Sitting of 4 November 1820

Preamble
The Earl of Liverpoolcontinued—
I proceed, my lords, with the explanation of the motives which have influenced my mind in coming to the determination which I have formed on this important question. In the first place, however, I beg leave to call your lordships' attention to what I stated to be my view of the case, as far as I had considered it, at the end of the observations which I had yesterday the honour to address to the House. I conceived, on the view which I then took of the evidence, that two propositions were clearly established. First, that beyond all doubt, if we can ever draw any conclusion from circumstantial evidence, the criminal intention of the parties was unequivocally manifested, during the time that Bergami was still a courier. Whether that evidence amounted to a proof of the completion of the act of adultery, I will not now affirm. If your lordships believe the testimony of Majoochi and Demont, there is certainly evidence of the completion of that act; but as, from the nature of their testimony, it is in many respects not only not corroborated, but is incapable of corroboration, I will not dwell upon it as to this point. But, laying that aside, I contend that on the incontrovertible and admitted testimony of other witnesses, the fact has been undeniably proved of the criminal intention of the parties, while Bergami was yet a courier. My lords, I went a step further; and I stated this second proposition as likewise fully established, namely, that looking to the whole period, up to the period of the embarkation of the princess on board the polacre, in April 1816, there was such a

1591
mass of evidence as amounted in my mind to a moral conviction that the act of adultery had been committed. Indeed, I am fully persuaded, that in the ecclesiastical courts decisions have been founded on evidence much less strong than that before your lordships as to what occurred previous to her majesty's arrival at Augusta. But whether that be so or not, I maintain that, taking all the facts which I yesterday detailed to your lordships into consideration, there is complete circumstantial evidence, sufficient to satisfy the mind of every unbiassed man, and to produce a moral conviction that the act of adultery had been committed by the parties in question, before their arrival at Augusta.
I now, therefore, take up the case at that period of time. But, before I notice that which will be the first main object of my observations this day,—I mean the affair at Catania, I wish to say a few words as to what took place on board the Clorinde. I do not state this as very material; but still I desire your lordships attention to the conduct of captain Pechell, in refusing to receive Bergami at his table, and to the kind of impression which that refusal appears to have made on her majesty. My lords, it seemed to me that there was considerable weight in the observation that if her majesty felt no consciousness of guilt, if she felt no sense of the degrading connexion which she was supposed to have formed, it is most extraordinary that, instead of hesitating, as she did, whether or not to comply with the request made to her by captain Pechell, she did not harbour a strong feeling of indignation at captain Pecheil's behaviour, and make a remonstrance, as it was perfectly competent to her to do, to his majesty's government at home, against the conduct of a British naval officer, who had refused to receive at his table her majesty's chamberlain. But there is another view of the subject which ought not to be overlooked. This refusal of captain Pecheil's must be considered still more important as affording a hint to her royal highness with respect to her future conduct. Was it possible, my lords, even if all had been innocent, pure, and unobjectionable in her royal highness's familiarity with Bergami, that this circumstance must not have brought to her mind the fact, that by-standers, and those respectable persons too, had some feelings of suspicion on the subject?
1592
I ask your lordships, whether, even as I have said, if the connexion between her royal highness and Bergami had been innocent, pure, and unobjectionable, this occurrence did not call on the princess, on every principle of duty, of delicacy, and of propriety, to conduct herself thenceforward to Bergami in such a manner, that no scandal should arise, either to herself or to the country?—Undoubtedly, this circumstance would have had a powerful operation on her royal highness's mind, if she had not been hurried along by a guilty passion.
I am now come to the case of Catania. In the first instance, I wish to direct your lordships' attention to the evidence on which that case is supported. I know it has been said, that it stands on the evidence of Demont only. But, if we look at the persons who composed the whole suite of her majesty at that time, we shall find, that there were only three individuals who could possibly know any thing of transactions such as these; namely, the countess Oldi, Demont, and her half-sister Mariette Bron. Of these persons, Demont has been produced, and your lordships must take her evidence for what it appears to you to be worth. The two others have not been produced; and I maintain, that this is a circumstance which ought never to be put out of your lordships' minds in judging of the merits of this case. If we can believe Demont, she has proved the act of adultery in many instances;—at Naples, at Genoa, at the house of general Pino. The answer, however, to this is, that Demont's testimony is so damaged, that it cannot be received to its full extent. Be it so for the present. I am ready, for argument's sake, not to dispute it. But in the case at Catania, Demont might have been easily contradicted. I recur to what I yesterday stated that I thought of Demont's and of Majoochi's testimony. I then stated, that when Demont's testimony was corroborated, as it was in many cases, by the testimony of Hownam and others, or when it was capable of being easily contradicted, and yet was not contradicted, I was decidedly of opinion, that it ought not to be rejected. Now, my lords, what was the case at Catania? The story told by Demont is particularly natural, and not likely to be invented. It is this:—that Bergami's bedroom having been in the first instance on the other side of the court-yard, he, in

1593
consequence of indisposition, was brought over to the side of the house in which the princess slept, and lodged in a room which had been previously that of the countess Oldi, the countess being put into the room of the princess, with whom also slept the little Victorine; that on the succeeding night, Demont, who slept between the two rooms, heard the cries of the little Victorine, calling mamma, and the countess Oldi endeavouring to pacify her; and that in the morning, she saw the princess pass through her room from the room of Bergami, with the pillows on which she used to sleep, under her arm.—My lords, if that is to be believed, it affords the most complete and conclusive presumption of adultery. Demont says, that she is not certain if her half-sister, Mariette Bron, was in the room with her, but that she rather believes she was. That uncertainty may be some ground, however unsatisfactory, for not calling Mariette Bron. But there can be no ground for not calling the countess Oldi. She was present on the occasion. She is now in London. She is held to be forthcoming. She is here, ready to contradict Demont's statement, if it is untrue; and, as she has not been called to contradict it, your lordships have no reason whatever to disbelieve that statement. I say, therefore, my lords, that the countess Oldi, who might have been called to contradict Demont's evidence, not having been called, the fact of adultery at Catania must in all fairness be considered as proved.
My lords; I now come to the tent at Aum, and to what I know is considered by many persons as the most material part of the whole case,—I mean what took place on board the polacre; and certainly it is so in some respects, because it is a part of the case in which it is distinctly admitted, that on the main facts there can be no doubt. As my noble and learned friend, and my noble friend on the cross-bench have observed, it is extraordinary that neither Carlino, nor Camera, nor Sacchini, nor countess Oldi, nor Mariette, who might have been called by the counsel for her majesty to speak to this part of the case, have been examined; but, putting these suspicious omissions out of the question, I will state the facts as they now appear in the Minutes of evidence.—Before, however, I state these circumstances, I wish to advert to one occurrence which took place
1594
on the voyage outwards, and which, although not perhaps of any very great importance, is nevertheless not altogether undeserving of attention. It has been proved at your lordships' bar, that after the vessel left Tunis, Bergami's bed was brought from another cabin into the dining-room. The only observation that I will make on this circumstance is, that it appears very singular that, whenever any accommodation is to be made, it is always for Bergami. One would have thought it more natural, if the princess wished to have any person to sleep in the dining-room, which was next to her cabin, that she would have chosen one of the naval officers, who, from his professional knowledge and experience, would have been enabled to satisfy her curiosity as to the state of the wind and weather, the course of the ship, and such other things as her royal highness is said to have been anxious about. It would certainly have been much more natural that such a person should have been selected for the purpose than a mere landsman. On this, however, as on every similar occasion, Bergami, and Bergami only, was selected to be near her royal highness. Having stated this fact, I leave it to your lordships to attach whatever importance to it you may think it deserves.
We now come, my lords, to the question of the tent, or awning, or whatever you may please to call it, on the deck of the polacre, and of the tent on land, at Aum, and at some other places. Under the tent or awning on the deck of the polacre, and under the tent at Aum, and: at some other places, a sofa and a bed were placed; and I assume as a fact, which has been clearly proved beyond the possibility I of doubt, that at Aum, and at one or two other places on land, her majesty passed the time of rest alone in an inner tent with Bergami; and that on board the polacre she slept alone under the awning or tent with Bergami, generally, during the whole of the voyage home. There may have been some nights of exception, Whether there were or not is of no consequence whatever to the main argument. I also assert that her majesty did this without the slightest pretence of necessity. I am led to that conclusion on the grounds which I am going to state to your lordships, I am perfectly ready to make every allowance for the inconveniences to which persons are exposed on board of ship, and for all the circumstances of dif-

1595
ficulty and annoyance to which they are occasionally subjected; but, still I contend it has been incontrovertibly proved, that her majesty and Bergami slept for above thirty nights (generally) under the tent on the deck of the polacre; and that without the slightest necessity or pretence of necessity.
In the first place, it has been assumed that there was no mystery in this arrangement. Even if it were so, I confess I do not see how that would make any difference in the conclusion to be drawn from it. But, my lords, I cannot agree that there was no mystery in it. If your lordships attended to what passed at your lordships' bar, I think you will say with me, that there has been a great deal of mystery, and a very unpleasant feeling on the part of her majesty's counsel on this particular point, through the whole of the proceedings. Her majesty's attorney-general, in the able and comprehensive speech in which he opened her majesty's defence, never mentioned the circumstance of the tent on board the polacre, although he must have been aware that it formed a most material part of the accusation against her majesty, and that it was evident, from the nature of the questions put by your lordships in the examination of witnesses, you considered it to be perhaps the most essential point. Mr. Williams half mentioned the circumstance. He never admitted it completely; but he undoubtedly reasoned upon it, as if it were true. I state this to prove that the counsel for the defence nave no right to take this as a part of the case that was fully and fairly admitted. On the summing up of the evidence for her majesty, I at first thought that Mr. Denman admitted the fact; but in the continuation of that learned gentleman's speech on the next day, he appeared to me to throw some doubts upon it. The only advocate for her majesty who fairly grappled with the circumstance, and" endeavoured to explain and justify it, was Dr. Lushington.
But is there no attempt at mystery on the part of the witnesses called for the Queen on this subject?—Lieut. Flinn tells us that at Augusta, when her majesty went on board, he had the direction of the ship, and made all the necessary arrangements with respect to the cabins for the accommodation of her majesty and all her suite. But, when Flinn is questioned as to this point of the tent, he tells
1596
us that he does not know where Bergami slept. At one moment, the vessel is so small, that he had full cognizance of every thing that passed; at the next moment, it would seem so large, that he did not know some of the most material things which occurred on board. When pressed on his cross-examination, he says he "believes Bergami did not sleep under the tent." Now, my lords, I put it to your lordships if it is probable that a person so circumstanced as Flinn avowedly was, being above thirty days on board that ship, having the responsibility for every thing, and knowing where everybody else slept, could be ignorant where Bergami slept? How, then, can it be asserted that there has been no attempt to make a mystery of this transaction?—In some degree the evidence of Hownam was also calculated to throw a doubt on the circumstance.
I say that the fact of Bergami's sleeping in the tent on board the polacre was, in a degree, extorted from him. It did not come out naturally, and freely, and clearly; and I can scarcely believe but that Hownam must have a much greater knowledge, and a much firmer conviction with respect to that particular fact, than he has thought proper to admit. For the reluctance which he betrayed on the occasion I know not how to account, if he believed the intercourse between her majesty and Bergami to have been innocent in its character.
Thus much, my lords, I have thought it right to say on the question of mystery. For one, I do not attach any very great importance to it, although I think it not wholly undeserving of attention. I return to the consideration of the question of danger or necessity; and I repeat that there was not the remotest danger or necessity which could lead Bergami and her royal highness to pass any one night, and much less a number of nights, together, under the tent on the deck of the polacre. My lords, I put this question to you. I do not ask what a woman of virtue and modesty would have done under the circumstances of the case. I ask what a woman who wished to keep up the appearance of virtue and modesty would have done? What were those circumstances? It was during the hot months; and at a time when the season was fine, and the weather generally calm; and her royal highness was naturally desirous to sleep on deck; partly on ac-

1597
count of the heat, and partly to avoid the stench and other inconveniences below. It must be recollected, that this polacre was not a passage boat, filled with a number of strangers, all under the control of the captain; and that for a few hours, or even for a long voyage. It was a vessel which had been hired by her royal highness expressly for her own use and that of her suite; and in which every arrangement was of course made for her accommodation. To compare the inconveniences of such a vessel with the inconveniences of a packet-boat from Harwich to Helvoetsluys, or even with the inconveniences of an East Indiaman on her homeward voyage, is wholly out of the question. Well, my lords, in this vessel, and under those circumstances, her royal highness chose to sleep on deck. I again ask, what would have been done by any woman, not of virtue or modesty, but who wished to maintain the appearance of virtue and modesty? Her royal highness had on board with her, her lady in waiting, and her two maids. What prevented her royal highness from having the former to sleep with her under the tent; or at least on alternate nights with one of her maids? What was there to prevent Hownam, or Flinn, from having his cot on deck, for her royal highness's protection? In fact, Flinn told us that he did sling his cot on deck, and that he did sleep there generally on the voyage homeward. If on any nights, why not on all? Why was not an arrangement made between Hownam and Flinn, both seamen, that one or other should sleep on deck every night for her royal highness's protection? My lords, I will go further. If there was no harm in any man's sleeping in the other bed under the tent with her royal highness, why did not either Hownam or Flinn sleep in that bed? I do not say that this should have been done. In point of delicacy, it would certainly have been most improper. But if, as it has been contended, there was no harm in any man's sleeping in the second bed under the tent, it would surely have been more advisable and natural that Hownam or Flinn should sleep there than Bergami. It has been declared that it was absolutely necessary for her royal highness's protection that she should have some male attendant to assist her in the event of a squall coming on, or of the vessel's shipping a sea, or of any similar accident. But, as Hownam has stated in
1598
his evidence, a landsman could have been of little use under such circumstances. The only person competent to lend effectual aid would have been a seaman. Neither Hownam nor any person could have occupied a place in the tent without exciting the strongest suspicion. But why was Bergami selected for that duty? Of what use could Bergami have been to her majesty more than Demont, or Mariette, or any female? Indeed, the very circumstance of the height of Bergami, his size, and his being a landsman, render it probable that Bergami was the individual on board who could have afforded the least assistance to her royal highness, in the event of any accident. I say, then, my lords, it is impossible that the slightest shadow of a pretence of necessity can be; advanced for Bergami's sleeping under the tent, with her royal highness either at sea, or on land.
But it has been said that there was a hatchway which led into the tent from below, and that it was always open. My I lords, it is in evidence before you, that that hatchway was not always open. But, admitting for argument's sake, that it was always open, it does not appear that this I would be of any great importance. Mr. Hownam tells you that on several occasions he went into the dining-room, at ten or eleven o'clock, for the purpose of going on deck, not knowing that the tent was closed. It thus appears, that any one might have been in the dining-room, without knowing whether or not the tent was closed. Mr. Hownam states that he was sometimes so. He also states, that the bed in the dining-room was rolled up; and that he was not aware that any person slept in the dining-room on the voyage homeward. On one occasion Majoochi appears to have slept in the dining-room after the tent was closed; but, generally speaking, none of the people on board the polacre were to be found there at that time. It has been said, that her royal highness and Bergami were not undressed. It appears that they were not undressed when they went in and came out of the tent. It has been proved, that in eastern countries it is the custom for persons to sleep dressed; and, if it were not so, what obstacle could this circumstance afford to the commission of crime, to persons who were confined whole nights in the same room or same tent?—It has been also said, that the tent was a place very unlikely to be chosen

