Sitting of 5 January 1807

THETFORD ELECTION.
Mr. Whitbread moved for discharging the order for taking the petition into consideration on the 27th instant, for the purpose of moving its consideration on a future day. The grounds

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that he stated for this motion were, that there was a number of persons who voted that were supposed to have no legal right to vote, and that therefore it was adviseable to try the legality of their votes in the usual manner, by moving a quo warranto in the Court of King's Bench. There had not hitherto been sufficient time for trying the validity of those votes in that manner, as the election was on the 4th of November, and the last term ended on the 26th. The object of his motion was, therefore, such a delay as would allow time for the question to be determined by a court of law. He should therefore afterwards move, that the consideration of the petition be postponed until the 12th of February.
Mr. Mingaydeclared, that he rose under considerable trepidation and alarm. If he were to say that it was diffidence, at presenting himself to a public assembly, such a declaration from a man of his years, and of his former professional habits, would draw down ridicule; but he felt seriously distressed, when he considered that he was so personally and pointedly attacked. Until yesterday he had not the slightest idea that any member of that house would bring forward such a motion. Although it was true, that the election of Thetford was on the 4th of November, yet the fact Was, that the point now at issue had been settled five years ago, and had been ever since acquiesced in. It was not one term alone that the petitioners had had to try the law of the question, but every term since the year 1801 they might have brought it forward, if they had thought proper. The question went to nothing less than tearing to pieces the corporate rights of that borough, and dissolving the corporation. This was a petition that the house would not shew peculiar favour to; and he hoped they would not let it hang for ever over his head, as he believed the real object of the petitioners was to keep him as long in hot water as possible. It was the death of an old alderman (his brother) that occasioned this petition. There were complaints now of what a man, who was alderman, and afterwards mayor of the town, had done in 1801, 2, 3. A great part of the voters that had been made during that time were now sought to be disfranchised. There was however, no objection made to the votes made by that alderman in 1801, and yet, after so many years, the petitioners wished to disfranchise, on
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a supposed irregularity, such a number of voters, as would in fact change the corporation itself. After distinguishing this case from the cases of Harwich and East Retford, he hoped the house would not now establish such a precedent for attacking corporate bodies.
Mr. Whitbreadwas not conscious of having said any thing which the hon. gent. was justified in considering as a personal attack on himself. The question was merely a legal question, whether a certain description of persons had or had not the right of voting. If they had, the hon. gent. was secure of his seat; if they had not, he would of course be removed from his seat. He could not suppose the object of the petition was by any means to harass him, or keep him, as he had expressed it, in hot water. Although it was possible that for the last 5 years, illegal votes might have been received, yet, if the flaw was not discovered until the last election, the petitioners were in sufficient time.
Mr. Mingayagain stated, that it was not one term only that they had lain by, but it was five years and one term. He was, therefore, against the motion for discharging the order.
Mr. Bragge Bathurstconsidered that the house had hardly sufficient materials to decide on, having only two contradictory statements. He thought, however, that as to this flaw, which had been only discovered the other day, the courts of law would be as slow to lend themselves to the overturning corporate rights as the committees of the house of commons.
The Attorney-Generalhad no objection to the delay of a fortnight, which was all that was asked for in the first instance, but he could not see why the petitioners suffered all the last term to pass over without moving for a writ of quo warranto. This was all they could do in the course of the next term, and that would be very far from deciding the question.
Mr. Whitbreadobserved, that the delay of a fortnight was all he asked in the first instance, and if, at the end of that period, he could not lay sufficient grounds for postponing it further, the house of course would not consent to put it off longer.
Mr. Roseconsidered that it was likely, that postponing it upon the grounds that were stated, would make it necessary that it should be postponed so long, that it could not be determined in the course of the present session.
Lord Howickobserved, that it would be extremely inconvenient that the house should that night divide upon the question: he therefore proposed the debate should be adjourned until to-morrow. This proposition was accordingly agreed to.

NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE.
—Lord Howick, having moved that the Papers presented to the house on the 22d of December last (see p. 91) relating to the Negociation with France, be now taken into consideration, rose, and addressed the house as follows:—Mr. Speaker, the Papers which have been laid before the house in consequence of his majesty's gracious command for that purpose, having now been for a considerable time under consideration, it becomes my duty to offer that proposition to the house which has been usual on similar occasions; namely, a motion for an humble address to his majesty, expressive of such sentiments as the house may think fit to convey to the throne, after a careful review of the whole of this most important question. In rising to perform this duty, it is impossible for me not to experience many painful feelings: in the first place, regret, deep and lasting regret, for the failure of an effort sincerely directed to the restoration of peace to this country and to Europe, aggravated as that failure has been by the increased difficulties which the rapid succession of the most fatal events has since opposed to the restoration of peace. But, sir, connected with these feelings, peculiarly affecting to myself, is another event which it is impossible for me to pass by unnoticed, for it is impossible for me not to recollect by whom this business would have been detailed to this house, but for the dispensation of Providence. It is impossible for me to speak a word upon this occasion, either as to the effort itself, or the failure of it, without recollecting the great and irreparable loss the country has sustained in the death of that loved friend and instructor, without whose guidance and support I have no confidence in my own strength. It is impossible for me to forget what he was, and what I am. In detailing his efforts, and defending his conduct, I feel more than ever my own insufficiency for the performance of the task which he alone could adequately fulfill. If any thing can support me under such apprehensions, and upon such an occasion, it is the knowledge I have of those principles, as connected with this subject, which he held invariably until he ceased for ever
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to think of any thing in this life, of his opinions, as to the means to be used for the purpose of restoring peace and prosperity to this country. It is that knowledge which alone can enable me, or rather encourage me adequately to perform the duty which I owe to his memory, to this house, and to the public. Sir, if I could be confident of a general concurrence in this house on this subject, such as I believe to prevail abroad; or if I could even trust that this house would follow the example of the other house of parliament in the unanimity of its vote, my task would indeed be grateful and easy; but I know too well, the severity of criticism which I have to expect from some quarters in this house, and I am too apprehensive of a radical difference of opinion, to entertain that confidence, or to think there will be any such unanimity of sentiment in this house, as to the result of the negociation. I shall therefore endeavour, by as clear and detailed an exposition as I can make of the facts, to shew, that as, on the one hand, the king's government has, in no instance, committed the honour of the crown, by any manifestation or disposition to make improper concessions and sacrifices so, on the other, it has neglected no means within its power to conclude such a peace as was consistent with the honour, prosperity, and interests of the country. I do not know whether, on the present occasion, it will be necessary to shew to the house that, at the time of opening the late negociation, peace was in itself desirable. This, as a general proposition, is always true; peace is always desirable. The only true and legitimate end of war is a safe and honourable peace. But the question will be, whether we stood in a situation, at the moment of opening the negociation, that we could open it with a hope of obtaining such terms as, under all circumstances, the country had a right to expect. I think it will hardly be denied, that after the failure of the third coalition, after the fatal day of Austerlitz, peace, if it could have been obtained without any important sacrifices, which should place us in a worse situation as to the renewal of a war to which we might be provoked by the injustice of the enemy—if such a peace could have been obtained, I think that, merely with a view to the temporary repose of the world, it would have been desirable. If it would have been desirable, then, upon what principle ought the negociation to have been

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entered into? And here I must refer to the principle stated in Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, in answer to the first overture, "that a peace, to be advantageous to the two countries, should be negociated on principles honourable to both, and, at the same time, of a nature, as far as possible, to secure the future tranquillity of Europe." This principle is what I wish the house to keep in mind, because it is that which was invariably pursued by his majesty's ministers. It was that which they made the basis of the negociation. They insisted, first, that we should treat in conjunction With our ally the emperor of Russia; and, in the next place, that the negociation should be conducted upon the basis of actual possession, because they thought that a negociation, to be honourable, should be equal, and, to be equal, it is necessary that at the outset each party should acknowledge that neither is in a situation to be under the necessity of purchasing peace of the other on terms of humiliation, or any other disadvantage; and this I say results as a necessary corollary from that principle laid down by Mr. Fox, in the outset, in his answer to the overture of M. Talleyrand for peace, that the peace should be honourable to both countries and their respective allies, and secure, as far as possible, the tranquillity of Europe. Then let us see how this matter stands at the outset of the negociation. A right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) upon a former occasion said, that there were three points to be made out by his majesty's ministers: First, that the first overture came from the enemy; next, that the negociation was instituted on the basis of actual possession; thirdly, that we should act only in concert with our allies. Sir, as to the first point, I think it has been proved. I do not know whether the right hon. gent. means to recur to the truly fanciful argument he threw out, that we should shew something that came from the French government, prior to the letter of Mr. Fox, on the subject of the assassin. I should suppose he does not think it necessary I should shew the existence of such a fact. In answer to that letter there came an overture for a friendly discussion; that is stated to have been the first overture, and it was made by the enemy upon a different basis than that which was afterwards adopted. It was proposed that the basis should be the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. What was the answer? It was, that it was
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a basis which could not conduct the negociation to any salutary end, because the basis of that treaty was so undefined and liable to cavil, that we should dispute about the basis itself. Accordingly, M. Talleyrand, in his answer, gives up the question almost in words; he says, that he does not think any of the articles of that treaty were the cause of the war. Throughout the whole of his letter he expressly admits, that actual possession was to be the basis of the negociation, for he tells you, that France desires nothing that England possesses; he wishes that the negociation may be conducted on principles of reciprocal equality. He states that France is a great power on the continent, England is a great power by sea, and that France would make such concessions as, from the naval superiority of England, she had a right to expect. In consequence of this admission the negociation was opened. Satisfactory as the letter of M. Talleyrand was in this respect, it however contained another point not to be passed over, for it was then proposed by the government of France that we should treat separate from our allies. This, Mr. Fox rejected at once. He rejected every idea of separating the interests of this country and Russia. This produced an answer from Talleyrand. The discussion now was, the propriety of our insisting upon a joint negociation. It was contended by M. Talleyrand, that we were the allies of the powers of the continent for some purposes, but not for others— that the war was not one war, but two wars—that there was not only a war on the continent, but a war at sea—that we were not the allies of Russia; forgetting what had been so often said by the French government, that we were the instigators of all the wars on the continent; and forgetting the glorious achievements of lord Nelson and sir Richard Strachan. Three of four lines of Mr. Fox overturned all the lengthened sophisms of M. Talleyrand. Thus we stand, on the 20th of April, with a refusal to treat, except in conjunction with our allies. Then, what has been done that should have had any ulterior effect upon the negociation? Every one must see that Mr. Fox thought the negociation at that time at an end. This was confirmed by the long interval of silence which afterwards ensued.—Here, then, I would ask, whether up to this period of the negociation there is any thing which any man can blame, any thing which were it to do, any man would

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choose to alter? A right hon. gent. indeed, did choose to taunt ministers on a former occasion with their simplicity and credulity, and affected to ridicule their diplomacy. But is this what the right hon. gent. thinks deserving of ridicule? If it be true that ministers had claimed from the country the praise of good faith, and dignity in conduct, and of openness and simplicity in diplomatic language, Mr. Fox's correspondence with Talleyrand might be held forth as their title to that merit. If the people of this country had expected to see a noble simplicity of thought and expression, combined with the most dignified manliness of proceeding, distinguish their diplomacy, they would find the model in Mr. Fox's letters. If the people of England expected to see a commanding superiority of genius displayed in its diplomatic transactions; if they wished to see the honour of their country strongly contrasted with that of France, could they wish for a better instance than the correspondence of Mr. Fox with M. Talleyrand? (hear! hear!) I am glad to perceive this opinion ratified by that of this house, as I am convinced it must be by the judgment, not only of this country, but of all Europe and of posterity.—After Mr. Fox's letter of the 20th April, the negociation seemed to be at an end, as no answer was received till the 4th of June, about which time also lord Yarmouth arrived from Paris. The letter of M. Talleyrand, then received, reverts generally to former discussions, and does not distinctly admit, either the basis of actual possession, or that we should negotiate jointly with Russia; though, in point of fact, it was accompanied with a direct overture, satisfactory on both these grounds. Talleyrand, however, proposes to recur to the precedent of 1782, though, indeed, he evidently misapprehends the true nature of that proceeding. Yet it is nevertheless true, that lord Yarmouth came over distinctly authorized to make an offer of negociation on the basis of actual possession, and to be carried on jointly with Russia. This, indeed, accounts for the delay which had intervened. M. Talleyrand sent for lord Yarmouth, and told him that he had been looking for a person to carry a confidential communication to the British government. It is clear, from this, that Talleyrand was unwilling to commit himself in writing, particularly respecting Hanover, and for that reason delayed sending the letter of the 2d of June till it was accom-
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panied with an explanation of points he considered too delicate to be in the first instance put into a dispatch. Upon this point the evidence of lord Yarmouth is full and decisive; and after his explanation in the house a few days ago, it is impossible for any man seriously to doubt that he was fully authorized by the French minister to offer the uti possidetis, and, in substance, joint negociation. I beg, therefore, that gentlemen will resort to this the best evidence, and not carp at any particular expressions in lord Yarmouth's communication of the 13th of June, a paper not drawn up with technical precision, nor intended for the public, but as a memorandum in the office of foreign affairs. Will it then be denied that lord Yarmouth brought for the consideration of ministers an offer of negociation on the basis of the uti possidetis and jointly with Russia? Is not the testimony of lord Yarmouth sufficient? But is not lord Yarmouth's understanding, that the proposal of France was such as he had described it, proved by the whole tenour of the papers on the table? In. the first conversation lord Yarmouth had with Talleyrand, does the latter deny those points? No; he, indeed, by his silence admits them, and only says, that as circumstances had changed greatly, he did not consider himself bound to the extent of former proposals; that Russia was negociating separately, and Sicily had been found indispensable to Naples. Such are the topics advanced by M. Talleyrand, but never does he deny what lord Yarmouth asserts. Nay, in a subsequent conference, when the acknowledgement of the French titles and establishments is waved, it is proposed that Sicily should be given up for Hanover; thus in substance recognizing the basis of uti possidetis, by proposing that we should give up for an equivalent that which it was agreed should be ceded purely and simply. The fact was never denied, though the terms were often changed. There are, indeed, some expressions in one of the notes of the French plenipotentiaries, which indeed seem to contradict the fact of the basis of actual possession having been admitted. It is said that such a thing never could have entered Buonaparte's head, and that, if he had negociated on such a basis, he must have continued in possession of Moravia, Austria, &c. forgetting that at the time of this negociation the French were in possession of none of those objects, and their arguments are so

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absurd they betray the consciousness of a bad cause.—Can any one doubt then that the basis of actual possession was proposed by the French? Can it be denied at least, that we understood that to be the basis? Is there any trace of our having at any period admitted another? Look at Mr. Fox's letter of the 5th July, in which he instructs lord Yarmouth to put an end to the discussion if the French government will not "revert to its original proposals with which your lordship was charged." Here I ought to take notice of a slight omission in the papers, which escaped my notice till pointed out. I had thought that the words "nous ne vous demandons rien," which lord Yarmouth mentioned as used by Talleyrand, and which Mr. Fox says had been employed by M. Talleyrand in one of his letters to him, were actually in a letter among the papers on the table. It has been observed to me, however, that Mr. Fox was too accurate to quote words which had not been used, though the sentiment is found in substance in M. Talleyrand's second letter. In reality it has been discovered, that in the private letter of M. Talleyrand, the latter uses the very words in question, accompanied with other expressions explanatory of them, such as "that the emperor had now greatly changed his views of things, and was convinced that the greatness of England was compatible with the greatness of France," &c. Clear it is, however, that ministers acted upon the supposition that France offered the basis of actual possession.—I might now ask gentlemen upon the other side, what conduct we ought to have pursued? Having received a verbal offer, do they think that we ought drily and peremptorily to have rejected it, though it was desirable to negociate, and if possible, to conclude peace? Do they think such a course would have deserved or obtained the approbation of this house, of this country, or of Europe? A noble lord opposite remarked, that we ought to have obtained an acknowledgement in writing, of the basis; and something of the same sort has been said by an eminent statesman in another place. But is it in the nature of things, is it consistent with the ordinary course of such transactions, that such an acknowledgement in writing can in the first instance be demanded or obtained? Has it not been usual in all times and countries, that negociations have commenced with some such unofficial proceedings? And, indeed, in proportion to
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the difficulty of the occasion, and the novelty of circumstances, to which assuredly the present can form no exception, it must happen that these unofficial proceedings must take place. If such dry, peremptory rejection of overtures of this nature, as that recommended, were to be given, it would encumber with new difficulties, that which with every facility is already so difficult, and peace would be rendered almost impossible.—But, without referring to precedents of the best times, and the examples of the most skilful negociators, I will prove from instances, which some of the gentlemen opposite will not dispute, that matters, fully as important as the offer of a basis of negociation, have been considered perfectly proper and authentic, when presented in verbal communication. I will shew, that an ultimatum in a negociation, previous to a rupture, an occasion surely not less important than that under consideration, was deemed by lord Hawkesbury perfectly regular. I have now in my hand the documents respecting the rupture with France, at the beginning of the present war. It is needless now to state what my own opinions were respecting that transaction, but on this point at least I never saw any thing to disapprove. At the time alluded to, however, the noble lord (Castlereagh) was a member of the cabinet, and is responsible for any transaction to which his sanction was required. The learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) was likewise committed to the approbation of the measures, and of the negociations which preceded that rupture, and defended them in parliament. Another right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning), indeed, is not so much implicated in this proceeding, as he was not much in the habit of approving the conduct of that administration, and though disposed rather to arraign their conduct, yet he never expressed any disapprobation of this particular point. I find, however, that lord Whitworth insisted upon three articles, which he had been instructed to demand as the ultimatum. M. Talleyrand desired that the articles in question should be presented formally in writing, with which, however, lord W. declined to comply. Lord Hawkesbury, in writing to him on the subject, mentions that it had been left to his discretion to make the communication in the way he might consider most advantageous, and he was authorized to do so. When we then received a verbal communication from the French government,

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ought we at once to have called them rogues and traitors, and refused to have any farther intercourse, or ought we to have got that verbal communication turned into writing? Lord Hawkesbury saw no impropriety in giving M. Talleyrand the written communication he asked; and we did nothing more than what M. Talleyrand had done when lord Whitworth made a verbal communication; he used no invective, he only asked it to be put in writing. The steps subsequent to lord Yarmouth's communication had no other view, and unless we had resolved to give a rude, peremptory refusal, and to depart from uniform diplomatic precedent, we could take no other course than that which the documents on the table shew us to have pursued. To the written letter, a written answer was returned. To the verbal communication, a verbal answer was made, and lord Yarmouth returned to Paris with instructions to ascertain the sincerity of the offer, and, in the regular progress of the affair, to obtain its formal acknowledgement.—Here I must correct a mistake which appears to have arisen upon this point. When lord Yarmouth went over to Paris, he was not authorized to insist upon an acknowledgement in writing, of the offer he had first brought to this country; because, in fact, lord Y. having no powers, could not ask or expect such an official communication. But the acknowledgement of the basis being made, and his powers produced, the authentic written communication of the proposed basis must immediately have followed. Lord Yarmouth was sent to Paris to establish the negociation upon this basis; and the whole train of the transaction evidently shews that this was the case. Indeed, so thoroughly am I satisfied that the assertions of his majesty's government are in every point strictly consonant with the real facts, that were they yet to be submitted to the world, I should consider the shape they now bear, that which the history of the case naturally dictated, and most satisfactorily proved. I cannot, indeed, conceive that any man of common candour and impartiality can doubt that the basis of actual possession was proposed by the French, and that his majesty's ministers uniformly acted upon that belief and understanding.—Upon lord Yarmouth's return to Paris, however, he found circumstances considerably changed. He found M. D'Oubril engaged in a negociation from which the
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French government conceived the highest hopes, and in consequence of representations from Naples, a new importance was attached to Sicily. Soon after M. D'Oubril concluded a separate peace. It certainly is true that lord Yarmouth had been instructed not to produce his powers till the French government reverted to the basis originally proposed. At the same time, the difficulty of his lordship's situation at that period was very great, and if he erred, every One must acknowledge the rectitude of his intentions, and the fidelity with which he discharged the trust reposed in him. Nevertheless the production of his powers was contrary to the intentions of this government, and to their views of the policy which the moment required. Lord Lauderdale was then pitched upon as a man, from his general ability, acquaintance with business, and his intimate knowledge of the sentiments of ministers, eminently fitted to the difficult state of the negociation at Paris. The first thing lord Lauderdale did on his arrival at Paris was, to present a note demanding that the negociation should be placed upon the basis which the French government had originally proposed, and on which alone we had consented to treat. But it will be said, that the answer to this note was a denial of the assertion. If, however, the papers be examined with care, it will be seen, that even the terms suggested by France amount rather to an admission in substance, of what we claimed, and of the basis, as it was understood by us, and explained by lord Lauderdale. In general Clarke's note, it is worthy of remark, that there is a word substituted apparently by the imperial pen. The word as it stands, is adopter. "The only bases," it says, "which the emperor veuille adopter." It appears, however, that the word as it first stood, was longer, and probably was reconnaître; and it seemed as if the French government had been resolved rather not to admit the uti possidetis, than bold enough to deny that it had been once admitted. Be this as it may, lord Lauderdale formally insisted on the acknowledgement of the original basis, and on its being withheld, demanded his passports. After some delays on the part of the French government, and after a new conference, and a partial return towards the former basis, lord Lauderdale found it impossible to place the negociation on the only admissible ground, and with great difficulty at last got his passports. Never

