Sitting of 12 June 1815

NEW POST-OFFICE BILL.
The order of the day for the further consideration of the report of the Post-office Bill, having been read, Mr. Lushington moved, "That the Bill be now re-committed."
Mr. H. Sumnerthen rose, and stated the objections he had uniformly advanced against the re-building of the Post-office, on the contemplated plan, since the measure was first agitated. He apologised for being absent when the subject was last discussed. The reason of which was, that, as it stood amongst the orders, and a great variety of notices preceded it, on a day when the notices were to come on first, he had no idea that the subject would have been discussed on that evening. Many of the notices were, however, deferred, foe the purpose of then considering the Bill—a proceeding which he did not think fair or candid. With respect to the mode in which the expense of erecting the new Post-office was to be defrayed, it appeared to him to be in the highest degree unjust. All taxation should be as general as possible; and, except in cases of local improvement, this principle ought never to be deviated from. But, in the present instance, the citizens of London, and the inhabitants of some of the adjacent counties, would be taxed for a public work, from which they would derive no more benefit than the other subjects of the empire. He never could agree to charge, on the Orphans' Fund, any part of the expense of the new building. That Fund was placed under the management of the corporation of London; and he was one of those who did not much admire the way in which they had discharged the trust committed to them. No less than. 900,000 l. had been subtracted from that Fund, and appropriated to that for which it was never intended. The bonds issued to raise 600,000 l. of that sum, bore a discount of 16, 18, and even 20 per cent., so that in raising the money, the public had sustained a loss of not less than 160,000 l. The works which the City had caused to be executed, and which were to be defrayed out of this Fund, were not entitled to approbation. Blackfriars Bridge had been open about 43 years, and it was now in such a state of decay, that, unless 40 or 50,000 l, were laid out in necessary repairs, it would not probably last for twenty years more. How ill Newgate

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was adapted to the purposes for which it was erected, was a complaint made by every person who examined it. That building cost 95,000 l.; and the committee of that House, lately appointed to examine the slate of the gaols in the metropolis, observed, in their report, that it was much to be lamented so large a sum had been so ill applied. In his opinion, the Orphans' Fund, placed as it was, under the direction of the corporation of London, was a perpetual source of job to many of the officers connected with that corporation. The hon. gentleman then adverted to the accounts of the balances of the Orphans' Fund, which had been laid before the House, and which, be expressed his belief, were not correct. He denied the necessity of having a collector of the coal duty in the port of London—although the person who filled the situation, he admitted, was very moderately paid, having only 150 l. per annum. But where there was a chamberlain, into whose hands the money ought to be paid, he could not see the prudence of allowing balances to accumulate in the bands of another person.
Sir James Shawdefended the city of London from the imputations attempted to be cast upon it by the hon. gentleman who had spoken last, and repeated the arguments which he had urged on former occasions in favour of this Bill. He considered the Orphans' Fund could not be better applied than in the erection of a new Post-office, which would not alone prove beneficial to the city of London itself, but to the country at large, from the great facility which would be given in the transaction of public business in this department.
Mr. Grenfellconsidered that his hon. friend was entitled to considerable praise for the zeal which he had displayed in his opposition to this measure. He could not agree, however, in the comments which he had made on the hon. alderman opposite (sir W. Curtis), whose conduct he considered as having been unobjectionable in every sense of the word, as far as regarded his duty of collector of the duty on coals.
Sir W. Curtisdefended himself from the charge which had been brought against him, and submitted, that the compensation which he received for the trouble of collecting the duties on coals was far from being too liberal. There were many situations in which collectors received per cent, for the execution of their duties,
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whereas he received but two-pence in the pound, and he was responsible for very considerable sums. With respect to the course taken by the city of London in the appropriation of the Orphans' Fund, he thought they could not do better than in appropriating it to the improvement of their streets.
Mr. Baringwas convinced that whatever the hon. baronet had had to do with the Orphans' Fund, had, like every other transaction of his life, been conducted with the strictest honour. But he could not let the subject pass without again entering his protest against the wanton and unnecessary expenditure of money on the building of the new Post-office. There was no doubt that it was intended to prolong the duty upon coals, in order to replenish the Orphans' Fund, and make up for the money to be taken from it. The city of London imposed these duties not only upon the city of Westminster, but also on the country for thirty or forty miles round; and this tax, altogether objectionable, was laid upon people who had no interest in the improvements to which it was applied. The hon. gentleman then repeated the objections be had made against the Bill in its different stages. It seemed as if the Treasury overflowed with money, and that Government was looking about to see how it could be expended. Something between 80,000 l. and 90,0000 l. had been spent upon the present Post-office within the last ten years; and before much of the mortar was hardly dry, the same persons who had thus enlarged it, came to parliament to apply to have it pulled down and rebuilt, at an expense of 600 or 700,000 l. The buildings as they now stood were in good repair, and perfectly adequate to the purposes to which they were devoted. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, as an amendment, that instead of 'now,' the House should go into the committee 'this day three months.'
The House divided: For the amendment, 35; Against it, 85—Majority, 50.
The House then went into the committee, when Mr. H. Sumner proposed an amendment to the clause relative to the committee for superintending the building. It was, that instead of the names of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of London, be substituted those of the members for London, Westminster, and the four counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Essex, and Kent. On

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this a division took place: For the amendment, 15; Against it, 62—Majority, 47.
The committee proceeded to go through the remaining clauses.
Mr. Sumnerobserved, that it would be proper to restrict the power of purchasing buildings, which was now given to the public for five years. He thought they should be obliged to decide in eighteen months what buildings or ground they would purchase, and to complete the purchase within six months after.
Mr. Gordonobserved, that there was no clause in the Bill to insure the competition of architects in preparing estimates.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, that it was for the Treasury to procure a plan by competition between the architects, but he did not intend to propose the insertion of a clause to that effect in the Bill. Before Parliament met again, it might be in the power of the Government to select the plan and submit it to the House.
Mr. Sumnerthought that the House should see the plan and estimate before the money was voted.
Mr. Butterworthobserved, that a fair estimate, founded on the size of the proposed area, had been given in.
Mr. Bankesthought the proposed area Was much larger than necessary.
Mr. Sumnersaid, that he always suspected, and still did suspect, that there was some abominable job lurking in the back ground. When an area was purchased so much larger than the necessities of a post-office required, he did suppose that the object was to build elegant Houses for the persons employed in the Post-office. When he endeavoured to get information for the committee on this subject, the constant answer was, that almost every office he could mention must be on the ground floor, or there might be a most serious public inconvenience. He had even asked, was it absolutely necessary that the room in which the coachmen's great coats were left should be on the ground floor, and he was told that it was necessary. The consequences that he expected to follow were—that after a very great area of ground was bought, and covered with all the necessary offices for carrying on the business of the Post-office on the ground floor, it would then be proposed to fit up elegant apartments over them, for the accommodation of those persons to whom it was wished to afford this accommodation.
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Upon the clause for appointing commissioners to superintend the clearing of the ground,
Mr. Sumnerobserved, that the value of the materials of the houses purchased for this area would be about 60,000 l., of which the Orphans' Fund ought to be given credit for its proportion. He understood that all this was to be applied to making a new great sewer. Now he could not see, if a sewer was necessary in this part of the town, why it should not be made at the expense of the parishes, or why it should be thrown on the Orphans' Fund.
Upon the clause, that the sum of 240,000 l. should be granted by Government for the purposes of the Act,
Mr. Sumnerdeclared, that he was not one who found fault with the right hon. gentleman for raising 36,000,000 l. for carrying on the war. He considered it as a choice of two evils, and was decidedly of opinion, that it was better to engage manfully in the contest at this moment, than to labour under more disadvantages twelve months hence. He thought it better to make the effort at once, and give his concurrence most cordially to the policy that was about to be pursued. At the same time, however, it was painful for him to find many grievous and unnecessary burthens brought into the account; he considered it quite unnecessary to vote so large a sum of money for building a new Post-office, whilst the Country was groaning and dying under the anticipation of future taxation. He objected to every superfluous expense, and must, therefore, resist this clause.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerthought it more manly to bring forward the expenses at once. It was not to be understood, that the whole of the money would be wanted immediately, but power was given to provide for the charges, as they should be required from time to time.
Mr. Sumnermaintained, that a progressive vote would manifest a due and proper attention to the expenses of the country, under existing circumstances. It would show a wish on the part of Government to reduce the expenditure as much as possible.
Mr. Gordoncould not understand that it was absolutely necessary to build a new Post-office this year, as the business had been hitherto conducted with so much ability. He trusted, therefore, that his hon. friend would press a division on this clause.
The House divided: For the Clause, 48; Against it, 14;—Majority 34. The House resumed, and the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.

