Sitting of 15 February 1808

MINUTES.
Sir James Pulteney,from the select committee appointed to try and determine the merits of the petition of Joseph Garland, esq.; and also of the petition of sir Rd. Bickerton, bait.; severally complaining of an undue election and double return for the town and county of the town of Poole; informed the house, that the said committee had determined, That Joseph Garland, esq. and sir Richard Bickerton, bart were not duly elected; that John Jeffery, esq. was duly elected; and that the last election for the said town and county, so far as respects the said Joseph Garland and sir Rd. Bickerton, was a void election: also, that the said petitions did not, either of them, appear to the said committee to be frivolous or vexatious.—Col. Strutt presented a Declaration from Mr. Fuller, one of the members for Sussex, declaring that it was not his intention to defend his election against the petitions of col. Sergison, and certain Freeholders. The consideration of the petitions was adjourned to the 24th of March. —In consequence of the ill health of sir Home Popham, leave of absence was given to him for a month. Mr. Lushington, on the same ground, postponed the motion of which he had given notice for

487
to-morrow, respecting advances from the Droits of Admiralty fund to sir Home Popham.

EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINOPLE.
Mr. Taylorrose pursuant to notice, to move for papers necessary to give a proper understanding of the particulars connected with the Expedition to Constantinople. The frequent references that had been made to this transaction, in the discussions on the affair of Copenhagen, to which it had been assimilated in principle, rendered a more particular investigation necessary. It was contended, that whatever difference there might be in appearance, and certainly there was great difference in point of execution and event, the principle of the right of attacking a neutral power was exactly the same. But it was not merely to estimate the comparative right and propriety of these attacks on neutral powers, that the papers he was about to move for, ought to be before the house. It was usual, when it had been thought right to go to war with a power before friendly, to make some communication to parliament with respect to the fact and the motives. Now, we were involved in a war with Turkey, brought on by that attack, and no communication whatever had been made to parliament on the subject. It was no private nor party motive that had induced him to bring forward this motion. He was not connected with any party, and he had communicated only with one or two members on the subject. Having a short time been resident in Turkey, and conversant with the manners of the people and their political attachments, his attention was naturally engaged by the dispatches from his majesty's ambassador and commanders in the Dardanelles, and with every attention that he was able to give, he could neither discover why the armament went, nor why it came away. Whatever might be the policy of the Copenhagen Expedition, it at least afforded an eminent example of judicious management and able execution. When a transaction of that kind was thought by some to call for enquiry, he could not bring himself to think that a transaction in which the character of the navy, the favourite service of the country, was brought in question by ill-success, ought to be suffered to pass without an investigation, which would fix the blame of the failure where it ought justly to fall. These were the motives which had induced him to bring this subject before the house. He
488
would abstain from pronouncing any opinion till the papers which were to guide his judgment, as well as that of the house, should be properly considered. He would enumerate shortly the circumstances of the transaction. The British fleet appeared at the entrance of the Dardanelles on the 29th of Jan. 1807, while the British ambassador was still at Constantinople. The British fleet attacked the castles, and forced its passage, burning a Turkish frigate. The British fleet remained 12 days before Constantinople, and then came back the same way without doing any thing farther. This situation was one in which no British officer would wish to remain, or ought to be suffered to remain, without inquiry. The papers which he would move for would go to show why the British squadron had gone to the Dardanelles, why it had come away, and what had been done there. He concluded with moving, "That there be laid before the house a Copy of the Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, between his majesty and the Ottoman Porte, signed at Constantinople, January 5, 1799, by sir Sidney Smith, and Mr. Spencer Smith; also a Copy of any Secret Articles of the said Treaty regulating the passage of the Dardanelles by British ships of war; a copy of a Dispatch of lord Elgin, notifying the exchange of the ratifications of the said Treaty; a copy of any Treaty existing between the Porte and Russia on the 19th of Jan. 1807; copies of the Letters of the secretary of state to Mr. Arbuthnot, his majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, at the time of the British squadron proceeding to that place; and of Mr. Arbuthnot's Dispatches after the arrival of the squadron; copies of the Instructions issued to lord Collingwood, and of those issued by him to sir John Duckworth; a copy of a Letter from sir Sidney Smith to sir John Duckworth, relating to the burning a Danish ship in the Dardanelles; and copies, generally, of all the Correspondence of lord Collingwood, and the officers sent by him on this service."
Mr. Secretary Canning,after waiting a few moments to see if any one would rise on the other side—the gentlemen there being particularly interested in this subject, and therefore naturally supposed to he anxious to take the earliest opportunity of delivering their sentiments—felt himself now called upon, in consequence of their silence, to state what his sense of his duty suggested to him with respect to the

489
motion now offered. He had said, on a former night, that the motion was brought forward without his knowledge or concurrence: the hon. mover had stated the same thing this night. Not having the honour of an acquaintance with the hon. gent., he had had no means of ascertaining the nature of the information he meant to call for, till the hon. gent. did him the honour to transmit to him, this morning, a list of the Papers he meant to move for. Since that time, he had considered and investigated all the circumstances as much as the time allowed, and he would now state, how far it was possible and proper to comply with the motions. The first motion, relating to the Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, there could be no difficulty of acceding to. The treaty was matter of public record and notoriety, and therefore there could be no reserve with respect to it. As to any Secret Articles regulating the passage of the Dardanelles by British ships of war, he could find no traces of such articles. On reference to the books of the Foreign Office, it was found that the Treaty had been for a time taken away by a person connected with the office, and not returned to the custody of the librarian to whom it properly belonged. Till the treaty was got back, it could not be ascertained whether there was or was not any secret articles of the nature alluded to. There could be no difficulty in producing a copy of the dispatch of lord Elgin, relative to the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty. With respect to any Treaty between Russia and the Porte, in Jan. 19, 1807, he did not conceive how that could be laid before the house. His majesty's government was seldom in possession of such copies of the treaties of foreign powers as could be laid before parliament, unless when such treaties were to be made the basis of any arrangement here. He was not prepared to say, whether the treaty between Russia and the Porte contained any stipulation to which G. Britain was invited to accede. But the treaty was matter of notoriety, to be found in all the books of public papers, and of course might be referred to without difficulty in debate. The copies of the Correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Arbuthnot were in the office, as well as the Official Notes during the transactions in the Dardanelles, and they might be produced if the house should think proper. Copies of the Orders to lord Collingwood, and from him to admi-
490
rals Duckworth and Louis, might also be produced. The Letter of sir Sidney Smith he had not been able to find; but when it should be found, it might be produced as well as the rest. He had thus far gone over the list for the satisfaction of the hon. gent. who had made the motion. For himself, he saw no ground for instituting an inquiry under present circumstances. But he was persuaded, the house would feel that his majesty's ministers were called upon to give every information, when the production of all that could be given was called for by the hon. gentlemen who composed the administration under which this transaction had taken place. He had followed literally the order of the motions made by the hon. gent. It was impossible for him to be aware what view the hon. gentlemen opposite took of the motion. They would themselves state how they wished to arrange and modify the production of the documents. He was not aware of any practical benefit that could arise to the country from the investigation proposed; but, after what had been said on the other side, he did not feel himself at liberty to dissuade the house from going into it.
Mr. T. Grenvillewaited for the right hon. secretary to state how far his sense of public duty would allow him to comply with the motions offered. Till he had heard the right hon. secretary's sentiments on this head, he could not know what further information it would be necessary for him to call for by a supplementary motion. The correspondence with Mr. Arbuthnot was extremely voluminous, much of it not bearing on the question the hon. gent.'s speech referred to. He could not say how much of that correspondence might be necessary to give the house just grounds to form its judgment. When the right hon. gent. should have produced all he intended to give under the motions now made, he should consider what further information it would be, necessary for him to call for. He agreed with the hon. mover, that no opinion ought to be expressed till the house should be in possession of the proper documents. But he thought the hon. gent. differed from his own rule, and expressed upon some points stronger opinions than were warranted the first stage of an enquiry. From the change which had taken place in his majesty's councils, the late ministers had not the advantage of being in possession of the papers principally relating to the

491
transactions in the Dardanelles, and therefore they could not know what those papers contained material or immaterial to their cause. In the admiralty, from the peculiar manner in which the business was carried on formally by the Board in general, but often confidentially by the first lord alone, who was generally a member of the cabinet, and who often did not think it necessary to communicate to the Board what he did; a correspondence frequently passed between the First Lord and the commander of an Expedition, which was not communicated to the Board. Having been himself in the situation of first lord of the Admiralty at the time of the transactions which were referred to in the hon. gent.'s motions, he could not ascertain whether all that had passed through his hands was to he had in the office. But a great part of the dispatches had arrived after, and of this he could know nothing whatever. It would appear by the report of sir T. Louis, who was sent to examine the state of the Turkish fleet, the arsenals and castles of the Dardanelles, on the 5th of Dec. that the hon. admiral thought the force sent amply sufficient. This was six weeks before the expedition. He was anxious to have before the house the dispatch of lord Collingwood respecting this report. He had in this view written to the Board of Admiralty, to ascertain whether the paper was in their office. The Board returned for answer that no such paper was to be found in their office, and that they doubted whether it existed. He then sent them his own copy, which, after pressing it as strongly as he could upon them on public grounds, they twice returned as not essential to any public service, and relating to a transaction wholly gone by:—a transaction in which lord Collingwood's conduct might possibly be implicated, on the ground of sending an insufficient force to the Dardanelles, could not be properly looked upon with such indifference; for though he did not mean to throw any part of the responsibility off himself on any body, yet certainly lord Collingwood might be supposed to have most to do with the appointment of the rate of force sent. Neither was it respectful to parliament to resist a document so proper to throw light on a matter, about which an inquiry was to be instituted in the house of commons. With respect to the aggravated statement of attacking a neutral and an ally in time of peace, it would appear
492
by the Instructions to lord Collingwood, that the attack was not to be made, nor any hostile step taken, till our ambassador should have informed the admiral that the relations of peace and amity had ceased to exist. Lord Collingwood being absent in the Mediterranean, he knew not how the house could be put in possession of the important papers he had referred to, except in the manner he had proposed, and he left it to the house to judge of the fairness with which he had been treated by the board of Admiralty. He hoped the house would give him at least the relief of considering the paper in his hands as authentic. He hoped the fullest information would be granted, and he challenged the fullest inquiry upon that information.
Mr. Wellesley Poleexplained the grounds on which the board of admiralty had conceived it impossible to retain the papers sent by the right hon. gent. The office of lord high admiral being executed by commissioners, it was necessary that all orders should be signed by three of those commissioners. The first lord was unquestionably in the habit of private correspondence with officers on service; but no officer would be justified in acting on such private communication. Even in the right hon. gent's. letter to lord Coilingwood, he had admitted this, by stating, that his lordship would receive official instructions on the subject. Those instructions were sent; duplicates of them were now in the admiralty office, and might be produced if required. He begged to call to the recollection of the right hon. gent., the practice of the admiralty when a private communication to or from the first lord was Made official. The first lord brought it to the board. It was read by the secretary; a minute was made of the transaction; an order proceeded upon it, and that document remained in the office. Surely then, the right hon. gent. could never contend, that letters of so old a date, which he had communicated to the board while in office, and which he had never communicated at all to the board untill the last 4 or 5 days, ought to be received as official. It was impossible to find a precedent for such a proceeding on the records of the admiralty office; and he had searched narrowly for that purpose. If the principle was admitted, what would prevent any private person, who had belonged to any board at any period, from sending to that board any private papers, and insisting upon their being received as

493
official documents? On this subject he could appeal with confidence to any gentleman who had sat at the admiralty board. There was no disposition to prevent the right hon. gent. from obtaining his object. He would tell him how he could perhaps get at it. Probably lord Collingwood had sent sir T. Louis's report to the admiralty, in which case it could certainly be produced. If the right hon. gent. in the plenitude of his power, fancied that he was lord high admiral, and that he could act as such without assistance, he was very much mistaken.
Mr. Grenvilleexplained, and defended himself from the imputation of having arrogated a consequence that did not belong to him.
Mr. C. Johnstonethought, that there was a very striking difference between the Copenhagen expedition and the Turkish in this respect. If ministers had been wrong in the Copenhagen expedition, there might be some practical effect in taking the opinion of the house upon it, as in such case the house might address his majesty to remove his ministers. He did not see, however, any practical result from enquiring into the expedition to the Dardanelles, as the advisers of it were not now in office. He presumed, that nobody wished to move an impeachment against them, or to address his majesty that they should never again be taken into his service.
Mr. Windhamthought the hon. gent. was much mistaken, in supposing that the only practical effect in taking the opinion of the house, could be to remove one set of ministers from their places. There Was a consideration still more important than places, and that was character. The practical result which other gentlemen who sat near him wished, was to vindicate their characters against unauthorized and unfounded misrepresentations and calumnies. Some of their opponents seemed to wish, that this subject should lie open as a perpetual fund for insinuations; but at the same time, they shrunk from bringing it fairly to a trial. He and his former colleagues in office wished that it should be brought to a trial, and that insinuation and misrepresentation upon this subject should be at an end. He could not conceive on what priciple the board of admiralty could refuse to keep in their house, documents so important as those which had been offered by his right hon. friend. He thought the public offices ought to be full of such records, which might be useful in future
494
wars. A board of admiralty might as well say they did not want maps or charts as to say that such papers as admiral Louis's report of the strength of the Dardanelles was unimportant. He thought that if they could not see any other way in which they might he useful, they might, at least, have seen that, in justice to the ministers who advised those measures, these papers ought to have been preserved.
Lord Castlereaghcould not perceive any necessity for entering into any enquiries on this subject, nor that it could lead to any beneficial result. He thought however that the board of admiralty were quite right in refusing to make this private letter an official document. Without meaning the slightest imputation on the right hon. gent. if he could make his private letter considered as an official document, any other gentleman who had been in office, might come at any time with garbled communications, and insist upon their being received as official. The gentlemen who pleased to make those communications to the admiralty, might give what they pleased, and withhold what they pleased. Although he had the firmest reliance on the honour of the right hon. gent. yet it ought not to be left entirely to individual integrity and honour, to say what papers should be presented for the purpose of being made official. He could not avoid noticing the laxity of public morals that was sometimes manifest in the conduct of gentlemen on the other side. They condemned most loudly the practice of reading partial extracts from dispatches, and yet it was what they proposed in the present instance. A noble lord also in another place (earl Grey), who had appeared to feel most sorely upon an extract of a dispatch of his being read, had yet shewn no scruple, at the time he was in office, to read extracts from other people's dispatches, and had read in that house extracts from his (lord C.'s) dispatches. In fact, it was well known, that when ministers laid any particular information before the house, it was from extracts; and they did not think it necessary to recite all the voluminous matter connected with the subject. As to the importance of these papers, he conceived that the report of admiral Louis was only introduced as a convoy to get in the private letter which the right hon. gent. wished to have entered as an official document. He could take upon himself to say confidently, that this report was either at the admiralty or at his office.

495
He remembered perfectly that he had read it, without being indebted to the right hon. gent.'s store of private information. The admiralty, therefore, could have no use in duplicates of dispatches which were already in their hands.
Mr. Tierneydefended the conduct of his right hon. friend, and denied that there was the smallest ground for the analogy the noble lord attempted to deduce between the case of this letter, and the garbled extracts to which the noble lord had alluded. But, to prove any sort of similitude between this transaction and the other, the noble lord must shew that his right hon. friend had attempted to produce partial and mutilated extracts from the letters in question, instead of the complete documents. He did not wish to enlarge further one this topic of garbled extracts, in charity to the feelings of a right hon. gent. opposite him, after the severe reproach he had received upon that head from the highest authority in this country. Another hon. gent. was averse to the production of the papers moved for, because he said, it was of no use to defend men out of office. But the hon. gent. seemed to be quite of the contrary opinion as to the necessity of adducing documents for defending men in office, from the loudness of his cheering, on a former night, when partial extracts from dispatches were read to vindicate their conduct; but the public, who felt that in the persons of his hon. friends on that side of the house the country had its best friends, felt anxiety for their vindication; and it was a duty the house owed to their characters to allow them the investigation they so earnestly desired. There appeared, however, an extraordinary degree of reluctance and uncertainty on the part of the right hon. secretary, in acceding to the motion before the house; his language was—'You may have this, and perhaps you might have that; but investigation is not necessary, because no charges are brought against you.' He denied the assertion: charges were brought, and those of the most serious nature; no less than those of having brought disgrace upon his majesty's character, and tarnished the splendour of his arms, by seizing upon Alexandria from a power with whom we were on terms of amity, without any declaration of hostility, and sending an expedition against Constantinople without a military force to support it. It was against those charges that his right. hon. friend
496
wished to vindicate their characters, by a full investigation of their conduct; and it might as well be said, that courts-martial, such as that now going on at Chelsea, were vain and useless, as an investigation of the conduct of public ministers, whose honour and characters were implicated, arid who had a right to demand a fair trial, and be either acquitted or condemned in the face of their country. He hoped, not only that the papers moved for would be granted, but even others which his hon. friends might deem necessary, to the fullest information of parliament and their own Vindication.
Mr. G. Johnstonein explanation, denied that he felt any pleasure, or expressed any applause when his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning) was reading the extracts from official dispatches, alluded to by the right hon. gent. who spoke last. On the contrary, much as he admired the speech of his right hon. friend, he had no hesitation in saying, that he highly disapproved of the introduction of the extracts referred to, because such a practice appeared to him quite inconsistent with fairness in debate.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerthought the papers should be produced. An hon. gent. had made a motion, accompanied with observations, pointedly criminating the gentlemen opposite, who wished for the papers to enable them to meet the accusation. Unless, therefore, the production of the papers would be attended with public inconvenience, which did not appear to he the case, he could see no ground for withholding them. He defended the Admiralty from the imputation of having acted in an unmanly and uncandid manner to the right hon. gent. If they had suppressed, or if they had burned, his communications, they might have justly been so accused; but by returning them, they gave him the opportunity of bringing them before the public in any other shape which he chose.
Mr. Crokerwould have been better pleased, if papers had been called for which would have thrown a light on the planning of the expedition, rather than on the execution of it; he thought that the admiralty were bound to refuse the right gent.'s letters as they had done.
Mr. Taylormade a short reply.—The question was then put on the first motion, which was carried, with the omission of that part which related to the Secret Articles in the treaty with the Ottoman

497
Porte, and the regulations for British ships passing the Dardanelles.
Mr. Johnstone,consistently with his declared opinion that investigation was not necessary, moved an amendment in the motion respecting the correspondence between his majesty's secretary of state and Mr. Arbuthnot, resident at Constantinople, relative to and connected with the causes of hostilities with Turkey, by omitting every thing after the word 'relative,' and inserting, 'the causes of hostilities now existing with the Ottoman Porte.'—The motion, as amended, was then put and carried. The following are copies of the papers moved for.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINOPLE.
The following are copies of the Papers presented to the House of Commons in pursuance of the above motions: viz.

PAPERS.
PRESENTED BY HIS MAJESTY'S COMMAND TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, PURSUANT TO THEIR ADDRESS OF FEB. 15, 1808.
No. I.—TREATY between his Majesty and the Ottoman Porte.
In the name of God Almighty.—The uninterrupted good understanding which has always subsisted between the august Court of London and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and the circumstances of that state of war in which the two sovereigns of the British and Ottoman empires are engaged, in consequence of the perfidious and multiplied aggressions of the French, have created in them a mutual desire to cement the ties of their ancient friendship; and a defensive alliance having just been concluded between the Sublime Porte and his maj. the emperor of all the Russias, the friend and ally of his Britannic maj.; in which alliance, founded upon the basis of a mutual guarantee of their empires, of the re-establishment and continuance of tranquillity, and of the preservation of other powers, it is agreed that his Britannic maj. shall be invited to accede to it: their said majesties, namely, his maj. Geo. 3. king of Great Britain, &c. and his Imperial maj. Sultan Selim the 3rd the most mighty Ottoman emperor, being equally desirous of contributing to the safety and interests of their respective subjects and to the restoration of general tranquillity in Europe, have to this effect nominated for their Plenipotentiaries, viz, the king of G. Britain on
498
his part, sir W. Sidney Smith, knight, commander and grand cross of the royal military order of the sword, and commander of his squadron at present in the Levant, and John Spencer Smith, esq. his minister Plenipotentiary to the Sublime Ottoman Porte; and his Imperial majesty on his part, the right exc. and right hon. Esseid Ibraham Isinet Bey, with the title of Cazi Asker of Roumili and formerly of Cadi of Constantinople, and Ahmed Aalif, Reis Effendi; who having reciprocally communicated their full powers, proved to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—Article I. His Britannic maj. already connected with his maj. the emperor of Russia by the ties of the strictest alliance, accedes by the present treaty to the defensive alliance which has just been concluded between his majesty the Ottoman emperor and the emperor of Russia, in as far as its stipulations are applicable to the local circumstances of his empire and of that of the Sublime Porte; and reciprocally, his maj. the Ottoman emperor concludes by this treaty the same engagements with his Britannic maj. that by virtue of the present defensive treaty, and of the alliances and treaties which already exist, there shall be established for ever between the three empires, peace, good understanding, and perfect friendship by sea and by land, so that for the future the friends of one of the parties shall be the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one shall be equally regarded as the enemies of the others: it is for this reason that the two high contracting parties promise and engage to communicate freely with each other in all affairs which may interest their tranquillity and reciprocal security, and to take with one accord the necessary measures to oppose all projects hostile to themselves, and to bring about general tranquillity.—Art. II. In order to give full and intire effect to this alliance, the high contracting parties mutually guarantee their possessions to each other: his Britannic majesty guarantees to the Ottoman Porte all the possessions without exception,which it held immediately before the invasion of Egypt by the French; and reciprocally his maj. the Ottoman emperor guarantees to G. Britain all its possessions without any exception whatever.—Art. III. Although the two contracting parties reserve to themselves the full right of entering into negotiation with other powers, and of concluding with them any treaties which

499
their interests may require, they nevertheless mutually engage, in the most binding manner, that those treaties shall not contain any condition which can ever cause the least injury, damage, or prejudice to either of the two, or be detrimental to the integrity of their states; they promise on the contrary to consult and to preserve to the best of their power their reciprocal honour, security, and advantage.—Art. IV. In all cases of hostile attack against the states of one of the contracting parties, the succour to be furnished by the other shall be regulated by the principles of good faith, conformably to the intimate friendship which exists between the two empires, and according to the nature and the exigency of the cases in question.—Art. V. The two contracting parties acting together, either with the whole of their forces or with the Succours furnished in virtue of this alliance, one of the parties shall not conclude any peace or permanent truce without comprehending in it the other party, and providing for its security; and in case of an attack upon one of the parties, in consequence ,of the stipulations of this treaty or of their faithful execution, the other party shall assist him in the manner the most expedient and most conformable to the common interests, according to the exigency of the case.— Art. VI. The two high contracting parties are agreed and have determined, that when their fleets, squadrons, vessels, and other ships of war shall meet, they shall salute each other, observing, as to which side shall commence the salute, the superiority of the rank of the commanders, indicated by their flags. And in case their rank shall be equal, they shall not salute each other. The salute shall be returned by an equal number of guns. On a meeting taking place, boats shall therefore be sent in order to concert mutually, and to avoid all misunderstanding.—Art. VII. The trophies and all the booty which may have been taken from the enemy, shall belong to the troops which have taken them.—Art. VIII. The two high contracting parties being actually at war with the common enemy, agree to make common cause, and not to conclude any peace or truce but with one accord, as has been stipulated in the fifth Article; so that on one side the Sublime Porte, notwithstanding the cessation of the present attack directed against her states, shall be bound to continue the war, and to remain faithfully attached to the cause of her august allies,
500
until the conclusion of a peace, just and honourable for them and for herself; and on the other side, his Britannic maj. shall be equally bound not to make peace with the common enemy, without providing for the interests, the honour, and the security of the Ottoman empire.—Art. IX. The two allies thus making common cause, promise to communicate to each other their intentions relative to the continuance of the war and the conditions of peace, and to concert with each other on these subjects, guiding themselves by the principles of justice and equity.—Art. X. In order to render more efficacious the assistance, to be furnished by both parties in the present war, according to the spirit of this treaty of alliance, the two high contracting parties shall concert together on the measures which may be best calculated to defeat the pernicious projects of the enemy in general, and particularly in Egypt, and to destroy his trade in the Levant and the Mediterranean; and to this effect his maj. the Ottoman emperor engages not only to shut all his ports without exception to the commerce of the enemy, but also to employ in his states against him, in order to impede the execution of his ambitious projects, an army of at least 100,000 men, and to augment it, if the case should require it, to the utmost extent of his forces. He shall also put his naval force in a state of preparation, to act in concert with that of his allies in the seas before mentioned; and his Britannic maj. reciprocally engages on his part, to employ in the said seas, a naval force always proportionate to that of the enemy, in order equally to annoy him, concerting with the fleets of his allies the means of throwing obstacles in the way of the execution of the enemy's plans, and more especially of preventing any attack upon the states and provinces of the Ottoman empire.—Art. XI. It being understood that the continuance of the British forces in the Levant has for its principal Object the defence of the Turkish coasts, and that desertion by weakening the means must infallibly prove detrimental to that object, the two high contracting parties engage not to tolerate it under any motive or pretext whatsoever.—Art. XII. Although the two high contracting, parties are anxious to preserve these engagements in force as long as possible, yet as circumstances may in time require some change in them, it is agreed to fix the term of eight years for the duration of this definitive treaty of alliance, counting from the day of the ex-

501
change of the ratifications. At the expiration of that term, the two parties will enter into amicable discussion for its renewal, conforming themselves to the existing situation of affairs.—Art. XIII. The present treaty of defensive alliance shall be ratified by his Maj. the king of G. Britain, and his maj. the Ottoman emperor, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople in 3 months, or sooner if possible. In witness whereof, we the undersigned, ministers plenipotentiary aforesaid, have signed the present treaty of alliance, and have affixed to it the seal of our arms, together with that of the legation of his Britannic maj. at the Sublime Ottoman Porte. Done at Constantinople, the 5th of Jan. 1799. WM. SIDNEY SMITH, JOHN SPENCER SMITH, IBRAHIM ISMAEL BEY, AHMED AATIFF REIS EFFENDI.
No. II.—Extract of a Dispatch from the Earl of Elgin to Lord Grenville, dated Constantinople, 25th Nov. 1799.
On Saturday (Nov. 23) I had the honour of presenting my credentials to the Kaimacam who now supplies the place of the Grand Vizier, and by particular request, at the same time exchanged the ratification of the treaty with which his mat. had been graciously pleased to intrust me.
No. III.—Extract of a Dispatch from the right hon. Ch. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Buyukdere, 25th Aug. 1806.— Received 29th Sept.
It was yesterday settled at the. Porte that the present Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be recalled, and that prince Charles Callimaki, the First Dragoman of the Porte, should be named to the government of Moldavia, and prince Alexander Suzzo to that of Wallachia; at the same time Mr. Bano Hanchyry was appointed Dragoman in the room of prince Callimaki. To give you a perfect idea of the disrespect with which Russia has been treated in this instance, it is necessary that I should transmit to you an extract from the Regulations respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, which were published in the year 1802. As no accusation whatever has been brought. against either of the Hospodars who are now removed, there can be no excuse for breaking the convention; by which it was stipulated with Russia that 7 years should be the period of each prince's government. You will probably expect to hear that this measure has originated with the French ambassador; in effect there are proofs sufficient that it is his work.
502
(Translation of Inclosure, referred to in No. 3.)
The term of the continuance of the Hospodars in their governments shall from henceforth he fixed at 7 complete and entire years, to date from the day of their nomination, and if they are not guilty of any open offence, they shall not be displaced before that term is expired; if they do commit an offence during that time, the Sublime Porte will inform the minister of Russia of the circumstance; and if, after due examination is made into the affair on both sides, it shall appear that the Hospodar has ready committed an offence, in that case only his deposition shall be allowed.
No. IV.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Buyukdere, 29th Sept. 1806.
On the 18th of this month the Dragoman of the Porte communicated to Mr. Pisani* for my information, a Note which had been presented by the French ambassador a copy of which I have herewith the honour to inclose.
Inclosure referred to in No. 4.—Note presented by the French Ambassador at the Porte, to the Reis Effendi. Dated Pera 16th Sept. 1806.
The undersigned, general of division, ambassador of his maj. the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has the honour to lay before his exc. the Reis .Effendi the following Considerations.—He has been positively informed, although in an indirect manner, that the Russian legation has delivered a Note to the Sublime Porte, in which it is said that the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed at Paris by his plenipotentiary. This refusal places Europe in the same situation in which she was 6 weeks ago, but it unmasks the projects of Russia. This treaty of peace stipulated for the independance of the seven islands; a stipulation which removing the Russians from the Mediterranean, where they had established themselves in order to attack the Ottoman empire at various points, could not be acceptable to them.—Ragusa was restored to its independance under the protection of the Sublime Porte: this arrangement rendering it impossible for the Russians to keep up their intelligence with the Montenegrians and with the revolted Servians, was contrary to their views.—Doubtless it is the arti-
*First Dragoman or Interpreter attached to the British mission.