1599
for the commission of the crime imputed to her royal highness. Now, I ask your lordships whether you believe that, in fine weather and a calm sea, a tent such as has been described, closed all round, and fastened down to the deck with ringbolts, was not a place in which the crime of adultery might be perpetrated with as much facility as in any place which could be selected? I put the question to any man of common sense and moral feeling; to any man who knows what female decency or delicacy is, whether it be possible that any woman could pass—not one night by accident—but above thirty nights together, in a close tent, so constructed, with a man (that man not her husband), without producing a moral conviction on his mind, either that the crime of adultery had been then committed, or that that crime had been committed by the same parties so often before, that the desire to repeat the offence did not exist? My lords, I know not what excuse may be found in any deviation from the ordinary course of nature; but, morally speaking, it is impossible that two parties should be so situated, without producing a conviction on the mind of every unprejudiced man that an adulterous intercourse had been carried on.
These observations, my lords, apply equally to the tent on land. Indeed, they apply more strongly. There, there was no hatchway. There, it is true, there was an outer tent, in which two servants slept; but where was the necessity for Bergami's sleeping with her royal highness, in the tent within? For what purpose was that? On what pretence of affording protection could it take place? Her royal highness and Bergami were inclosed in the inner tent, while Carlino and Theodore slept in the outer tent. If Bergami was considered as so superior a protector, why did he not sleep in the outer tent, and why was not one of her royal highness's women ordered to attend her within? Is it possible that your lordships can consider what female delicacy is, and believe that any woman would so place herself without entertaining a criminal intention? What woman would allow herself to be so situated with a man, whom she had not admitted, or whom she did not mean to admit to the last intimacy? Is it in human nature? Are there not circumstances that must have occurred, which could not have been endured by any woman, not merely of
1600
virtue and delicacy, but who was not gross in the extreme, unless there either had been, or was intended to be, the most intimate connexion between the parties? The case of Aum is likewise of importance, as it negatives the exclusiveness, if I may say so, of the case of the polacre. It cannot be said this never happened but at sea. It happened on shore as well as at sea. Some persons make a distinction between a tent and a room. For my own part, I can see none. I appeal to those who have spent their lives in camps, if there is any difference in this respect; and if there are any difficulties in the case of a tent, which do not exist in that of a room? I appeal to the common sense of mankind, if, when they find individuals of different sexes so inclosed, they can draw any inference from their being inclosed in one way, different from that which they would draw from their being inclosed in another? But at Aum it was said that the princess, having travelled all night, must of necessity repose in the day; and that she went into the tent tired and exhausted. Now that tells both ways. If ever there can be circumstances in which a woman of modesty and delicacy would be peculiarly anxious not to put herself in the power, or even be exposed to the perpetual presence, of a man, it is when she is in such a state of fatigue and exhaustion.
My lords; I have no difficulty whatever in stating, and I confidently rest on this part of the case, the facts of which cannot be contradicted, that the circumstance of her majesty's sleeping with Bergami for so many nights under the same tent on board the polacre at Aum, and at; other places, amounts, not merely to a I moral conviction, but to a distinct judicial proof of guilt. I do not believe that there is any court in the world which would hesitate for a single moment so to declare it. I say this, without reference to any of the preliminary circumstances; because I am perfectly ready to assert, that even if the statement were true which was maintained by the learned counsel at the bar,—even if her majesty and Bergami had come to the tent in the polacre without any taint or suspicion, yet, the circumstance of their having slept there, as I have described, would be quite enough to establish the crime of adultery. But, my lords, I entered yesterday into a history of all the previous circumstances. I then said, that I had established the ex-

1601
istence on the part of her majesty, not merely of a suspicious attachment, but of an infatuated passion for Bergami, before her arrival at Augusta. I now repeat: that declaration; and I call upon any man to lay his hand on his heart, and, looking on all that has passed, to say whether he does not believe it to have been unequivocally proved, that, before the occurrence of the polacre case, her majesty was vehemently in love with Bergami? I will not say, that this circumstance in itself implies criminality. But when we also find a disposition to create opportunities for being together in private manifested on every occasion, shown in all their acts, the greatest as well as the least (and there is often more to be deduced from the minor than from the great circumstances of a case), I can-Dot say that there remains in my mind the slightest doubt on the subject. If such is not to be the inference that we are to draw, then, my lords, the decisions in our law-books, the judgments in our Ecclesiastical Courts, and the sentences of divorce which your lordships have pronounced in this House, comprehend a code of the greatest cruelty, oppression, and injustice.
I now conclude my observations on what took place under the tent on board the polacre, and under the tent at Aum. I consider those two cases together as affording demonstration of the commission of the crime of adultery. Each, by itself, would, in my opinion, be quite sufficient for that purpose; but combined and coupled with the preliminary circumstances to which I have adverted, previous to her majesty's arrival at Augusta, they are irresistible.—Before, however, I entirely close my remarks on the vo3fagc to the East, I cannot help briefly referring to what took place at Syracuse. I yesterday alluded, to the celebration of Bergami's name-day at the Villa d'Este. We find the same incident occur at Syracuse. There, the feast of St. Bartholomew, the name-day of the chevalier, was again celebrated with every mark of pomp and rejoicing. The ship was illuminated, money was distributed among the crew, the company on board were feasted, and her royal highness walked up and down the deck, arm in arm with Bergami, the sailors shouting "Long live the princess," "Long live baron Pergami!" Now, really, my lords, I ask you whether you could have be-
1602
lieved this possible, if it had not been distinctly proved in evidence? Would it have been credited, unless distinctly proved, that the princess of Wales, the consort of the Prince-Regent of England, would thus have appeared with another man, in the relation of wife to husband, or that she would have celebrated, in the manner in which she did celebrate it, with every circumstance of pomp and splendor, the birth-day of an individual, who, not twelve months before, had been in her service as a courier, and had waited behind her chair, and the chairs of her guests? My lords, if this was not a state of degradation unparalleled in modern times, and unexampled in modern manners, I am ignorant of what, in the history of human nature, can be termed degradation.
I will not detain your lordships by any very detailed observations on what follows. I fairly own, that the cases to which I have already referred, are those on which I principally rely for the justification of the bill which your lordships are now called upon to read a second time. Still, however, I must be allowed to say a few words on the case of Carlsruhe; for though, in consequence of the peculiar and unfortunate circumstances which attend that case, it is not one I would select on which to rest my vote upon the great question before us; yet I wish to say a few words upon it, because I am convinced that, on a fair balance of evidence, your lordships will find, that even the case at Carlsruhe has been proved.—Your lordships all saw Barbara Kress at your bar. You heard her give her evidence. You had the opportunity of observing the manner in which she gave her evidence, and I am sure you will agree with me, that a more fair, natural, and ingenuous testimony, was never given by any witness in the world. There is one circumstance in Kress's testimony which I beg your lordships particularly to remark;—it is, that she told the story of what had occurred at the inn immediately after it happened. From this it is clear that her evidence in this place was not made up for the occasion. She was cross-examined at your lordships' bar as to the houses in which she had formerly lived, and she gave the whole history of her life in the most fair and artless manner. Your lordships also know, that a gentleman, an agent for her majesty, was dispatched, and very pro-

1603
perly dispatched, to Carlsruhe, after the close of the case for the bill. No doubt that gentleman, in the discharge of his duty, made every possible inquiry into Kress's conduct and character. But not a word was subsequently uttered by her majesty's counsel not the slightest attempt was made to impeach Barbara Kress's character. I have a right, therefore, to assume that her character is as unimpeachable as her testimony appeared to be pure, fair, and ingenuous. Now, my lords, what was the nature of the contradiction which it was endeavoured to set up to Kress's testimony? In the opening case for her majesty, it was said, that every moment of the time which her majesty passed at Carlsruhe, would be accounted for. For that purpose Vassali was called.—On his examination it appeared, that on the second night, which tallies with Kress's account, Bergami was taken ill at court, and was obliged to return to the inn, accompanied by his sister.—Vassali, with a view to refute the evidence of Kress, said, that when her majesty returned, he returned with her; that he was with her the whole of the evening; and therefore that she could not have been with Bergami, as Kress had deposed. My lords, the peculiar correctness of Vassali's memory on this particular subject is remarkable; he recollects every thing that took place at Carlsruhe, although he can scarcely recollect any thing that took place at Munich. I am willing to admit that there are some circumstances which make a much stronger impression on the mind than others; but I own that I do not see what there was in the visit to Carlsruhe to make a stronger impression on Vassali's mind, than in the visit to Munich; the first was only a visit to a duke, while the last was a visit to a king.—But, not to dwell on this point; not to consider whether it was probable that Vassali would remember so thoroughly in one place, what he had forgotten so easily in another; for I should be sorry unnecessarily to impute improper motives to any man;—I will undertake to say, that it is next to impossible, that her majesty, having dined and spent the whole day at court, should go home, without ever retiring to her room. I put it to the common sense and common feelings of your lordships, if such a thing is at all probable. If, however, your lordships believe that her majesty did retire, you have a confirmation of
1604
Kress's testimony; she being, let it be recollected, a witness wholly unimpeached; although every opportunity was afforded for impeaching her character, if it had been liable to impeachment. My lords, on a fair and impartial review of all these circumstances, I am prepared to declare my conviction, that any judge, charging a jury, would point out this particular case as one on which they ought to find a verdict of guilty. I really do not see, my lords, how the absence of the chamberlain of the grand duke of Baden can be considered at all material as affecting this part of the case. How the baron d'Ende can possess any knowledge of the truth or falsehood of the facts sworn to by Kress, I am quite at a loss to conjecture. But I am still ready to admit that the baron d'Ende's absence is deserving of some consideration. I sincerely regret it, and, adverting to that circumstance, and to the consideration that Kress's testimony, however unimpeached, is yet only the testimony of a single witness, I will not rest further upon this part of the case.
I now come to another case, which certainty deserves some notice—I mean the occurrence at Scharnitz. The case at Scharnitz, as it stands at present, is different from what it was, either according to the opening of the attorney-general in support of the bill, or according to the opening of her majesty's attorney-general in her majesty's defence. If that case had turned out to be as it was stated by the attorney-general in his opening in support of the bill, undoubtedly it would have established the presumption at least of adultery. If it had turned out to be as it was stated by the attorney-general for her majesty, in opening her majesty's defence;—if it had been proved, that while at Scharnitz all the attendants upon her majesty were in continual motion, and busily employed in packing up for the journey,—then, undoubtedly, the original allegation would have been very much, if not completely, shaken.—But what, my lords, are the circumstances of that case, as they appear in the Minutes of Evidence? It there appears, that on the arrival of her majesty and her suite at Scharnitz, some defect was discovered in their passports; and that Bergami and Vassali were sent back to Inspruck, to rectify it. There could have been no necessity for any packing up, either during their absence; or on their return;

1605
because the baggage was never unpacked. Nothing of consequence was taken from the carriages; which were left at the barrier, in readiness to proceed on the journey.—It appears, that on that night her majesty caused Demont to sleep on a bed which was placed on the floor in her majesty's room. In the course of the night Bergami (accompanied by Vassali) returned from Inspruck; in consequence of which, Demont was directed by her majesty to carry her bed into another, room. Bergami returned, according to Mr. Hownam's testimony, at about half-past one o'clock. By Vassali's account, it was not until between two and three o'clock. It appeared, however, that her majesty did not set forward on her journey until broad day-light, which was about seven o'clock in the morning.
In the first place, my lords, this observation naturally occurs. If her majesty required the protection of a man in her room, why was Demont selected on this occasion? Her majesty is stated by some of the witnesses to have been not undressed. There was Schiavini, Hieronimus, Hownam, William Austin, in the house; but, in the absence of Bergami, Demont, it seems, was considered a sufficient protector. When Bergami was not with her, she did not require the presence of any man. What is to be inferred, but that it was not the protection of a man which her majesty required, but the company of Bergami? My lords, I cannot look without strong suspicion on the circumstance that, when Bergami and Vassali returned from Inspruck, Demont, who was asleep, was ordered to get up, and to take her bed, and remove it into another apartment. It is undoubtedly true, that Vassali swears that after his and Bergami's return from Inspruck, they took no rest whatever. But it is certainly somewhat extraordinary, that men who had been travelling the whole of the previous day, and through the greater part of the night, and who had just returned from a hasty journey;—men, who had no business to keep them up; who had nothing whatever to do, for, as I have already observed, there was nothing to pack, and the only persons employed were the country-people, who were engaged to clear away the snow;—it is certainly somewhat extraordinary, that men so situated, should not have availed themselves of the opportunity of repose, simply because they had served in cam-
1606
paigns, and had led a military life!—I say, then, my lords, that the case at Scharnitz, though it does not establish the charge of adultery, affords, nevertheless, strong ground of suspicion.
The occurrences which are alleged to have happened at Trieste, resting on the evidence of a witness whose testimony has been in such a material point contradicted, must be considered as disproved.—I will now make a few observations on the indecencies and familiarities which, on the testimony of so many witnesses, appear to have taken place at the Barona, and at the Villa d'Este. In doing this, I will throw out of my consideration any evidence on which a fair doubt has been thrown, without inquiring too closely whether that doubt is well or ill-founded. No such evidence shall have any weight with me, in the vote which I am about to give. I have already said, that I discard the evidence of Cuchi, in support of the case at Trieste. I say the same with respect to the alleged occurrences on the journey from Rome to Sinigaglia. One word, my lords, on the nature of the contradiction which has been given to the testimony of Sacchi. Your lordships must have observed, that much stress has been laid on the circumstance of Sacchi's having changed his name—a circumstance of no great importance. It has been assumed also, that he was guilty of intentional falsehood and perjury in the reason which he assigned for having changed it. I really cannot discover this. I can discover nothing in this part of Sacchi's examination which might not easily have proceeded from a very natural hurry and confusion of ideas. He had no motive for misrepresentation on the subject; for he had freely admitted that he had changed his name several times. The assumption of another name on his journey from Paris was recommended to him on the ground of personal security; and, without having any intention to deceive, he might have easily confounded in his own mind other disturbances then existing in England with the occurrence which since took place at Dover. I agree that the evidence of Carlo Forti is completely at variance with that of Sacchi. Carlo Forti's evidence and Vassali's are likewise at variance with respect to the place at which he was hired. I do not mean, however, to say, that Carlo Forti's testimony can be fairly impeached by this latter circumstance; for it was very easy

