Sitting of 21 March 1817

UNJUST IMPRISONMENT—PETITION OF JOHN WEIR.
Sir Samuel Romillyrose to present a Petition, of the merits of which he knew nothing, neither did he know the person who made the complaint. It was transmitted to him by a professional gentleman in Glasgow, and he felt it his duty to present it to the House. The petitioner subscribed himself "John Weir," and was a muslin manufacturer at Glasgow. He stated, that on the morning of Sunday, the 23rd of February last, while in bed, six persons entered his House, found their way into his chamber, and demanded that he should immediately get up and accompany them to prison, on a charge of sedition or treason. After some delay and difficulty, they showed him the warrant on which he was apprehended, which merely contained his surname, and described his residence as in Black's-land, Green-street, whereas, in point of fact, he lived at Taylor's-land, Great Hamilton-street. He was, after being taken out of his bed, conveyed in custody to the common gaol, placed for a time in a confined cell at the felon's side of the prison, notwithstanding his full protestations of innocence, and not brought up for examination until the Wednesday following, when he was taken before the sheriff substitute, Mr. D. Hamilton, and examined on various points, all of which he met by a flat negative. He was asked, whether he knew and frequented the house of a man, named Hunter, or knew persons of the names of Boyle and Finlayson He neither knew the one nor the other; and was then told by the sheriff substitute, that his persevering in denial looked very suspicious. He was remanded to prison, and not discharged from thence until the Thursday following. He denied having ever interfered in politics. For this imprisonment, the particulars of which the petitioner, was ready to verify in any manner that the House desired, he claimed

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redress, and prayed for an inquiry into the nature of the transaction. The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by hoping that some member from that part of Scotland, where the act was said to have been committed, would be prepared either to give some explanation as to this business, or to make the necessary inquiries into the facts of the case. At present he would content himself by moving that the petition be brought up.—It was then brought up, and read at the table.
Mr. Finlayknew nothing of the circumstances alluded to in the petition, but he thought some consideration was due to the situation of a sheriff, who was very often compelled to discharge a painful duty, and to act at the suggestion of others. If the facts should turn out to be as they were set forth in the petition, he was satisfied, from the respectable character of the sheriff substitute, that that officer must have acted upon information, which at the time, he believed to have been correct. As to the early hour when the arrest was made, all he should say was, that in the part of the town where the warrant was executed, it was often necessary, if late in the day, to provide the civil power with military aid, to enable them to execute their duty, in consequence of the resistance which the neighbourhood sometimes afforded on such occasions. As to the circumstances of the mode of confinement, he was sure they were grossly exaggerated, for there was no prison in which more comfortable apartments and general accommodation were afforded than in that at Glasgow. He hoped the House would not decide on hearing an ex parte statement.
Mr. W. Smiththought the petition entitled to serious consideration. It sat forth a number of gross grievances, and the commission of several acts of hardship, quite needless for the safe custody of a prisoner. The hon. member who had last spoken, seemed to think that his own flat negative would be sufficient to warrant the House to reject all inquiry. He condemned this hasty and intemperate proceeding on the part of magistrates, whereby the personal liberty of the subject, was endangered without cause.
Mr. Finlaydid not wish to prevent, but to suspend inquiry, until the statement of the sheriff substitute was obtained. For this he should himself immediately apply.
Ordered to lie on the table.

