Sitting of 7 April 1815

DECLARATION OF THE ALLIES, DATED VIENNA, MARCH 13, 1815.
Lord Castlereaghpresented, by command of the Prince Regent, a Copy of "the Declaration of the Allies, dated March 13, 1815;" and Translation: viz.
"DECLARATION.
"Les Puissances qui ont signé le Traité de Paris, rassemblées en Congrès à Vienne, ayant été informées de l'évasion de Napoléon Buonaparté, et de son entrée en France avec une force armée, doivent à leur dignité et aux intérêts de l'ordre social de faire une déclaration solennelle des sentimens que cet événement leur a inspirés.
"En violant ainsi la Convention qui l'a établi dans l'Ile d'Elbe, Buonaparté détruit le seul titre légal dont son existence dépendait; en reparaissant en France avec des projets de confusion et de désordre, il s'est mis hors de la protection de la loi, et il manifeste à l'univers qu'il ne peut y avoir ni paix ni treve avec lui.
"Les Puissances déclarent en conséquence que Napoléon Buonaparté s'est exclu des relations civiles et sociales, et que comme ennemi et perturbateur du monde, il a encouru la vindicte publique.
"Elles déclarent en même temps qu'étant fermement résolues à maintenir dans son intégrité le traité de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, et les dispositions sanctionnées par ce traité, ainsi que celles qui ont été arrêtées ou le seront par la suite, pour le completter et le consolider, elles employeront tous leurs moyens et réuniront tous leurs efforts pour que la paix générale, l'objet des vœux de l'Europe, et le but constant de leurs travaux, ne soient pas troublée de nouveau, et pour se garantir de toutes les tentatives qui menaceraient de replonger l'univers dans les désordres et les malheurs des Révolutions.
"Et quoique bien persuadées que toute la France, se ralliant autour de son Souverain légitime, anéantira immédiatement ce dernier effort d'un délire coupable et impuissant, tous les Souverains de l'Europe, animés des mêmes sentimens et guidés par les mêmes principes, déclarent que si, contre toute attente, il résultait aucun danger réel de cet événement, ils seront prêts à donner au Roi de France et à la nation Française, ou à tout autre Gouvernement qui sera attaqué, aussitôt qu'ils
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en seront requis, toute l'assistance nécessaire pour rétablir la tranquillité, et à faire cause commune contre tous ceux qui tenteraient de la compromettre.
"La présente Déclaration, insérée au protocole du Congrès assemblé à Vienne, le 13 Mars 1815, sera rendue publique.
"Fait et attesté par les Piénipotentiaires des Hautes Puissances qui ont signé le traité de Paris,—à Vienne le 13 Mars 1815.
[Suivent les signatures par ordre alphabétique des Cours.]
AUTRICHE.—Le Prince METTERNICH, le Baron de WESSENBERG.
ESPAGNE.—P. GOMEZ LABRADOR.
FRANCE.—Le Prince TALLEYRAND, le Duc de DALBERG, LATOUR DU PIN, le Comte Alexis de NOAILLES.
GRANDE BRETAGNE.—WELLINGTON, CLANCARTY, CATHCART, STEWART.
PORTUGAL.—Le Comte PALMELLA, SALDANHA, LOBO.
PRUSSE.—Le Prince HARDENBERG, le Baron, HUMBOLDT.
RUSSIE.—Le Comte RASOUMOUSKY, le Comte STACKELBERG, le Comte NESSELRODE.
SUEDE.—Le Comte LOEWENHIELM.
Translation.
"DECLARATION.
"The Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled in Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of Napoleon Buonaparté, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own; dignity and to the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them.
"By thus violating the Convention which had established him in the Island of Elba, Buonaparté destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither truce nor peace with him.
"The Powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Buonaparté has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and a disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance.
"They declare, at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain entire the Treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814,

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and the dispositions sanctioned by that Treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and unite all their efforts; that thus the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled, and to guard themselves against every attempt which shall threaten to re-plunge the world in the disorders and miseries of revolution.
"And although entirely persuaded that ail France, rallying round its legitimate Sovereign, will immediately annihilate this last effort of a criminal and impotent delirium, all the Sovereigns of Europe, animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare, that, if contrary to all calculations, there should result from this event any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France, and the French nation, or to any other government that shall be attacked, as soon as they shall be called upon, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make a common cause against all those who should undertake to compromise it.
"The present Declaration, inserted in the Register of the Congress, assembled at Vienna, on the 13th of March, 1815, shall be made public.
"Done and attested by the Plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris."
Vienna, March, 13th, 1815."
[Here follow the signatures in the alphabetical order of the Courts.]
AUSTRIA.—Prince METTERNICH, Baron WESSENBERG.
FRANCE.—Prince TALLEYRAND, le Duc de DALBERG, LATOUR DU PIN, Count ALEXIS de NOAILLES.
GREAT BRITAIN.—WELLINGTON, CLANCARTY, CATHCARP, STEWART.
PORTUGAL.—Count PALMELLA, SALDANHA, LOBO.
PRUSSIA.—Prince HARDENBERG, Baron HUMBOLDT.
RUSSIA.—Count RASOUMOUSKY, Count STACKELBERG, Count NESSELRODE.
SPAIN.—Prince GOMEZ LABRADOR.
SWEDEN.—LOEWENHIELM.

PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE PERSON AND FAMILY OF BUONAPARTE.
Lord Castlereaghpresented, by command of the Prince Regent, the following Papers, relative to the person and family of Napoleon Buonaparté.
No. 1.—Viscount CASTLEREAGH to Earl BATHURST.
Paris, April 13th, 1814.
My Lord;—I arrived here on the 10th in the evening. The great and auspicious events which had intervened between my last dispatches from Dijon, I had the satisfaction to find had been regularly transmitted home by viscount Cathcart and sir Charles Stewart. The hurry of a first arrival must excuse me to your lordship, for adding little to the mass of important and interesting matter, which you will find detailed in the various Journals, with respect to the progress of the happy change which has been effected. I shall therefore, on the present occasion, confine myself to an explanation of what has passed with respect to the future destination and settlement of Napoleon and his family.
Your lordship has been already informed, by lord Cathcart, of the Act of Abdication which was passed by Buonaparté on the 4th instant, and of the assurance given him by the Emperor of Russia and the provisional Government, of a pecuniary provision of six millions of francs, with a safe asylum in the Island of Elba. The Act in question was deposited in the hands of M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals Ney and Macdonald, to be given up upon the due execution of engagements on the part of the Allies, with respect to the proposed arrangement. These persons were also authorized to agree to an armistice, and to settle such a line of demarcation as might be satisfactory to the Allies, and, in the mean time, prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood.
On my arrival I found this arrangement on the point of execution. A convention had been discussed, and would have, in fact, been signed in the course of the day, by the Russian minister, had not the approach of the allied ministers been announced. The motives for accelerating the immediate conclusion of this Act were the inconvenience, if not the danger, of Napoleon's remaining at Fontambleau, surrounded by troops, who still, in a considerable degree, remained faithful to him, the apprehension of intrigues in the army and in the capital, and the importance attached, by a considerable portion of the officers, to some arrangement favourable to their Chief, in satisfaction of their personal honour, before they left him.
On the night of my arrival, the four

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ministers had a conference with the prince de Benevent on the subject of the proposed Convention, to which I stated my objections, desiring, at the same time, to be understood as not urging them then, at the hazard of the internal tranquillity of France, nor in impeachment of what was due, in good faith, to the assurance given, under the exigency of the moment, by Russia.
The prince of Benevent admitted the weight of many of the objections stated, but declared that he did consider it, on the part of the provisional Government, as an object of the first importance, to avoid any thing that might assume the character of a civil war, even for the shortest time:—That he also found some such measure essential to make the army pass over in a temper to be made use of. Upon these declarations, and the count de Nesselrode's, that the Emperor his master had felt it necessary, in the absence of the Allies, to act for the best in their name as well as his own, I withdrew any further opposition to the principle of the measure, suggesting only some alterations in the details. I desired however to decline, on the part of my Government, being more than an acceding party to the Treaty, and declared that the Act of Accession on the part of Great Britain should not go beyond the territorial arrangements proposed in the Treaty. My objections to our being unnecessarily mixed in its forms, especially in the recognition of Napoleon's title under present circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable; and I now inclose the protocol and note which will explain the extent to which I have taken upon me to give assurances on the part of my Court.
At my suggestion the recognition of the imperial titles in the family were limited to their respective lives, for which there was a precedent in the case of the King of Poland, when he became Elector of Saxony.
To the arrangement in favour of the Empress I felt not only no objection, but considered it due to the distinguished sacrifice of domestic feelings which the Emperor of Austria was making to the cause of Europe. I should have wished to substitute another position in lieu of Elba for the seat of Napoleon's retirement; but none having the quality of security, on which he insisted, seemed disposable, to which equal objections did not occur; and I did not feel, that I could encourage
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the alternative, which M. de Caulaincourt assured me Buonaparté repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England.
On the same night the allied ministers had a conference with M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals, at which I assisted. The Treaty was gone through and agreed to with alterations; it has been since signed and ratified, and Buonaparté will commence his movement towards the South to-morrow, or the day following.
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.
(First Inclosure in No. 1.)—Protocol.
(Translation.)
The Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, and those of the Allied Powers, having met this day, have agreed upon the Articles of the Treaty containing the final arrangements with respect to the Emperor Napoleon and his family.
Lord Castlereagh, minister of his Britannic Majesty, declared that England could not become a party to the above Treaty; but engaged to notify, as soon as possible, the accession of his Court to so much of that Treaty, as concerns the free possession and the peaceable enjoyment, in full sovereignty, of the Isle of Elba, and of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, lord Castlereagh promised likewise, to furnish the necessary passports and safe conducts for the voyage.
The Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the emperor Napoleon having demanded, that her majesty the empress Maria Louisa should be allowed, in full property, an annual revenue of two millions, for herself and heirs, to be paid out of the funds placed by the Emperor either in the Great Book, in the Bank of France, in the Actions des Forêts, or in any other manner, ail which funds his Majesty gives up to the Crown; the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declared, that, as the provisional Government of France had refused taking, of itself, a determination to this effect, their Courts engaged to employ their good offices with the new Sovereign of France, to grant to her majesty the empress Maria Louisa such allowance.
An agreement was subsequently made with the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, that the provisional Government of France should deliver to the Plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor Napoleon, a declaration containing their adhesion and their full and entire guarantee

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to such stipulations of the above Treaty as concern France. Paris, April, 10 th, 1814.
(Second Inclosure in No. 1.)
Paris, April 11, 1814.
Lord Castlereagh, in undertaking on the part of his Government, for an Act of Accession to the Treaty signed this day, so far as the same concerns the possession in sovereignty of the Island of Elba, and also of the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, requests it may be understood that the Act in question will, in conformity to the accustomed usage of the British Government, be an act binding upon his Britannic Majesty with respect to his own acts, but not with respect to the acts of third parties.
No. 2.
Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et le Roi de Prusse, stipulant tant en leur nom, qu'en celui de tous leurs Alliés, d'une part; et sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, de l'autre; ayant nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires; savoir: sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, M. le Prince de Metternich, &c. sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, M. le Comte de Nesselrode, &c.; sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, M. le Baron de Hardenberg, &c.; et sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, M. de Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence, &c.; M. le Maréchal Ney, Prince de la Moskwa, &c.; M. le Maréchal Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, &c.; les plénipotentiaires ci-dessus nommés, après avoir procédé à l'échange de leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, sont convenus des articles suivans:
Art. 1. L'Empereur Napoléon renonce pour lui et ses successeurs et descendans, ainsi que pour chacun des membres de sa famille, à tout droit de souveraineté et de domination, tant sur l'empire Français et le royaume d'Italie, que sur tous autres pays.
Art. 2. Leurs Majestés l'Empereur Napoléon et l'Impératrice Marie Louise conserveront ces titres et qualités pour en jouir leur vie durant.
La mère, les frères, sœurs, neveux, et nièces de l'Empereur conserveront également partout où ils se trouveront les titres de Princes de sa famille.
Art. 3. L'Ile d'Elbe, adoptée par sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon pour le lieu de son séjour, formera, sa vie durant, une principauté séparée, qui sera possédée par lui en toute souveraineté et propriété.
Il sera donné en outre en toute propriétée à l'Empereur Napoléon un revenu annuel de deux millions de francs en rentes sur le grand livre de France, dont un million reversible à l'Impératrice.
Art. 4. Toutes les Puissances s'engagent à employer leurs bons offices, pour faire respecter par les Barbaresques le pavillon et le territoire de l'Ile d'Elbe, et pour que, dans ses rapports avec les Barbaresques, elle soit assimilée à la France.
Art. 5. Les Duchés de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalle, seront donnés en toute propriété et souveraineté à sa Majesté l'Impératrice Marie Louise. Ils passeront à son fils et à sa descendance en ligne directe.
Le Prince, son fils, prendra, dés ce moment, le titre de Prince de Parme, Plaisance, et Guastalla.
Art. 6. II sera réservé dans les pays auxquels l'Empereur Napoléon renonce pour lui et sa famille des domaines, ou donné de rentes sur le grand livre de France, produisant un revenu annuel, net, et déduction faite de toutes charges, de deux millions cinq cent mille francs. Ces domaines ou rentes appartiendront en toute propriété, et pour en disposer comme bon leur semblera,aux Princes et Princesses de sa famille, et seront répartis entr'eux de manière à ce que le revenu de chacun soit dans la proportion suivante; savoir,
A Madame Mère, trois cent mille francs;
Au Roi Joseph et à la Reine, cinq cent mille francs;
Au Roi Louis, deux cent mille francs;
A la Reine Hortense et à ses enfans, quatre cent mille francs;
Au Roi Jérome et à la Reine, cinq cent mille francs;
A la Princesse Elise, trois cent mille francs;
A la Princesse Pauline, trois cent mille francs;
Les Princes et Princesses de la famille de l'Empereur Napoléon conserveront en outre, tous les biens meubles et immeubles de quelque nature que ce soit qu'ils possèdent à titre particulier, et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent (également comme particulier) sur le grand livre de France ou le Monte Napoleone de Milan.
Art. 7. Le traitement annuel de l'Impératrice Joséphine sera réduite à un million en domaines, ou en inscriptions sur le grand livre de France. Elle conti-

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nuera à jouir, en toute propriété, de tous ses biens meubles et immeubles particuliers, et pourra en disposer conformément aux loix Françaises.
Art. 8. Il sera donné au Prince Eugène, Vice Roi d'Italie, un établissement convenable hors de France.
Art. 9. Les propriétés que sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon possède en France, soit comme domaine extraordinaire, soit comme domaine privé, resteroat à la couronne.
Sur les fonds placés par l'Empereur Napoléon soit sur le grand livre, soit sur la banque de France, soit sur les actions des forêts, soit de toute autre manière, et dont sa Majesté fait l'abandon à la Couronne, il sera réservé un capital qui n'excédera pas deux millions pour être employé en gratifications en faveur des personnes qui seront portées sur l'état que signera l'Empereur Napoléon, et qui sera remis au Gouvernement Français.
Art. 10. Tous les diamans de la Couronne resteront à la France.
Art. 11. L'Empereur Napoléon fera retourner au trésor et aux autres caisses publiques toutes les sommes et effets qui en auroient été déplacés par ses ordres, à l'exception de ce qui provient de la liste civile.
Art. 12. Les dettes de la maison de sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, telles qu'elles se trouvent au jour de la signature du présent Traité, seront immédiatement acquittées sur les arrérages dûs par le Trésor public à la liste civile, d'après les états qui seront signés par un Commissaire nommé à cet effet.
Art. 13. Les obligations du Monte Napoleone de Milan envers tous ses créanciers, soit Français, soit étrangers, seront exactement remplies, sans qu'il soit fait aucun changement à cet égard.
Art. 14. On donnera tous les saufs conduits nécessaires pour le libre voyage de sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, de Impératrice, des Princes et Princesses, et de toutes les personnes de leur suite, qui voudront les accompagner ou s'établir hors de France, ainsi que pour le passage de tous les équipages, chevaux et effets qui leur appartiennent.
Les Puissances Alliées donneront en conséquence des officiers et quelques hommes d'escorte.
Art. 15. La Garde Impériale Française fournira un détachement de douze à quinze cents hommes de toute arme pour servir d'escorte jusqu'à Saint Tropez, lieu de l'embarquement.
Art. 16. Il sera fourni une corvette armée, et les bâtimens de transport nécesisaires pour conduire au lieu de sa destination, sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, ainsi que sa Maison: la corvette demeurera en toute propriété à sa Majesté.
Art. 17. Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon pourra amener avec lui, et conserver pour sa garde, quatre cents hommes de bonne volonté, tant officiers que sous-officiers et soldats.
Art. 18. Tous les Français qui auront suivi sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon ou sa famille, seront tenus, s'ils ne veulent perdre leur qualité de Français, de rentrer en France dans le terme de trois ans, à moins qu'ils ne soient compris dans les exceptions que le Governement Français se réserve d'accorder après l'expiration de ce terme.
Art. 19. Les troupes Polonaises de toute arme qui sont au service de France, auront la liberté de retourner chez elles, en conservant armes et bagages comme un témoignage de leurs services honorables. Les officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats, conserveront les décorations qui leur ont été accordées, et les pensions affectées à ces décorations.
Art. 20. Les Hautes Puissances Alliées garantissent l'exécution de tous les Articles du présent Traité. Elles s'engagent à obtenir qu'ils soient adoptés et garantis par la France.
Art. 21. Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les Ratifications en seront échangées à Paris dans le terme de deux jours ou plutôt si faire se peat.
Fait à Paris le 11 Avril 1814.

(L. S.) Le Prince DE METTERNICH.

(L. S.) CHARLES ROBERT Comte DE NESSELRODE.

(L. S.) CHAS. AUG. Baron DE HARDENBERG.

(L. S.) CAULAINCOURT.

(L. S.) NEY, Maréchal.

(L. S.) MACDONALD, Maréchal.

No. 2.—Translation. Treaty between the Allied Powers and the Emperor Napoleon.
Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of all the Russias, the King of Prussia, stipulating in their own name as well as in that of all their Allies, on one part; and his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, on the other; having appointed their Plenipotentiaries, namely; his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the Prince

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de Metternich, &c.: his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Count de Nesselrode, &c.; his Majesty the King of Prussia, the Baron de Hardenberg, &c.; and his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, M. Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, &c. Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskwa, &c. Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum.
The Plenipotentiaries above-mentioned, after having exchanged their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:
Art. 1. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself, his successors and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all right of sovereignty and dominion, as well to the French empire, and the kingdom of Italy, as over every other country.
Art. 2. Their Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and Maria Louisa shall retain their titles and rank, to be enjoyed during their lives. The mother, the brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces, of the Emperor, shall also retain, wherever they may reside, the titles of princes of his family.
Art. 3. The Isle of Elba, adopted by his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as the place of his residence, shall form, during his life, a separate principality, which shall be possessed by him in full sovereignty and property; there shall be besides granted, in full property, to the Emperor Napoleon, an annual revenue of 2,000,000 francs, in rent charge, in the great book of France, of which 1,000,000 shall be in reversion to the Empress.
Art. 4. All the Powers engage to employ their good offices to cause to be respected, by the Barbary Powers, the flag and the territory of the Isle of Elba; for which purpose the relations with the Barbary Powers shall be assimilated to those with France.
Art. 5. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall be granted in full property and sovereignty to her Majesty the Empress Maria Louisa; they shall pass to her son, and to his descendants in the right line. The Prince her son shall from henceforth take the title of Prince of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla.
Art. 6. There shall be reserved, in the territories hereby renounced, to his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, for himself and his family, domains or rent charges in the great book of France, producing a revenue clear of all deductions and charges of 2,500,000 francs. These
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domains or rents shall belong in full property, and to be disposed of as they shall think fit, to the Princes and Princesses of his family, and shall be divided among them in such a manner, that the revenue of each shall be in the following proportion, viz.:

Francs.

To Madame, Mother

300,000

To King Joseph and his Queen

500,000

To King Louis

200,000

To the Queen Hortense and to her children

400,000

To King Jerome and his Queen

500,000

To the Princess Eliza

300,000

To the Princess Paulina

300,000

2,500,000

The Princes and Princesses of the House of the Emperor Napoleon shall retain, besides, their property, moveable and immoveable of whatever nature it may be, which they shall possess by individual or public right, and the rents of which they shall enjoy (also as individuals) in the great book of France, or in the Monte Napoleone of Milan.
Art. 7. The annual pension of the Empress Josephine shall be reduced to 1,000,000, in domains or in inscriptions in the great book of France; she shall continue to enjoy, in full property, all her private property, moveable and immoveable, with power to dispose of it conformable to the French laws.
Art 8. There shall be granted to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, a suitable establishment out of France.
Art. 9. The property which his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon possesses in France, either as extraordinary domain, or as private domain, shall remain attached to the Crown. Of the funds placed by the Emperor, either in the great book of France, in the bank of France, in the Actions des Forêts, or in any other manner, and which his Majesty abandons to the Crown, there shall be reserved a capital which shall not exceed 2,000,000, with a view of being expended in gratifications in favour of persons, whose names shall be contained in a list to be signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and which shall be transmitted to the French Government.
Art. 10. All the crown diamonds shall remain in France.
Art. 11. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon shall return to the treasury and

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to the other public chests, all the sums and effects that shall have been taken out by his orders, with the exception of what has been appropriated from the civil list.
Art. 12. The debts of the household of his majesty the Emperor Napoleon, such as they were on the day of the signature of the present Treaty, shall be immediately delivered out of the arrears due by the public Treasury to the civil list, according to a list, which shall be signed by a commissioner appointed for that purpose.
Art. 13. The obligation of the Monte Napoleone of Milan, towards all the creditors, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, shall be exactly fulfilled, and no change whatever shall take place in this respect.
Art. 14. There shall be given all the necessary passports for the free passage of his majesty the Emperor Napoleon, or of the Empress, the Princes and Princesses, and all the persons of their suites, who wish to accompany them, or to establish themselves out of France, as well as for the passage of all the equipages, horses, and effects belonging to them. The Allied Powers shall, in consequence, furnish officers and men for escorts.
Art. 15. The French Imperial Guard shall furnish a detachment of from 1,200 to 1,500 men, of all arms, to serve as an escort to the Emperor Napoleon, to St. Tropez, the place of his embarkation.
Art. 16. There shall be furnished a corvette and the necessary transport vessels to convey to the place of his destination his majesty the Emperor Napoleon and his household; and the corvette shall belong, in full property, to his majesty the Emperor.
Art. 17. The Emperor Napoleon shall be allowed to take with him and retain as his guard, 400 men, volunteers, as well officers, as sub-officers and soldiers.
Art. 18. All Frenchmen who shall have followed the Emperor Napoleon or his family, shall be held to have forfeited their rights as such by not returning to France within three years; unless they or he be comprised in the exceptions which the French Government reserves to itself to grant after the expiration of that term.
Art. 19. The Polish troops of all arms, in the service of France, shall be at liberty to return home, and shall retain their arms and baggage, as a testimony of their honourable services. The officers, sub-officers, and, soldiers, shall retain the decorations which have been granted to
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them, and the pensions annexed to those decorations.
Art. 20. The high Allied Powers guarantee the execution of all the articles of the present Treaty, and engage to obtain that it shall be adopted and guaranteed by France.
Art. 21. The present Act shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris, within two days, or sooner, if possible.
Done at Paris, the 11th of April, 1814.

