Sitting of 11 April 1815

INSOLVENT DEBTORS BILL.
Mr. Serjeant Bestrose, in pursuance of his notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the laws respecting Insolvent Debtors. His intention, in bringing in this Bill, was first, to force persons who were possessed of property to give it up to their creditors, and next, to punish those persons who had become insolvent through their own profligacy or vice. The first object which he had stated he had no doubt would meet with the general concurrence of the House. The proposition which he should submit was founded upon an Act passed so early as the reign of George the 2d, by which it was enacted, that persons imprisoned for debt should be obliged to deliver up their property for the benefit of their creditors, under the penalty of transportation. The provisions of this Act, however, only extended to persons having incurred debts under the sum of 100 l., and his desire was, to extend its operations to debts whatever might be their amount. It was, no doubt, well
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known to many members of that House, that at this moment there were numerous persons in prison for debt in various parts of this kingdom, who were spending their substance in the most luxurious extravagance, and who bid defiance to those creditors whose ruin they had promoted, by becoming largely in their debt. To give creditors the power of forcing those persons to deliver up their property was, therefore, the first object he had in view; and all the deviation he should make from the Act of George the 2d, was, to extend its operations in an unlimited manner. The other part of his Bill, which was to increase the punishment of persons who from their own acts of folly and imprudence had become insolvent, he was apprehensive would not meet with so general an assent as that which he had just stated; yet he trusted the explanation which he should give would tend to remove any difficulties that might arise. His principal and most anxious wish was to distinguish between the unfortunate and the fraudulent debtor; because he was aware that there was a species of credit that was absolutely necessary; and was far from thinking, that those whose only crime was poverty should be punished. In certain cases, punishment ought rather to fall on those who think proper to trust, than on those who apply for credit. Yet an excess of credit was a public injury; and the effect of the last Bill went to destroy that credit which was highly necessary to the public welfare. Amongst the middle classes, for example, there were persons who could not exist without it. Men in public offices, officers on half-pay, and others similarly situated, whose salaries were received only by the quarter, and then not precisely to a day, would be in the utmost distress but for this accommodation; but the present Bill had tended to withdraw this necessary credit. The reason was, that no tradesman could know whom it was safe to trust, when any man, after getting in his debt, and being pressed for payment, had only to warn him not to proceed against him, as he should in that case, give him a bill upon lord Redesdale at three months. This state of things went to destroy the credit that was necessary, as well as that which was improper. A tradesman might find himself utterly unable to carry on his business, if he was expected to examine most minutely into the circumstances of every body to whom he gave credit. It was no doubt familiar to the House that

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the Bill which was called "lord Redesdale's Bill" had given rise to many serious objections. It in fact gave the same facility to the dishonest as the honest debtor, to obtain his liberty at the expiration of three months imprisonment. He was willing to admit that the judge who should have to discriminate between these cases would be placed in a very trying situation. In, fact, the only way of separating the honest from the dishonest debtor, would be to introduce some sort of scale by which the claim to the advantages of the Act might be regulated. Such a scale he had prepared for the consideration of the House. He had to propose, that if the debtor was found in a condition to pay 15 s. in the pound, he should be entitled to his discharge at the expiration of three months. If he should from the improvident management of his affairs, be only in a condition to pay 10 s. in the pound, then he thought his imprisonment should extend to a longer period, namely, to twelve months. Again, if the debtor, by expending that which he must know belonged to others, was unable to pay 10 s. in the pound, such a man, he thought, ought to be imprisoned two years, twelvemonths of which, should be passed within the walls of a prison, and not as at present, in what were called the rules. And lastly, if a man was entirely insolvent, and without the hope of paying any portion of his debts, he considered it was but proper that he should be kept within the walls of a prison for two years. It would naturally occur, that there were many cases in which a prisoner might be in no condition, from misfortunes not originating in his own vices, to pay any thing in liquidation of his debts. To such an individual he by no means wished the scale which he had staled to apply; it should, therefore, be open in all cases for the debtor to prove by his own oath, supported by other satisfactory evidence, whether his distresses were attributable to imprudence or misfortune, and if he was able to establish the latter, then he should extremely lament his detention in custody beyond the time that was necessary to prove the fact. It was likewise his intention to provide, that the Judge of the Court should first decide whether a debtor was a fit person to be discharged, and that then a majority of his creditors should sanction that discharge before it took place. It had been remarked, that creditors often, from being at a distance from their debtors, would not be at
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the expense and trouble of opposing their discharge, and under this impression, many persons got themselves removed by Habeas Corpus, from Northamptonshire, and other distant counties, to the prisons of the metropolis, by which means they escaped all scrutiny whatever. To obviate this practice, he should insert a clause, by which, at the desire of a majority of the creditors, such persons might be removed down to the place where their debts were contracted, so that they might be opposed with effect, and without those enormous expenses which, by the present system, must be incurred, if opposition was to be made. The policy of these amendments to the Bill now in force, he was convinced, would strike every member in the House; and he trusted, if he was allowed leave to bring in the Bill, that he should be able more clearly to establish their necessity. The learned Serjeant concluded by moving, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill for the amendment of the laws relating to Insolvent Debtors."
Mr. W. Bathurstsaid, it was impossible for those who had fully investigated the effect of the Bill known by the name of "lord Redesdale's Bill," not to observe that it was injurious as well to public credit as to public morals; by exciting on the one hand a lawless extravagance, and on the other by creating distrust, and destroying that useful credit which was essential to the existence of the country as a commercial nation. He did not wish to advert to the law as it existed before the passing of this Bill, yet he most fully subscribed to the necessity of bringing forward some measure by which a distinction might be made between the unfortunate and the fraudulent debtor; and with this feeling he cordially seconded the motion of the hon. and learned Serjeant on the floor, than whom he thought no man more competent to the performance of the task he had undertaken.
Mr. Hornersaid, that from the reading of the motion which he had just heard, he had been released, from the uncertainty in which he was placed from the form of the notice of the learned serjeant, as it stood on the order-book, as it was there stated that his intention was to move for the repeal of the Insolvent Act altogether. He was glad to find that he was mistaken, and that the object of the learned serjeant was only to amend the Bill in question. It was not his intention to follow the hon. gentleman who had spoken last, in his

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disquisition upon public credit, as all must agree that it was of the last importance not to check the credit of this country by any enactment of law. If he understood the learned serjeant right, he had divided his Bill into two branches—the one for enforcing the delivery of the property of the debtor to the creditor, and the other for the punishment of the insolvent debtor. With reference to the first proposition, as far as it could be accomplished, he had not the slightest objection, as nothing was more just than that the creditor should have the benefit of any property of which his debtor might be possessed. This object, however, he apprehended, could be obtained, as far as it was practicable, under the present Act. The other proposition, for the punishment of the insolvent debtor, was one, however, at which he could not help expressing his surprise, as well from the nature of the proposition itself, as that it should have come from one so intimately acquainted with the laws of the country as the learned Serjeant. If a fraud was committed, he would ask, were there not penal statutes by which it was punishable? Could any thing be so incongruous as the principle of ascertaining the degree of a man's guilt by the number of shillings which he was able to pay his creditors in the pound? The House he was sure would never accede to this principle. What was the learned Serjeant's remedy for the unfortunate debtor? Why, to throw the burthen of reproof upon the debtor. This, however, was done by the present act, one half of which was occupied with clauses to prevent frauds. He decidedly condemned the notion of punishing a man for insolvency, except where the fraudulent or dishonest motives were most explicitly ascertained. He should not oppose the introduction of the Bill, because he was really anxious to see how the learned serjeant had defined the cases of fraudulent and dishonest insolvency.
Mr. Lockhartsaid, that the description of persons whom his hon. and learned friend was desirous of punishing, were not those who committed what were termed legal frauds, and who would, of course, be subject to the laws already in force for preventing such crimes; but it should be recollected that there were many frauds which did not come under the head of legal frauds, and which it was extremely desirable should not pass off with impunity. Of this description were those sorts of
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frauds which were committed by persons assuming false appearances of respectability, and inducing tradesmen to give credit, which, under other circumstances, they would not have given. It was the prevention of these practices his hon. and learned friend had in view, and therefore it was that he was anxious to fix such scales as would enable a due discrimination to be made between the fraudulent and the honest debtor. But the Act as it now stood was only for debauching the principles of a debtor for two or three months, and then setting him at liberty, to the injury of his creditors. Another detect of the Act was, that it made no distinction between the debtor who put his creditor to all manner of vexatious law expenses, and him who at once suffered judgment to go by default. He thought, too, it was a source of great regret, that there was not some mode of recovering small debts, of ten or twenty pounds, less expensive than the present means, by which an expense of 40 l. or 50 l. was often incurred. It was a fact, that from every cause which was carried into a court of law, not less than thirty persons received fees. This circumstance reminded him of a caricature of the inimitable Hogarth, in which all the powers of the engineer were represented as being applied to draw a cork from a bottle. The hon. gentleman said, it was strange, that in preparing Insolvent Acts, nobody had said a word about those debts which arose from, some species of wrongs, called malicious injuries, which a man may commit against another almost with impunity. Such were those of atrocious battery, or breach of promise of marriage, for which a man, after being convicted in large damages and imprisoned, got free at the end of three months, the same as if he owed only a simple debt. But the greatest injury the act did to trade was, the putting an end to all final actions; for nobody would think of prosecuting a man to recover a small debt, when he knew that the defendant could run him to great expense, and then throw himself in prison. After several other observations in favour of the proposed amendments, the hon. gentleman concluded, by expressing his confidence that they would have the effect of stemming the tide of dishonesty amongst the middling classes of society, and restore principles of equity and justice between man and man.
Mr. Abercrombiethought that the learned

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serjeant ought to have deemed it incumbent upon him to show that the Bill as it now existed, had been found inefficient for the purposes for which it was intended. The Bill, however, provided that the judgment which discharged a debtor should be revoked, if within a year it could be proved that he had been improperly discharged; yet the learned serjeant had not said that a single case of such revocation had occurred. In point of fact he was making a law to punish a man for all the casualties and misfortunes of life, but if he was well off, to prevent him from punishment. It was in order to remedy this very evil that the temporary Insolvent Acts had gained the attention of Parliament. The debtor was not the only person in fault. It was well known that a very large proportion of persons were brought into this situation by those who were endeavouring to establish themselves in business, through giving every facility to credit, and who, if they were not successful, could avail themselves of the laws of bankruptcy. But those persons who conducted their business with caution, had never experienced any of the consequences expatiated on by the learned serjeant. On the whole he thought that he had made out no case whatever for interfering with the Act.
Mr. Hurstexpressed his admiration of the present Insolvent Act, which he thought sufficiently effective without any amendment. It had fallen to his lot to sit as chairman under the Act, and from his own experience, he could state that every means were taken to prevent the discharge of fraudulent debtors. In the whole county of Sussex the discharge of but five persons had been opposed.
Mr. Serjeant Bestsaid, that the last observation of the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, afforded the best argument for his motion, inasmuch as by the Statement he had made, that but five persons had been opposed in the whole County of Sussex, the evil arising from persons removing from distant county gaols to the metropolis was rendered manifest. The learned serjeant replied to the objections that had been made against his proposed Bill, and complained of being misunderstood by those who contended that the object of the Bill was to punish insolvency. It tended merely to discriminate between this insolvency which was unavoidable, and that insolvency which was the result of misconduct.
Mr. Baringconcurred in the general principles of the present Bill. If the learned serjeant had left it to its course of operation for a year or two more, its good or bad effects would be more evident. Before any alteration in the Bill had been proposed, he should have been glad to hear that a committee had been appointed to examine the subject thoroughly.
Leave was then given to bring in the Bill.

