Sitting of 25 February 1808

EXPEDITION TO COPENHAGEN.
Mr. Sheridanrose and observed, that out of regard to the convenience of others, he had more than once postponed his motion; and there were many considerations which made against its being brought forward at so late an hour. But even if the hour

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were later, he would now persevere, and submit to the house a proposition which appeared to him of the first importance. In rising, however, to lay that, proposition before them, and to state the reasons on which it was founded, he confessed, at the outset, that he entertained no very sanguine hopes of success. He had no very sanguine hopes of success, because he had seen that motions founded certainly on as strong reasons as he could possibly urge, had been negatived; because he had observed a very peremptory determination on the part of ministers, and a very pliant acquiescence on the part of the house, to refuse the most essential information on the most important points. His hopes were, besides, not sanguine, because he had communicated the subject of his motion to his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning), at his request, and had received no very flattering expectations of a favourable result; and one could not help remarking that in proportion as the ministers manifested a determined obstinacy in withholding information, they insisted upon the courtesy of having previous notice of the different motions brought forward, under the pretence of putting them in a better shape; but he much apprehended, rather with a view, to have a more exact knowledge of the particular subject of each, in order to defeat their object.—The house being, then, disposed to agree so far with ministers in denying all material information, he did not think it necessary to detain them long, and he would tell them why; the house had never yet been pledged in any direct approbation or censure of the measures respecting Denmark. Ministers had, indeed, with a great deal of craft, on the different applications for information, turned the discussions to the question of the merits. In the motion which he had to submit to the house, he might take advantage of this practice, and enter at large into the general subject. But of this opportunity he was not disposed to avail himself, since an hon. friend of his (Mr. Sharpe) had given notice of a motion which was to come on so early as Wednesday next, when the merits would be brought regularly and fully under discussion; for, though the ministers had surreptitiously, he must say, on the first day of the session, procured an implied approbation, yet, certain it was, that the house had not as yet been directly pledged, either one way or the other. The time, however, was near when the
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subject would come under the review, of the house, and for that reason he Would not enter fully into its merits at present. He had, he declared sincerely, entered With the greatest reluctance into the condemnation of the principle of the attack upon Copenhagen. He had before said, and said truly, that on the first day of the session he had come down to the house, with a most earnest hope that ministers would be enabled to justify themselves by some kind of information at least; for it must be odious to a man to be enabled to make out a case against his country. He had hoped first, that strong information would be given, which would prove the measure to be an act of necessity, or that some unequivocal instance of the hostility of Denmark would be shewn; or, lastly, that every proof would be produced, which could afford a tolerable pretext for their conduct. But, when he found that instead of this, they only made an aukward attempt to form something of a mixture out of the whole three; that they first pretended a strong state necessity; that on being driven from this, they tried to point out a variety of provocations on the part of Denmark; that they then said that it was necessary to do some stout act, which would prove to the world that they could imitate Buonaparte; and that the result of the whole was a total denial of all actual information whatever; he could not then disguise the unfavourable impression which had been made upon his mind. He maintained, that there never was a case in the history of England, when a war was commenced, with all the taxes and privations to which it subjected the nation, where such a denial of all information as to the causes and grounds of it had been manifested. The house ought not to run away with the idea that the granting of information was dangerous; an allegation which was ever ready on the lips of those whose purposes required concealment. It led, they said, to the exposure of the fortunes and lives of those who gave it, and the correspondence of our ambassadors ought not to be laid open to general inspection. But, admitting that the granting of information might sometimes be inconvenient, perhaps even dangerous, still they overlooked the vital principle of our free constitution. Publicity was the very essence of that constitution. Despotic governments certainly had some advantages from that secret lurking manner in which business might be there transacted. But we ought

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to balance the advantages of the different forms of government; and consider whether, without those peculiar conveniences enjoyed by a despotic government, we had not advantages ten thousand times greater. On these grounds, he would call the attention of the house to three points: 1st, Such communications as had been made of the correspondence between our late government, and our minister at Copenhagen, consisting of two parts; that which had been produced entire, and the extracts which had been read here. He really wished to shelter his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) from the strong rebuke which he had met with from a high authority in the other house, as having lost sight of his duty. That would probably be overlooked here, if he did his duty in this house. 