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was a different basis for an instant admitted by this country.—Such is the plain history of the negociation, and in going through it I have not dwelt on the particular terms offered at different periods, meaning to touch on that point in the sequel. What part of our conduct, then, do the gentlemen opposite censure? A right hon. gent. has already said, that whatever be our merits, the cause of the country is clear. If, then the cause of the country be clear, I have gained that about which I am most anxiously concerned. Though, undoubtedly, I never can be indifferent to the censure or approbation of this house, yet the bitterest part of that censure would be taken away, if while our conduct was disapproved, it were admitted that in our hands the honour and the cause of the country remained unsullied and unquestionable.—Then what is it we are accused of? It has been stated, indeed, that the negociation betrayed a scene of artifice and duplicity on the one side, playing upon incredulity on the other. But in what have we been duped? Where is the proof of our credulity? These are assertions much more easily made than proved. I defy the gentlemen opposite to point to a single instance in which we have been imposed upon; and till they do so, I am not much afraid that the house will pay much attention to charges so lightly made, and assertions so little supported. Were we dupes up to the 20th of April? Did Mr. Fox in the correspondence with M. Talleyrand shew credulity? Did he make concessions? Was he seduced into sacrifices? No. All is refusal, the most victorious refutation of all the sophistry, and an utter rejection of all the offers that were employed to draw us into negociation on terms inconsistent with the just pretensions of the country. Was it in this point there that we were dupes? Whatever dispute there may be, for I will not say cavil, on other parts, I am confident that thus far, at least, we are beyond reproach. Will it be contended then that we should have refused to listen to the communication of which lord Yarmouth was the bearer? I do not believe that any man will venture his reputation so far as to say we should. And then, what was the object of lord Yarmouth's mission? what of lord Lauderdale's, but to place the negociation on the original basis, or to put an end to it? But the offers were false and hollow. Be it so; but, even if they were false and hollow, they could not have led
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to peace; we could not have been imposed upon by them. But, even after all the evidence obtained, after the fact of the insincerity of the enemy, strong as our suspicions may have been, what other course than that we adopted ought we to have followed? If an enemy, whatever suspicions you may entertain, assumes that appearance of sincerity, and makes proposals, not on the face of them unworthy at least of discussion, would it be wise, would it be politic, peremptorily to reject such advances; and would it be nothing to undertake the responsibility of such a proceeding, so as either to give rise to charges on our conduct abroad, or, what is more, create discontent and dissatisfaction at home, because we did not employ all just and conciliatory measures to put an end to the calamities of war? Is it nothing to expose the character of the nation with others, or to give rise to a spirit of dissatisfaction among ourselves, incompatible with those exertions and with those sacrifices which the true interest of the state might require? After the offer made to lord Lauderdale in September, to the moment of his departure from Paris, not a moment's delay intervened, which did not arise from a few days' indisposition with which his lordship was attacked, and from the refusal of the French government to grant passports. Of this the papers on the table furnish the most decisive proofs. Ministers pursued the only course which could afford to England and to Europe, the most convincing proof that our conduct was fair, equitable, and conciliatory, and that of the enemy, false, deceitful, and ambitious.—I will not deny that the prolongation of a negociation is in itself attended with inconvenience. But can it be expected that great and important interests in a perplexed and extraordinary state of human affairs can be adjusted without long and deliberate discussion? When have the long and fierce contentions of nations been adjusted without much difficulty and delay? A conqueror can speedily give the law, but when nations treat on equal terms, delays cannot be avoided. But it is said that the negociation prevented an arrangement with Prussia. I deny the fact. I defy any man to give the least proof of such an assertion. I do not wish to say any thing to aggravate the distress of that unfortunate power, but such had been the infatuated Conduct of the court of Berlin, that neither to Russia nor to this country had any oppor-

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tunity been given either of staying her precipitate counsels or assisting her rash operations. This, however, belongs to another discussion, and if gentlemen on the Other side can shew that in this or in any other respect the negociation suspended any measures of war, they will have proved a very heavy charge; but till they bring that proof, neither the house nor the country will be much influenced, far less will be led to prejudge us, by their bold assertions and their unsupported accusations.—With respect to fidelity towards our allies, I am confident that no reproach can justly be made to the conduct of the negociation. If the cause of the country be clear, our cause must likewise be unquestionable. We have seen how steadily Mr. Fox refused to listen to the proposal of separate negociation, and when the form was abandoned, the substance was strictly maintained. When M. d'Oubril was sent to Paris, it was no longer necessary to refuse that to which the emperor of Russia had consented. It is proper to remark here too, that it was expressly stipulated by lord Yarmouth, that the concert with Russia should be fully admitted, and that M. Talleyrand knew that he was to concert with M. d'Oubril. Even after the separate treaty concluded by that minister, this government saw the importance of still maintaining the most unlimited faith towards Russia, and when the refusal to ratify the treaty was known, lord Lauderdale was instructed to insist that the two powers should be considered as replaced in the situation in which they stood before that event, and to urge those articles for which Russia was most desirous. This conduct, indeed, Was due to an ally whose good faith had been so strongly displayed on former occasions, and to the character of the emperor Alexander, in whose honour the government had never ceased to confide, even under the most unaccountable appearance of his minister's conduct at Paris.—If our good faith cannot be impeached, are we culpable for the terms for which we insisted? Are we blamed, because, in the situation of the country, we thought it proper to retain what we possessed, as a counterpoise to the acquisitions of France? Are we blamed because we refused to cede any of our possessions, unless on the footing of a fair equivalent? Are we deserving of blame because we insisted upon a basis which implied perfect equality with the enemy, and which pre-
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sumed that our conquests were at least as much beyond their power to affect, as theirs were beyond the possibility of being shaken by our attacks? This, then, was the basis to which we uniformly adhered. The principle we applied to Sicily, though not exactly a conquest, since we held it in concurrence with its lawful sovereign, and it was included by name in our demands. This, our faith to the king of Naples required. Hanover having been unjustly attacked for the sake of England, the honour of this country compelled us to Stipulate for its recovery. The integrity of Turkey, of Sweden, of Portugal, was stipulated for, and it was our object also to secure the little states from the insults and encroachments they had experienced from France. From these points we never receded. How far we might have receded as to particular terms, it would not be proper for me in this place to discuss; but if the value of cessions must be calculated by the probability of the advantages and the duration of that peace for which they are given up, there was nothing in the aspect of affairs to lead us to make valuable Sacrifices to purchase peace.—But, it now remains for me to shew, that there never was any opportunity of procuring such terms as would have been adequate to the just pretensions, and consistent with the honour and interests of the country. There are two periods in the negociation to which we must now advert. There never was any question of particular terms before lord Yarmouth went to Paris, with the exception of Hanover and Sicily, which on account of the particular circumstances of each were specifically mentioned. After M. d'Oubril had arrived at Paris, and the French government had hopes of a separate treaty, lord Yarmouth still writes that Hanover, the Cape, Malta, and India remained pure and untouched. The fact, however, turned out that Malta was to be ceded under conditions; even a limitation of the garrison being proposed. From Hanover, the district of Hoya, containing 10,000 people, was to be taken off, and the Cape was to be made a free port. India, too, a very important object, was likewise reserved, and all the Dutch colonies were to be given up with Tobago, &c. in the West Indies. Independently of th want of faith exhibited by the French government, and the little security we could have for the observance of treaties, were these conditions such as we ought to have accepted, considering what France had ac-

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quired on the continent, and the little probability of her wresting from us our conquests? But were they such as we could accept when Russia must have been left alone, and the king of Naples abandoned? Besides too, it should be known that in M. d'Oubril's treaty it was not the king of Sardinia that was to be indemnified, but his son was to get the Balearic islands; while it was insultingly stipulated that the French government should not object to a provision being made for king Ferdinand by this country! Need I add a word to shew that we could not in such circumstances have acceded to these conditions without at once sacrificing the national honour and betraying the national interests? Such, however, were the conditions on which the French government insisted till the end of August, when the refusal to ratify M. D'Oubril's treaty produced a suspicious change. A different tone was now assumed; and not only Hanover, Malta, and the Cape, without limitation or condition, were offered; but also the settlements in India, and Tobago in the West Indies. These doubtless, though better terms than the preceding, were offered as the price of our abandoning every thing by which we could have held them with security in peace. Russia was to be given up, and Naples sacrificed. Besides, they were not offered till Bonaparte had left Paris, to command the army: but had they been much more advantageous, never could this country have consented to purchase them at the price of disgrace and infamy.—Then as to the connection between Great Britain and Russia; my opinion of that is this, that if there is any hope that the continent of Europe can yet be saved from the grasp of France, it rests upon Russia and upon that connexion. In the present circumstances, and under the present aspect of affairs, it is impossible for me to answer for events. But there is certainly every reason to believe, from what has already passed, that the emperor of Russia will continue faithful to his alliance as long as he can do so. What he may be induced to do through hard necessity, it is not for me to say, although I hope that such a necessity is not likely to occur. Certainly his situation is not such as to justify us, for any more immediate advantage to ourselves, in abandoning him. His means are still not inadequate to resist at least the last encroachment of France. Terms were offered us that were not compatible with our honour; and, if we were to accept of these, it
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would be at once establishing a system of non-resistance, and affording free scope to the ravages and ambition of France, and leaving her, without check or controul, to pursue her desolating career. We were bound in honour to Russia, and more than this, we were bound by express treaty. Was it stipulated by this treaty, that we should accede to any wild or extravagant demands on the part of Russia, and that we should support her in circumstances where we could not do it with honour? No. Were we bound to assist her in unreasonable and chimerical schemes? No. What were the objects for which Russia contended? She insisted that Sicily should be given to the king of Naples, and this was an object for which Great Britain ought to contend more strenuously even than Russia. When it is considered in what manner the king of Naples had been brought into the war, the obligation upon us to sign no peace till Sicily is confirmed to its lawful sovereign, or a just equivalent given which he would be willing to accept, I hope we can never abandon it except on these terms. It would have broken the hearts of those brave men who fought for it on the plains of Maida, if it could have been given up on any other conditions. Then in what view are we to consider Dalmatia, the other object of Russia? Had Russia no right to look for any thing upon the conclusion of peace? It is true, that scarcely any point of contact existed between Russia and France, until the barriers were lately broken down, and M. Talleyrand said that there was nothing to do between France and Russia, except to agree that there should be an end to the war. But, surely, something was due to Russia for acknowledging the title of the emperor, and those of the different branches of his family, and this was not too much. But Russia had before that time taken some pains with respect to the arrangement for Sicily, and even on the principle of the uti possidetis, she was entitled to look for something considerable, for she was in possession of the mouths of the Cattaro, and why should she abandon them without some equivalent? This then she certainly had a right to insist upon. But the matter does not rest here. Let us only consider for a few moments what is the nature of Dalmatia. It is not, when regarded with a view to France, a territory in any way calculated for objects of defence, but only for those of offence. It could be retained

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only for the purpose of having a connection with those disaffected bashaws, who were accustomed to make war on the Porte. It would open a passage to India, if ever the French could get there by land, which however, I trust, is not very likely; and above all, it is on the flanks of Hungary, and therefore is a position from which the chief of the French government could for ever threaten Austria, and prevent her from making those exertions to retrieve herself, which she might be enabled otherwise to apply. It is therefore a situation which would render France more formidable in time of peace, than the possession of it could make her in time of war. It was, therefore, not only a Russian object that it should be given up, but it was also an object that intimately concerned both this country, and all Europe. It was not only a Russian object, but strictly an English and European one. Add to this, sir, the infinite importance of preserving the most inviolable good faith with our allies. For this good faith, this support of our credit, this support of our commerce, this support of every thing that ought to be held dear among nations, I trust we shall ever be ready to make all reasonable sacrifices. This will be either the sure and firm foundation of our prosperity, or our solace and comfort under whatever misfortunes may befall us. In refusing then the terms of peace that were offered by France, we acted in a manner equally demanded by our honour and by sound policy. Considering the importance of Sicily and of Dalmatia, suppose that we had no choice but to accept of all the colonies of France, or of Sicily and Dalmatia alone, I would not hesitate to secure these, and would say, give us Sicily and Dalmatia, and take back all your colonies. If there would have been objections to this, what would have been said of a minister who would have surrendered Sicily and Dalmatia, and yet have accepted of worse terms than these? And here, sir, I cannot help adverting to that argument of which I have heard something, viz. that we are not likely at any future period to procure better terms. All I think it necessary to say on that point is, that it was not consistent with our honour or our interest to accept of these terms at present. And if the matter is considered with a vie to the future designs of France on Russia, no argument can be more unfounded; because, unless we can, by a peace, secure the
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peace of Europe, we do nothing. Now, if the terms offered by France were inadmissible before, how could they be admitted after the 25th of August, when the chief of the French government set out to join his army, which had before been sent against Prussia? Could any peace concluded with us have stopped him, or could we depend on his assurances? If any person thinks that we might, let him look at the Germanic Confederation, which was carried into execution after the treaty with M. d'Oubril. I am sensible that I am detaining the house long, but they will consider the importance of the subject. One of the inducements that was held out to him for signing the treaty was, that the arrangements intended for Germany might thereby be prevented; and yet the ink with which that treaty was signed, was hardly dry before the German arrangements were ordered to be carried into execution. Why then, sir, our only hope was, that Prussia would be successful, though upon that point there was great. room for apprehension. Now, suppose that she had succeeded, what would have been said to a minister who should have before concluded a peace, and thereby tied his hands and prevented his country from taking advantage of the new state of things in order to obtain better terms? Suppose, on the other hand, she did not succeed, which has actually turned out to be the case, does any one believe that peace with Great Britain would have induced Bonaparte to stop his victorious army? If he does, I would refer him to the note of Sebastiani, who was sent to Constantinople to insist upon the deposition of the Hospodars, in direct violation of the treaty with Russia. Sebastiani, on his journey, passed through the dominions of these princes, and received from them the rites of hospitality, and several valuable presents, at the moment that he was about to solicit their deposition. Peace then would not have prevented any of the scenes that have lately been exhibited on the continent. If Bonaparte had then stated that Great Britain, who had been the means of exciting the flames of war all over the continent, had seized the first opportunity of concluding a peace upon the most mercenary and selfish grounds, and then endeavoured to persuade the nations of Europe, that there could be no peace on the continent till England should be humbled, then, instead of possessing the friendship of Sweden, instead of being

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linked in the closest alliance with Russia, now opposing France with not inferior numbers, and with great advantages of situation, we should have been left alone, an object of universal jealousy and suspicion, and without the power of contributing any thing towards the exertions for restraining the ambition and encroachments of France. Every advantage, therefore, of which the nature of the case would admit, results from the part which we have acted. But, sir, I am at the same time far from encouraging very sanguine expectations, after all that has happened on the continent within these few years. The event is in the hands of "Him who giveth the victory." But one thing is clear, that the progress of Bonaparte has never yet been stopped by submission, and our only hope, therefore, is in resistance, as far as we can resist his ambitious projects. We have done what our honour and our duty called upon us to do. When this instrument of vengeance may be deprived of his terrors, I know not; but we may at least look to the honour and independence of this country, as secure against all his attacks, and while this country exists as an independent and an honourable nation, there will still remain some hopes of restoring that political balance in Europe, which has for the present been overturned.—I should have now concluded, sir, but there are two points which, in justice to my noble friend (Lauderdale) and the public, I cannot entirely pass over. On the 30th of August, the negociation appeared to be at an end. On the 4th of September, however, my noble friend was invited to a conference. The note said to be delivered to him by the French, was, in fact, never delivered. If such a note had been received by him, and he had his passports with him, he ought not, and I trust he would not, have waited a moment longer in France, but would instantly have considered the negociation as at an end. But what is the object of a note, which could be so easily disproved? This it is not easy to guess, but at all events sure I am that nothing could be more unjust. Now the other point is, the charge that a sudden change had taken place in the negociation after the political death of Mr. Fox. After he was dead, it was said that the war party had got the ascendancy, and that we wished to break off the negociation. That any change took place in consequence of that event, I most positively deny. My
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noble friend (lord Grenville) has too independent a mind to have been directed by any leader, and I can take upon myself to declare, that there never was the smallest difference of opinion on the subject in the cabinet. The last letter written by my deceased friend on this subject, is that of the 26th of June. But then he all along cordially approved of all that was done, and in his last letter expresses his strong sense of the cavils of the French government, and directed that our negociator should proceed no farther, except the basis at first agreed upon should be recognized. In the last conversation which I myself had with him, which was on the 7th of September, the Sunday before his death, three great cardinal points were insisted upon by him: 1st, The security of our honour, in which Hanover was materially concerned; 2d, Russian connection; 3d, Sicily. And the grounds on which the negociation broke off, were in direct conformity with this opinion. On that occasion he told me, that the ardent wishes of his mind were to consummate, before he died, two great works on which he had set his heart, and these were, the restoration of a solid and honourable peace, and the abolition of the slave trade. [A loud cry of hear! hear!] I have now, sir, endeavoured to shew front these papers, that the first overture came front France; next, that the basis agreed upon for conducting the negotiation was that of actual possession; and lastly, that no terms could be procured that could be accepted, with a view not only to our own honour and interests, but also with a view to the interests of Europe, and the maintenance of the most inviolable good faith, towards our allies. I shall therefore now move, sir, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to assure his majesty, that we have taken into our most serious consideration the Papers relative to the late Negotiation, communicated, by his majesty's most gracious order, to this house:—That we acknowledge, with heartfelt gratitude, the benevolent effort made by his majesty, to restore to this country the blessings of peace on terms consistent with the honour of his majesty's crown, with the general interests of Europe, and with the good faith which his maj. has ever maintained towards his allies: That, whilst we lament the unsuccessful result of an attempt directed to so beneficent an end, we feel the fullest con-

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viction that this failure can be ascribed only to the injustice and ambition of the French government; and we beg leave humbly to express to his majesty our firm and constant resolution, to give to his majesty the most effectual support in a contest manifestly continued, on the part of the enemy, with the hope of destroying the power and independence of the British Empire."
Lord Yarmouthapologized for offering himself to the notice of the house so early in the debate. He trusted he should be acquitted of presumption, in claiming the priority of persons much better able to direct the judgement of the house, by the candour of gentlemen on every side, who would be sensible of the propriety of his offering an elucidation of some circumstances respecting the negociation, and some respecting himself in this early stage of the debate. It was essential that he should rescue himself from some imputations cast upon him, in another place, by a noble lord high in authority, to whom he could not regularly allude. He had seen the expressions he alluded to in a very respectable newspaper early on Saturday. He could not doubt the authenticity of the report, and he wished to set himself right with the house, and to set the house right with respect to the question in the points to which he meant particularly to advert. He thought he could prove to the house, that the reflections cast upon him were unfounded. He hoped it would not be taking up too much of the time of the house if he should, in his view of the subject under debate, go back to the causes of the present war. Considering the assigned grounds for the renewal of the war, he was of opinion, that at the beginning of this year there was strong reason for entering into negociations for peace. One great cause of the war was the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient guarantee for the security of Malta. An official statement in the Moniteur declared, long after the commencement of the war, that so long as England retained Malta, Buonaparte would not relinquish the sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy. Malta, however, was not the only cause of the war: the desire to resist the aggrandisement of France was another cause. Russia was as averse as we to the overbearing power and character of France. But Russia was unwilling to engage in the enterprise of reducing France, till Great Britain, which had little danger to
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apprehend, individually, from the result of the Contest, should be engaged. From this principle arose the coalition, which, two powers joined, a third ought to have joined. That coalition was defeated by means of the policy Prussia had thought proper to pursue. In the Spring of 1806, the continent afforded a very gloomy prospect. Austria was prostrate at the feet of France; Prussia was bound to France in an alliance, offensive and defensive. There was no longer any hope of saving Europe by war. The only remaining chance of saving it was by peace. The existence of Austria could be preserved by peace alone: peace alone could break the union between Russia and France, so detrimental to every hope of the deliverance of the world as an union cemented by the transfer of a part of his majesty's dominions. It was of little moment, which power had made the first overture. The first that overcame the mad and foolish pride of robbing nations of peace rather than make an overture, was entitled to the praise of both nations, and of all mankind. The great statesman, whose loss Europe had to deplore, (Mr. Fox) had conducted the earlier part of the negociation by the channel of a private correspondence, the substance of which was before the house. When he (lord Yarmouth) was introduced into the negociation, one great difficulty in the way of peace was the connection with Russia. That, however, might be got over on paper. But there was a difficulty with respect to Hanover, which was much less capable of management. It was known that we should spurn any peace which would not be coupled with the restitution of Hanover to our sovereign. But at the same time Prussia had been the unalterable ally of France since the revolution, and Hanover had been conveyed to Prussia, as well in reward of that alliance as in consideration of valuable cessions in exchange. Hence it was material, that the intended cession should be made matter of confidential verbal communication till the peace, for which it was to be ceded, should be ascertained and agreed upon. The communication was made confidentially, and treated of in letters from one friend to another. So he might speak of the ministers of foreign relations of this country and of France, though the countries were at war. Though both parties, actuated by a desire of peace, had covenanted for the cession of Hanover as one of the terms,

