Sitting of 22 March 1808

WESTMINSTER ELECTION PETITION.
The time appointed for taking into consi-

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deration the Petition of the right hon. Richard Brinsley Sheridan, complaining of an undue Election and return for the city and liberty of Westminster, being come; and no counsel, agent, or party, appearing on the part of the said petitioner, the house was moved, That an Act, made in the 28th year of his present majesty, for the further regulation of the trials of Controverted Elections or returns of members to serve in Parliament, might be read:—and the same being read; the Order for taking the said Petition into consideration was discharged.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL.
Sir C. Pole, pursuant to notice, called the attention of the house to some appointments on the establishment of this hospital, in which due regard was not had to the preference which ought to be shewn to persons who had served in the navy. He cited all the commissions relative to Greenwich Hospital, from the first under William and Mary, to shew, that such a preference ought always to be given; and concluded with moving an Address to his majesty, praying, that he would be graciously pleased to give directions, that all the appointments belonging to the said hospital should henceforth filled with persons who had served in the navy.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid it must be the object of every one to promote as much as possible what the hon. baronet was desirous to accomplish. But there were offices for which persons properly qualified could not be found in the navy, such as clerk of the works, who should be an architect; auditor, who should be a lawyer; organist, brewer, clerk of the cheque, surveyor, and others. With these exceptions, he thought no other office should be filled otherwise than from the navy, except when, after a month's notice in the newspapers, no naval person should present himself with proper qualifications to fill the office vacant. He should propose an amendment, adopting the hon. baronet's idea, with this limitation, and he should, in the event of the amendment being adopted, propose an Address to his majesty, praying that he would cause a corresponding alteration to be made in the Charter of Greenwich Hospital.
After some observations from Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Rose, Mr. N. Calvert. and Mr. R. Ward, sir C. Pole agreed to the exceptions proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the motions were passed accordingly

PETITIONS AGAINST THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL.
On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the house went into committee, in which the adjourned consideration of the Petitions against the Orders in Council was resumed. The following witnesses were then called in and examined, Mr. Wm. Bell, Mr. Thomas Martin, Mr. Alex. Forrester, and Mr. Abraham Mann. On account of the lateness of the hour, and there being then five other witnesses to examine, the further consideration of the question was postponed till tomorrow.

COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL.
The Earl of Lauderdalein calling the attention of their lordships to this subject, observed, that the important question now for their consideration was, whether that system of mercantile policy under which the commerce prosperity of this country had so greatly increased until the issuing of the Orders in Council, should at once be done away, and the whole commerce of the country put to hazard, for the sake of the novel and dangerous principles contained in the Orders in Council. Upon this measure he was compelled to argue without the species of information which ought to have been before the house, namely, that which could be given by the merchants and manufacturers whose interests would be
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affected by it, but which their lordships had refused to hear. Amongst this class of persons the measure was generally condemned. It had been said, however, that several merchants highly approved of these Orders. This, he thought, required explanation. The manufacturers who contributed so essentially to the prosperity of the country, immediately felt their effects, in the suspension of orders, and the stagnation of their trade; but there were merchants who engaged in foreign commerce, and having a large stock of foreign commodities on their hands, would feel that the suspension of foreign commerce would greatly enhance the price of the articles on hand, and thus largely increase their profits; they might, therefore, approve of these Orders, inasmuch as they were beneficial to their particular interests; but to the commerce of the country generally, the measure must be ruinous. He was wholly at a loss to conceive what benefit could arise from it. It had been said on a former evening, by a noble and learned lord, that the object of it was, so to distress France, as to force her to come to terms; but how was that object to be effected? We might free neutrals to come into our ports; we might prevent all direct trade with the enemy, by means of the superiority of our navy; but then France, by her military superiority upon the continent, might interdict all commerce with the ports of the continent that was carried on through this country. Neutral trade would then be destroyed, and the commerce of this country deeply and totally injured. It had been said, however, that trade might still be carried on in a manner more easily understood than could with propriety be expressed; was it then to be urged, that the trade of this country was to be carried on by means of smuggling, and was it not easy to conceive that precautions might be adopted in France to prevent that species of trade? Had ministers reflected upon the consequences of this measure to our West India colonies? Instead of giving them relief, it would still further oppress them. Already more sugar came from thence than could be consumed in this country, and to this was now to be added the sugar of the Brazils and of the enemy's colonies. Where was a continental market to be found for all this produce? And supposing there to be a market, still the produce of the enemies colonies and of the Brazils would have the preference, because it