503
cle which stipulates for the independance of the Ottoman empire and the integrity of its territory which has occasioned the rejection of the peace at Petersburgh; Russia then perceived that she could no longer seize provinces of that empire by force of arms as she seized the Crimea, or extort them from her in time of peace, as she did with regard to Georgia and the passage of the Dardanelles.—This treaty of peace, in fine, leaving the French in Albania and Dalmatia, placed upon the frontiers of Turkey her most ancient ally and her most faithful friend, who would have remained and will ever remain ready to defend her. Such are the motives which have lend the cabinet of Petersburgh to this refusal. I do not give way to vain declamation; I lay facts before you; I beseech you to weigh them with all the attention to which they are entitled.—If in these difficult circumstances the Porte does not form a true estimate of her dangers and of her force, if she does not form the decision her interests require of her, I shall perhaps ere long have to lament her fate.—The undersigned has received the most positive orders from his maj. the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to declare to the sublime Porte, that not only the principles of friendship, but those of the strictest neutrality, require that the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian ships of war, as well as against every other vessel of that nation, bringing troops, ammunition, or provisions; and that the said passage cannot be opened to them without committing an act of hostility against France, and without giving his maj. Napoleon the great a right of passage over the territories of the Ottoman empire, in order to combat with the Russian army on the banks of the Dniester.—Any renewal or continuation of alliance with the enemies of France, such as England and Russia, would be not only a manifest violation of the neutrality, but an accession on the part of the Sublime Porte to the war which those powers wage against France, and his maj. would see himself compelled to take measures conformable to his interests and his dignity.—The Sublime Porte cannot maintain her relations with two missions from Naples, and his maj. the emperor of the French cannot suffer his august brother Napoleon Joseph King of Naples and the two Sicilies, to meet with difficulties here which he does not experience from any power in amity with France.—His maj. the emperor has a large army in Dalmatia:
504
this army is collected for the defence of the Ottoman empire, unless an equivocal conduct on the part of the Porte, and a condescension towards Russia and England, which might again throw her into their power, should compel his maj. the emperor of the French to bring forward his formidable forces for a purpose totally opposite to that which he had in view.—His maj. has ordered the undersigned to state to the Sublime Porte in the most friendly, though energetic manner, these demands, for the purpose of obtaining an answer in writing; and it is expected that this answer shall be positive and categorical.—No further delay can be allowed; and his maj. has no doubt that the Sublime Porte will give him the assurances he desires, and which are so much in unison with the interests of the Ottoman empire.—The undersigned has no wish to make a vain display of the formidable forces of the great Napoleon; his friends know how to estimate their importance; his enemies have felt their power.—The genius of his august master is well known; his determinations are wise and prompt, his personal attachment to his highness is sincere. He only seeks the independance, the integrity, and the glory of Turkey. He desires nothing. He asks nothing. What inducements to an union with him! At the same time what reason to apprehend the loss of his good-will by adopting a timid, uncertain, or inimical line of conduct! Under these circumstances the answer of the Sublime Porte .will regulate the conduct of my august master. Let not the threats of the enemies of France impose upon the Sublime Porte; they have been vanquished, and they will ever be so. The great Napoleon will employ all his resources for the glory of his highness Selim III. his friend; and his resources are immense, his genius is still greater.—This Note is of sufficient importance to be submitted to the profound wisdom of his maj. the emperor Selim III. and your exe. is requested to take the earliest opportunity of laying it before him. The undersigned &c. HORACE SEBASTIANI
No V.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox. Buyukderé, 17th Oct. 1806.—Received 2d Jan. 1807.
On the 15th inst. a conference with M. d'Italinsky took place according to appointment. The Ex-Chiaya Bey was present, and there was still an effort made to negotiate. The Russian minister, however,

505
would of course listen to nothing but the immediate and unconditional restoration of the Hospodars, which before they parted was agreed to in the manner that he required.
No. VI.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Howick, dated Pera, 1st Dec. 1806.
In the short dispatch which I wrote to your lordship on the 25th of last month, I had the honour of informing you that I was in daily expectation of the arrival of admiral Louis with a squadron at the Dardanelles. At the time I was writing to your lordship, the squadron, consisting of three line of battle ships, was anchored off Tenedos; from whence, however, in consequence of a letter from me, it was immediately removed to the Dardanelles, and the admiral himself having left two of his ships at that place, came up in the Canopus to Constantinople. He arrived here on Friday evening the 27th ultimo, and his ship, together with the Endymion, is now at anchor in this harbour.
No. VII.—Dispatch from Lord Howick to Mr. Arbuthnot, dated 14th Nov. 1806.
Sir; Your dispatches to No 69, inclusive, have been received and laid before the king.—In obedience to his maj's commands, I have the greatest pleasure in expressing to you his royal approbation of the whole of your conduct, in the discussions which have taken place between Russia and the Porte.—It is much to be lamented that any thing should occur to divide, and perhaps to turn against each other, the efforts of those powers which a sense of their mutual interests should unite against the common enemy; and on this account, however adverse the conduct of the Turkish government may have been to any expectation of its success, every practicable mode of calm and amicable remonstrance should be used in the hope of recalling the Porte to a better policy.—The fatal effects of French influence in the councils of other powers are not in want of any illustration; and indeed if the situation of so many nations, once independent, and now the vassals of France, did not place in the most striking view the nature of the security to be derived from an alliance with that power, whilst it holds a position enabling it to act offensively against the object of its promised protection; the little disguise observed by M. Sebastiani would alone be sufficient to open the eyes of any government not abso-
506
lutely blind to its own preservation. It is distinctly avowed in the Note of that minister, that the possession of Dalmatia and Albania by the French, whilst it is asserted to be for the defence of the Porte, may at any time be used for its destruction. Even the offer of protection is accompanied by a direct menace of attack on the Turkish dominions; if the Porte does not at once renounce its connexion with allies whose powerful and disinterested support it has already experienced, and become unfaithful to its subsisting engagements.—The evident tendency of such conduct on the part of the French government, and the effect it must inevitably produce. with respect to the allies, if the Porte should yield to an influence so fatal to its security, are very properly pointed out in the Notes which you have delivered. You will immediately state that they have met with the decided approbation of this government; and you will add, that there can exist but little hope of preserving the relations of amity between the two powers, whilst a minister, whose influence has already been so prejudicial to the friendship subsisting between them, is suffered to remain at Constantinople. The insulting and faithless propositions made by M. Sebastiani, which it is much to be regretted the Porte did not immediately reject With indignation, justify the allies in requiring that he should be removed. You will therefore, in enforcing the representations which you are hereby instructed to make, of the necessity of immediate satisfaction with respect to the just demands of Russia, urge this point also in the strongest manner, as of the greatest importance to the preservation of a good understanding between the two powers.—It was thought right to lose no time in forwarding to you this dispatch, at the same time that an additional naval force is preparing to be sent to lord Collingwood, which may enable him to detach a sufficient squadron to Constantinople, to give weight to, and if necessary to enforce an acquiescence in your representation.—Whether it may be prudent immediately to avow this intention, it will be for you to consider. The commercial establishments formed by British subjects in the Turkish dominions, and the danger to which their persons as well as their properties may be exposed from the violence of a power restrained by none of those rules of conduct which govern civilized nations, will not fail to be duly weighed by you in forming

507
your determinaiton.—When this force sails, further instructions will be sent to you, which the additional information that may be expected will probably enable me to apply with more certainty to the existing circumstances.—In the mean time, as a rupture appears but too probable, you will take all necessary measures of precaution for securing every thing that belongs to your mission, and for guarding the persons and property of the British merchants against any injury.—I am preparing instructions relative to the Dragomans, and other objects mentioned in your former dispatches, which shall be sent by the earliest opportunity. HOWICK.—P. S. I have every reason to expect that the proposed reinforcement to lord Collingwood will sail in 4 or 5 days, and his 1dp. will have orders immediately to detach a sufficient squadron to the Dardanelles.
No. VIII.—Dispatch from Lord Viscount Howick to Mr. Arburthnot, dated Downing Street, 20th Nov. 1806.*
Sir ; The particulars of the late conduct of the Porte, as detailed in your dispatches, have engaged the most serious attention of this government; they but too clearly demonstrate the prevalence of the French influence in the Divan, and impose on his majesty the necessity of taking the most prompt and vigorous measures for the security of his own interests, and for the fulfilment of his engagements to his ally the emperor of Russia.—You have been already apprized of the king's intention to send a powerful squadron to Constantinople for this purpose. The departure of that squadron now enables me to furnish you with these further instructions for your conduct.—You will immediately on its arrival declare to the Turkish government the reasons which have induced his majesty to take this measure. You will state that the British fleet comes either to attack or defend, as the conduct of the Porte shall determine; that it would always be more consonant with the most earnest wishes of his majesty's heart, to appear rather in the character of a friend than an enemy to a power whom interest should unite with him in support of the common cause, and with whom the increased dangers of the present crisis would dispose his majesty to strengthen the bonds of his alliance; but that the determination of
*Not received by Mr. Arbuthnot until after he had quitted Constantinople.
508
which of these characters his majesty is to assume, must now rest with the Porte; and that his Majesty feels himself under the necessity of peremptorily proposing this alternative, either the influence of France must cease, or the friendship so long established between the two powers, a friendship beneficial to both, but eminently advantageous to the Turkish government, can no longer continue.—Nor are the proofs which his majesty requires of the destruction of an influence so fatal to the best interests of the Porte, unreasonable in themselves, or difficult to be given. They consist simply in a faithful observance of the engagements which the Porte has contracted with the allies. By treaty the Porte is bound not to dispossess the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia for a certain time, or without the consent of Russia. By treaty the Porte is also bound to permit the passage of Russian ships of war, with the necessary transports to convey stores and provisions, through the canal of Constantinople.—Let the deposed Hospodars be re-instated in the governments of which they have been unjustly dispossessed. Let the passage of the Russian ships be granted, free from impediment, according to the terms of the treaty, and all appearance of hostility on the part of Great Britain shall immediately cease.—Upon these two points, therefore, you will immediately and peremptorily insist, as indispensable to the continuance of peace. Upon receiving a satisfactory answer, you will declare that the British squadron shall remain only so long as its presence may be necessary for the security and protection of the Porte itself; and you will give the strongest assurances of his majesty's support and assistance, if the Turkish government, adopting a better policy, should disengage itself from its connections with France. But if this satisfaction should unfortunately be refused, or improperly delayed, you will deliver in a note recapitulating the complaints which his majesty has to urge against the Porte, and declaring your mission to be at an end; and taking care, as far as may be possible, to secure the persons and property belonging to it, as well as to the British factory, you will retire on board the fleet, or to a place of safety, and immediately signify to the British admiral, that hostilities are to commence.—There are indeed other points which, even if the Porte should acquiesce in the demands which you are above

509
more particularly instructed to make, must not be overlooked; and particularly the removal of M. Sebasliani from Constantinople, and the renewal of the treaty with Great Britain. The first, more especially, should be much insisted on, as of the utmost importance to a preservation of the good understanding between the two powers; but neither of them are such as, if the principal objects in dispute are conceded, would of themselves justify a declaration of war.—The former part of these Instructions having been written in the hope that the Russian minister may not yet have quitted Constantinople, it still remains for me to provide for the case of war having actually begun between Russia and the Porte.—In this case you will offer the mediation of his majesty on the ground of immediate compliance with the two principal demands above referred to, viz. the restitution of the Hospodars, and the free passage of Russian ships to and from the Black sea. Should this offer be accepted, you will immediately dispatch a confidential person to the general commanding the Russian army, and to M. Italinsky, if he should be in a situation to receive such a communication, requesting a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of commencing a negotiation for peace, for the conclusion of which you will continue to employ your good offices.—If, on the contrary, this just offer should be rejected, you will, as in the former case, terminate your mission, and send the necessary information to the officer commanding his majesty's ships of war, that be may proceed, according to his instructions, to enforce, by the power of the British navy, those fair and equitable demands, a compliance with which it would have been so much more satisfactory to his majesty to have obtained from the Porte through a sense of its own interest, and an acknowledgment of their moderation and justice. Should the Turkish government unhappily persevere in listening to the councils of France, his majesty is confident, that the events which must follow cannot be imputed to Great Britain or Russia: their conduct towards the Porte has been uniformly that of the most disinterested friendship, and the Porte has, in more than one instance, experienced the efficacy of their power in defending her against the designs of France. Those designs, though not now pursued by open force, are not less apparent than when France, faithless to her engagements at the
510
same time that she insolently professed to act as an ally of the Porte, invaded and conquered one of the dependencies of the Turkish empire; that conquest was wrested from her, and restored to the Porte, by the successful arms and generous policy of Great Britain. In the same spirit the allies have still continued to act towards the Porte, and that government must be under the influence of a blindness hardly to be conceived if, in opposition to such recent experience, and to her most evident interests, she shall reject an alliance in which she has hitherto found security and honour, under the belief that either can be attained under the promised protection of France. Are the designs of France doubtful? Let the position which she occupies in Dalmatia and Albania, which cannot be stated to be in any way necessary to the security of her own frontier—let the language of M. Sebastiani himself, declaring that, from that point offensive measures may be taken, and openly threatening the destruction of the Turkish empire—answer that question. The proofs of the designs of France are indeed too numerous to be recited, and the invasion of Egypt serves as an example of the attempts which that government is prepared to make, not on that country only, but on Greece, on Syria, and on other valuable dependencies of the Turkish empire. In such a situation of affairs, the intrigues and the menaces of France equally render any temporizing measures impracticable; the Porte is placed in a situation in which a real neutrality can no longer be preserved, and she must choose between those powers whose friendship she has experienced, and those whose promises she has so much reason to distrust. Against France, more fatal to the interests of Turkey as an insidious friend than as an open enemy, his majesty and his august ally have offered their generous protection, and having exhausted all the means of conciliation consistent with their interests and their honour, his majesty awaits the result, whatever it may be, with an entire confidence, that the uniform disinterestedness of his intentions will be fully manifested to the world. I am, &c. HOWICK.
No. IX.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Howick, dated Pera, 27th Jan. 1807.
Late at night on the 23d inst. my servant arrived with your lordship's dispatch of the 14th of last Nov. It has been the highest gratification to me to learn from your lord-

511
ship that my conduct has met with his majesty's approbation. Your lordship will have the goodness, I hope, to take an opportunity of expressing to his majesty my deep sense of this distinguished favour, and you will allow me at the same time to offer my sincere thanks to yourself for the obliging manner in which you made to me so flattering a communication.—After the receipt of your lordship's dispatch I lost no time in asking for a conference. It was fixed for the 25th inst.; and on my arrival at the Porte I found Ismet Bey, the Reis Effendi, the Chiaya Bey, and the Ex-Chiaya Bey, all assembled.—As the conference lasted more than four hours, it would require a length of time to set down on paper all that was said on that occasion. Being anxious to inform your lordship without delay of my having received your instructions, and having also to forward my eight preceding dispatches, which have been detained till now by a contrary wind, I shall for the present do little more than refer to the contents of the letter herewith inclosed, which was sent by me yesterday to the Reis Effendi. Indeed that letter may give a tolerable idea of what passed at the conference; for the Ottoman ministers, who of late had been displeased at what they called my personal partiality to Russia, and who all along have expressed their conviction that his majesty was not acting in concert with Russia, were now so amazed and dejected, that they did not utter a single word which is worth repeating to your lordship. They confined themselves entirely to their usual professions of friendship for his majesty; to the complaints, which I had often heard before of the treatment they had received from Russia; and to excuses for their own conduct, grounded on the changes which have taken place in Europe. They declared, however, that they could give no official answer until the Sultan's pleasure had been known.—I have only to observe, in addition to what your lordship will find in my letter to the Reis Effendi, that as it was left to my discretion, either to announce or to conceal the approaching arrival of a second squadron, I determined on the former after some deliberation.—I was convinced that the only chance of opening the eyes of the Porte would arise from its being proved that his majesty's final resolution had been taken; and for this reason, I made to the Ottoman ministers the communication in question, and read to them such parts of
512
your lordship's dispatch as would be right for them to know.—Your ldp. left it also to my discretion how to act with respect to the eventual departure of the merchants. I knew that many of them had outstanding debts to a considerable amount, and here in particular, it would be impossible to settle their accounts at a short warning. I therefore informed the Porte that I should immediately prepare our factories for their departure, which had likewise the effect of shewing that his majesty's government was really serious; and I obtained a solemn promise that, should it be necessary, the British merchants, as had been the case with the Russians, should have firmans to pass the Dardanelles.—I have since made known to the factory here the present state of things; and should his majesty's subjects be ultimately obliged to leave the country, I will take every possible care to procure for them the means of departing in safety. I am no less attentive to the factory at Smyrna, and to the British commercial establishments at the other states of this empire.
(Inclosure referred to in No. 9.)—Letter from Mr. Arbuthnot to the Reis Efendi, dated Pera, 26th Jan. 1807.
Sir; Your excellency expressed a desire of receiving in writing, the substance of what I had the honour of stating to you in our conference of yesterday. In compliance with, this desire, I shall recall to your recollection the several topics which, by my sovereign's orders, I had to lay before you; and in again pointing out the line of conduct which his maj. expects from the Porte, I shall in their very words, repeat the orders which I have now received, and which, as they admit but of one construction, it will be my duty most literally and most faithfully to obey.—That your excellency and the other ministers who assisted at the conference might understand more clearly the motives which had induced his maj. after a long enduring patience, to change his conduct towards the Porte, it was necessary for me to allude to the first conference I had after my arrival in this country. I told you that Mahmood, who was then Reis Efendi, had scarcely given me time to leave the frigate, before he invited me to a conference; that his first question was, whether I was authorized to renew the treaty; and that to give me a convincing proof of the Sultan's desire to continue that connection with his maj, which had already been productive of such

513
inestimable benefits to this empire, be read to me a note from his highness to the Vizir, which had been written as I was coming round the point of the Seraglio, and which, as I remember well, contained these words: 'I see that the ambassador of my friend the king of England is arrived; let my Reis Efendi see him immediately, and let me know whether he has brought powers to renew the Treaty.' I should not presume to quote the words of the, Sultan's note, if even one of them had escaped my memory; but his highness I am sure will own the accuracy of my statement, and in revolving in his mind the feelings by which he was then influenced, he will regret perhaps that new counsellors soon inspired other sentiments.—I then informed you of the answer which I had given to Mahmood; and which, notwithstanding it contained the most satisfactory reasons for my not having been able to be myself the bearer of full powers, and was expressive of ray conviction that they would soon arrive, Was received however by that minister with marks of mortification which could not but prove that he, no less than his master, was aware that an alliance with England was the only means of insuring prosperity to this empire.—To save your excellency the trouble of reading the long details into which I was obliged to enter yesterday, I shall pass rapidly over all that intervened between that conference with Mahmood, and the arrival at Constantinople of the present French ambassador. Not that I consider the, events which happened during that period as of inferior importance, and am therefore inclined to notice them but slightly: I feel on the contrary that the conduct of the Ottoman government in regard to those events, has been the cause of all the evil which we are now witnessing; and as that conduct has been no less lamented by your excellency than by me, it would be with yourself that I ought chiefly to discuss it. To you, indeed, I might with peculiar propriety express my feelings of sorrow that the wise principles which I heard from you on your first entrance into office, have either been forgotten, or, what I think is more probable, have unfortunately been opposed by superior influence.—But to save time and to save you trouble, I shall briefly observe that consistently with what I had declared to Mahmood, full powers for negotiating the treaty did almost immediately arrive. Though your exc. was not then in office, you are
514
not ignorant of the joy which was expressed when it was known that my sovereign was willing to renew his connexions with the sultan. You remember well that the approach of the Ramazan alone prevented the immediate commencement of the negociation; and you are equally aware, that when that time of religious retirement was expired, the sentiments of the Ottoman ministers had entirely changed; and that, without frankly confessing the real truth, there was an attempt to justify delay by the most absurd pretences. You know that the misfortunes which had happened to Austria (instead of being considered as additional reasons for consolidating that system which in times of danger had proved the surest bulwark of this empire,) were the signal on the contrary for abandoning the principles which till then had influenced the Ottoman councils. As if, total blindness had been produced by a sudden panic, this government abandoned the security which had been derived from acting in conjunction with its allies; and imaginary perils gave place to real ones, when a connexion with that power was sought, whose professions of friendship have uniformly been more baneful than its open enmity.—By referring to the minutes of the conferences which I had at the time with your immediate predecessor, your exc. will find that when I discovered the intention to deceive me; far front insisting upon a renewal of the treaty, I expressed no more than the sense I justly entertained of the indignity which had been offered to my sovereign, and only demanded an explicit avowal of the real determination of this government.—Such an avowal the ministers of that day were not inclined to make to me; nor even did they think it necessary to advise the Sultan to open his mind confidentially to my sovereign, though some valid reasons were undoubtedly wanting, as an explanation for declining to renew the treaty which here and not in England had been so earnestly desired; though I as a friend had pointed out that a letter to that effect ought in prudence to be written; and though, as recent facts have proved, there is not the same unwillingness to address his maj. when his powerful interference is wanted, as was evinced when an offence against him was to be accounted for and explained.—But the advisers of his highness were then otherwise engaged. They were wholly occupied in receiving, with signal marks of distinction, the per-

515
son who had come to demand the acknowledgment of Buonaparte's new imperial titles, and in preparing the answer which was to announce to that chief of the French nation, that his demand had without hesitation been agreed to.—It is true that both to M d'Italinsky and to me communications were made of Buonaparte's overture; and as it came from the head of a government with which the Porte ought at least not to have considered herself as on terms of friendship, for treaties with G. Britain and Russia were existing by which she had expressly stipulated that their enemies should be hers, it was not unreasonable to suppose that in the communication made to us there was a desire to consult our opinion. —Our answers were not delayed, for the danger of becoming thus connected with the French government was sufficiently evident without deliberation. With a warning, and as it now appears, with a prophetic voice, we cautioned the Ottoman government against the admission of a minister whose unceasing efforts would be to sow dissension between the Porte and her allies: but though twenty-four hours had not elapsed between the time of the communications made by the Porte, and of our answers, the deed had been already done; and in an evil hour, a last and fatal blow had been given to the system which the Sultan's enemy, as well as ours, had so long and so unceasingly been endeavouring to undermine.—It was then that the triple alliances may be said to have been virtually dissolved; and then was prepared that new state of things which we are now witnessing, and which, from the effects it has already produced, does not argue great wisdom in its contrivers.—Tired out with such constant failure in our endeavours to save the Porte from the false measures she was pursuing, the Russian minister and I would both of us have gladly been relieved from long and unsuccessful labours. But still it was our duty to have constant discussions with the Porte; and still had we to lament that all our efforts to obtain justice for our governments, and to inspire councils wiser for herself, were equally without avail.—On commercial subjects:—On that of Protections, in regard to which ray sovereign in particular was treated with disrespect, for, to gratify the Porte, he had voluntarily abandoned long enjoyed privileges: On the right to carry the Russian flag, which my colleague had to assert: On the passage of Russian ships of war
516
through the Bosphorus, though it formed an article of a treaty but just renewed: On all these subjects, and on various others which could be enumerated, I and the Russian minister had daily to remonstrate with the Porte; and, as your excellency well knows, it was scarcely ever that we remonstrated with effect. Indeed so notorious was the disinclination of the late ministers to give us satisfaction with respect to our just demands, that your excellency at our first meeting assured me in expressions which did You honour, 'that the time of evil conduct was gone by, and that the commencement or your ministry should make an epoch more worthy of the Sultan, and more satisfactory to his allies.' Your excellency I am confident was sincere in these professions: to give them effect you wanted only that influence which I wished you to obtain; but which was still possessed by persons who had had their share in separating the Sultan from his allies; and who having now to work in secret, unchecked by the responsibility attached to public situations, had thereby the means of baffling more effectually your efforts as well as ours.—I come now to the event which was naturally to be the consequence of the acknowledgment of Buona-parte's title. I allude to gen. Sebastiani's arrival. He found the ministers of the allies injuriously treated by the Porte; and it was not to be expected that, after he was present, the conduct towards their governments would be improved; and in effect his arrival was the signal for those more overt acts of aggression which have so justly excited the displeasure of our sovereigns.—I shall pass by unnoticed the attentions shewn to the new ambassador: they were irregular and unprecedented; but I feel that they were more disgraceful to those to whose instigation they were owing, than it has been disreputable to us not to share them. But I shall confine myself to those two acts by which the embassy of M. Sebastiani has been principally marked. To the note he presented on the 16th of last Sept. and to the deposition of the Hospodars, which was so equally his deed that he did not scruple to take the glory of it.—Respecting the note, I need say the less, as the Ottoman ministers had at the time my written sentiments on the subject, as your excellency and your colleagues saw yesterday in the instructions sent to me from England, that those sentiments bad met with the most decided ap-

517
probation of his maj.'s government; and as, what is far more deserving your attention, you have from the very words of his maj.'s cabinet minister learnt the effect which the conduct of the Porte with regard to that note had produced in England. You have seen that the insulting and faithless propositions made by M. Sebastiani ought, in the opinion of my government, to have been immediately rejected with indignation; and you have perceived that little hope was entertained of preserving the relations of amity between the two powers, whilst a minister, whose influence had already been so prejudicial to the friendship subsisting between them, was suffered to remain at Constantinople.—On the other subject, that of the Hospodars I mean, it will be necessary to re-state to you as accurately as I am able, what I mentioned yesterday. It is true that you did restore them; but may I not ask, as I have done before, whether the unwillingness manifested to repair the injury you had committed, and whether the time which was allowed to elapse before you could be persuaded to give new effect to violated engagements, were not sufficient grounds for suspicion, and sufficiently strung motives for demanding some more solid security? May I not ask, whether this suspicion has not since been fully justified, and whether in your notes and Manifestoes, you have not avowed the reluctancy you felt in fulfilling your most solemn treaties?—Our governments were not to be deceived. The confidence I had placed in the assurances of your excellency, and your unqualified disapprobation of that conduct towards Russia, which is now represented as perfectly justifiable, had led me to give the praise of sincerity to this government which I find to have been ill deserved. But our sovereigns did not partake of the delusion which, I must fairly own, had blinded their ministers. They had not heard the strong and repeated professions of your exc.; they had only to calculate the time which had passed in negotiation, and to observe the difficulties which we had every instant to encounter, and they had already obtained too convincing proofs, that the influence inimical to the friendship between the Sultan and his allies still prevailed. They resolved therefore on such measures as would remove all doubt as to the real designs of the Porte; and these measures were to be accompanied with such declarations as cannot but prove that, notwith-
518
standing all that has happened, friendship, and not enmity, is their real object.—Gen. Michelson marched into Moldavia, and, in the proclamation which he then issued, you will have found the terms on which the emperor has offered the renewal of his friendship. You would have heard the same from his late minister at this court, if you had not hurried him from your country; and if, in contradiction to the solemn assurances given to me, you had not rashly committed an act of hostility by the seizure of the Russian brig, which had been the bearer of explanatory dispatches.—Of what is expected from you by my sovereign, I had the honour of informing you yesterday. You know the reasons why his maj. feels himself justified in requiring the removal of M. Sebastiani. He is convinced, as I have already told you, that the presence of that minister is incompatible with the existence of friendship between the Porte and the allies; and he thinks with the emperor, that a false and hollow peace would be worse than open war.—It is therefore for the Porte to make her choice between France and her allies.—Should the boastings of France continue to be credited; should faith be placed in her professions of friendship, and should the menaces which accompany those professions excite no alarm; then, most probably his maj.'s offer will be rejected, and gen. Sebastiani will remain. Should there, however, be some recollection of what Russian armies have atchieved, and of what British fleets have been known to execute, it may occur to the Porte that her late conduct has not been wise. She may, as I said yesterday, then wish to place herself in that situation in winch I found her when I first arrived. She has still the means of doing it. She has only to comply with the just demands of his maj. and the emperor; and both these sovereigns will, with greater joy, concert measures for her defence, than they have now concerted those which they found essential to their interests.—I might now conclude, for I have retraced to your exc. nearly the whole of what I stated in my conference, and I feel that I have fully executed all my instructions. But I cannot close the last letter which perhaps I may ever write to your exc. without exhorting you to exert that influence which belongs to your high and distinguished situation. Make those feel whose errors have caused the evil which is now impending, that, whatever changes may have taken .place in

