Sitting of 13 May 1811

REPORT OF THE BULLION COMMITTEE—MR. VANSITTART'S RESOLUTIONS.
The House having resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, to consider further of the Report which, in the last session of parliament, was made from the Select Committee appointed to enquire into the cause of the High Price of Bullion, and to take into consideration the state of the circulating medium, and of the exchanges between Great Britain and foreign parts Mr. Lushington in the Chair,
Mr. Vansittartrose and addressed the Committee as follows:
Mr. Lushington: The Resolutions proposed by the learned Chairman of the Bullion Committee (Mr. Horner) having been rejected by the House, it is now my duty to bring under their consideration those of which I have given notice, and which have for some time been printed. I shall think it unnecessary to enter at much length into the discussion of general principles which have been so fully debated, and upon which I have the satisfaction to find the opinion of a great majority of the House conformable to my own. And the course of proceeding adopted with great candour by the learned gent., enables me to dispense with that minute proof which I am prepared to give, by a reference to authentic documents, of the truth of the facts stated in my proposed Resolutions. With a view to fair and convenient discussion, be has prepared a series of amendments, in
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which he has specifically pointed out those facts alledged by me, which he disputes, and has brought forward such others as he thinks may destroy, or materially weaken, the impression of the chain of historical evidence which I have adduced.
I shall, therefore, consider myself as justified in arguing upon every fact to which he has made no objection in those amendments, as admitted; and only call the attention of the House to the proof of those which he thinks capable or being refuted or explained.
But, before I enter upon this discussion, I think it necessary to remove a few misapprehensions which have occured, and notice some of the arguments which have been adduced in the course of this long protracted debate. For in proportion as the supporters of the Bullion Report have found themselves pressed on the material points of the case, they have wandered into extraneous topics, and had recourse to some artifices of debate which it is not unnecessary to point out.
In the first place it has been observed, with a view of weakening the effect of my Resolutions that they have gone through three editions. If this were true, and if the alterations I had made had been considerable, I should have done no more than would have been both my right and my duty if I had fallen in to any errors at first. The fact, however is merely this:
On the 11th of April my learned friend communicated to the House the general substance of his intended Resolutions: on the 22 d they were presented in their present form, and ordered to be printed. On Friday the 26th my Re-

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solutions were presented, and ordered to be printed. The discussion being then fixed as early as the Monday following The 29th, I took the liberty of requesting that the printer might send a proof copy of my Resolutions not only to me, but to those gentlemen whom I thought likely to take a leading part on the opposite side in the discussion; and this mark of my attention and respect, to which they are so fully entitled, is now sarcastically called a first edition. On Monday the 29th, the Resolutions came from the printer, and were delivered, to the members in general: and this make the second edition. The debate being postponed for a few days, and accounts having been presented during the interval which enabled me to state more exactly a few of the sums mentioned in the Resolutions, and to bring some of them down to a more recent date than I had done before; instead of making such corrections, and a few others merely verbal, when the resolutions were to be actually proposed I desired for the sake of general convenience, that they might be reprinted:—and this form the third edition; and if any gentleman will take the trouble of comparing the three, which I think those who have made the observation cannot have done they will find that no one fact; or argument has been altered, with the exception of the sums I have mentioned. I state this, not because I should have been unwilling to confess any error into which I might have fallen, or should now feel a repugnance to admit any amendments which could render the Resolutions more strictly accurate, but to show to what expedients those are driven who wish to raise a doubt either of their truth or their importance.
On another point, I feel more anxiety not to be misunderstood. I have been supposed to use strong language in speaking of the proceedings of the Bullion Committee, and even to have insinuated that they countenanced a system of fraud and perjury. My known respect for all the members of the Committee, and the intimacy and friendship with which I am honoured by several of them, will, I trust, secure me from any suspicion of using, unless through mere inadvertence, any expression which could fairly bear such an interpretation. If ray argument had not been misunderstood, it would have been perceived to have a directly contrary meaning I argued, that the Committee
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could not seriously mean to recommend the repeal of the Bank Restriction Act, in the view of improving the course of exchange, without previously moving for the repeal of the laws which prohibit the exportation of our coin, because, while those laws subsisted, our money could only be sent abroad by a system of fraud and perjury, which it was impossible to suppose the Committee could intend to countenance; and without such exportation, no beneficial effect op the exchange could be produced. But I have thought myself bound to avow the opinion I entertain, that the publication of their Report has, although most contrary to their intentions, produced effects not beneficial but injurious to this country. For what other purpose has it been translated, circulated and commented upon by the partizans of France in every country in Europe? What other use has been made of it in America
It is not often that I think it necessary or becoming in a member of parliament to state the private motives which induce him, to take the part which he thinks it proper to do in a particular discussion. But there are some cases in which those motives are connected with the question itself, and may serve to illustrate it; and I shall, therefore, take the liberty to mention the circumstances which have led me to come forward, as I have done, on this occasion.
Several months ago, while in a state of mind the least inclined, and the least adapted to political inquiries, I received a sort of reference from one of the ablest men on the continent of Europe, desiring my opinion of the Report of the Bullion Committee, which had just fallen into his hands. He observed, that if the opinions of the Committee were well founded, all, his ideas of the resources and prosperity of England would be overturned: "Toutes mes idées seront bouleversées," was his expression. I answered him, that I thought the Committee had fallen into great errors, chiefly by applying sound and just principles of political economy to facts which did not support them; and that their opinions, if adopted by parliament, would produce great injury to the public; and very shortly stated some reasons for thinking so. Subsequent reflection and enquiry confirmed me in the judgment I had formed at first; and I found so large a portion of the public entertained the same sentiments with myself, that when my learned friend (Mr. Horner)

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first gave notice of a motion on the subject of the Report of the Bullion Committee) I really believed it was his intention to move that it should be referred back to a Committee, for a further investigation of the subject. In this case I entertained a hope that, if I should be a member of that Committee I should be able to propose such a course of inquiry, as might either induce them to retract some of the opinions formed last year, or lead me to concur with them upon sincere conviction. The answer of my learned friend, that he thought no further investigation necessary, destroyed those hopes, and left me, so far as I can judge of my duty to the public, no other alternative than that of stating firmly and distinctly, though I hope with becoming respect, my sentiments in opposition to those of the Committee.
In the many long and able speeches, in which the opinions of the Bullion Committee, with respect to the removal of the Bank restriction, were supported by the learned chairman and some of his colleagues, it is extraordinary that the practicability of carrying their recommendation into effect, was scarcely touched upon. But, indeed, the same want of inquiry into this most important point appears in the proceedings of the Committee. They called the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank repeatedly before them, and examined them at great length as to many other points of mere opinion; but they neither asked of them, or of any other witness, a single question as to the practicability of restoring the cash payments of the Bank in two years. If they thought the opinions of Bank directors too old-fashioned and erroneous to be deserving of any attention, how could they propose to leave to them the uncontrolled execution of so delicate and difficult an operation? On another point, that of the limitation of the issue of notes, the Committee were not sparing of their inquiries as to the opinion of the Governor and Deputy Governor. A considerable part both of their Report and of their speeches, has turned upon it. Two of my hon. friends (Mr. H. Thornton and Mr. Wilberforce) have assigned that opinion as one of their principal reasons for supporting the Resolutions proposed by the learned chairman. I must say that I think the Governor and Deputy Governor have been rather harshly treated on this occasion when so much stress has been laid on
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what I admit to be a hasty and inconsiderate answer at the close if a long and severe cross examination (which answer, however, is supported by the authority of Adam Smith*, and has been fully explained by such of their colleagues in the Bank direction as are members of this House—Mr. S. Thornton and Mr. Baring.)
But if the Committee were destitute of any evidence respecting the practicability of the measure they so earnestly recommend, we are not without such evidence. We have had the advantage of hearing a gentleman (Mr. Baring), himself a member of the Bullion Committee, himself a Bank director, and therefore combining an intimate acquaintance with the internal affairs of the Bank with the most extensive knowledge of commercial affairs in general. He has told us, in a speech full of information and profound research into subjects of finance and political economy, that the proposed resumption of cash payments is positively and absolutely impracticable.
This it may, however, be said, is only evidence of opinion, though an opinion entitled to the greatest weight from the talents and situation of him who gave it. But the same gent, gave us evidence of a fact. He told us that his house, one of the first mercantile houses in the world, carrying on the most extensive correspondence, possessing unbounded credit in both the hemispheres, could not how procure ten thousand ounces of gold, if they would give for it a premium of fifty per cent.
Oh! that he had raised his warning voice in the Committee as he has done in this House! It would then have been impossible for them to have made such a Report as they have done: the House would have avoided this long and painful discussion, and the public would have been spared many months of anxious suspense and uncertain credit.
Could the Committee, after such a statement, have affirmed in their Report; could the learned chairman have repeated in his speech, that there Was no real scarcity of gold? Yet such is the foundation upon which all their fabric rests.
But another assertion of the learned chairman is, if possible, still more extraordinary. He tells us the Committee only propose a measure of experiment; and, if it fails, there is no harm done. Oh! how
* See Wealth of Nations, book ii. chap, ii. vol. I. p. 455, edn 1784

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the love of theory and system can blunt the keenest intellect, and cloud the brightest understanding!
No harm done by an experiment which, whether it succeeds or fails, may occasion a general bankruptcy in London! This is no visionary apprehension of mine, but the deliberate evidence given before the House of Lords by his colleague and supporter (Mr. H. Thornton). That hon. gentleman now tells us it will do mischief, but it will establish a principle. A principle of what? The great principles of religious and moral truth are fixed and unalterable, and to them we ought to sacrifice every other consideration: but what are called principles of political economy are no more than maxims of prudence collected from observation and experience. Such a principle, whenever its application is mischievous, is, in that case false, however true and important it may be in other cases apparently, but not really analogous; and, in such a case, to adhere inflexibly to the principle, is not wisdom or firmness, but blundering pedantry. The great talent of political prudence lies in the discernment and discrimination of such cases.
The Committee cannot say that the resumption of cash payments can be carried into effect without such a reduction of the bank issues as might, according to the hon. gentleman's evidence, produce such an effect. Not only the obvious reason of the case shows that a great reduction would be necessary, and it was so stated in the evidence of the governor and deputy governor of the Bank, but the Committee themselves avow the reduction of Bank paper to be their great object.
From such a reduction they expect a melioration of the course of exchange. That it would produce such a melioration, I have, on a late occasion, expressed my doubts. I have since been triumphantly told by a right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Canning), that the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks differently from me on this point. It is true that he appeared to me to make a concession beyond what the case required. He admitted that a great reduction of the issues of the Bank would improve the exchange, but he objected to it on account of the danger with which, in other respects, it might be attended. I am far from denying the general tendency of a reduction of currency, whether metallic or representative, to increase its value, and, in consequence, to diminish imports, and increase exports, and therefore
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gradually, and by a slow process, to improve the rate of exchange. But though I agree thus far with the right hon. gent., I think that he overlooked one of the principal elements of all calculation respecting the intercourse of nations, the effect of which is not the less real from its not being capable of arithmetical estimate; I mean confidence.
Supposing the diminution of our currency to have the effect which he agrees with me and with the hon. gent, near me (Mr. H. Thornton), in thinking it would have, that of occasioning great commercial distress and numerous bankruptcies, the injury done to confidence abroad might produce an unfavourable effect on the exchange more powerful and more rapid than the beneficial operation of a reduction of currency could counteract. Commercial embarrassments would occasion a fall in the value of government securities, and particularly of the funds; foreign stockholders, as well as other foreigners possessing property here, would take the alarm, and would be desirous of withdrawing their capitals, even at some loss, and bringing home their property; and thus the general balance of payments, and consequently the exchange, might become still more unfavourable, notwithstanding some improvement of the course of trade abstractedly considered.
On this point, also, we have to a certain extent, the evidence of facts. In 1783 and 1796 and 7, the issues of the Bank were considerably reduced; not, indeed, to that degree which must be the effect of an approaching renewal of cash payments, yet sufficiently to produce much mercantile distress, notwithstanding the abundance of metallic money then circulating. But was this reduction productive of any beneficial effect on the exchange? Far from it. The exchange continued unfavourable till rectified by other causes; in the first case, by the peace; in the other, by the peace between Austria and France, and by the return of plenty after a period of dearth; and in both cases the improvement of the exchange was accompanied--(but I admit not produced) by a rapid increase of the issues of the Bank.
In discussing this question, an hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Huskisson), and my hon. friend near me (Mr. H. Thornton), laid considerable stress on the example of the Bank of France, which they recommend to our imitation, as another hon. gent. (Mr. Sharpe) has done the conduct of Holland

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and Hamburgh. Before I can attach any importance to this case, I should require some greater security for an exact statement of the facts, than an official Report made to the French government, respecting transactions in which the conduct of that government itself was involved* The Report certainly is very well written, and ingenious; but an account is circulated in common rumour respecting the causes of the embarrassments of the Bank of France, in 1806, much shorter, and more simple, than that of Mr. Dupont. It is said, that the French emperor, when about to take the field against Austria and Russia, in the autumn of 1805, found it convenient to possess himself of the cash reserved by the Bank of France, for which he gave the security of bills accepted by the receivers of the revenue: that the Bank was, in consequence, obliged to stop payment for four months; but that the victorious event of the campaign, and the contributions extorted from Germany, enabled the emperor, after that term, to replace the sums advanced, and the Bank resumed its ordinary operations. I cannot answer for the truth of this account, but it carries no improbability on the face of it; and the earnest manner in which Mr. Dupont deprecates all interference or connexion between the government and the Bank, naturally leads to a suspicion that some such story may be well founded.
But admitting his representation of the case to be exactly true, to what does it amount? First, that to restore its payments in cash, the Bank of France was obliged to reduce its issues from ninety millions of French money (something more than three millions and a half sterling) to fifty-four millions, and soon afterwards to less than forty millions, or sixteen hundred thousand pounds.
Secondly, that this diminution, so trifling in its amount in the vast empire of France, plentifully supplied with metallic money, and so little depending upon paper circulation, yet produced numerous bankruptcies, and, to use Mr. Dupont's own words, most fatal effects upon commerce.
Thirdly, it is evident that the depreciation of the notes of the Bank of France, which took place while it was obliged to suspend its cash payments, was a depreciation from discredit, and not a depreciation from excess. For it appears, that at the time when cash payments were stopped,
* Vide Mr. Dupont's Report.
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the amount of notes in circulation was less than it had been before, and the stoppage immediately followed a large advance made to the government, through the medium (as stated by Mr. Dupont) of merchants, who took as security the bills of the receivers general, and gave their own bills to the Bank. It is not extraordinary, that at this proceeding, which, even by Mr. Dupont's account, was nothing like a fair mercantile transaction, but nearly resembled whit we call accommodation bills, and which, perhaps, as indeed appears by the other accounts circulated, was exaggerated, the holders of notes took the alarm. A run upon the Bank followed, and a stoppage of payment was the consequence.
But, for the sake of those hon. gentlemen who hold Mr. Dupont's authority so high, I shall take the liberty of citing a short passage:—"Many persons," says he, "struck with the inconveniences of even a temporary excess of notes, have thought, that we ought to limit the amount which the Bank shall issue: to keep the tree a dwarf, that it may afford less hold to the wind. We (speaking in the name of the chamber of commerce) do not partake of that opinion."
Mr. Dupont tells us, that when he wrote (in 1806), the notes of the Bank of England were really depreciated to the extent of three or four per cent, but that this depreciation was almost imperceptible both at home and abroad. Now, this is a most valuable discovery for those gentle-men who are so fond of depreciation, because that to those who have faith enough to believe in this new imperceptible kind, it obviously is utterly impossible to prove the contrary.
But there is another passage to which I should desire not only their attention, but that of the House in general. Speaking of public credit, he says, it is at present the sole support of Great Britain.
I perfectly agree with the learned chairman in one part of his most able and eloquent reply; that in which he commented on the conduct (though, indeed, too much countenanced by the mode of proceeding first suggested by himself) of those gentlemen, who, agreeing in all the principles of the Committee, and supporting all his Resolutions, except the last; yet proposed to stop short, and merely to record the existence of the depreciation of our currency, without applying any remedy to so great an evil. If the fact were in-

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deed true, I am sure this House would be greatly wanting in its duty to the country, and would justly become the laughingstock of all Europe, if it were to rest satisfied with the discovery and publication of our situation, without taking any measures to prevent the impending ruin of our public credit.
Such a proceeding is justly exposed to the comments of the learned chairman, and cannot be defended by the arguments of the hon. gent, near me (Mr. H. Thornton), or even by the wit and eloquence of the right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Canning.) It is impossible not to remark the singular compliment paid by that right hon. gent, to the learned chairman, whose reasonings and whose Report he defends. He offered to vote for the two last of the Resolutions I am about to propose, on condition that I would accede to the first seven Resolutions of the learned chairman. However justly I should value the support of the right hon. gent., I cannot accept it on the conditions of recommending to this Mouse Resolutions which I think erroneous both in fact and law, and of depriving my own practical Resolutions of that chain of facts which appears to me to form their natural and proper support. In the learned chairman's Resolutions I did not, indeed, see any very strict and logical connexion, but I never thought of passing so bitter a sarcasm upon them as the right hon. gent. has done, who thinks that they are premises which will equally lead to contradictory conclusions:—that having been drawn up by the learned gent. for the purpose of proving that the Bank ought to pay in cash, they will serve rather more conveniently to prove that it ought not to do so
Those gentlemen, indeed, tell us, that these Resolutions will serve as a guide to the Directors of the Bank, who, they say, have the power of controlling the exchange, though the Directors themselves deny that they have any such power.
We read in Rasselas of an unfortunate philosopher, who, by intense meditation on the most abstruse theories, so bewildered his understanding, that he fancied himself intrusted with the direction of the winds and weather, and was worn with continual care and anxiety in the management of this imaginary charge. Such, but much worse, would be the situation of the Bank Directors under the control of the Bullion Committee. This poor astronomer was, indeed, harassed with visionary
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cares and useless solicitude; but he could do no real harm, he could not parch the fields of his neighbours with drought, or blast their crops with mildew; and he had the satisfaction of fancying himself beneficially employed. But the Directors of the Bank would be compelled, in the pursuit of an object which they knew to be equally chimerical, to inflict real and substantial evils on their country; to cramp the resources of the state; to fetter the exertion of the national power; and to spread distrust, alarm, and bankruptcy around them.
I should trespass too long on the attention of the House, if I were to pursue these general topics, which I consider, indeed; as having been practically and substantially decided by the House, in rejecting the Resolutions moved by the learned gentleman. I shall proceed, therefore, to the more immediate business of this evening, the discussion of the Resolutions I am about to propose. In this (as I before observed), the candour of my learned friend has brought the question of fact to a distinct issue, and a much narrower compass, by stating his objections to my Resolutions in the form of Amendments.
Before I proceed to examine them in detail, I must beg the House to recollect that these are the only objections which the acuteness and industry of the learned gentleman and his colleagues have met with to the facts stated in those Resolutions, which, short and simple as they appear, comprise no less than a review of the financial and commercial history of the country so far as relates to the subjects of money and exchanges, for upwards of a century, and that these Amendments point out no positive error. I might admit the whole of them without giving up one fact in the Resolutions. The force of the reasoning deduced from these facts, might be varied in respect of extent and degree, and some of them might receive a different explanation from that which I have given, but not one of them is contradicted. I need not repeat, that I should willingly adopt any modifications by which the Resolutions might be made to give a more correct view of the case, and, under the circumstances I have mentioned I should think, that even after acceding to all these Amendments, I should leave sufficient ground for the proceeding I am about to propose to the House; but I am compelled to observe, that the Amendments appear to me so inaccurately drawn

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as in every material point to be completely erroneous.
The first Amendment refers to the fourth of my proposed Resolutions, and is as follows:
" That, prior to the restriction of cash payments, the exchanges were never more unfavourable to Great Britain, for any length of time, than from five to seven per cent, below par, the depression appearing to have never exceeded the whole expence of transmitting specie abroad; except during a debasement of the coins of the realm.
" That, prior to the said restriction, the market price of standard gold in bars never rose above the Mint price more than 1½ per cent, and that only for a very short interval; except in 1720, the year of the famous South Sea scheme, when it rose to 4l. 1s. 6d. per ounce; and during the periods when the coins of the realm have been debased,
" That, in periods subsequent to the said restriction, and particularly of late years, the exchanges have been unfavourable to Great Britain much below the limit marked by the whole cost of transmitting specie abroad, and have continued so for a considerable time together, being at present, and having been for a considerable time, more than twenty five per cent, below par; and, in the same manner, the market price of standard gold in bars has been, and still is, more than twenty five per cent, above the Mint price."
In this statement, the periods in which the coin has been debased, are expressly excepted; and this debasement is, in the next Amendment, stated to have existed during the wars of William 3d, until the recoinage, and also during the seven years war, and until the year 1774.
On the two periods thus excepted I shall have something to say, in speaking of the next Amendment, because I suspect that, with regard to both of them, the learned gentleman, as well in his Amendments as his Report, has mistaken the effect for the cause; and that it was not the debasement of our money which occasioned the unfavourable exchange, but an unfavourable exchange which produced the debasement of our money.
But I shall now limit my attention to the two periods selected in the first Amendment, namely, from the recoinage in 1697, to the commencement of the seven years war in 1750; and from 1774, to the Bank restriction.
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The difference between the learned chairman and me, with respect to this. Amendment, is this, that he denies that at any time during the periods he has selected, the depression of the exchange exceeded the whole expence of transmit ting specie abroad, and that the price of standard gold ever rose above the Mint price more than 1½ per cent. excepting during the year of the South Sea scheme.
I affirm, on the contrary, in the fifth Resolution, that on the only occasions on which, from political and commercial circumstances, such an effect was to be expected within the periods alluded to namely, during the wars of queen Ann, and during part of the American war, a, depression of the exchange, and a rise of the price of bullion, actually took place; and I am prepared to show, from documents on your table, that they took place, to such a degree as to furnish a complete practical proof of the fallacy of the leading doctrines of the Bullion Report, say, these were the only occasions when such an effect was to be expected, because, from the termination of the wars of queen Ann by the treaty of Utrecht, till the end of the earlier period, in 1756, was a lime of peace and extraordinary commercial prosperity, with the exception of the derangement occasioned by the South Sea scheme (which is admitted in the Amendment), and the war terminated by; the peace of Aix la Chapelle. These hostilities, though they produced some effect on the exchange, do not appear to have much depressed it. And I am so far from supposing any great fluctuations in the course of exchange and in the price of bullion to be likely to take place during a period of peace and commercial prosperity, that, if they had actually occurred, I should have found great difficulty in accounting for them.
And I must not omit to mention here one circumstance which, for more than half of the last century, greatly contributed to render the exchanges favourable to England. During the whole of that period our growth of corn considerably exceeded our consumption. The export of wheat between 1700 and 1763, exceed-ed the import by more than 32 millions and a half of quarters, being, on the average, more than half a million a-year.
The regular periodical accounts of the course of exchange and the price of bullion, printed by order of the House, do not extend back so far as the reign of

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queen Anne; but their place is sufficiently supplied for our present purpose by an important document furnished by the Comptrollers of Army Accounts. From this it appears, that in 1703 the exchange with Flanders was at the rate of ten guilders eleven slivers for the pound sterling, being a loss to England of above 12 per cent. From 1703 to 1711, the accounts of the exchange with Flanders are wanting; but, from the well known circumstances of the war, as well as some others which I shall presently mention, it is highly improbable that any favourable change took place in that interval, especially as it appears, in 1710, to have been at 11½ per cent, loss with Genoa. In 1711, the exchange varied from ten guilders eight stivers, to ten guilders ten stivers, being a loss varying from 13⅓ per cent, to something less than 12. In 1712, it was ten guilders eighteen stivers, about 9⅙ per cent., in 1713, eleven guilders, about 8⅓ per cent, loss, and in 1714, ten guilders eighteen stivers, or 9⅙. In 1712, it was at 13⅓ per cent, loss with Dunkirk.
It is certain, that, during the whole of this period, the expence of sending gold coin to Flanders could not amount to three per cent, and probably could not exceed two per cent.; and therefore we have, for eleven years together, an example of a circumstance taking place, which the Bullion Committee positively pronounce to be impossible, namely, a depression of the course of exchange beyond the total expence of the conveyance of specie from one country to the other, without any depreciation of the currency.
Nor is the learned gent.'s amendment more correct with respect to the price of bullion. On this point the evidence is not, indeed so direct, but I think it not less conclusive.
It appears, by accounts on the table, that from 1702 to 1709, the Bank bought "o bullion. Now, as that corporation always buys bullion when it can be procured at, or but little above the Mint price, it is evident they could not at that time obtain any at such a price. In 1709, some gold was actually purchased at four pounds per ounce, and from that time the purchases continued.
This, according to the learned gent.'s next Amendment, would appear to be under the Mint price, which be computes at 4l. 7d. stating, that from the reformation of the coin in the reign of king William, to the fourth of George the first,
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the guinea passed by law for twenty-two shillings.
Here he has fallen into another mistake; the guinea never passed by law for twenty-two shillings. It was struck as a twenty-shilling piece, and valued accordingly in the Mint indentures. The Mint price of gold should, therefore, be reckoned at 3l. 14 s. 2d.; but not being made a legal tender, it passed at a higher rate by common consent; and, for a short time, about 1696, as high as thirty shillings. On the 10th of April 1696, all persons were forbidden, by Act of Parliament, to pay or receive guineas at a higher rate than twenty-two shillings, but they were not made current money at that rate.' They soon after fell to twenty-one shillings and sixpence; and, on the 10th of February 1698 a resolution explanatory of the act of 1696 passed the House of Commons, declaring that no person is obliged to take the guinea for more than twenty one shillings and sixpence, and the receivers of taxes were instructed to take it at that rate. It generally passed at the same value till 1717, when it was reduced, by Proclamation, to twenty-one shillings, and made current at that rate. The customary value of gold in coin was, therefore, at the time we are speaking of, 3l. 19 s. 8¾. per ounce, but the real Mint price (as I before said) 3l. 14 s. 2d.
These circumstances I should think sufficient to establish the fact that the price of gold from 1702 to 1709, when it could be procured at all, must have exceeded four pounds per ounce; but it is abundantly confirmed by the acccounts from the Mint. It appears, that in some years of that period, the Mint stood still entirely for want of bullion. In the whole term of seven years, from 1702 to 1709, no more than 391,000 l. was coined in gold, and 433,000 l. in silver, which latter was chiefly procured from the Scottish money recoined at the Union, and from the prizes taken at Vigo.
The Mint accounts furnish, indeed, one of the most certain proofs of the plenty or scarcity of bullion, as it is evident from the state of our laws respecting coinage and other well-known circumstances, that money will always be struck when bullion can be obtained at the Mint price.
In the latter years, in which the accounts distinguish between the coinage from light guineas and that from foreign gold, the criterion is still more perfect; because the Bank has frequently been