GAME LAWS.
Sir S. Romilly Sir S. Romilly moved the second reading of the bill for repealing the act passed in the last session for the preservation of Game.
Mr. Bankessaid, that as another bill (sir E. Knatchbull's) was then pending in the House, which met with general approbation, and had the same object in view as the present one, he thought that the measure of the hon. and learned gentleman should be suspended, until the other came under their consideration. He would, therefore, move as an amendment, that the bill be read a second time on Monday se'nnight.
Sir S. Romillysaid, that this bill was intended to repeal one which had been passed last year, in order to punish persons going out at night with arms in their hands to steal game. In its application, however, the bill had been made to punish persons who had been taken with nothing about them but nets, for the purpose of ensnaring game with seven years transportation, which punishment had only been intended to meet the other offence. He did not object to that offence being punished with transportation, and what he had in view would be in a great measure accomplished by the bill brought in by the hon. member for Kent, but that bill could not now be passed till the next quarter sessions were over. But for this circumstance he should not be anxious to press the bill now under consideration. When, however, he reflected, that if the subject were suffered to lie over till after the next quarter sessions, many persons, comparatively innocent, would probably suffer under the existing law, he thought it of importance that this bill should pass without loss of time. He had heard of several cases of great hardship which had occurred under the act now in force-cases, in which persons, whose offences were not of an aggravated nature, had been sentenced to transportation, partly on account of the character they had previously borne. In some cases, its operation had been peculiarly hard on those tried under it, as it had come upon them like an ex post facto law. The late Mr. Horner had been said to have approved of the bill now in force. To any person who knew that most respected individual, it must seem, when they were told this, that he had, on the occasion referred to, forgot for a time those principles which were nearest to his heart; for among all his good qualities there was no one by which

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his lamented friend was more distinguished than an anxious wish to protect the people against any measure of a character that at all approached tyranny. He, however, knew most positively that Mr. Horner had disapproved of the bill passed in the last session; for he (Mr. Horner) had attended with him night after night, for the purpose of opposing it. They were prevented from doing so by the circumstance of its being found impossible to get to the bill, from their being 30 or 40 orders a day before the House, while they came down for the purpose he had mentioned, and at last they had given up their opposition, as the lion, member who had brought in the bill agreed to strike out that clause which they considered most mischievous in its tendency. As originally brought in, the bill left persons taking at night without arms, but with nets and wires about them, liable to be transported for seven years, without a trial by jury, on a conviction before two magistrates. The omission of this clause was the cause of the bill passing without opposition from Mr. Horner, as, though still objectionable, he considered it to be much better than it had been. The game laws, as they at present stood, had a tendency to multiply crimes. They had the effect of exciting a ferocious spirit, not only among the lower classes, but also among those in the higher walks of life; as was seen by the use made of spring guns, and other engines of death, or of great bodily harm, now placed in inclosed grounds and woods, from which so many accidents occurred. The act now in force went to make offenders more desperate, as had recently been seen in the case of some poachers taken in the North of England, who, when informed that the offence they had committed subjected them to the punishment of transportation, immediately exclaimed, "if they had known that, they would not have been taken so easily." This was the consequence of a law of such severity; those against whom it was directed thought they might as well take the chance of a desperate resistance. Under all the circumstances of the case, he hoped the House would suffer the bill to be now read a second time.
Sir C. Moncksaid, he had committed the persons just alluded to, and they certainly had appeared very much surprised when informed of the punishment which they might expect, and had declared that if they had known such was the penalty
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they had incurred, they would not have been so easily taken. Under the present law, transportation did not necessarily follow on conviction. It was left in the breast of the magistrates to take this course, or to sentence the offender to imprisonment. He, however, would willingly consent to an alteration being made in the law, to define the different shades of offences, and the several degrees of punishment by which they were to be met, so as to leave as little as possible to the discretion of the magistrates. To repeal the present act would be to revive the Joddrell act. Of this he did not approve, and he had a great objection to the bill brought in by the hon. member for Kent. He thought a bill between the two might be beneficial, but as he wished the passing of the present bill to be at all events deferred, he should vote for the amendment.
Mr. Huskissonshould vote for the postponement of the bill. He was unwilling that it should pass before the ensuing quarter sessions were over. The present law, if its application were looked at, would not be found cruel absurd, and unjust; and there were many laws which left the magistrates as much room for the exercise of their discretion, as could be claimed under that which was now made the subject of complaint. He had been surprised to hear it spoken of as an ex post facto law. Such a character did not belong to it. He considered it not a law for the preservation of game, but a police law; and, when the bill brought in by the member for Kent came again before the House, he thought it would be as well to leave out the word "game" altogether, and make the act against all who went out at night in armed bodies, with any unlawful object in view.
The House divided: For the second reading, 14; for the amendment, 30; majority, 16; the second reading of the bill was of course postponed.

SEDITIOUS MEETINGS BILL.
The House went into a Committee on this bill. On the clause declaring a meeting of fifty persons or upwards, without previous notice by public advertisement, signed by seven householders, or a similar notice given to the clerk of the peace, to be an
*See 22 Howell's State Trials, 494.