ADDRESS ON THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH AMERICA.
Mr. Hart Davisrose for the purpose of moving an address of thanks to the Prince Regent, for the treaty of peace with the United States of America. He trusted the. House would do him the justice to believe, that it was with great diffidence he rose on the present occasion, when so many other gentlemen were so much better qualified for the task; but he should content himself with briefly stating the considerations which satisfied his mind that the treaty deserved the thanks and congratulation of the House. There were few men in this country, he believed, who did not agree that the war, as declared by America, was unprovoked on our part; and it was to him equally manifest that it was now brought to a close not inconsistent with our honour or our interests. That man must have singular views of the policy of Great Britain, who thought that it ought to have been continued by us for the purpose of territorial aggrandisement, from vindictive feelings, or from a wish to extend the triumphs of our arms in another hemisphere. Besides, it could not fail to be considered, that however unprovoked, it was a war carried on with a people of the same origin, the same language, and the same manners with ourselves,—a war, therefore, which must be naturally entered upon with reluctance, and terminated with satisfaction. Neither could it be overlooked, that the interests of America were closely connected with our own. She was essentially a great agricultural country, and could advantageously supply us with her raw produce, while she took our manufactures in return. The more she was driven from pursuing her natural policy, by war or a system of blockade, however necessary these might have been, in the same proportion was she forced to become a great maritime and manufacturing country. Peace with America, then, was the natural policy of this country; and indeed the

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sole object of the war on our part was simply to resist aggression, and support our maritime rights. America had avowed as her objects in going to war, the conquest of Canada, the enforcement of the principle, that free ships make free goods, and the right of naturalizing our seamen,—principles which could not be surrendered, and on the maintenance of which depended our existence as a great nation. Accordingly they had not been surrendered; Canada had been gloriously defended even by a small body of troops, and peace had been made in the spirit of peace. A wide field was again opened for the commerce and manufactures of this country,—a circumstance peculiarly gratifying to him as the representative of a large commercial city, and which became still more important from the new aspect of affairs in Europe. The war, if lamentable in other respects, had at least taught both nations to appreciate their own strength, and the mischief they could do each other. America had shown that she was most formidable on her own territory; while, on the other hand, she must have felt, from the destruction of her trade, and the harassing of her coasts, the extent of the calamity which war with this country was capable of inflicting. He hoped that this would operate as a lesson to both countries; and that the peace would be followed up by a treaty of commerce mutually advantageous. We had retained in our hands the Newfoundland fisheries, and the trade with India, and a participation in them might be conceded for an adequate return of commercial advantages. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to return to his Royal Highness the most humble Thanks of this House, for having been graciously pleased to lay before us a copy of the Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded and ratified between his Majesty and the United States of America: To assure his Royal Highness that, having fully considered the same, we reflect, with the utmost gratitude and satisfaction, on the fresh proof that has been afforded, by the conclusion of this important arrangement, of his Royal Highness's anxious regard for the welfare of his Majesty's people; an arrangement which, we trust, will establish a perfect reconciliation and permanent friendship between the two countries, united by so many ties of common origin and reciprocal interests."
Mr. Ponsonbyrose and said: I can assure you, Sir, that no man in this House rejoices more sincerely than I do, at the termination of the contest with America: but, in my opinion, it would be a disgrace to this House, to present the Address moved by the hon. member, as it now stands, to his royal highness the Prince Regent; because I think it is the duty of this House to inform his Royal Highness, of what I conceive to have been the gross misconduct, and entire mismanagement, of ministers, in the progress of the negociations, and in the execution of the Treaty, with the United States of America. The first thing that must strike every man who has read this Treaty is, that there is no one subject whatever, that existed in dispute between the two countries, before its signature, that does not, in fact, still exist; and that all the pretensions that were advanced by his Majesty's ministers, in the course of the negociations which ended in this Treaty, were, one by one, abandoned by them. I hope the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Goulburn), as I judge by his manner that he denies this statement, will prove that it is erroneous. I shall be very happy to find that he can do so on good authority. As the noble lord (Castlereagh) refused, on the motion of an hon. friend of mine (Mr. Whitbread) to lay before the House, the papers connected with the negociation, I can have no recourse to documents, except those which the American Government has, by its own authority, and on the responsibility of its own character, published to the world.* I here speak of those papers which were laid before Congress by the American President, and which were received by Congress on his responsibility. Another thing to be remarked, in considering this Treaty, is, the time of its conclusion. It was not signed till the 24th of December last; and I think it will puzzle any gentleman who looks to it, to find out what it contains that could have occasioned a delay till that period. The Treaty of Fontainbleau was signed on the 11th of April—this day twelvemonth; the Act of Accession by the noble lord, was signed on the same day, and the notification of the execution of that Treaty was stated, in a dispatch from, the noble lord to earl Bathurst, on the 13th
* For Copies of the Papers relative to the Negociations at Ghent, published by the American Government, see Vol. 29, p. 368.

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of the same month, two days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. The Convention with France was signed on the 27th of April, and the final Treaty was signed at Paris, on the 30th of May. Now, surely, it is necessary for the House to know, what obstacles opposed themselves to the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty with America, immediately after the entering into a Treaty with France. The Treaty of Paris had established not only peace with France, but with all Europe; and it would appear, that no time was so favourable for this country to enter into negotiations with America as that very period. At no time could a proposition of a pacific nature have had so good an effect, as it respected the American government, the American people, and the general system of politics in Europe. This Government was then in a situation to have continued the contest with America, if it pleased, on the most extensive scale. And the more elevated it stood in the estimation of the world—the more powerful and imposing was the attitude of the country—the more was it incumbent on his Majesty's ministers to set on foot a Treaty of Peace, and thus to nave demonstrated the generosity and magnanimity of that people, who, while they had ample means of prosecuting war, influenced solely by a spirit of moderation, had preferred peace.
The peace of Paris was concluded on the 30th of May, and the first conference between the British, and American commissioners at Ghent, took place on the 8th of August. A mediation had been before proposed—and (speaking on the same sort of authority which, I have already observed, I am compel fed to do, since the noble lord will not allow me any farther information) that mediation was declined—a mere negociation between the ministers of the two countries was considered preferable. At this first conference, on the 8th of August, if I am rightly informed by the papers laid before the American Congress, the terms on which alone Great Britain would make peace with America, were substantially proposed. The most remarkable of these terms were—a pacification with, (as they were called) the Indian Allies of Great Britain, and a settlement of their boundaries—military possession of the lakes of Canada, and of certain islands said to belong to us, but occupied by the Americans since the Treaty of 1783; to this was added, a de-
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sire of settling a new boundary for the American and British territories, between the Mississippi and the American lakes. But those points which appeared to be principally pressed by ministers were, the pacification of the Indians—the defining of the boundaries of their territories—the military occupation of the lakes of Canada—and the cession of those islands which the Americans had occupied since 1783. The papers from which I argue state, that the American commissioners were informed by those of Great Britain, that the concession of these points was the sine quâ non, without which peace would not be concluded.
The other terms, although to a certain degree insisted on, were not of so much importance; but no hope was held out that peace could be restored between the two countries, unless the propositions respecting the pacification with the Indians—the definition of their boundaries—and the military possession of the lakes—were agreed to. These terms the American commissioners peremptorily refused. With regard to some of them, they had no instructions from their Government. They stated, that they were not authorized to cede any island, part of the territory of the United States of America—and that they would not take upon themselves to do it. They did not feel themselves justified in joining in any instrument that might be supposed to look to an alienation of any part of the American territory. Under these circumstances, the negociations at Ghent continued for two days longer, and were, then suspended, while the American commissioners sent to their Government for instructions on the subject of the terms that had been offered. When the representations of the American commissioners, accompanied by the documents which had been interchanged in the course of the negociations, came to the hands of the Government of the United States, they unanimously refused the terms stated to have been offered by this country. The American President laid the papers before Congress; and, according to the forms of the constitution of that country, they were published to the American people. On the information thus given to the world—and on this alone—am I now enabled to state to the House the course which appears to have been taken.
The President took the advice of Congress on the subject; and it does appear, not only that the American legislature,

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but that the whole American people, were unanimous in refusing what was proposed by his Majesty's ministers; for it does not appear, that, even in those states which were least inclined to war—even in those states which were most unwilling to support the measures of the American Government—that the smallest disposition was manifested to agree to a Treaty founded on the terms proposed by his Majesty's ministers. And, Sir, it is somewhat remarkable, looking to the actual state of America at that time—marking those parts where an indisposition to war, as might be seen from their proceedings, appeared most strongly to prevail—it is, I say, remarkable, that his Majesty's ministers demanded one of the principal cessions of territory, in the state of Massachusetts—that very state, which was attached, less than any other, to the government of Mr. Madison—that very state which, above any other, had expressed opinions decidedly unfavourable to the war.—[Hear, hear!] Yes, Sir, the greatest cession of territory was asked from that state, which, I should have thought, above every other, it was the duty of this country and of ministers, to conciliate. They ought to have well considered, whether it was discreet or wise to make demands of such a nature, as must inevitably alienate its affections from this country—as must destroy the strong disposition which existed for cultivating the friendship of England—which, in fact, must place the people in that situation, in which they must either give up the honour of their country, or abandon those predilections in favour of Great Britain, which they had long cherished.
Sir, in debates on subjects of this sort formerly, and I have witnessed many of them in this House, I do not recollect a single instance, in which the Address to the Crown was moved by a gentleman not in any official or responsible situation. [Lord Castlereagh, across the table—'Yes, the Address on the Peace of Paris.'] The noble lord says, the Address on the Peace of Paris was thus moved. I hope he will not blame me, if I do not give much weight to his precedent. I am surprised that the Address should be moved by a gentleman not in any responsible or official situation—who, of course, cannot be accurately acquainted with the details of the subject—and cannot be able to give the House any of that authentic information which we have a right to expect, before we are called upon to come to a
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vote, and to express our opinion, on matters of the utmost moment. The noble lord has not stated why he has not himself moved the Address. But I think, after he had denied all papers connected with the Treaty, it would have been more respectful to the House, and more satisfactory to the country, if he had stood forward himself to propose the Address, and had, in the course of his statement, given us some of that information, for which there is so much necessity.
Sir, after various movements in the negociation, on the 8th of October in the last year, his Majesty's commissioners drew up an article, which they proposed for the acceptance of the American plenipotentiaries. This article referred merely to the simple pacification with the Indians, in consequence of the cessation of hostilities about to take place between Great Britain and America. Not a syllable about a definition of territory—not a syllable about a boundary line was mentioned. Whoever reads the correspondence, will see that the American commissioners always resisted this demand of a boundary line for the Indians, on these grounds: that, in fact, the Indians had no territory, as sovereigns of the country—that the United States were the sovereigns of the soil—and that they gave the Indians leave to reside there, for specific purposes. They had the liberty of hunting—they had the liberty of fishing—they had, in fact, little more than the liberty of existing on those territories. A property in the soil, farther than this, was utterly denied; and the commissioners refused, therefore, to agree to any article which went to form a new boundary line between the Indians and the subjects of the United States. They were ready, however, they stated, and so was their government, when peace was concluded with the United States, to extend that peace to the Indian allies of Great Britain; but they should be placed exactly in the same situation as that in which they stood when the war broke out; no new privilege should be extended to them in consequence of the hostilities between Great Britain and America.
The commissioners also stated, when the Treaty was almost concluded with this country, that the American Government had entered into negociations for peace with the Indians themselves, and that they probably were, at that time, brought to a favourable conclusion. The