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obliged to purchase foreign gold for coinage at prices considerably exceeding the Mint price, when light guineas could not be procured, which they always can be when the general price of gold does not materially exceed that of the Mint.
I have thus shewn, that in the former period alluded to in the learned gentleman's Amendment, namely from 1696 to 1756, the fact is completely at variance with the assertions of the Amendment in both its branches, as well as with the theories of the Committee.
Nor is the Amendment better founded with respect to the latter period, from 1774 to 1797. I am far from denying that the reformation of the gold coin which took place about the year 1774, might have a tendency to raise the exchange; but, it must be remembered, that this was a season of peace, and that the exchange Blight have become favourable from causes merely commercial. But it does not appear from the accounts, that any such effect took place. The recoinage which commenced in 1773 was not completed till 1777, and the exchange with Hamburgh, which, in the year 1773, previously to the new regulations respecting the coin, varied from 34-.6 to 35, was, in the year 1777, from 33.2 to 32.1, being not a rise, as by the theory it should have been, but a depression of about seven per cent.
This was, however, a season of peace, and it could not be expected, that the exchange could be depressed to any great degree, or for any long continuance, except in the case of scarcity.
But towards the end of the American war, from the year 1780 till some time after the restoration of peace, the exchange with Hamburgh continued from five to eight per cent, against England, though the expence of sending specie to Hamburgh could not have been more than about three per cent. At the same time the price of foreign gold rose about six per cent, and that of silver bullion no less than eighteen per cent, above the Mint price.
It is stated in the Amendment, that the price of standard gold in bars did not exceed the Mint price in any one year of the American war. Whether the learned gent, means one whole year or not, does not appear; but even in this sense, his Amendment is erroneous, as it exceeded that rate from May 1783 to May 1784. But the price of foreign gold exceeded the
18
Mint price for three whole years, from April 1781 to April 1784, and exceeded 4l per ounce, from July 1782, to September 1783. These returns do not, however, give a complete view of the case, for it is a common practice in making up the price-lists, to continue the last price when few or no sales appear to have taken place; so that, when a scarcity of bullion exists, the prices returned in the lists are often nominal rather than real. And this is particularly the case with respect to the standard bullion produced from light guineas, which cannot legally be exported, and which the Bank is always ready to purchase at the Mint price, or very near it; for which reason, the price of foreign gold is usually a fairer criterion of the real state of the market. And it is evident, from other circumstances, how great the scarcity of gold bullion must have been at that time. It was even proved before the Committees in 1797, that the treasure in the Bank was then reduced considerably lower than it was when the restriction on cash payments was imposed.
In 1780, the Mint was entirely unemployed, and for three years succeeding the amount of coinage did not, on an average, exceed 600,000 l.
From 1784, till the Bank restriction, was again (except in the last four years) a period of peace, during which it is so far from being extraordinary, that the exchanges should be favourable, and the price of bullion low, that those effects were rather to be expected upon common mercantile principles.
It will be more convenient to reserve any discussion of the circumstances of those last four years till we come to the next Amendment, in which they are again alluded to.
But in what has been said, I think that I have completely proved, that both in the earlier and the later period to which the learned chairman has referred, the statement in his Amendment is wholly unfounded, both as it regards the course of exchange and the price of bullion.
The learned gentleman's second Amendment refers to the fifth Resolution, and I have already answered that part of it which relates to the price of gold during the American war.
The greater part of the remainder relates to the wars of king William the Third, a period upon which the Committee in their Report, as well as the learned

19
chairman in his speech, appear particularly fond of dwelling. It is, however, most unfortunately selected for their purpose, for the Amendment begins with an extraordinary blunder.
It states, that immediately after the reformation of the coin, the market price of gold fell to the Mint price, and the exchanges rose nearly to par, although the circumstances of the war and the foreign expenditure continued unaltered.
It is evident, that the whole purpose for which the Committee and their learned chairman have dwelt so much on this portion of our history, rests entirely on this part of their statement; for it never can be proved that the depression of the exchange during the war terminated by the peace of Ryswick, was occasioned, not by the war itself, bat by the depreciation of our currency, unless it can be shown that the restoration of a favourable course of exchange was owing, not to the peace, but to the reformation of our coin.
To show how impossible it is for them to establish this position, it is only necessary to state a few dates.
On the 14th of December 1695, the House of Commons voted an Address to king William, to stop the currency of clipped money. On The 4th of January following, the king returned an answer, that he would issue his proclamation accordingly. On the 21st of January, a bill for remedying the ill state of the coin received the royal assent. Other acts passed for the encouragement of persons bringing bullion to the Mint. The coinage was carried on with activity; and before the 28th of November 1690, about 2,400,000 l. of the new money had been issued into circulation. Here, then, we should expect to see the improvement of the exchange if it had been produced by the reformation of the coin. But the remittances to Flanders, on account of government, which in May 1695 were made at the rate of ten guilders for the pound sterling, or 20 per cent., under par, were in September 1696, after a considerable quantity of the new coin had been issued, at nine guilders, or 25 per cent, loss; and, so late as January 1696–7, at nine guilders five slivers, or about 23 per cent.
But Louis the Fourteenth, whose re-sources were as much exhausted as those of Great Britain (for, as Burnet observes in 1696, "the common scarcity of money kept both armies quiet,") had before this
20
time turned his thoughts seriously to peace. He signed a treaty of peace with the duke of Savoy on the 29th of August 1696, and made overtures to the oilier confederates, of which king William took notice in his speech on opening the parliament on the 20th of October. The preliminaries were agreed upon on the 10th of February 1696–7, but without a suspension of hostilities. The negotiations continued all the winter and the following summer, and the peace of Ryswick was signed on the 20th of September 1697. The effects of the approach of peace were soon observable in the rate of exchange. The remittances were made in April 1697 at 22 per cent, loss; in July, at 13⅓; and in August and September, at 12½.
These rates are taken from the original minutes of the treasury, which I desired leave to consult, on account of some references made to them in a publication highly worthy of attention for its perspicuity and force of argument—I mean the "Review of the Bullion Controversy."
This simple statement seems to me sufficient to overthrow the learned gentleman's Amendment; but so much misapprehension has prevailed respecting this interesting part of our financial history, that it will not be without its use to look back a little further, and endeavour to trace the causes and progress of that degradation of the coin, which, at that time, occasioned so great an alarm, and was remedied, at so heavy an expence to the nation.
In this retrospect we shall derive great assistance from the Journals of Parliament. As early as the 9th of April 1690, a petition was presented to the House of Commons by the working goldsmiths of London, complaining of a great scarcity of silver, of large exportations of silver, and of the melting down of plate and silver money (which was then the only legal tender), whereby (as they state) "for six months past not only the petitioners in their trade, but the Mint itself hath been stopped from coining."
This Petition was referred to a Committee, who reported, "that the complaints of the petitioners were very just, and the inconveniences to the kingdom very great, but that they could not agree of a way for preventing the same, and recommended the subject to the further consideration of the House."
* Printed for J. Budd, Pall Mall.

21
On the 17th of November 1690, a bill for discouraging the exportation of bullion, and encouraging the importation thereof, and converting the same into the coin of this realm," passed the House of Commons, but appears to have been lost in the House of Lords.
The evil continued to increase, and encouraged a practice which so early as the reign of Henry the Fifth, and afterwards in that of Queen Elizabeth, had been prohibited under the penalties of high treason—the practice of clipping the silver coin.
It must be recollected, that the only legal lender in the time of king William, was in silver coin, and that this coin was of two kinds, milled and hammered money. The milled money, of which a few beautiful specimens had been struck under the Commonwealth, was first made current in 1663. But the largest proportion of the coin in circulation before the recoinage in 1696, consisted of hammered money very broad and thin.
From this sort of coin it was easy to cut off a circle round the edge, and the remainder containing the stamp passed current as readily as before it was thus diminished. To so great an extent was this practice carried, that Davenant estimates the clippings, thus procured and exported, as equal to one fourth of the total amount of our silver coin existing at the Revolution.
Early in the year 1694, a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to receive proposals how to prevent the clipping of tile coin and the exportation of silver, which reported on the 10th of March. Though their Report was not acted upon during the remainder of that session, the subject was resumed at the meeting of parliament, in November 1694, and an act passed to prevent clipping the coin of this kingdom (6 and 7 W. 3, c. 17.) By this act penalties were enacted against persons giving more for silver money than the current value—against persons buying and selling clippings, or having them in their possession; and the export of silver bullion, except under strict regulations, was prohibited.
These circumstances, I think, prove that the degradation of the coin was a consequence of the demand for bullion occasioned by the difficulty of defraying the expenses of the war abroad, as we find the petition of the goldsmiths respecting the exportation and scarcity of silver coin pre-
22
ceded any complaints of the clipping of the coin. This opinion is confirmed by the statement of Davenant, in a long memorial, dated November 1695, and preserved among the Harleian MSS. in the British Museum" He tells us that, "the opinion, which all along prevailed, that peace was near in view, made us imprudent. First, the foreign coin and bullion went; then foreign commodities, our own country goods, and bullion obtained by clipping." His statement is confirmed by the no less competent authority-of Gregory King, who estimates the decrease of the coined silver in 1695, to be from 8,500,000 l. to 4,500,000 l.; and that of the uncoined, from 500,000 l. to 100,000 l.
The opinion of the Bullion Committee, namely, that, in the case we are considering, the fall of the exchange was occasioned by the depreciation of the coin, must, therefore, be the reverse of the fact, since it appears, on the contrary, that the military expenses abroad producing an unfavourable exchange, and an exportation of bullion, were the cause of the depreciation of the coin.
In 1695, the difficulty was increased to such a degree, as to occasion a general controversy as to the measures which, ought to be adopted. Three different plans were suggested:
The first, supported by Mr. Locke, was in favour of an immediate recoinage at the public expence, and at the full weight and fineness then established by the mint indentures.
The second, maintained by Mr. Lowndes, the Secretary of the Treasury, was for a recoinage at a reduced weight as a temporary expedient during the war; or, which, was also suggested by many other writers, and recommended by the Committee in 1694, an increase of the current value of the coin.
The third, which is proposed by Davenant in the memorial I have alluded to, opposes both these plans, and suggests some temporary expedients, the most considerable of which is the raising a loan in Holland.
The opinion of Mr. Locke prevailed. On the 10th of December 1695, the resolutions of a Committee of the House of Commons, recommending the recoinage of the clipped money, were reported to the House, and, with some amendments, agreed to.
On the 14th of December, an address

23
was voted by the House, praying the King to stop the currency of clipped money; and on the 4th of January following, his Majesty returned an answer promising to issue a proclamation accordingly.
On the 21st of January 1695–6 an act for remedying the ill state of the coin, received the royal assent. Other acts passed in the same session*, for the encouragement of persons bringing plate to the Mint, and for reducing the rate at which guineas (which were then no legal tender) should be allowed to pass, first to twenty-six shillings, and afterwards to twenty two shillings. One of these acts (7 and S W. 3. c. 19.) contains a provision, which is curious, as it shows the tri-ing expedients to which the distress of those times compelled the state to have recourse. It prohibits the use of any silver plate, except spoons, in taverns and public-houses, in order to obtain for the Mint the miserable resource of the plate belonging to such places.
The coinage thus ordered, was carried into execution with vigour and activity and before the 28th of November, above 4,636,000 l. in tale of clipped money had been melted for recoinage; and about 2,400,000 l. of the new coin, amounting to nearly the same weight of silver, had been paid into the exchequer, or issued to the public.
The circumstances attending this memorable recoinage undoubtedly throw some light on the principles laid down by the Bullion Committee, but seem to me much better calculated to impeach, than to confirm, the validity of those principles as applied by then.
In the first place, it is clear that the calling in of the hammered money, must, until the new coin came into circulation, have occasioned a great diminution of the circulating currency; and that it did so in fact, to a degree producing extreme public inconvenience, appears from the numerous petitions from the principal trading towns (no less than eighteen in number), which were presented at the next meeting of parliament, complaining of the difficulties and embarrassments of trade caused by the want of the means of circulation*
* 7 and 8 W. 3. c. 1.7 and 8 W. 3. c. 10. 7 and 8 W. 3. c. 13. 7 and 8 W. 3. c. 19. 7 and 8 W. 3. c.30.
* See Petitions from Coventry, Birmingham, Norwich, the clothiers of Black-
This diminution of currency ought, on the principles of the Committee, to have had a great effect in raising the exchange; but this was so far from being the case, that the course of exchange became still more unfavourable in 1696 than it had been in 1695, and continued at nearly the lowest depression till the preliminaries of peace were actually agreed upon.
Another circumstance observable, is, that the distress arising from the want of a medium of commerce forced a representative currency into use. At this very time Exchequer-bills were first introduced, and struck for sums as low as five pounds, for the purpose of general circulation. By these, and by Exchequer-tallies, Bank-notes, and the notes of private bankers, or goldsmiths, the necessities of the public were supplied, and an absolute stagnation of business prevented. "During the recoinage of our silver (says Davenant), all great dealings were transacted by tallies, bank-bills, and goldsmiths notes. Paper credit did not only supply the place of running cash, but greatly multiplied the kingdom's stock, for tallies and Bank-bills did to many uses serve as well, and to some better, than gold and silver: and this artificial wealth, which necessity had introduced, did make us less feel the want of that real treasure which the war, and our losses at sea, had drawn out of the nation*." And here we have a striking illustration of the effects which might be expected from the execution of the plans of the Bullion Committee. Rank-notes might, indeed, be withdrawn from circulation, but the notes of private bankers would, after much inconvenience had been suffered, take their place. This would, certainly, be a much less evil than a general bankruptcy; but is it an end which the Committee would recommend to us to pursue with such risk and difficulty?
At the meeting of Parliament, on the 20th of October 1696, when, as I have mentioned, the King communicated to Parliament the overtures for peace made by the French king, the measures necessary for completing the recoinage were immediately resumed
well Hall London, the merchants of London, the clothiers of Devizes, from Southwark, Grantham, Peterborough, Bodmin, Chester, Derby, Wootten-under-Edge, Bishop's Castle, Leicester, and Exeter.—Journals of the House of Commons, Vol.XI.
* Discourses on the Public Revenues and Trade of England.
Hammered money was made current only by weight; and a short time afterwards,* was wholly prohibited, and various other regulations respecting the coinage were enacted; and, at the next meeting of Parliament (3rd of December 1697,) the King announced the signature of a general peace from the throne.
It may, perhaps, be observed, in answer to me, that as the improvement of the exchange was, in fact, subsequent to the recoinage, it may have been really occasioned by the recoinage, although it happened that the conclusion of peace took place about the same lime.
A MS. memoir of Davenant to the lords of the Treasury, somewhat later than that which I before quoted, and dated 15th of July 1696, will furnish a reply to this observation.
He says, "Notwithstanding the coin is altered, the remitting such large sums yearly to Flanders makes the exchange to Holland continue so hard upon us, that in spite of all laws made, or to be made, the species will be carried over. The Dutch are already so overstocked with all kinds of our manufactures, that we have no hopes to pay the troops by the returns arising from the sale of goods there, which must put the exchange yet in a worse condition and more to our disadvantage; and this great sum, which we remit, does not only influence the exchange in Holland, but also at Hamburgh, in Spain, and Italy, and well nigh all the parts to which we deal, and is so heavy a load on our trade, that we must quickly sink under the burden."
I shall beg leave to call the attention of the House to one or two other passages in this memoir, though less immediately relative to the point now before us.
He asks a question, not yet, I hope, applicable to our present situation, but well deserving, from its importance, to be borne in mind in the present discussion; "Has not the loss of credit made peace difficult, and war impossible?"
Another soon follows more immediately bearing upon the plains of the Bullion Committee: "Could it be wise in the heat of a war, by so many ways to make the people unable to pay future taxes, and at once to pull down both money and credit, the pillars that supported the king and his subjects?
* See S W. 3. c. 2. 8 W. 3. c. 1. 8 and 9 W. 3. c. 20. 9 W. 3. c. 2.>
"Upon the whole matter," says he, "the managers should not have disturbed what was quiet. They imagined two millions of bullion, to repair the coin, might be as easily sent from Spain as a tun of wine."
The same collection of the Harleian MSS. affords another authority completely decisive of the question, how far the loss upon the exchange is to be ascribed to the depreciation of currency, and in what degree to the circumstances of the war. It appears, that the contracts between the Treasury and the Bank for remittances to Flanders were made upon various conditions at different times. Sometimes the Bank agreed to accept Exchequer-tallies, or other government securities, in payment for their-remittances; in which cases the real loss by the exchange may be, in some degree, confounded with the, discount upon the advances, or with the depreciation of the clipped money. In one instance, a licence to export 700,000 ounces of silver, not with standing the general prohibition, was granted to the Bank; and this licence lord Godolphin speaks of as equivalent to a premium of 20 per cent. Yet this very contract for remittance was made at the rate of ten guilders per pound sterling, or 16⅔ per cent, loss, and with a further allowance to the Bank of 2 per cent, for management. And at other times the Bank stipulated for payment in new mint money, or in guineas.
In some of these latter cases, the Government was unable to fulfil its engagements, and a claim was made upon the Treasury, in 1696, by the Directors of the Bank, for a compensation for the losses which that corporation had sustained in 1695 and 1696, by being obliged to receive clipped money in payment, when they were entitled to guineas, or mint money of full weight.
The Memorial of the Bank was referred by the Treasury to lord Ranelagh, the paymaster-general, and his report is preserved among the Harleian MSS. I have already quoted.
He did not admit the full extent of compensation claimed by the Bank, but he recommended ah allowance of 13½ per cent, for the loss upon the clipped-money, exclusive of a loss of about 20 per cent on the exchange. Here, then, we have a distinct recognition of a loss by exchange of 20 per cent, clear of every other consideration Which might affect the account;

27
and another evident example of what the Bullion Committee pronounces to be impossible,—a loss upon the exchange greatly exceeding the expence of the transportation of bullion, which could scarcely at this time exceed 2 per cent, to the ports of Flanders or Holland. And this loss, as in the instance of the wars of queen Anne, which I have lately mentioned, continued during a period of several years.
I must next notice that part of the Amendment in which it is slated, "that, during the seven years' war, and until the year 1774, the gold coin of the realm was in a state of debasement."
That the gold coin was, towards the close of this period, reduced in weight to the extent of four or five per cent, is indeed, true; and, as I have stated nothing on this subject in the Resolutions, I might pass by this observation of the Amendment without any remark.
I think, however, it may not be useless to observe, that, as in the former instance in the time of William 3, there is sufficient reason to conclude that the fall of the exchange was the cause, and not the consequence of the depreciation of our currency, there are many indication? that this was the case in this latter instance also, though I will not venture here to state so decided an opinion.
I mean that there is reason to believe, that even after the foreign expenses of the seven years war had ceased, the balance of payments might be unfavourable to this country.
First, I should observe that we then, for the first time, began to import corn for our subsistence, instead of having a large surplus for exportation. From the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1758, we had an average exportation of above 500,000 quarters of wheat; but from 1764 to 1774, we had an average importation of 113,000.
Secondly, there was, during that period, a continued transfer of capital to America and the West Indies. The official value of the exports to North America, in ten years, from 1704 to 1774, compared with the ten years preceding, increased on an average from 1,700,000 l. to 2,553,000 l. The imports fell considerably short of that amount; but there is reason to believe that the balances, instead of being discharged by bullion, or other remittances, formed, for the most part, an actual transmission of capital from the one country to the ether.
In the third place, it appears that the general balance of trade with all countries, except America, was much less favourable during the period which followed the seven years wars, than during any preceding part of the century. The official balances in the Custom-house books for ten years, ending in 1774, compared with the ten years preceding, show a considerable diminution of the balances in favour of Great Britain, although the general amount of the trade was much increased.
I am aware that the custom-house books afford an imperfect criterion of the real state even of commercial payments; but in periods so near to each other, they may at least be depended upon as bearing a nearly equal proportion to the real value" in each of the two periods, and therefore showing the comparative general result with sufficient certainty. And I think it may be fairly inferred, that if the balance of payments, purely commercial, was in the period succeeding the seven years war in any degree favourable to Great Britain, it may not have been so, in a degree sufficient to counter-balance the dividend" paid to foreign stock-holders, and the remittances made to British travellers or residents abroad. And though during the war the balance of trade had been more favourable to us, it was then counteracted by large subsidies and great naval and military expenses.
If these conclusions are well founded, the long course of unfavourable exchanges will be accounted for at once, and may fairly be supposed to have produced the depreciation of our gold coin in the same manner as I have just shown that of our silver coin to have taken place during the wars of king William. The scarcity and high price of bullion would soon occasion an exportation of coin; and as the currency of the gold coin was not then restricted to any fixed weight, the heaviest pieces would always be selected for exportation; and thus a progressive depreciation of the coin would take place, and the attempt to counteract it by a fresh, coinage, always carried on at a great expense, would be in vain, as the new coin would disappear as fast as it came into circulation.
I shall dwell no longer upon this point, because, whatever difference of opinion there may be between the learned gent, and myself, I do not think the evidence sufficiently clear to justify us in affirming any thing positive in a Resolution of the House.
The next point touched upon in this Amendment is the price of gold during the American war, which is said never to have exceeded the Mint price in any one year of the war; but I have had occasion, in speaking of the last Amendment, to show this assertion to be completely mistaken.
What follows respecting the state of the exchanges in the period immediately preceding the Bank restriction, will be more conveniently discussed in speaking of the Amendment on the tenth Resolution, in which the same circumstances are stated more at large.
There remains only the statement, "that there was no rise in the price of standard gold in bars immediately prior to the 26th of February 1797, nor for a considerable number of years before." This is a point of some consequence, as all the circumstances attending the restriction on the Bank must be important in a discussion of this kind; but never was a more complete fallacy disguised under a slender veil of evidence.
It is true that in the printed Tables no higher price of standard gold in bars appears than 3l. 17 s. 6d. per ounce. But the learned gent, has omitted to inform us in his Amendment, that for eleven months out of the eighteen immediately preceding the restriction, no price of standard gold is given, because there was none in the market, and that for two years preceding the restriction, no price of foreign gold is given except for one month only.
Independently, however, of this evidence from the very tables from which the amendment itself is taken, I should think it impossible to believe that the directors of the Bank could hare been so devoid of common sense, as well as of regard to the public interest, as to suffer their treasure to be drained away to a degree which filled them with alarm, as appears from their correspondence with Mr. Pitt, laid before the Committees of both Houses of Parliament in 1797, while they could have replenished it by purchasing whatever quantity of gold they found necessary, without any loss. 'The evidence taken before the Committees of both Houses of Parliament, gives a very different view of their conduct. It shows their extreme anxiety to preserve, or to restore, the treasure of the Bank by all the means in their power. To this evidence, which is in the hands of every "ember, I shall in order to save the time
30
of the House, beg leave to refer, in a general manner, and only to trouble them with one or two answers of Mr. Newland, the cashier, to the Committee of the House, of Lords.
"I believe," says he, "that gold within the last two years has been at a higher price than 4l. 4s. per ounce, which is a great inducement for persons to melt the guineas which are circulated at 3l. 17 s. 10½d
He is asked, "Does the Bank ever pay more in their purchase of gold for it than the Mint price?" He answers, "Frequently."
"What is the highest price you ever knew the Bank pay for gold, per ounce?" He answers,' 4l. 1s.—4l. 2s.—4l. 6s. and as high as 1l. 8s.; but very seldom at those prices."
" State to the Committee at what time, the Bank gave so large a price as 4l. 8s?"—" I believe," says he, "it was about two years since the Bank gave about 4l. 8s. per ounce for gold; it was but a small quantity, it was soon stopped on account of its price.
With this evidence I shall leave the assertion of the Amendment, that there was no rise in the price of gold before the restriction on the Bank, and pass to the next amendment, that on the sixth Resolution, which states, "That taking the issues of bank-notes in circulation, not at their amount on a particular day, but on a fair average antecedent to any alteration of the exchanges and price of bullion, it does not appear, from the information which has been procured, that the price of gold has been highest and the exchanges most unfavourable when the issues of banknotes had been considerably diminished, and have been restored to their ordinary rates subsequently to those issue" being increased.
"That since the said restriction, the price of bullion has been highest, and the exchanges have been most unfavourable, at times subsequent to the periods in which the issues of Bank-notes have most in creased."
This is no answer to my argument, and proceeds upon a misunderstanding of the object of the Resolution. What I affirm is, that the price of Bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges most unfavourable, at periods when the issues of Bank-notes have been considerably diminished. The hon. gent's Amendment denies that it has been so, taking a com-

31
parison of averages and not of particular days. If he means, that, upon a comparison of averages, it never appears to have been so (which would be necessary to support the theory of the Committee, I can abundantly prove that the fact is against him. But if he means only to deny that it has been uniformly so, my argument will remain untouched. My object is to show, that the issues of Banknotes have produced no apparent effect on the exchanges and the price of bullion, in opposition to the theory of the Committee, who contend, that an increased issue of notes necessarily occasions an unfavourable state of the exchange, and a reduction of notes as uniformly corrects it. This theory cannot be well founded if any instances to the contrary can be produced. I have already mentioned several, but I will add another of more recent date. It appears by the accounts lately printed, that the amount of Bank-notes in circulation since January last, has been from two to three millions less than it was in the preceding summer, yet the exchange has since fallen 10 or 12 per cent. Or, as the learned gent, seems to think the question is most fairly to be tried by a comparison of periods of considerable length, I would desire him to examine the accounts contained in the Report of the Bullion Committee respecting the amount of Bank-notes and the rates of exchanges, from 1802 to 1809. If the increase of bank-notes depresses the exchange, and the diminution of bank-notes raises it, the exchange ought to have fallen, instead of rising, between 1803 and 1804, and to have risen, instead of falling, from 1804 to 1806 But for the same reasons an uniform issue of bank-notes must occasion a steady exchange, and an invariable price of bullion. In that period of seven years the amount of bank-notes was, however, increased only from seventeen millions to seventeen millions and a half, or Jess than 3 per cent, and the intermediate variations were not. considerable. Bat the exchange varied about 11 per cent,; the price of foreign gold, about 8⅙ per cent.; that of Standard silver, about 10; and that of dollars, 13 1/9 per cent.
The Amendment proposed on, the seventh Resolution, turns entirely on a question of degree, and, if admitted, would not affect the accuracy though it might lessen the force and importance, of the Resolution. But I have, however, already had occasion to show, that in all the material
32
parts it is unfounded in point of fact.
I now proceed to the Amendment on the eighth Resolution, the principal object of which appears to be to substitute an average account of the amount of banknote.; during periods of several months for their amount on particular days, and to enter in a more minute detail of the variations of the exchange during the years 1782–3–4. I had selected such dates as appeared to me to point out in the most striking manner, the fallacy of the principles assumed by the Committee, and the learned gent, has made no objection whatever to the accuracy of the statement; but I am so convinced that in any fair view of the case, whether taken on a comparison of averages, or of single days only, the result will be equally favourable to my argument, that I am willing to substitute for the eighth Resolution, a new-one in which the fluctuations of the ex-change are pointed out more minutely, which I beg leave to read to the House, viz.
"That the amount of bank-notes outstanding on the 1st of January 1781, was 6,794, 620 l. and was reduced on the first of October, to 5,987,790 l. during which time the exchange fell from 34.1 to 32.2, and the price of foreign gold rose from 31. 17 s. 6d. per ounce, to 3l. 19 s. 6d.; and dollars (which on the 2nd of March were at 5s. 4½. per ounce) to 5s. 9½d.: that in the beginning of March 1782, the amount of bank-notes was increased to 9,160,000 l. and that the exchange was then 32.10, foreign gold 3l. 19 s. and dollars 5s. 8½d.: that in the beginning of December 1782, the amount of bank-notes was reduced to 5,995,000, and that the exchange was then 31.10, foreign gold 4l. of. 1d. and dollars 5s. 11½d.: that in June 1783, the amount of bank-notes was 6,970,000 l. and the exchange 31.5, foreign gold 4l. 5s. 3d. and dollars 53. 8d.: that in June 1784, the amount of bank-notes was 6,717,000 l. and the exchange had risen to 34.4, and gold had fallen to the mint price, and dollars 5s. 3d. and that the exchange continued at 34.6, gold at 3l. 17 s. 5d. and dollars at 5s. 1½d, in February 1787, the amount of bank-notes being then increased to 8,638,000 l."
If the learned gentleman does not choose to accept my offer, I must adhere to the original Resolution, in which he has not pointed out the slightest inaccuracy.
To proceed to the Amendment on the ninth Resolution, which is, "That of the sum of 10,704,000 l. stated to have been coined in gold from February 1787 to February 1791, the sum of 8,084,982 l.. was a recoinage from the light guineas of the realm."
It is true, as stated in the Amendment, that of the sum of 10,704,000 l. coined in four years, from 1787 to 1791, no less than 8,084,982 l. were recoined from light guineas. But this fact is so far from invalidating the force of the Resolution, that it rather confirms an argument I have before had occasion to use. I have observed, that when the exchanges were favourable for any considerable period, the coin which was become too light for currency, has been usually returned to the Mint for re-coinage, because no profit could be obtained by the exportation of it; but that when the exchanges were unfavourable, the light coin was clandestinely exported as bullion, and the Mint supplied by foreign gold, imported at a considerable loss.
The period from 1787 to 1791, was one of great commercial prosperity and favourable exchanges, succeeding an expensive war and an unfavourable course of exchange. In consequence, a large quantity of British coin which had been sent abroad during the war, returned to this country, and was sent to the Mint for re-coinage. This supposition is confirmed by the well-known fact, that some time after the conclusion of peace, large quantities of guineas came back from America, and by the great proportion which the recoinage of light guineas during the period we are speaking of, bore to that of the periods both preceding and subsequent to it.
In nine years, from 1778 to 1787, the sum recoined from light guineas amounted to 3,190,000 l. or, on an average, to 354,000 l. only in each year; in four years, from 1787 to 1791, to 8,850,000 l. or 2,021,000 l. in each year; in six years, from 1791 to 1797, to 4,000,000 l. or 666,000 l. in each year.
My object was to show, that between 1787 and 1791, a large addition was made, to the amount of our current coin; and it is indifferent whether this addition was made by the recoinage of light guineas, or the importation of foreign bullion, unless it could be shown that those guineas became light, and were thrown out of circulation, during the same period. Upon
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the degree in which this might have taken place, every man will form his own judgment; but that in so short a term it was great, would be utterly incredible, even if their return to the Mint were not easy to be otherwise accounted for by the circumstances I have stated.
The Amendment on the tenth Resolution, like that on the eighth, does not impute any inaccuracy to the Resolution, but traces several intermediate variations of the exchange, which I have not thought it necessary to notice. Nor shall I now trouble the House with a minute investigation of these trifling circumstances, because any gentleman who may have a curiosity on the subject may easily satisfy himself, by a reference to the accounts upon the table, that during this period no visible connexion can be traced between the amount of bank-notes in circulation, and the course of the exchange;
The only remaining Amendment (that on the fourteenth Resolution) I have already anticipated by inserting in the Resolution the sums taken from an account presented within these few days to the House, instead of those which I had before placed in it from an earlier and less complete account.
I have now gone through this tedious, but necessary part of my statement; and I beg the House to recollect that the points I have been discussing are the only objections which the talents and industry of the Bullion Committee have been able to raise against the facts stated in ray proposed Resolutions. I am of opinion, that I have given a complete answer to each of them; but if the learned gentleman thinks they can be supported, he has now the opportunity of doing so; and if I have still left any thing unexplained, I shall be able, in the course of the debate, to supply the deficiencies which may have occurred in my statement.
Assuming, till I hear the contrary, that I have satisfied the House of the complete historical accuracy of the Resolutions submitted to them, I must now call their attention more particularly to such of them as demand the judgment of the House on questions of litigated opinion, or of practical effect.
In the discussion of these points, I now stand upon ground of much greater advantage than when I addressed you some days since, not only from the rejection of the Resolutions moved by the learned chairman, but from the established ac-