CONVENTION WITH THE KING OF THE NETHERLANDS.
The Substance of the Convention between his Britannic Majesty, the King of the Netherlands, and the Emperor of Russia, respectively, signed at London the 19th of May 1815; the statement of the capital, interest, and sinking fund of that part of the Russian debt in Holland, to be provided for by Great Britain, in pursuance of the Convention of the 19th May 1815, having been referred to the consideration of a committee of the whole House,
Lord Castlereagh, in rising, pursuant to the notice he had given, s0aid, he was desirous of carrying the feelings of the committee back to that period at which the independence of Holland was restored. At that auspicious moment he was sure but one sentiment pervaded the country, and nothing could have been less congenial with it, than for ministers to have exercised the rights of war with respect to the colonies of Holland, after the deliverance of that country from the hands of the enemy. It would have been in opposition to the feelings of the nation to have treated Holland in any other respect than as a country with which it was our object to maintain the most friendly relations; and, much as he should have lamented if an amicable arrangement could not have been made by which England could retain the Cape of Good Hope, which was so important to this country from its connexion with our territories in the East, and reluctant as he should have been to have lost any opportunity of placing so large a mass of British property as was contained in the islands of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, permanently under the protection of the Crown of England; much as he should have regretted such important cessions, still would he have been content to forego all the benefits of retaining them, rather than have failed to act with friendly liberality towards Holland. It ought not to be disguised, that though France might have overrun Holland from the lust of conquest, much of the misery which had fallen on that unfortunate country, had been inflicted on account of the attachment it had cherished for England. This feeling, so difficult to extinguish, has never ceased to manifest itself; and it
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was possible that but for this, Holland might for a longer time have escaped the storms by which she was overwhelmed. If he was right in supposing, that from the period at which we had the satisfaction of witnessing the restoration of Holland, there was no disposition to exercise the rights of war harshly against her, he trusted the arrangement he had now to bring under the consideration of the committee, would be approved as consonant with the true policy of England, and as fair and liberal with respect to Holland. There were three points to which he should now address himself: First, the sum proposed to be given to Sweden in consideration of the abandonment of her claims on the island of Guadaloupe: Second, the grant for the fortifications of the Netherlands: And, thirdly, the advance to be made in favour of Russia on account of a loan raised in Holland. The arrangements which had been made, and for which he was about to call upon them to provide, it was proper to observe, had all been made independent of the present circumstances of Europe, and would all have been to be submitted to Parliament, had no new occasion called for their cooperation with this country in a struggle against the power of France. It would be recollected that the island of Guadaloupe had been ceded to Sweden by this country. Our right to it had been transferred to Sweden, though no positive guarantee had been entered into that she should continue to possess it after war should be at an end. We, however, were certainly bound to support her pretensions as our Ally, when peace should be concluded, so far as circumstances would permit. When the Swedish Treaty was discussed and sanctioned by that House, there was no point perhaps that was more particularly looked to than this, on account of the embarrassments it was feared it might throw in the way of a future accommodation with France; and could it then have been foreseen that this difficulty might be obviated by a pecuniary arrangement, it would have lessened the number of the objections urged against that Treaty. When peace was about to be made with France, then no longer an adverse power, he could not but feel that having lost St. Domingo, unless she regained Guadaloupe, she would want that existence in the West Indies, which he thought she ought at all times to possess; for he was of opinion that the interests of

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her commerce made it necessary that she should be of importance in that quarter, and this he regarded as essential to the peace of the world. Under these circumstances, then, it would be seen, that had not Sweden lent herself to the arrangement necessary to get over this difficulty, there would have been much embarrassment in concluding the late peace. From this statement, it would be seen that the vote which would be proposed in favour of Sweden, did not at all arise out of the present circumstances of Europe, but out of the arrangement which had been thought advisable at a period of the late war, when the state of things was not so favourable to the Allies, as they were at a subsequent time, and when but for the arrangement referred to, it might have been impossible for Russia to make the efforts she had made, and which had led to the Treaty of Paris. The fortifications in the Netherlands would call for no advance from this country in the present year. The system of fortifying the Netherlands he considered wise, even as a measure of economy. It was necessary to preserve Holland and her navy independent of France, and this could only be secured by making the Netherlands strong as a military position. This would save the country the excessive expense of repelling the attempts which France might be induced to make at any future period. With this view of the subject, the conceived this country to be highly interested in fortifying the Netherlands in the manner proposed, the expense of which would be met gradually. With respect to the loan raised in Holland, for the service of Russia, which we were called on to pay, he really was not in possession of the information necessary to enable him to say whether or not the anecdote recounted by the hon. gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) of its origin, was correct. If the Joan was raised for the purpose which had been stated, he would join with the hon. gentleman in reprobating its object; but the propriety or impropriety of the present arrangement could not be determined by the policy which caused the loan to be raised. The fact was, such a debt was in existence, and the question for the committee to consider was, whether Russia was entitled to such assistance, and whether Holland had done any thing to entitle her to expect that England would give it? The noble lord then proceeded to set forth the claims which Russia had to the
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gratitude of Holland, and the necessity of those charges being cheerfully borne by a country delivered from foreign oppression, which were attendant on the operations of those who were the means of restoring its liberty. If nations placed in this situation failed gratefully to take upon themselves such expenses, the effect would be fatal to the cause of freedom, as those great Powers who had the means of procuring their emancipation, would be taught to pursue a more insulated line of policy. On the advance of the Allies to the Rhine, the Sovereigns of the smaller states (twenty-two in number) had agreed, in aid of the exertions of the three great Powers, not only to furnish a certain quota of men for the future operations of the campaign, but they had also agreed each to contribute a sum of money equal to one year's revenue of their respective dominions. It was thought Holland ought to do as much as these, and indeed something more, as before her military exertions had not been so great. With the wishes of the Allies the King of the Netherlands had complied. The noble lord then went on to prove how equitable the claim was which he felt it his duty to prefer on the part of the King of the Netherlands. The arrangement made would be as beneficial to him as it was consonant to the policy of this country. It went to give the greatest power in Europe an interest in the conservation of the independence of Holland; and however ready that Power might have proved itself to make great sacrifices for the public good, he considered it no misfortune for the politics of Europe, that interest should in this instance unite with duty. It was said that Russia might again act as from circumstances she had found herself compelled to do in the last war; and, in that case, the payments by Holland would cease. If that period should arrive, our payments also would be suspended, as they would if by any circumstance the Netherlands should be separated from Holland. The state of things which had called upon us to take this charge upon ourselves, had given us an opportunity of fairly, and without the appearance of illiberality, proposing to Holland the cession of her colonies to England. He had much satisfaction in stating, that our conduct in this respect had been justly appreciated on the part of Holland. She had viewed it as a fair proposition made by a friendly power, and not considered it as the demand of a

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nation who, having obtained possession of her colonies in time of war, refused to relinquish them on the return of peace. The colonies obtained by the arrangement entered into with Holland, were of great importance to this country, not only on account of their connexion with our Eastern possessions, but on account of the Situation in which they placed us with respect to South America, by which a constant supply of cotton was secured, which would prove an important advantage to the manufacturers of one of our staple commodities. The King of the Netherlands had certainly of himself taken measures for putting an end to the Slave-trade; but the situation of some of the ceded colonies presented such facilities to the smuggling of slaves into them, that it could hardly be hoped the evil would be effectually remedied but by placing them under the care of this country. The arrangement made had not been decided upon from an inordinate wish to extend our colonial possessions, but to promote the interests of our manufactures, and to give greater effect to that system of policy which the country had so anxiously at heart. With respect to the payments, he had to state, that the first to be made on account of the loan to Russia would be about the middle of the year 1816, and its amount, including interest and sinking fund, would be 136,000 l. This, as he had before stated, would only be continued so long as the Netherlands were separated from France, and would cease if the Orange family should unfortunately be displaced. Nothing would be required at present for the fortifications of the Netherlands; but in a Committee of Supply, he should move the grant of 1,000,000 l. to Sweden, as compensation to her for giving up Guadaloupe. The noble lord concluded by moving, "That provision be made out of the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain for the payment of the interest on the capital sum of twenty-free millions of florins, Dutch currency, being part of the loan made in Holland for the service of the Emperor of Russia; together with a sinking fund for the liquidation thereof, and the expenses attending the same."
Mr. Whitbread, in reference to what had been said by the noble lord of the agreement made by the Sovereigns of the smaller states, to advance in aid of the common cause a sum equal to one year's revenue of their respective dominions,
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desired to know if any payments had, in point of fact, been made. The debt owed by Russia to Holland, he believed, had been contracted by the grandmother of the Emperor Alexander, and for a number of years no part of the principal or interest had been paid.
Lord Castlereaghstated some issues to have been made by the minor states, of Exchequer-bills, or something of that sort, in consequence of the arrangement to which they were parties. The Emperor of Russia had indeed made the discharge of the debt due to Holland a point of honour; but the payments had been suspended while Holland was essentially French.
Mr. Whitbreadconsidered the explanation of the noble lord to be but a poor excuse for the conduct of Russia. The country, he thought, would be little disposed to pay a loan which had been contracted to put a Russian armament in motion against the independence of Poland, after supporting with their money the opposite side of the question on a former occasion. He thought it very desirable that we should know whether or not we were called upon to pay the price of that iniquity which we thought it our duty to oppose before. Notwithstanding the arrangement which had been made, he considered the situation of the creditors of Russia in Holland, to be but indifferent after all.
Mr. Tierneyadmired nothing so much as the ingenuity of the noble lord. It was only when he got to the end of his speech, that those who listened to him could tell what was going on. He spoke much of the amicable arrangement which had taken place, but spoke as if it was attended with no inconvenience, as if it was to throw no burthen on the people, and after all it came out that 8,000,000 l. was to be sent from this country.
Lord Castlereaghcontroverted this statement, and showed the right hon. gentleman that in no way could it be proved that the charges referred to would exceed 5,000,000 l.
Mr. Tierney, admitting them to be but 5,000,000 l., would venture to say, that nobody who heard the speech of the noble lord could have thought from his manner that he was about to propose a vote of 5,000,000 l. It was worthy of remark, that these conventions, which had been concluded some time, were not brought forward till the middle of June.