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unlawful meeting, which might be dispersed after proclamation made by one or more justices, and enacting the punishment of death on these persons, to the number of twelve or more, who should remain after such proclamation made.
Lord Grenvillerecommended a new wording of some parts of the clause, in order to render it more clear, it being at present a matter of doubt whether the penalty of death might not apply to persons who formed no part of the original meeting, but who merely happened to be present at the expiration of the hour. He therefore wished words to be used, applying the penalty specifically to such persons having been present at the meeting who remained at the expiration of an hour; and to this offence, it being a direct resistance of the lawful authorities of the realm, he agreed that it was not improper to apply the punishment of death.
Lord Hollandthought that the penalty of death was by far too heavy a punishment to be inflicted under the circumstances described in the bill. This part of the clause was, he was aware, copied from the not act; but it should be recollected, that to constitute the offence described in that act, there must be, on the part of the persons assembled, some riotous acts. Under the present bill, there was no such qualification, as, for any thing that appeared on the face of it, persons merely remaining on the ground where the meeting was held, to the number of twelve or more, perhaps conversing about it, or ignorant of the law, might be subjected to the punishment of death. Considering this as by far too heavy a penalty for such an offence, he should move to substitute a lesser punishment.
Lord St. Johnobserved, that as the words at present stood, if the clerk of the peace, having received a notice of an intended meeting, signed by seven householders, neglected to communicate it to three magistrates, such meeting might be deemed an unlawful meeting under this bill, although the parties calling it had complied in every respect with the enactments of this clause, and the persons remaining as described might be subjected to the punishment of death. He objected also to giving power to one magistrate (whose mind might possibly be warped by passion or prejudice) to place persons assembled at a public meeting in a situation which might subject them to the punishment of death; and this too, perhaps
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under the circumstances he had described, where the meeting was actually legally assembled. Two magistrates were required to remove a pauper, and the whole magistracy of a county, sitting with all the judicial forms of a court, could not subject any individual to the punishment of death. Still less, he thought, ought it to be allowed to one magistrate to place persons at his discretion in such a situation that they might be liable to the penalty of death.
The Lord Chancellormaintained, that the clause never could be construed to mean that a meeting legally assembled, in consequence of a notice given by seven householders to the clerk of the peace, could be rendered illegal by the mere circumstance of the clerk of the peace not having communicated the notice to three magistrates. The clerk of the peace might be indictable for a neglect of his duty; but his not performing that duty could not render the meeting, of which due notice had been given to him, illegal. With regard to the punishment of death, he could only say, it was matter of notoriety that meetings had been lately held greatly endangering the public tranquillity, and those noble lords who thought that such meetings ought to be effectually put down, would, of course, vote for the punishment of death, whilst those who considered that such meetings only constituted a minor offence, would vote for a lesser punishment.
Lord St. Johnstill contended, that under the words of the clause, as it stood, the construction might be as he had stated it.
The Earl of Rosslyncertainly did not believe that any court of justice would sentence an individual to death, on account of the omission on the part of another person to do a certain act; but he contended, that the clause ought to be made more clear.
Lord Ellenboroughthought the clause quite clear as it stood, the persons attending the meetings not being responsible for any omission of duty on the part of the clerk of the peace, but he had no objection to any alteration that would make it more clear.
The Earl of Lauderdalesaid, there was no doubt that the words "in such case" used in the clause, would apply both to the notice given to the clerk of the peace, and the communication to be made of that notice by the clerk of the peace to