1607
for Vassali to be mistaken as to whether Carlo Forti had been hired as a servant at Milan or at Rome. I am ready, however, to admit upon the whole, that as the evidence stands, such a degree of doubt has been thrown on Sacchi's testimony, that I ought to reject it from my consideration, both as it respects the alleged occurrences in the journey from Rome to Sinigaglia, and as it respects the other facts of the case.
My lords; I now wish to direct your lordships attention to what other witnesses have stated, with reference to the scenes of indecent familiarity which took place at the Barona, and at the Villa d'Este. And here I must maintain, that if her majesty laboured under any disadvantage with respect to her defence in the commencement of these proceedings, that disadvantage has been much more than compensated by the extraordinary advantages she has since received. Her majesty has, in fact, had an advantage, never before, I believe, enjoyed by an accused person. Having heard all the testimony that could be adduced against her, she was then allowed any interval of time which she might think it expedient to require, to collect her own evidence, and the other materials for her defence. When this delay was first allowed, heard the strongest opinions on the subject from professional men, who all protested that it must defeat the ends of justice, inasmuch as it would give the power and means of what is called manufacturing a case, against which no prosecution could possibly stand. It was, in truth, my lords, an immense advantage. How did it operate? It afforded her majesty's law advisers the opportunity of which they immediately availed themselves, of sending agents to Milan, and active agents they were no doubt, who very properly made it their business to inquire into the private life and character of all the witnesses who had been examined at your lordships bar in support of the bill; with a view of course, if possible, to contradict those witnesses, and to attach to them such circumstances of discredit as might induce your lordships to reject their testimony. In two instances, the evidence which these agents procured, either repelled or threw considerable doubt on the testimony that had been given. But your lordships must recollect that, notwithstanding all the opportunities afforded, and all the efforts made of this description, there are
1608
no fewer than seven witnesses, who all swear to circumstances of indecent familiarity, the character of not one of whom has been tainted or impeached by the evidence adduced on the part of the defence. Some attempt has indeed been made to diminish their credibility, by its being said that they never mentioned the circumstances respecting which they gave their evidence, until long after their occurrence. To four however of the seven, the question was never put whether they had ever before communicated the circumstances to which they then swore; and one of the other three distinctly declared in evidence, that he did tell what he had observed to the factor's son, immediately. That factor's son might have been produced at your lordships bar, to give his evidence in contradiction to the statement of that witness; but your lordships have seen nothing of him. Now, I ask your lordships whether you will lay out of your consideration the whole body of evidence resulting from seven unimpeached witnesses, who swear positively to strong and important facts? Would such a thing be done in any court of justice in the world? More especially, would it be done when every means had been afforded to the accused party, but in vain, of attacking the character and the credibility of those witnesses? Some of the facts stated by those witnesses are most material, and are highly deserving of your lordships notice. There is the evidence of Galli, and of Finetti. Both of those witnesses, and especially the former, deposed to many circumstances, which, if they were at all capable of contradiction, other persons might have been brought to contradict. Galli is not a common servant. He has been the principal waiter at the inn at Barlisina, near Milan, for five years. He does not swear to any occurrence which is rendered in itself improbable by the previous conduct of the parties. The occurrences which he relates are such as would naturally grow out of the manner in which it has been proved, that they behaved towards each other before that time. Some of the circumstances of improper familiarity which Galli describes, took place in the presence of eight or ten other persons; all of whom might have been called, but none of whom have been called, to contradict him? Will your lordships then, I again ask, consent to throw such a body of unimpeached evidence out of

1609
your consideration? I do not say that, if the whole case stood on the testimony of these persons, I should not feel some pain and uneasiness in bringing my mind to a decision on that testimony alone. But your lordships should recollect that all these witnesses swear to facts, which, previous circumstances that have been established at your lordships bar, render, not only not improbable, but in the highest degree probable; and therefore, although perhaps I should not feel myself warranted in resting on their evidence alone, neither do I Feel myself warranted in throwing that evidence altogether out of my consideration.
I proceed, my lords, to finish my observations on the only remaining circumstances of this important case to which I intend to solicit your lordships attention;—I mean the scenes which are represented as having taken place at the Barona, and at the Villa d'Este. It is with great pain and reluctance that I bring myself to remark on any private amusement in which her royal highness was pleased to indulge; but really for the princess of Wales, the wife of the Prince Regent of England, to be performing in a theatre, characters such as have been described, not before her equals in rank, but among her own servants, and before two hundred spectators, who were strangers to her, appears to me to be such an extreme degradation, that I am absolutely Astonished how her royal highness could ever consent to submit to it. It was not at the Villa d'Este alone that exhibitions of this nature took place. Similar scenes of impropriety occurred at the Barona. I am aware, my lords, that there is a great deal of contradictory evidence as to the character of the amusements at the Barona; but even on the testimony which has been produced in favour of her majesty, there is strong reason to believe that there existed considerable objection and disinclination on the part of the respectable inhabitants in the neighbourhood, and who were no doubt disposed to pay court to her majesty, to attend them. When Vassali is asked whether the wives of the prefect Tamasia and the baron Cavaletti were ever present at the balls at the Barona, he says, "Yes; but he thinks not their daughters." When he is further asked whether his own family were ever present at those balls, he replies in the negative, and endeavours to account for it by their not having been presented to her majesty.
1610
And here, my lords, I beg leave to make a few remarks on what has fallen from a noble earl opposite (Grosvenor) as to the exclusion of the wife of Bergami from her majesty's service. The noble earl says, that there is nothing extraordinary in this exclusion. My observations, I request the noble earl to recollect, have been directed not to the simple exclusion of Bergami's wife from her majesty's service, but to the inclusion (if I may be allowed the term) of all Bergami's family in her majesty's service, with the solitary exception of his wife. "But," says the noble earl, "it is a very common occurrence in hiring servants, to feel a reluctance in engaging both a man and his wife; and it frequently happens, that where the husband is hired, an objection is made to taking the wife, and that she is not hired." Certainly. Nothing can be more natural, or more usual. But what was the situation of Bergami, and his wife and family, with reference to her royal highness? Not only was Bergami's wife not admitted into her royal highness's service, although all the rest of his family, were admitted; but it appears from the evidence that she had never been even seen at the residence of the princess when her royal highness was there; that she never visited her husband at such a time: that she was never at any of the entertainments given by her royal highness; nay, that on one occasion, when she happened to be at the Barona on the sudden arrival of her royal highness, she was obliged to run out of the way as fast as she could. I say, my lords, that additional importance attaches to this cautious and constant exclusion of the wife of Bergami, when we recollect that all the rest of Bergami's family had been introduced into the princess's service in some capacity or other; one sister, in the high situation of a lady of honour; the other in the low situation of a maid; one brother as a chamberlain and equerry; the other, as a footman; and the nephew, as a stable boy. What fair comparison, therefore, my lords, can there be between this case and that alluded to by the noble earl, in which, when a husband and wife present themselves to be hired in your lordships families, it happens that the one is engaged, and not the other A wife may certainly not be taken into the same service as her husband; but even in any instance of that kind which has fallen under my observation, I have never found

1611
that it has been considered as objectionable, or as any sin, for the husband occasionally to receive a visit from his wife. But in no instance was Bergami's wife ever seen at the Barona when her royal highness was there.
Let me now recall your lordships attention to the various leading features of this great and important case. In the first place, my lords, you have it proved by evidence, that a great degree of familiarity between her majesty and Bergami, then a menial servant, began at Naples. You have it proved by evidence, that that familiarity continued, and was increased at Genoa, to an extraordinary height. You have it proved by evidence, that the relatives of Bergami were introduced in numbers into the service of her majesty. You have it proved by evidence, that not only were his male relatives brought into her majesty's household; but that his sister, the countess Oldi, was introduced in a manner so mysterious, as to excite the strongest suspicions with respect to the motives of that introduction. You have it proved by evidence, that Bergami, while still a courier, dined at her majesty's table, and in his courier's dress. You have it proved by evidence, that in course of a few months, he was created her majesty's equerry and chamberlain; that honours and favours were lavishly bestowed on him; that he was raised to the rank of a baron, and a knight of Malta; that subsequently the grand mastership of a newly instituted order was conferred upon him; and that an estate was purchased for him by her majesty, and called by his name. You have it proved by evidence, that on all occasions a constant system was pursued of creating opportunities for the commission of the act of adultery. What then, I ask, is the natural inference from all this, but that the crime of adultery has been committed? My lords, it has been said, "Why did not Demont prove more?" The reason is obvious. How could she? She has herself most satisfactorily accounted for her not having been able to prove more; for she swears that it was her majesty's usual practice, when she dismissed her attendants for the night, to follow them to the door, and to lock them out. This my lords, sufficiently accounts for more not having been proved.
My lords; when we take other circumstances into our consideration; when we look, for instance, at what took place at
1612
Syracuse on the celebration of Bergami's birth-day, can we entertain any doubt as to the nature of the connexion between her majesty and that individual? It has been justly observed by my noble and learned friend, and by my noble friend on the cross-bench, that this case is not to be altogether judged by a reference to the insulated facts which have been proved in evidence; but that a main and leading inference must also be drawn from the singular relation which appeared to exist between the parties; and which was incompatible with any other state of things than one of criminal intimacy? that mysterious relation, for instance, which is manifested in the expression, full of meaning, although it falls out simply and naturally, in Demont's letter to the Queen, where she desires to thank "her royal highness and the baron," for their kindness. Can your lordships hesitate for a moment to draw a moral conclusion from all these circumstances? But when we add the fact of her majesty's having reposed under the tent with this man for thirty, or twenty, or ten nights (for the number is immaterial) can any inference be drawn from that fact—are there any human means of accounting for it, unless by the violent passion entertained by her majesty for Bergami; a passion which sought to create every possible opportunity for its gratification? Those opportunities were created; and I maintain that the only inference, in law and in fact, is, that the crime was committed. On this view of the subject, my lords, I am perfectly ready to decide as if I were in a jury-box; and to declare that if ever there was a case of adulterous intercourse clearly and fully established by circumstantial evidence, it is the case before your lordships.
I now come to some other parts of the question, which, perhaps, belong more properly to another stage of the bill; but, as the noble earl opposite so immediately referred to them in his speech, I cannot pass them by without adverting to them. First, it is objected that this bill is a bill of pains and penalties. I allow that a bill of pains and penalties bears a bad name; one that carries something harsh and severe in the very sound of it. But let us look at the real nature End consequences of the bill. Is this bill in its effect more penal than the ordinary divorce bills which your lordships are constantly in the habit of passing?

1613
It may be said, that in those bills the accused party has certain advantages; of those I will speak hereafter; but I maintain that there is nothing in the present bill which will affect her majesty more than any private individual would be affected by the operation of an ordinary divorce bill. When the wife of any of your lordships, or of any of your lordships ancestors, has unfortunately been placed in such a situation, as to become the object of a bill of divorce, has she not been equally degraded in proportion; has she not been equally deprived of her rights, her prerogatives, and her privileges; has not her marriage been dissolved; has not the name which she has dishonoured and disgraced been taken from her, precisely on the same principle as that on which it is proposed by the present bill to degrade her majesty? If the guilt of her majesty appears to your lordships to be satisfactorily proved, I do not see any hardship, any cruelty, any thing unconstitutional, any thing contrary to the law and practice of parliament, in passing the bill before your lordships, any more than in passing an ordinary divorce bill. "Oh! but," it may be said, "in an ordinary divorce bill there is always the previous decision of an ecclesiastical court." To that I reply, in the first place, that the decision of an ecclesiastical court is not always thought necessary, for that the decision of an ecclesiastical court has not always preceded the passing of a divorce bill. Your lordships have passed divorce bills without the previous interference of an ecclesiastical court. I allow that it is a wise general rule to have the previous decision of an ecclesiastical court where it can be had; but I deny the absolute necessity of having it. The general principle is that when your lordships can obtain the previous decision of an ecclesiastical court, you require it; but there are cases—of which this is one—where that decision cannot be had; and then it is not considered essential. It may also be said, that in ordinary cases the accused party would have the right of recrimination; and that it is very hard that her majesty should be deprived of that right. But, my lords, I deny the existence of the right in the present instance. I deny that the operation of the bill is any hardship on her majesty in this respect. This, my lords, is not an ordinary case. The situation of her majesty is one which she voluntarily chose. The Queen of Eng-
1614
land is not a private individual, but a public character. As she has peculiar privileges and dignities, so she lies under peculiar responsibilities. In becoming the wife of the heir apparent, her majesty knew that a breach of her conjugal duties would subject her, except under the technical difficulties which the peculiar circumstances of this case present, to the punishment of death. When, under these circumstances, an endeavour is made to stigmatize a bill of pains and penalties, I have a right to say, that it is not more objectionable in its principle,—that it is not more severe in its operation,—than those bills which your lordships are in the habit of passing every day. In those bills, punishment is frequently visited upon injured individuals, who are not themselves the aggressors; but who have no opportunity of retaliation, and who are unable to resist the power by which they are oppressed; being upheld neither by the influence of high rank, nor by the support of popular opinion. I say then, my lords, that if you consider the alleged crime to have been satisfactorily proved, and I am sure you will give her majesty the benefit to which she is entitled, of any doubt that you may entertain on the subject, there is no hardship, there is no cruelty, there is no injustice, there is nothing unconstitutional, or contrary to the law and practice of parliament, in agreeing to the bill now before your lordships.
But a noble friend of mine, who spoke from the gallery, has argued on the question of the expediency or inexpediency of the measure. Of course, my lords, in what I am about to urge on that question, I address myself solely to those noble lords who think with me that her majesty's guilt has been satisfactorily proved. Every man who believes that her majesty is guiltless, or who is of opinion that her guilt has not been sufficiently established, is bound in conscience to vote against this bill. It is to those noble lords only, who think that her majesty's guilt has been satisfactorily proved, but who consider a bill of Pains and Penalties to be uncalled for and inexpedient, that I now address myself.—I ask them, while on the one hand they look at the inconvenience which they imagine would result from agreeing to the second reading of this bill, to look, on the other hand, at the inconvenience which would result from rejecting the bill. After the accused party has been heard at your