519
Europe, there are none which ought to affect the ancient system of this empire. Make them understand, that the armies Russia being concentrated are become more powerful, and that Great Britain has not lost the means of protecting her allies, and of injuring her enemies. Your exc. by enforcing these truths, may be the saviour of your country. You may renew the friendship which had existed between the Sultan and his allies; and you may thus render even to my sovereign a most grateful service. His maj.'s regard for the sultan remains unaltered. It has been with grief that he has been forced to measures so little consonant to his personal feelings; but he was aware, that it was the duty of a sovereign to make every sacrifice to the honour of his crown, and the interest of his people. He would rejoice if his private wishes could be made to accord with his public sentiments; and it may, I trust, be your exc.'s work to destroy the effects of evil councils, and to renew those happy days when Great Britain and Russia were united in successfully endeavouring to promote the interests of this empire. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) CHARLES ARBUTHNOT.
No. 10.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Howick, dated Canopus, off Tenedos, 3d Feb. 1807.— Received 2d May by Mr. Sec. Canning.
The dispatch which I wrote on the 27th of last month will have informed your lordship of my having received your Instructions of the 14th of Nov. and of the conference which immediately after their arrival I had with several of the Ottoman ministers.—It is now necessary that I should state my reasons for having joined his maj.'s squadron, instead of remaining at my post until I had been ordered to quit it by your lordship; and I feel perfectly confident that my conduct on this occasion will not subject me to any censure.—I shall be able to prove clearly that there was an avowed design to cut off my communication with his maj.'s government; and I shall have to relate some other circumstances which will make it no less evident, that I was residing in a country, where, in conjunction with our enemy, measures of hostility against his maj. had been already organized.—As the last dispatches which I transmitted to your lordship were of considerable importance, it was thought adviseable that a firman or passport should be procured for the officer of the Endymion, who was to convey them by sea to adm. Louis.—I accordingly di-
520
rected Mr. Pisani to apply for a firman, and to prevent any delay on the part of the Porte, I sent him to the Reis Effendi very early in the morning of the 27th of Jan. it being my intention that the boat with my dispatches should leave Constantinople on the evening of the same day.—Instead of bringing the the firman, Mr. Pisani came to me about 5 in the afternoon, to let me know that he had not succeeded in his application; that he hoped however to have better success on the following day, but that the Reis Effendi seemed to dislike my transmitting any dispatches to England, as my writing so immediately after my conference, and before I had an answer from the Porte, gave ground for apprehension that I was not inclined to an amicable termination of our differences.—Not having at the moment any idea that the Porte could really intend decidedly to refuse a firman, I had no scruple in authorizing Mr. Pisani to assure the Reis Effendi in writing, and to give my word of honour for the truth of what he was to advance, that I could not delay sending a messenger to your lordship, as I had several dispatches to transmit which had been prepared before the arrival of the late instructions from England; and that with respect to those instructions, I had merely informed my government of what had passed at our conference, but that I had scrupulously avoided to give any opinion as to the nature of the answer which I was expecting to receive. I was anxious to make it clear to the Porte that I had not acted so unfairly as to prejudge the question; and your lordship will in fact have seen that I confined myself to a bare statement of what had passed, without venturing to form a conjecture whether the demands I had made would be agreed to or refused.—Mr. Pisani wrote that evening to the Reis Effendi, and very early in the morning of the 28th be went to the Porte for the purpose of renewing his application for a firman, and with the hope that the explanatory letter which I had enabled him to write, would certainly have removed every difficulty.—It did not appear however, that my assurances had produced the desired effect. The Reis Effendi could not continue to alledge the same excuse for delaying to deliver the firman, but now he took another ground, and after keeping Mr. Pisani waiting at the Porte the whole of the day, he at last did not scruple to say, that in the actual state of affairs it would be extremely embarrassing for the

521
Porte if I held a communication with the adm. of the British squadron.—It might, he observed, be my intention to write in such terms to the adm. as would cause hostilities against the Porte, and as I had declared in my conference that the strictest union existed between his maj. and the emperor of Russia, measures might be taken, in consequence of my letters, for the fleets of the two nations to attempt in concert the passage of the Dardanelles. Mr. Pisani has not informed me whether it was intended that all these particulars should be related to me; but I recollect his saying that he was desired by the Reis Effendi to endeavour to persuade Me that the delivery of the firman had only been delayed, and was not decidedly refused.—As there was not a moment's time to be lost I quitted Mr. Pisani, and going immediately to capt. Capel, who happened fortunately to be in my house, I desired him to acquaint the Officer who was to carry my dispatches with the critical situation of affairs; and to give him orders to wait till it was dark, and then to set off for the Dardanelles without a firman.—I had hopes that the officer by taking this precaution might be able to reach the squadron without being detained, and I have been happy to learn since, that I was not deceived in my expectations.—With the view of ascertaining precisely what conduct towards me I might now expect from the Porte, I immediately wrote an official note to the Reis Effendi, in which I required to be informed whether the not allowing me to Communicate with my government, had been owing to a mistake, and whether any thing of the like nature could ever again happen. This note, of which I herewith inclose a copy, was sent to the Reis Effendi, with no other loss of time than what was required to have it translated, and it was accompanied by a letter from me to Mr. Pisani, in which it was expressly stated for the information of the Porte, that it would be absolutely impossible for me to remain at Constantinople, if passports for my messengers were refused.—In the mean time I had heard from various quarters that the Porte, elated by the news of a great defeat which was said to have been suffered by the Russians on the 22d of Dec. had determined not to attend to the representations which your lordship had ordered me to make; and that the intention was to seize the Endymion, and to thwart the operations of his maj.'s government, by keeping me and the
522
British factory as hostages.—As the Porte in the very recent instance of M. d'Italinsky had both verbally and in writing made no scruple to justify that treatment of foreign ministers, to which, in defiance of the usages established between civilized nations; she has always been accustomed; and as her not violating the rights of nations in her conduct towards the Russian mission, had been represented as a mark of peculiar condescension, I had no reason to expect that any the most reprehensible measures would be abstained from, which might afford the means of rendering it difficult for his maj. to defend his interests. Unless some such determination had been taken as I was informed of, it would have been difficult to account for the boldness evinced by the Porte in refusing passports for my messengers, and it might have been still less easy to explain her imprudence in having avowed her union with France, by employing in her service the military talents of gen. Sebastiani, and by distinguishing that ambassador, notwithstanding what had so recently been said on that subject, by new and unexpected honours. This minister of France had been appointed by the Porte to mark out the places where new batteries should be raised; he had been desired to station the ships where their range of shot would be most destructive; and to prove to him that in his person a defiance should be given to the English, he had been decorated with the insignia of that order which had been instituted by the Sultan as a token of gratitude to his maj. and as a lasting memorial of what had so gloriously been atchieved against the French by the British troops in Egypt.—Although I had so many and such strong reasons for mistrusting the Porte, and although capt. Capel had begun to be extremely alarmed for the safety of the Endymion, it was not till about 9 in the morning of time 29th of Jan. that I formed my resolution of endeavouring to quit Pera. I had not long resolved to do it before I learnt from a person who was not likely to deceive me, that according to the information I had already received, we were all of us really to be detained as hostages; and as Mr. Pisani came soon afterwards to inform me that he could neither obtain a firman nor an answer to my note, the Reis Effendi not having been prevailed upon to do more than to direct him to call again on the ensuing day; I had no doubt remaining as to the propriety of my retiring from a

523
post where I was not allowed the means of doing my duty to my sovereign.—But the more I was impressed with the indispensable necessity of taking measures for my removal from Constantinople, the more I was struck with the extreme difficulty of being able to effect it. I had to provide for the security of the British merchants, and I had also to convey my own family on board of ship without suspicion being given of what I was intending.—As all depended upon the secrecy of my plans, and as there could be no hope of impressing upon each member of the factory the danger which would arise from a premature discovery, I determined to have them assembled on board the Endymion under the pretence of their being invited to dine there, capt. Capel having given orders before-hand that no one who entered the ship should be allowed to leave it without his permission.—This precaution was necessary, as all communication with the shore was thereby prevented; and as my secret was confided to no one, except to capt. Capel and to a merchant who had been selected to take care that none of his countrymen should be missing; I was sanguine in my expectations that all my arrangements would be successful.—When I had reason to believe, that every British subject was already gone to the Endymion, I went on board myself, and had the satisfaction to find, that not a single person was missing.—I then assembled the merchants, and made them acquainted with the motives which had induced me to withdraw them thus privately from Constantinople. I told them that, as the conduct of the Porte, particularly since it was known that the Russians had been defeated in Poland, had destroyed all hope of attention being paid to my representations, a rupture with us must probably ensue; and that, in that event, they could have expected nothing less than the loss of all their property and imprisonment. I made them understand, that by the measure I was pursuing, their persons would at any rate be placed in safety. The merchants seemed to be unanimously of opinion that I had acted properly. It had come to their knowledge as well as mine, that there was an intention to seize the frigate, and thus to prevent their departure; and as most of them had been witnesses of the cruel treatment, which in the war with France the merchants of that country had suffered, they could not but congratulate themselves on finding that they were unex-
524
pectedly relieved from so distressing a situation.—Every discussion respecting our departure being now ended, I wrote the note to, the Reis Effendi, which I intended to leave behind, and gave it to one of my servants who was to remain at Pera, with orders to him not to deliver it before the next morning.—I have herewith the honour of enclosing a copy of that note; and I trust, that the contents of it will appear to your ldp. sufficiently expressive of my earnest wish to avoid hostilities.—At 9 at night, when it was so dark that our departure was not likely to be perceived, capt. Capel ordered his cables to be cut. Without troubling your ldp. with a long account of what happened to us on our passage, it will be sufficient to say, that after having had some reason to apprehend that the Capitan Pacha, who was with the Turkish fleet, might attempt to detain us, we had the satisfaction to find that our salutes were returned; and shortly after, it being early in the morning of the 31st Jan. we anchored in the midst of his maj.'s squadron, which, instead of removing to Tenedos as was intended, had been unexpectedly obliged to remain at the Dardanelles.—I cannot help considering it as most fortunate that sir Thos. Louis was still in sight of the Turkish ships, as I much doubt whether otherwise we should have been allowed to pass without molestation. That the Capitan Pacha might know exactly the real situation of affairs, I sent Mr. Pisani to give him the strongest assurances in my name, that my removal from Constantinople was merely a measure of precaution, and that it would rejoice me if the answer which I was expecting from the Porte should permit me to return.—When Mr. Pisani came back from the Capitan Pacha, who had charged him with an extremely civil message for the adm. and for me, and who I really believe deprecates the idea of a war with England, the whole squadron weighed anchor, and we repaired to our present station off Tenedos. It was right to lose no time in changing our position, for adm. Louis had given his word that this movement should not be delayed, and besides, I was desirous that nothing which could be construed into an hostile intention should appear to be the consequence of my arrival.
No. XI—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Howick, dated 14th Feb. 1807.—Received 2d May.
I yesterday received from Mr. Pisani the

525
translation of two Notes addressed to me by the Porte, and I herewith enclose copies of them.—One of these notes is perhaps intended as a kind of answer to the letter which I wrote to the Reis Effendi on the 26th of last month. The other is a circular note sent to the different foreign missions after I had retired from Pera.—It is asserted by the Porte, that I had no sufficient cause for removing from my post; and an attempt is made to explain away the refusal of a passport.—Having in a preceding dispatch most fully explained the motives of my conduct, I shall not trouble your ldp. with the numerous observations which the language of the Porte might enable me to make. I shall only say, that it was my duty to demand a firman for the boat which was to pass the Dardanelles, for it had been expressly declared to me, that in consequence of the war with Russia, every sort of vessel would be stopped, the navigation of which was not sanctioned by a permission from the Porte. If any thing had been wanting to prove the improper intention of the Porte, this part of the subject would have been placed in the clearest point of view by the unworthy quibble of endeavouring to make a distinction between an officer and a messenger. The officer, as the bearer of my dispatches, was to be my messenger, and it is a service on which officers are perpetually employed.
(First Inclosure referred to in No. XI.)—Translation of a Note from the Porte to his maj.'s ambassador, dated 25th Zilkaadé 1221, (5th Feb. 1807).
At an official conference which was held at the Sublime Porte by the request of the English ambassador the most esteemed Mr. Arbuthnot, the 16th of this present month Zilkaadé (25th January) after making some propositions not altogether of a proper nature, he declared in his statements that a fleet of English ships is to be joined by a Russian squadron at the isle of Tenedos; that the same was to force its passage through the Dardanelles to come to Constantinople; that he should send directions for the English dwelling in the capital and in the provinces abroad, to prepare shortly to depart or return to their own country; and that he intended to present a note after the conference, to which he should absolutely expect an answer from the Sublime Porte, in writing.—Three days after a very long and detailed note was received from him, written in a foreign language, and consisting of 13 pages. As a trausla-
526
tion was making, in view to consider of the contents, and to give an answer in consequence, he all of a sudden embarked in an English frigate which was here on Thursday after sun-set, and went away without leave or advice in the shape of a fugitive; which being an event whereof there is no example, it could not fail creating, much astonishment.—The Sublime Porte, in pursuance of the sincere friendship which she has professed for the court of Great Britain since time immemorial, and ever faithfully bent on the observance of treaties, has uniformly maintained every stipulation, and has bestowed the most perfect attention upon fulfilling the object and obligations of the alliance which had been contracted between us, for a time,—nay, this line of conduct to her best and most favourite friend Great Britain having constantly produced strong remonstrances and complaints on the part of the French court, who was at war with England, the Ottoman Porte, in the sole view of preventing the intervention of the least coolness between us, has never been brought to recede in the smallest degree from the system of regard and friendship she bore to that crown.—Moreover, when about two months since the Russian troops, unawares and without cause, passed the Ottoman frontier, and by employing artifices arid tricks inconsistent with the maxims of independent governments, took possession of the imperial Ottoman provinces without previous notice being given (as is known to all the world, and is manifest to all impartial persons, who see things in a right and equitable point of view) the Sublime Porte refrained notwithstanding from waging war all at once, because of that constant disposition which ever makes her prone to avoid parting and being at amity with her friends.—She being therefore in hopes that the British court, far from ever assenting to so improperly hostile a conduct on the part of Russia, would have on the contrary employed its good offices to prevent so glaring an injury and injustice as was offered to its sincerest friend the Ottoman empire, with a true interest, she waited during a space of more than 30 days, and she consented to use her calmness and patience in expectation of obtaining a better insight into the state of things—Such was the position of the Sublime Porte when the Russian troops continued to push on this way, and to encroach on our territory. Their persisting to advance at this rate, afforded a sufficient

527
proof what little likelihood there was of Russia's giving up a project of encroachment she had framed 7 or 8 months before, be the behaviour of the Sublime Porte ever so friendly towards her in the present case; and it being a positive fact by this time, that one moment of further hesitation and delay would have been attended with the most injurious consequences for the state, the Sublime. Porte compelled by necessity has ultimately complied with the tenet which prescribes that, "an invader must be repelled by force."—In the contest however thus occurred with Russia, there is nothing that can affect the stipulations and treaties subsisting between the Sublime Porte and Great Britain. There is not in fact the least subject between us to necessitate an interruption of the ties of friendship, or any one thing of a nature to lead to a discussion, much less to a rupture. On the other hand, no answer has as yet been received that we expect, to two official and confidential letters which have been written on a preceding and subsequent occasion, by his imperial Maj. to the most august king of Great Britain, upon the Russian business. It is certain that we are not without some flattering hopes of undoubted proofs coming to light of that august king's zealous and ancient friendship to this empire.—Under these circumstances we could not help being greatly surprised at the ambassador's running away, as above stated, by night, without waiting for an answer to the propositions of a groundless unprecedented nature, which he has made in terms of an equally unpalatable tenor; and at its being stated in a paper he left with the Danish charge d'affaires to be presented to the Sublime Porte after his departure, that, because a passport which he had asked for two days before, had not been given immediately, he considered himself as insecure; which was the motive of his going precipitately away from hence.—As to the passport above alluded to, at the time the ambassador's long note was presented, a firman had in fact been demanded for a courier to go to the Dardanelles, but at first the demand being stated with the word, 'Courier,' then with that of Officer,' this appeared contradictory. Next to that, there never has been an application made for a firman of the kind for the Dardanelles in former times. Besides, he having announced in the conference that a fleet was forcibly and infallibly to pass
528
through the Dardanelles, it became expedient to use some demur until the translation of his note might be gone through, and a clearer notion conceived of the state of the question; and after all, no decisive answer was given to say that the firman in question should not be granted, but the delivery of it was deferred till the next day.—Such being the case, and nothing of any kind, either of an important or trifling nature having occurred to cause a suspension of security in regard to the ambassador, and respecting his dependants, it is altogether needless to dwell on explaining in what light such open steps must be seen as his alledging such vague pretences destitute of every foundation, and leaving the residence with an air of abandoning the mission, and cutting off all connection with this place.—Notwithstanding all this, the Sublime Porte, ever bent on that pacific system which is her professed habit with her friends, actually considers G. Britain as being at peace with her, and unless hostilities be committed on their part, the Ottoman empire will refrain from shewing enmity to them: and whereas the Sublime Porte has determined to take under her protection the English dependants that have remained in Constantinople, and to treat them. with courtesy and attention, which measure appears stated in a circular note which has been sent to the ministers of all friendly powers resident here; that these circumstances may be likewise known to the aforesaid ambassador, a copy of that circular has been subjoined to this present official note, and the same is transmitted to him in consequence. 25th Zilkaadé 1221, (5th Feb. 1807.)
Second Inclosure referred to No 11.— Translation of a circular Note from the Porte, dated 29 of the Moon Zilkaad— 1221, (9th Feb. 1807.)
The Sublime Ottoman Porte having ever been intent on fulfilling every obligation of amity and friendship toward the court of G. Britain, not one thing did exist between them of an nature to bring on a rupture or a coolness.—The English ambassador resident at the Sublime Porte, Mr. Arbuthnot having in a conference held 5 or 6 days ago, made some strange propositions, the Turkish ministers in their answer limited themselves to saving that the Sublime Porte at this present epoch, was at war with Russia and at peace with G. Britain. Soon after the conference, the same ambassador presented a note, in

529
which he stated his claim of having an answer in writing. The same being taken into consideration, some hope was entertained of his drawing back from pretensions of a nature contrary to the rights of nations and independent governments, when immediately, after giving in that note, he all of a sudden, without sending advice and without the cause being known, embarked in an English frigate which was in the harbour at the time, and taking his people and some merchants with him, left Constantinople and absented himself in the middle of the night, by cutting and leaving the ship's anchor behind: a conduct which has created much astonishment.—After going away, he left a letter behind to be tendered to the Sublime Porte, wherein he alledges as a main subject of complaint, that some difficulty was strewn in granting a passport to a courier going to the Dardanelles, which had been asked for by him; and that under that circumstance he could not safely continue to remain here.—In the instance he alludes to, no answer having in fact been given him in the negative, it is clear that an incident of the kind could not be a matter to occasion his departure from Constantinople; and it is equally notorious that no circumstance, no proceeding, either of an important or a trifling nature, has Occurred to take away the security either of the ambassador, or of any one individual belonging to the English nation.—Things having come to this pitch, that is to say, the English ambassador leaving the residence in this way, all of a sudden, without receiving an answer, being an event susceptible of many constructions, it would appear incumbent upon the Sublime Porte to act in the same manner on her part, by placing her confidence in the help and mercy of that sovereign conqueror the Almighty God. Yet, being unwilling to depart from that system of equity which she is ever accustomed to follow, and she being never persuaded of a proceeding occurring from the court of G. Britain, which is not consistent with the dictates of justice; orders have been sent to the different Ottoman officers to whom it appertaineth,for those English dependants who have been left here, and for the families of such as have gone from their residence, to remain under the shade of his imperial majesty's protection, in perfect security; and the Danish chargé d'affaires our friend Mr. Hubsch, whom the said ambassador has left as his agent, has been charged with the care of the effects and
530
property belonging to the same ambassador here. Directions having also been issued to the same Turkish officers that no molestation be given to such ships as there may be in this harbour, every thing being to continue in its actual state for the present.—And that the Sublime Porte's perseverance in her uniform system of moderation and equity may also be made known in this instance, this present official note is written, and is delivered to the ministers of all friendly powers resident here, in order to their transmitting the same to their respective courts.
No. XII.—Dispatch front Mr. Arbuthnot to Lord Howick, dated Royal George, 14th February 1807.—Received 2d May.
My lord, when I wrote to your ldp. the letter marked private of the 10th instant, from on board the Endymion, I fully expected that on the ensuing morning I should have an interview with his highness the Capitan Pacha, and that it would be ascertained, whether our passage though the Dardanelles was to be amicable or hostile.—The wind however blew so hard on the following morning, that on account of the surf it was impossible to attempt to land me; and as the forts fired upon the Endymion, there was an evident unwillingness to permit the frigate to run into sufficiently smooth water, for me to be put on shore.—Nothing therefore remained to be done, but to write a letter to Mr. Pisani, in which the cause of my not landing should be explained; and in which one more effort should be made to inspire the officers of the Sultan with the pacific disposition by which we ourselves are influenced.—I have the honour of transmitting a copy of this letter to your ldp. which in the course of the day we had the means of sending by a Turkish boat into the Dardanelles, although the increased violence of the wind rendered it more impossible than ever to land me on the open beach.—Yesterday morning, and not before, the weather had become so moderate that I was enabled to pay a visit to the Capitan Pacha, and I accordingly went on shore to meet him.—With his highness personally I had the greatest reason to be satisfied, but he could agree to nothing which would have authorized me to propose to Sir J. T. Duckworth not to force the passage. He wished me to go with him in the Endymion to Constantinople, that I might propose my terms to the ministers of the Porte, and that the British

531
Fleet should in the mean while remain at anchor off Tenedos.—I told him that I could not return to the admiral with such a proposition, but that I would make an endeavour to stop the progress of the fleet towards Constantinople, provided it should be permitted to remove to the anchorage within the entrance of the .passage which had been lately occupied by sir Thomas Louis, and provided a British officer was allowed to remain at each fort for the purpose of ascertaining that no additional works were carried on during the time that the negotiation with the Porte was pending. I added, that should his highness adopt this idea, and should it be approved by the admiral, to whom I had not as yet had an opportunity of mentioning it, I would most readily go up to Constantinople; but that instead of taking the Endymion, I should, for the sake of saving time, prefer a Turkish row-boat.—The Capitan Pacha assured me that be dared not assent to what I had suggested, as he should have to answer with his head for having presumed to disobey the Sultan's orders. He observed likewise, that the rapid march of the French army towards the Dniester would oblige the Porte to be still more cautious in her negotiations, as should the alliance with Russia be at this moment renewed through the mediation of Great Britain, Buonaparte might have a pretence for considering the sultan as his enemy, and that then he would not fail to invade the Turkish empire.—To this I replied, that the misfortunes which, according to his highness's statement, had happened to Russia, would be an additional motive with us, as we were sure it would be with our sovereign, to give assistance to our ally, when it appeared to be most needed: that on account of the present situation of affairs, I might perhaps be induced to recede in some instances from what the interests of my own sovereign might have authorized rue to demand; but that every effort must be made on our part to relieve the emperor of Russia from the war which the Turks were carrying on against him, and that I would willingly, to effect this object, go myself in company with a Turkish negotiator to general Michelson's head quarters, and there employ my good offices to restore peace.—The Capitan Pacha seemed to listen with pleasure to all I said.—He regretted only that he did not venture to transgress his orders; and appearing to hope that sir J. T. Duckworth could be
532
prevailed upon not to remove from his present station, he earnestly desired me to use my influence for the attainment of this object.—On my return to the fleet I made the admiral acquainted with all the particulars of my conversation with the Capitan Pacha.—I cannot say what might have been the decision of the admiral if the Capitan Pacha had readily consented to all that I had proposed; but when he learnt that nothing whatever was to be obtained as a compensation for loss of time, he gave it without hesitation as his decided opinion, that we must pass the Dardanelles before we again attempted to negotiate.—I immediately wrote to inform Mr. Pisani (who was remaining with the Capitan Pacha) of our final determination; and the letter to him, of which I inclose a copy, shall be sent on shore the very moment that the boat arrives which is to come for my answer.—The die therefore is now cast. Every effort has been made by us to avert hostilities; and should the Turks commence them against us, every effort shall still be made to prove to the Porte, that the wish of our sovereign is peace. With this view I have directed Mr Pisani to inform the Capitan Pacha, that on our arrival before Constantinople, I shall once more offer to negotiate, and that no hostile measures shall be undertaken by us, while a hope remains that our pacific intentions will be justly appreciated.—Should we ultimately fail in our endeavours to preserve peace between his majesty and the Porte, every exertion will, I am certain, be made by sir J. T. Duckworth to succeed in those measures which he has been directed to undertake. But it is to be recollected, that ever since the commencement of the war with Russia, this government has been encreasing, and to a great extent, its means of defence, and should the Turkish navy have been removed into the Bosphorus, there would, I imagine, be an absolute impossibility of withdrawing it from under the new and strong batteries, which, under the inspection of general Sebastiani, have been now erected.—I mention this, because it is not unlikely that there may be a failure in some of the objects which we have in view. This apprehension, however, world have no effect on the decision of the admiral, or, if I may so say, on that of myself. Our sovereign and his ally had been greatly injured. A powerful Fleet has been sent to secure those interest which had been endangered; and though the

533
passage of the Dardanelles in its present fortified state cannot be undertaken without great risk, any probable loss would in my opinion be preferable to that dishonour which would be attached to his maj.'s arms if a menace had been made, which in the day of trial we had not dared to act upon.
First inclosure referred to in No. XII.— Endymion, off the entrance of the Dardanelles, 11th Feb. 6. A. M. 1807.
Sir; I am come in the Endymion according to appointment, but now I am here, captain Caper will not attempt to land me. He says, that he has no boat which in such weather as this could put me on shore.—It therefore only remains for me to repeat again for the Capitan Pacha's information, that our wish is to go up as friends; that we shall not fire the first shot; but that should hostilities be commenced against us, our demands will be greatly ,increased.—We now require no more than that the Porte should place herself in that situation with regard to her foreign relations in which I found her on my arrival in this country. She was then the friend of Great Britain and Russia. She is now the friend of France. She is called upon to make her choice; and our conduct towards her will be regulated by that choice.—If I were to see the Capitan Pacha I could say no more to him than what I have written before, and what I am now writing.—Admiral sir J. T. Duckworth dares not to disobey the orders which force it upon him as an indispensable duty to appear with his fleet off Constantinople, and the first fair wind will convey him thither. The Capitan Pacha must know better than we can, whether he can venture to save his country by not carrying into effect such orders as may have directed him to fire upon our fleet; for of course it will be obvious to his highness that, without meaning to speak arrogantly or presumptuously, we should not, as I have remarked before, be so easy to treat with after the commencement of hostilities as we are now.—My personal wish for peace is so great that I have no scruple in assuring the Capitan Pacha that if we are not treated now as enemies, I shall be found in future, having such a force to give weight to my representations, far less positive and far less peremptory than I thought it my duty to be, when, being left to my own individual exertions, I had to convince the Porte that my court was really in earnest.—It cannot be offensive to the Capitan Paella to be told that
534
with such means in our hands, we think ourselves, under the blessing of Providence, certain of success; and having this sentiment, I feel it no pusillanimity on my part to implore his highness not to plunge his sovereign and his country into irrecoverable woes. This is to be considered as my final declaration that the admiral is determined to avail himself of the first favourable wind; and you therefore have nothing further to do than to go as expeditiously as you can to Constantinople, and there to join me. Signed C. ARBUTHNOT.
Second inclosure referred to in No. XII. Copy of a letter from Mr. Arbuthnot to B. Pisani, esq. dated Royal George off the Dardanelles, 13th Feb. 1807.
sir; I did not fail to relate to vice admiral sir John Duckworth all the particulars of the conference which I had to-day with his highness the Capitan Pacha.— The vice admiral learnt from what I said, that his highness could not even adopt the idea which I had thrown out, of the fleet remaining at the anchorage occupied, within the passage, by the squadron under sir Thomas Louis. It therefore was evident that nothing was to be granted to us, while by my going up alone without the fleet, that greatest of all disadvantages, the loss of time which could never be regained, would be suffered by us. Under these circumstances the admiral feels that he has no option left to him, but that it is become his bounden duty to obey literally his sovereign's orders, and to proceed up the Dardanelles whenever the wind may permit it.—But the admiral to the very last will be amicably inclined. After he has forced the passage of the Dardanelles, he will again give to the Ottoman government an opportunity of terminating by a friendly negociation the differences which have arisen. For this purpose he will in the first instance anchor his fleet at such a distance from the town of Constantinople, as will remove every apprehension of his being hostilely inclined; and he will not proceed to extremities, even when the means of doing it shall be within his hands, until he has learnt from me that the negociation I shall propose has been fruitless.—I wish much that the Capitan Pacha had been invested with discretionary powers to treat with me. His highness says he has none such. He therefore must obey the orders of his sovereign, and we must be equally obedient to the orders of ours. I am, &c. CHA. ARBUTHNOT.
[PAPERS RELATING TO PORTUGAL.] Mr. Abererombysaid, that the information obtained relative to the Expedition to Copenhagen, was just enough to excite suspicion, but was not sufficient to give any satisfactory explanation of the conduct of ministers. He hoped this temper of reserve would not be shown in respect to the Papers he should apply for in a transaction that was said to bear so near an analogy to that proceeding: he meant the Papers connected with the negociation with Portugal. He did not think it was necessary to make any comment upon the propriety of acquiring this intelligence, until objections should be made, which he was not disposed to anticipate. He should, therefore, propose his first motion, which would be followed by several others. It was, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this house, copies of the Instructions to earl St. Vincent for the direction of his conduct at Lisbon, in 1806; and also copies of the Instructions given on the same occasion to the earl of Rosslyn and to general Simcoe."
Mr. Secretary Canningsaid, that not having had any communication with the hon. gent. on the subject of his motion, and not having collected from his speech what would be the extent of it, he wished to know what additional documents he meant to require, before he acceded to the proposition.
Mr. Abercrombyreplied, that his other motions would apply to the communications from the three persons he had named to the prince regent, and the replies to them; and further, the particulars of the interview with the prince regent prior to their departure from the Tagus.
Mr. Secretary Canningobjected, that a motion so general did not admit the exclusion of matter, however delicate in its nature, and however dangerous to impart. Applications of this kind, to provide the house with the particulars of a private interview with a sovereign prince, had never been attempted before, and if acceded to must have the most pernicious consequences. It was well known, that while the British ministers were waiting in the anti-room with the servants of Imperial princes, the French accredited agents had passed our envoys, and had bearded sovereigns within the recesses of their own cabinets. This preference had occasioned some complaints, and the result had been that, on various
536
occasions, the British agent had been admitted to the like privilege. But this footing of equality must be destroyed, if it were permitted that the private communications with an independent sovereign should be laid on the table of the house, subsequently become the matter of debate, and again be indecently circulated through the kingdom in the public newspapers. He was happy on this occasion to make a stand, and openly to resist such propositions. There was no country in Europe where direct intercourse between the foreign ministers and the monarch was so strictly guarded as in our own: none here were suffered to approach the throne, unless the servants of the crown were present; and in proportion to the difficulty of immediate access with us, were the obstacles presented to the same access of our ministers abroad.
Mr. Adamopposed the principle laid down by the right hon. secretary, and expressed his surprise at hearing such doctrine first broached by the person, who, on a former night, read in that house extracts of documents which belonged to the crown, and so far insulted the constitution as to withhold the document, which he had partially quoted, from parliament. He should shortly bring forward a motion on this subject, in order that the house might be convinced how it stood in this respect, and where the boundaries of the crown were limited.
Mr. Canningsuggested an amendment, by which the Instructions to lord Rosslyn, &c. and an account of their Expedition, would be given, so that the substance only of what passed at the court of Lisbon would be obtained.—The amendment was then agreed to.
Upon Mr. Abercromby'sthird motion being put, for obtaining copies of the Order of Recall of earl St. Vincent, &c. and of the dispatches containing an account of what passed at their audience of leave, Mr. Canning made an objection to the latter part of the motion, also upon grounds of delicate attention to etiquette, and the mischief that might arise from publishing official communications of that nature.
Mr. Sheridanobserved, that if an ambassador from England held conferences with no other person but the sovereign at whose court he resided, we could have no other source of information concerning his conduct, but the conferences with such sovereign; and was it to be said that these conferences should never be disclosed?