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three magistrates, and that thus a meeting might be declared unlawful, which was legally summoned.
The Lord Chancellorhad no doubt that a meeting legally summoned by a notice could not given to the clerk of the peace be rendered unlawful by the clerk of the peace neglecting to communicate that notice to three magistrates. He, however, would not object to an amendment that might render the clause more clear.
It was at length agreed to leave out the words "in such case."
Lord Holland Lord Holland moved, that the words "imposing the punishment of death" should be left out.
Lord Grenvillesaid, that if the act, in respect of which the punishment of death was imposed, had been the mere circumstance of going to an unlawful meeting, as his noble friend seemed to imagine, he admitted, that the punishment would be too severe; but it was not the going to the meeting, but the refusing to disperse, when commanded, that rendered the persons so disobeying liable to the punishment of death.
Lord Hollandwas perfectly aware that the act by which the penalty was incurred, was the sot dispersing, when commanded; but he repeated, that the punishment was infinitely too severe for the mere act of peaceably remaining. In the case of the not act, the penalty was incurred, not by the mere act of remaining, but by that of remaining riotously and tumultuously. He thought the punishment of death too severe for any of the offences described in these clauses; but here it was glaringly disproportionate to the crime. It was not analogous to the punishments imposed in other cases. A smuggler unarmed might, without incurring this penalty, do acts which, if done by an armed smuggler would render him liable to this punishment.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, there was a distinction certainly between an unlawful assembly and a riotous or routous assembly; but, under the present circumstances, the punishment of death ought to be here retained.
The amendment was negatived.
Lord Erskinerose on the clause relative to the holding of any meeting, the notice for which should purport that any matter or thing by law established may be altered otherwise than by the authority of King, Lords, and Commons, in parliament assembled; or tend to incite or stir up the people to hatred or contempt of his majes-
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ty, his heirs, or successors, or of the government and constitution of the realm, as by law established. He considered this clause as involving two offences of different descriptions. The first which was contained in the notice was punishable as libel on its publication; and with respect to both, to give any justice of the peace the power of determining what is or is not libel, was a greater power than was given to any judge. It was true, also, with regard to the second branch of the clause, that whatever had a tendency to excite hatred and contempt of his majesty, his heirs or successors, was a libel, and punishable by law: but to say when words spoken, or a paper published, may or may not have that tendency, was not left to his noble friend who presided in the court of King's-Bench. It was indeed his duty to state his opinion, as to their being a libel or not; but it was for the jury finally to decide. If at a meeting it was proposed to alter any thing, otherwise than by the consent of the King, Lords, and Commons, that was a matter of fact of which any magistrate could judge; and the sooner such a meeting was dispersed the better; but whether certain words might have a tendency to incite to hatred and contempt, was matter of opinion; and as the final decision on questions of opinion was not left to judges, it would thus be in the power of a single justice to construe words which might relate merely to the defects in the representation of the other House of parliament into libel, and to exercise an arbitrary power of punishment. Under such authority no meetings could be safely held, except Quaker meetings. No man reprobated more than he did those violent attacks which had been made in certain assemblies on the character of parliament. He condemned them, both on account of their violence, and of their tendency to place at fearful distance all due consideration of that most serious and important question, reform. With regard to the wording of the clause, it was absurd to suppose that such a notice could be given for a meeting as to alter any thing otherwise than by the consent of King, Lords, and Commons. Did any person ever hear of such a notice? That where there was disease it was right to apply a cure he was ready to admit; but here the cure was unnecessary, as a remedy was already provided by the due course of law.
Lord Hollandobjected to the clause on the ground of its inconsistency. It was a