1615
lordships' bar; after the investigation has been so fully entered into; after issue has been joined as to the facts of the case; consider the evil of rejecting the bill, if your lordships believe her majesty guilty. What can be the operation of such a rejection, but a triumph of guilt; under circumstances the most fatal to all those moral considerations which your lordships are bound to respect. Let me entreat you, my lords, to reflect on this subject in all its bearings. Consider that the Queen of England cannot retire from your lordships' bar as a private individual would retire. An humble individual against whom a similar charge might be brought, and who might be acquitted, either by a technicality in form of law, or by a want of satisfactory evidence, would be amalgamated and melted down into the mass of general society. But can it be so with her majesty? If you consider her to be guilty of that which is laid to her charge, and yet refuse to pass this bill, she is then Queen of this country, while in the opinion of so many of your lordships her character is tainted with crimes of the most heinous and disgraceful description;—crimes, which nothing but the existence of certain technical difficulties prevent from amounting to high-treason. Good God! I remember a case that occurred some years ago of a criminal intercourse between a lady and her coachman, in which a very powerful sensation was produced on the public mind, not merely from the heinous-ness of the offence itself, but in consequence of the grossness considered as incidental to the relative condition of the parties. The lady was not only found guilty of adultery, but the crime was generally considered to be greatly aggravated, and the lady herself to be still more degraded, by having descended to an intercourse of that nature with her own servant. How much greater the difference of rank between her majesty and a courier! My lords, I do not wish to prejudice the cause of the Queen by this comparison; but, if your lordships believe her majesty guilty of the offence with which she is charged; if you believe that she has been guilty of a criminal intercourse with her courier; if you believe that the attachment which it has been proved existed on the part of her majesty towards that individual was indulged, until it ended in the perpetration of the crime of adultery;—then, my
1616
lords, I put it to your moral feeling, whether you can allow a person who has been proved guilty of conduct so gross and degrading, to remain here, enjoying all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the Queen of this country, instead of marking her crime with the reprobation and punishment for which it so loudly calls?
Admitting, my lords, that we are so situated, that we are in some measure compelled to make a choice between evils; I say, that in this case, as in most cases, the straight-forward course is the most expedient to pursue. There may be inconveniences, my lords, in going on with this bill; but, if you believe her majesty guilty, you are bound by every just and moral consideration not to stop here. I say, let the consequences be what they may, if you believe her majesty guilty, you are bound to agree to the second reading of this bill. A noble earl alluded to the clamour which has been raised on this subject out of doors, and to the public discontent and ferment which the adoption of the measure would create; and the counsel at your lordships' bar very justly adverted to the attempts made by seditious and disaffected men to take advantage of the popular feeling which has been excited, and to convert it into the means of effecting their own infamous purposes.—Undoubtedly, my lords, this is too true. Undoubtedly, in times like the present, every public misfortune, every supposed public grievance, is laid hold of with eagerness by those whose object it is to overthrow the constitution of the country. It would be most unjust to lay this at the door of her majesty, or to sudor her cause to sustain any prejudice in consequence of it. Would to! God, however, I could say that her majesty' has preserved herself free from all participation in the acts of those who evidently wish to avail themselves of the peculiar and unhappy circumstances of her situation, for the purpose of furthering their own criminal views! But, can we look at the answers which have been returned to the addresses presented to her majesty, and say that any woman, conscious of innocence, would ever have written, or authorised, or adopted such answers? Would not the true line for her majesty to adopt have been that which she actually did adopt in her answer to the first address which was presented to her? In that answer, her majesty expressed her consciousness of innocence,

1617
—declared her readiness to meet her accusers, but added, that she could not allow her cause to be mixed up with any political or party question. Unfortunately, her majesty has since admitted to her confidence persons who have given to her whole conduct the air of its arising I out of the audacity of guilt, rather than out of the consciousness of innocence. Far be it from me to say, that any prejudice should be excited against her majesty on that account, which might in the least interfere or weigh in the decision of the great question before your lordships; but, after what the noble earl dropped on; the subject of popular clamour, I would not allow this part of the subject to pass entirely without remark. The only observation which I wish to impress on your lordships is this: that if you believe her majesty guilty, and that if you believe your not proceeding with this bill will give a triumph to guilt, no base principle of fear ought to prevent the firm discharge of your duty.
The noble earl who last addressed your lordships, made a personal appeal to me, with regard to my right or intention of voting on this occasion. I beg leave to say a few words in answer to the noble earl. It is a question which, as your lordships may suppose, cannot have escaped me. I have carefully referred to the conduct, on bills and measures of a kind similar to the present, of those who have formerly had the honour to fill the high offices of the state; and I find that it has never been considered consistent with the public duty of a peer, although holding a high official situation, to abstain from exercising his undoubted right of expressing his opinion, and giving his vote in this House, on a question like this now before your lordships. My lords, has it ever occurred in the case of an impeachment, to which the government of the day has been a party, that the members of that government have abstained from giving their opinions and votes in parliament? There is a recent instance in point. I remember in the case of impeachment of the father of my noble friend near me (lord Melville), some of the ministers of that day were managers of that impeachment; the Attorney and Solicitor-general of that day assisted in the management of that impeachment; yet none of the peers who were ministers, thought themselves thereby precluded
1618
from exercising their right of voting in parliament. Substantially, I say, that the present easels the same; and on a question of such high public importance, I will not divest myself of my right as a peer, not only to assert my opinions, but by my vote to sanction the opinions which I feel it my duty to maintain. I trust my motives will not be mistaken;—and I rely on the opinion of your lordships, and of the country, to do justice to those motives.—My lords, we have all a most important duty to perform. I hope that in the decision of this great question, not a single vote will be given either from fear, from influence, from affection, or from faction. I trust that every noble peer will pronounce his judgment from the bottom of his heart; and that he will be actuated by no other consideration than the impression made upon his mind by the evidence which has been heard at your lordships' bar. I believe the world will do justice to your lordships decision, whatever that decision may be. I have the highest confidence, and I am sure that the country has the highest confidence, in the wisdom and integrity of this House. Like all other tribunals, you now stand before that highest of all human tribunals, public opinion. By your acts you will be judged. I am persuaded that if you give an honest vote on this occasion, whatever that vote may be, the public will ultimately do justice to your motives, and will feel that your decision has been the result of your honest conviction.
My lords, some allusion has been made by the noble earl to the presence of the learned judges during this solemn investigation. I do not exactly know what the noble earl meant by that allusion; but, without adverting further to it, I will say that it has afforded me great satisfaction that this important trial has taken place in the presence of the judges of the land. I was most anxious that, even after the close of the judicial part of our proceedings, the debates on them should take place in their presence. It gives me satisfaction that they have thus taken place; because I feel that the presence of those eminent and learned individuals would have been a check upon me, if I could, by possibility, have been capable of advancing any doctrines, which I believe are not strictly consonant to the principles of law and justice. My lords, I am content to be judged by those learned persons; I am content to be judged by the

1619
profession of which they are the heads; I am content to be judged by your lordships; I am content to be judged by the public at large, as to the whole of my conduct in the course of these proceedings. I appeal to Him who alone knows the secrets of all hearts, and who can alone unravel all the mysteries and intricacies of this great case, if the judgment which I have given is not true—if it is not at least founded on a sense of integrity, and on a most sincere wish to do justice in mercy;—not with any disposition to visit the illustrious individual accused with a harsher measure of punishment than necessity requires-; but with an anxious desire—a desire which I am sure is entertained by all your lordships—to do justice, in this most important cause, between the Crown, the Queen, and the Country.
Lord Ardensaid, that he wished from his heart that the bill could be withdrawn, and that some other way might be devised, in order to take the sense of the House on the question of the guilt or innocence of the Queen. As a peer of parliament, he felt it to be a duty which he owed to his king, to oppose the second reading of this bill. Its rejection would relieve his majesty from a certain degree of odium, and ministers from a heavy weight of responsibility.
Viscount Falmouthsaid, it was with great unwillingness he troubled their lordships, because, unpractised as he was in that House, he was very sensible how little he was entitled to their attention. But, if he felt oppressed by this consideration earlier in the debate, how much more so must he now feel, after the brilliant display of eloquence which he had since heard, and which, he could assure the House, would have awed him into silence, if he were not sensible that he had a paramount duty to discharge? He wished he could think, that the only question to be decided by the second reading of the bill, was that of the guilt or innocence of the royal accused, because his duty would then be a more clear, though a most painful one. But there were other considerations which pressed themselves most seriously upon his mind, and impelled him, before the bill should be read a second time, to say, that after giving it all the consideration in his power, he felt a most decided objection to the divorce clause which it contained. He knew he might be told, that if he were clear as to the guilt of the Queen, it would
1620
be competent to him, to move to expunge that clause in the committee; but he desired to state his objection now, because he had reason to know, that very serious difficulties existed in the minds of learned and experienced persons against passing other penal parts of this bill without the divorce; and he was anxious not to be misunderstood, if those difficulties should appear in the committee to be insuperable, if the bill should consequently be pressed in its present shape, and if he should then feel compelled to vote against it. He would trouble the House very shortly with the grounds of his objection; he could not be ignorant that he was to look upon the offence of the Queen, if guilty, as an offence against the state; but when he was remembering to award punishment for the guilt of the Queen, he could not forget that she was also a married woman. The noble earl at the head of the Treasury had indeed reminded the House, that if it had come within an act which would have made it treason, the punishment would have been far more severe; but as, from whatever circumstances, it did not come within the compass of that act, there was, in fact, no special punishment for it in existence, he was therefore surely right when he said, that the station and dignity of Queen did not divest her of those rights, which were possessed by the lowest married woman. Few, indeed, were those rights, comparatively; but he could not persuade himself, under any circumstances, to treat them lightly. He must therefore look to the circumstances of this case; circumstances, which it was far from his intention to dwell upon, which he should not have thus distantly alluded to, but to make known the grounds of his opinion, and which he should willingly fly from, as from a subject pregnant with public mischief. Under those circumstances, however, he could not hesitate to declare, that he did not think tin's a proper case for divorce. He confessed it would have been more agreeable to him, with this view of it, to have heard from those best informed in that House, how far they thought the difficulty he had? mentioned, that of passing the penal clauses without the divorce, could be got over, and whether, if it could not, it was intended to press the bill, as it then stood. In saying this, he knew he spoke the sentiments of many other noble lords; but he was only anxious that his own conduct in the discharge of a most important

1621
duty should appear clear, unequivocal, and consistent. He could not support the bill, if the divorce clause was essential to it; and it was only in the hope it might be dispensed with, that he could vote for the second reading.
The Earl of Harrowbysaid, that if the noble lord had an objection to the second reading of the bill, in case insuperable difficulties appeared to passing it without the clause of divorce—he too felt himself precisely in the same situation. He was I one of those who concurred in introducing the bill; yet he was ready to declare, without at that moment entering into the reasons on which he formed his opinion, that if the question should be put, whether the divorce clause should be retained, he would certainly vote against it.
The Earl of Lauderdalesaid, that in the committee he should desire to be heard against the divorce clause, thinking that, on every principle, it was improper.
Lord Ellenboroughobserved, that as one of those who had concurred with the secret committee in recommending a solemn inquiry—as one who had agreed that it would be best carried on in a legislative form, and that the mode of proceeding actually adopted was the most convenient—as one, also, who had supported the bill on its first reading, but who now thought it highly inexpedient and detrimental to the public interests that it should proceed any further, he felt a natural desire to state briefly the grounds of his present opinion. The learned lord on the woolsack had truly said, that no noble lord ought to vote for the second reading of the bill, who did not think that the Queen was guilty; but they would allow him to add, that it was not necessary for at those who might vote against the second reading of the bill, to think that her majesty was innocent. The same learned lord had said to that House, "Be just and fear not;"—he would allow him to add, "be politic as well as just." The noble earl at the head of the Treasury, seemed to think that their lordships had already decided on the principle of the measure, and that they had now only to vote, whether the Queen was guilty or not guilty;—that it was due to the Queen and the country to express that opinion. It had been also said, that this bill of Pains and Penalties might undergo certain modifications. Now, he would in the first place say, that he considered the solemn inquiry which had taken place, had most
1622
properly taken place, and had taken place in a manner the most convenient to the parties. Their lordships had now arrived at that point, where it became their painful duty to take some measure with respect to the conduct of her majesty, as that conduct appeared in evidence before them. But they were bound to adopt the measure most suitable to justice and to the maintenance of the public morals—to the preservation of the national character and of the public peace. When he voted for the first reading of the bill, he certainly expected that the guilt of her majesty would have been proved in a manner the most clear—the most unsuspected and irresistible—in a manner so decided that it would have been perfectly impossible for any plain or reasonable man to refuse to give his vote on the question of her guilt. He did think, too, that when disclosures were made, they would necessarily create a material change in the public opinion; so much so, that the House in voting for this bill of Pains and Penalties, would have been in fact called upon by the nation to do so—and would have gratified the feelings of the people. Taking the particular view of the case that he now took, he would freely express the opinion he entertained of her majesty's conduct. He could not declare her majesty innocent—he was unwilling to pronounce her guilty. He did not think that the fact of her guilt had been clearly proved by evidence at their bar. He would not enter into the details of that evidence, but this he would say, that it appeared to him that several most material allegations had been entirely disproved—that other material allegations were not satisfactorily proved; and he confessed he was very unwilling to vote for so very important a measure, supplied, as it was, by evidence, a great part Of which was of a very suspicious kind. Notwithstanding what had been said as to public feeling, he was quite ready to confess, that, on a great principle, he would be unwilling to vote for a measure, against which there existed a very strong and universal opinion. He deeply lamented the existence of that opinion—he could not approve of it—he thought it was founded on delusion of the grossest nature—and if the public should still continue to entertain an opinion of the innocence of the Queen, he would consider it the most disgraceful triumph that falsehood ever obtained over truth that the world ever witnessed. He could