537
At the time when we made the late peace with France, we acknowledged the first consul as sovereign of that country. When this peace was put an end to, by the renewal of hostilities, were not the private conferences that passed between that sovereign and lord Whitworth, published in this country, as the justification of the war? Now, he contended, that no representation or misrepresentation of the words used by a foreign sovereign, could ever be so mischievous as the practice of reading partial and garbled extracts of letters and other documents, and refusing to produce the whole of them when called for.
Mr. Ponsonbycould not bear to hear in silence such language as had been used by the right hon. secretary. In the best times of English history, the conduct of persons in the highest stations, whether minister or prince, were openly, fairly, and boldly discussed in parliament; it was only at the most disgraceful periods that we find great men have shrunk from publicity, and parliament too easily led by confidence in a great name, or a high-sounding title. If members of parliament were to understand that the power of France had this effect, they had better say to their constituents, that the power of Buonaparte was so great, that it not only subverted or raised up kingdoms at will upon the continent, but that it succeeded in robbing them of their free constitution.
Mr. Windhamsaid, the house and the country might now be congratulated on having in the person of the right hon, secretary, a new defender of those rules of propriety, which he himself had so lately broken. Sometimes a smuggler made a very good custom-house officer. This was analagous to the right hon. gent. who spoke with such animation against the practice of disclosing confidential communications.—The house then divided—For the motion. 82. Against it 142. Majority 60.
The following are copies of the papers laid before the house in consequence of the above motions: viz.

PAPERS
RELATIVE TO PORTUGAL, Presented By His Majesty's Command To The House Of Commons, Pursuant To Their ADDRESS OF THE 15TH FEB. 1808.
No. I.—Dispatch from. Mr. Secretary Fox to the earls of Rosslyn and St. Vincent, and lieut. gen. Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 9th Aug. 1806.
My lords, and sir; Intelligence has been received by his maj.'s ministers of
538
an intention on the part of France immediately to invade the kingdom of Portugal, and the French government has, by its own Declarations, left little or no room to doubt the truth of that intelligence.—It has even been formally announced by that government to his maj.'s ambassador at Paris, that an army, said to be composed of 30,000 men, is actually assembled at Bayonne for this purpose, and that the object of this invasion is nothing less than that of dethroning the present royal family, and destroying the very existence of the Portuguese monarchy; the provinces of which are to be partitioned out, one part to Spain, and the other part, with the town and port of Lisbon, to be given as a separate dominion to the prince of peace, or to the queen of Etruria.—In that case his maj. has thought it right to direct that the force now embarked, consisting of the numbers stated in the margin, should be sent forthwith to the river Tagus, there to be met by a competent naval force which has been in like manner directed to repair to that station. And his maj. has thought fit to give directions that the land force appropriated to this service, should receive successive augmentations as fast as the means of transport can be provided.—In addition to the command of the naval and military forces which he has intrusted respectively to the earl St. Vincent and to lieut. gen. Simcoe, his maj. has been pleased to direct that full powers should be granted to them, conjointly with the earl of Rosslyn, to negociate with the court of Lisbon on all matters that may concern the joint interests of the two courts in the present conjuncture of affairs. I am therefore, in this dispatch, to explain the principles on which such negotiation is to be conducted.—The object most desirable, if it should be possible to be obtained, would be, to arrange sufficient and effectual measures, by concert between the two courts, for the complete defence of Portugal against the threatened invasion of Portugal; an object which it ought not to be difficult for Portugal to provide for, if the invading force should not exceed the numbers stated by the French government.—This is therefore the first point which is to be proposed to the court of Lisbon; and if that court, either singly by its own resources, or by such co-operation as it may be able to obtain from Spain, where it is probable the plans of France will create much more alarm than pleasure, should be willing seriously to engage in

539
vigorous and effective measures of defence; the king will approve your expressing his maj.'s disposition to support them to the full extent of such means as his maj. may be able to apply to this object.—You will however understand distinctly, that this instruction applies only to the case not merely of assurances, but, as I have already expressed it, of vigorous and effective measures, bonâ fide adopted by the Portuguese government for its own defence; a resolution which seems to be so strongly called for by the urgency of the present crisis, that one might look with some confidence to its adoption, if former experience did not give too much reason to doubt of it even under such circumstances. —Should it be found that either the means or energies of the court of Portugal are inadequate for such a purpose, the next endeavour must be to inspire that government with a resolution which they are understood formerly to have entertained, and which in the case supposed, is the only one that could be adopted either with dignity or prudence; namely, that of withdrawing at once from their European territories, and removing themselves, with all that they can carry with them, to their possessions beyond the Atlantic.—Should such be the disposition of the court, every encouragement must be given to confirm them in that intention, and the strongest engagements may be entered into, that in such case his maj. will not only by his naval forces protect and secure such retreat, but that he will respect and even guaranty to the court of Portugal the independance of its dominions in the Brazils, as well as the possession of all ships and other property that may be carried there by virtue of any such arrangement.—A case however must be provided for, different from either of the two preceding, and unhappily not the least probable, in which the government of Portugal, abandoning all idea either of resistance or escape, should wait in fearful acquiescence the approach of the danger, leaving the country with all that it contains to fall an easy and certain prey into the hands of the enemy.—In that case his maj. would feel himself impelled, as well by every consideration of duty to himself, as of regard even fir his ally, to take such steps as might be necessary to diminish the evil, by preventing the enemy from acquiring that accession of force, particularly of naval force, which the possession of the port of Lisbon, in such circum-
540
stances, would give him, and which may have had a principal share in prompting him to the present intended outrage.—You must, therefore, from the beginning, so regulate all your conduct as to keep in view this ultimate object, the only one possibly which may at last be left to you to accomplish.—This, of course, should it ultimately become necessary, must be done not by negotiation, but by demonstrations, and possibly by actual measures of force.—But even in this case, it is very material, that you should endeavour to the utmost to impress both on the government and on the people of Portugal, that the steps resorted to, are taken with no feelings or object of hostility towards them, but are the result only of that unhappy necessity which the injustice and violence of the enemy, and the weakness of Portugal, impose upon his maj.—Conformably to these impressions, if at any period before the ships and troops of his maj. are withdrawn from the coast, and even after measures of force shall have been mutually resorted to, the court of Portugal shall be disposed on better consideration and further evidence of the danger, to accept the proposal of removing to their possessions on the other continent, you will offer them every assistance for that purpose, and make all such engagements as may best soften and conciliate their minds to so painful an extremity.—In all your proceedings you will avoid carefully any thing that may give to the enemy any handle for misrepresenting the just and upright intentions of his maj. on this occasion.—Nothing would be more acceptable to his maj. than that the court of Lisbon should continue, if it were possible, in the enjoyment of a secure and undisturbed neutrality. It is matter of great regret to his maj. to look in any possible case to the necessity of employing force against the territory of a friendly power; and it is of great importance that his maj.'s conduct on this occasion should be represented in its true light, both to the court and to the people of Portugal. It will therefore be proper, not only to deliver in official notes to this effect, but to print and circulate in the Portuguese language a manifesto, in which those circumstances should be openly and frankly explained, which justify by the evident necessity of the case, the securing beforehand those military resources which the enemy has openly evinced, and formally declared, his intention of seizing for his own purposes.—His maj. has no desire

541
to derive from this measure any other advantage than that of depriving his enemy of means of annoyance, which are intended to be used both against the interests of his country, and for the purpose of attack against the colonies of Portugal herself. In order to avert these evils, his maj. authorizes you, to agree to any plan by which the Portuguese ships of war, if placed in his custody by that government without resorting to measures of force, shall be either retained in trust for Portugal, or shall be purchased from that government by his maj. according to their full estimated value. He cannot forego those measures, which are necessary to prevent the Portuguese navy from becoming an accession to that of France; but he is desirous of executing this purpose in such way as may be least offensive to the dignity or injurious to the interests of an ally, in whom his first wish would be to find the disposition and the means of opposing an effectual resistance against the common enemy.—The general objects which are in view, being thus explained to you, the particular course in which they are to be pursued, whether in measures of negotiation or of force, or by a mixture of both, is left with full confidence to the discretion of the persons in whom his maj. has vested such ample powers, and by whose entire and perfect co-operation in every step of whatever description that shall become necessary, the objects in view can alone be accomplished.—The precise period of the demand to be made for the debarkation of the troops, and for the placing them in a situation of security, is perhaps the most important among these points; and next to that, the mode and time of the requisition, that the Portuguese ships in the Tagus should be placed in such a state, as to be capable of being immediately removed on the approach of an enemy.—It will not escape your attention, that these are measures which must equally be adopted, in each of the three cases above stated. If Portugal intends, with the aid of this country, to defend herself; if the court should meditate a removal to the Brazils; or lastly, if a necessity should exist for measures of force, with a view to the removal of the ships: in every one of these cases, the king's troops must be landed, and a position must be occupied, that will both place them in safety, as far as possible, and will facilitate the execution of such measures as it may be necessary for the king's naval
542
forces to adopt for the removal of the ships.—As this step therefore must at all events be taken, it would seem desirable that as little time as is practicable should be allowed for the preparation of measures of resistance against this indispensable step.—In the state of indecision in which it is not improbable the Portuguese government may now be placed, you must naturally expect, that the existence, or at least the urgency of the danger will be denied to you; and it is indeed not absolutely impossible, that circumstances may in fact occur to delay the march of the French army, now fixed, as we are told by France, for the 15th of this month. Of this you will of course have the means of procuring without difficulty, authentic intelligence from Bayonne; but you will remark, that the measures now adopted are founded on no light surmises, but on the declaration of the French government itself; that it is the habit of that government thus previously to announce its acts of violence; that other measures of a like nature were in like mariner announced, and have actually been since carried into execution; and that therefore any temporary forbearance that may occur in the execution of this particular design affords no motive for delaying measures of necessary precaution against it.—If it should be urged, that the admission of the king's forces will be considered by the enemy as a violation of the neutrality of Portugal, and will therefore afford either a motive or at least a pretext for the invasion of that country, you will remark that the neutrality of that country is at an end from the moment that a design of invading its territory arid subverting its government is openly announced by one of the belligerent parties; and that neither justice nor prudence require, that we should wait for the actual execution of such a menace, before we take measures for averting or lessening the evil. And experience has but too plainly shewn, and in too many instances, with what facility the French government finds or makes pretences for such measures, When once announced.—If on your arrival at Lisbon you should find that, either from alarms excited by any accidental circumstances, or in consequence of requisitions and demands made by the French, the country should have been put in such a state of preparation and defence, as to make the execution of any enterprise of force more difficult than it is hoped it would be found; and parti-

543
cularly if you should judge from these or any other circumstances, that the safety of the army entrusted to your command would be compromised by a debarkation, or by the measures to be afterwards pursued; the king relies on your discretion not to adopt any step which might lead to the probable loss of the forces.—In that case the whole negotiation would of course assume merely a pacific shape.—It would be stated, that the troops are sent to cooperate in the defence of Portugal, if desired. by that government; but that such desire not being there entertained, they would proceed to their former destination. —In that case, however, as indeed in every case of discussion with that government, it must always be impressed upon them, that the certain consequence of submission to France must be, the loss of the Brazils; which, in such event, this country must occupy for its own safety.
I am, &c. C. .J. Fox. No. II.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to the earl of Rosslyn and lieut. gen. Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 12th of Aug. 1806.
As the wind still prevents the convoy from getting round from the Downs, I think it proper to apprise you, in addition to your former instructions, that it is thought adviseable that you should lose no time in proceeding to Lisbon in the frigate destined for that service.—On your arrival there, it is presumed, you will find the earl St. Vincent already there; you will of course, in the first instance, communicate with his lordship on the subject of the instructions which are jointly addressed to his lordship and you, and also on this dispatch.—As your arrival will in all probability precede that of the troops, it is thought proper that lord Rosslyn should, after communicating as above with lord St. Vincent, proceed to Lisbon, and there enter upon his mission; gen. Simcoe remaining with the fleet to wait the arrival of the troops.—Lord Rosslyn will begin his negotiation by stating the certainty and urgency of the danger as mentioned in your former instructions. He will remark, that while there was a hope that Portugal even by considerable pecuniary sacrifices would preserve her neutrality, the king felt too strong an interest in the safety of his ally to endanger it by any precipitate or premature measures on his part. But that the moment is now come when a decision must be taken.
544
The enemy has announced his immediate intention of subjecting Portugal to the greatest evils to which an independent state can be exposed—the subjugation of the country, the overthrow of the government by a foreign force, the expulsion of the family of its lawful sovereigns, and the partition of its provinces. There is no reason to doubt the reality of this intention, which is indeed talked of at Paris without any secret; and the existence of the preparations for giving effect to it has been confirmed by additional intelligence received since you left London.—In this state of things, the king can no longer forbear to urge the court of Lisbon to act as the urgency of such a danger manifestly requires. A force is collected for the purpose of their destruction, and the intention of so employing it is openly avowed. In such a situation, to wait till the hostile army is put in motion, or till some decree of the French government. publishes to the world the partition of Portugal, would be to expose the royal family, the government, and the country to the certainty of that ruin with which they are openly menaced. The only question can now be, whether to defend or to abandon the country?—Even if the latter resolution were adopted, that would require to be acted upon with vigour and decision in order to preserve to the house of Braganza at least its American possessions. If the former, the first step to be taken towards it must he that of apprising the country of the nature, extent, and urgency of its danger, in order to animate the whole community in common exertions of defence. This must be accompanied by effective and vigorous measures for putting the army in a state of activity and for defending the frontiers. Under such a system, and with the aid in money, troops, and ships, which his maj. would be entirely disposed to contribute to it, if really adopted and steadily pursued, there could be little doubt that the attack of a much more powerful army than that now said to be assembling at Bayonne might be successfully resisted. And in the present state of Europe, great as the means are which France possesses, it may be doubtful whether she would be disposed to apply a larger force to the pursuit of such an object.—If therefore, it still be possible to prevent the enemy from embarking in the enterprize, the course now recommended can alone effect that purpose. If the contest be unavoidable, no other means than

545
these can afford any hope of a successful issue. This reasoning lord Rosslyn will press in the most urgent manner.—The great obstacle for lord Rosslyn to combat will be the desire of procrastination so natural to a weak power, and the delusive hope that by perseverance in the temporizing system the evils which they fear may yet be averted. This must he met by strong representations of the imminency of the danger, and of the mischief of delay.—It is probable that when pressed upon this subject, M. d'Araujo will enquire what specific assistance his maj. will be disposed to grant to Portugal, if it should by such measures as are now recommended draw upon itself the resentment of France. To this, it must always be answered, that the attack from France will not be the consequence of such measures, but only the execution of a determination taken and announced antecedently to them. But there is no difficulty in its being explicitly said, that provided his majesty were satisfied that Portugal was taking vigorous and effective measures for her own defence, there is no exertion in the power of this country that his majesty would not be ready to make for that purpose, in pecuniary assistance as well as in military and naval succours.—In addition to these general assurances, it would be proper that lord Rosslyn should state specifically that an expedition of near 10,000 men is now ready in our ports; and that although these have been collected with a view to a different destination, yet that, on any intimation of such a wish from the Portugnese government, Orders would be given to these troops; and to others which might successively follow them, to sail immediately to Portugal. But lord Rosslyn will not let it be understood that such is actually their destination.—If the Portuguese government should be induced by these representations to adopt a system of active preparation and vigorous defence, laying aside all hopes of saving themselves by any other course, they will of course cheerfully accept the proffered aid; and the arrival of the troops which will still, in all events, follow you as soon as the wind permits, will be matter of great satisfaction to them.—If they decline this assistance, front the fear of irrevocably committing themselves with France, lord Rosslyn is not, till the actual arrival of the troops, to give any intimation that he expects them; nor to employ any other language than
546
such as is already pointed out in this dispatch.—When the troops actually arrive, he will lose no time in representing that event as the effect of the continued information received here, as to the urgency of the danger, and as the strongest proof of the king's solicitude to avert it.—He will represent that the disembarkation of these troops, when sent on such grounds, cannot be refused by the court of Lisbon, except on the ground of a resolution to abandon all measures of defence; in which case alone his majesty will be driven to consider what is due to the interests of his own crown, separately from those of his ally.—He will give the strongest and the most formal assurances that the continuance of the troops shall be limited to the extent of the danger; and on this ground he will demand their admission.—The time to be limited for a compliance with that demand must be arranged with the earl of St. Vincent and lieut. gen. Simcoe. But it will be proper that the actual knowledge of a refusal to admit the troops, as friends, should precede, by however short an interval, any attempt to disembark in any other manner.—If such refusal should take place, the Instructions already, given to you with the earl of St. Vincent will then apply in all their points, as indeed they do in a great degree to the course here pointed out.
No. III.—Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to earls Rosslyn and Saint Vincent, and lieut. gen. Simcoe, dated Downing Street, 28th August 1806.
My lords, and sir; Since the earl of Rosslyn and lieut. gen. Simcoe Sailed from Plymouth, his majesty's servants have received information which induces them to believe that the preparations for the attack of Portugal are in a less forward state than had before been supposed, though there appears no reason to entertain more doubt than before as to the final intention of the French government to carry into effect the plans for the conquest and partition of Portugal, which they have already announced.—In this state of things the whole expedition being now collected at Plymouth, and ready to sail with the first fair wind, it has been judged expedient to detain them until intelligence shall have been received from you of your proceedings, and of the state of affairs at Lisbon.—It is thought here, that there is now more prospect than before of accomplishing the objects in view, without the

547
necessity of resorting to measures of force, which, if practicable, is highly desirable.—The troops will however he kept in constant readiness to sail on the very first order, which will be given either on receiving such information from you as shall appear to require it, or on intelligence being received here in any other manner, of the French forces being in a greater state of readiness, or of the danger of the attack from Spain becoming imminent. I am, &c. W. WINDHAM.
No. IV.—Extract of a Dispatch from the earl of Rosslyn to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Lisbon, Aug. 30th, 1806.
I have the honour to inform you, that his maj.'s ship Santa Margarita, anchored in the Tagus late on Monday evening the 25th.—Early on the 26th lord St. Vincent came on beard, and his lordship, lieut. gen. Simcoe, and I, had a full conference upon the present state of affairs in this country.—Lord Strangford upon hearing of our arrival had made application for pratique for us, without delay.—In the afternoon I landed, and had a long conference with M. d' Araujo.—in this I took occasion to enter upon that point of our Instructions, which relates to the dangers of the country, and the proposal to assist in defending it. To this first head I chiefly confined myself. I stated the intelligence respecting the plans of the French government, and the persuasion of his maj.'s ministers, of the extreme urgency of the danger arising from thence, according to the tenor of the Instructions.—To this statement M. d'Araujo replied, that there was no actual assembly of troops at Bayonne, no camp formed, and no preparations made. That he had sept several couriers to pass through it, for the purpose of ascertaining the fact. That all his intelligence from Paris and Madrid concurred in that account, and that the forces collected there, consisted only of an Italian brigade of seventeen hundred men. That M. de Lima had given them no reason to apprehend danger, and made no communication from Paris of a declared intention to attack the country, nor of any reports to that effect.—He was persuaded that no measures had been taken for that purpose; and strongly stated the distinction between a formal declaration of the government or a conversation of Buonaparte himself, and the language held by M. Talleyrand; which he was disposed to consider as a mere device or threat to induce lord Yarmouth and Ins majesty's ministers, to con-
548
sent to the terms of peace proposed.—M. d'Araujo further stated, that the Spanish minister had expressed such surprize and jealousy upon the arrival of lord St. Vincent with the squadron, that he had thought it advisable to say that his Britannick majesty having received information of the measures taken by Spain for placing a part of the troops on the war establishment, and especially those which were upon the frontiers of Portugal, had with a just and natural alarm for the safety of his ally, ordered into the Tagus such forces as were most at hand and most disposable.—Upon this I told M. d'Araujo that he was at liberty also to communicate the intelligence given by me relative to the apprehensions that England entertained of France in consequence of M. Talleyrand's declaration. This, however, he declined for the present; adding that he could not attribute the arrival of lord St. Vincent to preparations which he did not believe to exist, nor to declartions of which he had received no account, and which had not been made and were not known to the Portuguese minister at Paris.—He shewed the greatest apprehensions that the sensations produced by lord St. Vincent's arrival would have the worst effects upon the interests and safety of Portugal, not so much from the number of ships as from the consequence attached to his lordship's exalted character, and the importance of the mission with which he was understood to be charged; and he strongly expressed his fears that this would provoke an attack not otherwise intended.—After stating in the terms of my Instructions the immediate succours which were embarked and ready to sail for the defence of Portugal, and which for that purpose his maj. had diverted from other objects of the first importance, I explained the unexampled generosity with which his maj. had determined to increase this force by further supplies, and to furnish every assistance that the case might require, or his resources afford, as well in ships and money as in troops.—The nature and extent of these offers appeared to have a very considerable. effect, and were received with civil expressions of gratitude.—I suggested to M. D'Araujo that they must decide promptly upon the offers of succour, for that the troops being already embarked, must, if not employed for the protection of Portugal, be sent forward to their destination, and that if the offer were now rejected,

549
his maj.'s government could not hereafter command the same means, whatever might be its disposition.—M. D'Araujo observed, that if the forces of England were distracted, and engaged in distant expeditions, Portugal would be exposed to the utmost danger, and left totally defenceless. He frequently repeated how desirable it would have been, that the arrival of a minister should have preceded the fleet, that full communications should have been previously made of the intentions of his maj.'s government and a due consideration bestowed upon the means which could be applied for the defence of the country; and seemed to be thoroughly persuaded that the arrival of a British force in the Tagus at this moment, connected with the circumstances of the present mission, would draw upon Portugal the resentment of France, and be considered as a violation of the treaty of neutrality.—I urged strongly the arguments suggested by my instructions upon that subject, and I did not omit to remark to him, that his maj. had suffered the court of Lisbon to pay subsidies to France, as long as a hope remained of its being able to preserve its neutrality. M. d'Araujo said, he found the treaty of neutrality in existence when he came into office, and believed it to be the only means of preserving Portugal, and repeated his arguments against the sufficiency of the evidence on which his maj.'s government founded their belief of the designs hostile to Portugal.
No. V.—Extract of a Dispatch from the earl of Rosslyn to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Lisbon, Sept. 2, 1806.
I am sorry to say that I cannot see the least grounds to expect vigorous efforts from this nation in its own defence; and it is evident that no force G. Britain can possibly furnish, would of itself be adequate to arrest the progress of a French invasion.—In short it is my duty to state, that I entirely despair of the possibility of defending Portugal against a French invasion by any means to be found here, or that G. Britain can even with great sacrifices supply.—With respect to the immediate objects of my mission, I must observe to you, that no apprehensions of danger from France existed in this country; and, that all the intelligence I have been able to acquire here, contradicts the supposition of preparations at Bayonne.—It appears to me quite incredible that an army could be suddenly assembled at Bayonne,to half the extent stated from the beginning of
550
August, without its being known to all the merchants; and when we consider the consequences with which the invasion and partition of Portugal would be pregnant, it must be evident that no efforts of the government could suppress the intelligence, or prevent the universal public alarm which the avowal of such a resolution, coupled with the preparations necessary to carry it into execution, must have produced throughout the kingdom, and especially in the towns of Lisbon and Oporto.—I must add, that I cannot imagine any interest which the court of Lisbon could have in shutting its eyes to such movements, had they been made; and it has shewn a sufficient sensibility to danger to assure us, that it could not conceal its fears if they had been really excited. I am therefore inclined to doubt this armament as stated.—I am confident that the arrival of the convoy with the troops will excite the utmost terror and despair in this government and city; but I do not think the Prince Regent will altogether refuse the permission to land when demanded. It is however unquestionable that he will protest most strongly against it, not only as derogatory to his independence, but as an infraction of his neutrality, likely to bring down upon the country the resentment of France, and to engage him in an unnecessary war. The most moderate tone that can be taken by the court here, will be to declare Great Britain responsible for all the consequences of the proceeding, and bound to undertake the defence and provide for the security of Portugal, should it be attacked. Although the permission to land and encamp may be granted, the possession of the forts will almost certainly be refused; and it is not easy to give any reason for insisting upon having them. The landing may be required because the troops are crowded in their transports and the anchorage without the bar unsafe at this season, and the Prince may content himself with not opposing it.—But if the government cannot be induced to consent to let the troops occupy the fort of St. Julian by the arguments drawn from the precedents in 1797, (which however in strictness do not apply, for the forts were then empty, and the Portuguese regiments upon the frontiers), and from representing how desirable it is that the British troops should be kept as much as possible out of the city of Lisbon; it will be a very strong step to require that the Portuguese troops should be removed, and that the absolute

551
command of the port and city should be given up to us. No pretext of common danger can be alleged, and no apprehension for the security of any separate interest of the British can be pretended.—If the court of Lisbon take the line of expressing its gratitude for the promptness with which the succours have been sent upon the supposition of danger, and of entreating his majesty to withdraw his forces, when it appears that such danger does not exist; or should it prepare itself for war as rendered inevitable by this expedition; it will be equally contrary to the professions which we have been instructed to make, and appear a most extraordinary preliminary to the defence of an ally to proceed to a reduction of their fortresses by force without any provocation on their part, or any motive of self-defence on ours real or pretended.—Our Instructions proceed upon a supposition that the French were in force at Bayonne, and the immediate invasion of Portugal indubitable; and those measures which would have been strictly justifiable in case this government should have abandoned all idea of resistance or escape from the danger, would, in the circumstances I have stated, assume an opposite character, and be made to appear to the rest of Europe as an act of unjustifiable violence and aggression. This case has not been foreseen, and could not have been distinctly provided for. But the 11th and 12th paragraphs of the first instructions strongly indicate the sentiments of his majesty's ministers as applicable to this question, and appear to me to preclude all measures of force which are not prescribed by the evident necessity of the case, and justified by the danger of the ships and military resources of the country falling an easy and certain prey into the hands of the enemy.—Governing ourselves by the general tenor of our orders, and the spirit of moderation and conciliation which pervades the whole of them, we must endeavour to make the best of this difficult situation; nor ought we to depart in any degree from those principles while this court Manifests a most friendly disposition, except upon the near approach of an enemy. Then the reason suggested for seizing the forts and ships may with propriety and truth be alleged, and those measures so necessary for the security of Great Britain be carried into execution.
No. VI.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to the earl of Rosslyn, dated Sept. 13, 1806.
552
Your lordship's dispatches have been duly received. A very careful attention has been given by his majesty's ministers to the interesting picture which your ldp. has drawn of the present situation of Portugal, and of the actual disposition of the court of Lisbon. To these two points your ldp. very properly directed your early attention, in order to ascertain to what extent the menaces of the French government, as avowed by M. Talleyrand, were actually ready to be carried into effect, and how far the pressure of that danger was imminent enough to call forth into action the utmost exertions which Great Britain could supply, as well for the protection of her antient ally, as for the security of her own maritime power and interests. Upon this great and essential enquiry did necessarily depend the prosecution of those ulterior operations which his majesty had entrusted to the direction of the distinguished officers who were for that purpose joined with your ldp. in commission to the court of Lisbon.—The peculiar and critical circumstances of the position of Portugal, and information received soon after the time of your ldp.'s sailing from England, seemed however to be such as to admit of deferring for a short time, the actual appearance of the British land forces at Lisbon. His majesty had therefore already been advised to direct the troops to remain in readiness at Plymouth till your ldp.'s dispatches from Lisbon should furnish the means of deciding upon the propriety of sending them to Portugal, or of continuing to apply them to their original destination.—In this respect therefore, the wish which has been so strongly expressed to you by his royal highness the Prince Regent and by Mons. d'Araujo, of the British troops not entering the Tagus, has been already anticipated; and your ldp. will not fail to impress his royal highness the Prince Regent with this proof of the delicacy and attention with which his majesty has consulted the wishes and apprehensions of the court of Portugal, while he was at the same time generously providing for the substantial purposes of their support and protection.—The general tenor of your lordship's most recent informations, concurring with the positive assurances of M. d'Araujo, in establishing the belief that there is no immediate menace of attack from Bayonne, and the fears and solicitations of the court of Lisbon appearing to be much alive to the supposed danger to Portugal by the

553
continuance of the British squadron in the Tagus, your lordship is instructed further to declare to his royal highness the Prince Regent, that his majesty, having performed the duty of a faithful and generous ally by the proffer of his powerful assistance, is satisfied to withdraw for the present, that assistance, at the earnest request of the court of Lisbon, and therefore that proper orders will be accordingly forthwith sent out to the earl of St. Vincent to that effect.
PAPERS RELATING TO AMERICA.] Lord HenryPetty moved that an humble address be presented to his majesty, "That he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this house, a copy of such communications as have passed between his majesty's government and that of the United States of America, relating to a ratification of a Treaty with the United States." In consequence of the above motion, three sets of Papers were, on the 18th and 22d instant, laid before both houses of parliament, of which the following are copies, viz.

