Sitting of 17 May 1808

CONDUCT OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY— CARNATIC QUESTION.
Sir Thomas Turtonrose to move his promised Resolutions respecting the deposition of the nabob of the Carnatic. He began by requesting the indulgence of the house, unconnected as he was with any party, and unsupported by any influence except what might be expected from the strength of the cause. Before he had become a member of the house, his attention had been turned to the subject by different motions for papers which had been made, and he was then anxious that the matter should be thoroughly investigated; feeling, in common with many others, for the honour and good faith of the country. When he come into parliament, he found the question still floating, and did every thing in his power to induce some other member to bring it forward, preferring to be the seconder rather than the mover: no choice, how-fiver, was left him. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan) to whom he had particularly looked, had found himself in circumstances that prevented his urging the question, as it might have much embarrassed those with whom he acted. He had no
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doubt however, that that right hon. gent, was convinced that he had just grounds for what he did. He did not mean to impeach his public spirit, which certainly, on many occasions, hail shewn itself superior to any private motive or consideration whatever: and even on this subject, the right hon. gent, had seized the occasion of a motion for papers to declare, that a more inhuman, a more atrocious, and a more disgraceful act never had disgraced any government. He had every disposition to think well of the politics of the marquis Wellesley, who had been educated in the same school with Mr. Pitt, and had for some time followed his steps; but at the same time, he had no hesitation to declare, that if he was guilty of the acts detailed in these papers, he was a most improper minister for this country, as he might bring into our councils that tyranny which had disgraced his Indian government.—The hon. baronet then gave a brief historical view of the progress of the company's interference with the Carnatic, from the beginning of the war that ended in 1754, when they supported one candidate for the musnud in opposition to another supported by the French, down to the treaty of 1796 with Omdut ul Omrah, by which the payment of a certain kist was secured to the company. That treaty continued till the death of Omdut ul Omrah, in 1801, when those disgraceful transactions commenced which the right hon. gent, opposite had not coloured more strongly than they deserved. On the 5th of July 1801, colonel M'Neil advanced to the palace of Chepauk, with troops, under pretence of preventing commotion at the death of Omdut ul Omrah. On their entrance the old monarch, labouring under the disorder which in eight days after terminated his existence, sprung from his bed and begged of major Grant not to expose him to the contempt of his subjects, by penetrating into the interior of his palace; and major Grant applied for instructions to col. M'Neil, who from motives of humanity did not enter. The troops, however, remained, surrounding the palace from the 5th to the 15th, when Omdut ul Omrah died, to all appearance in perfect amity with the company. At no period were our dominions in India more quiet and secure than at the time when this outrage was committed, under the pretence of guarding against a petty commotion. On the same day on which the old monarch died, the prince, his

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heir, was dragged from his apartment, and called upon to answer to certain interrogatories, on a charge of treachery preferred against his father. He was told that his father and grandfather had carried on a treacherous correspondence with Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun, and that he, though innocent, was to be deprived of his dominions and reduced to the situation of a private person, where he expected to be a sovereign; that his succession would be set aside, and another placed on the musnud, unless he complied with certain requisitions, which were, that he should give up the civil and military administration of his possessions, and accept of an indefinite sum to keep up his dignity, and of a body guard furnished by the company.—The hon. baronet gave a minute detail of the various conferences between the commissioners of our Indian government and the prince, who, with the advice of two old khans, appointed regents by his father, refused to accede to these conditions; though these khans were willing to give any reasonable security for the payment of the kist. Among the expedients tried in order to procure the prince's consent, intimidation was one. Troopers with drawn swords paraded before the tent in which one of the conferences was held, and the prince was told that the propositions did not solely originate with lord Clive, but that they were sanctioned by the governor-general, by the court of directors, and by the British government. If the directors had sanctioned this conduct, their letters of approbation would, no doubt, have appeared; and it was incumbent on those who had been members of the British government at the time to clear themselves, and to declare that they knew nothing of this transaction. But, if they were silent, he would prove that they could not have known it. The prince, however, still continued to rely upon the faith and protection of the company, and was at last told to prepare to receive the final resolution of the governor-general, which was, that his future situation would be that of a private person considered as hostile to the British interests. Where was British justice then? From the year 1798, when lord Wellesley had landed in India, the kists had been paid with a fidelity almost unprecedented, and yet this was the result. When the commissioners had set aside the prince, one would have thought that they would have applied to the next in succession; but no: they passed over two,
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and opened a negociation with Azum ul Dowlah, who from his situation, they imagined would be most likely to comply with all their requisitions. He, as was usual in that country, had been kept in confinement, and, when taken out, was greatly frightened lest they were going to kill him. They found him, however, wonderfully well qualified to undertake the government, and the conferences with him ended in his acknowledging that the whole right was in the company, his ancestors having forfeited it by their treacherous correspondence. The hon. baronet declared that he should have been much surprized if this had not been the result. Azum would no doubt be willing to believe that his ancestors had been capable of acting very improperly, since they confined him. This puppet was presented in form to lord Clive, on the 26th of July, and on the 28th was installed in the musnud, on which occasion, none of the nobles attended, except one, who was now an outcast from all parties. A treaty was executed on the 31st, in which it was stated that the hereditary right of Azum ul Dowlah to the throne of his ancestors had been acknowledged by the company. But this being communicated to the governor-general, this expression of right was objected to, and a direction sent to lord Clive to get the words altered, if he conveniently could, and to have it stated, that Azum had been established in the possessions of his ancestors by the liberality and moderation of the company's government, which liberality extended to the provision of a guard of their own for him, and a promise of a sum to support his dignity. But, what was remarkable in this treaty was, that it in one part gave these possessions, and in another took them away. The rightful prince was, from the 15th of July, 1802, to the day of his death, confined with his mother in the palace of Chepauk, which was his own private property; but where, notwithstanding, Azum resided—The hon. baronet dwelt upon the imprudence and indecency of placing the prince in the same palace with the usurper, and stated that as soon as Mr. Addington heard of it, orders had been sent out to remove him. He would not charge the persons concerned in this with murder, such as that which was sometimes proved at the Old Bailey; he would not say that lord Clive could have had an intention to have the prince assassinated; but he affirmed, that those who placed him in such a dan-

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gerous situation with their eyes open were in foro conscientiœ, in a great degree implicated. The hon. baronet here adverted to a pamphlet, entitled "The Carnatic Question stated," and said that he never read so disgraceful a defence of any transaction, or one which was more calculated to condemn the party in whose favour it was written. With regard to what had been said of himself in it, he pitied the author if he wrote from necessity; if not, he despised him. He had scarcely ever seen a production on any political question that contained such monstrous, he might say, such villainous doctrines. Was it tali auxilio, defensoribus istis, that marquis Wellesley was forced to be protected? Reverting to the situation of the prince, he stated, that the unhappy man, after several ineffectual petitions to be removed, had written a letter, in which he strongly pleaded for being sent to another place, instead of being kept constantly in the power of the usurper, who had only to commit one act to finish his crimes. This proved prophetical; for the prince not long after died of a dysentery. He would not take upon himself absolutely to affirm, that there was something unfair in this transaction, but he would say, that he believed there was. In these transactions he could discern nothing of the British character. The moment they passed the Cape, he believed, with Mr. Burke, that they unbaptized themselves; and that when they landed in India, they became something like the Upas tree, described by a Swedish traveller, that blasted and destroyed every thing that came within the reach of its pernicious influence.—The hon. baronet then entered upon the examination of the alledged treacherous correspondence of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, with Hyder and Tippoo, and contended that there was nothing in it that could be considered as sufficient evidence of the charge. He several times asked the hon. baronet opposite (sir John Anstrutther), whether he would admit such evidence in his court in India? The 8th letter was merely a translation of a copy, and he asked if any lawyer would admit this as evidence. The 9th was from Tippoo to Omdut ul Omrah, in which the latter was stiled nabob of the Carnatic, though the letter was dated 1792, and Omdut ul Omrah had not ascended the musnud till 1796, from which it would appear that the document was a forgery. The hon. baronet went through all the 23
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letters, commenting upon each separately, and contending that as they were merely representations of third parties of what they had heard, they were totally inadmissible as evidences of the guilt of Wallajah. But, even admitting that they could be received as evidence, he asserted that no honest man could lay his hand upon his heart and say, that they contained any indication of hostile intention on the part of that prince, or of Omdut ul Omrah, much less, evidence sufficient to justify the deposition of a sovereign and the usurpation of his dominions. Upon the parole evidence he observed, that it was given by the creatures of Tippoo, and the immediate dependants of the company, whom they alternately cajoled and threatened into giving such an account of the correspondence as it was the wish and interest of the British government, at the time, should be given. But neither by promises nor threats, to their own witnesses, could they attain their object of making good the accusation. And even supposing that Wallajah or Omdut ul Omrah, had been guilty of the alleged offences, what ground did his actions afford for the punishment of the son of the latter, and the grandson of the former? He put it to the house what effect such conduct would have, were any minister wicked or daring enough to attempt to practise it in this country? And was not justice the same all over the world, or had we one set of principles for India and another for England? With a view to the interests of the country, he maintained, that the extension of our Indian territory tended only to entail an immense load of debt upon the country. But this was but a secondary consideration, when compared with the iniquitous spoliation of an in de-pendant sovereign. Before sitting down, he conjured the house by the national honour and faith, of which it was the guardian; he conjured his majesty's ministers in the name of the national character, of which they were the protectors; he conjured every man in the name of that eternal justice which was the foundation of our happiness here and hereafter, to consider the importance of the vote which he was to give this evening. He was confident that it was essential to the security of our Indian empire to declare that the British legislature never would sanction any unjust or tyrannical act.—The hon. baronet concluded a long and masterly speech with moving the following Resolutions:

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Resolved, I. "That it appears to this house, that Mahommed Ally, otherwise called Wallah Jah, nabob of the Carnatic, was an ally of the East India Company, and under a vicissitude of fortunes, attendant on the introduction of the British power in India, adhered to the British cause, when it was endangered by the contending interests and arms of France; that under a just sense of the services so rendered by Mahommed Ally, and with the especial view to prevent all future controversy respecting the succession to that kingdom, an acknowledgment of the right in the person of the nabob Mahommed Ally, and in his heirs and successors for ever, was procured in the treaty concluded at Paris in the year 1763, and formally recognised therein by the powers of England and France.—That at various times since, the East India Company have entered into divers agreements and treaties, through their governments in India, with Mahommed Ally, under the character and title of nabob of Arcot, or of the Carnatic, for the express purpose, and with the avowed intent, of defending, jointly with their own, the title and rights of the said nabob; and especially in two treaties concluded in the years 1787, and 1792, the latter of which purports to be a treaty executed on behalf of the East India Company, their heirs and successors, and to be mutually binding as well on them as on his highness the nabob Mahommed Ally, and his successor, his eldest son Omdut ul Omrah, and his heirs and successors; that such treaty of 1792 remained in force, and as such, obligatory on the contracting parties, at the death of the said Mahommed Ally, which happened in the year 1796, who at his death was succeeded by his said son Omdut ul Omrah—That the said Omdut ul Omrah died in the month of July, 1801, without any alteration or modification of the said treaty having been made in his life, time—2. That it appears to this house, that the said nabob Omdut ul Omrah made a will, or testamentary writing, by which he appointed his son, the prince Ally Hussein Jah ul Omrah, &c. his heir and successor in the dominions of the Carnatic. An instrument which is admitted by the British government in India to have been competently executed, and in form, disposition, and principle, consonant to the Mahommedan law. That by such will the said prince Ally Hussein became, on succeeding to the rights of his father, a party to
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the treaty of 1792, which expressly included the heirs and successors of the said Omdut ul Omrah, and in virtue thereof entitled to the benefits, and bound to the observance of all the terms and conditions of such treaty. That the said prince Ally Hussein, on his succession, professed his readiness and determination strictly to fulfil all the obligations of the said treaty, and required the fulfilment of the correspondent obligations by the government of India—3. That it appears to this house, that the government of Madras, acting under the authority of instructions from the marquis Wellesley, the governor general of India, refused to admit the said prince Ally Hussein, to succeed to the musnud of the Carnatic, in virtue of the will of his father the late nabob, and of the said treaty of 1792, unless he would previously consent to an ignominious and disgraceful surrender of ail his rights in the territorial possessions of the Carnatic, and accept in lieu thereof an indefinite sum as a bounty or gratuity from the Company; and on the steady and dignified refusal of the said prince to accede to this unworthy and humiliating proposition, his, succession was set aside, and another and more distant branch of the family of Mahommed Ally, namely, Azeem ul Dowlah, was placed on the throne of the Carnatic,; on his acceptance of the above disgraceful and servile conditions.:—4. That it appears to this house, that the said Azeem ul Dowlah, was raised to the musnud of, the Carnatic, in the room of, and through the disinherison of the lawful successor, prince Ally Hussein;—that the injustice and tyranny of the act was not more disgraceful to the British name and character than the unfounded pretexts by which it is attempted to be justified, inasmuch as the pretended treason of the said nabobs Mahommed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, on which the assumption of the Carnatic was founded, although alledged to have, been discovered two years preoeding the death of the latter prince, was never brought forward during his life, and could by no possible construction affect the right of the said All Hussein, the innocent and unoffending successor of the said nabob This house, therefore, is of opinion, that the British power in India, intrusted to the marquis Wellesley, has, in this instance, been employed by him wantonly and unjustly, to deprive the lawful heir to the Carnatic of his undoubted rights, contrary to every principle of justice and equity,

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in violation of the sacred faith of treaties, and to the degradation of the British name and character in India.—5. That it appears to this house that the person of the prince Ally Hussein, the rightful nabob of Arcot, was committed to the custody of the said Azeem ul Dowlah, who had, through the undue exercise of the power of the company, usurped his dominions; that the said prince Ally Hussein, notwithstanding the frequent remonstrances and representations made to the British government, by himself and others, of the, humiliating and degrading state to which he and his family were reduced by such confinement—notwithstanding his representations of the imminent danger to his life, which he anticipated from being placed in the power of his enemy, and the usurper of his throne, was suffered to continue in such custody, until the 6th of April, 1802, when he died.—6. Resolved, That policy as well as justice loudly demands the vindication of the character of Great Britain in India, from the reproach of the above transactions; and that the interests, if not the preservation of our empire there, calls for some public act, which will convince the native princes, that a religious adherence to its engagements, will, in future, characterize the British government. Consistently with these sentiments, and at a time when our implacable enemy attempts to justify his atrocities and despotism in Europe by the example of our conduct in India, it is peculiarly incumbent on the house, in the name of the people of England, to declare openly to the world, that the British parliament never did, or will countenance any act of oppression and injustice in its Indian government. And as evidence of its sincerity, this house resolves forthwith to appoint a committee to inquire into the beforementioned act of the assumption of the Carnatic—the alledged motives thereof—and into the particulars of the treatment of the family of our late ally, the nabob Mahommed Ally and of the prince Ally Hussein, the lawful successor to the musnud of the Carnatic; and that it be an instruction to the said committee, to inquire into, and to report whether any and what reparation can, or ought to be made to the said family, for the injuries they have sustained by the usurpation of the said Azeem ul Dowlah; and that, they may further report their opinion by what means the British character can be most effectually rescued from the obloquy and
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odium incurred from the above conduct of its servants; and how the British interests in India may be best secured from injury thereby."
The question upon the first Resolution being put from the Chair,
Mr. Wallacerose and began by saying—In offering myself to your attention, Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of objecting to the Resolutions proposed, and taking a view of the event to which they relate, essentially differing from that stated by the hon. baronet who has just sat down, I may be permitted to express some degree of surprise, arising from the period at which this subject is now submitted to the consideration of the house. If the transaction in question be of the nature described in the speech we have just heard;—if the epithets of foul and atrocious, which have been repeatedly applied to it, have been justly applied;—if it does indeed, as vitally as it is said to do, involve the faith, the justice, and the character of the country;—if it is not brought forward rather for the distinction of an individual, than as a necessary vindication of the national honour;—it is surely a matter of just astonishment, that it should not be till after the sixth year from the time it was first brought under the notice of this house,—that it should not be till after every document elucidating it has been printed and reprinted for the consideration of three successive parliaments—that we are at length arrived at this long looked for discussion. I do not mean to accuse the hon. baronet: it is only for a comparatively short part of that period he has had a seat in this house, and I must do him the justice to say, that since he has undertaken the business, I am not aware of its having been delayed a single hour on the ground of his personal convenience;—but if there are those who concur in his impressions, who are prepared to manifest that concurrence by their votes this night, and who have enjoyed opportunities which he has not possessed, of appealing to the judgment of parliament,—it will become them, nay, sir, they owe it to themselves, to this house, and to their country, to repel, if they can, the charge of such a dereliction of their public duty, as irresistibly results from their having endured, for so long a period, a stain so foul to disgrace the British name—from having left the national faith and justice, six long years, wounded, impeached, dishonoured, and, as far as de-

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pended on their efforts, wholly unredressed.—Late as it is, it must still be a matter of satisfaction, as well to the noble lord against whom the resolutions are principally directed, as to all who either from personal or public motives feel an interest in the subject of them, that the accusation is finally before the house; and I trust that the decision of this night (not such as anticipated by the lion, baronet, but one more consistent with substantial justice) will set this question at rest for ever; that it will not be suffered to continue suspended over our heads, or furnish, any longer, against the noble lord and our counsels in India, a vehicle for every species of libel and calumny, that ingenuity, disappointment, and revenge can devise or propagate.—That a measure of the description of this now under our consideration should not excite clamour and hostility in some quarters, would have been contrary to every rational probability and expectation. No man who knows what has been passing in that part of India for the last thirty or forty years—the corruptions, the abuses, the iniquities, that have prevailed there, but must have foreseen that a measure calculated to eradicate those corruptions, to frustrate the hopes of avarice, to blight for ever the harvest of plunder and extortion, would have to encounter a host of foes, and be assailed by detraction in every form. But to me, sir, and I trust equally to the house, such enmity is in fact its best recommendation—it is a proof that it has effectually accomplished one of its most important objects; an object dear to the interests of humanity, and the happiness of millions, by destroying a system the most baneful that ever existed; to which not your resources only, but the country itself, and its inhabitants in all their gradations, were the victims; which degraded the prince; which impoverished the landholder; which oppressed the peasant; which drove labour from the field, and industry from the loom; which depopulated the provinces, and spread desolation and misery over the whole face of the land.—But, much, sir, as humanity, much as policy might be interested in the extinction of such a system, had they been the only grounds of the great measure adopted; however convinced I might have been of the soundness and the validity of each of them, I will readily own I should have thought the justification they furnished incomplete and unsatisfactory. I am too well aware of the danger of such alledged
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principles of action, and the abuse to which they directly tend; it is not on these grounds that a pretence of right is founded; it is on the violation of every tie of public faith, gratitude, and friendship; on the contempt of the most solemn engagements and binding duties of alliance, connected with a systematic conduct of unequivocal hostility on the part of the nabobs of the Carnatic, supported by facts no man can deny, established by inferences no man can dispute, that the rights we asserted rest, and that this measure was embraced by those to whom the care of the British interests in the East was delegated, and whose first duty it was to maintain and protect them.—The speech of the hon. baronet, and the resolutions, convey but a very imperfect outline of the transaction before us: from the documents on your table alone, can the real nature and character of it be collected. From them it will appear, that owing to the perfidious and hostile conduct of the successive nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, it became the right, and was consequently the duty, of the British government to provide for the security of its interests, as connected with the Carnatic; the intended exercise of this right having been evaded by the death of the latter, and not acceded to on the part of his natural heir, Ally Hussein, the usual course of succession was changed, and another prince of the same family raised, by our power, to the throne.—The considerations arising out of his statement obviously divide themselves into the rights we possessed; the duty of exercising those rights, in the manner and to the extent in which they were exercised; and, lastly, the circumstances with which the exercise of them were attended.—Before, however, I proceed to discuss the points I have adverted to, I feel myself under the necessity of detaining you for a few moments, to refer to the state and origin of our political connection with the nabobs of the Carnatic, because I am desirous of correcting some impressions on that subject, which the hon. baronet's speech seemed calculated to convey.—Those who are acquainted with the history of India know that the family of Wallajah had no hereditary claim to the situation of nabob of the Carnatic; that the way to the musnud was opened to Anwar-ud-deen, his father, by the means of two assassinations, of which he was not supposed to be wholly innocent. This prince afterwards sunk under the