1623
not, however, vote for the bill. He always considered the question as one of public morals and of national character—he always considered that the great object of their lordships was to make an impression on the public mind—to put a mark on infamy and guilt; but the consequence of passing the bill, in the present temper of the times, would be to make it a measure of violence—it was a measure unsuited to the place and situation of the Queen, as it was opposed to the feelings of the country; the measure, therefore, would only create a re-action—instead of instructing the people, instead of creating an impression favourable to public morals, it would create a feeling quite the reverse. It was impossible for him to vote for the bill in the present state of the public mind—it was, he thought, impossible for the House to proceed any further on it with effect.
But whilst he said that, he thought their lordships would desert the duty which they owed to the country, if they allowed the conduct of the Queen, such as it appeared in evidence before them, to pass, without the expression of their strongest censure. The situation of a Queen of England was a responsible situation—she was a great functionary of the state—the country required from her no abilities—she had not the power to advise or to act on public affairs—but she was expected, and ought to be a model and example of female conduct. All that the country required of her was, that her conduct should be correct and pure. Was such the conduct of her majesty? No man of any heart, who had heard the evidence at their lordships' bar—no man who had known, seen, and heard, what every man in the world must have known, seen, and heard, respecting her conduct—no such man would say that the Queen of England was not the last woman in the country whom a man of honour would wish his wife to resemble, or the father of a family would recommend as an example to his daughters. No man could put his hand on his heart, and say that the Queen was not wholly unfit to hold the situation which she holds. When they considered her offence, they must decide that she was unworthy of her rank. There was, he thought, a mode of proceeding against her which would produce the desired effect, without having recourse to a bill of Pains and Penalties. They might address the Crown on the improper conduct
1624
of the Queen—a mode of proceeding that would be consistent with the justice and expediency of the case. But a bill of Pains and Penalties would, in his opinion, produce a re-action in the public mind; but, by an address to the throne, the House might state their sense of her conduct, as it appeared to them by the fair, clear, and undisputed evidence of her own witnesses. The natural inference and conclusion to be drawn from that testimony, appeared to him to be this—that the Queen acted in a manner derogatory to her high station, inconsistent with the purity and delicacy of female virtue, so much so as to cast suspicions on her honour and her character which would prove indelible. Practically, what would be the consequence of presenting an address to the throne? Their lordships would, in the first place, get rid of the measure before them, and they would do enough to satisfy the public morals. Their lordships would recollect that, constitutionally, there was a mode to restrain the exercise of public functions where there was not a wish to destroy them. They might, in the present case, limit the allowance of the Queen, and they would thereby reduce her to a private station, from a station which she was utterly unfit to hold. He agreed with a noble earl on the cross-bench, that the great pride of this country had ever been the virtue of its women. It was a subject of national pride—a superiority which England could boast of over every other nation in the world. What was the love of country but the love of home? If there were no home—no domestic confidence, founded on virtue and cherished in affection—few would be the charms of life, and feeble the links, that could bind a man to his friends or his country. It was necessary not to allow the conduct of the Queen, disgraceful as it was, and injurious to the national character as it had been, to pass uncensured. The bare fact of her raising a menial to high rank, and sleeping by his side for five weeks, was a circumstance calculated to create suspicion, and rendered inquiry necessary. Other English princesses had had their frailties and their favourites; they had been attached to a Mortimer, an Essex, and a Leicester. But how great was the difference between men distinguished for rank, for education, for ability, for accomplishments, for public services, compared to the base object of the Queen's passion.

1625
"Lust, through certain strainers well refined, Is gentle love and charms all womankind."
But where were the strainers here? What was the object of her affection? What was he? A fellow-servant, the counterpart of Majoochi and Sacchi. He could not view the conduct of her majesty with any other feeling but that of unutterable disgust; and he hoped their lordships would not allow it to pass without expressing their strongest feelings upon it. It was not prejudice that induced him to think that a foul communication between a Queen and such a favourite was infamous, unnatural, and disgusting. The opinion was founded on sound reason and sound feeling; it was for the protection of families—it was for the safety of domestic virtue, of female pride and honour, that such conduct should be marked as infamous, ignominious, and base.
Their lordships would now allow him to say a word or two on the particular measure before them. They were told that the Queen had a right to a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty. If she were innocent, she certainly had a fair claim to demand a verdict in her favour; if she were guilty, the country had a right to expect that the House would pronounce her so. Though, from the fair inference that was to be drawn from the evidence their lordships had heard, there could be little doubt of her majesty's guilt, yet he could not decide on the expediency of the measure before them. If, indeed, the charges against her majesty were founded on clear and irresistible evidence—on evidence such as had been before the secret committee—then it would have been expedient to pass the bill. Such evidence he expected; he expected, from the bag that had been laid on the table, evidence the most clear and irresistible. But what was the evidence before them? Was it such as they ought to found a legislative measure on? He thought not. It had been said, that the preamble, as well as the enacting clauses, might undergo certain modifications; he did not see what modifications they could undergo. Could they divide the prerogatives of the Queen into unities of privilege? Then, as to the preamble; the preamble, as it stood, was necessary to support the superstructure of the bill; if they took away part of the preamble, what would remain would not be enough to support both the clause of degradation
1626
and of divorce. To him it appeared impossible for them to pass the bill unconnected with the clause of divorce. Their lordships would allow him to say a word as to the inexpediency of passing the bill. Hitherto the conduct of that House had been viewed with suspicion. But, in this instance, they had reclaimed and sustained that high character which was justly due to them. He trusted that there was not a man who had heard the evidence given at their bar, and seen the manner in which this trial had been conducted, who would, if his life and honour were at stake, desire a more just and impartial tribunal than the House of Lords. Their lordships had proceeded with calmness and dignity; the course they had taken had not been objected to by petitions; and the public had waited for their decision with the greatest tranquillity and confidence, being assured that their lordships would deliver a sincere and well-founded opinion. But, although he admitted that there were occasions on which it was highly necessary, for the general advantage, that parliament should act contrary to what appeared to be the public opinion—although he thought the great use of parliament, and particularly of the House of Lords, was to correct public opinion, under peculiar circumstances, instead of being swayed by it—although he conceived they were not, on all occasions, to follow rather than to direct the public mind—still, granting this, he was of opinion that nothing was of so much importance to give strength and firmness to the state, as that general coincidence of feeling between parliament and the country which imparted real health and vigour to the constitution. How long, he asked, was this painful subject to be kept before the public? How long was the public business to be neglected? How long were the functions of government to be suspended? How long were the basest passions of the worst of men to be allowed their fairest onset against all that was good and estimable in society? If ministers demanded a justification for bringing this subject before the country, he would give it to them—not from favour, but from a sense of justice. He thought they were justified in acting as they had done, after considering the evidence that was laid before them. But, while he was ready to give them that justification, he would not give it in a manner which, if not absolutely fatal,

1627
would be most dangerous to the country. He knew of no mode in which it was possible to express the guilt or innocence of the Queen—he knew of no mode in which it was possible to express their opinion of the conduct of ministers, so inconvenient and so unsatisfactory as by pressing the second reading of this bill. Was there any noble lord who really believed that this bill would ever become a law? He did not think there was. And, if that were the case, in what situation were their lordships placed? They were asked, on moral conviction, and on judicial conviction, to proceed to the second reading of this, bill, hostile as it was to the feeling of the country, severe in its operation, and scarcely justifiable under any circumstances—a measure not calculated to effect its ostensible object; but merely to express an opinion, contrary to that of the people, and which might as well be expressed by an address to the throne.
He had thus endeavoured shortly to explain, the reasons which induced him, notwithstanding the votes he gave when the subject was first brought before the House, to object to proceeding any further with this measure. He felt more apprehension than he could express when he contemplated the circumstances that might arise if this bill were pressed any further. Anxious as he was for the honour of that House—feeling as he did that its power was essentially necessary for preserving the balance of the. constitution—considering the peculiar nature of this measure, which imperatively called on them to act in the spirit of justice and sound policy—mindful also of the circumstances that might flow from its enactment—looking to all these points, and being strongly actuated by them, he would undoubtedly give his vote against the second reading of this bill. But he trusted the House would not separate without a very strong expression of their lordships' feeling and opinion on the subject of the. Queen's conduct, founded on the untouched part of the evidence—on that: portion of it which was not suspected, and which no man could deny. This, he firmly believed, was the safest course; and the course, also, which was best for the interest, of public morals, as well as the most consistent with public opinion.
Lord Ashburtonsaid, that after all that had occurred—after all the evidence and. argument that he had heard—there was
1628
not a syllable urged in defence of the bill, which satisfied his mind of its justice or expediency. Be the evidence what it might, still he was convinced that there were reasons which should induce their lordships not to pass the bill. This was an ex post facto bill and that alone, he humbly conceived, was of itself sufficient to cause it to be thrown out. There were four instances in the history of this country of the enactment of ex post facto laws, and they were uniformly condemned That of the earl of Strafford, that of the earl of Clarendon, that of Dr. Atterbury and that of sir J. Fenwick. These cases were all held to be had precedents; and he was astonished, considering the peculiar features of the present case, that they should have been followed. How stood the case? The persons who composed his majesty's administration, with a full knowledge of the facts alleged against the Queen, entered into a negociation with her, offering her 50,000 l. a year, on condition, of her remaining abroad. Now, this being the case, it seemed to him that, though this bill, technically speaking, professed to deprive her majesty of her privileges and immunities on account of a series of misconduct, yet it did in fact, go to deprive her of those privileges and immunities, because she had exercised her undoubted right of coming to Great Britain. The bill, in his opinion, was contrary to the known and recognised principles of the British constitution; because those who were to decide on it exercised a variety of discordant and anomalous functions. Their lordships had lived in very troublesome times, when many examples had been set of a dangerous nature, they ought, therefore, to act with caution, and to take care that they did not add another example dangerous to the constitution. By passing this bill, it might also be observed, as it at present stood (and he could only speak of it in that point of view), they would do a great deal of injury to an illustrious personage (the duke of York), whom he did not then; see in his place. If the bill were passed, that illustrious personage, and several other illustrious personages would he thrown further back from the succession, and deprived of rights which were as sacred as those of his majesty. The principle of divorce he could never sanction; it was a proceeding which in every way deserved the public censure. Their lordships would recollect that Napoleon

1629
had, through his influence over the pope, procured a divorce from his lawful married wife. And would George the fourth, the legal, undoubted, constitutional, limited monarch of England, follow the example of that ambitious and unprincipled despot.
Lord Erskineaddressed their lordships from the ministerial side of the House, and said:—My lords, it is not my intention now to resume the detailed examination of the whole evidence, which I was proceeding to do when I was prevented on Thursday by a sudden indisposition [See p. 1469.] The speech of my noble friend opposite (earl Grey) which, in disregard of every risk to my health, brought me down to the House yesterday to hear it, has rendered such a course unnecessary—it would only unsettle your minds from a conviction which cannot but be impressed on them, by the admirable perspicuity with which all the facts were laid before you, and by the eloquence with which they were enforced. The speech which you have just heard from the noble earl behind me (Liverpool) I am ready to say, was the best answer which could be given to it, but to which perhaps it would be a sufficient reply, to desire you only to recall (what must so easily be brought back to your recollections), the arguments to which I have alluded. A methodical detail of the whole proofs would therefore be superfluous; and I now offer myself to your lordships rather as a kind of authority from long professional habits, than as a debater upon the evidence; omitting, however, none of the supposed facts which have been insisted on as established; submitting to you, at the same time, the principles of law, by which their truth or falsehood ought to be examined, or the consequences, if taken to be true.
The noble earl behind me has made a strong and powerful appeal to your lordships, with all the natural and justifiable warmth of a responsible accuser—a course much more likely to command attention than the more dispassionate language of a judge, in which character only I wish to speak. I shall try to suppose myself, for the present, to be one of the judges of a court of law, after the evidence before us had been given in an action of adultery and summed up by the chief justice delivering a contrary opinion from that which it is my purpose to deliver—I think I should probably begin my address to them thus;—I am under no small em-
1630
barrassment, gentlemen of the jury, in stating my opinion on the case before you, after having seen your box opened, and the plaintiff in the cause admitted to assist you in the verdict you are to pronounce; but on this I wish to be silent, as it is a matter to which we must now submit, and which is expected to be a valuable improvement of the constitution. All things arrive, but by degrees, at perfection, and the prejudices of our ancestors regarding the trial by jury, and the securities provided by them for its independence, are likely to be superseded by this grand discovery of the present times. Passing that therefore, by altogether, the question to be decided by you is this, namely, whether the defendant, upon the evidence before you, has been proved to have been guilty of an adulterous intercourse with Bartolomco Bergami, a foreigner introduced from a subordinate military station, and advanced to a high rank in her service. It is charged, that this adultery continued during several years, and throughout the whole of her residence abroad in various countries; whilst she, oh her part, alleges, that the whole is the result of a wicked conspiracy to defame and ruin her by false testimony, collected at a vast expense, by subornation, supported by the power and influence of several foreign governments, whilst she was ah utter stranger to all those machinations against her.
Her majesty has to lament that she has been shut out from giving general evidence of this foul combination, the judges having decided, that such general evidence, when not brought home to the plaintiff or his agents, could amount, in the language of the chief justice, to "suspicion only," and that suspicion was not a legitimate ground for the verdict of a jury. I bow to that decision, which, however makes it necessary for me to remind you, that, for the same reason which thus excludes important testimony in favour of the accused, "suspicion alone" ought not to be a sufficient warrant for your verdict against the Queen; but in the language I have just cited to you "legal proof only." And whether that exists or not is the question you have now to decide. The cause will therefore rest entirely upon, the credit which ought to be given to the witnesses. If they swear the truth, there is amply sufficient, and more than sufficient, for conviction; but that very circumstance will require the greater

