Sitting of 11 March 1817

PETITIONS RELATING TO REFORM, &c.
Sir W. Gearypresented a petition from the freeholders and inhabitants of the county of Kent, praying for Reform.
Sir E. Knatchbullsaid, that the petition was presented as that of the county of Kent, and as expressive of the sentiments

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of the county. He believed that it expressed the sentiments of the majority of the meeting at which it was voted, but he denied that it expressed the sentiments of the county, or could be received as the petition of the county. The high sheriff had signed it in the name of the meeting; but he could only sign for himself—he could not sign for others; and this petition, therefore, could not be received, except as the petition of the individual whose signature it bore.
The Speakersaid, there were only two modes in which petitions could be viewed as coming before the House. They must either come from individuals, assemblies of individuals, or corporate bodies. If they came from corporate bodies, and were signed in the name of the corporation, and sealed with its seal, they were considered as the prayer of the corporation. If they came from individuals, or meetings of individuals, they were to be considered only as the petitions of the persons whose signatures they bore. They could not, when signed by one in the name of the rest, be considered as the prayer of the whole.
Sir W. Gearysaid, that the manner in which the petition was signed, arose from a misconception that it would be taken as the petition of the county if signed by the sheriff in county court: it would otherwise have been most numerously signed.
Mr. Calcraftwas sensible, after what had been said, that the forms of the House precluded the petition from being received as any thing else than the petition of the high sheriff who signed it; but he hoped that, as it was substantially the petition of the meeting, though signed in their names, it would have all the weight which such an origin could give it. The hon. baronet had allowed that it expressed the sentiments of the meeting. That meeting was most respectable—it was numerously attended—it was called with due notice—the requisition was most respectably signed. In consequence of the address to be voted to the Prince Regent, which was a part of the business of the day, the hon. baronet had it in his power to have assembled a greater number of his friends to oppose the petition. The hon. baronet might have exerted all his influence. He was well supported in his opposition by a young man, who displayed great abilities on the occasion, and he might have had the assistance of some demagogues.
Sir E. Knatchbullsaid, that he had not
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opposed the petition. He neither attended when it was discussed, nor offered it any opposition whatever. The chair had rightly decided, that the petition could only be received as the petition of the high sheriff. Though the high sheriff had signed it, however, as he conceived at the time his official duty demanded, he (sir E. K.) was convinced that he neither concurred in the sentiments of the petition, nor would have signed it in his own name.
Mr. Calcraftsaid, that had it not been thought sufficient that the high sheriff should sign the petition in the name of the meeting, there would have been no difficulty in obtaining numerous and respectable signatures. The hon. baronet had wished even to take away from the petition the advantage of its one signature, by saying that the high sheriff had signed it contrary to his own sentiments. He did not know intimately the sentiments of the sheriff; but he never heard that they were opposed to the petition, and could attest that he seemed perfectly willing to sign it in the name of the meeting.
Sir W. Gearywas of opinion that the petition spoke the sense of the county; for it was known that the meeting had been convened after a sufficient notice, and that the petition had been agreed to by a great majority. He could not, therefore, imagine that the opinion of the county could be collected in a fairer way. A case similar to the present had occurred at the beginning of the session. A petition had been presented from the county of Cornwall, signed by the sheriff, and afterwards another signed by a number of the freeholders. He was glad this conversation had taken place, that the rule of the House with regard to petitions might be known.
The Speakersaid, that the House would not only see the importance of the rule that had been laid down, but the importance of diffusing a knowledge of it. Petitions could only be received as the petitions of those whose names they bore. When there was only one signature, as in the present case, the House remained entirely in the dark as to the sentiments of the meeting from which the application was said to proceed.
Sir C. Moncksaid, that the object of sir E. Knatchbull was evidently to do as much injury as possible to the petition. That hon. baronet had, however, said that the sheriff, in his private capacity, was hostile to the sentiments of the petition: if this were true, it was clear that the

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sheriff would not have put his name to such a petition, but from a persuasion that it spoke the sense of the county meeting.
Mr. Lushingtonsaid, the petition undoubtedly spoke the sense of the meeting at Maidstone, but from what he knew of Kent, it did not speak the sense of the county at large.
Mr. Ponsonbysaid, that nobody could expect that those who visited the treasury, and were the friends of the hon. secretary to the treasury, would sign petitions for retrenchment and reform. This meeting was said not to combine the respectability, or to express the sentiments of the county, when it voted the petition now before the House. He would ask, did this meeting do nothing else that expressed the sentiments of the county? Were the other acts of the meeting not the acts of the county? Did the address to the Prince Regent not contain the sentiments of the county? Did the vote of thanks to the marquess of Camden not express their sentiments? Were not these two acts done by the same meeting with whom this petition originated, and at the same time? How, then, could they be said to express the feelings and sentiments of the county, while this petition did not?
Ordered to lie on the table.

MOTION RESPECTING FEES IN COURTS OF JUSTICE.
Sir John Newport,on rising to make his motion respecting the fees in courts of justice, said, that it was now three 3'ears since he had first submitted to the House the necessity of that species of inquiry into courts of justice, which was warranted by the practice of parliament in its earliest and best times, and which was peculiarly necessary to protect the public against the increase of fees, and to secure the due administration of justice. On that occasion he had not been supported by his majesty's ministers. Three cabinet ministers present at that time divided against him. His motion was, however, sanctioned by the House by a majority of one vote. He had been accused at that time by one of the ministers as having not made out any ground for his motion; by another as a visionary and a dreamer, for no abuses, he was told, did exist. The vote of the House for commissions to inquire into this subject was on June 20, 1814, and it was not till the 9th of February following that either of the commissions was appointed. The House had not been fairly
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dealt with in this delay, and still less in the appointment of the commissioners, for, out of five of the commissioners, two were masters in chancery, though the abuses alleged to exist were in their department; for an hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Stephen) now no longer in the House, though he objected to the motion then proposed, said, that if abuses were alleged to exist in his own department, he would give his vote for the measure, and that allegation having afterwards been made, he actually gave his vote in favour of the motion, which happened to decide its success. The reports of the commissioners which were before the House, showed that he (sir J. N.) was not a visionary. By the report of the commission on the English chancery, defective as it was, abuses of considerable magnitude had been discovered. He had also the testimony of the lord chancellor himself, who, in April 1815, about nine months after his motion for commissions, recognized that erroneous practices existed in the bankrupt department, and considerably curtailed the fees there taken. This error, it was to be observed, was not discovered till after his motion, and so far the public had been gainers by it. In support of his opinion he referred to the report of the 18th of April 1732* at which period an inquiry into the subject had been instituted by parliament. It was his intention to submit to the House two propositions, involving the general principle on which the inquiry ought at present to be regulated, and then referring the reports of the commissioners to a committee above stairs for their opinion, as to the best mode of carrying the suggestions in the reports into effect. He must observe, that there were many omissions in the reports on the table. Among others there was no statement of the aggregate amount of fees any where. Without this, no judgment could be formed whether or not the fees were upon the whole disproportioned to the service performed or inadequate to the just reward of that service. When on a former occasion this subject was taken into consideration by the House, the hon. member for Norwich complained of the abuse on the part of the officers of courts of justice in taking fees to expedite judgment. It was distinctly denied by another hon. member that any such practice ever exist-
* See New Parl. Hist. Vol. 8, 1072.

