Sitting of 21 February 1809

CONVENTION OF CINTRA.
Lord Henry Pettyrose and spoke as follows:—I rise, Sir, in pursuance of the notice I gave on the second day of the session, to call the attention of the house to the Campaign in Portugal; and, in so doing, I feel all the difficulty under which I labour, in consequence of the long and arduous Inquiry, in which the house has, for sometime past, been engaged. An Inquiry which has entirely occupied all its attention, and engrossed all the public interest during the whole course of its proceeding; and I am sure that I do not, in any degree, undervalue the delicacy and importance of that Inquiry, or wish to dissemble the solemnity of the duty imposed upon the house in every step of the investigation. Yet I do think that the circumstances to which it relates, unfortunate as they are, would be rendered infinitely more unfortunate, if they should induce this house to suspend, for any time, its attention to the external situation of the country, to prevent its inquiry into the state of our affairs abroad, and, above all, into the application and direction of that military force, on which we must rest the permanent security of that army with respect to the constitution and government-of which we are now inquiring, as the means by which we may be enabled to restore it to its purity, if it has been sullied; and not only to restore and improve it, but to transmit it, and the spirit which animates it, unimpaired to posterity. I hope that, whatever may have passed this session, this house cannot have relinquished the idea of giving its attention to the momentous and instructive transactions of the last Campaign in Portugal; to those events, the dawn of which were dressed in such brilliant and glowing colours; which in their progress, opened so many pleasing, yet delusive hopes, but which closed upon us in darkness and brought us, wearied, disappointed, dispirited, and dejected to the situation in which we find ourselves at this day. I therefore hope, that I shall be allowed to occupy the attention of the house, and to draw it to
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that part of the transaction, unfortunately but a part, connected with the Campaign in Portugal; and in so doing, I am sure that in this house it will not be thought that any form of inquiry, that has passed already, or any thing that has borne the name of Inquiry, has been of a nature to preclude the expediency and necessity of this house taking up the inquiry itself; because, with whatever respect I may view the individual and military characters of the persons who composed the Board of Inquiry assembled by his majesty's command, I must say, that constituted as that Board was, and directed as its functions were, that Board was a tribunal more incompetent to give satisfaction to the country, more irreconcilable with all the known and received principles of law and equity in this country, than any that has ever existed. And in order that I may be able to state that my opinion is in conformity with the best authorities on this subject, I shall, without detaining this house by going into any discussion of those authorities, slate the opinions which they have held. I hold in my hand the opinion delivered by my lord Woodhouselee, on the subject of Courts of Inquiry. It is here asserted by that able authority, that although there is in his majesty a power inherent to convene such boards as Courts of Advice, vet still that their decisions have no binding effects on the party accused. And though it has happened, that persons suspected have been examined by them, the call was not founded in justice, nor can persons be compelled to obey them. In this opinion Mr. M'Arthur and Mr. Adey, two gentlemen who have also written on this subject, concur. But, sir, these are not the only authorities to which I can appeal, in order to support the validity of the opinion which I have given. There is in our history a memorable instance, in which the reference to such a court was pregnant with evils; yet will it be believed, that this very instance, which had proved in its operation so mischievous, and in its consequences so pregnant with evil, was the very identical precedent on which the servants of the crown recommended to their sovereign the formation of the late Court of Inquiry! I allude to the case of sir John Mordaunt, whose conduct was first submitted to a Board of Inquiry, which next sent him to a Court Martial, where he was acquitted upon the ground that the only evidence against him arose from his own

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answers tending to criminate himself.—Such an example is of itself sufficient 10 satisfy the house of the inconvenience and disadvantages arising from that particular mode of inquiry. I therefore do think myself justified in asserting, that a Court of Inquiry held as this has been, opening its doors to the public, calling upon the very parties to give their testimony, and drawing from them information by which they were to be subjected to criminal prosecution, was a tribunal calculated rather to defeat than to promote the ends of justice, or to give satisfaction to the public. Even by the constitution of the Court itself, it was impossible for it to inquire into any demerits beyond those of the officers. The result of the opinion of that Court has been, that no further proceedings are necessary; but that opinion of the Court leaves it open to this house to consider what has been the origin of the transactions by which, in the eyes of the public, though whether in the eyes of his majesty's Ministers I know not, the principal object of the expedition to Spain and Portugal has, notwithstanding the victory, valour, and success of British arms, been completely lost in disappointment and disgrace. I do sincerely hope that the duty we owe the dearest interests of our country, and our regard for our own immediate character, will not allow us to acquiesce in so discreditable a determination. It is necessary to call to the attention of the house, that in the month of May last an insurrection broke out at Madrid—that insurrection was followed by insurrections in the southern provinces, and those soon after by insurrections in the northern provinces of Spain. It is not my intention to discuss the extent of these insurrections, the information received, or degree of satisfaction that could have been obtained respecting them, by the government of this country, and which it might have been expedient for the government to act upon; but this I must say, that if, from the circumstance of these insurrections breaking out, any room was afforded for great military exertions on the part of the government of this empire, it could not have been found more fortunately situated with regard to military means than it was. There was, at that time, a considerable military expedition prepared under the command of a gallant military officer. It was prepared for distant service; but not only was this expedition so prepared, but government had other bodies of dispose-
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able troops immediately applicable for service on any favourable emergency. There was a considerable military force in the Mediterranean, under the command of general Spencer, which had been originally sent, out from this country to take possession of Ceuta; but when the expedition arrived for the completion of its object, the attack upon Ceuta was found impracticable. (Hear, hear!). A short time afterwards a new prospect of vigorous exertion opened upon the view of the noble lord opposite (Custlereagh); and a third army was sent upon a voyage of discovery and observation to look for an expedition in the Baltic. (Hear! hear!). Thus, by the course of unexpected events, his majesty's government, at the moment when called upon by circumstances for co-operation with Spain, had in actual readiness three distinct masses of disposable force. The noble lord (Castlcreagh) was actually-rich in his own failures (Hear! hear!). Every expedition that he had dispatched had so failed, that every distinct portion of our military force was perfectly disposable, and, in the aggregate, constituted such a mass of force, that if any object required the aid of the whole of that force the whole was applicable to it. I must think that the force under sir Arthur Wellesley was that which, at the time, was most disposable, because it was an expedition then nearly prepared, and ready for foreign service. Upon the information that was received by government, of the occurrences in Spain, an intention was conceived of affording the aid of a large force to that country; and to command the expedition that gallant officer sir A. Wellesley was appointed; and I will say that it makes no part of the complaint which I shall urge tonight, nor do I believe that it ever will be a part of the complaint urged by any man, that the appointment of that gallant officer was not perfectly satisfactory to the public at large, or that it was not an appointment which was calculated to promote the glory and interest of the country. Well, then, sir A. Wellesley was appointed, and the ultimate destination of the expedition was Portugal. And here it is necessary to pause and consider what the grounds were which could have ultimately led to the destination of the expedition to that part of the peninsula. There was nothing in the possession of Portugal itself; nothing in the possession of the port of Lisbon, as a source of immediate succour to the

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Spaniards; nothing connected with the real interests of our faithful ally, the queen of Portugal, or of her subjects in Portugal, that could point out, much less justify, that destination. For, I will beg of the house to consider, that of all the calamities that can be inflicted upon a country, whether an ally or not, the conquest of it by a power that is not able to retain it, is the greatest; and for this reason, because it is thereby exposed to all the calamities and horrors of two revolutions. Such an operation subjects a country to all those calamities, of which the immediate evil inflicted by: the hand of the conqueror is the least, for it never fails to draw out all the lurking vices that are often concealed in the bosom of society; and to bring all those dormant bad qualities into pray, which never fail to accompany and aggravate the convulsions of a country. These are evils which are inflicted even by a change from good; to better; but how much more must they be encreased when the change is from bad to worse! I therefore cannot, on any of these grounds, approve of the expediency of selecting Portugal as the destination of the expedition, and the scene of our first operations. Such an assistance this country could not be called upon to afford; neither was Portugal inclined to require it; and such was the only assistance we could give to Portugal independent of Spain. But, unfortunately, it is not a question of doubtful speculation. We now see the expediency of conquering Portugal independent of Spain; and we now have been taught that it is not on the Tagus that Buonaparté was to be restrained in his pursuits. In the progress of his unlimited schemes of ambition, it is not to momentary triumphs, to the eclat of public rejoicing, or to the firing of Park guns (hear! hear!) that his exertions are directed. But it is because he aims at ultimate advantage, and hopes for ultimate success and ultimate glory, that he looks with utter contempt at Portugal whilst he presses without cessation upon the provinces of Spain. Do I say, however, that there were no objects in Portugal which claimed our attention? By no means. There was in that country a French army and in its port a Russian fleet. The capture of that army and the possession of that fleet were of the highest importance to this country, and it had fortunately so happened, that at the time we stood not only ourselves, but beheld the enemy, in such a relative situation, as we had never before the good for-
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tune to witness. We saw a French army in a position in which it was cut off from ail means of assistance. It was situated in an unfriendly country. It was unexpectedly found to be so deprived of every succour by sea and laud, that there was every reason to hope, that British valour would have to measure its strength with an army nearly equal in number, an opportunity which, unfortunately, it had seldom had. Every man who looked to the French army in Portugal might say that, whatever should be the fate of the other armies of Buonaparté, whatever views of aggrandisement they might be the means of promoting, here at least was an army cut off from all possibility of relief, an army that must be forced to pay the tribute due to British valour, and submit by British exertions to confusion and defeat.—The expectation was justifiable, not only with a view to the honour to be acquired, not only as it respected the triumph that would be obtained by British arms, but as it would ultimately have saved Spain from the pressure of such an army, if by our means it should have been removed. This expedition, however, required several important and necessary considerations to be attended to most particularly. It required, that the most positive and clear instructions, with regard to its nature, should be given to the officer who was to have the conduct of it—The expedition being intended to act in different situations, according to the different circumstances in which it found the country that was to be the scene of its operations, it was, above all things, necessary that it should be properly equipped for the service; that the commander, to whom the discretion of conducting such an expedition was entrusted, should at least have had the opportunity afforded him of choosing his own ground; that after such discretion was confided to him, he should at least be continued in his command. This every man who looked at the object and character of the expedition must admit was essentially necessary to insure its success. But it seems that the shores of Portugal were not the first object of the expedition. It fluctuated between the northern and southern coasts of Spain; and I shall shew to the house that the suggestion of carrying the expedition to Portugal, far from having been founded upon any previous original determination, was taken up in 48 hours, upon the suggestion of the Spanish Deputies. I shall state what appears upon the Papers in my hand.

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If you will refer to the letters to admiral Purvis, and sir Arthur Wellesley, you will find what was the original destination of the expedition.—The convoy which sailed with the expedition was applied for on the 14th of June. But I beg the attention of gentlemen particularly to the Letter of the noble lord (Castlereagh) to sir A. Wellesley, dated 21st of June, both because it is evident from that Letter, that the destination of this army could be no other than Spain, and because it contains the exposition of the noble lord, the principles of Which I wish had been attended to, but which unfortunately seem to have been departed from. He says, "it is better to" bring the whole force together, than to "trust to a junction on the coast of Spain;" but from that moment every thing was trusted to a junction on the coast of Spain. After the principle had been laid down, that the whole force should be brought together, sir A. Wellesley's expedition sailed separately, and the cavalry belonging to it sailed separately; gen. Moore's expedition sailed separately; gen. Acland's expedition sailed separately, the whole of the Ordnance sailed separately, and the junction of all these forces and equipments was left to be effected on the coast of Spain. Look, then, to what was the direction of this expedition afterwards. You will find three letters addressed, one to admiral Purvis, one to gen. Dalrymple, and one to gen. Spencer. The letter to admiral Purvis states, that sir A. Wellesley is about to sail to the north coast of Spain; and, as it was of importance that he should be- provided with intelligence, which government had not to give him, admiral Purvis is directed to write to him on the northern coast of Spain, and to furnish him with instructions, and with such intelligence as he might deem important; and it is stated that sir A. Wellesley is instructed to pay obedience to him, as to the application of the force under his command. No instructions to that effect to sir A. Wellesley accompanied this communication. The letter to gen. Spencer informed him that sir Arthur, who was to go to the north of Spain, was to co-operate with him (gen. Spencer) off Cadiz; so that the machinery by which this expedition was to be worked, was, that admiral Purvis, who was off Cadiz, was to send requisites to sir A. Wellesley, who was in the north of Spain, which were to induce, sir A. Wellesley to send orders to gen. Spencer to the southern coast of Spain where he was. These let-
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ters were accompanied by a third to sir Hew Dalrymple, whom we shall presently see making a more conspicuous figure in the history of this expedition. We shall find gen. Dalrymple, who was kept behind the scenes, and who was not thought fit to fill the office allotted to admiral Purvis, now brought forward.—All these letters were dated upon the 28th of June, and all were without any corresponding instructions to sir A. Wellesley to comply with the requisitions he might receive in consequence. The 28th passes, and on the 30th the whole of this plan for probable action in the north or south of Spain, and for co-operation in either according to circumstances, is over-turned by one single suggestion of the Spanish Deputies in London.—We now come to the Instructions of the 30th of June, when the whole of the plan was altered. On the 30th of June the noble lord writes to sir A. Wellesley, that, in consequence of an opinion given by the Deputies of the northern provinces, it was deemed advisable to direct the efforts of the British Army to the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal. I cannot but think it a most extraordinary thing that these provincial Juntas, who could not concert measures for the defence of their own country, should know how to advise the means by which a British Army was to co-operate with them. However, so it is.—The Deputies of one of these Provincial Juntas are employed to advise his majesty as to the best way of employing his troops elsewhere. I then knew as little as this house did, of his majesty or his majesty's ministers listening to the suggestion of the Juntas, who, I believe, were more actuated by the desire of not seeing the expedition come among themselves than any thing else, and who, seeing his majesty's ministers determined on having an expedition, thought that the best way would be to suggest some destination that would take it away from their country. On the 30th of June, in opposition to all the previous designs, the only direction is, as the words of the Juntas were, "to expel the French from Portugal," words with respect to which general Dalrymple says, if they were selected for being equivocal, they would not have been more so. Yet you will find much of counteracting the designs of the enemy, much of assisting our allies; but of precise instruction, nothing that does not come under the words, "to expel the "French from Portugal." On the morn-

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ing of the 30th, these Instructions were sent; on the night of the 30th there came something more—new Instructions were furnished in consequence of fresh dispatches from sir C. Cotton, that there were only 4,000 men left to defend, the forts of the Tagus. Upon this information so received, not a moment of hesitation is felt. Whether any previous information had been received of the state of the French army in Portugal, I know not; nor whether it had been stated how the army, which had amounted originally to 20,000 men, was diminished to 4,000, I believe no such information had been received, though there was not a country in Europe of the state of which every statesman, and every merchant in this country, was more informed than the friendly country of Portugal. Upon this information of sir Charles Cotton, however, it is thought fit to set out upon the expedition to Portugal. The information was found to be false. Lisbon and the other fortresses of Portugal were discovered to be occupied in a way which reduced the British Commander to the necessity of executing the service, which he had been appointed to, very imperfectly. And this brings me to consider the state of the equipments for the expedition.—Sir A. Wellesley has told you, that although he sailed under these Instructions of the 30th of June, he yet conceived himself to sail with general powers, and liberty to apply his force to any quarter, in which he conceived he might be serviceable to Spain.—One would have thought that, with the latitude allowed to general Wellesley, there being hardly a point on the coast where cavalry would not have been most useful, cavalry would have formed a considerable part of the force under his command. Those who have looked at the papers on the table know there were but 300 cavalry, out of which 200 only were effective.—We have the authority of sir A. Wellesley for saying that there is not a point in which cavalry would not be serviceable, and vet this expedition is set on foot with cavalry only to the amount of 300. I low far this want of cavalry affected the fate of the expedition, the result has shewn, and to whom is that want attributable? But, afterwards, when the noble lord had better information as to the French force in Portugal, that instead of 4,000 men, Junot had a force of 20,000, with a large proportion of cavalry, we shall find the noble lord, if we refer to his Instructions of the
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15th of July, stating his opinion with respect to cavalry; the noble lord at the end of that letter states, that a proportion of cavalry will accompany the troops. If gentlemen will turn to the account, they will find the proportion of cavalry that were embarked to have been 700 men; that the cavalry with sir John Moore's expedition amounted only to 700 or 800 men, and that there never were more than 1,500 cavalry in Portugal, even including I general Stewart's expedition, which, in point of fact, did not sail till the 9th of I August, about ten days after sir John Moore's, and did not arrive at the Tagus, till the month of September; therefore, the amount of cavalry pointed out by the ! noble lord, as that for which transports would be required, was but 7 or 800.— Now, the house must recollect, that in August 1807, when there was no hope of making any impression upon the continent; when no intention of making such an attempt was entertained, and when, of course, there was no occasion to have many transports in readiness, the noble lord felt so much dissatisfaction at the preceding administration's want of them, that he put a Resolution on the table of the house, declaring, that he had provided transports for 4,000 men; that there they were; that they wanted nothing but services. When there were no expeditions going on, then the noble lord was quite at home; then he had a plentiful supply of transports. But in 1808, two months after the insurrection had broken out in Spain, it appears that 800 is the limited number for which he has provided the means of conveyance, and in his dispatch of the 15th of July, he tells general Wellesley, that as great proportion of cavalry, as his means of transport will enable him, shall be sent, and that great proportion turns out to be 700 men!—So much for the cavalry employed in sir A. Wellesley's expedition: but there is another part still more singular. I have in vain sought for explanation with respect to this part. I mean the equipments of the artillery and horses. Except from the single evidence of sir A. Wellesley, I have been able to procure no information. He says, that when the expedition sailed, it being uncertain whether it might not remain long at sea, and it being doubtful in what part of the peninsula it might be serviceable, it was thought advisable not to take good horses to draw the guns.—I have heard of cases where it has been necessary to have particularly good