1631
attention in the examination of its truth, A great number of minute circumstances are detailed in the proofs, and a greater number of inferences are drawn from them than I ever remember in all my practice in the courts The elevation of this Bergami, her kindness to his family, the condescension of her manners, her gaiety, though remote from any imputation of guilt, are all brought together, to eke out the case when facts are deficient; a course that began, and, I thought, had ended, in the analogous proceedings against lord Strafford, where treason was to be made out, not by any breach of the statute, but by many assumed offences of of a lower description pieced together, on which Mr. Hume, the historian, makes the following remark:—"As this species of treason discovered by the Commons, is entirely new and unknown to the laws, so is the species, of proof by which they pretend to fix that guilt upon the pri-soner. They have invented a kind of accumulative or constructive evidence, by which many actions, either totally innocent in themselves, or criminal in a much inferior degree, shall, when united, amount to treason, and subject the person to the highest penalties inflicted by the law. A hasty and unguarded word, a rash and passionate action, as-sisted by the malevolent fancy of the accuser, and tortured by doubtful con-structions, is transmuted into the deep-est guilt; and the lives and fortunes of "the whole nation, no longer protected by justice, are subjected to arbitrary will and pleasure." This course seems to be pursued here, which ought to inspire great distrust and caution in the examination of the proofs. No description can certainly be more accurate than this, of the course which has been here pursued. Many circumstances altogether remote from criminality, or from reasonable presumption of criminal purpose, have been collected together, in a manner quite unprecedented in actions of adultery to excite unwarrantable suspicions, raising them by unfounded inferences to be legal presumptions of guilt, the total inefficacy of which I shall consider hereafter. The witnesses, besides, were examined by commissioners beyond the seas, some of them even sworn to their depositions, the contents of which have, however, never been made known to the defendant, which the meanest subject is entitled to by law, that perjury may be detected by the exa-
1632
mination of the proofs; and although general evidence of conspiracy and subornation have been excluded, yet the defendant has laid before you the most positive evidence of the foulest practices to corrupt the sources of justice.
My lords, although I shall continue to speak on the results of the evidence, yet I find I cannot go on with a suppositious case, nor continue to address you as a jury, nor can I, amidst such disgusting instances of fraud and perjury, preserve the calmness of a judge in a court of law; I must speak, therefore, at once to the case as a member of this House. It appears by the evidence of Omati, that he was taken to an avowed agent of the bill, charged with the whole management of this proceeding, who promised him employment in the police, and thereby obtained confidential papers of her majesty with which he had been entrusted; and what puts in the shade the basest and most infamous attempt at subornation ever heard of in the records of our courts of justice, the witness, Giarolini, who was a creditor of the Queen to the amount of 45,000 livres, for which he was naturally anxious for payment, was told by an acknowledged agent, that there were gentlemen at Milan, meaning no others than the commissioners Browne and Vimercati, and that this agent would see him paid his money if he had any thing to say against the Queen—This corrupt agent was no other than Restelli, whose infamy formerly provoked me to an intemperate expression, which my learned friend on the woolsack, with equal justice and kindness, suggested to me was then premature. But is it premature now? and is there any language now of abhorrence that must not fall short of the just indignation which a judge is bound on such occasion to express? This same Restelli, nevertheless, denied all corruption whatsoever; but, after this positive proof against him, and when, by order of the court, he was detained for further examination, he was dispatched as an agent to beat up for fresh witnesses, and never has returned—professional men are tender towards each other, and I make no attack upon Mr. Powell, who sent him; but instead of being examined before a secret committee, he himself, and all the commissioners, ought to have been the first witnesses called in support of the bill, and all the depositions taken before them ought to have been produced—a dark cloud, therefore, hangs

1633
over the very beginning of this case, which it is impossible to explore, and which, therefore, imposes the most solemn duty upon us to examine with the utmost jealousy the testimony of every witness who has been examined. When we find the accusation to have been thus hatched in secret, and to have been supported by all the power and influence of foreign governments—when we see that some of the witnesses have been thrust forward by force, whilst others, from the same force and influence, have been kept back, and that the foulest subornation has been detected, what security could we have had for the truth of any part of the evidence, even if it had not been impeached! by the palpable perjuries which have been exposed? All this, my lords, you must constantly Lear in mind, when you are weighing the credit of every syllable that has been sworn; though you might safely be released from the solemn obligation, when; the manifest and disgusting characters of the whole body of the proof is duly and attentively considered.
Before I proceed to pass along it, let me first remark, that if her majesty be really guilty, and the prosecution is therefore a just one, no false testimony could exist; false testimony is never found when an accusation can be supported by truth; and whenever, therefore, falsehood is found at all, much more if it predominates amongst accusing witnesses, it is a most decisive proof of a malicious prosecution. This, my lords, is so obvious, that the meanest understanding may embrace it, and I am therefore almost ashamed to remind you of its universal application. When crimes have actually been committed, and are to be detailed by witnesses, they have only to say what they saw. If they be honest and disinterested, bow can they possibly be involved even in a disposition to be false, when the truth is sufficient to support them? and it may therefore be laid down as a maxim quite familiar to all who are acquainted with the proceedings of courts of justice, that whenever the leading witnesses to support any accusation, give manifestly false testimony, much more if given in proved or probable combination, the whole mass is corrupted, and the victim is not only unbound and set free, but the prosecutor is subject to be instantly attached and punished.
Let the case before us be only shortly examined upon this principle, and let
1634
our judgment follow accordingly. The first witness in the launching of a case, which is always the most important part of it, is Louisa Demont, who was discharged in the end of the year 1817, from the princess's service, together with her lover, Sacchi, of whom presently; and about the same time Majoochi, Birollo and Restelli, all witnesses for the bill, were sent away. This woman, who has sworn to an act of adultery at Naples, and who is a witness to the whole adulterous intercourse which the bill alleges, not only implored the Queen to restore her to her service, and to take her sister Mariette under her protection, but deliberately, in her letters before us, extols the Queen as the best and most virtuous of her sex, and declared the same to madame Martigner, a witness not attempted to be impeached. She said, that on hearing the witness say that the Queen was thought to be a gallant and libertine, she put herself in a passion, and exclaimed that she had been surrounded with spies, and that the whole were calumnies against her. Now, my lords, there is a great difference between a witness contradicted by other witnesses, and one who contradicts herself. The first is a question of credit between conflicting testimony, but the second is conclusive—How is it possible, then, to accept this woman as a witness to the Queen's incontinence, when, after the latest period of such accusations, which she has sworn to have known the truth of, she declares them to be calumnies, the wicked inventions of the spies by which her majesty was surrounded? I maintain, therefore, that such a witness can receive no confirmation; an accomplice or any other witness, whose testimony is only collaterally and partially invaded, may be confirmed by other evidence; but a witness who has made contrary declarations on the whole matter in issue is no witness at all.—Yet this woman, after her admitted infamy and falsehood, has been carried onward through all the arguments, particularly at the bar, as if she were a witness in any possible manner—Though dead and buried in the very outset, they dig her up again, and carry on her putrid carcase till the very wholesome air is infected.—But even if this were not sufficient to destroy her testimony, she is contradicted also as to the fact at Naples by positive proof. She swore that the second night after the Queen's arrival at Naples, she returned early from the Opera in a state

1635
of agitation, directed the removal of Austin, and dismissed the witness, when in the morning her own small bed had not been slept on, and that of Bergami at first occupied, then much disordered, and at last as if two had lain in it, with a stain upon the quilt. Now, this bed had no sheets, and yet it was sworn by her to have been so occupied by her majesty and Bergami for forty days following, as if the Queen had constantly slept in it whilst in that condition, and as if she had lain naked on the quilt, without which it could not possibly have been stained. And to complete the destruction of this absurdly incredible falsehood, this very woman, the witness, throughout, to all the subsequent allegations of adulterous intercourse, though she had the care of her majesty's linen, both by sea and land, has not ventured to swear to any such marks in support of the criminal presumptions in the polacre, which, had they existed, would have been so very material.
But the most astonishing part of the case is yet untouched, inasmuch as though this infamous imposition has been in the argument distinctly admitted, yet the witness is still supported as deserving some credit. This reminds me of the strongest parallel case that I believe ever existed: an attorney of the name of Underwood had forged the will of a person near Bath, who died intestate; he had sworn to his being sent for—to his seeing the testator—and to the making and execution of the will, describing the very curtains of the bed he lay in, and the very colour of the ribband round his head. He then turned king's evidence, and to support an indictment, was called to deny all this, though he had obtained a probate of the will on his own affidavit, swearing to all the facts I have stated? he was, I think, improperly admitted, but on his coming forward to deny every word he had sworn formerly (being the very fact in issue), I would not even sit in court to hear such testimony, and my friend, Mr. Baron Garrow, now on the woolsack, who was counsel also in the cause, went out along with me into the sheriffs apartment at the Old Bailey whilst he was examined, although our clients, who had no other advocates, were on trial for their lives; but they ran no risk, and the best service indeed we could render either to them or to the public was, to show our utter contempt for such a witness.
I maintain, therefore, that Demont
1636
should be shut out as entirely from all consideration, as if she had never been examined. This principle is so very important in the administration of justice, that I cannot quit it without further trying its truth. I assert then, my lords, that a witness not merely contradicted, or inconsistent on some collateral matters sworn to, but who has deliberately and in writing maintained the perfect innocence of the person she comes to accuse, though after the period when she must have had full knowledge of all the facts she swears to; is so utterly discredited as to be incapable even of receiving confirmation from any other witness. Another witness may, indeed, swear to the same facts, and, according to circumstances, be credited, but credited only upon the intrinsic merits of his own testimony, and not upon the confirmation of nothing. Try this, my lords, by a series of figures—Demont must be admitted to be nothing, until, as it is said, she is confirmed, and must, in the mean time, be set down as O; and therefore, after adding other evidence to any amount or value, under any denomination of figures, the quotient could not be altered by the O standing at the beginning. No, my lords, quite the contrary: So far from it, that in all my experience such subsequent evidence to bolster up a matter before discredited, has always been considered with extreme caution, because given in collateral support of testimony which had been before disbelieved. Demont, therefore, is, in my opinion, wholly extinguished as a witness. Yet, nevertheless, she is still resorted to. Even when all other evidence, as in the case of Catania, having failed them, they are compelled to raise her up again from the dead.
"—The time has been
"That when the brains were out, the man would die,
"And there an end; but now they rise again
"With twenty mortal murders on their crowns,
"And push us from our stools."
My lords, I cannot leave this most important view of the evidence without adverting to the perfect consistency and fairness with which those who oppose the testimony of the accusing witnesses, on the ground of their contradictions, reject equally on the same principle any evidence for the Queen, however important for her defence, if at all

1637
open to the same objection. Lieut. Flinn's minutes had surely nothing what ever to do with tire merits of the case. He had nothing to distort or to conceal: It could be nothing to the support of the main body of his testimony, by whose hand they were written; yet they form an obvious state of confusion, having stated them to be of his own writing, which he afterwards admitted they were not. My noble friend (earl Grey), in the severest and most scrupulous measure of justice, set no value upon what he had sworn, tho' I have no doubt he believed! it. He did so in support of a principle,! without which there can be no human security. But, good God! my lords, if, ever the palpable and immaterial mistake of lieut. Flinn may be so dealt with, and if the mere forgetfulness of lieut. Hownam; to a conversation with captain Briggs of several years standing, tho' not at all invading the truth of any part of his evidence; if even this was brought up against. him by the authors and supporters of this bill, what, upon the same principle, must become of the whole body of the accusing proof, not only detected to be false throughout by the most positive contradictions, and even by self confessions of; falsehood, but abandoned, in the principal parts, by the ablest speakers amongst; your lordships; who have been content, because forced to be contented, with what they are pleased to term unsuspicious and unsuspected facts.
Compelled, my lords, by the closeness of the siege to this entirely new and narrow ground for supporting the bill, Sacchi is also abandoned. The disgusting account he gave of being at the carnage on the journey from Rome to Sinigaglia, being contradicted by three most respectable witnesses, I thought we should never have heard of it again; yet the noble earl behind me seemed disposed to revive it, by talking about the curtains which he described. All this, however, is given up and abandoned. Cuchi, who looked through the key-hole at Trieste, is also given up, not that looking through a key-hole may not be the best of all possible evidence, because secrecy always ac-companies crimes, and by stratagems they are often detected; but Cuchi, unfortunately for his evidence, saw all that he described three or four days after her majesty had left the place. Restelli, also, is an acknowledged false witness. Can there be more decisive proof of conspira-
1638
cy, than that so many witnesses should be detected as forsworn, and is it possible to say, without the destruction of all securities for our honour, our property, or our lives, that after such detections you may still go on, and throw the dice, as it were, till some equally false facts turned up, but which there may be no opportunity to contradict? The practice of the courts in my time was wholly different. Sir William Scott, the most eminent judge who ever presided in his court, calm and dispassionate as he is, has been known to cast away with indignation the papers lying before him, that in the very outset were disfigured by detected falsehood.
But it has been said, that facts sworn to ought to be contradicted, when contradiction was within reach. Yes, my lords, if the facts are sworn to by credible witnesses; but I never, when at the bar, contradicted a witness detected and abandoned; because such a contradiction would be a restoration of credit, and at all events useless. In the same manner the noble earl has said, why was. not the son of the factor called, to whom Galdini communicated what he had seen? But how could that have been a contradiction; because he might have told the son of the factor all that he told to us; jet the whole of it might have been a lie, as I verily believe it to be. Of Catania, I will not condescend to say a word, after the admirable manner in which this wicked branch of the conspiracy was exposed by my noble friend (earl Grey). It would be a burning day-light. And the same reason applies to Aura. The evidence of Majocchi also requires no other confutation than his own. Amidst a tissue of other falsehoods, he swore to having seen the Queen passing through his room into Bergami's, whilst within her full knowledge he was lying there in bed. To give colour to this falsehood, as it could receive no other support, he repeatedly swore, that there was this only passage; but was forced in the end to admit, that there was another. And, in the same manner, every one of the witnesses have been fully contradicted, or have shamefully contradicted themselves. I desire, therefore, here to assert, still remembering that I speak in the presence of the learned judges, that a prosecution so circumstanced could not have been permitted to proceed in any of our courts. It must have fallen of itself, when all the

