Clarence

(Aboyne)

Rutland

Ferrars

Richmond

Malmesbury

Marlborough

Maynard

Dorset

Farnham

Marq. Exeter

Prudhoe

Hertford

Willoughby de

Salisbury

Broke

Bath

Tyrone

Cholmondeley

Rous

Thomond

Strange

Earl Scarborough

Stamford

Kellie

Beauchamp

Loftus (M. Ely)

Rodney

Poulett

Suffield

Morton

De Clifford

Huntingdon

Middleton

Zouche

Denbigh

Orford

Graham

Sheffield

Salterford

Carrick

Norwich (Gordon)

Meldrum

359

Gordon (Huntley)

Rivers

Charleville

Stewart (Moray)

Lord Carleton

Manners

Home

Combermere

Harewood

Dudley and Ward

Fgremont

Falmouth

Wodehouse

Radnor

Gray

Aylesford

Archbishop of Armagh

Balcarras

Portsmouth

Bishop of Hereford

Nelson

Carlisle

Craven

Chichester

Brodrick

Durham