Sitting of 29 March 1808

DANISH FLEET.
Lord Folkestonerose, pursuant to notice, to submit to the house a motion on the subject of the Danish Fleet. He professed himself to be one of those who had approved of the expedition. against Copenhagen; but, the frivolous manner in which that expedition had been since defended by his majesty's ministers, had contributed considerably to shake his original opinion upon the question. When the expedition was undertaken, he thought it warranted as a measure of self-defence on our part, considering the situation of the continental powers at that time, and the probability there was of the Danish Flees being added to the other acquisition of France. He confessed, that so strong an act as this was, could only be justified by a most pressing emergency; and, therefore, it seemed to him that we were called upon by every principle of equity as well as of policy, not to appropriate the Fleet to ourselves in perpetuity; but to restore it, as soon as that could be lone consistently with the maintenance of our own security. He was aware, that a preposition had been made to Denmark to restore it, provided the Danish government would consent voluntarily to surrender it into our custody; but this proposition was so degrading in its nature, that it could not be expected that the Danish government would accept of it, and he was of opinion, that that people ought not to be placed in a worse situation, than if such a proposition had never been either made by us or rejected by them. If we were to retain the pos-

1285
session of the Fleet in perpetuity, he was afraid that it might be alleged, that the proposition was made merely to obtain a pretext for following up a hard but necessary measure, by an act of injustice. His lordship concluded with moving, "That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, to assure his majesty, that his faithful commons, anxious that justice should at all times be done to the upright views which direct his majesty's conduct towards other powers, are desirous of warding off a suspicion, however groundless, that the late attack of Copenhagen was made less with a view of averting an immediate and pressing danger, than for the purpose of permanently appropriating to the use of this country a great increase of naval means: that his faithful commons observe that his majesty, not imputing hostile designs to the king of Denmark, but apprehensive lest he should not be able to resist the attack about to be made on him by France for the purpose of getting possession of his fleet and arsenal, was willing in the first instance to enter into negotiations with him, and to agree to take his fleet in deposit until the restoration of peace, and that it was only after all proposals to that effect had been rejected that operations were commenced for the purpose of securing it by force of arms: that his faithful commons humbly submit to his majesty, that it was hardly to be expected that an independent sovereign should consent to acknowledge by a public instrument his inability to defend his territory and capital; and that therefore it is by no means a matter of wonder that he should reject the proposal so offered to him: that he should endeavour to repel the attack made on him to enforce it, and by a declaration of war resent and attempt to revenge it, when the attack proved successful: that his majesty's faithful commons therefore trust that his majesty, making due allowance for the feelings which may fairly be supposed to have actuated the court of Denmark on this occasion, will not be induced, by any acts of hostility thus provoked, to forget the terms which his majesty first offered, and which seem to be all that the necessity of the case, and the safety of his dominions, required; and that he will still be ready to fulfil them on his part, whenever the restoration of peace, and the state of the continental powers of Europe, hold out a fair and legitimate hope that by so king he will not be in
1286
fact adding to the means and naval resources of France: that his majesty's faithful commons believe and hope that such a conduct, as it will be perfectly in unison with the moderate and disinterested views which his majesty entertains, so it will make manifest to Europe, that while the enemy is actuated by views of ambition, aggrandizement, and conquest, his majesty will never he irritated by his example, nor induced by the possession of power, wantonly to attack the independence of other nations; that his sole wish is to obtain for himself and his people security and repose; and that if in the pursuit of these objects he is ever unfortunately compelled to adopt measures contrary to the interest of those states with which he is desirous of maintaining the relations of peace, he will yet seize the earliest opportunity, consistent with the honour of his crown and the safety of his dominions, to heal the wounds which he may have involuntarily given, and to make reparation for the injury which, in defending his rights against the unjust attacks of the enemy, he may have been necessitated to inflict."