35
of the series of historical Resolutions, now under consideration, the objections to which I think I have refuted.
I know not, indeed, whether I am at liberty to claim this admitted accuracy as applying to the first Resolution. It is a Resolution declaratory of law, as well as of historical fact; but equally capable of being combated by an Amendment, pointing out its inaccuracy if any exists. If I have laid down the prerogative of the Crown erroneously, why are not the statutes, the declarations of Parliament, the authentic documents of any kind, which prove my error, embodied in an Amendment to oppose me? I should, therefore, be entitled to assume, that no solid ground of objection could be found.
But as I am desirous, if possible, to avoid troubling the House a third time, and as many comments of various kinds have been made on this Resolution, and on the subject of the standard of money connected with it, I think it may be proper to say something respecting it, before I call upon the House in form to adopt it.
I have been charged by the right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Canning) with rejecting "altogether the established doctrine of a fixed standard of the currency of the realm; and with bending and accommodating the fundamental principles of our money system, to the state of our currency, such as I happen to find it."
I answer, that neither in this Resolution, nor in what I have said on a late occasion, respecting the standard of money, have I referred at all to the present state of our currency, as consisting chiefly of paper, but to the legal metallic money of this kingdom. What I affirm is, that a fixed and invariable equivalency between our legal money and bullion, never has been established by our laws. I have proved it in practice by showing, that very different weights of silver money are, and always have been, equally current as a legal tender. It is not less easy to prove in theory, that, until our laws are altered, it is impossible this equivalency should be pre-served. So long as the exportation of our coin is prohibited, the merchant who wants to send gold abroad must be contented to give more for such bullion as may be legally exported, than its weight in legal money. This is not a law of recent date.—not an attempt to bend and accommodate the principles of our money system to the state of our currency. It is
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what the Bullion Committee themselves call the ancient policy of our law. They call it, indeed, doubtful and questionable policy (and such I too think it); but it is a point on which they do not hazard an opinion—they do not recommend its repeal. Yet they contend, that bank-notes are depreciated because they have not an equivalency, which our legal coin never had, and, till our laws are altered, never can have. The value of our money may not only fall short of bullion, but may, under different circumstances, exceed it. That this might happen while a seignorage was taken on our coins, as it does in other countries where that is the case, is obvious; but we have a more recent instance of a different kind.
It is well known, that any person may carry gold bullion to the Mint, and is entitled to have it returned in coin, free of expence, the charge of coinage being borne by the public. While this is the case, gold bullion can never he materially cheaper than its weight in coin; or, in other words, can fall but little below the Mint price; that is, no more than may be equivalent to some trouble, and a small loss of interest occasioned by the delay. The same law subsisted with respect to the silver coin, till a few years ago; and therefore, standard silver bullion could never fall much below the Mint price of 5d. 2d. an ounce. But in 1797, an Act was passed, prohibiting silver coinage; and since that time, standard silver has fallen as low as 5s. Now will the right hon. gent, deny, that, at such a time, a pound weight of standard silver bullion might have been purchased and paid for in legal silver coin, worn down to no more than eight ounces weight; or will he, in such a case, affirm the exact equivalency of coin to bullion, and say, as some who maintain the same opinions have said, that a pound of silver, is, and always must be a pound of silver and nothing else, all the world over?
The right hon. gent, tells us, that "a pound sterling is either 20/62 of a pound of standard silver, or 20/21 of a guinea weighing not less than five penny-weights, eight grains. This is the simple, and the only definition, which the practice of our ancestors recognises, and the law of the country allows."
Let us now consider what the practice of our ancestors has really been, and what the law really is. We shall find, that, in the practice of our ancestors, the weight

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of silver, of the present standard fineness, contained in a pound sterling, has varied from eleven ounces, five penny-weights, to no more than seventeen penny-weights. With respect to the law, we know that the greater part of our silver currency now passes legally current, not at 20/62 of a pound weight, but 14/25 or 15/62 to the pound sterling. I beg not to be understood as defending the debasement of our money, which has, at various times, taken place; or as contending that the present state of our silver coin is not an evil. Neither am I discussing the true principles of legislation with respect to currency, or inquiring whether it might not be wise, by some regulations like those of the banks of Amsterdam and Hamburgh, or in some other way, to establish an equivalency of value between money and bullion. The right hon. gent, appeals to fact and law, and I am showing that fact and law do not support him. Upon these grounds alone am I reasoning, and on these alone the Resolution turns.
I have hitherto been speaking of the silver coin, which, till within modern times, was the only legal measure of value. Not only Mr. Locke, but a much later writer, Mr. Harris, in his sensible and useful work on coins, published so late as in 1757, contends that it is the true and only measure which can be properly established. But all I have said applies equally to the gold coin at any time previous to 1774, and the period from that time to the present has not only been much too short to constitute an instance of settled and established policy, but has been throughout a period of deliberation and suspense with respect to a revision of our monetary system, which temporary circumstances have always prevented from being completed and carried into effect. And it is observable, that it seems to have been in contemplation in 1774, when the current weight of the guinea was first fixed, to have limited the current weight of the silver coin also, as the same act which provided for the fabrication of weights and scales, for the gold coins, directed weights to be prepared for the silver coins also, although no limitation of their current weight was, in fact, established.
Thus far I have spoken of the weight only of oar coins; but the Resolution is purposely so drawn as to assert the prerogative of the crown to regulate their fineness also, in all cases not settled by Act of Parliament. I am aware
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that some respectable authorities may be adduced to controvert this position, at the head of which is that of Sir Edward Coke. But when I find it laid down as indisputable by so great a lawyer as Sir Matthew Hale, and affirmed, after an elaborate and able review of the question, by lord Liverpool, I cannot doubt on which side the weight of authority prevails. But above all, when I find that, in the course of ages, the legality of this prerogative appears never to have been questioned in any parliamentary or public document, though the mode of its exercise has been frequently and justly complained of, I cannot hesitate in recommending this Resolution to the House as a just exposition of the law.
In the course of this debate, the statute of the 25 Edward the third, chapter 13, has been quoted as controlling this prerogative; and Sir William Blackstone seems inclined to consider it in that view. But if this interpretation is to be put on that statute, and it is to be considered as applying to gold coin, every guinea which has ever been struck has been a violation of it, and it has never, in any instance, been obeyed since the time of Charles the second. For since that time, no gold money has ever been struck of the old standard of 23½ carats fine. Yet I do not find that the introduction of this new standard (as it was called) of twenty-two carats fine by Henry the eighth, or that of inferior standard he also introduced of twenty carats fine,* or even the enormous debasement of the silver coin in the reign of Edward the sixth, was ever considered as illegal, however justly condemned as impolitic and injurious. Nothing is more easy, but nothing more fallacious, than to argue from the abuse, against the use and to contend, that a prerogative does not exist, because, if unwisely or corruptly exercised, it may produce consequences injurious to the public. Power must, in every government, be lodged somewhere. And every prerogative is vested in the crown for the benefit of the people, subject to the responsibility of the advisers of the crown, and to the superintendence of parliament. What prerogative can be more important or more dangerous to the public than that of war and peace, and
* These three different standards of gold coin are distinguished by the names of angel gold, crown gold (which is the standard now in use), and sovereign gold.

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what other security than those I have mentioned, has the nation against unjust and impolitic wars?
Among the artifices of debate which have been resorted to on this occasion, one of the most common has been the introduction of great names as authorities in the question; but when the opinions of the great men so ostentatiously mentioned come to be examined, they will be found either to have no reference to it, or an effect contrary to that for which they were brought forward.
I might have been terrified with the introduction of lord Liverpool as an authority against my opinions, if I had not known that that nobleman states the royal prerogative very nearly in the same words as I have used in my Resolution: and even that a great part of his valuable work is taken up in discussing the mode in which that prerogative, which, following Sir Matthew Hale, he treats as indisputable, ought to be exercised.
I should still more have shrunk from the weight of a yet greater name, that of Sir Isaac Newton, if I had not recollected that his Report, instead of confirming the purpose for which it was cited by the hon. gent, in reality destroys it. It was produced to support the doctrine of an invariable standard of currency; but, unfortunately for the argument, Newton concludes by recommending an alteration of the current value of the guineas from 21 s. 6d. to 21 s.
This recommendation was actually carried into effect; and it is observable that the Parliament in 1717, was so sensible, that this was a subject properly belonging to the prerogative of the crown, and so cautious of interfering with it, that, instead of proceeding by act of Parliament, both Houses addressed the King to issue his proclamation.
I recollect only one other circumstance connected with the subject of this first Resolution, to which I think it necessary to call the attention of the House. It is that of a proposition, first, I believe, brought forward by the hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Huskisson), in his able publication on the Bullion Report, and since repeated both by him and his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) in their speeches, to allow the circulation of guineas, or at least of such guineas as are below the current weight, at whatever value they might find in the market. On this I must observe, in the first place, that light guineas
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are already a marketable commodity, they are no longer current money, but mere bullion, and may be lawfully bought and sold as such, though not for the purpose of exportation. But what a curious measure of value would those hon. gentlemen introduce by means of a currency which would have no fixed value in itself; when, in every purchase, there must be a double bargain, first, for the commodity, and next for the rate at which the money shall be received, which must, in all cases, be weighed with the greatest exactness!—a measure subject to daily variation, to continual dispute, and every species of fraud and imposition; for how are the peasantry of the country, for instance, to know and follow the fluctuations of the bullion market in London, and always to carry with them exact weights and scales? We should, indeed, possess metallic money, on which those gentlemen lay so much stress, but divested of every quality which makes money valuable as an instrument of commerce.
And what then will become of all their arguments respecting a fixed invariable standard, in commenting upon which, I have been obliged to trouble the House so lone?
But suppose the rate at which this new currency, the light guineas, shall pass, to be regulated by public authority, by proclamation, or by Resolution of the House of Commons, if it is thought right, as their arguments seem to imply, to take this branch of the prerogative from the crown, are all light guineas to pass at an equal rate—is one which has lost twenty grains of its current weight to be equal to another which has lost only one, or is the value to be regulated by weight? In this case, we return to the inconveniences of continued weighing and all the tricks which may attend it. And what security is there that the Resolution, which fixes the value of coin this week according to the price of the bullion market, may not vary from it the next, and the boasted equivalency of money and bullion be again as much lost as it is at present?
After all, what is such a suggestion but a proposal to debase the standard of money, by raising the denomination of the coin—an idea at which those very gentlemen express so much horror as to exclaim against a Resolution acknowledging the prerogative of the crown, because they think it may possibly be understood to imply that some such measure is in

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contemplation, though it has been most distinctly disavowed both by the advisers of the crown, and the framer of the Resolution himself.
But this proposition is particularly ludicrous as coming from that right hon. gent, after the ridicule with which he, like some other gentlemen, has treated the additional value lately given to the Bank dollar tokens. I am far from commending that measure in the manner in which it was carried into execution; but it is liable to no one objection to which the right hon. gentleman's proposal is not exposed, and it is free from the most important.
The dollar token bears be public authority, but is a mere silver note of the corporation of the Bank of England, and receives its value from their engagement to make it good at a certain rate. If they were to choose, for whatever cause, to undertake to pay eleven pounds for every ten pound note issued before a certain day, I know not who could have any right to Complain of them. And if the Bank were to issue golden tokens, though for other reasons, I might think such a plan objectionable, I should not complain of their want of weight, though as light as any of the right hon. gentleman's proposed money. But the light guinea, according to his plan, would be issued by public authority, and with all the circumstances attending a legal coin, and would, therefore, be neither more nor less than a debasement of the standard.
On the second Resolution it is unnecessary to dwell; I therefore pass to the third, which has substantially been the great subject of our long debate so far as opinion is concerned.
It calls upon the House to pronounce its distinct judgment of the falsity of those opinions, which maintain the notes of the Bank of England to be depreciated in the ordinary and popular sense of that word, that is, in the sense of their having lost their value compared with the legal coin of the country.
This Resolution has already been the subject of much wit, much ridicule, much loose and farfetched argumentation; but, I think, of very little sound reasoning or distinct evidence, on the part of those who oppose it.
My first appeal was to facts, because, in a case referring to the daily business and habits of life, facts cannot be wanting. In opposition to the daily evidence of the
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equivalency of Bank-notes and cash with which every man's experience must have furnished him, all the industry and research employed on this occasion have only supplied two or three instances, not of an established difference of price, but of single private transactions, all of them resting on hearsay (though I do not mean to dispute their truth), all of them attended by some circumstances which would lead to a suspicion of an intended illegal exportation of the coin.
With a view to place the question upon the ground of facts more authenticated and of greater notoriety, I referred to the absence of all legal proceedings on this subject. It was immediately hinted to me that such proceedings had taken place. My learned friend (Mr. Morris) has since produced his instance; and if ever a rule was proved by its exception, it is the rule which I have laid down of the equivalency of Bank-notes to cash. The case produced is that of Grigsby and Oakes, in 1800, of which I probably must have heard at that time, though it had escaped my recollection when he alluded to it.
In this case an action was brought by a gentleman against a country banker who offered payment for some of his own notes in notes of the Bank of England. This payment was rejected by the plaintiff, who demanded that a five pound note should be paid in guineas; and, on the refusal of the banker, brought his action. He obtained a verdict under the directions of the learned judge, and it was confirmed by the unanimous opinion of the court of common pleas, who determined that Bank notes were not a legal tender.
This case, therefore, proves that any statement of the law a few days ago was correct, an a that eleven years since it was solemnly adjudged and publicly known, that Bank notes are not a legal tender; and if, from that time to the present, they have passed generally current, and no other action has been brought, can a stronger instance be given that they continue to be supported by public opinion (as is affirmed in the Resolution) without the force of law.
There were some circumstances at tending the original trial which I have learnt from an eye witness, and which seem to me not undeserving of the attention of the House. The learned judge.(Mr. Justice Heath), in the first instance, ire-commended to the jury, to find a verdict for the plaintiff. After a few minutes con-
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sultation the jury, however, brought in a verdict for the defendant. Mr Justice Heath, deeming the verdict an improper one, refused to take it, and, after explaining to them how he understood the law to stand, recommended to them to reconsider their verdict. They again consulted, and, after a short time, the foreman turned about, and said, "My lord, we find for the defendant." Nor was it till after a serious admonition from the learned judge, that it was their bounden duty, under the oath they had taken, to sacrifice their honest feelings to the strict law of the case, that they could be prevailed upon to return a conditional verdict for the plaintiff subject to the opinion of the court on the point of law.
Nothing can more strongly prove the state of public opinion at that time, than the circumstances of this trial; nor is it possible to have more conclusive evidence of its continuance, than that from I8OO to this day, no fresh action has been brought, notwithstanding so clear and authoritative a declaration of the law.
A right hon. gent, opposite (Mr. Canning), in commenting on this Resolution, treated with great ridicule the idea which he supposed me to entertain, that public estimation could be the true standard measure of the value of a currency; and the common measure of the two parts of a currency, as compared with each other. I beg to remind the right hon. gent., that I never hinted, much less stated in a formal Resolution, that the value of a legal currency was to be measured by public estimation. But of the value of a paper currency, a currency purely representative, public estimation is the true and only measure. By what other measure would the right hon. gent, try the depreciation of Bank-notes? Whether he infers that depreciation from a comparison of notes with legal money, with bullion, or with any other article, public estimation is still the rule which ascertains their comparative value.
The legal coin has a specific value affixed to it by law. The notes of the Bank of England profess to have the same value; but whether they actually possess it, must be decided by the public opinion. That opinion is proved, and proved incontestably, by the general and acknowledged practice in ordinary transactions. This is my answer to the question put to me, by what measure the equivalency of Bank notes and cash was to be tried and it
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agrees in substance with that given by the noble lord opposite to me (lord Castlereagh), who referred to the equal value allowed for each in the purchase of commodities as the test of their equivalency. Among commodities I certainly include bullion; but the question would be less fairly tried by an inquiry into dealings in bullion than in any other article, on account of the temptation which must always occur to convert the gold coin into bullion of superior value by illegally melting it down. The comparison ought, therefore, in this case, to be made between purchases of bullion paid for in Bank notes and in silver coin, with respect to which the same temptation does not exist.
Upon this subject the right hon. gent, and his friends are very willing to talk largely, but not equally willing to come to a definition I took the liberty of asking the gentleman next him, in what sense he used the word depreciation, because, both from his general accuracy, and the peculiar attention which we all know he has paid to the subject, I thought him the most likely to give me a clear answer.
He gave me no answer at the time; and though he afterwards answered, not my question, but my speech, at great length, and, as usual, with great ability and information, he really at last left me at a loss to know what he meant upon this simple point.
The right hon. gent, however, afterwards took the place of his friend, and gave an answer to my question: "The alledged depreciation of Bank-notes consists," says he, "in this, that whereas they did, in fact, represent heretofore the real as well as the nominal value of the coin which constitutes our lawful money, they now represent its nominal value only." If by real value the right hon. gent. means the value of the metal contained in the coin considered as bullion, and by nominal value the legal current value of the coin, according to its denomination (and I tan-not give any other intelligible sense to his words), he may safely vote for my Resolution, for I only affirm that Bank-notes are equivalent to the legal current value of the coin; and the only difference between us will be, that he affirms that they heretofore did represent the bullion value of the metal, which I deny.
I affirm, on the contrary, that they have represented sometimes more and some-time less than that bullion value; nay, sometimes both more and less at the same

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time; and even that they represent both more and less at this very moment. This may seem paradoxical; but I beg the House to remember, that if Bank-notes are of less value than the gold contained in the gold coin which they represent, they are of much more value than the silver contained in the silver coin which they equally represent, and which is equally legal money.
If the right hon. gent, contends that they are depreciated eighteen or twenty per cent, because they are of so much less value in the bullion market than a quantity of standard gold equal in weight to their denominative value in gold coin, I have an equal right to affirm, that they are at a premium of twelve or fifteen per cent, because they are worth so much more than the silver contained in an equal denominative value of our present silver coin.
The argument is equally good in both cases, but indeed, in my opinion, little better than trifling in either. For the right hon. gent, forgets that when an ingot has passed through the Mint it loses the character of bullion, and can never legally resume it. The price of bullion bought with money, as it was before the Bank restriction, varies, therefore, as frequently as when bought with Bank-notes. Instead of its remaining fixed and invariable at the Mint price, we find by the accounts upon the table, that in seventy-eight years previous to the restriction, gold bullion was at, or under, the Mint price only twenty-eight years and a half, and silver bullion no more than three years and two months. Yet it is now contended that Bank-notes are depreciated because they do not preserve an equivalency to bullion, which, except at short and uncertain intervals, our coin never did. That equivalency is absolutely precluded by the laws which prohibit the melting down and exportation of our coin as bullion.
I am not arguing in defence of the policy of those laws, though it is much easier to see their defects, than to devise a system which shall be free from inconvenience. The Bullion Committee, who have not ventured to recommend the repeal of those laws, and have not even entered into any formal discussion of their operation and tendency, or suggested any other measures which might be substituted for them, but who merely—
"Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike;"
yet as well as the right hon. gent, con-
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stantly argue as if no such laws existed, or as if they were totally obsolete, and had no operation whatever. The fact is, that those laws have a real and not inconsiderable, though by no means an effectual operation; and it is precisely this state of things which constitutes one of my principal objections to the resumption of cash payments.
If the exportation of coin were free and lawful, the Bullion Committee could not recommend the removal of the Bank restriction, unless gold could be obtained sufficient both for our internal use and for exportation; and the moment they could prove that such was the case, I should most willingly concur in their recommendation.
On the other hand, if the exportation of coin could be effectually prevented, should see much less objection than I do to the removal of the restriction, because I do believe it to be possible, though at a considerable sacrifice, to procure as much gold as might be sufficient to supply our internal circulation; and I should think the object worth a considerable sacrifice, though whether to the extent which might be necessary, would require a careful examination.
But, in the present state of the law and the circumstances attending it, the real effect of the removal of the restriction could only be (and the real object of many of those who are clamorous for it, how ever they may have concealed their views from the Committee, I have no doubt is) merely to throw upon the Bank the loss arising from the purchase of bullion at the present advanced rate, in order to profit by the illegal exportation of the coin produced from it. In this object they would, for a time succeed, though commonly at the expence of perjury to themselves, and always of embarrassment and stagnation to trade in general, while the professed and ostensible objects of the measure would be entirely frustrated.
I am unwilling to revert to the argument for the depreciation of our currency, drawn from the state of the exchanges, having, on a former night, troubled the House for a considerable time, upon that subject, and not thinking that my arguments have received any answer which calls for a reply on ray part. I cannot, however, omit to notice an important admission made by the learned chairman in his reply; an admission which, indeed, flowed so evidently from the principles which be assumes, that Jus sagacity could

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not fan to observe and his candour to state
He admitted that the unfavourable state of the exchange would afford no presumption of the depreciation of our currency, uness the depression were general: and that if there were any country whatever to which the depression did not extend, its existence in other cases might be inferred to arise from other causes, and not from the state of our currency.
What then will he say if I am able to name a country, a rich country, a commercial country, and one with which we have extensive relations of trade, the exchange with which has not only not become unfavourable, but has considerably improved during this supposed depreciation off our currency?
That country is India. The computed par of exchange between Calcutta and London is 2s. 6d. for the sicca rupee, and, as at least twelve months interest must be allowed upon a bill at six months sight drawn from such a distance, the par of bills-draw at Calcutta may be about 2s. 8d and of bills drawn at London about 2s. 4d The actual course of exchange for bills drawn at Calcutta from 1800 to 1808, was 2s. 8d. for the sicca rupee. In 1808, it fell to 2s. 7d.; in 1809, to 2s. 6d.; in May 18 10, to 2s. 5d. and about December last, to 2". 4d I am aware, that the high value set, in the course of exchange, on the sicca rupee, arises from a Seignorage paid at the Indian Mints, and that its Intrinsic bullion value does not exceed 2s. 1d This, however, was long ago the case under the Mogul government, the Mint regulations of which have never been-altered. in Sir Isaac Newton's Table of Assays, the value of the rupee is stated at no-more than its actual intrinsic value; but from that time to the present, its value in exchange has been estimated at 2s. 6d. It is accordingly so estimated in a collection of tables of weights and coins which I have now in my hand, and which was printed in 1749. I shall consider myself as dispensed from discussing any theoretical question as to the propriety of estimating the par of exchange with reference to any seignorage taken upon the coin, by the authority of Adam Smith, whose words I beg leave to read:
"In some countries, the expense of Coinage is defrayed by the government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people who carry their bullion to the mint and the government even derives
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some revenue from the coinage In Eng-land, it is defrayed-by the government and if you carry a pound weight of stand and silver lo the Mint you get back 62 shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France a duty of eight per cent, is deducted for the com age, which not only defray the expence of it, but afford a small revenue to the government In England, as the Coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable. Than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In France, the workmanship as you pay for it, adds to the Value in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore, containing a certain weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of English money; containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities to purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their respective Mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of French money, containing an equal number of ounces of pare silver, nor consequently bill upon France for such a sum. If for: such a bill, no more additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between the two countries; thus debts and credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour of France*"
This celebrated writer, indeed, lays down the rule somewhat more extensively than I think strictly accurate, as it appears to me to be subject to some modifications into which I shall not now enter, as they do not apply to the present case. And I think it the less necessary, as it appear" to me much more important to show that the exchange has improved, than that it is actually favourable. For it appears to me impossible that any country should at the same time have an improving exchange and a currency progressively depreciated; and, from the learned gentleman's admission, it is clear that he is of the same opinion. Now, it is undeniable
* Wealth of Nations, book iv. c.3, vol. ii, p.216, edit. 1784.