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would be known by those who imported it here that none of it could be consumed in this country, and thus our own planters would remain without relief. Had they reflected upon the consequences to the American trade, and through that to the trade of this country? Taking the exports of America at 15,000,000 l. he believed about two-thirds of that amount were sent to the continent of Europe; if this trade was destroyed, would it not by the decrease of price greatly reduce the value of the remaining third exported to this country? He believed, that upon calculation, the remaining third could not then be estimated at more than 2,000,000 l. in value; and how in this case were the American traders to pay the debts due to the merchants aid manufacturers of this country? If it was conceived, however, that France would relax her decrees, and a trade be carried on to her ports under these restriction, still the government of that country, by means of countervailing duties, might throw back as great a burden upon us as our duties would be to them. Suppose we imposed a duty of ten per cent. on articles carried circuitously through this country to France; that country might impose a duty on the commodities sent in return, and might give the produce of that duty as a compensation to those who paid the additional duty imposed by us, and thus the object of the Orders, that of distressing France, would be defeated. Could it, however, seriously be believed, that enhancing the price of sugar, ginger, pepper, and other articles, would have that important effect which was imputed to this measure? What, besides, was the comparative disadvantage with which we entered into this new and unprecedented species of warfare; France could support her population by her own produce; it was calculated by Mr. Hume, that in his time, sixteen persons out of twenty in France, drew their support from agriculture and commerce; whilst in this country, fifteen out of twenty of the population drew their support from commerce and manufactures, and the produce of the country was not sufficient to support the population; this was proved by the statement, that during the years 1804, 5, 6, we imported 517,000 quarters of wheat, oats at the rate of 180,000 quarters, and barley 50,000. How seriously then, would such a mode of warfare injure this country, whilst it would comparatively do little injury to France! In every point of view,
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he could not but consider this measure as ruinous and destructive, and tending more immediately to increase a clamour for peace, and thereby to embarrass the country, by means of the great injury which it inflicted upon our manufactures. His lordship concluded by moving the following Resolutions:—"That the unprecedented commercial warfare in which his majesty had been advised to involve this country, by his late Orders in Council, must be peculiarly injurious to a nation whose extended concerns give her an interest, more or less direct, in all the mercantile transactions of the world.—That it appears to this house, that the system adopted by the said Orders, threatens the immediate extinction of maritime commerce; for while, on the one hand, the navy of G. Britain will, in a great measure, prevent all communication with the continent of Europe, except through this country and her allies; it cannot be doubted that the armies of France, and of the nations under her subjection, may, on the other hand, easily put an end to any such direct intercourse between this country and the continent.—That such annihilation of all maritime commerce, whilst it must totally exclude the produce and manufactures of this island from a foreign market, will leave to our enemies those means of trading in the produce and manufactures of the continent, which the land-carriage and internal navigation of such extensive countries must afford; means which their industry, urged by the necessity of the case, must rapidly improve and extend.—That it appears to this house, that there is just ground to apprehend that the exclusion of colonial produce from the continent of Europe, if it could be effected, would close many of those channels of industry, by the means of which the commerce and manufactures of this country have attained an unparalleled degree of prosperity: that it would divert the labour of the continent from the production of those articles for which maritime commerce has hitherto afforded a vent, to the culture of those productions for the supply of which the extinction of such commerce must create an imperious demand.—That it appears to this house, that the manufactures of this country must sustain irreparable injury, from forcibly diverting the labour of America, by the annihilation of maritime commerce, to the manufacture of those articles which habit has made necessary to that country, and the furnish-

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ing of which has long given sustenance to thousands of our industrious countrymen.—That this system which his majesty's Orders in Council are intended to enforce, whether regarded as a source of revenue or as a measure of hostility, appears to this house equally nugatory and absurd: as a source of revenue, its success must depend on the co-operation of the neutral whose property is to be taxed, on the inclination of our allies to sacrifice their interest to our views, and on the consent of our enemies to contribute to the increase of those resources which it is their known object to annihilate: as a measure of warfare, it is destructive of our resources, injurious to the interests of our friends, but wholly ineffectual against our enemies, whom it enables, by payment of the projected duties, to purchase a complete exemption from the distress which it professes to bring upon them.—That it appears to this house, that his majesty's ministers, by advising his majesty to adopt such a mode of warfare, are co-operating with the government of France to deprive the inhabitants of the respective countries of the comforts to which they are habituated, and even of the means by which they have existed: and that in so doing, they are concurring in an experiment which puts the great contest now at issue betwixt the two nations, on a ground highly disadvantageous to the British empire; for it is obvious, that this system of deprivation must bear much harder on the people of this country, where property has been uniformly respected, and the profits of industry held sacred, than on the people of France, who have been habituated to the extremes of distress, during the convulsions which the revolution has created."
Earl Bathurstdenied that the commerce of the country had, previous to the issuing of the Orders in Council, shown that increasing prosperity stated by the noble lord; on the contrary, the experts, which in 1806 amounted to 27,000,000 l. decreased in 1807 to 25,000,000 l. The exports of West India and East India produce had also declined in proportion. The Orders in Council had become, therefore, necessary for the maintenance of our own commerce, and their beneficial effects were proved by the increase in our exports from the 5th of Dec. up to the last week: an increase had taken place in the export of sugar, of woollen, cotton, and linen. Our West India colonies, instead of being injured, would be benefited. Their produce
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had previously been undersold in the foreign markets by the foreign colonial produce, conveyed by neutrals, and the certificates of origin were devised to prevent British colonial produce from finding a market. Now, however, under the operation of these Orders, the whole of the colonial produce being brought to this country, would be so mixed that it would be impossible for the enemy to distinguish the one from the other, and our own colonial produce would no longer be undersold. The same argument applied to the commodities from the East Indies. It had been said by a noble friend of his on the preceding evening, that it could not be supposed that the want of coffee could have any effect in France. His noble friend, he believed, did not like coffee, and therefore he might not care for the loss of it; but was it to be imagined that the population of a whole continent would suddenly change the habits of their lives at the bidding of the ruler of France? Would Buonaparte himself, would his tributary kings, would his tributary princes, would his generals, would his army, consent all at once to give up their coffee and their sugar? Would they agree to give up the constant habits of their lives? It was not in human nature. With respect to the American trade, he believed it would be found that half their exports came to this country, and about a fourth or third to the enemy's colonies; the effect, therefore, stated by the noble lord, could not be produced upon that trade; as, supposing the decree of the enemy to be most rigorously enforced, the Americans could not be prevented by their enforcement from trading with this country, or the enemy's colonies. The noble earl went through the Resolutions, and contended that they did not apply to the Orders in Council, which instead of injuring the trade of the country, tended materially to benefit it, by removing those injurious effects which had been produced by the enforcement of the enemy's decrees.
Lord Kingcommented on the apparent inconsistency of endeavouring to make the Orders in Council at once a measure of a belligerent nature and of commercial policy.
Lord Hollandentirely concurred with the noble lord as to the inconsistency he had stated; but it was not the only one: when the measure was censured as unproductive, they were told that it was not a measure of revenue; and yet when the