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artillery horses. I have heard of cases where it has not been necessary to have any artillery horses at all; but this is the first time in my life that I have ever heard of an expedition in which it was expedient to have bad artillery horses. It is the first time I ever heard of an expedition, the nature of which was such that it was necessary to work it up with bad materials; or that, because the expedition itself was uncertain, and the plan not fixed, therefore, if by chance it should become otherwise, the instruments were to be imperfect and insufficient, as it will be found these were. The account of colonel Robe describes the horses as sick, lame, blind, cast off, and unfit for service; and this was not by accident, but by conceit between lord Hawkesbury and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, before the Expedition sailed from that country. Thus appointed, the expedition proceeded to Corunna. At Corunna the General was directed to take the advice of the Junta. The Junta, finding no use for him, desired him to go to Portugal. You will find that the Junta of the Asturias applied to the General to come back, because they had the French in their neighbourhood. The Junta of Gallicia desired him to keep at a distance, as they apprehended nothing from the French, and they seem to have had no more partiality for the one than the other. The General debarked his troops in Mondego Bay. While he was doing this, a new scene opened. The gallant General sailed on the 12th of July, conceiving himself to be the Commander-in Chief of the expedition, which was to effect the destruction of the enemy in Portugal. And yet three days after that a new commander-in-chief is appointed. In fact, not only one, but six general officers superior to him in rank are successively sent out to Portugal. If gentlemen will look to the Papers upon the table, they will see the different dispatches appointing these different commanders, all dated the 15th of July. Among others, there is the commander-in-chief, who a short time before was thought a person of little importance at Gibraltar, but now thought a proper officer to be commander-in-chief, not, however, permanently, but for the present; for it seems, that the noble lord, when he appointed sir Hew Dalrymple commander-in-chief, had it in his head to give the army another commander over him, had the campaign continued. Having appointed all this variety of com-
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manders, having sent sir A. Wellesley to undertake a system of operations on the coast of Portugal, having sent general Burrard to supersede him, and general Dalrymple to supersede general Burrard, designing to send another general out to supersede general Dalrymple, it is entertaining to see the noble lord recommending persons so superseding each other to act together in harmony. The noble leader of the band puts all his instruments out of tune, throws them into a strain of discord, and then conjures them to be harmonious. By this time, however, the noble lord was himself become completely ignorant of who was the commander in chief; they had been appointed in such rapid succession, he knew not to whom he should address himself as such, and all his future Instructions were therefore directed to the senior officer for the time being. The noble lord too, in writing to the senior officer for the lime being, acquaints him that the nature and character of the expedition require that it should be followed up without delay; and yet every letter sent to the senior officer is only to be opened by him, in case some other senior officer has not superseded him. I could have conceived in some part of this system of the noble lord, in superseding the commanders, a reason which might have led the public to acquiesce in the propriety of placing in the first instance, one gallant general over sir A. Wellesley. When it was resolved to deprive sir A. Wellesley of the chief command, and to send to Portugal the force under sir John Moore, the unprofitable employment of which in another quarter was by no means chargeable upon him, one should suppose that this gallant officer was most likely to be sir Arthur's successor. Had this change been made, although I should not desire the removal of sir A. Wellesley, still I should applaud the feeling which pointed out the successor. But no, such a successor was not thought of by the noble lord. No respect was manifested for the feelings of sir John Moore. 'On the contrary, it seemed to have been studiously provided, that in all the changes, that highly meritorious officer should not have even a temporary command. He who throughout his life had displayed so much skill and valour, so much zeal and patriotism; and who had conducted his army with such distinguished judgment through a long, a fatiguing, and perilous march; he, who would have

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saved that army from all danger had his views been duly seconded, was not considered by the noble lord as deserving of any attention, for on the very day that sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command in chief, orders were sent out that sir Harry Burrard should supersede sir John Moore. A more unwelcome appointment to gen. Burrard could not have been given. I am sure nothing could be more repugnant to his mind than to learn that he was to command 14,000 men that had come from Sweden, and who, if employed, could not have been better disposed of than under the command of sir John Moore.—There yet remains one point with regard to the equipment of this expedition, to which it is necessary for me to call the attention of the house. I mean the Instruction in the letter of the 15th of July, as to horses. After stating the various measures taken by his majesty's government for a supply, it is stated that the great expence of rendering the army maintainable on its landing, has determined his majesty to trust to the resources of the country, as there was no doubt it would furnish every species of supply. Such was the confidence expressed with regard to the supply that Portugal was to afford. I will beg gentlemen to refer to the examination of sir Arthur Wellesley, and they will be enabled to judge how far Portugal was a country, on which, from considerations of expence or delay, any reliance was to be placed for obtaining the necessary supplies for the army. You will find that sir A. Wellesley was of opinion, that no exertions whatever could have drawn from Portugal a supply of bread. A little further he states, that the supplies of cattle for slaughter were not sufficient for the army; and in his letter to general Burrard he states, that Portugal is a country that never fed itself for more than seven months in the year; and yet this was the country on which the noble lord, from considerations of expence, was to rely, not only for sustenance for the army, but for the means of facilitating the rapidity of its motions. The noble lord is not often œconomical; but when his œconomy does come forward, it produces considerable effect. He deals with it as some men deal with their wealth, only to make a display of it. Philosophy has been stated to be a "good horse in the stable, but a sorry jade on the road." The same may be said of œconomy, but the œconomy of the noble lord is of a different
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nature; it is always on the road, never in the stable. In times of peace, when no expeditions are going forward, then we have transports for 4,000 cavalry kept in readiness; but in time of war, when every, thing depends upon rapidity of movement, then his œconomy will not allow more than transports for 7 or 800 horses; and with respect to the horses that are to draw the artillery, his œconomy makes it necessary that they should be lame and blind, and unfit for service; lastly, his œconomy in providing the necessary equipments for the army is such, that the supplies are to be drawn from a country, which has not the power of supplying itself with the means of existence for more than seven months in the yearœAfter all that I have mentioned with regard to the representations made to the noble lord, upon the necessity of sending out a supply of Cavalry, we find that so late as the 2d of August, the Instructions given to gen. Stuart were merely to call off Oporto, in order to see whether our army required the support of cavalry; and this officer did not land until after the battle of Vimiera. In the letter of the noble lord to sir Arthur Wellesley, which is dated the 19th of August, after the surrender of Dupont, the retreat of Bessieres, and the flight of Joseph Buonaparté from Madrid was known; after the appointment of so many general commanders; after circumstances had called for such rapid and decisive action, I perceive that the noble lord expresses a hope, that the events alluded to would enable sir Arthur Wellesley to commence operations without delay; the noble lord adding that he had the fullest reliance not less on that officer's "decision than his prudence." Such are the terms in which the noble lord addressed a general, whom he had determined to supersede. That the noble lord should profess to rely so much upon an officer whom he meant to remove, appears rather singular.—It may be said, that to correct the mischief of the successive appointments of these commanders a curious experiment was resorted to. A letter was written to the Commander in Chief, stating, that all the officers, including sir John Moore, were to understand, that although the gallant general (sir Arthur Wellesley) was superseded, he was superseded only de facto, and not de jure; and that although they were placed in a situation, de facto, above him, they were in a situation, de jure,

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below him; that, although they were in a situation higher, in point of rank, they were lower in respect of command and power. How that produced harmony, or was likely to produce harmony, we shall see after we have gone through the last stage of this history. Sir Arthur Wellesley landed between the 1st and 10th of August at Mondego-bay, and having been apprised of the progress of the Spaniards, and the surrender of Dupont, he commenced a bold system of operations, which led him to march along the coast, and with respect to which movement, we have sir A. Wellesley's own word for saying that every thing depended upon the celerity of the execution of the plan; a plan which has redounded so much to his honour, and supported by British bravery, could not have been otherwise than successful. In the prosecution of this plan, the battle of the 17th took place at Roleia, and was crowned with victory.—After this success, sir A. Wellesley received the intelligence of his being superseded, from his successor, sir Harry Burrard, who arrived off the coast of Portugal on the 18th, but was prevented by circumstances from landing immediately. To this, successor all the defects in the state of the army, which I have mentioned, were immediately obvious, lie saw the want of cavalry and of artillery, and also the insufficiency of the country to afford provisions; and these form the grounds upon which that officer rested the justification of his subsequent conduct. On the 21st sir Harry Burrard landed, and saw the result of the glorious battle of Vimiera, having superseded sir A. Wellesley on the preceding day, although he did not think proper to interfere with his conduct of the engagement. Sir II. Burrard's reign, however, was but short; for, on the 22d, another' commander in chief appeared. The north wind brought sir H. Burrard; the south sir Hew Dalrymple; and scarcely had sir Harry's sun risen, when it set for ever.— Here I must say, that it is but justice to call the attention of the house and the public to the very peculiar situation in which sir Hew Dalrymple was placed. He had just taken the command of an army which he had never before seen; and landed in a country with which he was not acquainted. He was committed to a system of operations upon which he had never been consulted. Never, perhaps, was any military officer more
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delicately circumstanced. I think, general Dalrymple describes his situation in terms peculiarly appropriate; when he stated that all the responsibility is vested in him, and all the direction is vested in others. One general directed the expedition; another general concluded it; and a third directed the consequences that were to flow from it. It was under these circumstances that general Dalrymple arrived in Portugal, and concluded the Armistice which ultimately led to the Convention. It is most particularly necessary that we should be in possession of the circumstances that led to the conclusion of the Convention. They were entirely founded, as we have the authority of this officer for saying, on the situation in which the army was placed. The want of cavalry completely disqualified our army from following up the victory of Vimiera. That want produced the pause on the 21st, which enabled the French to rally and resume their positions. Under these circumstances sir Hew Dalrymple assumed the command; and from the causes I have assigned he gave his consent to the Armistice. He found the army in good health and spirit; but with only 130 cavalry and an inefficient artillery; he felt that to pursue the French was dangerous, if not impracticable; and as to the junction of sir John Moore, our army did not derive any reinforcement of cavalry from that junction which could enable it, with effect, to pursue the French, who were so much superior in that description of force, particularly after passing Torres Vedras, where the country becomes more open; so that the want of cavalry to support our infantry, and with artillery to act with it, produced the unfortunate result of this expedition.—But there was another reason which induced them all to act as they did, which was, that no other object had been communicated to them by the noble lord but that of reducing the French, and driving them from Portugal. Such had been the communication to generals Burrard and Dalrymple; though none had been made to sir A. Wellesley to that effect. Although sir Arthur, previous to his leaving Ireland, had constant communications with the noble lord, yet they were not of such a nature as afforded him any light, with regard to the noble lord's objects. It appears that the gallant general was in want of every thing necessary to enable him to act with the decision becoming a general officer, entrusted with such an ex-

913
pedition. First, and most materially, he was in want of sufficiently precise instructions, lie was in want of cavalry and artillery-horses, and to these deficiencies was to be attributed the conclusion of the Armistice, that fatal and ever-to-be-regretted Armistice, which, let it be ever remembered, transferred to Spain an army that had been locked up in Portugal, which had released that army, and carried it to ports so near the Pyrenees, that before the end of the campaign it was found on the theatre of war, acting hostiley against Spain. Looking, therefore, to that as the principal object of our possession of Portugal, I apprehend that no consideration of releasing our own army with a view to its assisting Spain, could justify the Armistice which set at liberty the army of general Junot; because, when the British army marched into Spain, it could only keep in check an army equal in number to that which it had kept in check in Portugal. The honour of the military character, says sir C. Cotton, who looked on as a spectator, was concerned in a Convention, by which a French army, twice beaten, was set at liberty when there were 30,000 Englishmen in the field. Whatever may have been the causes of that Convention, this house cannot do otherwise than, in conformity with the opinion expressed by his majesty and the whole country, declare it to be a Convention which has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. But the house, I think, ought not to stop here. It is fit it should expressly state, that the Convention itself arose out of the inadequacy of the equipments of the army, the want of necessary information, the want of cavalry, the want of artillery horses, and the want of sufficient instructions to the commanders. I think, then, that the house cannot help following up the Resolution. I shall propose, first that it is the opinion of this house, that this Convention has disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country, and this I mean to follow up with another Resolution, expressing, that to the misconduct of his majesty's ministers the failure of the expedition is in a great measure to be attributed.—There is one part of the case upon which it will not be necessary to detain the house at any length; I mean the maritime Convention. I have said, that one object, which led our army to Portugal, was the existence of a French army there, and that another object was the existence of a Russian navy in the Tagus. Under the existing circum-
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stances of Europe it would have been a matter of the highest importance to convince the government and the people of Russia, of the hazardous nature of the war in which they were engaged, and of the danger of risking the consequences of a contest against the naval superiority of Great Britain. How this was achieved it will be necessary shortly to slate. It appears that so late as the year 1807, it had been suggested by lord Strangford, that it might be possible to reduce the Russian fleet, by blockade, to such a state as would in all probability lead to a maritime Convention. This was followed up by a letter from the admiralty to sir C. Cotton, authorising him to conclude a maritime Convention upon the terms in which this Convention was concluded. Having stated this, it is only necessary to say, that it is known to those who have seen and perused these papers, that, from the time these instructions were first conveyed, not a word of instruction was afterwards received by sir Charles Cotton respecting the Russian fleet. Nothing was communicated to him that could authorise him to believe that the former instructions had been suspended [Lord Castlereagh, 'Certainly not!'] Lord Henry Petty in continuation—The noble lord then means to admit, that sir C Cotton was right. What I have to observe upon that head is this, that circumstances were materially changed by the insurrection in Spain, and by the expedition to Portugal, and yet not a word of additional instruction is sent to sir C. Cotton. On the contrary, sir Charles Cotton remains in September with the very same instructions he had received in April. He goes on and concludes the Convention, and' then it is that the Board of Admiralty write a letter to sir C. Cotton, in which they do not condemn him for applying at one time the instructions meant for another period; but they blame him for introducing a new principle of maritime convention by which the ships were to be returned. Yet this was precisely the principle which had been suggested by the noble lord, on the 16th of April, and nevertheless when sir Charles Cotton has concluded a Convention upon the same basis, the noble lord thinks it ingenious to turn round upon the gallant admiral, and exclaim, "Thou can'st not say I did it." I say it was the noble lord himself, who introduced the principle, and that it is owing to him we have had the mortification of seeing Russian ships enter our ports in any other situa-

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tion than as prizes. I am convinced the circumstances that occasioned that mortification did not originate with sir C. Cotton, but with those who sent him. We do find that something like an Instruction upon this point was transmitted to sir Hew Dalrymple; for he tell us that a letter was received by him upon the 3d of September, and that if he had received it before, he never would have held out to the Russians the hope that their ships should be considered other than as prizes; so it seems that this letter, which would have induced him to have considered the Russians in a different point of view, he received so late as the 3d of Sept., the expedition having sailed a considerable time before that. The letter which was intended to guide his conduct, was not received until long after the Armistice was signed—an Armistice by which the men and officers on board the Russian fleet were sent, not to assist the French against the Spaniards, but to assist the Russians against our faithful allies the Swedes.—Then if it is true that the military Convention disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country, surely the maritime Convention is equally open to reprobation. I trust that the house, before it comes to a decision upon the Resolutions which I shall have the honour to propose, will look at the situation in which gen. Junot and his army are placed by the Convention. It is but within this short time that you, sir, in one of those Addresses, in which, as the organ of this house, you conveyed its sense in a manner not less acceptable to those who received than to those by whom you were authorized to express it—you stated, that in the glorious battles they had fought, their swords had not been drawn in vain. As far as valour and skill were concerned assuredly their swords were not drawn in vain; but for any purpose of solid advantage to ourselves, or of affording assistance to our allies, I would ask of any person whether they were not drawn in vain? I would ask our allies the Spaniards whether those battles have not been fought in rain? I would ask the people of Biscay, Gallicia, and Asturias, who have recently tracked the desolating progress of the enemy, whether, those battles have not been fought in vain—I would ask our own countrymen, who shed their best blood before Corunna, against that very army which had been transported from Portugal to fight them, and of which, army the only
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officer we captured was a member, whether the battles of Vimiera and Roleia had not been fought in vain—I would ask even the people of Portugal, whom we have now abandoned, or must speedily abandon, whether the skill and valour so gloriously displayed in these battles, was not displayed in vain—whether, in a word, our gallant countrymen did not draw their swords in vain?—It has been argued that our attack upon the French in Portugal was rendered advisable, in order to make a diversion in favour of the Spaniards, and to prevent Junot from sending any reinforcements to his countrymen in Spain. But those who rely upon such an argument in favour of the expedition, must be ignorant of the situation in which Junot was placed. This situation fully appears from his own intercepted letter. In this letter, which is dated June 7, and which was addressed as a confidential communication to the duke of Berg, Junot states that he is so hampered and alarmed by the apprehension of insurrections among the Portuguese and by the presence of the British fleet off the Tagus, that he could not afford to send him a single man. Then let the house compare the situation of gen. Junot in June, with what it was in the December following, when he was quelling insurrection in Spain, and assisting to drive the British army to Corunna. What had intervened between July and December? A British expedition! British success! British victory! (Hear, hear, hear!) I hope, at least, that the result of the Vote this night will be to give some important instruction to the country, and that those who have been attributing the failure of our expedition to other causes, will come to a distinct Vote, that they will inform the country, if they are of that opinion; that although the expedition was properly commanded, yet it was convenient that the Commander should be changed; that although it was proper there should be a large force of cavalry yet that it was not inconvenient to have scarcely any cavalry at all; that although it was proper to have efficient artillery horses, yet it was no detriment to the service to have horses that were wounded, lame, blind, spavined, and cast off; that it was necessary to have the most precise instructions given to the Commanders; and yet that it was no fault in his majesty's ministers to have abstained from giving any instructions at all. I am sure the house will act a right part if it should