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that the exchange with India has improved above 13 per cent. during the very period that our currency is supposed to have been depreciated from 20 to 25 per vent.
I cannot avoid figuring to myself what the Bullion Committee would say were they now sitting at Calcutta, and reporting the result of their inquiries to the government of India. It would be clearly proved to them, that for the last three years the exchange had gradually been falling, in a degree exceeding the expence of sending bullion abroad, and that, in fact, it was notoriously exported. "The case is clear," the Committee would say; "you have an excessive paper currency, which is become depreciated." The Indian government might then take the liberty humbly to represent, that this must be a mistake, as there really was in India no paper currency whatever. The Committee would then be completely at a loss, and, alter an infinite number of conjectures, might be forced to concur with the merchants of Calcutta in thinking that these unfavourable appearances were really owing to internal peace, a reduction of public expences, and an abundant sinking fund, which had enabled the government to reduce the interest of the public debt.
So various are the causes to which, in cases of this kind, effects may be traced, and so much are (hose liable to error who direct their views exclusively to a single point of the subject.
I think it unnecessary to detain the House longer on this question of depreciation, because I consider it as already decided by a great majority in the rejection of the learned chairman's thirteenth Resolution. We are now discussing not so much whether Bank notes are actually depreciated, as whether it is proper for the House to declare that they are not; so far, I mean, as it may be proper to settle that point in this general debate, in which the first Resolution only is regularly before us. Among those who agree with me upon the question itself, I think there can be no great doubt of the propriety of solemnly recording the opinion of the House. For if and effect is to be produced on public credit by the decision of parliament; if the impression occasioned by the Report of the Bullion Committee is to be counteracted by a solemn and deliberate judgment of the House at large, these consequences can only follow in proportion as that judgment is distinct and un-
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equivocal To pronounce no opinion, would be to leave it in perpetual doubt what the sentiments of parliament really were, and whether the rejection of the learned gentleman's Resolutions was not the effect of some difficulty of mere form, or, at most, of a doubling, hesitating, uncertain opinion, to which the House did not choose to stand distinctly committed. Accordingly, I have heard no gentleman express a doubt of the expediency of voting some such Resolution as I propose, except those who have thought the Resolution itself erroneous in point of fact.
Whether the precise form in which it now stands is the best which can be adopted, will be a question hereafter when the Resolution comes regularly before us. I am not anxious for any particular words, so long as the opinion of the House is clearly, fully, and unequivocally expressed. But here I must say, that no gentleman who has not objected to the substance of the Resolution, has hitherto offered any criticism on its form.
On the remaining Resolutions, it cannot be necessary that I should comment at much length, as their accuracy in point of fact is admitted, with the exception of the objections stated in the learned chairman's proposed amendments, which I have already discussed and I hope, sufficiently refuted.
The ten following Resolutions, from the fourth to the fourteenth, are occupied in a review of the most remarkable facts relating to money and exchanges, which have taken place since the Revolution, and comprise that chain of historical evidence upon which my own opinion has been formed, and which I desire the House deliberately to weigh in their decision of the great practical questions arising out of this discussion.
I might have taken a still longer retrospect, but, in proportion as we recede from the present times, our materials become more scanty and imperfect, especially with regard to subjects which have usually been little noticed by the general historian. The period of the Revolution is, perhaps, the first in which the political and commercial affairs of Europe, and especially those of our own country, assumed the aspect they have borne in modern times, by which I mean those which immediately preceded the terrible convulsions, through which it is now our duty to assist in guiding the state, it is also a period, to which the Bullion Committee have thought fit to call the attention of the House in a

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particular manner, and which, therefore, it would have ill become me to neglect in discussing the opinions they have advanced; and it is not an unimportant circumstance that about this very period, the Bank of England, on whose operations so much of our question turns, first-took its first took its origin.
It is upon an impartial accurate comparison of the events which have occurred (so far as they relate to our present subject), from the Revolution till the Bank-restriction with those that have happened since that measure took place, that I wish the House to form their decision and I have endeavoured, in these ten Resolution, to draw into the smallest possible compass the principal materials of such a comparison. Those gentlemen who may be inclined to go into more minute detail, will find abundant matter for research-in the papers on the table, and some other documents to which I have had occasion to refer; and I shall be ready, so far as I hare been able to make my self myself of so extensive an inquiry, to go With them into the examination.
But the general result of such a comparison appears to me to be that, from the Revolution to the Bank restriction, the course-of exchange has never Suffered any material derangement from any cause arising within the realm, except the scarcity and dearth of grain, and the confusion occasioned by the South Sea scheme. The mode in which a dearth of grain operates on the exchange, is too obvious to require "any observation; but the effects of the South Sea project have been noticed by the learned gent, in one of his amendments, and are worthy of a few minutes attention, not as supporting, but as over-'turning the ideas of the Bullion Committee. The effects of the imaginary and fictitious wealth, and the prodigious rapidity of circulation produced in the kingdom by that project, most while the delusion lasted have been the same as those of a great multiplication of paper currency. It ought, therefore, according to the ideas of the Committee, to have occasioned a considerable fall of the exchange, and arise of the price of bullion. This, however, was not the case. The exchange continued stationary, or rather became more favourable, while the price of south Sea stock was rising; bat when it fell from 800 per cent, to 150, and our visionary treasures vanished like a dream, the exchange fell likewise about 7 percent,
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and the price of bullion rose, and continued considerably above the Mint price for a twelvemonth
This according to the Bullion committee, may perhaps be impossible. It is, nevertheless, the fact, as appears by the accounts on the table. And upon the vulgar mercantile principles of credit and confidence, it is easily explained. While the delusion lasted, foreigners were anxious to obtain a share of our imaginary mines of wealth, and poured their capitals into this country; but as soon as the bubble burst, and despondency took the place; of presumption, they were anxious to save what they could from a country whose affairs seemed to be falling into inextricable confusion.
But while the course of exchange seems to have been uninfluenced by internal causes, except in the cases I have mentioned it has felt the operation of causes arising abroad in every instance in which their effect could reasonably have been expected to be considerable. In the wars of king William it was depressed in a degree fully equal to the present; and, indeed, the difficulties of that period appear, in some other respects, to have borne a near resemblance to those which we now feel.
In the wars of queen Anne, the fall of the exchanges was considerable, and entirely unaccountable upon the principles of the Committee, as the coin was then in an excellent state. The depression was not, however, equal to what it had been before the peace of Ryswick, the government being more firmly, settled, and public credit better established.
After a long interval of peace, we were again involved in war, and military operations were carried on abroad about the year 1740. The accounts relating to this period had not been presented to the House when the Resolutions, now under discussion, were prepared. They have since been produced; and it appears, that the course of exchange was affected by these hostilities, though, as might be expected, in a much smaller degree than in either of the former cases. The British trade had been greatly extended, and become better able to bear the pressure of the foreign expenses of the government;
After an interval of eight years, from the peace of Aix la Chapelle, the seven years war commenced; and this war is admitted by the learned gent, in his amendments, to have been attended with

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a depression of the exchange, which he can only account for by the supposition of a depreciation of our gold coin. I have already assigned my reasons for thinking that the depreciation of the gold coin which began during this war, and continued till the recoinage in 1774, was (like that of the silver coin before the peace of Ryswick) not the cause but the effect of an unfavourable course of exchange, and have endeavoured to point out the real causes which occasioned its continuance after the return of peace. To what I have already said respecting this period, I shall only add a remarkable circumstance which appears on the accounts from the Mint, namely, that in the whole term of thirteen years from 1760 to 1773, only 54,600 l. in light guineas were carried to the Mint, while 8,758,000 l. were coined from foreign gold purchased at an advanced price so considerable were the sacrifices which it was found necessary to make to supply the continual drain of our coin by an un-favourable exchange.
We are now arrived at the period of the American war, which I have before had occasion to discuss, and upon which, therefore, I shall only remind the House, that the pressure upon our currency became so great as nearly to have occasioned the necessity of a restriction on cash payments, or some similar measure, the treasure in the Bank having been reduced, in 1783, even lower than it was when the restriction actually took place.
From this time till within four years, of the Bank restriction, was a period of peace and unusual commercial prosperity but the renewal of war, in 1793, was ac-companied by a considerable failure of mercantile credit. That, indeed, was not of long continuance; but the increasing amount of our military expenses abroad, sand of the demands of our allies, produced a considerable drain of our currency; and though the exchange recovered itself after; the British army, was withdrawn from the continent, and the pecuniary assistance givens to our allies was reduced with in narrower limits, yet, from a succession of unfortunate events, credit received a shock which rendered the effects of any alarm extensive and formidable, and at length made it necessary to impose the restriction on the Bank in consequence of an attack upon our coast too feeble and desultory to have been of any importance in times less critical.
Let us now compare the events of which
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I have given this hasty sketch, with those which have taken place since the restriction; and if we find the same causes existing, and the same effects produced, can we hesitate to acknowledge the connexion between them, and to ascribe the effects to the operation of the causes?
About the time of the Bank restriction, peace was restored upon the continent, our foreign expenses were greatly reduced, and the exchange became favourable to an extraordinary degree, a degree, I be lieve, never equalled. Yet this was precisely the period of the substitution of a paper circulation for metallic currency and also of a great addition to this paper circulation, the average amount of Bank notes, in 1798, exceeding, by four millions, their amount when the restriction was imposed.
In 1799, the continental war was renewed, and our foreign expenditure increased in a variety of ways by military exertion. But a calamity awaited us much more seriously affecting the state of our currency. The failure of two successive crops raised the price of grain to an unprecedented height, and compelled us to avert a famine by an expense in the importation of corn of at least twenty millions. The combination of these circumstances produced a fall in the exchange between January 1799 and January 1801 of above 20 per cent. Can any man doubt that these were true causes of the fall? During the wars of king William, the exchange, fell to an equal, degree, though not so rapidly; but though the military exertions of our ancestors at the at time were, perhaps, even more, burdensome, compared with they resources of the nation, than those of the present day, can they be supposed to counter balance the additional calamity of such, a scarcity? If, however, a doubt could still be suggested, the events which immediately followed must remove it. In 1801 and 1802, we were blessed with favourable harvests, and peace was signed; and before December 1802, the exchange had risen, 13 per cent.; the Bank restriction, still, continuing in force, and the amount of Bank-notes in circulation having progressively and considerably increased.
This recovery of the exchange, under such circumstances, appears to shake the confidence of my hon. friend near me (Mr. H. Thornton), in his own principles. He acknowledges that it gives, him some hope for the future, and he seems unable

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to point out any distinction between the de and the present, except that the depression is now some what greater, and has continued longer The greater degree of depression is easily accounted for by the difference of circumstances distinctly stated in the twelfth and thirteenth Resolutions; and with regard to its continuance, I beg my hon. friend to recollect that in 1801, the depression continued till its causes were removed, by the return of plenty, and the Signature of the preliminaries of peace 11 the peculiar causes which have; produced the present still more unfavourable state of things were removed, entertain not only a sanguine hope, but a firm conviction that their effects would quickly disappear If in this expectation I shall here after appear to be mistaken, then, and then only, I may allow the reasonings, of the Bullion Committee be well founded.
That the peculiar and unprecedented: circumstances pointed out in those resolution are sufficient to account for the greater and more lasting depression, under which we new suffer I think no man who impartially consider the experience of former times can entertain a serious doubt we have seen great and lasting depression produced merely by military expence abroad; we have seen the still greater and more rapid effects produced when for again military expense was combined with a dearth of provisions, and we now suffer under the effect of both of those causes not indeed singly operating to so great a degree as in some former instances, but acting; with combined force, and aided in their effect by a state of things unknown and scarcely, conceivable before, and which so embarrasses the operations of exchange, and obstructs the course of trade, as to render it Wonderful how they exist at all.
Could it foreseen in any former time, that the whole continent of Europe would be placed under the sway of one potentate, and that potentate a despot, so violent, arbinary, and unfeeling, as to count the sufferings of his own subjects and dependants as nothing in the efforts which he makes for our destruction? Could it be foreseen that the ruler of Europe, reigning over so many states once wealthy, powerful, and flourishing, through the means of trade would deliberately settle, and systematically execute a plan for the annihilation of commerce, in the sole view of depriving as of our share of its advantages
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could it be foreseen that we should at the, same time be debarred from the trade of the most commercial part of the New world by a system of exclusion, little should of hostility And if these things could have been foreseen would it not have been expected that, so far as relates; to the circumstances we complain of, our situation would, have been even worse than actually it is Could it have been supposed that any trade, or course of exchange, could exist as all, or any means of carrying on our foreign expenditure beyond the limited stock of the precious metals which the country might still be able to supply?
I have thrown out the few reflection rather as a specimen of the sort of reasoning to which the series of facts before us seems to me naturally to lead than as an exposition of the inference arising from them, and which it would carry me much beyond the limits of my present, address to the House to pursue to then full extent.
We are now arrived at the fourteenth Resolution in which, have endeavoured to shew, by a comparison of the revenue; the public expenditure and the trade of Great Britain immediately before the Bank restriction with their present amount, that a large increase of currency must be necessary to carry on a circulation so greatly, extended. I have not attempted to show; the total amount of our currency in either period, because think the data on which either the amount of coin or of country; Bank-notes in circulation, at any time can be calculated, are too vague to be greatly depended upon even in argument and, therefore, much more unfit: to be made the subject of a Resolution of the House.
We have, however, sufficient reason, to conclude that they cannot exceed a certain sum; and several attempts have been made to estimate their amount by gentlemen of great experience and know; ledge of these subjects. I should lay the stress on an observation which yet I thank both just and important, namely, that the period immediately preceding, the Bank restriction was one in which we felt the evils of a contracted circulation that the amount of currency then circulating, was confessedly much les than the wants of the public demanded, and that many schemes were proposed for supplying its deficiency. We know, in fact, that the ordinary amount of Bank notes was considerably lessened during

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the letters parts of this period, and that the credit of country banks not having Completely recovered the shock it received in 1793 their notes in circulation were reduced according to the evidence given before the Committee of the Lords, in 1797 in the proportion of seventy eight to ninety. This observation I am willing to pass over because, taking the present amount of paper currency of all kinds at the highest, and the diminution of metallic money at the least which has been supposed by any gentleman who has attempted to estimate them, I am convinced that we have more reason to be surprised at the smallness of the augmentation of our currency, than alarmed at its magnitude.
My principal object in now calling the attention of the House to the increase of our trade, and of our public income and expences, is however, to make an observation on a part of the able speech of an hon. member whom I some time ago alluded to, an bearing a most important testimony to the impracticability of resuming the cash payments of the Bank (Mr-Baring. That hon. member treated the Bank restriction as a measure proposed by Mr. Pitt in consequence of views of profound, but dangerous policy, which led him to attempt to support the enormous expences of the war by introducing an artificial system of circulation, and that the apparent growth of our wealth and resources since that time, was consequently fictitious.
This is a remark sometimes made here, and frequently by continental writers, with little thought or meaning" and either arises from national animosity, or an en deavour to account, by mere empty phrases, for what they do not understand but, with the hon. gent.) it is undoubtedly the result of deep, though, I think, some what inaccurate, reflection upon the subject.
To pursue the question to the extent which it well deserves, would lead to discussions of political economy ill suited to the time and convenience of the House. I think, however, it is possible to give a solid and satisfactory answer to the observation, without any deep inquiry into principles
In the first place, as respects the conduct of Mr. Pitt, I am fully convinced that the hon gent, is wholly mistaken in the fact and that all Mr. Pitt's confidential friends will confirm the testimony
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right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Canning), that the measure of the Bank restriction was in no respect the result of any premeditated system in the government or, I may add, in the Bank; but that it was forced upon both by circum stances extremely alarming to them, and which they could neither foresee nor control, and was adopted most reluctantly as a mere temporary expedient during the crisis of danger. So much as to the origin of the restriction; and with respect to its effects in introducing an artificial sys tem, I can by no means admit that the wealth and resources, either of the public or of individuals, are now artificial in any other sense than they always have been so, or than the whole fabric of civilized society necessarily must be
So far as relates to the resources of the state, I think a circumstance pointed out by the hon. gent. himself sufficient to decide the question. He reasoned with great justice and force on the importance of equalizing the income and expenditure of the state. In this argument I perfectly concur with him, and no man has laboured more than I have done, in proportion to my means of influence, to carry this principle into full effect. But this argument Shows that the hon. gent, concurs with me in thinking, that a system which equalizes the income and expenditure of the slate, and provides for expences as they arise by supplies actually drawn from the people, and not by any resources depending on the credit of the government, whether in the shape of loans or of any circulating security, cannot, by possibility, be a fictitious system.
I am ready to admit that further steps ought still to be taken for equalizing the income and expences of the nation; but it cannot be denied that since the Bank restriction much has been done to effect this great object. Upon an average of three years previous to that time, the sum raised by loan was nearly equal to the total revenue paid into the exchequer; on an average of the three last years it has scarcely exceeded one fifth of it; in the course of the first term of three years, the-increase of the national debt was nearly seventy millions; in the last three years, it has been less than ten millions. It is true, that, in the first of these terms, the loans were raised almost entirely in three per cent, funds, and, in the latter period chiefly in five percent, stock; but this difference will not materially affect the

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comparison. It is obvious, that the nature of the currency employed as the medium of payment in either case is of no consequence, provided the payments of the government are made in the same medium which it receives from the subject. In fact, the greater part by far of the receipt and expenditure of the government was carried on in bank-notes previously to the Bank Restriction. Since that time a still larger proportion has been so received and paid; and this is the only difference which has taken place. But, supposing the greatest possible difference to have occurred; supposing, that, previously to the Restriction, the whole business had been transacted in coin, and that now, from the deficiency of coin, the whole revenues of the state were actually levied in the produce of the soil, and in articles of manufacture, and that the same articles were issued by the government in payment, and found sufficient to carry on all the necessary services; who could say that the resources of the state were less real, though certainly less convenient, in the latter case than the former? The difference between such a state of things and our actualsituation is this, that instead of a cumbrous and inconvenient payment in kind, the business is transacted by the intervention of a symbol, which both the government and the subject are willing to receive as of equivalent value with actual produce, and by means of which the exchange of values is carried on with a degree of facility and convenience unattainable in transfers, not only of produce, but of metallic money. Of what nature this symbol may be, is immaterial, so long as its equivalent value is preserved; and it is obvious how strongly the system, adopted since the Bank Restriction, of raising the supplies within the year, by means of war taxes, tends, when once established, to preserve the value of money fixed and invariable. Previously to that time the expenses of the war being defrayed by loans, a considerable amount of stock was created in each year, which might not improperly be called a fictitious addition to the capital of the nation, inasmuch as it consisted, not of any new wealth acquired by the nation, but of the value of an annuity formed by a reduction from property already subsisting, and continuing, not with standing the deduction, to preserve its former nominal value. Thus, if, at any time, the total property of the kingdom were worth, suppose two thousand millions and one hundred
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millions were added to the national debt, all other property preserving its former price, it is clear that the total amount would then be two thousand one hundred millions, which yet-would only represent the same-real property of all kinds as before, the hundred millions possessed by the new-stock-holders being; in fact, the value of an annuity charged upon every other kind of property. But so far as the supplies are raised within the years which they now are in a great degree; though not yet so much as is desirable; this accumulation of artificial capital and the tendency which it must necessarily have to lower the value of money, will be counteracted.
In proportion, therefore, as our present national income approaches nearer to the public expenditure than it did when the: Bank restriction took place, in the same proportion have we advanced from a fictitious system towards one of perfect solidity and security
The hon. gent seems to have been struck, as many others have been, with the prodigious numerical amount of the increase of our trade and national income, and to suppose that it must be unreal and fictitious, because its magnitude appears to exceed credibility. I admit, that so far as any sum of money has lost its value in the purchase of labour or commodities" since the period of the restriction, in that proportion is the increase of our wealth/ so far as it is to be show merely by-money statements, fictitious. But it must not be supposed that the whole, or the most considerable part', of the rise of price which has taken place since that time, is owing to any change in the value of money. The scarcity of 1799 and 1800 occasioned, indeed a great temporary rise of prices, and this rise has, in party perpetuated itself by giving an additional real value to labour, and the necessaries of life. But the principal reason which produced that remarkable increase of prices which has subsisted-from that time Without any extraordinary variation, was the great additional mass of taxes imposed while the effects of the scarcity were passing away, and prices returning towards their former level it may serve the illustration to mention particular instance. The price of beer had among other articles, been considerably advanced during the scarcity. In the Spring of 1802, the price of malt having fallen, that of beer was reduced; but a tax was soon

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after imposed by parliament to the exact amount of the reduction The price was accordingly raised again, and remained the same to the consume: the consumer as during the scarcity. This, however, clearly appears in this instance, not to be the effect, of any change in the value of money but of a division of the price between the state and the brewer; and the some observation applies to almost every other article as all have been exposed, either directly or indirectly, to the effects of increased taxation. Of this taxation, the state itself pays a considerable share in the enhanced price of all articles purchased and services performed for it and, to this extent the increase of revenue certainly is inefficient, and may be called nominal; but it bears only a small pro-portion to the total increase. And though it adds nothing in effect to the resources of the state, it is. not, therefore, fictitious, but really consists of a sum of taxes, at once received and paid by the government, an arrangement not convenient on advantageous, but which unavoidably arises out of our present system of taxation.
Another cause of the rise of prices not less distinct from, any change in the value of money though likewise often con founded with it is crease of consumption Not only does our population appear to be; increasing with considerable rapidity, but the consumption: of an equal number of people has been, from a variety of causes, considerably augmented, At the same time, the means of supply, by importation have been uncertain and interrupted. This observation may also be, illustrated by a familiar instance, there is scarcely any article of which the price has lately risen so much as that of butter, a circumstance which has been chiefly owing to the interruption of the usual supply from Holland.
Most of what I said respecting the growing wealth of the state, will equally apply, to that of individuals. To that proof of it, indeed, which is afforded by the increase of foreign trade, no observations respecting the, change of prices apply at all for the comparison is made between official values in which no change is made, and which, therefore, represent not sums of Money, but quantities of commodities. In this fair and incontrovertible mode of comparison, our foreign trade has increased in the proportion of 48 millions to 77. In what proportion our internal trade has augmented, does not admit of so accurate
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an estimate: but in what part, of the country can we move without seeing the proofs of its increased activity? Where do not new canals, and other works for the accommodation of trade, meet our view? Nor are the proofs of the improvement of our cultivation in any respect inferior to those of the increase of trade. When has the inclosure of wastes gone on so rapidly, and at what time have the skill and capital of the farmer in general been so remarkably improved?
It is not in the extension of this great metropolis that I should look for the proof of the growth of our national resources, if it were not accompanied by so many un., deniable proofs of public prosperity. But, as it only appears to keep pace with similar improvements in every direction, we may look with pleasure to the display of opulence around us. In this point of view, I have been struck by some recent proceedings of parliament as very remarkable.
For many ages, and till within the memory of persons now living, one bridge was thought sufficient for the accommodation of the metropolis. A second was then undertaken by parliament, as a great national work, and executed at the public expense. About 30 years later, in a time of great national glory and prosperity, the corporation of London erected a third after which it was supposed that few of the great cities in Europe could vie with that in which we reside in this species of useful and magnificent decoration. But parliament has recently been called upon not to contribute any public aid for the further accommodation of the city in which it meets, but simply, to grant its sanction to individuals who have under taken, at their own risk and expense, to erect three new bridges for the convenience of the public.
To say that these improvements are fictitious, would be an outrage to common sense. To say that they are owing to any particular system pursued by the government, beyond the general encouragement which the constitution of our state always gives to honest industry, would be to pay the government a compliment, which, in my opinion, it does not deserve; and to trace them to their causes, if I were capable of doing in satisfactorily, of which I am far from confident, would lead me to too great length. But one thing may safely pronounced, that these improvements could

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not have taken place if parliament had tampered with our currency, in the manner now proposed, and subjected us to the embarrassments of a contracted circulation.
These reflections naturally lead me to the Consideration of the two concluding Resolutions (the fifteenth being only an inference drawn from the facts which have been already considered:) and for them, as the substance of my practical recommendation to the House, I cannot but feel a more than ordinary degree of anxiety. I have, however, the satisfaction of knowing that the learned gentleman's Proposition, the reverse of mine, has been rejected by a majority of nearly double the proportion of members which negatived his preceding Resolutions; and, therefore, I may reasonably infer that the sense of the House is still more decidedly in my favour as to the course to be pursued, than as to the reasoning upon which it has occurred to me to re-commend it.
What I propose is merely to refrain from any interference with the system of currency already established by parliament, until a change shall take place in the circumstances which have rendered it necessary; not, however, without placing on the Journals a recorded opinion of the House, that it is highly important to revert to the former system whenever more favourable events may render it possible to do so, without endangering the safety of the state.
To this point the whole of the reasoning which I have addressed to the House, both on this and a former day, has been directed; and I hope I have been fortunate enough to make its application so distinct, that it is unnecessary for me to trespass on the patience of the House by further illustration.
I shall, perhaps, be asked whether I mean to rest satisfied with a mere negative recommendation, and have nothing to suggest by which the evils which we all feel may be remedied or alleviated? And to this question I will give an answer before I sit down.
If the question were merely commercial, I should certainly remind the House of the advice of the French merchants to Colbert, Laissez nous faire, and deprecate any interference on the part of parliament or the government. I should trust to the constant tendency of the course of trade to equalize itself, and to
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correct any inequalities which political circumstances may have occasioned and also to the impossibility which his always been experienced of opposing of effectual obstacles to the intercourse of nations. A system of despotism which interferes with the interests, the habits, and even the necessary wants of whole countries, cannot long be enforced. Regulations which every individual has an interest and a wish to elude, will be eluded, at first, with secrecy and caution, afterwards more openly and boldly And though the terrors of severity may for some time, repress these attempt the very restraint itself will increase the temptation, and the desire to renew them. That these oppressions, or any oppressions, will provoke open resistance on the continent, I do not, indeed, expect during the present dread of the French arms, and the habitual subjection of the few princes who are yet suffered to reign. But, I believe, that in proportion to the continuance of the system of coercion, the means and facilities of evasion will be multiplied by connivance and combination, and that the decay of internal industry under a rude so arbitrary and oppressive, will ultimately render the continental nations more rather than leas dependant upon us for the supply of their wants.
But even during the first impression of rigour, and the immediate pressure of the coercive system, I have no doubt that the exchange would recover itself considerably, and most of our present evils soon disappear, if the constant necessities of our military expenditure did not counteract any improvement.
Independently of any relaxation of the continental system, we should find its continuance become less injurious to us. Substitutes would be found for the articles we have been used to receive from the countries now shut against us; new sources of trade would be opened in those to which our naval superiority still commands access, and the industry of our manufacturers would be diverted into new channels.
But the difficulty which really presses upon us, and which it will require our utmost efforts to surmount, is that of providing for the foreign expenditure of the government during the struggle to which, our commerce is exposed, and until it either shall recover some degree of freedom, or settle in to a new course.
It been credit to the manly character of the chancellor of the Exchequer that he I has not attempted to disguise this difficulty or to keep out of sight the degree in which the evils we suffer are to be traced to the necessity of carrying on a vigorous and expensive war on the continent.
I will be seen from much that I have said that I think the most effectual remedy for those evils would be peace, if such a peace as alone we ought to seek for or accept, could be obtained. But it may also have been observed, and I am not unwilling distinctly to avow, that I think such a peace pot only unattainable at present but placed at a distance which I cannot pretend to measure. I can neither foresee any probability of such success as may decide the contest in our favour, or of such a reverse as to compel us to receive the law from our enemy; and, except in the one case or the other, it does not appear to me that any pacific arrangement could take place with the smallest prospect of permanency.
Next to a general peace, the most effectual relief we could obtain would be by conciliation with America. On this point I most be cautious not to be misunderstood, By conciliation with America, I do not mean concession to America on the contrary, I am convinced, that, in the present temper of a part of America, and that now the ruling part, any concession upon points in which we have a clear right, and an evident interest, would only be received as a proof of weakness, and not accepted as an indication of good will
But I mean, that in our language, our manner, and the general tone of our proceedings, we should not only avoid any thing irritating, but mark a strong sense of common interest, and a disposition to cordial union We should avoid all difficulties of etiquette; and especially we should avoid all such language as is frequently heard out of this House, and some times meets with too much countenance within it; language which appears to assert claims of some exclusive rights, founded on the greatness of our maritime power, which we would not acknowledge in other nations; or, which I still more Condemn language which would imply that the lawless and unprincipled conduct of the enemy had set us also free from the obligations of the general law of nations, and left us at liberty to pursue any course of conduct toward neutral states
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which we might think most suited to our own views of interest or convenience.
Of all claims of this kind, wherever urged, I must express the most decided disapprobation. I am convinced, that all enlightened views of policy no less than the obligations of justice require of us to support the authority of the ancient and established law of nations, as well by our example as our arms. I know of on symptom in the profligate policy and the depraved manners of recent times, more fatal in itself, and more ominous of general ruin, than the systematic disregard which, of late, we have seen sometime slightly disguised, and sometimes shamelessly avowed, of the principles of this law. It has been the just boast of this country generally to have obeyed its precepts, and always to have acknowledged its obligation; and to any deviation from such a system of conduct, I must profess the most determined and persevering op position. But I hope, that not, only no claim will be pressed upon America, to which we have not a clear right, but that her interests and her feelings will be consulted in cases in which, though our right may be clear, the policy may be doubtful or of no great importance, provided that the right itself shall not suffer from our forbearance to enforce it, and that there shall be on the side of America some apparent disposition to meet our advances with reciprocal good will.
I cannot easily believe that such measures will fail in their effect upon America. Where the mutual interest is so great, where the ties of amity are so various and so strong, I cannot easily under-stand what demon of discord can so pervert the understandings, as well as embitter the hearts of men, as to stir up enmity between countries so connected. I see many proofs that there exists, a great port at least of the people of America, that just veneration for our institutions, from which their own are derived, that sort of filial regard for the land of their ancestors which is natural and reasonable and I cannot but think that every symptom of an inclination on the part of our government, cordially to cultivate their friendship, will cherish and encourage these dispositions.
I must desire not to be understood implying in these remarks, any distrust of the wishes of his Majesty' ministers to conciliate America. I know of no reason to doubt the sincerity of the professions