2dly, The small portion of information which had been laid on the table: and, 3dly, The information which ministers had refused. As to the first of these points, his right hon. friend, in whose public conduct he felt a sincere interest, had read an extract of a letter from lord Howick, which called down the rebuke to which he had adverted; he then read extracts of the letters of Mr. Garlike, and left the house to gather from them, that the intentions of Denmark were hostile. Unless the papers were produced, there never was so foul a quotation as those in both instances. He did not say that his right hon. friend absolutely read from the letters, things that he knew to be contradicted in the next paragraphs; but he supposed some clerk in his office had put these extracts in his hands, telling him that they might be of use in affording some shadow of ground for the Danish expedition: and his right hon. friend had, not purposely but carelessly, taken them without further examination. But a secretary, of whom he had not so good an opinion as he had of his right hon. friend, might possibly, upon this principle, tell one of his clerks to make out a justification some way; advising him not to be nice, but to take a scrap here and a scrap there, and patch up a case of some sort. If ministers thought proper to make out a case against any country, they had only to have recourse to this ingenious sort of picking. The right hon. gent. had a model, of this kind of ingenuity hi Swift's Tale of a Tub, where three brothers endeavoured to find the words shoulder-knots in their fathers will, and gave a complete Specimen of this system of pickings and patches. They
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first attempted to find the shoulder-knots, 'totidem verbis;' but this being found impracticable, the eldest, who was afterwards distinguished by the appellation of lord Peter, suggested the expedient of looking for it 'totidem syllabis;' this, too, was found impossible, as they could not make out the first syllable. They then tried to make out their point 'totidem literis;' but, as bad luck would have it, they could not find out the letter k. What was to be done in this case Brother Peter got rid of the difficulty by giving it as his opinion, that the word knot ought to be spelt without a k; the other brothers agreed with him, and thus they made, out their authority for wearing shoulder-knots. So an acute secretary might make out a charge against any country. The right hon. gent. might perhaps have read or heard of an ingenious essay in favour of atheism, taken out of the Epistles of St. Paul. This was another instance of the system of picking scraps from different parts of the same composition. There was also a most indecent and abominable poem, written by Ausonius, which could not be quoted in the house, which even scarcely could be named with propriety, all taken from the chaste muse of Virgil. Perhaps his right hon. friend had read it, 'monstrum borrendum ingens! but though he believed his right hon. friend must have read it, yet he was sure that he would not attempt a translation for the use of the country gentlemen; otherwise he might be as severely rebuked by his right hon. friend the chancellor of the exchequer, as he had been by the noble and learned lord in the other house; and besides have a lecture from the Society for the Suppression of Vice; with leave to think himself lucky if he escaped a prosecution.—From the system that had been pursued of reading partial extracts, no credit whatever could be given to the information that had been laid before the house, till the whole correspondence was produced; for nobody could be sure that what had been brought forward was not a gross imposition. But, supposing that a case could be made out against Denmark, the house was without information respecting the real cause of the war with Russia. He took it for granted, that it was not simply the attack upon Copenhagen which had alienated the emperor of Russia from his attachment to this country; but it was owing to something which occurred posterior to that attack, that he had ranged himself in the

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list of our enemies. Lord G. L. Gower ascribed this change of sentiment, in one of his dispatches, to the arrival of a messenger from Paris, and to the strong representations made after the event by general Savary. But, with all due respect for the opinion of his noble friend, he shrewdly Suspected that it had arisen from the communication imparted to the court of St. Petersburg, of the foul, treacherous, and base proposals which were made after the capitulation of Copenhagen, by ministers, to Mr. Rist, the Danish agent in this country, to submit to any terms which they might think proper to dictate, on pain of having Norway wrested from the crown of Denmark and given to Sweden. If he could trust to the papers which he held in his hand, purporting to be the substance of a conversation which passed between Mr. Secretary Canning and Mr. Rist, and copies of a correspondence Which passed between the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm, it appeared that, at the very time that ministers were soliciting the Mediation of the emperor of Russia between G. Britain and Denmark, they were threatening to despoil Denmark of a part of her territory: and, after having evacuated Zealand conformably to the capitulation, to co-operate with a Swedish garrison in again taking possession of it. Not only this, but there was a rumour in circulation, that this plan was only abandoned in consequence of the commander in chief of the forces in the island of Zealand positively refusing to have any share in it. Flagrant and wicked as he considered the first attack upon Denmark was, to have violated the capitulation would certainly have been still more base and criminal; and, therefore, he hoped to hear an explicit declaration from his majesty's ministers, that they never at any time harboured an idea of committing such an act. Still, however, it was difficult to believe that there was no ground for the imputation; unless the supposed minute of Mr. Rist's conversation with Mr. Secretary Canning, and the correspondence which he now held in his hand, were impudent forgeries. The right hon. gent. here read the several papers to which he alluded; beginning with Mr. Rists note to count Bernstorff, containing a communication of five diferent menaces which were thrown out by his majesty's foreign secretary, if the court of Denmark did not agree to subscribe to certain terms, and ending with a note addressed by baron Taube, his