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article drawn up on the 8th of August, was, after these statements had been made, agreed to on the 13th. The American commissioners expressed their acceptance of it, provided their government did not disapprove of it. They made no objection to it—the parts which they had before opposed, having been given up by his Majesty's ministers. By this article, the Indians were to be placed in a state of pacification, precisely as they were before the war—nothing else was stipulated for, and therefore the American commissioners agreed to it. They did not, however, completely conclude on this point, until the approbation of their government was notified to them. The American government did not hesitate to give their approval; and that article, thus drawn up by our commissioners, and approved by the other side, is the very article relating to the Indians, which now stands in the Treaty itself. There seems to me to be no difference in substance. I know not what the hon. member opposite (Mr. Goulburn) may say, as to the authenticity of the papers from which I draw my information. I only know that they were published in America; and there really seems to me to be no difference between the article drawn up on the 8th of August and agreed to on the 13th, and that which we now find in the Treaty.
The second demand was the military occupation of the Lakes. On this subject the British commissioners stated, that the occupation of the lakes in common, each power being allowed to navigate them with such vessels as they thought fit, and to erect such forts as they pleased, would give rise to disputes and disagreements, which might probably occasion frequent war. And then, to remedy this evil, it was proposed that Great Britain should be allowed to build whatever forts she liked, and might navigate, in any species of vessels she pleased; but that America should have no liberty to raise forts, even on her own side of the Lakes, where her right was certain, plain, and undisputed—and that she should also be debarred from navigating ships of war on them. These conditions were promptly and peremptorily refused by the American commissioners—and the Treaty is quite silent on this subject. It leaves the state of things, with reference to this point, exactly as it was before the war. Now, Sir, I ask, is it true that the English commissioners made these demands of the American commis-
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sioners? Does the hon. gentleman opposite mean to deny that such a demand was made? If he should rise this evening, will he say that his proposition was not made—and that it was not immediately refused by the American commissioners? We know that the Treaty is altogether silent on this subject—we know that both parties are left in possession of the rights they before enjoyed—but, will the hon. gentleman deny, that, for the purpose of securing a safe passage from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Quebec, the demand I have alluded to was made? Will he declare it is not fact that such a demand was made to the American commissioners—resisted by iliem—and refused by their government; and that, inconsequence of this opposition, the parties stand precisely as they were before? If what I advance be fact, Sir, and the hon. gentleman may disprove it if he can, then I say, that ministers have entirely deviated from the course which they first proposed. The definite boundary for the Indians, the alteration to be made with respect to the relations between them and the American government, the military occupation of the lakes by England, the prevention of a military occupation by America, and the portion of territory to be given up in the state of Massachusetts; all these points I say, are abandoned. If they are not, I hope the hon. gentleman will point out to me my error on this subject, and that he will show something in this Treaty to prove that we have gained every advantage contemplated. If, Sir, he cannot do this, I trust he will make it appear that the British commissioners did not ask for the concessions stated in the papers to which I have alluded. Above all, I hope he will show to the House, that one of the demands I have mentioned was not made as a sine quânon, without a compliance with which, it was declared, that no peace would be made with America, although it was afterwards abandoned.
With respect to the possession of the Bay of Passamaquoddy and Moose Island, his Majesty's ministers replied to the representations made by the American negociators on this point, that it was not even a subject of discussion. "The property of that island," said they, "is a matter we cannot discuss. It is our own. It as much the property of the British Crown as Northamptonshire itself." This expression is to be found in the correspondence. Such a reply was evidently

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given for this reason—because it would be a sort of waver of the right to this property, if discussion were permitted to take place relative to it. Now, Sir, in the Treaty which has been concluded, we find that the property in Moose Island, and the other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, is to be decided hereafter according to the Treaty of 1783; and that the possession, by England, is not to deprive America of her right under that Treaty—nor, on the other hand, is the possession, by America, to destroy the right belonging to England; but each, according to the terms of the Treaty of 1783, are to have their respective rights secured to them; and, instead of this not being a matter that admitted of discussion, commissioners are to be appointed to examine into the claims of each country. The settlement of the boundary lines between the territories of the United States and those of Great Britain, as laid down in the Treaty of 1783, is to be left to the decision of some friendly European Power. Now, Sir, if we read the article of the Treaty of 1783, which calls for this settlement, I think there is no man in this House, however skilful, however acquainted with diplomatic subtleties, who will declare, that he ever saw a point of so much difficulty given to any Foreign Power whatever, for the purpose of having it clearly expounded and decided. It is really curious to read the article which is thus to be submitted to an independent foreign Sovereign, that it may be placed in a clear and proper point of view, so that no future disputes may arise. [Mr. Ponsonby here read the article in the Treaty of 1783, describing the boundaries of British North America, and the United States, the almost inconceivable perplexity of which occasioned much laughter.*]
These, Sir, continued Mr. Ponsonby, are the points which a foreign power is to be called on to determine. I believe, with the assistance of Mr. Arrowsmith to draw his maps, and aided by the ablest geographers in the world, there is not an independent sovereign in Europe who would not find it extremely hard to describe to us the course of a line "drawn due north down along the middle of Connecticut river to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river
* For the Treaty, see New Parl. History, vol. 23, p. 1182.
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Iroquois,"—(a laugh)—this being one of the boundary lines specified in the Treaty of 1783. I am sure no independent European sovereign can be found who could follow this extraordinary line, and I doubt whether any man in the world would be able to strike it accurately: certain I am, he ought not to be sought for in Europe, but in America. The Emperor of Austria, or the King of Prussia, would, I believe, find it the most difficult problem they ever were requested to solve, if they were called upon to draw this famous line. The subject is, indeed, rather ludicrous than important. It would have been better if two commissioners had been appointed on each side, with the power of nominating an umpire; or a greater number of persons might have been appointed to settle the dispute, a majority of whom might have been empowered to decide. But to call an independent sovereign of Europe to settle so complicated a point is, I think, most ridiculous.
The Treaty, on all the subjects of dispute that existed before the war, is perfectly silent. No mention is made of what is called our right of impressment—no mention is made of our right of blockade—no mention is made of the principle of those measures which gave rise to the war; the Orders in Council. I do not blame the framers of the Treaty for these omissions: because, situated as Europe was when the Treaty was concluded, I think it was much better to make peace between England and America, than to prevent that peace, by discussing points which had lost much of their interest—no man being then competent to say, when the same degree of interest was likely to be attached to them. Be this as it may, the Treaty is signed, and the pretensions on both sides remain just as they were. The signature took place on the 24th of December. The Treaty of Paris was signed on the 30th of May—and I have found it quite impossible to assign any substantial reason for the long delay that took place between the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and that of Ghent. It surely was desirable that a Treaty with America should have been concluded, the moment this country was freed from European war. At that time peace should have been offered to America. We should then, have appeared, in the eyes of America and of Europe, as acting with true generosity, as displaying real magnanimity. Such a proceeding would have disarmed the hos-

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tile feelings of those who were most unfavourable to us. Such an exhibition of temper and moderation would not only have been useful at the time, but would have been serviceable in all succeeding ages. Why that glorious opportunity was lost—why the Treaty with America was delayed so long after peace was restored to Europe, I am at a loss to discover. That mystery remains to be explained by some gentleman on the other side of the House.
But, Sir, what consequences have resulted from this delay? What a useless waste of treasure—what an unfortunate and ever-to-be-lamented waste of the best blood of the country—of the most distinguished officers—of the bravest, the most heroic troops! All sacrificed, as I conceive, through the negligence or indolence of his Majesty's ministers! all sacrificed by their not concluding a treaty of peace with America, the moment the Treaty with France was signed; and by delaying that Treaty still farther in disputing points with America which they afterwards thought fit to abandon! Would these points, even if carried, have balanced the misery which has followed the delay occasioned in discussing them? In my opinion, Sir, they would not. The hon. mover of the Address has spoken of the great advantage which must be derived from the cultivation of a friendly intercourse between the two countries. No man feels the truth of this fact more than I do. But has the hon. gentleman contemplated the consequences of the delay which has taken place, with reference to the renewal of that intercourse? The war for the taxation of America, hastened by a century her separation from this country; and I will venture, to say, that the war for the Orders in Council, the attempt to govern the commerce of America, has hastened the progress of that country towards being a great manufacturing and a great naval power, by at least a century. A war of this description, big with important consequences like these, ought to have been terminated as soon as the honour and interest of the country would have permitted. It was a war, of all others, that should have been prevented, if possible. I have heard a number of thoughtless people say, "O! let America go to war with us—of what consequence is her power, when compared with that of Great Britain?" I look upon such a feeling as this to be most mistaken. I declare there
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is no European power whatever, not even excepting France, a war with which I should think so ruinous to the permanent interests of this country. Those inconsiderate persons, from the consequences of the war with America, have probably found out their error. They now, I imagine, perceive, that she is not that contemptible power they were weak enough to think she was. Descended from the same ancestors, fired with the same spirit of independence, actuated by the same sense of honour as we are, a war with this people ought to be avoided above any other. I am sorry to say, Sir, that the history of mankind shows too frequently, that to make one nation treat another not only with liberality, but with justice, a certain degree of fear should enter into their mutual regard; and I am afraid, that the history of our species will prove, that no great country has, for any long period, treated its less powerful neighbour with respect, unless that respect has been produced by successful resistance. But, where a strong sense of superiority is felt on the one side, and decided and unresisting weakness is seen on the other, instead of receiving protection, the weaker state is almost sure to be oppressed. I trust in God, another war may never arise between these two countries, to teach them the respect which they owe to each other. There are no two countries in the world whose interests are more blended together—and there are no two countries where it is more easy for those who govern in them to observe the relations of peace and amity towards each other. It is not very easy, in governments constituted as our are, to induce a quarrel between the two countries, if the true state of affairs be known to the people of each. Nothing but deception—nothing but misunderstanding—can produce such an effect. Both Governments depend, in a great degree, on the support of popular opinion. That of America depends on it altogether; and, I thank God, the Government of this country is very much influenced by the same principle. If, therefore, the people are not led astray, and if the two Governments look to their true interests, it will be a difficult thing to encourage a war between nations so nearly assimilated. Many persons affect to look on America with great jealousy as a growing and powerful rival: for my own part, Sir, far from looking at America as a mere rival, I never turn my eyes towards that great continent, without