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He thought it must appear to the House, that there had been a wish for concealment on the part of the noble lord. On private information he had ventured three months ago to ask the noble lord a question connected with the subject of them. The answer was ambiguous—it was in substance, that the Opposition were at their old tricks—they were asking many impertinent questions, to which he should not then reply, but a time would come when he would satisfactorily answer all. It should seem this time was now arrived; but he thought he had a right to ask, why it did not come before? He thought there was something very improper, and (not to use the word in an offensive sense), suspicious, in such concealment. Why these papers had not been brought forward before, the noble lord ought to explain before he left the House that night. Those arrangements might be advantageous to Europe, but why should this country have to pay for them? Because Sweden had consented to accept a compensation of 25,000,000 of francs for Guadaloupe, his Britannic Majesty, as a friend and ally, was pleased to take the payment of that sum upon himself. But wherefore should he do it? This was what he wished to know. Holland had gained the whole of the Austrian Netherlands, and ought to consider the exchange of four colonies, for that large portion of European territory, a very good bargain. The noble lord's speech a few nights since had excited much astonishment in Holland; and he had received a letter from an honest Dutchman, who said, "I have endeavoured to understand lord Castlereagh's speech, and have not been able to make out one word of it." The finances of Holland were not in so dilapidated a state as to require such an interference on our part. By her union with France, she had got rid of two-thirds of her debt. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might smile at this method of disposing of a national debt; but if he went on much longer, he would be compelled to have recourse to similar means.—(Hear!)—The noble lord had no right to pledge the country to pay one million without the knowledge of Parliament. From his speech it would appear that the price of the colonies ceded to England was only 136,000 l., whilst it was, in fact, five millions, which far surpassed their value. What was the use of our retaining the Cape of Good Hope, when we were in
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possession of the Mauritius? Holland, at the time she gave us up the sovereignty of that colony, preserved, all its uses to herself, and only left us the expense of its possession. It was the same with the three other colonies; all persons residing in them were to have the right of trading as before, with the Dutch dominions in Europe; so that they might, if they pleased, refuse to convey their merchandize to this country. It made, therefore, no difference to us whether those islands were in the hands of the Dutch or in our own. The last thing that ought to have been done, ought to have been bargaining for colonies in the West Indies. But he was convinced there remained a story to be told of some secret arrangement, which would creep out in another twelvemonth. It had been said that we had made a good bargain, when for five millions, which the loss on the exchange would reduce to four, we had obtained 600,000 men from the Allies. But there was perhaps another colonial arrangement of five millions behind. The noble lord said, that the country would only have 136,000 l. to pay; but this expenditure was to go on until the two millions should be liquidated, which would not take a shorter period than 33 years. Could not Holland have endured such a debt? If unable to pay the two millions at once, she could not be embarrassed with the arrangement that had been made, and could have easily met the yearly instalments of 136,000 l. This very arrangement showed that there was no necessity we should take them, upon ourselves. With all the noble lord's power in that House, if he had fairly said that the country was to pay five millions, he would not have obtained a majority. He wished to know how we came into possession of the island of Banca, which we had ceded to the Dutch. When the noble lord wanted five millions to fortify Belgium, which was to remain in the possession of Holland, be ought to show that Holland was unable to do it herself; otherwise he plundered the people of England. He should like to see ministers negociating with Holland to pay for the fortifications of Plymouth or the Isle of Man! The country could not bear such expenditure. When the finances were completely drained, to pull out of one's pocket papers concealed for a twelvemonth, and ask five millions, required all the powers of the noble lord's countenance to face it. At this time of the session, the House was

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entirely at his mercy. Gentlemen were necessarily engaged in the country, and could not attend. After such a laborious session, he did not complain of their absence, but of the noble lord, for delaying matters of this importance until he knew there could be no opportunity of their being effectually discussed.
Lord Castlereaghstated, that the reason why the Treaties had not been brought down before, was, that they were not then in a proper shape: they were, even now, imperfect. The Convention between the emperor of Russia and the king of the Netherlands, which alone gave them validity, had not been concluded until the l9th of May last. He maintained, that to fortify the places in Belgium was not a Dutch object merely, but one which interested all Europe, and this country in particular, and that Holland ought not to be allowed to exhaust her resources by incurring expenses beyond her strength. If England alone had conquered the Netherlands, then it would have been fair and just in her to exchange them for the Dutch colonies, and to pay no other price. But that was not the case: she had no right to dispose of Belgium as she pleased, as it was as much in the power of the Allied Sovereigns as in hers. With respect to the island of Banca, he could not charge his memory with the manner in which we had acquired it; but he had no doubt our title to its possession would be found a good one.
Mr. Wallacestated, that the rajah of Banca, having murdered all the Dutch, and declared himself independent of them, which he was not before, had afterwards been obliged to fly. His brother had then been made sovereign, and had ceded his rights to us.
Mr. Forbesbelieved that the rajah of Banca had been forced to enter into an improvident contract for tin by the Dutch government: that he had assisted us in taking Java, but that when after the success of that enterprise, our commander had insisted on his fulfilling the contract entered into with the Dutch government, he had resisted it. The consequence was, that we had sent an army against him and taken possession of his territories. This, the was convinced, was the original cause of his losing Banca. As to his being deposed afterwards, he could say nothing.
Mr. Whitbreadremarked, that according to the last speaker, the rajah of Banca had assisted the English in the conquest of Java.
Mr. Wallacedenied that fact. He had never moved until after the English had taken possession of Java, when he had seized that occasion to murder all the Dutch inhabitants in his dominions.
Mr. Bankesobjected to the treaty under which the payment of the Dutch loan was guaranteed to Russia by this country, having formerly objected to the original treaty, of which this was to be considered a branch. The noble lord had rung the changes upon the terms, grand system, national generosity, and liberal policy, until he almost persuaded himself that this country was capable of supplying pecuniary resources to the whole of Europe; and it was obvious that Holland was not now, and could not for many years be in a situation to repay to England, even the salvage of her colonies, much less the enormous sums that they had cost this country. He objected to the system upon which Government was now acting with regard to foreign powers; they were embarking this country too much in foreign policy, and connecting her too intimately with continental affairs. Upon a question like the present, the utmost deliberation was necessary, and he thought that the treaty ought to have been presented to Parliament long ago.
Lord Castlereaghobserved, that it was wholly inconsistent with the practice of Parliament, and indeed with the established system of the constitution, that treaties should be laid upon the table pending negotiations, and, on that account, that which related to the question now before the House had been delayed. Undoubtedly his hon. friend possessed a very enlarged mind, but he had a singular facility in contracting it to the narrowest view of the question; thus, while he painted to the House so strongly the inconveniencies that might result from the payment of this money, he forgot entirely to consider the alternative, of what might be the consequences if the demand were not discharged: while he was censuring the subsidies that during the late war had been paid to our Allies, he neglected to notice the brilliant events that it had produced, and the full equivalent that Great Britain had derived for these sacrifices.
Sir John Newportdwelt upon the impolicy of repairing the fortresses on the frontiers of Belgium that might in future devolve into the hands of the enemy, and allow him to turn our own weapons upon ourselves, while we, even when we re-