(L. S.) The Prince DE METTERNICH.

(L. S.) CHARLES ROBERT Comte DE NESSELRODE.

(L. S.) CHAS. AUG. Baron DE HARDENBERG.

(L. S.) CAULAINCOURT.

(L. S.) Marshal NEY.

(L. S.) MACDONALD.

No. 3.—Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.
Paris, April 27, 1814.
My Lord:—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship an act which I have this day executed here, containing the accession of Great Britain to certain parts of the Treaty lately concluded with respect to the family and person of Napoleon Buonaparté.—I am, with great truth and regard, &c. CASTLEREAGH.
(Inclosure in No. 3.)
Whereas their imperial and royal majesties, the Emperor of Austria, king, of Hungary and Bohemia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Prussia, have entered into a Treaty, concluded at Paris, on the 11th April of the present year, for the purpose of granting, for such respective periods as in the said Treaty are mentioned, to the person and family of Napoleon Buonaparté, the possession in sovereignty of the island of Elba, and the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and for other purposes; which Treaty has been communicated to the Prince Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, by the ministers of their imperial and royal majesties the Emperor of Austria, king of Hungary and Bohemia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Prussia; who, in the name of their respective sovereigns, have jointly invited the Prince Regent to accede to the same, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty:
His royal highness the Prince Regent,

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having full knowledge of the contents of the said Treaty, accedes to the same, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, as far as respects the stipulations relative to the possession in sovereignty of the island of Elba, and also of the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla. But his Royal Highness is not to be considered, by this Act of Accession, to have become a party, in the name of his Majesty, to any of the other provisions and stipulations contained therein.
Given under my hand and seal, at Paris, this 27th day of April, 1814. By command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty.
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

PAPERS RELATING TO GENOA.
Lord Castlereaghpresented, by command of the Prince Regent, the following

PAPERS RELATING TO GENOA.
No. 1.—Extract.
London, December 28, 1813.
I have the honour of inclosing some information, communicated to me, respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Genoa and Piedmont, and also the defenceless state of the enemy in those countries. Between the time when this information was procured and the time you will receive this dispatch, material changes may have taken place in the state of the French forces; but it is not likely that the disposition of the inhabitants will have altered. If any circumstances should occur which should encourage the inhabitants to rise against the Government of France, and more especially, if they should declare for the King of Sardinia, you will, upon receiving intelligence thereof, lose no time in giving every possible assistance. You will, for this purpose, maintain a communication with the court of Cagliari and sir Edward Pellew. If the state of the force under your command shall allow of it, you may send a detachment of troops, and soon accompany them yourself, if the state of Sicily will allow of your being so far removed from that kingdom. The main object should be the occupation of Genoa, or at least of the two forts which command the entrance of the harbour.
Provided it be clearly with the entire concurrence of the inhabitants, you may take possession of Genoa in the name and
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on the behalf of his Sardinian Majesty.
(Signed) BATHURST.
Lieut.-Gen. Lord Wm. Bentinck.
No. 2.
Dijon, March 30, 1814.
My Lord;—This instruction will be delivered to your lordship by a courier of prince Metternich's. I propose in a day or two to forward, by an English messenger, a military instruction which I have received for your lordship from lord Bathurst; but as his lordship's dispatch is framed upon a supposition that the operations are much further advanced in Italy than is the fact, the delay of this communication for a few days can be of no prejudice.
I cannot dissemble from you lordship my disappointment, that the great superiority of force which the Allies possess over marshal Beauharnois has not, before this, produced the results which, for the honour of the arms of the respective Powers, and the ulterior objects of the war, we were entitled to expect from such ample and extended means. In your lordship's intercourse with the marshals Belgarde and Murat, you will not conceal from them that such are the sentiments of the British Government, and that we conjure them, by union and exertion, no longer to suffer this great and commanding army to be paralized by an enemy so much their inferior.
As the object is to promote union, and put aside every minor consideration, I am to signify to your lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure, that you do make every effort to this effect by lending yourself to whatever measures may best tend to combine the exertions of the allied armies for the early repulsion of the enemy from Italy. For this purpose you will, to the utmost, conform to the views of marshal Belgarde, regulating at the same time your conduct towards marshal Murat upon principles of cordiality and confidence; and in order the better to effect this, and publicly to evince the desire felt by your Government zealously to unite their arms with his, your lordship will select an officer of suitable rank and military talents to reside at the Neapolitan head-quarters, whom you will direct to correspond with me, and with your lordship, as sir Robert Wilson at present does.
Your lordship is already fully apprized of the earnest interest the Prince Regent takes in the restoration of the King of

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Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to their ancient dominions; you will give every aid to both, but you will studiously abstain from encouraging any measure which might commit your court, or the Allies, with respect to the ultimate disposition of any of the other territories in the north of Italy, the destination of which must remain to be discussed upon a peace.
I have, &c.
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.
Lord William Bentinck.
No. 3.—(Extract.)
Dijon, April 3, 1814.
In order to bring the Italian campaign to a speedy and successful result, it is essential that your lordship should consider your force merely as an auxiliary corps, and that you should accommodate it, as far as the safety of your army will permit, to the views and wishes of the Austrian commander in chief. It is from him your lordship will best learn what are the intentions of the Allies, including those of your own Government; and should your lordship find any difficulty in the execution of this service, arising from what may appear to your lordship to be a departure, on the part of any member of the confederacy, from the true principles of the alliance, your lordship will refer the matter for the opinion of the Austrian commander, avoiding as much as possible any separate discussions, which might interfere with the general union and necessary subordination which ought to pervade the whole.
There is one subject further upon which I deem it necessary to say a few words; not that I entertain the smallest doubts as to your lordship's own conduct being regulated in strict conformity to the present system of your Government: but as your lordship very properly, and under orders from home, gave great countenance at a former period to the only system which, previous to the revival of the continent, could afford a prospect of shaking the power of France, it is the more necessary, now that a different and better order of things has arisen, to guard against any act or expression which might countenance an idea, that either your lordship or your court were actuated by views of separate interest, inconsistent with the arrangements understood between the great Powers of Europe.
In your lordship's Proclamation there
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may, perhaps, be found an expression or two, which, separately taken, might create an impression that your views of Italian liberation went to the form of the government as well as to the expulsion of the French; but taking its whole scope, and especially its opening and concluding paragraphs together, I cannot assent to the interpretation the duke of Campochiaro, on the part of his Government, has attempted to give it; but this and the incident of the colours, proves how necessary, it is, surrounded as your lordship must be by individuals who wish for another system to be established in Italy, not to afford any plausible occasion or pretext for umbrage to those with whom we are acting.
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.
Lord William Bentinck.
(Paper referred to in No. 3.)
Leghorn, March 14, 1814.
ITALIANS!—Great Britain has landed her troops on your coasts; she offers you her assistance, in order to rescue you from the iron yoke of Buonaparté. Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and Holland, attest the liberal and disinterested principles which animate that Power.
Spain, by her persevering resolution, by her valour, and by the efforts of her ally, has succeeded in the most glorious enterprise: the French have been driven from her territory; her independence is secured, her civil liberty is established.
Sicily, protected by that same Power, succeeded in saving herself from the universal deluge, by which she has suffered nothing; through the beneficent disposition of her Sovereign, she passes from slavery to freedom, and hastens to resume her ancient splendour among the independent nations.
Holland will speedily have attained the same object: is, then, Italy alone to remain under the yoke? Shall the Italians alone contend against Italians, in favour of a tyrant, and for the thraldom of their country? Italians, hesitate no longer—be Italians, and let Italy in arms be convinced, that the great cause of the country is in her hands.
Warriors of Italy! you are not invited to join us, but you are invited to vindicate your own rights, and to be free.
Only call, and we will hasten to your relief; and then Italy, by our united efforts, shall become what she was in her

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most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is.
(Signed) W. C. BENTINCK,
Commander in Chief of the British troops.
No. 4.
Genoa, April 27, 1814.
My Lord;—I have had the honour to inclose two Addresses from the inhabitants and trade of Genoa, representing the unanimous (I believe justly stated) desire of the Genoese to return to their ancient state; and praying the support of the British Government.
As it was necessary that a provisional government should be established; that this government should be entirely Genoese; that it should be so conformable to the wishes of the people, as to receive their general support; and thus to render unnecessary the interference of a British authority, or the presence of a British force; I have had no hesitation in proclaiming the old form of government, and I have the honour of inclosing the Proclamation, which will this day be published.
The Genoese universally desire the restoration of their ancient Republic. They dread, above all other arrangements, their annexation to Piedmont; to the inhabitants of which there always has existed a particular aversion.
The people of Savona form an exception to the general feeling. They desire to belong to Piedmont; their trade is direct with that country; and it was the policy of the ancient Republic to sacrifice the commercial interests of Savona to those of Genoa, and they fear in consequence a renewal of the same exclusion. I have, &c.
W. BENTINCK.
Viscount Castlereagh, &c.
(Inclosure in No. 4.)—PROCLAMATION.
His Britannic Majesty's army under ray command, having driven the French from the territory of Genoa, it is become necessary to provide for the maintenance of good order, and for the government of this state. Considering that the general desire of the Genoese nation seems to be to return to that ancient government under which it enjoyed liberty, prosperity, and independence; and considering, likewise, that this desire seems to be conformable to the principles recognized by the high Allied Powers, of restoring to all, their ancient rights and privileges; I declare,

1. That the constitution of the Genoese States, such as it existed in 1797, with
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those modifications which the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1576, seem to require, is re-established.

2. That the organic modifications, together with the manner of forming the lists of eligible citizens, and the lesser and greater councils, shall be published as soon as possible.

3. That a provisional Government, consisting of thirteen individuals, and formed into two, colleges, as heretofore, shall immediately be appointed, and shall continue in office, until the 1st of January, 1815, when the two colleges shall be filled up to the number prescribed by the constitution.

4. That this provisional Government shall assume and exercise the legislative and executive powers of the state, and shall fix upon some temporary system, either by continuing and modifying the existing laws, or by re-establishing and new-modelling the old, in the manner that shall appear to it expedient for the good of the state, and for the security or the citizens, of their persons, and of their properties.

5. That two-thirds of the lesser and greater councils shall be appointed instantly; the others shall be elected pursuant to the constitution, after the lists of eligible citizens shall have been framed.

6. The two colleges shall propose to the two councils above-mentioned, agreeably to the constitution, all the measures which they shall judge necessary for the entire re-establishment of the ancient form of government.

And, in fulfilment of the present, I declare, by this Proclamation, that
Seignor Girolamo Serra, President; and the Seignors Andrea de Ferrari, Agostino Parreto, Ippolito Durazzo, Gio. Carlo Brignole, Agostino Fiesco, Paolo Pallavicini, Domenico Dealbertis, Giovanni Quartara, Marcello Massone, Giuseppe Fravega, Luca Solgri, Giuseppe Pandolfo, Senators, are elected to form the Provisional Government of the Genoese state; and I invite, and order all inhabitants, of every class and condition, to lend their, assistance and to yield obedience.
Given in my head-quarters, Genoa, this 26th April, 1814. W. C. BENTINCK,
Commander in Chief.
No. 5.—Extract.
Paris, May 6th, 1814.
With respect to the arrangement your lordship has made for the provisional go-

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vernment of Genoa, it is material that it should not be considered as prejudging the future system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe. Your lordship will adopt such measures as may conciliate the feelings of the people; but you will avoid referring to the ancient form of government in terms which may excite disappointment, should considerations, arising out of the general interests, induce the adoption of a different arrangement.
With respect to the measures to be adopted in the Milanese, I do not wish your lordship to continue general M'Farlane there now the Austrians have advanced. It may complicate injuriously the concerns of Italy, any interference on the part of your lordship, placed at such a distance as you are from the seat of the allied councils; and I am desirous that your lordship should not take any steps to encourage the fermentation which at present seems to prevail in Italy on questions of government.
(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.
Lord W. Bentinck, &c.
No 6.
Note presented by M. Pareto to Viscount Castlereagh at Paris.—(Translation.)
The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Genoa, has the honour to submit to ins excellency Viscount Castlereagh, H. B. M. Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the following note:
The great events which have recently taken place in Europe, and the magnanimous resolutions announced by the high Allied Powers, have raised hopes amongst all people subjected in these latter years to French domination: those of the Genoese nation have no other tendency than that of recovering its former existence, which has been momentarily suspended.
These hopes, which the desire of shaking off a yoke supported with impatience, has ever nourished, have augmented at the approach of the victorious armies of his Britannic Majesty. The Genoese, full of an equal confidence in the benevolent dispositions of all the high Allied Powers, could not however but see, with the most lively joy, that their destiny was about to depend more particularly upon that generous nation, with which they had uniformly had the most intimate connexion in industry and commerce.
Enthusiasm, indeed, was at its height,
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and the clamours of the people, and the declarations of the notables of the town, hastened perhaps the term of an useless resistance. Surely, indeed, the deliverance of Genoa was not the less assured, independent of these circumstances, in consequence of the triumphs of the British arms. But it is honourable to the Genoese to have co-operated themselves in some degree to attain it, and to have loudly declared their wish to be restored to their ancient laws and independence, being still, as it were, under the bayonets of the French.
This spontaneous wish is not only the general wish of the nation, it is become necessary to it. Placed in a territory narrow and barren, Genoa has only one means of subsistence, commerce with economy; and by the concurrence of the neighbouring ports, this commerce can alone exist, depending upon a system of financial regulations, as little oppressive as possible, as they existed formerly. The ancient Genoese government was by its nature the least expensive and most economical of any government in Europe; taxes were very light, and the imposts upon commerce scarcely any thing. In vain could they flatter themselves to preserve this system, if Genoa was ruled by any other form of government; still less, were she united to any other country of greater extent, whose wants, without number and without measure, would again crush this unhappy country; which, weakened by fifteen years of immense losses, her interests sacrificed to those of foreigners, instead of seeing her wounds healed, would soon see the resources of her industry for ever destroyed, and her ruin completed. These serious considerations receive additional sanction from the long and happy experience which has been had of the order of things of which they implore the re-establishment: during more than two centuries and a half, from 1508 to 1797, it has constantly produced the happiness of the nation, which after long disturbances has found in it the repose which she sought in vain in other systems of administration. If some modifications respecting the condition of eligibility to public functions have appeared necessary, the result of a common accord, and of a perfect unanimity among all ranks of citizens, will only thereby be better secured.
This accord and this unanimity have been proved by his excellency lord Ben-

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tinck, who has acknowledged the legitimate expression of the national wish. He might equally have perceived what invincible repugnance foreign domination inspired; the false reports of the re-union of Genoa with a neighbouring state, having been by chance circulated in the town, the consternation became general, and a day of festivity was converted into a day of mourning, until those apprehensions were allayed by the hope, which the repeated declarations of the high Powers could not fail to revive.
In fact, the wishes of the Genoese are in entire conformity with the grand design which has been the noble end of so many efforts, that of reconstructing upon its ancient basis the social edifice of Europe. The Republic of Genoa was not, until 1805, erased from the number of independent states, and that by an act of violence; in truth, it never ceased to exist. Its union with France never having been acknowledged by the other Governments, and still less by that of Great Britain, consequently the application of the principles established by the high Powers must, without doubt, apply to this Republic. It is even in proportion to the weakness of this small State that their magnanimity will more fully display itself.
If, after motives of such high importance, one might hazard conjectures upon what appears in this respect to combine with the interests of Great Britain, the undersigned would permit himself to remark, that of all the modes of disposing of the state of Genoa, that of preserving the ancient Republic appears to offer the most useful chances. Genoa, re-united to a continental state, whatever it may be, might be exposed, in spite of itself, to the misfortunes of once more becoming the enemy of England.
A State essentially maritime and pacific, supported by the powerful auspices of the British Government, it would be constantly friendly, and would never hazard seeing its best interests again committed by a continental government. In short, English commerce would no where find, in the rate of duties, such facilities as a government economical like that of Genoa, can offer.
But it is unnecessary to insist upon similar considerations, since the illustrious commander of the British forces in Italy, possessed of the intentions of his Government, has already been, by his proclamation of the 26th April last, the worthy
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channel of English generosity. The Genoese Government consequently flatters itself that his royal highness the Prince Regent, in sanctioning what has already been done in his name by lord Bentinck, will deign to extend his benevolence to the Republic of Genoa, and his good offices with the high Allied Powers, to induce them to acknowledge the re-establishment, as well as the integrity and continuity of its territory, equally indispensable for its existence, and without which it cannot but be precarious.
The undersigned, in recommending the fate of his country to the liberal principles which so eminently distinguish the administration of viscount Castlereagh, &c.
(Signed) PARETO.
Paris, 11 th May, 1814.
No. 7.
Paper of Observations communicated by Mr. Pareto to Viscount Castlereagh at Paris. (Translation.)
Paris, May 18, 1814.
The observations respecting the state of Genoa, which his excellency viscount Castlereagh was pleased to communicate to the undersigned, in the audience of the 10th inst., gave rise to reflections which it is thought right to submit to his excellency. The facts upon which these are founded can be verified by the English agents now at Genoa, and no doubt is entertained that they will be admitted to be in perfect conformity with what is herein stated.
His excellency seemed to think that if, in consequence of the arrangements which were to take place between the high Allied Powers, the state of Genoa were united to Piedmont, advantages would result from this arrangement sufficient to counterbalance the loss of its independence. He seemed to think that commerce would resume its course, industry its customary channels, and the whole country its ancient prosperity.
The undersigned cannot abstain from observing, that from all the data which the actual state of things and the mutual relations of the two countries can furnish, far from flattering himself that success will answer these hopes, he is persuaded that the union would be attended with consequences the most disastrous for the state of Genoa.
In the first place the interests of the two countries are essentially different. Piedmont is an agricultural country: the state of Genoa having only a narrow coast,

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and sterile rocks, is necessarily a maritime and commercial state. In Piedmont every thing depends on landed property (bienfonds), and on territorial produce. At Genoa all depends on capital employed in commercial enterprizes, and the productions of industry; independent of the general maxim, that commerce prospers best in free countries—a maxim so well known in England. It has been already observed to your excellency, that the species of commerce which is almost exclusively attended to at Genoa, is that of commission and of transit; which requiring the greatest facilities and the least possible shackles, is by its nature the most difficult to preserve. In the competition of neighbouring ports the preference which is given to one over the other depends upon the duties less onerous, and the forms less restrictive, to which they are respectively subjected. The least augmentation of the duties on the smallest financial regulation is sufficient to divert this commerce from its ordinary course, and to convey it elsewhere. The expenses of a court, and of a military state, producing considerable taxes, it is easy to foresee that if the burthen falls chiefly upon commerce, the interests of the ancient part of the nation cannot fail to outweigh those of the less numerous part newly united; thus the loss of the commerce of Genoa would be the infallible consequence of this union.
If any thing need be added to the subversion of the only means of existence of the country, the jealousy of the capital, towards a town whose rivalry she would fear, would still more speedily hasten its ruin.
Genoa, despoiled of the advantages of being the centre of the government, and losing every year a part of its population, to increase that of Turin, would be constantly sacrificed to the latter: the ancient Piedmontese would fill all the places at Court, all the situations in the administration, and the Genoese would gradually be absorbed.
Your excellency, in referring to the general interests of Europe, declared, that after the events which have so long disturbed it, it became necessary to form powerful States, which should offer, by their extent, a sufficient guarantee against the enterprizes of France.
If the undersigned might be allowed, upon such grand objects, to make any observation independent of the cessation
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of the fears inspired by a system which is for ever fallen, with the fall of its author, he would remark, that it is not always the extent which forms the power of States: true power consists in union, concord, and national spirit—that spirit certainly could not exist in the new amalgamation of two people divided by their character, by their habits, and by an invincible antipathy—the fruit of two centuries of political quarrels. Vain would be the attempt to make of them one nation—Far from uniting the means of force and defence, elements of discord only would be collected, and, perhaps, Piedmont alone would in herself be more powerful than if she were united to the state of Genoa; since, in case of war, the court of Turin would not have to contend at the same time against external enemies, and against her new subjects impatient to shake off a yoke which necessity alone compels them to endure. On the other hand, in re-establishing the ancient government of Genoa; which, in spite of the menaces of France in 1795 and 1796, was never, so long as it had existence, the enemy of the courts of London and of Vienna; and in the event of war, by placing this Government under the immediate protection of that amongst the Allied Powers, the most immediately interested in its preservation,—England, for instance,—the same end would be obtained, and which perhaps could not be attained by its union with Piedmont: the national spirit which, in the hypothesis of this union, would agitate the Genoese in a sense opposed to the Piedmontese government, or which at any rate would be entirely stifled, would, on the contrary, develope itself with the greatest vigour if the Republic were re-established, and would usefully succour the means of defence to be taken for the preservation of Italy against every attempt tending to renew the events which had taken place in it during these latter times. How could Genoa, a state purely maritime, having no other than commercial resources, united as much by gratitude as by interest to Great Britain, depart from that political system which could alone preserve her existence? Become in some respect an English city, she would, in time of peace, be the centre of British commerce in the Mediterranean, and in time of war, the asylum of her fleets: her port, the Gulf of Spezia, and that of Vado, offer, if there need any other pledge than her interest, the best guarantee that the British Govern-