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yet it was required on one side, and agreed to as reasonable on the other, that, with a view not to dissolve the bonds which united France with Prussia, this agreement should not be disclosed, unless peace should have taken place. In the beginning of June, the proposal was sent by him to Mr. Fox. He declined putting it on paper, in regard to the confidential restriction imposed by the French government; and it was not till the day of his departure for France, with the answer of his majesty's government, that he was induced, on the representation of Mr. Fox that we were all mortal, and that in cases of such importance, some fixed record, independent of human casualties, should be preserved, that he was induced, on the faith of an assurance that the document should not pass the cabinet, to commit the substance of the proposal made to him, to writing. He did not mean to decorate himself with plumes to which he was not entitled. It might be true that one motive for choosing him to be the instrument of the negociation was his having been the bearer of the proposition from the French government; but, if it were inferred, as it had gone abroad, that he had been chosen on that ground only, without any regard to qualification, the inference was false. He regretted as much as any one, that the choice of his majesty' government had not fallen on some person of greater ability; but it was at the same time material to be known, that any other person in such a capacity would not have been suffered to remain 12 hours in Paris without producing his full powers. M. d'Oubril was not suffered to remain so long without producing them; and he believed it was a case unparalleled in history, that he (lord Yarmouth) was not called upon to produce his. He had hoped that the private letter of Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, conveyed by him, contained some memorandum of the substance of what he had communicated, and he told Mr. Fox he did hope so. He communicated to M.Talleyrand the wishes of this government; he made the demands he was instructed to prefer, in a fair, direct, and manly manner, and not with any artifice for the purpose of taking in. He did state the basis of the intended negociation to be, that of actual possession, and no objection was made to that statement then, or at any other time, it being always understood that, though the uti possidetis was the basis, it was subject to explanation and variation, accord-
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ing to mutual interest and convenience. The negociation might have proceeded on this understanding, were it not for the jealousies conceived by the political death of Mr. Fox, which was understood to have taken place the 17th of July. He had presented a note to assert the basis of the uti possidetis, as soon as he had communicated his full powers; and, in his second note, that basis was insisted upon as much as it could be. It was not easy in private quarrels to make an individual eat his words; but it was much more difficult to bring to that submission a man who was at the head of 500,000 troops. Hence the management to avoid a retractation, the word adopte was substituted for the word reconnoit, in the acknowledgement of the long-contested basis. Little progress was made in the negociation, and scarcely had an exchange of visits taken place, when M. D'Oubril arrived at Paris. It was of little moment now to enquire, whether the treaty signed by M. D'Oubril was the act of his own impropriety, or whether the refusal to ratify it arose merely from a change in the Russian ministry, subsequent to his setting out on his mission. He had given his majesty's ministers intimation by which they might have anticipated the possibility of M. D'Oubril's concluding a separate treaty; and in fact he did, two days after, sign a separate treaty. Then arose the difficulty of his (lord Yarmouth's) situation; and on this point particularly he trusted to the candour of the house for a patient hearing, though the statement was, he was aware, tedious. On Saturday morning, on getting up, he had read these words in a respectable newspaper, imputed to somebody he could not say who, "the noble lord (Yarmouth) having instructions not to produce his full powers, without a written acknowledgement of the desired basis, did think it proper to produce those powers." It was impossible he could have had such instructions. It was a known thing, that no paper could pass, till the full powers had been exhibited. He was instructed to present a paper, containing the sentiments of his majesty's government, to the French minister. But the French minister refused to receive it as a diplomatic communication, without an exhibition of full powers. The French minister desired him, in these circumstances, to go home and copy the note, and give it to him as an extract from a newspaper; and then he would answer it, under

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an engagement not to make the contents public. If his majesty's ministers were desirous to get a written acknowledgement of the basis in question, there should have been a letter on the subject to the French minister, which he would have been well contented to have delivered as a mere post-boy, and which must have called forth an answer. This answer he might have had authority to open, and thus a written acknowledgement of the basis might have been obtained, which would not have been denied except in a moment of anger. In the events that had occurred, even the agreement to cede Hanover might have been denied. He expected it would have been, and it probably would, had it not been for the war between France and Prussia. When he had received the communication, reflecting on his disclosure of his full powers, he had sent a justification on the most material points, as between him and his majesty's ministers. He did not conceive that what he wrote would come before the public, or he would have written a great deal more. He had no instruction to withhold his full powers, except on the ground of Sicily: and he considered the consent of his majesty's ministers to negociate for that island, as an evasion of the claim to its absolute, unqualified cession, which he had been before instructed to insist upon as a necessary preliminary to the farther progress of the negociation. The only question between him and his majesty's ministers was, the question of expediency; and his answer to what they urged against him on this point was, that he could not possibly have advanced a step further in the negociation without exhibiting his full powers. It would have been a question in that case with the French government, whether it should sacrifice the chance of peace with England, and with that chance the king's German dominions, to the preservation of its alliance with Prussia? or whether it would encounter a Prussian war for the chance of a negociation with England. In order to create an alternative in this case, he thought it necessary to give a real existence to the negociation by the exhibition of his full powers. If he had not taken that resolution, he should have been under the necessity of getting into a post-chaise, and proceeding, not to Boulogne, for he was no an accredited negotiator, but to some other part from whence his majesty's ministers
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might have had news of him, and of the issue of the negociation with which he was entrusted, in a fortnight after the close of the proceedings. He wished he had had provisional instructions how he should act in the event of the conclusion of a separate treaty by D'Oubril. Then he would have been "in utrumque paratus." But it was not till the fact of the signature of the separate treaty was known to all the courts of Europe, that instructions were sent to him how to regulate his conduct upon that event. Shortly after, lord Lauderdale was joined with him in the management of the negociation. He had too long an acquaintance with that noble lord, too high a value upon that acquaintance, too high a sense of his talents and his character, to feel hurt upon that appointment. He owned that some men might have felt themselves hurt at the conduct of his majesty's ministers in the matter; but he had too high a respect for the noble lord, to allow him to see that he felt himself from that time to be a mere dead letter; besides, he dreaded, that if he should withdraw from the negociation, new difficulties and fresh coldness, and want of confidence would arise. No one could doubt that the opportunity was favourable for the conclusion of a more glorious peace than had at any other time been offered to this country. We had broken off in the consideration of Dalmatia and Sicily. Our engagements with the emperor of Russia were the ground of this tenacity, and our engagements with the king of Naples, and the intrinsic value of the island of Sicily itself. It was not very easy to justify the breaking off a negociation so essential to the repose of two great nations, without the proof of having made every reasonable attempt to bring it to a favourable issue. What we thought due to the honour of Russia, certainly could not wear an unfavourable appearance when proposed by us, but we should be informed whether Russia herself set an equal value upon what we insisted upon, from a sense of her regarding it with equal estimation. When the king of Naples entered into the war, with a view to the common interests of nations, he was naturally defended by a great part of the disposeable force of this empire at a vast expence. He wished we could be told that we were at war, because the emperor of Russia disapproved of the terms offered for himself or for the king of Naples. What would the country think when we were told, that more glorious terms than had

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ever before been offered, had been rejected at a time when we had failed in every continental attempt, merely on the ground of this one impediment? But was it to be supposed that the king of Naples would not have been extremely happy to exchange Sicily, from which he might easily be expelled by France at a favourable opportunity, for some possession which the maritime superiority of Great Britain would always be sufficient to preserve to him, or some one which, by its own territorial power, would be sufficient to maintain itself? Dalmatia and Albania had been offered to the king of Naples, and it was not clear, if the attempt had been made, but the Balearic Isles might have been annexed to these: Dalmatia would have excited more jealousy if given to Russia, than if given to Austria or Naples. If it was clear that the war was continued because justice would not be done to our allies, there would be no doubt as to the resolution the house ought to come to; no more ought there to be if the war were continued on account of India. But if it was continued on the former ground, the identity of the sentiments and the reciprocity of the obligations of our allies, ought to be established. He had risen merely to rescue his own conduct from the very extraordinary situation of a public man, charged with violating instructions which he had never received.
Lord Howickthought he had stated, as distinctly as possible, that the noble lord had had no instructions to insist on a written acknowledgement of the basis in the first instance. As the noble lord stated, he was sent to carry a verbal answer to a Verbal proposition, He was instructed to obtain in this way an acknowledgement of the basis, and directed not to use his full powers till the French government should return to the basis on which it had set out. It was not a written but an actual acknowledgement that the noble lord had been instructed to claim, previous to the production of his full powers; and as soon as he should have produced his powers, he was directed to seek, in his first subsequent note, a written acknowledgement. Mr. Fox's letter went back to the original offer of the uti possidetis. The demand of Sicily was a violation of that offer; and it was on that ground that the noble lord was ordered not to proceed one step further, till that demand should be relinquished, and the basis established; unless that requisition were complied with, the noble
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lord was instructed to demand his passports in civil terms, and to come away. He was only surprised, that, after the explanation that had already been given to this effect, the noble lord should have thought the vindication he had entered into at all necessary.
Mr. Montagueregretted, that in the whole of this business he saw the complete success of the machinations of France. The French policy put him in mind of the policy of the ancient Turks, which was, to make short truces to secure conquests, and short wars to enlarge them. Considering the case on this principle, we might find that the French had procured the benefit of a truce, and used it to blind our government. The origin of the negociation was owing to the death of that great statesman, Mr. Pitt, the pilot who had weathered so many storms. He thought he saw that illustrious statesman contending with the demon who endeavoured to entice him, as Somnus did the pilot Palinurus of old. He thought he heard the demon address him in the words used to Palinurus:—
Iaside Palinure, ferunt ipsa æquora classem; Æquatæ spirant auræ; datur hora quieti. Pone caput, fessÓsque oculos furare labori.
And so forth. He did not clearly recollect the rest (a laugh). But however the pilot did not trust the demon, but said—
Méne salis placidi vultum fluctúsque quietos Ignorare jubes? Méne huic confidere Monstro?
But he would ask whether this conduct of Mr. Pitt was at all similar to that of Mr. Fox? Did Mr. Fox distrust the demon? No, he was earnestly desirous of making peace, and of this desire the French had taken advantage. He lamented the death of Mr. Fox. He was acquainted with him, and valued him as a man but during the last 20 years, he had always differed with him in politics, and in all that period, he had never altered his conduct, which, in these times of shifting and returning, was rather a singular instance. As to the first overture, he considered it as having come from Mr. Fox, for his letter had broken the ice. It was impossible that those glances and oglings at peace which it contained, could escape the notice of such a penetrating politician as M. Talleyrand. He did not like the expression of perfect attachment to the man who had been the disturber of Europe in the late wars. It was natural to expect that a fulsome letter should be sent in answer; but this was not to be shewn to John Bull. He was not to see that. In saying this, he did not mean to cast any

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reflection on Mr. Fox more than the nature of the case warranted. When the friendship of Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand began, he could not say. Perhaps it was when Talleyrand was here, in 1792, and had kindled the flames of war over Europe. He would pass over what had occurred previous to the arrival of lord Yarmouth. He acknowledged that Mr. Fox had exposed the sophistry of Talleyrand in a clear and manly manner. But, was it the policy of Talleyrand to obtain peace? No. Why then it was nothing better than a truce upon the principle before mentioned, to enable Bonaparte to make preparations for his attack on Russia and Prussia. Talleyrand saw that Mr. Fox was desirous of peace, and though he himself was not desirous of it, yet he knew how to make the most of the disposition manifested by Mr. Fox. He saw how he might distract, disappoint, and confound us in all our operations, and he had succeeded. Mr. Fox's letter might, for any thing he knew to the contrary, have been given to the French party at St. Petersburgh, with a view to create doubts in the mind of the emperor. He knew not whether Mr. Fox had the precaution to inform the emperor of Russia that he had sent such a letter. It was sufficient to say, that he would not conclude peace without Russia, but he ought to have given the emperor notice beforehand. Talleyrand might have even insisted, from that letter, that a negociation was going on, and thus alienated the mind of our ally. Did he stick at going beyond the truth on another occasion? This negociation or truce was merely a blind, to enable Buonaparte the more securely to prepare for war against Prussia, our natural ally. It was only by a co-operation with Prussia that we could attack France. Now, he said that this obvious policy was lost sight of in our late war with Prussia, in consequence of which we had no influence in councils, so that the late calamities happened to the king, and such was his situation now, that we must run all over Germany before we could find him out. Buonaparte conjured up a phantom which set Prussia and us by the ears, and which, like the dispute of Achilles and Agamemnon, brought upon us whole Iliad of calamities. We did not seem to be aware of this. Now it was well known that Talleyrand was a man of considerable experience, and he chose the noble lord opposite (Yarmouth) to carry on the negociation under circumstances
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where he was not a proper person for the business, because he was then a prisoner in France, and had hopes of freedom only through the medium of peace. This country ought not to have entrusted such a burthen to a man unaccustomed to diplomacy; he said this without any disrespect to the noble lord, but really it was not fitting that he should be sent to treat with such a man as Talleyrand. This was very imprudent, and it was not less ungenerous to censure the noble lord in this public manner, when he happened not to have pleased them. Now, as to the basis of the uti possidetis , the whole lay between the assertions of the noble lord and of Talleyrand. A written note would have made the matter clear, and it was very inconsiderate in the government not to have insisted upon this. But the fact was, that Mr. Fox did not like to put the question suddenly. He was afraid he might lose his favourite object; following the policy of a man with a woman, he did not ask her the question broadly at once, otherwise she might have slapped the door in his face. From the conduct of the other noble lord (Lauderdale) entrusted with the negociation, in 1792, and his intimacy with the Brissotines, who had since put their king to death, and from the patience with which he had listened to the projects for the destruction of England, within the walls of the national assembly, he could not think him a fit person to be charged with the interests of his country in this negociation. He blamed the dalliance in which these ministers were kept. Their situation was no better than prisoners, being refused the passports they demanded. It reminded him of a story he bad read in the newspapers the other day, of a gentleman, whom two prostitutes seized in Bond-street, and embraced so closely, one behind and another before, that he was unable to move; while a third picked his pockets. They had granted him the fraternal embrace, and held him so tightly, that he could scarcely move, much less stir a hand or leg. He absolutely could not move, so loving was this said hug. They treated him as Mr. Burke said they had treated lord Malmsbury. They told him stories, such as nurses tell children, "Poor baby bunting, the king is gone a hunting." Yes! he had gone a hunting with a vengeance; but then it was to hunt the royal tiger of Prussia, and he carried with him a train no less numerous than that which preceded the tiger huntings in the east, And

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then what happened? Why did not lord Lauderdale demand a categorical answer at once? He had only to say, "this is the basis on which we shall treat;" and then he would have had a plain answer, aye or no. In short, our ministers had been bamboozled from the beginning to the end. Mr. Burke had described the case of a person in Turkey, who, while he received a certain unpleasant application, begged those who inflicted it to accept "the assurances of his high consideration." This was the case with lord Lauderdale at first, but at length he seemed disposed to retort not only on the prince of Benevento, the prince of Ponte Corvo, and the duke of Berg, but even on the emperor himself. Otherwise he would not have been described as betraying unsuitable, imperious, and savage manners. He had no doubt that the noble lord had done his duty, but having sat quietly in the Cyclops' cave, while the thunderbolts of war were forging against his country, he could not think him a proper person to be entrusted with the negociation. He could see no benefit likely to accrue from sending a second negociator, after the changes in Germany, which rendered any peace that could be made, as the noble lord observed, totally insecure. He charged ministers with obvious inferiority to the late government, which they represented as inefficient. He blamed them for the deficiency of their own performance, and for the recall of officers who had done well, merely because they were objects of private pique. He joined heartily in that part of the address, which pledged every heart and hand to the defence of the country; and if there had been a disposition on the part of government, to sacrifice part of what was necessary to the balance of power, the ill success of that disposition afforded double motives for vigorous exertions in war. Now was the time to put forth British fortitude. In peace, nothing was so becoming as meekness; but when the trump of war was sounded, the sinews ought to stiffen, and the senses become fierce as those of a tiger. Let ministers be vigilant and attentive, and they should have his support; not uniform, unqualified support, for he thought it right to keep them alert by admonition and castigation, but qualified and rational support, according as they should be found to deserve it. Many of them he esteemed personally, and he particularly requested the noble lord opposite (Howick) "to ac-
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cept the fullest assurances of his high consideration."
Sir Thomas Turtonrose and delivered his maiden speech. He said, he did not think he should satisfactorily discharge his duty to his constituents, to that house, or to himself, if he did not candidly avow his sentiments, upon the present most important question, and state as candidly the reasons upon which he grounded those sentiments, and which should alone influence his vote this night. He said, that in his view of the conduct of our ambassadors, the story of their proceedings might be summed up in a very concise way—that they were in this country when they should have been in France, and that they remained in France long after that period at which they should have dated their departure. He was anxious to assure the house, that the grounds upon which his sentiments of the general conduct of ministers during the late negociation were rested, were deduced solely from the papers now before the house; and the observations he had to offer to the house upon those papers he should divide under three distinct heads; first, from the commencement of the negociation to the time of lord Yarmouth's arrival. The second period to which he should call the attention of the house was from the arrival of lord Yarmouth in this country, to the refusal of the court of St. Petersburgh to ratify the treaty of M. d'Oubril; and 3dly, from that period to the rupture of the late negociation. As to the first, he would in general observe, that the first question that would naturally suggest itself in the opening of any treaty for peace between the belligerent powers would be, what further advantages were to be expected by either party in the continuation of hostilities—such treaties should be conducted by a policy conceded to by all nations, and indeed in itself justifiable, the contracting parties concluding upon terms mutually and respectively advantageous. In this point of view, he could not be brought to think that the conduct of our ministers in managing that treaty was marked with that jealousy and caution which were so necessary in any communication with a cabinet so proverbial for diplomatic intrigue as that of the enemy; at the same time he was willing to confess that if there was a man in the empire peculiarly fitted for negociation with any continental power, more especially for conducting a treaty with France the great and illustrious statesman whose

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loss was so generally and sincerely deplored, was that man. Though a long, and indeed an uniform opponent to the measures of that great man, this admission justice required from him, and he felt no reluctance in acceding to it; nor, as he never opposed him but when he thought him wrong, so he did not now panegyrize him without reason. He had said, that he (Mr. Fox)was best calculated to negociate with France: and why?— because the artifice, finesse, and machiavelian tricks of the court of Saint Cloud could be effectually opposed only by the candour and manly simplicity of Mr. Fox. He did not look upon a negociation on the basis of the treaty of Amiens, as so very alarming as it was described to be out of doors. Though Bonaparte might gain ships and colonies and commerce, he could never gain a growth of English sailors, and therefore we had nothing to fear. The superior skill and elegance of our fabrics would always secure the commerce and manufactures of our country. He was of opinion, that the assassin whom Mr. Fox denounced, was a spy of the French government, like Mehée de la Touche. Only three points were agreed upon in the long negociation that had taken place, the integrity of the Turkish Empire, the cession of Hanover, and the right of Great Britain to interfere with the arrangements of the Continent. We refused, however, to treat further without Russia, and on what ground? We had no treaty with Russia, except the treaty of concert. That was a treaty of subsidy and of military operations. In this sense it could not be in force, for since the battle of Austerlitz, no Russian army had acted, and therefore no subsidy could be claimed. The basis of the uti possidetis, subject to exchange and cession, had been acted upon. It was impossible to imagine any thing so vague as the principle of a peace honourable to both parties; for the honour of each, and what that honour required, was entirely in its own conception. He condemned the employing of a person, not used to diplomatic transactions, in the conduct of the negociation. If an experienced person had been employed, the basis would have been early acknowledged, or the negociation would have been broken off. The negociation was meant but to entrap; and hence the aversion to written documents. The proposition to indemnify the king of Naples by the seizure of the Hanse Towns, ought to have been rejected with indigna-
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tion. He thought the reasons assigned by the noble lord for producing his full powers, ought to acquit ministers on that ground. The noble lord said, in his first note to general Clarke, that he was ready to discuss the basis of a general peace. Hence it was to be inferred, that the basis was not considered as settled. He should have thought that lord Lauderdale would have been instructed to bring this matter to a conclusion. Till the 20th of April absolutely nothing was done, and the whole six months passed in negociation were nugatory. Though it might be a question, whether M. d'Oubril had exceeded his powers in concluding the treaty he had signed, there could be no doubt that he had authority to treat separately; and there were even rumours that negociations were going on at Petersburgh at the present moment. He thought we should consider, therefore, whether Russia had a claim on us for all this attention, amounting to a refusal to make peace without her, even when there could be no assurance that she was as decidedly with us. As to the question respecting Hanover, there was no Briton that was not prepared to make any sacrifice for its recovery, if the loss of his majesty's electoral dominions would produce a wrinkle on the brow of his declining years. He could not agree with the noble lord, that, if we had secured Sicily and Dalmatia, we might have given up all our other conquests. He saw no reason why we should not have claimed Naples as well as Sicily. It appeared to him extraordinary, that the question of indemnity for the king of Sardinia, who had been abandoned at the treaty of Amiens, had been in this instance revived. He was sorry to differ from his hon. friend, with respect to the policy of our supporting Prussia. The whole history of that power for the last 60 years, shewed, that her invariable policy was directed to her own aggrandizement. She had been the eternal enemy of Austria, and the uniform friend of all the different successive governments of France since the French revolution. He was glad to have observed in the address on the speech at the opening of the session, that there was none of that desponding language of exhausted means and dilapidated resources, used on other occasions, contained in it. The resources of the empire were said to remain unimpaired, and if they were unimpaired, it was owing to the measures of that great statesman now no more (Mr.