917
come to a decided opinion upon the subject. We have been warned that we ought to guard against the language of humiliation, and to prevent ourselves from being depressed by the appearance of the sinking fortune of the country. The language that infers national humiliation I do not approve of; but if results such as we have seen are to proceed from British I valour, if such are to be the only fruits that we are to reap from victory, all that I can say is, that the language of humiliation best becomes this house. But if valour and victory only lead to misfortune and disgrace, let us point out to whom the language of humiliation ought to belong. If the glory of armies be rendered unavailing by the weakness of our councils; if valour in the field be defeated by incapacity in the Cabinet, let us at least discriminate.—With this view, I shall propose, with deference to the house, the adoption of Resolutions intended to record a most important commentary on the past, and to present a most instructive lesson for the future.—The noble lord concluded by moving the two following Resolutions:
1. "That the Convention concluded at Cintra, on the 30th of August, 1808, and the Maritime Convention concluded off the Tagus on the 3d of September, 1808, appear to this house to have disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country.
2. "That the Causes and Circumstances which immediately led to the conclusion of those Conventions, appear to this house, in a great measure, to have arisen from the misconduct and neglect of his majesty's ministers."
Lord Castlereaghthanked the noble lord for the very fair and satisfactory statement he had given. He agreed that ministers were bound to vindicate, not the commencement merely, but the issue of the military transactions in Portugal, and he thanked the noble lord for the distinct, clear, and peremptory manner in which he had brought it forward, which if ministers could not meet they did not merit the confidence of parliament or the country. He confessed he was rather prepared to expect that the noble lord would have proposed an additional inquiry, and would have argued that the inquiry already adopted was not sufficient for attaining the ends of substantial justice. He congratulated the house, however, on the knowledge, that if the course adopted by government was not altogether approved by the noble lord, he did not quarrel with it;
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at all events, he did not ask for any farther inquiry. He could not but think, therefore, that the noble lord had rather been guilty of some small share of supererogation in the observations which he had used on this subject. Boards of Inquiry had been adopted in the most important, periods of our military history. If government had pursued another course, and assembled a Court Martial, they should tonight have heard that they were pursuing a narrow system of concealment as to themselves, and that they had provided for their own safety by the trial of the officers employed, lie prided himself, however, on thinking that he had adopted a course which the noble lord could not impeach; and that though sir II. Dalrymple had no objection to a Court Martial, or any other investigation, the mode adopted by government was one calculated to satisfy individual feelings and public justice, and which the noble lord did not attempt to arraign. He trusted, therefore, the house was now about to decide finally upon the transaction itself, assuring them, that there was nothing which government had more feelingly at heart than that the subject should be sifted to the bottom.—He was perfectly prepared to follow the noble lord into all his general points. He thought, however, the noble lord had gone a little too far in saying, that all our exertions had failed, that all the swords of our gallant countrymen had been drawn in vain. This was a cruel retribution to make to all those who had bled for us. That all the consequences of the operations were not such as we could desire, was perfectly true, but the failure, he was prepared to prove, had resulted from causes beyond the power of government to controul. If a power which could only act a secondary part on the occasion did fail, under circumstances that no ministry could direct or obviate, he thought it could make no charge against that ministry, especially when it was recollected that the result was not yet, perhaps, finally ascertained. If a government, entrusted with such extensive means as he allowed his majesty's government had been on the occasion, could be proved to have been deficient, or wanting in assiduity or zeal, they had a heavy responsibility to answer, and a difficult cause to plead before that country, which had so entrusted them. Under this impression and admission, he was willing to meet the question; and had every expectation that it would terminate

919
in the exculpation of his majesty's ministers.;—As to the object of ministers in sending expeditions, as had been stated, in search of employment, he would only say, that he was sure the expedition sent to Sweden, and that preparing at Cork, were fully as beneficial in their effects to the country, as those sent to Egypt or the Dardanelles. Ministers had at the commencement of the campaign, a disposable force of 5,000 men under genera! Spencer, at Gibraltar; of 10,000 men at Cork, under sir A. Wellesley; and he would ask, was it not better to send those forces to the immediate aid of the cause, than to delay them until additional succours could be provided in England? The force under sir John Moore could not be calculated on immediately, as its getting free of the Baltic was uncertain. So that there was no probable chance whatever, that these three corps could be brought speedily to act together on the same service, still less in one expedition. They would, at all events, however, ' have amounted only to 25,000, and was this an army competent, as had been sometimes 6tated, to seize on the Pyrennees, through which instead of one pass there were 43, and where, instead of an army of 25,000 men, we should have to contend with a French force of 100,000 men in Spain, and upwards of 400,000 men in France, according to the calculation of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Ponsonby) who suggested the propriety of such an application of the British army? This, however, the noble lord had not attempted to defend, and it was plain he considered the Pyrennean expedition a forlorn hope.—The question then was, what was it most advisable to do with the remaining disposable force? And here he begged to make some observations on what fell from the noble lord, who seemed to think, that because they had formerly laid a Resolution on the table stating that they had transports for the conveyance of 4,000 horses, they should have been prepared with at least an equal number to meet the emergency which they were then considering; that a resolution of such a nature had been brought forward he admitted, but he and those with whom he acted, did not think it right to continue that expensive establishment, instituted for a particular purpose, and unnecessary when that purpose was no longer in view; acting upon the system of Mr. Pitt, they had not entirely laid aside the force, but they had reduced the
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number, and diminished, without destroying, the establishment. The only corps, then, that could be reckoned on, were those under his right hon. friend at Cork, and those under gen. Spencer. Now, would the noble lord think it wise to keep the corps at Cork, until the 10,000 additional men could be procured? Could he recommend such a conduct to ministers? A conduct as little consistent with the rules of policy, as it would be grateful to the feelings of the country at large. It had also been objected, that there was a contrariety in the Instructions given to sir A. Wellesley: there were two distinct sets of Instructions given to that officer, the first of a general nature, the second particular, in consequence of the information derived from sir Charles Cotton, but they were not contradictory. The noble lord seemed to consider it a proof of great want of wisdom, that the government at home was not able to give specific instructions in all cases, and bind up their generals by particular mandates, adapted to all possible circumstances. That there might be cases in which it would be culpable to omit those specific instructions, must be allowed; but if ever there was a case, and that there was no man could deny, in which it would be wrong to fetter the judgment of an officer, it was that in which his right hon. friend was concerned. When our expectations in the South of Spain were disappointed, we did not know what effect our exertions in the North might produce in the South. But the question was not left to the discretion of his majesty's government. Portugal decided for herself, and they were in possession of her demands for assistance. He wished that the noble lord had thrown more of the responsibility of this business upon his majesty's ministers, and not shared it between them and the Junta of Gallicia. The Junta did concur, even with a view to their own interests, in the expediency of an attempt in Portugal. It was objected, however, that in the letter to admiral Purvis Spain alone was mentioned, as if it was necessary to tell the admiral of the alternative, when the only object of the letter was, that sir A. Wellesley might get information as to the state of Spain, which perhaps might have directed his views for the time from Portugal. Gen. Spencer, it was true, had been sent in the first instance to Cadiz, and not to Portugal; and the plain reason was, that if he had arrived in the Tagus before the

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main force under sir A. Wellesley, it might have been a signal to the enemy to concentrate his forces, and thereby present a greater power to us than he could otherwise have done: But the noble lord complained that no communication had at this time been made to sir H. Dalrymple. That officer, however, was not then Commander in Chief, nor in any way concerned in the questions which were proceeding. General directions were given to the officers employed to proceed, according to the information they might receive; but when certain information was obtained, a peremptory order was given to them to proceed off the Tagus. Then, if the measure itself was not unwise, the next question was, if there was any thing in the equipment which was wanting. The question in this respect had been greatly narrowed since it was originally made a subject of discussion. First, the whole failure was imputed to ministers:—they had sent out an expedition totally destitute of every thing:—Of ammunition, of artillery, of provisions, of tents, of every thing:—in short, wholly destitute. He now found that the deficiency of artillery horses, and the situation of Portugal with respect to the supplies relied on from it by government, were the things principally to be relied on.—The other questions of equipment for the reduction of the forts, heavy artillery, heavy ordnance or travelling carriages, &c. were not now likely to be urged. He wished to know if he ought to construe the silence of the noble lord into an acquittal on these points, or if he was to call the attention of the house to them. In calling their attention to the principle of equipment, he wished them to distinguish between an army landing in a country, and an army proceeding on its march after having landed; and stated, that an advancing army in general depended upon the country which it went to succour, for supplies. By supplies he did not mean provisions; for he could assure the house, that all the expeditions to Spain and Portugal carried with them provisions for three months, exclusive of the transport provisions, which amounted to eight weeks more. But it would be requisite for them to consider how to move, and what measures would be necessary to enable them to eat their provisions. The noble lord seemed to think, that an army had nothing to do but land and instantly penetrate through the country; but an army required a great supply of cattle to convey those provi-
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sions and other necessaries, and in general he believed the amount of cattle to be half the number of the men. This greatly depended upon the season of the year, &c. In the Austrian army so great a proportion as even one half was usual; so that if an army consisted of 30,000 men, probably 15,000 horses and other beasts of burden might be wanted. Therefore, it was not surprizing that for assistance of this kind they should depend on the country; and it was also necessary that an army should laud at some distance from the enemy, in order that it might have time to create and collect the means to enable it to advance. This was an inconvenience to which every expedition, sent by a naval power, must be subject. When a want of artillery horses was complained of, the noble lord must have willingly shut his eyes to the reinforcement which was immediately to follow from England, and which made all the artillery horses to amount to 778. If sir A. Wellesley's means had been more liberal, there was no doubt but his services would have been more brilliant; but, at the same time, there could hardly be a question that he would not have advanced, if he did not think his means sufficient to the object of occupying the city of Lisbon, and the forts of the Tagus. Sir H. Burrard also knew that sir J. Moore's army had arrived, and that he might expect the equipment of artillery horses, &c. which belonged to it. Instead of 300 horses, therefore, there were 678 artillery horses. For his countrymen (the horses from Ireland) he must be allowed to say a few words. They did not shew themselves to be so bad as the noble lord represented them in the battle of Vimiera. They were very much admired by the French, and 100 of them had been actually selected to pursue the campaign in Spain, through one of the most fatiguing marches ever made by an army. Such were the feats of the so unjustly and ungratefully abused Irish horses. [A laugh!] It was, however, a question, whether an army was useless without horses at all. In Egypt we had only about 150. The same was the case when sir Ralph Abercrombie was in Holland. All he meant to say was, government was not culpable, unless it had the means of sending out the horses in the first instance, and thought that an eligible course, and yet neglected to adopt it. In gen. Wolfe's battle, the picture of which was so universally known and admired, we observed that the sailors drew the guns. The noble

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lord reverted once more to the Irish horses, which had been acknowledged to have done their work well, and to have performed a most difficult and fatiguing march in an uncommon manner. On the whole march only S3 of them had fallen, 12 or 13 of them being killed. So that instead of being bad horses, as the noble lord had said, they had proved hardy Irish horses; and, so far as he had been able to trace their history, they were the best and most serviceable of any in the army. As to the want of cavalry, the noble lord did not suppose it would be contended, either that they could have been sent sooner, or that sir A. Wellesly should have been kept back till they could be sent. At all events, it would be sufficient if they could be shewn to have been equal to the enemy. In the whole they would have amounted to 1,500 rank and tile, and the enemy were never more than It or 1500.—There were two other charges which the noble lord (H. Petty) had not gone into; these were, first, that there were no heavy artillery; secondly, that there were no artillery travelling carriages. As to the first, he presumed to think that it did not require any extraordinary share of military charity to believe that if his right hon. friend sir A. Wellesley did not know that he was in a condition to possess himself of the city of Lisbon and of the forts on the Tagus, he would not have thought of advancing without the necessary artillery. It appeared, however, that while heavy artillery could with the greatest facility be got from the ships which were in possession of the banks of the Tagus, the roads were so extremely bad, that no travelling carriages could pass along. The noble lord had said, that nothing was more blameable than a generality of terms of Instruction to officers.— He could by no means, however, agree in thinking, that there was any thing improper in giving discretionary power. He thought it was hardly possible, that in any extensive military operations the chief command should not change hands. In the Low Countries it happened that, on one occasion within the period of 48 hours, no fewer than four such changes took place. (A laugh.) His lordship did not mean to say that there was any advantage in that circumstance.—lie proceeded to pass some compliments on the conduct of sir H. Dalrymple, who had acted in the most delicate matters with regard to Spain, with a strength of mind and acuteness of judgment which had inspired his majes-
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ty's servants with the greatest confidence in him; not only was there no complaint against him, but he had acted with the greatest propriety, skill, and bravery.—He differed from the noble lord opposite (H. Petty) in his ideas of the advantages resulting from the campaign in Portugal. Was it nothing in a short campaign of three weeks, to have taken possession of a country of great strength; to have defeated an army of 25,000 men; to have liberated an whole country from the grasp of our enemy, and to have restored it again to its own people and its native government? Was it nothing to the military character and glory of the country to have assembled such an army, and to have gained two such victories? Was it nothing to have restored Portugal to its legitimate sovereign? It was no doubt natural to have expected something great from so successful and gratifying an effort. It was natural to expect, after a victory where the public feelings had broke loose, that they should not be easily satisfied. He for one was of that mind; but he was satisfied that if the intelligence of the victory and the armistice had come at the same time, every thinking man would have received it differently. It was a heated and hasty feeling which the public had suffered to be too much indulged. As he went along with the public in this feeling, he felt himself entitled now to reproach the over-indulgence of it. It had been his painful duty to signify to sir H. Dalrymple the disapprobation of government as to some articles of the Convention, in which interference was had with the feelings of other states, but with that exception he could not on cool reflection withhold from the Convention his tribute of approbation.—The noble lord had expressed his surprise that no instruction had been given to admiral Cotton, to direct his conduct, except that of the 18th of April The instruction of the 18th of April was given without any view to the subsequent circumstances. It was merely applicable to a case of starvation, which alone was in view at the time. And after that, it was thought proper to leave his plan of co-operation with the army to his own discretion. The subsequent instruction on the subject, to sir H. Dalrymple, was given to prevent cavil, and was not thought very necessary. The Admiralty thought the conduct of the officer proper; but judged it necessary, generally, to set their faces against the principle of the conditional surrender

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of ships. During the whole course of the operations in the Tagus, it was not proved that the Russians had taken an active part against the Portuguese; and there was nothing in the conduct pursued by sir C. Cotton that appeared to beat all reprehensible. This was a question on which the mind of the country had been very much irritated. He trusted that the course pursued had been the best. If the government had proceeded to investigate the transaction by a Court Martial, instead of a Board of Inquiry, the information obtained would have been much narrowed. The whole of the case had been brought before the house by its having been referred to such a tribunal. He did hope he had submitted to the house ground for his opinion, that the Expedition against Portugal was a most wise and expedient measure, and that the various plans of operations suggested as preferable, would have been in some cases visionary, and in all dangerous; that the object of the expedition was the best that could be adopted—and; the equipment the most perfect which circumstances would permit—that the execution was as complete as the nature of the case would allow—and that there was no failure, except what resulted from causes which neither the administration nor the officers could controul. If the equipment of the expedition was maintainable, the result of the operation was such as at any other time would have satisfied the feelings of the country. It had expelled 25,000 men from Portugal, put the Russian fleet into our possession, and released from a tedious and hazardous blockade a British squadron of nine sail of the line. The Resolutions of the noble lord would answer no beneficial purpose. If the house should agree with him that the first proposition was unnecessary, he hoped that they would also concur with him that the second was unjust. His lordship concluded with moving the Previous Question upon the first Resolution, declaring that he would take the sense of the house upon the second.
Sir George Nugent,in so low a tone, as to be scarcely audible, stated his reasons for having approved of the Armistice and Convention; and, as they were founded upon the insufficient equipments of the army, gave his support to the original motion.
General Tarletonobserved, that the noble lord below him (lord H. Petty) had delivered one of the clearest, most com-
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prehensive, and most convincing speeches that had ever been pronounced within the walls of that house. While the noble lord opposite (Castlereagh,) instead of confining himself to the subject before the house, which related to Portugal alone, had wandered over the Pyrenees—given a lecture on the qualities of Irish horses— mounted his Rosinante and then dismounted—and yet after all, the house he believed would agree with him, that he had not rode post. The noble lord asked, whether it was possible for an army to move immediately on its landing? He answered, yes, and he would give an instance where this was done. When sir Win. Howe was sent to New York, he landed with his cavalry and artillery, after having been a long time at sea, and moved forward the same day, and shortly afterwards came into action. To follow the noble lord through the whole of his course, would ill become him at that hour of the night, and therefore he would at once come to the subject. What was the situation of the armies previous to the Convention? The French must have been dispirited, and the situation in which they were placed was extremely critical and hazardous. The situation was well known to have been a very miserable one. He had to cover an extent of ground of fourteen miles, which was the distance between Lisbon and fort St. Julien. If they meant to defend fort St. Julien, they could not occupy so much ground with advantage; and their situation at Lisbon must have been a bad one.— He agreed in the opinion, that it would have been useless to have encumbered the army with heavy artillery. This could be landed from the fleet, and with such an army and such advantages as we had, there could have been no great difficulty in landing 14 or 15 pieces of cannon, which would soon have reduced fort St. Julien. Lisbon and the country were friendly to us and hostile to the enemy. But then it was said that the Russians might act against us. But the British fleet might act also. He professed himself as entertaining sentiments of respect, individually, for the several officers composing the Board of Inquiry, and he was sorry to be obliged to express an opinion hostile to that which they had delivered as their conclusion upon that Inquiry. That the parties accused should be allowed to justify their conduct by any means in their power was most natural, but that seven

