Sitting of 7 November 1820

Preamble
The House having been called over,
Lord Dacrerose for the purpose of presenting a protest on the part of her majesty, which had just been put into his hands by her attorney-general. He ought, perhaps, to apologize for not having stated his sentiments as to the proceedings
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before the House; but his opinion was one which could not be affected by any thing stated on either side at the bar. His objection was, to the principle of the measure, to a bill of Pains and Penalties being introduced for alleged immoral conduct committed long since. It was therefore unnecessary for him to enter into any discussion of the evidence.—The noble lord then presented the protest, which was as follows:
"CAROLINE REGINA.
"To the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled;
"The Queen has learnt the decision of the Lords upon the bill now before them. In the face of parliament, of her family, and of her country, she does solemnly protest against it. Those who avowed themselves her prosecutors have presumed to sit in judgment upon the question between the Queen and themselves. Peers have given their voices against her who had heard the whole evidence for the charge, and absented themselves during her defence. Others have come to the discussion from the Secret Committee with minds biassed by a mass of slanders, which her enemies have not dared to bring forward in the light.
"The Queen does not avail herself of her right to appear before the committee; for to her the details of the measure must be a matter of indifference; and, unless the course of these unexampled proceedings should bring the bill before the other branch of the legislature, she will make no reference whatever to the treatment experienced by her during the last 25 years.
"She now most deliberately, and be fore God, asserts that she is wholly innocent of the crime laid to her charge; and she awaits with unabated confidence, the final result of this unparalleled investigation."
The Lord Chancellorsaid, that according to the rules and regulations of their proceedings fn all matters of accusation before them by bill, the person who was placed in the situation of the accused, after the second reading of the bill, had a right to be personally heard. That was a doctrine which prevailed in Atterbury's case, and several others. He thought it right, if it was to be considered as the address of the individual sending it to the House, that it should be taken notice of and received as such; but strictly speak-

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ing, it could not be received as a "Protest."
The Earl of Liverpoolhad no objection to the paper being received as the address of the Queen, provided a formal entry were made in the Journals to that effect. It might be entered on the Journals, not as a protest, but as a representation of what the feelings of the Queen were, and an address which she would have made had she been personally present.
The Lord Chancelloragreed, that it was proper to receive it in some way or other, and thought it might be received under the name of an address, but certainly not of a protest, which might form a precedent for individuals protesting against the proceedings of that House.
The Earl of Lauderdale greed, that this protest should be put, in some way or other, on the Journals. It should stand there as the address of the Queen. But, considering it as an address, he begged to ask, whether their lordships thought it one which, if delivered at the bar, would have been received by the House without interruption? It was said in that paper, that noble lords came from the secret committee "with minds biassed by a mass of slanders." How could her majesty know that all the evidence which had been brought before the secret committee had not been laid before the House? This was one of the most direct calumnies ever vented against the House. He, for one, had sat upon the committee, and he declared, before God, that his opinion of the Queen's guilt had arisen from her own defence. Was it possible that their lordships would permit themselves to be thus slandered?
The Duke of Newcastle, conceiving that he had been attacked by this protest, which, by a sort of ex post facto law, would deprive him of his right of voting, begged to say, that he had considered from the first, that if any peer were prevented from attending on any occasion, he was not to be therefore deprived of giving his vote, as he had a full opportunity of reading the evidence, either within or without the House. No slander should compel him to surrender his right as a peer of giving his vote conscientiously, as he had done on the present occasion.
Lord Somers, who had also been absent for a day or two during the defence, maintained his right of voting, and endeavoured to vindicate his conduct against the reflection cast upon noble lords in his si-
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tuation by the terms of the protest before the House. He had been absent, he said, in consequence of indisposition, but he had read the evidence taken during his absence, and he would say, that no noble lord could be more attentive to the evidence than himself while he was present. Having said thus much, he would now observe, that he had never attended any judicial proceeding in which he was more perfectly convinced of the guilt of the party, than in the present case. He was I convinced that the illustrious person was guilty of the essential parts of the charges brought against her. He lamented that such was the conclusion he had been forced to come to; but he was called upon to do his duty, and he had done it upon the most decided feeling and conviction.