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turned them, obtained no adequate advantage. The noble lord had said much of the increased facilities we possessed of terminating the Slave-trade when Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, were in our hands; but unless we possessed the most important colony of Surinam also, sir John doubted whether we could act with the least effect. He recommended that the House should pause before it consented to the present vote, or sanctioned a treaty transferring the island of Banca to another power, when in fact it was not known what right we had to dispose of it, no satisfactory information having been given it what way it came into our hands. All that the noble lord could say was, that we had possession of it, and therefore he presumed that it came fairly and honestly into our hands.
Mr. Baringcontended, that not the slightest foundation had yet been laid for the proposition of the noble lord; he conceived that it was quite irregular for Parliament to be called upon to give its sanction to a treaty before it had been ratified by the foreign power with whom it was made. There seemed neither reason nor justice in calling upon Great Britain to make good this debt to Holland; and the probability appeared to be, that while the Sovereigns were squabbling at Vienna for pieces of territory, the noble lord, to restore harmony, had thrown in the money of Great Britain, without reference either to the amount, or the benefits it was likely to produce. It would doubtless be replied, that the value of the Dutch colonies was great; but the truth was, that the island of Guadaloupe alone was worth infinitely more than all the Dutch possessions in the West Indies united. [Lord Castereagh shook his head.] If the noble lord ventured to contradict this assertion, it would only show that he really knew nothing about the subject. He doubted even whether it would have been politic to have accepted these colonies from the Dutch. The Cape of Good Hope could be of no use to us, Mauritius and St. Helena being in our hands; the only object which was desirable was to keep the Cape of Good Hope out of hostile hands: but in the hands of the Dutch, our allies, it would be safe; so that the only question was, who should bear the expense? There was one reason, to be sure, why we should bear it—which was, that we had a governor there, in the receipt of 20,000 l. a year (Hear!); for twice which
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sum the thrifty Dutchman would have supported the Whole colony. In the colonies also the Dutch were to have a joint trade with ourselves; for though this benefit was to be limited to Dutch proprietors, it would not be very easy to prevent those persons from exporting goods which were not the produce of their own estates. It was plain that the purchase of the colonies had been the real object, but that the business was transacted upon other principles, which the noble lord had styled grand views; and that, in fact, the States assembled at Vienna being dissatisfied with their shares of spoil, Great Britain had stepped in to supply all deficiencies with her gold. As to the sum to be paid to Sweden, the treaty and the statement of the noble lord were at variance: the treaty spoke of 24 millions of florins, which would amount to about a million and one-third; but the noble lord said it was but one million sterling.
Mr. Bathurstthought that too narrow a view had been taken by the opposers of the vote, as they had not considered the consequences which might have resulted, if any member of the alliance had withdrawn itself during the last war, or thrown, itself into the opposite scale. When an hon. member had said it was to supply the deficiencies in the spoil that we had stepped forward, why had he closed his eyes to the Low Countries, which was obviously an object for the annexation of which to Holland this country should make some sacrifices? By the Treaty of Paris, all that was decided as to the Netherlands was, that they should not belong to Trance. Though from what he had heard, he was not disposed to rank the Dutch colonies so low, in comparison with Guadaloupe, as the hon. member who spoke last; it was not on the ground of their absolute value that this country had retained them, but because so many British subjects, and so much British capital had been engaged. The fortification of the frontiers of the Low Countries was the only means by which that country could be made secure, and consequently of any advantage to this country; and as this object could not be accomplished for less than eight or ten millions, of which sum the revenue of Holland was not in a state to supply the whole, was not our aid justified? It had been proved by experience that it was not secure in the hands, of the Dutch; and it was therefore better, even with a view to economy, that we

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should retain it, than be at the expense of re conquering it at a future time. On the general view of the question, and not looking merely at the pounds, shillings, and pence, he thought the proposition justified.
Mr. Baringobserved, that the question had been put on a better footing by the abandonment of the allegation that the purchase of the colonies was the real ground for the vote. But still he thought that the arrangement was not justified on any principle of British policy. Our interest was, that some great Continental Power should hold the Netherlands, which might be able to protect them against France; but if no such power would take them, we should not at any rate have paid other Powers for the transfer of them to Holland. [Cries of 'Question!'].
Mr. W. Smithsaid, it was with the utmost difficulty that the House could be prevailed on to pay any attention to a subject of such importance; but he felt it his duty to protest against the vote. If this country had only contributed by her money to the object of the war, the other Powers might call on us to accommodate matters with our gold or paper; but they should remember that we had constantly kept up 150,000 seamen, and a land force immense in comparison to our population. Why then were we to pay all other Powers? As to the fortifications of Belgium, it was necessary, as we were to pay two millions towards that object, to have some security that it would be accomplished; otherwise, we might be merely so much the poorer, and the frontier of Belgium never the stronger. Why were we to pay Holland also for accepting what Austria rejected, and other Powers for giving up that which we paid Holland for receiving? He had no doubt, that even if we had not subsidized them, the Continental Powers would, by some means, have found money to continue the contest against France.
Mr. Lockhartopposed the principle of the treaties. The Netherlands, he observed, were in part conquered by British arms—they were conquered by our victories in Spain and France; and we had therefore a joint title to dispose of them. The Cape of Good Hope could be of no benefit to us—it was as safe in the hands of the Dutch. He did not think that industrious people could want our aid to repair their own fortresses. It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the hands
[756
of Government, but of greater consequence to maintain public credit, which could only be done by a vigilant eye on the public expenditure. The noble lord had boasted, at the time when the Treaty with Sweden was formerly considered, that we had not guaranteed Guadaloupe to her; but now we were called on to pay a million of money on the ground of some pecuniary engagement to that effect.
Mr. Forbesobjected to the transfer of the island of Banca, but considered the cession of the Cape of Good Hope as most advantageous to this country.
The House divided: For the motion, 104; Against it, 19;—Majority, 85. The report was ordered to be received tomorrow.

List of the Minority.

Barclay, C.

Moore, Peter

Bennet, hon. H. G.

Montgomery, sir H.

Birch, J.

Martin, H.

Baring, Alex.

Newport, sir J.

Bankes, H.

Pym, F.

Babington, T.

Ridley, sir M. W.

Duncannon, visc.

Tierney, rt. hon. G.

Grant, J. P.

Whitbread, S.

Grenfell, Pascoe

TELLER.

Gordon, R.

Smith, Wm.

Lockhart, J. I.

On the potion of lord Castlereagh, the House went into a Committee of Supply. Mr. Baring objected to going into the question of Supply at so late an hour. After some observations on the part of Mr. Bankes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Baring, it was agreed that the subjects likely to excite discussion should be postponed.
Lord Castlereaghthen moved, that 1,000,000 l. should be granted to enable his Majesty to carry into execution the Convention with the King of Sweden, dated 13th August 1814; which was agreed to.

OFFICES IN REVERSION.
Earl Grosvenorstated, that considering the advanced period of the session, it was necessary that the Reversion Bill should be brought to a second reading without delay. He had been desirous to wait till a time when he could be assured that the noble and learned

