Sitting of 26 February 1808

ARMY ESTIMATES.
The house having resolved itself into a Committee of Supply,
The Secretary of Warrose for the purpose of moving the Army Estimates. All that he thought it necessary to do was, to state the particulars in which the present Estimates differed from those of last year. The estimates now before the committee were classed under the following heads:

Numbers.

Great Britain.

Ireland.

£.

s.

d.

£.

s.

d.

Land Forces (including various Contingencies) 200,831

5,8892,922

9

1

1,385,057

11

6.

Regiments in the East Indies 30,884

691,525

8

9

Troops and Companies for recruiting ditto 437

25,281

12

9

Embodied Militia 108,384

2,236,462

0

4

816,408

17

6

Staff and Garrisons.

363,902

6

5

69,502

1

4

Full Pay Supernumerary Officers

32,213

2

8

778

1

9

Public Departments

188,680

19

6

8,921

14

—

Half Pay

209,750

—

—

26,732

8

1

In-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals

40,969

13

10

16,942

17

3

Out-Pensioners of Do.

329,619

9

2

46,878

8

6

Widows Pensions

40,495

10

6

6,000

—

—

Volunteer Corps

652,000

—

—

611,487

—

—

Foreign Corps 22,125

795,647

3

2

70,911

3

10

Royal Military College

21,525

17

4

Royal Military Asylum

19,908

9

3

Allowance to Retired and Officiating Chaplains

16,000

—

—

2,852

5

3

Medicines and Hospital Expences

100,000

—

—

18,676

8

9

Compassionte List

13,500

—

—

Barrack Department (Ireland)

412,262

13

5

Commissariat Department (Ireland)

190,253

7

4

Total 362,661

11,670,404

2

9

3,773,664

19

4

Deduct the Regiments in the East Indies 30,884

691,525

8

9

Remains to be provided 331,777

10,978,878

14

—

3,773,664

19

4

Several particulars with respect to marching-money, innkeepers allowances, and some other items, it was difficult to make out in the way of exact account. But as far as that could be done it had been. The principal alteration in point of charge arose from the care that had been taken to transfer from the army extraordinaries, every thing that could be made a subject of estimate. He had the satisfaction to state, that the army which the house was now called on to provide for was, in point of discipline, equal to any army in the world, and in point of numbers superior to any this country had ever had. The amount was in regulars and militia not less than 300,000 men. There was also a greater proportion of effective men than had ever been known, and the actual amount of force was as near the establishment as was possible. The increase from last year consisted chiefly in British regular disposable infantry, that most efficient description of force. The effective force was within 13,000 of the establishment; an approximation scarcely ever known before. The cavalry was on the same foot-
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ing as last year. Some trifling reduction was intended, but not sufficient to snake any alteration in the estimate. The waggon train was reduced to 500 horses. It had been proposed last year, but the employment of the number of horses and waggons now kept up, was more economic than the hiring of waggons to do the necessary work. The men were trained to arms, and it was desirable to keep them in his majesty's service. The next article was the militia, which, he was happy to say, was as near its full complement as ever, after having given to the line an addition, of 24,000 disciplined men. The Volunteer Estimate was the same as that of last year, with the addition of the charge for Inspecting Field Officers. With respect to Foreign Corps, a small addition had been made to the German Legion, but not such as to make any difference in the effective force, which was still the same. In the Royal Military College a Board of General Officers had thought fit to make a small increase of the salaries of the Chief Officers, and to augment the Staff. He trusted this establishment would be preserved, increased, and made permanent. In every military country there were establishments of this description, and in no country were they so much wanted as they were in this, in which there were not the same opportunities that the continent possessed of observing and comparing the merits and defects of a number of armies, and selecting whatever was good from the practice of each. After recapitulating the several items of increase, the right hon. secretary concluded with moving, "That 124,000 effective men be voted for the service of guards and garrisons, &c. for 366 days, from 1st Jan. 1808, to 1st Jan. 1809, both inclusive."
Mr. Calcraftasserted, that all his apprehensions of the disorganization of the militia, and the increase of the bounties by the volunteering were made good;. of. 16,000 men that had volunteered from the British militia, only 1600 had entered for life, and most of them being superannuated, entered for life to get the additional bounty, in the confidence of being discharged again before the 7 years should elapse. He allowed the militia would he filled up again by May, but not without infinite hardship to those classes of the people that ought to be particularly spread.
Mr. Windhamadmitted that the estimates, from the approaching expiration of the Mutiny act, must be voted without

755
delay. Still he thought it hard to be called on to vote them when they had not been 24 hours printed; and when some of the most important returns were not yet printed. He blamed the precipitancy with which the most important public measures were pressed forward, without sufficient information; and without sufficient opportunities of discussion.—After some further conversation, the various items of the Estimate were put and carried.

ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.
Mr. Ashley Coopernext moved the estimate for Ordnance service, amounting to 5,300,000 l.
Mr. Calcraftwished for some explanation how this estimate could exceed, by nearly a million and a half, that which he himself had brought forward when in office, about a year since.
Mr. Cooperexplained, that it arose from arrears of former years, and accumulated exceedings not provided for under the heads of debt to the navy departments for stores furnished; exceedings of former estimates for Ireland; expedition to Copenhagen; works at Chatham, Woolwich, and Dover, with various items, which he stated.
Mr. Calcraftthanked the hon. gent. for the explanation which it was his own duty to ask; but there were some other points of enormous expenditure, and particularly the Drivers' corps, in which he was not satisfied, and which he should take another opportunity of bringing forward for discussion.
Mr. Wellesley Polevindicated the whole of the estimate, and said the artillery of this country had attained a pitch of efficiency under the auspices of lord Chatham, not only unparalleled at any former period, but superior to any other train of Ordnance now in Europe. It consisted of 6000 men, with 4000 horses attached, and all in such a state of discipline and equipment, as to enable them to oppose a force of artillery against any enemy who should land in this country, in one-third the time, and with more than triple the effect that could be done at any former period.—The question upon the estimate was then put and carried.

PAPERS RELATING TO DENMARK.
Mr. Secretary Canning,pursuant to notice, rose for the purpose of moving for copies or extracts of any dispatches that had been sent in Nov. or Dec. 1806, by Mr. Garlike his majesty's minister to the court of Denmark, to his majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs, relating to the ac-
756
tual or intended invasion of Holstein by the army of France. It was also his intention to move for the several other Papers front which he had quoted passages to the house on a former occasion. His object was by producing the documents, to correct those misconstructions which had been put upon his conduct and language in that instance. As he did not feel it necessary to make any further observation on the subject of the motion, he should barely move, that an humble Address be presented to his majesty, &c.—On the motion being put,
Lord Folkestonesaid, that he had been one of those who, on the former occasion, in part persuaded by the arguments of the right hon. gent. and in part from his own conviction, had resisted the production of these Papers. Nothing that had since occurred had altered his opinion. If these papers were necessary to be produced, a great many more would be necessary, in order to set the persons who were concerned right with the public. These would not be sufficient to justify Mr. Garlike, who could not be set right with the public but by the production of all his dispatches, down to the time of the expedition to Copenhagen.
Mr. Ponsonbycould with difficulty object to the production of any papers that might be necessary for the justification of any hon. gent.'s conduct. But he had not so much respect for the feelings of any individual, as to think that the public service should be sacrificed to them. The right hon. gent. had made his extracts from the papers, to shew that there had been a hostile feeling in Denmark, and that this opinion of the present ministers had been fortified by the opinion of the late administration. But Mr. Garlike's dispatches dated in Nov. and Dec. 1806, would not be sufficient for his purpose, it would be necessary to produce all the dispatches that had been received down to the time of the expedition. A suspicion might have been entertained in 1806, which had afterwards been removed, and something of this description had, he believed, taken place, because in the commencement of 1807, a large fleet had been collected, intended for the Baltic, which had afterwards been sent on various other destinations, when the suspicion respecting Denmark had been removed. The right. hon. gent. first endeavoured to justify the expedition, and then he came to justify himself but he could not justify