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ed. An hon. and learned friend of his, however, expressed his astonishment at this denial, asserted that the practice was common, and represented the violation to which it led of that equality in the dispensation of justice to which all men were entitled. In the report on the table, all detailed account of these expedition fees was omitted. They were stated indeed to exist, but the statement was made in such a manner, with such a salvo for the practice, and with such doubts as to the expediency of abolishing them, as to render the whole subject still more worthy the attentive consideration of parliament. [The right hon. baronet here read a passage from the report to the above effect.] It would seem that the old maxim, that justice was not to be sold, was no longer to be acted on. The augmentation of the duties on stamps had nearly closed the avenues of justice against the poor, and if the very ministers of justice were to be allowed to make these demands on suitors, the effect must be utterly to debar from legal redress all persons who were unable to disburse large sums in the maintenance of their rights. It had always been the pride of this country, that within her courts of justice there was no respect of persons; but if the poor were prevented from entering, the evil was just as great to them as if the utmost partiality prevailed in the inside. If he had been correctly informed, he had not, when he formerly called the attention of the House to the subject, had in contemplation a tenth part of the grievances which actually existed. With respect to the commissions on the subject, however onerous; it was satisfactory to think that the public had derived, and were likely to derive great advantage from their investigations; and he felt the highest gratification in having been the humble instrument of bringing under the view of parliament transactions, which poisoned the source of justice and utterly prevented the poor man from obtaining it. The right hon. baronet concluded with moving the following Resolutions: 1. "That fees payable on law proceedings are to be considered as direct taxes levied on the suitor to defray the charge of the offices to which they are incident, and should be fixed in their rate, moderate in their amount, and duly proportionate to the service performed, and, as far as may be possible, carried over to a common fund for the general support of the whole establishment of those offices. 2. That the im-
§
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mense increase of taxation on law proceedings, which has resulted during later years, from the increased necessities of the state, imposes forcibly on the legislature an augmented duty of guarding the body of the people, who may become suitors in courts of law or equity, against the payment of any rate of fee which shall exceed a fair compensation for the service performed or preclude the easy attainment of justice equally by rich and poor. 3. That the several reports presented from the commissioners appointed by royal commissions, in consequence of an address of this House, to examine into the state of the courts of justice of England, Scotland, and Ireland, be referred to a committee of twenty-one members, who shall be directed to report their opinion as to the matters therein contained, and the best mode of carrying into effect any regulations which the said committee may deem advisable respecting the officers of the said courts of justice; and that the said committee shall have power to report thereon from time time as they may deem expedient."
The first resolution being put,
Lord Castlereagh,while he admitted that the right hon. baronet had brought this important subject under the consideration of parliament very fairly, clearly, and temperately, complained that he had not fully stated the grounds on which his motion with respect to it had, on a former occasion, been opposed. If he recollected rightly, the reason why his Majesty's ministers had formerly opposed the right hon. baronet's motion was, that no grounds had been laid for an inquiry into the English court of chancery, although they admitted that ample grounds had been laid for an inquiry into the Irish court of chancery, to which latter inquiry they stated, that they had no objection. Although he admitted to the right hon. baronet, that such inquiries as those which had been instituted on the right hon. baronet's suggestion, frequently brought out information that might prove useful, yet it certainly was the reverse of economy to institute such inquiries for the mere purpose of fishing, in the expectation that some information or other might possibly be the result of their labours. They were attended with considerable expense to the public. The inquiry already (he did not mean to say that an equivalent benefit might not be derived from it) had cost a considerable sum. Propositions, therefore, of that na-

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ture, ought not lightly to be entertained by the House, or without distinct grounds for expecting that the result would be attended with considerable national benefit. Notwithstanding these considerations, however, parliament had thought proper to extend the inquiry to the court of chancery in England, and that inquiry was still in progress. But hitherto the investigation of this subject by the several commissions was very incomplete. Only two reports had been laid on the table respecting the law offices in Ireland, one respecting those offices in Scotland, and one respecting them in England, forming, upon the whole, a result very short of the intention of the address to the Crown on the subject. In his opinion, it would be very unwise for that House to enter on the consideration of this very technical and difficult and complicated question, until it should be ascertained, that it was not the intention of government, or of the distinguished individuals at the head of the respective courts, to apply such remedy to the evils pointed out in the reports as might be calculated to remove them. This could not be suddenly accomplished. The lord chancellor had immediately, on the presentation of the report, put an end to all those fees, personal to himself, on which there could be the slightest doubt or question, as well as to those of a similar description paid to all officers of his court holding their situations during pleasure; and the noble and learned lord was now engaged with the master of the rolls in investigating the more elaborate parts of the subject to which the report of the commissioners referred. Little conversant as the house necessarily was with such questions, he was anxious that they should not commit their character in undertaking the examination of them, until they saw the whole scope of the inquiry by the commissioners, as affecting not only the courts of chancery, but all the other courts; for each court had principles of regulation, to which no general rule could by possibility be made applicable. With respect to the other branch of the subject, that of the constitution of judicial offices, it was a question which was certainly open to discussion. It could, however, never be in the contemplation of the right hon. baronet to leave the chief judges on the existing salaries, after striking off from them all the other means of fair emolument which they had hitherto possessed [Sir J. Newport observed across the table, that he had said
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nothing on the subject.] To inquiry into the other part of the subject, on which he had already dwelt, his objections were, however, by much the most strong. He had read the reports of the commissioners on the table, and was persuaded that it required great professional knowledge thoroughly to understand them. For himself he owned that there were parts of them of which he could make neither head nor tail; and he was persuaded that had it not been that two of those commissioners were masters in chancery (gentlemen, he understood, although he had not the pleasure of knowing them, of great learning and ability) the report must necessarily have been most insufficient. With respect to the practice alluded to by the right hon. baronet of paying fees for the expedition of judgment, he had no objection whatever to its being put down, if that could be done. The subject was distinctly noticed in the report, and the abolition of the fees recommended. The noble lord urged the right hon. baronet to withdraw his motion, on which, if that was not done, he should feel it his duty to move the previous question.
Mr. Webberdid not perceive any necessity for the appointment of a new committee, as the former reports were as full as time and circumstances could permit. It was more advisable to wait for all the reports of the existing commissions, before the House proceeded to any ulterior measures, as they would thereby have the whole case before them in a connected shape.
Mr. Ponsonbycontended, that the noble lord's memory had failed him, as to the nature of the opposition made by ministers to his right hon. friend's motion, which had been nevertheless carried for the appointment of the commissions, the reports from which were now on the table. His majesty's ministers had opposed every part of the proposition; and it had been carried by one vote, in consequence of an hon. and learned gentleman, no longer a member of that House (Mr. Stephen) having declared, that if his right hon. friend could show and abuse in the office to which, as a master of chancery, he belonged, he would support the motion, and he had very honourably done so on such an abuse having been pointed out to him. With respect to the expense of such commissions, that very much depended on the facilities afforded them, or withheld, by government and persons in authority. As to the objection made by the noble lord

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to the appointment of a committee to take into consideration the reports on the table because those reports were incomplete, he was far from thinking it a sound one. He doubted whether it would not be a wiser plan to take the matter up deliberately and in detail, as the reports from the commissioners might be from time to time presented rather than to wait until they should be so accumulated as to protract the termination of the labours of the committee to an almost indefinite period. The noble lord recommended that the subject should be left to government, and to the heads of the courts. He (Mr. P.) had known reports of similar commissions lie on the table of that House a long time, unnoticed by a minister of the Crown, or a head of the department to which they referred; nor was he very sanguine as to a more favourable result on the present occasion. If the noble lord would state any reasonable but specific time which, in his opinion, ought to elapse before the House, took any step on the subject, in order to give government, and the distinguished individuals at the head of the courts, an opportunity of taking up the subject, he, for one, would request his right hon. friend to withdraw his motion; but not otherwise. If the noble lord would not name any time, he must excuse him for saying, that his present opposition was evidently only a device for getting rid of the matter altogether.
Mr. Leslie Fostercontended for the propriety and advantage of committing the investigation in the court of chancery to the lord chancellor only, and in support of this opinion, he instanced the case of the commission appointed, in lord Hardwicke's time, for a purpose similar to that contemplated by the first motion of the right hon. baronet, when the report was made to the king in chancery, and in less than three years every abuse notified in it was corrected. There never had been so complete a clearance of the avenues of a court of justice. He had no doubt that, on the face of the report, there might be some instances of increase of fees and irregularity of practice; but in all the really important affairs of the court he was persuaded there was little ground for complaint. For the last seventy years there had not been one increase of fees, nor one abuse in the master's office; none in the register's office; in the six clerks office a few, but those small; in the sworn clerks office none since 1740; no increase in the
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examiners of the court; none in the master of the reports; and none in the register of affidavits office. In this enumeration he had set forth the whole machine which substantially did the business of the court. He was far from saying that the report did not deserve consideration; but the question was, how the matter should be taken into hand? and he thought the same course should be pursued as before, and believed it must finally come to this. If a committee, formed of professional men, were to sit every day till the end of the session, their undertaking would be little less laborious than that of the former committee. He knew this by experience, as he had himself sat upon the commission in Ireland. He had then found the difficulty of the subject, and he was persuaded that a committee of the House was more likely to take up insulated points and to do harm, than to effect any real service. It would be by far the best mode to submit the whole to the lord chancellor, and if there were any points which be might not like to venture on, they might be made the object of a supplemental act. He was aware it might be urged, that this was calling the chancellor to be judge in his own cause, and that many of the fees of the court appertained to himself. At least this would be no objection as far as the fees of others were concerned; and, with respect to his own, it was to be expected, that the consideration of his own interest would, with so exalted a character, be an additional motive for the exercise of impartiality. It appeared by the report that not one of the lord chancellor's fees had been increased; and the report stated, that they were all ancient and legal. The right hon. baronet seemed to think otherwise as to the office of secretary of bankruptcies; but that had been lately regulated, and the lord chancellor had himself voluntarily relinquished 1.000 l. a year to those who transacted a great share of the business. On these grounds he thought it would conduce to the public good, to put the reformation called for into the hands of the only competent authority, and he could assure the House that he would never support any undue delay.
Sir J. Newportshortly replied, that he would forbear to press his motion, if the noble lord would name a certain time for the settlement of the business. However, he thought it unfair to refer to the lord chancellor the revision of office, in the