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ment could desire, without having recourse to a measure destructive to the country.
His excellency remarked, in the last place, that the Genoese territory appeared too extensive for an establishment purely commercial; Genoa, like the Hans Towns, might be restricted to a more confined territory.
It may be matter of indifference for the commerce of the Hanseatic Towns, whether they have or have not any territory, because, from their geographical position, they cannot be deprived of their commerce; but it is far different with Genoa—it is the general entrepôt of merchandize of every description. Genoa supplies the whole of Upper Italy, which extends westward, and which comprehends Piedmont, the Milanese, and the States of Parma, Placentia, and Modena, with colonial articles, produce of the fisheries, and English or other manufactured goods. Her supplies extend as far as Switzerland, whence she receives in return, as well as from Germany, cloths and other articles, which she sends into Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia: it is therefore the transit which forms her commerce, and this transit would no longer pass through Genoa if a part of its territory were ceded to the neighbouring States: it would be the interest of these States to appropriate to themselves this commerce, and they could easily do it—the two rivers forming on each side situations favourable for commercial establishments, it would be sufficient for them to forbid the transit through their territory of every thing which came through Genoa, and these new establishments would soon raise themselves upon her ruins.
Genoa, insulated, borne down with wants, reduced by the enormous diminution of its capital to its last resources, would not be able to recover itself; further, in adding to so many losses, that of its territory, Genoa would have only a precarious existence; whilst by preserving her in her present state, not only would her existence be secured, but also the wishes of the whole population of the State of every rank; for instance, those of Ventimiglia and of San Remo, would be accomplished, who have no other desire whatever than to remain united to their ancient family.
In summing up the different observations which the undersigned has had the honour to submit to his excellency viscount Castle-
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reagh, he flatters himself that he has proved that the union of Genoa with Piedmont would bring with it the ruin of the former country, without any real assistance to the views of the high Allied Powers; that those views would be equally, nay better fulfilled, by the re-establishment of the Republic, and by suitable arrangements for securing in case of war, the occupancy of the ports and gulfs of Liguria; and, in short, that it would be impossible to separate Genoa from its territory, without destroying its commerce and consequently without risking to complete that ruin which it was wished to avoid. The undersigned, &c.
Viscount Castlereagh, PARETO.
&c. &c. &c.
No. 8.
Vienna, December 7, 1814.
My Lord; I have the honour to inclose for your lordship's information, a copy of the Report of the Plenipotentiaries who have acted as a Commission for the affairs of Genoa. This Report has not yet been confirmed by the plenipotentiaries of the several Powers; but I have the pleasure to acquaint your lordship, that it is approved by the marquis de Brignioli, who is charged here with full powers from the Government of Genoa. I have every reason to hope, therefore, that however the Genoese might have preferred to have remained under a separate government, and with this reserve the approbation of their representative must be understood, that they will receive the proposed arrangement as a pledge of the earnest concern taken by the great Powers of Europe, and by their future Sovereign, in the establishment of their interests, both commercial and political, upon a solid and liberal footing; and that they will particularly acknowledge the persevering protection which they have experienced from the Prince Regent, by whose arms they were delivered from the enemy, and through whose intervention they have been placed under the protection of an established constitution.
I have, &c. CASTLEREAGH.
Earl Bathurst, &c. &c.
(Inclosures in No. 8.)—Translation.
Projêt of the General Report.
Vienna, December 1, 1814.
The undersigned Austrian, English, and French Plenipotentiaries, charged by the Protocole of the conference of the 13th November 1814, to introduce the marquis de St. Marsan, and the count de Rossi,

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Sardinian plenipotentiaries, in the character of commissaries, at their intervention, to the marquis de Brignoles, deputy from Genoa, with a view of concerting, under such intervention, a plan, calculated at once, to establish the union of Genoa with the dominions of his majesty the king of Sardinia, and the declaring Genoa a free port, upon such solid and liberal bases, as shall be conformable to the general views of the Powers, and to the reciprocal interest of the dominions of his majesty the king of Sardinia, and of the state of Genoa; have, according to the wish of the same Protocol, called Messrs. de St. Marsan, de Rossi, and de Brignoles, to the conferences respecting the means of conciliation stated, in order to draw up a projêt comprizing all the several dispositions regulated to the mutual satisfaction of the plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty on one part, and of the deputy from Genoa on the other. M. de St. Marsan, and M. de Rossi, opened the business, by presenting a plan of concessions which his Sardinian Majesty was willing to make to his new subjects. M. de Brignoles also presented projects and observations, stating, at the same time, what were the wishes of his compatriots. The plenipotentiaries were diligently employed in accommodating the proposals of the Sardinian envoys, to those of the deputy from Genoa, by carefully modifying the demands of the Genoese, and the concessions of his Sardinian Majesty.
In this they obeyed the dictates of their sincere wishes for the repose of Italy, of their respect for his Sardinian Majesty, and of the good-will which they bear to the Genoese.
This day the plenipotentiaries present terms, which will satisfy, as far as can be expected, every interest, and which have received the approbation of the envoys of his Sardinian Majesty, and their own. The marquis de Brignoles declared, that, under the circumstances in which his country is placed, it appeared to him, that the terms granted her, would meet the wishes of his fellow-citizens. Nevertheless, count Alexis de Noailles, plenipotentiary of France, after stating that nothing could be more suitable to the intentions of his Sovereign, than the happy termination of this affair; and after affirming, that he acquiesced in all the above arrangements, declared, that he would not subscribe to them, except with an understanding, that they constituted part of the
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arrangements to be made in Italy, in concert with France.
The terms, therefore, now presented, will be found to agree with the wishes of the High Powers, as set forth in the Articles of the Treaty of Paris, and in the Protocol of November 13th, concerning the free port and the union of Genoa, upon solid and liberal bases. They guarantee the public debt, and grant to the city of Genoa, a senate or judiciary body, a tribunal of commerce, and a municipal authority. They protect all the public establishments of instruction and of charity, and assure them aid. The King will support the university, the college, the schools, the hospitals, and all the foundations that have for their object the prosperity of his Genoese subjects. The nobility preserve their privileges; all the Genoese subjects are placed on a footing with the ancient subjects of the king of Sardinia. The ranks and degrees are preserved. The condition of the civil officers shall be taken into consideration. The legal pensions to be continued. The King will give currency to the Genoese coins, and attend to the concerns of the Bank of St. George. Finally, the King intends forming a Genoese company of body guards.
The plenipotentiaries, after approving these terms, did not imagine they had yet brought their labours to a period. In order to consolidate, and render the cession, as it were, final, there remained still a variety of points to settle.
1. The solemn recognition of the hereditary right of the House of Sardinia, from male to male, in the royal branch, and in that of Savoy-Carignan. 2. The determination, by the High Powers, of the title, which, at the instance of the Genoese, his Sardinian Majesty is to receive on taking possession of the dominions of Genoa. 3. Finally, the fate of the imperial fiefs, ceded by two treaties, and now under the provisional government of Genoa. These points were made the subject of three separate reports.
(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
The Baron DE BINDER.
Projêt of the Report.—No. I.—CONDITIONS.
Vienna, Dec. 1, 1814.
The undersigned plenipotentiaries present, in the Act hereunto annexed, the conditions granted by his Sardinian Ma-

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jesty to his Genoese subjects, pursuant to the intentions of the Treaty of Paris, and to the wishes of the plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers. In proposing to their excellencies to adopt the present adjustment, which appears to satisfy the wishes and interests of all parties concerned, they submit to them the propriety of inserting in the Protocol, about to be drawn up, the guarantees necessary for seeming to the Genoese subjects of his Sardinian Majesty the perpetual enjoyment of the advantages granted them.
(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
BINDER.
Projêt of the ARTICLES agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries.
Vienna, Dec. 1, 1814.
Art. 1. The Genoese shall, in every respect, be assimilated to the other subjects of the King; they shall, in common with them, participate in the civil, judiciary, military, and diplomatic employments of the monarchy; and, excepting those privileges which are hereinafter granted and secured to them, they shall be subjected to the same laws and regulations, with such modifications as his Majesty shall deem expedient. The Genoese nobility, like that of the other parts of the monarchy, shall be admissible to the great offices and places at court.
Art. 2. The Genoese military, now composing the Genoese troops, shall be incorporated with the royal troops. The commissioned and non-commissioned officers shall preserve their respective grades.
Art. 3. The coat of arms of the city of Genoa shall constitute a pare of that of the King, and her colours receive a place in the flag of his Majesty.
Art. 4. The free port of Genoa to be re-established, under those regulations which were in force during the former Genoese government. The goods imported into the free port, when in transitu through the King's dominions, shall have every facility allowed them by his Majesty, provided such precautions be observed as his Majesty shall judge proper, to prevent those goods from being unlawfully sold, or consumed, in the interior. They shall only be subject to a moderate duty.
Art. 5. In every district having an intendant, there shall be established a provincial council, composed of thirty
[404
members, chosen from among the notables of the different classes, and out of a list of 300 of the most respectable in each district. They shall be appointed, in the first instance, by the King, and replaced after the same manner, one-fifth of them going out of office every two years. The lot to decide, as to the first four-fifths vacating their offices. The organization of these offices to be regulated by his Majesty. The president nominated by the King need not be elected from among those sitting in the council; in which case he shall be entitled to no vote. It shall not be lawful to re-elect members until four years after they have gone out of office. The council to attend solely to the wants and claims of the communities in its district, concerning their administration, and to make representations on this subject. It shall, every year, assemble in the principal place of the district, at a time and for a term to be fixed by his Majesty. The King may convene it, of course, whenever he judges it expedient. The intendant of the province, or the person officiating for him, shall, of right, attend the sittings in the capacity of King's Commissary. Should the necessities of the state demand the levying of fresh imposts, the King shall call together the different provincial councils in any town of the ancient territory of Genoa which his Majesty may appoint, and under the presidency of any person he may have delegated to that effect. If the President be not one of those who have seats in the councils, he shall not be entitled to a deliberative vote. No edict directing any extraordinary impost, shall be sent by the King to the senate of Genoa for the purpose of being registered, until it has been approved by the votes of the above provincial councils. The majority of one voice shall be sufficient to determine the vote of the provincial councils, either separately assembled or united.
Art. 6. The maximum of imposts which it shall be lawful for his Majesty to establish in the state of Genoa, without consulting the provincial councils, united in a body, shall not exceed the proportion at present established for the other parts of his dominions. The imposts at present collected, shall be regulated by this standard; and his Majesty reserves to himself to make such provisions as his wisdom, and his goodness towards his Genoese subjects may suggest to him, respecting what ought be assessed upon the ground

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vents or on the direct or indirect taxes. The maximum of imposts being thus settled, should at any time the occasions of the State require the levying of fresh impositions or of extraordinary taxes, his Majesty shall apply for the approving vote of the provincial councils with respect to the amount which he may judge expedient to propose, and to the particular kind of impost to be established.
Art. 7. The public debt, such as it legally existed under the last French government, is guaranteed.
Art. 8. The civil and military pensions granted by the State, pursuant to law, and to the established regulations, to continue to be paid to all the Genoese subjects inhabiting his Majesty's dominions; as also, on the same condition, those granted to ecclesiastics, or late members of religious houses of both sexes; no less than those which, under the description of succours, were granted by the French government to Genoese nobles.
Art. 9. There shall be formed at Genoa a grand judiciary body, or supreme tribunal, having the same authority and privileges as those, of Turin, of Savoy, and of Nice, and, like them, bearing the name of Senate.
Art. 10. The current gold and silver coins of the late state of Genoa, now in circulation, to be a legal tender at the public offices, in common with the coins of Piedmont.
Art. 11. The levies of recruits, called provincial, not to exceed, in the country of Genoa, the proportion of those which shall take place in the other dominions of his Majesty. The naval service shall be accounted the same as the land service.
Art. 12. His Majesty intends to raise a Genoese company of body-guards, which is to form a fourth company of his guards.
Art. 13. His Majesty designs to establish at Genoa, at own-body, composed of forty nobles, of twenty Bourgeois, living on their fortunes, or exercising liberal arts, and of twenty of the principal merchants. They are to be chosen, in the first instance, by the King himself, and the vacancies to be filled up by elections of the body itself, subject to the approbation of the King. This body will be furnished with particular regulations by the King relatively to its residence and the division of its labours. The presidents to take the title of Syndics, and to be chosen from among the members. The King, however, reserves to himself, that he shall deem it
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expedient to appoint, as president over this town-body, a person of high distinction. The town-body will have to attend to the administration of the revenues of the town, to the superintendence of its petty police, and to the care of its public charities. A commissary of the King to assist at the meetings and deliberations of the town-body. The members of this body to be dressed in a particular habit, and the syndics lo have the privilege of wearing the same gown as the presidents of tribunals.
Art. 14. The University of Genoa to be maintained, and to enjoy the same privileges as that of Turin. His Majesty will devise the means of providing for its wants. His Majesty will also take this establishment under his particular protection, as likewise the other institutions of instruction, of education, of belles-lettres, and of charity, which shall also be maintained. His Majesty will preserve, in favour of his Genoese subjects, the exhibitions founded for them in the college called the the Lyceum, at the expense of the Government, reserving to himself to adopt, in this respect, such regulations as he shall judge expedient.
Art. 15. His Majesty will preserve, at Genoa, a Tribunal and a Chamber of Commerce, and continue them in the exercise of the duties attached to these two establishments.
Art. 16. His Majesty will take into particular consideration the situation of the civil officers now employed in the state of Genoa.
Art. 17. His Majesty will receive the plans and proposals that shall be presented to him respecting the means of re-establishing the Bank of St. George.
(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
BINDER.
Projêt of a Report.—No. 2 HEREDITARY RIGHT.
Vienna, December 1, 1814.
Notwithstanding the order of succession established in the House of Savoy is general, as to the dominions possessed by that House, and that it must thence follow, that it is likewise maintained with respect to the new provinces which his majesty the King of Sardinia acquires by consent of the Powers, yet it has appeared to us expedient to propose, repeat, and apply it to the country of Genoa, in general terms, and without referring to the dif-

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ferent Treaties that have extended it to any particular country which either is, or has been, under the domination of his majesty the King of Sardinia.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries propose to couch the said article in the following terms:
The Slates, &c. united in perpetuity to the States of his Sardinian Majesty, for the purpose of being, like them, possessed by him in full property, sovereignty and hereditary right, from male to male, according to the order of primogeniture, in the two branches of his House, namely, the branch royal and the branch of Savoy Carignan.
(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Baron DE BINDER.
Projêt of a Report.—No. 3 TITLE.
Vienna, December 1, 1814.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries submit to the high Powers, the wish of the Genoese, who demand that his Sardinian Majesty should take the title of King of Liguria. The Plenipotentiaries observed, that the King of Sardinia is invested with the title of Duke, as sovereign of Savoy, and with the title of Prince, as sovereign of the dominions of Piedmont. They thought that the respect due to those countries, would not permit the State of Genoa to be erected into a kingdom, and therefore proposed, that the title of Duke of Genoa, which, in fact, was that of the Doge of the late Republic of Genoa, ought to be conferred by the Protocol upon his Sardinian Majesty, with a view of being added to those which his Majesty usually takes. The Plenipotentiaries were of opinion, that it would answer several good purposes to obliterate the recollection of the name of Liguria.
(Signed) Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Baron DE BINDER.
Projêt of a Report—No. 4.—IMPERIAL FIEFS.
Vienna, December 1, 1814.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries have deemed it their duty to present to the high Powers their ideas concerning the fiefs called Imperial, which, at this moment, are under the administration of the Provisional Government of the States of Genoa. The Plenipotentiaries observed, that by the Treaty of Campo Formio, and by that of Luneville, his Imperial Majesty
[408
of Austria renounces entirely the possession of the said fiefs, and that they are finally incorporated with the Ligurian territory.
In the former Treaty, his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty stipulates, in his name, promises his good offices with the Germanic body; and in the second, his Apostolic Majesty stipulates, in his name, and in the name of the Germanic empire.
The Plenipotentiaries have taken into consideration: 1. The formal cession expressed in the above-mentioned Treaties. 2. The ancient claims of the House of Savoy to the said fiefs, which that House has never renounced. 3. The situation of the said fiefs, and the intention, recognised by the high Powers, of destroying every subject of dispute and misunderstanding, and of uniting, as much as possible, under one domination, the countries enclosed in others.
The Plenipotentiaries, after weighing these considerations and the consequences of the Treaties referred to, have judged it expedient to propose to the high Powers to guarantee to his Sardinian Majesty the possession of the above fiefs, inviting the King of Sardinia to extend to the said countries the immunities which his Majesty has granted to his Genoese subjects.
Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.
CLANCARTY.
Le Baron DE BINDER.
No. 9.
Vienna, December 18, 1814.
My Lord;—I inclose a copy of a letter addressed by me to sir J. Dalrymple, commanding his Majesty's forces at Genoa; with several inclosures, directing him, in conformity to the decision of the Powers who signed the Peace of Paris, to deliver over the provisional government of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, or to such persons as his Majesty may appoint to receive the same. I annex a protest received from the existing Provisional Government; I have every reason to hope, however, that the arrangement made will be favourably received. I have, &c.
CASTLEREAGH.
Earl Bathurst, &c.
(First Inclosure in No. 9.)
Vienna, December 17, 1814.
Sir;—You will receive inclosed the final decision of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, annexing the state of Genoa, under certain conditions, to the

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down of Sardinia. The accompanying paper, bearing this dale, declares his Sardinian Majesty's assent to these conditions, as the basis upon which the said Powers have agreed forthwith to intrust to his Majesty the provisional government of Genoa, preparatory to the sovereignty being formally assigned to his Majesty by a treaty to be hereafter executed. I am consequently to signify to you the Prince Regent's pleasure, that you do lake the necessary measures, in concert with the existing Provisional Government, to deliver over the same, in conformity to the decision above-mentioned, to the King of Sardinia, or to such person as his Sardinian Majesty may appoint to take charge thereof; continuing yourself to act with the troops under your command as an auxiliary corps, at the disposal of his Sardinian Majesty, till you receive further orders.
You will carry these orders into execution, in the manner you may find likely to prove most acceptable to the existing Genoese authorities. The deep interest the Prince Regent takes, and will continue to take, in the happiness and future welfare of the people of Genoa, has rendered it a grateful part of my duty to watch over their interests from the moment the British arms were so fortunate as to be the instruments of their deliverance from the oppression of the enemy. I have regretted, in common with the ministers of the other Powers, that we could not, without introducing weakness, and consequently insecurity, into the Italian arrangement, meet that desire to preserve a separate existence which we had reason to suppose prevailed among the people of Genoa: but we persuade ourselves that we have provided more effectually for their future security, and not the less liberally for their commercial prosperity, in the system adopted.
In the liberality of the King of Sardinia, whose desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Genoese people, has in all these arrangements gone before the desires of the Powers, the state of Genoa has the surest pledge, that they are about to be placed upon fixed and liberal principles under the protection of a paternal Sovereign. Under these circumstances I trust the people of Genoa of all classes will receive this arrangement as beneficially intended for their welfare, and that they will conform cheerfully to what has appeared most conducive to their interests,
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as combined with those of the rest of Europe. I have, &c.
CASTLEREAGH.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Dalrymple.
(Second Inclosure in No. 9)—Translation.
Extract of the Protocol of the 10th of December, 1814.
To leave no doubt on the order of succession to be established for the States of Genoa, the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have agreed, that the article on this subject should be conceived in the following terms: The States which composed the former Republic of Genoa are united in perpetuity to the Slates of his Sardinian Majesty, to be like them possessed in perpetuity by him and his heirs male, in order of primogeniture, in the two branches of his House, namely, the branch royal, and the branch of Savoy Carignan.
(Third Inclosure in No. 9)—Translation.
Extract of the Protocol of the 10th of December, 1814.
The Plenipotentiaries have taken into consideration the desire of the Genoese, that his Sardinian Majesty should take the title of King of Sardinia.
The Plenipotentiaries observed, that the King of Sardinia is invested with the title of Duke, as sovereign of Savoy, with the title of Prince, as sovereign of the States of Piedmont. They conceived that the consideration due to the above-mentioned countries would not allow the erection of the State of Genoa into a kingdom; and they propose that the title of Duke of Genoa, which was in fact that of the Doge of the ancient Republic of Genoa, shall be conferred on his Sardinian Majesty, to be annexed to the titles commonly used by his Majesty.
This proposition of the Plenipotentiaries was approved in the conference of the 10th instant.
(Fourth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.
Extract of the Protocol of the Sitting of the 12th of December, 1814.
The Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, desiring to insure the tranquillity of Italy by a just repartition of forces between the Powers of that part of Europe, had agreed to give to the possessions of his Sardinian Majesty an increase of territory, by the departments forming the ancient republic of Genoa, reserving to themselves to stipulate in favour of the

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inhabitants, conditions tending to guarantee their future prosperity. The Plenipotentiaries of the said Powers occupied themselves with the subject, in the first instance, upon the opening of the Congress, by establishing a Commission for regulating with the Plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty, and the deputies of Genoa, whatever might have relation to this object. The labours of this Commission have received their approbation, and they have found that the conditions put forward by the said Commission were conformable to the tenour of the Treaty of Paris, and were founded on a solid and liberal basis. Desirous now to accelerate as much as possible the annexation of the states of Genoa to those of his Sardinian Majesty, and wishing at the same time to give this Sovereign an unequivocal proof of their confidence, the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have resolved to put his Majesty in possession of the said states, as soon as he shall have given his formal concurrence to the above-mentioned conditions, as slated in the accompanying enclosures, reserving to themselves the disposal of the Imperial Fiefs, which were part of the former Ligurian Republic, and which are at this moment under the administration of the Provisional Government of the states of Genoa. To prevent, however, the difficulties which might occur from the partial administration of the said Fiefs, as placed between the states of Genoa and Piedmont, it has been agreed, that they shall likewise be provisionally occupied, until the definitive Treaty, by the authorities whom his Sardinian Majesty shall entrust with the administration of the states of Genoa. It has been fixed upon, that the Prince de Metternich, first plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Austria, should be authorized to make known these determinations to the plenipotentiaries of his Sardinian Majesty, and to invite them to give the required concurrence, in case they are furnished with powers to that effect.
(Fifth Inclosure, No. 9.)—Translation.
Extract from the Protocol of the Conference of the 14th December, 1814.
The sittings opened by reading the minutes of that of the 10th December, which were signed and approved. It was resolved that in order to bring to a close the question of the reunion of Genoa to Piedmont, Prince Metternich should be requested to apply to the Marquis de St.
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Marsan, for his full powers, and for the Act of Accession of his Court to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and to the different arrangements which had been taken to realise and complete these stipulations: and it was agreed, that when Monsieur de St. Marsan should deliver the said instrument, it should be communicated to all the members of this meeting.
(Sixth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.
Vienna, 15th December, 1814.
Sir;—The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris have authorized me, by a resolution declared at their sitting of the 10th of this month, to communicate to you, Sir, the conditions and the restrictions which are to serve as bases in the annexation of those departments which formed the ancient Republic of Genoa, to the possessions of his majesty the King of Sardarnia, conformably to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. I acquit myself of this communication, by transmitting to your excellency, the extract of the accompanying Protocol, to which are annexed the conditions approved of by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris.
(Signed) METTERNICH.
The Marquis de St. Marsan.
(Seventh Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.
Act of Accession of his Sardinian Majesty.
Vienna, December 17, 1814.
The undersigned, his Sardinian Majesty's Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna, in virtue of the full powers of their Sovereign, which they have presented upon the invitation conveyed in the Declaration, which was published on the 1st of November last by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of May of the present year; and the Marquis de St. Marsan in particular, in virtue of special and most ample full powers from his said Majesty the King of Sardinia, for negociating, agreeing on, and accepting all the conditions relative to the annexation of the Slates of Genoa to those of his Majesty, which full powers he presents in original, to give, by the present Act, an accession formal, entire, and without restriction, to the conditions contained in the three papers annexed hereto, which they have signed for this purpose, and which are entirely in conformity with the papers annexed to the extract of the Protocol of the sitting of the 12th instant, which the Prince de