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they have always made of such a disposition as I recommend. But I wish, on this occasion, to point out its connection with the subject of our present deliberation, and its importance towards restoring our commercial transactions to their natural and favourable course.
In considering difficulties in which the most prominent feature is the scarcity and Want of the precious metals, it is natural to look for relief to the countries, of which the precious metals are the native produce. The accounts which reach the public, of the state of the Spanish colonies, are too uncertain and contradictory to enable us to form any distinct judgment of their real situation; and I can, therefore, only hint in general terms to the members of the government, the propriety of inquiring, whether, in the way of loan or some other mode, a supply of bullion may not be obtained from Mexico, or some other part of America. The Spanish government would be bound by the strongest motives of interest as well as gratitude, to lend all the assistance in its power to the execution of such apian; and its application might be exclusively directed, as indeed it would naturally be destined, to the support of the war in the peninsula.
There are other arrangements more immediately of an official nature, by which the executive government may, in some degree, be able to relieve the pressure of our foreign expences upon the course of exchange. I shall not attempt to go into any detail on this head, because such arrangements will be best settled between the board of treasury and the different departments of expenditure. There is, perhaps, no one in which something may not be done, either to find some resource abroad, of to provide at home supplies Which are usually procured from foreign countries. And, in a state of things so extraordinary as the present, it may be advantageous, in many cases, to change the course of proceeding which has, in ordinary times, Been found the best adapted to the public service. I am sensible that there; is always some difficulty and inconvenience in changing the routine of business; but, in an emergency like the present, all subordinate considerations must be sacrificed, and the most, unremitted vigilance exerted to find even occasional expedients.
I am aware that ideas, such as I have last mentioned, may probably have occurred to other gentlemen who hare paid
68
attention to this subject, and may, perhaps, have been anticipated by measures already taken by the government; but I thoughts them worth mentioning, not only from the'; chance of their suggesting some useful step, but in order to show, that I am not without hopes of our having some means of relief in our power.
What, however, I am principally anxious to impress upon the House is that as our difficulties arise, not from any radical defect in our own system, but from a violent and unnatural state of things operating abroad, in conjunction with other causes;, of which we have, in former times, often; felt the effects; it is not in any change of our internal arrangements, that me must seek for the remedy. So far as these difficulties arise from the coercive system of the enemy it is a consolation to us to know' from experience, that such measures of oppression have never been long executed with success. And so far a they may originate from causes known and experienced on former occasions, we have some means of judging of their nature and ex tent, and have reason to look for relief to the same counteracting principles which have formerly been found efficacious.
It seems to me at present to be the office of parliament to calm the agitation of the public, which has been in a great degree excited by the proceedings of its Committee, by declaring its decided and deliberate opinion, that our situation is still sound, and that any attempt to disturb it in the hope of improvement would only be productive of injurious consequences,
With a view to such a declaration, and at the same time to record the facts which appear to me most material is forming the; ground-work of such an opinion, I submit the Resolutions in my hand, to the judgment of the House. I cannot but hope-that when the facts recorded in them shall be brought before the public in so short and clear a form, they will add much to the impression which the deliberate judgement of the House, pronounced after a length of discussion almost unexampled, cannot fail to make. I wish to show, not only to this country, but to the world: at large, that the decision of parliament has, not been founded upon any fear of meeting our difficulties fairly, or any wish to disguise our real situation, much less on any views of political advantage to any division of this House, but upon a calm appeal to reason and experience and for this purpose the long and patient investigation

69
in which we have been engaged, will be eminently useful. And it adds not a little to the firmness of my conviction of the propriety the proceeding I have taken the liberty to recommend, to find, that I the most laborious research at last brings us back to the same conclusion, to which daily observation, and plain common sense, at once conducted the body of the nation;
In the course of this long debate, several of the gentlemen, from whom I have the misfortune to dissent, and whose argument I have thought it proper to disavow all motives of party feeling, or political partiality, I am ready to give the most perfect credit to then professions, for I cannot willingly believe that any member of this House would suffer himself to be guided by party feelings, in a question which involved the danger of a national bankruptcy, in which all distinctions of party would be swallowed up: in the general ruin; and, I may add, that the part which many gentlemen have taken, on this occasion, different from that of their usual political connexions, is an:. honourable proof of the sincerity of those professions. But since so much has been said upon this subject, I may be pardoned for reminding The House, that these Resolutions are proposed to them by a man who can have no party objects in view who has received much kindness from all parties, and favours from none; and who can have no other motive, in the part he has taken, than the hope that one of his days of mourning may not have been spent in vain.
The right hon. gentleman concluded with moving the following Resolutions:
1. Resolved "That the right of establishing and regulating the legal money of this kingdom hath at all times been a royal prerogative vested in the sovereigns thereof, who have, from time to time, exercised the same as they have seen fit, in changing such legal money, or altering and varying the value, and enforcing or restraining the circulation thereof, by proclamation, or in concurrence with the states of the realm by. Act of Parliament: and that such legal money cannot lawfully be defaced, melted down, or exported.
2. "That the promissory notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, are engagements to pay certain sums of money in the legal coin of this kingdom; and that for more than a century
70
past, the said Governor and Company were at all times ready to discharge such promissory notes in legal coin of the realm until restrained from so doing on the 25th, of February I797, by an order of council, confirmed by Act of Parliament.
3. "That the promissory notes of the said Company have hitherto been, and are at this time, held in public estimation to be equivalent to the legal coin of the realm, and generally accepted as such in all pecuniary transactions to which such coin is lawfully applicable.
4."That at various periods, as well before as since the said restriction, the exchanges between Great Britain and several other countries have been unfavourable to Great Britain; and that during such periods, the prices of gold and silver bullion, especially of such gold bullion as could be legally exported, have frequently risen above the Mint price; and the coinage of money at the Mint has been either wholly suspended or greatly diminished in amount: and that such circumstances have usually occurred when expensive naval and military operations have been carried on abroad; and in times of public danger or alarm; or when large importations of grain from foreign parts have taken place,
5."That such unfavourable exchanges, and rise in the price of bullion, occurred to a greater or less degree during the wars carried on by king William the third and queen Anne; and also during part of the seven year war, and of the American war, and during the war and scarcity of grain in 1795 and 1796, when the difficulty of procuring cash or bullion increased to such a degree, that on the 25th of February 1797, the Bank of England was restrained from making payments in cash, by an order of council, confirmed and, continued to the present time by divers Acts of Parliament and the exchanges became still more unfavourable, and the price of bullion higher, during the scarcity which prevailed for two years previous to the peace of Amiens.
6. "That the unfavourable state of the exchanges, and the high price of Bullion do not, in any of the instances above referred to, appear to have been produced by the restriction upon cash payments at the Bank of England, or by any excess in the issue of Bank notes; inasmuch as all the said instances except the last occurred previously to any restriction on such cash payments: and because so far

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as appears by such information as has been procured, the price of bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges roost unfavourable, at periods when the is sues of Bank notes have been considerably diminished, and they have been afterwards restored to their ordinary rates, although those issues have been in creased,
7. "That during the period of nearly seventy-eight years;, ending with the 1st of January 1796, and previous to the aforesaid restriction, of which period ac-counts-are before the House, the price of (standard gold in bars has been at or under the Mint price twenty-eight years and five moths; and above the said Mint price forty-eight years and eleven months; and that the price of foreign gold coin has been at or under 3l. 18 s. per ounce, thirty-six years and seven month", and above the said price thirty-nine years and three months; and that during the remaining intervals no prices are seated,—And that during the same period of seventy-eight-years, the price of standard silver appears to have been at or under the Mint price, three years and two months only.
8. "That during the latter part, and for some time after the close of the American war, during the years 1781, 1782, and 1783, and the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 34. 1 to 31. 5, being about eight per cent.; and the price of foreign gold rose from 3l. 17 s. 6d. to 4l. 2s. 3d. per ounce, and the price of dollars from 5s. 4½d. per ounce, to 5s. 11½d.; and that the Bank-notes in circulation were reduced between March 1782, and December 1782, from 9,160,000 l. to 5,995,000 l, being a diminution of above; one third, and continued (with occasional variations) at such reduced rate until December 1784: and that the exchange with Hamburgh rose to 34. 6, and the price of gold fell to 3l. 178.6d. and dollars to 5s. 1½d. per ounce, before the 25th of February 1787, the amount of Bank-notes being then increased to 8,688,000 l.
9. "That the amount of Bank-notes in February 1787, was 8,688,000 l. and in February 1791, 11,699,000 l.; and that during the same period, the sum of 10,704,000 l. was coined in gold; and that the exchange with Hamburgh rose about three per cent.
10. "That the average amount of Bank-notes in the year 1795, was about 11,497,000 l and on the 25th of 'February 1797 was reduced to 8,640,000 l. during
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which time the exchange with; Hamburgh fell from 36 to 35 being about 3 per cent and the said amount. was increased to 11,855,000 l exclusive of 1,512,000 l notes of 1l and 2l each on the lst of February 1798 during: Which time the exchange rose to 38,2, being about 9 per cent.
11." That the average price of wheat per quarter, in England, in the year 1d was 50 s. 3d.; in 1709, 634. 5d.,; m 1800 113 s. 7d.; in 1801, 1183 3d.; and in 1802, 67 s. 5d.
The amount of Bank-know of 5l and upwards, was

About

And under.

Makine together

in 1798,

10,920,400 l.

1,786,000 l,

12,706,400 l.

in 1799,

12,048,790 l.

1,626,110 l.

13,674,9061

in 1800,

13,421,920 l.

1,831,820 l.

15,253,740 l

in 1801,

13,454,370 l.

2,715,18 l.

16,169,550 l.

in 1802,

13,917,980 l.

3,136,470 l.

17,054,450 l

"That the exchange with Hamburgh was in January 1798,38.2; January 1799, 37.7; January 1800,32.; January 1801, 29.8; being in the whole a fail of above 22 per cent.—in January 1802,. 32.2;, and December 1802, 34; being in the whole a rise of about 13 per tent.
12. "That during all the periods above referred to, previous to the commencement of the war with France in 1793, the principal states of Europe preserved their independence, and the trade and correspondence thereof were carried on conformably to the accustomed law of nation"; and that although from the time of the invasion of Holland by the French in 1795, the trade of Great Britain with the continent was in part circumscribed and interrupted, it Was carried on freely with several of the most considerable ports, and commercial correspondence was maintained at all times previous to the summer of 1807.
13. "That since the month of November 1806, and especially since the summer of 1807, a system of exclusion has been established against the British trade on the continent of Europe, under the influence and terror of the French power, and enforced with a degree of violence and rigour never before attempted; whereby all trade and correspondence between Great Britain and the continent of Europe has (with some occasional exceptions, chiefly in Sweden and in certain parts of Spain and Portugal) been hazardous, precarious, and expensive trade being loaded with excessive freights to foreign shipping, and other unusual obarges: and that the trade of Great Britain with the United States of America has also

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been uncertain and interrupted; and that in addition to these circumstances, which have greatly affected the course of payment between this country and oilier nations, the naval and military expenditure of the United Kingdom in foreign parts has for three years past been very great and the price of grain, owing to a deficiency in the crops, higher than at any time, where of the accounts appear before parliament, except during the scarcity of 1800 and 1801; and that large quantities thereof have been imported.
14. "That the amount of currency necessary for carrying on the transactions of the Country, must bear a proportion to the exten of its trade and its public revenue and expenditure; and that the annual amount of the exports and imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 5th of January 1797, was 48,732,651 l. official Value; the average amount of revenue paid into the exchequer, including monies raised by lottery, 18,759,165 l.; and of loans 18,409,842 l making together 37,169,007 l.; and the average amount of the total expenditure of Great Britain, 42,855,111 l.; and that the average amount of Bank-notes in circulation (all of which were for five pounds, or upwards) was about 10,782,780 l.; and that 57,274,617 l. had been coined in gold; during his Majesty's reign, of which a large sum was then in circulation:
"That the annual amount of the exports; and imports of Great Britain, on an average of three years ending 5th of January 1811, supposing the imports from the East Indies and China, in the year ending 5th of January 1811, to have been; equal to their amount in the preceding year, was 77,971,318 l.; the average amount of revenue paid into the exchequer, 62,763,746 l.; and of loans, 12,673,548 l. making together 75,437,294 l.; and the;. average amount of the total expenditure of Great Britain, 82,205,066 l.; and that the average amount of Bank-notes, above 5l., was about 14,265,850 l. and of notes; under 5l., about 5,283,330 l.; and that the amount of gold coin in circulation was greatly diminished.
15. "That the situation of this kingdom, in respect of its political and commercial relations with foreign countries, as above stated, is sufficient, without any change in the internal value of its currency, to account for the unfavourable state of the foreign exchanges, and for the high price of bullion.
16." That it is highly important that; the restriction on the payments in cash of the Bank of England, should be removed-whenever the political and commercial relations of the country shall render it compatible with the public interest.
17. "That under the circumstances affecting the political and commercial relations of this kingdom with foreign countries, it would be highly inexpedient and dangerous, now to fix a definite period for the removal of the restriction of cash payments at the Bank of England, prior to the term already fixed by the act 44 Geo. 3 c. 1. of six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace."
Mr. Magensdeclared that there never was a Committee appointed by that House by which more had been done to elicit the truth, than by the Bullion Committee Their Report, however, was said by some gentlemen to have done mischief; and is had been alledged, that, had it not been for that Report, France would have rescinded her Berlin and Milan Decree, His own merchants, however, had the a told Buonaparté, that if those Decrees were not rescinded, they would cause the ruin of France. In this they had been found to be correct, and the trade of France was now reduced to a state almost of total annihilation. If so, he was willing to hope that, by comparing the last year with the present, the situation of this country would be found to be very different indeed. Many clerks, no doubt, who had received credit in consequence of the excessive issue of paper, and who had embarked thousands of pounds in the wildest of all speculations, had got their names into the Gazette; but had the real, fair, and substantial merchant been reduced to this situation? No. And, of course, instead of our mercantile situation being worse, we were now in a more wholesome state, after having got quit of this excess of paper, with which the market was incumbered; and we had now people of capital ready to embark in trade, whenever a fair prospect of doing so with advantage presented itself. He asked then, was not our situation mended, and was not that of France more fallen than it had hitherto been? All writers agreed that the standard must be either in gold or silver; it could not be in both. Till the year 1717, silver had been the standard in this country; then, indeed but more particularly in the year 1774 the preference was given to gold. The

75
main question here was, whether paper was depreciated He should not go over the arguments on this subject, agreeing as he did, with the Chairman of the Bullion Committee, and with the gentlemen who had followed him, in supporting that side of the question; but he begged to say a few words by way of illustration. He had never before heard of an non-convertible paper currency. Such an idea had always been treated as a vision, a scheme, a chimera. It might be carried on for a while, but could never be regarded as a standard. Our paper might be depreciated in four different ways: first, in sending supplies, pay, &c. to our armies abroad: Second, in our imports: third, in our exports: and fourthly, as to our situation at home. Under the first of these Beads, we had to send abroad last year, 2s millions, and in consequence of the depreciation of our paper, had to pay 120 l. for every 100 l. Our imports were 50 millions, and the persons who sent them here: calculated on receiving in return, not what we called the value, but what they found on the continent to be the intrinsic value of the imports, so that here again we had to pay 120 l. for every 100 l. that being the rate at which our paper was estimated on the continent.—Again, as to our exports; for what was worth one thousand pounds of our money, those to whom we sent them, would only give 800 l. if to be paid for in gold. Bank notes, therefore, were depreciated in all these respects. He could not resolve in his mind any other intrinsic value, but the value merchants put on any commodity. If the standard was found, no matter what it was; but, till found, every thing must be in confusion. If the Committee chose to confess that the paper currency was depreciated 20 per cent, and then to say, let it stand as it is, he had no objection. But the standard must be ascertained. Paper had a tendency to increase, and would go on increasing, if not checked. It had been said, that there would be a hardship in calling on people to make payments in gold now, when it was at an increased price. This was an evil, however, which would go on increasing every year, and; therefore should be remedied at once. He contended that paper was depreciated, when compared with gold even in respect to articles to: be purchased in this country, and that if he was to go to purchase an article of gold in a jeweller's shop, He would get it for a smaller propor-
76
tion of gold in coin, than if he were to tender paper in payment of it. He should move as an amendment on the 16th Resolution. That it was highly expedient that the Bank of England should resume payments in specie the moment it could be done consistently with the public safety. The evil could only be remedied by a firm determination to reduce the paper currency within its proper bounds, and by preparing for a gradual resumption of payments in cash.
Mr. Pattisonstated the fluctuations of the exchanges, and compared them with the issues of the Bank from the year 1756 to the present time. From the amount of the latter and the state of the former, be contended it was evident that the Bank issues had not the effect upon the ex change which had been supposed; as with reduced issues, the exchange had at various times been reduced, and when those issues were again increased the exchange had recovered.
Mr. Henry Thorntonobserved, that having, when he before addressed himself to, the House, spoken antecedently to alt those gentlemen to whom he was opposed, excepting only one right hon. gentleman (Mr. Rose), who had chiefly dwelt on they details of the Report; and having now the advantage of distinctly knowing the grounds on which their argument rested; he was anxious to be permitted once more-to offer himself to their notice.
The speech of his right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart), in support of the Resolutions now proposed by him to be substituted in the place of those of the chair man of the Bullion Committee, had particularly urged him to rise. In the conclusion of that speech, his right hon. friend had enumerated the various circumstances to which he looked as the means of producing an improvement of the exchange first, a continental peace; secondly; as better understanding, and, consequently an open trade with America; thirdly some extension of our commercial inter course with Europe; all of them especially the first, events which he did not; much encourage us to expect:—but it was remarkable that he totally omitted any mention of a limitation of paper, in this enumeration of the means of meliorating our exchanges. His right hon. friend, in one part of his speech, as well as the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer, had admitted that a limitation of paper had a tendency to produce this effect but it

77
was plain from the concluding part of it that the principle was practically disregarded Indeed his Resolutions were in the Same spirit; they were silent on this point they did not venture to deny the doctrine, that quantity of paper had an influence on its value; but they seemed to throw a doubt upon it; for they specified a variety of facts, with the evident view of discrediting the principle; and thus were calculated to lead men, less enlightened than the mover, to suppose that the tenets of the Bullion Committee, in this respect, were completely visionary and erroneous,
He rejoiced that his right hon. friend was the person who led the opposition to the Report of the Bullion Committee, because he was confident, that, with such an adversary, the discussion would be amicable and free from party spirit, and because the House was sure of hearing so much: ability employed on that side of the subject. He could not, however, help re-marking, that his right hon. friend himself had been a party in an administration which had twice extended the term of the continuance of the Restriction act on a principle which, if parliament would now give its attention to the subject, he could not help thinking that they would perceive to have been very objectionable,
Twice, under the administration of lord Sidmouth, of whom he wished to speak most respectfully—namely, once in peace, and once after the recommencement of the war—the act for restricting the cash payment of the Bank was renewed, upon the professed ground of the unfavourable-ness of the exchanges. This was not the principle on which the first act had passed, and he much questioned whether the parliament would have ever consented to institute such a measure merely on that plea. It was by means of an unfavourable exchange, and a high price of bullion, that an excess of Bank paper was detected and restrained, as he trusted that he had already sufficiently shewn. The ground on which the Restriction Bill had passed was much more justifiable, namely, that of an alarm arising out of the idea of an immediate invasion, which caused a violent run upon the Bank, and threatened suddenly and unavoidably to exhaust its coffers. The state, for political reasons, On that occasion interfered. To extend the suspension because the exchange was unfavourable, was to adopt a new and dangerous course He recollected to have
78
himself, on one occasion remarked on the in sufficiency of this motive for the renewal; but the subject did not always particularly attract the attention of the House; it now, therefore, became them and especially since they were resolved to continue the suspension, to look well to the general principles on which both they, and the Bank proceeded, and not to consider themselves as debating merely on a temporary measure.
One great security to the Bank of England, heretofore, had been its independence of the government its paper, had been properly restrained, because the government had felt no interest and taken; no part in the extended issue of it; and he submitted, whether, if the subserviency of large issues from the Bank to the purposes of the war, and the convenience of the state, were, during the suspension of cash payments, to be a principle recognised by, parliament, the state and the Bank might not become identified in point of interest, somewhat in the same manner as those; government banks on the continent, whose paper had become first excessive and then depreciated.
It might not be improper to take, to, slight survey of the whole period which, had passed since the first Bank restriction, bill in 1797. Probably, in consequence as he had before shewn, of a limitation of paper which was antecedent to that æra, and perhaps in consequence also of the caution which the Bank would naturally, exercise for some time after it, the ex-changes in 1797 and 1798 were peculiarly favourable, and a great tide of gold flowed into the country. In the year 1800 and 1801, when the scarcity of corn occurred—a commercial event more likely, per-haps, than any other to prejudice the exchange—the tide turned quite as much., against us: the exchanges then fell below the point which they had ever reached; while the Bank was open. The Bank did not at that time limit its issues, which it certainly would have done if it had been liable to make its payments in cash. The exchange, however, recovered itself, in 1802, but it did not improve so much as, to bring back gold into the country After a few more years, the exchange turned much against us; and it had now for the space of nearly three years, continued more unfavourable than it was ever known to be before the suspension Thus the only influx of gold, of which we had had the benefit, since the suspen-

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sion act of 1797, was, apparently, in consequence of a limitation of paper antecedent to that period. There would naturally be a tendency to excess during the suspension of cash payments; but the first consequences of such excess, as well as the peculiar pressure of 1801 and 1802, would undoubtedly be mitigated by the exportation of a large portion of that immense fund of gold, with which the providence of the time preceding the suspension had enriched us; and the recovery of the exchange in 1802 was thus facilitated. When the second great pressure, of 808 and 1809, arose, it found us stripped of a great part of our coin; and this probably was the reason why it proved so serious. It soon carried off our little remaining gold; and we were therefore now arrived at a period when we were no longer protected against the most fearful fall of our exchanges. As long as the foreigner knew that the bill on England which he bought, could be turned into cash, which cash was of a given value, and subject, though contrary to law, to be transported, there was a limit to the depression of the price of the bill; and this limit would exist even during the suspension of the cash payments of the bank, provided there was a moderate quantity of gold coin actually circulating; for, in that case, if the exchange fell below a certain point, some men would clandestinely collect our guineas, and thus furnish a remittance; but now a man must walk a mile before he can collect a guinea; he; must incur great expense in gathering, as well as in purchasing, the very trifling quantity of coin which remained among us. The limit, therefore, to the fall of the bill, was no longer what it had been: we were ceasing to have any limit, and were therefore now arriving at a new state of danger; so that it was difficult to say, in case untoward circumstances should arise, what might be the extent to which the exchange possibly might run down. Such had been the effect of the long continuance of the Bank restriction Bill, and of the system under which we had acted during the fourteen years of its existence. The House had now decided against the repeal of it, and seemed to intend that the bill should remain in force until the period already assigned to it, of six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace. He was not eager as to the question whether the Bank should now be required to open at any early period. He would wil-
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lingly have agreed to suspend the determination of that point, if he could but have seen a disposition to act in the mean lime, in such a manner as to facilitate the opening. But the misfortune was that the directors of the Bank seemed to consider the suspension as exempting them from the necessity of pursuing the principles on which they would have acted if no suspending hill had passed, and on which also they could not fail now to act, if they were liable to pay in Cash. To one of them the question was put, "Supposing the Bank to pay in cash, and a great drain to arise (and there could be no doubt that a great drain would now arise if the Bank were liable to pay in cash) should you advise some diminution of bank paper?" The answer was, I must recommend it from necessity, though in my opinion it would not improve the exchange. I think if one of the advantages of the restriction bill, that we are not driven to that necessity." The parliament, if they voted the resolutions of his right hon. friend, would fortify the Bank in these opinions. They had, in-deed, already indicated their approbation of them, by negativing all the first resolutions of the learned gentleman; and in consequence of that vote, which he had considered to be a vote against any limitation of paper, he had reluctantly joined in the subsequent vote for opening the bank in two years; a vote which he should have been glad to have had an opportunity of qualifying, by specifying certain accompanying measures, by which he thought that the apparent severity of it might have been mitigated, and the opening much facilitated. He had, when in the Bullion Committee, expressed a wish to soften the terms used in that part of the report which suggested that the restriction should cease in two years. He was clearly against a period so indefinite as that of six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace, considering all the experience we had had. He was for returning to the principle on which we had set out, that of allowing to the Bank only a short term; possibly renewing it, if necessary, but not as a latter of course, and on the mere ground that the exchanges were unfavourable. He was aware that the gentlemen opposed to him had gained a great advantage by turning the attention of the public to the opening of the Bank; as if that were the only thing recommended by the Bullion com-