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feeling in my mind emotions of a much nobler description. For such a country as England to have been the parent of such a country as America—to have raised that which was once a wilderness to its present state of cultivation—to have established wealth and prosperity over an immense empire—to have given to the people that free system of government, which we alone possess amidstsurroundingnations—to see all this—to consider America as the child of England, growing up and flourishing under her fostering hand—this, Sir, is a situation of more true glory and of more real happiness, than any other nation on the face of the earth can boast of. [Hear, hear!] England has been made great herself by her own liberty. That liberty never was threatened by free states. Whenever it was menaced, it was by powers differently constituted. It is her duty, therefore, to set up as the patroness of freedom, throughout the world. The nations ought to be taught to look to her for all the blessings which mankind may derive from independence—they ought to receive from her example those benefits which no other power can confer. With these sentiments, Sir, not thinking the Address moved by the hon. member such as ought to be presented to the Throne, I shall propose the following amendment:
"To assure his Royal Highness that we contemplate with great satisfaction the restoration of a state of peace and amity between his Majesty and the United States of North America; but we should deem ourselves highly deficient in the discharge of our duty towards his Majesty and his people, were we not to express to his Royal Highness our deepest regret, that a measure so necessary to the welfare and prosperity of his Majesty's dominions was not sooner accomplished: That in reviewing the terms of the Treaty which his Royal Highness has been graciously pleased to lay before us, we are at a loss to discover what were the causes which so long retarded its conclusion: That, in our opinion, the honour of his Majesty's crown, and the interests of his people, both required that so soon as the peace of Europe had been established by the Treaty signed at Paris on the 30th of May, in the last year, the speediest and most effectual measures should have been adopted for the negociation of a Treaty of peace with the United States of North America: That the complete and entire cessation of hostilities in Europe had removed or suspended
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the operation of the causes which had occasioned or accompanied the late war between his Majesty and the United States: That the elevated and commanding station which the United Kingdom then held amongst the nations of the world, would have rendered the manifestation of a sincere wish for the restoration of the blessings of peace with the United States, highly honourable to his Majesty's counsels; and would have afforded the Government and people of America the most unequivocal proofs of the generosity and magnanimity of the British nation; of a sincere desire to bury in lasting oblivion the recollection of that hostility which then unhappily subsisted, and of its anxious wishes for the re-establishment of peace upon terms honourable and advantageous to both countries, and likely to insure its own permanency by the justice and liberality of its conditions: That we are the more deeply afflicted by the long and (as we deem it) unnecessary delay in the conclusion of peace, when we reflect upon the great and irreparable injury his Majesty and his people have sustained, by the unnecessary and unprofitable waste of treasure, by the loss of so many distinguished and heroic officers, and of such numbers of brave, loyal, and experienced troops; and we most deeply lament, that these calamities should be aggravated by the mortifying reflection that the fame of the British arms may appear to be diminished by the failure of the latest military enterprizes of the war: That it affords us, however, consolation to find, that peace is at length re-established; and to assure his Royal Highness, that it is the earnest wish and desire of this House, to cultivate and maintain the most cordial and intimate union with the Government and people of the United States: That we rely upon his Royal Highness's wisdom and goodness to cherish and preserve the most friendly relations between them and his Majesty's subjects; and we confidently trust, that a corresponding disposition in the Government and the people of the United States will enable his Royal Highness to continue unimpaired and undisturbed the harmony now so happily restored between them and that the two freest nations in the world may exhibit to mankind the grateful spectacle of mutual confidence, and lasting peace."
The right hon. gentleman then said: It is with regret, Sir, that I make one more observation on this subject. It is hard to

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forget the loss of those officers and troops, caused by the delay which look place in concluding the Treaty with America: it is hard enough to lament their fate, when we consider what is due to their high character: but it is still more hard to be obliged to lament their fall, at this moment, when perhaps England may stand more in need of the assistance of such officers and such troops, than she ever did before. Yet this loss has she sustained by the negligence or blameable indolence of his Majesty's ministers."
The Address and the Amendment having been read by the Speaker,
Mr. Goulburnsaid, he could not remain silent after the animadversions which had been made by the right hon. gentleman upon the conduct of those who were parties to the Treaty. The line of argument, however, which the right hon. gentleman adopted, fortunately afforded him a full opportunity of refuting the misrepresentations which had been made, and of showing, he hoped satisfactorily, that no want of attention to the true interests of this country could be fairly substantiated against those to whom the arrangement of this Treaty had been confided by Government. With respect to the origin of the war, he greatly differed from the right hon. gentleman. So far from thinking that the Orders in Council had created it, he was of an opinion diametrically opposite; and he would also beg leave to recall to the right hon. gentleman's recollection, his (Mr. Ponsonby's) former observation, that from the moment when the Orders in Council were repealed, America had no longer any cause of complaint. She, however, thought otherwise—she declared war for principles that were not concealed; these were—what she termed the forcible seizure of her mariners; certain points relating to his Majesty's right of allegiance over his subjects; and certain principles relative to the right of blockade. Those points formed the real grounds of the war, and were wholly distinct from the Orders in Council. The pretensions with which America set out were those of resisting the rights of his Majesty over his own native subjects—rights acknowledged and sanctioned by public law. These, the right hon. gentleman said, were not stated in the Treaty; certainly not: it would have been abandoning them, to have them so recorded, or to admit their being called into discussion in a convention with any other power.
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Had this mode been adopted, at a future time the precedent would be adduced for their subversion; it was, therefore, in his opinion, far better that they should have received no insertion whatever.
He now came to the second point of the right hon. gentleman's speech, namely, the delay which had occurred before the negociations were entered upon, and also the delay in the progress of the Treaty: but before he entered into this point, he begged to admit the authenticity of the papers which had been alluded to, and which had received publicity through, the American Government; some errors were attached to them, but they were substantially correct. He was glad that these papers had been referred to, as he could equally resort to them, in the course of his arguments. With respect to the negociations having been delayed until after the treaty with the Allies, he would only observe, that the earlier it commenced, so much the better; but the procrastination was quite unavoidable on the part of this country. The facts were these: the American commissioners were instructed to make no peace without our first relinquishing the right of impressment—without our admission that the American flag covered all who sailed under it. If these points were conceded, they were authorized to sign a peace with Great Britain, but not otherwise. Upon this branch of the subject, the President of the United States had not then altered his determination; it continued precisely the same when we entered into a direct negociation, as it did when the mediation of Russia existed. Those points formed the sine quâ non. In one of his dispatches the President declared, that this practice of impressment must cease, or America was no longer an independent state. Referring to dates, it would be found that the 25th of June was the first day when the American commissioners were authorized to allow those matters to remain over undecided, and to sign a Treaty exclusive of their consideration. It was on this day that the first conference w-as held at Ghent. What use could there be of holding it sooner? It would have been useless to canvass terms which were wholly inadmissible, and therefore the Treaty could not have been matured at an earlier period. The right hon. gentleman had said that the British plenipotentiaries shifted their ground, and altered the tone of their stipulations; in proof of this he alleged

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two propositions as those which had been departed from—one was, that the Indians should be included in our pacification, and the other a line of boundary. Here Mr. Goulburn entered into an explanation of those propositions, and referred to the Treaty to show that they had not been overlooked. Stipulations for both those conditions were to be found in that document; not, indeed, in the one case of a boundary of that ludicrous character which the right hon. gentleman had described, but one recognised in 1811, and which America had now re-established. Whatever objections might have been urged against the Treaty or its conductors, he never could have anticipated that England would have been taunted with the crime of contending for the friendless and unprotected Indians, with whom she was in alliance; and he would plead guilty to the charge of having stipulated for them in the conditions of the peace. It had been said, that they had no right to make alliances with the Indians; but he trusted there would be but one opinion, that, when made, they should not be departed from. The American plenipotentiaries promised, that when our business was disposed of, the Indians should receive the conditions which were urged on their behalf; but however high the reliance which was due to those gentlemen, the country would not have been justified in allowing the matter to rest upon this footing.
In the progress of the negotiations, it was true, some points were abandoned—interests concerning this country were relinquished for the sake of contending for the Indians in alliance. The Canadian line was laid aside for the purpose of securing an indemnity for the Indiana, and a recognition of their territorial boundary, as it stood in 1810, a year or two before hostilities were commenced between them and the Americans. Those wretched persons were erroneously described as savages unentitled to our protection; but they were not of this description. Some of their nations were far advanced in civilization, and they were as sensible as any other people of the boon of independence, and as justly entitled to a fulfilment of all engagements contracted with them. The right hon. gentleman had said, that the delay in the negociation arose from the pretensions of the British commissioners. If the right hon. gentleman was in possession of the facts, he would soon
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find reason to alter his opinion. He merely drew his arguments from the American statement, sent forth by that Government for a hostile purpose, at a moment when peace was unlikely to be attained, with the sole view of fanning the spirit of war throughout that continent. At this moment it was not the interest of the British Government, for the sake of petty triumph, to publish more ample details, which would show the subject in another light, and elucidate the matter by unfolding the mutual concessions of the parties then negociating. The appointment of commissioners for the adjustment of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy had been described as ludicrous, from a garbled extract which had been made by the right hon. gentleman. The question was, whether these islands had ever, at any time, been within the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia, or the United States? This inquiry involved no deep diplomatic talents, which rendered its settlement essential in the first instance, neither did the issue depend upon any close geographical disquisition; it was only a duty which arose out of an examination of written and oral evidence, which any man of plain sense was capable of discharging—the public interest, therefore, sustained no injury by its having been thus consigned. The loss of lives which was consequent upon the prolongation of the contest was certainly a matter of melancholy regret; but it was one for which the commissioners were not responsible, as they were bound to proceed with caution and circumspection in their view of the interests of the country. For these reasons he could not concur in the amendment.
Mr. Ponsonby, in explanation of his former opinion, repeated that the war originally arose out of the Orders in Council, and the subsequent circumstances did not alter this fact.
Mr. Baringcondemned the mismanagement which marked the whole of the negociations on the part of this country. He said, that no answers appeared to have been given to notes from the American commissioners till instructions were received from hence; so that the blame or merit of the Treaty rested with ministers. We sent out a noble admiral of much experience, and conversant with the Admiralty business; a learned Civilian from Doctors-Commons, as a judge of the law of nations, and acquainted with

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all necessary technicalities; and the hon. gentleman who spoke last, as more immediately connected with the Government. No mission had a character and composition more likely to make a proper settlement; but at last out came the most meagre Treaty ever framed by the most timid diplomatist, and one that could not have been imagined after all this great preparation. There were points he should give up as unwillingly as any body; yet he did not see why they might not be discussed, in order to find out whether such delicate subjects might not be reconciled to the interests of both parties, rather than be left with the apprehension of their revival in all future wars. The Americans seemed willing to enter into the question relating to the impressment of our seamen; but the British commissioners refused to listen to this proposition, and allowed the matter to remain on a footing decidedly worse than any other in which it could have been placed. The case was simply this:—two countries which had been separated, as if by a civil convulsion, were so placed that they could hardly distinguish each other's subjects. One of these happens to be involved in hostilities with the other, and is exposed to maritime impressment; the difficulty is, how can the mistake of the subjects of each be provided against? One says it cannot; the other replies, let us try if some arrangement can be made to protect us from the chance of having our subjects hurried by impressment into oppressive servitude. This matter was entitled to particular consideration, from the abuses to which it was liable. A point of such delicacy as the identity of subjects so nearly allied, was left as it now stood, to the discretion of young officers habituated to control, unaccustomed to any restraint, and from whose decision there was no appeal. The point was decidedly one of great difficulty; and for this reason it should be carefully examined into, instead of being left wholly unprovided for. For his part, he was quite convinced of the practicability of an arrangement: for instance, America might consent, for the protection of her own seamen, not to hide or receive those of this country. Such an arrangement would be reasonable and satisfactory. From motives of policy, Great Britain should seek this adjustment, seeing that, as things now stood, from one fourth to one third of the American crews were
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British subjects. It was extraordinary that the plenipotentiaries should have separated without having concluded so important a branch of their respective interests; it was a proof of the most unaccountable indolence to see such an opportunity overlooked of deciding this momentous point. By no regulation that could be entered into would Great Britain lose the same number of men as she did by the present system. With reference to the origin of the war, although his own opinion decidedly was that it arose out of the Orders in Council, yet having been continued when these were repealed, he was free to admit, that it was prolonged by America beyond the period of its legitimate provocation. As to the instructions to the American commissioners, the hon. gentleman could not know them at the outset of the negociation. On the question of the Indian boundary, the hon. gentleman had not spoken with candour. He had treated the Indians as what he called the Allies of Great Britain. Upon that subject he (Mr. Baring) agreed, that the savage state of those people was no reason why they should be abandoned; but gentlemen must not suppose that they were people in the heart of America with whom we should have contracted any alliance. In the peace of 1783, the European Powers drew the line with reference to the Indians: in the time of lord Chatham, the strongest resistance was made against France, who wished to make some stipulations with respect to those within the Indian boundaries. He agreed that this country ought not to put an end to the war, and leave those Indians to the mercy of the American Government; but that a solemn pacification should be made for them, and that they should be left where they were before the war, was all that could be required from us. In the early part of the discussion the Americans resisted any interference with the Indians. They asked whether a pacification and a boundary for the Indians was made a sine quâ non; and the answer was in the affirmative. The question was then asked, whether the boundary was intended to preclude the Americans from purchasing lands without the consent of Great Britain, and whether the Indians would be restricted from selling them. The answer was, that they might not purchase, but that the Indians would not be restrained from selling to a third person.