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Swedish majesty's charge-d' affaires at the court of Kiel, to count Bernstorff, the Danish minister, (a man who was universally esteemed to be the honestest minister in Europe, not meaning by this expression to be guilty of any disrespect to the right hon. gent. opposite,) declaring, that "had his Swedish majesty judged it necessary to occupy Zealand with his troops, jointly with those of his ally, he should have done it; and the king wishes that he may never find himself in the case to regret that he had acted otherwise." He meant to give every credit to the gallantry of the king of Sweden; and indeed, considering that he was now our only remaining ally, it would be illiberal to withhold any praise that was due to him. This was a very stout declaration, and he sincerely "wished that his Swedish majesty might never have cause to regret" the counsels of those who had advised him to make it. He must remark, however, that there was something curious in the wording of it. He confesses that he would have taken possession of Zealand had it been necessary; and expresses a hope that he might never have cause to regret not having done it, even though it was not necessary. There the house would see the influence of example strikingly illustrated. The British government had bombarded Copenhegen; levelled its houses, churches, and hospitals; sacked its arsenals, and carried off its fleet; because it was given out it was necessary so to do. The king of Sweden declares that had it been necessary, he would have taken possession after it was evacuated by our troops. And now the emperor of Russia would find it necessary to march an army into Finland, and to take possession of Stockholm. A right hon. friend of his (Mr. Windham) had advised ministers not to attempt running a race of violence and injustice with the ruler of France, because they were sure to be beat; but he really thought that their first effort was no bad coup d'essai; and it now appeared as if Sweden had been so much animated by their example, as to shew a roving disposition to follow them in their new career.—The right hon. gent. next adverted to the promise which they had made of Norway to Sweden, at least if he was to believe the documents which he had read. Sweden, he said, must be very sure of getting Norway in the end; for, it seemed, it had been promised to her not only by the British government, but by the emperor Napoleon himself. Gen.

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Brune, in a conference with a Swedish general who had fallen into his hands in Pomerania (he did not know whether he was quizzing him or not), had held out precisely the same bait to the king of Sweden that his right hon. friend had done; and let it be remembered, that it had been stated by ministers as a matter of accusation against Denmark, that she had not communicated this offer to the British government, at the same time that she informed the British government of the offer of Sweden to send a Swedish force to her assistance. This offer, he contended, was sufficient of itself to have provoked, the enmity of the emperor of Russia; who, above all things, was jealous of the prerogative which he assumed to himself of protector of the North. He was therefore of opinion that lord G. L Gower was mistaken, in ascribing the hostile determination of the court of St. Petersburg to the interference of gen. Savary; and that it could be much better accounted for by the propositions which we made to Sweden, after the capitulation of Copenhagen was signed and ratified. But, as to our giving away Norway, or Sweden taking Norway, it was really too ridiculous for ministers to talk of it. It was no longer ago than in 1787, that a body of Norwegians put themselves in motion, and took possession of Gottenburgh, the second city of Sweden; and it was difficult to say where they might have proceeded, had it not been for the intervention of Mr. Elliott, at that time the British minister at Copenhagen. It was reported that ministers were preparing to send a fleet to the Baltic; and he hoped that they would do so, not for the purpose either of taking Holstein from the French, or Zealand from the Danes, or of making good their promise to the king of Sweden by taking Norway, but he hoped with the intention of securing the Swedish fleet. The king of Sweden must be the most unreasonable man in the world if he hesitated to deliver it into our hands as a deposit, and it certainly was an object of sufficient importance to engage the attention of ministers. It was well known that Sweden was in possession of the best flotilla in the world, and did it fall into the power of our enemy, it was much more likely to he converted into an instrument of effecting an invasion of this country than the Danish navy. But reverting to a general view of the question, he put it to the house whether it would sanction the
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new system of withholding all information relative to the measures of ministers. If it did, it would be better to decide at once, that the interference of that house was at all times an impediment to the operations of government; that parliament was a nuisance in difficult times; that it would be better for the king to prorogue it during pleasure, raise money as he pleases, and make war or peace when, how, or on what terms, he may think proper. He implored ministers, however, to give up the detestable system upon which they had lately been endeavouring to act; namely, that of fighting Buonaparte with his own weapons. They would do much better to continue to fight with those weapons which the nation was better accustomed to handle. Let them oppose lenity and moderation to his cruelty and oppression; let them oppose good faith to his treachery and duplicity; to his violence and despotism let them oppose the mildness of the British constitution; and above all, to his mystery let them oppose publicity. He concluded with moving, 1. "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions-that there be laid before this house, as far as the same can be done without prejudice to the public service, Copies or Extracts of any Correspondence which passed between his majesty's ministers and the Danish Chargé d' Affaires, or his secretary, resident at the court of London, from the date of the Capitulation of Copenhagen, to their departure, together with the minutes of any verbal communications between the same: 2. Copies or Extracts of all Correspondence which passed, after the Capitulation of Copenhagen, between his majesty's ministers and the court of Stockholm, relative to the retaining possession of the Island of Zealand by a Swedish army, or in concert with his majesty's forces; and also Copies of any Correspondence which may have passed between the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm relating to the same, and communicated to his majesty's minister residing at the court of Stockholm."