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mittee. This was hot the sole object of their report. There had been many shades of opinion upon that part of it, among men agreed in all their fundamental principles. The Bullion Committee had been far more united on the other point on which he had dwelt—the propriety of limiting the bank issues with a view to the improvement of the exchange. The parliament was now taking part with the bank against their own Committee, in respect to this important principle; and the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer, in exerting himself on the same side, appeared to him to be taking on Himself a fearful responsibility.
It had appeared in the course of the present debates that the chief circumstance which had led the Directors of the Bank, to embrace the opinion that the quantity of their paper had no influence on the exchange, was the doctrine which they entertained respecting; what is called the balance of trade. The state of the exchange was, according to them, the unavoidable consequence of an unfavourable balance: be therefore requested leave to enter some what fully into this tonic.
An inaccurate use or words had served to confuse many parts of the general subject under discussion; and the term balance of trade, in particular, had contributed to this perplexity; He would endeavour to expose the error involved in this expression; and in order to do this, it might be convenient to remark how it first obtained currency.
Our ancestors, eager for the acquisition of the precious metals, exploring, as is well known, new continents, chiefly with a view to this article; and accustomed to consider trade as profitable or otherwise, in proportion as; it brought in or took out gold and silver, were naturally led to de-nominate that part of our exports or imports which consisted of these metals, a balance. In truth, however, this was not a balance. Bullion was an article of commerce, rising or falling in value according to the supply and the demand, exactly like any other, transporting itself in greater or less quantities according to the comparative state of the market for that and for other articles, and forming only an item on one side of the general account. Corn, or any other commodity, might just as properly be said to pay the balance as gold or silver, but it would evidently be inaccurate to affirm that corn discharged it, because it would imply that the amount
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of ail the articles except corn was fixed; and that these having first adjusted them-selves with relation only to each other, a given quantity of corn was then added to pay the difference. It was, for the same reason, inaccurate to affirm, that gold or silver paid the difference. He was aware that many of our older writers of great name had used expressions of this sort, and that a phraseology borrowed from such respectable authority ought not to be too much censured. They had written, however, at a time when paper currency scarcely had an existence; they had not contemplated the consequence of the introduction of so much paper credit: they had therefore not guarded or measured their expressions, as they probably would have done, if they had foreseen the use which was now made of them.
The Governor of the Bank (Mr. Man-nine) had in his speech quoted a passage in Mr. Locke, containing the term oft which he had just animadverted, and had grounded himself on what he inferred from this expression to be the principles of that an hon. The words of Mr. Locke were these;—" the coming and going of our treasure depends wholly upon the balance of trade;"—a mode of speaking which certainly countenanced the doctrine of the hon. gent, and other Bank Directors, namely, that there is no possibility of preventing the departure of our gold by any measures which the Bank can take, inasmuch as it is balance of trade, and, balance of trade alone, which regulates both its coming and its going, over which balance the Bank has no controul. It would be found, however, that Mr. Locke could not be so completely claimed as an authority, on the side of the Governor of the Bank, as might at first view be supposed; for-Mr. Locke, in the part of his work immediately preceding that from which the quotation was taken, speaks of "two cases" in which profit may be made by melting down our money: "First, when the current prices of the same denomination are unequal and of different weights, some heavier, some lighter; the other that; of a losing trade, or an over-great consumption of foreign commodities; and then goes on to say, that "the coming and going of our treasure depends wholly on the balance of trade.
Mr. Locke, therefore, refers to either of two causes the disappearance of coin Agreeing in this respect with Sir Isaac Newton and others, whom his hon. friend

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(Mr. Huskisson) had quoted, he affirms that two kinds of circulating medium, if of different value, cannot long continue to pass interchangeably, because the heavier and more valuable pieces will be melted down, with or without law, and the light ones only will remain. Did gentlemen allow the truth of what Sir Isaac Newton and other high authorities, not excepting Mr. Locke, had laid down as a fundamental maxim in this science? If they did, they ought to admit not only that silver currency would disappear, if of more value than gold; and gold currency, if of more value than silver; and heavy pieces, if light ones were allowed equally to pass; but also that gold currency would vanish, if a paper currency of inferior value was circulating at the same time. Silver coin was not now a legal tender fur more than a limited amount; gold coin and paper were therefore the only two currencies in use for the payment of large sums; gold was now to paper what it had formerly been to silver, and what the heavier pieces of gold had been to the lighter pieces of the same metal. Thus, the present disappearance of our gold coin, might be ascribed to the first of the two causes mentioned by Mr Locke, namely, the difference in value between the two kinds of currency in the country: and not to the second cause, the unfavourable, balance of trade.
Still, however, the language of Mr. Locke was certainly inaccurate, when he said, that, the "coming and going of our treasure depends wholly on the balance of our; trade," and served, to countenance that dangerous doctrine which now prevailed, Recording to this doctrine, the fact of the disappearance of our guineas attended with the highest imaginable price of gold, was no indication of an excess of paper or of a depreciation of it, but was simply any evidence of an unfavourable balance of trade; and the only remedy was generally to promote national industry and œconomy. It might, indeed, be imagined by some, that according to this view of the subject, even additional issues paper, would operate as a remedy; for it might be said than an increased emission of it tended, to encourage manufactures, an augmented quantity of manufactures supplied the means of enlarging bur exports, and more extended exports, improved the balance of trade; and thus an increased issue of paper might be assumed to be the, means of rectifying the ex-
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change, instead of prejudicing it. This was exactly the course of argument into which the noble lord over the way (lord Castlereagh) appeared in one part of his speech to be running. It was an error to which he himself had once inclined, but he had stood corrected after a fuller consideration of the subject. There must obviously be a fallacy in this way of reasoning. It proved too much. It implied, that indefinitely to increase our paper, was the way indefinitely to improve its value in exchange for the circulating medium of other countries, as well as in exchange for bullion and for all commodities. The utmost admission which he was disposed to make was, that in proceeding to limit our paper with a view to the improvement of the exchange, we ought to avoid that severity of pressure by which manufacturing industry might be seriously interrupted
According to the same erroneous doctrine, the export of our gold coin in each of those instances of which Sir Isaac Newton and others spoke, was referable to balance of trade, and not to the cause to which they ascribed it. When in the reign of king William, our gold coin went abroad, in consequence, if we were to credit Sir Isaac Newton, of its Having become more valuable than our silver, through a change in the relative value of the two articles, it went to pay a balance of trade; for it was balance of trade, and balance of trade alone, according to the tenets a question, which caused the precious metals to transfer themselves to other countries. When in a subsequent year, a similar difference between the two kinds of currency occurred, it was in order again to pay a balance of trade that the better coin quitted the kingdom. He would put another case. Suppose a fisherman on our southern coast, to collect a thousand guineas, and exchange them in the channel with some French fisherman for as much French brandy as should be deemed an equivalent, the gold, according to the doctrine in fashion, would have gone to pay the balance of trade. It would have been employed to discharge a previously existing national debt. It was always, according to these tenets, the brandy which forced out the gold, and not at all the gold which forced in the brandy. By the Frenchman's putting the brandy in to his boat the Englishman was compelled to put the gold in to his. The brandy, always went before the gold always followed after It was one

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of the peculiar properties of gold that it always served to pay a balance.
The truth was, that our paper currency having become less valuable by nearly twenty per cent, than the gold contained in our coin, the coin could no longer circulate interchangeably for it, but went abroad, because there was a profit of nearly twenty per cent, on the transmission. This profit operated as effectually in withdrawing it from circulation, and causing that part of it which was not bought at a high price for manufacturing uses, to be exported, as if an actual bounty of twenty per cent, were given on the export of it; and as much prevented the importation of gold for the purpose of serving as currency—the only purpose for which large quantities of gold were usually imported as if a tax of twenty per cent, were levied on the import of it. We deplored the loss of our gold coin; but by not limiting our Bank notes, we were thus, in substance, laying a tax on its importation, and giving a bounty on its exportation: and then, referring its absence to balance of trade, we imagined that we had no power of recalling it.
He admitted that some thing was to be conceded on the ground of an unfavourable state of trade and a had harvest, as well as on account of large draughts on discharge of the foreign expenditure of government our manufactures, and other exportable commodities, might happen not to be in such demand abroad as to supply, on such occasions, the whole of the remittance advantageously. The precious metals were in more universal request than any other article; and the transmission of a certain quantity of these might prevent so low a selling prince of our commodities, in the foreign market, as might otherwise be necessary. But our gold, was now gone, and that disadvantage of which he was speaking, was therefore one against which we were beginning to be quite unprotected. Our coin had for the most part left us in 1801. The state of our trade and foreign expenditure seemed not likely to improve materially. The exchange could not be corrected, as heretofore, by the transmission of specie. The cautious limitation of our paper was, therefore, a principle to which every consideration of prudence should lead us to resort.
Several of the first Resolutions of his right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart) were intended to shew that there was no correspondence between the variations in the ex-
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change for some time past, and the existing quantity of notes. He had in his former speech remarked, in reply; that at three several periods—in 1783, 1795 and 1796, and 1797—the Bank had experienced a drain of gold, had consequently restrained their issues, and had experienced a subsequent improvement of the exchange. His right him. friend erroneously assumed that the Bullion Committee deemed the effect of a limitation of paper to be instantaneous; an error which was exposed by the amendments intended to be offered by the chairman of the Bullion Committee. The influence both of a reduction and increase of paper, though sure, might be slow, and probably would be various, both as to the degree and time of its operation: it would affect, first, one kind of commodity, then another; probably operating more early on those article" of which the sale was for ready money, reaching slowly the land, and still more slowly the labour of the country. When an over issue of paper had produced a general alteration in the price of labour, and, through the price of labour, on that of commodities, the improvement of the exchanges became more difficult and hope-less; and this consideration ought to induce us not to delay the reduction of our Bank notes till the wages of labour had become materially affected. In the case of an alteration in the value of the coin of a country, the operation on prices, though in like manner sure, was also in like manner slow and irregular. Mr. Hume, in speaking of the successive deteriorations of the Trench coin, in the reign of Louis XIV. had remarked, that they did not at once produce a proportionate rise of prices. He says, "Though the high price of commodities be a necessary consequence of the increase of gold and silver," (as it surely must also be of the increase of paper currency). "yet it follows not immediately on that increase, but some time is required before the money circulates through the whole state. At first, no alteration is perceived: by degrees the price rises, first of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie in the kingdom. In my opinion, he adds, "it is only in the interval; between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the increasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry Those gentlemen who are eager to maintain an extended paper circulation, with a

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view of Serving commerce, would do well to bear in mind this very sound observation of Mr. Hume. They should remember, that it is only by the perpetual increase of paper that their object can be fully effected. They should also reflect, that, in proportion to this increase, the exchange will be prejudiced, and the standard of the country forsaken. Mr. Hume goes on to specify some facts in proof of his general position And that the specie," says he "may increase to a considerable pitch before it have this latter effect" (of raising prices), appears, amongst other "stances, from the frequent operations of the French king on the money; where it was always found, that the augmenting of the numerary value did not produce a proportional rise of prices, at least for some time. In the last year of Louis XIV. money was raised three sevenths, but prices augmented only one.
The impression intended to be conveyed by his right hon. friend (Mr. Vansittart) was this; that, inasmuch as as there was he exact correspondence between the quantity of paper and the state of the exchanges, at the periods which were specified by him, the evidence of facts was against the doctrine of the Bullion Committee, that a diminution of paper tended to moderate the exchange. His right hon. friend, if reasoning at the time of Louis XIV. might have shewn the evidence of facts to have been against the corresponding doctrine of Mr. Hume, that a debasement of the quality, and consequent enlargement of the quantity, of the coin of a kingdom, tended to raise prices. He would have only had; to select some day almost immediately following the debasement, in order to shew that no perceivable consequence had followed. It then took a year to produce an effect amounting to 1–7th, when the whole ultimate effect ought plainly to be, and doubtless was, 3–7ths. The case of the Bank of France, in 1805, might, in like manner, have been turned by his right hon. friend to the purpose of proving his own point. The restriction of its paper was not effectual at once; it was not operative in any kind of regular proportion to its degree. These two cases served, nevertheless, on the whole, to establish the doctrine of the Bullion Committee. They shewed both the general effect and the irregularity of it. Nothing indeed, was more easy, than for one who in a case like this had the choice of the days on which
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he was to make his comparisons, to state, facts which would seem to prove almost any thing. In one instance, this, right hon. friend, arguing from the amount of Bank notes on a single day; had stated them three millions higher than a note supplied by a Bank Director (Mr. Raikes) had allowed them to be; of which error he had become so convinced, as to have altered his resolution. It was only by averages of the amount, and not by: the amount on single days, and it was by looking to periods subsequent to the limitation of paper, that any sound inference could be made.
There was another species of unfair Ness in the Resolutions. They stated the fluctuations in the exchange and the price of bullion, for a long time preceding the suspension of cash payments; and then spoke of the variations since that period, as if these were somewhat similar in their degree. But was the House aware of the different extent of the fluctuations in the two periods? He would specify the fluctuations in the price of bullion. This was a surer test of depreciation than the exchanges. Many circumstances perplexed our inquiry into the true par of exchange; it was necessary to know, first, the exact standard in foreign countries; secondly the degree of wear of the current foreign coin; for it was with the, coin actually circumstances and not with mat which was fresh from the foreign mint, that the comparison with our own was to be made—we ought likewise to be informed whether there was any, and what, foreign seignorage and also, indeed, what obstacles to the exportation of the foreign currency. But, besides these sources of inaccuracy, many of which were continually varying, there was another most fruitful cause of error, namely, the circumstance of the standard of this country having now for some time been gold, while that of Hamburgh in particular as well indeed as of Amsterdam, was silver. There had been a very varying disproportion between the; prices of gold and silver in the world; and this variation, as he believed, would serve to account for much of that occasionally great depression of our apparent exchange with Hamburgh in times preceding.1797 on which the opponents of the Bullion Committee had relied the, people of this country were not bound to examine into all the intricacies of the exchange in order to know whether their standard

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was adhered to. The state of the ex-changes merely afforded a confirmation of a depreciation of our currency; a generally high, price of bullion of itself distinctly,: established it. What, then, was the price of bullion before 1797, and what was it now? It had never, before 1797, except in the South Sea year, and at the time when our coin was deteriorated, risen higher than. 4l. 1s. 6d. per oz. and had scarcely ever reached that point; that is to say, it had never fluctuated more than from 3l. 17 s. 10 d. to 4l 1s. 6d.—it was now 4l 14 s It had not exceeded its proper mint price by more than 3s. 8d. or 2 to 3 per cent, in the one period—it exceeded it by 16 s. 2d. or 15 to 20 per cent, in the other. Was it fair, then, to infer, or to imply, that because we had occasionally departed from the standard before 1797, to the extent, at the utmost, of two or three per cent.; we need not now regard a departure from it of fifteen or twenty per cent? The Bullion Committee had never intended to say, that no deviation from the standard of our coin, however small, ought to be tolerated. They were not in this respect the theorists which they were sometimes represented to be. They, indeed, affirmed bullion to be the standard, and the more the subject was examined, the more did it appear that we had either this standard or none; but they allowed of a moderate departure from it. Nothing human was perfect. The very mint, though it professed to convert a pound of gold into forty-four and a half equal parts, or guineas, did not effect their object with mathematical precision, and to their deviation was given the technical name of a remedy. Even the most minute departure of this kind below the standard might be called a depreciation. Through the wear of guineas there arose a further depreciation, which the parliament had taken care to limit, by making them cease to be a legal tender when their weight fell below about one per cent. The strictness, of this limit shewed the principle in the mind of parliament; it proved that depreciation to a certain extent was contemplated, and that depreciation beyond that point was thought an evil to be carefully provided against. The operation of our laws, which prevented the melting and exportation of coin, had fed to a further increase of the difference between the market price and mint price of gold or in other words, to a further depreciation. The effect produced by all
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these causes had never, before the suspension of cash payments in 1797, been such as to cause the actual currency of the country to differ from bullion, more than to that extent of two or three per cent, which he had stated, except on the two occasions which be had spoken of. The people, therefore, up to that time, were secure of having the value of their currency thus far sustained. The liability of the Bank to pay in cash, guaranteed to them a paper incapable of departing below bullion further than in the degree which he had mentioned. At the present time this paper was fifteen or twenty per cent, be-low bullion, and they had no security against a further, and even indefinite depression. It was said, that gold itself had risen; but even if it had, gold, being the standard, we were bound to hold to it: we had held to it in its general fall, and we ought to abide by it in its, general rise also. The argument that gold had risen would justify an adulteration of the gold coil), just as much as it would justify the present depreciation on the whole, he thought, that to confound the little differences between the market price and mint price of bullion before 1797, with the great difference at present, was most unfair. The difference, it was true, might be said to be only in degree but degree was every thing in this ease and it was remarkable, that the Resolution of his right hon. friend studiously forbore to specify the amount of the difference between the market price and mint price of bullion at the two periods.
There remained only one other topic on which he had to remark—The Resolutions of his right hon. friend assumed that the notes of the Bank of England were not excessive, because the difference between their numerical amount now and in 1797, was not greater than the comparative trade and expenditure at the two periods would fairly justify.
The notes of 5l. and upwards, for the average of three years before 1797, were about. 10,700,000 l. and for the average of the last three years, were about 14,200,000 l. He would fairly say, that if he had beet) asked to pronounce them excessive on the simple ground of their relative quantity at the two periods be might have hesitated to do it. He should have inquired what was the stale of the exchanges and the price of bullion and should have formed his judgment chiefly by the answer to this question He

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was, however, very far from admitting, on the other hand, that the due limitation of them could be presumed from what Was called the small extent of their increase. There was much misconception on this subject, which those who, like himself, were acquainted with the money transactions of the metropolis, were best able to remove. A very increased degree of economy was practised in the use of notes. Gentlemen uninformed on this topic naturally assumed, that when our trade and revenue and public expenditure were extended, the amount of notes requisite for these enlarged payments must be nearly proportionate. But this was very far from being the case. In the infancy of paper credit, the circulation of such an establishment as the Bank of England might regularly and uniformly increase: a lime, nevertheless, would come when it would begin to diminish; but exactly at what period, and in what degree, this change would take place, was not easily ascertained. When the Bank was instituted, and for some time afterwards, the fund which private bankers, who were then goldsmiths, kept in store as a provision against emergency, consisted chiefly of gold; but by slow degrees it became Bank of England notes. The papers before the House would accordingly shew how very trifling was the circulation of the Bank at an early period of their establishment, and how greatly it after a time advanced. But it was not regularly progressive in proportion as confidence increased. The banker suffered a loss of interest proportionate to the amount of Bank paper in his possession for which, therefore, he would be disposed to substitute a paper from which he such disadvantage accrued. Exchequer bills furnished one provision of this sort. They yielded interest to the banker, and yet were convertible by a very short and sure process into bank-notes. Bank paper, therefore, was by no means the perfection of the system it was not his last and best supply." The last and best supply had been furnished from the Bank of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who well knew to what an extent his-issues of this kind had been recently carried. Bills of exchange also, and other articles of a similar nature, served exceedingly to spare the use of notes; and a variety of devices was resorted to for the same purpose. As in many manufacturing concerns there had been a perpetual
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exercise of ingenuity, and a consequent abridgment of labour; so in the banking system there had been an exertion of the talents of individuals in producing the necessary quantity of notes. Evidence had been given before the Bullion Committee of the increasing number of money-brokers, who passed from one banking-house to another, and supplied the daily and hourly wants of one quarter, by carrying away the superfluity of another. If we could suppose the sixly or seventy bankers of the metropolis to be reduced to six or seven, it was obvious that a very diminished quantity of notes would suffice for the same business. The improvements in the banking system tended to unite, as it were, into one house, for the purpose of which he was speaking, even those bankers who held no direct communication with each other.
The quantity of notes kept by private families was also, as he believed, continually diminishing through the increased habit of employing bankers, and of circulating drafts upon them, in and round the metropolis. The circulation of Bank of England notes in the country the still spoke of those of 5l. and upwards), had probably also diminished, in consequence of the immense increase of country banks. The sum total of the stock of Bank of England notes kept in store by these banks might be augmented; but that stock consisted, in a great degree, of those 1l. and 2l. notes, which he had left out of his calculation.
The hon. gentleman concluded with observing, that he was conscious of having left almost untouched many important parts of this extensive subject. The material point. however, of the nature of the standard, over which so much obscurity was thrown by the present Resolutions had been so very ably and satisfactorily-treated by the right hon. gentleman over the way (Mr. Canning), as well, indeed, as by the honourable gentleman near him; (Mr. Huskisson), that he had felt little inclination to dwell upon if but he could not sit down without adverting once more to the first of the Resolutions now proposed, in which the right of the crown to vary the standard, both with and without the concurrence of parliament, seemed to be asserted. It might be true, that to the king, generally speaking, was committed the regulation of the coin of a country; but the language which he should be disposed to use, Would be that, not of his right

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hon. friend, but rather of Sir Thomas Rowe, at the council table of Charles I.;—a language, indeed, in the first words of it a little resembling the Resolution on which he was animadverting, but far different in its conclusion. "The regulating of coin," said Sir T. Rowe, "hath been left to the care of princes, who have ever been presumed to be the fathers of the commonwealth. Upon their honours they are debtors and warrantees of justice to the subject in that behalf"
Dr. A. Smith had observed, that "in every country the avarice and injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the confidence of their subjects, has by degrees diminished the real quantity of metal in their coin." This was an evil to which, in times of difficulty, like the present, all nations were prone. The Romans (observed the same author), in the later and worse times of their country, reduced their coin to one twenty-fourth. England had reduced her pound only to one third. Scotland enjoyed the honour, and had also had the advantage—for such the principles of the right hon. bart. over the way (sir John Sinclair) would probably lead him to consider it—of having reduced its coin to one thirty-sixth; France to one sixty-sixth. He had always deemed it highly creditable to England, that the deterioration of her standard had been comparatively so small; but we seemed to be now willing to expose ourselves to the danger of giving way to this temptation, while Hamburgh and Amsterdam, and our great adversary in France, were superior to it. Their several standards were sustained. That we might not yield in this respect to the pressure of our present circumstances was the chief object for the sake of which he had spoken, A country seldom was sensible of the first steps taken in this downward course; and it therefore belonged to those who possessed an extensive knowledge of such subjects, and adverted to the history of other nations, to point out the approaching danger.
He feared that the members of the Administration, partly, perhaps, through their having taken in the first instance a too transient view of the question, in consequence of their multiplied employments, and of their buying then committed themselves too hastily upon it; partly also through a wish to enjoy the present benefit of extended issue, of paper in their financial and political concerns, were not the safest guides on the present occasion
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He had endeavoured, for his own part, to fulfil his duty, both as an individual of the Bullion Committee and as a member of parliament; and though he had not dwelt in his speech on the difficulties by which we were encompassed, he had not formed his judgment without taking them fully into his consideration.
Mr. Canningrose and said: I should not have thought it necessary. Sir, to trouble the Committee with the expression of my sentiments in this night's debate, after the able and lucid speech of the hon. gent, who spoke last, if I had not been desirous of addressing myself more particularly than he has done to the Propositions now brought forward, in the shape of Resolutions, by the right hon. gent, opposite to me, which are the immediate subject of this night's deliberation
I should indeed be unpardonable, if after having already trespassed at so great length on the indulgence of the Committee when the original Resolutions were under discussion, I should again expatiate upon the general subject which I conceive to have been disposed of by the vote of they former night. The present however, is a very different question from that which: was then decided. We decided by our former vote, not to adopt the practical re-commendation of the Bullion Committee In that vote concurred. We decided farther, not to sanction and record the declaration of the principles of our money system, on which the recommendation of the Bullion Committee was founded. In that decision I did not concur, and it is one which I deeply regret; because those; principles were, as I think, correctly defined in the original Resolutions; and because I think that a declaration of them under the sanction of this House, would have been eminently useful at the presents moment.
But the House having thought other wise; and having rejected all the Resolutions of the hon. and learned gent.; my next wish would have been, that with that rejection the whole discussion should.; have terminated. Why pursue it farther. The Bullion Committee is defeated; its doctrines are, at least, for the present set aside. Why could not its antagonists be contented with this negative victory Why must they aim at the unnecessary and perilous triumph of substituting their own doctrines in the place of those which they have discomfited?
In the majority of the former night

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were numbered many persons who profess to disapprove of abstract propositions. Those persons must, in common consistency, oppose the Propositions of the right hon. gent., which are to the full as abstract as the original Resolutions. In that majority were many who not only did not agree with the right hon. gent, opposite to me, in denying the existence of a depreciation of the paper currency; but who distinctly declared their entire conviction of the existence of that depreciation, and only thought it too notorious and undeniable to require the formality of a parliamentary affirmation. Can those persons be expected by the right hon. gent, to concur in the Resolutions which he is now bringing forward? Others again there were, who, neither admitting nor denying the depreciation, were desirous only of escaping from the necessity of a decision either way; contending that no result could be so satisfactory, as the discussion itself was mischievous. Will those persons thank the right hon. gent, for reviving a discussion which, if it had finally closed on Friday night, would have left them in quiet possession of their doubts,—doubts which any man might very reasonably prefer to a decision in support of the right hon. gentleman's third Resolution?
Independently of this violence to the feeling and judgments of his supporters has the right hon. gent, no consideration for the reputation of the House of Commons itself, when he calls upon us, by voting that Resolution, to affirm a proposition, which I will venture to say, no man with-out the doors of the House, could affirm with a grave countenance?
The third Resolution is the essential part, the soul and spirit of the right hon. gentleman's system. Of the other Resolutions, the 1st and the 15th are the only two, which, in my view of the subject, appear to require particular observation. The remainder, from the 4th to the 14th inclusive, contain a vast variety of statements, historical, political, commercial, financial and agricultural; some accurate, some inaccurate; but all valuable rather from their intrinsic erudition, than from any very near connexion with the subject before us. With none of these, therefore, Shall I presume to meddle.
But, before I proceed to the three Resolutions in which the whole of the right hon. gentleman's argument lies, I must say a word or two in answer to a challenge
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of the right hon. gent. as to his 16th and 17th Resolutions. He states, and states very truly, that I had declared myself ready to vote for those two Resolutions, provided they were prefaced and introduced, not by his own preceding Resolutions, but by the first ten of the original Resolutions moved by the hon. and learned chairman of the Bullion Committee. The right hon. gent, triumphs in this declaration of mine, as if it had been a concession to his argument, instead of an exposition of my own. He has caught me in a great inconsistency; it seems. And what is this inconsistency? That I am ready to affirm two things irreconcilable with each other?—that would vote premises that did not bear out their conclusion, or a conclusion contradictory to its premises? No such thing: but simply, that I am ready to adopt the premises suggested by one man, and the conclusion drawn by another. This is what he considers as am inconsistency; as it consistency hid reference not to the compatibility of doctrines, but to the identity of the persons holding them.
it is true that if the first ten of the original Resolution had been carried, I should not have objected to adding to them the two concluding Propositions of the right hon. gentleman. But I cannot consent to vote for them by themselves, nor if introduced by his own preceding Propositions.
I am not, any more than the right hon. gent, himself, for changing the period now fixed by law for the repeal of the Bank Restriction. I could therefore have been contented to vote for the 16th and 17th of the right hon. gent's Proposition's if those principles respecting the standard of our money, which were luminously and accurately developed in the Resolutions moved by the chairman of the Bullion Committee, had been previously recognized and sanctioned. The truth of these principles once admitted; there might hare been comparatively little danger in deciding either way the question, whether the period for returning to the strict practical application of them should be accelerated. But to decide that question in a way which should imply a denial of the truth of those principles, would be productive of a mischief than which none can be greater, except indeed that of adopting the right hon. gent.'s Resolutions, in which the truth of those principles is denied, not by implication but directly.
To have abstained from adopting the

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original Resolutions, provided no others were agreed to in their room, would be to leave the true principles of our money system unvouched indeed, but not discredited; and to leave the Bank Restriction precisely as it stands. To declare the continuance of the Bank Restriction by adopting the right hon. gent's 16th and 17th Resolutions only, without adverting at the same time to the principles laid down by the Bullion Committee, would be to leave it matter of doubt whether the restriction was continued because those principles were false, or only because their force was overborne by considerations of expediency. This result would be unsatisfactory enough. To adopt and record the right hon. gent.'s premises as the foundation of his own conclusion, would be in his view, no doubt, perfectly consistent but it would be a consistency obtained at no less an expence than that of abrogating, so far as the Resolutions of this House can abrogate it, the whole system under which the currency of this country has been hitherto regulated and preserved in a state of purity and integrity, equally creditable to the character of the state, and to the unceasing vigilance and anxiety of parliament.
In matters which have been frequently the object of parliamentary revision, it is no light thing to come to resolutions of a general and abstract nature without taking the former proceedings of parliament for our guide.
If they who dissented from the doctrines of the Bullion Committee thought the errors of that Committee the more formidable on account of the authority by which they were in calculated, how much more cautious ought we to be in ascertaining beyond possibility of doubt, the truth of those doctrines which we are now called upon to promulgate by the much higher authority of the House itself?
A declaration of the law by one of the branches of the legislature ought not to be made at all but for a grave and adequate object; and at least ought to be unimpeachably correct.
Let us examine the right hon. gent.'s first Resolution, in this double view. First, let us see how far it is positively correct and secondly, what is the object to which it is directed and how far it attains that object.
That the right of establishing and regulating the legal money of this kingdom is a prerogative of the sovereign, is most un-
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doubtedly true; that the sovereigns of this kingdom have at different times altered the value of such money, is also true—if by value be intended only the dew nomination of such money, that is the rate at which any given quantity of gold or silver should be current within these realms. But "value," absolutely stated is by no means a correct expression. To alter the positive intrinsic value of the-precious metals, or make it other than it is by nature, and by the relation which-those metals bear to other commodities, is a power, which neither kings nor parliaments have hitherto, so far as I know, arrogated; but the existence of which to be sure would at once put an end to all dispute, and give to the right hon. gent., and those who side with him, a complete triumph. If value were indeed the off-spring of authority, there is no doubt but that paper or pasteboard, or any viler material, might be raised by that authority to a level with gold. But the only power which sovereigns have ever yet exercised or claimed, has been to fix the rate or "current" value of coin within their own dominions.
Nor is it merely an inaccuracy of expression to omit this qualification of the word "value." It is an inaccuracy which may lead to serious misconception in case where the whole controversy turns upon this single question, "whether there be or be not an inherent inextinguishable value in the precious metals estimated ac cording to their relation to other commodities generally, throughout the world; and independent of any arbitrary valuation, which positive edicts Or enactments can affix to them?" The right hon. gent.'s proposition as it stands, with out the addition to the word "value," of the epithets "current" or "denominative," would go to favour the notion that edicts and enactments have this power a notion so wild that it might seem almost unnecessary to guard against it, if it or something very like it, were not in fact the foundation of almost all the right hon gent.'s arguments.
He cannot, however, intend to avow such a notion. 'He will there fore I presume, have no objection to qualify the word "value," by the addition of one or other of the epithets which I have suggested. So qualified, the proposition, that the Sovereign has at times varied the "current" or "denominative" value of the corn would be true, and perfectly harmless.