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Pitt), to whose politics he had himself been always attached. The sinking fund, which had been the work of that illustrious statesman, was that to which this country owed all its prosperity. It was the record of his services; and well he might have said, when bequeathing such a boon to his country;
"Non omnis moriar, Multaque pars mei vitabit ruinam."
He hoped the honourable gentlemen opposite would not hereafter give way to such desponding language as was contained in the letter of the noble lord opposite (Howick) to the lord mayor, on the subject of the capture of Hamburgh. That noble lord appeared somewhat partial to these communications; he did not mean to say, however, that he was influenced in that respect by the cacoethes scribendi. The hon. bart. commented with some severity upon the contents of the letter alluded to. He recommended to the noble lord, not to make such communications in future; and concluded, by assuring the house of his gratitude for their indulgence, and that, though he had trespassed at some length upon their patience, he had not uttered a single sentiment that was not sincerely and conscientiously the result of his unbiassed judgment.
Mr. Whitbreadrose, and spoke nearly as follows:—Mr. Speaker; it was my wish to have spoken immediately after the hon. gent. (Mr. Montague) who preceded the hon. bart. (Sir T. Turton), for the purpose of offering a few observations upon a speech abounding with classical quotations, and full of fanciful illustration; but which, I confess, appears to me not to have contained the sort of reasoning likely to produce conviction upon the members of this house; far less to convey sentiments agreeable to the friends of either of those illustrious men, whose loss we severally and deeply deplore. The hon. gent. has informed us, that having twenty years since taken his seat in the house of commons, he has been absent from it for the last ten: but, sir, one would have thought it impossible, that he should not have heard of the political transactions which have taken place within that period; that he should not have known that the animosities and contentions of which he was witness, had long since ceased; that the dissentions which he has endeavoured to revive are obsolete; and that at a most critical period of the affairs of this country, one of those great rivals represented to his sovereign, however unsuccessfully, that the other was
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the person most fit to be joined with him in the councils of his majesty. Had that advice been accepted, the destination of Mr. Fox would no doubt have been to that office from which he has so lately and unhappily been torn by the hand of death.—Neither, sir, was it necessary for the hon. gent. to recur to those invidious topics, which in his estimation disqualified the earl of Lauderdale from acting in the capacity of plenipotentiary from this country to France. The leaders of the different revolutionary factions in France have expiated their crimes by their blood. But if to the various qualifications for such a situation possessed by my noble friend; his extensive information, his indefatigable industry, his acknowledged talents, and his inflexible integrity, could be added an actual acquaintance with the characters and persons of some of those with whom he might have to transact business of such importance, surely in the eyes of any reasonable man, it would decide the preference in his favour.—It is not, however, sir, merely for the purpose of animadverting upon these objectionable parts of the speech of that hon. gent., or of refuting his argument that I have risen to-night, but also for the purpose of expressing opinions, the influence of which upon my mind I am not able to controul. So far from entering into the sentiments of the hon. gent., I entertain those of a nature entirely opposite, respecting the negociation the details of which are now under the consideration of the house. I cannot concur in the language of the Declaration which it has been recommended to his majesty to publish, that the failure of the negociation is attributable solely to the injustice and ambition of France; neither can I concur in voting an address which tends to annihilate all hopes of peace to this country and the world.—No one, sir, who may have thought it worth while to look at my situation personally, or to attend to the conduct I have adopted from the formation of the existing administration to the present day, can doubt of the pain I must experience in the execution of the task I feel myself called upon to perform.—My known love and enthusiastic veneration for the dead; my close connexion with, and affectionate friendship for the living; my active and zealous support of measures which I approved, but for which I was not responsible; my public declarations on the subject of this very negotiation, upon the

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faith of those whom I trusted; must, I think, secure me against the slightest imputation of acting from any motives but those of unmixed and sacred duty.— Sir, I will confess that in conformity to the sentiments I have always expressed in this house, peace is the object nearest my heart: and I need hardly explain, that by peace, I mean peace achieved with honour. One, therefore, of the principal sources of gratification to my mind arising out of the change which took place some time since in the councils of his majesty, was the conviction that the first opportunity of effecting a pacification with France, would be seized and improved by the persons now in power. I looked with an eager eye for the first symptom that might indicate the possibility of so joyful an event. I listened with an anxious ear for the first favourable rumour: and when I caught the grateful news of a correspondence actually on foot, I drew happy omens of the event, from my firm persuasion that all the parties engaged were sincere; and from my belief that peace sought in the spirit of peace is seldom sought in vain.—When the scene had closed, when all hope had Vanished, my disappointment was keen, but my confidence was unabated. Upon the faith I had in my noble and hon. friends, and most especially in my noble friend, and relation below me (lord Howick), I believed that peace with France had not been concluded, because it had not been possible to conclude it with honour. Certainly, then, I came to the consideration of the papers before you with the strongest feelings of partiality. I expected and was disposed to find the cause of the English government triumphant; the conduct of the government of France without justification or apology.—If, with such previous impressions, I am not satisfied that England is undeniably in the right, and France as completely in the wrong; if I think that, under any imaginable circumstances, it is the height of impolicy to declare that all hope of peace must be abandoned; how can I vote for the Address which is now proposed to you, or how can I refrain from stating the arguments which induce me to differ from those I so much respect and admire, and whom it has hitherto been my pride to support?—Nothing which I can have to utter will be more painful than this, that I think I perceive in the beginning and the conclusion of the negociation recently terminated, a
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character perfectly distinct.—The house, sir, has already heard a great deal of the details contained in these papers, and I should be unwilling to detain you by any unnecessary recurrence to the particulars of what has passed; but I trust I shall be excused if in my present situation I should dwell somewhat minutely on those parts of the transaction which at least justify my own conduct to myself. I have spared no pains to inform myself, I have omitted no opportunity which has offered of being either persuaded or convinced, but in vain.—I may be allowed, Mr. Speaker, to indulge in the effusion of my heart, relative to the opening of the correspondence, with the French government. Sir, it was not any disposition to ogle for peace, as it has been called by the hon. gent., which induced Mr. Fox either to invent (for to that length it has been carried by some) or to give information of the circumstance which gave rise to his first letter to M. Talleyrand. It was the spontaneous act of that noble and generous heart, impelled by no motive but that of the pure and exalted benevolence with which it at all times overflowed.—Had he then thought peace as impossible as I am sorry to say my noble friend has now represented it to be; nay, had it happened at a much earlier period, and he could have foreseen, and have been sure that the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Auerstadt could have been prevented by the perpetration of a deed so foul; he would have rejected it with the same indignation, and made the communication, which might counteract it, with a feeling of abhorrence as strong, and an alacrity as decided as in the instance before us. As an admirer of the qualities of Mr. Fox's head and heart, I am glad such an opportunity was afforded of exhibiting to mankind his genuine philanthropy in its brightest colours.—This letter, sir, however, produced the correspondence, which forms the first part of the papers submitted to our consideration: and in all these letters, written by Mr. Fox's hand, there is exhibited a model of frankness, simplicity, wisdom, and resolution. It is obvious, that the proposal to negotiate, came from the French government, and that the basis suggested was the treaty of Amiens [No.4. of the Papers laid before Parliament, p. 93.] By the address of Mr. Fox, this basis, which as he truly said, might have been the source of endless difference and dispute, was immediately superseded, and the true

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basis of all treaties proposed; namely, "that the treaty should be reciprocally honourable to both countries and their allies." [No. 4, p. 94.] At the same time, it was explicitly stated by Mr. Fox, that England could not negociate unless Russia was admitted as a party to the negociation. France, as she had an undoubted right to do, refused to consent to that proposition. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the vague but ingenious reasoning with which the French minister attempted to shake the purpose of Mr. Fox, whose jealousy became justly alarmed by the perseverance of M. Talleyrand; lest France should entertain the idea so derogatory to the dignity and the right of Great Britian, of excluding her from all interference in continental affairs. An explanation, however, was produced on that head, perfectly satisfactory, by a declaration that the French emperor wished to erect it into a principle, "that each country should have an interest and interference in all that concerns the continent of Europe." [No. 10, p. 105] Still the point of joint or separate negociation was not adjusted, and the correspondence had ceased from the 26th of April to the 2d of June, when it was resumed by M. Talleyrand in his letter of that date. In answer to which, Mr. Fox stated that the difference between France and England as to the mode of negociating was a difference of form rather than substance. But, sir, it must be acknowledged, had joint negociation been conceded by France, that Mr. Fox would have advised its being commenced the next hour. [No.7, p. 97.] Sir, I would refer to the Papers before the house, for the truth of the statement with which I have troubled you, and I would then ask of my noble friend, whether up to the moment to which I have brought the transaction, there was any other sine quá non than that of joint negociation? The unhappy term of uti possidetis had neither been introduced nor thought of and most unlucky in my estimation it has been that it was ever used, for it has proved the bane of the negociation.—Sir, I must here repeat, that if a letter had come from the French minister conceding the admission of Russia to the treaty, the negociation would have gone on, and might upon a free discussion of terms in the hands of Mr. Fox (had it pleased God to spare his invaluable life) have been brought to a happy issue.—A new æra commenced
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by the arrival of lord Yarmouth from Paris with a verbal communication from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox. The substance of that communication is given in the written note of the 13th of June, [No. 12, p. 109.] and unquestionably if we had received no information but from the contents of that note, I must have been compelled to say the basis of uti possidetis was not proposed by the French government at all. Fortunately however, sir, for himself, and for the satisfaction of the house, my lord Yarmouth is present at our deliberations, and has upon this and a former occasion thrown great light upon the subject, and much assisted us in forming a judgment upon the case. Sir, my lord Yarmouth has told us that M. Talleyrand proposed the basis of uti possidetis in those express terms, and at the same time gave full assurance of the disposition of France to make specific concessions to England of the highest national importance.—Hanover was to be restored unequivocally and without compensation. Mr. Fox instantly adopted the proposition to treat upon this basis. The difficulty with regard to Russia having been removed by the arrival of her plenipotentiary at Paris, and it being understood that the two countries, although treating separately would not sign treaties separate from each other or be parties to any arrangement in which the honour of each country, as well as her interests, was not guarded by the stipulations of the other.—My lord Yarmouth returned to Paris, and, from whatever causes, found the French minister receding from the propositions with which he had charged him. In these circumstances lord Yarmouth conducted himself with propriety and dignity. [No.14, p. 111.] He recalled to the recollection of M. Talleyrand the conversation which had passed between them, the truth of which was acknowledged by the French minister; and held out no hope of a favourable issue, under the altered disposition of the court of France.—In this situation he addressed the letter to Mr. Fox, which produced the spirited and indignant dispatch of the 26th of June [No. 15, p. 112.] which my noble friend has informed us was the last written by the hand of Mr. Fox. Much stress, sir, has been laid by my noble friend on the arguments urged by him as tending to shew that Mr. Fox would not have consented to proceed in any negociation unless the uti possidetis was acknowledged by the French govern-

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ment as the basis of the proceeding. Sir, I cannot find any ground for that assertion in the whole of this dispatch. True it is that Mr. Fox desired lord Yarmouth to recall the French minister to his own original proposal: but he emphatically states that "Sicily is the sine quâ non," and although he argues with great warmth upon the conduct of the French government, and even says that it was upon the faith of the uti possidetis having been agreed to as the basis of the negociation that lord Yarmouth was then at Paris; he does not direct him to break off the negociation unless that basis was again recognized. He sums up the whole of his reasoning in one remarkable paragraph: "The result of what I have stated to your lordship is this, 1st, That Sicily is a sine quâ non; on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place. It is clearly within his first opinion delivered to your lordship; it is clearly within his last description of places, which are reciprocally possessed by the two countries, and cannot in all probability be recovered by war."—But, sir, can my noble friend find in any part of this dispatch any other ground stated upon which the discussions are to be finally and peremptorily closed? On the contrary, is not lord Yarmouth told that the moment the single point of Sicily is conceded, he may open the full powers (with which he had been furnished, in consequence of a suggestion from the French government) and that upon the refusal of that single point those powers were to be with-held. Further, sir, I would put it to my noble friend, whether upon the contents of the letter from lord Yarmouth to Mr. Fox, of the 19th, and Mr. Fox's answer of the 26th, the inference is not undeniable, that it was not the intention of either government to insist upon the absolute recognition of the abstract basis of the uti possidetis as preliminary to negociation, or even to negotiate strictly upon that basis.—Why, sir, the state of actual possession on both sides must have been intended, if on either: and yet we find that in the relation of the very first conversation held by the English plenipotentiary, on his return to Paris, with M. Talleyrand, (wherein he urges upon that minister the correctness of the terms of the message he took to England) he gives Mr. Fox to understand that he had asked for the ces-
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sion of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, as well as an alienation of some parts of the French emperor's Italian states to form a provision for the king of Sardinia, and at the same time had solemnly protested on the part of England against cessions in the West Indies, or elsewhere. [No. 14, p. 111]. That lord Yarmouth did not act without authority, in making these demands of France, if it could be otherwise supposed, is to be collected from the answer of Mr. Fox; who expressly directs him to "mention the questions of Na"ples and Istria again, but not to state "them as conclusive reasons against agree"ing on preliminary articles." [No. 15, p. 112.] Where then is this abstract basis of the uti possidetis to be found, as indispensably necessary to further proceeding? Not, sir, in any part of the papers, which I have so carefully searched; not in the narrative of lord Yarmouth, which he has so candidly given to the house; not in the able reasoning, or eloquent speech of my noble friend. After all I have read, and all I have heard, I am bound to say I do not find that the uti possidetis was, up to this period, the sine quâ non of negociation.—In a short time, sir, it will appear from the papers, that Sicily itself ceased to be the sine quâ non of negociation. For after the rejection of the absurd proposition relative to the exchange of the Hanse Towns for Sicily, a second proposal having been made by the French government, and an intimation held out, that if Sicily was not ceded for some equivalent, the meditated changes in Germany would be published, the Russian negociator M. d'Oubril requested that the English cabinet would temporize rather than abruptly terminate the negociation, and it was admitted that an equivalent might be found for Sicily. This is acknowledged in a dispatch from the English cabinet to lord Yarmouth, dated July 18, [p. 118.] and at the same time a compensation is named, which I confess it appears to me almost as unreasonable for us to expect that France should consent to, as it was extravagant in France to suggest the exchange of the Hanse Towns for the island of Sicily.—On the 20th of July, notwithstanding the warm and repeated remonstrances of lord Yarmouth, the separate treaty was signed by M. D'Oubril with France, the terms of which appear to have been highly disgraceful to that court, and injurious to the cause of her allies.—But, sir, here it may

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not be improper to remark, in order that justice may be done to all parties; which it is essential should be done, in order that we may obtain a just view of our situation; in order that we may stand, both now and hereafter, clear before the world at large; and especially that we may deserve from Providence, under whose aweful eye we act, that protection which we implore, I say it is but proper to remark that in signing a separate treaty with Russia, France did not violate any principle of good faith with this country. She had expressed from the beginning a determination to treat separately with the powers to whom she stood opposed, if she could effect it; and in so doing she had neither deceived nor injured Great Britain; nor, indeed, is want of good faith upon this score attributed to France in any part of the correspondence. With Russia it is impossible not to observe the case was different; and certainly her plenipotentiary had acted in a manner most inconsistent with every principle of justice and honour. The situation of lord Yarmouth was thus rendered almost beyond precedent difficult and distressing, and I cannot help saying that he had hitherto conducted himself in a manner which did him great credit; nor do I think that his subsequent conduct deserved the sort of censure which was thrown upon him by the king's ministers at the time, and which has been in some degree insisted upon by my noble friend below me to-night. True it is, that lord Yarmouth did at this crisis, upon the demand of M. Talleyrand, produce the full powers which had been intrusted to him on the 26th of June, on the express condition that they were not to be opened unless the French government would relinquish its claim to Sicily: but it must be recollected that in the interval, compensation for Sicily had been suggested by France, and the possibility of it not only admitted by England, but a specific mode of compensation pointed out. So that the circumstances of the negociation were changed altogether: and if under such circumstances lord Yarmouth, contrary to the letter of his instruction, did in consequence of the remonstrances of M. Talleyrand, as detailed in his lordship's letter of the 30th of July, produce his full powers, though not strictly justified in point of diplomatic etiquette, surely there was such palliation, if not complete ground of vindication to be found, as might have saved him from reproach on the part of his employers; more especially

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now it turns out that nothing injurious to this country of any sort arose out of his conduct. For although it is suggested in the correspondence that the negociation was in some sort, of necessity continued in consequence of the step taken by lord Yarmouth; by the declaration it would appear that it was the determination of the king's government at this period to send a minister duly authorized, to Paris.—Sir, my noble friend and his colleagues have accused the French government as having manifested an unbecoming elation, in consequence of the advantage they had obtained, and of having greatly increased in their demands. Upon this point I beg to refer to the short abstract from lord Yarmouth's dispatch of the 21st of July, wherein he tells his court, that "he can "perceive, that the terms of France are in"creased, but still not so much so as the "sudden defection of Russia had led him "to apprehend. Hanover, Malta, the "Cape, and India remained pure and un"sullied." [No. 23. p. 123.] Was it reasonable to expect that France would not increase in her demands in consequence of the event which had taken place? did we not afterwards rise in our demands when it was found that Russia would not ratify the treaty signed by her minister and is it wise or dignified in a great nation to represent as an act of gross injustice on the part of her enemy, a line of conduct, which under a change of circumstances she herself has actually adopted? If we could but weigh the conduct of the adversaries with whom we treat and our own in the same equal scale, how much would it conduce to establish the tranquillity, and render permanent the happiness of mankind!— To this observation, sir, I might have been led by the comments of my noble friend on the communication made by lord Yarmouth of the conference which took place between his lordship and general Clarke after the exhibition of his full powers, in which conference [No. 25, p. 125.] the English plenipotentiary conducted himself with exemplary discretion, sagacity, and moderation; in no instance committing the high character with which he was invested, giving no hope to the French plenipotentiary that England would depart from the basis on which the negociation was avowedly instituted, at the same time in a discussion of many hours, seeking to ascertain the extent of the demands of France, and in what manner they could be modi-

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fied. Sir, I would ask of my noble friend, how the most experienced diplomatist could have conducted himself in a manner more satisfactory, or could have evinced greater skill in a situation of extreme delicacy?—Now, sir, it becomes necessary to observe upon that part of the speech of my noble friend wherein he states the increased and extravagant pretensions of France, as arising out of the successful issue of her schemes with the Russian minister; and surely it is not just to take the terms mentioned by general Clarke, in this conference with lord Yarmouth, as the ultimatum of the French government, far less to assert that the French insisted with great elation upon their success with Russia, and in consequence of it demanded terms to which England could not accede. That a considerable advantage had been gained by France, no man can deny, and that such advantage would not be improved was unreasonable to expect. But the words of general Clarke are extremely cautious. He says that it would entitle the emperor to more advantageous terms. That, "the "emperor would be authorized to with"hold some of the great points, but having "repeatedly said the contrary, though not "in an official manner, he would abide by "it."—My noble friend has justly remarked, that in the subsequent explanation of these great points by general Clarke, the proposed cessions of Hanover, Malta, and the Cape, were burthened with conditions wholly inadmissible: and my feelings revolt at them as much as those of my noble friend. The difference between us is this, that my noble friend considers these propositions to have been seriously intended as the ultimatum of France, whilst I consider them only in the nature of preliminary discussions, and if those discussions had proceeded, terms of a different nature, and perfectly admissible terms might have been proposed.—Here, sir, I would beg to refer those who are disposed to contend that the uti possidetis had been hitherto, and was now considered as the sine quâ non of the negociation, to the note prepared by lard Yarmouth for his discussion with general Clarke, and which was read by his lordship to the general. [No. 25, Inclosure D. p. 129.] You will there find that the English plenipotentiary states himself to be authorized to "discuss the basis, and to give full effect to the reciprocal desire of the two countries." Now surely, sir, if there had been but one indispensable basis upon
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which England would condescend to proceed, no discussion could arise upon the subject. The simple question was, Yes, or No? as was put by Mr. Fox relative to the joint or separate negociation in his correspondence with M. Talleyrand, and by the same minister also in the case of Sicily.—However, sir, to revert to the account of the conference itself. I maintain, that my noble friend is no more entitled to say that the terms mentioned by general Clarke, were the only terms which could have been obtained from France, than that the French minister would have been justified in affirming that the cession on the part of the French government of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, together with a part of the emperor's Italian dominions to the king of Sardinia, (p. 113) were the only terms upon which England would consent to make peace with France. Sir, I confess that such laxity and indulgence towards ourselves, and such strict interpretation of all that comes from the opposite party, seems to me, with great submission, neither to be in the true spirit of conciliatory treating, nor to be founded in equity or wisdom.—We now come to a period when the news of M. D'Oubril's conduct had reached England, together with the account of the step lord Yarmouth had consequently taken, and there is submitted to us a dispatch [No. 26, p. 129] bearing Mr. Fox's signature which unfolds the sentiments and views of the English cabinet at this juncture.—I cannot refrain from remarking by the way, that it is extraordinary to find M. D'Oubril's conduct in signing the separate treaty always referred to the threat held out about the affair of Germany; whereas the French minister from the beginning of the first correspondence with Mr. Fox always insisted that Russia had shown a disposition to negotiate separately, and lord Yarmouth himself says, (p. 122) "that from the first "hour he met M. D'Oubril in France he "thought he was come determined to "make a peace good or bad, with or with"out Great Britain."—Sir, there is something to me unintelligible in the conduct of the Russian plenipotentiary in the whole of this affair, and it would be improper perhaps to ask, or to give any explanation upon the subject at this moment. But to this I think there must be an universal assent, that no effort was left unemployed by lord Yarmouth to prevent M. D'Oubril from taking the step so justly deprecated.