Mr. Brandexpressed much regret, at seeing so thin an attendance upon a discussion of so much importance. Upon the question of the Copenhagen expedition, he had all along differed with those with whom he was in the habit of agreeing upon most political questions. He thought that expedition justifiable upon every principle of national and public law; but the grounds of defence which had been adopted by his majesty's ministers, he had no hesitation in pronouncing to be wholly untenable. A nation was certainly entitled to seize upon any instrument of hostile attack which was in the hands of a weak neutral, and which was likely to fall into the hands of a powerful enemy, and to be used by him for the purposes of further aggression. And, this being incontrovertibly a general principle, perfectly consonant to the law of nations, he contended, that there never were circumstances which more loudly called for its application, than those in which this country stood in relation to France and Denmark, when we took possession of the Danish fleet. But, having gone thus far in justifying the measure, he argued that the same reasons which rendered it necessary and proper that we should take possession of the fleet for a time, did not make it either necessary or proper that

1287
we should retain possession of it in perpetuity. Were the temper and views of Buonaparte to change, were his ambition to subside into a policy more consonant with the peace and happiness of mankind, and were a treaty of peace to be concluded similar to that of Westphalia, he thought, that it would be incumbent on this country to shew to Europe and the world, that its councils were not influenced by a selfish policy; but that having provided for its own security when that security was in danger, it was equally ready to respect the rights of other nations, and to make every reparation for a strong measure which was forced upon it by an imperious and overruling necessity. On these grounds, he should vote for the Address which had been moved by his noble friend.
Mr. S. Thorntonexpressed an opinion that the seizure of the Danish fleet could only be justified by an urgent necessity, and that, had no other measures of hostility taken place between this country and Denmark, that act on our part ought to have been limited by the necessity that gave rise to it. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was in the power of Denmark, at one time, to have secured the restitution of the fleet, but that she did not chuse to accept the proposition. that had been made to her with this view. As matters now stood, the fleet had come into our possession by conquest, and it appeared to him, that publishing a declaration avowing our intention of giving it up, without any knowledge whatever of the future state of Europe, would be a step dictated neither by policy nor justice. The address was also, to say the least of it, the more unnecessary, as it was not known what intentions his majesty's ministers might have without the interference of the house of commons.
Sir T. Turtonsaid, that if the weakness of Denmark had been the only reason why we should have had recourse to the seizure of the Danish fleet, in order to prevent its falling into the hands of France, a declaration of this kind would be very proper. But that was by no means the case, for there was proof of a hostile disposition on the part of Denmark ever since the French revolution, He denied that any new principles of morality had been maintained on that side. It had only been said, that circumstances might alter the mode of acting upon the old and real principles. Government might, per-
1288
haps, be disposed, in the event of a change taking place, which would fully restore the neutrality of Denmark, to give up these ships; but they ought not to be bound by a resolution of the house; such a resolution would only be giving an advantage to Buonaparte in any negotiation that might take place.
Mr. Davies Giddysupported the Address, not that he looked upon the restoration of the ships to Denmark as a matter of right; but that he thought it an act of generosity becoming the character of the British nation.
Mr. Wilberforceprofessed himself one of those who thought that ministers had conscientiously and ably discharged their duty towards the country, in taking possession of the Danish fleet. He was satisfied they were aware of all the objections in point of morality; but that a paramount duty had compelled them to over-rule those objections. He would not allow that any consideration of time or circumstances warranted a deviation from the great principles of morality. In the expedition to Copenhagen, there was no such deviation. A superior duty had outweighed a lesser; and that was itself one of the first principles of moral duty and moral reasoning. The transactions with respect to Portugal involved the same principles, and the result made no difference. It might have been said that Portugal should be controuled by force, and that Denmark might have accepted the proffered alternative of amity and protection. Denmark was unwilling to take any measure whatever of defence against France; and if she had been willing, all she could have done would have been inadequate. It was, therefore, perfectly allowable in us, to secure the arms, which, if directed against us, might be dangerous. But, he was unwilling to carry violence beyond what the necessity of the case required. He would not have the high character of the nation sunk, by shewing a disposition to retain a valuable possession, when the exigency that caused us to seize that possession should have passed away. He wished, therefore, to take no step, with respect to the application of the ships, which might make it matter of difficulty for his majesty to restore them, when circumstances should render that proceeding perfectly consistent with the public safety. The naval and military officers might be compensated as they usually were, by a compensation from the public purse. He

1289
wished to prove to Denmark, and to the world, that we were actuated by no feeling of interest in taking the Danish fleet; and that the fleet would be given back, if the independence of Denmark should be again established.
Mr. Hawkins Browneentered fully into the generous feelings of his hon. friend, and agreed that all he had said would have been applicable, if the Danes had no hostile feelings to this country, and if their weakness alone had been the ground of danger to this country. But Denmark had acted like an enemy, and was treated as such, and her fleet was as lawful prize as any of the enemy's ships captured at sea. The motion was, besides, imprudent, even if there had been a ground for it; for who was to judge when Denmark might be completely neutral or not?
Mr. Hanbury Traceyconcurred in the motion. But, as to the ministers restoring the ships at the end of the war, he hoped that would not be exactly applicable; for he expected that before that time they would be out of power.