Mr. Secretary Canningwas not ashamed to confess, that he at all times felt considerable difficulty in disagreeing from his right hon. friend; and that, in this instance, his difficulty was much increased, not by the line of argument adopted by his right hon. friend, but by the humour with which he had treated subjects stated to be atrocious, and the gravity with

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which he had dwelt upon things trifling and unimportant. The right hon. gent. had set out with a discussion of the particular benefits of the British constitution, which he contrasted with the practice of despotic governments. But his right hon. friend had pushed this contrast to a greater extent than any writer or speaker with whom he was acquainted. His right hon. friend had said, that his, majesty's ministers were preserving the gloom of despotism upon every transaction, upon which they did not, shortly after the transaction took place, or whilst the consequences were yet flowing from it, give the fullest information to the house, and through that house to the public, and through the public to the enemy, by which the enemy might be enabled to defeat the objects of them. He had always thought that the constitution had solved that problem which his right hon. friend seemed to think insoluble, by enabling that house to steer between difficulties, and by uniting the promptness of the executive with the salutary corrective of its popular branch. But the extremity to which his right hon. friend had pushed his proposition was not to be maintained in argument or in fact, and the former of his motions allowed the principle which the whole tenor of his speech went to invalidate. His right hon. friend had complained of the sparingness with which his majesty's ministers granted papers; but he was sure his right hon. friend must be convinced that papers bad been laid upon the table this session in greater masses than upon any former occasion. It began to be the feeling of the house, that he and his colleagues had granted too many papers, and that the few which remained in the public offices should be retained there, if not for the guidance of future ministers, at least for the service of future oppositions. His right hon. friend had asserted, that because only extracts had been laid before the house, they were not entitled to credit; and that the remainder of the documents, if produced, would contradict the tenor of the parts given to the public; as well as that, because chasms existed in the chain of papers, those which were forthcoming were not to be credited. The instance which his right hon. friend had selected to prove a deception in the case of the three dispatches from lord, G. L. Gower, and upon which he dwelt with so much earnestness, as if they might have been written at intervals of some weeks, was rather
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an unfortunate one for his argument; because he had antecedently proved in his speech that they must all have been written between the 30th of August and the 2d of Sept. The clerical error of the copying clerk, in dating one of these dispatches the 2d instead of the 1st of Sept. was the ground upon which the right hon. gent. built his argument, to prove the deception which he imputed to his majesty's ministers. But, in contending that these dispatches were framed with a view to justify his majesty's Declaration of Dec. 19, which was issued in answer to the emperor of Russia's Declaration of Oct.26th which had been received in this country on the 3d of Dec. his right hon. friend gave credit to him and his colleagues for a portion of political sagacity which he was not, on other occasions, disposed to allow them. But as the observation had been applied not only to the dispatches from lord G. L. Gower, but to his answer to these dispatches, dated Sept. 17th, his right hon. friend cut him short a fortnight of the allowance of political sagacity. The view which his rt. hon. friend had taken of the statement in lord G. L. Gower's dispatch, relative to the amicable tone assumed by gen. Budberg, was not maintainable in argument, or by the fact. Did his right hon. friend mean to say that general Budberg, at the time of adopting that tone, was not acquainted with the transactions at Copenhagen? If he did, he was mistaken; because these transactions had been known at St. Petersburg either on, or shortly after, the 20th of August. If that were so, he would ask his right hon. friend whether, under such circumstances, he would not think it proper to take advantage of such a disposition, in order, if possible, to preserve the relations of amity and alliance which had previously subsisted between the two countries? The note demanding an explanation of the attack upon Copenhagen, had been communicated under the influence of a power which had since acquired and exerted an ascendancy in the Russian councils. Though the dispatches communicating this note had been received with the other, they did not seem to his majesty's ministers sufficient to alter the view which they had of turning to advantage, if possible, the friendly disposition which had appeared on the part of Russia. If this had been the use which his right hon. friend made of the papers produced at the desire of his own friend, what credit would he have given to the dispatches if they had been voluntarily