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—In this situation of things it was judged adviseable to add another minister to the earl of Yarmouth; and the earl of Lauderdale was selected for the purpose; a person perfectly qualified for any station where talents, activity, and integrity are required, and whom from motives of personal regard and friendship I should have wished to see placed in situations of eminence and distinction. If I shall be compelled hereafter to disapprove of that part of the negociation in which he was principally concerned, lord Lauderdale may no doubt appeal to his instructions as furnishing at once the best vindication, and the highest authority for his conduct.—About the same period we have been given to understand by lord Yarmouth, an impression was created in France most unfavourable to the issue of the conferences, by an event which was deemed to have taken place, I mean the political death of Mr. Fox. Alas! sir, how fresh causes of grief and lamentation for the loss of that illustrious man daily arise! how much more than ever are we now bound to deplore his untimely death! but was it unnatural that the French should conceive it probable his death would make a considerable difference in the British councils as to the great object of peace? Sir, notwithstanding, my noble friend, who has been during the whole course of his parliamentary life for 20 years the zealous advocate, and the Most able and eloquent supporter of those enlightened and glorious principles which actuated Mr. Fox; notwithstanding, I say, he and others of his warmest friends and admirers were to be found amongst the advisers of his majesty, was it surprising that the French government should be somewhat diffident of other servants of the crown, who, whatever their sentiments might now be, had certainly upon former occasions not evinced the readiest disposition for peace with the chief of the French government. Sir, from my soul, I believe that every member of the English cabinet was sincerely desirous of peace. I have publicly expressed that conviction, and I repeat it: but am I to be surprised that France had not the same confidence as myself? and ought not peculiar caution to have been taken at a juncture so critical, to avoid giving the slightest appearance of a change of sentiment on the part of this country? The path was plain and obvious; I do not think it was pursued. That there had been
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in the case of Sicily, and possibly in some other points, something of tergiversation and chicanery on the part of France, is undeniable; but if it was fit to pursue the negociation at all, it was fit to pursue it in the spirit of conciliation and peace, both as to form and substance: and to judge from his manner of treating, I must say, it appears to me that lord Lauderdale's instructions were not judiciously drawn.—Sir, from the papers before you we find that lord Lauderdale arrived at Paris on the 9th of August and in a dispatch, dated on the 9th, he informs this government of interviews which had taken place between the English plenipotentiaries and general Clarke, to whom had been added M. Champagny as coadjutor, which had been announced to the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, with "something like an insi"nuation that an unfair advantage had "been taken by the English government "by the appointment of two ministers on "their part." [No. 35, p. 114.] I confess, sir, that I wish lord Lauderdale had omitted so invidious a communication to his court. It does not appear in the true spirit of amity, that any thing so vague and uncertain, as "something like an insinuation" should be seriously noticed and recorded. I am the more confirmed in the wish I have expressed, by adverting to the dispatch from the English cabinet, dated the 14th of August, [No. 38, p. 163] wherein the expression I have quoted, is so strongly taken up as to make it the ground of lord Yarmouth's recall from Paris.— Sir, the conference which took place immediately after lord Lauderdale's arrival at Paris is rendered for ever memorable by the delivery of a Note, (p. 145) signed by the new English negociator, doubtless, in strict conformity to his instructions, which indeed, did raise the uti possidetis into a sine quâ non, and threw such an in pediment in the way of pacification, as was not surmounted till the period for a temperate discussion of terms was passed; the whole of the intermediate time having been lost in a fruitless dispute upon a barren proposition, which France nevertheless, as I shall hereafter shew, made an effort to surmount, an effort which might unquestionably have been highly improved. This same proposition we ourselves at last abandoned, for the purpose of doing that, which we ought to have done in the outset, namely, of considering the terms upon which a peace honourable to both countries might be ef-

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fected.—Sir, my noble friend has paid to lord Lauderdale the tribute due to him from ministers for the faithful discharge of his duty; for the spirit with which he upheld the honour of the nation confided to his care, and for the ability with which he performed his various functions. I wish not to detract from that praise. They have both now, and in their dispatches addressed to him, done him no more than justice: and I am sure but little impression can have been made on the house by that part of the speech of the hon. gent. to which I have before alluded, wherein he tried to expose the noble earl to ridicule for the easiness with which he suffered himself to be duped, and the tameness with which he suffered the character of the nation he represented, to be insulted. Sir, to uphold the character of a great country is the first duty of a negociator, but not the only one. There is a skill which will combine firmness with conciliation, and obtain the object sought for without the slightest departure from the true feelings and expressions of national honour.—Sir, the note in question, at the same time that it demands the previous recognition of the basis of actual possession, admits, "that an indemnification "may be found for Sicily, and that pro"positions may be accepted for the ex"change of territory between the two con"tracting parties upon just and equal "principles." (p. 148). Sir, may we be allowed to ask, why not, as in the ordinary transactions of life, go at once to the substance, and dispense with the formalities, the recognition of which cannot conduce to any good purpose? Why not proceed to discuss those exchanges which it is admitted may be made, instead dwelling upon a preliminary admission, which, when obtained, would not, in the slightest degree have accelerated the work? The recognition of a technical basis, which, whatever was her original proposition, you knew that France was now indisposed to admit, which, at all events, she would not be compelled to acknowledge, and which it does not appear to me to have been necessary or adviseable to send a fresh plenipotentiary merely to urge. But whatever may have been the course which I, as a person ardently wishing that every facility, consistent with national faith and honour, should have been given to this great work, might deem most proper, certain it is, that the course which was actually pursued after the arrival of lord Lauderdale at Paris,
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created a difficulty which delayed its progress during the whole of that valuable and irreparable period, which elapsed between the 7th of Aug. and the 18th of Sept.—My noble friend has commented with just severity upon the Note which was delivered by general Clarke to the English mission, (p. 150.) in answer to that which I have just mentioned. Undoubtedly, in that paper is contained great intemperance of expression, much vague and false reasoning, much exaggerated statement, and a great deal of assertion as to the possessions which the French emperor would retain, provided the basis of uti possidetis should be adopted. However Moravia, part of Hungary, the whole of Austria, &c. might have been his by the right of conquest, they had been restored by treaty, and, at the time of opening the correspondence, were not in the possession of France.—But in this note, the basis of actual possession is positively and violently rejected, and it is said that France will treat upon that basis alone, which was proposed by Mr. Fox, namely, "that the treaty should be ho"nourable to each party, and its allies; "and at the same time of a nature to in"sure, as far as should be in their power, "the future tranquillity of Europe, accom"panied by an acknowledgement in favour "of both powers, of the right of inter"ference and guarantee in continental "and maritime affairs." —According to the instructions given, no alternative was left to the English plenipotentiaries, after the step which had been taken, and the reception it had met with, but to demand their passports, and immediately to quit Paris. Passports were accordingly demanded, but the demand was eluded, as is said in the Declaration, by an unusual and unexplained delay, from the 9th to the 11th of August. The conduct of the French government in acting so directly in opposition to all established forms, in violation of that perfect freedom which must be allowed at all times to accredited ministers sent to treat with a hostile power for the great object of peace, has been deservedly reprobated. But I think the hon. gent. who spoke early in this debate, bore much too hard upon the noble earls in attributing to them any blame for their conduct at this crisis. They insisted upon their passports, and reiterated their request in a laconic, and forcible manner, such as could give no reason to doubt of their being sufficiently alive to the insult which was

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offered to their mission, and of the necessity there was for full and immediate apology and redress. But, sir, the 11th of August produced another note, signed by MM. Clarke and Champagny, far different in its language and tenour from the intemperate paper which had been before delivered, and which seems to me to have been calculated to remove all the difficulties created by the unfortunate adoption of the two baneful words which destroyed the power of treating.— Sir, I beg the favour of my noble friend, and of the house, to peruse with attention the following paragraph, contained in this note, signed by MM. Champagny and Clarke. "In laying down the principle of uti possidetis, have the English plenipotentiaries had it in view to propose a means of exchange and of compensation? If this is the meaning, the emperor adopts it, because it appears to him conformable to the two principles already agreed upon by both parties." And having considered the import of this declaration, I request them to compare it with the paragraph contained in the first note signed by lord Lauderdale, part of which I have before quoted, "He cannot consent to treat upon any other principle but that of the uti possidetis, as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France; at the same time he desires it should be well understood, that the adoption of this principle will not prevent him either from listening to any just and adequate indemnification to his Sicilian majesty for the cession of Sicily, or from accepting any proposition for the exchange of territory between the two contracting parties, upon just and equal principles, such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of the two countries." (p. 148.) Having compared these declarations, I would put it to my noble friend, to the house, and to the world, whether there is any substantial, nay, whether there is any formal difference between them? Why then did not the negociation proceed? the obstacle was removed; why was it revived? the simple answer, yes, on the part of England; which was the true, the obvious, the politic, the only answer to be given to the question of France, would have broken this unhappy barrier to treating between the two countries, and would have allowed of an immediate investigation, whether such terms as are described in the note of lord Lauderdale could be actually accepted
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or offered. Here, in my opinion, a golden opportunity was lost, not indeed of making peace; I cannot tell whether peace would have been the issue, nor am I called upon for an opinion upon that point; but of ascertaining whether peace could be made. But, sir, as this opportunity, amongst others, was missed, it is impossible for me to say, that the continuation of hostilities is entirely owing to the injustice and ambition of France; and that "with her altogether rests the awful responsibility." [Vide Declaration, p. 212.] It was not possible, certainly, for the English plenipotentiaries to return an answer to this note without an explanation on the subject of the passports which had been so unwarrantably withheld. They consulted their dignity; a previous explanation was demanded; an apology was made; and an answer was returned. It was in adverting to this part of the papers, I believe, that my noble friend indulged in some sarcastic remarks on the French ministers, which I think, as well upon general principles, as upon their application to this particular case, might better have been avoided. He taunts these gentlemen with the possible difficulties of their situation, in having a double negociation to conduct; the one at Paris, and the other at St. Cloud.—To allow for mankind in situations of difficulty is one of the first principles of wisdom and of charity; and the more arduous the situation, the greater the allowances must be. Taking it for granted then, that the persons employed by the chief of the French government were desirous of peace, which from the evidence of the papers in my hands I sincerely believe; if they had to allay some irritation, to conquer some prejudice, and to controul some violence, surely it would be more fair to applaud endeavours than to make them matter of reproach to those who were engaged in the task. Supposing my noble friend to be connected in administration with persons who had not all the same hearty dispositions to peace as himself, his difficulties in negociation would certainly be increased; but the minister opposed to him would be a very unskilful negociator who did not discover and allow for such disadvantages; and, if he himself were truly desirous of peace, did not dissemble his knowledge of them, and by every means in his power lend his assistance to their being overcome. I am not afraid to say that such allowances ought to be made for the minister and the

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plenipotentiaries of France. After the explanation, however, with regard to the passports, had been given, a note was delivered by the English mission, which at the moment when one word would have settled the whole of this preliminary difference between the two countries, puts them at a greater than ever. It is said, "That the "undersigned have only to regret that "they cannot, consistently with the in"structions of their government, do other"wise than insist upon the previous re"cognition of this principle." (p. 162.)—Why, sir, had not the principle been recognized or adopted (for my noble friend has given us to understand that the latter word was substituted for the former by the hand of the French emperor himself,) in the very note to which this was an answer? Sir, I cannot, I confess, comprehend the refined punctilio which still adhered so tenaciously to the empty form, when the invaluable substance was allowed to perish. Soon after this lord Yarmouth was recalled from Paris. A long interval took place from the delivery of the last note on the part of England, which, I cannot omit repeating, was conceived in error: and during that interval, it for the first time appears that a suspicion was entertained by the English ministers, that Russia would not ratify the treaty of M. D'Oubril. The instructions given in the letter signed by Mr. Fox, supposing that event should happen, are consistent with all the principles of policy and good faith; and it is here not an improper place to observe, that the strict adherence to the terms of our treaty with Russia, however I may disapprove of the treaty itself, is highly deserving warm and universal commendation.—At length, sir, a conference [No. 43, p. 172] was desired by the French plenipotentiaries on the subject of the English note of the 11th of August, which took place on the 27th of the same month, and was totally ineffectual. A second conference was pressed for by MM. Clarke and Champagny, and agreed to by lord Lauderdale, who in the interval between the two conferences held a long conversation with M. Talleyrand; in which some strong expressions were used by the French minister relative to the determination formed by the emperor, not to cede any part of the French dominions, and a surprise, not altogether unwarrantable, I think, was expressed by M. Talleyrand, (p. 173) that no impression was made upon lord Lauderdale, and that he did not feel
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that in obtaining Malta, the Cape, and Hanover, England would make a glorious peace. Still the unfortunate basis stopped every avenue to discussion; and is again insisted upon in a paper delivered by lord Lauderdale on the 29th (p. 175). On that day the conferences were renewed, and although, according to the account given by lord Lauderdale himself, the tone of France was wonderfully lowered, and she appeared willing to make large concessions; his lordship's mouth was shut, and all debate upon the substance of the thing was precluded, by the old and worthless demand of the previous recognition.—Sir, I deeply lament the fatality which attended the introduction of this indispensable condition. I lament the false sense of punctilious honour, which did not use the means of relieving the difficulty which occurred on the 11th of August. I lament its anxious influence at this moment, which prevented the two countries from ascertaining whether their long and bloody differences could be reconciled or not. I lament that lord Lauderdale, at the conclusion of a conference, which, according to his own account, was of a nature more pacific than any which had previously taken place, should have felt himself under the necessity of drily asserting, that he must terminate his mission (p. 177); and I should indeed have been astonished if he could have withstood the warm remonstrance of M. Champagny, and have absolutely refused all further intercourse.—On the day proposed for further conversation, M. Talleyrand announced to lord Lauderdale, in a manner acknowledged to have been frank and candid, that news had arrived of the refusal, on the part of Russia, to ratify M. D'Oubril's treaty [No. 46, page 180]; and the orders of the emperor to inform his lordship that this event would dispose France to make peace upon terms more advantageous to England than she would otherwise have offered. Whatever any hon. gent. may see of trick, contrivance, finesse, or chicane in the conduct of France in every other part of this history, I think no one will be so unfair as to deny, that in this particular point before us at least, the conduct was natural and ingenuous. At the same moment, sir, it appears that the intelligence of this event reached England; and a dispatch with instructions was forwarded to the English plenipotentiary at Paris, signed by earl Spencer.—Lord Lau-

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derdale very properly deferred any renewal of the conferences till he should have received such instructions as the English cabinet might think proper to send in consequence of the event which had been then so recently made known. These instructions were communicated in a dispatch signed by Mr. Secretary Windham, dated Sept. 10, of which we have an extract. [No. 48, p. 181.]—Sir, I must beg to call the attention of the house most particularly to this paper, because it completely bears out many of the arguments with which I have troubled you in the earlier part of my speech. But I cannot help observing upon the remark made in the first part of this extract on the communication made by M. Talleyrand to lord Lauderdale. Sir, it was the avowed policy of France to detach you from Russia, if she could:—to adhere to Russia was not only your avowed policy, but your bounden duty; and whatever might be her wish, France could now less than ever entertain the hope that she should be able to effect the separation. The uti possidetis is mentioned in this dispatch as the basis on which his majesty had originally intended to treat; and as the basis to which he still adheres: but the tone in which it is mentioned, is very different from that in which it had ever been talked of since lord Lauderdale's first arrival at Paris. Its previous recognition is no longer made an indispensable preliminary to negociation; and indeed how should it, when in the same dispatch we are informed that in the outset of the negociation every effort had been made by England to obtain the restitution of Naples to the king of the two Sicilies? Further, it is recognized that in the original instructions to lord Yarmouth, Sicily, was a sine quâ non condition; and, sir, I again repeat and maintain, that it was the only sine quâ non insisted upon, or even mentioned by Mr. Fox in his dispatch of the 26th of June; the last he ever wrote. This alteration indeed now appears to have taken place; that whereas at the solicitation of the Russian minister, compensation for Sicily had been admitted as possible; the views of Russia had been ascertained on that point, and Sicily itself was again become not only essential, but indispensable to any arrangements for peace, with both the allied powers.—Sir, I contend that a new turn was now given to the negociation, and that this dispatch was calculated to effect that which ought to
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have been effected in the very outset; and accordingly by lord Lauderdale's answer, which is dated on the 18th of Sept. (No. 49. p. 184) we find that he had at length come to the discussion of terms. A conference with M. Talleyrand is there detailed, in which it appears not Only that "if the difficulties in respect of form could "be got over, that he did not think any "material objections to terms would oc"cur, but that the interests of Russia "might be treated for by lord Lauderdale "himself," waving all formalities on the subject; and thereby removing the only difficulty which had occurred to Mr. Fox in his early correspondence with M. Talleyrand against an immediate and avowed negociation.—Sir, the difficulty of the basis of actual possession was removed: but the French minister was given to understand that there would be a rigid adherence to the terms which had been communicated to him both for England and Russia. Sir, on that I shall, for the present, make no observations; but I must remark that the note presented by lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated Sept. 13th, (p. 186) preparatory to this conference, fully bears out the argument I have founded on the dispatch of Mr. Windham, and lord Lauderdale's answer to that dispatch. Would to God, sir, that at the first arrival of the English plenipotentiary at Paris, he had been instructed to hold such a conference as the one just observed upon! Then there was time to have discussed, considered, referred, conciliated, and agreed. Events were now pressing forward which cut off the possibility of further communication, which extinguished all hope of softening acrimonious feelings, of reconciling opposite and jarring interests, and finally restoring tranquillity to the world. And why not then as well as now? if the previous recognition of an abstract principle was necessary then, why was it abandoned now? and if abandoned now, why had any stress been laid upon it at all? In a former part of my speech, I looked forward to the period at which I am now arrived; and was I not justified in Saying that the unfortunate introduction of that technical term of diplomacy was the bane of the negociation?—Sir, we are afterwards informed that M. Talleyrand, in another conference to which he was admitted by lord Lauderdale, and in which he evinced much personal civility, and disposition to please, presented a note, which