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which has in every war in which, we have been engaged, embarrassed the progress of united arms of the French and the soubah of the Deccan, and fell at the battle of Amboor, where his eldest son was at the same time made a prisoner; while his second son, Mahommed Ally (known subsequently by the name of Wallajah) fled, stript of every thing, to the fortress of Trichinopoly; a new nabob was immediately appointed by the victorious party, and the fortunes of the house of Anwar-ud-deen seemed to be for ever extinguished. In vain did Mahommed Ally proclaim his pretended title to the succession; in vain implore the friendship of the French, by whom his rival was avowedly supported. His last resource was to solicit the protection of the British government. Fortunately for him our situation at the moment, and the necessity of preserving our own existence in the peninsula, forced upon us that of resisting the increasing power and ambitious projects of France. We extended to him therefore the protection he solicited; and how we performed our part need not now be told. After an arduous and glorious contest, success crowned the British arms, and the consequence of that success placed Mahommed Ally on the musnud. Having thus raised him from the dust, and, in an evil hour, given him the possession of a great and flourishing kingdom, having procured the recognition of his title both in India and in Europe, it is not easy to conceive what services he could render that were more than adequate to those he had received—less than fidelity and attachment to the power which had retrieved the fortunes, and revived the splendour and power of his house; less than a fair participation in the resources of the country, gained by our arms, to the extent which might be necessary to maintain the common interest of its defence, we could not, in justice to ourselves, demand, and more we did not claim.—This, sir, is the language of all the treaties concluded with this prince, and these the conditions of all his claims to the support which he invariably experienced from the British power.—It is not my intention to enter into any details relative to what has passed during the connexion which has so long subsisted; or to give you a history of the intrigues, the corruptions, the impatience of our power, the struggles for independence, and the unprincipled ambition, which have been exhibited on the part of the nabob; neither do I mean to detail the instances of his faithlessness to all his engagements,
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which has in every war in which we have been engaged, embarrassed the progress of our arms, and more than once brought our affairs to the very verge of ruin; but I shall come at once to what bears more directly upon the subject of our discussion; I mean the treaty concluded by sir Archibald Campbell in the year 1787.—That treaty was in part pecuniary, and in part political; it provided an annual sum for the discharge of the nabob's debts, and for a large military subsidy, for which it appointed a landed security; and it precluded him from entering into any political negociations or controversies with any state or power, without the consent or approbation of the president in council of Fort St. George.—The alledged distresses of the nabob, and the difficulties he professed to feel in fulfilling his pecuniary engagements, induced lord Cornwallis to consent to a revision of this treaty; and in consequence of that revision a new treaty was concluded in 1792, between the British government in India and Mahommed Ally, known by the name of lord Cornwallis's treaty. By this engagement the nabob was relieved from a large proportion of the burthen of his payments', and his son Omdut-ul-Omrah was acknowledged as his successor.—For this modification of our rights, for this relief of the nabob, what was our compensation? A recognized power of assuming the civil and military administration in time of war, which we had before really possessed, and practically exercised: a security, supposed more efficient, for the regular and permanent discharge of the military subsidy; and a renewal, in more precise terms, of the article precluding all political correspondence between the nabobs of the Carnatic and foreign powers, without the knowledge of the British government.!
!Tenth article of Treaty of 1792.—"The said Nawaub shall receive regular information of all negociations which shall relate to declaring war or to making peace, wherein the said Company may engage, and the interest of the Carnatic and its dependencies may be concerned; and the said Nawaub shall be considered as an ally of the said Company in all treaties which shall in any respect affect the Carnatic, and countries depending thereon, or belonging to either of the contracting parties contiguous thereto; and the said Nawaub agrees that he will not enter into any negociation or political correspon-

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This treaty, exhibiting on our part nothing but consideration for the situation and feelings of the nabob, and giving us additional claims to his attachment and gratitude, was scarcely concluded, before it was basely violated, not in its letter merely, but in its vital spirit and fundamental principle. While it was yet actually negotiating, the nabob will be found to have commenced a correspondence, not with an allied or friendly power, but with Tippoo Sultana, the sworn enemy of the British nation, with whom peace was only a preparation for war, and the undisguised purpose of whose hostility was the total extirpation of our name from the peninsula of India. A prince, whose very act and thought bore testimony of irreconcileable hate; whose daily meditations and nightly dreams, presented to him but one object, and that object the destruction of out-empire. With this man, did the nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, (both parties to the treaty of 1792,) while the ink was yet wet with which they signed their engagements to be faithful to us; in contempt of that solemn tie, in defiance of every condition by which their power was enjoyed; with this man, did they solicit communion and correspondence; to his projects did they become accessaries, and for his successes, did the aged Wallajah (as he tells us) weary heaven with petitions. Successes which could only be obtained by our loss, and triumphs which could arise only from our humiliations and defeats.—What rights such perfidy, when detected, confers, I shall discuss presently. The first question is, whether there is sufficient proof in the documents before the house to establish the charge.—I remember, sir, a right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan,) who formerly called our attention to the subject of the present discussion, and on whose powerful aid, the hon. baronet has told us, he places his chief reliance in this day's conflict, when addressing you on one of the preliminary discussions relative to the production of papers, implored the house to weigh well the delicacy of the situation in which it stood, in coming to the consideration of this transaction. Who, he asked, was the accuser? the British government. Who the judge? the British government. To whom accrued the benefit of the convic-
dence with any European or native power, without the consent of the said Company."
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tion? the British government. This, sir, is true; and I hope with these impressions, and with an honest wish to decide without prejudice, I entered upon the consideration of it. I know not what credit I may have with the hon. gent, when I declare the result of that consideration to have been, a conscientious conviction, that the charge against the nabobs was substantiated. I do not mean, that the evidence is such as the strict accuracy of a British court of justice might require; but that there arises from it that degree of presumption, on which nations have universally acted, and on which nations must act if they have any regard for their safety. There is reason for caution undoubtedly, but caution ought not to degenerate into timidity; and I own I should have little respect for that man, and think him little fitted for his situation, who, entrusted with the affairs of a great people, from apprehension of the clamour of the misrepresentation and injustice he might eventually experience, could consent to sacrifice one atom of the interests he was delegated to preserve—The evidence is of two kinds, partly to be found in the correspondence, and partly in the conduct of the nabob. The first part I shall consider is the correspondence.—After the fall of Seringapatam, it is known that all the papers of the sultaun fell into the hands of the British government. In these papers were discovered the various negoeiations in which he had been engaged with different powers, and amongst them, a correspondence implicating the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, carried on through the vakeels, who attended the sons of Tippoo when hostages at Madras, for the performance of the conditions of peace in 1792.—Of the authenticity of these papers, the hon. baronet has not ventured to express much doubt. In fact, sir, they are so recognized by the evidence of the vakeels themselves, through whom the communications passed, that it is not necessary to rest on the circumstance of their transmission by the governor general, whose authority, in-dependant of that circumstance, I would not condescend to balance against the supposition of the khans, that it was possible they might have been introduced among Tippoo's papers, by enemies of the nabob; Omdut ul Omrah.—Assuming then their authenticity, they prove in the first instance, that a correspondence was carried on between Tippoo Sultaun and the nabobs of

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the Carnatic, through a secret and un-avowed channel.—Fully am I aware of the spirit of intrigue prevailing among the princes of India; and I admit, that a correspondence, which, in Europe, would infer a violation of every tie of honour and good faith, may not, in the native courts, be always liable to such an imputation: but, to that I must answer, that the British government was known to act on other principles; that it was known to apprehend danger from such correspondence; that it had anxiously precluded them in two successive treaties, and that the nabobs had every reason to be sufficiently conscious of the interpretation we should put upon, and the indignation we should feel, at the discovery of such clandestine intercourse.—The first observation, then, that presents itself is, that any correspondence between the parties in question, was at least a ground of grave suspicion. Next, that a correspondence carried on in defiance of the warnings arising out of the treaties, and with a certainty of the feelings that would be excited by the detection of it, could not be one of idle form or empty compliment; that it must have had distinct objects, and objects of an interest commensurate' to the risk incurred; objects which demanded secrecy, and rendered the precautions resorted to, not superfluous; that this correspondence must therefore have been of a nature, not less important in itself than inconsistent with the relations of good faith, common interest, and friendly connection, in which the nabobs stood towards the British government. Such, I say, would be the inference from the very existence of a secret correspondence, between parties so circumstanced as the nabobs and Tippoo Sultaun. The one, our ally, united to us by every tie that can be supposed binding on man; the other, instigated by the most inveterate hate, and in the very act of meditating, if not preparing hostilities against us.—If this interference be a just one, the object of inquiry is, next, whether there is any thing in the contents of the papers themselves to invalidate or destroy it, or whether they are not, (as I think they will be found to be when fairly examined,) calculated to confirm and support it, and when combined with subsequent events, to establish it beyond the possibility of refutation.—The hon. bart has objected to these papers as being extracts. It is true, sir, they are so; but that they are fairly taken, that they con-
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vey the real sense and purport of the letters from which they are drawn, is proved, by their having been exhibited to the very parties who wrote them, who, disposed as they appear in the course of their examinations, to make the interpretations they give most favourable to the innocence of the nabobs, would undoubtedly have urged the objection, had they recollected or perceived the omission of any passages in the letters, likely to contradict the obvious tenor of the extracts produced.—To the general truth of what is related, (though the expressions of personal regard may be, as indeed they are said to be, occasionally heightened,) the very situation in which the vakeels stood, bear, as well as their subsequent examinations, ample testimony. It is scarce possible to imagine a statement, generally speaking, more to be relied on, than one made by ministers without any visible interest to deceive, intended for the guidance of their sovereign's conduct, and of a sovereign too, of the character of the sultaun, whose vigilance would probably have detected, and whose arbitrary and cruel disposition would have led him to punish, any material deviation from the truth, with the last, and most exemplary severity.—The general style of these papers is that of extravagant adulation towards the sultaun, and had they contained no more, I should have, in a great measure, agreed with the hon. baronet, that they would have been little entitled to our attention, as we all know, that in the inflated terms of eastern correspondence, assurances of attachment and devotion, mean frequently nothing beyond common compliment, or at most, general friendship and good will.—But to come to the papers themselves: it is with regret I feel that the hon. baronet's speech has imposed upon me the necessity of entering into a detail that may be fatiguing to the house; but I can assure gentlemen, that I shall detain them no longer than maybe absolutely requisite to do justice to the cause I am supporting, and will call their attention to those points only, which appear to me most important in directing our judgment, and which are generally confirmed by the concurring testimony of the witnesses examined at Vellore.—The first paper, with which this singular correspondence commences, relates two separate conversations, which appear to have taken place between the nabob Wallajah, and the vakeels of Tippoo, on the

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10th and 13th of June 1792. It should seem, that from the events that had taken place in the course of the last years, the nabob entertained some doubts of the manner in which his proposition might be received, and that some management was requisite in the introduction of it: he therefore begins by an address to the ruling passion of Tippoo's mind, his bigotry and ambition to be universally considered as the chief pillar and champion of the Mahommedan faith. In this character, the nabob directs his address to him, and follows up his expressions of attachment to the faith, and to him the protector of it, by reprobating, as a confederacy formed for the subversion of religion, the war recently concluded. A war, (if ever there was one) strictly just and defensive on our part, and deriving its origin from the unwarrantable aggressions of the enemy; after then adverting to the events of former hostility as past recal, the nabob declares his desire to establish a cordial harmony with the sultaun, and earnestly solicits the vakeel to forward his purpose, as pregnant with great and numberless benefits to both parties. Thus, sir, is laid the foundation of this extraordinary correspondence, an intercourse between the nabobs and the sultaun.—The subsequent conversation is said to have passed in the presence of lord Cornwallis. His expressions of attachment to Tippoo, his dislike of the war, are both expressed indeed, but expressed in more guarded terms. The circumstance, however, to which I particularly wish to call your attention in the conversation, is this, that not one syllable is breathed, which indicates the connection he had proposed in the former one. If, as it has been pretended, this was perfectly innocent, if he was acting only in conformity to the wishes of lord Cornwallis, and this connection was held out merely to conciliate the sultaun, without any serious intention attached to it, why this difference? why the suppression of all mention of that which, if known, could, on these suppositions, be known only to his advantage?—The next letter on which I wish to fix your attention, appears marked No. 4. The contents of the intervening ones are confined to the sultaun and his ministers: they relate to a writing and a couplet connected with a secret commission he had entrusted to them, and which is satisfactorily explained in the evidence: on them, therefore, I shall offer no comments, but shall come to No. 4. In this also a con-
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versation is related between the nabob Wallajah and the vakeels, in which the former, after again connecting the sultaun with the cause and maintenance of religion, and praying to God to preserve him victorious and triumphant, is represented as adverting to his former conversation, and the proposition he had offered, and inquiring if the vakeels had communicated it to the sultaun, and received a favourable answer. They replied, they had communicated it; and then proceeded to convey the answer with which they were charged, and which amounts to a ready acceptance of the proposition, on the ground of that friendship which ought to subsist amongst the professors of the Mahomedan faith—It is at least manifest from this letter, that the nabob attached an interpretation not quite consistent with barren compliment, to the proposition which he had hazarded. Had he felt that it was in the common course of complimentary intercouse between princes; had he felt that in that light, the sultaun would have received and interpreted it, why this solicitude for an answer which, in its nature, could be nothing but an echo of his own idle and empty compliment? The following letter still more confirms my inference, and shews that in the mind of Tippoo, no more than in that of the nabob, was the proposition in question considered as a mere unsubstantial illusion.—This is a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to his ministers, expressive of his sense of the friendship of the nabob, and the kindness shewn to his sons, with the strong intimation of his hope that the nabob would do whatever may tend to the support of the religion of Mahomed.—What precise expectation this is intended to convey, is beyond my power to ascertain with distinctness, but the nature of the services looked for, may be in some slight degree conjectured, as well from what is deemed generally necessary to the support of the cause of the Mahomedan faith, namely the co-operation of all Mussulmans for the destruction of infidels, as from the known views and sentiments of the sultaun, and the services we shall find hereafter to have been actually rendered to him by the unquestionable fidelity of this our ancient and trusty ally.—Notwithstanding the contempt with which the worthy baronet has affected to treat the correspondence generally, he has vouchsafed, not without reason, to honour the next paper with a considerable portion of his attention, and laboured, if not suc-

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cessfully, certainly zealously, to destroy the effect which such a paper cannot fail to produce. It professes to be the key to a cypher—it bears the strongest internal evidence of having been contrived for correspondence embracing political subjects, and is authenticated by the signature of Omdut ul Omrah himself.—Ally Reza Khan, one of the vakeels, gives you the history and intention of it. He is asked if he ever saw the paper, he says, I have—it was instituted by Wallajah for the purposes of secret communication, and the original, I believe, is written in pencil by Khader Newaz, or some person about the nabob Wallajah. He says afterwards, To my knowledge it was never brought into use, it having been intended for use after the departure of the hostages, in case of necessity Again, It was delivered to Gholam Ally Khan by Khader Newaz Khan, and to me at my departure (to Seringapatam) by Gholam Ally Khan, who told me it had been composed for communication between Tippoo Sultaun and the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah. That a copy should be given to Tippoo, and the original brought back to Madras. Tippoo Sultaun, however, kept the original.—No one will feel surprize that some pains should be taken to discredit and invalidate this fatal document; but till the ingenuity or eloquence of the hon. gent, can erase the contents of it, till he can rail away the signature that authenticates it, or completely pervert the course of human understanding, here it remains, and will ever remain, an irrefragable testimony of the faithlessness and duplicity of which it was devised to be the instrument. We are told cyphers are common in India—it may be so; but to be used, I apprehend, as cyphers are habitually used in Europe, in confidential communications between a minister and his court: but this I believe is the first instance in the history of cyphers in which one was ever devised to be the means of communication between two courts; if there ever was such an instance, I shall be most thankful to learn where it is to be discovered.—In his endeavours to throw discredit on this document, the hon. baronet has resorted to the observation of the key and the cypher being upon the same paper. The very mode, sir, of its transmission, in the course of which it was to pass only through the most confidential hands, may sufficiently account for this
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circumstance. It is said too to be so aukward and ill-contrived, that it never could answer the purposes of secresy: Be it so, be it as wanting ingenuity as you will. What is its ingenuity to the purpose? Ingenious or otherwise, it is still a cypher; and no cypher is instituted except with the intention of concealing what is supposed to require concealment. If we make this admission, (and how is it to be refused) if we believe the account given by Ally Reza Khan, which there is no reason to dispute, can we doubt that the correspondence of which this cypher was the intended instrument, in case of necessity at a future time, was felt to be of a nature to involve matters to which concealment was essential? and to what correspondence such a concealment could be essential, except to one, repugnant to the existing engagements between the nabobs of the Carnatic and the British government, I own myself incapable of imagining, and must rely on those who support the resolutions to explain—Were the evidence drawn from written papers confined to this document, coupled with the details already adverted to, and combined with subsequent circumstances, I should think it far from inconsiderable. We have the proposition on the part of the nabob—the acceptance on the part of Tippoo, and in consequence of the harmony, as it is called, so established, a cypher manifestly calculated for correspondence on political subjects, and avowedly devised to carry on the purposes of such correspondence, whenever the present channel of communication between the parties should cease to be open. To have thus conveyed to Tippoo, under every precaution of secresy, the means of communication, means which anticipated all the chances of interruption with a providence and anxiety nothing but objects the most important could call forth, would, in itself, prove the eager solicitude in the nabob to maintain a connection with a prince, who, inexorably hostile towards the British power, not only habitually cherished, but, at the very instant, was meditating hostile projects against it. Had we no more than this, I say, it would warrant, not simply a suspicion of the most faithless designs, but would amount, if not to a literal infraction of the subsisting treaty, at least to a virtual violation of the vital spirit of it, and justify the adoption of measures for the protection of our rights and interests in the Carnatic, from the injury to which

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they might be exposed by the infidelity or treachery of our ally.—About this period it appears that Ally Reza Khan made a journey to Seringapatam; it is mentioned in the next letter, the principal object of it is explained by the evident as having been to impress with greater force upon the mind of the sultaun, the representations of lord Cornwallis, relative to the prisoners still detained, and the cruelty with which they were treated; the allusions in it are said to apply to lord Cornwallis and Wallajah. On this letter I shall not detain you with any remark, beyond calling the attention of the house to the journey adverted to, and the period at which it took place. I proceed, then, to the two which follow. They are from Tippoo to the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah: they contain little more than professions of regard, and merit observation only on account of the application of some of the designations in the cypher, as the well-wisher of mankind to the nabob Wallajah, the distinguished in friendship to Ally Reza Khan. The second of these, however, from a supposed trivia mistake in the title of it, has been selected by the lion, baronet, and treated as a convicted fabrication. If, sir, there is one letter more than another, that bears internal evidence of its own authenticity it is this: for in the whole collection there is scarce one of so little importance. Had those who conducted the transaction, in question been capable of condescending to any forgery as the means of warranting it; had they really introduced a fictitious letter into the correspondence, it is not surely presuming much to suppose that they would have introduced one that might have borne strongly upon the point it was their natural object to establish, and from which powerful inferences might be deduced. But from this it would require more than human ingenuity to extract any thing of real importance. And if it be a fabrication, it is not only improbable in respect to the character, and unworthy of the ability of those to whom it must be attributed, but certainly the most gratuitous and unprofitable one that ever was committed.—The harmony and union being thus, sir, established, the letter we now are to consider begins to display the fruits of it; to this I shall join No. 12, because the observations, applicable to that immediately before me, are, in a great degree, applicable to both. They alike convey intelligence of considerable moment to the
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sultaun's interests, and advice for the regulation of his conduct as arising out of it. They alike expressly refer to the good understanding recently established, and may be not unfairly admitted as a proof of the nature of those services which the sultaun appears to have expected from the nabob, as tending to the support of the Mahommedan faith.—Before I proceed to the contents of these two letters, I beg to be allowed to put it to every man who hears me, with what impressions he would learn, that a person who had received the most substantial benefits from this country, who, maintained by its bounty, and existing but by its protection, after soliciting and establishing a secret intercourse with a foreign power, had been detected in conveying to it intelligence, and suggesting counsels for the government of its measures, at a period too, when, though nominally at peace, it was known not only to entertain the most inveterate enmity toward us, but was suspected of actually preparing to give effect to that enmity? Suppose, for instance, that one under these circumstances had been detected at any time, in writing to the French, or any foreign government actuated by feelings similar to those of France, in terms of this kind: "The conduct you are pursuing excites suspicion—be more cautious—this is not the moment to commence hostilities with any prospect of advantage. There is now a minister who enjoys the confidence of the—country who is capable of calling out all its resources, and directing them against you with energy and success—wait a little—symptoms of a change in our counsels manifest themselves, and there appears the chance of a successor the very reverse of the minister I have described: when this change takes place, you may prosecute your hostile purposes without apprehension.—Or, imagine, sir, the design of the hostile power to be the invasion of this kingdom, and the person I am supposing had written Do not attempt to invade great Britain. Here every man is devoted to the government of his country, and every arm will be raised to drive you from its shores—Here your attempt can only expose you to inevitable destruction: but, there are other parts of the British empire more vulnerable, where you may possibly find less of union, or less preparation to resist your attacks; there direct your efforts; but as you tender your hopes of success, or