Mr. Babingtonthough he thought the expedition justfied, concurred in the address, on the same grounds as his hon. friend (Mr. Wiberforce).
Mr. Simeonargued that there. was no ground for such an address, either in point of justice, policy, or generosity. We were justified in seizing the fleet, on the ground of necessity, whether Denmark should be considered as weak or as hostile; and therefore could not be bound in justice to restore the ships after the course which Denmark had taken at the time, and subsequent to the event. The policy also would be, absurd, flagrante hello; for it would prove an obstacle to future negotiation, and to our obtaining peace on such good terms as we might otherwise do. It would be regarded, in fact, as a censure on the expedition, and, therefore, he could see no ground for the motion, but a romantic generosity, which was of no use.
Mr. Bathurstcould not agree with an hon. gent. on the other side, that the ships in question, whether our lawful prize or not (for into that question he should not now go), were to be considered as the same sort of capture as if they had been taken on the high seas, durante hello. He denied, that any conviction was entertained of any previous hostility on the part of Denmark toward this country. Gentlemen, in saying so, said more than was
1290
even insinuated by ministers themselves, for they had never contended that there had been any previous hostility; for, if there had been such, why Were there any amicable proffers made to them On the part of this country? He thought, upon the whole, that complying with the present motion would be worthy of the characteristic magnanimity of England.
Mr. Stephensthought the present motion went to bind the future discretion of the country, by promises and stipulations which might ultimately prove more injurious and restrictive than it could now be possible to foresee. If the ships were to be restored, merely on the plea generosity, he did think that the object of the present motion would be to rob that generosity of its grace.
Sir James Hallhad never spoken with any gentleman upon the subject of the Baltic expedition, who did not, however strongly its advocate, seem to think that some degree of shame attached to it. That was a feeling rather foreign to the success that crowned the British arms in general; and, as he thought that the conditional restoration of the ships in question might serve, in some measure, to do away that imputation, he should feel it his duty to vote for the motion of the noble lord.—The house then divided: Ayes 44, Noes 105; Majority against the motion 61.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL, AS CONNECTED WITH AMERICA.
Lord Holland.My lords;
1270
in pursuance of the notice I have previously given, I now rise to submit to this house certain Resolutions upon the general policy of those measures which his majesty's ministers' have thought proper to carry into execution against the rights of neutral and independent states. In discussing this momentous subject, both as to the application and effect of the measures adopted, I can safely assume, that under the designation of neutral countries, America stands the most prominent, if not the only nation against which the immediate operation of the Orders in Council is directed. In the many debates to which these Orders have given birth, it has been argued with considerable force by my noble friends near me, that the system pursued by the king's ministers, since the 11th of Nov. last, was not only incompatible with that public law which hitherto regulated the conduct of civilised nations in their intercourse with each other, but was also repugnant to the municipal enactments of this country. Upon this part of the subject it is not now my intention to enlarge, for, allowing that to be true which I do not feel, namely, that the Orders in Council were justified by the law of nations; allowing that in place of being hostile to the spirit and letter of our municipal code, they were to be defended by the provisions of positive statutes; still I contend, that under the present circumstances of the world, and with a view to the nature of the relations existing between this country and the U. States of America, and, above all, as I reflect upon the dangerous consequences to which they will probably lead, still I contend, that upon their policy alone his majesty has been advised to adopt a course of proceeding vitally injurious to the best and most essential interests of G. Britain. It is with such an impression that I have felt it a most pressing duty to call upon this house to interpose. I call upon it to record its deliberate opinion upon the ruinous impolicy of the conduct pursued by his majesty's ministers. Past experience has proved, that such an interference on the part. of the parliament of this country has heretofore stopped the career of injudicious violence, and preserved the country from the difficulties and dangers which the continuance in a course of policy similar to this must have inevitably intailed. We have not yet, fortunately, so far proceeded in this path of impropriety, as to be deprived of the power of retracting

1271
our steps We have not plunged so deep into this sea of troubles, that we may not yet be able to regain our course. We have not yet gone so far in this work of calamity, that the warning voice of this house might not still save us from impending ruin and absolute destruction. That rum and that destruction there was no more certain method of effecting, than by driving the people of America into hostility with G. Britain. And what other effect than this can the noble lords opposite expect? Do they conceive that a great and independent nation, with rights and interests which it is her duty to protect, will quietly succumb to a course of proceeding which goes to interrupt the whole of her extensive commerce with the continent of Europe, and subject to imposts, to prohibitions, arid, in some cases, to confiscation, her shipping and cargoes. It is impossible that any such hope could be entertained, even by the most credulous. But, was this all? Were ministers satisfied with the aggression committed by the execution of the