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from the manner of his presenting it, [No. 50, p. 189] does not appear to have been altogether such as he could have wished to have had committed to him, and which certainly did contain, according to his own phrase, both evil and good. In that note there is much unnecessary and irrelevant matter; much that marks prejudice and irritation; much that is objectionable; but there are many points stated, of which it would have been well if the allies could have taken advantage. Sir, it is stated that "the emperor adheres to the following proposal. That the negotiations between France and England shall continue, and the minister of his Britannic majesty shall be at liberty to introduce into the treaty either as a secret article, or in any other form which would answer the same end, whatever he may conceive would tend to reconcile the differences between the two countries." "That the emperor will not hesitate to "make some sacrifices, in order to acce"lerate peace, and render it durable."—"That France does not pretend to dic"tate either to England or Russia, any "more than she will be dictated to by ei"ther of those powers." "Let the con"ditions be equal, just, and moderate; "and peace is concluded."—Sir, it would be injustice not to allow that the answer returned by lord Lauderdale (p. 192) to this note was dignified and moderate; but, sir, matters with Prussia were unhappily drawing to a crisis. The time in which temperate and repeated discussion might have relieved all difficulties, was irrevocably gone: and lord Lauderdale was informed of general Clarke's departure from Paris, to accompany the emperor. A conference, however, soon took place with the remaining minister, M. Champagny, [No. 51, p. 193.] when at length the terms on which France would consent to make peace, were opened by that gentleman. These were, the cession of Hanover and its dependencies to Great Britain: To confirm the possession of Malta: The absolute possession of the Cape: The confirmation of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahee, &c. in the East Indies. Also Tobago: The Balearick islands, as an indemnity for Sicily; and an annuity to the king of the two Sicilies from the crown of Spain. The answer given by lord Lauderdale was, that no proposition respecting an exchange for Sicily could be attended to, and that he was bound to insist peremptorily upon all
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the demands of Russia. In the subsequent conference which took place on the 26th of Sept., [No. 52, p. 197.] the demand on the part of Russia was again insisted upon, and the French plenipotentiary said he had no authority to make any offer for Russia, further than the full sovereignty of Corfu. This was positively rejected, and the negociation declared to be at an end. Notwithstanding M. Champagny again pressed for another conference, and held out the prospect of receiving fresh instructions.— Another conference was actually agreed to by lord Lauderdale, but whether it took place is not, I think, quite clear: and if it did, we are not informed of the particulars. Neither indeed is it material, for the emperor had quitted Paris, to put himself at the head of his army, and I perfectly agree with my noble friend, that when that event had once taken place, every hope of success in negociation was at an end, although perhaps the mission need not have been declared terminated, till the ultimatum of the emperor had been received— This was the position taken by my noble friend: not that which has been ascribed to him by the hon. gent. that all hope of peace was over, when the Confederation of the Rhine had been framed and published; for it is sufficiently obvious, that however the allies may have disliked that act, whatever character may be ascribed to it, the correspondence and negociation was never for a moment stopped on that account.— Thus, sir, I have taken a review of most of the papers submitted to our consideration by order of his majesty, longer and more tedious than I could have wished, but which has appeared to me necessary in order to justify to myself, to my friends, and to the country, the conclusions to which I have come, and the part I feel compelled to take. Sir, it remains for me to take some notice of the terms which were offered at last by France to this country and to her ally; and the propriety of our rejecting or accepting those terms for ourselves, and insisting upon all that Russia thought proper to claim for herself. Hanover, that jewel of the crown, as it has been represented, without which its lustre would be incomplete, was ours. The honour of the country therein was secured. Malta was ours. This surely was an important point. What, sir, was the original object of the war in which we have been engaged since 1803? Malta. If Malta could have been obtained, war would have

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been avoided. At least we had the positive assurance of that fact, in the papers which were then laid upon the table of this house. True it is that the first step taken by the persons who then directed the counsels of his majesty towards the rupture of the treaty of Amiens was the king's message of March, 1803, relative to the movements in the ports of the enemy. But the communication contained in the message did not, at the time, nor has it ever since appeared to me to be justified by any thing which could be shewn to have taken place. Indeed, I should grieve for the character of England if the imputation cast upon her by the hon. gent. to whose speech I have frequently alluded, could have credit with the world. He has told you, that England, bound by the solemn obligation of a treaty which she had concluded but a few months before; pretending an earnest desire for the continuation of peace, saw a moment in which she thought the powers of the continent might be excited against France, and that she sought a pretext for war, in order that she might persuade, by her example, those powers to join again for that chimerical object, which had been twice attempted and twice defeated. Sir, it cannot be so. It is impossible to believe it. The Cape of Good Hope, the cession of which by England at the treaty of Amiens had been so much censured, was ours. Every point of consequence in the East was yielded; and Tobago, perhaps of little importance in itself, but which having been originally an English colony was, on that account, an acquisition honourable to this country, was also to be given up. What was there remaining for England, as England, to ask? for I shall presently come to the stipulations for Russia. Surely for wealth, power, or the occupation of our naval force for their defence, we wanted no further accession of colonial possession. Sicily, sir, has been represented as an object important to British as well as to Russian interests; and my noble friend has laboured the question not a little upon that ground. Sir, I do not profess, upon the present occasion, either to concede or to contest this point: but I may be allowed to say, that an indemnity for Sicily had been admitted by the king's servants as possible, and if that time had been given for the consideration of the question which was wasted in useless discussions, such an indemnity might, I think, possibly have been found. That the real inclinations of the
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king of Naples must have been consulted upon the subject, is beyond dispute. We are bound by no treaty to that unfortunate monarch, but having been the cause of his breaking the treaty he had made with France in the autumn of 1805, having taken him under our protection, having occupied his dominions for his defence, no consideration upon earth could, I am sure, have induced the king's present ministers to have coerced, far less to have abandoned that monarch in the manner in which other princes to whom we were bound by the most solemn treaties, have been abandoned in the course of the sanguinary wars which have been waged with little intermission for the last 13 years. I confess I cannot lay great stress upon that part of the argument of my noble friend which presses the necessity of retaining Sicily for the purpose of supplying Malta. The confined territory of Malta, sir, I should conceive, might without any difficulty be furnished with provisions of all kinds from the Surrounding Mediterranean states; and with the present increased population of Sicily diminishing so materially, if not destroying her power of exportation, we might be induced to ask, How is Malta supplied now?— Dalmatia has also been a little touched upon by my noble friend, as an English object, in consequence of the facility it would give to France to foment disturbances in the Turkish dominions, the possession of which by France would facilitate her views upon our eastern territories. Sir, I confess that I cannot quite keep pace with my noble friend. For however right and proper it may be in all cases to guard against contingencies. I do think there are some so remote, as not quite to deserve the attention sometimes bestowed upon them. Besides, sir, however we may talk of the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, an object frequently insisted upon as dear to France and England in the course of these papers, we all know that the councils of the Porte are, at all times, either Russian or French. We conceive it to be our interest to support the preponderance of Russia at the Porte; but we know that the policy of Russia long since conceived, is not abandoned; that her desire for the possession of the Turkish provinces is not abated; that she will acquire that possession whenever the opportunity shall offer; and that whenever the acquisition of those provinces shall be made by any state really powerful, if the way to

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India be laid open, the way to India will be travelled. But, sir, it seems that Sicily and Dalmatia were objects so important to Russia, that she would not yield an iota upon either, and bound as we were by treaty, in that case we could not recede. Be it so. State it then, that we are at war because Russia would not allow us to make peace. That however is not said to be the case: and indeed, I think there can be no doubt, that if England deemed the pretensions of her ally unreasonable and extravagant, it would have been competent for her to have used such arguments, and to have had recourse to such means as might induce her to modify her demands. In the case before us, however, lord Lauderdale insists upon all the demands of Russia, with as much perseverance as he does on those of Great Britain. We are to suppose then, that the ministers of this country deemed those demands such as Russia was entitled to expect.—It may then be fair to canvass their justice, and to express our opinion on their propriety. I think, sir, they resolve themselves into two; Sicily and Dalmatia. I will not trouble the house by a repetition of what I have said on the subject of Sicily. It is for persons better and more accurately informed than I am to determine the point: but as an exchange for Sicily had once been talked of, I might perhaps have hoped that such an exchange could have been found as would have afforded a just equivalent, and with the perfect and unconstrained concurrence of the unfortunate monarch most interested in its fate. Sir, before I say a word upon the subject of Dalmatia, I beg to recall the recollection of the house to one of the speeches of Mr. Fox, charged with those maxims of moral and political wisdom, which fell in such copious abundance from his lips, and which speech will, I am sure, be long recollected by those who heard it; I mean that delivered on the 21st of June, 1805*. Wherein he vainly endeavoured to incite the persons who had then the government of the country to avail themselves of the mediation of Russia to effect a peace; and almost in a spirit of prophecy dwelt upon the evils which might arise from the line of conduct which was unhappily adopted. Mr. Fox's recommendation was to place yourself in the situation of France at the time you treated with her, and moreover, to let the
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terms you asked, to use his phrase, be moderate in the extreme. Now, sir, placing ourselves in the situation of France, let us see whether we can deem the demand of Dalmatia moderate. How had Dalmatia been acquired by France? At the point of the sword. By the treaty of Luneville, Dalmatia was left to Austria. What had happened subsequent to that treaty? the peace of Amiens had been made and broken. The chief of the French government, on assuming the imperial dignity, had addressed to this country a proposition for peace. He was answered by a letter, signed by lord Mulgrave; that his majesty could not attend to any proposition of that nature without consulting Russia. For what purpose did it afterwards turn out that Russia was consulted? for the purpose of obtaining her mediation to pacify the world? No such thing. But for the purpose of forming a general coalition against France, and again to revive the chimerical project of her subjugation. Into this coalition, framed under evil auspices, ill concerted, without bonds of union, without a due preparation of those means acknowledged by the framers of it to be necessary to its success, Austria was reluctantly dragged. Its formation was kept as secret as a scheme of that magnitude could be. It burst unexpectedly upon France. Its explosion was not to depend upon the conduct of the French emperor. Terms of peace were talked of amongst the coalesced powers, to be proposed to France; such as they knew it was absolutely impossible for France to accept: and after having decided upon asking what they knew she could not give, they determined to attack her at the season most convenient to themselves, without waiting for the result of any negociation at all. Sir, I refer to the Papers laid before parliament last year, for the truth of every assertion I have made*. Sir, unhappily, we know the issue of that project. The emperor of France marched his army from the coasts of the channel, and in a few short weeks, a series of successes then unparalleled, and terminating in the battle of Austerlitz, had destroyed the coalition, and laid Austria again prostrate at his feet, her capital in his possession, and her condition ten times more abject than ever. The peace of Presburg was made, and the peace of Presburg gave Dalmatia to France. Was it probable then that France would

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cede Dalmatia within a few months after she had so acquired it? Was it reasonable to expect she would? or to require it peremptorily of her?—Had the success of Russia in the war been such as to entitle her to make large demands on France, or to make it reasonable to expect that France would listen to great pretensions on her part? Sir, placing ourselves in the situation of France, I think we should say decidedly, no. Sir, my noble friend has truly stated that Dalmatia is not necessary to France, either for the integrity of her dominions, or for her defence. Is Dalmatia necessary to Russia, for either of those purposes?—But France, it seems, has been desirous of possessing herself of that province, as a point of offence in war both to Austria and Turkey, and for the still more dangerous purpose of fomenting disturbances in the provinces of both those empires in time of peace. Granted. But, sir, after such repeated and signal defeat of the one power, such a career of victory of the other, can we well be surprised, talking soberly, and considering the matter impartially, that France should, when almost every thing was in her power, select such possessions as would most effectually disable Austria from the like attempts; and if Austria, Russia, and England, conjoined, could not prevent the peace of Presburg, which gave Dalmatia to France, could it be hoped that she, for the sake of Russia, would do that for Austria, which Austria, with the assistance of Russia, could not obtain for herself?—But then, it is a point from which the independence of the Ottoman empire may be attacked. Granted again. Sir, of the independence of Turkey I have said as much as may be necessary; but if Russia is jealous of French influence in Turkey, is not France equally jealous of the influence of Russia? and in the hands of either of those powers, would not Dalmatia be equally a point of offence in war and intrigue in peace against that empire? What rational ground of hope, then, that you could obtain this province for Russia? But it has been insinuated, if not stated, that the object was not to obtain Dalmatia for Russia, but only its evacuation by France. Why surely, sir, no one will be brought to believe that if France could have been persuaded to march out, Russia would not have marched in. And even the undefined state in which such an arrangement, if practicable, would have left it, must have laid the foundation of future
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strife. But it so happens, that the stipulations of the Treaty of Presburg have never been fulfilled, and that the Cattaro has never been evacuated. A still stronger ground for supposing that, if ceded by France, Russia would not relinquish her hold; and a still stronger ground for believing, that France would never agree to the cession.—The result is, that if Russia insisted peremptorily upon her terms, and we agreed with her as to the propriety of her demands, peace was not attainable, because we asked that which, placing ourselves in the situation of France, we would not, I think, have given.—Sir, without presuming positively to contend in opposition to the authority of my noble friend, and those who are connected with him in official situation, that the terms proposed by France were such as ought to have been accepted; but as far as Great Britain alone is concerned; surely it was no disgraceful or inglorious offer that was made; and to Great Britain and her ally, the offer was such as may not speedily be made again; and the probability, or improbability of obtaining better terms than those which you refuse, is always a consideration of the utmost importance to those who are engaged in negociation. But, sir, I maintain that the terms stated even in the last communication between lord Lauderdale and M Champagny, far less those originally talked of by general Clarke to lord Yarmouth, and upon which my noble friend has more particularly dwelt, cannot fairly be stated to be the ultimate terms of France. To the last hour, M. Champagny, with an eagerness which to me evinces sincerity, presses for further communication hopes for fresh instructions. In the conference detailed by lord Lauderdale in his dispatch of the 19th of September, (p. 189), M. Talleyrand, in answer to a question proposed to him, says, "The emperor will leave every thing to his plenipotentiaries." All tends to shew, that if the time which elapsed from the commencement of the negociation, had been duly improved, it might have been known what the ultimate terms of France were, and then only could you have said with truth to the world, that it was solely owing to the injustice and ambition of France, that peace between the two countries had not been concluded. —Sir, it has been thrown out in the course of debate, that at all events we have had a good escape; for that as no peace between England and France could be deemed

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worth our having, which did not hold out a prospect of security to the continent, seeing what what happened to Prussia, we may congratulate ourselves upon not having concluded a peace, which would have been immediately followed by a war between that power and France. Much has been said of the injustice and the violence of France in her present contest with Prussia; and even in the speech from the throne we were told that Prussia was forced into the contest by France (p. 15). Sir, I was unwilling to express any difference of opinion on that day, but undoubtedly I could not concur in the justice of that position. Of Prussia, in her present state of abasement and dejection, one cannot speak as one would have done in her more prosperous moments. But the truth is, that having, during 13 years, evinced any thing rather than magnanimity of conduct, she rushed into a war with France, with an inconsiderate folly, amounting almost to madness: and for what?—Why, sir, according to the confession of Prussia herself, because she had evidence that France was negociating with England, and that the restoration of Hanover was to be a condition of the treaty.—It was not any act of recent aggression on the part of France; not the Confederation of the Rhine, not the lengthened abode of the French troops in Germany; but because Hanover was to be taken from her, that she did that desperate deed which has been succeeded by events so terrifying and stupendous. We, ourselves, then, sir, were engaged in an act which provoked the open hostility of Prussia; and what would have been the situation of the continent, had a treaty been concluded between the allies and France, of which the restoration of Hanover to the crown of Great Britain bad been a condition! If Prussia had refused to yield it, we must have united with France to have wrested it from her. Sir, my noble friend has asked, whether we could have continued to negotiate after the war had begun; and what security we could have had, that the French emperor would have checked his career after one victory, and whether he would not have followed up his successes to the extermination of the Prussian monarchy. Sir, in the other alternative; if peace with us, had produced war with Prussia, what security could we then have taken or obtained, that the same events should not have taken place? and yet by the very preliminary of our negociation with regard to the king's German domi
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nions we risked it. Sir, it may be said, that I am putting a most improbable, if not an impossible case, for that if a treaty had actually been concluded, Prussia would have acquiesced. In all reasonable probability, sir, she would. But seeing what we have seen, it may be fairly said she might not; and to have resisted France and England united, would have been scarcely less insane, than to have gone to war with France at the time, or in the condition she did.—Sir, lord Yarmouth tells you, that M. Talleyrand sought a mode of secret communication with England, lest Prussia should take umbrage at the proposition respecting Hanover. It was known that she would not part with it, except by compulsion; and certainly her acquisition of that province was as much contrary to every principle of honour and good faith, as any that was ever made by any power at any time.—Much, sir, has also been said of the insincerity of the French, and of the dupery of the government of this country. I believe, on the contrary, and upon grounds which appear to me rational and satisfactory, the ministers of France to have been sincere in their wishes for peace. I believe the chief of the French government to have been desirous of it: and if not so, I am labouring under a great, but I hope, a pardonable error.—Sir, I am upon principle, as well as from feeling, in all transactions of life, public as well as private, an enemy to perpetual and endless suspicion. It is not the character of true wisdom, and it impedes the progress of all human affairs. That a man should be upon his guard against the machinations of the bad, and the artifices of the designing, is most necessary. Certainly, one would not employ a person who would be likely to become the dupe of others, to conduct any affairs of importance; but there is such a thing, as for a man to become the dupe of his own distrust, and that is in my opinion the most disgraceful as well as most fatal of all kinds of dupery:—Now, sir, what motive could France have had to desire negociation with England, but that it should terminate in peace? My noble friend has been unjustly accused of having delayed expeditions, and withheld armaments, in consequence of my lord Lauderdale's procrastinated stay at Paris; the 'truth of which charge he has denied. I believe, what he says, that we lost nothing by it; but if that be so, France gained nothing by it. Why, sir, if no correspondence had

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ever been entered into, would not every accession of power to France have been made, as it now has been made? would not the Rhenish Confederation have taken place? could we by any means within our power have delayed, much less have prevented it?—Till good grounds, then, can be shewn to me, to believe that France was insincere, I must trust to her sincerity in this case: and I think the papers before you justify me in so doing. Some topics, sir, have been urged by my noble friend, which I confess, I had rather he had not used, because I am loath to hear, and more especially from him, any thing like the sentiments which have always called for my decided reprobation in this house. Sir, the mere character of any person in power distinct from his conduct, can never be made a motive of action, and the reproach of ambition, injustice and rapacity, is, alas! but too applicable to more than one country, to make it any thing like a substantial reason of itself for a continuation of hostility with any. Is it upon the theatre on which they are now contending, —is it in Poland, that Russia and Prussia can with any face reproach France with injustice, rapacity, violence, and cruelty? When England looks at her Eastern empire, does she feel herself sufficiently innocent to throw the first stone? These charges may serve mutually to exasperate and inflame; they may tend to revive that acrimonious feeling, which M Talleyrand in his first interview with lord Yarmouth, told him had so happily subsided. This rooted and rancorous hatred and animosity, which may be created even in one country towards another, can never afford just ground for war; but it may prevent, and I fear, within the last few melancholy years, has materially contributed to prevent, the restoration of the blessings of peace.—Such, sir, are my sentiments; and I could not help delivering them to the house, and to the world, however painful the execution of the task has been: and with those sentiments, it is quite impossible for me to vote for the Address which has been proposed by my noble friend. Sir, we are told in the declaration of his majesty, that he looks with confidence to the issue of the contest, the continuance of which he laments. The address holds out no hope of peace, it includes not even the word; and the speech of my noble friend gives me no consolation on that head. Good God! if peace be not the issue of the con-
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test, whither are we hurrying? Contemplate, sir, if you can with composure, these two mighty empires exerting their utmost efforts, each for the destruction of the other; and think upon it, if you can without horror, that before the contest be ended, one or the other must be destroyed. Sir, this is a catastrophe I cannot bring my mind to anticipate, without sensations of the deepest anguish: it is a prospect which I do not think, with the blessing of God, it is necessary, even in the present disastrous state of the world, to look forward to. If it be, how trifling are the woes and calamities already suffered by mankind to those which are yet to come!! Sir, I for one will cherish the hope that even in the days of some now living, peace may be achieved, and I will not contribute to increase the difficulties in its way, by saying or allowing that it is impossible.—In the last note of the French minister, dated from Mentz, (p. 201) wherein Great Britain is forcibly reminded of the elevation to which France has been raised by the combinations to destroy her power; and the successes of the new contest are predicted, we are told that amidst all "the chances of war, the emperor of "France will renew the negociations upon "the basis laid in concert with the illus"trious minister, whom England has lost." Russia in her manifesto, published after she had refused to ratify the treaty, signed by D'Oubril, declares her readiness to enter into immediate negociation. Why should Great Britain alone refuse to open her ear to any overture? Why should she alone reject all hope?—I am a friend to peace, I opposed the commencement of the first war with France. There never was a moment during the whole of that contest in which I did not wish and think that efforts might have peen made for its termination. I supported with the little strength I had, every attempt that was made towards a pacification. At the conclusion of each, I anticipated that the offer at the next overture would be far inferior to what had been rejected at the preceding. I expressed my deep regret at the rejection of that favourable opportunity which was spurned in the year 1800. I supported the treaty of Amiens, and expressed my strong disapprobation of its rupture. I am sorry indeed that the offer of 1805 was answered by the mouth of the cannon. I deeply regret the conduct of some parts of the negociation which has just been concluded; and although it has been unsuc-