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your escape from destruction, avoid an invasion of England. If, sir, such counsels were detected, accompanied with every expression of attachment and devotion to that power and to its cause, I ask, What would be the impression on every unprejudiced mind? would it be, that this was done in the spirit of loyalty, and zeal for the service of this country?—that in one instance it was to obviate the calamities of war—in the other, to avert the perils of invasion from the shores of England? Or, is there a man who would not feel that such counsel must be intended for the benefit of the adverse power, and that it spoke the language, as it betrayed the heart, of an enemy and a traitor?—Having made this observation, I beg the attention of the house to the letters in question. They relate two messages conveyed through Kader Newaz Khan, a person enjoying a great share of the confidence of the nabobs of the Carnatic. Tippoo, as it seems, was endeavouring to excite and combine all the Indian powers against us; while in the prosecution of this object, the activity of his negotiations at Poonah, alarmed the vigilance of the British resident, who immediately apprized the supreme government of his suspicions. This comes to the knowledge of the nabob; and what is the conduct of our faithful friend on the occasion? He proceeds directly to communicate the intelligence he had received to the sultaun, advising him, at the same time, in the spirit of that cordiality by which they were united—to do what? to lay aside, no doubt, his hostile designs, to cultivate friendship, and preserve peace with the British power? No, no, quite the reverse, the advice of this our incomparable ally, is of a very different complexion, (in conformity, no doubt, to the British interests, and the views of its government); it prudently suggests, to the sultaun the policy of suspending his measures, till the approaching departure of lord Cornwallis should leave the field open to him, to act with safety and effect; and then, whatever might be his highnesses pleasure would be right and proper. Such is the purport of the first message. The second contains also similar information and counsel, relative to the situation of tire French at Pondicherry. Nothing is now, says the nabob, to be expected; and following the impulse of his friendship towards the sultaun, he advises him, not as one should expect, to detach himself from
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his dangerous connection with the French, but to communicate with them less directly—to refrain for the present from open correspondence, and to confine his intercourse to verbal communication. To the nature of that intercourse we must, therefore, conclude the nabob to have been no stranger, and his suggestion the result only of his interest for its safe continuance, without interruption or observation from us; an intercourse doubtless most friendly to the British power: between parties such as Tippoo Sultaun and the French, how could it be otherwise?—I shall conclude my remarks on these important documents, by observing, that the intelligence contained in them is, in both instances, referred to the union and friendship established between the nabob and the sultaun. Both instances prove the hostile designs then meditated by the latter; and that the nabob, neither ignorant of them, or unsolicitous for their success, was prepared to avail himself of whatever means might be in his power, to promote and assist their accomplishment.—Though the obvious connection of the two letters I have just commented upon, led me for a moment to pass the one that intervenes, I cannot consent to leave it entirely unnoticed; containing, as it does, a message from Omdut ul Omrah, in his own name, expressive of the most fervent attachment to the sultaun, followed by a promise, that, please God, at a proper time, his fidelity should be manifest. I notice it first, because it shews how cordially Omdut ul Omrah acted, not merely as the minister of his father, but as a substantial party in this negociation, and still more, because in this promise so given, will be found the key to his subsequent conduct: it will hereafter be seen, when the occasion did occur, how he remembered the pledge he had given, and redeemed it with but too faithful punctuality.—The secresy that is one of the striking characters of the whole transaction, now increases in an extraordinary degree. New precautions are devised, and the in terviews with the vakeels (which had never been hitherto subject to any restriction) are covered by fictitious pretences, totally foreign to their real objects.—The letter I next refer to, relates a meeting to which the vakeels were invited, under pretence of seeing a mosque, but for the real purpose of learning something of a secret nature, which the nabob Wallajh had long felt a wish to convey to them;

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the interview takes place in a tomb near the mosque, and a question is put to them by Omdut ul Omrah, whether they had full powers? Being satisfied on that head, he proceeds to deliver to them a message in the name of Wallajah: 'That for a long time there had been, without a cause, a veil, (or want of cordiality) between his highness and your majesty, which had been productive of injuries to both; but now that, by the favour of God, a system of harmony, such as is becoming among the professors of Islamism, had taken place, his highness confidently hoped from God, the prime cause of all, that the time past might be amply redeemed; that for his highness's own part, considering from his heart himself, his country, and his property to belong to your majesty, he had made it a testamentary injunction to his children and family, taking God and his Holy Prophet to witness, to pray night and day for the pillar of faith, (that is to say) your majesty; and to consider their prosperity and welfare as inseparably connected with your majesty; that we must ascertain your majesty's wishes on this head, in a manner satisfactory to both; and if your majesty should be, from your heart, solicitous of this proposed cordial harmony, his highness would, under the testimony of God and his prophet, detail to us his sentiments fully at the time of our departure, which, please God, would soon take place'—Without adverting to the marriage, which is said to have made at this meeting the subject of a separate conversation with Gholam Ally, I must remark that, either there is a strange confusion in this message, or the words friendship, harmony, &c. must be understood in more than one meaning. The nabob first talks of harmony being established, and then desires them to ascertain if Tippoo is really desirous of the proposed cordial harmony; they either mean different things, and more is contained in the latter words than at first appears, or the passage is nonsense. Why, we are tempted to ask, is there any anxiety about full powers? All that was proposed in its simple and obvious sense, had been long ago both proposed and cordially accepted. To desire the vakeels, then, to ascertain the sultaun's disposition on this point, appears absolutely absurd, and we have no other way of extricating ourselves from the difficulty, but by concluding, that under the words, 'cordial,
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harmony, was veiled some new and distinct proposition, comprehended by the vakeels and the nabob, and involving in it what was far beyond any common meaning conveyed by the expressions in which it was couched; as well as beyond that union said to have been already established between the nabob and the sultaun. It could not be the marriage, because Omdut ul Omrah appears to be a party in it; and it is only in the succeeding letter we find he had been induced to take any share, or interest himself in the negociation relating to the marriage.—The following letter describes also a similar meeting in a garden, under an equally fictitious pretext, with this difference, that it was solicited on the part of the vakeels. Omdut ul Omrah is there stated to have conjured them not to commit to writing some expressions he used, saying, that he so expressed himself out of regard to the faith, and his friendship towards the protector of it. In the last paragraph of this letter it is mentioned, that they had induced Omdut ul Omrah to lay the foundation of the connection by marriage. To those who refer to this letter it will be clear, from the manner in which the marriage is mentioned, that whatever was conveyed under the mysterious expressions that were not to be committed to writing, it had no reference or connection with the marriage. The marriage, if at all a subject of negociation, was entrusted exclusively to Gholam Ally Khan. It is stated that a negociation for marriage is a matter of much delicacy among the Mahommedans, the nabob, therefore, would certainly not propose to treat on it with both the vakeels jointly. It appears besides, that separate conversations took place between Omdut ul Omrah and Gholam Ally Khan, at each of these meetings, said to be in relation to that subject, but we learn from the evidence of Gholam Ally Khan, that what they were conjured not to commit to writing, was communicated to both. The short extract from a letter of the sultaun too is a confirmation of this argument, and seems to leave no question of the marriage and the subject of these confidential expressions to be totally distinct. He directs them to inform him of the expressions of Omdut ul Omrah, and the 'thing you know of', which is explained by the evidence always to mean the marriage. What then was the purport of these expressions? Ally Reza says, it was confined to professions of attachment, and to information relative to

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the French. Now, sir, it cannot be forgotten that both these had been long before communicated and written, and could not, therefore, require that solemn injunction of secresy that was imposed. We are thus reduced, I say, to the necessity of doing one of two things, either totally withdrawing our belief from Ally Reza Khan's account of what passed; or in admitting the truth of it, to admit, that under the words, friendship, attachment, and regard, was veiled a sense little corresponding, in point of comprehension and effect, to that in which they are usually accepted.—The ceremony which is related in the ensuing letter, as having taken place under the immediate directions of the sultaun, in the Jaumah mosque, does not immediately involve either Wallajah, or Omdut ul Omrah, as the younger branches of the family appear to have alone been present. The remark, therefore, that I wish to offer on this document, relates rather to the sultaun—the probability of his anxiety to connect himself with the nabob, and the prevailing purpose in his mind, of the connection he desired. It has been held out that the sultaun was indifferent to the pretended advances of the nabobs; and, it has been asked, what benefit could he possibly hope from such a connection?—Why should he be solicitous to contract ties with persons so little able to assist him as the princes of the Carnatic?—The question is satisfactorily answered by the evidence of Ally Reza Khan. He tells you, it was the sultaun's object to unite all mussulmen for the purpose of extirpating the English. It appears too, that though an oath of fidelity on this occasion was administered to the subjects of Tippoo only, yet that an exhortation was addressed to all who were present; and the intention of it was to attach the mussulmen to the sultaun, and to reprove them for adhering to those of a different persuasion. Let me ask, then, if the sultaun did entertain the object thus ascribed to him, the truth of which is beyond dispute? if he condescended, as stated in this letter, to appeal to the lowest of our subjects, with the view of subverting their allegiance, and of attaching them to his cause? must it not be evident that he would be most anxious to win over by every means in his power, not only a most considerable member of Islamism, but a prince whose influence extended over those very people, whom he had thus shewn his desire to enlist under
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his standard, and who possessed such means for aiding him in the prosecution of the object nearest to his heart? Is it credible, then, that he would have slighted such a prince, and neglected the proffered advantages of his friendship and assistance?—The delivery of the hostages, and the return of the vakeels to their master, took place in the interim between the date of this letter, and that of the one which follows, a letter, in some points of view, of considerable importance. It is addressed to Gholam Ally, under the fictitious signature of Gholaum Hussein, but written in the hand of Omdut ul Omrah. The difficulty and danger of communication sufficiently accounts for the purport, of it being so little detailed, but those who have attended to the preceding letters, will easily trace in it a continuation of the former expressions of attachment, founded on the same basis, the maintenance of the Mahommedan faith, so well adapted, and so conciliating to the spirit to which they were addressed.—Repeat this couplet, he says, on my part, to the sultaun.—In the preservation of thy person is the perpetual permanence of the faith. Let him not remain who wisheth not thy preservation.—How unlike is this to the coldness of the avowed letter of form, written on the same occasion, namely, the marriages of two of the sons of Tippoo, and transmitted through the British government. I have received, says the nabob, your letter, informing me of the celebration of the weddings of Abdul Khaleh and Mohammed Moizud Deen, together with a dress and jewels, and are made happy beyond measure by this agreeable intelligence—may the Almighty render this event happy. How impossible it is not to be struck with the marked difference of the sentiment of the couplet from the style of the letter I have just read, and why this difference? Why? but that one is intended to convey what the other is intended to conceal.—In the year 1795, the nabob Wallajah died, and Omdut ul Omrah succeeded to the musnud. An embassy, charged with the compliments usual on such occasions, was sent by the sultaun; the letters, No. 18 and 19, are from the ambassadors; but there is nothing related, except one long conversation about union and friendship, on which his highness is said to have expatiated with great warmth. It is indeed stated, that the vakeels employed on this occasion were not persons to whom a negociation of much delicacy

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was likely to be entrusted:—at the same time, we must observe, that the following letter from Omdut ul Omrah makes a reference to his communications with them, as if something had passed connected with the former intercourse. This letter is, like the other, marked with the fictitious name of Gholam Hussein, and addressed to Gholam Ally. The introduction of it is material only on account of the reference I have stated, and as it carries on the existence of the correspondence to so late a period preceding the Mysore war.—The impression of the nature of that reference is forcibly confirmed by the subsequent letter from Khader Newaz Khan, the confidential minister before alluded to, whose name appears more than once as the channel of communication between the nabobs and the vakeels. Adverting in this to his previous services, he congratulates himself, and thanks the Almighty, that the system of harmony and union between the two chosen of the Lord,' (meaning Tippoo Sultaun and Omdut ul Omrah,) calculated to promote the happiness of God's people, and which his labours had been employed in establishing, had acquired the requisite degree of stability and firmness. The authenticity of this letter is fully supported by the oral testimony; nor is there any thing that has a tendency to invalidate the obvious inference resulting from it. It stands then as a convincing testimony, that whatever that mysterious and enigmatical connection, established under the name of union and harmony, really was, it was in force and operation up to the year 1797; that the same sentiments which impelled Omdut ul Omrah to participate in, and conduct the intercourse during the lifetime of his father; the same supposed interests, the same attachment to the cause of the sultaun that had previously governed and animated his exertions, accompanied him, undiminished, to the throne, where he waited only for an opportunity favourable to his friendship, and an emergency in which the fidelity he had solemnly promised could be manifested with effect.—Though many additional remarks on the contents of the several papers of the correspondence obviously present themselves, I will not further exhaust the patience of the house by continuing them; and in here concluding this part of the subject I only regret that a sense of justice to the question before us should have made me feel it a duty to dwell on it so much at length. But, sir, on the de-
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gree of conviction resulting from these documents, much must depend. The inferences I have deduced, the conclusions I have drawn, the impressions I have endeavoured to inforce, I must leave to the judgment of the house. I can only say, that to mine they are decisive, and that each suspicion the existence of such a correspondence excites, appears to me to derive validity and confirmation from every step we advance in examining its contents. All the facts they discover are so far from being weakened by the oral evidence, (if indeed such evidence could weaken the authority of any written documents) that they are more distinctly corroborated and established. Without troubling you by dwelling particularly on the evidence taken at Vellore, but leaving it to those observations which must strike any mind from the most cursory attention to it, allowing also to the witnesses whatever credit can be claimed for them, (and some credit I admit must undoubtedly be given) there is still nothing of moment that can be collected from them, that either in fact, or by inference, goes to refute or weaken any material part. By what has been stated from the papers, as well as by the concurring testimony of the vakeels, it is proved, that a correspondence embracing political objects was carried on, that a connection under the mysterious and indefinite terms of union and harmony was proposed on the part of the nabobs of the Carnatic, and accepted by Tippoo Sultaun; that for the purpose of continuing their correspondence, when the departure of the hostages should remove the existing channel of it, a cypher was instituted—that in prosecution of this connection, assurances of fidelity had been given to Tippoo, and intelligence conveyed to him accompanied with advice for the regulation of his conduct;—that in these transactions the utmost precautions of secresy had been deemed necessary, and the interviews held with the vakeels had been covered with fictitious pretences; and lastly, that the connection, whatever it precisely was, (for of its nature little doubt can be entertained,) actually subsisted in full force, integrity, and operation, in the year 1797.—It has been endeavoured to defend this correspondence, and to rescue it from the impressions it is obviously calculated to produce, by an explanation resting in part on a connection of simple friendship, and in part on an alliance by marriage at one time in agitation between the families of the sultaun

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and of the nabob Wallajah. On the fullest consideration of this explanation I own I have found myself unable to accede to it: the difficulties it presents appear to me insurmountable. If it be possible to suppose a desire of mere friendship without an object, between persons so situated in relation to each other; if Tippoo Sultaun and Wallajah were likely to feel the influence of a pure disinterested sentimental attachment, it is yet hardly probable that a connection on this ground should have been solicited with so much earnestness and anxiety, as is manifested by the nabob in the first proposition of it, or an intercourse entered into by him at such mighty risks; nor is so innocent a view of the subject quite consistent with the secret meetings, the various precautions for concealment, the intelligence conveyed, and, above all, with the preparation and transmission of the cypher before adverted to. If, indeed, it is that union and friendship, which as it is said, ought to bind together the mussulman powers; if it meant to describe alliance and co-operation, mutual support, and inexpiable hostility against those of a different persuasion,—it may be nearer the fact, and remove these inconsistencies I have stated; but if it does so remove them, it demonstrates by their removal the establishment of that sort of connection which no one can deny was essentially repugnant to the spirit and sense of every engagement under which the nabob stood, and directly subversive of the interests and safety of the British empire in India.—But then there is the marriage. On the discordant accounts of the origin of that affair, as stated by the vakeels, I shall say nothing. I will admit that a marriage might be in agitation; but a marriage, if it be allowed to have made any part, on their own shewing, can account for a very small part only, of the communications that are related. It confessedly did not come into question till after the return of Ally Reza from Seringapatam; but before he went there, it must be remembered that this union of harmony and friendship between the sultaun and the nabob, had been proposed, accepted, and established, and for the purpose of continuing it, a cypher had been already transmitted, of which Ally Reza Khan was actually the bearer. In addition to this, sir, as the friendship and harmony commenced before the marriage was agitated, so it continued long after a connection of that kind had ceased to be thought of.
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Moez ud Deen was the only son of Tippoo, whose alliance was supposed ever to have been the object of a negociation of marriage. The marriages of this prince, however, and his brother, Abdul Khaliel, are recorded to have taken place in the year 1794, at which time we find ceremonial letters from the nabob were conveyed to Tippoo, congratulating him on the event. From that moment, then, all idea of alliance by marriage between the families must have vanished, but it appears from the letter of Khader Newaz Khan, the confidential minister of the nabob, that the other connection which had been established was still carried on, and possessed, as late as the year 1797, what he called the requisite stability. I need not say more to make it evident, than that neither the marriage on one hand, or simple friendship on the other, is sufficient to explain the species of connection thus established, to reconcile the difficulties, or to dissipate the suspicion, and the obscurity, in which it is involved.—It is affirmed by the khans, and also in Ally Hussein's letter to his agents, that no correspondence was carried on by the nabobs, contrary to their engagements: if a direct correspondence with Tippoo is meant, it may be literally true, and consistent with these papers, for they may be considered as an indirect, and not a direct correspondence. But so despicable a subterfuge is not worth dwelling upon or exposing. It is said too, that all that was done was done in conformity with the wishes of lord Cornwallis, who was desirous of preserving peace, and conciliating, if possible, the irritated and vindictive feelings of the sultaun. That this correspondence should have been carried on, with any knowledge or approbation of the governor-general, I venture to pronounce absolutely impossible. Whatever the policy and wishes of lord Cornwallis might be, with respect to Tippoo Sultaun, that he should encourage a separate correspondence between this prince and the nabob, at the very time he was changing the expressions of the former treaty of 1787, for the very purpose of more completely and effectually precluding any such intercourse, is, I say, absolutely impossible in itself, as it is inconsistent with the counsel conveyed to the sultaun, in one of the letters above referred to, to pause in the prosecution of his hostile
*Appointed by Omdut ul Omrah ministers to Ally Hussein.