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lord who usually sat on the woolsack could be in the House, and he hoped that the noble lord would be able to attend before Friday; but he did not at any rate think it would be proper to postpone the second reading beyond Friday, and therefore he gave notice that he would make the motion on that day.
Lord Ellenboroughadverted to the circumstance that the opinion of the House had been lately taken three times on this subject, and that the noble and learned lord alluded to had taken a large share in the discussions which took place on those occasions. He therefore suggested that the second reading, according to the usual courtesy shown by their lordships to each other, ought not to be proposed at a time when the noble and learned lord might not be able to attend. There were strong hopes that he would very soon be able to attend in his place; but in case he should not be there on Friday, he trusted the noble lord would not then press the second reading.
Earl Grosvenoragreed to name Monday instead of Friday, but stated, that considering the time of the session, he could not accede to any further delay.—The Lords were ordered to be summoned for Monday.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS—RUSSIAN DEBT.
Lord St. John, after adverting to the Convention between Great Britain and the United Netherlands, which had the other day been laid on the table, stated, that there appeared in that document a stipulation, with respect to which it was desirable that their lordships and the country should have some explanation. He alluded to that part of the Convention by which we agreed, in conjunction with the King of the United Netherlands, to take upon ourselves a part of the capital and interest of a loan contracted by Russia with certain Dutch merchants. A very general impression prevailed in the country, that part of this loan was contracted by Russia for the carrying on of that war which ended in the cession of Oczakow to that Power; a measure which this country, out of its anxiety to preserve the balance of Europe, had opposed. Another part of that loan was said to have been contracted for the purpose of carrying on those operations which terminated in the subversion of the constitution of Poland. Could the noble earl opposite give the House
[718
any explanation on this point? He should be sorry, indeed, if this country were to be called upon to take upon itself the payment of debts contracted for any such purposes as those which he had mentioned; and, therefore, he was most anxious to hear from the noble earl some explanation on the subject, which would at least relieve the country from so severe a mortification. If the noble earl would have the goodness to state to the House the dates of the periods at which the loans were contracted, the House and the country would be enabled to form some judgment as to the objects for which the money was raised.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that he was disposed to give the noble lord and the House all the explanation on the subject which he could give; but he really did not know what were the dates of the periods at which these loans were contracted, nor with what views the debt had been originally incurred, nor did he conceive that these matters had any thing whatever to do with the merits of the question in the shape in which it at present came before their lordships. He did not mean, at this moment, to enter into any detailed discussion of that question: but the state of the case was exactly this:—The great exertions which Russia had lately made in the common cause, and the distressed state of the finances of that empire, were both well known to all Europe. An application had, under these circumstances, been made to Great Britain, to take upon itself the payment of a part of a certain debt which Russia had contracted; and from a consideration of the vast exertions which Russia had made in the cause of Europe, and the distressed state of her finances, it had been thought that the proposition was entitled to some favourable attention. On this account the ministers of the Government had thought themselves justified in taking upon themselves to recommend to the British Parliament to enable the Prince Regent to become bound for the payment of a part of the Russian debt. This might be wise policy, or it might not. He should not now enter into that question, though he was perfectly prepared to argue the paint when the proper time came: but the object was merely to relieve Russia from a part of this pressure, for the reasons which he had stated, without reference to the cause for which the debt had been originally incurred, or the period when it was con-

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tracted. These were considerations which, in the view taken of the case by the British Government, had nothing whatever to do with the present question: but considering the prodigious exertions which had been made by Russia in the late campaign for the great cause in which the Allies were engaged, he did maintain, and would be ready to argue at length when the proper occasion arose, that this circumstance, combined with the actual pressure on the Russian finances, did afford a strong ground for receiving the proposition with the most favourable attention.
Earl Greysaid, that he was very far, indeed, from being satisfied with the explanation which the noble earl had given on a subject which, under the present circumstances or the country, must be regarded as one of the greatest importance. He did not mean at this period of the session, and with the sort of attendance which he should be likely to procure, to bring forward any formal motion on the subject; but he could not suffer this opportunity to pass, the last which he should probably have for the present, without making some observations upon this lavish expenditure of the public money, and the careless indifference which appeared in this as well as in other instances, about heaping the most enormous burthens on the oppressed and deluded people of this country. His noble friend had stated the general impression which prevailed that this debt, for the payment of part of which this country was to become bound, had been contracted for the purpose of carrying on the operations which ended in the cession of Oczakow to Russia, and he had very properly asked, whether it was possible that this nation was at last to be called upon to pay the debt incurred by that loan, which had enabled Russia to carry those measures into execution which Great Britain had opposed, on the ground of their tendency to subvert the balance of Europe. This, in his opinion, was a most material question, and one which well deserved their lordships most serious attention. But the noble earl had said, that this consideration had nothing to do with the question; and defended the stipulation on the ground of the great exertions made by Russia, and the pressure upon the finances of that country. The exertions of Russia, however, were made in a cause common to all; in a cause in which Russia was no less interested than the rest of the confederates.
[720
In the course of this long war, (for it might be considered as one continued war from 1793 down to this moment,) had the exertions of this country been inferior to those of Russia, or any other Power of Europe? This nation had made its proportion of exertion, and had suffered its full share of the burthen; and why, in a cause common to all, should it be called upon to take upon itself an additional burthen which did not properly belong to it? Look at the expenditure of the present year: it was absolutely frightful. If any credit was due to the rumours that prevailed out of doors, the loan for the present year would amount to no less a sum than 36 millions sterling. Besides this, there had been issued 18 millions of Exchequer-bills, and to all this was to be added a vote of credit of 6 millions, making in all 60 millions sterling. Let it be recollected, that this enormous sum was to be raised at a time when taxes unknown to our ancestors had been resorted to in order to raise a large proportion of the sums necessary for the expenditure of the year, and that, too, for the very purpose of keeping down the capital of the national debt; but at a time when twenty millions of war taxes were collected, a sum three times that amount was raised in the manner he had stated, making an addition to the capital of the national debt of about one hundred millions. It was absolutely impossible they could go on in this manner without speedy and irretrievable ruin. At the commencement of the revolutionary war, if he was not mistaken, the whole capital of the national debt was about 240 millions; and now, after the unparalleled burthens to which the country had been exposed in this war which had lasted ever since 1793—for during the whole period we never had really enjoyed the blessings of peace—an amount of capital was in a single year to be added to the debt, nearly equal to one half of the whole of it at the commencement of the revolutionary war? Yet under these circumstances the country was to be called upon to take upon itself additional burthens, which no consideration of justice or sound policy required that it should bear. Never were burthens imposed with less reason upon an oppressed and deluded people; and the result of such a lavish and inconsiderate expenditure must at last, he repeated, be irretrievable ruin. Besides this payment on account of Russia, there was another sum of two millions, and possibly of five

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millions to be paid to Holland for augmenting and improving the defences of the Low Countries; and this, too, deserved the most serious attention of their lordships. This expenditure he considered as entirety useless. If the arrangements made at Vienna had been brought under consideration, he would have contended, that the incorporation of the Low Countries with Holland was a most impolitic measure. He should have preferred infinitely to leave her colonies with Holland, and give up the Netherlands to some third power capable of defending them. But as for those sums employed in the repair of the fortresses on the frontiers, he considered them as entirely thrown away. As a measure of defence, or for any other good purpose, he considered it as perfectly nugatory. As to the advances to Holland in lieu of her colonies, be protested that if those colonies had been offered to him gratuitously he would have declined accepting them; for, instead of being an advantage to this country, he was convinced they would be only another burthen added to those with which the nation was already so heavily loaded. He did not, as he had before stated, mean to go at length into the subject; but as this opportunity had presented itself, it was impossible for him to allow it to pass without thus stating to their lordships the impression made on his mind by the papers now laid on their lordships' table, and the state in which the country was placed under these circumstances of enormous and lavish expenditure.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, it was not his intention to go at large into this subject now; but after what had just fallen from the noble earl who spoke last, it was impossible for him not to say a few words. He had before said, and he still maintained, that the prodigious exertions made by Russia in the common cause, and the distressed state of her finances, entitled the proposition to take upon us a part of this debt to our favourable consideration. True, the exertions of Russia were made in a common cause; but let it be recollected that the exertions of Russia had gone much beyond what was necessary for her own security. After the enemy had been driven from her own territory, and at a time when she might have made peace with much less danger than any other power in Europe, she still continued, in spite of the deranged state of her finances, to make exertions chiefly in
[722
favour of the rest of Europe, such as had never been surpassed by any nation in the world. True, this country, too, had made its exertions, and had endured its burthens. No one could be more sensible than he was how much this was the case. The situation which he held necessarily gave him the means of being peculiarly able to appreciate the burthens and privations to which the nation was exposed; but it ought never to be forgotten, that during; the whole of this eventful struggle this favoured country had never been the scene of foreign invasion. It had at least escaped that dreadful devastation—those tremendous calamities—with which the progress of the invader must have been attended; and when we looked at the exertions and sacrifices of Russia as compared with our own, let us consider what would have been, the situation of this country if a great part of it had been occupied by the enemy; if our territory had been ravaged, and London had been laid in ashes! He was well aware of the efforts which this country had made—of the burthens which it had endured—of the privations which it had suffered during the period which the noble earl had mentioned: but it was a most erroneous view of the subject to look at it in that light merely. This country had, indeed, made exertions, and suffered much and severe privations; but let the effect of these exertions and privations be also taken into account. To what did we owe our present state of comparative security and prosperity—to what did we owe the preservation even of our existence? When we looked, therefore, at our burthens, let it not be forgotten that to our patient endurance of those burthens, to our persevering exertions, we owed the comparative security and prosperity, probably the salvation of our country. Considering, then, the vast exertions of Russia beyond, her own territory, the great advantage which we derived from those exertions, and the slate of the Russian finances, he would confidently submit to their lordships and the country, that the engagement of ministers was fully justified by the soundest views of policy and expediency. He admitted that it was not a claim of strict and rigid justice, but an appeal to the liberality of this country; but he trusted their lordships and the nation at large would concur with the Government in thinking, that it was an appeal which, under the circumstances, merited the most favourable attention and consideration. With respect

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to the sums to be advanced to Holland, their lordships would observe that only two millions were to be paid at present.—The noble earl had said, that the money expended on the frontier fortresses was thrown away: but in that respect his opinion was widely different from that of the most eminent military characters; and on a former occasion it had been urged with considerable force, that this was by far the cheapest mode in which the great interests which this country had in the protection of the Netherlands could be secured. The expense of one campaign to repair the mischief that might result from the want of these fortresses would be greater than that which would be required to put the whole of the frontier in a complete state of defence. This, therefore, was an expense which was warranted by every consideration of sound policy, and even of an enlightened economy. With regard to the colonies, they were in many respects of great importance to this country, but particularly so in this view—that they were in a great measure cultivated by British capital. Without going further into the subject at present, he trusted their lordships would be of opinion that the ministers of Government had not departed from the line of their duty, but had, upon a sound view of the whole circumstances of the case, acted in the manner best calculated to promote the permanent interests of the country.
Earl Greyconceived the security of which the noble earl boasted, to be good for nothing, and to be just so much money thrown away. It would have been better to have left the Sovereign of Holland his colonies, and to have given the Netherlands to some third Power, capable of defending them.
The Earl of Liverpoolsaid, that the opinion of the noble earl on this subject was at variance with the opinion of the first military authorities.