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cessful, I will not yet despair of peace; will not consent to shut the gates of mercy against mankind—Sir, I am aware, that my opinions are peculiar, perhaps they may be singular. I hope, however, some gentleman may be found so far to concur with me, as that the Amendment I shall have to propose, may be seconded; and that it may be recorded upon the Journals of parliament, that there were some (however few) who thought it unwise in policy, and false in principle, to assert that peace with France was, under any circumstances, impossible: but, sir, if I stand alone, I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of putting into your hand, this paper, which contains the amendment moved by my noble friend, upon the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, and I have selected the words as the most expressive of my sentiments and feelings on the present occasion. Sir, I move to leave out all the words of the Address after the word end, in the third paragraph for the purpose of inserting the amendment: "To assure his majesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his majesty in calling forth the resources of the united kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war, in which we are involved, and to pray his majesty that he will, in his paternal goodness, afford as far as is consistent with his own honour and the interests of his people, every facility to any just arrangement, by which the blessings of peace may be restored to his loyal subjects."—The motion was seconded by Mr. Johnstone. The question upon the amendment having been put, it was negatived without a division. The main question upon the Address was then put, and none of he ministers shewing any disposition to speak,
Mr. Canning rose, and said:—I cannot think, sir, that I need offer any apology to the house for having deferred till the very last moment obtruding myself upon your attention. It was not until the last question now in your hand, was about to be put and decided, that I could believe it to be the determination of his majesty's ministers to suffer such a speech as we have just heard from the hon. gent. opposite (Mr Whitbread) to remain unanswered; to suffer their own conduct in a transaction so momentous as that which we are this night considering, to go forth to the world under the imputations of their enemies abroad, and the inculpation of their friends at home, without an attempt to set themselves right
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in public opinion.—A complete vindication I did not expect from them, because there are some particulars in their conduct of the negociation, with respect to which the hon. gent. has accused them but too justly: but as to the general result of the negociation itself, they have a case which I think they can maintain; and which they owed it to themselves, to this house, and to the country, not to abandon in dumb despair, without an attempt to defend it against an attack so powerful, and coming from a quarter from which I think they must feel that attack with more than common severity.—If, indeed, the speech which has just been delivered had come from this side of the house, I could imagine that the ministers might have passed it over in silence; that they might have considered the charge of not having done enough towards making peace, directed by us against them, as one which they could safely leave unnoticed; as one to which we could not be supposed to have thought them seriously liable. I freely acknowledge that my suspicions of their conduct in the negociation were pointed quite another way.—But coming from one of their own body, from a friend and champion of their former politics, himself still apparently maintaining opinions which they—which the noble lord (Howick) especially,—has (much to his own credit, and to the advantage of his country) relinquished; opinions which have dictated so many motions in this house for peace and for negociation in the course of the last 12 years; many of them made by the noble lord himself, and all of them supported by him, and by the hon. gent. under circumstances much more unfavourable than those under which the late negociation has terminated; coming, I say, from such a quarter, and urged not only with so much ability, but with such peculiar force, from long personal and political friendship, and from that former similarity of opinions, I do think the speech of the hon. gent. required an answer. And I should have thought also that the noble lord (Howick) himself would have sufficiently felt the pride and the comfort of the situation in which he now stands, the advocate for the justice of the cause of his country against France, not to have omitted an opportunity of vindicating that cause against the objections of his hon. friend.—Since, however, neither the noble lord himself, nor any of his colleagues, have thought it worth their while to endeavour

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to counteract the impression which the hon. gent.'s speech is calculated to produce, I feel myself obliged (though very reluctantly at this moment) to state my opinion upon the question now before the house. I feel myself the more especially bound to do so, because agreeing with the hon. gent. in many of the premises which he has laid down, I am proportionably the more anxious to disclaim agreeing with him in his conclusions. I am anxious to repeat what I have before said upon this subject, that however the negociation may have been mis-managed, it has not, it cannot have been, so mismanaged, as to put France in the right, and this country in the wrong, as to the general result of the negociation, much less as to the general question of the war. There may have been, and I agree with the hon. gent., in thinking there have been, some considerable errors in the conduct of our government. There may be, and I agree with the hon. gent., there are assertions in the king's Declaration, which are not borne out by the papers upon the table: but I cannot agree with the hon. gent., that the effect of these errors or misrepresentations is to prove that an opportunity has been lost of making an advantageous peace; that the negociation has been prematurely and unnecessarily broken off on the part of this country; or that with a little more patience and dexterity on our part, we should have found France ready to give such terms as it became his majesty's ministers to accept. I cannot believe that there was, from the beginning, any other intention on the part of the enemy, than to delude and amuse us; I think the false statements in the Declaration are only so many ill-contrived attempts to conceal or to excuse our having been so amused and deceived; and so far from conceiving the rupture of the negociation to have been premature, while I agree in thinking the opportunity ill-chosen, I blame only that choice which let so many better opportunities pass by; which suffered a negociation which it was evident, from the earliest stage, must terminate, as this has terminated, to be protracted, by the artifices of the enemy, to his advantage alone, and to the infinite detriment of this country.—In stating the grounds upon which I have formed these opinions, I cannot do better than follow the order which the noble lord (Howick) has pursued in his speech. The noble lord did me the honour to begin by a reference to a part of my speech, on the
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first night of the session; in respect to the 3 material points upon which, as I then took the liberty of saying, it appeared to me the averments of his majesty's declaration required explanation and proof. These 3 points were, as the noble lord has correctly stated: 1st, The assertion that the first overture came nom the enemy; 2dly, That that overture was accompanied by a proposal to treat on the basis of the uti possidetis; 3dly, The question of our having kept faith and concert with our allies, particularly with Russia, during the whole course of the negociation. The noble lord trusts that I am satisfied upon all these points; I will tell him how far I am so.—With respect to the first point, that the first overture came from the enemy, I have no hesitation in avowing myself perfectly satisfied. My doubts upon this subject, the noble lord will do me the justice to recollect, were founded upon the two letters, Nos. 2, and 3, of the French publication; the first of which is now shewn to have been interpolated, a trick of which it was impossible to form a suspicion; and the second to have been written in answer—not to that which it is made to follow immediately in the French publication—but to that other note of M. Talleyrand, inclosing an Extract from Buonaparte's Speech, which in the French publication is wholly omitted. When I said that the letter about the assassin would be of itself an overture, unless something anterior to it in date could be produced, I said so on the presumption (which I should never have dreamt of questioning) that all the correspondence subsequent to that letter was correctly given in the Moniteur. Undoubtedly the case is altered by that letter of M. Talleyrand, which is now brought to light. Undoubtedly that letter, and the communication of Buonaparte's speech, expressing his willingness to treat on the basis of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, constituted a distinct overture, to which Mr. Fox replied as it was fit he should do.—Two things, however, I must remark, which the noble lord does not appear to bear in his recollection; 1st, that I never attributed any blame to the making the first overture, supposing we had in fact made it; on the contrary, I distinctly said that at any time when negociation might be desirable, I could not conceive that any delicacy as to which party should make the proposal ought to stand in the way: the

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blame would have belonged wholly to the publishing in his majesty's declaration, an assertion not supported by facts. 2d1y, That my objections to the letter about the assassin were not confined to the single point of its unfitness as an overture; but were many of them of a nature to be in no degree done away by the proof of its not having been intended as an overture for negociation. Those objections I still feel. I still think the letter in its whole style and tenour, in conception and in taste, altogether unworthy of the great man who was the writer of it; and so unlike him, so wholly unlike any thing else of his writing which appears in the papers upon the table, that, when I heard the noble lord speak of the interpolations which the enemy had audaciously inserted in the publication in the Moniteur, I profess I fully expected to find this letter one of them. I was disappointed at finding it among our own official papers unaltered, and still attributed to Mr. Fox.—I was no less disappointed at not finding something else, which I understood the noble lord to have promised; but I suppose I must have misunderstood him. I did, however, understand him to say, that when the official correspondence came to be published, we should find that Mr. Fox had rejected with disdain, those exclusive compliments to himself, the object of which is obviously not so much to exalt him, as to vilify all the ministers who had gone before him. I find nothing like it. I wish I did. I retain my opinion as to what ought to have been an English minister's conduct in this respect. But having said thus much, I am not desirous of pressing this subject farther.—I will come next to the point which the noble lord has treated as the third in succession; that of our good faith and concert with Russia: because upon this point also I have to express, in the main, great satisfaction; and I willingly defer as long as I can that upon which I continue to entertain an unfavourable opinion.—I am happy to declare, that so far as the papers enable us to judge, ministers appear to have maintained our good faith towards Russia wholly unimpaired. And so far from undervaluing this merit in the negociation, I am ready and anxious to hold it up as that which is at once most praise-worthy, and most politic; for which, ministers are entitled to the highest credit, and by which the country obtains the most solid advan-
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tages, those of character and confidence for the future.—The noble lord will not think this commendation unreasonably qualified by the reserve with which I am obliged to accompany it,—that it is due so far as the papers enable us to judge. I do not blame ministers for not furnishing us with more ample documents upon this subject; perhaps they could not be furnished without hazarding mischievous disclosures: but unquestionably the want of any knowledge of the communications between us and Russia, which preceded the mission of M. D'Oubril, leaves us under the necessity of taking upon the minister's word the assurance that, up to that period, Russia and England acted cordially and confidentially together. For, if one could suspect that the mission of M. D'Oubril to Paris was intended by the court of Petersburgh as a reprisal for our having advanced before them in the negociation faster than they had expected, or than we had given them notice of our doing or intending to do,—it would then be impossible to contend that we had kept faith and concert with Russia, as strictly as we boast of having done: but even then I will confess I should be inclined to doubt whether our subsequent conduct, after M. D'Oubril's separate treaty, had not redeemed, or even more than redeemed our original failure. If, on the contrary, M. D'Oubril was sent without sufficient previous notice to us, and without waiting for and obtaining our full consent, our conduct would then be not only unexceptionable, but such as would have entitled us to the lasting gratitude of Russia, and have left her deeply our debtor;— but even then I should think that what we had done, though more perhaps than Russia would have been in such a case entitled to claim, was not more than an enlarged and enlightened policy warranted us in doing for her.—I am willing, however, to believe that there was nothing to atone for or to forgive on either side. That Russia and England took every step in concert: And then, while I admit and rejoice in the admission, that the good faith of the two governments towards each other has been sacredly observed, I cannot forbear regretting that so laudable a system should not have been carried fully and beneficially into execution; that there has not been as much wisdom as generosity and sincerity displayed in the conduct of the alliance; that a concert, so perfect in principle, has been acted upon so ne-

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gligently or ill-avisedly, as to lose in policy all the main advantages which such a concert between two great powers is calculated to procure, and which constitute its principal value.—What is, in truth, the main advantage of such a concert and union between two great powers such as England and Russia, in a negociation with a common enemy? Not surely, that it obliges their respective plenipotentiaries to communicate with each other upon every step which each may advance in their treaty—not because it binds each not to conclude without the other. These are, abstractedly taken, disadvantages rather than advantages; they tend to complicate and embarrass; to retard the work of pacification; and ultimately may lead to the rejection of a peace in the highest degree desirable for one party, from the want of some petty object, or the failure of some unreasonable pretension, of the other. But what is the advantage which compensates, and more than compensates, all these possible inconveniencies? and which, especially at such a moment as the present, and against such an enemy as the nations of Europe have now to contend against, makes the union of two such powers as England and Russia not only a mutual security to themselves, but a common blessing to mankind? What, but that assurance which it holds out to the world of co-operation for ends in which all the world is interested—of a determination either to obtain such a peace as shall secure the general tranquillity, or to carry on war together for the general protection? What, but the rallying point which it affords to the weaker powers;—the hope which it offers of assistance to those who are able to contend for their freedom, and of refuge and protection to those who fly to it from tyranny and oppression?—But, for the attainment of these objects, what can be more obvious than that it is not sufficient for such an union to exist, unless its existence be known?—that a concert may be perfectly cordial between the two contracting powers; but if its operation be kept secret, if it be not diligently and (I would almost say) ostentatiously blazoned to the world, it is utterly useless for any purpose of larger benefit? And what was the fact? Was it notorious that England and Russia negociated in concert? Was not the direct contrary more than suspected? Was not the mission of M. D'Oubril universally believed to be a surprise upon our govern-
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ment? Was not the omission of any mention of Russia in the king's speech, at the end of the last session of parliament, understood both here and abroad as a tacit abrogation of our alliance? If that alliance still subsisted at that time, and if the concert was going on as intimately as is now insinuated, was it not our obvious policy to give every degree of publicity in our power to a state of things so honourable to ourselves, and in its consequences likely to prove so beneficial to the rest of the world? But what was our conduct? and what were its effects?—When once we had agreed to treat, [See Mr. Fox's dispatch to lord Yarmouth, June 26, 1806. No. 15 of the papers, presented to both houses of parliament, page 140 of the present volume,] "separately in form, though in substance, in concert with each other," (a most dexterous contrivance some appear to think it—I conceive it to have been a most mischievous concession); from that moment however our good faith might still be saved, every other advantage of concert was irretrievably abandoned. Russia and England might still be true to each other: but Russia and England together were no longer true to the cause of Europe and of the world.—And were not the effects correspondent with the error of the policy? What lost Prussia? I know, the noble lord says, the madness, the precipitancy, the infatuation of Prussia herself. But are we wholly guiltless? Had Prussia nothing to mislead and to deceive her? I know, the noble lord will tell us, as he has already told us, that Prussia acted without concert or communication. He will quote that note of the king of Prussia, in which he states that his resolution to go to war would be known at Paris before it was known at London or at Petersburgh. He will lament that Prussia did not throw herself upon the courts of London and Petersburgh for counsel and assistance. But what temptation had Prussia to take this course? Had she nothing to deter her from it? Let us see what the court of Berlin would answer for itself. In the declaration which was published by that court at the beginning of October, speaking of the time when Prussia was goaded by France into the measures which led immediately to the war, it is said "two negociations were at that time carrying on at Paris; one with Russia, the other with the English ministry. In both these negociations the intentions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested."

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And then it proceeds to specify the stipulations hostile to Prussia in each. Such then was the impression at Berlin. The court of Berlin was satisfied that England and Russia were carrying on not a joint negociation, but two distinct and separate negociations:—"separate in form" we know they unfortunately were; and how should the court of Berlin guess that they were "in substance" united? And under this impression it is that the noble lord expresses his astonishment and indignation at the conduct of that court—that he admires the rashness, the want of common sense, the absolute madness and infatuation of Prussia in not having thrown herself altogether upon the courts of Petersburgh and London:—Upon two courts, of whom she only knew that they were engaged in separate negociations,—of whose concert with each other therefore she could entertain no reasonable belief; and further, that as far as related to herself, they were each in their respective treaty, stipulating something disadvantageous to Prussia! Would not the infatuation, the folly, the childish credulity of Prussia have been much rather to be admired, it with no other data than these she had formed the rash opinion that to the courts of Petersburgh and London she could safely betake herself for succour?—And if at the same time at which this undoubted fact of the separate negociations with M. D'Oubril and lord Yarmouth was communicated by M. Talleyrand to the Prussian minister at Paris, M. Talleyrand had (as no doubt he had) the goodness further to communicate in confidence that sentence of the English secretary of state's letter of the 8th of April, in which Mr. Fox declares his persuasion that "the project of a new combination against France is utterly chimerical,"—then I would be glad to know what rational Prussian could have advised his king to look for aid against France from the joint counsels and exertions of two powers, who were notoriously pursuing courses separate from, and independent of, each other; but each separately and respectively hostile to Prussia: and of whom one, and that the one which had been hitherto the soul of all confederacies against France, had voluntarily confessed to France herself that the day of such confederacies was gone by, and that the attempt to revive them would be utterly chimerical:—I trust that in all alliances which this country may hereafter contract, whether for war or for negocia-
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tion with France, it will be remembered, that though good faith between the contracting parties be much, it is not all; that such a connection loses half its value, as well as half its sanctity, when it is not avowed in the eyes of the world; that what we appear anxious to conceal, or afraid to acknowledge ourselves, will not readily be believed or trusted in others; that "separately in form, but substantially in concert," is a form of treaty which has all the disadvantages of combination, without any of the advantages for which combination is most to be prized. Had we treated "formally,"—as well as "substantially,—in concert," M. D'Oubril could never have signed his separate treaty; even had we been "substantially," —as well as "formally,—separate," we at least should not have been subject to the awkward and difficult suspense which followed that signature. This difficulty, however, was undoubtedly well worth incurring for the benefit of effectual concert; but how could that concert be effectual, which was known to none but the parties who concealed it, and to the enemy who stipulated for its concealment in order that he might deny it, and which presented to all other nations no other appearance than that of disunion of councils and diversity of objects?—I come now to the last of the three points, upon which the noble lord expects to find me satisfied, the assertion in his majesty's declaration, that France proposed to treat on the basis of the uti possidetis. And upon this, with the utmost seriousness and sincerity I feel myself compelled to declare, that so far from having received any satisfaction, I am, after the most diligent and impartial examination of the papers, more than ever convinced, that the assertion is not borne out by the evidence adduced in support of it. It is a question of evidence; it is a plain issue of fact, upon which an ordinary jury might decide; and I am confident that any jury would find the allegation not proved. The noble lord, indeed, goes a very short way to work upon this point, and travelling altogether out of the record before the house, and putting by all the written documents by which he originally engaged to convince us, betakes himself at once to the aid of the noble person whose intervention was employed on this occasion, and asks us if we will not believe lord Yarmouth's word? 'Is the assertion of my lord Yarmouth good for nothing?'—For every thing:

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and in a matter of private concern, I, for one, should desire no other evidence; though even there, if there were contradictory testimony offered in opposition to it, I am afraid I must have recourse to other collateral evidence to turn the scale. But can any thing be more unfair or unreasonable than this direct personal reference to lord Yarmouth? unfair to the noble person himself, upon whom, singly, is thus attempted to be thrown the whole weight of a question upon which the honour of this country is pledged, upon which we are at issue with the enemy in the face of the world? Was such a question ever so decided? Was a point in dispute between two governments ever before attempted to be rested on the single responsibility of any individual, however respectable? Would any individual whatever undertake to convey a communication from government to government, at the risk of having such a load of responsibility cast upon him? We have heard from the noble lord himself that he had no such apprehension; that he was not by any means prepared for the use which is now made of his name; that he took for granted all along, that he was not the single and sole testimony on which the question between the two governments rested; that he imagined there was other concurrent evidence in the correspondence which was carried on, concurrently with his mission, between the two ministers for foreign affairs; that M. Talleyrand distinctly told him, that he wrote to Mr. Fox to the same effect with the communication made to him (lord Yarmouth); that he fully believed the letter of which he was himself the bearer from Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, to be upon the same subject; and that he is astonished to find himself at this time of day the only support with which ministers have provided themselves for a point upon which they lay so much stress. And well may the noble lord express his surprise, and his resentment at having such a burthen laid upon his shoulders. The noble lord himself feels—and cannot therefore think it any personal disrespect to him, if there are those who feel with him—that he is not alone presentable to the world as a sufficient evidence upon such a question. We, to be sure, have the advantage in this house of the noble lord's presence, as a member of it. But this house is not the only judge in this question. It is a question for Europe, for posterity to decide: and what is the noble lord's private parole testimony
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to them? How can they know it? how can they be expected to take cognizance of it? Even in the other house of parliament they have not the advantage which we have here; and even we should have been deprived of it, if the noble lord had happened not to be returned to the present parliament.—If it was intended from the beginning to lay the whole weight of this assertion on lord Yarmouth's single declaration, why was not lord Y. duly apprised of this intention, and directed to reduce that declaration into a written official shape? The memorandum of the 13th of June is wholly insufficient for this purpose. Why was he not instructed to obtain in writing from M. Talleyrand the proposal which he understood him to have made in conversation? It is said,"M. Talleyrand would not have given it in writing!" How do you know that? Lord Y. distinctly says that he was never instructed to attempt to obtain it. 'But it was in the very nature of such a communication,' says the noble secretary of state (lord Howick), that it should not be reduced into writing: —the attempt to embody such overtures into a distinct official shape; has a tendency to put an end to that sort of preliminary, unavowed insinuation which has usually preceded formal negociations for peace; and which if you discredit and bring into disuse, wars must go on interminably; for how is the disposition to put an end to them to be ascertained? I confess I see none of the dangers which the noble secretary of state apprehends here: but if they exist, they are of his own creating. It is not the reducing into writing such communications as were made unofficially; it is not that, but it is the relying upon them, when not so authenticated, in subsequent official papers; it is the making a whole negociation turn upon an imputed admission of the enemy, which admission, at the time when it was made, you thought it indelicate to reduce into writing; this it is that has a tendency to discredit and bring into disuse that sort of preliminary overture. Every foreign minister may well be cautious how he commits himself by any verbal communication; which, while out of pretended delicacy you will not press him to render it precise and formal, you at the same time carefully lay up to be produced against him afterwards, according to your own construction. And after th example of lord Y., any gentle man may well decline to be the channel of such a communication, at the risque of