Orders in Council on America? No; insult was added to injury, and the evil was considerably aggravated by the contumelious manner in which it was carried into effect. This system, so destructive to the prosperity of America, is first adopted without any alleged provocation, and of the intention of acting upon it the ministers of this country would not deign to communicate to the American government any previous intimation. Indeed, we have it from their own mouths, that even the very gentleman (Mr. Rose) whom it was deemed advisable to send so recently to that country, on a special mission, was, at the time of his departure, totally ignorant, not only of the nature of these Orders in Council, but of the intention of the king's government to resort to such a course of policy. And, my lords, let us consider the period which was selected for the adoption of this system. It was at a time when, from certain occurrences, our relations with America were disturbed, and when actually a special mission was sent forward, by G. Britain, to enter into such explanations as were most conducive to an amicable arrangement upon that point. Under such circumstances it was that ministers ventured to carry into operation measures which go to deprive a great and growing nation, such undoubtedly as America is, of its great staple trade, namely, the exportation of cotton to the continent of
1272
Europe; and subject to the taxation of a foreign state, possessed of no right or controul over her, the whole of her commercial and shipping interests. One would have thought that there could not be found in this country, so recently after what has happened in our connection with America, persons determined to revive that principle of American revenue which lost that country for ever to G. Britain.—It was not only to impositions or restrictions upon her trade that these Orders were limited. They took a more extensive range, and were attended with more violent consequences. They devoted to confiscation any American vessel on board of which a French certificate of to growth and origin of the cargoes was found by any of our cruizers. It is necessary on this point to observe, that any belligerent has a right to demand such a certificate from any neutral trading to the ports of that belligerent. Such a right was recognized by the law of nations, and had been exercised heretofore by France, and also acted upon in this country. To the Americans trading to the ports of France, it was necessary, in order to legalize the sale of their cargo in that country. But, the Orders in Council have reduced them to -this, dilemma, that without this certificate of origin, they are liable to confiscation in any port of the continent of Europe, subject to the dominion of France; and, on the high seas, the very discovery of this document, by a British cruiser, is sure to expose them to unconditional confiscation, in all places under the dominion of the sovereign of this united kingdom.—But, without arguing upon the abstract merits of this part of the subject, the fact was this. That the certificate signed by the French consul in the ports of America was but a sorry security to France against the importation of British produce and manufactures into the continent of Europe, whilst its possession by the American trade gave him they ability of conveying into the very ports-of the enemy, without risk or disturbance, those very articles, against the introduction. of which this very document was substituted as an expedient. But, it was not merely in the measure of the Orders in Council that this disregard for the friendship and amity of America was evinced. The same feeling uniformly characterised every proceeding of the king's ministers with regard to that country. It was manifested in the tone and temper of the communications which had recently taken.

1273
place between the two governments, and most conspicuously so in the manner in which the negocation, which, in concert with my noble friend near me, I had the honour to conduct, was so improvidently and intemperately broken off by his majesty's secretary for foreign affairs (Mr. Canning.) And, with respect to that treaty, I must be allowed to offer a few observations, in order to rebut the misrepresentations which have been so industriously circulated out of doors on this subject. It has been asserted, that the executive authority of America had actually sent back the treaty itself, with a refusal to ratify it; and that certain amendments were affixed, without which it would never be sanctioned in that country. It is not true that such a proceeding took place. It was true that a copy of the treaty had been transmitted from America, with certain explanations, which the president of the U. States had temperately recommended as proper to be maturely determined, particularly upon the point affecting the right of our armed ships to impress American seamen. No such peremptory admission was affixed, and, therefore, it is with no small share of astonishment, that in the form in which the copy of that treaty is printed for the use of this house, and with the proposed amendments affixed to the margin, I find the source from whence this impression on the public mind originated. I do not charge any person with such an intention, but am certain that it was calculated, and actually did produce this delusive effect; and, moreover, I do assert, that these proposed amendments were not meant as the sine qua non, without which the president of the U. States would not sanction the treaty. In all former discussions on the subject of the Orders in Council, the great ground upon which ministers have ventured to defend them, the. only point of justification on which they rely, is the Order of the 7th of Jan. 1807,which the late administration had conceived it its duty to enforce. If, therefore, this ground be proved to be not only untenable, but that ministers themselves were aware of its not being at all applicable to the system which they have pursued, there is a duty left for this house to interpose by is solemn and recorded resolution The Order of the 7th of Jan. did not excite in America any strong objections against the principle of the policy. The uneasiness that was there excited, and the apprehensions which were