PAPERS

  RELATING TO AMERICA. (FIRST SET, PRESENTED FEB. 18.)
  No. I.—Extract of a Dispatch from the hon. David M. Erskine to lord visc. Howick, dated Washington, March 2d, 1807.
  I have the honour to enclose the President's Message to the Congress, which conveys the information of the adjustment of the negociation between his majesty's commissioners and the American ministers. Your lordship will also find in it, the Correspondence of the American Minister at Paris with the French minister of the Marine, relative to the effect that Buonaparte's Decree of the 21st of Nov. declaring England to be in a state of blockade, is intended to have on American Commerce.
  (First Inclosure referred to in No. 1.)— Extract of a Message from the President of the U. States. Feb. 19, 1807.
  To the Senate and House of Representatives of the, United States: I transmit to congress, a Letter from our ministers plenipotentiary at London, informing us that they have agreed with the British commissioners to conclude a Treaty on all the points which had formed the object of their negociation, and on terms which they trusted we would approve. Also, a Letter from our minister plenipotentiary at
  554
  Paris, covering one to him from the minister of marine of that government, assuring him that the Imperial Decree lately passed was not to affect our commerce, which would still be governed by the rules of the Treaty established between the two countries. T. JEFFERSON.
  (Second Inclosure referred to in No. 1.) —To James Madison, Secretary of State, Washington, dated London, Dec. 27th, 1806.
  Sir; We have ,the pleasure to acquaint you that we have this day agreed with the British commissioners, to conclude a Treaty on all the points which have formed the object of our negociation, and on terms which we trust our government will approve. It will require only a few days to reduce it to form. When that is done, we shall transmit it to you by a special messenger. We hasten to communicate to you this interesting intelligence, for the information and guidance of our government in such measures as may have reference to the subject. We have the honour, &C. JAMES MONROE. WM. PINCKNEY.
  (Third Inclosure referred to in No. 1.)—To Mr. Madison, Washington, dated Paris, 24th Dec. 1806.
  Sir; I have the honour of transmitting the copy inclosed of a Letter from his majesty's minister of marine and colonies, in Answer to mine of the 10th inst. on the subject of the Imperial Arrêté of the 21st of Nov. 1806. An additional explanation, which it may be well to communicate, is, that neutral vessels coming from England or her colonies, into the ports of France, &c. since the date of the aforesaid Arrêté, will not be received, and that if any person or persons, charged with the ship or other vessel and cargo, shall be detected in evading this regulation by means of false declarations, they shall forfeit the said ship or other vessel and cargo. I am, Sir, &C. JOHN ARMSTRONG.
  (Fourth Inclosure referred to in No. 1.) —Imperial Decree of the 21st Nov. 1806.
  Art. I.—The British Islands are declared in a state of Blockade.—II. All commerce and correspondence with the British islands are prohibited. In consequence, letters or packets addressed either to England, to an Englishman, or in the English language, shall not pass through the Post Office, and shall be seized.—III. Every subject of England, of whatever rank and condition soever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or

  555
  by those of our allies, shall be made a prisoner of war.—IV. All magazines, merchandize, or property whatsoever, belonging to a subject of England, shall be declared a lawful prize.—V. The trade in English merchandize is forbidden. All merchandize belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories and colonies, is declared lawful prize.—VI. One half of the proceeds of the confiscation of the merchandize and property, declared good prize by the preceding Articles, shall be applied to indemnify the merchants for the losses which they have suffered by the capture of merchant vessels by English cruizers.—VII. No vessel coming directly from England or from the English colonies, or having been there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received into any port.—VIII Every vessel contravening the above clause, by means of a false declaration, shall be seized, and the vessel and cargo confiscated, as if they were English property.—IX. Our Tribunal of Prizes at Paris is charged with the definite adjudication of all the controversies, which may arise within our empire, or in the countries occupied by the French army, relative to the execution of the present decree. Our Tribunal of Prizes at Milan, shall he charged with the definite adjudication of the said controversies which may arise within the extent of our kingdom of Italy.—X. The present Decree shall be communicated by our minister of exterior relations, to the kings of Spain, of Naples, of Holland, and of Etruria, and to our Allies, whose subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and the barbarism of the English maritime laws. Our ministers of exterior relations, of war, of marine, of finances, of police, and our post masters general, are charged, each in what concerns him, with the execution of the present Decree.
  (Fifth Inclosure referred to in No. 1.).—Gen. Armstrong to the Minister of Marine and Colonies, dated Paris, Dec. 10, 1806.
  The undersigned, minister plenipotentiary of the U. States of America, has the honour of demanding from his exc. the minister of marine and colonies, the official Explanation which may have been given to the Imperial Decree of the 21st Nov. 1806, so far as that decree involves the rights of neutral nations.—The undersigned would more particularly wish to be Informed whether by 'British Islands' mentioned ill Art. I. are to be understood
  556
  all Islands in the possession of his Brit. majesty, and Islands merely, or whether the rule will be so construed, as to extend the Blockade to the continental possessions also, of his said majesty? Whether it be meant that the Arrêté shall operate from its date, and that seizures made under it before notice shall have been given, shall be considered legal? Whether American vessels, navigating the high or narrow seas shall be liable to seizure, on evidence only, that they are going to, or returning from, a port or ports of his Brit. majesty? And whether Art. II. and V. shall operate only as domestic Regulations, or whether their injunctions shall extend to citizens of foreign and independent nations? His exc. the minister of marine is sufficiently aware of the interest of the United States in the interpretation which shall be given to these Articles, and will readily and justly appreciate the motives of the undersigned, in requesting that his excellency's Answer may be given as, promptly as possible. JOHN ARMSTRONG.
  (Sixth Inclosure referred to in. No. 1.)—Dated Paris, 24th Dec. 1806.
  Mr. Minister Plenipotentiary; I hasten to answer the Note you did me the honour to address to me on the 20th of this month. I consider the Imperial Decree of the 21st Nov. last, as, thus far, conveying no Modification of the Regulations at present observed in France with regard to neutral navigators, nor consequently of the convention of the 30th Sept. 1800, with the United States of America. But although, by this Answer, the four Questions upon which your exc. has desired to know my opinion, have been implicitly resolved, I think I can add, 1st, That the Declaration expressed by the 1st Art. of the Decree of the 21st Nov. net at all changing the present French laws concerning maritime captures, there is no reason for enquiring what interpretation or restriction or extension may be given to this Article. 2d, That Seizures, contrary to the present Regulations concerning Cruizing, shall not be allowed to the capturers. 3d, That an American vessel cannot be taken at sea for the mere reason that she is going to a port of England, or is returning from one, because, conformably with the 7th Art. of the said Decree, we are limited in France not to admit vessels coming from England or the English Colonies. 4th, That the provisions of Articles 2d and 5th of the said Decree, naturally apply to foreign citizens domiciliated in France

  557
  or in the countries occupied by the troops of his majesty the emperor and king, inasmuch as they have the character of a general law; but that it will be proper that your exc. should communicate with the minister of exterior relations as to what concerns the correspondence of the citizens of the United States with England. I pray, &c. (Signed) DECRES.—It will not escape gen. Armstrong that my Answers cannot have the developement which they would receive from the minister of exterior relations, and that it is naturally to him that he ought to address himself for these explanations, which I am very happy to give him, because he wishes them, but upon which I have much less positive information than the Prince of Beneventum.
  (Signed) DECRES.
  No. II—Message from the President to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States. Dec. 18, 1807.
  The communications now made, shewing the great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandize are threatened, on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerents of Europe, and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to the consideration of Congress; who will doubtless perceive all the advantages which may be expected from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States. Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present crisis. I ask a return of the letters of Messrs. Armstrong and Chempagny, which it would be improper to make public.
  TH. JEFFERSON.
  No. III.—Extract of a Letter from the Grand Judge, Minister. of Justice at Paris, to the Attorney General for the Council of Prizes there, dated Paris, Sept. 18th, 1807.
  I have submitted to his majesty the emperor and king the doubts raised by his exc. the minister of marine and colonies, on the extent of certain dispositions of the imperial decree of the 21st Nov. 1806, which has declared the British isles in a state of blockade. The following are his majesty's intentions on the points in question: May vessels of war by virtue of the imperial decree of 21st Nov. last, seize on board neutral vessels, either English property, or even all merchandize proceeding
  558
  from the English manufactories or territory?—Answer. His majesty has intimated that, as he did not think proper to express any exception in this Decree, there is no ground for making any in its execution in relation to any whomsoever, (à l'egard de qui que ce pent être.) His majesty has postponed a decision on the question, whether armed French vessels ought to capture neutral vessels bound to or from England, even when they have no English merchandize on board. (Signed) REONIER.
  (SECOND SET, PRESENTED FEB. 22.)
  No. I.—DISPATCH from lord visc. Howick to the hon. David Erskine, dated Downing Street, 8th Jan. 1807.
  Sir; Your dispatch No. I. announcing your arrival at Annapolis on board the Avon sloop of war, was received here on the 6th of Dec. and, together with Mr. Merry's dispatches, which were received at the same time, has been laid before the king. It is with great satisfaction that I inform you that the Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, between this country and the U. States, was signed on 31st ult. by lords Holland and Auckland on the part of his maj. and by M. M. Monroe and Pinkney on the part of their government.—Mr. Purviance, secretary to the American legation here, who leaves London to-day, is the bearer of the Treaty for ratification. I have the honour herewith to transmit a copy of this Treaty for your information, together. with a copy of a Note, delivered previous to the signature by the lords Holland and Auckland, relative to the complaints of the Canada merchants, on the subject of the estimation of the duties on the inland trade, in certain parts of the U. States. These complaints, which were communicated by Mr. Merry in the early part of last year, but from various circumstances postponed for consideration, certainly must not be lost sight of by his majesty's government, and every means will be taken to obtain redress for the removal of the inconvenience complained of.—I transmit to you also the copy of another Note presented by their lordships to the American commissioners previously to the signature of the Treaty, on the subject of the extraordinary Declarations and Orders of the French government issued at Berlin on the 16th Nov. last. This Note I must recommend to your particular attention; you will state to the American government, that his majesty relies with con-

  559
  fidence on their good sense and firmness in resisting pretensions, which, if suffered to take effect, must prove so destructive to the commerce of all neutral nations.—His majesty has learnt, that the measures announced in the Decree have already in some instances been carried into execution by the privateers of the enemy, and there could be no doubt that his maj. would have an indisputable right to exercise a just retaliation. Neutral nations cannot indeed expect that the king should suffer the commerce of his enemies to be carried on through them, whilst they submit to the prohibition which France has decreed against the commerce of his majesty's subjects.—But though this right of retaliation would unquestionably accrue to his maj. yet his maj. is unwilling, except in the last extremity, to have recourse to measures which must prove so distressing to all nations not engaged in the war against France.—His maj. with that forbearance and moderation which have at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the present to confine himself to the exercise of the power given him by his decided naval superiority, in such manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged privileges of the law of nations, and has issued an order for preventing all commerce from port to port of his enemies, comprehending in this order, not only the ports of France, but those of such nations as, either in alliance with France or subject to her dominion, have by measures of active offence, or by the exclusion of British ships, taken a part in the present war.—His maj. feels an entire confidence, that the moderation and justice of this conduct will be duly appreciated by the United States; and you will express to that government, in the strongest terms, the regret. his maj. has experienced in being thus compelled in his own defence, to act in a manner which must prove in some degree embarrassing to the commerce of neutral nations; and his majesty's sincere desire to avoid any stronger measures, to which, however, if the injustice and aggression of his enemies should not be resisted by those nations whose rights and interests are invaded by so flagrant a violation of all public law, it may be ultimately necessary for the king to have recourse. I am, &c. HOWICK.
  No. II.—Note from Lords Holland and Auckland to Messieurs Monroe and Pinkney, Dated London Dec. 31, 1806.
  The undersigned, Henry Rd. Vassal lord Holland, and Wm. lord Auckland, plenipotentiaries of his Britannic maj. have the honour to inform J. Monroe and Wm. Pinkney, commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiaries of the United States of and America, that they are now ready to proceed to the signature of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, on the Articles of which they have mutually agreed. But at the same time they have it in command from his maj. to call the attention of the commissioners of the U. States to some extraordinary proceedings which have lately taken place on the continent of Europe, and to communicate to them officially the sentiments of his maj.'s government thereupon.—The proceedings alluded to are certain Declarations and Orders of the French government, issued at Berlin on the 21st of Nov. last. In these Orders the French government seeks to justify or palliate its own unjust pretensions, by imputing to G. Britain, principles which she never professed and practices which never existed.—His majesty is accused of a systematic and general disregard of the law of nations, recognized by civilized states, and more particularly of an unwarrantable extension of the right of blockade; whereas his maj. may confidently appeal to the world on his uniform respect for neutral rights, and his general and scrupulous adherence to the law of nations, without condescending to contrast his conduct in these particulars with that of his enemy; and with regard to the only specific charge, it is notorious that he has never declared any ports to be in a state of blockade without allotting to that object a force sufficient to make the entrance into them manifestly dangerous.—By such allegations, unfounded as they are, the enemy attempts to justify his pretensions of confiscating as lawful prize all produce of English industry or manufacture, though it be the property of neutrals; excluding from his harbours every neutral vessel which has touched at any port of his majesty's dominions, though employed in an innocent commerce; and of declaring G. Britain to be in a state of blockade though his own ports and arsenals are actually blockaded, and he is unable to station any naval force whatever before any ports of the United Kingdom.—Such principles are in themselves extravagant and repugnant to the law of nations; and the pretension founded on them, though professedly directed solely against G. Bri-

  561
  tain, tend to alter the practice of war among civilized nations, and utterly to subvert the right and independence of neutral powers.—The undersigned cannot, therefore, believe, that the enemy will ever seriously attempt to enforce such a system. If he should, they are confident, that the good sense of the American government will perceive the fatal consequences of such pretensions to neutral commerce, and that its spirit and regard to national honour will prevent its acquiescence in such palpable violations of its rights and injurious encroachments of its interests.—If, however, the enemy should carry these threats into execution, and if neutral nations should, contrary to all expectation, acquiesce in such usurpations, his maj. might probably be compelled, however reluctantly, to retaliate in his just defence, and to adopt in regard to the commerce of neutral nations with his enemies, the same measures which those nations shall have permitted to be enforced against their commerce with his subjects. The commissioners of the United States will therefore feel, that at a moment when his maj. and all neutral nations are threatened with such an extension of the belligerent pretensions of his enemies, he cannot enter into the stipulations of the present Treaty without an explanation from the United States of their intentions, or a reservation on the part of his maj. in the case above-mentioned, if it should ever occur.—The undersigned, considering that the distance of the American government renders any immediate explanation on this subject impossible, and animated by a desire of forwarding the beneficial work in which they are engaged, are authorized by his majesty to conclude the Treaty without delay. They proceed to the signature under the full persuasion that, before the Treaty shall be returned from America, with the ratification of the United States, the enemy will either have formally abandoned or tacitly relinquished his unjust pretensions, or that the government of the United States, by its conduct or assurances, will have given security to his maj. that it will not submit to such innovations in the established system of maritime law: and the undersigned have presented this Note from an anxious wish that it should be clearly understood on both sides, that, without such abandonment of his pretensions on the part of the enemy, or assurances of such conduct on the part of the United States, his maj. will
  562
  not consider himself bound by the present signature of his commissioners to ratify the Treaty, or precluded from adopting such measures as may seem necessary for counteracting the designs of the enemy.—The undersigned cannot conclude, without expressing their satisfaction at the prospect of accomplishing an object so important to the interests and friendly connection of both nations, and their just sense of the conciliatory disposition manifested by the commissioners of the United States, during the whole course of the negociation.
  VASSAL HOLLAND. AUCKLAND.
  No. III.—Extract of a Dispatch from the hon. David Erskine to lord vise. Howick, dated Washington, March 30th, 1807.
  In compliance with your lordship's Instructions, I communicated to this government his majesty's views relative to the French Decree of the 21st Nov. 1806, as detailed in your dispatch to me of the 8th January last; and received the Answer which I have now the honour to inclose.
  (Inclosure referred to in No. 1.III)—To the hon. David Erskine, &c. Dated Department of State, 20th March 1807.
  Sir; I have laid before the president your Letter of the 12th inst. communicating the views of his Britannic maj. in relation to the French Decree of Nov. 21st, 1806, and to the principle of retaliation, through the commerce of neutrals who may submit to the operation of that Decree; as also the measure actually taken, of prohibiting all neutral commerce from port to port of his enemies, not only the ports of France, but those of such other nations, as, either in alliance with France, or subject to her dominion, have by measures of active offence, or by the exclusion of British ships, taken a part in the present war.—The president cannot be insensible, sir, to the friendship and confidence towards the United States which are signified by his Britannic maj. in this communication.—In making this acknowledgment, however, the president considers it not less incumbent on him to reserve for a state of things which it is hoped will never occur, the right of discussing the legality of any particular measures, to which resort may be had, on a ground of retaliation; at this time, it would suffice to observe that it remains to be more fully ascertained in what sense the decree in question will be explained, and to what extent it will be carried into execution,

  563
  and consequently whether in any case the United States can be involved in questions concerning measures of retaliation, supposed to accrue to one belligerent from such a proceeding, by another.—But it is worthy the justice and liberty of the British government to recollect, that, within the period of those great events which continue to agitate Europe, instances have occurred, in which the commerce of neutral nations, more especially of the United States, has experienced the severest distresses from its own orders and measures, manifestly unauthorized by the law of nations. The respect which the United States owe to their neutral rights and the interests they have in maintaining them, will always be sufficient pledges, that no culpable acquiescence on their part will render them accessary to the proceedings of one belligerent nation, through the rights of neutrals, against the commerce of its adversary.—With regard to the particular order issued against the trade of neutrals from one port to another of the enemies of Great Britain, no fair objection can lie against it, provided it be founded on and enforced by actual blockades, as authorized by the law of nations. If, on the other hand, the order has reference not to such a blockade, but to a supposed illegality of the neutral trade from one to another of the described ports, the remark is obvious, that, on that supposition, the order is superfluous, the trade being as interdicted by the law of nations, liable at all times, without any such order, to the capture of British cruizers and the condemnation of British courts; and if not interdicted as such by the law of nations, it cannot otherwise be made illegal, than by a legal blockade of the ports comprehended in the order. This inference is applicable even to the case of a neutral trade between the ports of France herself, since it is not a principle of the acknowledged law of nations, that neutrals may not trade from one to another port of the same belligerent nation; and it would be an innovation on that now not before attempted, to extend the principle to a neutral trade between ports of different countries, confessedly open in times of peace as well as of war.—If the British order refers for its basis, to the principle of retaliation against the French decree, it falls under the observations already made on that subject, and which need not be repeated. I have, &c.
  JAMES MADISON.
  No. IV.—Dispatch from the hon. David
  564
  Erskine to lord vise. Howick, dated Washington, 31st March, 1807.
  My Lord; After 1 had closed the preceding number of my dispatches which accompany this, I received another letter from Mr. Madison, in answer to the communications, which, in obedience to your lordship's orders, I made to this government, of his majesty's views relative to the French decree of blockade of the 21st of November last, and his majesty's prohibitory orders against the neutral trade from port to port of his enemies. As I conceived it would be most prudent to wait for your lordship's instructions, I did not send any reply to the letter, but have now the honour to inclose it to your lordship. I have, &c. D. M. ERSKINE.
  (Inclosure referred to in. No. IV.)—To the hon. David Erskine, dated Department of State, 29th March 1807.
  Sir; Further reflection on the tenor and tendency of the order of his Britannic majesty, communicated by your letter of the 16th instant, which was answered by mine of the 20th, induces me to resume that important subject.—From the difficulty of supposing that the order can have for its basis either a legal blockade, impossible to be extended to all the ports described in the order, or a supposed illegality of the trade between those ports, an illegality which has never been applied by the British government or its admiralty courts, to use accustomed trade even between ports of a belligerent nation, and is utterly at variance with the conduct of both, in reference to a trade between a belligerent nation and its allies; a necessity seems to result of ascribing the order to the policy of countervailing through the commerce of neutrals, the French decree of the 21st of Nov. last.—In this view of the order, it demands, on the part of the United States, the most serious attention both to its principle and to its operation.—With respect to its principle, it will not be contested, that a retaliation by one nation on its enemy; which is to operate through the interest of a nation not its enemy, essentially requires, not only that the injury inflicted should be limited by the measure of injury sustained, but that every retaliating step in such a case should be preceded by an unreasonable failure of the neutral party, in some mode or other to put an end to the inequality wrongfully produced. Were it certain, therefore, that the French decree is to be enforced in the sense in which it is taken, and that,

  565
  in violation of the, treaty between France and the United States, the commerce of the latter will not be exempted; the British order being peremptory in its import and immediate in its execution, might justly be regarded by the United States as a proceeding equally premature and unfriendly. But in the uncertainty as to the real meaning of that decree, and whilst a presumption offered itself, that the decree, if avowed and executed in an unlawful extent, might not embrace the commerce of the United States; they are bound by justice to their interests, as well as by respect for their rights, to consider the British order as a ground for serious complaint and remonstrance. Should it prove that the decree had not the meaning ascribed to it, and particularly, should the respect of France for her treaties with the United States, except their trade from the operation of the decree, the order of the British government will stand exposed to still severer comments. It will take the character of an original aggression, will furnish to the French government a like ground with that assumed by itself, for retaliating measures, and will derive a very unfavourable feature from the consideration that it was a palpable infraction of a treaty first signed on the part of the British government, and expected, at the date of the order, to be speedily ratified on the part of the United States.—The necessity of presenting the subject in its true light, is strengthened by the operation which the British order will have on a vast proportion of the entire commerce of the United States, not to dwell on the carrying branch of the commerce between the ports and countries of Europe, and which the immunity given by our flag, in consequence of treaties with the enemies of G. Britain, to British property, and not enjoyed by the property of her enemies, has hitherto been advantageous to G. Britain; and without inquiring into the effect of an application of the interdict to the other quarters of the globe, all of which are evidently within the comprehensive terms of the order, it cannot be overlooked, that the character and course of nearly the whole of the American commerce with the ports of Europe, other than of Great Britain, will fall under the destructive operation of the order; it is well known that the cargoes exported from the United States frequently require that they may be disposed of partly at one market and partly at another. The return cargoes
  566
  are still more frequently collected at different ports, and not unfrequently at ports different from those receiving the outward cargoes.—In this circuitous voyage, generally consisting of several links, the interest of the undertakers materially requires also, either a trade or a freightage between the ports visited in the circuit. To restrain the vessels of the United States, therefore, from this legitimate and accustomary mode of trading with the continent of Europe, as is contemplated by the order, and to compel them on one hand, to dispose of the whole of their cargoes at a port which may want but a part; and on the other hand, to seek the whole of their returns at the same port, which may furnish but a part, or perhaps no part of the articles wanted, Would be a proceeding as ruinous to our commerce as contrary to our essential rights.—These observations, which are made in conformity with the sentiments of the president, cannot fail, sir, to have all the weight with an enlightened and friendly government to which they are entitled, and the president persuades himself, that the good effect of truths which they disclose, will be seen in such measures as will remove all grounds for dissatisfaction, and demonstrate on that side, the same sincere disposition to cultivate harmony and beneficial intercourse, as is felt and evinced by the United States and their government. I have, &c. JAMES MADISON.
  THIRD SET OF PAPERS, PRESENTED FEB. 22.
  No. I.—NOTE from Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, 24th July 1807.
  The undersigned, commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the U. States of America, have the honour to inform Mr. Canning, that they are instructed by the president of the United States to propose to his majesty's government a renewal of negotiation relative to the objects of the mission of the undersigned, with a view to a more satisfactory result than is found in the Instrument signed on the 31st of Dec. last, by his majesty's plenipotentiaries, and those of the United States.—The undersigned are persuaded that his majesty's government will see in this measure, an unquestionable proof of the sincere desire of the president to place the friendly relations of the two countries beyond the reach of those misunderstandings which either the absence or the inadequacy of precise arrangements on subjects

  567
  of the greatest delicacy and importance might from time to time occasion. —It is under the influence of this solicitude, that the president has charged the undersigned to express to his majesty's government, his unfeigned regret that the Instrument above-mentioned does riot appear to him to be such as he can approve, and at the same time to declare his entire confidence that the just and liberal sentiments which animate his majesty's government, corresponding with those which belong to the government of the United States, cannot fail to lead, without delay or difficulty, to such an issue of the negotiation which is now proposed, as shall be suited in all respects, to the rights and interests of both nations, and therefore calculated to insure a long continuance of the friendship which so happily subsists between them.—The undersigned have already had the honour to present to Mr. Canning a Paper, which, taken in connection with a Project on the subject of Impressment, and another on the subject of certain Claims to Compensation by American citizens, presented by the undersigned at the same time, will be found to exhibit a compleat view of the Alterations which the Instrument above-mentioned is deemed by the president to require. They forbear to trouble Mr. Canning with a recapitulation of the details which these Papers contain; but there are some Explanations upon the topics of Impressment and Compensation which they do not furnish, and which it is therefore incumbent upon the undersigned to avail themselves of this occasion to give.—It was one of the primary objects of the mission of the undersigned to adjust with his majesty's government a formal and explicit arrangement relative to a practice by British ships of war, which has excited in a very great degree the sensibility of the American people, and claimed the anxious attention of their government. The practice alluded to, is that of visiting on the main ocean the merchant vessels of the United States, navigable under the American flag, for the purpose of subjecting their crews to a hasty and humiliating inquisition, and impressing as British seamen such of the mariners, as upon that inquisition the visiting officer declares to be so. The effect of this practice is, that the flag of an independent power is dishonoured, and one of the most essential rights of its sovereignty violated; that American citizens, either mistaken for British subjects, or assumed to be such without in-
  568
  quiry, are forced from the quiet pursuits of a lawful commerce into the severe and dangerous service of a foreign military navy, to expose their lives in fighting against those with whom their country is at peace; and that the merchant vessels of the United States are frequently thus stripped of so large a portion of their hands; before their voyages have been performed, as to bring into the mast imminent peril, and sometimes to produce the actual loss of the vessels, their cargoes, and their remaining crews. It cannot be thought surprising that a practice like this should act with peculiar force upon the feelings of those whom it oppresses, and that the sensation should- extend itself to their countrymen and their government.—The government of the United States has accordingly made this pretension the subject of frequent discussion with G. Britain, and when an extraordinary mission to his majesty's government was last year determined on, it was one of the Instructions to the undersigned, to whom the duties of that mission were confided, to make no treaty which should not provide for that object. In the first stages of the negotiation, which followed that mission, the undersigned were led to indulge a confident expectation that such a provision should be obtained. At length however the rejection by his majesty's government of a project of an article on this point, which, without touching the question of right, offered on the part of the United States an effectual equivalent for the mere forbearance of the practice, having extinguished all hope of an immediate adjustment of this subject by treaty, the undersigned felt that they were called upon by candour as well as by their duty to their government, to inform the British commissioners, that the project relative to Impressment having failed, they had no power to conclude a Treaty upon the other points which had been discussed between them, so as to bind the government of the United States. The undersigned did accordingly give them this information in the most explicit terms, and the negotiation was in consequence for a short time suspended. It was soon afterwards, however, suggested by his majesty's commissioners, that, if this topic should be expressly reserved for future conventional arrangements, and a pledge given to the United States for resuming the consideration of it at a convenient season with that view, and if, in the mean time, such