The Duke of Athol, justified his voting on the bill, notwithstanding a temporary absence from the House during the investigation, by saying that he read all the evidence with the utmost attention.
Lord Sheffieldsaid, that he should not have thought it worth his while to notice the allusions in which he was included, if he had not been desirous of appearing to noble lords, for whom he bad great respect, to have had sufficient reason for occasional absence. He had been extremely ill since the adjournment of the House, and he came up on the 3rd of October, at the hazard of his life, to attend his duty in that House; but when he did not attend, it was at the urgent solicitation of his medical advisers. He was credibly informed, however, that he had lost nothing by not attending the debates, but that he was saved some mortification by not being a witness to certain; concessions and submissions—that he I always understood their lordships should I be guided by the written evidence, and no other—that it should be recollected the I written evidence alone guided the decisions of the Court of Chancery, and also I Doctors' Commons; and he presumed to say, he was as well acquainted with the evidence as any of their lordships; but he particularly protested against the suggestion, that it was unfair to her majesty's cause to decide on the written evidence, and insisted that it was infinitely more favourable to the Queen, because that evidence did not record many prevarications, evasions, change of countenance, faintings, and other symptoms that might have made a very unfavourable impression.
The Earl of Carnarvonsaid, it had never occurred to him, that those who did not hear the whole of the evidence for and against the bill, could be competent to give a vote in a case of this description. This was certainly a matter in the discretion of their lordships, and he was far from saying, that it was wrong that it should thus be left to their discretion. With respect to the protest before them, he could have wished certain unguarded expressions to have been omitted; at the same time, considering the painful situation in which her majesty was placed, he thought the greatest latitude of indulgence ought to be allowed. Wishing to do justice, according to the principles of British jurisprudence, had he been on the secret committee, he thought he could hardly have trusted himself to come there as an impartial judge. After what had taken place, had he been counsel for the Queen, he thought he should have advised no further appeal to their lordships in any future stage of these proceedings. Of all the calamities which had grown out of this great national calamity, he considered the declarations made in that House, that day, were not the least. Those declarations, which went to assert a right to condemn the Queen without hearing the whole of the evidence, appeared to him calculated to induce their lordships to trample on the vital principles of justice. He had thought it a vital principle of justice that no accused person should be condemned but on oral testimony. Those who felt exempted from the observance of this principle, seemed to him to act in violation of the most sacred principles of British justice. He then commented on the conduct of certain noble lords in this respect, and contended, that when proxies were excluded from voting, it was intended to preclude those from giving a vote on this bill, who had not heard the whole of the evidence, as the vote of the proxy would be good, but it was objected that the party had not had the advantage of witnessing the proceedings. Again, in reference to the protest, he would contend that they could not relax the strict rule too much with respect to any representation which this unfortunate lady might be disposed to make.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, he had heard of no disinclination—he felt no disinclination himself—to receive, in some form or other, the matters contained in the
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paper of her majesty. As, however, it contained matter reflecting on the conduct of noble lords in that House, and yet ought to be received, the proper course would be to adopt some mode of expressing their opinion, with regard to the circumstances under which it was received. He had nothing to say respecting his own absence, having never been absent; but a great deal must necessarily be left to the discretion of noble lords themselves, as to whether they would vote or not. In cases of impeachment, proxies could not be admitted; but he knew of many cases of impeachment, in which noble lords had voted without hearing the whole of the evidence. With respect to the observations upon the votes of such noble lords as had sat on the secret committee, although he was one of those who sat upon that committee, he could not, looking back to what had been done in all former cases, refuse to act in the discharge of his duty and the exercise of his right as a peer, to vote upon the bill.—His lordship then moved a resolution, declaring, "That the House, notwithstanding the exception which it might take to some points of the matter contained in the paper, did, nevertheless, under all the circumstances, consent to receive the same as a representation of what her majesty wished to state further in her defence in the present stage of the bill."