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gains of which he himself participated. It had been said, that the lord chancellor had relinquished 1,000 l., a year; but when had fie relinquished it? After the commission had been instituted! The office of secretary of bankruptcies had been discharged sometimes by one person and sometimes by another, and no regular appointment had been made till the inquiry took place. The noble lord had alleged that it was inconvenient to adopt general principles which might be controverted by the language of some subsequent report; but it was impossible that the principle contained in the first resolution could ever be impugned. The second resolution stated, that the immense charges on all proceedings at law imposed a binding duty on the legislature to examine into the charges made by the officers of the courts of justice, for the purpose of preventing abuses. The stamps imposed on law proceedings were the most fatal tax ever proposed, and had the effect of shutting up every avenue to justice. The noble lord was afraid of encouraging litigation, if the stamps should be abandoned; but if they were continued, the poor man was denied justice altogether. The load of law taxes had induced thousands to relinquish altogether their legal demands, because they could not pay the duties of the suit. No tax that could be devised could be half so injurious as this; not even a tax on the necessaries of life. If, by such a tax as that, an individual were prevented from purchasing a whole loaf, he might purchase perhaps half a one; but no man could obtain justice by halves, or pay for half a writ, if unable to discharge the stamp for the whole. The legislature should be called on to abandon these duties, which closed the courts of justice against every poor man, taught him to look for irregular means of redress and destroyed the proudest boast of England—that her courts of law were open to the poor as well as to the rich. He would not, however, press his motion, if the noble lord would name a certain day; but if the matter was to be delayed indefinitely, he must now take the sense of the House.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, it was impossible to name a certain day on such a complicated subject; but it was open to the right hon. baronet to apply to the House again, if he thought the interval which might take place too long.
The House then divided; For the motion, 16; against it, 63.

IRISH PEACE PRESERVATION BILL.
Mr. Peelrose to ask for leave to bring in a bill to amend an act of the 54th of the king, for enabling the lord lieutenant of Ireland to appoint superintending magistrates and constables in those districts of Ireland which might unhappily become the scene of disturbance. The object of that bill was to supply a deficiency severely felt in Ireland in the civil power, and to introduce something like an effective police, instead of having recourse on every occasion to the cumbrous, though powerful instrument, of a standing army. The measure might probably, at first, seem liable to some objections, if applicable to this country, but the House were to balance between expedients: and if it were found less expensive and more effective than a large military force, he trusted the House would not prevent its being carried into operation. In introducing this measure to the House, he should not enter into a detail of the expense that would be saved by it. The employment of the soldiery, the charge of erecting barracks, and a great variety of other items, formed, however, a considerable aggregate of expense, under the existing system. The best disciplined soldiers, it should also be observed, if obliged to disperse themselves over the country, in small parties, as they were now compelled to do, in search of offenders, would very soon become lax and careless in the performance of their duty. He would leave entirely out of the question, the idea of men who had been employed in putting down the greatest military despotism that ever existed—who perhaps wore on their breasts the proud reward of their honourable services—being; now placed in the humiliating situation of seizing private stills, and apprehending trifling offenders. In the year 1814, when he brought forward the measure which he; now wished to amend, he proposed that the lord lieutenant in council should have the power of placing, in disturbed districts magistrates specially appointed, and constables to assist them in preserving the peace. This measure met with the almost unanimous approbation of the House and it was particularly approved of by the right hon. baronet opposite (sir J. Newport), whom, although he had often differed from the Irish government in opinion, he had ever found desirous, when measures were proposed for the benefit of that country, of which he was a native, and to which he did honour, to give them

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every assistance in his power, instead of throwing obstacles in the way of their accomplishments. The act of 1814 had been carried into execution in six instances. In three instances, in the county of Tipperary, and once, respectively, in the counties of Louth, Clare, and Cavan. It was found to have a most beneficial effect. The lowest orders of the people applied to the magistrates to settle disputes between them and their employers, and the advantage was so great, that the farmers had frequently expressed their opinion, that the peace and tranquillity which reigned in those districts where the law was acted on, was cheaply purchased by the sum they paid to support the establishment. Under that act, the whole expense was to be defrayed by the disturbed districts. This provision was introduced because it gave those who lived in those districts a direct interest in preserving the peace. This mode of proceeding would operate very well in some parts of Ireland; but others were so poor and exhausted, that they were unable to bear the expense, and, therefore, it was found impossible to carry it into effect in those districts. In those places, where the land-owners did not reside—where, in consequence, insubordination was very general—there, although the greatest necessity existed for rendering the act operative, it could not be done, because, in those districts, the least possible means of supporting the expense existed. There was a certain district in the county of Donnegal, where illicit distillation was carried on systematically—where the laws were openly violated—and those who broke them were defended by large bodies of men—to that district it had been found necessary to send a special magistrate, escorted by a party of 50 dragoons. It was to provide against the recurrence of cases of this kind—to render it unnecessary, as far as possible, to employ the military force—that he now asked for leave to amend the act of 1814; the alterations he meant to propose in which, would, he conceived, have the effect of creating a proper civil force. As the law at present stood, it was necessary on the appointment of a certain number of peace officers, to create a superintendant magistrate. If a neighbouring district became disturbed, and constables were appointed to protect the peace, they could not be directed by the magistrate who had already been created, and who was acting near the spot—it was neces-
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sary to appoint another superintendant magistrate for the newly disturbed district. To prevent this accumulation of magistrates, he should propose, that different bodies of constables belonging to different districts, should be allowed to act under the same magistrate. He should next propose, that the lord lieutenant and council should have the power of apportioning what part of the expense incurred by a disturbed district should be paid by the inhabitants, and what should come out of the public funds. He did not mean that the lord lieutenant and council should have authority to remit the whole expense; but, where great distress appeared to prevail, they ought, in his opinion, to have the power of removing such portion of it as circumstances might warrant. The last amendment would direct, that in all cases where the act was introduced, an account should be laid before parliament of the expense to be defrayed by the public, and also of the appointments, made under it.—The right hon. gentleman then proceeded to combat such objections as, he thought, might be urged against the bill. If it were said, that it would be better not to pay constables to preserve the peace, but to leave it, as was the case in this country, to the population in general to exert themselves to keep the peace, he should answer, that such a system could not, at present, be effectual, and in that statement he would be borne out by every gentleman connected with Ireland; in which country the introduction of a police at all was comparative modern—not, he believed, of more than thirty or forty years standing. The expense might possibly be objected to. The House would recollect the discussion on the military establishment for Ireland, which took place last session. There was a tolerably unanimous impression, at that time, that the force proposed was by no means too great. It was with great satisfaction he now stated, not only that it was not found necessary to extend to Ireland the Habeas Corpus suspension bill, or the bill for preventing seditious meetings, but that a very considerable reduction was proposed to be made in the military force employed there. The army in that country at present amounted to 25,000 men: these would be reduced to 22,000. There were now seven brigades of ordnance, which would be reduced from 400 to 200 guns. Thus a great expense would be removed, and,

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what was infinitely more important, a foundation would be laid for inspiring the people with an habitual obedience to the law, and, when that frame of mind was once introduced amongst them, government might dispense with the less constitutional mode of enforcing the law, which it was now so frequently necessary to resort to. The right hon. gentleman concluded by moving, "That leave be given to bring in a bill to amend the act 54 Geo. 3d, c. 131, to provide for the better execution of the laws in Ireland, by appointing superintending magistrates and additional constables in certain cases."
Sir J. Newportknew not how to reply to the compliments which the right hon. gentleman had paid him. He had but one claim to his good opinion—that of acting conscientiously, and that claim, he hoped, he should never forfeit. He approved highly of the bill now proposed: it was perfectly constitutional. He had never, for a moment, doubted, that the best boon the House could bestow on Ireland, was a police, established on an efficient footing, instead of resorting to that military force, which was too much employed in that country, and which had outraged the feelings of its population to such a degree, as would render it a matter of great difficulty to return to the spot from which they had set out. This principle, if pursued further, would place Ireland in a state of military tutelage—than which no situation could be more revolting to the feelings of humanity.
Mr. Carew, Mr. Chichester, and Mr. V. Fitzgerald, severally expressed their approbation of the proposed measure. Leave was then given to bring in the bill.