757
himself, unless he produced all the papers. He had thought the hon. gent. had intended to produce all the correspondence of Mr. Garlike, but if he should not, he gave him notice that he would again vote for the production of those papers which he had before made motions to obtain.
Mr. Tierneyfelt compassion for the right hon. gentlemen opposite, whom he beheld in the pitiable situation of being called upon now to vote for what they had rejected but two or three weeks since. This was the first instance in which such a proceeding had taken place in parliament. The right hon. gent. had first resisted the production of the papers on public grounds, and afterwards when called for on private grounds, for the justification of his noble friend (lord Howick); but now that the right hon. gent.'s own character was touched, he was ready to produce the papers. He was glad the right hon. gent. at length shewed such a laudable attention to character, and thought it worth preserving. But, leaving private character out of the question, he saw no reason why more attention should be paid to the character of the right hon. gent. than to that of his noble predecessor, who had served his maj. in the same office, with as much fidelity, as the right hon. gent. The effect of the proceeding of the right hon. gent. would be to shew that that house was the instrument of the secretary of state. Had any thing occurred since the former vote, to shew that there was less danger in the production of the papers now than at that period? The character of Mr. Garlike, to whom public character must be so dear, could not be justified but by the production of all the papers. If right. hon. gent. should not consent to that, he would compromise the character of the house by the refusal. Let the house sec in that the danger of raising men too high, let them see the degraded and disgraced state to which they would be reduced, and which would sink them in the estimation of their country, and perhaps of the sovereign himself. (A loud cry of order.)
The Speakerdeclared his disapprobation of the course pursued by the right hon. gent.; and for this reason, because he appeared to be expressing an opinion of the sovereign on the conduct of an individual in that house.
Mr. Tierneywas not conscious of having any such intention, but having been interrupted in the chain of what he had to state to the house, declined proceeding, declaring that nothing had occurred in the
758
few last weeks to justify the alteration of the course then adopted by the house.
The vote of the 8th of was then read, on the motion of Mr. Adam; and the Speaker decided, that if the paper now moved for was that which had been in the former instance rejected, the house could not now vote for it, but it would be for the house to judge how far the present paper was more or less than that which had been refused in that case.—After a short conversation upon the subject of order, relative to comments upon the expressions of Mr. Tierney, which had not been taken down, but which the Speaker decided might be made the subject of comment by way of explanation, though not the ground of a decision of the house.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, he was at a loss to know whether the gentlemen opposed or supported the motion of his right hon. friend, [it was intimated across the table that they supported it.] Then, he could not see how his learned friend's question upon the order, by,requiring the entry of the vote of the 8th of Feb. to be read, could be construed into a support of the motion. The house would perceive, that the production of these Papers would be a source of disappointment to the gentlemen opposite, because it would deprive them of the foundation of much declamation, in accusing his right hon. friend of having made garbled extracts. The Papers had never been refused on public grounds. They had been asked for to prove that his right hon. friend had misrepresented the contents of lord Howick's dispatches, which he had not done, and it was on that ground that they had been demanded and refused, because the granting them on that occasion would have been an admission on his part of the misrepresentation. If the Papers had been demanded on other grounds, his right hon. friend would not have objected to their production. What had been said would, he trusted, be sufficient to satisfy the house of the propriety of his right hon. friend's motion.
Mr. Windhamobserved, that the hon. gentlemen opposite shewed a disposition to laugh, though their mirth resembled the singing of children in the dark, to shew they were not afraid. He contended, with his right hon. friend, that the house would, by their proceeding, be placed in a situation of indignity, and he lamented that the forms of the house did not admit of

759
ascertaining who would follow the example of the hon. gent. The papers had been refused on public and private grounds, and were now to be granted, because the character of the right hon. gent had been touched. They ought to have been produced to clear up the character of the late foreign secretary equally as well as the present. The right hon. gent. then argued to shew, that many more papers were necessary to be produced, in order to justify the right hon. secretary, or to do justice to the characters of those who had been misrepresented.
Lord Castlereaghentered his protest against the doctrine laid down on the other side of the house, that no papers should be refused but such, as, if produced, would be prejudicial to the public service. Nothing was more common than to refuse papers when no adequate or sufficient ground was laid for the production.
Mr. Sheridanhad thought, when his right hon. friend introduced his motions without any observations, that it was a bad plan. But from the line of argument pursued by the noble lord, and the rt. hon. gent. on either side of him, he could not but applaud that course of his right hon. friend, and he was sure that his right hon. friend would have been well pleased, if his friends had practised the same taciturnity with himself. He defied the noble lord to produce any reason now that would not have applied equally against the papers in the former instance, and argued at some length to prove that the papers then moved for would neither be sufficient to the purpose of his right hon. friend, nor to acquit the character of Mr. Garlike; and concluded with an amendment for the production of all the communications which had been received in the course of last year—A conversation followed, in which Mr. Bankes observed, that the amendment could not be received, as being word for word the same as a motion already rejected.
The Speakerconfirmed the observation of Mr. Bankes, as to the point of order.
Mr. Secretary Canningsaid, that though some papers which had been refused were included in his motion, the motion was in form, very different from any before offered.
Mr. Tierneyproposed to adjourn the debate, on the point of order.
Mr. Adamby moving that the entry on the journals, with respect to the former motion, should be read, did not mean that
760
the rejection at that time should preclude the house from adopting the motion; but he wished the house to bear in mind all that had been done in this case, when he should come to offer his intended propositions to fix the practice of the house. He recommended that the amendment should be offered again in such a form that the house could receive it.
Mr. Sheridanmoved the amendment in a form different from that in which the papers mentioned in it had been formerly refused.
Mr. Secretary Canningdenied that he had made any accusation against lord Howick, by quoting his dispatch, consequently there was no necessity for producing the papers as a vindication, when no charge was made. He had merely made the quotation to shew that it was in lord Howick's contemplation, that if the French should enter Holstein, Denmark might possibly compromise for the occupation of Zealand by French troops. The present motion stood on different grounds; and he trusted the house would see reason to produce it, upon the principle on which it was now asked for, without at the same time passing the amendment. His majesty's ministers rested their defence of the proceedings against Copenhagen, upon the information already produced, upon existing circumstances, and the notoriety of what the enemy had done in similar cases. The whole of our diplomatic correspondence was not to be ripped up: it was enough, if what was material to the case in question was produced.—After some further debate,
In consequence of the above motion, the following papers were on the 5th of March, presented to the house, by Mr. Secretary Canning: viz.
the house divided—For the Amendment 40. Against 110—Another division took place on the original motion. For the production of the Papers 140, Against 9, Majority 131.