The Earl of Lauderdalesuggested, that the word "justly" should be inserted in the resolution, immediately after the word "might."
Earl Greysaid, that the House had already done mischief for which there was no remedy; and, though their lordships might still compel his attendance, he would not utter a single word during the remainder of the proceedings. The suggestion of his noble friend appeared to him to be unnecessary. The only exception which the House had a right to take, referred to that part of the protest in which allusion had been made to the conduct of noble lords in that House. But if it was meant to be insinuated, that the other exceptions made by her majesty were not just, from that conclusion he must dissent, thinking, as he did, that they were most just. It was true that some noble lords had reconciled it to their consciences to pronounce a verdict of guilty, without hearing the whole of the evidence. Of that he did not com-

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plain; if they thought it reconcilable with their own honour to do so, it was not for him to find fault; they must answer it to God, and their own consciences. He could not, however, but remark upon it as a little extraordinary, that, when it was declared improper for a peer to vote by proxy in that proceeding, noble lords should come forward as their own proxies as it were, and vote without having heard the defence.
Lord Redesdalesaid, he could conceive nothing more mischievous than suffering it to be understood, that, because a peer had been a member of a secret committee, he should therefore be disqualified from his vote. With respect to the statement in the paper which referred to the members of the secret committee, it was an imputation not only absolutely false, but scandalous.
The resolution, as amended, was then agreed to. On the motion, that the House should resolve itself into a committee on the bill,
The Earl of Darnleysaid, he never could believe that, ultimately, the House would pass a measure which was unnecessary, which was defective with reference to the mode of proceeding, and which was not established by that incontrovertible evidence, on which alone it ought to stand. He could not avoid congratulating their lordships on the division that took place yesterday. Let their lordships look at that division, and ask themselves whether it was possible that a large proportion of those noble lords who voted for the bill could have come to the consideration of this subject with perfectly unbiassed minds? It could not be forgotten that a large proportion of that majority was composed of the accusers themselves—a large proportion of it was constituted of individuals who had recently received favours from the Crown.
The House having gone into the committee,
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that in the usual proceedings of the House, the course adopted in committees was, in the first instance, to postpone the preamble. In the present case, however, the proceeding should be on the truth or falsehood of the preamble. That was the question now. The early part of the preamble he considered to be completely proved. With respect to that part of the clause in which her majesty was stated to have obtained for Bergami
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titles of honour, he meant to move that those words be struck out, not that any of their lordships could have the least doubt as to the fact, but because no direct testimony had been produced upon that part of the case. He next proposed to substitute the words "various places and countries," instead of the various places and countries which her royal highness visited. The words, as they now stood, implied that the charges had been proved in all the places and countries which she had visited, which he was perfectly ready to admit had not been the case.
Lord Ellenboroughobjected to the words "and in other respects."
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the allegation was most material, and he begged to call the attention of the House to that part of the evidence by which it was borne out [Here the noble earl referred to various parts of the evidence which supported the allegation.]
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, he understood the words "and in other respects" to mean offensive and indecent familiarities towards other persons besides Bergami. The instances stated by the noble earl were all instances in which Bergami was present.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, his idea was, that the words did not imply familiarities towards other individuals, but that they expressed offensive and indecent familiarities where Bergami was not alone with her. He had, however, no objection to leave out the words.
After a short conversation, it was agreed, that the said words should be left out.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, that although the evidence at the bar proved her majesty guilty of adultery, yet, thinking that the bill ought not to pass, he submitted, that the person who was to remain Queen of this country ought not to be declared by their lordships guilty of "adulterous intercourse." To retain such an allegagation would be to degrade the king and the queen.
The Earl of Harrowbyasked, if the fact was proved, how it was possible not to state it in the preamble? This was the feeling of every man who voted for the second reading; and many who had voted against the second reading had stated that they believed the adultery.