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The Americans said that peace with the Indians was so obvious as to require no comment. With regard to the extent of the Indian boundary, he would maintain, that, objectionable as that point must be to any country, it would not only not be to the advantage, but to the detriment of Great Britain, even if we could have enforced it. It would have been the most absurd policy that could be adopted. This Indian territory would have taken up more than one half of the United States, and this was to be put under savage tribes. Any one who knew what sort of a neighbour an Indian was, must be aware of the danger of setting up hordes of savages, who would rob and murder without the least restraint. The effect on America of establishing the independence of the Indians, would be this: instead of spreading out her people in agriculture, it would force her to become a manufacturing, and a great naval power. Even, therefore, if we could have our will, and could establish those savages in independence, it would be the worst thing for this country that could be devised. As to the lakes, he should say but little, as it was evident that this country forced the Americans to have an establishment on them. All that the Treaty provided for was, that we should be at peace, and that all decisions should be referred to a friendly Power. The whole of it was a mark of great neglect on the part of his Majesty's ministers, who left the negociators at Ghent in the greatest indecision. Looking at the delay of the Treaty, it was impossible not to be aware of the injury of not making peace with America when the Treaty of Paris was signed. If peace had been concluded at that time, the country would have had to boast that we had fought a defensive war with America in the most honourable manner; that with the most trifling force we had shown ourselves capable of defending our colonies against all the power of America; and that we had left an impression on that country which for half a century would not have been worn out. The Government, however, had thought otherwise; they thought that that was a moment for making an impression on America: they made that trial, and were foiled both in the north and in the south. Gentlemen might say it was not fair to argue from accidental circumstances, and what had been the result of the campaign; but none could say there was any chance of
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making an impression on that country, either in the north or in the south. He should like to hear the hon. gentleman defend the policy of penetrating into America. He should like to ask him, what could be the object of the expedition to New Orleans? Supposing we had taken that city, what benefits would this country have derived? We should have plundered some warehouses of cotton, to our great and eternal disgrace. One half of that article was purchased by persons in this country on speculation: but the object of the expedition was plunder, and nothing else; for if we had taken possession of New Orleans, the very first warm day the men must have walked out, if they had any legs to walk on. It was a spot on which the Americans themselves lost two or three thousand men; and if ten thousand had been sent on that expedition, we could not have had 500 capable of performing their duty. It was his opinion, that the northern states of America would be the first formidable enemy we should have to meet at sea; and he only hoped, as peace had been concluded, that a little more attention would be paid by Government to the concerns of the two countries, and that means would be adopted to preserve friendship between them. From the circumstance of both countries having colonies, and the great commercial relations that subsisted between them, it was necessary that a treaty should be made to define those relations more distinctly, for, without it, it was impossible that peace could be maintained.
Mr. Marryattcontended, that the concessions of Great Britain had failed to conciliate America, who, however, in the treaty of 1787, allowed France to reclaim her subjects, so that she stood condemned out of her own mouth. With regard to what the hon. gentleman had said concerning the Indians, it was incumbent on Great Britain to make some stipulation on the part of those who had bled in her service. That unhappy race had been treated by the Americans with the greatest cruelty: they were shot at with no more hesitation than if they were deer or hares, and their territories were constantly seized by their encroaching neighbours; but in this Treaty they had found a legitimate protector, such as they had never known before. The great object of peace, as Mr. Maddison had observed, was to prevent a recurrence of war and ministers had

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done all they could in making peace with America, as soon as they could so do consistently with the honour of this country. The object of America was, to prevent Great Britain from reclaiming the allegiance of her own subjects; but in this America had completely failed, and Great Britain had been successful.
Mr. Charles Grantjun. said, that the subject under the discussion of the House was strictly the Treaty, and the subject grafted on that was the conduct of his Majesty's ministers during the negociation. It had been observed, that several points remaining unsettled, the Treaty was not complete; but in spite of what he had heard, he really thought that an adjustment would be made. He would not enter into the subject of the origin of the war; but he reminded the House that Mr. Maddison had said, that if the repeal of the Orders in Council had been known, it would not have prevented war. The fact was, that there existed a hostile spirit in the American Government towards this country. The right hon. mover of the amendment had said, how advantageous it would have been, if, on the 30th of May we could have concluded peace; but it could not then be done, for the American President still insisted on the flag of the United States protecting all seamen under it, and no peace could be established while such a principle, subversive of all our national rights, was demanded. With respect to the character of this country, which it had been argued was lowered by her late military attempts, he contended that the Treaty itself, so favourable to her interests, showed the respect in which Great Britain was held by the inhabitants of the United States. The hon. gentleman observed, that no Treaty was perhaps ever known to have been concluded upon the terms originally proposed. Those terms generally underwent some modification. It was notorious, indeed, that a negociation with France was some time since broken off by this country, because the negociators on the part of that Government demanded an ultimatum at the outset. The delay which took place after the meeting of the commissioners was chiefly occasioned by the article relating to the Indians. Delay was not our object: we had nothing so mean or unworthy in view as to protract. He begged to express his regret, that the negociations had been laid before the world: it was a measure that was likely to renew all those irritations
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and animosities which had existed between the two countries. He had heard it said, that the American Government was required to do this; but when Mr. Jay addressed Gen. Washington for an account of his negociations, he replied, that he conceived it unconstitutional, and that the precedent would be dangerous in the extreme. Mr. Grant contended, that this Government was bound in honour, policy, and justice, to give its protection to the Indians, whom they had drawn into the contest against the Americans; and he thought it a high honour to this Government that they had secured to the Indians the possession of those rights and privileges which, in his opinion, had been so shamefully sacrificed and given up in the treaties of 1763 and 1783.
Sir James Mackintoshsaid, that he rose after his hon. relation, partly to express the pride as well as pleasure with which he had listened to his arguments, though he was obliged to controvert their justice. He would begin by avowing, however unfashionable such principles had now become, his partiality to America, because she was not only bound to us by the ties of common origin, but by the closer fellowship of civil and religious liberty. The spirit of liberty had given us an American empire: the spirit of domination had robbed us of it. Peace with America he considered as one of the greatest of national advantages; for of all separate objects of our foreign policy, he thought friendship with America was the second. The strength and security of Holland he allowed to be the first. He had at all times equally lamented and reprobated those vulgar prejudices, and that insolent language against the people of America, which had been of late so prevalent in this country, and which had reached so extravagant a height, that men, respectable in character as well as station, had spoken in this House of the deposition of Mr. Maddison as a justifiable object of war, and had treated a gentleman of English extraction and education with a scurrility which they must now be the first to regret, for no better reason than that we happened to be at war with the great republic over which he presides. He did not, therefore, object so much to the Treaty as to the Address. He objected to it because the Treaty was not concluded sooner, because the delay was unfavourable to its conditions, and above all, because the negociations were not conducted

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in the spirit most likely to render the peace permanent. The question before the House was twofold:—Whether any unnecessary delay had occurred in the negociation; and whether that delay was culpably imputable to his Majesty's ministers?
He should venture to assume, that the negociation would have been better conducted if it had been commenced in April or May, and closed in July, than as it was from August to December. Every thing during the first period was favourable to Great Britain. That Government in France which America might consider as the check on British power, had just been overthrown. The Allies were closely united; they were in possession of the French territory. The renown of their success subdued and overawed the minds of all men. It was the moment for England to prove her sincerity in disclaiming views of American aggrandizement. The cause of war was removed. Peace was in substance, if not in form, made with France. No maritime war existed. All questions respecting the right of impressment, or any other right of a maritime belligerent, were become matters of pure speculation. The subject in dispute was vanished. Cadit questio. "Shall we continue at war for a theoretical principle of public law?" was the language openly held by the American negociators on their arrival in London in April. To go still further back, he could not discover why ministers had rejected the mediation of Russia. A mediator is a common friend, who counsels both parties with a weight proportioned to their belief in his integrity, and their respect for his power. But he is not an arbitrator to whose decision they submit their differences, and whose award is binding on them. Russia, at the moment of the proposal, was the most hearty ally of England. No two states were ever joined by stronger bands of common interest. Russia had, by the Convention of 1801, renounced the principles of the Armed Neutrality. She had, indeed, renewed them when she fell under the influence of Napoleon. But as soon as she was emancipated from that yoke, she must have disclaimed all the doctrines that she was then forced to profess. She must have supported our general maritime rights; and it would have required extraordinary disinterestedness for her, at that moment, to have been even impartial respecting the single right in dispute be-
[526
tween America (from whom she had nothing to hope or to fear), and England, her most effective and indispensable ally. Ages might elapse before such an opportunity of pledging Russia in favour of our maritime rights would again occur. But at least, why was not the Congress opened in April? Will it be said, that the American ministers had not then received instructions adapted to the success of the Allies, and the new state of Europe? But enough must have been known in America in January to dispose that Government to terminate a war which had no longer any object, in which they could no longer hope for aid or diversion, and in which their enemy was the ally of all Europe. The battle of Leipzic, the passage of the Rhine, the occupation of a third of France, the Conqueror of Europe reduced to a doubtful and perilous defence of his capital, were surely motives enough for putting an end to a contest about the laws of naval war, at a moment when all war was about to close. And how could the English ministers then know the instructions given by the American Government? It is perfectly ridiculous to urge these instructions now, and to say, as his hon. friend (Mr. Grant) had in substance said, that the ministers had prophecied truly by chance, and were right, though they did not know it. Men cannot be justified by instructions, of which they did not know the existence at the moment of action. It was impossible to explain this delay from the Convention with Monsieur in April, or the Treaty of Paris in May, unless on the miserable policy of protracting war for the sake of striking a blow against America. The disgrace of the naval war, of balanced success between the British navy and the new-born marine of America, was to be redeemed by protracted warfare, and by pouring our victorious armies upon the American continent. That opportunity, fatally for us, arose. If the Congress had opened in June, it was impossible that we should have sent out orders for the attack on Washington. We should have been saved from that success, which he considered as a thousand times more disgraceful and disastrous than the worst defeat. This success he charged on the delay of the negociation. It was a success which made our naval power hateful and alarming to alt Europe. It was a success which gave the hearts of the American people to every enemy who might rise against Eng-