1639
leading witnesses for the Crown had in this manner, one after another, been manifestly perjured. Every judge attending to the just and humane principles of our criminal law, would in such a case interpose his advice that it should cease; because, under such circumtances, there could be no reliance upon any proofs that might be behind; much more if any combination had been established, as in the case before us; since it appears, that from the moment when all these witnesses, so combining, left the service of her majesty, no misconduct, secret or public, has ever been imputed to her. And is it possible to believe, that, if during all the periods of their service she had conducted herself with such open and abandoned profligacy as they have wickedly represented, she could at once, not even knowing she had been detected, have reformed her morals and her manners so as to be set free from all imputations or suspicions whatsoever,—a thing so improbable, that no man in his senses can believe it.
Her majesty, my lords, has therefore, in my opinion, great reason to complain that when the criminal acts relied on have been thus exposed and abandoned, false inferences should still be raised upon other assumptions equally unfounded. It has been relied on, that she had been left by her English attendants, from their sense of her misconduct, which has in the same manner turned out to be false, and in the same manner her exclusion from the societies corresponding with her illustrious rank, has been with equal falsehood asserted, though she appears to have been received with distinction at all the courts she visited, with the exception indeed of Vienna, where our ambassador was no doubt instructed to object to her reception. She was received at Naples, at Turin, at Baden, and at Bavaria, where Bergami was also received without objection; nor was a word heard against her in any quarter until apprehensions were entertained that she meditated a return.
On the failure of all these inferences from facts which failed them, they as unwarrantably have erected them on facts that exist. The noble earl behind me has gone the length of presuming a sense of guilt or misconduct regarding Bergami, from her majesty's not remonstrating at home against captain Pechell's rejection of him. Upon what ground could such remonstrance have been made? That
1640
officer was to judge of his own fit command in his ship; and had there been even just ground for complaint could this unhappy, rejected, deserted princess have been expected to remonstrate with her own government, which was raising up all the powers of the earth against her? Guilt has been also inferred from the order of St. Caroline at Jerusalem; but that which may be caught up as a presumption by a prosecutor ought to make no manner of impression upon us who are judges, until it is more duly considered. Upon me, my lords, that circumstance has had quite a contrary effect. I am bound to believe, in the absence of contrary proof, that her majesty was educated in the Christian faith; and believing that, upon what possible ground can I be justified in presuming that coming out of this polacre, the scene, as it is insisted on, of ungovernable lust, she should advance with her adulterous paramour, to the sacred temple of the resurrection at Jerusalem, the very shrine where our Saviour suffered in agony for our redemption, and there have consecrated the symbols and rewards of her criminal and degrading passion? For my own part, my lords, I can give no credit to this; because, though my passions in my youth were as strong as any man's, I could not have put bracelets upon a favourite woman as a memorial of my own offences. I feel, on the contrary, that if I were brought to the scene, where without what had passed at the era of our redemption, I must have perished for ever, I should (putting all self-reproach out of the question) have scarcely been able to hold up my head. Why, then, am I to presume against another, and upon no proof whatsoever, what I feel to be quite impossible in myself? If inferences were to be thus indulged in on the subject of orders, they might be equally presumed—but I am persuaded most unjustly—to apply to noble lords in the House, ever since these proceedings were instituted abroad. I remember when the ancient order of my native country was given to me by his present majesty whilst those with whom I had always acted were not in office, it was presumed by some to have been bestowed to detach me from my principles and my friends; I was not angry at this unfounded supposition, since so many public men have fallen off from their integrity and because jealousy is a mark set upon the value of former conduct. But the total falsehood

1641
of the presumption may show how hazardous it is to presume any thing whatsoever, against all probability and without any kind of proof. But whatever, my lords, may be the just range of inferences or presumptions, it must I am sure be impossible, with reason, to infer, that the opinion I have formed on this unfortunate subject have arisen from prejudices or from partial inclination. To the king, who cannot be indifferent to this proceeding, I have many many obligations, from the warm interest formerly taken by his majesty in my prosperity and happiness, and from my belief that I am still held in the same personal regard, though political changes have removed me at a greater distance from his person. If his majesty were ever exposed to any thing injurious, I should ever be ready to protect him at the peril of my life, and to contribute to his happiness by every sacrifice but that of my duty. My principles I never have deserted and never will desert [Loud cheers].
If then, my lords, all unjust and unauthorized inferences are withdrawn, and the antecedent evidence is totally annihilated, we are brought at last to the polacre, and to the facts as they are established to have taken place in that voyage; on which facts, even on the admission of the supporters of the bill, the whole case may be said to rest. And be it remembered, my lords, that if the case is to be thus narrowed, without any retrospect to evidence discredited and abandoned, her majesty must be taken to have entered into that vessel without proof of any previous guilt, and Bergami must also be taken to have been an attendant upon her up to that time as a faithful and respectful servant, so as to bring the evidence on board this polacre to its true bearings according to the facts proved there, and to the consequent presumptions of law. Without this clear understanding, justice cannot possibly be administered. If, indeed, antecedent indecencies were to be believed in, even in the absence of consummated guilt, my opinion would be very different from that which I am about to give; but which I rest upon the discredit which it is admitted ought to belong to the proof of previous misconduct.
Removing that which ought to be wholly removed when the combined and detected perjuries are attended to, there is no proof of adultery, whatsoever, much Jess, as has been asserted, by "unsuspi-
1642
cious, unsuspected, nay, uncontroverted proofs," unless it could be contended, that lieut. Hownam proved it, who said expressly, that he suspected nothing wrong from Bergami's sleeping in the tent—"I thought there was no impropriety, because I must have felt it, and I did not feel it." They had slept below during part of the voyage, till they were obliged to remove from the heat of the weather and the horses that were on board. There they might have had unsuspected access to each other; but in the tent, or awning on deck, open from the hatchway, and subject to constant interruption, criminality, though possible, was far more improbable.—And what, besides, could they have sought for but the act of adultery, which did not require being exposed to suspicion by sleeping so close to each other?—They were not undressed, and there could be no enjoyment in sweltering in each other's arms in a vehemently hot climate. He was her attendant besides, from duty, a circumstance never to be forgotten; had he been a stranger, a mere passenger on board the ship, I should have thought the presumption conclusive; or if his place of sleeping had been at a distance, and he had been traced secretly in the night into the Queen's tent, and had remained there, I should have thought the evidence very strong, if not quite conclusive. Of the legal proof of adultery I cannot be ignorant, having conducted every cause of that kind for nearly 30 years, not only in Westminster Hall, but often on all the circuits. The presumptions of law on that subject are presumptions of reason and common sense. If a married woman leaves her own bed secretly in the night, and is found, whether dressed or undressed, in a man's room who stands in no relation to her to account for it, nothing more can be necessary to convict her, because she could go there for no other purpose, and of course the proof is the same when the man goes into the bedchamber of the woman, because why else should he go there, or why else should she receive him? The same presumption, if not explained by circumstances, would apply even to attendants as well as strangers, but not from such circumstances as attended this voyage, only sleeping thus near to each other. How many hundreds of single men have only a woman servant, often married, and who of course are left alone in the night in

1643
apartments often close to one another? Could the husband in such case, without proof of criminal access, bring an action against the master for adultery? Certainly not; but if a married woman, not his servant, were to be found in his house in the night, the evidence of adultery would then be complete, because why else did she come there? If the indecencies on deck, indeed, could be believed, I should think a legal presumption, if not the strongest suspicion, would then follow; but it is not supported by any probable proof. How, indeed, is it possible, when, after having guarded herself so closely, if she was criminal, that nothing, except accidental discoveries, sworn to by false witnesses, had been attempted, could she thus, after the full enjoyment of the nights had been at her command in secret, rush into his arms in the presence of all the crew upon deck, who, as was proved by Paturzo, were all there enjoying the air of the evening? Where, then, are those sailors? The governments of Italy, that have compelled the attendance of other witnesses, might have beat the drum for them throughout the whole Mediterranean sea. Evidence by Oldi or Vassali, had they been called, would have been useless, as they could only have said (which would have been nothing) that they did not see it, but the sailors might have sworn that they saw it. It rests, then, on the testimony only of Gargiulo and Paturzo, on which I need only remind you of the observations of lord Grey—the former, as he truly said, coming here not only from resentment, but expectation to get his six thousand dollars, which Bergami would not pay; he must have been well aware that the fulfilment of his expectation would depend upon his evidence; and that if he failed on being useful, he could have little dependence upon his dollars. The other witness is in the same condition, and his evidence is incredible, notwithstanding the pious care of his relation, that his morals should not be corrupted by the view of what was passing; a thing so disgustingly false, as to deserve no other notice than that which last night was so successfully employed to expose it. This then is the whole, as I was quite astonished that Carlsruhe should again have been mentioned.—The noble earl behind me said, that baron d'Ende, though his absence was improper, could not have given material evi-
1644
dence in contradiction of Kress. How so, when he said that his heart beat to come over as a witness? An expression lie could not have used but from the knowledge that he could have proved the princess to have been at the court of the duke of Baden when Kress swore she was in the inn.
It was said on a former day, by my learned friend (lord Redesdale), that the witnesses whom I have put aside as wholly discredited by their own inconsistent declarations, had received sufficient confirmation; but I maintain positively, nevertheless, that they could not be accepted as credible in any of our courts, and that the evidence falsely called confirmatory, must rest wholly upon its own intrinsic credit, whatever that may be; and I repeat it again, as my firm and unalterable opinion, that a cause of this description, ushered in and pursued by witness after witness, detected in palpable falsehood, could not be made the foundation of any criminal sentence. Were I a judge in such a case I would not advise a jury to find a verdict of guilty; and were I a juryman, I should not follow such a direction or advice.
As to the alteration of the preamble, I cannot even understand what is meant by it. I must vote upon the proof as it is, and as it supports the charge now before us; and even if I believed that adultery had been committed, I can find no credible evidence, whatsoever, of public crime or licentiousness bringing scandal and dishonour upon the country, which is the charge in the bill, and from which it is impossible to depart. I find, on the contrary, out of the fifteen or sixteen overt acts which have been sworn to, all of them except a masquerade, and the ball at the Barona, which came to nothing, were avowedly secret; and nothing that passed in this little polacre was ever heard of, nor ever would, to the end of time, had it not been fished out and got up by the Milan commission, through the terrors and influence of foreign governments; and as to any intended mitigations, if I were in the Queen's situation, and I were convicted of adultery upon such evidence, I would cast your mitigations in your face, and appeal in the other house of parliament, to the representatives of the people. The House of Commons never can pass this bill against their own declaration; they cannot pass it as a national wrong against the national nolle

1645
prosequi which will continue to issue from every quarter of the island. My noble friend, the secretary of state, brought in a bill some years ago to alter the Toleration act, by an abridgment of the liberty bestowed on dissenting congregations, which the House seemed to approve, and in argument never abandoned that approbation; but when I could scarcely seethe table before me for the petitions of the dissenters, which I presented to the House, no minister could have carried it through; and on my motion it was instantly and without a struggle rejected, just as this measure, if persevered in, must infallibly perish. My lords, I am very sorry to have broken my promise as to the time I should detain you, but I felt myself bound to give the opinion I have delivered and I misreckoned the time it would consume.
Lord De Dunstanvillesaid, that the objections principally relied upon by the opponents of the bill were; first, that if it were passed, it would be rejected in the Commons; and, secondly, that the public mind had already decided against the measure. With respect to the first objection, he thought it should have no weight with their lordships, as it rested upon a calculation which he believed to be erroneous; and as to the second, he thought the public mind was much deceived upon this subject, through the garbled statements and inflammatory comments which had appeared in the newspapers. The public, then, could not be so competent to form a judgment upon the merits of the case as their lordships, who had been occupied for forty-five days in hearing the several witnesses, with the arguments of the counsel on both sides. The noble lord then adverted to the rapid exaltation of Bergami, who, after all the endeavours to throw a sort of credit over his origin, was clearly shown to have been a menial servant. Yet this man, from the lowest situation was raised to the highest to which the princess could elevate him, and with the most unaccountable celerity. Then was he seen surrounded by his own trusty relatives, and shut in by them from the eye of observation—Sisters, brothers, cousins, all but his wife; who was excluded, though her child, who wanted her protection, was a part of the family circle. What construction could their lordships put on these broad facts; on the suspicious condition of madame Oldi and on all the circum-
1646
stances in the open relation that subsisted between the princess and her favourite, but that the flagitious conduct charged in the preamble of the bill had taken place? Among the general objections taken to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, the only one, applying to two of them, the master and mate of the polacre, was, that they were exorbitantly paid. He did not believe that they were. If the fact, however, was so, how happened it that the counsel for the Queen had not brought forward witnesses to prove it? With respect to Majoochi, their lordships would not consider his evidence impeached in any material point. As for any trifling inaccuracies, if such there were, the House would remember, that the interpreter himself on one occasion remarked, that Majoochi appeared to be so stupid or ignorant, that lie thought the man was not aware of what he was saying. He denied that the evidence of Carrington at all affected that of Majoochi. Carrington stated, that he had had a particular conversation with Majoochi. The latter positively contradicted this assertion. On what principle, then, were they to believe the one and discredit the other? Much had been said by one of the counsel for the Queen, in favour of Carrington; but how far their lordships would rely upon the judgment of a man who could compare his sovereign to the bloodiest tyrant of antiquity, he did not know. Carrington having, in instances which it was needless for him to recapitulate, proved himself a liar, he would not trouble their lordships with a further examination of what he had deposed to. His lordship then adverted to the evidence of Demont, which, he contended, was of a clear and. consistent character. He was sure that in this great and important case their lordships would deliberate with caution, and decide upon the conviction of their own conscience.
Lord Mannerssaid, that he felt it impossible for him to give a silent vote on the present occasion. The material question for their lordships to consider was, whether the preamble of the bill, which charged the Queen with having been guilty of an adulterous intercourse, was proved. If the case, as it had been established, rested solely upon the evidence of foreigners, it had been said, that their lordships ought to hesitate before they gave implicit credit to their testimony. This doctrine he did not consider correct; for although Eng-

1647
lishmen knew the value of sincerity, it was wrong to arrogate the conscientious habit of considering themselves bound by the sanction of an oath. If their lordships were not thoroughly satisfied of the truth of the allegations of the bill upon the evidence given by the Italian witnesses, they had lo look to the corroboration given to their testimony by witnesses belonging to other countries, and also by the witnesses who had been brought forward on the part of the defence. Confirmed as the testimony of those foreign witnesses materially was, he knew not how it was possible to refuse credit to it. There was another circumstance which, he confessed, had made a great impression on his mind. He alluded to the caution given by Mr. Craven lo her majesty soon after her arrival in Naples, respecting her conduct towards Bergami. It appeared strange to his mind that such a liberty could be taken by Mr. Craven as to offer any comments upon her royal highness's behaviour to her royal highness, and he certainly thought that such a liberty would have been resented, if there had not been sufficient ground for Mr. Craven's taking such authority upon himself. But the conduct of the princess at that time, and her subsequent treatment of her favourite Bergami, proved that the caution had been well justified. If any doubts were entertained by their lordships on that point, those doubts must be removed by the consideration of the conversation which had been proved by captain Briggs to have taken place between him and lieutenant; Hownam, and according to which it was established, that lieut. Hownam had gone upon his knees before her royal highness, and with tears in his eyes, besought her not to admit Bergami to her table. How was that action to be accounted for, unless; it was admitted that lieut. Hownam had: seen the influence of the growing passion of her royal highness for Bergami, and that fearing that influence would be detrimental to the honour and happiness of her royal highness, he endeavoured to dissuade her from yielding to it? That circumstance appeared to him to throw light on the whole case. In what manner was the polacre case to be explained, when it was connected with the former circumstances in her royal highness's conduct? On the voyage from Jaffa the; princess of Wales slept on the deck, when, if even the attendance of a servant might have been necessary, why had Bergami
1648
been chosen rather than lieut. Hownam, or any other of the attendants upon her royal highness, unless for the purpose of indulging a criminal passion? Was it consistent with the delicacy of a virtuous and modest female to sleep for more than five weeks under a tent with a man? No; every feeling of delicacy and of propriety would have prevented any modest woman from acting so: indeed, it would have prevented any female, unless one blinded by passion, from sleeping in such a situation for so long a time. The sleeping in that manner under the tent, and for such a period, appeared to be so destitute of delicacy, that it was a decisive proof to him that the crime of adultery had been committed. He was almost ashamed to hear his learned friend (lord Erskine) doubt whether adultery had been then committed. He should say that proofs so circumstantial as those which had been advanced in this case could not be doubted. The preference given by her royal highness to Bergami over the other servants, could not but give cause for suspicion. The sleeping under the tent with such an attendant was a proof to him of the commission of the crime attributed to her royal highness. He was therefore of opinion, that the evidence had substantiated the allegations of the bill. For how otherwise, could the evidence of six or seven witnesses be explained, who deposed that the princess had slept for five or six weeks on the deck of the polacre, in a tent, with a man servant, to whom she had before that time exhibited such proofs of attachment and of preference? Such conduct, in his judgment, distinctly proved that adultery had been committed. Independent of the case on board of the polacre, there were other circumstances which established the charges—circumstances which had been proved by witnesses whose credibility he considered as beyond doubt. Such was the case stated by the witness Kress to have occurred at Carlsruhe—a witness who had given her evidence with so much diffidence, and whose whole demeanor was so consistent with propriety while she was at their lordships bar, that he considered no imputation could be cast upon her evidence. In her testimony respecting the facts at Carlsruhe, she had stated something respecting the countess Oldi, as being at the time in the inn, and consequently capable of declaring the truth; yet the countess, although in England, had not