Lord Calthorpeobjected to the clause on the broad ground of expediency.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the

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question was now, whether the allegations I in the preamble had been made good? Those noble lords who thought the case of adultery made good, ought to vote for those words.
Lord Erskinesaid, that the words ought to be left out; first, because they were not proved by the evidence, and, also because the paper laid by her majesty on the table confirmed the opinion of her innocence. In the course of his professional life he had heard protestations of innocence from the mouths of persons whom he believed to be guilty; but, feeling an opinion that she was innocent from the evidence, that declaration by her majesty confirmed his opinion on the evidence. As the case was not proved by the evidence, the protestation of the accused must confirm the belief of her innocence. But his reason for opposing the words was, that they were most degrading to the king. How was it possible to degrade the Queen, and not to divorce her? Was it not the first object, in every case of adultery, to be relieved from the party whose infidelity should be proved? He was of opinion that no adultery had been proved, and he thought the first moment of striking out the charge ought to be taken.
Lord Gagesaid, that, it being not a case of adultery, the word "suspicious" was the proper term.
The original words were agreed to. The Divorce Clause having been read, The Archbishop of York rose to oppose it. On the principle of impartial justice, he thought it could not be allowed to remain in the bill. In the Bible he found no mention of such a thing as religious expediency to justify such a proceeding. Marriage was not merely a civil contract, but a solemn ordinance of religion, and upon this question, he could look only to the word of God as the guide of his conduct. He could not, therefore, consent to have this clause retained. If, however, this clause was expunged, and the other enactments of the bill agreed to, their lordships would exhibit to the world the monstrous spectacle of a degraded Queen still continuing the spouse of the sovereign. From this dilemma he saw no way of escape but by rejecting the bill altogether. In voting against the second reading yesterday, he had this very difficulty in contemplation. On the 'evidence itself he had no hesitation in making up his mind; and, though as a legislator, he would say Not Content to the bill; if
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called upon as a Judge, to deliver his sentiments, he must say, Guilty. In his view of the case it would be much better had the bill been never introduced. It was lamentable to reflect how deeply the interests of religion and morality must have been injured by the introduction into every family, of such odious and disgusting details. The interests of morality and religion must be still more vitally injured by persevering in a measure which was derogatory to the honour of the Crown, and injurious to the best interests of the empire; which gave the utmost pain to every good man, and tended most effectually to forward the views of a party whose object was to vilify the constituted authorities, and to bring into disgrace all that was most sacred and venerable in the laws and constitution of the country.
The Bishop of Chestersaid, that having no doubt that the crime of adultery bad been proved against her majesty, he voted yesterday for the second reading of the bill. This vote, however, he gave on, an understanding that the divorce clause was to be laid aside.
The Archbishop of Canterburysaid, that if the question was, whether divorces a vinculo matrimonii, were consistent with the word of God, he felt bound to answer, that they were expressly declared to be lawful by our Saviour himself. They were certainly not authorized by the Canons and Institutions of the Established Church, nor by the common law of the land. And why? Because marriage lay at the very foundation of civil society, and, therefore, it had been the anxious wish of all countries to protect it from dissolution. Yet instances of divorce had occurred in this country, not only subsequently to the Reformation, but antecedently to that period; and in the Mosaic law there was also mention made of divorce. Our Saviour had said, that "he who putteth away his wife for any other cause than adultery, causeth her to commit adultery." Did not this obviously infer that divorces were allowable? He considered the charge of adultery established against her majesty, and, under that conviction, he had no objection of any description, least of all of a religious nature, to the bill proceeding in its present form.
The Bishop of Worcesteropposed the divorce clause. He could not vote for it, unless the Queen were allowed the same

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advantages and the same means of defence I as other persons were entitled to.
The Bishop of Landaffthought that to retain the clause would, on the whole, be most advisable. According to the law of the country, ho knew no other cause of divorce than adultery, and no other punishment for adultery than divorce; and, as to the Christian law, it certainly provided that dissolution of marriage might take place in any case of adultery.