PAPERS

  RELATING TO DENMARK.
  No. I.—Dispatch from, Benj. Garlike, esq. his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the court of Denmark, to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 11th Nov. 1806.—Received 29th Nov.
  My lord; Your ldp. will have received accounts of an affair which has taken place on the Holstein frontier, between the Da-

  761
  nish troops and those of France; of which I beg leave to transmit the following particulars.—On the 6th inst. a corps of Prussians, under the command of gen. Blucher, were on their way to take refuge in the town of Lubeck. They were pursued by a French corps under the command of gen. Murat. The object of the latter was to turn the wing of the Prussians in order to intercept their passage. In attempting this manœvre the French troops crossed a strip of Danish territory, and, heedless of the notice given by the advanced posts, brought on a skirmish, in which 2 or 3 persons were killed on both sides, and 2 Danish cannon taken. Three Danish officers, lieut. col. Kardorff, commander of a battalion of light infantry; maj. Gruner, aide de camp to the prince royal; and lieut. Schow, adj. to col. Kardorff, who were proceeding in an open Holstein carriage to the Danish advanced guard commanded by maj. gen. Evald, were also made prisoners by the enemy.—Gen. Evald proceeded himself to gen. Murat, to learn the cause of what had happened; he was coarsely received, and informed, possibly with more haste than reflection, that the French troops would pursue their enemies wherever they were to be found. On gen. Evald's return, the prince royal dispatched an aide de camp, capt. Romeling of the engineers, to acquaint gen. Murat, that the king his father having entrusted the army on the frontier to his command, he thought it his duty to his majesty and to the army to require satisfaction for the insult.—Since these first accounts reached Copenhagen, a packet boat has arrived from Kiel, and it is pretended that the answer returned by gen. Murat has been deemed satisfactory by the prince royal; but I am unable to ascertain this latter circumstance before the post goes out.—The Danish troops on the advanced post are chasseurs; the colour of their uniform (green) is different from that of the rest of the army. Some persons here are willing, therefore, to persuade themselves that the Danish troops were mistaken for Prussians; and in the same manner to account for a blow of a sabre given to a Danish officer in a Danish village through which the French were passing. It is presumed the officers are released. I have, &c.
  B. GARLIKE.
  No. II.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 14th Nov. 1806.—Received 29th Nov.
  My lord; The answer required by the prince royal of Denmark to his representations to M. de Murat, has been received. He retorts on the Danish troops the accusation of violating their neutrality, but declares that he had no intention to commit hostilities against Denmark; and has the more reason to regret the mistake, as he has lost one of his best officers in the action. This answer is considered as satisfactory. The loss on time Danish side amounts to 25 men killed. The French escort given to gen. Evald, on his return to the Danish advanced guard, carried off his horse, his watch, and some other articles. Two of the officers, maj. Gruner and lieut. Schow, are returned to their posts; but lieut. col. Kardorff is missing. The French troops (marauders) have also committed further depredations on the Danish territory, have burnt a village, plundered the estate, and destroyed the cattle belonging to count Bernstorff. I have, &c.
  B. GARLIKE.
  No. 3.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 14th Nov. 1806. —Received 29th Nov.
  I have the honour to inform your. ldp. that I have used my utmost endeavours to impress count Bernstorff with the sentiments contained in your lordship's dispatch, of No. 3 *, and it is with extreme regret that I have not been able to obtain the desired success.—Although the progress of the French arms opposite the very coasts of Denmark the insults and hostility committed on the Danish frontier, and the Proclamation of gen. Mortier to the people of Hesse, are facts more powerful than any language I could use, and with sentiments of grief must excite those of the keenest resentment; it does not apppear that the Danish government are more disposed to prepare against the infliction of similar violence and dishonour; on the contrary, that they derive from those events the confirmation of their present system of neutrality, and the still stricter observance of all its
  *This Dispatch is verbatim the same with the Dispatch to Mr. Pierrepoint, No. 2. of the Papers presented to the House of Commons, by his majesty's command, in pursuance of their Address of the 16th;of Feb; with the variation only of "Court of Copenhagen" for "Court of Stockholm," See p. 621.

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  obligations.—Such at least is the language which, in explanation of that neutrality, the Danish ministers think it right to hold to me. They do not, however, shut their eyes on the scene before them; they know what they may expect from the wanton abuse of the power of France; or what is worse, from the determined method and perseverance with which France is subduing the states and directing the resources of the continent against G. Britain.—I have dwelt on these topics in formal conference and familiar conversation with count Bernstorff, as also in the frequent occasions I have of seeing—and the ministers of the cabinet. They avow the precarious tenour even of their present disturbed existence; but their fears are paramount; they consider the Prussian monarchy as annihilated for the present, and believe if they resolve on further measures of defence, that they would draw on this country the worst consequences that may be apprehended.—In the mean time, they regard the actual state of Denmark as of the utmost importance to the allies; and persuade themselves that for the sake of the common cause, as well as of Denmark, it behoves them to adopt no measure which may augment their difficulties, or hasten the disasters they would avert. They therefore, conclude, that their best policy will be the continuation of their present defensive system, and of their reliance on the friendship of G. Britain and Russia; of which policy they say the merit and best effect would be the assistance of those powers when Denmark is endangered by an attack from France. I asked count Bernstorff the direct question, If it was intended to arm such a part of the fleet as might be useful in defeating an expedition from the ports now falling into the hands of France? He replied, that this was not the season.—Disposed as your ldp. may be to allow for these apprehensions in the present calamities of the north of Germany, and to coincide with the Danish ministers as to the readiness of G. Britain and Russia to afford every practicable assistance against the enemy, you will probably not less lament that no preparations have hitherto been made, in concert with the natural allies of Denmark, either to resist a sudden attack, or to impede the gradual encroachments France will continue to make, till she is in an attitude to require the exclusion of British ships from Danish ports, and the surrender of the Copenhagen dock-yard to her purposes against G. Britain.—By pre-
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  parations I do not so much mean a display of military force which this court calls a defiance of the enemy, and the seeking of their own undoing, as some previous concert, some signal for succour or combined operations, some stipulated degree or disposition of force, some security to the powers at war, for the proper application of the assistance they may be able to furnish.—I have this day urged these remarks, and it is readily allowed, that however well-disposed the powers on whom Denmark may rely in the hour of danger, the greatest inconvenience must arise from distance and delay; and that in such an emergency, whatever is irresolute, or timid, or bad, will endeavour to perplex the public councils, for want of a direct recourse to a steady and provident system.—Yet the Danish ministers shrink at all appearance of concert, and at the responsibility of a written engagement. They dread the effects of its publicity, which they think unavoidable; and as count Bernstorff has told me, believe that the mere suspicion of such a concert, though conceived for the duties of defence alone, would on such art occasion as that of the 6th inst. have determined immediate war against Denmark.—I should think it unnecessary to lay these remarks before your ldp. if I had not to make the melancholy addition, that several of the principal departments (I except the ministers of the council and for foreign affairs) as well as many of the inferior ones with their dependencies, are filled by persons in a state of delusion and blind attachment to the interests of France.—The only check to the more open display of these dispositions, is the character of the prince royal.— who marks in the strongest terms his sense of the firmness of his royal highness, observed to me yesterday, that the most entire reliance may be placed on his not yielding to the proposals it may be expected France would make——But too many precautions could not perhaps be taken against the efforts of deluded or ill-disposed persons to perplex or mislead the government in an emergency that may well be foreseen, and when no preconcerted system would be opposed to such attempts, except that of confidence towards G. Britain and Russia; which, however real or well-founded, is not it seems to be acknowledged or carried into effect, till France is in the act. of binding this country never to make the attempt—Among the measures which have already been recommended to the attention