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY.
The Earl of Darnleyrose and said:
My lords; Under the most favourable circumstances—with public attention perfectly alive to the subject, and with all the charms of novelty to recommend it—I am not vain enough to imagine that any thing brought forward by me can have much claim to the attention of the House; but when I consider the many and unusual disadvantages under which I labour on the present occasion, I am under the necessity
[724
of soliciting a more than usual portion of your lordships' indulgence. Nothing, indeed, but a sense of duty, and the desire to appear consistent, would have induced me, at this late period of the session, with, other objects of more immediate interest, and of greater importance than this (however important I may still think it) pressing upon your attention, to attempt to divert it for a moment, to the mass of papers on your table, for which I have moved in order to prove the assertions I have heretofore made, on the conduct of the late War with America, and more especially the Naval Administration of the Country. I certainly could have wished that the task of calling your attention to this subject had originally fallen into other and better hands. I am fully aware of the difficulty of doing justice to so extensive and complicated a subject; and think I have some reason to complain that, among near a thousand members, of which the two Houses of Parliament are collectively composed, there should be found no one, but the humble individual who has now the honour of addressing your lordships, to call for an inquiry into those repeated naval disasters, which more than two years since first impelled me irresistibly to bring forward that most interesting subject.
On that occasion, your lordships, it is true, thought fit to reject my motion for inquiry; but I have the satisfaction to reflect, that your time was not altogether thrown away. I flatter myself that my attempt to direct the attention of Government more particularly to the causes of the disasters of which I complained did not altogether fail. Certain it is, that, from whatever cause, about that time they began to equip and construct a larger description of frigates, of which there are at present, as appears by one of the papers on the table, twelve in commission, whereas at that time there was not one; the Endymion, the only one in existence, not having then been fitted out. The manning, however, of ships, is of far more consequence than their construction. For I will venture to assert that the difference of a few more guns is comparatively of little importance, provided the two ships opposed to each other are upon something like an equality in the number and description of their crew. I believe, if the ships had been tolerably well manned, the three successive disasters of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java, would not have taken place. The last of these was

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the immediate cause of my having originally brought the subject before the House; and I cannot but recollect that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty on that occasion stated, that at least the Java was adequately manned. In point of numbers she certainly was; but injustice to the memory of her gallant and lamented commander, I must now state, what I have lately learnt from the best authority, that the crew of the Java was of the worst possible description, composed, in the first place, of a small and weak crew of a frigate, paid off in the river, and sent to Portsmouth just before the ship sailed, and made up to the number wanted by that of a sloop of war sent home from the West Indies, for having shown symptoms of mutiny, and disinclination to fight against the Americans. Captain Lambert was so well aware of the nature of his ship's complement, that nothing but a sense of duty, paramount to every other consideration, would have induced him to go to sea with them; and he was heard to declare, that in the event of falling in with an American frigate he must inevitably be taken. Yet notwithstanding the disadvantage of such a crew, which he had not any time to discipline or arrange, in the well-fought action, which terminated in the destruction of himself and his ship, by a foe in every respect so much superior, he not only did not decline the contest, but was uniformly the assailant. Since the destruction of the Java, no disaster of the same nature has happened in the case of frigates; but many circumstances have taken place equally disastrous in the capture and destruction of sloops of war. The minutes of the courts-martial in two of these cases are on the table, in consequence of motions made by me; and your lordships will see, by referring to these documents, that in point of size and guns, and still more in the inadequacy of their crews, the British vessels had no chance whatever of success, in these unequal, though well-fought contests. In the case of the Epervier it appears that, in addition to these disadvantages, by some strange and most culpable neglect in fitting her out, the guns of this ship were so badly secured, that at the first broadside, five out of nine became unserviceable; and by referring to the Sentence of the court-martial, you will find the Court agreed, that the cause of the capture of his Majesty's late sloop Epervier, was the very superior force of the
[726
enemy, the insecure manner in which the fighting bolts of the Epervier were fitted, and the breeching bolts drawing from being badly clinched, and the inefficiency of the crew." With respect to the last, it consisted of 103 men (proved in the evidence to have been of the worst description) and 15 boys; whereas the crew of her opponent, the Peacock, consisted of 182 picked men, and only 3 boys. The other case of the Wasp and Avon terminated in the destruction of the latter, with the loss of 40 killed and wounded, out of an equally weak crew, while the American lost only 1 killed, and 2 wounded, and was apparently unhurt by the effects of the action.
These, and other disasters of the same nature, we must conclude, at length induced the Admiralty to turn their attention to providing a better and stronger description of sloops of war to cope with, those powerful and well-appointed vessels of that class belonging to the United States, as they had before in the case of the frigates; but in doing so, they appear to have exceeded all the bungling and ignorance which have at all times more or less prevailed in this branch of our naval service. To prove that this has been the case, I will quote an authority to which the noble viscount must pay the greatest deference—I mean the Report of the Commissioners of Naval Revision. In their third Report they state that, "Where we have built exactly after the form of the best French ships that we have taken, thus adding our dexterity in building to their knowledge in theory, the ships, it is generally allowed, have proved the best in our navy: but whenever our builders have been so far misled by their little attainments in the science of naval architecture, as to depart from the model before them in any material degree, and attempt improvements, the true principles upon which ships ought to be constructed being imperfectly known to them, have been mistaken or counteracted, and the alterations, according to the information given to us, have in many cases done harm. From the same cause there has been infinite variety in the alterations made, and in the forms which have been adopted. The alterations being on no certain principles, no similarity in the form of the ships could be expected, and they have the appearance of having been constructed on the chance, that in the multitude of trials made, some one might

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be found of superior excellence. While, therefore, our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents and most extensive acquirements to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping only in the dark in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in cur way. Nothing certainly can be more surprising, than that in a nation so enlightened as this is, and whose power, importance, and even safety, depend on its naval superioity, matters so essential to the preservation of that superiority should so long have been neglected."—[Signed, Fordyce, Curtis, Domett, Serle.]
This Report was made, I think, in the year 1806; and, to prove that no amendment has yet taken place, in the construction of the two large ships, the Newcastle and the Leander, the Navy-board having procured a plan for the former ship, which they were themselves unable to furnish, and which by all accounts has perfectly answered in the construction of the latter, have, as usual, made some alteration which has spoilt the symmetry and perfection of the model. But the most curious instance of ignorance and misconduct in the construction of ships of war, that ever appeared, is probably to be found in the papers on the table; and to which I must beg the attention of the House. It seems, that before the war with America, as long ago indeed as the beginning of the year 1810, the Board of Admiralty gave directions for the building of a sloop of war to be called the Hermes, after the model of the Bonne Citoyenne, which had formerly been taken from the French, and was found to possess excellent qualities as a vessel of this class, far superior indeed to any sloops of war originally of British construction. Not having any model of our own to work from, or any men of sufficient science to furnish a plan equally good, I do not blame the adoption of this measure. But how was it carried into execution? The Hermes, when fit for sea, was placed under the command of an officer of great merit and abilities, whose case has lately been brought before your lordships by a noble earl (Egremont); and in consequence the Admiralty have restored him to his rank, of which he appears to have been deprived, without sufficient reason, by the sentence of a court-martial; and are about, I trust, by employing him again, to make him farther amends for the injury he has sustained. It ap-
[728
pears by the correspondence between captain Browne and the Admiralty and Navy Boards, that as usual the model was altered and spoilt. The Navy Board at first assert positively, as appears by the Report on the table (see Letters of the 4th of October, 1811,) that the new ship is built by the lines of the old one, and precisely similar; but afterwards, when pressed on the subject, they confess, that they had given her greater width in the after-part, at the wing transom; the consequence of which was, that although when light, the Hermes sailed well (for then the lines of the Bonne Citoyenne took effect), as soon as the increased width touched the water, she could not sad at all; and in other respects her construction was so faulty, that nothing but the skill and exertions of her commander could have rendered her an effective man of war: that, however, she became, notwithstanding her faulty construction, and was one of the very few in the British navy, in any way likely to be capable of contending on equal terms with the American ships of the same class. Another ship was then ordered to be built after the same model, to be called the Myrmidon, whose captain informs us in a letter on the table, of a recent date, that though intended to resemble the Bonne Citoyenne, she is unlike her in every respect. It appears, also, that among the alterations suggested by captain Browne in the Hermes, one was to lower the deck forward, or to raise it abaft. In the Myrmidon the surveyors of the navy did both, and thereby equally spoilt the ship.
We come now to the remaining fourteen ordered to be built on the same lines, but of reduced dimensions. The credit of these precious vessels belongs, as I have been told, rather to the Admiralty than to the Navy Board; but, be that as it may, it appears clearly that they never have been, and never can be, with all the bungling expedients and alterations that have been resorted to, efficient men of war, so that their cost (which, exclusive of alterations, amounts to between two and three hundred thousand pounds) has been absolutely thrown away. But that is not the worst; for the attempt to use these vessels, puts in perpetual danger the lives of our brave officers and men, and the honour of the British flag. If your lordships will take the trouble of reading these papers, you will find that some captains complain of one thing, some of an-