527]
land. It was an enterprise which most exasperated a people, and least weakened a government of any recorded in the annals of war.
For every justifiable purpose of present warfare it was almost impotent. To every wise object of prospective policy it was hostile. It was an attack, not against the strength or the resources of a state, but against the national honour and public affections of a people. After 25 years of the fiercest warfare, in which every great capital of the European continent had been spared, he had almost said, respected by enemies, it was reserved for England to violate all that decent courtesy towards the seats of national dignity, which, in the midst of enmity, manifests the respect of nations for each other, by an expedition deliberately and principally directed against palaces of government, halls of legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the muniments of property, and of the records of history—objects among civilized nations exempted from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as possible, even from its accidental operation, because they contribute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to purposes of peace, and minister to the common and perpetual interest of all human society. It seemed to him an aggravation of this atrocious measure that ministers had attempted to justify the destruction of a distinguished capital, as a retaliation for some violences of inferior American officers, unauthorized and disavowed by their Government, against he knew not what village in Upper Canada. To make such retaliation just, there must always be clear proof of the outrage; in general also, sufficient evidence that the adverse government refused make due reparation for it, and at last some proportion of the punishment to the offence. Here there was very imperfect evidence of the outrage—no proof of refusal to repair—and demonstration of the excessive and monstrous iniquity of what was falsely called retaliation. The value of a capital is not to be estimated by its houses, and warehouses, and shops. It consisted chiefly in what could be neither numbered nor weighed. It was not even by the elegance or grandeur of its monuments, that it was most dear to a generous people. They looked upon it with affection and pride as the seat of legislation, as the sanctuary of public justice, often as linked with the memory of past times,
[528
sometimes still more as., connected with their fondest and proudest hopes of greatness to come. To put all these respectable feelings of a great people, sanctified by the illustrious name of Washington, on a level with half a dozen wooden sheds in the temporary seat of a provincial government, was an act of intolerable insolence, and implied as much contempt for the feelings of America as for the common sense of mankind.—[Sir James enlarged on a variety of subjects in which we have not been able to follow him.]—On the right of searching foreign ships for English seamen, he mentioned a remarkable instance of its ancient and general acknowledgment, which he bad lately found in the Manuscript Memoirs of king James 2. That prince, being in Holland in 1657, was desirous of returning to France, and first proposed to go by sea, but renounced that intention from "the hazard his Royal Highness would run, in case they met with any English man of war, whose custom it was to search any strange ships to see if they had any English seamen on board, and, if they should find any such, to take them out."* Here was an instance of the exercise of this right a century and a half ago, the practice being then spoken of as familiar and acquiesced in by the ships of so great a nation as France. This passage, which had come to light thus accidentally, he considered as decisive evidence of the ancient and unresisted exertion of this important right.
The right of every state to the perpetual allegiance of its natural-born subjects, was an undisputed principle of public law. But it was one of those extreme rights which were peculiarly liable to degenerate into wrong, if the utmost caution and humanity did not regulate its exercise. Notwithstanding this right, Irish officers in the service of France, during all the war of the eighteenth century, had been treated as French subjects. Notwithstanding this right, Louis 15 treated his natural-born subject, marshal Ligonier, as a prisoner of war, and a conversation between them is supposed to have had some share in producing the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But never yet did a case arise in which the application of the principle was so difficult as in the relation between Britain and America;
*Manuscript Life of James II, in the Library of his royal highness the Prince Regent, p. 824.

529]
nations of the same language, of similar manners, of almost the same laws, the one being a country of overflowing population, and the other of a boundless extent of vacant land to receive it: the two first maritime states in the world, the one habitually belligerent, under the necessity of manning her prodigious navy by very rigorous means; the other disposed to commerce and neutrality, alluring seamen by every temptation of emolument into her growing mercantile marine. Never was there such a dangerous conflict between the rigorous principle of natural allegiance, and the moral duty of contributing to the defence of a protecting government. To reconcile these jarring claims by general reasoning, or by abstract principles, was a vain attempt. To effect a compromise between them, would be an arduous task for the utmost caution, and the most conciliatory spirit. Yet it must be tried, unless we were willing that in every future war America should necessarily become our enemy.
He proceeded to examine the causes of delay after the Congress was assembled at Ghent. These were all reducible to one,—a pretension set up by the British negociators, to guarantee what was called the independence of the savages whom we had armed, and to prohibit the Americans from purchases of land from them. The first remark on this pretension was, that it ought never to have been made, or never abandoned. If honour and humanity towards the Indians required it, our desertion of it is an indelible disgrace. It is abandoned. The general words of the Treaty are of no value, or amount to no more than the Americans were always ready to grant. Having been abandoned, it can have been made only as a philanthropic pretext for war.
But, in truth, it was utterly untenable, and it must have been foreseen that it was to be abandoned. It amounted to a demand for the cession of the larger part of the territory of the United States, of that territory which is theirs by positive treaty with Great Britain. Over the whole of the American territory, even to the Pacific Ocean, the Crown of Great Britain formerly claimed the rights of sovereignty. By the Treaty of 1783 the United States succeeded to the rights of the British Crown. The Indian tribes, who hunted in various parts of that vast territory, became vassals of the United States as they had been vassals of the King of Great Britain. Possessed
[530
doubtless of the most perfect right to justice and humanity, entitled like all other men to resist oppression, undisturbed, in regulating their infernal concerns, or their ordinary quarrels with each other, rather to be considered as subjects of their own chiefs, than as directly amenable to the paramount authority of the territorial sovereign; they had still, in all treaties respecting America, been considered as vassals and dependents, bound by the stipulations of their superior state. However undefined this character might be, whatever doubt might be entertained of the original justice of such treaties, it was not now for Great Britain to deny the existence of rights which she had herself exercised, and which she had solemnly ceded to the United States; and once more, if the Indians were her independent allies, it was disgraceful in the highest degree to surrender them at last into the hands of the enemy. Never was a proposal in fact so inhuman made under pretence of philanthropy. The western frontier of North American cultivation is the part of the globe in which civilization is making the most rapid and extensive conquests on the wilderness. It is the point where the race of men is most progressive. To forbid the purchase of land from the savages, is to arrest the progress of mankind—it is to condemn one of the most favoured tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility, as the hunting-ground of a few thousand savages. More barbarous than the Norman tyrants, who afforested great tracts of arable land for their sport, we attempted to stipulate that a territory twice as great as the British Islands should be doomed to be an eternal desert! We laboured to prevent millions of millions of freemen, of Christians, of men of English race, from coming into existence. There never was such an attempt made by a state to secure its own dominion by desolation, to guard by deserts what they could not guard by strength. To perpetuate the English authority in two provinces, the larger part of North America was for ever to be a wilderness. The American ministers, by their resistance to so insolent and extravagant a demand, maintained the common cause of civilised men—and the English, who by advancing so monstrous a pretension protracted the miseries and the bloodshed of war, who had caused the sad defeat of New Orleans and the more disgraceful victory of Washington, had rendered themselves accountable to God and

531]
their country for all the accumulation of evils which marked the last months of an unfortunate and unnatural war.—For these reasons he heartily concurred in the amendment of his right hon. friend.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, he had purposely abstained from rising at an earlier period of the debate, from a wish to hear what objections could be made to the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, before he entered on their justification. They must all feel, that at the close of a transaction which Was happily wound up in peace, it would not be advisable to argue it in any feeling calculated to disturb the amicable relations that at present subsisted. But it was hard that ministers should have to defend themselves against a disclosure on the part of the American Government, made under circumstances which it would now be injudicious to argue. The right hon. member who had examined the discussion of the negociators, guided by the result, was such an economist in point of time as to take advantage of events which, having subsequently taken place, ought not to be applied to the negociations by which they were preceded. But would the right hon. member undertake to say that it was not right to send a force then disposable into America, in the month of May? If he would now do so, it should be recollected that he did not do so at the time. The concessions on the part of this country were all made at the period when our successes were most conspicuous; and such was the spirit of conciliation on our part, that we even agreed to an arrangement by which his Majesty's Government was bound, while it was left to the discretion of the American Government to agree or not. So far was the desire of peace exemplified on our part. As to the mediation of the emperor of Russia, it was declined, not from any doubt of the liberality of that monarch, but on the ground that England was the best and only competent judge of her own rights. With respect to the charge of delay, he could state, that down to the 9th of last August, the American commissioners had no instructions from their Government on the subject of the maritime rights; and he had no hesitation in admitting that it was his wish, and the wish of those with whom he acted, that the transactions which had taken place in Europe should be known in America. Another circumstance worthy of remark was, that his Majesty's negotiators had stated all their objects at once. From the
[532
principle of the maritime rights they never could depart; but they had never refused to go into any question of modification. If the frontier could be established, it would have been a great object; but with all its importance, it never occurred to them to make it an object of war. The great end they had in view was one that affected the honour of the country, that of protecting those who had fought and bled with us. We owed to the Indians to replace them in a state of peace, and in the enjoyment of such possessions as they had before. This was done, and the result was at least so far advantageous to the Indians, as to make their interests an object of regulation to a country which was capable of protecting them. Besides, the negociation was almost exclusively occupied in discussing questions that originated with the Americans themselves. Nothing had been stated that could impeach the Treaty itself, or render the House and the country dissatisfied with its provisions. In the conduct of the negociation every thing was done by this country to facilitate those amicable regulations which it was the wish of Government to establish. Even our military exertions were made with a view to peace. Seeing that the war could be concluded at that period, we had concluded it; and he trusted that, from all these considerations, the House would be disposed to reject the Amendment, and agree to the Address.
Sir James Mackintosh, having been accused of sacrificing justice and humanity to his sanguine views of progressive civilization, observed, in explanation, that if in the year 1600 any European Powers at war with England, under pretence of humanity for the Indians, and of the injustice which they always suffered from Europeans, had compelled us to promise by treaty that we should make no purchases of land from these Indians, the whole of North America would at this day have contained fifty thousand cannibals, instead of ten millions of British freemen, who may be numbered among the most intelligent, the most moral, the bravest, and the most happy of the human race. Sentence of desolation and barbarism would have been passed on a considerable portion of the globe. Our ministers in this proposal had tried to doom to the same fate all that yet remained to be reclaimed.
Mr. J. P. Grantsupported the Amendment, on the ground of the delay with which the negociators of this country were

533]
chargeable. The mediation of the emperor of Russia might, he thought, have been accepted without the surrender of any right.
Mr. Robinsonsupported the Address, and contended that no unnecessary delay had been occasioned by the the British commissioners. With respect to the attack on Washington, as that event took place in the month of August, and the first meeting of the commissioners was on the 8th of that month, the event would have equally taken place, if they had concluded the treaty the first day of their meeting.
The House then divided:

For the Amendment

37

Against it

128

Majority

91

The Address was then agreed to.