  765
  of the government, there is one which appears to unite many opinions and interests in this country; namely, that in case of an attack from France, Holstein, Sleswick, and Jutland shall be abandoned, and the principal force be concentered in the defence of the Islands, (even with the exclusion of Fionia.) This project has never been mentioned to me by one of the ministers, but without any reserve by several leading persons; and it would be seriously supported by many who see the principal strength of the monarchy in the island of Zealand; Its fleet and arsenals in Norway, in the West India possessions, and in the commerce of the country. A military person of rank who has been employed in a very confidential station, and now fills an important post at this place, is occupied in writing a Memorial to be sent to the prince, in support of this measure, with the additional advice, to put it into immediate execution by the recall of the army and the return of the prince royal to Zealand.—From all these considerations your ldp. will best judge how far it may be advisable to make a joint formal representation on the part of his majesty and the emperor of Russia, for the purpose of concerting with this country the best means of counteracting the projects France, which are but too clearly avowed in her practice and declarations, and become every day more alarming, from the extent and nature of her acquisitions in the Baltick.—It is indeed possible that the operations about to commence in Poland may suspend for a while the intention of attacking this country; but those operations must so much the more call for every effort that may be to be made, either against the body of France, or to prevent that success in her present undertakings, which will otherwise certainly overwhelm this country.—I shall continue in every event to be entirely guided by your lordship's instructions, and to use my utmost endeavours for the success of the objects to which they are directed.
  No. IV.—Dispatch from viscount Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 3d Dec. 1806.
  Sir, your dispatches to No.—inclusive. have been received and laid before the king. The language of count Bernstorff and the Danish ministers, as described by you, is such as was naturally to be expected from their former policy, and from the effect of the recent events in the north of Germany. Any endeavour to induce
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  them to adopt other sentiments, if indeed such an attempt were adviseable, would, at the present moment, probably be without a hope of success.—At the time of writing the Dispatch to which yours is an answer, the extent of those extraordinary misfortunes which have since happened, was far from being foreseen or expected. A hope was then entertained, though not unmixed with doubt and apprehension, that the power of the Prussian monarchy, aided by the neighbouring states, and by the allies, might have opposed an effectual resistance to the armies of France. But since the afflicting events which have ended in the total dispersion of the Prussian army, the question no longer is whether Denmark should give her aid to a powerful ally, but whether she should, without any continental support, expose herself alone to the resentment of France. So long as the question remains on this footing, it cannot be expected, nor is it to be wished, that the court of Copenhagen should take any measures of direct hostility against France. But the care of its own safety requires more vigilance than ever. While France abstains from any attack, or from any direct menace, a prudent system of neutrality, which shall not impair the means of future defence, is probably the best. But that this forbearance on the part of the French government should last longer than may be found convenient for the execution of those further schemes of ambition in which Buonaparte is at present engaged, seems to me very improbable. After the accomplishment of his more immediate objects, demands may be expected equally inconsistent with the neutrality and the independence of Denmark; and it is for that government to consider whether it will place itself in a situation to defend those parts of the Danish dominions which possess effectual means of resistance, or whether it will follow the example of so many states, which, by seeking safety in submission, have successively fallen under the dominion of France. In looking forward, however, to the probable conduct of France, there is one point which cannot be too soon understood between this government and that of Denmark. Though his majesty must experience the deepest regret from any interruption in the relations now so happily subsisting between the two powers, it would be impossible for the king to acquiesce in any arrangement whereby the whole, or any part, of the Danish navy might be

  767
  placed at the disposal of France. If therefore it should so happen that in order to secure the German dominions of the Crown of Denmark, that power should be induced to comply with a demand of this nature, his majesty could not avoid taking such measures as in that case would become indispensible for the honour of his crown and the interests of his people. Should any question of this sort arise, you will at once state distinctly and unequivocally the feelings of this government upon it. But the king is far from believing, though it is necessary to provide against it as a possible case, that any thing so injurious to both countries, as the submission of Denmark to so humiliating a condition, is likely to happen. His majesty relies with entire confidence on the wisdom, the spirit, and the honour of the prince royal; and I revert with pleasure to a more pleasing part of my duty, that of authorizing you to repeat the assurances already given, of his majesty's constant disposition to afford to the court of Denmark the most effectual assistance and support, if that government, deceived in the hopes which it seems at present to derive from the observance of a strict neutrality, should ultimately be forced into a war with France for the preservation of its own independence.—In such a case, it is obvious that, notwithstanding the great continental superiority of France, the attack of the Danish islands would present many great difficulties, such as might indeed with proper exertion on the part of that court, prove insurmountable. To this supposition, it is therefore, the king's pleasure that you should particularly direct the attention of the Danish ministers. The king would see with pleasure a successful defence of Holstein, and offers for assisting in this, have this morning been communicated to me by M. Rehausen on the part of his Swedish majesty, who proposes to unite a corps of 25,000 men to the Danish army in Holstein for this purpose. With such a force, it is to be hoped, not only that Holstein might be defended, but that the most beneficial effects for the safety of the north of Germany might ensue from its position in the rear and on the flank of the operations of the French army. You will therefore recommend this offer of his Swedish majesty, which probably will have been communicated to the court of Denmark before this reaches you, to the most serious attention of the Danish ministers. It that government should decline entering into
  768
  any measures of this nature, or should deem the defence of Holstein impracticable, his majesty still trusts that no effort will be omitted to put the Danish islands in a proper state of defence, and he would gladly co-operate in naval measures necessary for that purpose, if Denmark should really stand in need of such aid, I am, &c.
  Howick.
  No. V.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 9th Dec. 1806.
  Though no dispatches have been received from you since my last, the accounts which have reached this country of the retreat of the Danish Army from Holstein, and the advance of the French to the Eyder, from which river there is reason to apprehend that his majesty's flag has been excluded, render it necessary that I should instruct you immediately to require of the Danish government a frank explanation of the motives which have produced measures apparently so injurious to the interests of his majesty; and also of the system of policy which that government means in future to pursue in its relations with this country and with France.—This explanation you will require in the most friendly terms, but at the same time in such a manner as to prevent any delay. The interests of Denmark itself and the known character of the prince royal, encourage his majesty still to entertain a confident expectation that, notwithstanding present appearances, the answer will be such as the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two governments requires.—With respect to the views entertained by his majesty's government on the present alarming crisis, and the advantage which may be derived from the generous offer of the king of Sweden to assist in the defence of Denmark, I must refer you to my last dispatches. I am, &c.
  HOWICK.
  No. VI.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 24th Nov. 1806.—Received 11th Dec.
  My lord; The reports of the declared intention of general Mortier to occupy Hamburgh, had been in circulation here for some days. The intelligence of his having entered the town with a number from seven to eight thousand men, was received last night. This government did not appear to believe the event was probable. There seems now to remain a stand of opinion, that the French troops will pro-