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Metternich has transmitted to the undersigned.
They accede, in the name of their Sovereign, to these conditions of the annexation of the departments composing the ancient Republic of Genoa, to the other possessions of his Majesty—an aggrandisement, the object of which is to establish a just repartition of forces in Italy, which may insure its tranquillity, and testify to the high Powers the acknowledgment of their Sovereign, both for the above-mentioned annexation, and for the mark of confidence which they give him, by putting him in immediate possession of his new States.
They consent to the reservation made with respect to the Imperial Fiefs which formed part of the former Ligurian Republic, and which are now under the administration of the Government of Genoa, the disposal of which the Powers have declared their wish to reserve to themselves; and that they shall only be provisionally occupied and governed by the administration of the King, which shall be established at Genoa until the definitive treaty; declaring, at the same time, that they do not intend thereby to prejudge in any wise the claims which his majesty the King of Sardinia may have upon these Fiefs, and which his Majesty reserves to himself the right to make good.
In testimony whereof, they have signed the present Act, and each of the annexed Papers, separately, and have affixed thereto the impression of their arms. Done at Vienna, the 17th December, 1814.
A true copy.
(Signed) Le Marquis DE ST. MARSAN,
Le Comte ROSSI.
(Eighth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.
Vienna, December 10, 1814.
My lord;—I have the honour to transmit herewith to your excellency, the copy of a note which the Government of Genoa, by its dispatch, dated the 23d of November last, ordered me to lay before their excellencies the ambassadors and ministers assembled at the Congress. I seize with avidity this opportunity to offer to your excellency this fresh homage of my highest consideration.
The minister of the Government of Genoa,
(Signed) Le Marquis DE BRICNOLI. Lord Castlereagh.
(Ninth Inclosure in No. 9.)—Translation.
Protest of the Government of Genoa.
Vienna, December 10, 1814.
The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Genoa, has the honour to lay before their excellencies the Ambassadors and Ministers assembled at the Congress, the Declaration which his Government transmitted to him for the eventual case which has unfortunately occurred, of the note of the 3rd of October having produced no effect.
Nothing can equal the respect and veneration with which the Genoese Government is penetrated for this illustrious assembly: but nothing at the same time can prevent his acquitting himself of what he owes to his conscience, to his honour, and to his fellow-citizens, to protest against all resolutions contrary to their rights and independence. His demands are founded on the most respectable titles; a political existence old as the origin of many monarchies; treaties without number during a long succession of ages, with the principal courts of the world; the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, (basis of that of Paris) wherein the Republic of Genoa concurred formally with them in the reciprocal guarantee of their possessions: the evident nullity of its annexation to an empire which was usurped and is destroyed; an independent administration since that period with all the marks of sovereignty, and without the opposition of any one thereto; and what is much more, the immortal declarations of the high Allied Powers. The town of Chaumont and of Chatillon-sur-Seine are yet resounding with the noble assurances, that nations should henceforth respect their reciprocal independence; that no more political edifices should be built upon the ruins of states formerly independent and happy; that the alliance of the most powerful monarchs of the earth had for its object to prevent those invasions which for so many years past had desolated the world; and that at length a general peace, the due effect of their alliances and their victories, would insure the rights, the independence, and the liberty of all nations.
The justice of the Governments which have guaranteed these tutelary maxims, may be tardy, but the result will, sooner or later, be accomplished. The duty of states which are ill known and feeble, is to invoke it incessantly, and to wait for it with confidence and courage.
The undersigned most respectfully demands, that the present declaration may be inserted in the Protocol of the Congress, and he has the honour to offer to their excellencies the homage of his highest consideration.
(Signed) The Marquis BRIGNOLI.
No. 10.—EXTRACT.
Turin, January 24, 1815.
Major Andrews reached this place on the 18th, and continued his journey on the same day to Genoa with your lordship's letter to sir John Dalrymple. Count Revel has succeeded admirably since he has been at Genoa; and the King has received deputations from all classes and all parts of the Genoese territory. Yesterday he gave audience to a deputation of the very highest rank, and was addressed in a most flattering discourse, of which I shall have the honour of enclosing a copy if I can procure it in time. I have, &c.
Viscount Castlereagh, W. HILL.
&c. &c. &c.
(Inclosure in No. 10.)—Translation.
Address of the Deputation from the City of Genoa, to the King of Sardinia.
Genoa, Jan. 5, 1815.
Sire; The city of Genoa, renowned in every age, and constituting no small part of the glory of Italy, has rejoiced to behold the destiny of the Republic, for so many years fluctuating, now fixed by its annexation to the ancient dominions of your Majesty.
Your clemency alone, Sire, and our admiration of the virtues which adorn your paternal and beneficent heart, have produced this unforeseen change in the affections of the Genoese, and have weaned them from those habits of independence which formerly constituted their greatest happiness.
The moment we were permitted to express our sentiments and the satisfaction of our fellow-citizens, we have hastened to the foot of your Majesty's throne, to offer the homage of their loyalty and obedience, determined to rival in attachment the ancient subjects of your Majesty.
The prosperity of Genoa, Sire, was, for many ages, an object of envy to the richest States; but the vicissitudes of years which have passed, have, for the greatest part, destroyed and annihilated her opulence.
It was reserved to your Majesty to reinstate her in her former splendour, The
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royal patents of the 30th of last month, afford us already a pledge of your paternal benevolence in favour of our beloved country, and are to us the harbingers of a more auspicious futurity.
Navigation and commerce were the principal sources of Ligurian power and wealth. May we presume to implore your exalted protection for these two branches of the public welfare! Let the first act of your beneficence, Sire, be to throw down the barriers which separate two nations, become brethren under a common father: and let those pirates, who, neglecting the fertile lands of Africa, infest the Mediterranean Sea, and are a discredit to our times, disappear from our seas, if they refuse submission to the sacred law of nations. The arms of our Ligurian mariners shall second your orders.
The husbandman of the mountainous and rocky territory of Genoa, is subject to expenses little known, and which far exceed those of champaign countries: we hope that your Majesty will be pleased to take this important subject into consideration when the amount of the land-tax shall be discussed.
Finally, encouraged by your sovereign goodness, we particularly solicit your Majesty, that our municipal administration may, together with its other functions, be continued in discharge of its important duties for the maintenance of the port, and of the public aqueduct, with both of which it was always entrusted, and which require a local and practical knowledge.
We recommend to your Majesty's regard for religion, the hospitals of Genoa, those illustrious monuments of the piety of our ancestors, from which, notwithstanding the disorders of late years, their descendants have not degenerated.
The city has at all times maintained, as far as it was able, these valuable establishments; but the immense losses which they have sustained, urgently demand, that the State should take upon itself to make provision for their funds, in like manner as the royal patents have already secured to the other creditors the payment of their interest, or require that Government should make a fresh endowment in their favour.
Vouchsafe, Sire, to interest yourself in the establishment of the House of St. George, the model of all other banks in Europe. Deign to look upon Genoa as your second capital.
We shall esteem ourselves happy, if, while we convey to your royal throne, the sincere wishes of our fellow-citizens, we should be able to assure them also of your gracious compliance, and flatter them with the hope of speedily seeing within bur walls, our august Sovereign.—Done in the Municipal Council, the Senior Magistrate, (Signed) PASSAGNO.

ADDRESS ON THE PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RELATING TO EVENTS IN FRANCE.
The order of the day for taking into consideration the Prince Regent's Message of yesterday being read,
Lord Castlereaghrose and spoke to the following effect:—In rising to call the attention of the House to the gracious Message of the Prince Regent, now read from the Chair, I assure the House, that, at no period of my political life, and under no circumstances which I can recollect, have I ever felt more deeply or more sincerely, the importance of those considerations which arise from passing events, or which may be produced by the counsels growing out of those events, than I do on the present occasion. It has been my lot, during almost all the discussions which have taken place in this House, in the last and present session, to endeavour to direct the attention of Parliament to those events which were rapidly taking place, and which we might flatter ourselves, without appearing too sanguine, were likely, not only to deliver the world from those dangers which it had ultimately passed through, but to conduct it to a state of permanent pacification; and, although so desirable a state of things might not take place with all the precipitancy which ardent minds might hope for, yet that we should finally be led to that ancient social system, which had long predominated in Europe, and of the enjoyment of which we had been too long deprived. Whatever difference of opinion may have prevailed, between the gentlemen who sit on the other side of the House, and those who are seated on this, with respect to certain details connected with the arrangements made for the security of the peace of Europe—yet this I may say, that a complete coincidence of opinion has existed as to the principle which was acted upon. The details might have been more skilfully managed; but, I am sure, every individual, however he might disapprove of minor parts of the arrangement, must have been gratified at seeing a state
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of things likely to arise in Europe, which would again present to the world such a mass of independent Powers, endued with all the qualities calculated to render them, secure, with reference to each other, and, at the same time, possessing that degree of control, which would produce an effectual resistance against any attempt made to destroy the system, as must have tended to give permanent peace to the earth. I am sure every reflecting mind must have derived pleasure from the thought, that the world was likely again to be governed by a well-balanced system of political authority: instead of being, as was unfortunately the case for the last 20 years, plundered, and persecuted, and oppressed by one overweening Power, which endeavoured to engulph and swallow up every other state in Europe. This favourable prospect has been overshadowed by the events that have recently happened in France—and which, if they do not menace with destruction the result of the efforts and labours of the last twenty years,—the result of the mighty exertions of this nation—(an epithet which I may well apply to them, without meaning to degrade or disparage the exertions of other countries)—united with the labours of the different States, which assisted in restoring Europe to its present situation—certainly cannot be contemplated without considerable apprehension. That the stability of the present situation of Europe is endangered by the late events in France, no person who seriously reflects on them, can entertain a doubt. It is impossible for any individual to call the fact in question. For, if a military chief, whose only pretensions to the situation in which he now stands, are founded on the attachment of an army—and if a military system is to be again established in France—it is not difficult to conceive what the result will be. We know the effect which the late revolution in the politics of France has already had on the other Powers of Europe. If that military chief, and the French army, find the peace so contrary to their favourite views, as it evidently appears they do, can any doubt be reasonably entertained as to the course they will adopt? I am sure, Sir, the House will feel with me, that enough was done to show, that this was not a revolution growing out of the sentiments of the French people. It was a revolution effected by the army—effected by artifice—and by that sort of overweening influence, which a person

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long at the head of a military system, and addressing himself to great military bodies, may be supposed to have possessed and exerted. If that system be again erected in France—whether at this immediate moment, or at a period more remote—it must, both politically and morally, either inflict on Europe all those calamities from which she had escaped, by exertions the most extraordinary that were to be found in the history of the world, or we must be compelled to depart from, and turn our backs on that ancient social system, which we were anxious again to enjoy; when the military character would not be predominant, but would be merged in the general mass of the community, and take its place and order among the other ranks of society. I feel the great considerations to which this immense and awful subject leads; for we must all feel, after the arduous struggle this country has gone through—after a war of three or four-and-twenty years continuance—that a fresh contest, commenced even under the most ordinary circumstances that could present themselves, would be an event involving the most weighty and serious points of reflection, that could be entertained by the reflecting mind of Parliament. But, when we look to a question, either of absolute war, or of a peace of precaution, which must be joined with the consideration of those social relations belonging to a natural or unnatural constitution of the world, I do feel, that the subject is the most serious, the most awful, that ever attracted the attention of Parliament—and that an imperative duty devolves on us to examine it in the most grave and deliberate manner. If I felt that I was calling on Parliament, at this time, or that I was in a condition to call on Parliament, to discuss all those views which belong to the question—and more particularly those which, in my conscience, I believe, ought to guide their decision on this subject—I should certainly proceed at greater length. But, at the present moment, I should be to blame, if I precipitated any counsels of state, respecting this question, without, at the same time, giving full information to the House. As the question is not, however, in that state, in which I can lay before the House the manner in which the prerogative, placed, for the benefit of the people, in the hands of the Crown, may have been used, I shall not, advert to the various points which bear on the subject, and which, at another period,
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it will be proper to submit to Parliament. I am rather disposed to follow the course pursued, on a former evening, by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Ponsonby), and to defer much that might be offered on the question, until we know whether the state of precaution in which the country is now placed, shall ultimately terminate in peace or war. With this feeling, I wish to narrow the question to those points on which I think the House, in its present situation, may fairly be called to decide, rather than, by anticipation, to enter into those views, which, though they bear strongly on the subject, are more proper for future consideration.
The Prince Regent's most gracious Message states, that events have taken place in a neighbouring kingdom, in direct contravention of the engagements made in the treaty of Fontainbleau, not only with reference to that Treaty, but as far as it formed the basis of the Treaty of Paris; necessarily and naturally implying, as the contravention of all treaties must, a justifiable cause of war. If this Government and its allies think, under all the circumstances, that such a state of things has arisen, as calls for every effort of precaution, I apprehend there are few persons in this House disposed to doubt the propriety of the decision. Nor do I believe that any person, either within those walls or without them, can doubt, that the Executive is equally called upon to complete those measures, in conjunction with the allies of the country by whose exertions the world was saved, which Parliament, being impelled by a series of extraordinary circumstances, demanding vigorous efforts, may be disposed to sanction. The nature of those measures, and the object to be attained, must remain subjects of ulterior consideration. I am sure the House would not wish, prematurely to draw from ministers, the nature of the event contemplated—its probable operation—or the mode in which Europe is to be protected, in future, against the dangers with which it is now threatened. In the present posture of public affairs, I am convinced no gentleman would call for such a disclosure. In order to preserve entire the control of Parliament over the executive servants of the Crown, who know that they cannot prosecute any design, not only without the sanction, but without the assistance of the strong arm of the Legislature, I conceive that a certain extent of confidence is necessary. It is not more

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contrary to the prerogative of the Crown, than it is hostile to the controlling power of Parliament, for gentlemen, without due information, on narrow, abstract views of important questions, to assume to themselves the premature exercise of that power which ultimately belongs to them, as possessing a final control over the acts of the Crown. It is, Sir, manifestly wrong to give a hasty and improvident opinion on transactions of the most complicated nature at a moment when the House is necessarily ignorant of the details. The power of censuring or of approving, can only be exercised with a sound discretion, and honourably to the character of Parliament, when transactions have arrived at a stage where all the circumstances of the case are constitutionally laid before them.
Sir, with this feeling of the course that ought to be adopted, I shall narrow my view of the question to the expression of those opinions, which, I think, the Message of the Prince Regent demands; namely, that the events which have taken place in France, in avowed contravention of the engagements entered into with the Allies, have created a state of things so alarming, that the British empire cannot remain in any other than an armed posture—that Parliament cannot but express their gratification at the steps which have been taken, by the Government of this country, to form a union with those Powers who have been fellow-labourers with us in restoring the peace of Europe—and, that in such a juncture of affairs, the House are ready to give the Executive Government every assistance towards the promotion of this important object; at the same time reserving their opinion on ulterior measures, until they are in possession of the necessary information. I should hope, Sir, that the discussion, on the present occasion, would not be carried beyond these limits; but I certainly feel that I should not discharge what I owe to the subject and to the House, if I did not take this occasion to submit to it, some considerations which must, ultimately, have great weight on both sides of this arduous question—wheiher the final result be peace or war? I should also feel, that I had not discharged my duty, if I did not endeavour to relieve the House and the public from many misrepresentations and delusions which have prevailed with respect to the conduct of the British Government and our allies. An impression has undoubtedly gone abroad—which,
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when the House examines the fact, will be found exceedingly erroneous—that the arrangements made, prior to the peace of Paris, were improvident and ill-advised—that no considerations of general policy could justify such arrangements—and that, if the result had been, unfortunately for the world, again to place at risk and hazard, the continuance of tranquillity, the blame is alone imputable to the Allies. These untoward events, it is said, have arisen solely from their counsels, and cannot be attributed to any other cause. Almost every person with whom I have conversed, has indulged in this feeling. It is, naturally enough, the custom of mankind, and I mention it not as a reproach to the general wisdom of human nature, where serious dangers threaten, on political occasions, to throw the blame on those who were furnished with responsible powers, and to accuse them with having acted improvidently and unwisely. I have heard it said, that when the Treaty of Fontainbleau was concluded, the Allies acted with a foolish generosity, without any reference to true policy—that they had granted to Buonaparté an asylum which he was liable to abuse—and that his power had, in consequence, been reestablished. But Buonaparté has not made use of any of the apologies which have been offered for his conduct. He has unblushingly avowed the principles which have guided his conduct. Instead of complaining of any breach of the engagements entered into with him (and, if he had made such a charge, I could shew the House that he had imputed to the Allies that which never had been committed,) he has, in the very first instance, shown a complete contempt for all treaties and arrangements whatever. He has not concealed from the world, that no control or limit shall confine his power, except what the failure of his means might impose. He has shown himself no longer to be controlled by treaties. He has shown himself, in the pursuit of his views, to be bounded only by his inability to proceed. He has set at nought every ordinary tie—and he has, if I may use the word, in describing a series of conduct, which does not present one particle of morality, honestly placed himself on the pedestal of power, and boldly avowed his acts. He calls himself Emperor of France, impiously, "by the Grace of God;" and he is, in no degree, fettered in the exercise of his authority, by any of

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those acts, which he, for the moment, and to deceive the world, agreed to. Sooner than shed one drop of French blood, he declared that he would abandon France and his family—and, in violation of this statement, he now returns to that country—not in consequence of any new request—not in consequence of a defeasance of any engagement that had been entered into with him—but in absolute defiance of the most explicit stipulations that human foresight could devise. Such is the situation under which that individual returned to power.
Sir, I was saying, that the general impression which prevailed was, that the Allies, in concluding the Treaty of Fontainbleau, had done a gratuitous act, which they might have avoided. Generosity certainly was the prevailing feature which marked the policy of the Allies towards France, and whatever calamities may arise to the world from the transaction in question, I, for one, shall never lament, that the Powers who inarched to the gates of Paris, did act on that generous principle, and thereby showed their deference to the rights and feelings of the people. That principle is one, of which, I am convinced, a British Parliament will always express its approbation. It is the only great, and strong, and true one; and Parliament has never omitted any occasion, where it could be recognised and supported, of so doing. I am sure, I shall not have to regret, on account of the display of any contrary feeling in this House, that it there was an error in the conduct of the Allies towards France, it was on the side of generosity. The exercise of that principle is due to all countries, until they do something which forbids it—until they prevent their opponents from being generous to them, without risking the imputation of being unjust and ruinous to themselves. If, therefore, Sir, any blame be imputable in this transaction, I feel confident that it is to be found on the right side; for whatever may hereafter be the relative situation of France and the rest of Europe, the former can never assert, that the Allies harboured an intention of acting ungenerously by her. A peace was concluded with France, which not only secured her former extent of territory, but which granted an increase of it; nor was she visited with any of those grievous contributions which were levied by the. French armies wherever they went. All the repositories of art which adorned
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her capital were left untouched; and the whole of that forbearance was exercised from a wish to conciliate the social feelings of the people, by leaving no badge of their humiliation, no mark that might recall their disasters and defeats.
Now, Sir, the fact is, that when the treaty of Fontainbleau was signed, Buonaparté could not be considered, in any degree, practically speaking, within the power of the Allies. I do not mean to say, that a protracted war might not have led to his capture, or driven him from the country. But when that treaty was signed, as will be seen from the papers on the table—and here I can speak with the more confidence, because I am not called on to say any thing in my own behalf, because it was agreed to when I was not in a situation to alter it—it was sanctioned by the Emperor of Russia, under such imperious circumstances as would justify the House in considering it not merely a treaty of generosity, but of policy. The fact was, that, after the capital was taken by the Allies, and Napoleon had proceeded to Fontainbleau, he was at the head of a very considerable body of troops, ready to act in his support; and there was no reason to presume, but rather the contrary, that the corps outstanding in the other parts of France, would not also, as they had previously done, continue to espouse his cause. There was not even a certainty, that the troops whom marshal Marmont had paralysed, on the other side, would remain faithful to the Provisional Government. In short, the question then was, whether the treaty of Fontainbleau, should be agreed to, or whether the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity? The decision which took place, in favour of the former proceeding, was not that of the Emperor of Russia alone; it was also supported by the Provisional Government of France, acting for the interests of the Bourbon family, and with a view to their restoration. It was, therefore, a matter of policy and not of generosity, to agree to an arrangement which brought the contest to an end, instead of carrying on a protracted war in the heart of France.
When I arrived in Paris, as will be seen by the papers, this question was, in fact, decided; an assurance having been given to Buonaparté, with respect to the general engagement, and also with reference to the specific arrangements made at Elba. Seeing the obvious danger of placing a person who had so recently wielded the

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power of France so immediately in the neighbourhood of his former empire, and also in the neighbourhood of another part of Europe, which might be influenced by sentiments favourable to him, I thought it my duty to make every opposition in my power to the arrangement. But, on a further examination of the subject, the difficulty of finding a situation, at once free from the dangers I apprehended, and, at the same time, answering the character which Buonaparté stipulated for in his negociation, induced me to withdraw my opposition; making, however, some alteration in the details. Looking to the policy of settling the business amicably, instead of proceeding farther with the war, I ceased to oppose the place of retreat which had been provided; and I think the House will feel with me, that when the utmost result which could have been anticipated from a prolongation of the contest would be either the capture or the escape of Buonaparté, it would have been impolitic to continue that contest for such a purpose, and to make it determinable upon such an event. It was quite impossible for the parties to Buonaparté's abdication to have speculated on the recent conduct which he adopted, even if it were in their power effectually to have guarded against it; besides, the House must see that it was unlikely the contest would be prosecuted with the same spirit, if such a determination was avowed. The plain fact was, that the question among the Allied Powers, relative to this point, was not decided under the circumstance of Buonaparté being within their grasp; for such was not the case; he was not so situated, but was placed in a situation, and with a force immediately about his person, which was entitled to serious consideration; and when combined with other troops, then scattered about the country, and his opportunities of uniting them with those of marshal Soult, and other generals in the south of France, it became a matter of plain expediency to calculate his means of prolonging the warfare, and to consider the alternative which might prevent such an event. This was the plain fact which led to his term of security.
With respect to the residence and situation of this personage at Elba, whatever may be my own individual opinion upon the subject of the arrangement which gave to him that jurisdiction—whatever objections I may have had from the beginning to this settlement, and the opportunities
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its locality afforded for the realization of what has unhappily since occurred, there can, I trust, exist but one feeling among liberal minds, and that is, that when this island was given to Buonaparté for his residence, that residence should comprise the portion of fair and free liberty, which was then due to a person in his situation. When the island was secured to him by treaty, it was of course done with as much exercise of personal liberty as became the compact: it was never in the contemplation of the parties that he should be a prisoner within that settlement; that he should be the compulsory inmate of any tower, or fortress, or citadel—they never meant that he should be so placed, or that he should be deprived of sea excursions in the vicinity of the island, for fair purposes of recreation. In fact, if such a jealous stipulation had been made, it would have afforded him the opportunity of making that the veil of his own suspicions, and the extenuation of his own infraction. Under this cloak he would have sought the justification of his own non-fulfilment of the treaty, and would have charged it upon the menacing treatment which had been adopted towards him; he would have then stood differently in the eyes of the world from his present position, which left him without a shadow of defence, and exposed him to all Europe, as an open violator of his faith. A report has gone abroad, that if those who placed him at Elba, had omitted any precautionary security, which rationally suggested itself, to protect the world from the calamities consequent upon the return of this man to his former station in France, that in such a case they incurred a dreadful responsibility. Now, Sir, I have no hesitation to answer this argument. The Allied Powers who concurred in the treaty of Fontainbleau never intended to exercise a police, or any system of espionage either within or without the residence which they had ceded to him; it was never in their contemplation to establish a naval police to hem him in, or prevent this man's committing himself, as he has done, to his fortunes; in fact, if they were so inclined, they were without the means of enforcing such a system, for the best authorities were of opinion that it was absolutely and physically impossible to draw a line of circumvallation around Elba; and for this very conclusive reason, that, considering the variation of weather, and a variety of other circumstances,