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The Resolution proceeds to state, that this has been done by proclamation, "or" by act of parliament—This is also a true proposition; but upon this also I must observe, that it is not stated with sufficient qualification. The Resolution seems to imply that the option between the two modes of" proceeding is perfectly arbitrary; that parliament may be either admitted into, or excluded from, a share in the operation, exactly according to the will and pleasure of the crown. But, I would take the liberty of suggesting to the right hon. gent, that it was not enough to state the abstract principles and theory of the constitution; it was incumbent on him to state them as they have been acted upon, as they are modified by practice, as they are to be found, net in the proclamations of Henry 8th, but in the statute book; in statutes of the last century; in those of the present reign.
The Sovereign (says the right hon. gent.) can alter the value of the coin. But can he do that at the present moment, without consent of parliament? Can he do it against existing acts. of parliament? Can he, except by the aid and concurrence of parliament, repeal the acts of the 14th of the present reign, which were passed on occasion of the last re-coinage of the gold and which must be repealed or amended, if any alteration should be made in the current value of the guinea?—Unquestionably the King, according to the theory of the prerogative, can, by his proclamation, reduce or raise the denomination of the current coin. But, if by doing so, he would place his subjects in the dilemma of either disregarding his proclamation, or acting in contravention of an act of parliament; would it be in that case a sound or a safe statement of the law, to give a naked definition of the prerogative, without reference to the practical restrictions by which the exercise of it must necessarily be controuled?
Are the opinions of lawyers so settled and uniform upon this subject as to warrant the right hon. gentleman's sweeping and unqualified assertion? Do lawyers agree that there is no limit to the power of the crown in this respect? that the crown may give what current value it pleases to coin, which it may debase at its pleasure?
I do not assert that all such authorities are uniformly the other way: it would, perhaps, be difficult to name that branch of the prerogative which has not been
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exalted to an excess in the speeches or writings of some one or other of the great crown lawyers who have spoken or written upon the prerogative. But such opinions" even if they were more general than they will be found to be, surely could not avail against positive statute,
"The denomination," says Blackstone, or the value for which the coin is to pass current, is likewise in the breast of the King; and if any unusual pieces are coined, that value must be ascertained by proclamation. In order to fix the value, the weight and the fineness of the metal are to be taken into consideration together. When a given weight of gold or silver is of a given fineness, it is then of the true standard, and is called sterling. Of this sterling metal all the coin of the kingdom must be made by the statute of 25 Ed. 5, cap. 15; so that the King's prerogative seemeth not to extend to the debasing or enhancing the value of the coin below or above the sterling value: though Sir Matthew Hale appears to be of another opinion."
The right hon. gentleman may perhaps tell me that his opinion agrees with that of Sir Matthew Hale; to which Judge Blackstone here refers as seemingly more favourable to the prerogative than his own. But if he will look into that elaborate and instructive treatise, which contains an abstract of all the learning and of all the history relating to our coinage—I mean the Letter of the late Earl of Liver-pool to the King—he will there find in what respects the legislature has limited the exercise of that prerogative, since the death of Sir Matthew Hale. He will find it stated, that even in Sir Matthew Hale'" opinion, "though this great prerogative is unquestionable, it is certainly advisable that in the exercise of it, whenever any great change is intended to be made, the King should avail himself of the wisdom and support of his parliament." "Sir Matthew Hale observes," says lord Liverpool, "that it is neither safe nor honourable for the King to imbase his coin below sterling; if it be at any time done, it is fit to be done by the assent of parliament;" and he concludes, that on such occasions fieri non debuit, factum valet."
Even if such were still the, state of the prerogative, would it justify a Resolution of the House of Commons, which describes that prerogative as absolute and indefinite, and describes "the assent of parliament not as that, with which, ac-

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cording to Sir Matthew Hale, "it is fit" that such alteration should be made, if made at all; and without which, according to the same authority, "fieri non de-butt;"—but merely as that which it is optional with the crown to ask or not to ask, according to its good pleasure? Would such a Resolution have befitted the House of Commons, even at the time when Sir Matthew Hale wrote? Is it possible to pass it now; when that prerogative, which by Sir Matthew Hale was considered as unfit to be exercised with-out consent of parliament, stands actually limited by statute?
Let us next consider what is the object with a view to which this exposition of the law is made, and how far that object is attained by it.
The question in agitation is, whether our paper currency be or be not depreciated? The price of gold in that paper currency is adduced in proof of the depreciation. What answer is it to this question—what refutation is it of this proof, to say "The King's prerogative can alter the value of the coin?"—Granted that it can. At least it has not done so in the present instance. The coin is rot varied in value: the paper currency, it is contended, is. The King's prerogative has nothing to do with the paper of the Bank. The paper of the Bank is not God forbid it ever should be!) the legal money of the realm. How, then, does the King's prerogative decide—how does it even affect—the question as to the depreciation of Bank paper? It can by no possibility affect it at all, unless the right hon. gent. be prepared to address us in something like the following manner—" The King has a power to make whatever he pleases money; and to make that money of what value he pleases. If you murmur at the supposed depreciation of Bank notes, beware that you do not provoke an exercise of the prerogative, which shall make those Bank notes to all intents and purposes legal money; or which shall cure that pretended disparity between paper and gold about which you clamour so loudly, by raising the denomination of the coin."
Is this what the right hon. gent, means to say? If so—though I do not think that there would be much wisdom in the measure,—I admit that his Resolution is an apt and natural introduction to it. I can at least understand its application to the subject. I can see what is meant by it
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But unless this be his meaning, I am at a loss to conceive how the assertion that the paper currency is actually depreciated, is disproved, or even touched by tin; assertion of the King's prerogative to establish and alter at his pleasure the legal money of the realm.
The Resolutions on the subject of the coinage laws, which we rejected on a former night, and for which this of the right hon. gent. is intended as a substitute, had a direct and sensible bearing upon the question in dispute. In affirming the depreciation of the paper currency, it was-necessary to define the standard by which such currency was to be measured. The hon. and learned mover of the original Resolutions did define it, and, as I think,-with perfect truth, as well as precision. Can it be the right hon. gentleman's intention, by stating with such laxity the absolute and indefinite power of the crown over the legal money of the realm, to imply that, where every thing is liable to such arbitrary fluctuation, there can be no fixed standard by which to measure the value of the currency? If his argument be good for any thing, it can only be so by being pushed to this extent: but even then it affords no answer to the Re-solutions of the hon. and learned gent. Those Resolutions asserted that the paper currency is in a state of depreciation, if measured by the existing standard of our legal currency. The right hon. gent. does not contradict this assertion; he passes it by; he says nothing at all as to what the standard of our currency really is; but contents himself with disparaging its fitness as a measure of value, by insinuating that, whatever it may be at the present moment, the King has, by his prerogative, an unlimited power of changing it.
But, again, even if the King has this power, it is not pretended that he has la point of fact thought fit to exercise it. If any part of our currency has been varied in its value, either in respect to another part of it, or in respect to the standard, it is not pretended that this has been done by the interposition of the crown. The complaint is, however, that such a; variation has in fact taken place in the value of Bank paper. What answer is it to this complaint, to say, that though the King has not, yet he might, if he pleased, have made a like variation in the current value of the coin?
There is, however, another operation of the prerogative, which, to make his defin-

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nition complete, the right hon. gent. ought to have noticed; but which he has altogether omitted, perhaps because he saw that it would bear inconveniently upon his argument: I mean the King's power of giving currency to foreign coin within his own dominions. Now one of the plainest illustrations of the actual depreciation of our paper currency has been derived from the change which has been recently made in the current value of the dollar.'
" The King," says Mr. Justice Black-stone in the same part of his work to which I have already referred, "may also, by his proclamation, legitimate foreign coin, and make it current here; declaring at what value it shall be taken in payments. But this, I apprehend, ought to be by comparison with the standard of our own coin; otherwise the consent of Parliament will be necessary.
" This great prerogative," says lord Liverpool in his Letter to the King, which the kings of this realm have immemorially enjoyed and exercised, of giving currency to the coins made at their mint, and sometimes to foreign coins, at a determinate rate or value, and of enhancing and debasing them at their pleasure, is of so important and delicate a nature, and the justice and honour of the Sovereign, as well as the interests of the people, are so deeply concerned in it, that it ought to be exercised with the greatest judgment and discretion."
We here see the limitations in point of law, which, in the opinion of so able a lawyer as Blackstone,—and those in point of prudence and discretion which in the opinion of so profound a practical statesman as the late earl of Liverpool,—would have governed the exercise of-the prerogative of the crown in giving currency to the dollar. Have these limitations, has this caution, been observed in fixing the rate at which the dollar now circulates? The intrinsic value of the dollar "by comparison with the standard of our own coin,"—as compared for example with the British crown piece, is nearly in the proportion of nine to ten. The current rate at which the dollar circulates, as compared with the crown piece, is now in the proportion of eleven to ten.
By what authority hag so strange an anomaly been introduced into our money system—an anomaly which, according to Blackstone, the crown in the exercise of its prerogative is bound to avoid. By an
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ordinance of the Bank. The prerogative of the crown, we have seen, might have given currency to the dollar: but it could only have done so at a rate proportionate to its intrinsic value, as compared with the standard of the realm; or for any deviation from that standard it must have obtained the concurrence of Parliament. But the thing is done. It is one of the main features of our present system. It makes one of the grounds of the complaint which the right hon. gent, proposes to answer by the authoritative language of his first Resolution. And how does he answer it? By referring to the prerogative of the crown as the authority by which alone the currency can be regulated; and yet omitting altogether a part of that prerogative, so essential to the present subject, a the power of giving currency to foreign coin! He omits it—Why?—Evidently because he could not state it, without acknowledging at the same time that the rules by which the exercise of that part of the prerogative has always been governed, have been entirely neglected in the issue of the dollar at its present rate; and because he could not make that acknowledgment without avowing the depreciation of our currency.
Before the late ordinance of the Bank, nine crown pieces would have exchanged for ten dollars. Now ten dollars cannot be had for less than eleven crowns. If this be not depreciation, what is it? Perhaps, I shall be warned that this argument proves too much; for that the depreciation here established would be that of the lawful coin of the realm,—not of the paper currency, of which alone the depreciation is asserted.
I answer,—the depreciation of the lawful coin in respect to the dollar is effected through the medium of the paper, if the crown piece and the dollar circulated together without the intervention of the pa per, it would be impossible that they should bear to each other, any other relation than that which arises naturally from their respective intrinsic values. It is by the intervention of the paper, which measures the one according to its nominal, the other according to its intrinsic value, that this relation is forcibly inverted, and the more valuable is degraded below the less valuable coin.
I shall probably be told, however, that the dollar is a mere token; it is no more than a promissory note in silver, which no man is bound to accept in payment this

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is perfectly true: but it is a singular argument to be relied upon by the practical school,—since it is no less true that the dollar, such as it is, constitutes in fact by far the greater part of the metallic currency now in circulation. In the same way it has been argued, that a Bank note is not a legal tender, that no man is bound to take a Bank note from his neighbour in satisfaction of a just de to This also is true: but it is no less so that he public creditor is bound to receive Bank notes, or at least can get nothing else, in payment of his demand upon the slate; and it seems to be no great consultation to the public creditor be assured that what he is compelled to take from the government, nobody is compellable to take from him.
This being then practically the state of our currency, what satisfaction, I must again ask, does the first Resolution of the right hon. gent, afford to those who complain of the depreciation of Bank paper, by stating, and stating as it appears, incorrectly, the money prerogatives of the crown:—prerogatives which, in respect to the bulk of our currency,—the paper,—have no operation at all; and which in respect to the small portion of metallic currency which we possess, have been suffered to be dormant and passive, while that currency has been regulated by another authority on principles directly contrary to those by which the crown must have been guided in giving currency to a foreign coin?
This Resolution therefore the House of Commons cannot but reject: first, because it is defective as a definition of the prerogative which it affects to define; secondly, because it is wholly inapplicable to the only points about which there is any dispute, namely. Bank paper, which is out of the province of the prerogative; and the foreign silver currency, of which in fact it has taken no cognizance; and lastly, because is calculated, by implication at least, to exclude parliament from ell share in the regulation of a subject in which, in all good times, parliament has claimed it as a right, and felt it a duty to interfere, whenever the occasion has called for its interference.
It is impossible to pass over the second Resolution without observing, that it remains liable to the objection which I took the liberty of making to it in a former debate. The words "on demand" are still omitted: I trust, the right hon. gent, intends to supply this omission, I must
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say, that the persisting in it would afford just ground of serious suspicion and alarm.
I now come to the main Resolution of all, the third. This it is that contains the sum and substance of all the right hon. gentleman's arguments and doctrines; and to which I cannot believe it possible, until the vote shall actually have passed, that any assembly of reasonable men can be persuaded to give their concurrence. The Resolution is as follows: 3. That the promissory notes of the said Company have hitherto been, and are at this time, held in public estimation to be equivalent to the legal coin of the realm, and generally accepted as such in all pecuniary transactions to which such coin is legally applicable."
The right hon. gent, in stating what he considered to be the effect of this Resolution, made use of an expression which does indeed most truly describe its character, and the character of that assent which he reckons upon obtaining to it. By this Resolution, said the right hon. gent, we "pledge ourselves to believe the equivalency of Bank notes to coin."—Pledge ourselves to believe! This is perhaps more than any man ever before avowed of himself; but certainly more than any man ever openly declared his intention to exact from others. Belief is not usually matter of volition; therefore one should think, it cannot reasonably be made matter of undertaking and engagement. Of all martyrs of whatever faith, I have always conceived the just praise to be, that they adhered stedfastly to a belief founded on sincere conviction; not that they anticipated that conviction by pledging themselves beforehand what their belief should be. The right hon. gentleman's martyrdom is of a superior description; it not only professes its faith, but creates it; and, to say the truth, it does require a faith, rather of the will than of the understanding, to believe the doctrine which the right hon. gent, has promulgated in his third Resolution.
The right hon. gent, however, has not done full justice to his own Resolution. The pledge which it contains goes much farther than he describes. It is not we, the resolvers, that are pledged by it to the creed of the right hon. gent.: It pledges all mankind, except ourselves. It is so contrived that even I might consistently vote for it, denying as I do every syllable of the doctrine which it contains. Whatever other merit the Resolution may want,

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this is at least ingenious, and I think I may venture to say it is altogether new in parliamentary proceeding.
The object of the right hon. gent, is to settle the public mind on a question on which there is great division of opinion.—There are various modes on which the public mind may be settled in matters depending on positive authority. The first is, proclamation by the King, where the subject matter is one to which the royal prerogative is of itself competent; and such the right hon. gent, contends this matter to be. A second mode is by act of parliament, in which the united wisdom of the two branches of the legislature is sanctioned by the authority of the crown. A third mode is by concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Parliament, declaring their joint opinion. A fourth mode is, by resolution of one or other House of Parliament, declaring its opinion alone. But to these four recognised modes, it remained for the ingenuity of the right hon. gent, to add a fifth; that of a resolution of the House of Commons, declaring not its own opinion, but that of the litigants themselves.
Are Bank notes equivalent to the legal standard coin of the realm? This is the question which divides and agitates the public opinion. I, says the right hon. gent, will devise a mode of settling this question to the satisfaction of the public. By advising a proclamation? No.—By bringing a vote into Parliament? No.—By proposing to declare the joint opinion of both houses or the separate opinion of one? No.—By what new process then? Why, simply by telling the disputants that they are, and have been all along, however unconsciously, agreed upon the subject of their variance; and gravely resolving, for them, respectively, an unanimous opinion. This is the very judgment, I should imagine, which Milton ascribes to the venerable Anarch whom be represents as adjusting the disputes of the conflicting elements:
Chaos umpire sits,
And by decision more embroils the fray.
That the public would have bowed in reverence and submission to the pronounced opinion of the House of Commons, cannot be doubted: but when the House of Commons speaks, not as a judge but as an interpreter, it can hardly expect to be regarded as infallible by those whose sentiments it professes to interpret.
"In public estimation," says the right
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hon. gentleman's Resolution, "Bank notes and coin are equivalent." Indeed? What then is become of all those persons who for the last six months have been by every outward and visible indication evincing, maintaining, and inculcating an opinion diametrically opposite? Who wrote that multitude of pamphlets, with the recollection of which one's head is still dizzy? What is become of the whole class of readers of those pamphlets, of whom to my cost I was one; and a great number of whom at least were convinced, like me, of the actual depreciation of our paper currency? Were these writers and readers no part of the public? or does the right, hon. gent, apprehend that his arguments must have wrought their conversion? Far be it from me to say that, whatever I may think of his arguments, the authority of his name would not have great weight with me and with the public. Therefore do I regret that, if he does not think fit to frame his resolution in the name of the House of Commons, he should not at least resolve in his own name the equivalency which he is so bent upon establishing. A Resolution, importing that "in the estimation" of the right hon. gent, individually, "Bank-notes are equivalent to the legal coin of the realm," though I do not pretend to say it would carry all the force of a decision of the legislature, would yet be a prodigious comfort even to those who are hardened in their disbelief of that equivalency; as it would show them in that quarter to apply when they wished to make an exchange on equal terms.
Nor would such a declaration of individual opinion, though unusual, be wholly without example. I saw the other day an address to the public, from a patriotic Lottery-office keeper, which in truth I should think had not escaped the right hon. gentleman's notice, since his third Resolution is nearly a transcript of it. This worthy distributor of the favours of fortune disclaims in the most indignant terms the intention to "make any distinction between Bank-notes, and the current coin of the realm." He is, "at all times ready," he says, "to serve the public with tickets or shares, on equal terms for either." Why should not the right hon. gent, give a similar demonstration of the sincerity of his own opinion? It is obvious, that if the lottery office keeper, instead of speaking for himself, had only declared that "in the estimation of the

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public," Bank-notes and coin were equal, I his assurance would have gone but for little; and I really cannot see why, in adopting as he has done, the very words of the lottery advertisement, the right hon. gent, should decline adopting the advertiser's test of his sincerity.
I must however observe, that the right hon. gent, carries his doctrine somewhat farther than his prototype, the lottery office keeper. The advertisement is much more cautiously worded than the Resolution. The advertisement only affirms the equivalency of Bank notes to the "current" coin of the realm. The Resolution says, that they are equivalent to the "legal" coin. Now the assertion of the advertisement may be perfectly safe from contradiction, forasmuch as, "current" coin of the realm, there is at this moment, none. But the "legal" coin of the realm, though driven out of circulation, is capable of strict definition; the right hon. gent.'s proposition therefore admits of a test, which the advertiser's does not. To make his proposition perfect, the right hon. gent, ought to define both those things which he declares to be equivalent to each other. Bank notes he has defined in his second Resolution; they are "engagements to pay certain sums of money in the legal coin of this kingdom." But he has omitted to define the "legal coin."
With his leave I will venture to remind him that one pound in sterling money of this realm is either 20/21 of a guinea weighing not less than 5dwts, 8grs. standard fineness; or it is 20/62 of a lb. of standard silver. Does the right hon. gent, object to either of those definitions If not, does he maintain his proposition of equivalency? Does he maintain that a one pound note is equivalent to 20/21 of a lawful guinea, or to 20/62 of alb. of standard silver Does he not know that a guinea is intrinsically worth not a pound-note, with one shilling in addition, but with the addition of four or five shillings, at the present moment; and that so far from purchasing nearly the third part of a lb. of standard silver, a Bank-note of 1l. would now purchase little more than the fourth part of it?
But the right hon. gent, warns us, that we overlook the force and real meaning of the word "legal" as employed in his Resolution. He alludes not to the laws which have fixed the standard, and which ensure the weight and purity of our coin; but to those which provide by wholesome
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penalties against the influence of its real upon its denominative value. The gold of a guinea may be worth what we will; the Resolution applies only to the gold in a guinea. It does not say that a Bank note is worth as much as a guinea. It says only that the guinea can pass for no more than the bank note. It ties the living to the dead, and then pronounces them equal to each other. The gold which is necessary to constitute a guinea, may be worth twenty-six or twenty-seven shillings. The right hon. gent.'s business with it commences only when it has received the stamp and sanction of the sovereign. It is then that, degraded by this distinction, and restricted by this guarantee, it loses about a fifth of its value, and becomes worth only a one-pound note and one shilling.
Be it so. This then may be the state of the law; but how does this prove "public estimation?" If the Resolution had purported merely that by law the guinea could pass for no more than twenty-one shillings, perhaps the right hon. gent. may have the law on his side. But this proposition he had the sagacity to see would not answer his purpose. It would do nothing for the Bank note. It would settle the proportion between gold and silver coin; but not between either of those metals and Bank paper. Bank papery until it is made the paper of the state, and a legal tender (which as yet happily it is not), must depend upon confidence for its value; and I am afraid that confidence may rather be impaired than restored by such a Resolution as the right hon. gentleman's.
There is, however, yet one addition, which qualifies the right hon. gentleman's proposition. Bank notes are not only "equivalent to legal coin," it seems, but are "generally accepted as such;" which to be sure it is natural to expect they should be, if equivalent. They are so accepted, however, not in all transactions. No,—only in "transactions to which such coin is legally applicable." There are transactions then, it seems, in which they are not accepted as equivalent? Yes,—but those transactions are not legal ones. Is the purchase of gold bullion a legal transactions I presume it is. A lb.: of gold bullion is at this moment worth about 58 l. 16 s. in Bank notes: 58 l. 16 s. in guineas, according to their current value, makes fifty six guineas. Now forty-four and a half of these guineas, we know

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weigh exactly lib. The right hon. gent., therefore, means gravely to affirm that there exist persons who will with equal readiness give 58 l. 16 s. in Bank notes, or fifty-six golden guineas, in payment for a commodity which is intrinsically worth exactly forty-four guineas and a half. It warms one's heart to hear such heroic in stances of more than Roman virtue: but I must be permitted to doubt whether they can be; truly stated to be as "general" as the right hon. gentleman supposes. I doubt whether even the patriotic lottery-man from whom the right hon. gent, has borrowed his third Resolution, would make such a sacrifice as this to the laws of his country. I doubt whether the right hon. gent, himself does not stand the single in-stance of such striking self devotion: and would again submit to him, therefore, whether his third Resolution, instead of affirming any thing about the public, ought not to run singly in his own name.
But after all, is the right hon. gent, sure that he is prepared to define exactly, at this moment, the legality or illegality of interchanging guineas and Bank notes, at any other than the nominal current value? What cognizance does the law take of the rate at which Bank notes shall pass? Is there any law which touches this matter? If any body had such a fancy for Bank notes, and differed so entirely from the Bullion Committee, and from the right hon. gent., as to think them not only not depreciated in respect to coin, but as worth being bought up in coin at a premium; is there any law which would prevent him from gratifying his taste in this particular? If for more, might be not also buy them for less than their nominal value? If there any law to prevent that? The man who has been convicted and is how expecting judgment for buying guineas at a premium, might be not justly aver that he had only sold Bank notes at a loss? Is there any law which forbids that? The right hon. gent, may tell me, that this question is at this very moment before the judges of the land, by whose determination the conviction to which I have referred, will be either confirmed or reversed. And so I tell the right hon. gent.; and from that very circumstance, from the law on that subject being in a state of such uncertainty as to require a reference to the judges, it is in my opinion unseemly, and must be most unsatisfactory, for the House of Commons to assume the law to be such as the right hon. gentlemen's Resolution declares it.
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But, supposing the declaration of the law by the right hon. gentleman's Resolutions to be correct, still how does it bear out his assertions as to "publicestimation?" Does he not know; is it not notorious—has it not been admitted in the course of this debate, that in one part of the United Kingdom at least, in Ireland, so far are bank notes from being "equivalent to the legal coin in the public estimation," that a premium is openly given for guineas? Does the right hon. gent, forget, that the House of Commons, to which he proposes hi.'" Resolution, is the House of Commons of Ireland, as well as of Great Britain? And can he conceive a proceeding more likely to bring that House of Commons into contempt with the people of Ireland, that that, with the perfect knowledge which we have that they are every day exchanging bank notes against guineas at a discount, we should come to a Resolution that, not in our estimation but in theirs, bank notes and guineas are equivalent?
When Buonaparté, not long ago, was desirous of reconciling the nations under his dominion to the privations resulting from the exclusion of all colonial produce, he published an edict, which commenced in something like the following manner:—" Whereas sugar made from beet-root or the maple-tree is infinitely preferable to that of the sugar-cane…"and then proceeded to denounce penalties against those who should persist in the use of the inferior commodity. The denunciation might be more effectual than the right hon. gentleman's Resolution: but the preamble did not go near sol far; for though it asserted the superiority of the maple and beet-root sugar, it rested that assertion merely on the authority of the state, and did not pretend to sanction it by "public estimation."
When Galileo first promulgated the doctrine that the earth turned round the sun, and that the sun remained stationary in the centre of the universe, the holy fathers of the Inquisition took alarm at so daring an innovation, and forth with declared the first of these propositions to be false and heretical, and the other to be erroneous in point of faith. The holy office "pledged itself to believe"—That the earth was stationary and the sun moveable. This pledge had little effect in changing the natural course of things: the sun and the earth continued, in spite of it, to preserve their accustomed relations to each other, just as the coin and the bank note