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laid upon the table by his majesty's ministers? Would he not have said, that ministers had produced them in order to make out their own case? But he should not then enter into the general question, until it should be regularly brought before the house, by the motion of the learned gent. on Wednesday. If his right hon. friend was prepared to contend that the question ought to be answered because it was put; or that, according to the daily practice of that house, it ought to be answered without any reference whatever to any particular course to be grounded upon it; he was of opinion that it would require somewhat more than the ingenuity of his right hon. friend to establish that point. If he understood his right hon. friend right, he had adverted to certain misconstructions which had been put upon what had fallen from him on a former occasion, as if he had made statements from documents in order to misrepresent the general tenor of their contents. Upon this particular point he should observe, that if other reasons did not interfere with the production of these documents, he could, for his part, have no objection to producing them; and on this occasion he trusted he should meet with the indulgence of the house, in adding a few words upon a subject so immediately personal to himself. If he were to look to himself alone, he should have no difficulty in producing the papers, which would take away all misconstructions upon the subject, and leave the learned gent. when he came to bring forward his motion, to discuss it upon the mere naked principle. His right hon. friend had mis-stated the view in which he had used one of those papers which he had read. He had stated, that he (Mr. C.) from lord Howick's dispatch, had imputed that the Danish court was in collusion with France, but this was a mistake; he had only stated that, from all the circumstances of Denmark's having retreated as the French advanced towards Holstein, there was reason to apprehend, if they got possession of Holstein, Denmark might dread their proceeding to do the same by Zealand, and that might be a means of drawing the Danish fleet into the hands of France; and he thought the noble lord had good cause for fearing that might be the case. His right hon. friend, in one part of his speech, admitted, and in the wording of his motion, had more strongly confirmed the admission, that it must be left to his majesty's
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ministers to say what particular papers ought to be laid before the house, and what would he inconvenient or dangerous so to do, and then called on him to say whether there would be any inconvenience in the production of the papers now moved for? To this he distinctly answered, yes, there would be the highest inconvenience. His right hon. friend had told them that we had but one ally in Europe, and that he was in the greatest danger. He argued that this danger would arise to Sweden, from having entered into a compact with this country relative to taking possession of Norway, and in return asked for the whole correspondence relating to that transaction. His right hon. friend's belief with respect to that was founded on a few paragraphs in the Moniteur, which he brought down, threw on the table, and then called on ministers for all the correspondence between them and their only ally; he thought, however, ministers knew too well how to spew their value for their only ally, to comply with so unreasonable a request. He did not know how it was, but it seemed to him the Moniteur had been strangely favourable to the views of the hon. gentlemen opposite; for they no sooner began to be exhausted in topics of declamation against ministers, and to shew symptoms of being languid and flat, than over popt a Moniteur with some agreeable information to cheer their drooping spirits, and to give them a fresh opportunity of calling for more papers, in doing Which he thought his right hon. friend had, on the present occasion, shewn a voracious curiosity. If he would limit it to any information that could safely be laid before the house, he would be glad to oblige him as far as possible, to give him an opportunity of joining more effectually in the motion, which the hon. and learned gent. soon meant to move on the capitulation of Copenhagen. He assured the house, that in every respect that treaty had been complied with on our part. There had been a conference as to British property seized and detained prior to our taking possession of Zealand, a doubt having arisen whether the capitulation meant to confine it to Zealand only, or to the rest of the Danish territory. It was agreed to be submitted to the officers on both sides, who made the capitulation, and was determined against the English, and implicitly complied with. The same, as to hostilities, by the declaration war, which were not known at the time of the capitulation; every thing had

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been abided by, that was stipulated by the capitulation. His right hon. friend was also mistaken, as to the offer of Norway to Sweden by France. It was prince Murat, and not gen. Brune, that made the offer which Sweden communicated to Denmark, but which Denmark concealed from us. His right hon. friend seemed to think, that France might do as she pleased— might give away Norway with impunity, whilst we should be highly criminal in any such intention, let the state of warfare between us and Denmark be what it might.—His last point, however, was, that we should not follow the example of the enemy. In that respect his majesty had hitherto carried on a system of scrupulous forbearance. If his right hon. friend meant that we should not imitate his cruelties, oppressions, and unbounded aggressions, he would coincide with him; but if he meant that we should not follow him in every measure which might tend to put us on a perfect equality with him in carrying on the war, he must differ with him entirely. His right hon. friend had indulged the exuberant fancy of his classic mind, by giving garbled extracts from Latin poets, by way of quotation; such as— 'Ridiculum acre quid, vetat.—If, he was inclined to retort a quotation on his right hon. friend, it would, he thought, be strictly allowable to him to say.— 'Arma virumque cano—fas est et ab hoste doceri'— Buonaparte whatever might be his cruelties, his oppressions, or his aggressions, had on all occasions scrupulously adhered to and protected those who had entered into alliance with him: he had never sacrificed an ally to any consideration, however pressing or important. Ministers were that night called on to give up the correspondence of our only ally, which could not fail of being attended with great inconvenience; and he would, therefore, so far follow the example of the enemy as to adhere to our ally, and to refuse his assent to his right hon. friend's motion.