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which could not be controlled, the whole British navy would be inadequate for such a purpose. If this force had been actually there, they could not have circumscribed Buonaparté in the manner in which some persons expected he should have been, without a violation of the treaty which had been granted him. It was open to argument that this treaty was wrong, that it should not have been conceded. Points of this description were certainly fair for discussion; but having once been made, it was clear from the face of the document, that any restrictions could not have been imposed without a breach of the treaty itself; by this he was invested with the entire sovereignty of the island; he was also assigned a sort of naval equipment, certainly upon a small scale, but one which allotted him a flag, and which it was not extraordinary to meet on the neighbouring sea; one of his vessels was constantly seen for ordinary purposes in several of the ports of the Mediterranean. The British officer commanding on that station had not the power of visiting these vessels whenever they were occasionally met. Had he known that Buonaparté was on board with an armed equipment, he would have exercised that right, there can be no doubt, and would hare been justified in doing so; but he was not authorized, nor would it have been consistent with the treaty, to have empowered him on all occasions to use a right of visitation with a flag of this description. Elba, it is true, is an insulated position, but it has considerable commercial intercouse among other places with the different ports in the Mediterranean; and unless this search and examination could have been exercised in every instance throughout the whole range of the Elbese trade, no protection would have been insured by it; he would therefore have had means and opportunities enough of effecting his object: for it cannot be disguised, that the danger did not arise from the immediate force of his equipment; this was in itself quite insignificant: the danger would have been precisely the same, had he proceeded in any disguise which he might have assumed, and personally landed in any of the ports of the Continent. I have not the least doubt, Sir, the effect would have been exactly similar. But I repeat, that our Government never undertook to establish a police at Elba. Colonel Campbell was certainly there for the purpose of occasionally communicating with
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our Government upon such matters as might pass under his observation, both there and in Italy, where at that time we had no accredited agent; he was there at first merely as one of the conductors according to the Treaty, and I afterwards suffered him to remain between that island and Leghorn, for the purpose I have mentioned; but nothing more was ever contemplated. It would have been out of colonel Campbell's power to have attempted any thing further: he could not have done it; for the fact was, that although at first treated with familiarity by Buonaparté, his visits were subsequently disapproved of, and it was even hinted that if they were repeated, he should withdraw from the island; latterly he found the greatest difficulty in obtaining an interview with Buonaparté, so completely did the latter surround himself with imperial etiquette. Of the inefficacy of any thing which colonel Campbell could have done, were he on the spot to have attempted the experiment, I need only mention the following fact: a number of vessels from all nations were in the habit of arriving for trading purposes in the three principal ports of this island; on the part of the English ships, a Mr. Ritchie resided there as a sort of vice-consul, to see that our ships wanted nothing that was necessary for them: the moment when Buonaparté prepared, to carry his plan into execution, he placed this Mr. Ritchie under the surveillance of two gens d'armes. Mr. Grattan, jun. who happened to be on the island, and who conveyed the earliest intelligence of the event to the nearest public agent of this country, was also taken into custody, and there can be no doubt, that colonel Campbell would have encountered a similar restraint; his presence, therefore, would have had no effect in preventing the escape of Buonaparté, or in transmitting any intelligence of that event sooner than it reached us in the ordinary course. It is also a remarkable and almost incredible circumstance, and one of the truth of which I have every reason to be satisfied, that so completely within his own bosom did Buonaparté carry the plan he meditated, that his confidential companion, Bertrand, was wholly unapprised of his intentions, until the very hour in which he received the order for his embarkation: from information which I possess, and on which I rely, Bertrand was ignorant of the plan until four o'clock in the evening,

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when the embarkation took place, and this was effected in the course of three or four hours after, and the flotilla was clear at sea that night. It is also a fact, that no previous preparations were observable for this expedition, except the ordinary repairs of his principal vessel, which was not a matter of any particular consideration, and the other vessels containing the troops were in the harbour for private commercial purposes, and had been then seized immediately before the embarkation, when the gates of the port were ordered to be suddenly shut. I have already said, Sir, that the troops thus conveyed did not form any essential feature in the success of this enterprise, and that the individual escape of this person would have been attended with the same result; and this, under the terms of the Treaty, could hardly have been prevented, consistently with that personal liberty which was manifestly secured to him—to have attempted it by blockade, would have been morally impossible. France had two frigates and some smaller vessels cruising in the vicinity of Elba, Corsica, and Leghorn, for the purpose of vigilantly watching his manœuvres; our naval force was also not inattentive to this consideration, for lord Exmouth and admiral Hallowell had had an understanding with the Admiralty, that if they suspected Buonaparté was contemplating a descent upon the opposite shores, they should immediately adopt such measures as would frustrate the attempt, and secure him in his passage to carry it into execution. Oar sloop, the Partridge, which was crossing with col. Campbell at the time, did, in point of fact, give chase to this flotilla; and if it had reached Buonaparté would have seized him as a prisoner, for what they would have justly termed a breach of the Treaty, and an act of hostility on his part, in contravention of his express stipulation.
From a reference to the true state of the case, I trust, Sir, that the supposition which has prevailed, that the Allies were too generous, in the first instance, or too remiss in the second, will, in no degree be admitted; it is entirely wrong to harbour such a notion. I think I have shown that they could not have maintained that species of police which would have been operative upon the occasion; for unless this man was actually destroyed or shut up, it was impossible by a maritime or internal precaution to stop his purpose, if he determined upon its execution. Every
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legitimate means of examining what was passing at Elba, had been resorted to; and among the variety of persons from different nations who had visited that island and conversed with Buonaparté, none had ever discovered any preparations for the event which has caused such a sensation throughout Europe. If any measure approaching to personal restraint was resorted to, is it at all probable he would have submitted to such an ordeal, against the provisions of a Treaty, behind which he would, doubtless, have fenced himself. From these statements it is evident, that neither our Government, nor that of our Allies, are fairly responsible for any mischief that may grow out of the fortuitous event which has so unfortunately taken place; it is essential that this should be known and felt, in order to prevent those imputations and prejudices which a contrary feeling is calculated to engender, and than which there can be nothing more injurious and unfounded.
I will now, Sir, quit this branch of the subject, and call upon the House to accede to an Address to the Prince Regent, declaratory of their determination to enable his Royal Highness to adopt such measures, in conjunction with his Allies, as the present crisis may render imperative for the general tranquillity of Europe. I will not detain the House by any precise specification of measures which cannot at once be developed, or of plans which it may not be necessary hereafter to mature: the House must be aware, that such a disclosure would at present be highly premature. There is one point, however, which I must not overlook—I allude to the rumour which has been mentioned, as, in a certain degree, extenuating the infraction of the treaty by Buonaparté, namely, that his pension had not been faithfully remitted to him. The fact was not so—it was an annual stipend, which, of course, did not become due until the expiration of the time specified; but having heard, whilst at Vienna, that some complaints upon this head had been made, I felt it my duty to inquire of the French minister into this circumstance, and took that occasion to observe upon the unfavourable impression, which, if true, it was calculated to excite. In this opinion prince Talleyrand fully concurred, and immediately addressed his government on the subject. They were of opinion that Buonaparté had manifested, upon several occasions, a spirit of infringement with

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respect to the Treaty; that this was apparent, in his recruiting for his guards at Corsica, and other places; and that some satisfactory explanation was due from him relative to those points, before their part of the Treaty ought to be fulfilled. I subsequently heard, that he was, to a certain extent, in pecuniary want for the necessary exigencies of his establishment, and that he was actually selling his provisions, and some of his cannon, for the maintenance of his military household. Not approving of this state of things, when last in Paris I had an interview with Louis 18, and held a conference with his majesty, with a view to inquire into this matter. The French Government persevered in the opinion, that the suspicious nature of some of Buonaparté's acts at Elba, disentitled him from a conditional obligation, unless he previously tendered an explanation of certain acts which bore a dubious interpretation; but at my suggestion of the impolicy arising out of any complaint which personal want might create on his part, a person was dispatched by the French Government to Elba, to give him that quantum of aid which would prevent the possibility of his incurring that species of privation, but not to give the entire stipend until a satisfactory explanation was given relative to certain points of his conduct, which lay open to suspicion. So that it is evident there can be no ground for any argument in defence of his conduct, from the non-payment of a stipend which, as yet, has not become due: besides, he has never alleged any such complaint, nor was France responsible for that Treaty, at least in a personal sense with him. If a complaint of infraction was to be alleged by Buonaparté, it should not have been made in the first instance to France; the Allies were the parties to the Treaty, and to them alone, if it was violated, the complaint should have been carried: he never remonstrated with those with whom the compact had been formed; and it is therefore evident that he never had any notion of standing on that ground, that he never meant to urge any such plea; in grasping at all, he did not stop to arraign or discuss any particular allegation, but absorbed the whole in his arrogant and unprincipled declaration, that he was "the sole and legitimate monarch of France."
The noble lord said, that the question now before the House was not as to peace or war, but merely as to the
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necessity of precautionary measures at the present crisis. He believed that the House would see, that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue lay between two alternatives. It must either embark in a war, in conjunction with the other continental Powers, or it must, in conjunction with them, adopt measures of military precaution, sufficient for its protection under the present circumstances. He was sure that it would not be contended in that House, that while the powers of government in France were exercised by such a man, it would be possible, consistent with our safety, to reduce the establishments of the country to that scale which might be considered sufficient under other circumstances. However sanguine he might have been in the hope of bringing the nation back to its ancient principles and policy, yet he never did or could have supposed, like the gentlemen on the other side of the House, that there was to be no intermediate state between such a war as we had for so many years waged with France, and that peace establishment which would be sufficient for the sound health of the country, in settled times, and when the former social relations of Europe were completely reestablished. The danger was now more deeply rooted, which had arisen from a state of things that had unfortunately had too long a continuance. From this state of things, France had now become a military nation, and all other classes of the community had become, in that country, subordinate to the military class. It was then easy to see that France could not break loose from that unnatural state to which it had been reduced, without a great danger of what had now actually taken place, from a re-action of the army. Although, in her political situation, France might now be prostrate at the foot of her armies, yet, who would venture to say, that the return of Buonaparté was the act of the French nation? Who could hesitate to allow, that the late revolution was purely the act of the military? If the authority of their own paternal monarch, to which the military, as well as the nation, had not only submitted, but had sworn to support, was now of no validity—if they had now broke loose from ties so binding in duty and in honour, to what could it be attributed, but to that overweening principle, that their interests, as military men, suffered from a state of peace? The military class, that had been

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accustomed to seek their fortunes by rapine and plunder, and who looked to promotion, advancement, and rewards from the blood and plunder of other nations, naturally opposed an order of things that promised peace. But after having betrayed their king, and violated their oath, he believed, if they had any of the honourable feelings of military men remaining, they must feel themselves ill at case, and degraded in their own estimation. He did not believe that an army so degraded in their own estimation could perform those services to their new master that, under other circumstances, they might have done. He conceived that it had been proved most unequivocally, that although France might now, as a nation, be prostrate before her own army, yet that the public feeling, throughout the greater part of that country was in favour of their amiable King, whose conduct had been as unimpeachable as his character. Whatever difference of opinion there might be upon that most grave and important question—whether, in point of prudence and calculation, it was better to allow the power now in France to exist; or whether it was better to deal with that power in the very outset, and before its authority was established in full vigour, by the resources of all France,—still, in either case it would be allowed that some measures of precaution would be absolutely necessary. If Europe should not determine upon active war, still there was no alternative left, but to remain in a state of military organization, sufficient to protect them from future dangers. If he could not now bring the whole case before the judgment of the House, he should, on a future occasion, if it should be necessary, leave the whole question to be decided on its own merits. It was the business of this country now, to watch the temper and spirit of the continental nations. He did not mean to say, that any ardour of the continental nations should precipitate this country into any war that was not just and necessary. As we had, however, already saved the world, in concurrence with the Allied Powers, it was in concurrence with them that we must preserve it from future dangers. Notwithstanding our feelings of security from our local and insular situation, yet we should not, on that account, be forward to goad the Powers of the Continent into a war that they were not convinced was necessary for their interests. He considered that
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the proper source of our political influence on the Continent was from the full conviction that our influence was exerted for the preservation of the interests of the Continental Powers, and for the general good of Europe, and not for any private or separate interest of this country. If this was admitted to be the case, he hoped the converse of the proposition would be allowed, that there was no rational security either for this country or for Europe, but in keeping together that mass of continental force to which Europe had already owed her deliverance. He looked at the present circumstances, not as destructive of all that had been hitherto done for the peace of Europe, but as containing the seeds of future danger. He thought that the line of conduct which this country had to pursue was to find out what was the true spirit of the Continent upon the present occasion. We should see whether the continental nations thought their security would be better provided for by war, or by precautionary preparations. We should not give them a fictitious wish, for war, nor overstrain the arguments in favour of it: but if, in their deliberate consideration and conscientious judgment, they should conceive war to be the only means of permanent security to Europe, it could not be expected that this country should separate itself from the interests of the rest of Europe. It was a gratifying and proud consideration for this country, that we had already accomplished every thing of territorial arrangement that appeared to be necessary to secure the balance of Europe. Those arrangements had been so fully assented to by all the great Powers of Europe, that they might now be considered as secure. The relation in which we now stood to the Continent, was not that of desiring any private objects of our own, but as ready to give what assistance we could to support the general interests. The noble lord concluded by moving,
"That an humble Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to return to his Royal Highness the thanks of this House for his most gracious Message:
"To assure his Royal Highness, that it is impossible for his Majesty's faithful Commons not to be fully sensible of the dangers to which the tranquillity and independence of Europe are exposed in consequence of the events which have recently occurred in France, in direct con-

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travention of the engagements concluded with the Allied Powers at Paris in the course of the last year:
"That, in a cause of such general concern, it must afford us the greatest satisfaction to learn that his Royal Highness has lost no time in entering into communications with his Majesty's Allies, for the purpose of forming such a concert as may most effectually provide for the general and permanent security of Europe.
"That, with a view to this important object, we shall, with the utmost zeal and alacrity, afford the requisite assistance to enable his Royal Highness to make an augmentation of his Majesty's forces by sea and land, and to adopt all such measures as may be necessary for its accomplishment."
Sir Francis Burdettfelt it his duly to state to the House and to the country the reasons which rendered it impossible for him to concur in the Address just proposed by the noble lord. If he could understand that it went merely to assert the expediency of a preparation on the part of this country, in order that it might not be taken unawares—a preparation called for alone by the apprehensions which arose out of the supposed character, true or false, of the present emperor of France, he would not dissent from it. But if it was intended to plunge the country again into a war, for the purpose of replacing the Bourbons on the throne of France, he should not discharge his duty if he did not raise up his voice against our entering upon such an unjustifiable and ruinous enterprize. It was said that Buonaparté had entered France in contravention of the treaty concluded with him; but if in that treaty there was no mention of his not entering France, he could not see the contravention. He was old enough to remember when the former war for placing the Bourbons on the throne of France was undertaken, and the effect of that war was to give to that man, who was now the object of their apprehension, such power as made him too strong for all Europe, till he dissipated and lost it in the plains of Russia. But there was no ground for any hope that he would lose his power by such means again. The consideration now was, as Buonaparté was on the throne again, whether it was for this nation to wage another twenty years war to reinstate the Bourbons. He was far from wishing to criticise the conduct of the Bourbons, or to be too severe on any one in misfortune:
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but he could not help saying, that the conduct of the Bourbons had not been such as to please the French. The noble lord had said, that this Government was not blameable for not keeping Buonaparté under greater restraint. He agreed with he noble lord, that this Government was not blameable on this point; but he thought his Government would be blameable, if hey attempted to impose a governor on in independent nation against its will. Was it not plain that Buonaparté was the Ruler of the French people's choice? The step he had taken had very absurdly been called the invasion of France. But who ever heard of a single man invading a nation of thirty millions of inhabitants, and gaining the sovereignty of that nation against its will? The fact was, that the nation wished for him, and had in a great degree wished for him from their dislike of the government which he superseded. There was not a man in France who did lot see a new order of things rising up under the Bourbons, and who did not fear that property was insecure. The government of Louis did not act up to the principles of that constitution which his brother had accepted for him before his return. He repeated, that he was desirous not to speak harshly of the Bourbons; but it was their own conduct alone which had deprived them of the throne. That conduct had been most hostile to liberty, as indeed had also been the conduct of the assembled Sovereigns at Vienna, who had themselves subverted the principles on which they originally took their stand; and who on that account did not possess the same power which they had formerly wielded against the emperor of France with so much success. With respect to the "dreadful note of preparation" now sounded, he repeated, that if he could consider it as only for defence—for resistance against aggression—he would concur in the Address before the House. But by what he could collect from the ambiguous expressions of the noble lord, there existed a strong desire in the British Government, if the elements of war could be found in Europe, to recur to that detestable principle—the re-establishment of what were called Legitimate Sovereigns; as if nations belonged irrevocably to certain families—a principle which it was still more reprehensible to maintain in a country, the sovereign of which held his throne alone by the will of the people; and who, if the principle thus asserted were correct, was

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a greater usurper than Buonaparté. This country had done enough for the Bourbons; they had cost this country 800 millions of money, and oceans of blood. Even in 1793, the purpose of re-establishing the Bourbons on the throne of France was disavowed by the minister of that day, potent as he was. The war, at that period, was asserted to be for the opening of the Scheldt, for the defence of our allies the Dutch—for any thing, in short, but for the restoration of the Bourbons. It was against that object that he now protested. The noble lord had chosen to keep a great many things out of sight. While the noble lord was talking of the little faith and reliance that could be placed in the present Ruler of France, he (sir F. Burdett) could not divest his mind of the recollection of the long negociation of the noble lord with the late Ruler of France on a subject so deeply important, and so much felt in this country; he meant, the abolition of the Slave Trade. The noble lord, even with all his sacrifices, had not been able to persuade the Bourbons to comply with his wishes on that point. And why? Because while they declared their anxiety to adopt his proposition, they expressed the impossibility of their doing so from their fear of the French nation. Buonaparté, whether from motives of virtue or of policy, had done it at once. The one talked—the other acted. It had been said by Ferdinand of Arragon, that "words were the counters of wise men, and the money of fools." This step on the part of Buonaparté spoke plainly. There was no hypocrisy in it; at least if it was an act of hypocrisy, he wished with all his heart that this and all the other governments of Europe would show themselves equally hypocritical. He had seen enough of the sufferings of war, to make him wish that it should be avoided in almost every possible case. At this period particularly, and on this occasion, it appeared to him most desirable that the country should not be plunged into it. It had been said by a wise man of antiquity, "Iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero;" he had no hesitation in declaring, that he should not say "antefero inquissimum bellum justissimæ paci." It was impossible to doubt that Napoleon Buonaparté was emperor of France by the wish of the French people. It was said that Buonaparté was supported only by the military; but what was the ground of thinking so? Could it be believed, that a single man landing in
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a nation containing thirty millions of inhabitants, with a government in active organization, and armed with a great civil and military power against him, could proceed for 500 miles to the capital of the country, and assume the government, against the consent of the people? In all that length of way there was not a single individual to lift his hand against him. How could the approbation of the people be more unequivocally shown? But however it was with him and that people, this country had nothing to apprehend from them, and therefore ought not to interfere with them. Feeling this to be the fact, he contended, that it was a most abhorred and detestable principle to interfere in the internal concerns of another country. Let the French settle their own affairs. We had nothing, he repeated, to apprehend from them. But he would abstain from entering prematurely into the great question of peace or war, satisfied with having communicated the reasons which compelled him to vote against an Address, which seemed to him to be the first step towards involving us in a contest, of which no man could anticipate the termination, and which, he was persuaded, would be as unsuccessful in its event as it was unjust in its principle.
Mr. Ponsonbydeclared that he should support the Address. If he viewed it in the same light as the hon. baronet, he could by no means concur in it; but so far did it seem to him from being the first step to involve the country in the war, that it did not bind the House down by a single expression on the question of peace or war at all. Those words which spoke of the contravention of the Treaty of Paris were founded, not on the circumstance of Buonaparté having quilted Elba to go to France, but on the consideration that by the Treaty of Paris, terms more favourable were granted to France than had been offered to her when she was under the government of Buonaparté, on the specific ground that she was to return to what was called her legitimate monarchy. When, therefore, Louis the 18th withdrew from Paris, and was no longer governor of France, and when Buonaparté returned to Paris, and again became governor of France; then France, was no longer in the state in which she was when the Treaty of Paris was concluded. It was in that sense, and in no other, that he understood the Treaty to have been contravened. A condition of the Treaty was, that the