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libel on the government of the country to suppose that crimes went unpunished; which it was to be presumed was the case from the wording of this clause. If such a notice as that contemplated in the clause were given, it would be the duty of his majesty's government to order a prosecution. Another very serious consideration was, that persons might assemble under a notice, which having passed through all the regular forms required by the law, might appear to them legal, yet those persons thus assembled would be liable to the same punishment as those who framed the notice.
Lord Grenvillecould not but admit that two very distinct things were mixed up in this clause; but he by no means thought the giving of a notice of the description in question so very improbable a case as his noble friends had supposed. If he was not deceived, he had in his time seen a convention sitting in this country under a notice which had for its object to alter things established by law, otherwise than by the consent of King, Lords, and Commons. He therefore, thought that means should be adopted to counteract notices of the kind referred to in the clause. At the same time he thought it right, that an assembly, which might be so called together, should not be misled as to their situation. With a view to the precautionary purposes of the bill before their lordships, it was a fair question whether it might not be proper to legalize notices, which would otherwise be illegal: but, then, it would be proper to provide, that the persons giving such notice should still be liable to be proceeded against by due course of law. On the other hand, the situation of persons who might be misled under the sanction which the law gave, ought not to be overlooked; and it were to be wished that some mode should be devised of cautioning people against attending such illegal assemblies. He had considered this subject, but had not discovered any mode of attaining the object he had stated which was satisfactory to his own mind.
Lord Ellenboroughwas of opinion that the authority given to a single justice of the peace was not of the nature his noble and learned friend had described it to be. It did not constitute the magistrate a judge of libel, nor invest him with a power of punishment. It only gave him the power of dispersing the meeting: whether what had been spoken or published was libellous, was a ques-
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tion to be afterwards determined. Under the circumstances of the case some power must be given; and what less power could be given in a crisis of urgency and probable mischief, than that of dispersing a meeting from which danger might be apprehended?
The Earl of Lauderdaleobjected to the clause. It implied, on the face of it, that the existing laws were not executed; and if the bill passed in its present form, it would amount to a declaration, that the legislature suspected that the magistrates of the country did not do their duty.
The Lord Chancellordid not conceive the clause to be liable to the objections which had been urged against it. If, however, any words could be suggested to make it clearer, or to remove the scruples of noble lords, either by a provision for making the persons who issued the notice liable to be prosecuted by a due course at law, which they certainly were as the clause now stood; or for preventing persons from being so far misled, as to assemble under the notice, or for both of those objects, such alteration might be made by way of rider, on the third reading of the bill. With respect to the possibility of a notice of the nature referred to in the clause, he agreed that it was not so very improbable an occurrence as some noble lords had supposed. Indeed, he had seen a notice for a meeting, in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, previous to the 2d of December, which was of a highly blameable nature. It was true, as his noble and learned friend had said, that the notice might be made the subject of prosecution on its being issued, and the persons signing it brought to punishment: but in the mean time the meeting would be held. Before even instructions could be given to an attorney to proceed, all the mischief, which it was the object of the clause to prevent, might be completed. No more power, then, was given than was absolutely necessary at a time like the present, when wicked and artful men were seeking, by speeches and publications, to undermine the principles of the people; because they knew that, unless they first succeeded in shaking the morality and religion of the country, and banishing the best feelings which glowed in British hearts, they could not hope to overthrow the constitution. With regard to the act for the suspension of the Ha-

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beas Corpus, which a noble lord opposite had considered as aggravating the enactments of the present bill, he must observe, that that act did not deprive persons of the right of being bailed, except in cases of committal on charges of high treason and treasonable practices. In the present state of things, no precautionary measures had been adopted beyond what was absolutely necessary. If a system was acted upon in the country, tending to make public meetings a means of overturning the government, the persons having such object in view, would laugh at the punishment of their notices by the usual course of law. No feeble measures would do. If their lordships thought it right, that the religion and morality of the country should be destroyed, and the government disrespected, they would leave the law as it now stood. If, on the contrary, they wished to secure the inestimable blessings the country enjoyed, they would not hesitate to invest the magistrates with the stronger powers proposed to be given by the bill, in so doing, they would only imitate what had often been done by their ancestors, namely, to suspend their liberties for a short time, in order to have the full enjoyment of them for ever after.
Lord Hollanddid not see how the particular powers given by this clause, and defended by the learned lord, were necessary. He entirely dissented from the clause which gave one magistrate, merely upon his own discretion, authority to disperse a meeting.
Lord Erskinewas of the same opinion. When a notice was altogether unexceptionable, the meeting that assembled in the terms of it ought not to be dispersed merely because a magistrate, in his zeal or ignorance, might think that it entered into discussions which to him might appear dangerous.
The Earl of Lauderdalesuggested, that some alteration should be made in the clause that related to the giving of lectures. By the bill as it stood, any person giving lectures on philosophical subjects, without licence, would be liable to a penalty of 20 l., and this licence might be refused by the magistrates. In Edinburgh, where the magistrates were patrons of the university, and where they might be supposed to view with some jealousy any rival institution for instruction, they might refuse a licence to a lecturer; and, if he proceeded to discuss philosophical sub-
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jects afterwards, to give lectures on anatomy, on chemistry, or any other science, both he and his pupils would be subject to the penalties of the act.
Lord Sidmouthanswered, that the penalties would not apply.
The House resumed, and the report was ordered to be received on Monday.