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON PARISH APPRENTICES.
The following Report was presented to the House:
REPORT.
The Committee appointed to examine into the number and state of Parish Apprentices, bound into the country from the parishes within the Bills of Mortality, and to report the same, with their observations thereon, to the House:—Have examined the matter to them referred, and agreed upon the following Report:
Your Committee have to observe, that the attention of Parliament has for some time been called to this subject, and that so long ago as the session of 1811, a bill was brought into the House, to amend the laws in respect to Parish Apprentices, and to make certain regulations, with the view of ameliorating their condition; but was withdrawn, in order that some information might be procured which was conceived to be wanting.
A committee was in consequence appointed, which set on foot an inquiry. This inquiry has since been prosecuted with as much perseverance as was required by a subject of so much importance to the happiness and well-being of a large class of the community, though hitherto but little made an object of the attention of Parliament.
It would have been obviously an impracticable task to have attempted to ascertain the number of parish apprentices bound, from various parts of England; to a distance from their parents; and the committee being therefore under
[534
the necessity of limiting their inquiry to those points which were capable of being ascertained, conceived that the parishes, which are comprehended in the Bills of Mortality, would afford a tolerable criterion to enable a judgment to be formed, as to the comparative number of parish, apprentices bound near home and at a distance, and as to the advantages or disadvantages resulting from the latter plan.
This was the more practicable, as by the Act passed in the 2d and 7th years of his present Majesty, some humane regulations were made in the management of parish apprentices in those parishes; and by the latter Act, in certain of those parishes, namely, the seventeen parishes Without the walls of London, the twenty-three in Middlesex and Surrey, being within the Bills of Mortality, and the liberty of the Tower of London, and the ten parishes within the city and liberty of Westminster, a list of poor children bound apprentices was directed to be delivered annually from each parish to the clerk of the company of Parish-clerks, to be bound up and deposited with that company. To those lists your committee have had access, an abstract having been made by the clerk of the Committee; and it appears from them that the whole number of apprentices bound, from the beginning of the year 1802 to the end of the year 1811, from these parishes, amounts to 5,815; being 3,446 males, and 2,369 females. Of these were bound to trades, watermen, the sea-service, and to household employment, 2,428 males, and 1,361 females, in all 3,789; fifteen of whom were bound under eight years of age, 493 between eight and eleven years, 483 between eleven and twelve, 1,656 between, twelve and fourteen, and 1,102 between fourteen and eighteen. Though not immediately applicable to the subject of inquiry, it may not be altogether irrelevant to mention, that of this gross number of children amounting to 3,789, there were bound to the sea-service, to watermen, lightermen, and fishermen, 484; to household employments, 528; and to various trades and professions, 2,772: the remaining children amounting to 2,026, being 1,018 males, and 1,008 females; were bound to persons in the country; of these, 58 were under eight years of age, 1,008 between eight and eleven, 316 between eleven and twelve, 435 between twelve and fourteen, and 207 between fourteen and eighteen, besides

535]
two children whose ages are not mentioned in the returns from their parishes.
Before they enter on the subject of what has become of these children, your Committee beg leave to observe, that from all the parishes within the city of London, only eleven apprentices have been sent to masters at a distance in the country;—that of the five parishes in Southwark, only one (Saint George's) has sent any considerable number;—that in Westminster, the parish of St. Anne, has not sent any since the year 1802; those of St. Margaret and St. John, since the year 1803; and the largest and populous parish of St. Pancras has discontinued the practice since the year 1806. From those of Newington, Shadwell, Islington, and several others, no children have at any time been sent.
The Committee directed precepts to be sent to the various persons in the country to whom the parish apprentices, to the amount of 2,026, were bound, directing them to make returns, stating what had become of them, to the best of their know ledge. These returns have in general been compiled with, but in some instances have not, owing probably to the bankruptcy or discontinuance in business of the parties to whom these children were apprenticed; and in some cases the information required has been furnished by the overseer of the poor, to whom the charge of assigning the apprentices devolved, on the failure of the master.
The general Classification may be made as follows:

Now serving under indenture

644

Served their time, and now, in the same employ

108

Served, and settled elsewhere

99

Dead

80

Enlisted in the army or navy

86

Quitted their service, chiefly run away

166

Not bound to the person mentioned in the return kept by the company of Parish-clerks

58

Sent back to their friends

57

Transferred to tradesmen in different parts of the kingdom

246

Incapable of service

18

Not accounted for or mentioned

5

In parish workhouses

26

Not satisfactorily or intelligibly accounted for by the persons to whom they were bound, or by the overseers where the masters have

[536

become bankrupts

433

2026

Of the number comprised under the last head, consisting of 433, some few of the masters have sent a return, but without giving an account of the whole of the apprentices; so that it may be fairly judged that one third of these cannot be accounted for at all.
Your Committee having abstracted the whole list of parish apprentices bound into the country, might make this Report more full, by enumerating the particular returns made by each master or by the overseer, as well as the names of such masters as have not given any answers at all, or unsatisfactory ones; but they conceive that it might be invidious to do so, especially as those details would make no difference in the state of the question which it is their object to bring before the consideration of the House. They therefore abstain from inserting any such returns in their Appendix, satisfied that the House will give them credit for the reason of such omission. They think it right, however, to state generally, that, of the children bound in ten years, the following is the proportion of the different trades and employments:

Silk Throwsters

118

Silk Manufacturers

26

144

Flax Dressers

21

Flax Spinners

58

Flax Manufacturers

88

Sail-cloth Manufacturers

8

175

Woollen Manufacturers

24

Worsted Spinners

2

Worsted Manufacturers

146

Carpet Weavers

2

174

Frame-work Knitters

9

Earthenware Manufacturers

3

Cotton Spinners

353

Cotton Weavers

67

Cotton Manufacturers

771

Cotton Twist Manufacturers

7

Calico Weavers

198

Fustian Manufacturers

71

Cotton Candlewick Makers

24

1493

Manufacturers (supposed to be Cotton)

28

2026

It appears by the returns from the metropolis, that the children bound to manufacturers in the country have generally been apprenticed on the same day, in numbers of from five or six to forty or fifty. They have not unfrequently been taken back to their parents, and sometimes after having been bound, have been assigned to another master. In the parish of Bermondsey, out of twenty-five apprenticed to manufacturers, sixteen, it is said, did not go, but no reason is given for it; and in several instances, after the children have been taken into the country, they have been returned to the parish, in consequence of the surgeon having pronounced them unsound. It appears also, that of the whole number of parish apprentices included in the above returns, no less a proportion than three-fourths have been bound to masters connected with the cotton manufacture. Most of the remarks, therefore, which they conceive it their duty to make, will be more directly applicable to that branch of employment; though many of their general observations, as to the impolicy of removing children to a considerable distance from their parents, as well as from those whose duty it is to see that they are properly taken care of and treated, are equally applicable to all professions.
In considering this subject, it is necessary to advert more particularly to the causes and circumstances attending the original appointment of a committee. A Bill having been brought into the House four sessions ago, at the desire and under the direction of one of the most populous manufacturing districts of this kingdom, the professed object of which was to prohibit the binding of parish apprentices to above a certain distance from the abode of their parents, and making other regulations in the management of them, some or the parishes of the metropolis menaced an opposition to the Bill, as taking from them the means of disposing of the children of the poor belonging to them, in the manner in which they had before been accustomed to do. It was therefore judged expedient to ascertain the extent of the practice which had prevailed, in order to form a judgment of the necessity of continuing it; and with that view, as well as for the reasons before mentioned, these returns were called for. There was also another reason for confining the returns to the metropolis and its vicinity, exclusive of the facility which the re-
[538
gisters kept as above mentioned, afforded for that purpose.
In the populous districts of England, whether that population is caused by manufacturers or by other employments, the same causes which produce it provide support for the inhabitants of all ages, by various occupations adapted to their means. Thus in manufacturing districts, the children are early taught to gain their subsistence by the different branches of those manufactures. In districts where collieries or other mines abound, they are accustomed almost from their infancy to employments under ground, which tend to train and inure them to the occupation of their ancestors: but in London the lower class of the population is not of that nature, but is composed of many different descriptions, consisting of servants in and out of place, tradesmen, artisans, labourers, widows, and beggars, who being frequently destitute of the means of providing for themselves, are dependent on their parishes for relief, which is seldom bestowed without the parish claiming the exclusive right of disposing, at their pleasure, of all the children of the person receiving relief. The system of apprenticeship is therefore resorted to of necessity, and with a view of getting rid of the burthen of supporting so many individuals; and as it is probably carried to a greater extent there than any where else, for the reasons here stated, your Committee has been enabled to form an opinion, without the necessity of referring to any other part of the kingdom, whether it could be discontinued, without taking away from the parishes the means of disposing of their poor children. It certainly does appear to your Committee, that this purpose might be attained, without the violation of humanity, in separating children forcibly, and conveying them to a distance from their parents, whether those parents be deserving or undeserving. The peculiar circumstances of the metropolis, already alluded to, may at first seem to furnish an argument in favour of a continuance of this practice; but it can hardly be a matter of doubt, that apprentices, to the number of two hundred, which is the yearly number bound on the average of ten years before mentioned, might, with the most trifling possible exertion on the part of the parish officers, be annually bound to trades and domestic employments, within such a distance as to admit of occasional intercourse with a

539]
parent, and (what is perhaps of more consequence) the superintendence of the officers of the parish by which they were bound. That this is not attended with much difficulty seems evident, from the fact that many parishes have never followed the practice of binding their poof children to a distance, though quite as numerous as those in which this practice has prevailed; and that some parishes which had began it, have long discontinued it.
In making these observations, your Committee beg to be understood as not extending them to the sea service, in favour of which they make a special reservation, on account of considerations of the highest political importance connected with the maritime interests of the country. They therefore carefully abstain from recommending any interference with the law as it now stands, which admit of binding parish apprentices to the King's or merchants' naval service.
The system of binding parish apprentices, in the manner in which they are usually bound, to a distance from their parents and relations, and from those parish officers whose duty it is to attend to their moral and physical state, is indeed highly objectionable; but the details and the consequences are very little known, except to those persons to whom professional employment, local situation, or accident, may have afforded the means of inquiry and information on the subject. There are, without doubt, instances of masters, who in some degree compensate to children for the estrangement which frequently takes place at a very early age from their parents, and from the nurses and women to whom they are accustomed in the Workhouses of London, and who pay due and proper attention to the health, education, and moral and religious conduct of their apprentices; but these exceptions to the too general rule, by no means shake the opinion of your Committee as to the general impolicy of such a system.
The consideration of the inconvenience and expense brought on parishes, by binding apprentices from a distance, is of no weight, when compared with the more important one of the inhumanity of the practice: but it must not be kept out of sight, that the magistrates of the Wost Riding of Yorkshire, or of Lancashire, who are of all others the most conversant with the subject, may in vain pass resolutions, as they have done, declaring the
[540
impolicy of binding parish apprentices in the manner in which they are usually bound, and attempting to make regulations with a view to their better treatment, if these wholesome regulations can be entirely done away by the act of two magistrates for Middlesex or Surrey, who can, without any notice or previous intimation, defeat these humane objects, by binding scores or even hundreds of children to manufacturers fn a distant county, and thus increase the very evil which it has been endeavoured to check or prevent. Indeed in so slovenly and careless a manner is this duty frequently performed, and with so little attention to the future condition of the children bound, that in frequent instances the magistrates have put their signatures indentures not executed by the parties. Two of these indentures have been submitted to the inspection of your Committee, purporting to bind a boy and a girl from a parish in Southwark to a cotton manufacturer in Lancashire, and though signed by two justices for the county of Surrey, neither dated nor executed by the parish officers, nor by the master to whom the children were bound. Under these indentures', however, they served; and on the failure of their master, about two years after this binding was supposed to have taken place, these poor children, with some hundreds more, were turned adrift on the world, one of them being at the age of nine, and the other of ten years.
It is obvious that these considerations apply equally to the assignment of parish apprentices as to their original binding, and therefore the restriction of distance, proposed in the latter case, should be extended to all parish apprentices, who during the term of their apprenticeship are assigned to another master; nor should any master have power to remove his apprentice beyond the limited distance, as such power would have a direct and immediate tendency to defeat the object of these regulations.
Your Committee forbear to enter into many details connected with the subject of apprenticeship of the poor, which, though in the highest degree interesting and worthy of the attention of the House, are yet in some measure foreign to the immediate object of their inquiry. They cannot, however, avoid mentioning the very early age at which many of these children are bound apprentices. The evils of the system of these distant removals, at all times