  769
  ceed no further in this direction, but that they will respect the neutrality of Denmark.—With regard to Holstein, it would not only be a vain endeavour to urge this country to other measures of defence than those they have already adopted; but there are no measures of a nature purely military, which could now be taken in concert with other countries, to second the efforts of the Army which is there established, if it should be brought into immediate action. What I have now principally to submit to your lordship, is accordingly meant to apply only to the case of hostilities being actually commenced by France against Denmark, in the duty of Holstein.—Nothing, I imagine, need be urged to prove, that if the French troops succeed in occupying that part of Denmark, the sole purpose cannot be the shutting of the ports of Tonningen and Husum against the British Flag; there must also exist the intention of seizing these islands, and of directing their resources against the interests of Great Britain and Russia.—The conduct of the Danish government, if Holstein and the Peninsula should fall, must, I suppose, be that which has been so often insisted on, namely, a perseverance in the firmest resolution to resist the enemy; and, as count Bernstorff informed me this morning, the immediate arming of the fleet for the defence of this and the adjacent Islands.—But having said this, it is my duty not to conceal from your lordship how much my apprehensions increase with respect to the persons in high though not in the first offices, to whom great confidence will be shewn in the hour of danger, and who must have considerable influence in the direction of the public opinion, and of the means of repelling the enemy.—The character and bias of these individuals (many of whom I know personally) were undoubted before the present continental war took place. Their language in all the changes which occur, leave nothing but a formal declaration of their principles, to convince me of what may be expected from them when the enemy is in possession of Holstein. They will represent the danger to be less than it is, in order to prevent the activity of others, and will exaggerate it with the chance of securing and extending their own authority. These persons will then be capable of imputing as a crime, that more effectual means were not concerted for the defence of the country; and will recommend an accommodation with France,
  770
  through the voice of the populace not as an avowal of their choice, but as a measure of the necessity to which they have been reduced.—The danger of a war with Great Britain, which, in such circumstances, is already foreseen by the thinking part of the country, would not overrule those who are guided only by their prejudices and their ambition; or if that danger were attended to in the general tumult, it would be only as a reason for arming and stationing whatever could be found in the arsenals of this place, assisted by the supplies of the Mecklenburg and Pomeranian coasts, for purposes of which France would assume the direction.—These are not idle surmises. I do not pretend to describe by what gradations they will be realized; but I cannot observe the confidence and listlessness of some, with the activity and growing hopes of others, or attend to the conversation of this place for a day, without being this day more than the preceding, justified in pointing to the most melancholy results, not as a determination of the government, but as a consequence of the confusion of late measures against an active enemy, amidst undecided and misguided friends.—The contrary too may take place. The activity, firmness, spirit, and popularity of the prince royal, may have the fullest effect against all internal impediments of whatever nature.—In the possibility of one or the other course of these events, I would submit to your lordship the two following considerations: 1st, How far, after the attack or possession of Holstein by the French troops, it may be proper to reduce his majesty's offer of assistance to some specific shape, especially of a maritime nature, for the defence of this and the neighbouring islands. The Danish government will continue to be so totally unprepared for a defence of this nature, as possibly not to be able to bring it forward on a very sudden emergency. 2d, Whether it may not be proper, on such opportunities as occur, without formal declaration, or menace, to give it to be understood, or even finally to announce, that such an arrangement with the French government, as may be attempted in the circumstances I have described, will infallibly lead to open and active war on the part of Great Britain.—I have seen count Bernstorff since I wrote the above. He expresses himself without, any alarm from the presence of the French troops at Hamburgh or Lubeek.—I understand from him clearly, that the Danish troops are re-

  771
  tiring from the frontiers; and I make no doubt that this has been done at the desire of the French emperor. I beg leave to transmit, as nearly as I can, the very phrases he made use of, in this unasked-for intelligence. "Loin de nous alarmer sur ce qui vient d'arriver, le prince Royal a cru devoir retirer une partie des troupes rassemblées sur la frontiere du Holstein. C'est à dire qu'elles ne resteront pas aussi concentrées qu'elles ont été depuis quelque temps. En effet nous n'avons par les mênies motifs pour les y tenir. Ni les Prussiens ni les Suedois ne s'y trouvant plus, il n'est plus aussi probable que les Hostilités s'engagent sur notre propre territoire; de sorte que la plupart des régimens avaient réçu l'orde de se retirer du coté de Sleswick avant l'occupation de Hamburg; et nous ne voyons point dans cet évenement qu'il y ait lieu à le contremander. Mais le quartier géneral sera toujours a Kiel." The Danish army then, except the small garrisons of Gluckstadt, Kiel, and Ploen, and an advanced guard under general Evald, may be considered as having retreated to the Dutchy of Sleswick behind the Eyder. The French minister at Hamburg, and M. de Mortier, have conveyed the most positive assurances to this government of the respect which will be shewn to its neutrality; and as a proof of it, have insisted on the precautions taken in the march of the troops from Bergedorff to Hamburg, to avoid a portion of Danish territory, which lies more conveniently for the road between the two places. I have, &c. B. GARLIKE.
  No. VII.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 29th Nov. 1806.—Received 11th Dec.
  It was perhaps to be expected that as the Danish troops had remained on the Holstein frontier, when there was no war in the north of Germany, and had actually been engaged with those of France, their sudden retreat to the Eyder would give rise to the supposition of some arrangement between the Danish and French governments.—Mr. Pierrepont will have informed your lordship of the very unfavourable construction of that retreat, which has been transmitted to his Swedish majesty, and of the strong measures of precaution which that monarch has judged it proper to adopt against the new danger that would result to his own interests and to those of the allies.—Your lordship will have borne in mind, that the very essence of the neu-
  772
  tral system maintained in this country has been repeatedly declared to be the guarding against every dishonourable proposition that might be recommended to the adoption of the prince royal.—With this recollection on my part, it did not even occur to me, that his r. h. could consent to a concession so much in his abhorrence as that of the abandonment of the duchy of Holstein to the French troops, for the sake of the quiet retreat of those of Denmark to the banks of the Eyder; that is to say, that the richest province of the crown should be gratuitously ceded to the enemy, with increased disadvantage and insecurity to Denmark; and though the cession (of Holstein) would not have included Tonningen and Husum, both being in Sleswick, yet that the French troops should be brought within sight of one of those ports, and within a few English miles of the other.—Your lordship will therefore judge of the earnestness and of the caution with which I brought this subject forward with count Bernstorff, as soon as possible after I had received Mr. Pierrepont's letter, for the purpose of learning if any and what conditions had been stipulated with France on the retreat of the Danish troops to the Sleswick frontier; and I have the satisfaction of assuring your lordship, that, in terms and manner to which I give my perfect confidence, did count Bernstorff endeavour to remove the suspicions (which in truth I had not entertained) by assuring me, that no transaction whatever had taken place relative to the respective positions of the French and Danish troops, either in the shape of condition or of explanation, or by any communication between the two governments, and even that the retreat of the prince royal, and the assurances of security conveyed by M. de Mortier and M. de Bourienne, had not depended on each other.—Count Bernstorff was further earliest that I should understand that the retreat had not been determined on at the suggestion of France. But as it may be impossible for count Bernstorff himself to explain how a suggestion of this nature may have been conveyed or admitted, this last circumstance did not so particularly engage my attention.—The retreat having taken place with the approbation of the prince royal, there may be occasion to regret that M. de Mortier and M. de Bourienne were not every way competent to the assurances in which they have abounded, that Holstein will not be attacked. The