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officers of such known experience and talent should agree in the decision they came to, appeared to him most extraordinary. He totally disagreed with the Court of Inquiry as to the opinion that the French could pass the Tagus and occupy Elvas; and was astonished that the Board could have admitted such a plea. The Tagus was one of the most rapid rivers in the world, and four miles broad at Lisbon. Now, though he would not follow the noble lord over Spain for the sake of spending time or for amusement, he must cite a fact, from history: Lord Cornwallis was shut up in York Town, with this advantage, that he had not been beaten—he had to cross a river only one mile broad, his horse and artillery were on the other side: his boats were ready in a bay defended from the enemy, and the two points of the crescent, which the bay formed, were defended by redoubts, and he had no plunder to carry over,—the event there was well known. The French had a river of four miles to cross; they had to carry over their artillery, their horses, their plunder, and all their baggage, and yet notwithstanding all these disadvantages, they had procured from us the Convention which had been so much reprobated, and this was the result of two brilliant victories—a result which had disgusted Spain and Portugal, and covered England with disgrace. If ministers had had the judgment to allow the right hon. general (sir A. Wellesley to have conducted the whole of the operations, the result might have been different. He respected sir Hew Dalrymple, but he thought it a most extraordinary proceeding in ministers to remove that officer from a situation where they themselves had said he was so useful, in order to place him in a new one, of the nature of which he at that time knew very little. This was admirable foresight! They said, that it would have been doing injustice to many officers in the army to have continued sir A. Wellesley in the command. But when they had appointed him to conduct an operation, they ought to have allowed him to finish it, as the immortal Chatham had done with regard to gen. Wolfe. But the right hon. general had been told, that a successor would soon be appointed, and thus that honourable ambition which so well became a soldier was roused to do something before he was superseded; and this, perhaps, induced him to proceed rather rashly. He would not pursue this topic fur-
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ther now, as the conduct of the gallant officer had already been approved of, but he thought he could convince that gallant and hon. officer himself, that there was something rash in the action of the 17th, and something wrong in that of the 21st. Me reprobated the instruction given to the superior officers to consult an inferior officer, on all occasions, as indecent, and also censured the rage for a change of commanders, which the ministers had evinced. But the noble lord, in justification of this, had mentioned a a similar case in the armies of Austria. The noble lord, however, did not follow this up by saying that, owing to this circumstance, the Austrians had made a successful campaign. He thought the conduct of ministers reprehensible in various points of view in the management of this Expedition, and would therefore vote for the motion of the noble lord near him.
Sir Arthur Wellesleythen rose. Before he proceeded to make any observations on what had fallen from the hon. general who had spoken last, he hoped he might be allowed to advert to some particulars in the speech of the noble lord who had proposed the Resolution. What the noble lord had said related partly to the government, and partly to the officers who had the conduct of the Expedition. For the plan and equipment the government was answerable; for the execution and the result the officers, in his opinion, were alone responsible.—He had given it as his opinion, and it was still his opinion, that the operations in favour of Spain could only be carried on with any chance of success, in conjunction with, and by the consent of the people and public authorities of that country, and therefore it was necessary to come to a right understanding with the Juntas before the commencement of the campaign. When he communicated upon the subject with the Juntas of Gallicia and Asturias, it was conceived that the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal would be a valuable object, not only with a view to the naval station which this would procure for us, but also with a view to support the operations in Spain. When he arrived at Corunna, they had heard of the defeat of their army at Rio Seco; and he then thought it his duty to offer to land his troops and to assist general Blake in covering the seat of their government. They said in reply, that they did not want men; but that the best service which could be done to them and their cause,

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would be to expel the French from Portugal. He had stated to the Board of Inquiry, and he now begged leave to repeat, that he had received a species of requisition, if it might be so called, from the Junta of Asturias, through sir Tho. Dyer, to drive the French from St. Andero. This Letter he begged leave to lay on the table. [Here sir Arthur read the Letter, which contained nothing material, except the do: sire that he would land near St. Andero, unless their situation should be soon altered. It was dated the 31st of June.]—It did not appear to him that this was a requisition of a nature that ought to induce him to relinquish the design on Portugal. He understood from the Junta of Gallicia, on mentioning the subject to them, that measures had been taken to expel the French from St. Andero, and that they considered it as a point of no importance, with a view to the possession of Asturias, which must have been his great object; and in answer to all that he said on the occasion, they repeated, that the best service that could be done to the cause of Spain, by the British troops, would be the expulsion of the French from Portugal. The view which they took of the matter was this, that if in possession of Portugal the British army might be a link between the northern and southern armies of Spain, which had then no point of union. In order to shew what importance they attached to this service, although threatened by the enemy from two points after the defeat at Rio Seco, they sent 2,000 men to Portugal to assist his operations in that quarter. The expulsion of the enemy was not only therefore an immediate British object, but a British object of great consequence, with a view to the future operations in Spain.—The next view that had been taken of the subject, respected the Equipment of the corps sent out on the expedition. Upon this head it would be recollected, that his majesty's ministers had received intelligence from admiral sir Charles Cotton that there were only 4,000 French in Lisbon, the rest having proceeded to Spain, and it could scarcely be alledged as a charge against them, that they acted upon the information of one, who had been eight months on the station, and might be supposed to have the best means of ascertaining with accuracy the real situation of the enemy in that quarter. He had then been ordered to go to the Tagus, and when the equipment was considered with a view to an attack under the infor-
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mation which he had just stated, it might be regarded as amply sufficient. But at the same time there might, no doubt, be other reasons for the choice made of horses for the commissariat and the artillery. It was obvious, however, that with the operations in the Tagus in view, such an ample equipment was not necessary, as would be required for those which he afterwards undertook. He must also state, that when he embarked at Cork he was to proceed to the coast of Spain, without any certainty whether he should be allowed to land at all, or if he should, where he might land; and it was therefore considered that the horses must suffer considerably from being kept a long time on board, and consequently those of an inferior description were chosen, which, under all the circumstances, might be best fitted for a service of this nature.—The next point to be adverted to, respected the operations which he himself undertook, on which the noble lord had said nothing. The hon. general however who spoke last had said that he (sir A. Wellesley) had been hurried forward by an honourable ambition to undertake an operation of considerable risk. Now, he wished to call the attention of the house to what had passed at the Board of Inquiry. He conceived as he had stated to that court that he had a larger British force than any which the enemy could bring into the field against him: he was, indeed, inferior in cavalry, but he expected to be joined by some Portuguese cavalry, which, together with the British, would form a respectable corps, though then, no doubt, he might in that respect be inferior to the enemy.—But under all these circumstances he asked, whether the hon. general himself would have hesitated, if he had been in his situation, to act as he had done? He assured the hon. general, that he would much rather follow his example in the field, than his advice in the senate, (Hear! hear!) He had the choice of two lines of march when he landed in Portugal, and, for obvious reasons, had chosen that along the coast. Besides the troops which he had under his command at the time, he had reason to expect reinforcements under general Ackland, sir H. Burrard, and sir John Moore. Now, in order to shew how well satisfied he was of the sufficiency of his own force to execute his object, he did not intend to have employed the corps under general Ackland in the field at all, but intended to have sent it to besiege

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Peniche. When sir II. Burrard arrived, he had no longer the command, but he recommended to him a plan of operation for the corps of sir John Moore, and if that had been adopted, he should not this night have had the mortification to hear the noble lord propose a Resolution that the Expedition to Portugal had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. That plan was, that sir John Moore should advance upon Santarem, with a view to intercept, the enemy. He thought that the French would endeavour to cross the Tagus. That plan was feasible, not only in his opinion, but in the opinion of all the general officers who had given evidence at the Court of Inquiry, and even of the Court itself, which the hon. general would find if he would be so kind as to read the Report. Sir H. Burrard, however, thought proper to call that corps to the assistance of the army. It was not necessary now to enter into any discussion on that subject, I but it was material to observe that this circumstance altered the whole system of operations.—With respect to the change of commanders, when he left England, he never expected to bo continued in the command after large reinforcements had arrived, to the exclusion of many valuable officers. But at the same time he did not think that the command ought to be changed in the middle of expeditions—(Hear! hear!) In the course of a campaign the command might be changed without injury, but these expeditions were not campaigns, they were only operations. But as by the change of the commanders the whole system had been altered, this circumstance necessarily governed him in his subsequent views. His original plan was to have engaged the enemy as near Lisbon as possible, and to have followed up the advantage, which he undoubtedly expected, with the utmost, expedition; by which means, he trusted, he would have got to Lisbon nearly as soon as themselves, and prevented their crossing the Tagus. His opinion still was, that if they had been followed closely after their defeat at Vimiera on the 21st, they would not have been enabled to cross the Tagus. He was no party to the question, and had never come forward as the accuser of sir H. Burrard, but, as he had conducted the previous operations—as he had commanded at Vimiera, and held himself responsible for that action, he thought his opinion ought to have had some weight on that occasion, and also with the Court of Inquiry; espe-
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cially as that opinion had been supported by all the general officers whom he had then under his command. It had been said indeed, that a gallant general (Spencer), a friend of his, had given a different opinion; but notwithstanding the caution with which that gallant officer had spoken, yet a close examination of his evidence would shew, that he was, in fact, of his opinion; and, in answer to one of the questions, that opinion had been strongly expressed. It was upon the principle which, he stated that he had advanced from Mondego Bay; and he never could understand, how the Court of Inquiry, which had approved of all that he had done, up to the close of the battle of Vimiera, could have said that these troops, which had been, constantly beaten in the field, ought not to be pursued when beaten. He would' certainly have pushed them so hard after that battle if he had retained the command, that it would have been impossible for them to have crossed the Tagus. But there was one part of the Report of the Board, with respect to the question of advancing alter the action of the 21st, to which he must refer. The passage was this, "This very circumstance of a superior cavalry retarding our advance would allow the enemy's infantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat in the most rapid manner, till they should arrive at any given and advantageous point of rallying and formation; nor did sir A. Wellesley, on the 17th of August, when the enemy had not half the cavalry as on the 21st, pursue a more inconsiderable and beaten army with any marked advantage; for he says (Gazette Extraordinary), 'The enemy retired with the utmost regularity, and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain.'—And again, 'He succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my want of cavalry.'"—Here, in the first place, although he meant to impute no blame to the Court of Inquiry, they must have thought him at least very inconsistent, if not very incorrect in his statement: now, he apprehended he was neither incorrect nor inconsistent. The fact was, that there were two parts of the action of the 17th—the one in the mountains, and the other in the plain. In that part of the action which took place in the plain, the enemy had retired in good order. After the battle of

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the 21st they had retired in great disorder.—And the good order of the retreat in the one case, and the disorder in the other made all the difference. Although it might not be proper without an adequate force of cavalry to pursue the enemy closely, when they retired in good order on the 17th, it by no means followed, that they ought not to be pursued on the 21st, when they had been completely beaten, and had retreated in great disorder. The disorderly retreat of the enemy on the 21st was the ground of his opinion, that they ought to be hard pushed; and, if they had been vigorously followed up on that day he was satisfied in his own mind, that there would have been no reason for concluding the Convention, which had given to much offence. Now, as to this Convention it was rather hard to charge it upon the government, when, if a certain plan of operations had been followed, the reason for it would not have existed. The necessity for concluding the Convention had been ascribed to the want of artillery; of horses; of equipment of various kinds; but he was bound to state, that, in considering the propriety of concluding an Armistice, and afterwards the Convention, these circumstances had never been taken into account by him, nor by an of the officers concerned in the negociation upon that subject. The only question at all connected with the state of the army in point of equipment was, as to the difficulty of supplying it with provisions, when the whole of the troops should be collected.—The next point to which it was necessary to advert was, that which respected this Armistice and Convention. Here it was proper to consider the situation of the two armies at the time when the Armistice was concluded. The French, after the battle of Vimiera, had occupied a strong position, in which they would have been enabled to stop the progress of a superior force for three or four days. The advancing army, after being occupied for three or four days in dislodging them from that position, would have further to drive them from two or three other lines which lay between the main position and Lisbon, During the whole of this time the French might have been employed in preparations for the passage of the Tagus, which it would have been impossible to prevent.—An hon. and gallant general over the way had adverted to the situation of lord Cornwallis in the American war. Without entering into any comparison between
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Junot and lord Cornwallis, he had only to observe, that the situations in Which they stood were very different. Lord Cornwallis was shut up in a town and actually besieged, but Junot, instead of this, might be said to have the military possession of the country. Then the hon. general said, "How was it possible to cross a rapid river from 4 to 6 miles broad, in such a situation?" Why, that was matter of opinion; and it was the opinion of all the officers who were there at the time, and of all the members of the Board of Inquiry, that it was impossible to prevent their crossing the Tagus. He had heard that it was the opinion of a high military authority (the Earl of Moira) that if the French had been driven to cross the Tagus, they would have been reduced to extreme distress. His answer to that was, in the first place, that it was the duty of Junot to have suffered that distress, however severe, rather than have surrendered at discretion, and there was no reason to believe that he would not have done his duty in that respect.—But in the second place he did not allow that the French would have been reduced to this extreme distress. General Loison had crossed the Tagus, quelled the insurrection in Alentejo, returned again by repassing the Tagus, and by this means removed the difficulties which the French might otherwise have experienced in the retreat to Elvas. But it had been said that Junot would have been obliged to surrender at last. This was true; but at what time of the year? After our army should have got possession of the forts on the Tagus it would have been necessary to put it in a situation of equipment fitted for reducing the fort of Elvas by a regular siege, and for this a considerable length of time would have been required. He (sir Arthur) affirmed that the British army would not be in a condition to reduce the fort till the beginning of December, and then it might be thought advisable to give the French army the same, or nearly the same terms, as those which were granted them in August. Considering the relative situation of the armies then, he did not think it disgraceful to allow the French to embark. He thought the gaining of time also an important object with a view to the operations in Spain.—He was aware that the presence of a British army there might be of the greatest consequence, in order to give the Spaniards strength in their own union, and to prevent their being cut off in detail. The

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same noble lord, to whom he had alluded as a high military authority, had said that the officers in the command of the expedition ought to have attended more to the great advantages which in the then situation of affairs would have resulted from compelling the enemy to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion.—But no such object had been prescribed in the Instructions to the officers commanding the British forces. Undoubtedly, as it was the duty of every officer, to endeavour to oblige a hostile force opposed to him to lay down their arms, there was no need of such Instructions.—But the question was, whether to prosecute that object they ought to have given up other material points in time and circumstances, and to abandon the advantages they had gained. It would not be as honourable to the British arms, if after pursuing the enemy into Alentejo, and the consequent loss of time and blood, the same, or nearly as good terms were to be granted to the enemy. If it was not disgraceful to have allowed the French to evacuate Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, the Convention for the evacuation of Portugal could not be disgraceful, he allowed that the circumstances of the two cases were different, as was also the state of Europe, though he contended that the result in both was equally free from disgrace. There was one topic more to which he was anxious? to advert, with regard to the Court of Inquiry. He perfectly agreed with the noble lord in the wish that this might be the last Court of this kind which should ever assemble. It was not a Court before which any officer would desire to be tried. A general impression had gone abroad, that this Court had been instituted by his noble friend out of friendship to him. It was rather hard upon him to be subjected to such a reflection; as, if he had been tried in any other manner, he must have been acquitted. As far as he was concerned, he must say, without meaning to blame any of the members, that this Court had been a source of injustice, and he therefore hoped it would be the last Court of the kind to which the investigation of the conduct of officers should be submitted.—As to the Letter sent by his noble friend, desiring his superior officers to consult him particularly, had he been aware of the existence of such a document, he should have felt his situation very uncomfortable. But he must say, that from the first hour these officers landed, nay
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even before they had landed, he perceived that lie was not in possession of their confidence. He, however, had done every thing he could to forward their objects, though he differed from them in opinion. This was what he considered as the great distinction between military and civil inferior situations. If, in a civil office, the inferior differed materially from the superior, he ought to resign; but in military appointment it was the duty of the inferior officer to assist his commander in the mode in which that commander might deem his services most advantageous. If he thought himself capable of giving advice, and of suggesting plans, it was his duty to endeavour to carry them into execution. But, if the commander did not think proper to listen to his advice or suggestions, it was his duty to assist his superior in that way which to that superior might appear most eligible (Hear! hear!). This was the principle which, in his opinion, ought to regulate the conduct of military officers. It was a principle on which he had on that occasion, as ever before, acted, and on which he ever would act.
Mr. Windhamshould be sorry to have it supposed, that in rising after the hon. general, he had a wish to do away any part of the impression which his speech could not fail to have made. Nothing could be more clear, fair, and manly than the manner in which the hon. general had spoken of all the persons with whom he had acted, and of all the transactions in which he had been concerned. He (Mr. W.) must necessarily feel diffident in delivering any opinion on subjects of which he could know so little as of military operations; and was well aware that, in offering his testimony to the merits of the hon. general, he was offering what was of little value. But he could not, for his own sake, abstain from expressing how entirely he concurred in opinion with the views and conduct of the hon. general; not only in those parts where his measures might seem to have a voucher in success, however he might still think some of them questionable in point of prudence; but in those also where the intentions of the hon. general had been unfortunately over-ruled. Though there was nothing to which he (Mr. W.) was in general more adverse than to confident judgments on professional subjects from persons not professional, and that it might be true in part that the merit of an officer could not be judged but by a judgment