  569
  an informal understanding should be substituted, as in its practical effect would remove the vexation complained of, it might perhaps be yet possible to conduct the negotiation to a result which would not be unacceptable to the respective governments; and in pursuance of this suggestion the British commissioners presented to the undersigned on the 8th of Nov. last, the official Note, of which a copy is herewith enclosed. The undersigned transmitted to their government, for its consideration, a copy of this Note, together with a statement of the circumstances connected with it, and, without giving it their sanction, agreed in the mean time to concur with the British commissioners, as they were invited to do, in an effort to adjust the stipulations of a Treaty upon the remaining objects of their mission, and to leave the effect of what should be adjusted to their government.—It appears that the president of the United States considers this collateral proceeding upon a concern of such paramount importance, as unsuitable to the nature of it, as well in the mode as in its terms. In this opinion the president does but continue to respect the considerations which heretofore induced him to believe that an arrangement upon this point ought to stipulate with precision against the practice in question, and that the manner of it would properly be that which should be chosen for the arrangement of the other points of discussion; and in the Instructions which, in conformity with that opinion, he has now given to the undersigned, he does but manifest his reliance upon the spirit of justice and amity, which he is assured his majesty's government will bring to the renewed consideration of a subject so interesting to the rights and feelings of a friendly nation, for such an adjustment of this, as well as of every other question belonging to the relations of the two countries, as shall confirm their dispositions to mutual kindness, and promote the happiness and prosperity of both.—The subject of Compensation will perhaps be sufficiently explained by the inclosed copies of two Notes from the undersigned to lord Holland and lord Auckland and to lord Howick.—It will appear from the last of these Notes, that this subject, for which the projected Treaty did not provide, was not to be affected by it; but on the contrary, that the rights of the United States and the Claims of their citizens were understood to be reserved for
  570
  future adjustment, as compleatly as if no-treaty had been made; and it will occur to Mr. Canning, that the project of an Article on this point, which they had the honour to leave with him at their late interview, is in the spirit of that understanding, and is besides so entirely free from objection, that no motive is likely to exist against the adoption of it.—There is another subject, to which the undersigned have the orders of the president to invite the attention of his majesty's government, as affecting materially, and giving a new and unexpected character to the proposed Treaty. They allude to the written Declaration relative to the French Decree of the 21st of Nov. last, by which his majesty's plenipotentiaries accompanied their signature of the Treaty; a Declaration, which, in its actual form, creates unnecessary embarrassments in the way of an acceptance of the treaty by the United States.—The undersigned persuade themselves, that as this proceeding, to which no sanction was given on their part, imposed on the United States no new obligation, and could only be intended to declare that, in signing or ratifying the Treaty, it was understood by G. Britain that nothing contained in it would be a bar to any measure which, if no such treaty had been signed, would be lawful as a measure of retaliation against her enemy, and as the occasion which produced it does not now appear to exist as then supposed, it will not be thought that any thing is sacrificed by withdrawing it as unnecessary.—The undersigned, &c.
  JAMES MONROE, WILLIAM PINKNEY.
  First Inclosure referred to in No 1.) Copy of the TREATY Or AMITY, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION, between his majesty and the United States of America, concluded and signed on the 31st Dec. 1806, by the right hon. Henry Rd. Vassal lord Holland, one of his majesty's privy council and lord keeper of his majesty's privy seal, and Wm. lord Auckland one of his majesty's privy council, and president of the committee of council for all matters of trade and foreign plantations, plenipotentiaries on the part of his Britannick majesty; and James Monroe and Wm. Pinkney, commissioners extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary on the part of the United States.
  His Britannic majesty, and the United States of America, being equally desirous

  571
  to promote and perpetuate the good understanding and friendship which happily subsist between the subjects of the united kingdom and the citizens of the United States, and for that purpose to regulate the commerce and navigation between their respective countries, territories, and people, on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, have respectively named their plenipotentiaries, and have given to them full powers to make and conclude a Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce; that is to say, his Britannick majesty has named for his plenipotentiaries Henry Rd. Vassal lord Holland, one of his majesty's privy council and lord keeper of his majesty's privy seal; and Wm. lord Auckland, one of his majesty's privy council, and president of the committee of council for all matters of trade and foreign plantations: And the President of the United States, by and with the advice of the Senate thereof, bath appointed for their plenipotentiaries James Monroe and Wm. Pinkney, commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiaries; who, after having exchanged their respective full powers, have agreed on the following Articles:
  Art. 1. There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between his Britannick majesty and the United States of America, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of persons or places.
  Art. 2. It is agreed, that the several Articles of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his majesty and the United States, made at London on the 19th of Nov. 1794, which have not expired, nor as yet had their full operation and effect, shall be confirmed in their best form, and in their full tenour;. and that the contracting parties will also from time to time enter into friendly explanations on the subject of the said Articles, for the purpose of removing all such doubts as may arise or have arisen as to the true purport of the same, as well as for the purpose of rendering the said Articles more conformable to their mutual wishes and convenience.
  Art. 3. His maj. agrees, that the Vessels belonging to the U. States of America [and sailing direct from the said States,(1)] shall
  Alterations proposed by the President of the United States.
  (1) Omit the words 'and sailing direct from the ports of the said States.'—
  572
  be admitted and hospitably received in all the sea ports and harbours of the British dominions in the East Indies; and that the citizens of the said United States may freely carry on a trade [between the said territories and the said United States, (2)] in all articles of which the importation or exportation respectively to and from the said territories shall not be entirely prohibited: Provided only, that it shall not be lawful for them, in any time of war between the British government and any power or state whatever, to export from the said territories, without the special permission of the British government there, any military stores, or naval stores, or rice. The citizens of the United States shall pay for their vessels, when admitted into the said ports, no other or higher tonnage than shall be payable on British vessels, when admitted into the ports of the United States; and they shall pay no other or higher duties or charges, on the importation or the exportation of the cargoes of the said vessels, than shall be payable on the same articles when imported or exported in British vessels. But it is expressly agreed, that the vessels of the United States shall not carry any of the articles exported by them from the said British territories to any port or place, except to some port or place in America, where the same shall be unladen, (3) and such Regulations shall be adopted by both parties as shall from time to time be found necessary to enforce the due and faithful observance of this stipulation.—It is also understood, that the permission granted by this Article is not to extend to allow the vessels of the United States to carry on any part of the coasting trade of the said British territories,(4) but the vessels going out with their original cargoes or part thereof from one port of discharge to another, are not to be considered as carrying on the coasting trade. Neither is this Arti-
  (2) Omit the words 'between the said territories and the said United States,' and insert 'with the said territories.'—(3) After the words where the same shall be unladen,' insert 'or to some port or place or ports or places in China, or the Indian or other seas, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, from whence the said vessels shall proceed as aforesaid to some port or place in America, and there unlade their cargoes.' —(4) After the words 'British territories,' insert 'without the special permission of the British government.'—

  573
  cle to he construed to allow the citizens of the said States to settle or reside within the said territories, or to go into the interior parts thereof, without the permission of the British government established there; and if any transgressions should be attempted against the Regulations of the British government in this respect, the observance of the same shall and may be enforced against the citizens of America in the same manner as against British subjects or others transgressing the same rule. And the citizens of the United States, whenever they arrive at any port or harbour in the said territories, or if they should be permitted in manner aforesaid, to go to any other place therein, shall always be subject to the laws, government, and jurisdiction, of whatever nature, established in such harbour, port, or place, according as the same may be. The citizens of the United States, may also touch for refreshment at the Island of Saint Helena, (5) but subject in all respects to such Regulations as the British government may from time to time establish there.
  Art. 4. There shall be between all the dominions of his majesty in Europe and the territories of the United States, a reciprocal and perfect liberty of commerce and navigation. The people and inhabitants of the two countries respectively shall have liberty freely and exclusively, and without hindrance and molestation, to come with their ships arid cargoes to the lands, countries, cities, ports, places, and rivers within the dominions and territories aforesaid, to enter into the same, toresort there, and to remain and reside there without any limitation of time; also to hire and possess houses and warehouses for the purpose of their commerce; and generally, the merchants and traders on each side shall enjoy the most compleat protection and security for their commerce, but subject always as to what respects this Article, to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively. (6)
  (5) After the words 'St. Helena,' insert 'or at such other places as may be in the possession of Great Britain in the African or Asiatic seas.'—(6) At the end of the Article add 'And it is further agreed, that if any other trade in and with the said British territories in the East Indies than is hereby authorized, or any other or greater rights or advantages in respect thereof shall be granted or permitted to the citizens or subjects of
  Art. V. It is agreed, that no other or higher Duties shall be paid by the ships or merchandize of the one Marty in the ports of the other, than such as are, paid by the like vessels or merchandize of all other nations. Nor shall any other or higher duty be imposed in one country on the importation of any articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the other, than are or shall be payable on the importation of the like articles, being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country.(7)—Nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the exportation or importation of any articles to or from the territories of the two parties respectively, which shall not equally extend to all other nations. But the British government reserves to itself the right of imposing on American vessels entering into British ports in Europe a tonnage duty equal to that which shall at any time be payable by British vessels in the ports of America; and the government of the United States reserves to itself a right of imposing on British vessels entering into the ports of the United States, a tonnage duty equal to that which shall at any time be payable by American vessels in the British ports in Europe.—It is agreed, that in the trade of the two countries with each other," the same duties of exportation and importation on all goods and merchandize, and also the same drawbacks and bounties, shall be paid and allowed in either country, whether such importation or exportation shall be made in British or American vessels.
  Art. 6. The high contracting parties. not having been able to arrange at present, by treaty, any Commercial Intercourse between the territories of the United States and his majesty's islands and ports in the West-Indies, agree that, until that subject shall be regulated in a satisfactory manner, each of the parties shall remain in the complete possession of its rights, in respect to such an intercourse.
  Art. 7. It shall be free for the high con-
  any European nation, the same shall be common to the citizens of the U. States.'—(7) At the end of the first Paragraph insert 'nor shall any higher defies or charges be imposed in one country, on the exportation of any articles to the ports of the other, than such as are payable on the exportation of the like articles to every other foreign country.'—

  575
  tracting parties respectively to appoint consuls for the protection of Trade, to reside in the dominion and territories aforesaid; and the said consuls shall enjoy those liberties and rights which belong to them by reason of their function; but before any consul shall act as such, he shall be in the usual forms approved and admitted by the party to whom he is sent: And it is hereby declared to be lawful and proper, that in case of illegal or improper conduct towards the laws or government, a consul may either be punished according to law, if the laws will reach the case, or be dismissed, or even sent back, the offended government assigning to the other the reasons for the same.—Either of the parties may except from the residence of consuls, such particular places as such party shall judge proper to be excepted (8).
  Art. 8. It is agreed, that in all cases where Vessels shall be captured or detained [on just suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or of carrying to the enemy any of the articles which are contraband of war (9)] or for [other (10)] lawful cause, the said vessel shall be brought to the nearest or most convenient port; [and if any property of an enemy should be found on board such vessel (11)] that part only which [belongs to the enemy or (12)] is [otherwise (13)] confiscable, shall be made prize, and the vessel, unless by law subject to condemnation, shall be at liberty to proceed with the remainder of the cargo, without any impediment. And it is agreed, that all proper measures shall be taken to prevent delay in deciding the cases of ships and cargoes so brought in for adjudication, and in the payment or recovery of any indemnification adjudged or agreed to be paid to the masters or owners of such ships.—It is also agreed, that in all cases of unfounded detention, or other contravention of the Regulations stipulated by the present Treaty, the owners of the vessel and cargo so
  (8) Propose to strike out the last Paragraph.—(9) Omit the words 'on just suspicion of having on board enemy's property, or of carrying to the enemy any of the articles which are contraband of war.'—(10) Omit the word 'other,' and substitute (11) Omit the words 'if any property of an enemy should be found on board such vessel.'—(12) Omit the words 'belongs to the enemy, or.'—(13) Omit the word 'otherwise.'—
  576
  detained shall be allowed damages proportioned to the loss occasioned thereby, together with the costs and charges of the trial.
  Art. 9. In order to regulate what is in future to be esteemed contraband of war, it is agreed that under the said denomination shall be comprized all arms and implements serving for the purposes of war by land or by sea, such as cannon, musquets, mortars, petards, bombs, grenadoes, carcasses, carriages for cannon, musquet rests, bandoliers, gunpowder, match, saltpetre, ball, pikes, swords, head pieces, cuirasses, halberts, lances, javelins, horse-furniture, holsters, belts, and generally all other implements of war; as also timber for ship building, copper in sheets, sail cloth, hemp, and cordage, and in general (with the exception of unwrought iron and fir planks; and also with the exception of tar and pitch (14.), when not going to a port of naval equipment, in which case they shall be entitled to pre-emption) whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels; and all the above articles are hereby declared to be just objects of confiscation, whenever they are attempted to be carried to an enemy; but no vessel shall be detained on pretence of carrying contraband of war, unless some of the above-mentioned articles not excepted, are found on board of the said vessel at the time it is searched.
  Art. 10. Whereas in consideration of the distance, and other circumstances incident to the situation of the high contracting parties, it may frequently happen that vessels may sail for a port or place belonging to an enemy, without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded, or invested, it is agreed, that every vessel so circumstanced, may be turned away from such port or place, but she shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, be confiscated, unless after such notice she shall again attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to any other port or place she may think proper; nor shall any vessel or goods of either party, that may have entered into such port or place before the same was besieged, blockaded, or invested by the other, and be found therein after the reduction or surrender of such place, be liable to confiscation, but shall be restored to the owners or proprietors
  (14) After the words 'tar and pitch,' add 'turpentine and rosin':—

  577
  thereof (15).—Neither of the parties when at war, shall, during the continuance of the Treaty, take from on board the vessels of the other, the subjects of the opposite belligerent, unless they be in the actual employment of such belligerent.
  Art. 11. Whereas differences have arisen concerning the trading with the colonies of his majesty's enemies, and the instructions given by his majesty to his cruizers in regard thereto; it is agreed, that, [during the present hostilities (16),] all articles of the growth, produce, and manufacture of Europe (17), not being contraband of war, may be freely carried from the United States to the port of any colony not blockaded, belonging to his majesty's enemies.—Provided such goods shall previously have been entered and landed in the United States, and shall have paid the ordinary duties on such articles so imported for home consumption, and on re-exportation shall after the drawback remain subject to a duty equivalent to not less than one per cent. ad volorem, and that the said goods and the vessel conveying the same, shall from the time of their clearance from the American port, be bonâ fide the property of citizens and inhabitants of the United States: And in like manner, that all articles not being contraband of war, and being the growth and produce of the enemy's colonies, may be brought to the United States, and after having been there landed, may be freely caried from thence to any port of Europe (18) not blockaded, provided such goods shall previously have been entered and landed in the said United States, and shall have paid (19) the ordinary duties on colonial articles so imported for home consumption, and on re-exportation shall, after the draw-back, remain subject to a duty equivalent, to not less than 2 per cent. ad valorem; and provided that the said goods and the vessel conveying the same,
  (15) At the end of the first Paragraph introduce, a definition of the Blockade: 'In order to determine what characterizes a blockade, that denomination is only given to a port where there is, by the disposition of the power which blockades it with ships stationary, or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.'—(16) Omit 'during the present hostilities.'—(17) After the word 'Europe,' insert 'or elsewhere.'—(18) After the word 'Europe,' insert 'or elsewhere.'—(19) After the word 'paid,' insert 'or secured to be paid.'—
  578
  be bonâ fide the property of citizens and inhabitants of the United States (20).—Provided always, that this Article, or any thing therein contained, shall not operate to the prejudice of any right belonging to either party; but that, after the expiration of the time limited for the Article, the rights on both sides shall revive and be in full force.
  Art. 12. And whereas it is expedient to make special provisions respecting the Maritime Jurisdiction of the high contracting parties on the coasts of their respective possessions in North America, on account of peculiar circumstances belonging to those coasts, it is agreed that in all cases where one of the said high contracting parties shall be engaged in war, and the other shall be at peace, the belligerent power shall not stop, [except for the Purpose hereafter mentioned.(21),] the vessels of the neutral power, or the unarmed vessels of other nations within 5 miles from the shore belonging to the said neutral power on the American seas (22).—Provided that the said stipulation shall not take effect in favour of the ships of any nation or nations which shall not have agreed to respect the limit aforesaid as the line of Martime Jurisdiction of the said neutral state: And it is further stipulated, that if either of the high contracting parties shall be at war with any nation or nations which shall have agreed to respect the said special limit or line of Maritime Jurisdiction herein agreed upon, such contracting party shall have the right to stop or search any vessel beyond the limit of a cannon shot or 3 marine miles from the said coasts of the neutral power, for the purpose of ascertaining the nation to which such vessel shall belong. And with respect to the ships and property of the nation or nations not having agreed to respect the aforesaid line of jurisdiction, the belligerent power shall exercise the same rights as if this Article did not exist;
  (20) At the end of the Paragraph introduce the following 'It is understood, that no inference is to be drawn from this Article to affect any question, now or hereafter to be judicially depending, touching the legality or illegality of a direct trade from Europe, or elsewhere, by citizens of the United States, with enemies colonies beyond the Cape of Good Hope.'—(21) Omit the words 'except for the purpose hereafter mentioned.'—(22) Omit the last Paragraph.—

  579
  and the several provisions stipulated by this Article shall have full force and effect only during the continuance of the present Treaty.
  Art. 13. With respect to the Searching of Merchant Ships, the commanders of ships of war and privateers shall conduct themselves [as favourably as the course of the war then existing may possibly permit towards the most friendly power that may remain neuter (23,)] observing as much as possible the acknowledged principles and rules of the law of nations. And for the better security of the respective subjects and citizens of the contracting parties, and to prevent their suffering injuries by the men of war or privateers of either party, all commanders of ships of war and privateers, and all others the said subjects and citizens, shall forbear doing any damage to those of the other party, or committing any outrage against them; and if they act to the contrary, they shall be punished, and shall also be hound in their persons and estates to make satisfaction and reparation for all damages, and the interest thereof, of whatever nature the said damages may be.—For this cause, all commanders of
  (23) Propose to introduce, as the first Paragraph of the Article, the following, If the ships of either of the parties shall be met with, sailing either along the coasts or on the high seas, by any private armed vessel of the other party, such armed vessel shall, for avoiding all disorder in visiting and examining the same, remain out of cannon shot, unless the state of the sea or place of meeting render a nearer approach necessary; and shall in no case compel or require such vessel to send her boat or her papers or any person from on board to the belligerent vessel, but the belligerent vessel may send her own boat and may enter her to the number of 2 or 3 men only, who may, in an orderly manner, make the necessary enquiries concerning the vessel and her cargo: And it is agreed, that effectual provision shall be made for punishing violations of any part of this stipulation.'—Omit the words 'as favourably as the course of the war then existing may possibly permit towards the most friendly power that may remain neuter,' and insert according to the acknowledged principles and rules of the laws of nations, and as favourably, moreover, as the course of the war then existing may possibly permit towards the most friendly power that may remain neuter.'—s
  580
  privateers, before they receive their commissions, shall hereafter be compelled to give, before a competent judge, sufficient security, by at least two respectable sureties, who have no interest in the said privateer, each of whom, together with the said commander, shall be jointly and severally bound in the sum of 2000 l. sterling; or, if such ship be provided with above 150 seamen, or soldiers, in the sum of 4000 l. sterling, to satisfy all damages and injuries, which the said privateers, or officers, or men, or any of them, may do or commit during their cruize, contrary to the tenour of this Treaty, or to the Laws and Instructions for regulating their conduct; and further, that in all cases of aggressions, the said commissions shall be revoked and annulled.—It is also agreed, that whenever a Judge of a court of Admiralty of either of the parties shall pronounce sentence against any vessel or goods or property belonging to the subjects or citizens of the other party, a formal and duly authenticated copy of all the proceedings in the cause, and of the said sentence, shall, if required, be delivered to the commander of the said vessel, without the smallest delay, he paying all legal fees and demands for the same.
  Art. 14. It is further agreed, that both the said contracting parties shall not only refuse to receive any pirates into any of their ports, havens, or towns, or permit any of their inhabitants to receive, protect, harbour, conceal or assist them in any manner, but will bring to condign punishment all such inhabitants as shall be guilty of such acts or offences.—And all their ships, with the goods or merchandizes taken by them, and brought into the ports of either of the said parties, shall be seized as far as they can be discovered, and shall be restored to the owners, or the factors or agents duly deputed, and authorized in writing by them, (proper evidence being shewn in the court of admiralty, for proving the property) even in case such effects should have passed into other hands by sale, if it be proved that the buyers knew, or had good reason to believe, or suspect that they had been piratically taken.
  Art. 15. It is likewise agreed, that the subjects and citizens of the two nations, shall not do any acts of hostility or violence against each other, nor accept commissions or instructions so to act from any foreign prince or state, enemies to the other party, nor shall the enemies of one

  581
  of the parties be permitted to invite or endeavour to enlist in the military service any of the subjects or citizens of the other party; and the laws against all such offences and aggressions shall be punctually executed: and if any subject or citizen of the said parties respectively shall accept any foreign commission, or letters of marque, for arming any vessel to act as a privateer against the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the said party to treat and punish the said subject or citizen, having such commission or letter of marque, as a pirate.
  Art. 16. It is expressly stipulated that neither of the said contracting parties will order or authorize any acts of reprizal against the other on complaints of injuries and damages, until the said party shall first have presented to the other a statement thereof, verified by competent proof and evidence, and demanded justice and satisfaction, and the same shall either have been refused or unreasonably delayed.
  Art. 17. [The ships of war of each of the contracting parties shall at all times be hospitably received in the ports of the other, their officers and crews paying due respect to the laws and government of the country (24).] The officers shall be treated with that respect which is due to the commissions which they bear; and if any insult should be offered to them by any of the inhabitants, all offenders in this respect shall be punished as disturbers of the peace and amity between the two countries. And both contracting parties agree, that in case any vessel of the one should, by stress of weather, danger from enemies, or other misfortunes, be reduced to the necessity of seeking shelter in any of the ports of the other, into which such vessel could not in ordinary cases claim to be admitted, she shall, on manifesting that necessity to the satisfaction of the government of the place, be hospitably received, and permitted to refit, and to purchase at the market price such necessaries as she may stand in need of, conformably to such Orders and Regulations as the government of the place, having respect to the circumstances of each case, shall prescribe.—She shall not be allowed to break bulk or unload her cargo, unless the same shall
  (24) Substitute the following: 'The ships of war arid privateers of the two nations, as well as their prizes, shall be treated in their respective ports as those of the nation most favoured.'—
  582
  be bonâ fide necessary to her being refitted; nor shall she be obliged to pay any duties whatever, except on such articles as she may be permitted to sell for the purpose aforesaid.
  Art. 18. It shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers (not being subjects or citizens of either of the said parties) who have commissions from any power or state in enmity with either nation, to arm their ships in the ports of either of the said parties, nor to sell what they have taken, nor in any other manner to exchange the same; nor shall they be allowed to purchase more provisions than shall be necessary for their going to the nearest port of that prince or state from whom they obtained their commissions.
  Art. 19. It shall be lawful for the ships of war and privateers, belonging to the said parties respectively, to carry whithersoever they please the ships and goods taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any fees to the officers of the admiralty, or to any judges whatever; nor shall the said prizes, when they arrive at and enter the ports of the said parties, be detained or seized; nor shall the searchers, or other officers of those places, visit such prizes (except for the purpose of preventing the carrying of any part of the cargo thereof on shore, in any manner contrary to the established laws of revenue, navigation, or commerce); nor shall such officers take cognizance of the validity of such prizes; but they shall be at liberty to hoist sail, and depart as speedily as may be, and carry their said prizes to the place mentioned in their commissions or patents, which the commanders of the said ships of war or privateers shall be obliged to show.—No shelter or refuge shall be given in their ports to such as have made a prize upon the subjects or citizens of either of the said parties, but if forced by stress of weather or the dangers of the sea to enter them, particular care shall be taken to hasten their departure, and to cause them to retire as soon as possible. Nothing in this Treaty contained shall however be construed to operate contrary to the former and existing public treaties with other sovereigns or states: but the two parties agree, that while they continue in amity, neither of them will in future make any treaty that shall be inconsistent with this or the preceding articles.—Neither of the said parties shall permit the ships or goods belonging to the subjects or citizens of the other to be taken

  583
  within cannon-shot of the coast, nor within the jurisdiction described in Art. 12. so long as the provisions in the said Article shall be in force, by ships or war or others having commissions from any prince, republic, or state whatever. But in case it should so happen,-the party whose territorial rights shall thus have been violated shall use his utmost endeavours to obtain from the offending party full and ample satisfaction for the vessel or vessels so taken, whether the same be vessels of war or merchant vessels (25).
  Art. 20. If at any time a rupture should take place (which God forbid) between his majesty and the United States, the merchants and others of each of the two nations residing in the dominions of the other, shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade, so long as they do it peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws; and in case their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should think proper to order them to remove, the term of 12 months from the publication of the order shall be allowed them for the purpose to remove them with their families, effects, and property; but this favour shall not be extended to those who shall act contrary to the established laws: and for greater certainty, it is declared, that such rupture shall not be deemed to exist while negotiations for accommodating differences shall be depending, nor until the respective ambassadors or ministers, if such there shall be, shall be recalled or sent home on account of such differences, and not on account of personal misconduct, according to the nature and degree of which both parties retain their rights, either to request the recall or immediately to send home the ambassador or minister of the other, and that without prejudice to their mutual friendship and good-understanding.
  Art. 21. It is further agreed, that his majesty and the United States, on mutual Regulations by them respectively, or by their respective ministers or officers authorised to make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the countries of the other; provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of criminality,
  (25) The two last Paragraphs to be struck out.—
  584
  as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the requisition, and receive the fugitive.
  Art. 22. In the event of a shipwreck happening in a place belonging to one or other of the high contracting parties, not only every assistance shall be given to the unfortunate persons, and no violence done to them, but also the effects which they shall have thrown out of the Ship into the sea shall not be concealed or detained nor damaged under any pretext whatever; on the contrary the above mentioned effects and merchandize shall be preserved and restored to them, upon a suitable recompence being given to those who shall have assisted in saving their persons, vessels, and effects.
  Art. 23. And it being the intention of the high contracting parties that the people of their respective dominions shall continue to be on the footing of the most favoured nation, it is agreed that, in case either party shall hereafter grant any additional advantages, in navigation or trade, to any other nation, the subjects or citizens of the other party shall fully participate herein (26).
  Art. 24. The high contracting parties engage to communicate to each other, without delay, all such laws as have been or shall be hereafter enacted by their respective legislatures, as also all measures which shall have been taken for the Abolition or Limitation of the African Slave Trade; and they further agree to use their best endeavours to procure the cooperation of other powers for the final and complete Abolition of a Trade so repugnant to the principles of justice and humanity.
  Art. 25. And it is further agreed, that nothing herein contained, shall contravene or affect the due execution of any treaty
  (26) To stand thus: 'It is agreed, that in case either party shall hereafter grant any additional advantages in navigation or trade to any other nation, the subjects or citizens of the other party shall fully participate therein freely, where it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation when the grant is conditional.'—

  585
  or treaties now actually subsisting between either of the high contracting parties and any other power or powers.
  Art. 26. This Treaty, when the same shall have been ratified by his majesty, and by the president of the United States, with the advice of their, senate, and their respective ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding and obligatory on his majesty and on the said states for ten years (27), from the date of the exchange of the said ratification, and shall be reciprocally executed and observed with punctuality, and the most sincere regard to good faith.
  (27) Period to be five years.—
  Articles proposed —No person whatever shall, upon the high seas, and without the jurisdiction of either party, be demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to citizens or subjects of one of the other parties, by the public or private armed ships belonging to or in the service of the other, unless such person be at the time in the military service of an enemy of such other party.—Art. 2. Complaints having been made by divers merchants and other citizens of the United States, that during the war in which his majesty is engaged, they have sustained loss and damage by reason of the irregular and illegal captures and condemnations of their vessels and other property, under colour or authority of commissions from his majesty, contrary to the tenour of a communication from lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King, of the 11th of April 1801, of which a copy is annexed to this treaty, or contrary to the tenour of a Letter from Mr. Merry to Mr. Maddison, of the 12th of April 1801, of which a copy is also hereto annexed, or otherwise contrary to the known and established rules of the law of nations; and the said merchants and others having farther complained, that full and complete redress for the said losses and damages has not been, and cannot be, for various causes, had and obtained in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, his majesty agrees that he will, without delay, cause the most effectual measures to be taken in concert with the United States, for an impartial examination of the said complaints, and that he will cause full and complete reparation to be made thereupon to the parties entitled, as justice and equity, and the nature of the respective cases, shall appear to require.
  (Second Inclosure referred to in No. 1.)—To the right hon. lord Holland and lord Auckland: dated London, Aug. 20th, 1806.
  The undersigned, commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States of America, think it necessary to give to lords Holland and Auckland, the commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary of his majesty, a brief explanation in writing of the claims which they have already had the honour to mention to their lordships in a recent conference, of sundry American citizens, for suitable Compensation for loss and damages sustained in the course of the present war, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and other property, and at the same time to call the attention of their lordships to the situation of certain Prize Causes arising out of some of these captures now depending in the tribunals of this country.—The undersigned are happy in having it in their power to state, that, according to the information they have been able to obtain, such of these Claims as relate to captures, which, from causes peculiar to themselves, have excited in America a more than ordinary degree of sensibility, are not so considerable in number as at first was supposed.—The complaints of this description, to which the undersigned would particularly invite the attention of their lordships, have been produced by seizures as prize, made in direct violation of rules of maritime practice previously declared by his majesty's government to the government of the United States, and in no degree revoked or affected by any arrangement between them, or even by any notification, they were about to be abandoned.—Of these seizures, the most important, and in every view the most interesting, were made in the year 1805, and in tile early part of the year 1806, of the ships and merchandize of American citizens, upon the pretension, that the voyages on which they were engaged were direct or continuous between the colonies of his majesty's enemies and some port in Europe.—Although it is certain that the government of the United States had never admitted that illegality can be imputed to such a trade, even when confessedly continuous or direct, and had concluded that the question had been otherwise formally settled in its favour, the undersigned believe it to be unnecessary to bring that point into view, with any reference to the cases now un-