Mr. Windhamsaw, very little in the speech of the right, hon. gent. that had any application to the question, and even in that little could discover no force. The right hon. secretary had laid down a doctrine with regard to the communication of papers to that house, which, even supposing it were admitted, could not operate against the motion. For according to the terms of that motion, ministers would be left the option of presenting such information only as could not militate against public con-
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venience: Of course no detriment could arise from acceding to it. What objection to it, then, could be sustained by the right hon. gent. Indeed, he had offered none. The character of the country had been seriously accused, and to that accusation the rt. hon. gent. contented himself with returning a mere assertion; in which, as usual, he was confident, just in proportion as he was deficient in proof and argument. But the right hon. secretary stated, that even were the papers applied for laid before the house, the gentlemen who supported the motion would not find what they wanted. They wanted some proofs to contradict the statements which had appeared in the Moniteur, and to vindicate the character of the country; which they must feel to be very imperfectly vindicated indeed, if it rested upon the mere assertion of the right hon. gent. If the right hon. gent. thought the papers would support his assertion, was it not natural to infer, that he would produce them? and was it not equally natural to infer the contrary from the pertinacity of his refusal? But, the right hon. gent. acted like a witness who should say, 'Accept my allegation without any further question: do not attempt to cross-examine me; for I assure you, I tell nothing but the truth.' Should the house, however, upon such a grave occasion, content itself with the mere word of the right hon. gent. without asking for any vouchers? The. motion sought to ascertain whether the charge was true, that our government, contrary to the express terms of a capitulation, negotiated with Sweden, an ally of Denmark, to take hostile possession of the island of Zealand. This was the gravamen of the charge against ministers, and nothing could be fouler. It was said, that the enemy had done worse; and some people seemed to think, as it was termed, of 'fighting the enemy with his own weapons.' He hoped and trusted, that never would be the case. In fact, we could not fight with such weapons, to advantage. They were not understood by us, and he hoped they never would. For what were these weapons? A total had indifference about good faith, a perpetual violation of truth, a systematic outrage of humanity and justice; in a word, a contempt of every principle of private morality and public law.
Mr. Ponsonby,though sensible of the just rebuke of the right hon. secretary upon himself and his colleagues; that they

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were grown dry in the debate; that they were quiet exhausted in language, and required the Promethean fire of the Moniteur to rekindle them into activity; could never admit that any such imputation was ever likely to attach to the right hon. secretary himself No; that right hon. gent's ideas were SO numerous that they could not in a moment be put in array. The man who had few ideas could easily summon them into action, particularly when by perpetual practice they were drilled in, all the evolutions of the disputant. The right hon. gent. was such an economist in thoughts, and such a prodigal in words, that he could feel no embarrassment in debate. He could upon any occasion bring forward that chain of words which jingled in the ear, but which rarely affected the understanding, and never approached the heart; and some of his partisans might call it eloquence.—The right hon. gent. animadverted, in terms of peculiar pungency, upon the several parts of the right hon. secretary's speech. He particularly pointed out his disposition to quote garbled extracts to suit his object; which he illustrated by referring to the quotation of the right hon. secretary this evening, from the declaration of his majesty relative to Denmark. The right hon. secretary only quoted a line which spoke of his majesty's 'too long forbearance and moderation:' but he declined to read the whole passage, which spoke of 'the exertion of the powers of the country which were called for at this crisis, and proportioned to the magnitude of the danger.' What, however, he would ask, did this exertion of 'the powers of the country,' &c. amount to? Why, to the attacking of a neutral unprepared power, bombarding its capital, and taking away its fleet! Did the right hon. secretary call this a great exertion of our power, or could he call it advantageous? No; for we had left behind us a country more hostile than it was before our theft was committed, and with means of hostility not very materially diminished. Was this, then, that signal and exemplary exertion of our power, of which ministers in their public declaration were so forward to boast? The conduct of ministers in negotiating with Sweden for the occupation of Zealand after it should be evacuated by our army according to the capitulation, excited his astonishment. But the doubts they affected to entertain as to the terms of the capitulation were still more astonishing. How could they
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suppose that gen. Pieman, whose command did not extend beyond Zealand, could conclude for the Danish government, or that he could covenant for the restoration of British property in other parts of the Danish territory? But, the course of ministers towards Sweden, when it was proposed, in apparent conformity with the capitulation, to evacuate Zealand, and to which the motion alluded; was of a most extraordinary character. The right hon. gent. wished and hoped that ministers would acquit themselves of the imputation which attached to this part of the transaction. It was, in fact, an act of much greater turpitude than the attack upon Copenhagen. It was, indeed, so considered throughout Europe; and for the honour of the country, and of ministers themselves, it was highly desirable to contradict it.