  773
  danger to which that duchy was exposed, is at best not less than it was; and every account transmitted within these few days to Copenhagen, except those received by the government, encreases our apprehensions that the attack is not far off.—This possibility is at least now become so familiar to the government as to shew that they place their principal strength and hopes in the defence of the islands; and I have now, for the first time, some reason to believe that measures of precaution begin to be taken for the case of withdrawing the troops from Holstein, and of establishing some points of union and supply. I have not this intelligence from the government. If measures of this nature have been considered as advisable, they will not be pursued without the strictest secrecy, on the ground of not forfeiting by preparations which may invite the enemy, the advantages of the system in which they have persevered so long. I mean that they will not avow any measure of defence respecting the islands, till Holstein be really attacked by France, and certainly not take any of an ostensible description.—This disposition of the government makes the difficulty of affording or concerting the assistance of which they may stand in need. It is of that apprehensive nature, as would refuse to admit the most effectual succour that might be sent to the country, before it has been determined to adopt a course of undisguised and active war; and it must be on that occasion the more natural to hope, that however they may veil the attempt, every secret preparation for a sudden display of force will be the daily and earnest labour of the Danish ministers.—To this object I have directed my conversation with count Bernstorff. I should hope also, that there is fair ground to urge the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm to some well concerted common measure of defence of the Danish islands. If the prejudices of the two countries are not insurmountable, Denmark and Sweden have the motives and means of self-defence within themselves. They have local knowledge, and ships of war fitted to the coast; the proximity of Sweden and her actual hostilities may give the readiest assistance; and favour even the timidity with which Denmark may be disposed to come forward.— I am aware that the approaching season may render the operations of a fleet neither safe nor practicable; and that the main passage to be defended between Zealand
  774
  and Fionia (Fiunen) may require vessels large enough to be able to keep the sea, and small enough to shelter in the common ports of the islands. If these are difficulties, they are to be subdued by the governments themselves. My purpose can only be to advert incessantly to the subject in every direction likely to produce the good understanding and concert, without which Zealand must become the passage for French troops into Sweden, and the seat of every mischievous operation against all the powers interested in the defence of the Baltic.—Hitherto I have not been able to engage the Danish ministers in a satisfactory discussion of the points in question; but I shall make the attempts with the greater earnestness at this moment, as I learn from Mr. Pierrepont that the king of Sweden intends without loss of time to propose an interview with the prince royal; the object of which I would flatter myself must be, their endeavour to concert the best means of their common defence.
  No. VIII.—Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing street, 26th Dec. 1806.
  Sir; The apprehension entertained here, at the time of writing my last dispatch, of the entrance of the French troops into Holstein, I am happy to find, was unfounded. But I cannot regard the respect which has hitherto been paid by the enemy to the neutrality of the Danish territory as any thing more than the effect of a policy which for the moment is more convenient to themselves.—It would be madness to trust to any assurances which may have been received from the French government on this point, so far as to neglect a timely preparation of those means of defence which to be effectual must not be left to be sought for in a moment of immediate and pressing danger.—I have urged the necessity of precautionary measures, which might be so conducted as neither to provoke nor to afford a pretext of hostilities on the part of the French, in the strongest manner to Mr. Rist. Above all, it is necessary that no time should be lost in concerting measures of common defence with the court of Sweden, to which so good an opportunity has been offered by the prompt and generous offer of his Swedish majesty.—You will continue therefore to request from the court of Denmark a frank communication of its views, and to urge their immediate attention to the important objects above stated. I have, &c.
  HOWICK.
  No. IX.—Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to viscount Howick, dated Copenhagen, 20th Dec. 1806.—Received 7th Jan. 1807.
  My lord, I deferred the honour of writing to your lordship on my communication to count Bernstorff of the principal points of your dispatch of the 3d December till I had an opportunity of seeing that minister again, after he had submitted them to the cabinet ministers. I advert first, to the proposal of his Swedish majesty for the co-operation of 25,000 Swedish troops with those of his Danish majesty in Holstein. I cannot yet say in what manner this overture has been made to the prince royal; but on both the occasions which I have had of discussing the subject here, I have found it attended with the most undisguised aversion; as incongruous at this moment from a power at war to a power at peace; inapplicable with respect to time, if relied on when the attack of Holstein is no longer a problem; unseasonable when no new circumstance has occurred, except the repetition of friendly assurances on the part of France; and dangerous above all, as inviting, or rather immediately committing, the country to unavoidable war.—I endeavoured in the gentlest manner possible to rescue the Swedish proposal from the weight of objections, which thus tend to enervate every wise and provident scheme of self-defence, and carried one degree further, must leave the country prostrate to no good-will, but that of the enemy.— I think it natural to suppose, that the Danish minister urged his objections in this instance with more than usual quickness, from his consciousness that the resolution is already taken to withdraw the Danish troops from Holstein. I felt the conversation clogged on my side with the knowledge of that resolution; but it was not openly noticed on either.—Count Bernstorff than asked me, if 1 believed the king of Sweden could spare from his own dominions any number of men, which approached that of 25,000? This was not a question for me to answer; but I pressed the Danish minister to consider, as exceedingly probable, that when his Swedish majesty resolved on making the offer, he was alarmed for the safety of the Danish peninsula; and that if such a force could not well be spared from Sweden, nothing could be a stronger proof of his Swedish majesty's friendship, than the prompt desire which he must have enter-
  776
  tained to raise it by extraordinary means.—It occurred to me before this last conference took place, how little the probability was that the measure thus recommended by his maj. would meet with the success it deserved. I therefore previously prepared myself for endeavouring to derive from it at least the next and very important advantage, that of familiarizing the Danish minister with the prospect of sincere co-operation on the part of Sweden, and of impressing them with the notion that, whatever be the fate of the Swedish overture, the ground-work is thereby laid of a real good understanding between the two countries.—Count Bernstorff acknowledged that his Swedish majesty's desire to have an interview with the prince royal, and the communication of the present overture, would be felt by the entire government; and he assured me, that if Holstein were attacked, the concert between Denmark and Sweden, G. Britain and Russia, would be de facto established, and that this country would be most willing to add every resource of the monarchy to the assistance the allies could furnish.— returned to Copenhagen a few days ago. I saw him the next day. He was more than usually prompt and clear as to the necessity of maintaining the present system. He was averse to the admission of a Swedish army into Holstein, but was persuaded of the advantage of an unreserved intercourse with Sweden. He acknowledged, I may say, the propriety of not defending Holstein (that is, the peninsula,) and as proof of his sincerity in this opinion, remarked that the abandonment of those provinces would expose his own estates to the ravages of the French army. He thought the nature of the embarrassments of Denmark called for the utmost frankness towards enemies as well as friends, and believed that as little remains to be explained to France as to any other country. He appeared on all these points to speak as of so many fresh decisions of council, and desirous I should so understand them.— I make no doubt that the withdrawing of the troops sent to Holstein last year will be completely effected, (Count Bernstorff, however, always speaks of a cordon that will remain,) and that the government is sincere in the determination to oppose every thing to France, if she abuse the extreme condescension to which the prince royal has been brought.—glanced of his own accord to the consequences of a contrary line of conduct, and

  777
  of further compliance towards the French government, and did not scruple to declare, that the effects alone of a war with England must destroy the Danish monarchy in a couple of years.—According, then, to this language, matters have advanced to an epoch in the neutrality of Denmark. Holstein will be deprived of its main defence; it is foreseen that it may be occupied by the troops of France; Denmark will then be in a state of war with France, and will openly concert with G. Britain and Russia, and possibly with Sweden, for the defence of the Danish islands and the Baltic.—To these, the only measures that remain, the different parties may be desirous of directing their own views, and encouraging each other; but I have not scrupled, in conversation with the proper persons here, to speak of this position as fallacious and insecure, because weak in its nature, and liable to be surprised by the arts and activity of the enemy, and by the events which will arise.—If, however, the Danish navy is in the state of forwardness which has been represented, and nothing intervene to disturb the good intelligence of G. Britain and Russia with Denmark, it may still be hoped that every effort of France will fail against the power and resources of the Danish islands.—I have not failed to repeat to this government his majesty's most gracious and friendly offer of assistance and support, if Denmark should ultimately be forced into a war with France for the preservation of her own independence; and I have the pleasure of informing your lordship, that the assurances of this constant disposition on the part of his majesty have been received with every expression that can interpret the fullest sense of the obligations and thankfulness of the Danish government. I have, &c.
  B. GARLIKE.
  No. X.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, Jan 9th, 1807.
  His majesty has received with satisfaction the assurances that the court of Denmark is determined to resist the demands of France, if pushed to a point that should be inconsistent with the honour and independence of that power. Of the sincerity and constancy of this determination his majesty's government will not allow itself to doubt. But it is necessary to repeat, that to make such determination effectual, timely measures should be taken.—An immediate junction of a Swedish force to the
  778
  army of Denmark might, as has been stated by count Bernstorff, put an end at once to the neutrality which the latter government still wishes to preserve. But a previous and confidential explanation and concert with Sweden on the measures necessary for the common defence of the two powers, could not have this effect, and is evidently necessary to render the co-operation offered by Sweden of any advantage, whenever the time shall arrive at which the court of Denmark may find itself desirous of availing itself of this offer.—Upon the best means of defence it is impossible for this government to pretend to form a satisfactory opinion. It may be true that the peninsula affords no position in which the force of Denmark could hope to withstand the power of France; and it may be advisable, therefore, to withdraw the troops for the defence of the islands.
  No. XI.—Extract of a Dispatch from Benj. Garlike, esq. to visc. Howick, dated Copenhagen, 28th Dec. 1806.—Received 12th Jan. 1807.
  My lord; In your lordship's dispatch of the 3d Dec. the passage relative to the possible sacrifice of a part of the Danish navy to the French, concludes with these words: "Should any question of this sort arise, you will at once state, distinctly, and unequivocally, the feelings of this government upon it."—I have presumed, that this passage gave me some latitude to judge of the propriety, as to time, of making the declaration which the chance of such a transaction would necessarily call for. It is therefore important that I should inform your ldp. that I have not communicated that part of the dispatch to the Danish government. The ground on which I have ventured on such a discretionary reserve is the strong belief, I trust I am justified in entertaining, not only that no proposition of the nature in question has as yet been submitted to the prince royal; but that the military progress of the French arms is not yet such as to suggest an arrangement so incompatible with the sentiments and principles which are known to predominate in that prince's character.—Without, therefore, some new and describable appearance to engage my attention, different from those which had possibly been conveyed to England when the dispatch was written, I humbly trust it is consonant to the feelings of his majesty's government towards that of Denmark, not to have taken a step, which might at this moment only wound the prin-