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on the merit of his particular measures, yet there was a certain character of talent and ability that might be capable of making itself visible even to persons the most unlearned, and might shew the superiority of one player over another even to those who were most ignorant of the game. It was impossible not to discern in the whole stile of the hon. general's conduct, those characteristic marks, which have at all times, and not least in those in which we live, distinguished the successful from the Unsuccessful side, the victor from the vanquished.— But the statement of the hon. general, though proper for him to make, and satisfactory for his justification, was no vindication of his majesty's ministers upon the present question. Whilst it justified his character it was the condemnation of theirs. It was the glory of a military officer to achieve success under great disadvantages. There was no credit to be gained horn good fortune, where there were no disadvantages to be encountered, no difficulties to be overcome. But, the glory of an administration consists in placing their officers in circumstances where success shall be easy, where they cannot chuse but win, and where of consequence their glory must, be little. The merits of executive officers and of those who employ them move often in this respect exactly in a counter order. What is the boast of the officer, is the reproach of the minister; and the triumph of the minister in preparing an easy victory takes from the officer his means of distinction. The circumstances, therefore, which enhanced the merit of the gallant general constituted the blame of the ministers who produced them. As to the opinion expressed by the hon. general respecting the Convention, he must differ with him upon that point; though the reasons assigned for that opinion were perfectly neutral, so far as his majesty's ministers were concerned. Unquestionably, a prima facie responsibility attached upon ministers for every public measure; yet he would admit that, upon examination, the Convention was one of which they stood perfectly clear. But when he allowed they stood clear of the Convention itself, he did not mean, that there was not matter of responsibility in their preceding conduct; that they were not responsible for the manner in which they superseded the commanding officers; and for all the other circumstances which arrested the hon. general's career of success, and led to the Convention. The
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hon. general had certainly stated that the want of cavalry would not have prevented him from following up his victory. But had he stated, that it had not produced that effect in others? and was it not the reason principally insisted upon by the members of the Court of Inquiry, why the generals who refused to concur in that course, were justified in their refusal? He could not but believe, notwithstanding this opinion of the members of the Court, that the hon. general was right, and that if left to himself he would have accomplished all that he had said he could. He (Mr. W.) must fairly confess that he could hardly entertain a doubt upon that point. Still the doubt was entertained, and, in the opinion of the members of the Court, was rightly entertained, and it is this which in point of fact, prevented the victory from being followed up: and this doubt was founded almost entirely upon the deficiency of cavalry. So that, let who will be right, it was they, who, for whatever reasons, forbore to provide the army with a larger proportion of cavalry, upon whom it must be charged, that the victory of Vimiera fell so far short of what it might have done, and instead of the capture of the enemy's army, only produced their removal from Portugal, upon the disgraceful terms which we had witnessed. This was the great feature of the case, as it respected his majesty's ministers. This was the great connecting link, which made them responsible for measures in which directly, it is true, they had no share. They did not make the Convention. No: but they made that which did make the Convention; which rendered it necessary, as some say; but without which, it is agreed on all hands, the Convention, would not have been made.—Was the result of the Campaign in Portugal such as to satisfy the hopes and expectation of the country? This was the first question to be asked, as the means by which it must be ascertained, whether there existed or not a corpus delicti. Upon this point the answer was unanimous, without the exception even of his majesty's ministers. There was a failure to be accounted for, a ship lost, for which the commander must be tried, whether blame must ultimately be imputed to him or not. In the present instance he would say confidently, that blame must be imputed somewhere, either upon the officers or upon the ministers. The Court of Inquiry was a tribunal very little competent to this purpose.

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It was confessedly confined to half the object which the house and the country would have in view. In the manner in which the hon. gentlemen had conducted it, from motives and purposes of their own, it was wholly unfit even for that part of the subject which it did embrace, and was in every respect a most unjust and unconstitutional mode of proceeding. The true conception, as he apprehended, of a Court of Inquiry, was that of a set of persons delegated to inquire into the circumstances of any transaction, for the purpose afterwards of advising his majesty confidentially, whether there was ground for submitting the matter to an inquiry of a more judicial nature. They were a set of advisers and not of judges, or, if judges, judges who were to judge of nothing but whether the matter ought to be submitted to judgment. As far as resemblances and analogies might be admitted, (never very safe to be trusted to, they were), as had been observed, of the character of a Grand Jury: and therefore according to the analogy, as well as according to the nature of the thing, ought to have kept their proceedings secret. As a secret tribunal they were to determine whether they would advise his majesty to try his officers. But what the ministers wanted, was that, as a public tribunal, they should determine whether the country ought to acquit his ministers. They pervert therefore the whole nature of the tribunal, and have produced out of it such a strange, anomalous, and inconsistent proceeding, as was never known in the laws of this or of any country, and cannot be made conclusive to any purpose that shall be at once Rational and honest. It is a trial and no trial. It can neither condemn so as to inflict punishment on the guilty, nor acquit so as to protect the innocent from further prosecution. In the mean while, witnesses are I to be pledged, impressions made and facts prematurely disclosed, so as to render a fair trial before a regular tribunal no longer practicable. The cause of all this is to be found in the sinister purposes of the ministers on one side, and in their fears on the other. They wanted to hush up the business so as to prevent that full disclosure which a trial would bring out, and which might involve statements not so convenient to themselves. For this purpose either no inquiry at all, or an inquiry in the regular mode, with shut doors, would have been most convenient. But that the impatience of the public would
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not readily acquiesce in. To that the terrors of the newspapers were opposed. They therefore conceived and brought forth that monstrous production, unknown to our laws and our usages, an open Court of Inquiry, of which the only effect has been to throw dust in the eyes of the people, by a show of trial without the reality, and by making them believe, that what after all is said only of the officers, was to be applied to the ministers.—My noble friend (lord H. Petty) has been asked, Why, if he disapproved so much of the Court of Inquiry, he did not propose a substitute? But what is meant by a substitute for a thing that is past? A past measure cannot be displaced so as to have something put in the room of it. The measure must for. ever have been. The effects of past measures may often be corrected and their force or operation reversed; but even that cannot happen in the present instance, and one of the complaints made is, that the proceeding is of such a nature as precludes the possibility of its being set right.—But, even supposing the establishment of this Court and its decision to be perfectly justifiable, what would it have to do with his majesty's ministers? The declaration, that none of the officers concerned ought to be put upon their trial, could be no justification of government. The Board of Inquiry had broadly stated, that it was the want of means that prevented the victory of Vimiera from being followed up in the manner in which the gainer of that victory would have improved his advantage. Agreeably to what he had before observed, the acquittal of the officers might be, and was in the present instance, the condemnation of the government. As to the measure of the Convention becoming then necessary, he differed from the hon. general in one point not military; and upon that the hon. general and the officers who composed the Board of Inquiry, appeared to him to have a fallacious view. It had been stated by them, that the object of the expedition was to procure the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops. This assertion he should deny. What advantage, it was asked, would it have been to Portugal to have driven the French troops into Spain? But might it not as well be asked, what advantage could it have been to Spain to transport the French troops in our ships to port of France from which they could speedily march into Spain? If that was the original view of the expedition it was a false

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one.—There was another point touched upon by the hon. general, and with the same clearness and perspicuity which characterized the other parts of his speech, but from which he must dissent. The hon. general had said, that the advantages which resulted from the evacuation of Portugal by the enemy, and the time gained thereby, were equivalent to all that might have been lost in other respects. This he could not admit, because any time that might be necessary for the reduction of the enemy would have been amply repaid by its consequences. But if, after a considerable loss of time and much effusion of blood, the terms granted were to be such as they were, and that nothing could be done, then, though the Convention might be right, yet he must ask, why send an army to Portugal at all? If the object were not to compel the French to far other terms than those they obtained, he would never have thought of sending an army to Portugal. The hon. general had stated, that he thought himself competent with the force originally under his command to accomplish the objects of the campaign; it was therefore what he could not understand, why, when that force had been doubled and trebled, no more could be done than to bring the French to the terms stipulated in the Convention. If so, there was a want of prudence, a culpable precipitancy, in the original advance of the hon. general with so inferior a force; and what was to be thought of the conduct of those ministers, who had sent him out with such insufficient means? If the French force could not have been reduced, after the victories that had been obtained over them, before December, if the Convention was therefore justifiable, why tell us of the superiority of British troops? a superiority, by the by, of which he had always been convinced, and had uniformly declared, notwithstanding a base, degrading and degenerate opinion to the contrary, which had for some lime prevailed amongst certain descriptions of persons in this country. Had the hon. general, if the Convention under all the circumstances was necessary, instead of gaining a victory, suffered a reverse, which might possibly have been the case, how could he have escaped from au enemy, that gained such terms, when opposed to a force so greatly superior to that the hon. general had originally commanded? Reasoning, therefore, upon their own grounds and admissions, he might ask, why his majesty's ministers had not waited
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till all the troops destined for the Expedition had joined, until they had collected a force sufficient to accomplish the total and complete military reduction of the French Army in Portugal? But no: they felt it necessary on that, as on other occasions, that they should appear to be doing something; that they should make a bustle; should support their characters for vigour: Portugal was the first object that presented itself, and they ran at it like an overdrove ox, and as that animal too is said to do, with their eyes shut; not having at all thought what they were to do till after they had got into the country. When a measure therefore came, by which, whether advantageously or not, the object was accomplished which they now profess to have had in view, viz. the getting the French out of Portugal, they were embarrassed with their own success, and were not at all prepared with what was to be the next step! Nothing, therefore, is more completely unfortunate, than the argument, which they now urge in defence of the Convention, namely, that it had the effect of getting the French out of Portugal sooner than could otherwise have been done: For, first, it is not true. The speediest way would undoubtedly have been to have conquered them in the first instance, as the hon. general would have done, with the troops that he had, and as the other generals do not deny that they could have done with a sufficiency of cavalry: next, it is not at all clear, that even when that opportunity was lost, the expulsion of the enemy by subsequent operations would not have been quite as speedy, and a good deal more satisfactory, than the method of Convention. But lastly, of what advantage was it to "the hon. gentlemen, thus to endeavour to accelerate the evacuation, when, as it was, it came upon them before they were prepared for it. They are arguing therefore against themselves, when they give as a reason for adopting the Convention, that it sooner left them at liberty to transfer the army to Spain. If this effect was of so much consequence to them, why were they not prepared for it? Or why make such sacrifices for an object, which when they had got, they were not in a state to make use of?—These points, therefore, are established against them: 1st. That they are answerable for the Convention, good or bad as it may be, inasmuch as it is admitted on all hands, that it was from the want of means which they ought to have

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provided, that it became, or was thought, necessary: 2dly. That when they had got this God-send, they were not at all prepared to profit by it; and that therefore, 3dly, If the hon. general's success had been completed in the way that he had proposed, they would still less have been prepared; and have made it still more evident, that they had sent the troops into Portugal in the most headlong, blundering manner, without the least idea of what they were to do, or what plan was to be pursued in different results that might be supposed.—But the noble lord had attempted to answer a part of these charges, by justifying the state, in which the Expedition had been equipped originally and sent out; and asserting, that cavalry was not necessary to its success, because victories had been obtained without cavalry. Who had ever said, that victories might not be gained without cavalry? The glorious battle of Maid a, the reduction of every fortress was an instance. I wonder the noble lord, when he was about it, did not cite the victories of St. Vincent and Trafalgar. There are battles however, which are not to be won without cavalry. But whether that were so or not makes no difference. The question here is not about gaining victories, but about improving them. The victory here was gained, and perhaps with no very material use of cavalry: but for want of cavalry it produced nothing but the Convention, instead of producing, as is hardly denied, the instant and unconditional surrender of the whole French army.—The hon. general had stated, that, as the Expedition had been originally destined against the Tagus, no cavalry was necessary. And here he must notice the sarcasm of the noble lord, in which, with his usual correctness of statement and argument, he had adverted to the Expedition sent by the late administration to the Tagus, to which no cavalry was attached. Unquestionably, on an expedition to the Tagus no cavalry was necessary, but though ministers now thought proper to say, that the present expedition had been originally destined for that port, he had hitherto understood, that the hon. general had been sent out with a roving commismission, not certainly authorising him to proceed to the East Indies, to Surinam or Buenos Ayres, but to commence operations upon any part of the Peninsula that he should think proper. The hon. general did land in a part of Portugal where cavalry was necessary, and consequently
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the want of that species of force produced the failure of the campaign, and constituted a heavy ground of accusation against the noble lord. It had been charged upon the late administration, that they had neither provided nor left to their successors any cavalry transports; but as they had no object for the employment of cavalry, why should they have put the country to the expence of keeping them? The noble lord had boasted, that, as soon as he and his friends came into office, they had provided transports for 4,000 cavalry; but if they had had no object for the employment of cavalry, the noble lord must have got the transports for the sake of his argument, and if so, he must say, that the noble lord's argument cost the country very dear. Yet when the occasion did occur for the employment of cavalry, the noble lord had no provision for their conveyance, and therefore so far as the Convention is bad, as it had been produced by a want of cavalry, so far ministers were condemned even upon their own shewing.—There was another argument which had sometimes been adverted to, and which had been renewed that night, as to the quality of the horses sent out with the Expedition, which it would be necessary for him to notice. It was said, that less valuable horses had been selected, in order that the loss to the public should be lighter in the event of their being destroyed; as if they had been sent out to be sacrificed! Why, the same reasoning may be applied to the ordinary comforts or necessaries of life; when we shall see at once its extreme absurdity. What opinion would be entertained of the understanding of a man, who should say, "give me a bad coat, a bad horse, or a bad house, as I shall then lose the less, if they be destroyed?" At this rate men must chuse their possessions upon principles the very reverse of those commonly followed, and instead of selecting the best of every thing, must endeavour to get the worst. This is not the common way. Men calculate commonly upon the value of a thing, while they have it, and not upon the loss they must sustain in losing it, which must be greater always as the thing is better. But the hon. gentlemen say, "this is a mistake; it is the loss and not the use that is to be considered. Chuse me that which I may part with, without regret." I suppose it was upon this principle, that the present Administration was chosen, But does it escape the noble

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lord, that in many instances things good of their kind, besides that the value of the use compensates the evil of losing them, are less likely to be lost? And that part of their excellence consists in that very circumstance? One of the excellencies of a house is that it may be expected to stand long. One of the advantages of a good ship that it is less liable to be lost. This is eminently true in the case of troops and armaments. The capture of good troops is, it will be admitted, a greater evil than that of an equal number of bad ones; but then it must be allowed, that good troops are less likely to be captured. Such a perversion of argument and commonsense never was heard of, he supposed, since the days when reasoning began till the present moment.—The noble lord had stated, that it would have been improper to send out a large army under an inferior general; that a large force required, as it were, a large general; but surely it did not follow from that position, that a small army must be sent out with a small general? It was not necessary that the general and the army should fit with such exactness. There was not the same danger in making the general too big as in making him too little. When he used the word 'little,' with reference to any thing that had passed, he certainly must be understood to mean, little in rank, not little in talents. Why, however, should they not put their best foot forward at once? Why not send out, in the first instance, the proper general with a small army, especially when that small army was to be immediately encreased to a large one? It was from the neglect of this principle, that the rapid supercession of the generals, and all the calamitous consequences of the campaign, had arisen. He could not conceive a more perfect recipe for exciting dissention and jealousy in an army; for sweeping away all cordiality and union from amongst its members; and destroying every prospect of the prosperous issue of a campaign. The hon. general had stated, that, from the first moment of their arrival, he perceived he could not flatter himself, that he possessed the confidence of either of his successors in the command. This was the natural consequence of the rapid supercession, in which general succeeded general, wave succeeded wave, rising some of them as it were literally out of the sea: assembled upon the stage like persons at the end of a comedy, with all
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the happiest effects of surprize, some from one part of the world, and some from another, one from Syracuse and another from Ephesus; bringing with them their various views and prejudices, and marring whatever was to be done by their total ignorance of all that had preceded.—It had been declared to the house and the country from the highest authority in the state, that the Convention of Cintra had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. He wished the noble lord then to state, whether ministers had changed their mind; whether they entertained a different opinion with respect to that transaction now and at the time they caused the guns to be fired? Did they at that moment really think the news was good? or were they only endeavouring by noise and clamour, by a bold and confident show of exultation, by firings at midnight and puffs in the morning, to confound the sense of the country, and, as sometimes happens in other theatres, to force, as excellent, down the throats of the public, what they knew in their own minds to be most execrable stuff? He should really be curious to know in which way the hon. gentlemen meant to take it? whether they meant to describe themselves as dupes upon that occasion, or as only intending to dupe the nation? Among their friends, perhaps, they will prefer the latter description; but as they can hardly venture to profess this publicly, they must be content to be set down as persons, who were unable to discover that this Convention was a bad measure, till it had received the comment of the public voice, till the knowledge of its merits was forced upon them by the universal cry of the country, by the groans and murmurs and hissings and cat-calls, and cries of, 'off, off,' which assailed them on every side, and from every rank or order of people, from pit, boxes, and gallery. One merit, however, may be allowed them. They did not, like many authors, set themselves obstinately to resist the general judgment, but after the hints they had received, appeared willing at length to withdraw their piece, and to confess that it was, to be sure, a most wretched performance.—But, there was another and a weightier ground of accusation against the right hon. gentlemen, founded upon their total want of foresight in all their military measures, and the culpable absence of any general or comprehensive plan. This lamentable defect