The Bishop of Londonsaid, that in the present case a great constitutional question was involved, and in a constitutional point of view it must be regarded. It was a maxim of the constitution of this country, that the king could do no wrong. It was said by an able writer, that the king could not be guilty of a folly, much less a crime. This principle, if carried to the full length, would seem to remove all ground for recrimination, all inquiry into the conduct of his majesty in his conjugal relations. He did not, however, mean to argue it on such a principle. He saw no reason why the clause of divorce should not remain. There were many instances of bills of divorce having passed that House, though the conduct of the husband was notoriously reprehensible. The essential point was, the proof of adultery, which he considered to be established, and therefore, in a moral, constitutional, and religious point of view, he felt it his duty to support the clause.
The Earl of Lauderdalesaid, that in wishing to exclude the divorce clause, he contended for no other proposition than this,—that the parties had not come before them in a situation that admitted of its application. Her majesty had acquired, by her marriage contract, rights both public and private. She had been found disqualified for exercising her public rights, and, therefore, she was by this bill to be deprived of them. But, was this any ground for the House going farther? Was there to be one law for the King, and another for the subject? No. He agreed with the learned doctor (Lushington), who had spoken admirably and eloquently for the defence, that the law of marriage was the same with regard to the highest as to the lowest subject in the realm. If he was rightly informed, adultery in the ecclesiastical court was considered as a peccatum, and not as a crime, and was therefore punished on a different principle. In his opinion, therefore, there ought to be no difference in
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the case of the sovereign and that of a private individual. He had originally some doubts upon the subject. One ground for a divorce appeared to him to be, that if the situation of the Queen were destroyed as femme sole, her situation ought to be destroyed as femme couverte. From this difficulty, however, his mind had been relieved on further examination. The rev. prelate who spoke last, seemed to think that, in ordinary cases, if the fact of adultery were proved, they proceeded to grant a divorce without further ceremony. But that House took especial care in all cases of divorce, that the husband should be liable to examination with respect to his conduct, in order that it might be ascertained whether or not that conduct had been such as to effect his claim. He thought the bill, with the divorce clause in it, highly absurd and inconsistent. It would certainly be injurious to the public morals to allow a person guilty of such conduct as had been proved against her majesty, to remain as Queen, to be looked up to as at the head of society in the country. But, was he, by passing the divorce clause, to declare, that the king might conduct himself as he pleased, without having the same check on his conduct as a subject? This would, in his opinion, be as injurious to the public morals as to abstain from degrading her majesty. For himself, he was perfectly astonished to hear any right rev. prelate maintain, that the ground for such a clause might be laid in the holy writings: that was directly in the face of all he had ever read or learned with respect to them.
The Earl of Darnleyalso expressed his astonishment that the right rev. metropolitan, should lay the ground for the divorce clause in the Scriptures. He had never seen any thing of the kind in the Holy Scriptures: he recollected a text which said, "he that putteth away his wife, saving for fornication, causeth her to commit adultery." Now, in this case, had not the husband put away his wife? If he had, and it was not for fornication, had he or had he not caused her to commit adultery? It appeared to him that they could not pass the bill with the divorce clause, nor without it. Not with, for the reasons he had already stated; not without, for how could the Queen be degraded without being divorced? Could the wife of the King be other than Queen? Could any of their lordships wives lose

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their titles without being divorced from their husbands? Queen she must be, unless divorced. Sooner or later, he trusted, they should get rid of this detestable measure. It could in no case do good, and the only question was, what was the quantum of evil which their lordships would allow it to do?