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government of France should not revert to Buonapaté—having, however, so reverted, France and the Allied Powers stood in the same relative situation as that in which the were before the conclusion of the Treaty. He did not think that the hon. baronet had fairly and candidly interpreted the words of the noble lord, in imputing to them that they evinced a determination to deprive France of the government of Buonaparté, and impose on her the government of the Bourbons. For his own part, he positively and peremptorily denied that any such consideration weighed with him in support of the proposed Address. He had no right to consider, whether it was wise or unwise in France to prefer her present to her late Sovereign. It was for France herself to determine that point; and he would never vote in that House on the principle of imposing a specific government on any nation. It was true that this consideration was connected with that most material question—the question of peace or war; but that was not before the House—the Address did not pledge any opinion—the communication from the Prince Regent did not call for any advice on the subject; and he, for one, would not be rash enough prematurely to discuss it, and to give opinion and offer advice where neither was required. To him it appeared most wise that the country should be put in a state of sufficient preparation; and he was persuaded, that both then and at all times it was our sound policy to stand on such a footing with reference to the great Powers of Europe as might tend to the general security. There was one point in the noble lord's speech, in which, however, he perhaps misunderstood him—but in which, if he did not misunderstand him, he could not concur. He meant that part in which the noble lord appeared to intimate that Parliament should in no wise interfere with the responsible servants of the Crown, so as to offer to the Crown their opinion on any great public question, until ministers had taken their decision, and having communicated that decision to Parliament, required their opinion upon it. This statement of the noble lord did not quite satisfy him. For if he agreed to such a latitude of allowance, he should bind himself and the House to take no step, not even to require information, pending any undetermined situation of public affairs. But he had probably misunderstood the noble lord, and he should be very glad to find that it was so. As to what the result of
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the existing circumstances might be, it was impossible at that moment to say any thing. He had formerly expressed a sincere hope that they might terminate in peace. He entertained the same sentiment that night. He was ready cheerfully to place power in the hands of the Executive Government, because he did not think they would use that power for the purpose of inducing the Continental States to do that which they were not disposed to do, or which they did not think it their natural interest to do; but that they would avail themselves of it to make ourselves strong for defensive operations, and for the preservation, in concert with our allies, of peace, if that were possible; and if that were not possible, to enable us to carry on war in the way best calculated to ensure a speedy and successful termination of it. He would, however, to the last moment cherish an ardent hope that peace might be continued. He was the more inclined to hope that his Majesty's ministers might be enabled to continue it, when he recollected that the noble lord himself had been engaged in the preparation of a treaty of peace with France, while France was under the government of Buonaparté. When the negociations at Chatillon took place, France was not under the government of the Bourbons; she was under the government of Buonaparté and the noble lord and the Allied Powers were then of opinion that it was practicable to conclude a treaty with Buonaparté for the peace of Europe. He flattered himself, that as this had been once their opinion, it might prove to be so again. For although he admitted that much depended on the personal character of the individual at the head of a powerful nation, he was nevertheless persuaded that his Majesty's ministers and the Allies, by adopting a wise, moderate, and firm course of proceeding, might find present means of concluding and maintaining peace with France under the government of Buonaparté. With respect to the mode in which Buonaparté had regained his power, he would not give any opinion. But he thought we should deceive ourselves, were we to imagine that he had no support in France but that of the army. Although it was evident that the military were principally instrumental in restoring him to the throne, yet he conceived that had the whole of the population been against him, it would have been o impossible for him to have made his way to Paris. He implored the House and his

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Majesty's Government, therefore, not to deceive themselves on this point, and plunge the country into difficulties, extrication from which would perhaps be impossible. He must do the noble lord the justice to say, that he seemed to disclaim any attempt to induce the Powers of the Continent to act otherwise than as their natural interests appeared to dictate. What the steps were which would be taken by all parties in this momentous crisis, he knew not; but he should vote for the Address, because he thought the country ought to be put in a defensive state, and because that Address left the House quite unpledged as to its future conduct.
Mr. Whitbreadobserved, that if he could take so narrow a view of the question as his right hon. friend who had just sat down, or if he thought with the hon. baronet who preceded him, that there was any thing like ambiguity of sentiment in the speech of the noble lord (ambiguity of expression was inseparable from the speeches of the noble lord), he might be content to vote for the Address. But, thinking that those who voted for the Address, unamended, would lose their only opportunity of protesting against that which, whatever might be the equivocal language of the noble lord, was his obvious policy—seeing through the flimsy veil with which his Majesty's ministers attempted to coyer their real objects—aware of the trap into which they were anxious to betray the country—he could not let the occasion pass without availing himself of it to contend in the strongest manner against its being the interest of the country, on any of the grounds hypothetically stated by the noble lord, to begin a fresh crusade for the purpose of determining who should fill the throne of France, after the experience which we had had of the last crusade of twenty years—terminated only by accident, and by the temporary madness of the man who then filled, and who now fills the throne of France. He should maintain that it was the clear and unequivocal interest of this country, and of the Allied Powers on the Continent to fulfil the treaty which they had given to France, when France was under the dominion of the Bourbons. The noble lord having refused to lay the Treaty of Chatillon on the table of the House, had nevertheless assumed in his speech, that the peace given to France under the Bourbons by the Treaty of Paris was on better terms than the peace which
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would have been given to France under Buonaparté. Of this fact he had not the means of judging; but if rumour was to be at all believed, the noble lord, at the period to which he alluded, was prepared to affix his name and seal to a treaty by which much more favourable terms would have been granted to this Buonaparté, who, whether by unanimous re-election, or by trampling on the independence of his subjects, was again on the throne of France, than were subsequently granted o Louis the 18th. He would refer also o the Declaration made by the Allies at Frankfort on the 1st of December 1813, in which they offered to Buonaparté an extent of territory never possessed by the Bourbons. He would not, therefore, allow that the Treaty of Paris had been contravened, the Bourbons having had terms allowed them which would not have been allowed to Buonaparté, unless the noble lord would produce a distinct statement if what had been previously offered to Buonaparté. He begged his right hon. friend—he intreated the House—to consider the drift of the noble lord's observations. The noble lord had told them, that the alternative was only between immediate war, and a state of precaution which was to last only as long as might enable the Powers of Europe to pounce on France—[lord Castlereagh said "No, no!"] He was glad to hear the noble lord deny this. Such was the ambiguity of the noble lord's phraseology, that it was always difficult, and sometimes impossible to ascertain what he actually did mean to say: but he was happy to understand that he disavowed this most nefarious project. The noble lord had accounted, in a very detailed manner, for the departure of Buonaparté from Elba. He had added a volume to the statement we had already had on the subject. The fact was, there had been no control over the person of Buonaparté. It was true that the noble lord had objected to the situation of Elba as one of extreme inconvenience; but that objection had been over-ruled; and at Elba, Buonaparté was destined to remain. With respect to the Treaty by which he had been so placed, the noble lord had by no means satisfied him that faith had been kept with Buonaparté. In adverting to the stipulation for the payment of a sum of money by the French Crown to Buonaparté, the noble lord had said that the year had not expired, and that Buonaparté had no right

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to the money until that period. This was a pettifogging objection for a great nation to make, when they knew that the individual to whom the money was to be paid was in great distress for want of it. But it had been also said by the noble lord, that France was no party to that Treaty. France no party to that Treaty! Were not the Bourbons on the throne of France in consequence of that Treaty? Did not the high contracting parties engage that they would obtain the concurrence and guarantee of the Bourbons to the Treaty? And yet now the noble lord said that France had been no party to it! [Lord Castlereagh—"No, no!"] He appealed to the judgment of the House whether that was not the impression made by what the noble lord had said. So dangerous had the noble lord thought the non-performance of the Treaty on the part of France, that he had spoken to prince Talleyrand about it. The French Court, it seemed, were jealous on the subject. They were afraid that Buonaparté was enlisting too many men, and that he thought of attacking France by main force from Elba. Blind as beetles they observed only his outward demonstrations, and never thought that he was working with the subtlety of intellect. They conceived that to deprive him of money, would be to thwart his designs. At length the noble lord obtained this—not that his money should be sent to Buonaparté, but that a gentleman should be sent to him to observe his motions!
In the opinion of the noble lord, (an opinion expressed with the utmost confidence) Buonaparté owed his restoration to the throne of France—an event much more miraculous than his original elevation to it—not to the population of France, but to the military. The fact was, that Buonaparté landed in France without a man to defend him, and that in his progress from the South to the North of France he was exposed daily and nightly, and every hour of every day and night, to the attacks of those who were inimical to his cause, if such existed; but that not a single hand of all that population which the noble lord stated he had good reason to know were friendly to the Bourbons, was raised against him as the invader of France, or as the destroyer of its lawful Sovereign. The noble lord, as a member of his Majesty's Government, was supposed to possess secret information of every kind—for which at least the public
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certainly paid. He was at Vienna, associating with the cleverest princes in the world—old diplomatists—men who knew exactly where to place a spy, whether on this king or on that priest. Yet, in spite of this combined diplomatic wisdom, in spite of all the means and appliances possessed by the noble lord, Buonaparté landed in the Bay of St. Juan, and marched to Paris, to the great astonishment, no doubt, of the wise-acres of the Congress. And yet, the noble lord declared that he had authority for stating that the population of France were hostile to him! Away with such authority! It was equivalent to the noble lord's information. The noble lord knew every thing—after it had taken place! Had he but known what he did not know, he would have known all about it.
The question now came to this—Whether Buonaparté was emperor of France by the will of the people, or by the will of the soldiery, or by their combined will? If the last, which he verily believed, what was the chance of overturning a throne so established, and which, if not originally desired by the French people, Buonaparté would take care should exist so much for their benefit as to be assuredly continued by them? Let the House, in contrast, place that glorious decree fur the abolition of the Slave Trade, with the volume presented by the noble lord of that negotiation in which Louis le Désiré declared that he could not put an end to the Trade because the feelings of the French people were against it. Napoleon Buonaparté had done it by a stroke of his pen; and he had so done it, that if the Bourbons were restored, or if a Republic were to be established, or if any other change were to take place in the government of France, the resurrection of the Slave Trade would be impossible in that country. Adverting to the Declaration of the Allies, which the noble lord had that evening adopted as an act of the executive government, he maintained that lords Cathcart, Clancarty and Stewart, and the duke of Wellington, deserved impeachment for putting their names to such an instrument. A right hon. gentleman had on a recent occasion contended, that this Declaration contained nothing which was not loyal, wise and honourable. The noble lord, more wisely, had abstained from touching on its character. But, surely, if words meant any thing, that Declaration went to designate an indivi-

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dual for assassination. Much might be said (and he trusted much would be said by some of his hon. and learned friends) of its inconsistency with the law of nations, as well as of its hostility to every principle of social order. It led directly to a war of extermination. He had heard that other Articles in the Treaty of Fontainbleau, besides what was alluded to by the noble lord, had been violated. And here he could not help expressing his regret, that one of the greatest names of which England could boast had been sullied, by setting his seal to such a deed as the Declaration of the Allies. All the brilliancy of his achievements, and all the splendour of his character, would not be sufficient to drag him out of the abyss of shame into which he had plunged himself, by setting his name to this Declaration. The duke of Wellington, and lords Cathcart, Clancarty, and Stewart, had thought proper to say, that the only title Buonaparté had to his existence was the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Did they mean to say, that Buonaparté's head was on the block? What could possibly be the meaning of the insane declaration, "that he was out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he had rendered himself liable to public vengeance?" How would the casuistry of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his Christian feeling, be able to explain this? He would defy him to say that such a declaration meant any thing more than this, that any man who met him might stab him [No, no! from the Ministerial side of the House]. He did not regard the exclamations of gentlemen opposite. He appealed to the words themselves. Without again recurring to the names of the other persons, he would say that he most sincerely lamented, that that distinguished individual, who was said to be appointed to the command of an army of 250,000 men for the purpose of driving Buonaparté from the throne of France, and who had already driven him from the Peninsula, should now think it proper to call in the hand of an assassin to do what he could not do at the head of the confederated troops. Why, war was declared against France in that Declaration. True, however, Napoleon seemed to be conducting himself with more wisdom than those precipitate diplomatists at Vienna, and with more consummate skill than his former confidential friend, prince Talleyrand. Knowing how
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little regard that Declaration was entitled to, he had treated it in the way it deserved. By the information received within these few hours, it appeared that Buonaparté had published notes and a commentary on this Declaration, in which he declared that he would maintain the Treaty of Paris, although he thought that better terms than those in that Treaty ought to have been obtained for France—that he would not stir out of his boundaries, or resort to hostilities, except the territory of France was invaded. Whether his conduct was dictated by hypocrisy or wisdom, it was certain that he had conciliated the people of France to his authority. The noble lord had not told the House a single syllable of the endeavours on the part of Government to find out whether the state of the public mind, or the present Government of France, was pacific towards this country or not. He wished to ask the noble lord, whether, in point of fact, his Majesty's cruisers had not already committed an act of aggression against France? Whether, without any express orders, but upon an understanding of what was expected of them in certain circumstances, they had not committed such an act of aggression? And here he could not help saying, that he considered the Government dealt hardly and unfairly with the officers of the navy. They did not give any positive orders to them, but an ambiguous something which they were to do. They thus threw the performance or non-performance of the duty on the discretion of the officers, and consequently threw the responsibility on them, and took the merit of success to themselves, What could be more ambiguous, for instance, than the order said to be given in the Mediterranean? There was an understanding given to the master of one miserable vessel, to this effect—if you think Buonaparté is intending any mischief, you may stop him, but not otherwise. Why, the Elbese flag was more common in the Mediterranean than the flag of almost any other nation. What sort of an understanding was this? Good God! this officer had need to have had a better understanding than those who sent him such a communication [a laugh]. And all this was for want of a combined understanding in the Cabinet. If, as had been contended, the troops of Buonaparté were anxious for war, and that in order to gratify them he would be under the necessity of making it, here he was supplied

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with a pretence at once—for bringing in merchant vessels, was nothing less than a declaration of war.
He should be glad to know the description of war in which we were likely to be engaged. There was one, which, if he could draw any conclusion from what fell from the noble lord, was a war of aggression against Buonaparté for the sake of replacing the Bourbons on the throne. He did not wish to say a single word at present against the Bourbons; they were under misfortune, and had a greater claim than ever on the protection of this country. His mouth would be sealed in silence on account of that misfortune, which was now, he believed, irretrievable; and if not irretrievable, would certainly be so by the steps which the noble lord was proposing to take for restoring them to the throne. He had no hesitation in saying, that a war of aggression against France ought to be resisted by this country. If Louis the 18th had been attacked, this would have been a signal for war. But things had so instantaneously changed. It was not five weeks ago, since he had in that House talked of Buonaparté's being wished for by some part of the people of this country; and he was convinced that some persons were actually clamorous for war, because they considered it would serve their interests. It was not long ago that the noble lord had told them that they ought to consider that France was always France, and that they ought to lay their account with the existence of ambition under the present as well as under former governments. One of the most witty and eloquent men that ever sat in that House (Mr. Sheridan) had said, that one half of our national debt had been contracted in endeavouring to suppress the power of the Bourbons, and the other half in endeavouring to restore them to power. We ought to recollect that the Bourbons had not always been the friends of this country, but on the contrary, almost always our most inveterate enemies. He did think that before the late great event, we might have done with an establishment considerably less than what had been announced—an establishment of 19 millions! The Netherlands were to be strengthened for the sake of protecting the flank on that side of France, according to the noble lord. The powers of Austria and Prussia were considered as every thing, and all the other States were to be hashed up, as it were, in one cauldron, and dealt out in
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such a way as should be most conducive to the strengthening these two powers, and the strengthening the flanks on the different sides of France. For this purpose we were to keep a large army on the Continent. We were to reconstruct all the dilapidated fortresses of Belgium. If we put ourselves into an attitude of precaution, we ought to take into consideration what additional precautions we take now, to those we should have taken had the Bourbons continued on the throne of France. It would seem from the language of the noble lord, that he considered it a good reason for going to war at present, because Buonaparté was weak and we were strong. He appealed to the House if he did not tell them of his weakness, and of the salutary effect which timely aggression might have—that the question of war was a matter of expediency, and not of morality—that having violated the Treaty, they were justified in going to war, and if a timely blow could be struck, it might be proper to consider how far such a measure might be considered expedient. And all the difficulty that he (Mr. W.) felt on this occasion was, that they would receive no information from the noble lord, before that in which he condescended to tell them the blow was already struck. Such was the paralysis which the Congress of Vienna had given rise to, that they would find there never would be a time when the different Sovereigns were so little disengaged from the care of keeping their subjects in order as to be at liberty to go to war. The noble lord had said that the Allies were entitled to go the whole length in disposing of Saxony; but that the measure would have been so disgusting to the people of Germany, that that country was only partially divided. Did the noble lord think that Saxony on the present occasion would be any advantage to the public weal? Did he think that the Saxons would enter cordially into any war at present, and that they would not rather take the first moment of Prussia's weakness to emancipate themselves? Did he think that Venice would be a source of strength? He had talked of the vested rights of Austria in Venice, forgetting the rights of the people; and that Austria had no other right to that state, than the having received a transfer of it from the hands of a robber who had no right, and who could not make the rights of any other power better than his own. Such was the situation of Venice, and such was the morality

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of the Congress. Did the noble lord think that Italy would concur with the Allies? The noble lord had lately told them that the French government was so popular in Italy, that when the French armies were all withdrawn from that country and in the peninsula, the Italians would not rise to throw off the French yoke, and made no effort for that purpose. Had the noble lord reconciled the Genoese? Had he not rather given to Austria and Prussia elements of discord within themselves? and would not all their troops be consequently wanted to quell the disturbances among their new subjects? What had their conduct been to the King of Naples, after pledging themselves as strongly to him as it was possible for men to do, and after, on the faith of such pledge, he had performed his part? What would the situation of the South of Italy be? These were the circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration, if they were to have a war of aggression against France. What would be the situation of things within France itself? The noble lord had said that, from what information he was possessed of, he believed the greatest part of the population of France was in favour of the Bourbons. Now, from what he (Mr. W.) had learned, he had no doubt this was not the case. He believed that there might be many thousands who were sorry the Bourbons were dethroned and Buonaparté restored; but the very first act of aggression on the part of the Allies would have the effect of consolidating all these parties; and if, therefore, we were to have a war carried on for the dethronement and extermination of one man, all the population of France would rally round him, and after all the horrors and massacres which would take place the matter would end in the army of aggression being expelled. Even in case of the death or defeat of Buonaparté, did the noble lord think that the Bourbons could ever be restored? Would not some other chief be elected, or some other government be appointed, either that of a collective body, or of one man? The French had had an experience of the Bourbons; and whatever their virtues in other respects might be, he was strongly of opinion that they were not persons who could maintain themselves on the throne of France. If the war was to be a war of aggression, it was his thorough conviction we should be foiled in our purpose. It would be impossible for the noble lord to keep the
[450
coalition together unless it was cemented by English money; and in this case the fate of it would be the same as before, and England would be left in the lurch, and obliged to make a disgraceful peace either with Buonaparté, or some other person in his place. What reason was there for not making a peace with him now, which was not equally powerful when we were ready to conclude a Treaty at Chatillon? All his most insane and unprincipled acts were done before that period. And yet the noble lord then, with all the confederated Powers, were willing to negociate a peace with Napoleon Buonaparté. What the terms then offered were would never, however, be known by the House, unless they were published by some other Government. If at the end of a war the country had been told that Napoleon Buonaparté was confined within the limits of the Treaty of Paris, which he was now willing to keep, would not this communication have been received by the whole nation with acclamation? If in that case there was not one person who would not have subscribed to those terms, and if within those limits France was now placed, what motive could there now be for not being contented with what was then considered as sufficient? If France stepped beyond these limits, then France would be the aggressor, and that would give us a title to repel the aggression. He implored his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), and his other friends on his side of the House, to reflect, that if they agreed to the Address without any amendment, they would give an instrument to ministers which would enable them to commit the country in a war of aggression, without their having any opportunity of expressing themselves on the propriety or impropriety of such a war. He could not help thinking that the daily publications which were at present such strenuous advocates for a war for the extermination of Buonaparté, were carrying the matter a little too far for their own interest, which was so often very different from the true interests of the country. They ought to consider, that if Buonaparté should be exterminated, it would be as flat for them as when he was at Elba. He knew that the return of Buonaparté had thrown a number of persons in this country into the most serious state of alarm and apprehension. He implored those persons to beware lest by premature measures they increased the danger of which they were apprehensive. He wished

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therefore to submit an amendment to the Address, limiting the means entrusted to ministers to means of defence, and taking from them the means of aggression. He was willing to see the country in a sufficient attitude of defence till the danger should be past; but beyond this he could not with propriety go. The hon. gentleman concluded with moving an amendment to the Address, in the following words:—"And that at the same time we earnestly implore his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he would be graciously pleased to exert his most strenuous endeavours to secure to this country the continuance of peace, so long as it can be maintained consistently with the honour of his Majesty's Crown, the security of his dominions, and the faith to be preserved with his Majesty's Allies."
Mr. Frederick Douglasalluded to the decree of Buonaparté for the abolition of the Slave Trade. From all he had been able to learn, it was a mistaken idea amongst the people of France, that the abolition would be injurious to them if suddenly effected. Thus Louis 18, attending to the feelings of the people, gained time for the termination of a traffick which his rival, on coming to power, had, without any regard for their feelings, abolished at once. Respecting the prospect before us, there was an essential principle in the government of France, which must necessarily be repugnant to the tranquillity of the Continent. The change that had taken place had been effected by the army, and not by the sense of the people. The real voice of the people was to be found in the towns where they were not overawed by the military. It was the natural consequence of any invasion, that in the first moments the people would lie by and not declare their sentiments. He would not contend that the voice of the people had been declared against Buonaparté but, when it was asserted that their voice was in favour of him, he must say that such an assertion was totally fallacious. Buonaparté was stimulated by revenge against all the nations of Europe. His landing, therefore, was not so much an invasion of France, as an invasion of all Europe. It must be obvious to all who had any knowledge of human nature, and who reflected on the extraordinary character of this man, that he could have no intention of remaining at peace; but even if he had, it was perfectly out of his power; for the soldiers under him were anxious to be called back
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again to their employments of plunder and peculation; and this would impel him to go to war. But it was said that we had no legitimate grounds for going to war. The hon. gentleman who spoke last, however, had viewed the Treaty of Fontainbleau on very fallacious grounds. The hon. gentleman here entered into a view of the conditions of the Treaty with Buonaparté, which gave him the sovereignty of Elba, and contended that by his return he had broken his faith with the Allied Powers, which justified them in joining to expel him. If he went to war at the present moment, he must proceed by the common means of taxation, loans, and credit; but these were things which were quite unknown in France. He therefore was not able to put his forces immediately into activity, which was the true reason for all his professions of moderation. The noble lord had spoken of the unanimity which prevailed on the subject of opposing Buonaparté on the part of the Allies. Recollecting as he did the events of the last twenty years, he felt anxious to take advantage of this unanimity, before Buonaparté should be able to destroy it. He had no hesitation in saying, that the French army being the active power which supported Buonaparté, it was absolutely necessary for the restoration of tranquillity, that this army should be extirpated! [Cries of Hear, hear!] He did not mean the extirpation of the individuals, but the extirpation of their existence in the shape of an army. Their restless agitation, their unparalleled fearlessness of death, and their unconquerable passion for glory, formed their very excellence; and this would ever render them the enemies of the tranquillity of the world. The hon. gentleman, after a few more remarks on the peculiar crisis at which we had arrived, concluded with giving his assent to the Address.
Sir John Newportdeclared, that in giving his vote he should look at the question divested of all the commentaries he had heard upon it. He should not vote for it under the same view as the hon. gentleman had taken of it, who had advised the extermination of the whole French army; because such an idea was absurd, and if the project was attempted, it would certainly be the most unwise crusade that had ever been heard of. He would go as far as the noble lord had gone, but no farther. Instead of entertaining any abstruse question of peace or war, he should wait till