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was no less obvious in the more enlarged operations of the campaign, than in the particular arrangements which led to the Convention. His majesty's ministers never seemed to know what to do. They sent out troops before they knew where they would be received; they sent them in a state of equipment inadequate to the object for which they were destined; and, when these troops had at length been brought to act upon the great theatre of the war, the occasion had gone bv, when they could be of any effectual use.—As to the noble lord's allusion to the campaign of the Pyrenees, he was quite a stranger to its meaning; but he was certain, that nothing had fallen from his noble friend to provoke the facetious irony of the noble lord's comment. He could admit, that it might be desirable to send a force to reduce general Junot's corps in Portugal, if there had been any room to apprehend, that that corps could be brought to act against Spain. But, it was well known, that Junot at that time, hemmed in on all sides by the tumultuous but determined levies of an enraged nation, was not in a state to co-operate with Dupont. At all events the defeat of Dupont afterwards settled that point, and left us at liberty, and in very good time, to alter the whole plan of our operations. Junot and his corps could not be better placed any where than as they were, cut off from all communication with their countrymen, pressed upon all sides by the accumulating force of the Portuguese nation, and condemned either to shut themselves up in the fortresses of that country, or by taking the field to expose themselves to the destruction which the vengeance of an irritated and insulted people was prepared to inflict. In this state of things, the question was, Whether it was good policy to make any attack upon Junot with a view to destroy his force? but if that were not good policy, it was still less so, to attack him with a view to grant him such terms as would send him into Spain, from which, whilst in Portugal, he was effectually cut off. Unless ministers were prepared to say that they had been successful before their lime, they had no way of accounting for the interval that elapsed before the army proceeded to Spain; and, if they rested their Defence upon that ground they must stand selfconvicted of a criminal want of foresight, and were deeply responsible for all the losses which resulted from that unfortunate
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expedition to Spain having been undertaken too late. But how would the case have stood if Junot's force had been destroyed or made prisoners of war? What would have been the inevitable consequences of such a result, in the impression it would have made upon our allies, upon our enemies, upon ourselves, and upon all Europe, as to the comparative character of British and French troops? This impression alone was equivalent to most of the objectsth at campaigns the most successful are able in general to give. Those who think otherwise, must know but little of the state of the world, particularly at the moment in which we live, or of the feelings and judgments of mankind on other occasions. What had we gained at Maida? In point of territory, nothing. In point of acquisition of any pecuniary value, nothing: but we had gained glory, military glory, and this single circumstance was sufficient to render the battle of Maida one of the most useful, as well as most honourable, of any that had ever been fought for the country. By the reduction of Junot's force we should have incalculably enhanced this invaluable national object; that base and unworthy feeling, of which he had before spoken, would have been destroyed; and above all, the French armies and nation would, however reluctantly, have been constrained to admit the decided superiority of British troops. Our army had fought as well at Vimiera as at Maida, but unfortunately the same credit will not be given for its conduct. The troops with whom our force had come to blows would remember their superiority, but the people of France would not be inclined to admit it upon our statement. Whenever we should claim this superiority, they would quote the Convention against us. They would ask, "What have you gained? What have you to show for your victory? Have you brought home the game? What have you bagged? Have you taken gen. Junot? On the contrary, is he not now at the head of his division in Spain? Have you made his corps prisoners of war? On the contrary, are they not lighting against you and your allies at this moment in Spain? It was this loss of glory, this deplorable neglect of the opportunity to make an indelible impression upon the French themselves, and the Spanish nation, as to the striking superiority of the British army, that were most to be regretted in the unfortunate result of the campaign in

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Portugal. He was convinced, that the hon. general would not say, that any thing could compensate the loss of so precious an object, and such a golden opportunity. Upon the whole, therefore, he contended, that his majesty's ministers, from their want of diligence, from the absence of all the ordinary official activity, from their total want of all general plan, and from the blind inconsiderate way, in which they had conducted the whole of the campaign, stood, even upon their own shewing, condemned before their country, and he should consequently feel it his duty to support the motion of his noble friend.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerconsidered the proposition of the noble lord not only untenable in itself, but wholly unsupported by the argument of the right hon. gent. who had just sat down. The view which that right hon. gent. had taken of the question fully justified the measures of his majesty's government The right hon. gent. had acknowledged that if the gallant general near him (sir Arthur Wellesley) had, as he so earnestly wished, followed up his plan, and pursued an already discomfited enemy, the result would have been as decisive and as glorious as ever marked the progress of the British arms. He had also staid, that the cause of this not having been the happy consequence, was to be found in the conduct of sir Harry Burrard and sir Hew Dalrymple; but instead of blaming those, who over-ruled the plans of his gallant friend, the right hon. gent. turned short round, and laid the whole burden upon the shoulders of ministers, because, as he argued, they had an excuse for acting wrong, in not following the advice of sir A. Wellesley; from the want of cavalry, which was the fault of ministers. How could ministers be blamed for not providing means for carrying a campaign to a satisfactory issue, when in the same breath it was acknowledged, that if the opinion of one general, who commanded in the field of battle, had been followed, it would have terminated so gloriously to the British arms? That was the species of logic, which the right hon. gent. employed, that the course of argument which he adopted, in order to persuade the house to agree to the two Propositions of the noble lord. For his own part, he had no objection to the first Proposition, which adopted the language of his majesty's Speech from the throne, and expressed the sentiments of the country; and he should not give any op-
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position to it, if it were not to lead to another, which was to cast a censure upon his majesty's ministers, which he was confident they had not merited. But, it seemed that the right hon. gent. in the course of his reasoning upon the present question, had mistaken all the measures of the existing administration as well as forgotten all the measures of his own. He had also fallaciously contended, that because his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) had said in the preceding year, that he had cavalry transports to the amount of 4,000 tons, that he ought to have had sufficient for the conveyance of cavalry with this expedition. But did not the right hon. gent. know that upwards of that quantity of tonnage was employed at the time, in the Baltic. The transports were not, as when the late administration had promised aid to the continental powers, laid up, dismantled, and destroyed. The expedition was originally destined for the Tagus, on which service cavalry was not deemed necessary It was admitted even by the right hon. gent. that, if the expedition had been destined for the Tagus, cavalry would not be necessary, because of his own expedition to the same point, with which no cavalry had been sent. A great deal had been said of the supercession of commanders, and that it was improper to send a junior officer with a large force, if he was afterwards to be superseded in the command. With regard to the point of the superceding of officers, perhaps the right hon. gent. spoke feelingly on that subject, from having found the inconvenience of it. He had employed a junior officer (brig.-gen. Craufurd) to go with 4,000 men, by the Antipodes to Botany Bay, from whence they were to proceed to Chili, which they were to conquer. This done, a line of posts was to be established across the Andes, to Buenos Ayres, to secure the possession of that settlement! Surely, the right hon. gent. could not have forgotten this; for such an idea, when it once entered the mind of man, could not be got out of it again. This officer was, after a long voyage, recalled in order to be placed under the command of gen. Whitelocke at Buenos Ayres. He would put a case, however: was it not possible that it might be expedient, when a small expedition was increased to a very large army, to supersede the original commander, and appoint a senior officer, in order to preserve in the service of that army many excellent officers, who could not, from the usage in the army, serve under a junior

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commander, or one of lower rank? This was precisely the case in the present instance; and his gallant friend himself had told them, that he could not have expected to be placed at the head of so great an army, which would by that means have been deprived of the assistance of many of those generals who had eminently distinguished themselves on other occasions. He could assure the right hon. gent. that no persons in the country were more disappointed or grieved at the issue of the campaign in Portugal than his majesty's ministers. They lamented the Convention, and they lamented that it bad not been demonstrated to the world, beyond the possibility of controversy, that the British army was infinitely superior to the French. The character of the British army was, however, in the course of this campaign established in the mind of every impartial man in Europe, for incomparable discipline, irresistible valour, and unwearied perseverance. He agreed, then, with the right hon. gent. on this point, but he could see no occasion for the house to re-echo what had been declared by his majesty, and was a general sentiment in the country, with a view to censure his majesty's ministers. It would be worth while to observe how curiously the right hon. gent. and his friends on the other side of the house argued. They were content to leave the proposition thus: "something ought to be done on the Peninsula: we censure you for having done wrong, but will not shew where and how you could have done right." The noble lord who brought forward this subject, had stated, that Portugal and the possession of the port of Lisbon were not objects worth attending to. Did he mean to say, setting every political consideration out of the question, that our feelings were not interested in the rescue of our ancient allies from the tyrannous grasp of an usurper? Was it no object to secure the Russian fleet in the Tagus? Our ancient allies were in insurrection, calling on us for our aid, and the whole world was fixed in attention on the British government, to see whether that aid would be afforded, or whether we would desert the cause of these to whom we were hound by the long accustomed ties of friendship and amity. It was at this momentous interval, dubious where or whether we could land in Spain, that the noble lord would advise that the forces should have been kept at home doing nothing, till every thing was ascertained and settled, rather than be sent out
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with a discretionary power to the commanders to act in one or other situation as circumstances required (Hear, hear!). As to what had been said respecting the firing of the guns on the receipt of the intelligence of the Convention, he had no hesitation in saying, that the rescue of our allies from the grasp of their oppressors, and the expulsion of the French army from Portugal, were circumstances of which we ought to be proud, and which justified the firing the guns. If the right hon. gent. would but recollect, he must admit, that, since the commencement of the French Revolution, except in the issue of the campaign in Egypt, there had been no instance of such signal defeat of French objects, as in the expulsion of Junot's army from Portugal. Notwithstanding, therefore, all that had been said on this subject, it was his conviction, that there had been enough of triumph on the whole to justify the demonstration of joy manifested by firing the guns.—One word he had to add respecting a point, upon which he differed from his right hon. friend (sir A. Wellesley) as to the course which had been pursued by government on this occasion. His right hon. friend had, in a fair and manly manner, expressed what he thought necessary for the justification of his character. But, whilst he was ready to do justice to his feelings, he could not coincide in his opinion upon the subject of the Court of Inquiry. In what manner, he would ask, could an Inquiry be instituted, except as had been clone, by the appointment of a Board of General Officers to examine into the circumstances of the transaction, and ascertain, whether any ground of charge existed against any of the parties? It had been admitted on all hands, that some Inquiry was necessary, but, in the actual state of the information which government had upon the subject, a Court Martial could not have been resorted to without injustice to one of the officers against whom a distinct charge might have been brought. In the cases quoted by the noble lord, not only had a ground of charge existed, but a Court Martial could have been resorted to without any inconvenience, as all the officers, whom it might have been necessary to examine, were in the country. In this case, however, it was not thought desirable to resort to a fishing Court Martial, when also it would have been necessary to have brought so many officers from their duty in Spain, to attend its proceedings. The course therefore pur-

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sued by government was not only the most desirable, but was also justified by two precedents in good times. It had been said that on a late occasion (that of general Whitelocke) a Court Martial had been resorted to without any previous inquiry, and thence argued that a similar course ought to have been pursued in the instance then under consideration. But, on the late occasion it had not been considered necessary to institute any such previous inquiry, because the documents in the possession of government, were fully sufficient to warrant the bringing a distinct charge against the particular officer. Having made these few observations, after the able, complete, and lucid statements of his noble friend, he felt it unnecessary to trespass any further upon the house at this late hour, than merely to repeat that he did not dissent to the first proposition upon its own grounds, but because it was the prelude to an unjust attack upon his majesty's ministers.
Mr. Windhamin explanation, said, that he never had intended to have established military posts from Chili to Buenos Ayres. The only posts he ever thought of, were posts for letters and communication.
Mr. Whitbreaddeclared that it was his intention to trouble the house but with a very few observations, owing, not only to the lateness of the hour, but the present state of the question. Indeed it was unnecessary; for, notwithstanding the able speech of the gallant general (sir A. Wellesley), the lucid harangue of the noble lord (Castlereagh), and the ingenious remarks of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the eloquent and able charge of his noble friend had met with a defence so feeble as to leave him in perfect possession of the field. With all the force they had collected, they had not brought one point to bear against him; There was, indeed, remaining one literary and political warrior, who might yet perchance retrieve the fortunes of the day. (A laugh.) The noble lord had stated his opinion, that the Convention of Cintra was not agreeable to his feelings, when he had received the first intimation of its conclusion; yet he was accessary to the Answer to the citizens of London, which the servants of the crown had put into the mouth of their sovereign. The noble lord had not condescended to explain in what way even he could reconcile such contradictory conduct. The gallant general, too, had this night, in an impressive
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speech, stated to the house, that no Convention would have taken place, if he had been allowed to follow up his plan of operations; an opinion in which he (Mr. W.) most heartily coincided; yet still that gallant officer, after such an avowal, was determined not to support the proposition of his noble friend, namely, that that event which he, if permitted, would have prevented, "had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country." The right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had gone farther than his noble friend: he thought that the Convention was justified; and because such was his opinion he has called upon this house not to confirm that, judgment which their sovereign had previously pronounced. And his argument to induce the house to act upon such judgment was, that by so doing blame would attach somewhere. Thus, then, had the swords of the gallant Wellesley, and of his brave companions in arms, been drawn in vain; not in vain for their own glory and character, but most ineffectually for the honour, the credit, the glory, the interests, and the superiority of their country (Hear! hear!). Such a distressing result seemed not to have produced the natural effect on the mind of the noble lord (Castlereagh). On the contrary, for the first time in his life, he was found light and ludicrous, and jocular and even witty, on subjects the most momentous and heartrending. His answer, his justification for all these evils, was, that his opponents, four years ago, had evinced similar, if not greater, imbecility and ignorance. But, was that any apology to the country for disappointed hopes and degraded character? If, in the name of truth, both had been proved guilty of blunders the most criminal, let that be a reason for punishing them both together; but never let it be advanced as an extenuation for every future act of criminal and disgraceful mismanagement. The, public had before them a great stake. By whom was it thrown away? Was it by sir Arthur, sir Harry, or sir Hew! or was it by his majesty's ministers? (Hear! hear!). Guilt had attached in some part, and the public indignation had been consequently excited. That indignation must have a direction; the people would not be satisfied without fixing it in one point or the other.—He should not then stop to enter into the consideration of the propriety or impropriety of the Court of Inquiry, as to its being legal or illegal; but the question was, how

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did the people of England consider it? They deemed it to have been a court for screening the guilty: and they knew the result of its decision would be, that no blame was attachable to any one. The decision had accordingly been in favour of the officers. Sir Arthur had been declared blameless, zealous, and firm. Sir Harry had been declared blameless, zealous, and firm. Sir Hew also. Yet still blame had existed somewhere. To whom, by that decision, imputable, but to the ministers of the crown? (Hear, hear!). But the learned Chancellor of the Exchequer had found, in his own ingenuity, a defence for himself and his colleagues. Sir A. Wellesley, said he, has said, that if his plan was followed up he would have expelled the French from Portugal, and this, at least, proved, that the means, which ministers afforded to him, were fully sufficient to the object! But, how did the matter stand? The learned gent. forgot that the gallant general had broadly stated, that if he had been provided in the battle of the 21st of August, with a sufficiency of cavalry, there then would have existed no excuse for a Convention. Here, then, was the charge of failure and of disgrace brought back to his own shoulders by his own authority (Hear, hear!). The noble Secretary of State had said, that finding the first intelligence of the victory and the feeling it excited, a little exaggerated, he thought it would be improper to give a military opinion, on receiving the intelligence of the Convention, and therefore he took that of the learned Chancellor of the Exchequer, as to the propriety of firing the Tower guns upon occasion of this Convention, and they both together had at last agreed to fire away. The guns had been fired for the success at Roleia, they were fired for the splendid triumph at Vimiera, and in due respect to the feelings of the country, and to the gallantry of our armies, fired they were a third time for the ratification of a most disgraceful compact. But the noble lord had hit upon an admirable excuse, in his own inability to give a military opinion. Let the country form its own comment. When, at a time, to speak no more of it, it was opposed to Buonaparté, it had a military secretary, whose principal point in defence for the failure of his military schemes, was simply, that he could not give a military opinion (Hear 1 hear!). Was the country to be told that such transactions were of no importance? Was it to be so far deluded, that, at a time when the love of po-
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pular distinction was so prevalent—when a red ribband was sought by that general, and a star by another, that it was equally a matter of indifference, whether the annunciation of a disgraceful Convention, was or was not accompanied by such public demonstrations of rejoicing, as the country would have expected on the communication, that Junot and his whole army had surrendered prisoners of war? If the Convention had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country, why should not ministers acknowledge it, in order that we might ascertain the party to whom our disgrace had been owing? Where could the noble lord find an excuse for the rapid and unexplained supercession of the general officers commanding? His gallant friend had told him, that in expecting harmony, the noble lord was mistaken, for scarcely had the generals who commanded successively, been two minutes together, when, as sir A. Wellesley stated, harmony disappeared. But what was the ground for any reasonable man, much more an executive government, to expect that it would continue? Was it that they had appointed men of extensive talent and acknowledged genius, too proud to admit in their breasts a narrow and illiberal jealousy? Was it that they had selected officers to supersede sir A. Wellesley in the supreme command, under whom he had previously served, and who entertained the high and merited opinion of his capacity and his services? No—there was no such palliation for his majesty's ministers, arid it had been that night proved by the able general himself, that he had no reason to expect being superseded, unless a very considerable increase took place in the army which he commanded. But if it was necessary for the public service, why did the king's government extend the chief command successively to so many officers without any seeming cause? Why was it deemed expedient to interpose sir H. Burrard and sir H. Dalrymple between other gallant officers and the interests of the country? Of living characters he would not speak, but he would comment upon the pretensions of those that were departed. The apotheosis of the lamented Moore had taken place, and of him he would say, that throughout the whole of the heroic army of Britain, there could not be found any officer with claims to distinguished command greater than his. Why, then, was he not allowed to assume that lead of which the gallant Wellesley