ABOLITION OF SINECURES, USELESS PLACES, &c.
Earl Grosvenorrose, pursuant to notice, to submit some resolutions to the House on the subject of sinecures, useless places, and the granting of offices in reversion. The subject, he observed, was at all times important, but particularly important at the present moment, considering the state of the public mind; but he did not agree with the noble earl opposite, who had on a former occasion said, that it was not material that the matter should be brought under discussion at an earlier period of the session. The noble earl probably alluded to certain measures which were stated to be in contemplation for the reduction of sinecures and useless places; but he did not feel himself justified in placing much reliance on hopes held out by ministers; and more especially on a subject like this. What he contended for was this—that their lordships ought to take the subject into their own hands, and give a distinct and solemn pledge to the country upon it. It was, however, with considerable pain that he now brought the matter under discussion, not merely on account of the delicacy of the subject, and the prejudices connected with it—not merely on account of the negatives which he had met with, when on former occasions he called the attention of the House to this matter; but also on account of the critical situation of the public mind. In looking at that situation, he could not view it without something like despondency; not from any such alarms as the noble lords opposite felt, but from the mistaken notion which the executive government appeared to entertain of the character, of the people of England. They totally misunderstood the open, generous, liberal, and manly character of the people, whom they
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charged with disloyalty and disaffection; and with that opinion, adopted measures which might be attended with the most fatal consequences. The ground on which those measures had passed, was an imputation of disloyalty on a great portion of the British public.
With respect to the question which he was about to submit to their lordships, although he did not despair, and although he held in contempt the doctrine of the poet that
"When vice prevails and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station;"
(he by no means meant to apply this quotation to his majesty's ministers), he certainly feared that he should not meet with adequate support. The subject had been so often discussed, that much novelty, could not be expected, and he should confine what he had to say within as narrow bounds as possible; and so he wished that the various petitions on the subject of retrenchment and reform should be entered as read. Their lordships would observe, that, though these petitions differed materially as to the nature and extent of parliamentary reform, they all agreed in condemning useless places and sinecures, and in calling for economy and retrenchment. Many a long and weary contest had he had with the noble and learned lord on the woolsack on this subject. The argument of the noble and learned lord was, that innovation was a dangerous principle; but, adopting the language of a celebrated dramatic poet, he might say, that it might be dangerous to eat, drink, or sleep; but that out of the nettle danger, they would pluck the flower safety. The object of the noble and learned lord was to embrace the constitution as it was, with all its decays and corruptions. His (Earl Grosvenor's) object was, to cut off the gangrened limb, and restore the constitution to its full health and vigour. On former occasions he had been met by the objection, that this was not the proper time—that it was a period of war;" and he was asked whether he would set about building his house in a hurricane? And he was apprehensive that, though this was a time of peace, he should still be met by the old objection—that this was not the proper time. In his present view of the subject it would not be necessary to enumerate all the sinecures and useless places at home and in the colonies, which gave so much improper influence to the ministers

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of the Crown, the masterships of the revels, and such places, sometimes given, to the amount of 5,000 l. each, to children of two or three years old. Into these details it was not necessary for him to enter. He only called upon their lordships to night to declare their opinions on the principle, and to vote that sinecures and useless places ought to be abolished. He did not wish to throw imputations on individuals. There was no demerit in holding these offices; and if indignation were felt on the subject, the public indignation ought to be directed, not against the individuals holding the offices, but against the offices themselves. His object was to procure a vote of the House that these sinecures ought to be abolished on the fall of the lives of the persons by whom they were now held. The very name of these sinecures excited disgust; and a great and eminent lord, who once sat on the wool-sack, had this opinion of them.
It had been objected, on former occasions, that sinecures ought to be reserved for; the reward of distinguished services: but it seldom happened that, when such services were to be rewarded, any sinecure was vacant; and in reality it was well known that for the most part they were not the reward of great and distinguished public services. Witness the instances of Marlborough, Nelson, and Wellington. There were, however, some eminent exceptions; such as his noble friend the auditor of the exchequer, and the noble earl opposite, who had been much employed in the public service. He might be told, that it had already been recommended to abolish several sinecures—the surveyer-generalship of the Isle of Wight, the wardenship of the Cinque ports, the clerkship of the pells, the justiceship in eyre, and four offices in the exchequer; but then he wished their lordships to give a distinct pledge on the subject. He was not called upon to place implicit confidence in what he heard; and he had so often found these things come to nothing, that he did not feel satisfied without a pledge from their lordships: and, besides, though the Commons might think that these offices ought to be abolished, their lordships might, perhaps, unless they gave that pledge, be of a different opinion, as on former occasions. The object, then, of the first resolution which he should propose to their lordships was, to procure their vote that sinecures ought to be abolished. The object of the second resolu-
948
tion was, the abolition or regulation of useless places. He was aware that the noble earl opposite had laid a paper on the table relative to that point; in the examination of which he would not take up their lordships time. The noble earl might say, that a great deal had been done by a committee appointed by the treasury board: but the paper in question, if it showed that something was done, also proved that a great deal was still to be done. Two inspectors-general were continued at large salaries; and in the barrack department, great reductions might have been made which had not taken place. The treasury board itself might have done all that had been done by its committee, and much more. These things they ought to have done, and not left others undone. The treasury might have reduced the salaries of those under their own control; for instance, that of the resident at Lisbon, whose salary was greater than that of the ministers who had been sent thither—certainly not greater than that of the present president of the board of control. There were other offices which had not been considered, though they well deserved consideration: the office of the secretary for the war and colonial department, for example—that was a question which ought to have been considered. There was another officer also, which he bad mentioned on a former occasion, which he conceived to be not only useless but illegel; and that, also, ought to be abolished. It would also have well deserved consideration, whether the office of one of the paymasters of the Army, and whether the offices of two of the lords of the Admiralty, might not be abolished. It had been said that the board of admiralty was a school for young politicians. If so, these young politicians ought certainly to pay 1,000 l. a year instead of receiving it. He had himself on one occasion been in the admiralty, and he remembered that the course of education which he received, was to have some large volumes of statutes relative to the Admiralty put into his hands, which he was desired to read all over, and these contained frequent references to other acts of parliament. The late lord Stanhope had read the whole statute book, but he believed few others had done so. However, he had been desired to read over these statutes, which he did not feel at all inclined to do; but as to the duties—he had been certainly very often called upon