  587
  der consideration. It is sufficient to state, that at the date of these seizures the merchants of the United States did explicitly understand, and justified in a confident belief, founded not only upon antecedent practice, but upon a formal communication, in the year 1807, to the American minister in London from his majesty's principal secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, that the circumstances by which these voyages were accompanied, had been and were distinctly admitted by the British government and by British courts of prize, to break their continuity, and render them unquestionably lawful.—The following detail will shew more precisely the nature and effect of the communication to which the undersigned allude.—The public and private armed ships of this country having seized American vessels bound from the United States to the Spanish West Indies, on the pretext that their cargoes consisted of articles of the growth of Spain when at war with Great Britain, and the vice admiralty court of Nassau having condemned the cargo of one of these vessels upon that pretext, Mr. King in a note to lord Hawkesbury of the 13th March 1801, remonstrated against these acts as palpable abuses.—The subject of this remonstrance was immediately referred to the king's advocate, whose report of the 16th March 1801, after declaring that the sentence of the vice admiralty court Was erroneous, concludes with the following exposition of the law as understood in G. Britain, relative to the commerce of neutrals with belligerents and their colonies: "It is now distinctly understood, and has been repeatedly so decided by the high court of appeal, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and may be re-exported from thence even to the mother country of such colony; and in like manner the produce and manufactures of the mother country may in this circuitous mode legally find their way to the colonies. The direct trade, however, between the mother country and its colonies have not, I apprehend, been recognized as legal, either by his majesty's government or by his tribunals.—What is a direct trade or what amounts to an intermediate importation into the neutral country may sometimes be a question of some difficulty. A general definition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case Perhaps
  588
  the mere touching in the neutral country to take fresh clearances may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and is in effect the direct trade; but the high court of admiralty has expressly decided, (and I see no reason to expect that the court of appeal will vary the rule), that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalises the trade, although the goods be-reshipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and to be forwarded for sale to the mother country or the colony." An Extract from this Report, containing the foregoing passage, was transmitted by the duke of Portland, in a letter of the 30th of March 1801, to the lords commissioners of the admiralty. His grace's letter concludes thus:" In order, therefore, to put a stop to the inconveniencies arising from these erroneous sentences of the vice admiralty courts, I have the honour to signify to your lordships the king's pleasure, that a communication of the doctrine laid down in the said report shall be immediately made by your lordships to the several judges presiding in them, setting forth what is held to be the law upon the subject by the superior tribunals, for their guidance and direction."—On the 11th of April 1801, lord Hawkesbury communicated to Mr. King, for the information of the government of the United States, a copy of the above letter of the duke of Portland, which is stated by his lordship to have been written by his majesty's command, in consequence of Mr. King's representation of the preceding month, together with a copy of the extract from the report of the king's advocate, referred to in his grace's letter, and already above quoted. Upon the receipt of this communication Mr. King transmitted it to his government in a letter (of which a copy is annexed) containing the following observations: "I take the liberty of suggesting the expediency of publishing these copies in our newspapers, as the most expeditious means of communicating the same to the cruizing ships and privateers in the American seas. Having intimated this suggestion to lord Hawkesbury before he prepared and sent me his answer, there can be no exceptions here against such a publication." The publication was directed and took place accordingly.—The undersigned are persuaded that lord Holland and lord Auckland will at once perceive that the Report of the king's advocates

  589
  thus unequivocally adopted by his majesty's government, and communicated as an act to be respected and confided in, through the American minister, to the government of the United States, and finally to their citizens, and to Europe through the medium of a publication expected and authorized, cannot in any fair construction be viewed as any thing short of a formal declaration on the part of Great Britain; that the landing of the cargo and the payment of the duties in the neutral country would be considered as legalizing the circuitous trade, even between a belligerent and its own colonies.—The practice during the late and the two first years of the present war was in perfect conformity with this document, and by that conformity en-creased its authority, and furnished an additional justification, if any had been required, for a dependance upon the doctrine which it announced.—In the summer of 1805, however, when a large amount of American property was afloat, undeniably entitled to the protection of the above rule, and committed to the high seas, under an implicit reliance upon a strict adherence to it; the rule was suddenly abandoned, and British cruizers fell upon this trade, thus sanctioned by the express admission, as well as by the acquiescence of their government; and these captures are understood to have received the highest judicial sanction.—The undersigned have no desire to dwell upon this subject. They are convinced that the liberal and equitable sentiments which distinguish his majesty's government render unnecessary the farther explanation of which it is susceptible. Referring to two notes from the undersigned, Mr. Monroe, to lord Mulgrave, of the 23d of Sept. 1805, and to Mr. Fox, of the 25th of Feb. 1806, the undersigned have only to declare their sincere conviction that his majesty's government will not fail to see in the facts which they have had the honour to state, an irresistible call upon it to repair the injurious effects of these seizures. As to the few cases of this class now depending before the lords commissioners of appeal, or in other prize courts of his majesty, the undersigned feel assured that measures will be taken to cause them to be favourably disposed of, and that suitable reparation will moreover be secured to the parties injured, for the, loss and damage they have sustained. The undersigned have the honour to transmit herewith a list of all the cases of this class, in which are distinguished such as
  590
  are still judicially depending.—The next class of these cases (of which lists and estimates will hereafter be furnished) comprehends captures during the existing war, contrary to the tenor, of a letter of the 5th of Jan. 1804, from sir Evan Nepean to Mr. Hammond, on the subject of the Blockade of Martinique and Guadaloupe, of which a copy was enclosed in a letter of the 12th of April 1804, from Mr. Merry to Mr. Maddison, of both of which letters copies are herewith transmitted.—The citizens of the United States complain that they have suffered severely by captures, in violation of the rules laid down with so much fairness and precision in this communication, and that, where condemnations have not followed, compensation equivalent to the actual loss have not been and cannot be procured in the ordinary course by any exertions on their part. The pretext for some of these captures has been the breach of an alleged blockade of Martinique or Guadaloupe; for others, the breach of an imaginary blockade of Curracoa; and for others, the breach of an equally imaginary blockade of other ports and places. In all of these cases either the actual investment of the particular port was wanting, or the vessel seized for an imputed criminal destination to it, had not been warned as required. The just extent of these claims the undersigned are not able to state, but they presume it cannot be considerable.—The only remaining claims which are reducible to any precise class, are those which relate to captures within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Of these, as well as of some others of a miscellaneous nature, which the undersigned have not at present the means of prescribing distinctly to lord Holland and lord Auckland, lists shall hereafter be prepared and laid before their lordships accompanied by suitable explanations. The undersigned, &c. JAMES MONOROE, WILLIAM PINCKNEY.
  (Letter referred to in second Inclosure of No. 1.)—To the Secretary of State of the United States. Dated Washington, April 12th, 1804.
  Sir; Mr. Thorntonnot having failed to transmit to his majesty's government an account of the Representation which you were pleased to address to him under date of 27 Oct. last year, respecting the blockade of the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe, it is with great satisfaction, sir, that I have just received his majesty's commands signified to me by his principal

  591
  secretary of state for foreign affairs, under date of the 6th Jan. last, to communicate to you the instructions which have in consequence of your representation been sent to commodore Hood and to the judges of the vice admiralty courts in the West Indies.—I have accordingly the honour to transmit to you, sir, the inclosed copy of a letter from sir Evan Nepean, secretary to the board of admiralty, to Mr. Hammond, his majesty's under secretary of state for foreign affairs, specifying the nature of the instructions which have been given.—His majesty's government doubt not that the promptitude which has been manifested in redressing the grievance complained of by the government of the United States, will be considered by the latter as an additional evidence of his majesty's constant and sincere desire to remove any ground of misunderstanding that could have a tendency to interrupt the harmony which so happily subsists between his government and that of the United States. I have &c. ANT. MERRY
  (Letter referred to in second Inclosure of No. 1. and in the preceding Letter.) To George Hammond esq. Dated Admiralty Office, 5th Jan. 1804.
  Sir; Having communicated to the lords of the admiralty lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 23d ultimo, inclosing the copy of a dispatch which his lordship had received from Mr. Thornton his majesty's chargé d'affaires in America, on the subject of the blockade of the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe, together with the report of the advocate general thereupon; I have their lordships commands to acquaint you, for his lordship's information, that they have sent orders to commodore Hood not to consider any blockade of those islands as existing, unless in respect of particular ports which may be actually invested, and then not to capture vessels bound to such ports unless they shall previously have been warned not to enter them, and that they have also sent the necessary directions on the subject to the judges of the vice admiralty courts in the West Indies and America. I am &c.
  EVAN NEPEAN.
  (Third Inclosurse referred to in No. 1.) To James Monroe esq. and Wm. Pinckney esq. Dated Holland house, Nov. 8th, 1806.
  His majesty's commissioners and plenipotentiaries have the honour to represent to the commissioners and plenipotentiaries of the United States.—That the project of
  592
  an article on the subject of impressing seamen, together with the reasonings by which the commissioners of the United States have urged the expediency of an engagement on that subject, has been considered with the same friendly and conciliatory disposition, which has marked every step of the negotiation:—That his majesty's government has not felt itself prepared to disclaim or derogate from a right which has been uniformly and generally maintained, and in the exercise of which the security of the British navy may be essentially involved; more especially in a conjuncture when his majesty is engaged in wars which enforce the necessity of the most vigilant attention to the preservation and supply of the naval force of his kingdom:—That his majesty's government, actuated by an earnest desire to remove every cause of dissatisfaction, has directed his majesty's commissioners to give to Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney the most positive assurances that instructions have been given and shall be repeated and enforced for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of British seamen; and that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve citizens of the United States from any molestation or injury; and that immediate and prompt redress shall be afforded upon any representation of injury sustained by them:—That the commissioners of the United States well know that no recent cases of complaint have occurred, and that no probable inconvenience can result from the postponement of an article subjected to so many difficulties. Still that his majesty's commissioners are instructed to entertain the discussion of any plan that can be devised to secure the interests of both states without any injury to rights to which they are respectively attached:—That in the Mean time the desire of promoting a right conclusion of the proposed treaty, and of drawing closer the ties of connection between the two countries, induces his majesty's commissioners to express their readiness to proceed to the completion of the other articles, in the confident hope, that the result cannot fail to cultivate and confirm the good understanding happily subsisting between the high contracting parties; and still further to augment the mutual prosperity of his majesty's subjects, and of the citizens of the United States. VASSALL HOLLAND. AUCKLAND.
  (Fourth Inclosure referred to in No. 1.)—To L. Visc. Howick. March 14, 1807.
  My lord; In conformity with the intimation which your lordship was so good as to make to us at a late interview, relative to certain claims and prize causes, which had been brought into discussion in the course of the late negotiation, between his majesty's commissioners and those of the United States; we have the honour to transmit to your lordship, the copy of a note to lord Holland and lord Auckland, in which those claims and prize causes are fully explained. It is proper to add, that at the time of the signature of the Treaty, it was distinctly understood between the commissioners on both sides, that this subject was not to be affected by it, but was to remain completely open for future adjustment.—We have it upon the statement contained in that note, and the documents to which it refers, in perfect confidence that it will be viewed by your lordship with the interest which belongs to it, and that every thing which is suitable to the high and honourable character of his majesty's government, and the just claims of the United States will be done, with relation to it, as promptly as circumstances will permit. We have &c.
  JAMES MONROE. WM. PINKNEY.
  No. 2.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Canning to Lords Holland and Auckland. Dated Foreign Office, July 25th, 1807.
  My lords; I have the honour to inclose to your lordships, the copies of a note which I have received from Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, and of the several documents that accompanied it; I submit these papers to the consideration of your lordships, for the purpose of calling your attention to that passage of the note which refers to a suggestion on the part of his majesty's commissioners, on the impressment of seamen from on board of American ships. It is extremely desirable that his majesty's government should have the fullest information on this important point; and I have to request, that your lordships will be pleased to state to me, whether the representation contained in this part of the note of the American commissioners be accurate; and whether your lordships signified any such acquiescence as is there described in the implied "informal understanding, respecting the forbearance to be observed by the British cruizers, in regard to the practice of impressment of seamen on board of American vessels."
  I have, &c. GEORGE CANNING.
  No. III.—Letter from lords Holland
  594
  and Auckland to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated July 28th, 1807.
  Sir; We have received the honour of your Letter with its several lnclosures; and are desirous to give the fullest information in our power respecting any part of our late negotiation with the commissioners of the United States. We have accordingly applied our attention to that passage of the Note delivered to you by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, which states that "soon after the suspension of the negotiations, it was suggested by his majesty's commissioners) that if the topic relative to Impressment should be expressly reserved for future conventional arrangement, and a pledge given to the United States for resuming the consideration of it at a convenient season, with that view; and that, if, in the mean time, such an informal understanding should be substituted, as in its practical effect would remove the vexation complained of, it might perhaps be yet possible to conduct the negotiation to a result which would not be unacceptable to the respective governments. And in pursuance of this suggestion, the British commissioners presented their official note of the 8th day of Nov. last."—It appears to us, that the several parts of this statement taken with the context, have all the accuracy and honourable and right meaning which we experienced in the whole negotiation.—When the American commissioners speak of "such an informal understanding to be substituted, as would in its practical effect remove the vexation complained of," they do not mean, and certainly his majesty's commissioners never meant, that there should be a forbearance or suspension or discontinuance of the practice and exercise of the Impressment of British seamen. On the contrary, they proceed to say that "pursuant to the Suggestion of the British commissioners, the official note of the 8th of Nov. was presented." To that Note we beg leave to refer.—We considered that Note, and still consider it as pledging his majesty's government to give instructions to British cruizers, "to be very cautious in the exercise of the right of impressing British seamen, to take the strictest care to preserve the citizens of the United States from molestation or injury, and to redress any grievances which might be sustained by them."—When the negotiation proceeded after our delivery of that Note, we thought, and still think, that the treaty which we signed (omitting the

  595
  point of Impressment, and several other points afterwards included in the proposed additional articles) was in itself compleat and unconditional, and subject to no reservation on either part, except that which was expressed in our second Note of the 30th of Dec. on the signature of the treaty.—If circumstances had not taken place, which made it our duty to suspend the signing of the additional articles, and which eventually discontinued the negotiation in our hands, we should have considered ourselves as bound to advert bonâ fide to the further pledge contained in our official note of the 8th Nov. We mean that paragraph which states, "that no recent cases of complaint have occurred (respecting the exercise of the right of Impressment), and that no probable inconvenience can result from the postponement of an article, subject to so many difficulties; still, that his majesty's commissioners are instructed to entertain the discussion of any plan that can be devised to secure the interests of both states, without any injury to rights to which they are respectively attached." The obvious sense of this paragraph, and the forms and substance of the compleated treaty, and the proposed additional articles appear to us to leave no doubt relative to the mutual understanding and views of those who were employed in a negotiation of such importance to their respective countries.
  We have &c. VASSAL HOLLAND AUCKLAND.
  No. IV.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Canning to Lords Holland and Auckland, dated August 6th, 1807.
  My lords; In acknowledging the receipt of the letter which your lordships have done me the honour to address to me, in answer to mine of the 25th ult. I am sorry to have occasion to trouble your lordships with any further enquiry; but I am sure that your lordships will feel that the point most immediately in question, respecting the Impressment of British seamen from American ships, is one of such essential importance at the present moment, as to make it necessary for me to ascertain, with as much accuracy as possible, what has really passed between your lordships and the American commissioners upon this subject.—I understood the American commissioners to say, that in addition to whatever passed in writing between you, they received from your lordships an informal assurance of something that "should in its practical effect remove the grievance
  596
  complained of." By "the grievance complained of," I understood the commissioners to mean the practice of impressment itself, not any abuses of that practice.—Your lordships deny, that any forbearance was promised, "In the sense of any suspension or discontinuance of the practice," and your lordships refer to your Note of the 8th of Nov. as containing the correct statement of what you communicated to the American commissioners.—The Note of the 8th of Nov. certainly promises forbearance in the practice, but not a discontinuance of the practice, of Impressment.—I am therefore under the necessity of requesting your lordships to have the goodness to state to me, whether the Note of the 8th of Nov. does, according to your lordships recollection and belief, contain the whole of what was promised or held out by your lordships to the American commissioners upon this point?—Whether whatever else passed (if any thing else did pass) in conversation, was in strict conformity to that Note; implying no further concession or forbearance on the part of Great Britain, and authorizing no further expectation on the part of the United States?—If this be so, it does appear to me that the American commissioners have misconceived the effect of your lordships communication to them; and must have represented it to their government as implying a much larger concession than was in fact in your lordships contemplation. I have, &c.
  GEORGE CANNING.
  No. V.—Letter from Lords Holland and Auckland to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Aug. 10th, 1807.
  Sir; In answer to your letter of the 6th instant, we have the honour to repeat our former assurances that it is our desire as it is our duty, to give you every possible information respecting the negotiation with the American Commissioners, which his majesty was lately pleased to entrust to us.—As the points in which our answer to your letter of the 25th ult. has not appeared to you sufficiently clear and satisfactory, we must again refer you to our official Note of the 8th of Nov. last, as Containing a full and authentic statement of what was settled between us and the American commissioners, with regard to the Impressment of British seamen from on board of American ships. That Note was delivered after many fruitless conferences, held for the purpose of devising some expedient that might reconcile the

  597
  interests and pretensions of both nations on this important point. But finding after much careful consideration of the different plans proposed to us, that the difficulties which stood in the way of any final and permanent adjustment were at that time insurmountable, we were compelled to rest satisfied with the temporary and imperfect arrangement, which our Note of the 8th of Nov. promised to afford. We certainly did not then understand, nor do we now understand, that by that Note we pledged our government to abstain in future from the practice of impressing British seamen front American merchant vessels. We certainly, however, did mean to pledge the British government to make its cruizers observe the utmost caution, moderation, and forbearance in the exercise of that practice; but we never either expressed or implied, that they were to desist from taking British seamen from American merchant ships. We farther engaged that our government would be at all times ready to take into its serious consideration any proposal made to it by the American government, for the recovery of deserters from the British navy, who take refuge in the American territory or on board of American ships, without having recourse to the means which are at present resorted to for that purpose.—Whatever passed in conversation was, we conceive, in strict conformity to that Note, and implied no farther concession nor forbearance on the part of G. Britain than extreme caution and moderation in the exercise of the right, which alone, without any discontinuance, much less renunciation of the practice, we expressed our confident hope would be sufficient to prevent such inconveniences and outrages as the American commissioners represented and contended had frequently arisen from it. We have, &c.
  VASSALL HOLLAND. AUCKLAND.
  No. VI.—Letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Oct. 18th, 1807.
  Sir; In our interview of yesterday, you requested that we would explain the ground of the opinion which is expressed in our letter of July 24—that the occasion which induced the British commissioners to present to us the Note of the 31st Dec. preceding had ceased to exist. We hasten to comply with that request, as we shall do, to give an explanation of any other passage in that letter which you may desire. We were of opinion at the time
  598
  when the British commissioners presented to us that paper, that the decree of the government of France, to which it related, ought not to be considered applicable to the United States, because such a construction was plainly repugnant to the treaty subsisting between the United States and France; and likewise, because the decree might be understood to relate only to France and the dominions subject to her arms. We alluded however, in our letter of July the 24th, to circumstances which had occurred since the date of the decree, as fixing unequivocally an interpretation of it, which we at first supposed to be reasonable.—Great anxiety having been excited by a different construction, which many believe the decree to be susceptible of, the minister of the United States at Paris requested of the minister of marine, who was charged with its execution, an explanation of the sense, in which it was understood by his government, who assured him, that it was not intended that it should in any degree interfere with the provisions of the treaty of 1800 between the United States and France.—We relied also upon the fact, not only that no countenance had been given by any practice or judicial decision in France to a different construction, but that the practice was in precise conformity with the view above suggested; and that in a cause in which the question had been brought into discussion, the court had sanctioned the conclusion that the treaty between the two nations was to be exactly fulfilled, and that the decree was to be so construed as not to infringe it.—We think it proper to confine ourselves to the explanation which you have desired, of the passage alluded to in our former letter, and not to enter in this communication in any other respect on the subject of the paper with which it is connected. We have, &c.
  JAMES MONROE. WILLIAM PINCKNEY.
  No. VII.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Canning to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, dated Oct. 22d, 1807.
  Gentlemen; The considerations which have hitherto suspended our communication on the subject of the treaty returned from America, having ceased by the termination of the discussion between Mr. Monroe and myself, respecting the encounter between the Leopard and the Chesapeake, I have now the honour to transmit to you the answer which I have been commanded by his majesty to return to your note of the 24th July. I have, &c.
  GEORGE CANNING.
  No. VIII.—Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, dated Oct. 22d, 1807.
  The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, in returning an answer to the official note with which Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney have accompanied their communication of the copy of the treaty which has been sent back unratified from America, is commanded, in the first place, to inform the American commissioners, that his majesty cannot profess himself to be satisfied that the American government has taken any such effectual steps, with respect to the decree of France, by which the whole of his majesty's dominions are declared to be in a state of blockade, as to do away the ground of that reservation which was contained in the note delivered by his maj.'s commissioners at the time of the signature of the treaty; but that, reserving to himself the right of taking, in consequence of that decree, and of the omission of any effectual interposition, on the part of neutral nations, to obtain its revocation, such measures of retaliation as his majesty might judge expedient, it was nevertheless the desire and determination of his majesty, if that treaty had been sanctioned by the ratification of the president of the United States, to have ratified it, on his majesty's part, and to have given the fullest effect to all its stipulations.—Some of the considerations upon which the refusal the president of the United States to ratify the treaty is founded are such as can be matter of discussion only between the American government and its commissioners; since it is not for his majesty to inquire, whether in the conduct of this negotiation the commissioners of the U. States have failed to conform themselves in any respect to the instructions of their government.—In order to determine the course which his majesty has to pursue in the present stage of the transaction, it is sufficient that the treaty was considered, by those who signed it, as a complete and perfect instrument.—No engagements were entered into, on the part of his majesty, as connected with the treaty, except such as appear upon the face of it. Whatever encouragement may have been given by his majesty's commissioners to the hope expressed by the commissioners of the United States, that discussions might thereafter be entertained with respect to impressment of British seamen for merchant vessels, must be understood to have had
  600
  in view the renewal of such discussions, not as forming any part of the treaty then signed, (as the American commissioners appear to have been instructed to assume) but separately, and at some subsequent period more favourable to their successful termination.—But the alterations proposed by the president of the United States in the body of the treaty thus formerly concluded, appear to require more particular observation.—The undersigned is commanded distinctly to protest against a practice altogether unusual in the political transactions of States; by which the American government assumes to itself the privilege of revising and altering agreements concluded, and signed, on its behalf, by its agents duly authorized for that purpose; of retaining so much of those agreements as may be favourable to its own views, and of rejecting such stipulations, or such parts of stipulations, as are conceived to be not sufficiently beneficial to America.—If the American government has a right to exercise such a revision, an equal right cannot be denied to others. And it is obvious, that the adoption of such a practice by both parties to a treaty, would tend to render negotiation indefinite, and settlement. hopeless; or rather to supersede altogether the practice of negotiation through authorized commissioners, and to make every article of a compact between state and state the subject of repeated reference, and of endless discussion.—The alteration of particular articles in a treaty, after the whole has been carefully adjusted and arranged, must necessarily open the whole to renewed deliberation. The demands of one party are not to be considered as absolute, and the concessions of the other as unconditional. What may have been given, on the one hand, in consideration of advantage to be derived, in return, from accompanying stipulations, might have been refused, if those stipulations had been less favourable; and must necessarily be withdrawn, if they are changed.—It cannot be admitted, that any government should hold those with whom it treats to all that has been granted by them in its favour, relaxing at the same time, on its part, the reciprocal conditions for which its own faith has been engaged; or that, after having obtained by negotiation a knowledge of the utmost extent of concession to which the other contracting party is prepared to consent in the conclusion of a treaty, it should require yet further concession,

  601
  without equivalent, as the price of its ratification.—The undersigned is therefore commanded to apprize the American commissioners, that although his majesty will be all times ready to listen to any suggestions for arranging, in an amicable and advantageous manner, the respective interests of the two countries, the proposal of the president of the United States for proceeding to negotiate anew, upon the basis of a treaty already solemnly concluded and signed, is a proposal wholly inadmissible. And his majesty has therefore no option, under the present circumstances of this transaction, but to acquiesce in the refusal of the president of the- United States to ratify the treaty signed on the 31st of Dec. 1806. The undersigned, &c.
  GEORGE CANNING.

Orders in Council.
Lord Aucklandrose, for the purpose of calling the atten-
466
tion of their lordships to a subject, perhaps of as much importance as any that ever came before them. It must, he said, have occurred to every noble lord, that the issuing of these Orders in Council had set up a new and unprecedented system of warfare, which, from the immense magnitude and importance of the subject, required the most mature deliberation. In calling their lordships' attention to this subject, he wished them to bear in mind five points. He must suppose, in the first place, that ministers previous to issuing these Orders, had satisfied themselves with respect to their legality, both as relating to the law of nations and to the statute law; he must also suppose, secondly, that they were satisfied that there was a justifiable ground for issuing these Orders; thirdly, that they were also satisfied that it was expedient to apply that ground; fourthly, that the manner and time of issuing them were precisely those which Were proper: the fifth point was of a more trifling nature, but upon which their lordships, perhaps, might have a great deal of trouble; he meant the intelligibility of the Orders. Before, however, going into a discussion on these points, he thought it necessary to state the circumstances connected with the subject. On the 21st of Nov. 1806, the French Decree of Blockade was issued at Berlin. It was soon found, that however boasting the terms of this decree were, it was not intended to be executed. The American minister at Paris, general Armstrong, having made an application to the minister of marine, in the absence of the minister for foreign affairs, received for answer, on the 26th of Dec. that it was not intended to be applied to American vessels, nor to interfere With the Treaty of 1800 between France and the United States. On the 31st of Dec. the Treaty was signed between this country and the United States, previous to which, however, his noble friend (lord Holland) arid himself, received his majesty's commands to sign a declaration relative to the French decree, which was delivered to the American plenipotentiaries, and which was perfectly well known. Then came the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. 1807. It had been said, that this Order contained expressions which recognised the principle assumed in the orders of the 11th Nov.; he contended, on the contrary, that the principle of the former order was merely the rule of 1756, according to which the

467
enemy was not to be allowed in time of war the benefit of trade which had no existence in time of peace; thus, the object of that Order was to prevent neutrals from carrying on a trade between the ports of the enemy, including under the term enemy, those countries under his influence. This was the principle of that Order, and no abstract expressions in it ought to be taken for the purpose of making it appear to have any other object which it had not. On the 17th of Feb. a message was sent by the President of the United States to the Congress, stating the satisfactory explanation, with respect to American vessels, Which had been given of the French decree by the French government. In July a bill passed their lordships house for continuing the effect of the provisions of the former treaty with the United States, Without comment or observation. On the 26th of Oct. the Message from the President of the United States to Congress again stated the satisfactory explanation of the French government respecting the Decree, as affecting American vessels; but 8 days before that, the 18th, there was a Note from Messrs. Monro and Pinckney to Mr. Secretary Canning, which was before the house, and which purported that they were satisfied with respect to the explanation given of the French Decree. Notwithstanding this, however, the Order in Council of the 11th of November was issued, and upon what grounds?—it was said as a measure of retaliation: but the justification failed, inasmuch as the French Decree had not been executed. With respect however, in the first instance, to the legality, he apprehended that the Orders in Council were in violation of the law of nations, which clearly prescribed that neutral vessels should not be molested in entering the ports of an enemy, unless those ports were actually blockaded, or unless such vessels were carrying contraband of war. He apprehended, also, that they contained a breach of the statute law in the trade which was allowed to the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, and the Isle of Man. As to the grounds which he had heard alleged as the justification, or as proving the expediency of these Orders, he did not think that any one of them at all supported the measure. To talk of starving France, who was in possession of a continent producing every thing, appeared to him to be a most absurd proposition. How were we to effect it, and was it not
468
to be apprehended that by attempting to starve France we might at length teach her to make those articles which she had previously bought of us? There could not, in his opinion, be a worse argument used than, that, because France had issued a decree against neutral commerce, therefore we were to do the same by way of retaliation. The French decree against neutrals could not be executed for want of power, and it seemed as if the effect of our Orders in Council would be to carry that decree into execution by destroying the trade of neutrals. Was it expected to derive any revenue from this measure? he did not think the revenue to be derived from it would be worth 500 l. We placed neutrals between confiscation and confiscation; if they went to an enemy's port without first paying duty here, they were to be captured by our cruizers, and if they came here and paid duty, then they would he confiscated if they went to the ports of the enemy. How, then, was it to be expected that any revenue could be derived to this country from such a measure, under such circumstances? There was something absurd in the very titles used with respect to this subject; thus, in the copy sent to him of the Orders in Council, they were stated to be the Orders for regulating the navigation of the seas, and now he had heard of the Continental Blockade bill. These were high sounding titles, but how would these measures really affect our commerce? He observed, from the returns on the table, that the exports from the United Kingdom, including Ireland, had, for the last 3 years, amounted to 125 millions. What they might amount to by the same period in 1808, under the influence of these Orders, was a subject to him of anxious consideration. In what manner did these Orders affect the West Indies? He thought that the obvious policy would have been to have precluded neutrals from trading in the produce of the enemy's colonies; and this upon the just principle, that a neutral had no right to a trade during war to which he was not entitled during peace. Ministers had, however, adopted a directly contrary principle, and had expressly allowed neutrals to trade with the enemy's colonies. An opposite policy would, he conceived, have tended to relieve the West India interest from that pressure which now affected them, in consequence of the superabundance of produce beyond the demand. The pro-