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was deprived? It seemed almost in the opinions of ministers unnecessary to ask any question; because, said the Board of Inquiry, with the military men no blame rests; nor with us, say the Ministers; but the country, with one accord, had proclaimed, that blame attached somewhere. To fix the blame upon thereat delinquents under these circumstances became the first duly of the people's Representatives.—The noble lord had told the house, that his noble friend had too strongly coloured his statement respecting the quality and defects of the horses, because that noble lord knew, that the French themselves envied and admired them. But the gallant general opposite (sir A. Wellesley) would excuse him, he trusted, for the opinion that he formed, when he believed, that during the whole of his enterprising life, that officer never struggled so unsuccessfully with difficulties as in his endeavour to march to the defence of the noble lord with regard to those miserable horses. Indeed, the noble secretary had made a most diversified effort, but, he assured him, to little purpose. In shewing off these' poor beasts, he reminded him of a hackneyman's servant in his smock frock endeavouring to make his galled jades prance, if possible, before the house. There was certainly one limit to his unqualified panegyric, as the noble lord did not go quite the length of praising a dead horse (A laugh!). Really, were not the consequences in every view so disastrous, so fatal to the dearest interests of the empire, the campaign of the noble lord could only be considered as an Opera Ballet, where, after one fine fellow had well performed his part, some unknown characters arose at the critical moment from the ocean, and drove him from his operations—the scene at length terminating in confusion and distress. But what but that downright fatality which seemed to mar all the efforts of the executive government could have induced them at such a conjuncture in the concerns and hopes of the world to interfere with their meddling nonsense about command? Was there not something, however, more than met the eye? What, he would ask, was meant by including in the instructions of sir Hew Dalrymple, that he was appointed 'for the present?' The noble lord had, indeed, referred to precedents for superseding generals. But what were they? He had attempted to justify the conduct of his administration upon the base and miserable policy of Austrian military coun-
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cils;—councils which so often cramped the exertions of the Archduke Charles. Councils which teemed with treachery, to whose corrupt and baleful influence prostrated Austria and enslaved Europe, might fairly attribute their forlorn condition. Councils which led to the disastrous but decisive victory of Jena, to the recapture of Madrid, and to the exclusion of Great Britain from almost every part, of the continent of Europe. Yet these were the precedents conjured up in his own vindication by a military secretary, who at the same time had professed that he could not give a military opinion—(hear! hear!). Of the Spanish Campaign he would not then speak, but he could not sit down without impressing on the house the necessity of inquiring into those causes, by which a gallant army, after unprecedented efforts of valour, patience, and endurance, were obliged to terminate a campaign in a victory, from which, in the words of general Hope, no useful consequence would follow. It was by giving command solely to men of merit that we were to insure success. Why, then, should we not imitate the conqueror instead of the conquered? He had only to lament that the victory we had achieved had not been attended with any success or advantage to the country; for England would certainly have been much stronger at this moment if the French had been driven across the Tagus. He lamented, too, that the present system of ministers, in acting upon Mr. Pitt's policy in war, was one that had always proved unsuccessful. It was a policy only adapted to produce facts for the purpose of introducing them into the King's Speech, or matter for temporary joy, rather than permanent security to the country.
Sir Arthur Wellesley,alluding to reports which had been circulated of his having had nothing to do with the Convention, and of his having even protested against it, referred gentlemen to the Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry, for an explanation of his sentiments on that head. The letter, No. 152, written by him to his noble friend and dated October 6th 1808, contained his detailed opinions upon the subject; opinions, too, which he still entertained.
Mr. Wellesley Poleassured the house, that no authority had ever been derived from him, for the insertion of any paragraphs in the newspapers to the effect imputed to the friends of sir A. Wellesley. He was the only relative of sir Arthur in

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town, at the time the news of the Convention had arrived; and although he had been applied to by several persons for materials to write in defence of sir A. Wellesley, he had uniformly refused affording any, observing, that he trusted that sir Arthur, on his return, would he fully able to vindicate his own character.
The Hon. Christopher Hely Hutchinsonwas reluctant to trespass on the patience of the house at so late an hour; but the concluding words of the gallant general's (Wellesley) speech compelled him to rise. Having compared the Conventions of Cairo and Alexandria with that of Cintra, and drawn a conclusion favourable to the latter, and discreditable to the former, by stating that "The French army in Portugal possessed advantages which the garrisons in Egypt had not, and that those who had to decide on the Convention of Cintra knew, that there were other objects for the British troops in Portugal, which the situation of Europe, at the period of the Egyptian expedition, did not hold out:" he concludes thus, "If the convention of Cintra be disgraceful, then are those of Cairo and Alexandria also disgraceful." Mr. Hutchinson declared himself amongst, the most enthusiastic admirers of the brilliant exploits performed by the hon. general, and his troops, while in active operation in the field; he regretted that the public, unmindful of the indulgence due to the arduous situation of officers, when occupied in the discharge of painful and complicated trusts, too often Formed hasty and incorrect judgments, sometimes even condemned without investigation the most honourable individuals, and transactions highly laudable. He apprehended, that frequently in this country victory was mistaken for conquest, a flag of truce for unconditional surrender.— However decidedly he disapproved some parts of the Convention of Cintra, and the spirit of the whole, and had no doubt that that measure could not be defended by the precedents drawn from the Egyptian campaign, still less that a comparison could with justice be made to their disadvantage; yet, had the honourable member satisfied himself by merely justifying under the celebrity of these proceedings, he would have remained silent; but it will be in the recollection of the house, that this has not been the line of argument pursued; for a severe and unmerited censure has been pronounced against the Egyptian expedition, when it is asserted,
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tnat, the Conventions of Cairo and Alexandria are disgraceful, provided that of Cintra be considered in this point of view.— The proceedings at Cintra have already been condemned by the highest authority in the empire, his majesty, and by almost every description of subject, so generally at least, that no public measure for several years past, has been so universally reprobated. It is true, the house of commons have not yet pronounced their judgment; but a resolution has been moved this night by the noble lord, and sentence of condemnation is at this moment impending; under these circumstances, being intimately acquainted with the Egyptian expedition, and having the honour and credit of the officers and troops there employed sincerely at heart, he would little deserve a seat in that house, or estimation any where, could he remain silent, and permit slander such as this, and from authority so exalted, to pass unnoticed. To preserve unsullied for that meritorious army their fair and hard-earned fame, he must request the attention of the house, while he shortly adverted to some principal circumstances in elucidation of that campaign. —He would not venture to weaken by any faint representation of his, the impression which the transcendant merit of sir Ralph Abercromby had fully and justly made on the public mind; in the short interval which elapsed between his daringly heroic landing on the 8th of March 1801, in Egypt, at the head of a small corps of British troops, in the presence, and in defiance of an insolent vaunting enemy, who, drawn out on the beach in all the pomp of military parade, threatened instantaneous destruction; and the glorious action of the 21st, when this gallant chief fell in the arms of victory; in this short interval were eminently displayed, every qualification requisite to entitle him to the love and confidence of his troops; the esteem even of the enemy; the enthusiastic admiration of the present age, and of all posterity! At his death, the British were in effective force, little more than 9,000 rank and file, with 250 mounted dragoons, and their guns drawn by seamen. They occupied the sandy peninsula of Aboukir but with the inestimable advantage of having three times defeated the enemy in action; on the last occasion, signally so. The French had effective, much more than double this number.; a strong corps of cavalry, a species of force well adapted to that country, and an ad-

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mirably well appointed field train; they were in possession of all the resources; all the towns and fortresses: their former successes had intimidated the inhabitants into submission, several of whom were serving in their ranks, and the Mamelukes, the only part of the population which could be serviceable as an ally, or formidable as a foe, were in alliance with them. They were, moreover, from long residence, accustomed, and in a degree prepared, to resist the diseases of climate. In this comparative state of the two armies, could he have chosen between the fate of sir Ralph Abercromby, and the perilous situation of the individual who had succeeded to the command, without hesitation, he would have preferred for his relation, the death of his lamented friend.—An officer, whose loss is much too recent, and too severely felt, to allow him at such a moment, to dwell even on the grateful subject of his fame, sir John Moore, a few days after the death of sir Ralph, in a letter to his successor, expressed himself thus, "I hope you see some prospect of terminating this expedition with success; left to my own mind, I own it suggests nothing comfortable."—An attack of the enemy's lines and fortifications being deemed unadviseable, the commander-in-chief having left the strengthened position of the British before Alexandria, in charge of a highly meritorious officer, (sir Eyre Coote) advanced in conjunction with some Turks, and a small corps of British (at first about 4,000) towards Rhamaniah, between Rosetta and Cairo, where it was hoped that another action with the enemy would decide the fate of Egypt; but after a short ineffectual resistance, he fell back to Cairo. Having maturely considered the relative circumstances of the French and allied armies at that moment in Egypt; the military operations out of which he had to select; the manifold discordant materials with which he had to work; the chances of failure; the difficulties of success; the General resolved on approaching to Cairo, with the united British and Turkish force.—Mr. Hutchinson refrained from troubling the house with a detail of the various and numerous inducements to this undertaking.—The General aware that the operation from which alone he conceived there was the smallest chance of conquering Egypt, would be attended with infinite peril, and not being so fortunate as to have his decision approved by those, whose according sentiments, at such
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a moment, would have been most cheering and satisfactory; persevered in this movement under the most awful responsibility.— After some delay, occasioned by the low state of the river, as also from a wish to give time to the Mamelukes to decide, to the Turks to collect and arrange their force, the army appeared before Cairo, two of the objects of the march being already accomplished; for the Mamelukes had joined, and the resources of the country were opened to the British, and closed against the enemy.—Accounts had been received from England of pending negotiations for peace; information from the fleet, of expected reinforcements from France; the river was shortly to overflow its banks, by which all operations in that part of Egypt would be prevented for several months; these were powerful motives for dispatch, and consequently the British general felt most anxious not to be delayed a single hour before Cairo. He knew, also, that the fatigue and danger of a siege would have fallen principally on the small corps of British, at this time about 4,500 effective, and that, in the event of successful attack, every horror was to be apprehended from the Turks, not merely against the enemy but the citizens; he therefore felt no hesitation in granting to general Belliard, who offered to capitulate, the most honourable terms. By this capitulation, all the cavalry and field train of the enemy were captured, and his hold in the country so essentially weakened, that even in the event of considerable succours from France, it was scarcely possible for him to recover the possession of Egypt. The arrival of the Indian army from the Red Sea, was now secured, which would have been impracticable, had the enemy continued possessed of Cairo; and the Vizier's army, by the co-operation of a small corps of British, had thus been saved from annihilation (which had been the fate of his troops the preceding year in the neighbourhood of this city) and marched triumphant to the gates of their capital.— The French, to the amount of 13,700, of whom more than 12,000 were troops, 10,000 of them fit for any duty, were escorted to their ships, by 4,500 British, under sir John Moore; the inequality of numbers between the escorted and escorting, was the ridicule even of the French officers of that army. General Menou treated general Belliard as a traitor, and so reported him to his government. He

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would now ask the gallant general, in what this Convention of Cairo resembled that of Cintra? Had his majesty disapproved any of the articles of that Convention, on account of "their impropriety and danger, as affecting the interests or feelings of his allies," the Turks, as he had done in the case of Cintra, in behalf of the Portuguese and Spaniards? Were the Turks dissatisfied with a Convention, which repossessed them of the capital, and insured to them the conquest of Egypt? Had not the voice of the people of this empire been as distinct in approving and admiring the one proceeding, as it had been loud and unanimous in condemnation of the other? Did the gallant general forget what were the feelings of his own troops on the occasion of the Convention of Cintra? Were not his officers deeply disgusted, and did they not, in the most unqualified manner, so express themselves? Had he to learn that these officers of the Egyptian army, who at the commencement of the march to Cairo, appalled, as it were, by the difficulties of the undertaking, felt it to be their duty strongly to urge an apprehension of disastrous issue, did, on the fall of that city, compliment the General upon the success of an operation, which they were kind enough to declare, appeared to have been decided by an inspired judgment. In short, was the hon. gent. to this hour, ignorant of the fact, that it was the capture of this city (a design conceived in wisdom, and executed by British soldiers and seamen, under the most patient endurance of many privations), that rescued Egypt from the grasp of French domination!—The combined British force, with the exception of the Indian army, which was still at a considerable distance, now assembled before Alexandria, in effective number about 15,000: the enemy had about 10,400, including 1,900 seamen; his efficient strength, for every purpose of defence, is undervalued, when stated at 9,000; his position was protected by nearly 400 pieces of artillery; he had provisions for some weeks (not for two or three days as has been erroneously stated); his entrenched camps and forts, though not by any means regular fortifications, were excessively strong. He did not, however, lay much stress on this part of the argument, for he admitted that a short time, without any untoward accident, must have decided the fate of the city; but the reasons for dispatch were much more urgent
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now than ever. Accounts had been received from England, not only that negociations were pending, but that Egypt was likely to be the great difficulty in the way of peace; perhaps the cause of a new war should peace be accomplished, leaving the French masters of that country. So convinced was the British general of the necessity of dispatch at this critical moment, that on general Menou sending out his flag of truce, he forwarded a messenger to Constantinople, requesting that lord Elgin would communicate, without delay, to the ministers in England, this circumstance. The possession of Egypt was known to be considered by the First Consul of France, as a conquest of inestimable value; he had connected with it much of the fame of his military life; he had considered and proclaimed Egypt, as likely to become a compensation to France, for the loss of her colonies; that in her hands it would create a great commercial revolution, and he had lately declared, to the Minister of Russia, that no consideration would induce him to relinquish that country. Positive intelligence had been received from various quarters, from the coast of Spain and Italy, from England, Germany, and France, that powerful armaments were preparing to relieve Egypt, reinforcements under admiral Gantheaume had actually anchored on the coast; besides, it was possible, that the First Consul might attempt, by treaty with the Porte, to retain possession of Egypt. In this state of things, the British general did wisely resolve, not to delay one hour the completion of this conquest. He had considered general Menou and his garrison entitled to all the honours of war, and he was not to be shaken in the resolution which he had early formed, of not unnecessarily exposing the brave troops he had the good fortune to command. However, in the opinion of the multitude, he might have added to his military reputation, by a different mode of proceeding; at fame so acquired, he spurned, and he would have considered the rusty sword and the private property (at all times very inconsiderable in Egypt) of the French officer, dearly purchased at the expence of the life of the youngest drum-boy in his army.—The importance of expelling the French had been repeatedly stated by ministers in the strongest manner; and the Commander in chief, in direct positive terms, had been authorized by them to accomplish this in any way; in the field; by negotiation;

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in short, per fas et nefas. Such were the causes and inducements which influenced him to terminate, on the moment, this war in Egypt. He treated the French general, doubtless, with that respect which his obstinate defence, and the privations his troops had so patiently endured, fully entitled him to; but throughout, in the tone of a conqueror! Menou attempted indeed to return to France, not merely with his arms and private property, but with the manuscripts, sarcophagi, and statues, which had been collected by Buonaparté and his troops, and were destined to perpetuate in France, the remembrance of the conquest of Egypt; but this endeavour wholly failed. He evacuated Alexandria with 11,712 persons, which, with the garrison of Cairo, other prisoners, besides the killed in action, and those dead by wounds and disease, since the landing of the British, made the whole French force, captured and destroyed, exceed 30,000 men.—The immediate consequence of the total conquest of Egypt was, that the General, who had lately received instructions from England to apply a part of his force, after the termination of the war in Egypt, to the attack of Corfu, was thus enabled a few days after the surrender of Alexandria, to forward a corps, under the command of general Craddock, in execution of that service.—Thus ended, marked with every feature of victory, a campaign, greatly brilliant, throughout successful; in all its points and bearings the most complete, that had ever been achieved by British heroism; the only one too, in all respects perfect, during the last long eventful war. It commenced under the auspices of a gallant chief (sir Ralph Abercromby),who, idolized by his troops, was, perhaps, more than any other man, the perfect hero in the fight, whose immortal fame was far beyond the reach of his weak tribute of applause; and it was conducted to its glorious termination, by the friend, who most loved and valued, because he best knew him; one, who notwithstanding his near affinity, he would proudly assert, united to the valour and firmness of the soldier, that scope of intellect, that mine of information, that inflexibility of principle, requisite to the general, as to the states man.—During the course of a tedious, painful, perilous command, his solicitude for the preservation of the health and lives of his soldiery, was as conspicuous as it was unceasing; with the co-operation of the gallant and experienced officers, the
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highly disciplined and brave troops, whom it was his good fortune and honour to lead, with their assistance, to have brought to a prosperous conclusion, with the least possible effusion of blood, this ever memorable campaign, has been a reward, a blessing conferred on his arms, far more estimable to him than the highest favours, or the most enthusiastic applauses, which his sovereign or his country could have bestowed; and he (Mr. Hutchinson) trusted he was not too sanguine in expressing a confident hope, that this campaign would be recorded amongst the proudest periods of our military annals, while the consummate wisdom and humanity, of British officers, the valour and discipline of British soldiers so eminently displayed, shall be held up to all posterity as an example worthy of imitation.—He hoped that the house and the public would never forget, that in Egypt the enemy was, until the last, moment of the campaign, more than double the number of the British, and possessed of every military advantage; that when beaten in the field, he retired behind his strong works, where he hourly expected reinforcements, some of which, under admiral Gantheaume, actually anchored on the coast. That in Portugal he was, during all periods of the operation, inferior in number to the British; at the signing of the Convention greatly so; and in the field, where, as it were, at the point of the bayonet, he dictated for himself the most favourable terms, though, from the total occupation of Buonaparté elsewhere, assistance to this small corps was, if not quite impossible, an event the most improbable. That, during the campaign in Egypt, Europe was in a state of profound peace; that pending the operations in Portugal, war raged in Spain; that the French soldier was removed from Egypt, where he was greatly mischievous to our ally, whence he threatened our own colonies in the cast, and was deposited in France, where he immediately became inactive and harmless; that the Egyptian Campaign preserved to the Turks the integrity of their empire, and is supposed to have rescued British India from the grasp of France. That the Convention of Cintra released from Portugal a French army, where it was comparatively of little injury; where, if in no other place, it should have been enchained, and forwarded that army to Spain; thus furnishing reinforcements to the enemy, and accelerating the subjugation of that country in alliance with