541]
severe, and aggravating the miseries of poverty, are yet felt more acutely and with a greater degree of aggravation, in the case of children of six or seven years of age, who are removed from the care of their parents and relations at that tender time of life; and are in many cases prematurely subjected to a laborious employment, frequently very injurious to their health, and generally highly so to their morals, and from which they cannot hope to be set free under a period of fourteen or fifteen years, as, with the exception of two parishes only in the metropolis, they invariably are bound to the age of twenty-one years.
Without entering more at large into the inquiry, your Committee submit. That enough has been shown to call the attention of the House to the practicability of finding employment for parish apprentices, within a certain distance from their own homes, without the necessity of having recourse to a practice so much at variance with humanity.
The said Report was ordered to be printed.

PETITION FROM THE BRITISH INHABITANTS OF ROTTERDAM.
The following Petition from the British Inhabitants of Rotterdam; praying for pecuniary Aid to repair and reinstate the English Episcopal Church there; was laid before the House, and ordered to be printed.
"To the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury. The humble Petition of the undersigned British Inhabitants of, Rotterdam, and Members of the Established Church of England,
"Sheweth,
"That your petitioners having, until the year 1794, enjoyed the free use and comfort of their religion, were, most of them, from the invasion of this country by the French armies, obliged to quit it, together with their clergyman, at that period:
"That their Church is a handsome detached brick building, and was erected in 1706 and 1707, by means of the liberal contribution of her majesty queen Anne of glorious memory, his grace the duke of Marlborough, and the officers and privates of her majesty's army and navy; to which were added subscriptions from the two Universities of England, dignified and ether clergy as well as nobility, and in-
[542
dividuals, by which means the present building was erected at an expense of nearly 12,000 l. sterling:
"That during the years of trouble and desolation which followed the French invasion, this building became seized by that government, and suffered the greatest abuses, by being converted into an hospital, and afterwards a storehouse:
That during the interval of peace in 1802, the period was too short to reinstate the building, and make it fit for resuming Divine Service; the war soon broke out, the church was again seized by the French, and threatened to be confiscated as a national domain belonging to British subjects, which however was with difficulty, resisted by some of your petitioners, but who could not prevent the French government from appropriating it to the service of the marine, who cut down the oak pews, destroyed the organ, took up the pavement, broke all the windows and ceiling, while the roof, gutters, timbers, and principal parts of the outside of the church were year after year suffered to go to decay, for want of the necessary repairs; which your petitioners had not the means or power to prevent:
"The glorious successes of Great Britain and her Allies, having among other nations happily delivered this country from foreign oppression, and restored to it its former free and protective Government: your petitioners, anxious to be enabled again to assemble themselves together in the worship of the Church of England, most humbly approach your lordships, praying that they will be pleased to grant them the necessary pecuniary aid to accomplish so desirable an object for the benefit of themselves and their children, as well as the numerous class of his Majesty's subjects constantly employed in the shipping trade between Great Britain and this Country:
"Your petitioners beg humbly to state, that according to an accurate survey made by the government architect of this department of Holland, he has reported that it will take the sum of 4,500 l. sterling, to put the Episcopal Church in complete repair, and reinstate the same as it was heretofore fit for the performance of Divine Service, the brick-work and outside shell of the building being still in good order.
"Your petitioners are under the necessity of stating to your lordships, their utter inability to raise the sum, or any

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part of it, and your petitioners will still have to provide the necessary funds for the annual stipend of their clergyman, whose appointment is with the right rev. lord bishop of London, and whose fixed pay from the Crown is only net about 83 l. sterling a year. Your petitioners humbly hope your lordships will graciously take their case into consideration; and, as in duty bound, they will ever pray, &c.
"Rotterdam, July, 1814.
"(Signed) James Le Marchant, jun. G.

ACCOUNT RESPECTING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT.
The following Account was laid on the table of the House:—
An ACCOUNT of the Amount charged by the Bank of England, against the Public, for the Management of the PUBLIC DEBT, including the Charge for Contributions on Loans and Lotteries, in the Years 1792, 1793; 1813 and 1814; for each Year respectively; stating the Rate of Charge on the Amount of the National Debt, and on Contributions on Loans and Lotteries; and the whole Amount of such Charge under each head respectively.

£.

s.

d.

£.

s.

d.

CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, from 5th July 1791 to 5th July 1792, at the rate of £.450 per Million on the Amount of the National Debt

98,803

12

5

CHARGE for receiving Contributions on the Lottery, for the Service of the Year 1792

1,000

0

0

99,803

12

5

CHARGE for Management of the Public Debt, from the 5th July 1792 to the 5th July 1793, at the rate of £.450 per Million on the Amount of the National Debt

98,273

19

3

CHARGE for receiving Contributions on the Loan for the Service of the Year 1793, at the rate of £.805 15 10 per Million

3,626

1

3

CHARGE for receiving contribution on the Lottery for the service of the year 1793, at the rate of £.805 15 10 per Million

1,000

0

0

102,900

0

6

CHARCE for Management of the Public Debt, for one Year ending 5th April 1814, at the Rate of £.340 per Million on £.600,000,000 of the National Debt, and at the rate of £.300 per Million on the Remainder

217,665

9

½

CHARGE for Management of Life Annuities for one year ending 5th April 1814,at the rate of £.340 per Million on the amount of Stock transferred

678

13

3

CHARGE for Management for receiving Contributions on the Loan for the Service of the Year 1813, at the rate of £.800 per Million

21,600

0

CHARGE for Management for receiving contribution on Debentures for the Service of the Year 1813, at the rate of £.800 per Million

639

8

9

CHARGE for Management for receiving contribution for on Six Lotteries for the Service of the Year 1813, at the rate of £.1,000 for each Contract

3,000

0

0

243,583

11

7½

CHARCE for Management of the Public Debt, for one Year ending the 5th April 1815, at the rate of £.340 per Million on £.600,000,000 of the National Debt, and at the rate of £.300 per Million on the Remainder

241,971

4

2½

CHARGE for Management of Life Annuities, for one Year ending the 5th April 1815, at the rate of £.340 per Million on the Amount of Stock transferred

798

3

7

CHARGE for receiving Contributions on the First Loan, for the Service of the Year 1814, at the Rate of £.800 per Million

17,600

0

0

CHARGE for receiving Contributions on the Second Loan, for the Service of the year 1814, at the Rate of £.800per Million

19,198

19

2

CHARGE for receiving Contributions on Four Lotteries, for the Service of the year 1814, at the rate of £1,000 for each Contract

2,000

0

0

281,568

6

11¼

£.727,855

11

5¾

RECAPITULATION:

The Total Amount of Charge of Management

£.658,191

2

3¾

The Total Amount for receiving Contributions on Loans

62,025

0

5

The Total Amount for receiving Contributions on Debentures

639

8

9

The Total Amount for receiving Contributions on Lotteries

7,000

0

0

£.727,855

11

5¾

P. Becher, Catherine Bastre, Anna Mary Johnston, James Henry Turin; for George Rex Curtis, and Margaret Jackson, James Henry Turin; John Turin, Edmund Mitchell, J. Jones, James Smith, Robert Twiss, George Craufurd, Wm. Collings, Thomas Maingy, Shad' Jones, James Martin, John Locke, Mary Lloyd, Charles Ley, Adah Vardy, Jane Gibson, Mary Ann Paget, C. R. Hake, C. Crabb, John Ferguson, Widow A. Hill, Wm. Smith, John Dixon, Thomas Atkinson."

PETITION OF MR. JAMIESON.
The Petition of Mr. W. Jamieson, one of the writers to the Signet in Scotland, and now confined in the Cannongate gaol, complaining of the circumstances under which he was imprisoned, having been read,
Earl Stanhopeobserved, that he did not intend to offer any opinion upon the subject of this Petition. From its nature, however, he thought it due to justice, and to the petitioner, to have the documents to which it referred laid before their lordships, with a view to have the matter investigated. Were he, indeed, a member of the Court of Session, he should be anxious to become acquainted with such an accusation, and to have his conduct explained. It was his intention, therefore, to move that a copy of the Petition be transmitted to the Court of Session, accompanied, however, by an order, that the documents connected with the accusation should be transmitted to their lordships. In thus proceeding he was governed by the precedent of Judge Fox's case, in which that judge being accused, and being properly alive to the protection of his character, petitioned himself for a copy of the accusation. He trusted that the Scotch judges equally valued their reputation, and would be desirous for an opportunity of vindicating themselves against a charge of this nature. If the course of proceeding which he proposed were deemed objectionable, and that any other noble lord should suggest a better course, the noble earl expressed his disposition to accede to it.
The Lord Chancellorthought it impossible to comply with the noble earl's motion. The petitioner appeared to have been committed for a contempt of court, and he presumed their lordships would not be disposed to interfere with such a committal. Indeed, he should conceive it inconsistent with the dignity of that House, and the respect due to the Court of Session, to interfere at all upon this subject. No grounds were stated to justify such an interference; and he hoped the House would recollect the difficulty in which it was involved in Judge Fox's case, when, after proceeding to a certain extent, it was found that it could not go on with effect. The first question in this case was, whether there ought to be any proceeding at all; and he deprecated an interposition of this nature with the conduct of judges, not so much for the sake of the judges themselves, as for the sake of suitors, whose interest must always be affected by the entertainment of charges upon light grounds against those who were appointed to administer the justice of the country. If a judge really deserved accusation, he ought, in his view, to be

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proceeded against in a much more formal and grave manner than the noble earl proposed.
The Earl of Lauderdatethought the better mode would be to move for all the acts of sederunt with regard to the petitioner, because it appeared that the petitioner was committed by an order of the Court of Session, and not by that branch of the court to which he had appealed, and which was competent by the late statute to commit him, had he been guilty of contempt. The petitioner's committal, therefore, did not afford evidence of contempt. But he was anxious for some inquiry respecting those acts of sederunt generally, because he understood that great abuses of power were connected with them.
After a few further observations from the Lord Chancellor, who urged the propriety rather of a distinct motion to settle the law respecting the acts of sederunt without any connexion with this case, and of lord Melville also against the motion, with a remark from lord Lauderdale that the petitioner did not make out a case to warrant the interference of the House, the motion was negatived, as was a motion also of earl Stanhope for copies of the acts of sederunt with respect to Mr. Jamieson.