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suffering manufacturer, when the injured trader, petitioned for relief against its ruinous operation, they were driven from the bar, and told that it was a matter of revenue. With respect to its producing any sensation in France, he could hardly believe that ministers themselves were serious in that expectation.
Lord Grenvillesaid, he did not rise to prolong the debate. Upon a former occasion he had taken an opportunity of stating fully and distinctly his sentiments upon the commercial policy of these Orders. His object in rising, was, to resist altogether the idea of any similarity between these Orders and that of the 7th of Jan. He contended that they were not only not alike, but essentially different. Sardinia, it was true, had been excepted; but Sardinia was not the only exception. At that time Denmark (would to God she were so now !) was neutral, and engrossed by much the greater portion of the neutral trade of Europe. The able and statesman-like note of his-noble friend (earl Grey) to the Danish minister, was a sufficient commentary upon the nature and object of that Order: but this mode of justifying by recriminating, involved the noble secretary in a strange dilemma. That Order was either right or wrong; if wrong, why attempt to justify the present Orders by proving their similitude to that? and if right, why make it the object of such extraordinary censure, that even his majesty in council was made, in the preamble to those Orders, to censure that act as injudicious and ineffectual, to which he had been advised to give his royal sanction? With respect to their effect on America, he should not now say any thing: the event would be shortly known, and he trusted that when it should be known, the result would not verify his apprehensions. As far as he could judge from such private advices as persons were pleased to communicate to him, he was, he confessed, inclined to believe that the intelligence of his majesty's ministers' intentions, with respect to the measure of the Orders in Council, was known in America several days before the measure of the embargo had been resolved on: and if so, it was not unreasonable to conclude, that that intelligence must have had no inconsiderable influence in producing the adoption of that measure.
Lord Hawkesburysaid, that ministers had received no intelligence, from any authentic source, that could lead them to believe, that the Americans knew any thing of the
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Orders in Council previous to the embargo; but, as he had stated on a former occasion, it was by no means improbable, that the embargo might have been resorted to in America, from a conviction that such measures of retaliation as the present would naturally be adopted by this country, in consequence of the French decrees. The noble baron, however, might have secret advices, that the Americans had been previously informed of the intention to issue the Orders in Council, and had acted accordingly; but until that was distinctly asserted, he must still believe, that the fact was as he himself had stated it. He allowed, that it was unwise to enter upon a commercial war; but the question here was, whether you were to submit to the embarrassments thrown by the enemy in the way of your commerce, without adopting some measure of retaliation? If we were not to engage in a commercial war of this kind at all, then the Order of the 7th of Jan. was a most unwise one. His lordship also stated, with regard to the American embargo, that the preamble of the Order of the 7th of Jan. announced further retaliation, in case that should take place which had actually happened; and this might have corroborated the idea, that such a measure as the late Orders in Council would be adopted by this country, and by that means have contributed to the laying on of the embargo.
Lord Grenvillesaid, that he had no secret advices, nor did he know what the noble secretary meant by the words 'secret advices.' His information was as public as the public papers of the country could make it. A commercial house here had sent information to America of the intention to issue these Orders, and of their nature and tendency, and that information was perfectly accurate. Their correspondents in America acknowledged the receipt of the intelligence on the 16th of Dec. being six days before the embargo was laid on. He desired the noble secretary not to take this statement upon his authority, but to call the merchant to the bar, who would confirm it on oath.
The house then divided on the question of agreeing to the first Resolution: Contents, 21; Non Contents, 56; Majority, 35.