Mr. Canningbegged the indulgence of the house, merely to put a question, whether, if the Moniteur should make a charge against the government of this country, such a charge should become a ground for the opposition in that house to draw from his majesty's ministers a public disclosure of their confidential communications with friendly powers?
Mr. Laingstated, that the king of Sweden indirectly confirmed the accusation in the Moniteur, by saying he would occupy Zealand with Swedish troops if he thought it necessary. Another confirmation was, that it had been matter of deliberation whether Zealand could be retained by British troops, and that the officers consulted declared against the practicability.
Earl Templethought the matter under consideration might be brought within a very small compass, and decided by a single question. That question he should put to the ministers; and it was of such a character that the country would draw its conclusion as much from silence as from an answer. Ministers were most seriously accused of intending to break or evade a solemn capitulation. Now, he would ask, was there, or was there not, any negotiation with Sweden, or any foreign power, to occupy Zealand after our troops were bound to evacuate it, pursuant to the terms of the capitulation?—No answer was made.
The question being loudly called for, the gallery was cleared, and the house divided. The numbers were, Ayes 85; Noes 184; Majority 99

BRAZIL TRADE BILL.
On the second, reading of the Brazil Trade Bill,
Earl Bathurstobserved, that some misapprehensions had existed with respect to sugar from the Brazils coming into competition with the sugar from our own colonies, in the home market, and thus injuring the West India interests. This, however, would be effectually prevented by the high duties imposed upon foreign sugar. His lordship urged the importance of the trade with the Brazils, whence might be derived cotton, tallow, and various other articles, and which might also be of essential benefit to our colonies, as a vessel trading from this Country to the Brazils might take in there a cargo of articles of provision and lumber, of the latter of which there was a plentiful supply in the Brazils, and carrying them to our colonies in the West Indies, it might from thence bring home a cargo of colonial produce.
Lord Aucklandadverted to the state of the sugar market, hoping that it would not be still further depressed. His lord ship stated from the information he had been able to procure, that the quantity of sugar produced in the Brazils, was about 73,000 hogsheads, the quantity produced in our own colonies, was about 280,000 hogsheads, the latter of which was already about 70,000 hogsheads more than our own consumption required, and with respect to the use of the surplus in the distilleries, he observed, that the whole distilleries of the united kingdom would not consume more than 12,000 hogsheads. With respect to cotton, he believed the produce of the Brazils to amount to 24,000,000 pounds, that of our own colonies was about 16,000,000 pounds: he was ready to admit this part of the trade to be of very great value to this country.
Lord Grenvilleobserved, with respect to the idea of making this country an entrepot for colonial produce, that it would be found impossible to force upon the continent, that quantity of colonial produce which it would consume under other circumstances, and with a direct trade. He did not View this bill precisely in the same light as his noble friend, and if considerations arising out of the situation of the prince regent of Portugal and his connection with this country, induced him not wholly to oppose it, he must still give a decided opinion with respect to some circumstances connected with it. As to the idea of the noble lord, that corn and lumber could be procured from the Brazils for our West India colonies, he thought it was not to be, expected, nor did be con-
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ceive it possible, that under the present circumstances of the Brazils, any attention could be paid to the cultivation of corn or the cutting of lumber, particularly under that system of cultivation Which would be adopted there, namely, by means of slaves, continually imported; it was rather to be apprehended that, from the fertility consequent upon breaking up new lands, So large a quantity of sugar might be produced, as greatly to diminish the price of that article. It was upon this system of importing slaves that he founded his principal objection to the bill. His lordship briefly recapitulated the proceedings of parliament with respect to the abolition of the Slave Trade; and observed, that that act would confer immortal honour on the parliament that agreed to it, and would be remembered when all party disputes and dissentions were forgotten. Ministers, he contended, ought to have followed up that act, and the address to his majesty then voted, by refusing to enter into any commercial engagements with the Portuguese government unless it consented to abolish the Slave Trade; otherwise British capital would be employed to a great extent in carrying on this detestable traffic to the Brazils, which would thus derive great benefit from which our colonies were excluded. The legislature had decided, that whatever commercial benefit might be derived from that trade, nothing could justify the inhumanity of its continuance. The Brazils must exist as an independent state, by the protection afforded by the British navy; was it then to result, that notwithstanding the act of the legislature, this trade was to be allowed to be carried on by British capital, and under the protection of the British navy; and this too for the still further increase of produce, of which there was, unfortunately, too great an accumulation in our own colonies? Every consideration of humanity, justice and policy required in his opinion, that ministers should have made the abolitions of the Slave Trade a previous condition to entering into any commercial engagement with the Portuguese government.