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measures, till the departure of lord Cornwallis to Europe. But, sir, had the nabob felt this to be the case, had he felt that he was acting in support of British views, in alliance with British interests, why all this mystery? Why all these multiplied precautions to avoid detection r Why the cypher? Why the meetings under fictitious pretences? Why the hazards incident to all these proceedings? Why disguise that which, if known, would have been praiseworthy—which breathed nothing but firm attachment, loyalty, and affection to the British power, and zeal for its service, under the mask of deceit, perfidy, and breach of faith? Is it, then, too much to assume that this could not be; that instead of holding a conduct so repugnant to common sense, and disgraceful to a rational being, the nabob did feel that his objects were of a nature to require concealment; that, if detected, they would have excited the utmost jealousy and indignation of the British government; that they would have brought his state and situation into jeopardy; and that they were, therefore, of a nature subversive of his alliance, and in violation of every obligation towards that power which had raised, supported, and protected him. Admit this supposition, and every difficulty disappears, every contradiction vanishes, all is plain, simple, rational, and consistent. With this is consistent the anxiety with which a connection with the sultaun was desired and solicited: With this all the ardent professions of zeal for the support of the faith: with this, the undisguised reprobation of the war and our allies: with this, the intelligence conveyed, and the advice that accompanied it: with this, the assignations under feigned pretences, and the solemn adjuration to secrecy: with this is consistent the prayers of Wallajah for the triumphs of Tippoo, and with this the assurances of his son and successor, that when the occasion should arrive, his fidelity to him should be manifested; and, with this is consistent all the subsequent conduct of Omdut ul Omrah; when, in the course of the Mysore war, in his contemplation, the anticipated occasion did arrive; when the exigencies of our situation, when the success of the contest, and the safety of our empire, demanded every exertion, and every proof of his zeal and attachment. At that moment of pressure did he withhold his resources—at that moment did his officers impede the supplies
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of the army, in some cases resorting even to force to obstruct their passage, and at that moment did they create every embarrassment and oppose every obstacle within the extent of their power, to the progress of our arms. In short, sir, such was the conduct we experienced from, this faithful and devoted friend, that during the existence of hostilities, and long previous to the discovery at Seringapatam, the governor-general, as it appears, not only entertained suspicion, but repeatedly and pointedly declared that the perverseness and disaffection displayed by the nabob, was reconcileable to nothing but a connection, or secret understanding, with the enemy.—It has been asked what interest the nabob could have in such a conduct? I do not feel, sir, that to infer the reality of the conduct I am obliged to assign to it an object of sound and rational policy. It is too much to presume, after all that the times in which we live have exhibited, that projects may not be formed, and designs pursued, that are not warranted by a true and enlightened wisdom. But if the policy of the nabob was not to aid the efforts of the sultaun; if, on the contrary, we admit what is stated, that he had little to hope, every thing to fear from their success, it must follow, that it was his real interest, faithfully to adhere to our cause, and to contribute, to the utmost of his means, in promoting and facilitating the triumph of our arms. That he did the very reverse, is incontestibly proved; and, if in so acting, swayed by any imaginary interest, he trampled on every principle of true policy and duty, by which he ought to have been governed, may we not presume that, swayed also by the same supposed interest, he may equally have carried on a correspondence, and formed a connection, at once hostile to his real welfare, to the faith of his engagements, and to the cause he was bound by every tie to make his own.—What beyond a general and mutual aid, as occasions might offer, were the precise expectations of Tippoo on the one hand, and of the nabob on the other, I will not detain you by an attempt to explain; on that the question does not turn, and I venture to call, with some degree of confidence, upon the house, to consider well the case laid before them, and after adverting to the relative situations of Tippoo Sultaun, and the nabobs of the Carnatic, one actually preparing war against us, the other our most intimate ally; looking at the

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correspondence itself, confirmed as it is by the oral testimony, in all its facts, with all the precautions for concealment that pervades and characterizes it; recollecting the solemn pledge of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and the manner in which, when the occasion was presented by the exigencies of a war in which we were called on to defend the existence of our empire in India, that pledge was afterwards redeemed. Let any man, I say, consider these things, and pronounce, if he can, in the face of God and his country, a conscientious belief, that the nabobs of the Carnatic were faithful to our cause, the duties of alliance, and their own engagements; that the charge against them is without foundation; that the treaties by which they were bound were not violated; that a correspondence of a political nature was not carried on; and a conduct resulting from it pursued, hostile to the just rights, and affecting the security of the British empire in India.—If, sir, the conclusion I feel it my duty to draw, and as it appears to my apprehension the only just one that can be drawn from all that has been stated, is the direct reverse of this. The rights accruing from it to the British government, become the next subject of inquiry and consideration.—The situation of the nabob may be considered in two points of view; one with reference to the original dependancy of his station, under the mogul constitution, and the opinion that, in releasing him from his allegiance to his natural superior, we only transferred that allegiance to ourselves, as well as with reference to the revertible condition on which he received the Dewannee, and the state of practical subjection in which he stood controlled in his foreign relations, and indebted to us, both for the external defence, and internal security, of all he enjoyed, regarding him, in a word, as a mere feudatory of the British power.—In the other point of view, he may be considered as relying, indeed, upon us for his safety and protection, but possessing, nevertheless, the rights of an independent prince; rights deduced from the circumstance of the condition of his engagements which have been alluded to, having been, on his part, repeatedly infringed, and that infringement never having on ours been made a pretence for resuming what our friendship had conferred on him, from repeated treaties having been concluded with him, both sub equent to, and in contemplation of these very breaches
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of engagement, and his having on these occasions, both treated and been treated with, in the character of an independent prince. Thus it may be said, as far as related to us, though maintained by the power and protection of our government, he was invested with all the political and personal rights incident to real sovereignty and independence.—To this latter opinion I own myself inclined to accede, but I cannot admit that the treaty of 1763, alluded to in the resolutions, has any bearing or effect on this question. The article in that treaty which alone mentions the nabob, was introduced for the sole purpose of terminating the disputed claims of Salabat Jing, and Mahomet Ally, in support of which respectively, France and England had carried on the war in the peninsula of India. They therefore joined in recognizing, as far as they were concerned, the former as subah of the Deccan, the latter as nabob of Arcot. What the powers and privileges of each were in their several situations, was a point left wholly untouched, and to be determined by the laws and usages of the Mogul empire.—The character then in which I am willing to consider the nabob, is that of an independent prince under the protection of the British power, nor have I a wish to insist on any right, or to appeal to any law in favour of what has been done by our Indian government, which might not be 'equally appealed to, and insisted upon towards a prince who was exempted from all reliance on our friendship, either for his defence or security. All I ask, in return for this admission, is, that he may be considered in one only of these capacities, and that it may not be contended that he was at once entitled to the rights of a subject, and to the immunities of a sovereign.—It is superfluous to argue that the nabob Omdut ul Omrah was in conjunction with his father, a party to the treaty of 1792, not merely as his future successor, recognized in that treaty, but individually in his own name and person. He was, therefore, from the period of its conclusion, bound to the observance of all its stipulations, and had, in the same degree with his father, conveyed to us what is called a perfect right to the benefits they conferred. If, therefore, the obligation contracted was not fulfilled in both according to its tenor, we acquired with respect to both, I apprehend, the right of enforcing it, if it was desirable it should be enforced; of compelling reparation for

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the violation of it, if reparation was deemed beneficial, or of avoiding the treaty altogether, if that should be most consistent with our views of expediency.—I trust, sir, I cannot be so much misconceived as to be supposed to contend, that every little failure in fulfilling the strict letter of a treaty, is to be a ground for resorting to the exercise of these rights; far from it. In my conception the infringement must be not of the letter only, but of the spirit and intent of the engagement, that too in points not trivial, but essential and important. Such are the points that present themselves in the grant of assignments, confessedly made, although expressly prohibited, which involved both the violation of the treaty, and the destruction of the resources on which we depended: and also in carrying on political correspondence with a foreign power, even destitute of any special aggravations. From infractions of this kind there is no doubt we should have derived a clear right to demand present reparation, and future security, and from the refusal of these demands, an unquestionable right of war would have accrued. Were it requisite, it would not, perhaps, be a difficult task to prove that, under all the circumstances of the case, what we have actually obtained in the Carnatic, does not exceed the bounds of this necessary security; but this discussion would here be mere waste of time. I have adverted to it only to mark that even the accumulated injuries we suffered, have not carried us materially beyond what the infraction of the nabob's engagements, without the aggravation, might have well warranted.—If it is not such infractions alone, but if in addition to such infractions of the subsisting treaty, there be shewn an association with a prince, not simply unfriendly in his character, and opposite in his interests, but in the actual preparation of war; the object of which was our utter extirpation, if it be shewn that this association betrayed itself, not only while war was in contemplation, but continued and operated, during the whole course of the hostilities that ensued. No one, I apprehend, will contend, that from the instant such an association existed, the respective parties did not assume the position of enemies, and that all the rights which a state of war can convey, did not accrue to the injured power; rights coextensive with the demands of permanent and effectual security, and limited only by the great principles of hu-
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manity and justice.—The sudden irruption of the king of Prussia into Saxony, in the year 1756, in the midst of apparently profound peace, is a fact with which every one must be acquainted. What was his defence? he had reason to believe that Saxony participated with other powers in a confederacy for his destruction, and that this gave him the right of immediate war. On this right he acted, and though there were circumstances in the manner in which he conducted his measures that excited clamour against him at the time, there is no man at this day, I believe, who does not admit, that the act of carrying war into Saxony was fully justified. Such then is the right towards a power wholly independent. What is the difference in respect to a dependent and protected one? it is this; that in the case of an independent power, our eights can only be realised through the medium of successful war; in that of a protected one we are already in the situation in which successful war would place us; but it will not be, therefore, contended that our rights are less; it will not be contended that what, consistently with every law, may be justly pursued through all the hazards and calamities of war, we are forbid to attempt when those calamities are dissociated from the acquisition of it—that, the measures which it is our unquestionable right to take against a foreign foe, we may not, legitimately, resort to, against a traitor in our very bosom: the rights are the same, though the means of them are widely different.—If these principles are just, let them be applied to the case before us; and if gentlemen agree with me, in the conviction that the documents adduced, combined with subsequent circumstances, clearly prove a connection to have been established, on the part of the nabobs, with Tippoo Sultaun, at the very time he was meditating hostilities against us, and that in prosecution of the purposes of this connection, he was not only furnished with intelligence and advice, but during the contest, is which our very existence was involved, Omdut ul Omrah adhered to his cause, and aided him to the extent of his power, by treacherously obstructing our supplies, and embarrassing the progress of our arms. They must feel also with me, that every engagement between us and our ally was abrogated; and so abrogated as, at the same time, to constitute that case of injury, from which, according to the usages of nations, the rights of war legitimately

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result.—Had the detection of this correspondence occurred previous to the fall of Seringapatam; had we, during the actual existence of hostilities, discovered the course of infidelity by which the nabob was betraying our cause, and counteracting our measures; had we at once, in the moment of indignation, repaid his ingratitude and perfidy, by driving him from the throne, and assuming his country, where is the man that could have hesitated upon the justice of the act? But, sir, neither did the discovery take place under these circumstances, nor when it did take place, did the governor-general so act upon it; on the contrary, a period of time was suffered to elapse before he availed himself of any of the rights with which the disaffection of the nabobs had invested him. And this is supposed to create a new and different case. What real difference can be found in it is beyond my comprehension; but so it is contended; and being contended, I cannot, pass it by without notice. The right of war is one thing, and the exercise of that right is another; the principle of the first is justice, of the latter expediency. Every one can figure to himself situations in which a nation may stand, where rights of war, the most clear and incontrovertible, cannot be acted upon without the greatest hazard; and where the sense of the deepest injuries must be, (as it often is) for the time, suppressed or dissembled; but are all the rights arising out. of such injuries thus destroyed? or will it be asserted that, in the event of a country possessing rights, unquestionably just, it can be placed in this dilemma, that it must either consent to abandon them entirely, or immediately to act upon them, at the imminent risk of its own destruction. Is it possible this can be so? and if not, the exercise of the right of war necessarily resolves itself into a question of pure expediency, which the circumstances of each individual case must govern. At the same time I am far from saying, that these rights are such as may be laid aside, and stored up for ages, to be resumed at any period t hat ambition or interest may dictate; if acted upon, they must be acted upon with in certain restrictions, and free from the intervention of any acts of confidence and friendship which imply the relinquishment of even hostile intention. Mere delay, within given limits, cannot, I apprehend, be assumed as a ground on which alone to presume such a relinquishment, and what besides took place that
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could rationally afford the nabob grounds for a presumption, that the guilt of which he was conscious, and which he had reason to believe detected, would not be acted upon, I do not know. If any acts from whence such an inference could be drawn did occur, I must confess my ignorance of them. The causes of the delay appear in the documents before you; they are to be found in the critical state of important negociations with other powers, the condition of the neighbouring provinces, in which rebellion was raging, and the desire the governor-general naturally felt to investigate fully the particulars of the case, and to receive an intimation at least, of the feelings of those to whom he was responsible, before he proceeded to take the measures which the situation of the country, and the permanent safety of the interests it was his duty to guard, obviously demanded. These, sir, were the considerations that, for a time, suspended the exercise of our rights,—considerations which must, to every unbiassed mind, (if the exercise be as I have stated it, a question of expediency) satisfactorily warrant the delay, without at all invalidating the right; and justify, the final orders when given, to demand from Omdut ul Omrah the security we ultimately obtained.—That security, it is said however, was not, in point of fact, demanded from Omdut ul Omrah, but from his unoffending successor. Why was it not? At the moment when the order arrived, the nabob, who had been long in a state of declining health, appeared to be fast approaching to his final dissolution. Insensible and obdurate indeed must be the heart that cannot sympathise in the last hours of human existence. Not such a one was that of lord Clive. He did feel all the compassion the situation of the nabob was calculated to inspire. He respected the inviolable privileges of a death bed, and Omdut ul Omrah was permitted to close his eyes in peace, neither molested by accusation, or disquieted by the consequences of his perfidy and ingratitude. Can it be argued that rights so suspended were thereby extinguished? Was the conduct of a prince merely personal, this might be true; and on this ground, I presume, it is stated, and most unjustly stated, that the British government punished the innocent for the guilty. I deny the charge. I deny that punishment in any respect, however flagrantly provoked, was the object of the British government its object, its sole

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object was security for its own legitimate rights—security which the violation of those rights, and the perfidious and hostile conduct of the nabobs had imposed onus the duty of enforcing, and the claim to which, according to the best principles of public law, applied as strongly to him who inherited, as to his guilty and faithless predecessor. It is one of the first principles, says a distinguished authority on these subjects, of general equity laid down by the writers on that law, that, an heir or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inheritance, is not only bound for the engagements of the person whom he succeeds, but cannot be discharged from the obligation to repair the damage which the deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences; neither under the pretext that he derives no benefit from these crimes or offences, nor because there may have been no accusation or condemnation against the deceased. It is a doctrine, as new, as contrary to reason, that the conduct of princes by whom states and nations are represented, should be considered as the acts of individuals, and perishing with them. As well might it be contended that the enmity and aggressions of Tippoo Sultaun were obliterated when he fell upon the walls of Seringapatam, and all our claims to reparation buried in his tomb; that nothing-remained for us to doubt to place his innocent son upon the vacant throne, with the undiminished power and dominion of his father. If the principle applies to one case, it applies to the other. Our rights were the same in both; in the one indeed we were obliged to establish them by successful war, in the other we had happily the power of securing them without a similar struggle.—The proposition offered to Ally Hussein has been adduced in confutation of this principle, and as an acknowledgment, on our part, of the right that devolved to him. A right to what? I do not enter into the question of his legitimacy, I am ready to allow him to be the legal heir of the late nabob Omdut ul Omrah. And what then? he could possess no further right by inheritance than that of assuming the situation his deceased farther possessed, rendered subject, by the conduct of that father, to the claim of whatever might be necessary to the effectual security
*Domat's Compendium of Civil and Public Law.
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of the British interests. The very proposition made to him expressly included the condition of his accession to this claim—the place in which he naturally stood—the wish on the part of the governor-general to accomplish this object by the forms of treaty, rather than by an immediate and painful exercise of our just rights, desidesignated him as the person to whom, if any proposition whatever was thought expedient, it should be made in the first instance. But that proposition, dictated as it was by a generous impulse of humanity alone, when refused and rejected, could not have the effect of limiting those rights which, if they exist at all, areas extensive as the interests they are intended to protect. In fact, sir, if the conduct of the nabobs was such as to place them in the situation of public enemies; if the rights of war, as it has been contended, justly attached upon them, every hereditary claim was extinguished, and the whole state was submitted to whatever disposition the security of our interests, and the prosperity of the country, might prescribe.—The principle of humanity, and consideration for the family of Arcot, which dictated the offer to Ally Hussein, presided also over the disposition that was finally made, and limited it to the necessary objects that were to be attained and secured. What but this, and the recollection of our alliance with the nabobs of the Carnatic, subsisting almost from the first dawn of our political power in the peninsula? What but the reluctance to expose to disgrace and humiliation those whom we had adopted as the partners of our fortune, and raised to sovereign dominion? What but the generosity characteristic of the British nation, could have led us to forget that from the nabobs we had experienced little but faithlessness and ingratitude, and the people committed to their rule, nothing but misery and oppression? What but these sentiments could have stifled our just resentments, under the accumulated injuries we had sustained, and produced the efforts that were made by our government, to obtain by friendly negociation, what as a right it might have at once confidently assumed? What but these, to continue to their families as we have done, the enjoyment of all the affluence, dignity, and splendour, which belonged to their station, and to which they had ever been accustomed?—On the next point, relating to the manner in which our rights were exercised, and the duty of exercising

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them to the extent we did. I am happy to think that little doubt can be entertained; indeed, I shall be surprised if, in any part of this discussion, it should be contended, or at least contended by one acquainted with the state of the Carnatic, that any thing short of the transfer of the whole civil and military administration of the country to the British government, was capable of providing effectually for the rights we were bound to maintain, and for the prosperity of the long oppressed inhabitants of a country which it now became equally our duty to watch over and protect. Though I do not admit the state of the Carnatic, deplorable as it might be, could form any ground on which to found a right to adopt the measure that has been resorted to, yet it can scarcely be denied, that when the circumstances of hostility and perfidy before stated, did place the whole country at our disposal, we became responsible for the effects of whatever dispositions we should make, and for the happiness of the people, no less than for our own security: from that moment on our heads must naturally rest the odium of every abuse, injustice, and oppression chat was suffered to prevail, and it was in our power to avert. And was there even a possibility of averting them otherwise than by the complete transfer of the administration? Did not the state of things, and long experience alike demonstrate that every hope of obviating the recurrence of the numberless evils with which the Carnatic was afflicted, founded on any other basis, was but visionary and delusive.—There are many gentlemen in the house who from local knowledge and personal observation, are much better able to detail to you, than I can be, the state and condition of that unhappy country. The documents themselves contain abundant and melancholy proofs of the sufferings of its inhabitants, under the operation of assignments made to those who, having no interest or object, but to repay to themselves with usury the money they had advanced, let loose every species of cruelty and extortion in accomplishing it. Nor less under the immediate managers appointed by the nabob, who seem to have been commissioned only to exhaust and ruin the provinces committed to their charge, and to whose uncontrolled rapacity, the insatiable wants of the circar, delivered over, without remorse, an unprotected and unresisting people. For the first I beg leave to refer to the sicken-
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ing detail given by lord Hobart, in one of the papers on your table (it is too long to read, and it is scarcely possible to make selections) in which, after describing the progress of these transactions, through all their circumstances, and tracing a truly afflicting picture of the iniquity and barbarity that accompanied them, he concludes a part of his statement by observing: After this exposition, no comment can be required to shew that this species of government, if it deserves the name of government, contains the most grievous oppression of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country; and consequently the inevitable decay of the revenue. In another passage, speaking of the effect of the system pursued, upon the resources as connected with the state of the country, he says, whatever diminution (and it is considerable) in value, the security is gradually though rapidly sustaining, carries along with it the desfraction of the human race, and the desolation of the country.—With respect to the latter, I shall only beg leave to read the account of the collector of Trichinopoly: alluding to the management previous to the transfer of the administration, he writes; The late management, whether considered in a speculative or practical point of view, presents, generally speaking, as its distinguishing features, a total want of system, where system would have been beneficial, a most baneful spirit of extortion and oppression, and an indifference to the happiness and welfare of the people, as senseless as inhuman. The people never knew when the demands on them were to cease, nor do the managers seem to have known when their extortions were to stop. The assessments called fixed, seem only to have been calculated to point out where extortion might be levied and increased, and to induce the inhabitants to cultivate, in the vain hope that no more than the fixed assessment, whether in grain or money, would be taken from them; a hope which returned with every season, but which returned only to blast the prospects of those who too credulously indulged it. I will venture to assert, that if the revenues were in any one year collected according to the established rates of assessment, it was only to in duce the inhabitants, by this apparent moderation, to increase the cultivation of the succeeding year, and thus afford the managers or renters an opportunity