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the point was decided, and should then deliver his opinion, however painful it might be to his feelings. At present the question did not bind any member to support any proceedings that would involve this country in a war so wild and unjust as to attempt to dictate to any nation what form of government it should adopt. It was advisable that this country should be put in a state of preparation for the worst, and to take such measures as should best enable us to act in concert with our Allies, for the security of all Europe. He trusted, however, that nothing but circumstances of absolute compulsion would induce us to enter into a new war; and believing that this would be our line of conduct, he should support the Address. He dissented, nevertheless, with reluctance, from the amendment of his hon. friend, not because he thought that those words did not convey a proper feeling, but because he did not think that this was a fit opportunity for the House to pronounce their judgment, when no information was before them. He would give his vote for the Address, because he saw no reason for withholding his confidence from ministers in the present instance.
Mr. Crokersaid, he rose merely to speak to a matter of fact. The hon. gentleman opposite had been pleased to say that a French vessel had been brought in by his Majesty's cruisers under an ambiguous understanding. This statement was totally unfounded. He had not officially heard that any such capture had been made. He had heard a report that a French ship had been sent in; but whether she was navigated under the Imperial flag of France be could not say. If he, were to judge from the statements of some merchants of London, he should believe that the detention had been made under the Hovering Act, and that the ship bore the white flag. But neither directly nor indirectly had any orders been given which would justify any officer to interfere even with the tri-coloured flag of France. The ship by which the French vessel was said to to have been captured, had sailed three weeks ago for a specific purpose; and it was scarcely possible that her commander, in obedience to his orders, could have deemed himself authorized to interfere with the flag of France, of whatever colour it might be. He had been thus explicit, in order that it might not he supposed that this country had shown any bad faith.
Mr. Bankesgave his full concurrence to
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the motion. He took a view of what had been said by the different speakers, and added, as his own opinion, that so far from thinking the Message and Address to be too pacific, his only fear was that they were too warlike. He nevertheless saw nothing objectionable in the wording of either, as they were applicable either to peace or war. But it was impossible not to be a little alarmed at the Declaration which bore besides the signatures of the ministers of the Allied Powers, those of four British ministers. If this document were authentic, all doubts must be at an end; for war remained not to be deliberated about, but was actually resolved on. Yet from the tone of the noble lord that day, so far from this being the case, it would appear that the subject was still open for discussion. He would agree, that under the present circumstances of France, the contravention of the Treaty by Buonaparté was a sufficient cause for war, and the revolution ought not wholly to prevent the interference of foreign nations; but it became a prudential consideration what steps ought to be taken; and before it was resolved upon, it might be hoped there would be full time for discussion. He would defer his opinion till he heard what line of conduct was decided upon. The Declaration of the Allies certainly confined the war to a much more simple object than that of his hon. friend who had contended for the extinction of the whole French army; as the object of the Allies could only be the deposing of that particular man, who, by his conduct, they declared had put himself out of the pale of civil society. He should be happy if he could entertain the sanguine belief of his noble friend, that a large proportion of the people of France were adverse to the dominion of Buonaparté bat it looked rather suspicious, that with only a handful of armed men, he should be able to make his way, unmolested, almost from one extremity of the kingdom to the other. He feared, lest the appearance of a foreign force on the frontiers of France, coming with professions of revenge and ruin, might have the effect of uniting the people even though a great proportion of them were hostile to Buonaparté, and thus might throw much greater obstacles in the way of peace. Whatever might be the real intentions of Buonaparté, it was much safer for him to hold out professions of moderation than to adopt any other course. On the whole, he must admit that he could

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see no safety for this country but in a great and extensive establishment. He could not, however, but deprecate hostilities, if Buonaparté made no signs for committing actual aggression, because he did not think that a lengthened war could possibly be carried on, if attended, as it must be, with the peculiar expenses of that which had just ended. But if it was necessary, he had no doubt that every effort would be made at once, as the only way by which success could be expected. The hon. gentleman concluded by cautioning the House to beware of entering into any arrangement with the Allies which might lead to dispute hereafter.
Lord Althorpsaid, the main question to be decided was, whether, if war was to take place, it was to be a war of defence or of aggression? In 1793 the experiment of forcing a government on France had been tried and had failed, and he thought such an attempt now would be attended with a much less probable degree of success than then. Under all the circumstances, therefore, he was favourable to the amendment.
Mr. Abercrombietook a view of the nature of the Address, and declared that he should have liked to have heard the question more fully discussed than it had been. He would reserve his opinion as to whether this country was justified in going to war; bat with respect to the necessity of precautionary measures, he trusted there could not be a dissentient voice. He could have wished that no amendment had beer proposed; as the tone of ministers was certainly less high than that of the Declaration of the Allied Powers. As the House was not in a situation of offering any advice to the Crown, there was no resource but in leaving the whole subject to the responsibility of ministers. It was impossible for him, however, to vole against the words of his hon. friend's amendment because the noble lord might derive great advantage from the amendment being negatived, and the opinions of all those who did negative it might be subject to a degree of misconstruction.
Mr. Elliotsaid the Address seemed to meet with the general approbation of the House, and should have his support. The Amendment of the hon. gentleman seemed framed with a wish that no measures should be taken but with a view to peace with the person now at the head of the French Government. This was a proposition which at present he was not pre-
[456
pared to approve, nor on the other hand was he prepared to say that a contrary course ought to be taken. The decision on this point must depend on circumstances with which he was not acquainted—circumstances which perhaps were not at present known even to ministers. Placed in this situation, till further information could be given, they ought not to take upon themselves to decide on a subject of such importance. The Address, he was of opinion, went to bind the House to nothing to which they could hesitate to give their sanction.
Mr. Tierneystated it to be his intention to vole in favour of the Amendment. His object was to arm ministers with the powers for which they called; but at the same time he wished to have some guard on their conduct, as from the speech of the noble lord he could not but consider them disposed to consult the security of this country, not in a state of peace, but of war. He wished the House to remember how often the British Parliament had been accused in foreign countries of stirring up wars; and he thought this idea would be strengthened, if, on the present occasion, they came to a vote which would almost amount to a direct declaration in favour of a renewal of war. He had heard that treaties of subsidy had already been negociated. He shuddered at the expenses which a new war must throw on the country; but if the state of the world should seem to make this necessary, he should consider he did his duty to his country in consenting to such an increase of the public expenditure. If it was thought that peace could not be attained but by dethroning Buonaparté, the prospect now before the country appalled him to the heart. Great exertions had been made by England within the last two years; but no man, at all acquainted with the slate of our finances, could say, that at the end of the next two years the country would be in a situation to support a new contest, if the people were not united in their sentiments, and had not their affairs conducted by an administration which possessed their confidence. His object was to make the war a just and necessary one. The Amendment proposed, tended to the accomplishment of this object; and he was of opinion it did not go too far. He trusted he should not be considered as the defender of Buonaparté, or as one who wished to throw impediments in the way of his own govern-

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ment, when he stated these to be his sentiments. If such motives were imputed to him, he should treat them with the contempt with which he had heretofore been accustomed to regard such imputations. He was convinced, that in order to support another war, it would be necessary that the Government should carry the people with them; and this could not be done, if the contest were not made to appear to them just and necessary. If a war were undertaken with any heated views of dethroning Buonaparté, or punishing France for putting away one government and setting up another, he could not but shudder for the result. He wished the Address of that House to go forth to the world, expressing their readiness to support the Government in a just and necessary war, but also expressing an anxious wish that no means should be left untried to secure the continuance of peace.
Mr. Charles Grant, jun. agreed with the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, that ministers could not support a new war unless they carried the people along with them; but he contended that the Amendment which had been proposed was not necessary to effect this. The speech of his noble friend had been as much distinguished by moderation, as the Message which was the subject of it, and which had met with general approbation. The arguments of those who supported the Amendment on the ground that the speech of the noble lord was in a more warlike tone than the Message of the Prince Regent, were therefore, in his opinion, without foundation. Some members in the course of the debate had fallen on the assumption, that the present revolution in France was a revolution of the people. This, he contended, was a subject for future inquiry. At present there was a struggle in France on the question of peace or war, and the war party seemed to be triumphant. It was for that House to act on a knowledge of the existing danger. Knowing the character of the man now at the head of affairs in France, knowing the description of the persons by whom he was surrounded, knowing what his conduct had been for twenty years, up to the last flagitious act (for so he would call it), which had again brought him before the world, it was absolutely necessary that their measures should be framed accordingly.
Mr. William Smithsaid, he had decided
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on the course he should pursue from hearing the speech of the noble lord who moved the Address. But for that he should have concurred in the Address as first moved; but he now felt it his duty to vote for the Amendment of his hon. friend. The right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had said, that the speech of the noble lord was not more warlike than the Message of the Prince Regent. He was glad to hear this asserted; and if the noble lord would rise up and concur in that interpretation of his speech, even now he, for one, would support the Address. Unless this were done, he should feel it to be his duty to support the Amendment. The noble lord had said, that nine-tenths of the population of France were in favour of the Bourbons. If he were of the noble lord's opinion, he should at once be satisfied that no moral objections could be urged in opposition to hostilities being commenced against Buonaparté but when he saw how that man had marched, or rather walked in France, from South to North, without opposition, he could not but think the probability was, that nine-tenths of the people were for him. He was glad the Slave Trade had been abolished, and wished the Bourbons (whom he should rejoice to see established on the throne) had been strong enough to venture on such a measure. He did justice to the exertions of the noble lord (Castlereagh) on the subject of the Slave Trade; but when he saw that done at once by Buonaparté, which the Bourbons could not venture upon in less than five years, he could not help thinking that the former government were less powerful than the present, or that they were not altogether sincere in the wish they expressed. He had as little respect for the motive which had actuated Buonaparté in abolishing the Slave Trade, as for those which guided his conduct in other transactions. He had no doubt it was dictated by interest; but whatever his conduct had been, he hoped the nation would not hastily be plunged into a new war.
Mr. Robinson, from the opportunities he had had last year of ascertaining the sentiments of the people of France, with respect to Buonaparté, thought he could take upon himself to say that the general feeling was against him. He was looked upon by almost all classes as the author of the misfortunes which had befallen them, and his system seemed to be universally execrated. He did not say that this feel-

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ing would have disposed them to rise against Buonaparté but he thought it was pretty strongly shewn in their not rising for him. Every artifice had been resorted to by Buonaparté to excite a strong feeling against the Allies, in order to make the war national, and had totally failed. Such being the feeling last year, there must be strong circumstances that would convince him, that it was wholly extinguished in the present, and that a state of things favourable to their wishes, should have disposed them to turn from the Government to whom they owed the advantageous change which had been effected, to him who had been the object of their hate. This to him would be miraculous. That which had struck him most in the course of the last year, was the want of energy which appeared in the French character. To him their spirits seemed to have been quite worn out. They seemed to wish for peace; and hoping this would be the result of the invasion of their country, they did not care to oppose it. From what he had observed of the French character at that time, he was not surprised, when Buonaparté appeared among them on a sudden like an apparition, that he should have been able to advance without opposition from the people. The soldiers had certainly always been for him; but that no opposition had been given to him, did not prove to his mind that the great body of the people were indifferent to the change which had taken place, and still less that they were favourably disposed to him.
Mr. Plunkettsaid, he should have thought, that on the subject of the proposed Address, there would have been but one opinion in the country—that at a crisis so important the hands of Government ought to be strengthened, and enabled to take such measures, in concert with their Allies, as circumstances should require. To be lulled into security by any good acts which Buonaparté might, perform at such a time, would be to be greatly wanting to ourselves. The Amendment contained no assertion which was not in itself perfectly true and just; but, unseasonably introduced, it would by implication throw a censure on ministers which was not true, and unjust. The Amendment, if adopted, would, by implication accuse the Government of wishing to involve the nation in an unjust and unnecessary war. If the House were to assent to the proposition of the hon. gentleman, they would indirectly
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be understood to decide, that, under all the circumstances of the case, peace would be preferable to war. He was not prepared to come to such a decision. He was not for entering into an unnecessary war, nor was he willing to repose on a hollow and insecure peace. In the events which had taken place he could see justifiable cause of war. This he thought beyond all doubt. The only question to be considered was one of very great importance—the expediency of acting upon that, cause of war. He had no difficulty whatever in voting for the Address.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, had relieved him from the necessity of stating much of what he had it in contemplation to offer on the subject of the Amendment which had been moved to the Address. From what that right hon. gentleman had said, the House would feel that nothing could be more cruel than to bring forward as an amendment certain truisms, which went by implication to impute to ministers a design to commence a war which was not warranted by justice, necessity, and good faith to his Majesty's Allies. He looked upon this, question, as the right hon. gentleman did, as one entitled to the gravest consideration, and as being one of the most important and momentous on which any government had ever been called upon to decide. It was for the Government of this country to consider whether the interests of Europe called upon them, in concert with their Allies, to prefer a state of war or of armed defence. In moving the Address, and stating the two alternatives, he had said nothing with a view to bind the House to one of them more than to the other. If the hon. gentleman who had moved the Amendment, or those gentlemen who had supported it, meant to declare that ministers ought to be bound to one of them, they owed it to the country and themselves not to endeavour to effect their object, by moving a string of truisms to bind down the Government by implication, but to embody their sentiments in a specific resolution. The Government ought not to be crippled in its negociations with friendly Powers, and prejudiced in its transactions with that country most concerned in the result of the present state of things, by restrictions introduced by a side wind; the necessity for which those who brought them forward were not prepared openly to declare.

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With respect to what had been said by the hon. gentleman on the subject of the negociations at Chatillon, he had to answer, that because terms had then been offered to Buonaparté, accepted, and departed from by him before they could be carried into execution, it did not follow, that if, on a future occasion, he, in his weakness, should be disposed to accept of those terms, that they were to be conceded to him. Nor ought the Allies to be influenced at such a time by his publishing decrees, conformable to the line of policy which they had adopted, and in favour of that to which he had been the greatest enemy before. On the subject of the Slave Trade, the noble lord took occasion to observe, that the favour which Buonaparté had done the cause of humanity, was not quite so great as the hon. member seemed to imagine, as he had always been the most declared enemy to the abolition, nor was he now to be confided in. He repeated that it by no means followed, that the terms formerly offered to Buonaparté in concert with the Allies, ought now to be submitted to him. He did not assert that this would not be done, but he contended it did not necessarily follow that it should. This the Allies had formerly felt, before they had reached Paris. When Buonaparté perceived they were advancing in that direction, he had offered to accept of those terms from which he had previously withdrawn himself, and was answered, that the time for treating with him on those conditions was then gone by; and his having departed from them once, was considered a sufficient reason for not acceding to his wishes at a subsequent period. Would it be maintained, that under any circumstances an individual who had foiled them so often, was still entitled to the terms they formerly offered him? and while he came unblushingly forward, having deceived them once more, was he still to be considered in the same point of view as formerly? It might be thought that an armed peace would be preferable to a state of war, but the danger ought fairly to be looked at: and, knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the party to be treated with, knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision they came to, must rest on the principle of power, and not on that of reliance on the man. To the Declaration which had been published, the Government of this country
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could not have been a party at the time it appeared; but he did not hesitate to uphold and justify it, though, from the circumstances under which it was issued, and the changes that had since taken place, which at that period were not known, that Declaration was not to be considered as a declaration of war. Had it been received in that light, it would have become the duty of ministers to issue letters of marque and reprisal immediately. He agreed with his right hon. friend, that the great names affixed to the Declaration of the Allies, furnished the best refutation of the tortured meanings which had been attached to it. They were justified, however, in holding Buonaparté out as an object of terror, and in endeavouring, by ail legitimate means, to destroy and extinguish his power. Statements had been made within those walls, respecting persons in friendship with this country, which were more likely to expose the parties to assassin nation, than any thing contained in the paper which had been so much animadverted upon. When a hope was expressed that this country and its Allies would not engage in a war of aggression, he wished to guard the councils of the Allies from such an imputation, if they should proceed to repel an aggression which had been already committed. We had a full, sufficient, and moral justification in commencing war against Napoleon, if we considered it wise and right to do so. The Government would act in concert with the Allies; and his Majesty's ministers, he contended, were entitled to claim that their responsibility should not be broken in upon by the truisms of the honourable gentleman.
Mr. Ponsonbyshortly gave his reasons for not voting for the Amendment. The speech of the noble lord he thought had been much over-stated. He had been represented to have spoken as if he was resolved on immediate war, if he could but persuade the Allies to take part in it. He understood no such statement to have been made. He wished to ask the noble lord if he had said this? [A cry from the Opposition of "the question is not answered."]
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that on this subject he had given no opinion.
Mr. Ponsonbysaid, he was right, then, in what he had said. The speech of the noble lord had not been fairly described. If it should hereafter appear that Government unnecessarily engaged in war, none of his friends would surpass him in zeal to heap censures on their conduct. The

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Amendment to him appeared perfectly unnecessary. His hon. friend seemed to have intended it to assist him (Mr. P.) in deciding on the Address before him; but he wished to inform his hon. friend (in perfect good nature) that he was not quite such a fool, but he could understand what had been submitted to them without his assistance.
The House then divided:

For Mr. Whitbread's Amendment

37

Against it

220

Majority

173

The Address was then agreed to.

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, J.

Lemon, sir W.

Brand, T.

Moore, Peter

Bennet, hon. H. G.

Martin, H.

Burrell, hon. P. D.

Martin, J.

Burdett, sir F.

Molyneux, H.

Butterworth, J.

North, D.

Barnard, Lord

Osborne, lord F.

Bewicke, C.

Pigott, sir A.

Campbell, J.

Pierse, H.

Calvert, Chas.

Ridley, sir M. W.

Coke, T. W.

Romilly, sir S.

Duncannon, lord

Ramsden, J.

Dundas, hon. L.

Smith, J.

Fergusson, sir R.

Tierney, rt. hon. G.

Gordon, Robert

Whitbread, S.

Horner, F.

Wilkins, W.

Heathcote, sir G.

Walpole, hon. G.

Hamilton, Ed. A.

TELLERS.

Kemp, T.

Althorp, lord

Lambton, F. G.

Smith, W.

ADDRESS ON THE PRINCE REGENT'S MESSAGE RESPECTING THE EVENTS IN FRANCE.
The Marquis of Lansdownewished, before the order of the day was read, that the noble lord opposite, or some other of the Prince Regent's ministers, would give some explanation on a subject nearly connected with it: he alluded to the alleged detention of French ships by our cruisers. There were two questions which required an answer: first, whether any ships had been so detained? second, whether, if they had been so detained, the detention was authorized by Government?
Viscount Melvillereplied, that the detention had occurred in only one or two instances; and certainly they had not been authorized by the Government.
The order of the day for the consideration of the Prince Regent's Message being read,
The Earl of Liverpoolrose. Approving as he did of the answer given by his noble friend to the questions which had been put to him, he had nothing farther to say upon that subject, and he therefore would now proceed to call their lordships attention to the Message which be had last night the honour to deliver to their lordships from his royal highness the Prince Regent; and though he did not anticipate much opposition to the Address which he intended to propose, yet he felt it his duty, considering the nature of the crisis, and of the events which had lately taken place, to make some few observations: but a desire always to spare the time of their lordships as much as possible, and a desire likewise to abstain from all discussion of topics on which considerable differences of opinion might be entertained, would

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induce him to keep clear, as far as he could, of every point not necessarily connected with his motion. He was not one of those who expected, that after the changes which had taken place in France during the last twenty-five years, and the moral convulsion which had agitated that and other countries of Europe, affairs would settle in a permanent stale of repose and security, without any danger of a revulsion, against which it was wise to guard by prudent measures of precaution: but he admitted at the same time, that none of them had in contemplation the events which had happened in March last, or that so sudden and entire a change should have been effected in so short a time without a struggle. In looking at the Treaty of Paris, to which he must now pall their lordships attention, there was one circumstance which could not fail to strike every one who considered the time and state of things under which it was concluded—he alluded to the remarkable liberality of the conduct of the Allies on that occasion. He could not look at that circumstance, even now with regret, because no one could contemplate the power, the extent, and population of France, and not feel that it would have been unwise to have exacted from that people any thing which could reasonably humble them in their own estimation. If advantage had been taken of the situation in which the Allies then stood, to demand any thing which might he dishonourable for France to grant, the Allies were aware, that by that course they would have been sowing the seeds of future wars, that the first opportunity would perhaps be taken to infringe the Treaty, and that its nature might furnish some excuse, though not a just ground for the infraction. It was, therefore, the policy of the Allies to act with a wise liberality. Perhaps there were some concessions with respect to which there might be a doubt whether they were necessary or advisable: but this, at least, was clear,—that the character of the Treaty was, under the circumstances, that of an arrangement highly honourable to France. It was a treaty with which the people of that country had every reason to be satisfied—one which had been studiously rendered consistent with every feeling which they could justly entertain as Frenchmen and good subjects. Such being the general nature of that Treaty, he was desirous also to call their lordships attention to the Treaty of Fon-
[358
tainbleau, and to the circumstances under which it was concluded; and he was the more desirous to do so, because he believed that some misapprehension had prevailed on that subject. The part which this country had taken in that Treaty, rendered it necessary to say something on that point. Whatever might have been the wish of the Government of this country as to the matters which formed the subject of that Treaty, there was, in truth, no alternative for them. They were obliged to give a qualified assent to it: but in justification of the Sovereigns, the circumstances under which that Treaty was made ought to be considered in all their bearings. These circumstances were very different from what they were supposed by many persons to have been. When in March last year the Allies advanced to Paris, a declaration was issued by the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, that they would not treat with the person then at the head of the French government. After the attack upon the French troops near Paris, and the entrance of the Allies into that city, a revolution took place: the Conservative Senate was assembled, and a provisional government appointed to negociate with the Allies. Under these circumstances it was proposed to grant a place of retreat for the person who was then ruler of France, and it was represented in support of this proposition, that it afforded the only means of avoiding a civil war in France, and of bringing over the marshals, who probably would not accede to the new arrangement unless that point were secured. At that time the only marshal who had acceded to the new order of things was Marmont. Besides the consideration of the state of the provisional government, it was to be recollected that Buonaparté himself was at the head of 30,000 men; that there was an army of 50,000 men in the south, under the command of marshal Soult, whom there was no reason for supposing to be unfaithful to Buonaparté and there was also in Italy a large army, much superior, taking into consideration its appointments, to that opposed to it, which there could be no doubt would be faithful to him. In addition to this, all the fortified places in France, Holland, and on the Rhine, were nominally subject to his authority—nominally, he said, because it was impossible to know what effect the appointment of the provisional government might have had upon the garrisons. With the know-