Lord Hawkesburyobserved, that the trade in the Portuguese colonial produce, had been previously carried on through the mother country, and the colony having become the seat of government, there was no principle upon which these commercial arrangements could have been refused. As to the Slave Trade, his opinion upon that subject was well known;

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but the abolition of that trade having become an act of the legislature, it became the duty, and it was the wish of the executive government, to carry that act into effect, and to use every means to carry into effect the object of the address to his majesty, with respect to inducing foreign powers to abolish that trade. The circumstances in which the Portuguese government had been placed, and the departure of that government for the Brazil, had hitherto precluded any attempt to enter into negociation with a view to attain that object. It was scarcely possible to prevent British capital from being embarked in this trade, carried on to the Brazils; but no opportunity would be lost by the executive governments, in endeavouring to procure the consent of the Portuguese government to abolish the trade. It could not be expected of him to enter into any discussion upon the supposition of a refusal on the part of the Portuguese government to consent to such abolition.—The bill was then read a second time.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.
The Earl of Carlislemade his promised motion relative to the illegality of the Orders in Council. He adverted to the point which he had before stated to the house, respecting a contradiction between the Order in Council of the 25th of Nov. and the act of the 7th Geo. III. c. 43. By that act, certain enumerated articles were prohibited to be exported from the Isle of Man, under the penalty of the confiscation of the vessel. By the Orders in Council it was declared, that any articles might be exported from the Isle of Man to any ports except those of this country. This he conceived to be clearly a contravention of the statute. He did not mean to charge ministers with any thing else, but he thought it was incumbent on them to come to parliament for a bill of Indemnity. He trusted that against this the king's war prerogative, of which much had lately been said, would not be urged, nor the right of retaliation. It might be said, that his objection was trifling; but it should be remembered that it was the first fissure in a bank which let in the overflow, and thus the first contravention of the law, by the privy council, however trifling in itself, ought to be met in a decided manner, lest it might lead to consequences injurious to the constitution. His lordship concluded by moving a, Resolution, which, after stating the enactment of the act of the 7th Geo.
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III. and the provision of the Order in Council respecting the Isle of Man, concluded by stating, that the latter was a manifest violation of the former.
The Lord Chancellorcontended that the Order alluded to was not only not a breach of law, but actually within the comprehension of the very statute to which the noble earl applied the violation.
Lord Grenvilleobserved, there was an end of the constitution of parliament, if the privy council assumed to itself the power of legislation.
Lord Hawkesburyopposed the motion, and considered the principle of those Orders to have been fully discussed, and their execution approved of by the assent of parliament.—Lords Erskine, Auckland, and earl Grey, supported the motion, and contended that the law of the land had been violated without any ground of necessity that could entitle ministers to ask parliament for a Bill of Indemnity.—The motion was then put and negatived.
[PROTEST.] Against the rejection of the above motion of the earl of Carlisle, the following Protest was entered in the Journals: viz.
"Dissentient—Because the proposition stated in this motion is evidently and undeniably true.—We conceive the Proper mode of interpreting the laws of our country, and the acts of its government, to be according to the plain sense of the words therein contained., —The Words of the Order stated in the motion expressly declare, That the articles therein mentioned may be exported to certain. places there referred to; and the statute of the seventh of his present majesty does, in terms equally explicit, prohibit such exportation.— "And we conceive that any case of an Order issued by his majesty in council, contrary to the statute law of the realm, is a matter of such importance as to require the most serious attention of this house. (Signed) Carlisle, Grenville, Erskine, Spencer, Lauderdale, Gray, Auckland, Wentworth, Fitzwilliam."