The Earl of Donoughmoresaid, that the case was not to be considered as one in which common parties were concerned. The King was not a suitor to the House; he only appeared as the head of the state, and not in his personal character. The case could not, therefore, be decided by the rules applicable to private individuals. Their lordships had already determined that the conduct of the Queen had been such as to render her unfit to remain a sovereign. They owed it to the country, to the King, to themselves—they especially owed it to the women of the country, to pass this clause. There were few of their lordships who had not declared their opinion, that the act of adultery had been proved. Many of those who had voted against the bill, thought it right to state their conviction of the guilt of the illustrious person in question. The evidence had proved her to be unfit to sit as Queen Consort of these realms. They had understood on high authority, that his majesty himself had no feeling on the subject. It was not for any purpose of a personal nature that this bill ought to be passed. God forbid that the House should pass it on such a ground. But in what a light would their lordships appear, if, after agreeing to the early part of the preamble, they should omit the two concluding lines, lest it should be supposed they were courting the royal favour! He was fully convinced, that the clause ought to be retained in the bill.
The Earl of Harrowbysaid, that the measure was founded on state policy; but the introduction of the divorce clause appeared to him to give it the air of a measure of personal relief. Since that time he found that a great impression to that effect had been made in other quarters. Consider-able difference of opinion prevailed among the right rev. prelates, who had devoted themselves to the consideration of the subject, and he understood that the disinclination to agree to this clause was not confined to those who had stated to the House their individual sentiments. It would by no means be necessary, if the divorce clause were omitted, that the re-
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lation between their majesties should be left in its present state. A clause providing for a more limited species of separation might be substituted In considering this subject, their lordships ought to advert to the letter sent by the King to the Queen twenty years ago, and which amounted to a complete separation. Under that circumstance, and without the slightest reference to what had passed in the interval, he considered that his majesty was not entitled to the relief which the: divorce clause would give. He did not believe that such a clause could be justified by the law of God:—by the law and practice of that House he was perfectly satisfied that it would not be justified. He objected to their lordships doing in the present, what they would not do in any similar case. He objected to any proceeding which might make it be supposed that they were actuated, not so much by motives of state policy as by a wish to grant personal relief.
Earl Fitzwilliamsaid, that he had the strongest objections to the clause under consideration, and thought it was impossible that the House could proceed to separate a man and wife from the marriage state, neither of whom sought for such separation.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the House would do him the justice to recollect, that on the 19th of August, he had particularly urged this proceeding, on the grounds of public justice, and had then stated, that he knew much misrepresentation had elsewhere prevailed on the subject of the remedy required by one of the parties. It was said to be sought for as a measure of personal relief for the prince I on the throne. On that ground, he did distinctly disclaim the measure, and had said, that so far from that being the ground on which he proposed the bill, he was ready, if any religious feeling prevailed upon the divorce part of the measure, to relinquish that part of the relief altogether. He had always said, that: though a divorce might be the effect of the bill in one respect, yet that it was not its principle; that the bill was in fact a I public measure, and not one of private relief. And he had even gone further, and said, that there might be cases of a young king and a young wife, in which was involved the integrity of the succession, when the House would not be warranted to pronounce a divorce, if the parties had previously been in a state of

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separation, unless the public necessity were striking and imperious. It was said, that in this case the House could not degrade the Queen without following the degradation up by a clause of divorce; and that if the latter were not adopted, the measure would be a bill of degradation against the King. Their lordships would however see, that there were many causes which would justify the degradation of a Queen, in which a divorce would be totally out of the question. Suppose, for instance, a Queen were to commit felony—would any man say, that that was not sufficient ground of degradation? But could it be argued, that it was a sufficient ground for a divorce? He had not the presumption to discuss a religious question; but he fully agreed in one opinion with those who thought that for adultery alone was divorce inflicted by the divine law. Recrimination had been well said to be no part of the law of God, but had been wisely decreed the laws of man, for the purpose of controlling and punishing human passion. How recrimination was attainable in this case he was not prepared to say. With respect to the high station of the parties, it had the disadvantage of exposing one of them to the effect of widely circulated calumnies, which he could not, consistently with the dignity of his station, publicly