1274
entertained on that subject, arose from a total misconception of the American government as to the legal construction, of that Order. It was supposed by them, that the operation of that, Order was directed, not only against the coasting trade of the enemy, but to interrupt neutrals in a commerce of discharge from port to port of the enemies territories. That is, an American ship, trading direct to Bordeaux, and there having disposed of a part of her cargo, was restricted from continuing her voyage to any other port, for instance, Amsterdam, in order to sell the remaining part of her cargo. Accordingly we find, that Mr. Madison, in a note to the British envoy, did express such an apprehension, and his majesty's present ministers were advised of such a communication being made, in April last. What was the conduct pursued by them, on receiving such an intimation? Did they proceed to dissipate the apprehensions so ideally entertained by the American government? They did no such thing: they, the king's ministers, in full possession of the means of knowing that the uneasiness was unfounded, positively abstained from any step calculated to explain to America the fallacy of its fears, or to uphold, from the censure of imputed violence and aggression, the character of their sovereign's government. What the motives were which could induce them to this desertion of their public duty, it were difficult to determine, had not subsequent occurrences served to solve the difficulty: it only could be attributed to the anxious wish of converting the effects of this misapprehension into a weapon against their political opponents in parliament, to have the opportunity of throwing Mr. Madison's opinion on that Order, in the teeth of those who felt it their duty to expose the injustice, improvidence, and insanity of that system which commenced its operation on the 11th of Nov. Honourable and conscientious atonement for a breach of public duty! I assure the noble lords that I envy them not the gratification of a triumph so obtained; neither could I appreciate that as an advantage, which compromised the character and consistency of the country.—The noble lord next adverted to the clamour which had been raised upon the pretence that in the late, negociation conducted with the American commissioners, an intention was manifested of yielding any of the maritime rights of this country. He ad-

1275
mitted, there were considerable difficulties in the way of an arrangement with respect to the impressing of seamen; but still he did not think, them insurmountable: of our right to take British seamen out of American merchant vessels, there could be no doubt; but how did this right arise? The American merchant vessel, met on the high sea by a British ship of war, was extra-territorial, and the latter had an undoubted right to take out of her a British seaman for his majesty's service; but it was also a right on the part of the American, that no American subject should be taken, and that the British. right should be exercised as moderately as possible. Between these conflicting rights it might be difficult to make an arrangement; but, surely, it was unwise to shut the door against any arrangement. His lordship took a view of the effects likely to result from the Orders in Council, and contended that it was clear they would produce injury to our manufactures; and, as to the West India interest, which it was boasted would be benefited, how was this to arise if a war took place with the U. States, which, he contended, the Orders in Council were calculated to produce, when it was clearly ascertained, that the West India islands depended upon the U. States for a large proportion of their provisions? In whatever point of view these Orders were considered, they must, he contended, be found highly injurious to the interests of the country. If it was the object of Buonaparte to force America into a war with this country, this measure tended to facilitate that object; the policy should rather have been to have remained quiet, and if Buonaparte had urged the American government to a war with this country, then all the odium would have remained with him, and a large proportion of the population of the U. States would have been with us. When we saw all Europe under the dominion of one man, pressing and urging forward plans inimical to the interests and happiness of mankind, we might have looked to America for that order of things congenial with our own feelings and our own views, and as forming a counterpoise to the power of the ruler of the continent; whilst G. Britain held the balance between the new and the old world, and enjoyed all those immense advantages which must result. from such a commanding situation. The measures of ministers, however, forbad this pleasing prospect, and threatened us with
1276
a war with those, from whose increasing prosperity we might otherwise derive the most solid advantages. His lordship concluded, by reading the following Resolutions, the first of which, he moved:—1. "That it appears to this house, that his majesty hath been advised, without any alleged provocation front the U. States of America, to issue Orders in Council, on and subsequent to the 11th of Nov. 1807, for interrupting nearly the whole of the commerce of the said states with the continent of Europe; for limiting such trade to be carried on in future through. British ports only, (with the exception of neutral and allied ports in certain cases); thereby exposing it to such restrictions and duties, and even prohibitions, as the government of G. Britain may think it to impose upon it; and for confiscating the property of the citizens of the said states, in all cases where the same shall be accompanied by particular documents, certifying the place of its growth or manufacture.—2. That it appears to this house, that previous to the issuing of the said Orders in Council, a negotiation had been carried on between this country and the U. States of America, for the maintenance of peace and friendship between them, and that a treaty had been actually signed respecting some of the most material points in discussion; that a desire had been expressed by the government of the said U. States for the addition of certain other provisions to the said treaty, and that a proposal was made for renewing the negotiation for that purpose; but that this offer was abruptly and intemperately rejected by his majesty's ministers.