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Britain. That the French general did not retire from Portugal, until, in the language of his master, the great Napoleon, he had erected on the shores of that country, by the Convention of Cintra, a monument to the fame and power of his troops and nation. That the British army of Egypt compelled the enemy to regorge much of their illgotten treasure, and that having stripped them of the spoils of their boasted African campaign, crowned with their laurels, returned to deposit in the British isles the trophies of those troops, which their leader had in his presumption pronounced "Invincible;" which spoils and trophies (at the same moment when he, Mr. Hutchinson, could with difficulty obtain a hearing, in behalf of the much injured reputation of that army) were exhibiting in this capital, to record and perpetuate the shame of France: to immortalize the glory of Britain over her rival mistress of the world! — He was sorry to have detained the house, wearied as it must be, after a debate of so many hours; but he could not silently listen to a comparison, where there existed no assimilating circumstanstances. The Conventions alluded to were, in every respect that affected the honour and interests of the country, diametrically opposite to that of Cintra.—The gallant general says, "That the French army in Portugal possessed advantages that the French garrisons of Cairo and Alexandria did not;" the very reverse he, Mr. Hutchinson, had proved to be the fact; that "they who had to decide on the Convention of Cintra were aware, that there were other objects for the British troops besides Portugal." Mr. Hutchinson had no doubt of this; but surely the generals who, apprized of an ulterior destination for their troops, signed a Convention which deprived them of a mode of conveyance (their shipping) perhaps the only one by which they could have rendered their troops serviceable, acted whimsically indeed! Those who had to decide in Egypt, were also aware, that there were other objects for the army, after the conquest of that country, and, one of these objects they were enabled to commence the execution of, by forwarding, immediately on the fall of Alexandria, the corps already mentioned under general Craddock.—He apologized for having entered so much at large into the detail of the Egyptian war; but he was obliged to do this, in order that gentlemen might understand fully the subject, and thus be enabled to per-
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ceive the correctness of his conclusions. He had made this statement, not with a view of condemning any officer, but in order to rescue the campaign of Egypt from unmerited obloquy. The gallant general might have been satisfied with his own fame, deservedly high, without making allusions, tending naturally to depreciate in the public opinion an army, whose heroic achievements had till that hour been universally admitted; whose brilliant exploits in Egypt, notwithstanding the attempt, made to sully them, shall live in the recollection of a grateful posterity, when every trace even of the disgraceful proceedings of Cintra, shall have been for ages effaced. He desired to be understood, when speaking of the Convention of Cintra, as wishing entirely to separate this part of the proceedings of Portugal from the operations of the troops in the field; no person in the country estimated higher, or more sincerely applauded those exertions; he had no hesitation in saying, that that army had performed a most important public service, by driving the French from Portugal, and securing in British ports (though but for a season) the navy of Russia; nor could he consider it by any means fair, to estimate the importance of their services, either according to the terms of the Convention of Cintra, or by the result of the campaign in Spain. Their victories at Roleia and Vimiera, were not the less glorious, though they had been ultimately compelled to abandon the Spaniards; pursued to their ships even by those troops whom they had signally defeated in Portugal.—He hoped he had convinced the house, that the Conventions of Egypt and Portugal had been made under circumstances totally dissimilar, and attended by results the most opposite; that the former furnished to the troops abundant matter for pride and exultation; that they were perfectly satisfactory; essentially and lastingly serviceable to the allies; highly creditable to the national character, meriting the applause, and in all respects worthy the glory, of this united empire; that the latter, the Convention of Cintra, mortified the troops, disgusted (he allies, elated the enemy, dissatisfied the king, and enraged his people, who, by acclamation, condemned the measure.
Earl Percyobserved, that it was agreed on all sides, that the Convention of Cintra had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country; and he therefore

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saw no necessity of corning to a vote upon the first question. As to the second question, which went to censure ministers for their conduct, as connected with that transaction, he was not aware that any blame could be brought home to ministers, though he could not help saying, that blame seemed to attach somewhere.
Mr. Secretary Canningthen rose, He should not detain the attention of the house to any length at so late an hour; indeed, he had but little to add to what had fallen from his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) and from his right hon. friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer). Yet without agreeing with either of them on some points, he should feel himself nevertheless justified in concurring with them in the same vote. It was the open, undisguised opinion of every man, that the Convention in Portugal had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country. There was much of reasoning deduced upon the subject from analogy and example, but he must acknowledge that to him it appeared to fail. The Convention in Egypt afforded, in his mind, no apology for the Convention of Cintra. Such comparisons would be as invidious as they were incorrect. His wish was to see the country continually rising in character and glory. The idea of its degeneracy he could not endure. Those for whom stipulations were made, were unwilling parties to them. While he concurred with his colleagues in the vote he should give, there were some points respecting which, as he had already observed, he must differ from them; and these were rather political than military points; points that were beyond military competency to execute, or military tribunals to decide upon. Among these points he first objected in principle to the practice of stipulating conditions respecting which we had no right or power to act, points moreover, which were neither expedient nor necessary. He must also object to the non-admission of the Portuguese general, or government, as parties in the negotiation. It had also been stipulated that their property should be secured to the enemy. This stipulation was afterwards indeed amended; but the milder execution of it did not atone for the carelessness about terms, which we had no right to stipulate. He had further to object to the exchange of civil prisoners for Spanish troops—here again we had no right to stipulate for Spain, even though the stipulation should
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appear advantageous; for Spain should be left to judge for herself, and the British commanders had no competence of authority or right to determine upon such matters. Equally objectionable were the stipulations for those Portuguese who were partisans of France. Such stipulations were sometimes allowable, as in the capitulation of islands, where the conquering force would remain. Such stipulations seemed to give us the air of domineering in Portugal, and of acceding to conditions which we had no legitimate power to fulfil. Upon the Armistice and Convention, in their military nature, his majesty's ministers did not take upon themselves to judge, but called in to their aid the opinion of military advisers. This they deemed the most effectual mode to adopt, not that the conduct of the military commanders might not appear to them to be open to criticism, but because any other mode seemed liable to greater objections. Many would have preferred a court-martial, and were loud in calling for that mode of trial. But a court-martial seemed to presume the existence of a charge of some specific crime. His majesty's ministers professed to have none, and they felt it would have been an harsh measure, while so strong a feeling pervaded the country against these transactions, to have sent any officer to trial with the weight of that clamour upon his head. Had sir H. Dalrymple been selected as the person, would not ministers, with every appearance of justice, have been accused of partiality, in sending to trial an officer who had to plead his scanty information of the state of things on his arrival in Portugal, and who had no time to pause to acquire any? If government had selected sir H. Burrard, it might likewise be observed, that he had the command only for 24 hours, and had scarcely interfered in the operations; and here again ministers might appear guilty of partiality. Had he been selected, it must only be on military principles, and this was what government were anxious to deliver no opinion upon. Indeed, it was impossible for men in civil offices to decide on matters of that sort. Was sir A. Wellesley to be selected? He could only be accused of having excited those proud hopes which were afterwards unfortunately disappointed. What mode, then, remained to be adopted, but that of an Inquiry, when there was brought forward no distinct accusation, or specific charge, against any of the

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commanders? Under those impressions a Board of Inquiry was resorted to, and the decision of that court we had reason to consider as final; for if, after that, government should have sent any officer to trial, not only would they have sent him to trial prejudged by popular clamour, but also loaded with the decision of government against him.—The next charge urged by the noble lord and the right hon. gent., was the appointment of sir H. Dalrymple. In the selection of that officer for the command, all his colleagues in office were unanimous, and they were all ready to share in the responsibility of it. They could have no personal bias in their favour. He himself had never seen sir H. Dalrymple, but on account of the confidence with which he had inspired the Spaniards, and the correspondence he had kept up with them, he was deemed a fit and proper person to take the command.—Such being his opinion of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, and the reasons which induced him to prefer that mode of investigation, he could not but think the decision of the Board as final, constituted as it was by officers of the first distinction; and however he might seem to differ upon some points with his colleagues, yet he could not but agree with them in proposing the previous question on the first Resolution of the noble lord. For it would be contrary to parliamentary usage and practice to record on the Journals of the house a barren unproductive truth, which could now lead to no practical result. It would be saying no more than what his majesty had already said from his throne, and which must likewise be deemed the opinion of his ministers who had so advised him. But the hon. gent. had observed, that when ministers first heard of the Armistice from the Portuguese minister, they could not bring themselves to believe it. There were then many reasons to justify that disbelief. On the 4th of Sept. the Portuguese minister received a copy of the Armistice from the Junta of Oviedo. When it was first examined, it appeared incredible to government, not only on account of its matter, but because it was drawn up in French only; because it differed in nothing from the form in which it was originally proposed; and because it did not purport to be finally concluded. It was not exactly looked upon as a forgery, but as the rough draught sent to sir H. Dalrymple for his acquiescence, but in which no change or
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alteration had yet been made. This was all the knowledge government had of the transaction, until the official copy of it arrived on the l6th of Sept—It had also been urged as a cause of the failure, that the army sent to Portugal was deficient in equipment, and unprovided with cavalry. Had that really been the case, then blame would attach to ministers; but how did the thing stand? Had the army been so deficient in these essentials as gentlemen would represent, could it have gained not only that splendid victory, but complete triumph, which was won at Vimiera? But, it would be said it might have been more complete. The gallant general who commanded well knew that reinforcements would soon arrive. It had been even prescribed to him where to wait their arrival, if he did not conceive the force he already possessed to be equal to the objects he had in view. He was not for attaching any blame to his right hon. friend for not waiting their arrival; the spirit, the boldness, the courage, and the correctness with which he achieved the victory, proved that his means were not inadequate. The gallant general succeeded; but it was insinuated he ought not to have succeeded. Such was his brilliant career, however, till the negotiation. But was there no period after, when hostilities might have been recommenced? Bid not reinforcements arrive on the 26th of August? Was not the British army then superior to that of the enemy both in cavalry, in artillery, and in every equipment? Beyond that period was there any room for complaint? But other motives induced a conviction of the propriety of the Armistice. As to the appointment of sir Hew Dalrymple, he had already explained the motives upon which it took place. It might, indeed, be desirable that sir A. Wellesley should not have been stopped in his brilliant career; but, it should be recollected, that it was the undoubted right of his majesty to select his commanders, and that he was known to exercise that right for the good of the military service. It was a right not to be interfered with. The almost contemporaneous arrival of sir H. Burrard and sir H. Dalrymple was also matter of blame in the eyes of the noble lord; but was that not owing to the variation of the winds, and was this a thing which his noble friend could be expected to calculate? Upon the whole he strongly and sincerely felt, that great objects were obtained by the

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Convention, and that whatever it failed in, was neither imputable to the generals who commanded, nor to the government that had appointed them. The other topics touched upon, there would be future opportunities of canvassing.
Mr. Bragge Bathurstspoke against the Convention, and referring to the mode of appointing a commander for each of the expeditions to the North of Europe, before such expeditions sailed, expressed his regret that a similar mode had not been resorted to on the occasion which gave rise to this debate.
Mr. Yorkedefended the Convention. Indeed, after all the general officers had expressed their approbation of it, he could not see upon what ground he could disapprove of it.
General Fergussonwas aware that many general officers of great eminence had approved of this Convention. He was not of rank to be consulted upon it; but if he had been so consulted, he had no hesitation in saying, that it should have met his decided negative.
Mr. R. Wardsupported the motion for the previous question.
Lord Henry Pettyably replied to the several speakers on the other side. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, he observed, had pursued a course of reasoning, which notwithstanding the acquittal pronounced by the Court of Inquiry, had for its object to transfer from ministers to the general officers the whole of the blame attributed to the measure under discussion; and this after all the general officers concerned had unanimously declared that the necessity which produced this disgraceful Convention arose out of the inadequate equipment of the expedition. The noble lord dwelt upon the statement of sir A. Wellesley, that he bad a political view in agreeing to the Convention, namely, that of dispatching a British army into Spain, in order to collect and rally the scattered forces of the Patriots, so that the gallant officer had a view quite different from that of ministers, one of those ministers, Mr. Canning, having very recently declared in that house, that it was determined on their part not to send a British army into Spain, until a Central Junta was established. Let the house and the country decide from this circumstance, what degree of concert and union there was between ministers and their generals. As to the grounds upon which the motion for the previous question was supported, they seemed to hit mind
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to rest upon this proposition, that although his majesty and almost every public body had recorded an opinion upon the merits of the measure under consideration, that house should be restrained from declaring any opinion whatever respecting it, thus encouraging the dangerous doctrine, that the people should look any where rather than to that house for decision upon a great public event.
Upon a division the numbers were,

For the Previous Question

203

For lord H. Petty's Motion

153

Majority

50

Adjourned at six o'clock on Wednesday Morning.

List of the Minority.

Abercrombie, hon. J.

Freemantle, W. H.

Adam, W.

Gower, earl

Adams, C.

Grattan, r t. hon. H.

Addington, r t. h. J. H.

Giles, D.

Agar, E. F.

Greenhill, Robert

Allan, A.

Grenfell, P.

Althorpe, visc.

Giddy, D.

Anson, G.

Grosvenor, T.

Antonie, W. L.

Hall, sir J.

Astley, sir J. H.

Halsey, Joseph

Aubrey, sir J.

Herbert, H. A.

Barham, G. F.

Hibbert, G.

Baring, A.

Hobhouse, B.

Baring, T.

Howard, H.

Bastard, J. P.

Howarth, hon. W.

Bathurst, r t. hon. C.

Howard, H.

Bradshaw, hon. A. C.

Hughes, W. L.

Brogden, J.

Hume, W. H.

Brand, T.

Hurst, R.

Byng, G.

Hussey, William

Calcraft, J.

Hutchinson, h. C. H.

Calvert, Nich.

Jackson, John

Cocks, James,

Keck, G. A. L.

Combe, H. C.

Kensington, lord

Craig, J.

Knapp, G.

Creevey, Thos.

Knox, hon. T.

Cuthbert, J. R.

Lambe, hon. W.

Colborne, N. W. R.

Langton, W. G.

Cooke, B.

Latouche, J.

Daly, rt. hon. D. B.

Latouche, R.

Dundas, hon. C. L.

Leach, J.

Dundas, hon. R. L.

Lefevre, C. S.

Dundas, hon. L.

Lemon, sir W.

Eden, hon. W. F.

Lemon, colonel

Egerton, J.

Lloyd, sir E.

Elliot, r t. hon. W.

Lyttleton, hon. W. H.

Estcourt, T. G.

M'Donald, J.

Euston (earl of)

Madocks, W. A.

Fellowes, hon. N.

Mahon, viscount

Ferguson, gen.

Maitland, G.

Fitzgerald, lord.

Martin, H.

Fitzgerald, r t. hon. M.

Mathew, hon. M.

Fitzpatrick, r t. hon. R.

Maule, hon. W.

Folkes, sir M. B.

Maxwell, W.

Folkestone, visc.

Mexborough, earl of

Frankland, William

Milbanke, sir R.

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Miller, sir T.

Shelly, H.

Mills, C.

Shelly, T.

Mills, W.

Shipley, W.

Milner, sir W.

Simpson, G.

Milton, viscount

Smith, J.

Moore, P.

Smith, S.

Morpeth, visct.

Smith, W.

Mosley, sir O.

Smith, G.

Mostyn, sir T.

Stanley, lord

Neville, hon. R.

Symmonds, T. P.

Newport, r t. hon, sir J.

Talbot, R. W.

North, D.

Tarleton, B.

Northey, W.

Taylor, E.

O'Callaghan, James

Taylor, M. A.

O'Hara, Charles

Tempest, sir H. V.

Ossulston, lord

Temple, earl

Percy, earl

Templetown, lord

Petty, lord H.

Tracey, C. H.

Pigott, sir A.

Tierney, r t. hon. G.

Pole, sir C. M.

Tighe, W.

Ponsonby, hon. F.

Vansittart, r t. hon. N.

Ponsonby, r t. hon. G.

Vernon, G. V.

Porchester, lord

Walpole, hon. G.

Prittie, hon. F. A.

Ward, hon. J.

Pym, F.

Warrender, sir G.

Quin, hon. W.

Western, C. C.

Ridley, sir M.

Whitbread, S.

Romilly, sir S.

Williams, O.

Russell, lord W m.

Williams, sir R.

St. Aubin, sir J.

Windham, r t. hon. W.

Scudambre, R. P.

Wynn, sir W. W.

Sebright, sir J.

Wynn, C. W.

Sharp, R d.