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of doubling their plunder.—The conviction of the house must anticipate any observations of mine on the effects of such a system, under which no country, however otherwise blessed by the bounty of Providence, could flourish; rapid decay must have reduced, and speedy extinction impended over the resources on which our dependence rested,—To arrest the progress of this evil would have been in itself a sufficient motive, were we even incapable of feeling the more noble one of rescuing a suffering people from such calamity. That the transfer of the administration, and that alone, could accomplish these objects, I will not endeavour to make out in argument. By relying for the proof of its necessity on the highest authorities to which, on Indian subjects, we are accustomed to refer, I am sure I shall serve my cause more effectually, more completely, and satisfy the minds of all who hear me. Is or does it rest alone on the authority of every governor who has presided there, but of every individual whose judgment has been of real value, who felt or understood either the British interests, or the interests of the country itself; and who has been free from the participation and taint of the abuses and corruptions known to exist; abuses, which had long and successfully combated every measure, and baffled every attempt to restrain or correct them. I will select only the testimonies of sir Eyre Coole, of lord Macartney, and principally of lord Cornwallis, as stated in the papers on the table. Sir Eyre Coote's marks in the strongest terms the effects of the nabob's government on our affairs. The whole of the argument of lord Macartney on the subject of surrendering the assignment, proceeds upon the necessity of our possessing the whole administration of the country, if we would have any chance of security for our interests on the coast. The opinion of lord Cornwall is I shall read at length, as I am aware it is one of deserved weight in this house, and wherever the name and character of that great and excellent man is known. I have long seen, says his lordship, with very great concern, the various defects of the system of the government of the Carnatic; and being extremely anxious that some plan should be introduced and established there that should be better adapted than any that has yet been tried, for securing the country against external enemies, and for promoting its general prosperity,
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I have been hitherto prevented from making propositions to the nabob to that effect, more by my distance from the scene, or my other occupations, than by the consideration of the obstacles that might occur in the negociation with his highness, or of the disapprobation that interested and disappointed men might afterwards express of my conduct. The disadvantage and danger arising from the separation of the internal government, and management of the revenue of the country, from the responsibility for its defence, is so obvious, that if there had appeared to be the least chance of obtaining the nabob's voluntary acquiescence, I should, without hesitation, have been ready to propose to him, as the plan best calculated for promoting his own interest and comfort, and the happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic, that be should entrust the company with the entire management of the country, in addition to the responsibility for its defence, under an engagement on then part, after allotting certain sums for public purposes, and for the gradual liquidation of his private debts, to pay him, regularly, a liberal portion of its revenues, for the maintenance of his family, and the support of his dignity.—On another occasion his lordship expresses himself as follows:—I must freely own that I could not venture to propose any plan, on the success of which I could have any firm reliance, unless the nabob could be induced, by a large annual revenue, regularly paid, and properly secured to him, to surrender the management of his country, for a long term of years to the Company.—The nabob's age, his long connection with us, his rights to the possession of the country, which, however, without our assistance, would have been of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of his former services may furnish topics for popular declamation, and may possibly engage the nation, upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression. But, whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind, and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations, and should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high and responsible office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare, that the present mixed government cannot prosper, even

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in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed, and that, unless some such plan as that which I have proposed, should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and tire country an. useless and expensive burthen to the company and the nation—The state of the country was, indeed, deplorable, and it is with grief and shame I add, that our fellow subjects appear to have had but too great a share in contributing to produce that state of things, and not less in rendering abortive every attempt to improve or correct it. With reference to this point, and also with a view to the condition of the country, the necessity, (if not of the precise change that took place) of a modification of our relations with the nabob, and a new and more effectual arrangement, in order to realize the objects of our connection with him, I adduce, as my last authority, one which will be certainly deemed disinterested, and to which I am persuaded some gentlemen will pay a degree of respect, they may be disposed to refuse to any other testimony that can be offered, I mean that of Omdut ul Om-rah himself, the purport of whose conversation with lord Hobart, is given in his lordship's minute of the 24th of Nov. 1795, on the subject of the modification of the treaty of 1792, then proposed to him, of which I will take the liberty of reading the following extract:—It has been with the deepest regret that I have found the nabob unmoved by my entreaties and remonstrances upon this subject; not that he has been insensible to the justice and expediency of what I have proposed; but, as he has candidly confessed at several interviews with me, that he has not the resolution to comply; informing me that his native ministers, and European advisers, so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him, that he could not venture upon the measure, notwithstanding his conviction that he ought to do so—Long experience, not less than the preceding authorities I have quoted, sufficiently pointed out the only change that could, in the nature of things, prove successful. If it was our duty, then, to regard the preservation of our rights, and to fix the happiness of a people whose fate was placed in our hands, could it be otherwise than our duty to enforce the transfer of the civil and military administration as the only security for those rights, and the only remedy for the evils endured by the country.—
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The value and the benefits of a measure of this nature, had been long and universally felt, both at home and in India. That they were so felt is not to be denied, nor do I desire to deny it. The feeling breathes through every part of the documents on the table. I am aware it may be argued (as, indeed, it has been argued) that this feeling alone dictated the measure we are discussing. But, sir, there are happily facts to be referred to, that amply refute such an accusation. Had the sense of advantage, independant of the principles of right and justice, been the governing spring of our conduct, why the long-permitted continuance of the miseries of the Carnatic under our eyes? Why did the various attempts made by us to correct the inadequacy of our relations with the nabob, as successfully as they were perseveringly resisted, prove uniformly abortive? Why the restoration of the country to that iron rule, which had so abused and oppressed it, in the several instances when under lord Macartney and lord Cornwallis, it came into our possession, and when policy spoke at least as decisively in favour of retaining it, as it could ever do afterwards for its acquisition. These are proofs that it was not to the suggestions of interest alone to which we listened. It was not, till an occasion actually arrived, in which justice warranted the measure which policy recommended, that we availed ourselves, as I contend we were bound to do, of the means our power afforded, to effectuate an object too long unaccomplished.—I demand then, sir, of the house; I demand even of those who are most vehement in their condemnation of the transaction be fore us, whether they would have found reason to applaud a governor-general, to whom the care of our interests was delegated, who had not availed himself of the contingency that arose; who, when the disposal of the country was submitted to his discretion, had relinquished our rights, had again put to hazard our resources, had deliberately revived the alreadly experienced calamities of fluctuating and conflicting authorities, had restored that blasting and inhuman tyranny, which before subsisted, and again delivered over the inhabitants of the Carnatic to that system of slavery, extortion, barbarity, and oppression, which, to use the emphatic words of lord Hobart, in diminishing our resources, carried with it the destruction of the human race, and the desolation of the country..—It is urged, however, that measures

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which, even in point of policy, might be necessary towards a prince, whose misconduct we had experienced, were not equally so towards an innocent, unoffending, untried, young man: in a matter of personal consideration merely, the justice of this observation could not be disputed. But in determining our judgment of the propriety of the conduct pursued, we must look not to the personal qualities of Ally Hussein, but to his political situation, and to the circumstances in which he would have been left, had a different line been adopted by the British government. If the calamities of the Carnatic had their source in a divided and fluctuating authority, that divided and fluctuating authority would have remained; for I do not think any man is romantic enough to entertain the idea of our abandoning the country entirely to the nabob, or indeed that it was safely practicable. From the influence of that confederacy of European and native harpies that beset the Durbar, and combined to obstruct every effort towards correction or reform, what probability was there that he, young and inexperienced as he was, would have been able to break the shackles which his father had confessed himself unable to struggle with, and was forced to submit to? With respect to his councils, his parent had not indeed made it a testamentary obligation upon him to pray for the enemies of Great Britain, but he had done more; he had committed him to the care and guidance of those with whose assistance all the oppressions of the Carnatic had been exercised; who having been in his own confidence, and that of his predecessor, must have contributed to, and partaken in, all the projects of faithlessness and disaffection of which they were guilty. Where then was the ground of a rational hope, that any one evil would have been corrected? any one danger averted? any attachment found that would have warranted the relinquishment of the smallest part of that security which alone could be effectual and permanent?—But it may be asked, even allowing this, why degrade the unhappy prince? why not accept the submission that was at last offered, and conclude with Ally Hussein the engagement you ultimately concluded with Azim ul Doulah? I say, sir, we did not degrade him; his disherison (as it is called in the resolutions) was his own deliberate act; it was the consequence of his refusal to admit the incontestable rights we were called
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upon to realize—those rights were again and again explained to him; the consequence of his resistance was again and again announced; he again and again rejected the condition offered to him, and trusted to his fate. Enough was given to humanity; enough to our own character and his inexperience, and the treaty was closed. It was not then to us, but to his voluntary adherence to the fallacious hopes and delusive confidence with which he had been insidiously inspired—to the pernicious impulse of that cabal which had betrayed his progenitors, and been the bane of his house, that he owed the change in his fortunes, and the disappointment of all his natural prospects. Under this fatal influence, he firmly pronounced his own sentence, and drove us reluctantly to the decisive measure of raising another prince to the musnud. It was possible, undoubtedly, that notwithstanding these circumstances, we might have still given to him possession of the throne: but would it have been wise, would it have been consistent with our tranquillity or safety? He had refused our offers, rejected our favour, impeached our justice, and his whole efforts and resources would have been employed to subvert the order of things we had established. His means, perhaps, to affect us were not extensive or powerful, but his object and mind would have been certainly hostile, and we should have created, in the very heart of our empire, a counteracting influence—a centre of disaffection, around which all the dissatisfaction, intrigue, discontent, and turbulence of the country might gather and accumulate—where every hostile movement would find a promoter; every enemy, foreign or domestic, Indian or European, a friend, an ally, and an instrument. This surely was sufficient to have dictated to us the prudence of consigning the sceptre, nominal and barren as it appeared, to safer and less doubtful hands.—It is with sincere regret I venture to recal to the recollection of the house an event so afflicting as the late mutiny at Vellore; but, sir, nothing can more forcibly illustrate my argument. If a son of Tippoo Sultaun, a prisoner in that fortress, without power, without wealth, without means of seduction, could be supposed to produce such effects as by many are attributed to his intrigues and exertions, what might not have been those produced by the prince of the country with similar dispositions, and means infinitely more extended. I

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will only add, though they would not, perhaps, have shaken the foundation of our empire, they might yet have given birth to such scenes of convulsion, horror, and bloodshed, as would have been long to be remembered and deplored.—It now remains for me to say a very few words (very few, I assure the house, they shall be,) on what I own is, in my estimation, a comparatively subordinate part of our consideration, I mean the circumstances that attended the execution of the measures in question. Indeed, sir, for the detail of them I am inclined to rest simply on the contents of the documents on tire table; and I do so with the more readiness, because I feel I have already trespassed much too long on the patience of the house, and am certain whatever I shall omit, will be amply and more ably supplied by others, who are likely to take a share in this discussion.—The circumstances are stated in the report of the commissioners, and very differently in a letter, professing to be written by Ally Hussein, and addressed to his agents in England. On that letter, some reliance may probably be placed, by those who shall follow the honourable baronet in the debate; upon that letter, therefore, I wish to make a single observation, without entering into any particular refutation of the statement it contains.—It was originally produced by a motion of my awn. Having heard that parts of it had appeared in the newspapers, and that it might be produced entire if moved for, I was desirous of having it before the house, as well as every other document that could be supposed to bear upon, or elucidate the measure under our consideration. In moving for its production, however, I certainly did not intend to convey any opinion of its authenticity—of that I know nothing. The style and sentiments of the letter, certainly betray the character rather of European (than of Indian origin, and do not at all wear the semblance of the unassisted performance of a person of the age of Ally Hussein. There is that contained in it besides, which is so averse from all the principles of Eastern governments, that the idea of it could scarcely have entered into the imagination of an Asiatic prince: what I allude to is the recommendation of an appeal to the British people. Yet, sir, it may nevertheless be authentic, and, if it is, I only entreat the house to allow it the weight it deserves, and no more. Even if authentic, it is but, the statement of an individual
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in his own case, suggesting to his friends applications in his behalf, to every quarter where application might be supposed advantageous—supplying them with grounds of appeal to every feeling, every sentiment, every interest, which could be conceived capable of creating dispositions favourable to his cause; they are directed to address themselves to the king, to the prince of Wales, to the board of controul, to the court of directors, to the house of commons, and, lastly, to the creditors of his predecessors, the nabobs of Arcot, on whom he appears justly and confidently to have relied, as his best allies in overturning the present arrangement in the Carnatic, and effecting his full restoration to the musnud.—That in such a representation facts should be disfigured, and every topic should be insisted upon that could move compassion for unmerited suffering, excite indignation against injustice and cruelty, or fix upon the measures of the British government the odious imputations of oppression and tyranny, is not to be wondered at; but, it does not follow that because such statements are affecting, they are, therefore, entitled to our implicit confidence; it must be remembered, that severe truth is not the distinguishing characteristic of Indian representations, and for the veracity of any one word contained in this letter, no responsibility whatever exists. On the contrary, the report of the commissioners which is opposed to it, appears as an official document, authenticated by men of the highest estimation for truth, humanity, and integrity, deputed by the British government, acting under the eye of the British government, and responsible to it for the correctness of every circumstance and fact related in it. Although there are several points of difference on which I should be glad to remark, I shall leave that task to others, and content myself with dismissing these discordant accounts, with the single observation I have made, in the full conviction, that where contradictions appear (which cannot escape any one in the comparison of the statements,) the house will feel on which side the truth is likely to rest, and to which its confidence ought to incline.—It is scarce within possibility, that to a transaction of this nature, circumstances of apparent hardship should not be incident; circumstances to touch our best feelings, to call forth our compassion and sympathy, and to afford the materials for much eloquent and impressive declamation. But

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before gentlemen abandon themselves to emotions of this nature, I implore them to weigh well and impartially all the considerations connected with the case before them. In doing so, I am persuaded they will be satisfied that no degree of attention that humanity could dictate, has been wanting, that every hardship that could be avoided was prevented, and those which were inevitable alleviated, as far as was compatible with the secure accomplishment of the measure to be effected. Whatever, as a matter of unavoidable hardship, fell upon Ally Hussein, I unaffectedly regret; his early death I regret also; but in the compassion I may feel for his fate, I cannot forget justice, or consent to admit that his death has any direct connection with the measures that were adopted. Examine every circumstance of it, and no unprejudiced mind will discover even a colourable ground for suspicion. If even his situation preyed upon his mind and affected his health, (of which, however, there is no proof,) it may be a matter of concern, but can be none of criminal accusation against the British government. The rigorous severity of restraint and confinement, so loudly complained of, appears never, in fact, to have existed, cither with respect to Ally Hussein, or to the princes of the family generally; on the contrary, it is proved incontestibly by the papers, that full liberty was afforded them of quilling the precincts of the palace, if they preferred it to yielding the usual obedience to their constituted: head. That they were under the authority of the nabob is true; but, such were the precautions taken by lord Clive, such his constant communication with the palace, that no abuse of that authority, no outrage or violence could take place without, his knowledge, and in speaking of various representations from several discontented members of the family, he distinctly declares himself enabled to state, that the facts described in them, are, in some respects, exaggerations of trivial circumstances, in others, absolutely without foundation.—The illness of Ally Hussein commenced, as it appears, in the apartments of his aunt, the Sultan ul Nissa, one of the most active and avowed enemies of the new arrangements, with whom he had resided for some time, and who would naturally watch over his safety with more than common anxiety and vigilance. There he remained, till removed to the house of his mother, a few days preceding
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his dissolution, in a state of hopeless insensibility. The first intelligence of his illness was communicated by the nabob Azim ul Doulah. Every medical assistance was immediately offered that it was in the power of the governor to furnish, it was at first, resisted by the prince's attendants, and when with difficulty admitted, proved too late to be availing. Not an idea seems to have been entertained at the time, that the cause of his death was otherwise than natural; there is no suspicion thrown out, and even the letter, professed to be sent but could not be sent, by Ally Hussein to lord Clive, the day before his decease, confirms the innocence of the nabob. The mention of spells and incantations, if they prove nothing on one side, prove much on the other; they indicate the spirit in which the letter, from whatever quarter it came, was composed; and, by a reference to such grounds of accusation, prove the total want of all that was more substantial and credible. What benefit, in truth, could be derived from such an act, compare; with the risk attending it? The establishment of the new order of things was complete; all rivalry was at an end; the determination of the British power was manifested, and its support irrevocably pledged to Azim ul Doulah; had he then felt the idle desire to make assurance double sure, by a crime so atrocious, could he have promised himself any advantage to balance the consequences of almost inevitable detection, which must, have raised against him the horror and detestation of all mankind, and most of all, I trust, of those by whose favour he had been elevated, and whose indignation could in a moment have dismissed him from the throne, of which he was unworthy, to the obscurity from whence he was taken?—I have now, sir, traced, (I am conscious how imperfectly,) the circle I proposed in my outset. If I have had the good fortune to be at all successful in conveying to the house the impressions of my own mind, lean entertain little doubt of the result of this discussion. If I have failed in so doing, convinced as I am of the truth of those impressions, I have the consolation of knowing there are many present who equally feel, and by their superior authority and eloquence, are infinitely more capable of giving them weight than I can pretend to be, and who will, do justice to a cause to which my powers are, I am sensible, little equal.—With the views I. entertain of the trans-

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action before us, it will not be wondered at that I should not have thought it necessary to inquire particularly whence it originated, whether in the orders transmitted from home, or in the unaided and spontaneous zeal of the government in India? Approved and sanctioned as it has been by the authorities constituted to superintend the administration of our Indian affairs, I consider the measure as an act of the British government; what may be the sentiments of the court of directors, I do not pretend to know, but I must remark, that though on many other points lord Wellesley has incurred their censure, into the catalogue of his faults or errors this has not been introduced. I am, therefore, willing to infer, that in acting with zealous solicitude for their interests, he may have been felt to have deserved, though he has not received, the expression of their approbation. In that sentiment of approbation, whether participated in by them or no, I cordially concur. In my official capacity I have cheerfully declared it, and here, as a member of parliament, with equal satisfaction and sincerity in the presence of my country I repeat it, and rejoice in the opportunity once more afforded me, of bearing a public though feeble testimony, to the transcendant merits of the late governor-general. Under his auspices this great and desirable measure was accomplished. Under the same auspices the British power in India has attained a height that will be the admiration of future times, when the transient feelings of this day are past and forgotten. I rather wish, for the honour of my country, to dwell on the services he has rendered, than that return of obloquy and persecution with which they have been rewarded. It is true, sir, in assuming the government of India he found a great and powerful empire, but he found it encompassed with perils, exposed to the rivalry, and threatened by the designs of surrounding powers. Tippoo Sultaun cherishing implacable hatred against us, was maturing his projects of vengeance, and preparing as he thought our destruction. The extensive resources of the Maratta confederacy, influenced by councils hostile to our empire and interests; were formidable and unbroken. The Nizam subjugated by a numerous force, under the command of French officers, was a slave in his very capital. A more considerable, and almost independent French power, fixed in Doab, and in possession of the person of the mogul, menaced our most
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vulnerable frontier on the side of Oude, allied with France, and prepared to cooperate with her or any other invader of the British dominions. Mark the change. The sultaun overthrown; his hatred, his name, his kingdom extinguished for ever. The Nizam emancipated from French influence, amongst our closest and most attached allies. The Maratta confederacy, broken, disjointed, and humbled by our arms, is no longer an object of anxiety or alarm. The French force in every part of India dissolved and dispersed, and scarce an individual of the nation remaining on that vast portion of the earth, but by our sufferance and permission. The unquestioned predominance of Britain established, without a rival throughout the Indian world, and the blessings of British justice and government extended to millions of thankful and protected subjects.—In the course of these events much has been added to the British dominions, much to the glory and splendour of the British name, to which no one has more contributed than my right hon. friend near me. (Sir A. Wellesley.) But, sir, the wisdom which guided, and the genius which inspired all the measures from which those effects have flowed, have not so much added to the extent of our possessions and the glory of our name, as to the permanent strength, solidity, and security, of our empire. Contemplating our situation as the late governor-general found it on his arrival, and comparing it with what he left it at his departure, we may well say, lateritiam invenit marmoream reliquit.—I shall trouble you no further, than merely to acknowledge with gratitude, the indulgence I have received, and entreat the house to believe if I appear to have abused it, that I have been induced so long to trespass on its patience, in obedience only to the strongest sense of public duty, and a conscientious conviction, that in vindicating the acts of lord Wellesley's administration, I am defending the most important and valuable interests of my country.
Lord Archibald Hamiltoncontended, that the nabob's father and grand-father had lived and died in amity with the British government, and that by the treaty of 1792, the nabob was not precluded from any but a political association, or correspondence with the native powers. No one act of hostility had been committed by the nabob, nor had he been proved in any instance to have violated his engagements with the company. He could not agree in