—3. That at the time when the said Orders were issued, his majesty's ministers had recently received from the ministers of the U. States in this kingdom, assurances that the injurious decrees of his majesty's enemies had not, in any one instance, been executed against the commerce or navigation of the States: and that from all that had passed subsequent to the issuing of the said decrees, his majesty's ministers had every reason to conclude, that any attempt of the enemy so to execute the same; would be decidedly resisted by the government of the U. States; whereby it must have happened, either that the, said decrees would have continued to be wholly nugatory and ineffectual, or that the enemy, by endeavouring to enforce the same, would have driven the U. States into a closer connection with this country.—4. That it ap-

1277
pears to this house, that the Order issued by his majesty in council, on the 7th of Jan. 1807, was not intended to interrupt neutrals in a commerce of discharge from port to port of the enemies territories; that such was understood to be its legal construction by those who were in his majesty's service at the time the said order was issued; and that an explanation to that effect was given by them to the Danish minister, in an official Note dated on the 17th of March, 1807.—That in a note from the American secretary of state to Mr. Erskine, dated on the 20th of the same month, considerable uneasiness was expressed, under an apprehension of a contrary interpretation of the said Order; and that the above mentioned Note was actually received by his majesty's present ministers in the month of April last. Yet no steps have been taken thereon, up to the present hour, for removing the unfounded apprehensions of the American government on a point to which they appear to have attached so much importance. And that by this omission, much unnecessary irritation has been suffered to prevail in America, long after it was in the power of his majesty's ministers to have effectually removed the same; and fresh obstacles to conciliation and friendship have thus wantonly been interposed.—5. That it is, therefore, the opinion of this house, that the said Orders are in themselves unjust and impolitic; that the issuing of them at the time, and under the circumstances, above mentioned, was an act of the utmost improvidence and rashness: and that by abruptly breaking off a friendly negotiation, and withholding a satisfactory explanation on a point, on which it might have been given with so much ease and advantage, his majesty's ministers have acted in diregard of our true policy, which is to cultivate the friendship of a nation, whose interests and prosperity are so intimately interwoven with our own; and have conducted themselves in a manner the least adapted to enable his majesty to maintain that maritime superiority, on which the greatness, and even the existence, of his empire so much depend."
The Earl of Westmorelandcontended, that the Order of blockade, issued by the late administration in May, 1806, produced the Berlin decree in Nov. 1806, which gave birth to the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. 1807, which produced the further and more severe decree of
1278
the French government against commerce, and which rendered necessary the Orders in Council of November, 1807. The noble lord also contended, that the conduct of the late administration, in throwing Russia into the arms of France, occasioned the loss of Portugal, which rendered necessary the expedition to Copenhagen. With respect to the Order of the 7th of Jan. he maintained, that its legal construction went far beyond the interpretation put upon it by noble lords on the other side, and it was thought by ministers a preferable mode of conduct to leave the Note of Mr. Madison unanswered, and to wait the result of the treaty The Orders in Council, his lordship contended, were necessary, in order to maintain our own commerce, and to prevent the enemy from enjoying all the advantages of peace, through the medium of an extensive neutral commerce, whilst our own trade was suffering under depression.
Lord Aucklandmaintained, that the true interpretation of the Order of the 7th of Jan. was to be found in the Note of lord Howick to Mr. Rist, and contended, that ministers ought to have made that interpretation the basis of a communication on the subject to the American government.
The Earl of Darnleyfollowed on the same side, and contended, that the Order of the 7th of Jan. was strictly within the law of nations, whilst the Orders of Nov. last were wholly contrary to that law.
The Earl of Lauderdalesaid, he had not intended to have troubled their lordships any more on this subject, as it had been most ably discussed by his noble friend; but, what fell from the noble earl opposite by way of invective, and to raise a laugh against the late ministers, induced him to break silence. The noble lord had stated," that the cruel attack on Copenhagen was caused by his majesty's late ministers: the argument that had been adduced to prove it, was too weak to require an answer, and he would pass the assertion with what it deserved—contempt. But the great question for noble lords to consider was, whether the measure of the late Orders in Council was a good one or not?
Lord Mulgravedenied that the interpretation given by noble lords on the other side, to the Order of the 7th of Jan. was consistent with its fair and legal construction. With respect to Russia, the noble lord contended, that the conduct of the

1279
late ministers had tended to indispose that power towards this country; and, with respect to the Orders in Council of Nov. last he maintained their necessity, policy, and expediency, and saw no reason to believe, that any intelligence of them could arrive in, America, so as to operate at the seat of government, in contributing to produce the embargo.