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to sign his name, so that the office was no indifferent school for writing: still if the first lord of the Admiralty had consulted them frequently, these additional lords might perhaps be considered as of some use, especially if they were naval lords; however, he believed that the first lord of the Admiralty was not in the habit of consulting them. All these offices therefore were very proper subjects for consideration.
An act had lately passed for authorizing the receiving of voluntary contributions from certain offices; and it was said, that this had been done on various occasions: but he could not agree that those who were employed in the active service of the state ought to be called upon so to contribute from their salaries; at least there was only one case in which such contributions might be proper, to a certain extent; and that was, when the salaries had been considerably increased a few years ago, during the depreciation of the currency. In such a case some contribution from these offices might be proper: but, generally speaking, nothing ought to be taken from the salaries of those employed in the active service of the state. It was not the active bee, but the idle drone that ought to give up his emoluments. After the example which had been given by one nobleman, who had held a large sinecure, it might be expected that others would follow. But a noble lord had, on a former occasion, recommended that the landed proprietors should contribute. Such however, was the general distress of the country, that none were exempt from it except those who derived their incomes from the taxes; and the distress was very heavy on the landed proprietor. A friend of his had told him, that the distress was so great, and the tenants so unable to pay that his present income was no more than that which he had formerly paid in property duty; so that had not the income tax been taken off, he would have had nothing to live upon. Whether the distress was generally felt by landed proprietors with such severity, he could not undertake to say: but it was unquestionable, that they were exposed to a very heavy pressure.
The third resolution which he intended to propose to their lordships, had for its object to put an end to the practice of granting places in reversion. Unless an end were put to that practice, no good could be done; and neither sinecures nor useless places could, to any very great ex-
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tent, be abolished or regulated. The fourth resolution was of a more general nature, and related to the subject of reform, for which this was a proper time. He earnestly requested the attention of the House to the state of the public mind; not as a mind filled with disloyalty and dissatisfaction, but as one calling for some reform. The want of reform was considered as a practical grievance. The people thought that, in the present state of the representation, they had not that check and control over the conduct of the executive government which they ought to have; and without some reform the public mind never would be at peace. No people ever were more attached to their institutions than the people of England were to what they considered as the true and genuine constitution of their country. The public mind had become more enlightened, and the people in general understood what were their rights and privileges much better than formerly; and were naturally anxious to have that to which they conceived themselves entitled. These opinions were not confined to England, but were circulated throughout Europe; whether derived from the American or French revolution, it was not, for the present purpose, very material to inquire. But the sentiment had embodied itself in the minds of the European population; and all the power of governments, though accompanied with racks and tortures, would never be able to crush it. The public mind never would be satisfied till the people, all over Europe, obtained what he wished to God they might obtain—a fair representation. An able and eloquent writer had attributed the downfal of the French monarchy to clubs and corresponding societies, and those practices which were at present made the ground of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act: but he considered those practices not as cause but effect. They were the effect of dissolute morals and manners, of financial embarrassments; and above all, of the despotic nature of the French government. Many a government had begun under the happiest auspices, and ended as the French government had done:
"Fair laughs the morn, and soft the zephyr blows,
Whilst proudly riding o'er the azure realm
In gallant trim, the gilded vessel goes;
Youth at the prow, and pleasure at the helm,
Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway
That, husht in grim repose, expects his evening prey."

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He could not help now saying a few words with respect to a matter personal to himself. He had on a former occasion been called to order for naming certain members of the executive government in the other House. He had been made in some quarter to say, that by the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act the liberties of the people would be placed at the mercy of such and such persons. Now, he had not made use of these words; and he was desirous that this should be understood lest an impression should prevail any where, that he acted from any personal motives, instead of acting on public grounds. But it was on public grounds alone that he proceeded; and he protested and declared, that if his noble friends near him were to become ministers, and were to act on the principles which appeared to govern the conduct of the present ministry, he would oppose them. The ministry which he wished for was one which would look, not merely to the prerogatives of the Crown, but also to the privileges of the people; a ministry which, while it stedfastly regarded the prerogative and dignity of the Crown with one eye, would regard the privileges of the people no less stedfastly with the other; and if the caprice of the sovereign should at any time call upon it to deviate from these principles, he wished for ministers who would resign their places rather than comply. He did not oppose the present ministers on any personal ground; and he earnestly and solemnly intreated the House, and especially the bench of bishops, to recollect, that if it was possible that a people should conspire against their government, it was also possible that a government might conspire against the people. There was one point more to which he wished to call the attention of the House. The saving, as it appeared from the papers on the table, amounted to 50,000 l.: but the excess of salaries lately created amounted to 126,000 l., or from that to 170,000 l.! from which their lordships would perceive, how small in comparison the saving was. He proposed then, these four resolutions:

1. "That it is the opinion of this House that all sinecures in the patronage of the Crown ought to be abolished after the expiration of the subsisting interests.

2. "That all useless places should be abolished or regulated forthwith.

3. "That for the future no places should be granted by the Crown in reversion, as tending to prolong and perpetuate useless
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offices, and to render inadequate the discharge of those to which active duties are annexed.

4. "That it is more especially the duty of the House to adopt the foregoing resolutions at a period of unusual difficulty and distress, and of universal petition for economical reform and retrenchment."

The Earl of Liverpoolobserved, that the noble earl who had just sat down began the speech which contained the grounds on which he had submitted his resolutions to their lordships consideration with a general eulogium on the loyalty of the people, which he seemed to think there was a disposition on the part of government and parliament to libel. He should be glad to know whom the noble earl considered as the people of England? Was it those who were disaffected to the government and constitution of the country? Was it those who had lately assembled at certain meetings—the meetings at Spa-fields, and others of a similar description—whom he considered as the people of England? In the noble earl's general eulogium on the loyalty of the people, he was sincerely disposed to concur; but he believed that no man who fairly considered what had recently been the state of the country, what the probable effect of the treasonable practices which had been disclosed, but would agree that precautionary measures were necessary; not indeed on the supposition of disloyalty in the great body of the people, and therefore not adopted against them; but for the protection of a loyal people against those who wished to seduce and demoralize them. When the noble earl said that the bill which had passed for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act, and those now in their progress before parliament, had excited discontent and dismay, he asserted what appeared to him completely contradictory to the real state of the case. Where were there any evidences of discontent or dismay since these measures had been originated? Let the noble lord, on the contrary, compare the despondency which existed a few weeks ago, with the state of the public mind now, and judge fairy of the difference. What had been the effect of the measures introduced by his majesty's government, and already, in part, sanctioned by parliament? It was to be seen in the removal of that apprehension and despondency which had prevailed; it was to be seen in the ameliorated state of the public mind and public

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credit; as was evident from the very considerable rise of the funds which had taken place. He certainly did not mean to undervalue that consideration which was due to the measures which had been adopted, or to insinuate that the grounds on which they were proposed ought not to be jealously canvassed; but this he would maintain, that their immediate consequence had been the restoration of public credit and confidence. With regard to the only one of those measures which as yet had through all the forms requisite to it a law, nobody regretted its necessity more than himself, but it was rather singular that the noble earl should regard it as so peculiarly objectionable. The noble lord ought not to deal quite so hard with those who now supported the suspension of the Habeas Corpus, act as he had voted for it himself not less at least than 6 or 7 times. It was true, the noble earl would say, that when he so voted, the circumstances of the country were very different, and that the present circumstances did not call for such a measure. This however, was what he disputed; and whether the circumstances of the country now required the passing of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act, was not a question to be argued between him and the noble earl—it had been decided by parliament. Before he proceeded to make any remark on the objects of the resolutions themselves, he must observe, that it was possible for resolutions to be so drawn as to contain nothing objectionable on the face of them, and yet to be such as it would be very improper for that House to adopt. A subject might be stated which would be a very fit one for inquiry, in certain circumstances: and which would be unfit in others. It certainly would be neither regular nor proper in their lordships to go into an inquiry on the subject of the resolutions proposed by the noble lord, with a knowledge that an investigation on the same subject was in progress in another place. It was also to be considered, that this was a branch of legislation not so appropriate for their lordships deliberation; and that if the noble earl's resolutions were adopted, it was not easy to see how any practical measure could be founded upon them. The first resolution which the noble earl proposed to move was for the abolition of sinecures, Now, the question he would wish to ask on that resolution was, what the noble earl meant by a sinecure? He would contend, that no
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noble lord could give a distinct answer to the question. He would be glad to be informed, how any definite meaning could be attached to the word sinecure. The noble earl would find the term sinecure-office in a bill which had been introduced into parliament; but neither in that bill, nor in the long list of officers pointed out as fit objects of regulation, by a report of the other House, could any one be found to which the term sinecure would with propriety attach. To certain offices in the exchequer this term had often been applied; but were they really sinecures? On the contrary, they were offices of high importance and great pecuniary trust. It might be proper to regulate them: it might or it might not be proper to find other means for rewarding merit than the existence of these offices presented. This was a question he did not at present mean to argue; but what he contended for, and would maintain, was this—that if the noble lord regarded any one of these offices as a sinecure, in the proper sense of the word, he was most completely mistaken. They were all offices of trust demanding not merely a responsibility of character, but a pecuniary responsibility, and security, was given to the public by the individuals who held them. Whether the employment of them in rewarding public services was wise or not, was, as he had already stated, an entirely different consideration. In fact, the term sinecure, applied to any office of the state, was a perfect nickname. The noble earl called to abolish something of which the House knew nothing, and the existence of which he could not point out. Where were those sinecures the noble earl would abolish? And how many were thereof them? He should be glad to hear any noble lord answer those questions. Here he begged it might be understood that he was not giving any opinion against legislating on the subject of the offices in question; that was a matter on which parliament was competent to determine; but of this he was certain, that to ascertain what offices might with propriety be abolished, and what others might be changed, reduced, or otherwise regulated, required very mature deliberation; and more knowledge and experience of business than he believed the noble earl could pretend to possess. What the decision of their lordships might be, when the subject should be fairly under their consideration, would depend upon a view of the effects of the present system of rewarding merit, with the