  779
  cipal persons, and repel the confidence they seem willing to manifest.—The explanation into which I have entered, will, I hope, guard me from the supposition of not endeavouring to give the proper effect to the Instructions in question, on any change of circumstances leading to the supposition of your lordship's dispatch. If I have already expressed some alarm on the chances of so bold an attempt on the part of the French government as that to which I allude, it has not been from apprehension of dishonourable compromise on the part of Denmark, but of the consequences of timidity and inadequate preparation, by which the enemy might be enabled rather to seize the fleet than treat for it.—Your lordship's dispatch No. 7. having been written on the presumption that the French troops had entered Holstein; and probably after your lordship had received the report of the enquiries I had made as to the retreat of those of Denmark (in my No.) I have also for the present desisted from a formal application on the subject of that dispatch; and humbly hope that my conduct in both these instances will not have met with his majesty's disapprobation.—I find it difficult to obtain precise information as to the number of Danish troops in Holstein, because it is not ascertained how far the regiments still there have been reduced. Two regiments have returned to Funen. The Sleswick and Jutland regiments have also returned. Two regiments belonging to the garrison of this place, are left at Kiel, Ploen, and Gluckstadt. Count Bernstorff tells me that four thousand men are on the line between those places; but these must be in the towns and villages. The garrisons just mentioned, and that of Rendsburgh, compose therefore the only remaining active force against the enemy. I shall resume this subject without delay. I have &c.
  B. GARLIKE.
  No. XII.—Extract of a Dispatch from visc. Howick to Benj. Garlike, esq. dated Downing Street, 22d Jan. 1807.
  Upon the points referred to in your dispatches, I have already sent you full instructions. However desirous his majesty may be of preventing any embarrassment to the court of Denmark with respect to the neutrality which that government is desirous of preserving; this consideration, it is evident, can only apply to a real neutrality, and cannot be carried so far as to admit of a succession of measures dictated by the fear of France, which would in ef-
  780
  fect place Denmark in a situation of aiding the hostilities of that power.—It so nearly concerns the safety of both powers to cultivate the most friendly understanding, in order to prepare the means of defence against a danger which equally threatens both, that this alone ought to obliterate the jealousies which have too much prevailed between the courts of Stockholm and Copenhagen.—So obvious and so pressing a consideration, it is, however, but too evident from the tenor of your dispatches, has not had its due weight; and your constant attention and good offices will be employed to remove, as much as possible, the causes of that mutual suspicion and distrust, which must favour the designs of the common enemy. The evident necessity of providing for the security of his own dominions must, as I have formerly stated, sufficiently account for the preparations of the king of Sweden. Situated as he is, it is as clearly necessary for his Swedish majesty to require an explanation of the intentions of the court of Copenhagen. You will therefore support any requisition of this nature, which may be made in a friendly manner by the Swedish minister, with a view to those preparations of defence so imperiously called for by the present crisis.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.
Lord St. Johnrose, in pursuance of notice, to bring forward his Resolutions respecting the Orders in Council. His lordship took a review of the explanations given by the French government of the Decree, and of the documents shewing the manner in which it was understood by the American government, for the purpose of proving that the latter government never acquiesced in the French decree, considered as affecting neutrals, and thence concluding, that this government had no right to issue Orders affecting the American trade. He contended also, that there was no sufficient evidence of the execution of the French Decree, in making captures on the high seas, according to the terms of it, which could alone be evidence of such an execution of the decree as could be considered a violation of the law of nations. The information laid, on the table was in this point defective, and did not appear to him to afford any sufficient reason for issuing the Orders in Council, which he considered a gross violation of the law

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of nations, and fraught with great injustice towards Neutral States. His lordship concluded by reading the following Resolutions:—"1. That previous to the 11 th of Nov. last, his majesty's government was not in possession of any proof, nor supposed ground of belief, that the United States of America had acquiesced in or submitted to, or intended to acquiesce in or submit to, the execution of such parts of the Decree of the 21st of Nov. 1806, as purported to impose on Neutral Commerce, restraints inconsistent with the law of nations. 2. That it does not appear, that the said Decree, in so far as it may have been supposed to relate to captures at sea, was in any one instance carried into execution, by the Prize Courts of France, or her Allies, previous to the 11th of Nov. last. 3. That on the 18th of Oct. last, the ministers of the United States at this court, officially apprized his majesty's Secretary of State, that their government had received from that of France, satisfactory explanations and assurances, and that, in fact, the same never had been enforced against the Neutral Commerce of the United States. 4. That no official denial of the facts so asserted by the American ministers, appears to have been made on the part of his majesty's secretary of state; nor any grounds alledged by him in which the American ministers could be questioned. 5. That under such circumstances the issuing the Orders in Council of the 11th and 25th of Nov. last, which Orders purported to compel the trading vessels of the said United States in all their voyages to and from the Continent of Europe to touch at the ports of this country, and to be there subjected, by the authority of the British government, to many and grievous restrictions, and a manifest violation of the law of Nations, and of the rights and independence of a friendly Power."—On the first Resolution being put,
The Duke of Montroserose and said, he perfectly agreed with the noble lord, that although the subject had been already before the house, it was one that merited discussion. He had forborne as yet to deliver his sentiments upon it, from a wish not to make up his mind without giving it the fullest consideration; and having so done, he should not hesitate to give it as his firm opinion, that the Orders in Council were wise, politic, and calculated to answer the great purpose of defeating the designs of our enemy, and ultimately convincing him of his error in the unjust system he was pur-
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suing in carrying on the war. It was the government of France which had violated what was considered the law of nations, and it was prudent in that of this country to retaliate those measures that were aimed at our very existence; if the neutrals suffered any injury, it was France, and France alone, that they ought to look upon as the cause of that injury, and to which alone they ought to look for reparation. In his opinion, it was idle to talk of waiting to see whether the neutrals would have acquiesced in that Decree; for when the distance was considered, it would plainly appear that our forbearance might have continued 3, 6, nay even 9 months, during the whole of which time the enemy would have derived all the advantages they expected therefrom, and England sustained all the injuries that were levelled at her; for, light as some persons might treat the force of France, he could not but recollect that she had still fleets, frigates, and numerous privateers; from these, under that Decree, much injury might have been done, in defiance of that superiority which, he was thankful and happy G. Britain could boast. As to what the noble lord had urged relative to the answer which the minister of marine had given to general Armstrong, it amounted to nothing more than that he thought America was not to be included. But could any man suppose that the je pence of a French minister of marine was a sufficient security against a positive decree so plain and direct, that those who ran might read? No; the American Resident ought not to have rested satisfied with less than a formal renunciation, nor could our ministers consider less than that renunciation as a proof that the United States were not included. Nay, upon the question being afterwards put to another French officer, his reply was, that he saw no exceptions. For these among other reasons, he thought our executive government had acted wisely and politically in issuing those Orders in Council; that the Resolutions moved by the noble lord were unnecessary, and he therefore hoped the house would agree with him in his moving the previous question.
Lord Hollandobserved, that the Orders in Council fell far short of that clearness which would enable him who runs to read. He would not now enter into the question of the policy of these Orders, that being reserved for a subsequent discussion, but with respect to the question of the law of nations, he held a very different opinion