Lord Grenvilleobserved, that were it not that ministers were eager to catch at any thing which could enable them to avoid the particular subject under consideration, and to distract the attention of their lordships, they would never have wandered so much from the point as to enter upon the discussion of the merits of the conduct of the. late government towards Russia. They having adverted to that, however, he might be allowed to say a few words by way of reply. Assurances of aid, it was said, had been given to Russia, which were not followed up by corresponding efforts. Where did that appear? Russia might naturally be anxious to obtain, but it was for the government of this country to consider whether it ought to promise or to grant. The whole correspondence was a Series of refusals—refusals justified in every view of sound policy by the then situation of affairs. With respect to the refusal of the loan, his lordship stated, that the late government had seen no hopes of such advantages resulting from a compliance as would counterbalance the additional pressure on the people which it would occasion, if granted in the manner solicited. It was required that it should be raised at 5 per cent. and that it should be guaranteed by parliament. Was there any man who could say that this was a requisite which ought to have been complied with? With regard to the point of co-operation, he said, that whoever considered the state of the contending parties at the time, coolly and dispassionately, must be convinced, that it would have been madness to have sent an army to the continent. It was not money that Russia wanted, nor the comparatively feeble aid which we could have sent her. The resources of that great empire had not before been well organized: France had from the other corner of Europe, met Russia, with equal or superior numbers on her own "frontiers; France had for 17, years been engaged in war, and there was a difference, therefore, in the experience of the officers and the soldiers. These were the causes of failure on the part of
1280
the Russians, who had most unjustly been charged, by the present ministers, with having unnecessarily put an end to a contest which, if continued, could only have been attended with additional disasters. The facts of the case had been rendered more notorious than he could have expected them to have been. At one time the contest assumed something like a doubtful appearance; but when examined into, these appearances were found to be completely fallacious. The illustrious officer (lord Hutchinson) on whose opinion, in this case, the late government had been disposed to place a great deal of reliance, had at first suggested that some co-operation might be of use. But when he had visited the scene of action, he then immediately saw that the idea of military aid from us would be of no advantage, and had accordingly said, "for God's sake, don't send a man: they can be of no use here, and most probably not one of them can ever get back again."—In answer to his noble friend, the ministers had entered upon a discussion of the effects of the Order in Council of the 7th of Jane in pursuance of their plan of avoiding the subject more particularly before them. But the proposition of his noble friend had nothing to do with that, nor with the late Orders in Council generally. It only related to them so far as they affected our relations with America, and to his point his noble friend had confined himself, in arguing, that they would be attended with the most pernicious consequences to this country. The evidence which had been given at the bar, had been called by ministers ingenious speculations. Whether the assertions of ministers, who said that these Orders would be beneficial to our commerce, or the evidence of those practically concerned, who affirmed, that they would be destructive to it, were most to be relied on, he would leave their lordships to decide. But his noble friend had only adverted to that evidence for the sake of a fact, which had been proved beyond the possibility of contradiction; that the intelligence of the Orders in Council had reached America previous to the embargo. Since the fact had been known to one individual, it must have been in the possession of the commercial interest in general, and have reached America through a variety of Channels, and this he understood actually to have been the case. The embargo must have been the consequence; for it was impossible, that the decrees of France could ap-

1281
pear of such consequence to America, as to induce her to undergo the hardships which she must feel from this measure. It was a matter of substantive charge, too, against ministers, that they had not explained the Order of the 7th of Jan. to the Americans, so far as related to the discharge of cargoes at one port, and taking in others at other ports. They knew the meaning of the Order in this respect, and if they had been desirous of conciliating America, they would have explained it. With regard to the treaty lately negotiated, that was now before the house, and the members of the late-government would be ready to enter upon the discussion of its merits, when the subject should be specifically brought under consideration. The manner in which the negotiation on that treaty had been put an end to was most intemperate and absurd. Nothing had been more common than to suspend ratification, in order, if possible, to have something adder, omitted, or altered. The instances of this were innumerable; and he affirmed, that no men of sound judgment, being at the same time desirous of conciliation, could have put an end to the negotiation in the manner ministers had done. He was glad that now, however; the conviction began to prevail among the people, and even with the government, that the neutrality of America was advantageous to this country. Every one knew with what industry ridiculous opinions had been circulated, that we should lose less by a war wish America than we did by her neutrality, because our commerce was carried on in her shipping instead of our own. The very advantage to us was, that our commerce was by means of American shipping carried on with the enemies colonies and ports, into which British ships would not be admitted. He would not enter into the particulars of the calamities which might result from a war with America in our present situation; the has of our trade with the continent; the loss of the supplies to the West Indies; the loss to our own home manufactures, &c.; but it was obvious, that it would be a most serious calamity. Still, he advised no concession inconsistent with the honour of the country, in the proper sense of the term. But honour and dignity consisted not in holding haughty language With a friendly power. He agreed with the noble lord who spoke last, that nothing said in that house could have the effect a driving America into
1282
measures of hostility which she would not otherwise have recourse to. If both governments understood the interests of their respective countries, war might still be avoided. America would consult her dignity by acting directly contrary to the spirit manifested by our government, by offering explanation, by seizing every opportunity of negotiation, and by employing the most conciliating language, while there was a chance that war could be avoided. It was a most inconvenient circumstance, that negotiation proceeded while the embargo continued; but still he was glad that negotiation was going on. If ministers, convinced of their error, should renew the relations of amity between the two countries, they would not be reproached from that side of the house with inconsistency. He concluded by expressing his perfect concurrence in the resolutions.