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the view of this subject taken by the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, because it appeared by the Papers, that the general government in India had the intention to annex the nabob's territories to those of the East India company, long before any charge of perfidy was imputed to him. What must have been the fidelity of the nabob, if the governor general could not from the year 1798 to 1801, find any pretext for the usurpation of his territories, for an usurpation he considered it? After the clear and able statements of the hon. baronet, it was unnecessary for him to say any thing more on the subject. He was aware how little the house was inclined to entertain a question of this kind. If any thing was calculated to rouse the spirit of that house, the statements lately made in it, relative to the nabob of Oude, must have done so. At that time the house must have seen the honour and interests of the country sacrificed; and after the same had been passed over without the slightest notice by the house, it was impossible for the people to look up to its justice with the respect and reverence it had been accustomed to do. He thought nothing but the most cogent and satisfactory reasons could justify the proceedings towards the nabob; and that, as yet, nothing but reasons the most frivolous and inconclusive had been produced. He should certainly support the Resolutions.
Colonel Allanfelt that, having on a former night ventured to state his opinion upon a question of a nature similar to that which was now brought before, the house, (the Oude Charge,) he should not discharge his duty with satisfaction to his own mind, were he to be silent upon a motion that related to transactions, which took place in the Carnatic, where he resided for an uninterrupted period of 20 years; having, in the course of that time, also, held a confidential situation under his noble friend lord Buckinghamshire, during the whole of his administration in India, he had opportunities of knowing many of the facts, which were stated in the papers before the house. As the nabob of Arcot had never wanted advocates (as they had witnessed even that night,) to assert that he was an independent sovereign, and as many hon. members might not have had leisure or inclination to peruse the papers laid before parliament upon this subject, he wished shortly to draw the attention of the house to the origin of our connection with Mahomed Ally, and to the founda-
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tion of his pretensions as nabob of Arcot, in order that a correct idea might be formed of the title and privileges which he actually possessed.—He thought he could shew, that it was during the contest between the English and the French, who had gained great influence in the Decan, and aimed at the exclusive possession of the Carnatic, that Mahomed Ally first introduced himself to our notice, not as the acknowledged nabob of Arcot, but as the competitor of Chunda Saib, whose pretensions were supported by the French.—He thought he could shew, that in that war, which terminated in leaving the English masters of the Carnatic, so little did Mahomed Ally or we think of conquering merely for him, that the British colours were regularly hoisted on the forts which surrendered to our arms: that we obtained from the mogul the sanction of his authority, under a commission to Mahomed Ally, as nabob of Arcot: that that office was one of deputation and dependence of a military nature, and quite distinct from the administration of the revenues, which belonged to the office of Dewan; and that, through British influence, those two offices were united in his person, under the express condition, that the management of the revenues should revert to the Company, in the event of his being guilty of any secret practices, or of any failure in his pecuniary engagements.—But he thought he should best consult the wishes of the house, and certainly his own inclinations, by abstaining from these details; he should therefore content himself by observing, that the nature of our connection with the nabob of Arcot would be found accurately described by lord Macartney, in a letter from the government of Madras to that of Bengal; in which letter, speaking of this independent sovereign, his lordship observed, that he was no more reckoned than the nabob of Oude, among the native powers of Hindostan; that they were both Europeans, in connection and dependence"—He was aware that it was irregular to repeat the words made use of by any hon. member in a former debate, but he hoped he should not be considered out of order by slightly alluding to them. An hon. member, who took a different view of the Oude question from that which he did, having adverted to the situations of the vizier of Oude, and the nabob of Arcot, brought the latter below the level upon which lord Macartney had placed them; observing, that the vizier was more

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of an independent sovereign than the nabob of Arcot. He certainly was so; he resided in his own capital, at a great distance from the seat of the British government; he had numerous armies, and his Forts were garrisoned by his own troops; but he wished to state to the house, and to bring to the recollection of some hon. members of it, the opinion of that great man, Mr. Burke, regarding the independency even of the vizier. In the 4th Article of charge against Mr. Hastings, presented by Mr. Burke to this house, in April 1786, he says, that the reigning nabob of Oude, by taking; into and continuing in his pay certain bodies of regular British troops, and by having afterwards admitted the British resident at his court, into the management of all his affairs, foreign and domestic, and particularly into the administration of his finances, did gradually become, in substance and effect, as well as in general repute and estimation, a dependent on, or a vassal of, the East India Company. And he would beg to refer hon. gentlemen to Mr. Burke's speech on the nabob of Arcot's debts, for his opinion regarding the independent sovereignty of Mahomed Ally. The nabob of Arcot, says Mr. Burke, has, in truth and substance, no more than a merely civil authority, held in the most entire dependence on the Company.—The nabob, without military, without federal capacity, is extinguished as a potentate. On this topic, he could also quote the sentiments of a person whose testimony would always be entitled to consideration. He meant lord Macartney, who, in a letter to the secret committee, July 1785, observes, that to conciliate the nabob's mind to his real situation, which he seemed willing to forget, to revive in his memory, without wounding his delicacy or his pride, the steps by which he had risen to elevation, to lead him to feel his obligations to the Company, that whatever rank or territory he had ever possessed, cither by his paper titles, or by actual occupancy, he derived from their arms, their influence, their generosity, and that his interests and security were so involved in theirs, that to pretend to a distinct, separate, independent, sovereignty, as he talked of, or to imagine that he could exist without the Company; or to expect, that the Company would go on defending the country at their own expence, without an adequate share of the
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revenues of it, were absurdities that, though in some measure warranted by former friendship or connivance, he ought no longer to indulge in, as they would prove a fatal deceit upon himself, and must soon end in his total destruction, and in that of his best friends on the coast.—To engage the nabob's mind to a calm consideration of these points was not an easy task, but it was a necessary one, and was performed with success; the result was his assignment of the revenues.—The view taken by the government at home of the relative situation of the nabob and the East India Company, corresponded with that taken by lord Macartney; they say, in the month of June 1785, We are ready to admit that Mahomed Ally is the lawful nabob of the Carnatic; at the same time we must observe, that he acquired that title by our means, and is now supported in it by our authority, nor have we the smallest intention of withdrawing that support; but it must be remembered that the sword, that most prominent and essential mark of sovereignty, is exclusively in the hands of the Company; the nabob can form no alliance, either offensive or defensive, with foreign powers.—Even in the last treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, who had invaded the Carnatic, he is merely recognized as the friend and ally of the Company, and under their protection.—The hon. member contended, therefore, that, after what he had taken the liberty of stating to the house, he thought it could not be asserted, that the nabob of Arcot was an independent sovereign; in fact, he was in a complete state of subordination, and totally dependent on the British power.—Under the view of this relation to the Company, the hon. member said he would examine what had been the nature of the conduct of the nabobs of Arcot, in fulfilling the obligations of their alliance with the British power. Mahomed Ally having failed in his first engagements, by which be was bound to liquidate the debt; incurred by the war, which had established him as nabob of Arcot, he was called upon, in 1763, to assign to the Company certain districts contiguous to Madrass, (now called the Jaghire); at first he refused, and wished to annex some conditions on the part of the Company; but. lord Pigot, then governor, informed him, that it did not become a man, who owed to the Company the situation he enjoyed, to make any conditions under such cir-

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cumstances; that they did not take any tiring from him, for that they, in fact, were the givers and he the receiver.—After this transaction no material change appears to have taken place, until lord Macartney's administration, which commenced in 1781. That noble lord found our affairs in the peninsula of India in the most critical situation. Hyder Ally had invaded the Carnatic the preceding year, and it required the exertion of the greatest talents to extricate us from our difficulties.—Lord Macartney soon discovered, that the sole cause of all our embarrassments proceeded from our having most unwisely committed to the nabob the unr controuled management of the revenues.—In a letter to the secret committee, dated in Jan. 1784, to which the hon. member was anxious to draw the attention of the house; his lordship observed, that the first thing that struck him, as defective in your system, was the nature of the Company's connection with the nabob, by which the resources of a province, garrisoned and defended by your forces in peace and war, was altogether in the controul of his highness, under a simple and insecure engagement of reimbursing, by instalments, the current charges of a certain proportion of those forces. This stipulation, even in peace, was, from the constant failure and backwardness in the nabob, a source of perpetual alarm to government, which often found itself absolutely unable to provide for the payment of the troops when it became due: but if such are the inconveniencies of this system in time of peace, how totally unprovided, weak and defenceless must be your situation under it in time of war. Lord Macartney, therefore, prevailed upon the nabob to confirm the assignment to the Company of the revenues of the Carnatic during the war, and until his debt was liquidated.—Unfortunately, however, the assignment was surrendered back to the nabob; but two years had scarcely elapsed, before the embarrassments of government were greater than ever.—The court of directors, alarmed at the accounts from Madras, sent orders to sir Archibald Campbell, then governor, to make a treaty with the nabob, and to stipulate for a subsidy of 10 lacks and 50 thousand pagodas. A treaty was in consequence concluded in 1787, by which the nabob voluntarily agreed to pay nine lacks; but, in less than eighteen months, he failed in his engagements, and his arrears, at the commence-
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ment of the war, in 1790, were so enormous as to oblige lord Cornwall is to assume, once more, the management of the country: certainly on the principles of justice, though not provided for by treaty. The assumption of the Carnatic in time of war, afterwards became an article in the treaty of 1792, upon which occasion, the nabob having represented to lord Cornwallis the inadequacy of his resources to discharge his pecuniary engagements, an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787 was framed. Had the treaty of 1792 been adhered to with that good faith, which we had a right to expect from the nabob, the country would have found in it a source of increasing prosperity; for, by its wise provisions, a considerable portion of the Carnatic was exonerated from those private assignments, which had ever been productive of oppression and distress to the inhabitants; but the expectations, justly entertained from the operation of that treaty, were disappointed, and the evils of the administration of the Carnatic, if possible, increased, after the death of Mahomed Ally in 1795. It now became necessary, continued the hon. member, to examine whether the nabob adhered to the treaty of 1792, and he thought he should have no difficulty in shewing that he had violated, not only the spirit, but the letter, of that treaty.—In the year 1794, his noble friend, lord Buckinghamshire, assumed the government of Madras. It was notorious, at that time, that the nabob had granted assignments on the districts mortgaged to the Company.—In the minutes in council of his noble friend, the mischiefs resulting from that practice, were fully explained, and the system was traced through all its intricacies.—In a letter to the Court of Directors, dated in Sept. 1796, lord Buckinghamshire observed, that the fullest consideration of this important subject, with the contemplation of that ruin in which the nabob's breach of engagement is involving the Carnatic; the daily accounts which he received of the oppression and miseries of the unfortunate inhabitants, and the conviction which he had of the progressive annihilation of the resources of the Company, had so strongly impressed his mind with the necessity of a change of system, that he had no hesitation in saying, if there be no doubt (and it is not possible for any man in India to doubt it,) of the treaty of 1792 having being violated by the nabob, there can be no

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question of our right to avail ourselves of every means in our power to enforce such a modification of the treaty, as will guard against the fatal consequences of future violation, and he was not afraid to hazard his character upon the policy, the justice, and the humanity of the measure Mahomed Ally, the hon. member said, was apprized by his noble friend, that by the infraction of one of the main articles, the whole treaty had been cancelled, and lord Buckinghamshire endeavoured, but without success, to prevail upon the nabob to agree to a modification of the treaty, by placing under the Company's management a permanent territorial security equal to the amount of the subsidy; and, as an inducement, offered to give up a claim which the Company had on the nabob for about SO lacks of pagodas.—After the death of Mahomed Ally, lord Buckinghamshire made a similar proposal to the nabob Umdit ul Omrah, to which he likewise refused to accede. Umdit ul Omrah was also informed by lord Buckinghamshire, that he considered the granting assignments on the mortgaged districts, a violation of the treaty. And the government at home, in July 1796, warned the nabob of the consequences of such conduct; but there is stronger evidence than this, of the nabob's violation of the treaty, for the nabob himself, in a paper delivered to lord Wellesley, in May 1798, says, Having complained that, under the present arrangement of my monthly kists, he was compelled, at a particular period of every year, to raise money for the payment of the Company's military subsidy, which money was repaid from his countries in the following manner; viz. supposing a kist of a lack of pagodas was to be paid, we received 60 thousand from the country, and borrowed the remaining 40 thousand from some person, and give him an order on that country for that amount, which he receives. It was well known that these assignments extended to the districts specified in the treaty, for it was recorded by lord Buckinghamshire, in a minute in council, that the southern districts of the nabob's country, and Tinnivelly in particular, as being the most distant from the presidency, have been the theatre in which these scenes have been chiefly exhibited; but it is notorious that similar practices have been introduced, and are now actually carried on in Nellore, Arcot, and Trichinopoly.—The house
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would recollect, that every one of those districts was specified in the treaty.—But it had been attempted to be argued by the nabob, that his granting assignments on the mortgaged districts, was not a violation of treaty; and that the only penalty for so doing, was in the event of those districts being assumed by the company, that the assignments should be of no value and of no effect. The 5th section of the 8tli article of the treaty of 1792 was as follows, and with the leave of the house, colonel Allan said, that he would read it. in consequence of the measure whereby the districts mentioned in the Schedule, No. 2. become responsible for any arrears that may accrue in the payment of the above stipulated kists, the said nabob agrees that he will not grant tunkaws or assignments on any account on the revenues thereof; and if, contrary to this condition, any tunkaws or assignments should exist when the said districts, or any of them, shall be assumed by the said Company, such tunkaws or assignments shall be declared, by the said Company, and the said nabob, to be of no value, nor shall they remain in effect.—He would not, however, attempt to argue what should be the just construction of this clause, as he had no doubt, that, if it should be necessary, it would be ably and successfully argued by persons whose opinions would have more weight in the house than his could have; but he must say, that he thought his noble friend, lord Buckinghamshire, had put that construction upon it, which was intended by lord Cornwallis, who framed the treaty, and that it was at the time of its conclusion so understood by the nabob.—That he might not misstate his noble friend, he should make use of his own words contained in a public letter to the Court of Directors. The 5th section of the 8th article of the treaty of 1792, says lord Buckinghamshire, is made to affect two parties, the nabob, and the money lender; if the former grants assignments on the mortgaged districts, he is liable to such penalties as generally attach upon a breach of engagement; if the latter advances his money upon securities upon the districts in question, he hazards the loss of it, on their falling into our hands; how a clause distinctly affecting two separate objects, can justly be construed to exonerate the one from all penalty, because its final operation upon the other is specifically provided for, is beyond my capacity to

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discover.—Upon this authority then, he had no hesitation in asserting, that the nabob, by granting assignments on the districts mortgaged to the Company for the security of the subsidy, violated the treaty of 1792. That the government at home were decidedly of that opinion, is evident from a letter to Madras in June 1799, in which they observed, that his highness has distinctly acknowledged, that he is in the practice of raising money annually by assignments of the revenues of those districts which form the security for the payment of the Company's subsidy; as this practice is unquestionably contrary to the letter, and subversive of the spirit of that treaty, we direct, that immediately upon the receipt hereof, you adopt the necessary measures for taking possession, in the name of the Company, of the whole, or any part of the said districts, which shall appear to be so assigned.—Col. Allan then said, that if he had succeeded in shewing that the treaty of 1792 had been violated, the justice of the late arrangement in the Carnatic must be admitted. But the nabob had not only violated the treaty, by granting assignments on the mortgaged districts, but also by entering into a correspondence with Tippoo Sultan, without the knowledge and consent of the British government. It had been asserted, that an eager examination of the papers of Tippoo Sultan, was amongst the first acts of the general stall after the fall of Seringapatam. It chanced, the hon. col. said, to be his lot to be the first British officer that entered the palace of Tippoo Sultan; he was on the general staff, and in the confidence of the commander in chief, and had opportunities of knowing what was done. Tippoo having been killed in the assault, his sons and generals, who commanded divisions of his army, as soon as they were apprised of his death, surrendered themselves to general Harris. Measures were immediately taken to secure the quiet possession of Tippoo's dominions.—The records of the Mysore government were carefully preserved; they were examined, and the correspondence of the nabobs of the Carnatic having been discovered, it was, of course, transmitted to the governor general. Of the nature and object of that correspondence, he admitted, that different opinions might be formed; but we knew that, by the treaty of 1792, the nabob was bound not to enter into any political correspondence with any native power with-
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out the consent of the British government; and we also knew that the nabob, in compliance with that stipulation, was in the practice of sending to the government of Madras, for their approbation, not only the drafts of the letters, which he proposed writing to Tippoo, but also the letters which he received from the sultan. Keeping this in their recollection, gentlemen would observe, that among the papers before the house, are numerous letters from the nabob to Tippoo on the most trivial occasions, merely complimentary, all submitted to the inspection of the government before they were dispatched, clearly shewing that the nabob did not consider himself at liberty to hold any correspondence whatsoever without the knowledge and consent of the British government.—What were we then to infer? when on the occasion, perhaps on the very day on which the nabob had sent one of these complimentary letters to the government for their approbation, we found that he had also written a letter of a secret, and at least a mysterious nature, which he dispatched to Tippoo without their knowledge.—Some of the communications made by the nabob through Tippoo's ambassadors were for the purpose of apprising the sultan, that he was suspected by the British government of carrying on an improper negociation with the Mahrattas, of advising him to suspend his plans until a more favourable opportunity occurred, and of recommending him to be more guarded in his intercourse with the French; and we must not forget, that Tippoo had, on his part, sent ambassadors to France and to the Mauritius, in order to prevail upon the French to afford him military assistance. What then, asked the hon. member, are we to infer from the secret meetings of the nabob with the ambassadors of Tippoo?—From the communications made only under a solemn oath of secrecy? From a cypher evidently intended, if not for hostile, certainly for political, purposes? And all this at a time, when, it would be recollected, that Tippoo was endeavouring, by every means, to unite all the Mahomedan princes in Hindostan for the avowed purpose of expelling the English from India. But was this the extent of the nabob's treachery? By no means; for we are informed, that in a conversation held by Mahomed Ally with one of the ambassadors, the nabob reprobated the war carried on by lord Cornwallis, as a war undertaken for the subversion of the Maho-

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medan religion; by that war, Tippoo was reduced in power, wounded in pride, and he determined on revenge; he, therefore, determined to support the faith, and to exterminate the Infidels, meaning the English. With such feelings on his mind, what was the language of the nabobs of Arcot, the allies of the Company. It will be found in one of the letters from Umdit ul Omrah, which contained this remarkable passage, which he desired might be repeated to the sultan: 'In the preservation of thy person, is the perpetual permanence of the faith.—Let him not remain who wisheth not thy preservation.'—The hon. member thought no man would be bold enough to assert, that the nabob would have ventured to have submitted that letter to the inspection of the Madras government; and yet there were persons disposed to offer an excuse for every act of perfidy in the nabob, and to brand with odium the British name in India. In his opinion, however, it was enough, that the correspondence found at Seringapatam was secret, and that it had been carried on by the nabob without the knowledge and consent of the British government; for his part, he thought that no impartial man, who had perused the letters which were submitted by the nabob to the inspection of the Madras government, and had compared them with the letters which were found at Seringapatam, could lay his hand on his heart, and pronounce that correspondence to have been innocent;—the fair presumption was, that it was of a nature hostile to the British interests, it certainly was a violation of the treaty of 1792.—With this impression on his mind on the subject of the nabob's conduct under the treaty of 1792, he should trouble the house with a few words with regard to the policy adopted by the British government on the discovery of the violation of that treaty. In the first place, he would remark, as a general principle, that the policy of some arrangement similar to that which has recently been adopted in the Carnatic, could not be doubted by any person who had looked into the papers.—As far back as 1774 the inconveniences and dangers resulting from the system of the nabob's administration, had been often experienced by the government of Madras, and as often represented to the court of directors. When Hyder Ally invaded the Carnatic in 1780, there was an instant stop to all payments from the nabob.—In that dreadful exigency, so eloquently de-
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scribed by Mr. Burke in the speech to which the hon. member had before alluded, the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic was obtained, without which all our revenues and credit must have been inevitably sunk to no purpose. Of the importance of that assignment, and of the danger of restoring the Carnatic to the nabob, lord Macartney was so deeply impressed that, in one of his letters to the court of directors, he says, From the moment you surrender the assignment, you cease to be a nation on the coast; and in another, Without the assignment, I see not a ray of hope for the preservation of the Company or the security of the nabob.—Lord Macartney justly considered the assignment to be, not only the rock of our strength in the Carnatic, but that the nabob's real interest and happiness, as well as the general security would have been best consulted by retaining it; and that the Company, upon the same principle that they exercised the right to wield the sword for the common good in time of war, ought to have administered the revenues for the common good in time of peace. Lord Cornwallis perfectly coincided in opinion with lord Macartney as to the necessity of a radical reform, and he examined the whole system of our connection with the nabob, with a view to that object. The opinion of lord Cornwallis must have so much weight with the house and with the country at large, that the hon. member was anxious to draw their attention to an extract of a letter from his lordship to the court of directors in Aug. 1790, I must freely own says lord Cornwallis, that I could not venture to propose any plan, on the success of which I could have any firm reliance, unless the nabob could be induced by a large annual revenue, regularly paid avid properly secured to him, to surrender the management of his country for a long term of years, to the company. The nabob's age, his long connection with us, his right to the possession of the country which, however, without our assistance, would have been but of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of former services, may furnish topics for popular declamation, and may possibly engage the nation, upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression; but whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind, and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations,