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other. In general they think them overmasted. One officer is of a contrary opinion, and wants larger masts and yards. But one thing, of which frequent notice is taken, appears quite sufficient to account for their bad qualities. The size of these vessels was considerably reduced, and yet they are fitted with the same guns and weight of metal as the larger vessels. At first, indeed, the Board ordered them to carry two guns more; till one of the officers commanding represented that with only 20 ports he could not mount 22 guns. But it is obvious, that if a certain weight of ordnance was just sufficient for a ship of 500 tons, it would be too much for one of 450; and that, in this case, as in all others, the ignorant attempt of partial alteration had destroyed the symmetry of the machine, and utterly spoilt it. One of these ships, the Lee, was in March last nearly lost, and with difficulty escaped, by throwing over-board her guns in a gale of wind; and after this severe trial her captain earnestly recommends that she should be armed with 24 instead of 32 pound cannonades, which he deems "far too heavy for her;" and although this suggestion of the captain was supported by the recommendation of the Navy Board, the captain is threatened to be superseded if he does not choose to go to sea in the ship—or, in other words, for doing his duty by stating that these wretched craft were unequal to their weight of guns. In short, whoever will take the trouble of looking into the details which the papers furnish on the subject of these vessels, will find that a stronger case of mismanagement and waste of public money never was presented to Parliament. This miserable attempt to provide a number of vessels of adequate qualities to cope with the powerful American sloops of war, has utterly failed; and at this moment, after all the experience and warning we have had, there are not more than two or three vessels of that description in the British navy. For I repeat what I have before asserted, that a very large proportion of the smaller vessels of war, which by the accounts on the table appear to have been in commission at the close of the contest with America, were utterly useless for any purpose except that of patronage. The list of sloops of war amounts to 173. The best of these were, in point of force, and still more from the inefficiency of their crews, unequal to the adversaries they had to encounter, as has
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been abundantly proved by the minutes of the courts-martial on the table, as welt as by other instances. But 72 of this number being of a small size under 16 guns, could, as ships of war, be of no use whatever; and served only to occupy 4,000 seamen, exclusive of officers; which, if they had been judiciously distributed, to strengthen the more effective ships, would, in all probability, have prevented those disasters of which the country has so much reason to complain.
On the subject of the warfare in the lakes of Canada, I must beg the House to recollect, that, on the first day of the session, the noble viscount boldly asserted, that it would be found on inquiry, that every thing necessary to carry on those naval operations with vigour and effect, was not only supplied, but amply supplied by the Government at home, and generally (I think he added) in a twofold degree. But how does the correspondence on the table substantiate this assertion, imperfect as I believe it to be, and without those earnest and repeated applications which I understand were made by sir James Yeo, for men, and supplies of every description? But this correspondence between the Government in Canada and his Majesty's ministers, abundantly proves that the frequent disasters were occasioned by the want of adequate means. At the commencement of the war (August 26 1812) sir George Prevost informs you, that the British force was decidedly superior on all the lakes. In less than a year (on the 24th of July, 1813) he tells you, "the United States have acquired a decided superiority on Lake Ontario;" and an equally decided superiority on Lake Erie was too fatally proved by the disaster of the gallant and unfortunate captain Barclay. The details of this transaction are in the papers before the House; and every part of them prove most decidedly the total want of every thing necessary to constitute an adequate naval force. The whole squadron had not more than 50 British seamen, while that opposed to it appears to have been perfectly well manned and equipped, and superior in sailing and efficiency of every description.
Amongst the attempts made by Government to remedy the want of an adequate force to cope with the Americans on the lakes, the building of two frigates and two sloops at Chatham,—to be again taken to pieces, sent across the Atlantic, landed

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at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and taken up the rapids to Lake Ontario, to be built there a second time,—is not the least curious. It appears by the papers on the table, that on the spot the plan was at once deemed impracticable; and although, by the zeal and exertions of an individual, one of the ships was actually conveyed to its place of destination, and there altered and launched, the three others were disposed of—we are not informed how; nor are we told what the expense of this senseless project has been to the nation.
Just at the close of the war we recovered, it is true, our superiority on Lake Ontario, by the equipment of a three-decker. But how was this effected? Not by any forethought or provision made by the Government at home, but by the accidental arrival of some men of war on the coast of America, with part of the Duke of Wellington's army, after the conclusion of the war with France, which furnished their stores just in time to enable sir James Yeo to fit out the large ship, which, but for this accidental supply, could not have been brought forward before the winter. Some of these ships furnished anchors and cables and other necessary stores, and the Centaur her lower-deck guns; without which the new ship could not have been effective; and her being rendered so, in the opinion of sir James Yeo, as I have been informed, saved the province of Upper Canada.
On the subject of the military operations in the late war with America, I shall say little; and it is but justice to acknowledge that our gallant army, on every occasion, maintained its high reputation; even in that concluding scene, in the ill-judged and ill-fated expedition to New Orleans. On this subject I must observe, that no disaster in the history of this country ever called more loudly for inquiry into the conduct of the authors and projectors of the plan. It seems to have been originally undertaken without, any object but that of plunder; and it is difficult to imagine what national advantage could have arisen, or how the great objects of the war could have been materially promoted by complete success. Its complete failure was calamitous indeed, attended by a heavy loss of the gallant and victorious followers, and of the companion and brother of the illustrious Wellington himself. And yet such was the total absence of all public feeling
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or attention, even when the intelligence first arrived, that, I am ashamed to say, I really believe, the paltry occurrence of the breaking of my windows, and those of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, which happened about the same time, occasioned a greater sensation. How then can I, at this distance of time, hope to call the attention of this House and the public to this fatal and disgraceful transaction? But it was impossible altogether to pass over what appears to me to form a most prominent feature in the misconduct of the late war.
But, my lords, to return to the conduct of the Naval Administration, which is my principal, object,—it appears to me, that however you may be disposed to forget the late war with America, and to think all retrospective inquiry inexpedient and unavailing, you cannot shut your eyes to the importance of considering, whether the naval service of the country is well or ill conducted. On the subject of the construction of our men of war, I have endeavoured to call your attention to a very flagrant case of misconduct, detailed in the papers on your table. But this is by no means the only case of a similar nature. In the naval administration of the noble earl now at the head of the ordnance (earl Mulgrave), a great number of 74-gun ships were built, which, as I hear, are familiarly known in the navy by the name of the Forty Thieves. The plan and construction of these ships were faulty in the extreme; and they never could have been good men of war, if they had been composed of good materials; but the execution was, if possible, worse than the plan, and many of them showed immediate symptoms of premature decay, and the necessity of great and expensive repairs before they had been many months at sea. The original cost to the nation of these 40 ships cannot have been so little as four millions; and I fear very few of them would be found at this moment in any respect effective men of war.
The Queen Charlotte, a first rate, is well known to have been found in so defective a state, as soon as she was launched, that it became necessary, before she could be sent to sea, to repair her, or rather, it may be said, to build her over again at an expense (as I have been informed) of 70,000 l.
With these and many such facts before us, can it be stated, that the faulty consrtuction and premature decay of our men