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ledge of these facts, though it was probable that, if the Allies had thought proper to continue their attack upon him, they might have succeeded, yet the struggle would have been formidable, and its result doubtful. It was, therefore, matter of serious consideration, whether they should not accede to an arrangement which would at once end the struggle—which would bring all the marshals into obedience to the provisional government—stop the effusion of blood, which was always so desirable to avoid—secure the great objects for which the Allies had entered France; and, above all things, prevent a civil war from arising in that country. Under those circumstances was the Treaty of Fontainbleau agreed to by the two Sovereigns then at Paris. When his noble friend who was then in France (viscount Castlereagh) knew that the Allies had entered Paris, he proceeded to that capital, and learnt that the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been entered into with Buonaparté, and expressed his strong disapprobation of its. Bat having been convinced by the representations of the Sovereigns who had concluded that Treaty, that it had been the only means open to them for putting an end to the contest, and to avoid a civil war in France; and being of opinion that the words of the allied Sovereigns being pledged, they had no alternative but to abide by that Treaty; he consented to accede conditionally to that engagement. That accession could not be unconditional, as we had never, acknowledged Napoleon as the Emperor of the French. We, therefore, did not accede to such part of the Treaty as continued his title of Emperor, nor such part as regarded the pecuniary arrangement; but to the part which guaranteed the sovereignty of Elba to Napoleon, and the duchies of Parma and Placentia to the daughter of the Emperor of, Austria. The peculiar circumstances under which the Treaty of Fontainbleau was entered into, not only afforded justification to the allied Powers who concluded it on one part, but were most material in the view of another subject before the House. That Treaty was concluded with a person with arms in his hand, which gave him an option to conclude it or to continue the contest:—as he had chosen to agree to that Treaty, having embraced the alternative, he was bound in all the principles of good faith to adhere to it.
Having stated thus much as to the circumstances under which the treaty was
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concluded, he should say a few words as to the manner in which it had been executed. It had been asked, why precautions had not been taken to prevent the escape of Buonaparté from Elba. It was to be recollected, that the individual in question was not to be considered in any degree as a prisoner in Elba: the sovereignty of the island had been conferred on him; and to look on him in any other light, would be in contravention of the Treaty which had been concluded with him. He should not enter into the merits of that part of the arrangement. It had been said that Elba was an improper place for Buonaparté: but in what view was it stated to be improper? Not as connected with any thing relating to France, but on account of the superior means of escape which it afforded. He did not know-whether it did afford such means in a superior degree; but if they adverted to the circumstance, that in whatever situation he was placed, he must, according to the treaty, be at liberty, they would see, that in whatever place he was put, he might hare escaped from it. As to the precautions which had been taken, he should merely observe, that the whole of the British fleet could not have effectually blockaded the island so as to have prevented an escape; but so far as was consistent with the spirit of the Treaty, the object had not been neglected, and an understanding existed (as had been explained by a noble friend of his in another place) that the commanders of the vessels should prevent any attempt to escape as far as was possible. With respect to the character of the British officer attached to Buonaparté at Elba (sir Neil Campbell), and who was absent at the time of his escape, it was but just to say that there was nothing improper in a temporary absence from the island; neither could it be said, even had he continued in Elba, while the military power and the police of the island was in the hands of the man who had made an escape, that he would have been able to have prevented it. Indeed, the case of other individuals who were in the island when the plan of escape was put into execution, proved the contrary. An embargo was laid on all vessels the day before the escape took place, and some individuals, who were suspected, were put under restraint until the plan had been put into execution. As to the supposition that any breach of the treaty had been

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committed by the king of France, he could positively deny that any such breach had taken place on the part of that monarch. The pecuniary article of the Treaty, taken in its literal sense, could not have been violated, because, as the annual payment of a certain sum was stipulated for, it was clear that the first payment could not yet have become due. Neither could it be said that any breach had taken place of the Treaty, unless a representation had first been made to the Allied Powers, and they had refused to compel the fulfilment of it. But it was not necessary to argue at length, that no breach had taken place in the Treaty. The proclamations of Buonaparté proved, that it was not on account of any violation of the Treaty of Fontainbleau that he had made his attempts; but he professed that he meant to violate, on the first opportunity, this Treaty, and to resume his power, which he had sacrificed when he had no other alternative but to do so, with the intention of recovering it. On the first proposition, therefore, there could be no ground for doubt, that the spirit and effect of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, of the Treaty of Paris, and the preamble on which it had been founded, had been violated. Those treaties had been concluded on the condition of the absolute renunciation of the crown of France by Napoleon, for himself and his descendants. The resumption of the authority in that country was, therefore, a distinct, positive, and Undeniable violation of the Treaty of Paris, and the agreements on which it was founded. If the French nation had recalled Buonaparté, they also would have been a party to that violation:—the nation, however, had not recalled him, and he had not that ground to rest on; he had acted in defiance of all the legal authorities in that country.
It was to be remarked, that in all the former revolutions which had taken place in France, during the last twenty-five years, although in reality they were often effected by military force, or by mobs directed by individuals or clubs, yet there had generally been some pretence of a legitimate authority, either a convention, or a national assembly, or a senate; but now the whole transaction had been purely a military act, not referable to any legitimate organ of the public will, but a direct assumption of power by the military force. On the first article of the Message it was not, therefore, necessary for him
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to trouble the House farther: it was evident that this country had a just cause of war against Buonaparté wielding the power of France. But he was far from wishing to say, that because a war was just, it should therefore be entered upon. The justice was but one part of the question; another part was, whether the war would be wise, prudent and politic, under the present circumstances of the country. It was impossible to conceal from themselves the dangers with which the recent event threatened this country; it was impossible to conceal from themselves the conduct and character of the person now at the head of the French government, and the events which, during the last eighteen years, that character and conduct had produced. It was impossible to forget the invasion of so many independent countries—of Spain, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Russia, and the impossibility which seemed to have existed formerly of preserving relations of peace with the individual in question. They could not turn their eyes from the peculiar circumstances under which he had returned to France: he had returned under the protection of the military power, and had professed his object to be to restore the tarnished glory of the French arms. All these considerations were grounds for the most serious apprehensions. He did not, however, wish to pledge the House to any rash, hasty, and inconsiderate declaration, but to place fairly before their minds the alternatives—armed preparation and defence, or active war. Between those alternatives, he requested their lordships not to decide at present, and he requested it for these reasons—because it was a question that involved many circumstances which they could not then have before them. It was not a British question merely, but an European question. It was necessary that the most perfect concert should exist between the British Government and his Majesty's Allies, before any just decision could be formed. It would be therefore an act of imprudence, if at that time he called for any other decision than that which the subject of the Message required. The first point was one on which there could be no difference, viz. that it was expedient that there should be the most intimate concert between this Country and the allied Powers on the Continent. Consistently with this principle it would be necessary to weigh well the interests of the other

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powers of Europe, as well as the interests of this country. What his own sentiments were, as far as he was acquainted with those interests, he should think it inconsistent with his duty to state. Whatever that opinion was, he could confidently state that there was no disposition on the part of this Government to drive the Allies into a more extensive war policy than might be consistent with their own sentiments and feelings. After remarking that the House could feel no difficulty in agreeing to the opinion of the Message, that armed preparation was necessary, and that concert with the Allies was desirable, and would be beneficial to the general interest of Europe; his lordship concluded by moving the Address, which was an echo of the Message.
Lord Grenvillesaid, he knew not whether he should have troubled their lordships on the subject of the Address moved by the noble earl, had it not been to remark on the impropriety of any premature allusion to points not included in the Message or the Address. If at that time he was to have entered on the consideration of the policy of that treaty, by which it was hoped the contest in which this country had been engaged was finally terminated—if he had then to examine the loose and negligent stipulations which had produced that dreadful alternative which lay before them—he should have had much to remark; and should have inquired how far any circumstances could have justified the bringing that struggle to a conclusion, by a treaty which, as it now appeared, though he had long strove to hide it from himself, afforded no security whatever against its instant and immediate renewal. If that had been the proper moment, he should have inquired what new plan was it, under which the conduct of gallant officers, in matters affecting their own honour and the interests of the country, was to be regulated, not by instructions—but to rest on an understanding, loose and undefined, between them and some of the superior officers of the state; whence an accident had happened, which placed before them the alternative of armed and insecure peace, or fierce and doubtful war. But at the present moment, those considerations were foreign to the question before them; and he knew not why the noble earl had called up the remembrance of that negligence—of that neglect of the vital interests of the country—which the circum-
[364
stances he had referred to betrayed. But being placed as they were in a perilous situation, it was the conduct of men, of Englishmen, to consider, not how we had come into such a state, but what line was to be adopted to extricate ourselves. The Message which had been communicated to the House, and the directions which the Prince Regent declared he had given, he fully approved of—both the measures of concert which had been taken, and that armed and formidable preparation by which the interests of the country had been saved. He had eagerly cherished the hope that the struggle had been brought to a final termination, and had anxiously anticipated the moment when we were to reduce our naval and military establishments; which reduction he thought was due to the past exertions of the country, to the state of our finances, but above all things to the principles of the constitution. It was without reluctance, that at the present moment he gave up all idea of reduction for the present; and he should cheerfully assent to measures which, instead of reducing establishments, would increase the burthens under which the country laboured, but which were, at the same time, indispensably necessary. As to the concert between the Allied Powers, he was persuaded that there was no possible issue by which we could hope for success, but through the road which the Message pointed out to the House and the country—a close, intimate, and cordial connection between this country and the allied powers of the Continent. He hoped, therefore, that every effort would be made to maintain peace and harmony between the different Powers, if it existed; to reestablish it, if it had been unhappily interrupted; and as the most cordial union was to be hoped for among the Allies, as the best security for Europe, so the unanimous feeling of the country was to be encouraged. If he could hope that the voice of an individual could be heard beyond those walls, or even beyond this country, he was most anxious to impress on the House, and he hoped that it would be impressed on foreign powers also, that, now we had again been plunged into that dreadful situation, every state should give up the idea of separate interests. It was to be recollected by all, that they had not to consider whether this or that separate interest might be pursued with hope of success, but that all hope of general safety, as well as the particular interest of

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each state, entirely depended upon the abandonment of every private and particular interest. If he were asked, what for the last twenty-five years had been the general cause that had subjected nearly all the slates of Europe to calamities and ruin, and which had enabled the French to carry their triumphant arms from one capital to another,—that no government was undisturbed, no country secure, no people safe,—the cause, he should answer was, that no arguments, no force of reason, not even the dreadful force of calamitous experience, could inculcate the idea, that not merely a nominal federation, but an intimate union of feeling and purpose among the governments and people could afford safety to any part of Europe from those calamities. No separate interest, therefore, should at such a time be suffered to intrude on the mind of any man, or into the counsels of any state. Having heard the Address which had been proposed by the noble earl, he could not but state, that it met with his entire and cordial concurrence, because it was strictly limited to what circumstances required. It would have been most improper that Parliament should have been called on to decide on the ultimate course to be pursued, till the circumstances by which that course could be properly determined, were communicated to them by the constitutional authority from which they were entitled to receive it. Whenever a perfect concert was established, which might justify such a Message as would put Parliament in possession of the policy which the Powers might think proper to pursue, then would it be for them to decide on the great and difficult question between two dreadful alternatives. He trusted he should not then be found wanting in duty to his country: his judgment might be erroneous, but it should be founded on the best lights which Parliament might be in possession of; but he should be sorry if any thing had escaped him at present which might be misconstrued (for it could only be misconstrued, if so interpreted,) to convey an opinion on a matter which Parliament had not yet to decide. It had been said, that the question was an European as well as an English question. It was an English, because it was an European question. He should cheerfully await the decision of the Powers who had deliberated on the common safety of Europe, and each particular state; and when Parliament was
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called on to examine the subject, he hoped all the grounds which could with propriety would be laid before them; well assured that as unanimity in Europe was the only hope for the general safety, so the unanimous spirit and opinion of the people of this country was to be regarded as the most effectual security for this country, and the most animating prospect of success in whatever line we sought to pursue.
The Marquis Wellesleysaid, that whatever was the ultimate result of the present calamitous crisis, it could not fail to be animating, amidst the danger which threatened this country and Europe, that the spirit of our people, the valour of our arms, the extent of our resources, had been carried to their utmost pitch; and while we had afforded an example to others, we had saved ourselves, and risen to a height beyond our hopes both in security and glory. He rejoiced also, that instead of being hurried precipitately into violent acts of war, which would have betrayed real timidity, the more dangerous, because it assumed the garb of courage, they had merely been called on to give credit to his Majesty's ministers for those measures of prudence and precaution which would enable the country to resist the danger in whatever shape it appeared. Wish these sentiments he should have terminated his observations, but for certain remarks of his noble friend (the earl of Liverpool), which were such that he could not remain silent. The observation to which he particularly alluded was, that we could not expect Europe to subside into a state of peace without some further convulsions. It had been long his opinion, and it was known to be so, that the conduct of Congress had led to the events which we had now to regret; that system (if indeed that could be called a system, which was nothing but an undigested mass of mutilated materials) which the Powers at Vienna had established, had been in his judgment the true cause of the dethronement of the august family of Bourbon. The noble lord had said, that in framing the Treaty of Paris, care had been taken to consult the character and honour of France. In viewing this subject, it was evident that there were two systems of policy that might be pursued. In the first place, that France should be required to withdraw within her ancient limits; if this principle were adopted, then it ought to be applied equally

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to all the other governments of Europe:—in the second place, if general changes and distributions of territory were resolved upon, that the same rule should be applied to France that regulated other powers. Had either of these lines of policy been pursued? No: no general system had been acted upon; the mere will and pleasure of the parties was consulted, and the Sovereigns at Vienna had punished one Power because it first entered into the contest with them, and another because it had last quitted the cause which it had espoused. The result had been, that instead of fixing a system of permanent tranquillity and happiness, the labours of Congress had been devoted to establish a system of gross injustice and absolute discordance. The misfortune with regard to France was, that neither of the two principles he had noticed had been observed: she had been compelled, with a very slight deviation, to retire within her ancient frontiers; she had been severely punished, while other Powers had bee a aggrandized to an immense extent, and great accessions of territory and strength had been given to those who had, from various causes, become objects of peculiar favour. This it was that had produced so strong a feeling in France against the Bourbons; for the people considered them merely as agents in the hands of foreign Powers, who had made them the instruments of degradation and injustice to the French nation. One of the chief advantages obtained by Buonaparté, and of which he had made such ample use in his declarations, was, that France had been degraded and lowered in the eyes of all Europe, by means of those whom foreigners had placed upon her throne. With respect to what the noble earl had said upon the Treaty of Fontainbleau, he had no difficulty in admitting, that there had been such a contravention of its articles as would justify this country in going to war: we had the right of commencing hostilities; but that was only half our case, since before war was declared, it would be fit to know whether such a measure were prudent and politic. He was, however, by no means disposed to admit all that the noble earl had stated upon the subject of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, especially that part in which he had argued that the terms had not been infringed, because the sum agreed to be paid had not yet become due. But even for a moment allowing that assertion, what
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had been done on the stipulations regarding the duchess of Parma and Placentia, and her son? What steps had been taken to carry them into execution, or had they not been entirely neglected? The Powers of Europe might, perhaps, deem themselves secure; but under any circumstances could it be held wise or prudent not to keep up at least the semblance of justice with regard to those distinguished persona in whose fate France was so deeply interested? Was it wise or prudent to afford such a powerful weapon to Buonaparté? The noble earl had asserted, that the Treaty was made when Buonaparté was at the head of a large force; if so, all who still adhered to his cause must be considered, in some sort, parties to the engagement; and what could be thought of the combined wisdom of those who not only neglected the proper custody of the person of the individual, but were so careless in the observation of the articles as to enable him to return with a strong semblance of justice on his side? He hoped that the noble earl would, on an early day, fulfil his promise of bringing down a full explanation of all the circumstances of this arrangement, and then the House would have an opportunity of more satisfactorily investigating this point. In the mean time he should express his sincere hope, that any dreadful consequences resulting froth a breach of this Treaty, on either side, might be averted, and that it might be attended with the beneficial result of enabling Congress to review the arrangements they had made, and without any views of individual aggrandizement to act upon the broad principle of general advantage. As his noble friend who spoke last had well observed, all private and personal interests must be sacrificed to the general welfare; and it was in vain to hope for harmony and union among the Powers of Europe until they consented to look at Europe as a whole, and to legislate for the happiness and tranquillity of that whole. The noble marquis ardently hoped that the aggravated calamities of a new war would be averted, and that the state of peace which we had only contemplated might be realised, for our own welfare, and for the welfare of the rest of Europe; but if it were necessary to recommence hostilities, if its policy were proved, he would say in conclusion, that no man in the country would be found more ready than himself to give every support to the executive government, for the vigorous

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and successful prosecution of a just and necessary war.
Earl Greywas happy to be relieved from the necessity of giving any opposition to the motion before the House; he consequently should not detain the House at any length upon the present occasion, more especially after what had been so ably stated by his noble friend who had just taken his seat. He could not, however, avoid making a few observations upon some part of what had fallen from the noble mover of the Address. Among other things it had been observed, that it could not be expected that Europe could revert from a state of military armament to a condition of tranquillity and social happiness, without some convulsion or disturbance in our progress to that condition. All men who contemplated the affairs of Europe with the eye of a statesman, must be sensible of the truth of the remark; but what his lordship complained of was this, that instead of measures having been taken to avert the evils which the noble lord had asserted were foreseen, all the arrangements of Congress had contributed to produce that convulsion and disturbance. At one time there was actually danger, that before the conclusion of any negociations, a war would be commenced between some of the Powers, and the arrangements were not completed without many disputes and differences. Indeed it could scarcely he hoped, even if France should have continued under the reign of the beneficent monarch, whose dethronement all regretted, that she could long remain uninvolved in hostilities. Why had not precautionary measures been taken, if such consequences were foreseen? Ministers might on some future occasion be called to a severe account for the share they had had in this neglect; and if his lordship was not much mistaken, their conduct throughout had been marked with a total absence of principle, and a most culpable blindness to that which they now wished to persuade the House they had contemplated. By their means, in his lordship's judgment, some of the highest interests of Europe and the world had been sacrificed, and to them was principally to be attributed the new war in which we were about to be involved. The noble earl had argued, that it was our interest to conclude a peace honourable to France. Unquestionably that was the fit line of policy. Such conduct would hare been wise and
[370
meritorious; but instead of pursuing it, as the noble marquis had said, our conduct had been totally different, and we had given Buonaparté and the French people, reason to say, that we had made the family of Bourbon, instruments in the disgrace and degradation of France in the eyes of the world. Thus, then, ministers had abandoned that very line of policy which the noble lord had declared to be just towards France and politic towards ourselves. For this deviation from their duty ministers had incurred a heavy responsibility, and might be called to a severe account.—The noble earl had next adverted to the inducements held out for the Treaty of Fontainbleau. Admitting that Buonaparté was then in power, and that it was necessary to make some concessions to obtain his removal, yet in that very proportion were ministers bound strictly to observe the conditions of the Treaty. If it was then important to obtain it, it was equally important that it should be observed by the good faith of the nation. The noble earl declared, however, that the articles of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been broken, and that Buonaparté had not insisted upon it in his declarations. The public journals were the only source from which he (earl Grey) could of course obtain information, and they contained a proclamation, in which Buonaparté expressly stated as a ground for his conduct, the breach of the article that related to the duchess of Parma and his son. If the noble earl rested the right of this country to make war upon France upon the infraction of the Treaty of Fontainbleau by France, it became him in the first place to shew (and the House would require further information upon that point), that we at least had done our duty, that we had broken no faith—and that before any plea was given by the late emperor of France to renew hostilities against him. He hoped, whatever might be the result, that we never should be reduced to the low and pitiful expedient of arguing, that the terms of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been infringed with regard to the pecuniary engagement, because the money stipulated to be paid did not become due until the termination of the year.—As to what the noble earl had observed upon the immediate subject of war, his lordship thought that it would have been much more prudent and politic not to make any declaration of a right to make war until the country was prepared to maintain that

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right by the actual commencement of hostilities. The noble earl admitted, that the question had not yet arrived, whether we should or should not actually declare war; then, where was the prudence or policy, in the mean time, of insisting upon the right? Many inconveniencies might result from such a hasty proceeding; we insisted to France upon our right to make war, and that we would prosecute it if we were able. If, then, we abstained from the prosecution, what was the inevitable inference, but that we were not in a situation to do so from the state of weakness to which we had been reduced? There did not, therefore, appear much wisdom in this premature and hasty assertion of the abstract right. At the same time his lordship readily allowed that it was necessary to take precautionary measures, by the augmentation of the effective force of the country, as was stated in the first part of the Message, and, as in the second, to establish such an intimate connexion and concert with our Allies, as to enable us to act with vigour and decision, should we unfortunately be reduced to that extremity.—His lordship begged to state, in a few words, the grounds of his opinion, with respect to the question of the right of war. The noble earl, in arguing this point, had, in his opinion, rested it upon the very worst grounds that he could have chosen, when he argued, that Buonaparté had broken the conditions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; and, therefore, that we had a right of war, although he (earl Grey) was not at all prepared to deny the conclusion; on the contrary, he was about to argue in its favour, but on different grounds. It would be right, considering the circumstances under which they were executed, to contemplate the treaty of Fontainbleau, the Convention of Paris, and the Treaty of Paris, as but one instrument; and there was no principle of the law of nations more clear than this, that if in a treaty between two powers, certain conditions are inserted, grounded upon a particular state of circumstances, if those circumstances should be altered with respect to one of the powers, the other party to the Treaty is absolved from all the obligations which were binding, until the condition of affairs was so altered. Consequently, the right of making war, and of demanding additional securities, reverted to the power whose circumstances remained unchanged. His lordship further established his position by a quotation from Vattel. He then proceeded to apply
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this principle to the case of France: the Treaty of Fontainbleau had been signed in contemplation of Louis the 18th continuing upon the throne of France; those were the circumstances, which were now totally changed by the invasion of Buonaparté consequently the conditions of the Treaty were abrogated, as far as related to this country, and we were absolved from any adherence to it. On this ground, setting aside the flimsy pretences of the noble earl who moved the Address, his lordship was of opinion that we had a claim to demand from France, under the new circumstances of the case, additional securities, and a right of resorting to arms in case the Government of that country should refuse to afford Great Britain those securities. Such were the general principles of the law of nations on which his lordship grounded the abstract right of Great Britain to make war upon France, should such a step, on future consideration, be deemed necessary, politic, or expedient. He begged leave, however, to disclaim that against which he had ever protested, the interference of this country with the people of France, or of any other kingdom, in the internal arrangements they may think fit to adopt. In all that had been so eloquently stated by his noble friend (lord Grenville) upon the general interests and the true mode of promoting the general welfare of Europe, he fully concurred, and he hoped that the Allied Powers, should they again be called upon to legislate for Europe, would revert to those general and generous principles for which they professed to have fought, and upon which their declarations originally avowed that they were determined to act. No opinions upon this subject were however contained in the Address; and he therefore cordially approved of its terms, and rejoiced that he was placed in a situation to concur in its spirit and its letter, the ulterior question being still left undecided. His lordship hoped that before Parliament was called upon to make any decision on a question of such incalculable magnitude, such communications would be made as would enable the House to exercise a sound judgment and a wise discretion, without hurrying the country into a war in which its best interests were involved. So important to England and to Europe, did his lordship consider a state, of tranquillity, that to the last he should fondly cherish a hope that peace might be maintained.
The Address was then agreed to nem. diss.