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will in spite of the right hon. gentleman's Resolution.
The reverend fathers, indeed, had the advantage of being enabled to call in the aid of the secular arm, to enforce the acceptance of their doctrines. I confess, I am not wholly without apprehension, that Some of the zealous advocates for the right hon. gentleman's doctrine may have it in contemplation to employ similar means of proselytism. There is something ominous in that mixture of law and opinion, which pervades the right hon. gentleman's Resolution. The business of law is with conduct; but when it is put forward to influence opinion, pains and penalties are seldom far behind. I like but little the period of our history, to which my hon. and learned friend the Attorney General, was obliged to go back to find a penal statute for settling opinions upon the value of money; that statute upon which the late convictions have taken place, and upon the applicability of which to the present times the judges are now deliberating. 'This statute was passed at a period when our coin had been debased, in the course of three years, considerably upwards of 200 l. per cent.; and when the total debasement, as compared with the original standard, was not less than 355 per cent. The consequence of this debasement, as stated by lord Liverpool, was, that merchants and tradesmen increased the price of every article which they had to self to counteract this effect, government tried every method to keep up the value of the debased coins: prices were set on all the necessary articles of consumption; laws were passed for regulating the manner of buying and selling; the law against regraters, forestallers, and engrossers, since repealed, was passed on that occasion. Amongst those admirable and judicious efforts of wholesome and enlightened legislation, was enacted the law, for inflicting penalties on those who should "exchange any coined gold or coined silver at a greater value than the same was or should be declared, by his Majesty's proclamation, to be current for within his dominions."
Such is the law which, according to the Tight honourable gentlemen, secures the equivalency of the different sorts of our currency—Such is the shelf from which that law has been taken down and brought into use on the present auspicious occasion:—a law passed at a time which the late lord Liverpool forcibly describes as a
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" period of convulsion in our monetary system," and in company with laws which have since been repealed as a disgrace to the statute book. Faulty, however, as our legislation appears to have been at the period to which we are referring, it at least did not fall into the absurdity of declaring such laws to be the opinions of the people. If the right honourable gentleman is determined to force opinions to conform to his law, he must come down a few years later in our history. He must pass from the reign of Edward the 6th, to that of queen Mary, to find the most approved method of applying the operation of law to the reformation of speculative opinions.
Even in times, however, of such ignorance and such licentious theory in respect to the value of money, there were not wanting in one part of this island, shrewder spirits, who saw the errors into which the English government were running, and determined to guard against their effects at least upon themselves. it the year 1529, it is related, in a note to lord Liverpool's Treatise: 'Gavin Dun bar, bishop of Aberdeen, in a contract with William Sutherland, of Duffus, stipulated that, "if it should happen that the money of Scotland, or of any other kingdom which passes in Scotland, be raised to a higher price than it is now taken in payment for, whereby the reverend father, his heirs or assigns, be made poorer or in a worse condition, he the said William Sutherland should pay to the possessors; (whoever they may be), of the annual rent reserved therein, for every mark of 52 pennies, one ounce of pure silver of a certain fineness, or else its true value in the usual money of the kingdom of Scot land." This contract took place about twenty years before the statute of Edward S. If that statute shall be revived and acted upon, and if the doctrine of the right hon. gentleman's Resolutions shall be sanctioned by parliament, it requires no great stretch of apprehension to foresee that men will ere long endeavour to guard themselves against the effects of such a system by resorting to contracts of a similar nature.
I have now done with the right hon. gentleman's third Resolution; I will only again say, that if any man had mentioned it to me out of this House, as a proposition which the right hon. gentleman intended to offer for our acceptance, I should have utterly disbelieved him: I should have considered such a rumour as a more

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device on the part of his opponents, to place in the strongest light imaginable the absurdity to which, it pushed to all their consequences, the right hon. gentlemen's arguments were capable of going.
Passing over the statistical Resolutions from the fourth to the fourteenth inclusive, I come now to the fifteenth, which contains the right hon. gentleman's doctrine of Exchanges.
This Resolution partakes, in a very striking degree, of the faults which I had occasion to remark upon in the first of the series to which it belongs. From the vague and imperfect manner in which it is expressed, the proposition intended to be conveyed by it, is rather insinuated than affirmed. The right hon. gentleman does not distinctly deny that the state of our currency has any influence on the foreign exchanges, or on the price of bullion: at the same time, he certainly does not admit that it has any such influence. He only asserts that there are other causes "sufficient to account for the unfavourable state of the exchange, and the high price of bullion, without any change in" (what he calls) "the internal value of our currency."
Now it cannot escape so accurate an understanding as that of the right hon. gentleman, that this mode of stating his argument, is not an answer to the main points in dispute, but an evasion of them.—The Bullion Report asserts, that our paper currency is depreciated, and that the depreciation of our currency has raised the price of gold, and turned and kept the foreign exchanges against us. The right honourable gentleman replies—not by denying both these assertions; but by affirming, with respect to the latter, that the imputed consequences may have been produced by other causes, without the existence of the cause specifically assigned for them.
We know indeed, from the preceding part of the right hon. gentleman's argument, that he docs deny the depreciation of our currency—So far he is perfectly intelligible. But, as to the second proposition, "that the depreciated currency has occasioned the rise in the price of bullion and the unfavourableness of the foreign exchanges," are we to understand him as saying, that a depreciated currency would not have those effects? or only, that as our currency is not depreciated, such effects cannot in this instance be attributable to that cause?
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If he admits that such would be the natural effects of a depreciated currency, admitting at the same time (as he does) that such effects do exist, the whole of his argument is destroyed by his own admissions. The utmost advantage that he could then derive even from the undisputed admission of all the facts enumerated in his statistical Resolutions—of his prices of stocks, and prices of corn, his exports and imports, and revenue and expenditure—would be to show, that there are other causes which may enter for something into the degree of the rise in the price of bullion, and into the degree of the unfavourableness of the exchange:—Which nobody denies.
But to acknowledge the tendency of a depreciated currency to produce certain effects,—to acknowledge these effects to have been produced to an extent, and to have continued for a length of time, unexampled in the history of the country,—and then to expect that upon the mere dictum of the right honourable gentleman, his adversaries in the argument shall consent to ascribe those effects wholly to other causes, of which they deny the sufficiency, altogether excluding the operation of that one, the efficacy of which he himself admits, is to reckon upon a degree of ductility in those with whom he argues, which even the right honourable gentleman's authority is not entitled to command.
On the other hand, does the right hon. gentleman contend, that the depreciation of our currency, even if it existed, would not affect the exchange? To argue that it would not affect the price of bullion in that currency, is certainly more than he can venture. But it has been contended by others who take the same side with him, that depreciation "of internal value" in the currency of a country has no tendency to alter the foreign exchange. Is this the right honourable gentleman's meaning?
By "internal value," I now understand the right hon. gent, to signify not "intrinsic value," as I was at first inclined to suppose, but value in internal or domestic currency, as opposed to value abroad. The proposition then of those who push the right hon. gentleman's argument to its extent, is, that the currency of a country may be depreciated to an indefinite degree, and yet, if the inhabitants of that country continue, no matter whether voluntarily or by legal compulsion, to re-

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ceive that depreciated currency at its full nominal value, the foreigner has no business with it, and the foreign exchange would not exhibit and symptom of being affected by it. The very definition of exchange, about which I apprehend there is no dispute, is of itself sufficient to confute this doctrine. The par of exchange between any two countries, being an equal quantity of precious metal in the respective currencies of those countries; how is it possible, that if by any process the currency of one of those countries shall cease to contain or to represent that quantity of precious metal which it did represent or contain when the par of exchange with the other country was assigned—the currency of that other country remaining precisely the same—there should not take place a proportionate variation in the rate of the exchange? To say that the rate of exchange will continue unaltered, when one of the currencies between which the comparison is made has lost part of its value, is to say, in other words, that an equation is not destroyed by a change in the value of one of its terms.
We should be sufficiently alive to the fallacy of such a doctrine, if applied to the Currency of other countries,—In the edict lately published in Austria, which has been referred to more than once in the course of these debates; while a gradual depreciation, amounting in the end to no less than 400 per cent, is acknowledged, and the paper directed to be current henceforth at 400 per cent, below its nominal value; sundry excellent reasons are given why in Austria, in the particular circumstances of that country, this depreciation ought to occasion no manner of alarm—and especially why foreigners ought not to consider it as vitiating or confounding the transactions of exchange. The foreign creditors of Austria, however, probably entertain a very different opinion: and it is a curious fact, which has been vouched to me on what I believe to be unquestionable authority, that even before the Austrian paper money was depreciated to the present extravagant degree, the monied men on the continent who were engaged ill loans to the emperor, were in the habit of stipulating that those loans, if repaid any where else than at Hamburgh or at Amsterdam, should be repaid, not in the currency of Austria, or of any other country, according to its denomination, but in specific quantities of gold or silver. And why this exception in favour of Ham-
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burgh and Amsterdam? For a reason which at once explains the nature of exchange, and the true principles of value in money, namely, that at the Banks of Hamburgh and Amsterdam, all payments, are made, not in reference to coins of any county or any denomination, but by the transfer from the debtor to the creditor of a specific quantity of bullion.
Can we really flatter ourselves, then, that the currency of this kingdom might be depreciated with impunity so far as relates to transactions with foreign countries? If a bill upon England for 46 l. 14 s. 6d. would heretofore have purchased, on the exchange of Hamburgh or Amsterdam, a credit on those banks for a lb. of gold bullion, and if a lb. of gold bullion cannot now be purchased in England for less than 58 l. in English currency—can we imagine, that nevertheless, the bill upon England for 46 l 14 s. 6d. will still purchase a lb. of gold at Hamburgh or Amsterdam? Yet this is, in fact, the proposition of those who contend that an alteration in the value of the internal currency of a country does not proportionably affect the foreign exchange.
But whilst this is the argument of many who have taken part in the debate—whilst it is covertly, though not avowedly, the argument of the right hon. gentleman's 15th Resolution—it is not the argument of my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who has admitted the influence of the internal currency of a country upon its foreign exchanges, by admitting that a diminution in the quantity of our paper would tend to turn the ex-changes in our favour. Does the right hon. gent, agree in this admission, or differ from It? If he differs, I refer him for conviction to my right hon. friend: if he agrees, there is no escape from the conclusion to which this admission leads—that the unfavourableness of the exchange, which would be in part at least cured by a diminution in the amount, and consequent rise in the value, of our paper currency, is in part, at least, occasioned by the excess and consequent depreciation of it.
What then becomes of the assertion in the right hon. gentleman's 15th Resolution, whichever sense we assign to it If it is meant to deny the connexion of internal currency with foreign exchange, can the House consent to adopt a vote so directly at variance with the fact?—If, admitting that connexion, it is meant only to deny its effect now—why, I should be glad

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to know, is the present time to afford an exception to an universal ruler what is there now to suspend I he operation of principles, not, dependent upon circum-stance but inherent in the nature of things? There is a great stagnation of commerce, it is true: but that stagnation of commerce is not peculiar to this country. The continent shares largely in all the distress which the decrees of the tyrant of the continent produce; and yet it is in comparison with the continent that the exchanges are in our disfavour. True, we are carrying on an expensive and extended war: but the exchanges have been permanently against us in peace as, well as in war, when the same cause, a depreciated currency, his operated to produce that effect. In 1696, a period of war, the deterioration of our silver, then our standard coin—in 1773, a time of, peace, the deterioration of our gold coin—were indicated alike by the long-continued unfavourableness of the foreign exchanges. In both instances the reformation of the coin remedied the evil. What the deterioration of coin occasioned in those instances, the depreciation of paper has occasioned now. The coin had then ceased to contain, as the paper has now ceased to represent, the quantity of precious metal implied by its denomination. Foreign countries estimated the coin then as they do the paper now, not by what it was called, but by what it would exchange for in those commodities,—gold and silver,—which are, by the consent and practice of mankind, the common measures of all marketable value.
However gentlemen may endeavour to disguise and perplex this simple view of the question, it is, after all, that by which it must be decided. If this be not the test, there is no other. If gold and silver have ceased to be the common measures of the value of other commodities, and weight and fineness combined have ceased to be the standard of value in gold and silver, there is no more to be said; but in that case, instead of these Resolutions, let the right hon. gent., come forward boldly at once with an assertion, not merely that paper is equivalent to the precious metals, but that it has altogether superseded them.
If on the other hand the same standard of value remains, let not the right hon. gent, attempt to draw a veil over it. In all our departures from it, let us fairly own that we are departing from it,—by necessity if you please; but with a resolution of returning to it again. Let us
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not, like men who, when hurried down a rapid stream, fancy that the shores are flying from them—
"terræque urbesque recedunt,"
let us nut conceive that, by some strange revolution in the physical world, the precious metals are retreating beyond our reach; when it is in fact only by a rapid depreciation that our currency is leaving then behind. Neither let us suppose that we have already gone down so far, that to re-ascend the stream is impossible—that,
"Should we wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o'er."
A very little firmness, a very little sacrifice, might at present enable us to retrace;, our course. The half of the ingenuity which is employed in the right hon. gentleman's Resolutions to gloss over our situation, might suffice to find a remedy for it.
It is asked—shall we attempt this in time of war I Can we attempt it without abandoning our present military system, with all its hopes, and all its glories. Undoubtedly, I think, we can. I never can believe, of this mighty empire, that it has not sufficient energy in itself at once to right whatever may be amiss in its own internal situation, and to maintain its accustomed place and movement in the system of the world.
But, it is said, we are only going on in the course in which greater authorities have led the way; Mr. Pitt had made up his mind to this depreciation of our currency. 'He contrived it,' says one hon. gent. He could not avoid foreseeing it,' says my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
First, the inconveniencies which now result from that depreciation, and which constitute the proof of it, were not felt in Mr. Pitt's time. Neither could they possibly be foreseen by Mr. Pitt, if they in fact arise only from the causes to which my right hon. friend and the right hon. gent.'s fifteenth Resolution ascribe them: Mr. Pitt certainly could not foresee the Berlin and Milan decrees. The war, indeed, raged in his life-time with not less violence than since: but yet in the very hottest and most disastrous part of the war, at the moment of the greatest public alarm and calamity, the exchanges were in our favour: and the price of gold did not materially rise. He therefore did not witness any of those symptoms, which have awakened anxiety and led to investigation on the present occasion.

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Further we have the testimony of my hon. friend opposite to me (Mr. Wilber-force), that in the year 1802, when the probable tendency of unredeemable Bank paper to excessive issue and consequent depreciation became a subject of alarm to some men of great ability in financial matters—we have, I say, that most satisfactory testimony, that Mr. Pitt at that time professed his entire agreement in the principles laid down in a very able publication of the hon. gent, who preceded me in this night's debate, which I presume every man who has attended to this question has read. And what are those principles?—Why, these—
'It is the maintainance of our general exchanges, says (Mr. Thornton), "or in other words, it is the agreement of the Mint price with the bullion price of gold, which seems to be the true proof that the circulating paper is not depreciated."
If these are the principles which Mr. Pitt sanctioned, what pretence is there for saying that he foresaw the present state of things? or that, if he had lived to see it, he would now have asserted our circulating paper to be in an undepreciated state? Are our "general exchanges" now "maintained?" "Does the bullion price of gold" now "agree with the Mint price?" Are not, on the contrary, the unfavourable exchanges, and high price of bullion, the very particulars which are cited as affording the most irrefragable proof of a depreciation? If the absence of those criteria at that time was conclusive one way, must not the presence of them be now admitted to be conclusive the other? If Mr. Pitt was then satisfied that all was right because these symptoms had not appeared, is it fair to inter, that he would have been equally satisfied now, when they are seen in so aggravated a degree? Is not the fair inference directly the contrary?
Nor is it an unimportant evidence of Mr. Pitt's general view of this subject, that the letter of lord Liverpool to the King was the result of an investigation commenced in Mr. Pitt's first administration in 1798, and concluded in the year 1805, when he was again minister of the country. In that letter not only are all the principles of our money system distinctly and ably expounded, according to the authority and the practice of the best times; but with respect to the system of our paper currency, the danger of its being carried to excess, and, the necessity of a parlia-
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mentary revision of it, are stated in a manner which shows with how much attention, in the opinion of the government of those days, that system required to be watched.
But if Mr. Pitt had happily been still alive, what remedy would he have applied to this evil? Far be it from me to presume on this or on any other occasion to usurp the authority of his name, or to employ it for any purpose, which is not warranted by his recorded opinions. But that he would have applied some remedy,—that he would not have been contented to let the evil take its course, if there were in human wisdom the means of checking it;—that he would not have sought to reconcile delusion with credit;—and to palliate a departure from principles by a denial of the principles themselves;—every man who remembers his characteristic firmness, who recollects the difficulties which he had to combat, and the manner in which he combated and overcame them, will, I think, be ready to acknowledge.
If I am asked what remedy I would my-self apply, I again say, as I have said before, that it must rest with the executive government to propose, as they alone cart advantageously carry into effect, any measure of practical benefit. But I have no difficulty in offering one suggestion," which has indeed been in some degree anticipated in the course of these debates." The Bank proprietors have made great and unusual gains under the operation of the Bank restriction I say this without the smallest intention of laying blame upon the Bank, or of exciting any invidious feeling towards them. The directors of that institution, I again repeat, have, so far as I can judge, acted for the best in the discharge of a new and most difficult duty. But the fact I believe, will not be disputed. Great gains have been made in consequence of the Bank restriction. The issues of Bank paper, whether" too large or not in another view, have un-' deniably been much larger than they could have been, had the obligation to"' pay in cash upon demand continued, or been renewed—These gains certainly formed no part of the inducement to lay on or to renew the Bank restriction. They form no ground to continue it. But it is obvious,—t is in the principles of human nature—hat they must form a temptation to the Bank proprietors to with for its continuance. It is obvious also, that if

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the issues are inordinately extended, the difficulty of resuming cash payments must be proportionably augmented. And it is still more obvious, that whether those motives and those causes do in fact so operate or no, from the natural invidious-ness attendant on great gains, the world in general will be apt to suspect and impute their operation.
Now the public has no right to complain that the Bank Restriction, though not laid or continued in contemplation of advantage to the Bank proprietors, has incidentally been productive of such advantage: but they hare a right to expect that no impediment shall on that ground be thrown in the way of the removal of the Restriction. A continued increase of profit, and a continued raising of the dividends to the Bank proprietors, if it had not that effect, would have I hat appearance. The dividend is now, I believe, 10 per cent. There surely it might stop. All surplus profit beyond that amount, during the continuance of the Restriction, might be strictly appropriated as a fund for the purchase of bullion, at whatever price.
It is not in my contemplation that the public (as has been suggested in several quarters since this question has been in discussion) should enter into any share of the extraordinary profits, or meddle in any degree in the management of the Bank. No such thing. Let those extraordinary profits remain in full, undisputed and unenvied property to the Bank. But as they are created by the suspension of-cash payments, let the public have the assurance that they are so employed by the Bank, as to ensure their ability to resume those payments, without convulsion or distress, at the period which the legislature has fixed for the resumption of them.
This, I think, is a suggestion, the adoption of which would be no less creditable to the Bank than satisfactory to the public. For this or any other measure calculated to remedy the evils acknowledged to exist, we can, after the decision to which this House has already come, rely only on the effect which may be produced by our discussions upon the advised discretion of the Bank, and upon the awakened attention of the public.
But at least, if we will do no good, let us, in the name of common sense, not do any harm. If we will not set right the course of the vessel, let us at least not destroy the chart and compass by which it may steer
Let us leave the evil, if it must be so
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to the chance of a gradual and noiseless correction. But let us not resolve as law, what is an incorrect and imperfect exposition of the law. Let us not resolve as fact, what is contradictory to universal experience. Let us not expose ourselves to ridicule by resolving as the opinions of the people, opinions which the people do not, and which it is impossible they should, entertain. This is not the way to settle the public feeling, and to set the subject at rest. It is the way to ensure renewed and interminable discussions. That we may at least not incur this unnecessary mischief, by adopting the Resolutions now before us, I move. Sir, that you do now leave the chair.
The chancellor of the Exchequerregretted, that he was again under the necessity of trespassing upon the time of the Committee upon this subject, but there were some points in the speech of his right hon. friend which he could not avoid noticing. His right hon. friend seemed to think that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) ought to retract the admission he had made on a former night, namely, that the diminution of the quantity of paper might diminish the balance of exchange against us, because it made against his general argument the admission which he had made, however, he was not disposed to retract, because it did not appear to him to clash in the slightest degree with the principles which he maintained. The diminution of paper in circulation would make a favourable alteration in the exchange, but then it would be necessary to discontinue the exertions we were making abroad, and to abandon our allies: but this would not be the only inconvenience which would result, because the same operation would affect our commerce, our agriculture, and all those sources of wealth by which we had been so long able to maintain this contest. It appeared to him, therefore, that the question for the Committee to decide was, whether it would be a wise policy to discontinue those exertions which we were making upon the Continent, and injure our agriculture and commerce, which we must do if we dimnished the quantity of paper in circulation for the purpose of making an alteration in the course of exchange.—He would not repeat all the arguments which he had before used, to shew that what gentlemen termed the depreciation of paper, did not arise from an over-issue of it, but from: other causes; but he was convinced that

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the more gentlemen investigated the subject, the more they would be convinced of that fact. It had been asked, whether it was prudent and safe to continue the present system, and to suffer gold to go out of the country? In answer to this question, he begged, in the first place, to observe, that we sent gold abroad for articles that were necessary, not because we preferred sending gold, out because, in me present stale of the world, we could send nothing else. Most undoubtedly it would be more for our interest to purchase what we wanted abroad with other articles, rather than gold, and those with whom we were dealing would prefer those articles to gold; but in the present unprecedented state of things, we had no alternative. But with respect to the question which had been proposed, be could only say, that those who thought as he did, that our military operations, which we were carrying on abroad, were more important and more beneficial to the country than the retention of its gold; those who thought it, as he did, more important that corn should be imported, and that the people should not starve, than that we should keep our gold, which we could not eat, would find very little difficulty in answering, that it was better, infinitely better, to persevere in our present course, than to incur the inevitable consequences of the measures Recommended by the gentlemen on the other side.—It had been laid down as a principle, that if there were two species of currency in a country, and that the one was depreciated, the one that was depreciated would soon drive the other out; but however plausible that proposition appeared in theory, it was not true in fact. At the period which had been so often alluded to, when our silver was so very much depreciated, how did it happen that we retained our gold? If the principle laid down was correct, our gold must have all disappeared. It had been said that the exchange could never fairly be more against a country than the sum that it would cost to transport goods to the country with which it was dealing. This proposition, in the ordinary state of the world, and when commerce was uninterrupted, might be true; but was it possible to apply general principles, made for ordinary occasions, to such times as the present? If bullion was to be found in a particular part of the world, and it was absolutely necessary that we should obtain it, why, we must of course pay
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what might be called usurious interest for it. With respect to corn, it was the same if France had corn and we wanted it, and France would not permit us to purchase it with any other article but bullion: was it not obvious that the bullion must be sent, and the price paid, however exorbitant? Suppose corn could be imported for 40 per cent, profit and a man was obliged to give 30 per cent, for gold, would he not naturally buy the gold at that price, because he would gain ten per cent, by the transaction. The same argument applied to the case of the army in Portugal. If the commissary, acting under the orders of the commander in chief, found that there was a deficiency of money, and yet knew that it could be procured in the country, was it to be supposed that he would not, in order to procure it, pay a greater premium for it than the transit of the sum wanted would cost from England to Portugal? undoubtedly he would. It was; therefore absurd to apply general principles, applicable only to commerce in its ordinary state, to the unprecedented situation of affairs at present. He wished particularly to press this part of the subject upon his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) and begged him to consider what must be the consequence if in such a state of affairs our internal circulation was stopped; what must be the inevitable effect upon our trade, manufactures, agriculture, and all the sources of our internal wealth. Would his right hon. friend, thinking as he did of the importance of our exertion in Portugal, discontinue those exertions,: unless gold could be procured in Portugal; at no greater premium than what it would cost to send it from this country to Portugal? Those indeed, who disapproved of the efforts that we were making abroad, and thought that peace ought to be obtained at any price, might not concur with, him in his argument; but knowing the opinion entertained by his right hon. friend, of the importance of our foreign exertions, he was really unable to account for the sentiments he had delivered upon this question. He entreated his right hon. friend to consider what must have been the consequence if the original proposition had been agreed to. His right hon. friend had not, indeed, concurred in the opinion that the Bank ought to be compelled to resume its cash payments in two years, though, in point of consistency, he ought to have adopted that part of the Resolution, upon the same principle that he

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adopted the others. His right hon. friend, however, seemed delighted when the Resolution for compelling the Bank to resume its cash payments was negatived; he seemed to have got rid of a burthen which had encumbered him; and it was natural that he should; because however he might be misled by the-general abstract principles, which were not applicable to times like the present, it was impossible that he could shut his eyes to the fatal consequences that must have resulted from the adoption of such a measure.—The right hon. gentleman then adverted to the subject of exchange, and said, that the exchange between this country and Madras and Calcutta was in our favour, and had been for a long time improving. Now, if the principle of the gentlemen on the other side was a correct one, it would apply generally. If it was true, that the excess of our paper currency had turned the balance of exchange against us, why did not that excess produce the same effect at Calcutta, as it was contended it had done at Hamburgh. The answer was plain; the exchange with Calcutta was in our favour, because Buonaparté's restrictions could not there impede our trade; and the result would be the same wherever commerce was unshackled. It was therefore obvious, that the unfavourable course of exchange arose from the impediments which Buonaparté had thrown in the way of trade, and not from an over issue of Bank paper, as had been contended by the gentlemen on the other side.—He begged here to repeat an observation which he had made on a former night, because-gentlemen had persisted in the same line of argument. They had, in order to prove that paper was depreciated, compared it with bullion, instead of comparing it with coin. It was obvious, that there was a difference in value between gold in coin and gold in bullion, because the latter could be exported, and the former legally could not. The bullion for that purpose, was of course more valuable. It was not therefore fair to compare paper with bullion; but compared with coin he contended it was not in any degree depreciated. As to the security of Bank notes, he should contend that, when the Exchequer received in payment every quarter almost as many Bank notes as were in currency, that this alone afforded a very considerable security, and was lively to preserve their value, and their credit in circulation. The simple propo-
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sition was, that notes were to all intents and purposes as good as cash for internal payments. So he apprehended it was, in spite of some extraordinary cases, and so he apprehended it would be. There had been only one case where coin had been demanded by a creditor, and pronounced to be the only legal tender; and did not this prove, that in the common transactions of life. Bank notes were held to all intents and purposes equivalent to coin?—Upon the whole, the present times were totally different from all former precedent, both in respect of our foreign expenditure, and the state of commerce. If the mound erected by the enemy against our continental trade were once removed, this country was full of all those commodities which would speedily restore the exchanges. Undoubtedly, the expenditure of a war of 20 years had greatly increased the circulating medium, the value of which was of course diminished in the same way as would be effected by a great influx of the precious metals. But this operation had taken place gradually, and therefore 30 far, injustice to creditors had neither been intended nor produced. With these views, he had no difficulty in concurring with the Resolutions of his right hon. friend.
Mr. Morrisopposed the Resolutions.
Mr Tierneybegged to know whether it was the intention of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have the Report brought up immediately, as he had an Amendment to propose?
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, he would prefer bringing it up to morrow.
Mr. Tierneythen gave notice, that he would move an Amendment to the-first Resolution, if that of the hon. gent.,(Mr. Canning) was rejected, the object of which would be to do away all the Resolutions.
The House then divided on Mr. Canning's Amendment, when there appeared

For the Amendment

42

Against it

82

Majority against it

—40

Mr. Vansittart's Resolutions were then agreed to pro forma, with an understanding that they should be discussed upon the Report, and at three o'clock on Tuesday morning the House adjourned