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probable consequences of that system which it might be proposed to substitute. He would not pretend to anticipate that decision: nor did he now object to the discussion of the subject, but should reserve his opinion until it came before their lordships in a proper shape. With respect to the noble earl's proposition, respecting an increase of the influence of the Crown in parliament, it was so monstrously absurd he did not think it necessary to enter into that subject. The contrary was notoriously the fact; but he should be ready to state his opinion on that question, also, if it should be at anytime brought in a practical form under their lordships consideration. That there was a call, an imperious one, on the government to inquire into the state of the public expenditure, he would not deny. If ever there was a time for economy it was the present, when the public distress was, from various causes so great. Whether ministers had or had not done their duty in the measures of economy they had adopted, there would be other opportunities of considering; and he should not now detain their lordships by discussing that point. He would, however, just observe, that the reductions made in a great branch of the public expenditure exceeded what had been expected by the best informed advocates of the system of economy in another place. The peace establishment was estimated, by a person well qualified to judge, and not disposed to take the most favourable view of the conduct of ministers, at 700,000 l. more than the sum at which it had been fixed. This he thought might be considered as at least a strong presumption of the disposition of his majesty's government to adopt every practical measure of economy. As to colonial offices, all of that class which it was possible to do without had already been abolished: but the increase of our foreign settlements, and the extent of their relations, required a department for the management of colonial affairs. No offices, however, in the colonies themselves, were in future to be given to, or held by any persons who did not reside in the colonies; which would at once render them all efficient offices. He was confident that it was impossible for public business to be carried on without three secretaries of state. Under the present, or any ordinary circumstances of the country, it was evident to any one at all acquainted with public business, that the business of the
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office of the third secretary of state, to be properly executed—and it never had been better executed than now—was as much as physical and moral strength was capable of performing. Among those who might choose to take the trouble to inquire what business was really done at this office, he was confident there would be no difference of opinion on this subject. Upon the whole, seeing no practical good that could be derived from the resolutions proposed by the noble earl, which on the contrary appeared to him only calculated, if they should be carried, to embarrass the discussion of questions subsequently to come before parliament, he should move the previous question on them.
Lord St. Johnsaid, it had been often observed, that persons entertaining different political questions saw things in very different lights; and that observation was never more applicable than to the different accounts given by his noble friend and the noble earl opposite (Liverpool) of the opinion now entertained with regard to the measures lately resorted to, and the impression which those measures had made on the public mind. Many circumstances were calculated to have a considerable effect on the public funds, but he never should have expected to be told that the suspension of the British constitution was calculated to produce a favourable effect on the funds. He should much rather have been disposed to attribute any rise in the funds to an understanding that considerable reductions were about to be made in the public expenditure. The noble earl had also described the measure to which he attributed this beneficial effect as a precautionary one. Now this seemed quite anew way of viewing it. If he had at all understood the way in which the measure was proposed by ministers, it was for the purpose, not of preventing, but of putting down sedition. A great deal had also been said by the noble earl about the difficulty of defining what a sinecure office was. The noble earl had misconceived what his noble friend said. An office might be not a sinecure, and yet the person who held it a sinecurist, if the business was done by deputy. Though the office might be an efficient one, and required security to be given by the individual who held it, yet if the business was done by deputy, the individual holding the office was purely a sinecurist. The noble earl opposite had said there was an objection in limine to entertaining questions of this
§

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nature. Nothing was, in his opinion, more desirable than that the petitions of the people, at a conjuncture like the present, should have every possible weight with both Houses of Parliament. He recollected all the discussions during the American war, when the complaints on the subject of retrenchment were as loud as at present. He recollected that the House of Commons were often called to the consideration of questions of economy when petitions for economy and retrenchment, and complaining of the extravagant expenditure of the Crown, were poured in from all parts of the country. They would be holding their dignities too high were they to say they would not pay attention to such petitions. That their lordships were also competent to originate measures for abridging the influence of the Crown, surely could not be questioned. The act of succession, by which the privileges of the House of Commons were so essentially secured, did not originate in that House, but with their lordships. Yet that was a subject respecting which the other House might have been expected to be as jealous, as respecting questions of expenditure. But according to the noble earl, every thing relating to expenditure was so peculiarly the province of the Commons, that though the table of their lordships should be loaded with petitions, they were not called on to take any notice of them. The noble lord (St. John, went into an examination of the result of the labours of the committee appointed to inquire into offices erected since the war, with a view to reduction; and maintained that the reductions, which amounted to about 50,000 l. were compensated for by superannuations very nearly to the same amount. He contended, that offices created during war, and depending for continuance on the war, were to be considered as temporary offices, and that the persons filling them had no right to consider themselves as permanent officers, and entitled to superannuation. He complained also of the withdrawing from the controllers of army accounts the auditing of the commissariat accounts which formed part of their business.
The Earl of Lauderdalecould not concur in opinion either with his noble friend who moved the resolutions or with the noble secretary of state. His noble friend had described the difficulties which the country experienced from the weight of taxation. The fact was that the landed
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interest was in a situation of distress never before felt in this country. The noble earl opposite seemed to doubt this statement; but if, he inquired into the state of the tenantry, he would soon be convinced of the fact: he would find that few of them were able to pay their rents; and that the greater part of those who did pay, derived the means of so doing from their capital, and not from the produce of their farms. Did the noble lord consider what must be the ruinous effect of this state of things? It was capital in the hands of the tenantry that had created that high state of cultivation for which this country was justly famed; but if the capital was exhausted, the effect would necessarily cease. A noble lord had said, on a former occasion, that the situation of the agricultural classes could not be so bad as it was described, as the repeal of the property-tax must have been a great relief to them. If, however, inquiry were made among the farmers, it would be found, that they would be content to suffer the infliction of the property-tax, if they could be placed in the situation in which they stood five years ago. Whatever measures might tend to relieve them, he was certain the abolition of sinecures was not among the number. Nothing was more ridiculous than the expectation of great public benefit from that abolition; except, perhaps, what the noble secretary of state had asserted to be the effect of the abolition of the Habeas Corpus act. What facilities that measure might give to the noble earl's tenants, in enabling them to pay their rents, he did not know; but if the suspension had really raised the funds, as the noble earl asserted, it was fair to suppose that the subsequent fall of one per cent, had been owing to the discovery made by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, that the amendment made on the bill by the Commons had done it great injury, inasmuch as the benefit of the measure would not be extended to Scotland. Would the suspension of the Habeas Corpus enable the manufacturer to obtain a price for his goods from those who had nothing to give for them? The state of the country required very different remedies than those proposed by either of the noble earls. A noble friend near him had spoken of the table being loaded with petitions: but if the public distress was to be in any way attributed to the existence of the offices in question, it would follow that public offices were now more highly