1649
been called to contradict the statements of Kress. Why had not she been called? The same observation would apply to the other witnesses who might have been brought forward on the part of the defence, and who were not produced. It might be fair to doubt the testimony of only one person, but when that testimony was not only confirmed, but even not contradicted when it could be contradicted if untrue, its effect remained undiminished. To his mind, the case on behalf of the bill, on his conscience and on his honour as a peer, he considered to be as fully established as any case he had ever heard. He was convinced that the adulterous intercourse had taken place. If their lordships were of the same opinion, it was not possible for them to stop there; for if they rested at that stage, what had they been doing heretofore, except uselessly and mischievously exposing the vices of her royal highness to the world, and for no good purpose? It might be said, that they had done enough in going so far; but was it possible to say that the public had no interest at stake in the present proceedings? Would any noble lord say, that the moral character of the people would not be affected? Could it be maintained that the example of the Queen—particularly if no mark was affixed by their lordships on what was deemed scandalous conduct—would not have its influence on the morals of the whole community? Would any one deny that the good example of the late Queen was attended by the best effects through every class of society. Their lordships were bound to take care that, in the highest situation in the country, such an example should be held forth, as would be productive of good effect, particularly when every engine was at work in order to sap the foundations of morality, to destroy the throne, and to overturn the church and state. There was no man who could regret more than he did, that such a bill should be considered necessary; but as it was necessary, their lordships were bound to do their duty. It was impossible to allow this woman to ascend the throne, after the establishment of the case against her. The arguments in support of the bill he considered to be irresistible. He was perfectly satisfied in his mind that the preamble had been fully proved, and therefore he would give his consent to the second reading.
The Duke of Newcastlewas anxious to
1650
state the reason why he felt himself justified in voting as he should do on the bill, though he was not present at the examination of the witnesses, or at the previous discussions. He had been prevented by domestic business of a pressing nature, from attending in his place until Wednesday last, but he had read over the whole of the evidence with all the attention in his power, and he felt that he was as capable of pronouncing a verdict in the case, as if he had been present. His opinion was, that the Queen was clearly, indisputably, and incontestibly guilty, not only of the alleged adultery, but of conduct in other respects disgraceful and degrading. He therefore should vote for the bill when the time arrived for doing so; though he felt it right to state, that some clause or provision should be introduced to restrict one of the high parties from contracting marriage.
The Marquis of Lansdownobserved, that he was both glad and sorry that an opportunity for explanation had been afforded to the noble duke who preceded him. He was glad that any explanation which he might have thought necessary to the justification of his own conduct should have taken place, but sorry that the explanation given, however it might justify the noble duke in his own opinion, was not of a nature to satisfy the public mind as to the propriety of his interference. Did the noble duke think that to be present during the whole of the prosecution was a mere formality which might or might not be observed, according to the inclination or convenience of the parties. The noble duke had stated, that he was prevented from attending by domestic circumstances, by circumstances connected with his own personal convenience; he had stated, that he had not heard the speeches of counsel at the bar, nor the evidence by which the case was to be supported on either side, and yet, after such admissions, the noble duke had gone on to say, that having read the evidence, he was as well prepared as if he had heard it all, not only to vote for the second reading of the bill, but for all the penalties attached to the imputed offence. No doubt the noble duke thought he was acting conscientiously; that he thought he was sufficiently informed on the subject, and was as capable of coming to a just and equitable conclusion, as those who had attended the investigation of the charges from day to day. That such was

1651
the impression of the noble duke he had no doubt; but how he had formed that impression, or by what process of reasoning his mind had been enabled to come to such a conclusion, the noble duke himself could alone explain. If the mere reading of the evidence was sufficient to enable a juror to pronounce a verdict, that great constitutional safeguard, the trial by jury, which was only good as it imposed the necessity of being present at the evidence was rendered nugatory. But what would be said, if any person who being absent during a part of the trial, should say that he had read the evidence, and was ready to pronounce for the guilt of the accused? They had heard a noble lord (de Dunstanville) affirm, that the public were not capable of judging in that case, as they were not present to hear the evidence. What must that noble lord think of his fellow juror, who was absent when the evidence was going on, and who yet came to that House to give his vote against the accused. He had spoken warmly on this subject, because he felt warmly; but, sitting there as a fellow juror, he would have gone away unhappy if be had not delivered his candid opinion upon the conduct of the noble duke.
He would now address himself to the subject before the House. If he felt any difficulty in doing so, it did not arise from a hesitation as to the vote which he should give, but from an apprehension that feeling still so much under the influence of the speech made yesterday by his noble friend (earl Grey), he might run a risk of enfeebling any of the points by an imperfect repetition. Oppressed as he felt by the nature of the cause, and the talent of the speech to which he had alluded, he still felt it to be his duty to offer some observations in support of that vote which he should give. He did not feel himself in a situation to dismiss from his mind altogether the evidence produced at their lordships bar. He thought it his duty to listen to the whole of the evidence. In doing so, he did not look at it to discover proofs of the Queen's innocence, but proofs by her prosecutors of her guilt. The distinction he had here drawn was a correct one, and one without which criminal justice could never be administered with effect. There had been instances of bills of pains and penalties, but there never was an instance of one in which the guilt was not accurately defined. Bills of that description were introduced for various
1652
reasons. Sometimes to let in evidence which could not otherwise be produced, and without which the guilt of the offending party could not be established; sometimes to expedite the course of justice, in cases where delay might be fatal to the issue; and sometimes to alter the punishment itself, by making it more severe than the ordinary penalty; but in all instances a distinct crime was proved, before parliament agreed to such an extraordinary remedy. If, in the present case, the charge of adultery was not proved, all the improprieties, all the indelicacies of conduct with which the Queen was charged, even though they should be established in the most minute particulars, ought to be dismissed from their lordships minds in coming to a decision on the bill; they were bound as legislators and as jurors to dismiss them. It was in vain to say that they ought not to pass unpunished; for there still remained the most powerful of all tribunals, the tribunal of public opinion, which assigned the most unerring penalties to vice, and the best security to virtue. He therefore could not agree with a noble lord who had said, that if her majesty was sent away from the bar, she would be sent under different circumstances from those which attended other women in ordinary cases of divorce. If there was any difference, it was only this, that the publicity and importance of these proceedings insured to her majesty a fairer, more candid, and just judgment from the public, than those who were the parties in private cases could expect. But he agreed with a noble earl who had spoken yesterday under the gallery, that the tribunal of public opinion never acted so powerfully as when the legislature did not attempt to meddle with it. How cautious, then, should they be not to raise up a counter feeling in the public mind, or give to the people of this country a motive for deviating from that view in any case which the facts themselves might be calculated to impress.
He now came to what was considered as the gravamen of the charge against the Queen; he alluded to what had taken place on board the polacre. Other points had, indeed, been relied upon by counsel; but anxious as those who were bringing their minds to vote for the bill naturally were to find some prop on which to rest, he had heard no other part of the accusation relied upon, without statements, in

1653
his opinion, manifestly unfair. All the evidence relating to other transactions was of a character more suspicious than the transactions themselves,; and he did not know a better mode of guiding his opinion than by balancing the degree of suspicion attached to the evidence against the degree of suspicions belonging to the facts to which it referred. He would not go into detail, but touching upon the testimony generally, he must confess, in the outset, that though he should have been better satisfied if the countess Oldi and Mariette had been examined, yet it was but fair to recollect, that the occurrences at Catania were not brought home to any particular date to which their contradiction might have been directed. Nay, what was sworn regarding Catania, rested on the testimony of that witness who could hardly exist as a witness in the minds of their lordships—Demont; and in whose deposition there was among the many contradictions, one not noticed in the course of debate; she first swore that at Catania she had supped and gone to bed before the princess, so that she could have no opportunity of knowing how the princess was dressed, yet she subsequently stated, that she had seen the dress of the princess as she passed through the room when the princess was going to bed. He had been surprised to hear the noble earl opposite rely upon what passed at Scharnitz, where he had said that the princess had not thought the protection of Bergami necessary for her security. Her small room was there surrounded by several men who could have assisted her if necessary, and they were not undressed, because they were prepared to set out on their journey at break of day. All this had been most naturally accounted for by Vassali: nobody had undressed; it was a small inn, in a small town, and the princess and her suite retired where they could, under the inconveniences to which they were exposed.
Proceeding to she polacre, he was perfectly ready to admit that it must be allowed that the sleeping under the tent was distinctly in evidence. He had seen no disposition on the part of lieut. Hownam to conceal this part of the subject: that officer had always made a distinction between what he knew and what he believed, and he was always willing to state his belief when called upon. If the House looked at the examination of lieut. Hownam by Mr. Tindal, they would see,
1654
that he endeavoured to make the witness prove who it was that slept under the tent. He went even further than the rules of examination would allow for that purpose; "For he said, if you do not know who slept under the tent with the princess, state who you believe it was. Here he was stopped by the other side on the ground that the counsel had no right then to inquire as to the belief of lieut. Hownam. Having stated this, did he (the marquis) mean to say that he thought there was no objection to this situation? On the contrary, lie could not pass over the subject without admitting, in the strongest terms, that it was deeply to be lamented that the princess of Wales, or any other person so near the throne of these realms, should be placed in such a predicament. This at least must be said of it—that if it were not proof convincing of her guilt, it made it impossible for the Queen to prove her innocence. When she placed herself in that situation, she could scarcely have been ignorant of the imputation to which it must expose her. Allowing its imprudence—its impropriety—was it to be considered as a direct proof to establish a crime of the great character here charged, and to be attended with such consequences as were here contemplated? That he must utterly deny. If presumption of guilt was to be admitted on the one hand, the presumptions of innocence could not be excluded on the other. He appealed to the House whether there was any probability in the position, that the princess and Bergami having their option of time and circumstances for committing this crime, would have chosen the deck of a polacre as the scene of their intercourse? In such a situation was there not every chance that they would be exposed to all risks, both of comment and detection? Parties, when driven to it by necessity, might sometimes be found carrying on an illicit connexion under most inconvenient circumstances; but here it was assumed, that the princess and Bergami voluntarily placed themselves in a situation where concealment was almost impossible. The noble earl opposite insisted that it was not necessary, for the purpose of protection, that Bergami should sleep under the same awning with the princess; neither was it necessary, he would tell the noble earl, to the carrying on of a criminal intercourse that Bergami should sleep there. Was it not in evidence that the hatchway was con-

1655
stantly open? And might not such an object have been obtained, with ten times greater security, by Bergami's sleeping below, and using the hatchway at his pleasure for access to the tent? It was impossible to believe that the princess, using that excessive caution which the very case of the prosecution ascribed to her—using that extreme caution during a period of three years—so discreet during the whole of that time, as not to afford her enemies one single positive proof of her guilt—could have been all at once so abandoned by her caution, so deserted even by common discretion, as the prosecution represented her to have been on board the polacre; it was incredible, that she and Bergami, the moment they got into that vessel—the moment they became subjected at every turn to the comment of Greeks, Sicilians, and Turks—the moment they lost the aid and protecting ministry of those servants who might be supposed to have been favourable to them—the moment, in a word, they became exposed in a tenfold greater degree than they had ever been exposed before to observation, and to suspicion; that that moment they should have laid aside all care, all caution, all ordinary prudence, and have literally courted that detection, which their own folly was rendering inevitable. Because, let the House remember that all this was going on upon the deck of the polacre; that the selected spot for this criminal intercourse was within a few feet of the ever-present steersman; and a spot about which two and twenty sailors were constantly moving in all directions. He would not say, that this was evidence unanswerable of the innocence of the Queen; but he would say, that it was such evidence as must engender doubt in the mind of any man; and that every doubtful point ought to be construed in favour of the accused. With him, however, the case did not rest there; because, far from concluding with the noble earl opposite that the circumstances proved in other cases formed accumulated grounds of presumption against her majesty, he thought that those circumstances, taken with fair reference to the characters of the witnesses by whom they had been proved, afforded no ground for unfavourable presumption. For what was in evidence as to these terrible circumstances in other places? What, except this—that the identical persons above all others able to give direct and
1656
positive evidence against the princess, if her conduct had been guilty, that those persons, now hostile to the princess, and in the power of her enemies, had failed in every situation to make out such proof. In any case, no matter what, where the existence of guilt was assumed, and where, with the chambermaids, the house servants, with all the persons enjoying most familiar access in their hands, the prosecutors were unable to prove a single distinct fact; in any such case he should say at once, that adultery was not made out. And supposing there had been, even occasionally, adulterous intercourse, much less a constant course of adultery during three years, was it possible, he would ask, for the chambermaid who had charge of all the linen during the time—a chambermaid not backward, in discovering any thing to the prejudice of her royal mistress, a lady who had her journal ready to note down a fact, and her double entendre to explain it—was it possible, supposing crime to have been committed, that such a woman should be unable to fix a single direct fact.
The hour of four having arrived, their lordships adjourned.