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of war is not a fit object of the most serious inquiry? On the important subject of the preservation of timber for naval purposes, I have heretofore troubled your lordships. In the last session I presented a petition from captain Layman on the subject of a discovery, which he states has been made by him, of a method to increase the strength and duration of timber. Captain Layman is a very intelligent and well-informed man; and as an officer, he has the highest testimony, that of the illustrious Nelson, in his favour. But whatever his personal claims to attention may be, his alleged discovery must be admitted to be of the utmost importance, and well deserving the consideration of Parliament. There are many other topics connected with this subject of the navy, on which neither the patience of the House, nor the present state of my health (which almost incapacitates Die from addressing your lordships at all) will permit me to enlarge. I cannot, however, sit down without briefly adverting to some of them. Perhaps the most injurious consequence of the naval disasters we have experienced in our late contest with the United States, has been the moral effect produced by them on the minds of our seamen. Doomed as they have been, in so many instances, to certain defeat, it is impossible that their minds should not have been alienated from the service, and disgusted by the manner in which their, lives have, been sacrificed in unavailing contests with such superior force. I have, indeed, heard that great disinclination to serve in these inefficient sloops of war has been manifested, and frequent desertions have been the consequence.
Amongst other reforms, which it appears to me the naval service requires, the constitution of courts-martial ought not to be forgotten. It certainly should seem by some late instances that have come before the public, that the sentence, is sometimes at variance with the evidence and the law of the case. That to which I have before alluded, appears to have been unwarrantably severe; and the conduct of the Admiralty, in restoring to his rank the officer condemned, shows they were of the same opinion. But I have seen lately another case of a contrary description, where too much lenity appears to have been shown; where the evidence established proofs of the most deliberate and cruel murder. I forbear to particu-
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larize; but the noble viscount knows the case to which I allude, and I think it of the utmost importance that British seamen should be well assured that they can never be ill-treated with impunity; but that the most strict and impartial justice should punish every case of cruelty or oppression. These cases, I will admit, are extremely rare. There is perhaps no body of men equally numerous so free, from blame, in this respect, as the officers of the navy. They are, for the most part, as humane as they are brave; but there will be always amongst a great number of human beings, some of a contrary description; and these should be restrained by the strong and impartial arm of the law, and the certainty of punishment.
Although I am ready to admit that Government has not been regardless of the just claims of the navy, and has shown a disposition to improve the condition both, of officers and men, on this head much still remains to be done; and I think the navy have a right to expect that no less favour should be shown to them than to the army, which in several points is not the case. For instance, the widow of a naval officer, when she applies for her pension, is obliged to swear, that she derives no emolument from any other source whatever; whereas the widow of an officer of the army proves only, that she receives no other emolument from Government.
My lords; it appears to me too much the practice of the present, day to strain every nerve to make this country a great military power; which, in my judgment, it can never become, advantageously to any great degree; but must mainly depend for its security and greatness on its naval strength. This is the natural foundation of the power and glory of the British empire; and on this basis our principal security must ultimately rest. It is true, the contest in which we are unfortunately engaged, assumes at present almost exclusively a military character; but if it should be protracted (and even the most sanguine cannot deny the possibility of such an event), we shall have to contend not only with the naval power of France, but, in all probability, with that of America also. A state of war in Europe can scarcely fail to bring forward again those questions of neutral rights and blockade which have not been decided by the peace; and their successes in the late war will tend greatly to encourage the

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Americans to renew the contest. In this point of view an inquiry into the state of our naval affairs must be deemed an object of the highest importance; but, for the reasons I have before stated, it is not my, intention at present to urge it.
I am fully aware of the very imperfect manner in which I have discharged the duty I had imposed on myself of bringing the subject before your lordships; and nothing but a paramount sense of duty, and a desire not to appear to act with levity or inconsistency, in leaving the documents for which I had moved under more promising circumstances unnoticed on your table, would have induced me at this time to trespass on the patience of the House. The noble earl concluded with moving, That the House do now adjourn.
Viscount Melvillesaid, he should leave it to the House to decide whether the noble lord had made out a grave case against the naval administration of the country, and should content himself with noticing only a few of the most prominent topics of the speech they had just heard. The first charge brought against the Admiralty was, that of neglect in not fitting out a class of vessels able to cope with those of America. With regard to this he would observe, that it had always been the system of the British Admiralty to adapt our ships to the nature of those with which they had to contend; but it could not be supposed that the whole system of our navy could at once be changed in order to meet a few American frigates of a larger size than any vessels that had ever gone under that name. The fact was, that the Admiralty had fitted out two or three vessels of this class, but it was impossible to cover the seas with them, so as to meet the American vessels wherever they were to be found. With regard to the noble lord's statement, as to the deficiency of the Java's complement, it was the first time he had ever heard of it, and he believed it to be totally unfounded. With regard to the capture of that frigate, he thought it no disgrace in a ship of inferior force being obliged to yield to another that was greatly its superior. The same general observation was applicable to the capture of some of our sloops of war. The Americans had three or four heavy vessels of this class, and it so happened that they fell in with some British sloops of inferior size, when the result of the contest was unfortunate. But the noble lord had not adverted to the captures of American
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merchantmen and men of war by the British navy, by which their commerce had been almost annihilated, and by which the honour of the British flag had been upheld. The noble lord complained, that adequate attention had not been paid to skill in ship-building by the British Admiralty. It might be said, however, that this country had become the first naval power in the world, and that no nation could send to sea and keep at sea the same number of valuable and useful ships. From the number of our distant settlements, it was absolutely necessary that we should have large and roomy ships, capable of great stowage, and of keeping the sea for a long time; we could not, therefore, generally imitate the light American schooners, that were calculated rather for expedition than for those purposes to which our navy must generally be applied. Measures had been adopted to remedy that deficiency in ship-building skill which had been complained of, and he trusted that they would soon remove all ground of complaint. The noble viscount next adverted to the complaints of the inadequate protection of our trade, which he contended to be without foundation. They had heard of American privateers infesting our coasts, and committing depredations even in our creeks and harbours. He would assert, that the complaints on this head were grossly exaggerated; and when the merchants who made them were asked for their authority, they could assign no other but that of newspaper reports. He would repeat what he had stated on a former occasion, that it appeared from the books at Lloyd's, that the number of captures last year in the European seas as far as the Canaries, amounted to 172. Of these the whole number of coasters captured was 13, while of running ships, and those that deserted convoy, the number was 94. The fact was, that many captains of merchantmen, on hearing of the termination of hostilities with France, ventured a run without convoy. This was peculiarly the case with those from the Mediterranean; and off Cape St. Vincent's they were exposed to American privateers. He could add, that the report of several captures, which, appeared in the newspapers, was totally unfounded. Of this description was that of a vessel said to be taken in Dublin bay, and also the reported capture of the Blazer gun-brig off the coast of Ireland.—The next topic to which he should briefly advert,

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was the conduct of the war on the lakes of America. The noble lord asserted, that our disasters there arose from inadequate supplies: but perhaps there was no one circumstance more surprising than the extent of the naval exertions that were made in that quarter. For every seaman, shipwright, cable, and every article of military equipment, sent out from this country, the Americans could with facility supply double the number; and yet the war ended with an acknowledged superiority on our part on the principal lake—a superiority so decided, that the enemy durst not venture to come out to meet us. The noble lord had insinuated that desertion had latterly increased in the British navy, from the moral effects of American success. He would utterly deny the assertion; for the fact was, that desertion had greatly decreased; and it was a circumstance most honourable to the character of British seamen, that it was almost unknown on the lakes, where they were engaged in a species of service the most laborious and anxious, without hope of prize-money, and where strong encouragements to desertion had been held out by the enemy. If any one circumstance had more than another engaged the attention of the Board of Admiralty for years past, it was that the seamen should have no just ground of complaint as to their treatment; and he would venture to say, that there was not a seaman in the navy that was worth his victuals, who would assert the contrary. The noble viscount next proceeded to make a variety of observations on the state of the dockyards, in the course of which he said, that there was now a constant supply of well-seasoned timber for the purpose of shipbuilding, and that no necessity now existed for resorting to the merchants' yards. He concluded by opposing his negative to the present motion.
Lord Rollerose to express his opinion that a weaker case had never been brought before the House, particularly as contrasted with the voluminous mass of papers that had been moved for in support of it. He could assure the noble mover, that he would never vote for his being made first lord of the Admiralty.
The Earl of Darnley replied; after which his motion was put, and negatived. The Bills on the table were then passed through their various stages, and the House adjourned.