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paid than they had been in former times; which was not the fact. The opposite parties of that House had often been described as two factions, only contending for the loaves and fishes of the British constitution; but as each party in its turn had yielded to the public prejudice against these offices, if the same system proceeded there would soon be neither loaf nor fish left. If any man wished to make his fortune a seat in parliament was the last course which he ought to take. With regard to the influence of the Crown in the House of Commons, there was a report on their lordships table which placed that question in its true light. That report, which was made to parliament in 1807, proved that the number of persons holding offices had diminished instead of having increased, To avoid entering into details on this question, he should only state some prominent facts. Before the Union with Scotland, the number of members of the House of Commons holding places under the Crown was greater than at later periods, though the House of Commons was augmented by that union. In 1705, 98 individuals holding offices had seats in the House of Commons: in 1807, the number was only 74, being a diminution of 24. In the year 1716, the difference was still more remarkable; there were then 164 placemen in the other House; which, compared with 1807, gave an excess of 90. In 1718 the number of placemen who had seats was 154; which made the excess at that period 80. In 1797, the number of placemen was 193, and the expense of their salaries above 285,000 l. In 1807, the number, as he had said before, was reduced to 74, and the expense to only 193,000 l., making a difference of 119 in number and 92,000 l. in expense. This comparison decidedly proved that the influence of the Crown had greatly decreased in the House of Commons: but he begged that he might not be supposed to state that it had decreased on the whole. On the contrary, he was aware that it had infinitely increased through the country at large. This was naturally to be expected, from the large civil and military establishments maintained by the government, and from the influence of a national debt, amounting to 700,000,000 l.; the charge on which was 37,000,000 l., while after the American war, it was only 240,000,000 l., with a charge of 10,000,000 l. It was not, therefore, the influence of the Crown in the House of Commons which was to be
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guarded against, but the influence out of doors. This was evident from the readiness with which the Crown appealed to that influence whenever a majority of the House of Commons was disposed to bring about a change of administration. The noble earl who moved the resolutions had talked of the great emoluments of public offices; but the view he had taken was altogether erroneous, and founded on the common public prejudice. There never was a period in our history when men in office were less corrupt; and perhaps never a time when the public was more corrupt. He agreed with the noble secretary of state as to the impossibility of pointing out any office which was completely a sinecure. No man was more aware than he was of the deep necessity for adopting measures of economy, yet these measures were not to be adopted, when they came in contact with the safety of the state. Nor did he agree in the opinion, that because an office was held by a person who employed a deputy to discharge its duties, that that individual was a sinecurist. He undoubtedly received a salary from the public, but then it was to be remembered he became responsible for the performance of those duties. No man, he believed, could suppose that system of government to be right which allotted no rewards to its public servants. Rewards were indispensably necessary for meritorious services, and certainly sinecures were infinitely better than public pensions. Convinced as he was, that the giving of pensions would be felt to be a more serious evil than sinecures, he thought the granting of these pensions would disgrace parliament more. He looked upon sinecure offices as a sort of lottery, where, though the rewards were few, yet the hope of the great prize would induce many a man to exert himself to deserve it. He had not himself been much in office; but though he had never been minister, he was perfectly acquainted with this circumstance—that three or four importunate claimants might be put off by the hope of a reversionary sinecure, who, without such a mode of rewarding public service, would at once have required a pension. His noble friend had truly observed, that the distresses of the people made them look on all sides for relief: he was one of those, however, who believed that the people would never have turned their attention to this particular subject, nor have looked to such a source for relief, unless the parliament itself had set the

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example of referring to such a fund for a supply. In fact, the evil under which the country laboured lay much deeper; it was the infinite load of the public debt. He had himself published to the world his sentiments on this point, though he had not had the good fortune to be listened to. He should say further, that he did not see the policy or propriety of ministers recommending his Royal Highness to renounce part of his income. The salary given to that illustrious personage was in consideration of the high situation in which he was placed, and it had been given to him after a solemn and dispassionate deliberation in parliament. He had no hesitation to state, clearly and explicitly, that he deprecated and even reprobated the discussion of these minor matters, because he felt a conviction that they took off the public attention from greater objects. He was ready to admit, that no taxes could be too great for a nation to pay, provided the objects to be attained were greater: but such a fact must be fully proved, which had not yet been done. As to the argument drawn from the funds, every man who looked to the state of the currency must know, that though the funds might probably be yet considerably higher, yet speculators alone would derive any benefit, while the labourer and the manufacturer would be entirely without relief. The funded system had been productive of the greatest disadvantages, and had taken as much as five millions from the pocket of the landholder. That was the wisest distribution of property which would give happiness to a whole people: but as to the abolition of sinecures, he thought that the measure would not only do no good in itself, but that the discussion of it would tend rather to increase than to diminish the hatred of public men; and would in its consequences force upon the people a stronger idea that such men lived only on the public property.
The Earl of Darnleyhad no hesitation in admitting that the constitution of parliament was much better with respect to the influence of the Crown than it once was. If, however, no other argument could be found for the abolition of sinecures, yet it ought to be accomplished for this single reason—that such a measure comprehended the general principle of a disposition to reform. When the times were so severely pressing as the present were, he thought some attention and respect should be paid to the public voice. The country
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had, he might say, almost with one voice, declared the system of rewarding public services by sinecures to be extremely objectionable, and certainly some attention should be paid to that voice.—He said, he was ready to agree, that a system of pensions must be substituted for the present system; but he thought such a mode of remuneration would be more economical, and (he begged pardon of noble lords) less offensive, than the present. But, be this as it might, he thought that the circumstances of the country were such, that it became the duty of parliament to direct its attention to some species of reform, whatever difference of opinion might exist as to the particular and specific plan.
The Earl of Liverpoolhad no objection: to withdraw the previous question, if it were agreeable to the noble lords upon the opposite side, and hoped should such be the mode of proceeding adopted, that their lordships would, by a direct vote, completely and at once negative the proposition.
Lord Hollandthought the noble secretary of state had great reason to flatter himself on the accession of strength which he had obtained on this question; but the principle of it was by no means affected by that circumstance. He objected to the noble earl's withdrawing his motion for the previous question. It was at the option, of the House to permit that noble earl to withdraw it or not, and he had his reasons for wishing their lordships to refuse him that permission. The great questions which had deservedly agitated all persons within and without those walls, had formed part of this night's discussion. These were, the generally discontented state of the public mind, and the late suspension of the Habeas Corpus act. He did not exactly see the relation between the latter and the question before their lordships; but as it had been again introduced, Ecce iterum Crispinus, he must in the strongest terms object against the measure of suspending the most valuable part of our constitution. How absurdly had it been stated by the noble earl that the resorting to this measure had already raised the funds of the country! Why then, for Heaven's sake, and his own sake, for he seemed then to be sadly at a loss for any one argument for the measure, had he not mentioned to their lordships when the suspension was first proposed that it would materially raise the stocks? This rise of the stocks must be considered by the whole nation as

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well as himself, a subject of the utmost alarm, and even terror and dismay; for if the suspension of this act for three months, before it had been consummated an entire week, be receiving the royal assent, had produced such an effect, what might not be the sanguine expectations raised in the breasts of the noble earl and his colleagues, should they be enabled, by the fatal complaisance of parliament to abrogate the Habeas Corpus act altogether? If by this temporary measure the three per cents. had thus rapidly risen to 70, might not the permanent measure raise them above par? Could any person who loved sound argument, or loved his country, listen to such assertions without alarm and apprehension?—Upon the subject of that report so generally and justly reprobated, it must be confessed therein the minister, whether he had or had not libelled the people of England collectively bad certainly chastised them collectively for the sake of the disaffected; and then because he had libelled only the few, he proceeded to punish, chastise, and oppress all the people of this country. When on a former occasion a suspension of this act had taken place, it was justified in some measure by the circumstance of our being engaged in a war with a powerful, intelligent, and energetic government, seeking to revolutionize and overthrow all established systems of government; but on the present occasion, the only reason adduced for these arbitrary measures, was the alleged perversion of a small portion of the public mind in the lower classes. What! was not this libelling the government of the country, as inefficient to resist these puny efforts, and libelling the people of England, by confounding the mass of the nation, patient and resigned under its sufferings and privations, in the crime, and also m the punishment of those objectionable few? It was not true, however, that the measure was of such prodigious importance, and the argument of the noble earl was good for nothing, unless he could go on to show, that the measure besides raising the funds, would give employment to the idle, and food to the hungry. With respect to the immediate question before their lordships, although he was satisfied of the propriety of concurring with the other House of Parliament in declaring the expediency of the abolition of sinecures and useless places, yet he never had heard any man in either House of Parliament contend that this was a measure of
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such material consequence as could affect the reduction of our expenditure within the compass of our revenue. Yet it was necessary to oppose some mound to the incursions of the Crown. The noble lord whom he was happy to call his friend had expressed his regret at differing from those with whom he generally acted. He always heard the speeches of his noble friend with pleasure, when he considered the luminous and eloquent manner in which they were delivered. He did not, however, agree with his noble friend respecting the increase of the influence of the Crown being confined to the mass of the people. If the Crown actually had so much influence out of the House, that influence was of necessity exercised in the House for the most obvious reasons. Nor did he conceive the debt of the country to be the principal evil, because he thought the unconstitutional standing army, the unnecessary, extravagant expenditure of the public money, &c. were equally bad. He did not concur in the comparison made between the period of Queen Ann's reign and the present, respecting the influence of the Crown, because it should be remembered two unions had taken place, since that, and besides the colonial department had increased to such an extent as, in the opinion of the noble earl at the head of the treasury, to require the services of a third secretary of state. And here when speaking of the secretary of state, he could not help noticing the opinion of the noble earl. He had said the business of the state could not be conducted without this secretary. Surely the duties of that office could not be so highly important or laborious, when it was recollected that lord Melville had been both president of the board of control and secretary at war (as the office was then called) at one time. [Here some noble lord said, that lord Melville had held all the secretaryships of state at one time]. This was indeed new to him; he had no idea that lord Melville had been such a pluralist. Thus then he held all these offices, and it made the argument the stronger, controllership, secretary for the war and home department, as well as colonial. [The earl of Liverpool—"No, not colonial."] Well, be it so, in all conscience he had enough for the drift of his argument: and perhaps the noble earl might think enough for his (lord Melville's) capacity, for either occupation or emolument. He knew enough of public business to say that the business