refute. And with respect to these calumnies he must say, without meaning to bear hard upon the Queen, that it was highly improper for those who could not know the whole of what might have occurred between the parties, to pronounce in a harsh and calumnious manner upon one side of the question between them. On the subject of the present clause, he must repeat, that as no inconsiderable religious part of the community objected to the divorce in this case, he was not disposed to press it. It was a fact that the illustrious parties had lived in a state of separation for 24 years; and that that State had been sanctioned by the late; king, and afterwards confirmed by act of parliament. He had not certainly the same doubts which others had upon the propriety of enacting the divorce clause, after what had occurred; but he thought that where there was a strong religious; feeling in the country upon the particular clause, it should not be pressed, and particularly where no great state necessity called for its adoption. He was at the same time aware, that if the House agreed to strike out the divorce clause, it would still be
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necessary to introduce a clause confirming and arranging the separation, so that the King should suffer no future inconvenience from the contract which subsisted.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, he could never bring himself to agree with Black-stone, that marriage was merely a civil contract. In truth, it could not be a civil contract, for it was the parent not the child of civil society—"principiumurbis et fundamentum reipublicæ;." It had been said, "those whom God hath joined, let no man put asunder." But this doctrine was fully explained in many parts of the New Testament. During the period of the Reformation, when men's minds were much afloat on the subject of religion, he took the Marriage law to be settled thus—that marriage was a civil contract. But unless the ecclesiastical law formed no part of the law of the land, it was a religious contract also. It was a civil contract as far as civil rights were concerned, and it was equally a religious right in religious matters. The ecclesiastical courts can know nothing of a divorce è vinculo matrimonii; but parliament had been in the habit of granting relief, in particular cases, by dissolving the bond. It was not until 1795 that it was required that the proceedings in the ecclesiastical court should be produced, with the petition of the party claiming a divorce bill. These were required to show that the party seeking relief was entitled to it. On the subject of recrimination, he had been unable to find any passage in scripture which stated that a woman who was an adulteress should be deemed otherwise because her husband had committed the same crime. The House required always, that the part suing should come with clean hands; and if a husband neglected his own obligations to his wife, it had decided that he should not be permitted to complain that his wife had forgotten hers. This was not all: the House would not allow a woman' to obtain a divorce but under very special circumstances. Almost the on case on record was that of Mrs. Addison, where the House granted the bill, because the husband had committed incestuous adultery with the sister of his wife. A noble earl had objected, that the House could not interpose by way of divorce without some instigation on the part of his majesty, and another noble earl had alluded to supposed difficulties

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to arise from tendering the bill for the royal assent; but, in any form of proceeding, the assent of the Crown could not he dispensed with. The learned lord next adverted to the expediency of the measure. He conceived that, from the decision of yesterday, the preamble was substantially proved; as no man who was not fully convinced of her majesty's guilt could have supported the second reading of the bill; indeed, many noble lords had opposed the bill solely on the ground of; expediency, being at the same lime convinced of her majesty's guilt. But for himself, he could not see how their lordships could stop, after having gone so far in pronouncing her majesty guilty, in that stage of the bill. To degrade her; majesty without divorcing her, would be to draw the bonds of connexion between her and the King closer. One of her majesty's rights or exemptions was, that she was considered a femme sole; that she could hold property in her own name; that she could sue and be sued as a single woman. But if she was degraded from her rank, her rights, privileges and exemptions, then she would become, as wives in ordinary cases, solely dependent on her husband. If the House did not think that this clause should stand part of the bill, would it not be proper to make the separation effectual, which at present depended on a civil contract, supported, as that separation had been, by the consent and approbation of his late majesty. He would declare, in conclusion, that no man had ever been guilty of more cruelty and injustice than he had been in acting upon the evidence in divorce causes, if the testimony now upon the table was not sufficient to support the clause under consideration. His own opinion he would reserve to a future period, but he should feel dissatisfied if he heard nothing more than the contents and not-contents of those who supported or opposed the clause. He trusted, there-tore, that the discussion would not close that night.
Lord Duncantook the opportunity of asserting, that the whole proceeding against the Queen obviously arose out of abase and foul conspiracy, supported by perjuredwitnesses. For one, he could fearlessly lay his hand upon his heart, and give a verdict of "not guilty."
The further debate upon the clause was adjourned till to-morrow.