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and I should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare that the present mixed government cannot prosper in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed, and that unless some such plan as that which I have proposed should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and his country an useless and expensive burthen to the company and the nation. This was not the only proof that this subject had engaged the most serious attention of lord Cornwallis, for in a letter written two years afterwards, his lordship observed that, If there had been the least chance of obtaining the nabob's acquiescence he should without hesitation have been ready to have proposed to him as the plan best calculated for promoting his own interest and comfort, and the happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic, that he should entrust the company with the entire management of the country, under an engagement to pay him regularly a liberal portion of its revenues for the maintenance of his family and the support of his dignity. The hon. member said, that he need not remind the house, that this plan exactly corresponds with that which was proposed by lord Powis to Ally Hussein. Of the practical wisdom of that plan, no man could doubt, when we find, notwithstanding all that had been done by lord Macartney, by sir Arch. Campbell, and by lord Cornwallis, that the evils of the nabob's administration still continued to exist as late as 1795, and to require correction. Lord Buckinghamshire, in his minute dated in Oct. 1795, observed, That no comment could be required to shew that that species of government, if it deserved the name of government, contained the most grievous oppressions of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country, and the inevitable decay of revenue.—Impressed as his lordship was with a serious conviction of that truth, he looked with extreme anxiety to the nature of the security provided by the treaty of 1792, and his lordship stated his opinion, that there was no other remedy than placing the districts pledged for the security of the subsidy in the hands of the company. The conduct of his noble friend was highly approved by the court of directors, who sincerely lamented, that the nabob could not
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be prevailed upon to adopt the modification of the treaty proposed by lord Buckinghamshire, which, they observed, was founded upon principles of sound policy, humanity and justice; they therefore directed his noble friend to renew the proposition in their name. So deeply indeed were the court of directors, and the government at home, impressed with the absolute necessity of this arrangement, that they requested lord Wellesley to make a short stay at Madras on his way to Bengal, in order to prevail upon the nabob of agree to the plan proposed by lord Buckinghamshire. But these were not the only testimonies of this branch of the question to which he could refer the house. We find, said the hon. member, in the papers before us, that as late as the year 1801, the opinions of lord Powis strengthening and confirming those of his predecessors, his lordship observed, that It was material for him to repeat, and with impressive earnestness, that no security, sufficiently extensive and efficient for the British interest in the Carnatic, can be derived from the treaty of 1792, and that no divided power, however modified, can possibly avert the ruin of that devoted country.—The hon. member declared, that after the opinions of lord Macartney, lord Cornwallis, lord Buckinghamshire, and lord Powis, publicly recorded, and to which he had endeavoured to draw the attention of the house; after the fullest enquiries on the spot, possessing also, as lord Wellesley did, every means of acquiring correct information, he could not feel surprised, that lord Wellesley should have considered the late arrangement in the Carnatic as founded in the wisest policy. Its impolicy however had been argued upon grounds, in his humble opinion, quite erroneous. It had been remarked by those who differed from him on this occasion, that formerly we had no invidious duties to discharge, that the nabob's government exacted the revenue and inflicted the punishments, that they were regarded as the oppressors, whilst we were considered as the benefactors of the country; but that now we had changed places with the nabob; and we were then gravely asked, whether it was wise to have taken upon ourselves a task which must render us odious to the natives? To this point the hon. member said he could speak from his own personal knowledge, for he was employed for 7 or 8 years making surveys of the country, and traversed every part of it,

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and he believed he might venture to say, that at the time he quitted India, no European had seen more of the Carnatic than himself; he had many opportunities of learning the real sentiments of the inhabitants, and he had no hesitation in declaring, that they invariably spoke in praise and admiration of the system pursued during the period that the country had been under the management of the company's servants; and with detestation and abhorrence of the nabob's managers, whose oppression and cruelty were so great, that he had known all the inhabitants of a village fly from the nabob's territories, during the night, to seek protection in those of the company, or perhaps to retire altogether into the dominions of the nizam or of Tippoo Sultaun.—It might be argued however, (and some had already made the attempt) that although the late arrangement in the Carnatic was founded in justice and policy, the family of Mahomed Ally had strong claims on the liberality and indulgence of the British government. It may, therefore, continued the hon. member, be worth while to examine how far such claims are well founded. From our earliest connection with Mahomed Ally, we had reason to be dissatisfied with him for his want of faith and honour, instances of which had been recorded as far hack as the administrations of Mr. Bouchier and Mr. Dupré, and the government of Madras had declared that the nabob's conduct was such as to destroy all confidence in his engagements.—Lord Macartney observed that the records were full of essential failures on the part of the nabob in his pecuniary engagements. In the war with Hyder Ally in 1780, we applied to the nabob in vain for assistance; the same when we were preparing for the war in 1790.—In the war of 1799 the government was compelled to call upon the nabob for pecuniary assistance; for when lord Wellesley assumed the government of India, he found an exhausted treasury and our credit very low. The nabob promised three lacks of pagodas, no very large sum, but it will scarcely be believed, that he advanced only 16,000 pagodas, or 6,400 l.; private individuals shewed more zeal, and to the honour of the British commercial houses at Madras, they afforded every possible assistance, and enabled the army to move from our frontier to Seringapatam. But this want of attachment to his allies was not confined to failures in his pecuniary engagements the nabob actually
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shewed an indifference to the British interests, which might justly be attributed to disaffection. In a letter from the Madras government to the court of directors, Aug. 1799, they observed, We are concerned to inform you that this is not the only instance in which we have had to lament an indifference to the success of our measures on the part of his highness, for instead of calling forth the resources of the Carnatic, for the supply of your army, his highness's managers, in every province of his dominions, not only withheld all assistance from their respective districts, but opposed every possible object to the passage of supplies, procured for the use of the army beyond the limits of his highness's dominions.—And the governor at home in a letter to Bengal, dated the 4th Dec. 1800, mentioned the particulars of the nabob's conduct regarding the fort of Chandernagherry, and observed that, a more decided instance of disaffection could scarcely be imagined.—Underall these circumstances of the nabob's repeated, he might almost say constant, failure in his engagements; of his indifference to the British interests, an indifference amounting nearly to disaffection;—of his violation of the treaty of 1792, not only by granting assignments on the districts which were mortgaged to the company as the security for his subsidy; but also by entering into a secret correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, the implacable enemy of the British name in India; the hon. member contended that we were justified in considering the treaty of 1792 as annihilated, and in adopting whatever measures we deemed necessary to secure our rights in the Carnatic. With this view it was the intention of the British government, to have made a communication to the nabob, Umdit ul Omrah, of the proofs which they had obtained, of his having carried on a secret correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of 1792.—He had previously been apprised of his violation of that treaty by granting assignments on the mortgaged districts. Circumstances of expediency however interrupted this communication; it was protracted by the nabob's illness, and his death frustrated the wish of the British government to obtain from him satisfactory security for their rights in the Carnatic.—Released from the treaty of 1792, which had been repeatedly violated by the nabob, with the recorded opinions of lord Macartney,

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lord Cornwallis, lord Buckinghamshire, and lord Powis, that no divided power, however modified, could possibly avert the utter ruin of the Carnatic, the opinion of lord Wellesley was further strengthened in these sentiments by a letter from the secret committee approved by the board of controul, transmitted to him in June, 1799. In this letter the secret committee observed, In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, the respective countries of the nabob of Arcot and the rajah of Tanjore, will of course come under the company's management, and they direct that they be not relinquished without special orders from us or the court of directors. Without entering into any detailed examination of the contents of this letter, he would be satisfied with merely begging the house to remark, that even upon a general principle of expediency, and without any knowledge of the secret correspondence found at Seringapatam, the government at home ordered lord Wellesley not to relinquish the Carnatic even upon the conclusion of a peace with Tippoo Sultaun. Therefore, he was clearly of opinion, that under all these circumstances, it was the duty of lord Wellesley to form such an arrangement for the future administration of the affairs of the Carnatic, as should result from a full consideration of the relative situation of the nabob and the East India company; the ruinous consequences of the repeated violations of the treaty of 1792; the interests of the inhabitants of the country, the security of the British government, and the orders that had been received from the court of directors.—A difficulty however arose with respect to the person who was to succeed to whatever degree of power it might be deemed safe to place in the hands of the successor of Umdit ul Omrah. His illegitimate and adopted son was considered entitled to a conditional preference, but when, under the suggestion of those, who had been the advisers of his father, he refused to accede to the terms which it had become necessary to annex to the situation of nabob of the Carnatic, the succession, subject to the stipulations required, was offered to and accepted by the next legitimate heir, the son of Ameer ul Omrah and grandson of Mahomed Ally. But it had been said, that that arrangement in the Carnatic was begun, continued and concluded with a rapidity which was observable in all the foreign transactions of the Bengal government; it was no doubt
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easy to make, but it certainly was as easy to refute such an assertion. So far from that rapidity with which the Bengal government was unjustly charged, it appears that lord Wellesley investigated the business with the most deliberate caution.—He appointed commissioners (of whom, in consequence of what had fallen from the hon. hart, who opened the debate, he should say a few words before he sat clown) to examine the persons concerned in the correspondence, and to ascertain the nature of the connection between the nabobs of the Carnatic and Tippoo Sultaun; he reported the proceedings to the secret committee and to the board of controul; and it was not until lord Wellesley was informed by those high authorities that their sentiments perfectly coincided with his own, and with lord Powis's, that he gave his final instructions on the subject, two years after the discovery of the correspondence of the nabob with Tippoo Sultaun; the charge therefore of precipitancy was quite unfounded. The treaty with Azeem ul Dowlah was concluded in July 1806; it was immediately transmitted to England, and it was now only necessary to shew that it was approved of by the government at home. The house would, he flattered himself, agree with him, that a hasty decision had not been pronounced upon that important measure. In Sept. 1802, fourteen months after the treaty had been concluded, the secret committee having had the papers a long time under consideration, wrote to lord Powis as follows, We do not feel ourselves called upon to enter into the detail of the circumstances connected with the case, or to state at length the reasoning upon those circumstances, which has led to the conclusion we have come to, after the fullest and most deliberate caution. It is enough to state to you that we are fully prepared, upon the facts, as at present before us, to approve and confirm the treaty in question; and we are of opinion, that acting under the instructions of the governor-general, you stand fully justified (upon the evidence written, as well as oral, on which you proceeded,) in deeming the rights of the family of Mahomed Ally, as existing under former treaties, to have been wholly forfeited, by the systematic perfidy and treachery of the late nabobs of 'the Carnatic, Wallajah, and Umdit ul Omrah, in breach of their solemn treaties with the company. The claims of the family having been thus forfeited,

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and a right having accrued to the company of making provision at their discretion, for the future safety of the Carnatic, we are further of opinion, that the nature of the security which has been provided by the treaty for the defence and preservation of our interests in that quarter, is of a satisfactory description. After having so long troubled the house, he would merely observe, that the view which he had taken of this subject, was formed upon an attentive perusal of the papers laid before parliament, upon which alone we could form our judgment. Indeed the substance, almost the whole of the speech, with which he had presumed to trouble the house, was founded upon those documents, and he should therefore oppose the resolutions moved by the hon. bart.—The hon. bart. however, in speaking of the commissioners, had used an epithet, which the hon. member said he was sure he would not have done, if he had been personally acquainted with them; and yet a very slight examination of the papers would have enabled the hon. bart to have known those gentlemen, by character and reputation.—Whatever opinion the hon. bart. might have formed of those gentlemen, he could assure him that there were not in the house, nor in the country, two men of a higher sense of honour, of more conscientious and honourable feeling.—Col. Close, so highly distinguished by his talents, his zeal and integrity, was resident at the court of Poonah; if he were in this country he should have wished him to have been examined at the bar of the house, and he was persuaded that the hon. bart. would have formed a different opinion of the secret correspondence to that which he entertained. With Mr. Webbe, late chief secretary to the government, the hon. member said he had been in habits of the most affectionate friendship; unfortunately for his friends and his country, this valuable public officer was dead; he sacrificed his life in the service of his country; he was a man of the nicest sense of honour, justly looked up to as one of the highest characters in India; he could truly say, that Mr. Webbers memory was universally revered. His noble and independent mind would not have allowed him—[Here the feelings of the hon. member were so acute, that he was unable to proceed, and sat down with marks of the greatest sorrow and agitation.]
Mr. Windham, on account of the lateness of the hour, and the number of hon. mem-
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bers who had yet to speak upon the subject, proposed that the debate should be adjourned to Tuesday next, which was ordered accordingly.

DANISH MERCHANT SHIPS DETAINED IN BRITISH PORTS.
The order of the day having been read,
Lord Sidmouthsaid, that he was at length enabled to submit to their lordships' consideration a subject highly important to the interests of many individuals, both foreigners and natives, as well as to the honour and reputation of the country.—But before he entered upon the details to which it would be necessary for him to call the attention of their lordships, he was desirous of being understood, as having no intention to re-agitate a question, which had been already decided; much less to aim at rescinding a judgment, which had been solemnly pronounced: for that in fact, between the merits of the subject to which he particularly referred, namely, the Attack on Copenhagen, and of that then before the house, there was no necessary connection; and all he had to ask, (and he assured their lordships that what he asked of them should be observed on his part,) was that the opinions entertained on this point, might be kept in their proper place, and not brought forward to bear upon arguments, and conclusions, to which they had no direct or regular application.—It could not, he said, be denied, that according to the principles of natural

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justice, and the established law of nations, safety and protection were due to the merchant ships and cargoes of all neutral states engaged in the peaceable pursuit of a lawful commerce. Following up this just and salutary principle, our municipal laws held out the promise of security to the ships, persons and property of merchant strangers, eundo, morando, et redeundo, in carrying on a legitimate traffic with this kingdom; and this right to security and protection could not be forfeited, except by the misconduct of the individuals themselves, or of the state to which they belonged. It could not be forfeited, except in consequence of such antecedent injuries as, if unredressed, would afford just grounds of war, or reprisals; of which last it had been said by high and undoubted authority, that 'the law of nations does not allow them but in case of violent injury, directed, or supported by the state, and of justice in re minimè dubiâ, absolutely denied' The seizure and detention of ships and property belonging to the subjects of a foreign state could therefore only be justified by a previous act of aggression; and, except in the instance to which he felt it to be his duty to call the attention of the house, it could not be shewn that an order for that purpose had ever been issued under the authority of the British government, unless it had been preceded by the existence of a real, or supposed cause of war.—It would be recollected, that in the month of July last, when a large armament was assembling on the eastern coast of this kingdom, its probable destination was a subject of general and anxious speculation; and it appeared that a rumour had reached the masters of Danish merchant ships, then in our ports, that it was directed to the Baltic, in consequence of a misunderstanding between this country and Denmark. An immediate enquiry was accordingly made of the British government through the Danish Minister, Mr. Rist: the answer, whatever it was, certainly was not one which confirmed, or created apprehension: their enquiries were then directed through the same channel to the government of their own country, from whom, on the 10th of August, an answer, of which the following is an extract, was received through the College of Commerce at Copenhagen, and communicated to them by the Danish Consul, Mr. Wolff:—In reply to your letter of 14th inst. (July), stating that it is currently reported in London, that a misunderstanding
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is likely to arise betwixt Denmark and Great Britain, we acquaint you herewith, that such report is entirely without foundation, and that nothing has been done on our parts, whereby the good understanding hitherto subsisting betwixt both courts could anyways be considered lessened or interrupted. We request therefore, that you will positively contradict such unfounded rumours, and quiet the apprehensions of our sea-faring countrymen, assuring them, that they have no reason to fear, as the College will not fail, should any unforeseen event have a detrimental influence on Denmark's hitherto maintained neutrality, to give the earliest information thereof, through the Royal Consuls, to all our sea-faring countrymen.—To Mr. Wolff; London.—This communication had the intended effect; the fears of the sea-faring subjects of Denmark then in our ports, were completely quieted; and they remained in this state of confidence and delusion till the end of August. Nothing indeed occurred to alter it; on the contrary, it was known, that after the sailing of admiral Gambier, on the 30th of July, many ships had cleared out for Danish ports, and some with admiralty licences; and so little apprehensive was the Danish consul of approaching hostilities, that, in many instances in which offers were made to release, upon the payment of certain charges, Danish ships which had been brought in, under the expectation of a rupture, he positively rejected all such offers, being resolved that the captors should abide the consequences of their own violence and injustice. In Denmark too, a similar degree of confidence and delusion prevailed. The appearance of the British fleet produced no alarm at Copenhagen, nor any degree of caution with respect to ships, then preparing to proceed to British ports. In proof of this, lord Sidmouth read the following extract of a letter from the captain of the Danish ship, Frederica:—I received a letter from my agents, Messrs. J. P. Suhn and son, dated Copenhagen, 7th of Aug. stating that ail Danish ships might proceed to England in safety, as he was assured, that the British fleet lying at anchor before Copenhagen, had no hostile intention towards Denmark; that according to information, it was his opinion, that it was bound to Cronstadt. In assurance of the above account, I left Dram the 13th of Aug. with a cargo of timber and deals, shipped and loaded for