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of these three secretaries of state would be better transacted by two persons than by a multiplicity of officers. This opinion might be corroborated by persons of the highest authority. In fact, before the American war, there had been three, but parliament then inquired into the evil, and reduced them to two. With respect to the puisne lords of the Admiralty, he had heard with surprise that it had been asserted, that the best lords of the Admiralty were not to be found amongst those most conversant with nautical affairs, who had been designated sea monsters. Such language was neither wise nor respectful to the country. In the civil department of the admiralty he was sorry to find that a distinct stand had been made against economy. And though ministers had taken great credit to themselves for some general reductions, he begged to know why the retrenchments had not been made last year. The noble earl might think these concessions boons; but in fact they were extorted only by the petitions of the people—by such petitions as he trusted still to see the table crowded with, one noble lord had denied the existence of sinecures: with all his well known acuteness, he could, not it seemed clearly comprehend the meaning of a sinecure. Such had actually been the confession of the noble earl. Now if he wanted an explanation of its nature, perhaps he might bring his mind to understand the abstruse signification of that complex definition of a sinecure, viz. a patent place, executed by deputy. If such places were not sinecures, he did not know what they were; but if the word was matter of objection, let it be altered; and the substance of the present motion would still stand. And as to the reason assigned for not entering upon the question, that inquiries were now pending in another place it was precisely the reason why this proceeding should be adopted. A noble earl had objected to this as an abstract and speculative proposition; but "abstract" and "speculative" were nick-names too often applied. He must here allude to an assertion in a speech made the other night, that the French revolution began by the abolition of sinecures. Was it so? Who, then, was the great author of a similar revolutionary measure in this country? At whose instigation were sinecures first abolished? Was it not by the great champion of anti-revolutionary principles? To what extent would such an argument lead us? If the abolition of sine-
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cures was a revolutionary measure, then Mr. Burke was the great revolutionist: if it was jacobinical, Mr. Burke was himself the arch-jacobin. If the Spencean doctrines should prevail, and every proprietor's land be divided into squares for the public good, Mr. Burke alone was answerable; nay, if their lordships should all have their throats cut, all the dire mischief was to be attributed to Mr. Burke's bill. Such was the absurd consequence to be deduced from the argument of a noble lord—that the very proposal of abolishing sinecures was in itself revolutionary. The noble earl had talked of certain salaries (offices would have been a proper term) as necessary to maintain the splendour of the Crown. He was himself as anxious as any man to support the due splendour of the regal dignity; but he thought that too much might be expended about it as well as too little. When Mr. Burke spared the great offices of the household, his professed object was to keep about the throne persons of refined education, of exemplary character, and of high rank; persons, in short, whose situations were such that they were not likely to attach themselves to the Crown for the sake of the salary. On this point he would not be so personal as to point out what individual offices might be abolished; but he thought the subject extremely fitting for parliamentary inquiry. The noble earl had said, that pensions would be as expensive a mode of remuneration as sinecures; but the question was not one of sinecures versus pensions, or of pensions versus sinecures; but of pensions versus sinecures plus pensions, for we had both the one and the other; and it was the desire of ministry to keep both. He had never seen that the existence of sinecures tended in the smallest degree to diminish the number of pensions. Whenever any public service was performed, or any great, man was to be rewarded, a pension was immediately demanded for him as much as if no such thing as a sinecure was in existence. He did not mean to cast any personal reflections, but two instances occurred to him too striking to be omitted. The first was the case of the late Mr. Pitt, a man whom, though he differed widely from him in politics, he was ready to praise for his noble disinterestedness and disregard of money? When he died, application was made to parliament, and all his debts were paid by the public. On Mr. Perceval's death, a similar application was I made, and pensions were given to his chil-

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dren. So in all cases, whenever an opportunity presented itself, a message came down immediately to parliament, and a pension was recommended to reward each fresh instance of merit in a public servant. It was not fair, therefore, to call it a question whether pensions or sinecures should be allowed to be the best mode of public reward; for the real matter in dispute was whether both modes of remuneration should exist at the same time, and for the same purposes. For his own part, he thought sinecures the most unjust species of compensation; but, if not unjust, he was sure that it was the most invidious; and that was no slight objection. To call it by the gentlest name, he would say it was inconvenient, because it was peculiarly liable to unconstitutional influence. In this point of view, there was much more room for abuse in the distribution of sinecures, than of pensions. In every case of pension, whatever influence might be exerted was manifest and declared. All was open. A regular request was made to parliament; the service of the person to be rewarded was publicly announced, and was discussed and weighed, and calculated before the pension was bestowed. But it was not so with sinecures. Sinecures had been aptly compared to great prizes in the lottery of political reward; because very often they fell by mere accident to persons of neither merit nor service, whilst veteran servants of their country, merely from ill luck, after 40 or 50 years labour, had no opportunity of obtaining one of those prizes. Nothing could more strongly elucidate their impropriety. He might apply to pensions and sinecures the language of scripture, which had lately been quoted for another purpose; with respect to their different natures and effects, he would call the pension, "the arrow that flieth by day," and the sinecure "the pestilence that walketh in darkness." It was, indeed, the chief and prevailing objection against sinecures, that their influence was secret and silent. It was this that made them so offensive to the country: it was this which would ever continue to make them offensive, though the degree of injury which they produced might be infinitely less than it was pretended to be. This, therefore, was alone a ground (he would, I if their lordships pleased, allow it was the chief ground) why they should be abolished. It was no doubt true, that the Crown had an interest in remunerating its servants by this mode; but it was at least
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equally clear, that public opinion was decidedly against it. The nation at large considered sinecures as odious burthens; and ministers were bound, not merely to listen to the voice of the people, but to obey it. The noble earl had talked of delusion, and of false persuasion, that had been super-induced on this subject; but the best way of removing it, was to abolish sinecures; and as they were the cause, the effect would cease with them. The plan hitherto adopted, if indeed it deserved the name of a plan, was most injurious to the purposes of ministers themselves: they refused to abolish at once in an open and manly way; but, by degrees, they clipped and trimmed one office and then another, without giving satisfaction to their own or to any other party. The sinecurists in the colonies it had been said, had been compelled to perform their duties themselves personally by a late act. In fact there had existed no necessity for this act. The act passed under lord Lansdown's administration, had it been put in force, would forty years ago have compelled their attention to their duties in person; and it was shameful on the part of government to allow that act to remain a dead letter upon the statute book, when the national complaints so loudly called for its enforcement. The noble earl had spoken of the danger of concession; but that danger was incalculable, when compliance was extracted and extorted by the compulsion of national sentiment. His majesty's government might delay as much as they pleased, but the time would come when they must grant what the nation required; they might patch and paint for a time, but "to this complexion they must come at last;" and it was not only far better for themselves, but for the public tranquillity, that they should comply at once with a good grace, instead of being forced to yield what in itself was most just and reasonable.
The previous question being put, the House divided: Contents, 5; Not Contents, 45; Majority against Earl Grosvenor's Resolutions, 40.