469
vision in the Orders respecting the warning to be given to neutral vessels, he considered as tending to harass them, as well as that relative to certificates of origin, rendering vessels having them liable to capture, which he considered a peculiar hardship. The whole of this measure reminded him strongly of what was said several years ago respecting Frederic of Prussia, that it would not be surprising if, in the extravagance of his projects, he should issue an order directing all English vessels to come to Memel and pay duty, before they went any where else. His lordship instanced the supposed cases of six American vessels, under different circumstances, which would all, under the operation of these Orders, be liable to capture, detention, or the interruption of their voyages; and concluded by moving, "That the house should resolve itself into a committee, to consider of the Orders in Council."
Earl Bathurstrequested the indulgence of their lordships, whilst he endeavoured to explain the reasons and motives on which the Orders in Council were founded. With respect to the Order of the 7th of Jan. he contended that it did distinctly assert the right of his maj. to adopt further measures of retaliation, if France did not in the mean time recede from the violent pretensions on which the Decree of the 21st of Nov. was founded. France had not receded; but on the contrary, the head of the French government had ordered a more rigorous execution of the Decree, and therefore the Order of the 11th of Nov. and the subsequent Orders, became necessary. If the principle stated by the noble lord was to be taken as that of the Order of the 7th of Jan. then it went much farther than the Order of the 11th of Nov.; because the former asserted a permanent right of preventing, during war, all trade between one port of the enemy and another, whilst the latter measure arose out of the violence of the ruler of France, and with that would cease. The noble lord had quoted a letter from Messrs. Monro and Pinckney, for the purpose of proving that they were satisfied with the explanation of the French Decree; but that satisfaction arose out of the explanation given in Dec. and which was given without any authority, and was merely the opinion of the minister who gave it. Subsequently, upon an application made to the Grand Judge in August, it was stated, that the Decree applied equally to all neutrals, and
470
that one neutral could not be distinguished from another. From this, and from other parts of the conduct of the French government it became manifest, that the Decree was to be rigorously executed. Under these circumstances his majesty's government thought it their duty to adopt a measure of retaliation, upon what he conceived to be a clear principle of right, that when one belligerent adopted measures for the purpose of embarrassing the commerce of another belligerent, the latter had manifestly the right of retaliating by embarrassing; the commerce of the former. It must have been in this principle that the Order of the 7th of Jan. was issued, and that Order affected neutrals in a much greater degree than that stated by the noble lord, because under that Order, which prohibited a trade between one of the enemy's ports and another, a neutral vessel trading, as was generally the case, with part of her cargo to one of these ports, and part to another, or taking in part of a cargo at one port, and intending to take the remainder at another, was liable to capture in thus going from port to port, or at least to be brought into one of our ports, and subjected to great delay and expence; and in most instances of this nature, which had come before the Board of Trade, it had been found expedient. not to break in upon the general principle adopted in that Order, and therefore not to grant licences for any voyages of that description. The Order was besides evaded, and turned to the advantage of the enemy in carrying on a circuitous trade through this country, as in the instance of a cargo of wine from Bourdeaux destined through this country for Amsterdam, the insurance was effected at 30 per cent. and the trade could be carried on through this country at 5 per cent. To prevent this, one measure might be adopted, which was to prevent the re-exportation; but great injury would result to commerce (he did not allude particularly to wine) if the merchant was not allowed to re-export on finding the market overstocked. It was therefore found expedient to regulate that trade which could not be prohibited, and with this view the Orders in Council were issued, which were, in fact, a compromise between belligerent rights and commercial interests. In the exercise of belligerent rights for the purpose of embarrassing the commerce of the enemy, and making him feel the effects of his own acts of violence, every possible attention had, at the

471
same time, been paid to the commercial interests of the country. The noble lord had expressed some surprise at the trade with the enemy's colonies which was granted to the Americans; but it was, in fact, intended as a boon to the Americans, and must be to them of great value; because, when the intelligence arrived in America of the intention of the French government rigorously to execute the decree, and the embargo was in consequence resorted to, the general impression there was, that we should resort to measures by way of retaliation, which would amount to a prohibition of their trade with these colonies. It was intended that all American domestic produce should be allowed to pass through this country, without the payment of any duty, except the article of cotton. The importance of this trade to them would be evident from a statement of their exports, which according to the last return amounted to 104,000,000 dollars, 43,000,000 of which was domestic produce, and of which 8,000,000 was exported to the enemy's colonies,from whence they derived a re-export of 30,000,000. It was found that the surplus of the produce of our own colonies beyond our consumption, was not above a third of what was wanted for the supply of the continent, it was therefore thought expedient to admit of the trade with the enemy's colonies, with the intention, however, that the produce of such colonies, should, in the circuitous trade through this country, be subjected to a duty, sufficiently high, to prevent its having the advantages over our own colonial produce; and also, that the commerce of the enemy should be embarrassed. With respect to the warning, that was in conformity with the rules of blockade, and was merely applied in a more enlarged sense. As to the certificates of origin, they were documents prescribed by the French government, to shew that the property they covered was not of the manufacture or produce of G. Britain; they were therefore belligerent instruments, and shewed that the neutrals using them, acquiesced in the Decree, and confederated with the enemy, and were therefore good grounds of capture. The noble earl repeated, that the object of these Orders was to regulate that which could not be prohibited, the circuitous trade through this country.
concluded, that the Orders were a violation of the law of nations, and that we had no right to molest a neutral going to an enemy's ports, unless in the
472
cases mentioned by his noble friend. The violent Decree of the French government, undoubtedly gave us a right to retaliate; but to retaliate upon the enemy and not upon neutrals. He denied the construction put by the noble earl, upon the Order of the 7th of Jan.; and contended that principles had been now attached to it, which were never in the contemplation of those who framed it. The noble earl had spoken of an impression in the United States; but upon whom, or upon what part of the people, was the impression? What was called a retaliation of the threatened blockade of France, he contended was much more than a blockade; and he would ask the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, whether this was not so? The principle of a blockade was to prevent the entrance of vessels into the blockaded ports—it went no farther: vessels having notice not to enter the blockaded ports, might proceed to any other port whatever that was not in a state of blockade. But here we not only extended the principle of blockade to ports not actually blockaded, which was all that was on any side contended France had done, but we would not permit the vessels thus excluded, to proceed to any other ports they pleased. We forced them to come in here. They might choose to make for Sweden or any other neutral country; but even this they were not allowed to do. And, therefore, these Orders in Council were not only contrary to the law of nations, but exceeded any thing that it was pretended France had done.—His lordship then went on to observe, that we had no right to alter the law of nations of our own authority. It was a question in which other nations were concerned, and they ought therefore to be consulted. We had no more right to alter it for our own convenience, than a judge here had to alter the law of the land without the authority of parliament. Suppose the lord chief baron, for whom he expressed a high respect, should take it into his head to say that smuggling had grown to such an extent, that he would permit no goods to be carried from one place to another without being first brought to London; and that to prevent all fraud, they .must come in by Westminster-bridge and go out by London-bridge. He might be told, that the common law of the land did not permit such a regulation, and that parliament must be applied to before it could be altered. Upon the authority of the principle

473
which we were now setting up, that we had a right to alter the law of nations, so as to suit our own convenience, he might reply, that the evil was of such a nature that rendered it necessary for him to apply the remedy immediately, and that it would be very inconvenient to wait for parliamentary proceedings. But after all, what was the value of this decree, which Buonaparte, drunk with his victories, had issued? It was worth no more than the paper on which it was written. What was the use of talking of blockading G. Britain, when he had scarcely a ship on the ocean to enforce his Orders? He might as well have talked of blockading the moon [a laugh], and possessing himself of all the lunar influence. And then the Royal Society might imitate the example of ministers, and say, 'Good God, what a number of wrecks we shall have; let us think of some means of retaliating this dreadful blockade.' Their lordships laughed at this, but he declared he thought it the dullest thing on earth. Buonaparte might equally well have pretended to blockade the moon as to blockade this country, for he was as competent to do the one as the other.—His lordship then particularly directed the attention of the house to the injustice and the impolicy of inflicting a great injury on neutrals, in order to do a trifling one to our enemies. He felt a sort of enthusiasm in favour of America; not only on account of the origin of the people, but also on account of the noble stand they had made for their independence. How could they endure an act, now they were independent, which they could not have borne if they were still a colony? It was of the last importance, that both countries should continue in peace and amity with each other, and every thing ought carefully to be guarded against which disturbed their harmony. He was far from saying, that every thing should be given up to America; but he did say, that nothing but the last necessity could justify our engaging in hostilities with that country.
The Lord Chancelloragreed that the Orders in Council could not be defended, if they were a violation of the law of nations; and if their lordships could be persuaded that such was their character, there could be no occasion to urge their going into a committee, to consider of the propriety of addressing his majesty to check the operation of regulations which were contrary to the law of nations—that is, the natural justice which ought to be held sa-
474
cred between nation and nation, as well as between one individual and another. Whatever was contrary to the spirit of the law of nations, he allowed could not be justly altered, even by parliament; but, at the same time, it was to be observed, that from the nature of the thing, there must necessarily be variations in the application of the principle to different circumstances. This was all that had been done by these Orders; nor did they trench more upon the municipal law than they did upon the, law of nations. That the crown had a right of its own authority to make regulations for the internal trade of the country, to intermeddle with the finances, &c. &c. would not be contended; but certainly it had been the practice for the crown, when the nation was at war, to affect the trade of neutrals, as far as that might be called for by the conduct of our enemies.—As it had been argued, that the previous measures of the enemy were only matters of internal regulation. or a farther extension of a navigation law, which they had a right to resort to if they pleased, his lordship proceeded to state his reasons why they ought to be regarded as a direct violation of the rights of neutrals and the law of nations. For this purpose he began with the preamble of the Decree of the 21st of Nov.; the preamble, as he said, being considered by lawyers as a key to the body of the enactment. From the words of this recital, and the nature of the complaints against G. Britain, which was charged with having put whole coasts and empires in a state of blockade, without having the power actually to execute that blockade, in the established form and manner, he contended that Buonaparte must have meant not only to exclude British produce and manufactures from his ports, but also to prevent all trade whatever in British commodities. This was a flagrant violation of the, rights of neutrals; for it was as much as to say, that whoever traded with G. Britain would be considered as an enemy by France. Coupling the preamble with the enactment, this was the obvious sense of the Decree. His lordship then adverted to the Order in Council of the 7th of Jan. last year; and argued also, from the plain construction of this Order, that the Decree must have been understood by the late ministers as extending farther than mere internal regulation which France had a right to adopt. It had been said that the present ministers were more ready to argue that their predecessors

475
were in the wrong than that they themselves were in the right. This could not be imputed to him on the present occasion; for, as far as the Order of the 7th of Jan. went, it had his approbation. At least there was here a recognition of the injustice of France to neutrals, if not an approval of the principle of retaliation, by establishing a similiar system of nominal blockade. But the Order at all events extended further than the old mode of applying the law of nations. It might be said, that, according to the rule of 1756, we had a right to interrupt the coasting trade of France; but this interrupted the trade of Spain, &c. with France, and included those nations where France had such a controul as to enable her to enforce the exclusion of our ships. Any nation bad a right to exclude our ships; but the Order proceeded on the sound principle, that in fact the exclusion was owing not to the nation itself, hut. to France. To support this construction of the Order, his lordship cited the speech of the President of the United States, who, he observed, understood it in the same way; and for the justness of his construction of the French Decree, he cited the Spanish Decree. He also cited the pretensions and complaints of the Danes to the same effect. With regard to the opinion of M. Decres, in reply to gen. Armstrong, who consulted him about the application of the Decrees to America, he considered that as worth nothing. The whole answer evidently amounted to this, that Decres knew very little about the matter. This appeared from a sentence in the answer which he observed in a very excellent pamphlet on this subject, which, he knew not for what reason, was not published in the official letter. There Decres distinctly stated, that he had much less positive information on the point than the prince of Benevento, whom he advised gen. Armstrong to consult. The Court of Admiralty also had certainly adopted his construction of the French Decree. When a neutral was captured by an enemy, it was not the practice to grant salvage for releasing the vessel because she was in no danger of confiscation; but on an American vessel being seized for trading with this country, and released by one of our ships, one-eighth of the whole was granted as salvage. As to the question of the right of retaliation, his lordship contended, that when our own preservation required that we should take measures against our ene-
476
my, the neutral had no right to complain; for the injury to her was consequential. He stated a variety of instances to prove the correctness of this position, and cited cases of blockades, embargoes, &c. as illustrations of the doctrine. As to the mode of the retaliation, he did not think it necessary to say a word on that subject.— With respect to the policy of the measure, he maintained that a false view of it had been taken, particularly with regard to America. We were not to consider merely the greatness of the advantages which we derived from an intercourse with America, but also what would be our situation if America should submit to the decrees of Buonaparte. To preserve peace with America no one could be more anxious than he was. He wished well to America, first, because it was his duty as a man to wish well to every nation; and next, because the welfare of America was materially connected with the interests of G. Britain. But he could not suffer the enemy both of G. Britain and America to make use of the one to destroy the other; and his duty to his own country was clearly paramount to his regard for any other. He hoped these orders would not be productive of a war with America. Do not, my lords, he said with earnestness, bring on such an event, by arguing the case upon any such supposition. America, I trust, will still listen to the voice of truth; she will see that the whole of this is owing to France; and perhaps she may be at last sensible of the policy of joining with us in opposition to the wild and extravagant pretensions of a power whose object is to crush us both.
Lord Kingcontended, that France had not put her decrees into execution, and that we had no proof that neutrals would submit to them. As to the argument, that we had a right to hurt our enemy though a neutral might be injured consequently, he denied that we ought to do a great injury to a neutral in order to hurt, our enemy a little. Buonaparte could never have put his decrees in execution if we had not assisted him, and stopped our own goods while finding their way to the continental markets. Commerce was much more necessary to us than to France, and therefore it was folly in us to act upon these Orders, which only secured the attainment of the objects of France. He also strongly insisted upon the inconsistency of the conduct of ministers, who, while they were the loudest in extolling

477
the advantages of a commercial intercourse with South America, both in the case of Buenos Ayres and the Brazils, were so ready to put an end to our commerce with the continent, which was so much more valuable. He hoped the Orders would not be productive of a war with America, but even if they stopt short of this, they would be attended with most pernicious consequences.
Lord Grenville began with observing, that it was common for speakers, in order to arrest the attention of their audience, to exaggerate the importance of their subject; but, of the magnitude of the present subject, so far from its admitting of exaggeration, it was impossible for any eloquence to convey an adequate idea. He was glad to see that at last the public were becoming alive to its importance, and he ventured to predict, that the anxiety which was now felt concerning it would daily increase, as there was too much reason to dread that misfortune would be accumulated upon misfortune, should the, measures be persevered in which gave rise to this evening's discussion. He was decidedly of opinion that the house ought to go into a committee upon the Orders in Council, because of the variety of questions which grew out of them, involving their legality or illegality, their constitutional or unconstitutional tendency, their policy or impolicy—in a word, their bearings upon the prosperity and the very existence of the country. It was the duty of the house, and he conjured them not to lose sight of it at a moment so critical and perilous, to intervene between the country and the ruin by which it was threatened, by the rashness, improvidence and folly of the government. So pressing was the emergency, that the smallest delay might be attended with the most destructive consequences, and the most irremediable evils; he hoped therefore, that their intervention would take place before things arrived at a state in which it might no longer be effectual. Nothing to him was personally more painful, than being obliged to combat the sentiments of the noble lord opposite to him (earl Bathurst), for whom he entertained the highest esteem and respect, but the task was imposed upon him by an imperious sense of public duty, and he trusted that if any expression should escape him of a nature to give any unpleasant feelings to the noble lord, that he would believe that it would give him (lord G.) greater
478
pain in uttering, than it could possibly give the -noble lord in hearing it. He should begin however, with what had fallen from the noble and learned lord (Eldon), who, he was happy to find, had abstained on this evening from justifying his own conduct, by attempting to criminate that of his predecessors, a very unsatisfactory mode of defence, which of late had been too much practised. Still, however, the noble and learned lord had not defended the Orders in Council upon their own merits; but, by way of calling off the attention of the house from the measure now before them, he had directed it to a measure of the late administration, for which he was disposed to give them credit, but between which and the present there was no analogy whatever, and which, if it was defensible, it was precisely because it rested on principles directly adverse to those by which the Orders in Council, dated last Nov. were dictated. The noble and learned lord had dwelt much upon the blockade of the French ports from the Elbe to Brest, that had been proclaimed in the decree issued by the late ministers, but all the conclusions which he attempted to deduce from it fell to the ground, when the single fact was stated, that this was not a fictitious, but a real blockade, perfectly conformable to the understood and acknowledged laws of war, and that the publication of the proclamation was accompanied with directions to the admiralty to carry it into effect. The late ministers in this case therefore, instead of violating the law of nations, upon any plea of necessity or convenience, or temporary expediency, had done nothing more than apply the principles of this law to the circumstances under which they were called to act. The noble and learned lord farther contended, that in the preamble of this Decree of blockade the principle of retaliation was set forth: he reminded, however, the noble and learned lord, that this principle was not acted upon; they had merely asserted, that they would have been justified in recurring to it, always understood, that it should be exercised within the law of nations, and instead of recurring to it they adopted a measure of quite a different nature. He intreated, however, their lordships to get out of the eternal circle of justifying one act by comparing it with another; to abstain from the petty warfare of crimination .and re-crimination, and to canvass the measure, now before

479
them, on its own individual merits. In this view it was important to inquire how far it was consistent with the principles of national law; and, in the next place, how far it was consonant with the maxims of sound policy. In the first place, he examined it in reference to national law, and here it was extremely important not to confound the law of retaliation with the law of self-preservation. The latter was paramount to all laws, and might justify even such a horrible act as the attack upon Copenhagen, provided the case was clearly and satisfactorily made out. The right of retaliation on the other hand, could only with justice be exercised upon an enemy, and could not be extended to the detriment of a neutral power. If a neutral power granted certain advantages to the enemy, then we had an undoubted right to insist upon being admitted to the same advantages; or if a neutral power acquiesced, from weakness, in the demands of the enemy, all that we could in justice require was, that in consequence of this demand the enemy should not be placed in a better situation in regard to her than we were. But we had ho right, because the enemy violated the rights of one neutral, to violate the rights of all neutrals; for if this principle were once admitted, it would lead to an extension of hostilities over the whole civilized world. He then applied these general principles to the present case. The meaning of the French Decree was, he allowed, to put the ports of G. Britain in a state of blockade; but if a measure was to be founded upon it by the government of this country, it ought to be directed to its effects, not to the form in which it was expressed. The first question, then, which arose was, whether it had ever been executed against America, or acquiesced in by the government of the United States? for if it should turn out that it never had been applied to the commerce of America, and that it never had been submitted to by that power, the framers of the Orders in Council had not a foot of ground on which to stand. Now, his lordship asserted, that Denmark, immediately after the Decree was published, received explicit assurances from the French government that it did not go to capture the ships of neutrals trading upon the high seas, but that its object was merely to prescribe the terms on which the ships of foreign nations were to be admitted into the ports of France. The same explanation of the nature and tendency of the Decree was
480
given to America, and as a proof of the sincerity of the explanation, an American vessel, which was carried into a French port, was released by order of their court of admiralty. It was understood in the same manner in Spain, and ship, which was carried into a port of that kingdom, under similar circumstances, was released by order of their court of prizes. But even supposing that the French decree did not admit of this mitigated construction, it would by no means follow that we had a right to publish orders which amounted to a total prohibition of American commerce, till we saw what steps America would take in consequence of it. The government of Denmark had submitted to the decree, which accounted for the spirited note written by his noble friend (earl Grey) on the occasion, in reply to a very insolent one that had been received (p. 402). But, a different language had been held to America, because her conduct was the reverse of that of Denmark; and because at that time a negotiation was then depending between this country and the United States by which all their differences were likely to be adjusted.—Here the noble lord repelled the accusation which had been brought against his two noble friends who negociated the treaty, of their having made any unbecoming concessions in the course of that negociation. He ventured also to predict, that if there were any persons mad enough to be induced by the motive of obtaining a little temporary popularity to adopt a different tone from what at that time animated his majesty's councils, that they would find such popularity to he of very short duration.—But to return to the subject immediately before the house, not only had M. Decres, the minister of the French Marine, assured gen. Armstrong that it was not intended to execute the decree against America, than this assurance was fortified by the fact that it had never been executed. This matter, however, did not rest wholly either upon the assurance or the fact, or upon both together. In the President's speech at the opening of Congress, on the 19th of Feb. 1807, a document which had not reached the late ministers previous to their dismissal from office, but which must have been received by their successors about the end of last March, he had avowed his determination, to demand an explanation from the French government of the Decree, and an assurance that it was not intended by any of its provi

481
sions to break in upon the existing treaty between France and America. Was it to be argued, then, that we were better judges than Mr. Jefferson of what trenched upon American rights or American interests? Or were we to set ourselves up and to say to the government of that country, that we did not like the terms on which the ruler of France had explained his intentions in regard to her? His lordship particularly called the attention of the house to the preamble of the Orders, and to a document which had this day been laid upon the table. In this preamble the foundation of the Orders was stated to be, neutral states not having obtained the revocation of the French Decree, a circumstance, which, he contended, was of no importance whatever; for, if it was not executed, it was the same as if it had never been published. They did not dare to assert that America had acquiesced in it; and, indeed, how could they, since it appeared that as late as the 18th of Oct. last, they had received a Note from the two American Ministers, then in London, assuring them that France had uniformly conformed to the articles of the Treaty between that country and America, in the execution of the decree? And, notwithstanding this assurance, in three weeks after the date of this note, these Orders in Council were issued, by which the whole commerce of America was to be annihilated; because, forsooth, she had not Obtained the revocation of a decree, which in regard to her was the same as if it never had been passed. Perhaps he should be told, that the fact as stated by the American ministers, was not true. But in the first place, he could scarcely believe that they would have hazarded a false assertion, and in the next place, if ministers did not believe them, why did they not contradict them, or at least call upon them for proofs of the truth of their declaration. It was remarkable too, that this Note was written in answer to a question, as if ministers had been determined to leave the injustice of their country on record. If any thing, after all the circumstances which he had enumerated, was necessary to evince the determination of America not to submit to any invasion of her rights on the part of France, the embargo lately laid upon her shipping, not after receiving the British Orders in Council, but after the receipt of advices from France, would be amply sufficient for that purpose. In short, he could not conceive that a more compleat
482
case of non-acquiescence in the Decree could be made out than the American government had to lay before the world. The late administration had requested information from the government of America of its intentions in consequence of the French Decree; but before an answer had been returned to this demand, the measures in question were adopted, in which a gross and flagrant violation of public faith had been committed.—The noble lord next considered the Orders in Council as a violation of the municipal law of the country. He contended that they were violations of eight or ten positive statutes of the realm; of the Navigation Act; of the act for regulating the commerce of the Isle of Man; of the act for regulating the commerce of Guernsey and Jersey; and of the act for regulating the commerce of hostile (not of neutral) ports. If the lords of the privy council, at any future time, thought the laws not so good as they could make them, they had nothing to do but to follow the example set them in the present instance, and alter and suspend them at pleasure. The old arguments which were used in favour of the dispensing power, of raising ship-money, &c, were, like the present, justified upon the plea of necessity. He had always thought, however, that our ancestors had set these question, and all of a similar nature, to rest at the time of the Revolution, when it was stipulated in the Bill of Rights that in every emergency which might render an alteration necessary in the established laws of the country, that alteration should be made by the king, lords, and commons in parliament assembled. In all cases in which this constitutional principle had been departed from, there had been three points required to be proved, 1. The existence of an urgent necessity; 2. The impossibility of assembling parliament in time to provide for it; and, 3. That the remedy did not overstep the demands of the necessity. In the present case, since the French Decree, there had been two sessions of parliament, and since the Orders in Council were published, parliament had been twice prorogued.—The noble lord next pointed out the unintelligibleness of the Orders. He would take upon himself to prove that in four clauses of the same paragraph they contained four direct contradictions. After much study, however, he believed that he had at last found out what they meant to express, and he was not a little proud of the solution of such a

483
problem, particularly as an eminent civilian (Mr. Robinson,) had declined altogether to interpret them, and they had been misunderstood by the most eminent writer upon political economy now in the country; and by Mr. Baring, in the pamphlet which he had published upon the subject, and upon which his lordship bestowed the most unqualified praise. The noble lord proceeded to shew their extreme impolicy. They went to effect a radical and fundamental change in the whole commercial relations of the country, both with belligerent and neutral powers. They tended to subject this country to a loss in the same proportion that they distressed the enemy, and in the same proportion that we gained from them, they afforded relief to the enemy. This principle of forcing trade into our markets, would have disgraced the darkest ages of monopoly. The impediments which it was intended to throw in the way of the importation of cotton into France, would have the effects of stimulating that government to encourage its cultivation in quarters where it did not grow, of producing a redundance of the article in the foreign market, of lowering its price, and consequently of diminishing the cultivation.—He then shewed that the orders defeated their own object, because by making it necessary for every foreign ship to touch at a British port, to pay a certain tribute, and this circumstance exposing every such ship to capture and confiscation by the French decree, it was obvious that no ship would submit to the ignominy, merely for the purpose of exposing itself to the subsequent danger. It was surely better then for ministers to retract what they had done, than to persist in an error to avoid the shame of retraction.
Lord Hawkesburyvindicated the line of argument pursued by his noble and learned friend. If ever there had been a time, or a question, upon which it was proper to refer to past measures, to the persons by whom such measures had been adopted, and to the circumstances under which they had taken place, it was the present moment, and the question then under the consideration of their lordships. The preamble of the Orders in Council shewed that they were not founded upon any recent act, that the only were to carry into effect the principle laid down in a former act, which had been insufficient to its professed object. However he might differ as to the policy of the precise act which
484
had in the former case been resorted to, he approved of the principle upon which it rested. When the French Decree was published there appeared to him two causes, one of which might have been taken, either to consider that Decree as idle words, and to treat it with contempt, or to look upon it as a substantial measure, calculated to injure the interests of this country, and justifying measures of retaliation. The late ministers did not consider that Decree in the former light, or pass it over in silence and contempt, though they noticed it only by an abortive attempt at retaliation. The arguments that had been urged by the noble lords opposite in this instance, would apply with more force against their own measure. The learned lord (Erskine) had said, that the Order of the 7th of Jan. was only a trifling enlargement of the principle of the war of 1756. But the principle of that war was founded upon this, that neutrals should not be allowed, during war, to possess a trade which they had not enjoyed during peace. Neither France nor Spain allowed neutrals to carry on their coasting trade during peace, and the principle of the war. of 1756 was that they should not carry it on in time of war. This, a belligerent had a right, upon the broad principle, to resist and refuse. But though neutrals were not allowed to trade between Brest and Bourdeaux, in time of peace they were not prohibited from trading between Ferrol and Brest, and between the ports of France and Spain. This trade therefore allowed during peace, they had a right to possess during war, and upon the general principle no belligerent had a right Consistently with the law of nations to take it from them. This, however, the Order of the 7th of Jan. did take from them, and unless that Order could be defended, upon the principles of the law of nations, it was not to be justified at all. By. the copy of an official dispatch found by his majesty's present ministers on their coming into office, it Was evident that their predecessors entertained opinions similar to their own, on the justice of retaliating upon the enemy the measures of hostility which he might choose to adopt towards this country. We had a right to retaliate, we did retaliate. The extent of the powers with which we were at war, had no effect in depriving us of that right. If by that retaliation neutrals were incidentally injured, it was to be lamented, but could not tend to the diminution of that right. In the last war, the

485
Elbe and the Weser were blockaded, although one side was occupied by neutrals, who must consequently have sustained material injury. The tenor of the French Decree had been admitted by the noble lords opposite themselves. As to the attempt made to insinuate, that its virulence had been abated by the explanation given by Decrès, the minister of marine, to general Armstrong, nothing could be more futile. How could any renunciation, but one as public and as formal as the Decree itself; be said to do away its effect? Was France to be left to blow hot and cold at pleasure? In cases tried in the admiralty court in England, the eminent person who presided in that court, declared that Decrè's explanation was nugatory. So much for the justice of the Orders Council. With respect to their policy, the noble lord entered into an exposition of the advantages derivable from them. He compared the measure with that of the late administration, and contended that while by the Order of the 7th of Jan. the ordinary law of nations had been just as much Violated as by the Orders of the 11th Nov. the latter secured to the country benefits which the former was not calculated to obtain. It was intolerable that England had enjoyed little advantage from her maritime superiority; and that France, who did not dare show a flag on the ocean, had carried on such a trade by neutral bottoms, that the people of that country consumed colonial produce at a much less rate than the English. To prevent this was the great object of the Orders in Council; and in doing this, so far was the trade of G. Britain from being injured, that the exports of the months of Dec. and Jan. last, had exceeded the exports of the corresponding months of the preceding year.
The Earl of Lauderdalewished the Orders to be discussed on their own positive merits, and not on their comparative merits. He believed that they had been infinitely mischievous. They injured neutrals much more than they did the enemy; and were, in his opinion, tantamount to a declaration of war against America.
Lord Sidmouthwas desirous that the Orders might be referred to a committee, in order to give him an opportunity of fully investigating, and making up his mind upon this important subject, on which he had not vet been able to form a decided opinion.—The house then divided.

Contents,

30

Proxies,

18— 48

486

Non-Contents,

61

Proxies,

45—106

Majority against the motion, 58.
Adjourned at four o'clock on Tuesday morning.

List of the Minority.

Gloucester,

Ellenborough,

Norfolk,

Ponsonby,

Bedford,

Carrington,

Argyle,

Lauderdale,

Stafford,

Hutchinson,

Derby,

Cassillis.

Jersey,

Proxies.

Cowper,

Bute,

Essex,

Thanet

Albemarle,

Shaftesbury,

Spencer,

Bulkeley,

Bristol,

Lucan,

Breadalbane,

Ossory,

Grey,

Carnarvon,

Sidmouth,

Blandford,

St, John,

Rosslyn,

Darnley,

Guilford,

King,

Buckinghamshire,

Besborough,

Stawell,

Moira,

Mendip,

Grenville.

St. Vincent,

Somers,

Braybrooke,

Auckland,

Yarborough,

Erskine,

Holland.