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the accounts of Messrs. Joshua and Thomas Carroll, merchants, of Cork, in Ireland. I was detained in the north-sea the 28th of Aug. before any orders from the British government for the detention of Danish ships had been given, and likewise prior to the bombardment of Copenhagen.—On the 25th of August, however, many days before information was received of the commencement of hostilities, and at a time when it was not pretended that there was any hostile intention on the part of Denmark, orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty, in consequence of directions from one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, to detain and bring in, provisionally, all Danish merchant vessels; and these orders were not confined to the Channel, but sent to all our naval officers, commanding-in-chief, in every part of the world. On the 2d of Sept. a similar order was issued, under the authority of his majesty in council; accompanied by orders, that no ships belonging to any of his majesty's subjects should clear out for any of the ports of Denmark; and that a general embargo should be laid on all ships and vessels belonging to subjects of that country, together with all persons and effects on board. It appeared, that the account of the commencement of hostilities was not received till the 4th of Sept. and it was admitted, that previous to that time, there was no ground for imputing a hostile disposition to his Danish majesty; so that at the period of issuing these orders, Denmark was considered, although not treated, by the British government, as a neutral and friendly power. In consequence of these orders, 320 ships were seized and detained before information was received of the commencement of hostilities; and after the issue of orders for general reprisals, which took place on the 4th of Nov. the whole were condemned as prize to the crown.—Lord Sidmouth said, that on a former occasion, when he had stated a report, that the value of the ships and cargoes, &c. so seized, was little short of two millions, the noble secretary of state (lord Hawkesbury) declared, that this was an exaggerated statement. He had mentioned it at that time, in the hope that it might be contradicted from authority; but he had not mentioned it upon light or frivolous grounds. On the contrary, he then knew the number of ships which had been seized; and that 53, with their cargoes, had been sold by auction, and had
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produced, upon an average, 5,200 l. each. Supposing these ships to be of the average value of the whole that had been seized, 320 ships would produce above 1,060,000 l; and it was well known that when prizes were sold in this manner, the auction price was in general far below the real value. It was usual to estimate this difference at one third: upwards of 550,000 l. must therefore be added to the above-mentioned sum; making an aggregate of more than 2,000,000 l. as the value of seizures in our own ports, exclusive of those which took place under the Orders of the 25th of August, and the 2d of Sept. in all other parts of the world. He would close this statement by repeating the hope which he had expressed on a former occasion, that the declaration of the noble secretary of state, might prove more correct than the report which he had taken upon himself so positively to contradict.—To justify a measure of such severity, it was absolutely necessary to shew that it was occasioned by an antecedent aggression on the part of Denmark; for it would not be contended, that the seizure of merchant ships and of commercial property, was called for by the urgent and imperious duty of self-preservation; but it had been distinctly acknowledged that on the part of Denmark there was no hostile aggression, and the difference between the present case, and all others which preceded it, consisted in the absence of that which had been the immediate cause, and which had solely and exclusively constituted the justification of every similar measure. True it was that the king of Prussia at the commencement of the seven years war had entered Saxony, when there had been no public act of aggression on the part of the elector; but he found in the palace, of Dresden a copy of a treaty, the known existence of which had occasioned his irruption into the electorate, and which was of itself a sufficient cause of war. It was also well known, that lord Chatham quitted the councils of his sovereign in the year 1761, because his colleagues refused to concur with him in advising his majesty to proceed, without a formal declaration of war, to acts of hostility against Spain: but lord C. proceeded upon intelligence (which was afterwards verified) of an agreement on the part of that country to make common cause with France.—From the uniform tenour of our history it would be found, that such measures as those of the 25th of Aug. and 2d of Sept. were

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never resorted to, unless they had been preceded by a real or supposed cause of war. The capture of the French ships in 1756, and of the Spanish frigates in 1805, were preceded by causes of war, the legitimacy of which has never been questioned, however the latter measure might have been censured on other accounts. The cases of Prussia and Holland had been mentioned: but previous to the detention and seizure of the merchant ships of the former power, she had actually received from France, whilst at war with Great Britain, the dominions of the elector of Hanover, and had excluded all British vessels from her ports;—and with respect to Holland, it was only necessary to refer to a few dates to shew that our measures of hostility towards that country were neither marked by precipitancy nor injustice. On the 18th of Jan. 1795, the French army entered Amsterdam. On the 19th, the revolutionary committee dismissed the established magistrates, and took on themselves the provisional administration of affairs. On the 30th, all ships and property belonging to enemies of the French republic were ordered to be seized and confiscated by a decree of the French commissioners confirmed by the provisional government of Holland. On the 9th of Feb. orders were issued by the British government for the provisional detention of Dutch ships and cargoes.—At the commencement of the year 1801, orders were issued to detain, provisionally, ships belonging to Russia, Sweden, and Denmark; not, however, till the conduct of the government of each of those countries had afforded a legitimate cause of War: but in that case, lord Sidmouth stated, he was one of those who had concurred in advising his majesty not to issue orders for general reprisals; and accordingly the ships and cargoes so detained, were not condemned as prize, but were all restored upon the re-establishment of peace. Lord Sidmouth said that some noble lords, who were then his colleagues, would admit that the beneficial effects of that conduct had not only been manifested at the time, but that they had been also experienced in the course of the present war.—It seemed, therefore, impossible to justify the measure of issuing the orders in question by attempting to bring it within the application of any admitted principle, or the fair analogy of any precedents afforded by countries, whose conduct it would not be disgraceful to cite as an ex-
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ample.—But the motive of the measure was perhaps to be found in the view which ministers had taken of the necessity of the expedition against Copenhagen. Being convinced of that necessity, they thought no means unwarrantable, which, in their opinion, were likely to contribute in any degree, to its success. For this purpose, private property was seized, as an instrument of coercion and intimidation, and in the hope that the importance of recovering might induce Denmark to accede to the demands of the British government. Thus was the principle entirely disregarded and inverted, upon which, on all former occasions, such a proceeding had been resorted to. It was not a measure of just retaliation for an unredressed injury, nor of seasonable and provident vigour, founded on the knowledge of a hostile design, which it was intended to counteract, but an act in furtherance of our own measures of severity and violence towards a state, which, it had been distinctly admitted, was not, at that time, chargeable with any hostile intentions against this country. This however, feeble and futile as it was as an attempt at justification, was far the most favourable interpretation that could be given of the causes, which led to this unparalleled transaction. If this were the true explanation of it, nothing could be more obviously just, than that its effects ought to have ceased, as soon as its design was frustrated. To give a retrospective operation to hostilities, for the purpose of appropriating that which had come into our possession under such circumstances, and the seizure of which had not answered the novel and extraordinary purpose for which the measure was resorted to, was surely a most lamentable, and disgraceful extremity of injustice: which however was still aggravated by the fact, that we had ourselves occasioned the hostilities of which this retrospective advantage was taken, and that they were in no degree produced by any aggression on the part of that state, against which, and the unoffending subjects of which, these proceedings were directed. Under these impressions, lord S. said, it was to him a subject of the deepest regret, that when his majesty was advised to declare to Europe the motives which had led to the Danish expedition, a decisive proof had not been afforded, that the plea of necessity, upon which government had rested its justification, was sincere. A declaration that the

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ships of war, taken at Copenhagen, should be held in deposit, with a view to eventual restitution, and that private property seized and detained under such circumstances as those which had been described, should be instantly restored, would have placed the motives which had influenced the British government out of the reach of suspicion, and guarded, if not exalted the national character.—With respect to ships of war, the house had already decided, and he would not now re-enter upon that subject: with respect to the merchant ships, and their crews, his sentiments were expressed in the three Resolutions, which he submitted to the house.—[Lord Sidmouth then read the three first Resolutions.]—On the subject of compensation to those British subjects who had consignments and effects in Denmark at the time of the commencement of hostilities, (which effects were afterwards sequestrated,) he was convinced there could be no difference of opinion: they had an indisputable claim, not merely on the liberality, but on the justice of their country; that claim might be fully satisfied out of the proceeds of Danish ships and cargoes, which had been condemned and sold; and this deduction would be counterbalanced by what might be termed a set-off arising from the sale of British property sequestrated in Denmark; so that justice, to a certain extent, might be done to the aggrieved parties in both countries. But to reach the limits of justice, compensation must proceed farther: all British subjects were entitled to it for losses sustained in consequence of any lawful adventure entered upon previous to the commencement of hostilities. Losses from such a cause could not be said to come within the reasonable scope of mercantile calculation. They were occasioned by a measure of the British government founded upon a supposed necessity, and directed to the object of self-preservation, to which it was contended that all other considerations must give way. But those who applaud, and who believe that they have derived security from this policy, must surely be willing to pay the price of it. A few individuals could not justly be made the victims of a measure, which could only be warranted by its tendency to provide for the security of all. The mode of indemnifying that class of sufferers, whose property was sequestrated in Denmark, had been suggested and was obvious: the claims of others on the justice of their
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country, was not less forcible. The means of satisfying them must be left to the discretion of government, and the wisdom of parliament.—But this measure, extraordinary and harsh as it was both in its origin, and in its general operation, was attended with circumstances of peculiar severity and injustice. Amongst the ships and cargoes detained under the orders of the 25th of Aug. and the 2d of Sep. were many which had been wrongfully brought into British ports by our cruizers and privateers, the masters and crews of which were too generally actuated by a spirit of rapacity, by which individuals were cruelly injured, and the country disgraced. These, to a considerable amount, had been ordered to be restored by decrees of the high court of admiralty, or of the supreme court of appeal; but in consequence of the supervening hostilities, the benefit of these decrees was withheld, and the property, the restitution of which had been directed by judicial authority, was condemned in the same court as prize to the king. Other ships and effects which were under adjudication at the commencement of hostilities, and which, as appeared from the proceedings concerning them, must also have been decreed to be restored, were condemned, and shared the same fate:—thus was an advantage taken of an original and admitted wrong, and the fruits of it became the property of the crown.—It was in vain to set up in such a case the undoubted right of the crown, under other circumstances, to the effects of an alien enemy; the principles of natural justice, implanted in the heart of every man, must, in this instance, revolt at such a claim; and this sentiment was happily sanctioned by ancient practice, and the highest authorities. In the year 1753, a memorial from the court of Berlin was referred by his late majesty to his principal law-officers; namely the judge of the admiralty, the king's advocate, and the attorney and solicitor general; which situations were then respectively filled by sir George Lee, Dr. Paul, sir Dudley Ryder, and Mr. Murray (afterwards lord Mansfield). Their report, in answer, was declared "to be founded on the principles of the law of nations, received and acknowledged by authorities of the greatest weight in all countries." Of this report, it was said by the president Montesquieu, that it was "une rèponse, à laquelle il n'y a pas de replique:" and such was its authority, that the present learned and

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highly respectable judge of the admiralty, sir William Scott, upon being applied to in the year 1795 by Mr. Jay, the American minister in London, for an account of the principles which govern our Courts of Admiralty, and of the mode of proceeding in those courts, answered the enquiry by transmitting to him an extract from this able and luminous state paper. This document was transmitted by the duke of Newcastle, the first lord of the Treasury, accompanied by a letter from himself, addressed to the Secretary of Legation from the court of Berlin; of which the following was an extract:—The late war furnished many instances which ought to have convinced all Europe how scrupulously the courts here do justice upon such occasions. They did not even avail themselves of an open war to seize or detain the effects of the enemy, when it appeared that those effects were taken wrongfully before the war'.—In the Report itself was the passage, which he was about to quote, and upon which he would offer no other comment than that it most distinctly and forcibly affirmed the principles for which he was now contending, and which he trusted would be solemnly recognized by their lordships this night. Having stated that the conduct of civilized nations towards each other was regulated by the principles of natural justice, and that the proceedings of our courts had been uniformly governed thereby, and not by motives of national convenience, it thus concludes: Upon this principle of natural justice, French ships and effects wrongfully taken after the Spanish war, and before the French war, have, during the heat of the war with France, and since, been restored, by sentence of your majesty's courts, to the French owners. No such ships or effects ever were attempted to be confiscated as enemies property here during the war; because, had it not been for the wrong first done, these effects would not have been in your majesty's dominions.—He would offer to their lordships only one other authority, but it was not inferior to that of the former, if authority was to be founded on knowledge, probity, and experience: it was that of sir W. Wynne, who in the year 1784, soon after the conclusion of the war, returned this answer to a case which had been submitted to him, as king's advocate, by the lords commissioners of the Treasury:—'I think that this ship and
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cargo, having been seized before the hostilities between England and France commenced, and having been decreed by the Court of Admiralty to be restored to the claimant, and again seized in a port of his majesty's dominions, ought not to have been condemned under such circumstances. The sentence is however conclusive, no appeal having been interposed in due time; but the proceeds are at his majesty's disposal, and I should conceive, that as the sentence of condemnation could not be supported, if the owner was in time to appeal from it, it would be proper that his majesty's interest in them should be given up, and some person nominated to receive the proceeds for the use of the French owner. (Signed) Wm. Wynne. Doctors Commons, 18th Nov. 1784.'—In consequence of this opinion, the proceeds of this ship and cargo were given up, and paid to the agents of the French owners.—Lord Sidmouth concluded by saying, that the subject upon which their lordships had to decide, was now before them: he had been impelled to submit it to their consideration by a sense of justice towards individuals, and by an ardent anxiety for the honour of the country. The inducements to take this step, he felt to be the more urgent, on account of some new doctrines and opinions, unwarrantable, as he thought, in themselves, and most dangerous in their tendency, which were too likely to gain ground, as they appeared to be countenanced by the declared sentiments and evident policy of the government. It seemed to be imagined, that the flagitious conduct of France, and the consequences which had resulted from it, had absolved us from the obligation of a strict adherence to those principles of good faith and justice, that have been heretofore considered as necessary to keep together the great fabric of civil society; and further, that the existence of a gigantic power, created and maintained by violence and fraud, not only gave the right of resisting and retaliating upon that power, by means similar to those by which it had been established, but also justified us, with a view to our own immediate interests, in employing the same weapons against unoffending states, not parties in our quarrel: in fine, that, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to maintain an equal contest, with France, and to counteract the danger arising from her extended dominion, it was become necessary for us to follow her

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example.—Against such doctrines he would ever protest, in the name of all that had hitherto given dignity to our councils, or lustre to public or private character; of all that, by making this country the object of just and general confidence, had contributed to establish its reputation, and to preserve and extend its influence and power. He well remembered that, in the year 1794, we were exhorted from the throne, to render our conduct a contrast to that of our enemies: an exhortation worthy of the high quarter whence it came, and which made upon his mind a deep and lasting impression. In proportion as our adversary extended his systematic violation of all the principles of public law and natural justice, it should be our object, by our conduct towards other states, to manifest more strongly, if possible, our determination to observe and to uphold them. He, indeed, could command nearly the whole population of the continent: but the spirit by which it was to be actuated might depend, in a great degree, upon ourselves. Let it therefore be our endeavour to influence that spirit, by commanding universal confidence in our honour and good faith, as well as respect for our naval and military power: let it appear that, at least in this country, justice would find a sanctuary until the storm was overpast, and the authority of public law could again be diffused throughout the civilized world. It had been under these impressions, that he had so frequently felt it to be a duty to address the house in the course of the present session: it was under these impressions that he brought foward the resolutions, which he had now to propose; and he would only add, that he should consider the present, as one of the most fortunate, because he was convinced it would be one of the most useful days of his life, if the principles upon which they were founded, and the measures they suggested, sanctioned as they were by the practice of our ancestors, and by recorded opinions of the highest authority, should meet with their lordships approbation and support.—Lord Sidmouth then proposed the following Resolutions; I. "That it appears to this house that ships and other property, to a large number, and amount, belonging to subjects of his Danish majesty, have been seized and detained under orders, and instructions, issued before information was received by the British government of the commencement of hostilities with Denmark, and at a time when
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there was no alleged or supposed cause of war, or reprisals; and, when in pursuit of a peaceable and lawful commerce, there was an unusual accumulation of Danish ships and cargoes in our ports under the most perfect confidence of security; and that the said ships and other property have been since condemned as prize to the crown.—2. That in consideration of the extraordinary circumstances under which the said orders and instructions were issued, it is highly expedient, that, except for the purpose of indemnifying such British subjects as may have suffered from the sequestration of their property in Denmark, the appropriation of the proceeds of the said ships and other effects should be suspended, so that no obstacle may be occasioned thereby to such eventual compensation to the original owners, as circumstances may appear to admit of, and as his majesty, in his justice, and liberality, may be pleased to direct—3. That it would be highly honourable to the character of this country, that, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case, all mariners and others, detained and taken under the orders and instructions aforesaid, should be released upon such terms and conditions as his majesty may think fit to require.—4. That at the time of issuing the orders and instructions aforesaid, there were also in the ports of this kingdom, many ships, and cargoes, belonging to subjects of his Danish majesty, which, having been unjustly and wrongfully brought into the said ports, had been decreed to be restored to the owners; and that many more then under adjudication, must, as it appears, have been in like-manner, decreed to be restored; that freight-money, to a large amount, had been, and other sums of the like nature must have been, pronounced to be due; all which ships, cargoes, and freight-money, have, in consequence of the supervening hostilities, been condemned as prize to the crown.—V. That it is essential to justice, and to the honour of the British name, as well as conformable to the ancient practice of cur courts, and to the established principles of the law of nations, that effectual means be adopted for giving to the owners of the said ships, and other property, the full benefit of the decrees pronounced in their favour by the High Court of Admiralty, or by his majesty's High Court of Appeal for prizes; and the adoption of such means is rendered the more obligatory on the faith of this na-

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tion, inasmuch as the positive stipulation of a treaty then subsisting between this country and Denmark, was intended to provide against a delay, which, however unavoidable in the present instances, has proved so injurious to the interests of the subjects of Denmark.—6. That it is equally essential to justice, and to the honour of the British name, that the crews, or such part of them as had remained in this kingdom for the better custody and protection of the ships and cargoes, so as aforesaid ordered to be restored, should no longer be considered as prisoners of war.—7. That the principles of the foregoing resolutions be considered as extending to the proceedings of all his majesty's courts of prize, wherever the facts of the case, which at present are not before this house, shall warrant their application."
The Lord Chancellorcontended, that the real question before the house was not with respect to those principles of justice alluded to by the noble lord, but with respect to their application, under certain circumstances; it being quite clear to his mind, that there were circumstances under which the application of those principles must be very different to what it would be under other circumstances. With respect to the opinion of those eminent men whom the noble lord had quoted, it was quite clear that it was not the opinion upon which the state had acted, as in the year 1761 a diametrically opposite doctrine was held, and this country would not subsequently make peace with France until she gave up the demand that no vessels should be considered as captures which were taken previous to hostilities, or the issuing of reprisals. With respect also to the opinion of sir W. Wynne, a decision of the court of admiralty in 1779, was in direct opposition to it. An article upon this subject was formerly inserted in the several treaties, and from forming part of the conventional law of nations, had been confounded with the unwritten law. There could be no doubt, however, that as the law stood, all enemy's property was forfeited to the crown; a vessel therefore detained, although at the time there might be no reason for the detention, yet from the circumstances of hostilities commencing, became forfeited to the crown. This might operate as a hard case in many instances upon individuals: but he had great doubts that there could be any thing like a commercial peace and a political war at the same time; he thought such a system, and the
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idea of compensation for losses, would only lead to ruinous speculations on the part of individuals. He saw no ground for the interposition of the house, and should therefore move the previous question.
Lord Erskineadmitted that the vessels detained must be forfeited to the crown as enemy's property, and that the court of admiralty could give no relief; but that was no reason why the crown Could not give relief. On the contrary, that was the very object of his noble friend's proposition in this case, to address the crown, with the view of relieving those who had suffered from the application of this principle of law. This proposition had his full and entire approbation, and those who combated it must shew that there was an actual necessity for detaining and keeping these trading vessels; otherwise the owners were entitled in justice to a compensation.
Lord Hawkesburycontended, that neither the noble viscount, nor the noble and learned lord, had proved that there was any departure in this instance from the usage and practice with respect to other nations, or that, being consistent with such practice and usage, there was any injustice committed. There could not be any doubt as to the law, that enemy's' property was forfeited to the crown, and therefore, that detained vessels in the event of the commencement of hostilities became forfeited.
Lord Ellenboroughsaid, the motion of his noble friend did not go to ask a favour of his majesty, in surrendering any thing to which he was entitled jure coroœ; but purely to demand from the justice and honour of the country the restitution of those ships, which had been seized at a period when peace and amity existed between the two countries; when we were holding out inducements to them to confide in our assurances of continued friendship; at a period, in fact, when their ships were in a manner domiciliated in our courts of admiralty.
Earl Stanhopecould not avoid making some observations upon the question before the house. His lordship proceeded to quote different passages from Magna Charta, as to the kindness and hospitality to be exercised by the people of this country towards strangers trading towards our coasts; and comparing these passages, and the inducements held out to the Danes to consider the amicable relations between them and this country secure, asked, if our afterwards seizing, as

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lawful prizes, on the vessels which, in time of peace, we had detained, could be regarded as any thing short of chousing and rascality? He thought the motion did great honour to the noble viscount, and must raise him still higher than he at present stood in the opinion of the country and every honest man.
The Earl of Lauderdalepressed upon the consideration of the house, the peculiar claim which the Danes had upon our performing some act of remuneration for the losses which they had suffered. They had been particularly impressed with the good faith of this country, and entertained a strong sense of its honour and integrity. By no other means could any people in their situation have been led to send their ships to the ports of England. G. Britain had hitherto been celebrated for her love of justice, her honour, and her sincerity; in this disposition the Danish merchants unwarily confided, and were ruined.—The house then divided on the question, that lord Sidmouth's motion be now put: Contents, 16; Non-contents, 36. Majority, 20.—And, on the fourth Resolution, another division took place: Contents, 16; Non-contents, 37. Majority. 21.