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from the noble duke. If a belligerent adopted a mode of conduct towards a neutral, which amounted to an act of hostility, and in which that neutral acquiesced, then he would admit the right of the other belligerent to retaliate. But in the case of the Berlin Decree, it had not only not been acquiesced in by America, but there was no proof of that part of it being executed which alone was a violation of the law of nations, namely, capturing neutrals on the high seas, for violating the terms of the decree. He contended, therefore, that on neither of these grounds was there any justification of the Orders in Council. His ldp. commented on the Note of Mr. Canning to the American ministers, stating, that it was the duty of the neutral to endeavour to procure the revocation of the obnoxious decrees, a doctrine which he considered as tending to produce endless warfare.
The Earl of Mulgravecontended, that the French government having endeavoured to execute its decree of blockade against this country, by the confiscation of all neutrals conveying British produce or manufactures, or trading from the ports of this country, it became the duty of this government to adopt some counteracting measure, which should force the enemy to raise the blockade of this country. That which had been resorted to, was the most mitigated measure that could be adopted with a view to the continuance of neutral trade, and compelling the enemy to receive neutral vessels into his ports trading from this country. If the French decree and the Orders in Council were both executed, then of course there could be no trade between this country and that part of the continent of Europe under the influence of the enemy, some injury would result to us, but the greatest privations must be indured by the enemy. With respect to Mr. Canning's Note, his ldp. referred to the Note of lord Howick, stating that the measures adopted by the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. would be continued till the decree of the French government was formally repealed, for the purpose of proving that the language in this note was similar to that used by Mr. Canning. His lordship deprecated the conduct adopted by noble lords on the other side, in discussing different parts of the Orders, and called upon them to discuss the whole policy of the measure.
Lord Aucklanddeprecated a war with America, which he considered one of the
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worst misfortunes that could befal the country, and which he thought the Orders in Council tended to produce.
Lord Redesdalecontended that the Orders in Council of the 7th of Jan. and those of the 11th and 25th of Nov. were founded on the same principles, and were equally consistent with the law of nations.
The Earl of Lauderdaledeprecated the mode of argument adopted by the noble and learned lord, by justifying one measure by another. He contended, that the information on the table not only did not prove an increased rigour in the execution of the French decree, but that a great part of it rather proved a relaxation of the provisions of that decree, and he believed, that his noble friends, had they continued in administration, would rather upon such information have been inclined to revoke the order of the 7th of Jan. than to have resorted to any harsher measure. As to the objection, that they discussed parts of the Orders, each part formed a question of the greatest magnitude to the country, and if they were not all discussed together, it was the fault of noble lords on the other side, who had refused to go into a committee on the Orders in Council. A noble duke had quoted the letter of his noble friend to Mr. Rist, to shew that he threatened to put the coasts of the enemy into a state of blockade, as a matter of retaliation. If he had proceeded but four or five words farther, he would have seen that the noble lord's words were, "that G. Britain would have enforced such blockade by its maritime superiority," a thing which made the measure legitimate, and consistent with the law of nations; and there was not one word to shew that they meant it in mere retaliation.
The Earl of Westmorelandsaid, that noble lords made the inconsistencies of which they complained. They would not divide the question of the Orders in Council into two points of view, in which it ought to be considered—into that which the crown did from its prerogative of war, and what was agreeable to the municipal law of the land.—In adverting to America, he warmly contended that the measures of the late government caused that irritation which appeared in the disposition and councils of that country; and concluded by expressing a sentiment of amity and friendship towards that country, whose very existence he considered to depend upon the greatness and prosperity of this.
Earl Greyvindicated the late govern-

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ment from the aspersions that had been thrown upon them, by asserting that the Order of the 7th Jan. was an act of retaliation, and that it avowed the principle upon which the Order in Council of the 11th Nov. was founded. He distinctly shewed, that there was not the slightest similiarity, and he strongly animadverted on the disingenuous manner in which a noble and learned lord had partially quoted and misrepresented his note to Mr. Rist. He also explained the course of proceeding which had been taken with respect to America, and shewed that the declarations made to them by the late government, had been satisfactory, as would have been proved to the house, if the Answer to Mr. Madison had been laid upon the table. He observed, on the reparation made by the present ministers for the affair of the Chesapeake, that it had at least been tardy, since several months had elapsed before the departure of Mr. Rose, and he expressed his fears, that at the very time they were now debating the Orders in Council, as they applied to America, ministers might be in possession of the determination of the American government on the point.
Lord Hawkesburyentered at length into the pretended distinction between the Order of the 7th Jan. and the late Orders. He declared that he could not discover any difference in principle, and scarcely any difference in language. When noble lords said it was not an act of retaliation, they should look back to the Papers, where it was distinctly stated to be in retaliation of the enemy's Decree. But neither that measure nor the present, though in their consequences they touched neutrals, could be said to be against neutrals. They were against the enemy, and it was only by their consequences that they affected neutrals. This was the nature of all belligerent acts. A measure was taken by the enemy in hostility to us, and which in its result affected neutrals; we retaliated on the enemy and that also affected neutrals; but surely they could only complain of the original aggressor. With respect to the tardy reparation made to America for the affair of the Chesapeake, they had made instant reparation, even before any remonstrance or complaint was made. They expected that the American ministers would have been intrusted to settle the business here. And so they were; but their instructions were to mix so many other matters with it, that it was found to be impossible,
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and so at length they determined to send Mr. Rose to America. He defended the measure of the Orders in Council as indispensible on our part,and argued that the profs of the submission of neutrals to the Decree of the French were clear and manifest. The answer of M. Decres to the application of Mr. Asmstrong was by no means satisfactory. He stated only his own opinion, whereas he ought to have given the explanation of the government.
Lord Grenvillecombatted the arguments on the other side. His lordship reviewed the decrees of France against the trade of this country, and cited the few instances in which they had been fully enforced: he admitted the right of fair retaliation, provided it did not extend to the injury of neutral powers. He adverted to the calamities which must arise to our merchants and manufacturers by enforcing these orders in council; and the mischievous consequences to our West India colonies, should the differences between this country and America long subsist; and concluded, by advising his majesty's ministers to adopt those measures now that would be considered as acts of generosity and conciliation towards that country, rather than wait for the time when they must adopt them through necessity.
The Earl of Gallowaycontended, that the justification of ministers might be drawn from the speeches of noble lords on the other side of the house, who all made the reservation that the maintenance of our maritime rights ought to be paramount to every other consideration. The Orders in Council, he considered a just and a wise measure, which should therefore have his support.—The house then divided—For the

previous ques

66,

Proxies 71—137

Against it

24,

Proxies 23—47

Majority.

—90.