Lord Hawkesburyexpressed his belief, that there was some ground for expectation in Russia that she would receive some assistance from this country. As to the exact nature or amount of that assistance, it was not for him to determine what it might have been; whether an expedition ought to have been sent to this point or the other, or at what precise period of the year it ought to have been equipped. A noble lord had dwelt with peculiar force upon the circumstance of a loan having been refused by this country to be granted to Russia. He lamented as sincerely as that noble lord, the burthens to which the people of this country were necessarily subjected; but, though-it might not suit the convenience of the country to advance six millions as a loan or subsidy to Russia, was the government of this country to consider itself so far restricted by the proposition of an advance to that amount being made to us, that it was not at liberty to say what sum it could afford, or what amount of money the nation would advance towards the support of the common cause of Europe? This, he contended, ought to have been done; for, on Russia, and on the assistance that it received, in order to enable it the more effectually to resist that overwhelming power which had now almost deluged the continent, depended the welfare of almost every other state. If Russia had received sufficient assistance, the emigration of the court of Lisbon might have been prevented; and if Russia had been properly supported, it might not have been neces-

1283
sary to have made the late attack upon Copenhagen, which had been so much the subject of complaint.—There was another point to which their lordships' attention was particularly called; namely, the probable effect which our Orders in Council would have on the government of America, the degree of irritation which they would be likely to occasion in the minds of that people, or, in short, how far they would be likely to affect the relations, political or commercial, of the two countries reciprocally. At present, he would not tell all that came within his knowledge on that subject, neither would their lordships think it becoming in him, if, pending a negociation, he were, in his place in that house, publicly to announce the whole amount of whatever information he might obtain elsewhere, by means of his official situation. But, this much he could assure their lordships, that, notwithstanding the apprehension which some noble lords might have upon that point, and notwithstanding the alarm which appeared to be entertained elsewhere, he could assure their lordships, that no such disagreable sensation was occasioned in America by the promulgation of these Orders in Council. A noble lord, however, had stated, that it was proved at the bar that such was their effect; but this he begged leave to contradict, and in so doing he believed the house would eventually see that he was warranted by the facts as they would be hereafter disclosed. They had not a statement to that effect, but a speculative opinion of an interested merchant at their lordships' bar. With respect to the treaty that had been referred to, he had to inform their lordships, that the reason it had not been so speedily ratified as might have been expected, was, that an alteration had been made in it; not a trivial alteration or addition, but a most substantive and complete deviation from the principles upon which that treaty was originally agreed to: to the final execution of a document so altered, some resistance was naturally given; but there was good reason to believe, as indeed he wished, and no doubt every noble lord who heard him wished, that America must shortly have a proper sense of its own interest; and noble lords must see, that this was not to be obtained by a tame acquiescence in every fear or alarm with which weak or interested might endeavour to impress their lordships.
Lord Hollandreplied to the arguments and assertions of noble lords on the other
1284
side. He particularly insisted, that it would appear, from the evidence which either now was, or would soon be, in the possession of each individual of that house, that the substance of our Orders in Council was known in America, before the laying on of the embargo in that country; a fact which was also apparent from this circumstance, that a description of the enactments of these Orders in Council was given in an American; paper some considerable time previous to the laying on of the embargo.
The question was then put on the first Resolution, when the house divided: Contents, 25: Non-contencs, 53. Majority, 28.—The other Resolutions were put, and negatived without any division.