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finding himself, some six months afterwards, committed in the face of the world against the minister from whom he had confidentially received it.—For these reasons, and as much out of delicacy and justice to lord Y. (for whom I wish to shew more tenderness than has been shewn by his employers, and who, I think, has acquitted himself throughout the whole of this arduous business in a manner to entitle him to the highest respect and consideration), I beg leave to put wholly out of my view any other information than that which ministers have thought fit to lay before us in an official shape; upon which I originally understood the noble lord (Howick) to state himself to be prepared to go to trial on this question; and upon which alone, I repeat, it must, whether he be so prepared or not, be tried, in the opinion of Europe and of posterity. —In this view of the question, I confess I entirely agree with the hon. gent. who spoke last, not only that the uti possidetis was never offered in the sense in which the declaration affirms it; but further, that we have Mr. Fox's authority with us, for the sense in which we (the hon. gent. and myself) understand it. It is clear that Mr. Fox never understood the suggestion of the basis of uti possidetis as that regular offer and proposal, which it has since been attempted to represent it; and that he never laid that stress upon the question of the basis alone, as distinct from specific terms, which has been laid upon it in the subsequent part of the negociation. I think also, and upon this second point I have also Mr. Fox's authority clearly with me, that, even if the proposal of treating upon this basis had been distinctly made by France, and afterwards departed from unwarrantably (which I say is not proved), that even in that case the proposal was not one so advantageous to us, it was not so important to us to obtain the recognition of that basis, as we seem to have imagined. I think I can easily shew, that it would have been the most inconvenient basis, the most inapplicable to the actual state of the world, that could have been adopted as the foundation of our treaty. And thirdly, even if the two former points were decided in the affirmative; if France had indeed proposed the uti possidetis; and if it was indeed important to us to obtain the recognition of it: I think nothing is more demonstrable than that we went the very worst way about obtaining it.—1st, then,
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the main foundation on which the allegation rests, is to be found in lord Yarmouth's memorandum of the 13th of June; a memorandum which (be it remembered), his lordship was officially compelled to commit to writing, in direct violation of the promise originally exacted from him by M. Talleyrand. Lord Y. however, tells us, as well became him, that he declined committing it to writing, until he had obtained a solemn promise that no public use should be made of it. Such is the character of this document; and now for its contents. It contains, as I contend, but one positive averment, namely, that M. Talleyrand said, "We do not ask Sicily of you,—nous ne vous la demandons pas;" the rest is inference and induction merely; and subject, like all matter of inference, to be questioned by fair reasoning, without any imputation, or supposed imputation, upon the veracity and perfect honour of the person whose inference it is. Having obtained this admission respecting Sicily, lord Y. "conceived it improper to enquire further, 'Nous ne vous demandons rien,' amounting (in his lordship's opinion) to an admission of the uti possidetis, as applicable to his majesty's conquests." Now here are no less than three successive inferences, every one of which I confess myself inclined to dispute: 1st, That "nous ne vous la demandons pas," the expression applied by M. Talleyrand specifically to Sicily, is equivalent to the sweeping admission, "nous ne vous demandons rien;" an inference of a general proposition from a special one, which is not, I believe, very usually admitted to be sound in reasoning,—however possible it might have been to maintain the direct converse, and to infer the special from the general proposition. 2dly, That even "nous ne vous demandons rien," (supposing for a moment that we had arrived fairly at that proposition, which I deny,) amounted to an admission of the uti possidetis;—Was it to be supposed that France had nothing to ask of us for her allies, though not for herself? The direct reverse is certain and notorious. 3dly, That the admission (supposing it to be one) was an admission with respect to "his majesty's conquests." The whole admission, whatever its force may be, had its root in Sicily, and is to be construed with reference to Sicily only—and was Sicily a "conquest" of his majesty? Was the auxiliary army which we sent to the aid of the king of Naples, a conquering army? Had we van-

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quished our ally? And if not, what inference could properly be drawn from Sicily to "his majesty's conquests?"—So much then for the original text, upon which so many commentaries have been built, to sustain the imputed offer of the uti possidetis. If that offer is not found in this memorandum, it is to be found no where. Every thing else is at best but collateral and constructive argument, upon which no stress can be laid, when the original foundation fails us.—Where, in fact, did lord Y. himself look for the confirmation of his own impressions; (for that the noble lord's impressions were sincere, that he reported here no more than he firmly believed and really understood to have been said to him, no man can doubt for a moment;) where did he expect to find a confirmation of what he understood M. Talleyrand to have intended to convey through him to the British government? Why, naturally, in that letter to Mr. Fox, which (as M. Talleyrand informed him) was dispatched, at the same time with his lordship, and which arrived the same day in London. And does that letter contain any thing to countenance the notion of the uti possidetis? Look at it; it is No. 10 of the papers laid before parliament. (p. 105.) So far from any allusion to any such basis as the uti possidetis, another basis is distinctly proposed in that letter, a basis to be formed out of two principles; one of which was suggested by Mr. Fox in his letter of the 26th of March, "that the peace should be honourable for "the two powers and their allies;" and the other is now brought forward for the first time by the French minister, "the continental and maritime guarantee." Lord Y. ingenuously describes himself as having been disappointed at not finding in this letter a single word in allusion to himself, or to the new basis intrusted to his charge. —Where should we next expect to find some allusion to the uti possidetis? Why, of course, where lord Y. next looked for it, in Mr. Fox's answer to this letter of M. Talleyrand, or in his letter of the same date, which lord Y. carried back with him to Paris. Is there any such allusion in either of these letters, (Nos. 11 and 13 of the papers, p. 107 and 109)? Nothing like it. Is there any thing contradictory to such a notion, and inconsistent with it? Much. Mr. Fox in his letter of the 14th, written after he had received lord Y.'s communication, long after he had received it verbally, but the day after it was reduced into the
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shape of the written memorandum, which is now considered as conclusive upon this point, not only does not appear to think that the uti possidetis has been proposed as a basis, but directly adverts to the other basis which has been proposed, and says,in plain terms, "The basis offered in your second proposition, is exactly conformable to the views of our government;" and then goes on to qualify this statement, in a way which proves that the proposition to which he refers is (and it manifestly can be no other than) the principle of continental and maritime guarantee.—'O! but,' says the noble secretary of state, 'there is a form in these things; it is a rule to answer written communications in writing, and verbal ones verbally.' It was impossible, therefore, for Mr. Fox to allude to the uti possidetis, in answer to a letter from M. Talleyrand, in which it was not mentioned? Possibly this may be so. But was it reasonable, or was it like that plainness and simplicity which are so much boasted of in Mr. Fox's system of diplomacy, to go an with a correspondence directly at variance with the private communication that had been made to him? Would he have done so—can any man believe he would—if he had attached to that private communication all the precision and importance which is now contended to have belonged to it;—if he had considered it, as it was afterwards considered, as absolutely superseding all that had passed, or was still passing in open correspondence between him and the French minister;—as making that correspondence mere waste paper, and be ng in fact itself the origin from which the negociation was to date, and the sole foundation on which it was to stand? But above all, is it credible, that if he had so understood what passed between M. Talleyrand and lord Y.—though in compliance with the strict diplomatic form, which the noble secretary of state holds so sacred, he could not have committed any thing to writing in the first instance, on his own part,—is it credible that he could not have directed lord Y. to press for a more precise and formal statement from M. Talleyrand; —well knowing (as he must have known), that though verbal communications are very good as an overture to lead to negociation, they are not a sufficiently regular method of carrying on a negociation once begun? Had lord Y. any such directions from Mr. Fox when he returned to Paris? None. But he returned, it is said, as he had come, a

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simple unauthorised individual;—he had no character or powers; he therefore could require nothing in writing. But on the 26th of June, (No 15, p. 112) ten days after his return, full powers were sent to him. Is he then directed to employ them for the purpose of obtaining a written authentic avowal of the basis of uti possidetis? No; he is indeed directed to press for the admission of the basis: but Sicily —and Sicily alone is to be a sine quâ non. And even here it is remarkable, that the coupling of this supposed basis with Sicily, appears to arise from what, with Mr. Fox's general accuracy, is an extraordinary mis-recollection of the words of lord Y.'s original communication which is here stated: "Vous l'avez; nous ne vous demandons rien," instead of "nous ne vous la demandons pas," the words really employed by M. Talleyrand.—But after all there is one short view of this question, which with me, I confess, is more decisive than almost all that can be collected from the papers; it is this, that to prove such a point as the proposal of the uti possidetis, there should have been any need of argument, of inference, and induction, at all. The moment that you tell me you have arrived at the uti possidetis, through a long train of reasoning, and by an operose process of comparison and analogy, I think that very statement disproves your case. If those short and comprehensive phrases, by which particular forms and bases of negociation are described, have any character or meaning at all, it is this, that they are not to be argued to, but from; they are not results at which you are to arrive through a series of laboured argumentation, but points from which you are to start in commencing your discussion. As in the severer sciences there are certain axioms and definitions, which nobody dreams of analysing when they set out to the proof of a proposition, so in diplomacy these forms have been uniformly adopted, not as matter of substantive disquisition in themselves, but as clearing the way to the examination and solution of other questions. Whether it be true or not, as M. Talleyrand affirms that no treaty between two great powers was ever negociated on the basis of uti possidetis, I will not venture to say; but I have little doubt that neither the uti possidetis, nor the status ante bellum, were ever admitted, or contended by either party to have been admitted, as the basis of any negociation, by any process of reasoning
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and inference, or in any other less unequivocal form than the direct plain terms uti possidetis, or status ante bellum. If the admission requires to be made out circumstantially, by confronting detached passages, and collecting together scattered phrases and inferences, the only thing that is plain is, that no such admission has been distinctly made.—There is, indeed, one mode of inference to which the noble lord (Howick) has this night resorted, which is much too curious to be passed over without notice. He infers the uti possidetis from the several exceptions which are made to it. Was not Hanover to be given up to his majesty unconditionally; and is not that a deviation from the uti possidetis? Was not Sicily itself claimed rather as something which should not be too strictly subjected to the rule laid down, than as coming within the direct operation of the uti possidetis? Did not we claim Naples, (he might have added) in the very first conference which took place after the alleged proposal, in direct contempt of the uti possidetis? Why, sir, we have heard it said that exceptio probat regulam: but when the proofs of the rule are nothing but exceptions, the rule itself may reasonably be thought to be in some danger.—But if the noble lord's argument is not of much avail in establishing the admission of the uti possidetis; it does go some way towards proving the second proposition on this Subject for which I contend, that the uti possidetis was by no means so desirable for this country, as is all along taken for granted by those who are only busied in arguing for the fact of its having been proposed. It was not important for the sake of Hanover; for Hanover was to be recovered, if at all, not by being included within its operation, but by being excepted out of it. And as to Sicily, there is no imaginable basis of negociation to which it would not have been more easy to reconcile our claim of Sicily, than that of the uti possidetis.—There are three different bases suggested in the course of the correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand, before this of the uti possidetis; and there is besides, the status ante bellum, which no where comes in question: and I will venture to say that there is not one of all these bases upon which the determination—the just and wise and honourable determination—not to give up Sicily to France, might not be more satisfactorily supported, than upon that to which we appear to have attached so much

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importance. 1st, The basis of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens: that would keep Sicily out of the hands of France; for, by the treaty of Amiens, France, so far from claiming Sicily, consented to evacuate Naples. 2d, The basis of "what should be honourable to the contracting parties and their allies," would clearly keep Sicily in our power; for what more honourable for us than to secure the dominions of the king of Naples, or for the king of Naples, than to retain them? 3d, The basis of "maritime guarantee" is equally clear in our favour: for is not Sicily a maritime state, and do not we propose to guarantee it to its sovereign? 4th, The status ante bellum hardly requires to be argued. The French had not Sicily before the war, and they must not have it now. In short, the uti possidetis, that basis for which we contend so earnestly, as peculiarly contrived to secure Sicily, is the only one of which (as we propose to apply it) the application is equivocal; or, I should more truly say, wholly unmaintainable. Sicily ours by occupancy, and claimed from France upon this ground! Is it possible that we did not see the fallacy and the danger of such a claim? how untenable on our part? how prolific of claims of the most immeasurable extent on the part of the enemy? Sicily ours! What then becomes of its lawful and actual sovereign, the king of Sicily? Ours by military occupancy! Is then the existence of an auxiliary military force in the country of an ally sufficient to transfer the possession of that country from the ally to the auxiliary? These surely were questions worth weighing.—Indeed, it did strike me that at one time the danger of this sort of claim on our part (which, however, is not once, but twenty times, repeated; which is, in truth, interwoven throughout with the doctrine of the uti possidetis), had begun to suggest itself to his majesty's ministers; for in the dispatch signed by Mr. Windham (No. 48 p. 181), I find a new and bold construction of M. Talleyrand's imputed basis; so bold and so new, that I imagined there must be some good reason for venturing it. Mr. Windham says that the "basis proposed by France was that of the uti possidetis, for the two powers and their allies in all parts of the world." Now as this construction has never been hazarded before, in the whole course of the discussions, from the 14th of June to the 10th of Sept. and as the admission of the words
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"and their allies" is manifestly disadvantageous to us in one respect, inasmuch as by admitting the claims of the allies of France it destroys the whole of the argument arising from our wide and general construction of "nous ne vous demandons rien," in lord Yarmouth's memorandum; and of the words "l'empereur n'a rien àdésirer de ce que possède l'Angleterre," which are brought in aid of that construction from M. Talleyrand's letter to Mr. Fox of the 7th of April; I could not but suppose that we had some adequate point to gain by this same admission, and I conceived it to be this; that having seen reason to doubt the solidity of our claim to Sicily, under the uti possidetis, from our own military occupancy, we were desirous of erecting a new claim, and with a much better grace, on the undisturbed possession of Sicily by its lawful sovereign. But I found myself mistaken. For after having made this bold push for no purpose that I can discover, except it were for that which I ascribed to him, the secretary of state, about ten lines afterwards, reverts to the old ground, and claims Sicily for Great Britain;" our actual occupancy of that island (he says) brings it fully within the benefit of the uti possidetis."—On this principle then, I beg the house to consider what would have been the advantage to this country, to have established military occupancy as the rule and measure of territorial possession; to have set out with a basis which should ascribe to each party the actual dominion of every state, of which their arms might be at the moment in the actual keeping or controul; subject to no other recovery than what might be effected by exchange and compensation. I say, to each party; —because I cannot suppose that his majesty's ministers can have entertained the opinion that the uti possidetis, if admitted at all, was admitted by France as applicable to "his majesty's" conquests or possessions only, and not equally to those of France: it is of the essence of a basis of negociation to be equal and reciprocal. And is it possible that ministers should not have seen what the effect of equality in this case would be? or seeing that they should still have thought it a point to be contended for? Is it possible that they should have been so dazzled with our "military occupation" of Sicily, as not to have seen the danger of admitting, and the difficulty of denying, a reciprocal claim on the part of France, to every coun-

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try in which France might have a soldier? Did they consider well to what extent such a claim would go? And if, as the noble lord (Howick) has informed us, Mr. Fox rejected the suggestion of taking the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens for the basis of negociation, because he thought that they were vague and indefinite, and that more time therefore would be lost in defining and adjusting the basis than might be sufficient (if well employed), for discussing and settling the main points of a negociation; is it possible that the noble lord should not perceive that the adoption of the uti possidetis would have been liable to similar embarrassment;—that he should not be aware of the perplexed and interminable discussions which must have arisen in the attempt to define the precise degree of possession, occupation, or controul, which should or should not entitle to the benefit of the uti possidetis; to determine, for instance, whether the kingdom of Holland, whether the principalities of the Rhine, whether southern Germany, whether the fortresses of Austria herself, should, at the outset of a negociation, be acknowledged by us to be the lawful and confirmed possessions of France, except so far as they might be redeemed by such equivalents as we might be able and disposed to give in exchange for them?—I am confident, (and the very argument which the noble lord himself has advanced, renders me still more confident in the opinion,) that such was Mr. Fox's view of the subject;—that his passing by the treaty of Amiens, when it was first suggested by M. Talleyrand, and proceeding to suggest instead of it, something which he called a basis, but which, in fact, amounted to nothing more than the statement of a principle which might be taken for granted to prevail in every negociation, "The honour and glory of the two countries," was dictated by precisely the same motive which afterwards induced him, in his answer to M. Talleyrand's letter of the 2d of June, to accept so eagerly M. Talleyrand's proposed additional principle of "continental and maritime guarantee," in preference to (and one must fairly say, in exclusion of) the other offer which is asserted to have been made at the same time through lord Yarmouth, of the uti possidetis. And the motive which in each case operated with Mr. Fox, appears to have been simply the desire to avoid any technical basis, as utterly inapplicable to the existing state of the world,
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and as likely to require (as the noble lord has himself contended would have been the case with the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, and as I think I have shewn would equally have arisen in any attempt to apply the uti possidetis) more time in the application and adjustment of the basis, than would have been sufficient to discuss and settle the terms of the most complicated negociation.—It remains to shew, in the 3d place, that, supposing the offer of the uti possidetis to have been unequivocally made, and afterwards departed from; and supposing the recognition of it to have been as important to us as it is now pretended, we took the very worst course for obtaining that recognition. And this I really think it impossible for any man to doubt, who will take a fair review of the correspondence upon the table, and who will only consult his own feelings and common sense, and reason from the analogies of private life to the case before him.—I am not the champion of French good faith in general, nor of M. Talleyrand's in particular; but I believe it is pretty clear with respect to M. Talleyrand, or any other man living, that when he has once committed himself by a direct disavowal of any thing which he may have said, or may have been supposed to have said, in a private conference, there can be no rational hope of inducing him to retract that disavowal merely by a sturdy repetition of the assertion that he did say that which he has thus disavowed. When two parties in a discussion are thus directly committed against each other, it is evident that to persist in re-affirming what your antagonist must as constantly re-deny, is only equivalent to a determination to make no progress whatever. There are obviously but two modes of proceeding in such a case which can be resorted to with any chance of advantage; and your choice between the two must depend upon the manner in which you estimate the point in dispute. If you consider it as a point of honour; if you feel that the faith of your own negociator is compromised against that of the enemy's, and that both cannot come with credit out of the discussion, every other object ought of course to give way to this consideration; and you can in that case do no otherwise than break off the negociation upon the very first peremptory denial by the enemy, of the first distinct assertion on your part. A contest for three months of "You did say so," on one side, and "I did not," on the other, is undigni-

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fied and discreditable to both parties. If, on the other hand, the obtaining the admission itself was so great an object that you would be content to sacrifice a little punctilio to obtain it, then is it not plain to any man's understanding, that instead of pressing and pinning your adversary into a corner, and insisting upon his making the recognition which you demand of him in a precise form of words that should carry his own self-contradiction upon the face of them, you ought, as soon and as decently as you could, to have afforded him a retreat and outlet from the difficulty in which his first denial had involved him; you ought to have changed your first peremptory interrogation of "Will you confess that you did propose the uti possidetis?" into the milder form of "Will you now agree to it?" If the practical concession was to be obtained, this was the only way to go about it: but with a curious felicity, ministers appear to have mixed these two modes of proceeding together, and to have produced a result which (as might be expected) has the advantages of neither. They adopt the high tone belonging to a point of honour, so far as to put the question in its most irritating and offensive form, and to make it impossible for the French minister to give the answer which they wish, without confessing himself guilty of falsehood and prevarication: and yet, instead of acting on the same tone in which they speak, they consent to prolong this miserable altercation for three months, and instead of recalling their whole embassy, recall only that member of it who is best qualified to maintain the point in discussion. They hold high lord Yarmouth's word; but they do not suffer lord Y. himself to stay to maintain it. They choose to rest every thing upon testimony, and they withdraw their witness. This could by no possibility be right. If you meant to abandon your point of honour, good care ought to have teen taken not, even in appearance, to abandon lord Y.: and if, as appears, you meant still to maintain it, what chance could remain of maintaining it with effect in any other hands than his?—But neither is this all. The manner and very language in which our plenipotentiaries are instructed to insist upon the uti possidetis is not calculated to produce the effect desired, that of a previous and unconditional recognition of it, as a basis already admitted by France. In order to have extorted that recognition, it was surely necessary that the demand should be made in the plainest and most in-
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telligible shape, unincumbered by questions about terms of peace, which naturally led the discussion away into other subjects. Yet I am pretty sure there is no one instance; or at most but one, (which I shall have occasion to refer to presently,) throughout the whole correspondence in which this demand is made in distinct aud unqualified terms, and without the accompaniment of other matter. The very first instance of any distinct mention of uti possidetis by us to France (between our own ministers at home and our ministers abroad, there is certainly no want of mention of it before that period) is in lord Y.'s note, read, but not delivered, to gen. Clarke in the conference of the 24th July, [p. 129.] In that note, lord Y. describes himself as authorised "à discuter les bases," to "discuss the basis," of the treaty (which certainly does not imply the previous settlement of it); and after describing the respective situations of England and France, he says, "that the king would treat generally on the basis of uti possidetis;" an expression which certainly has rather the air of an original suggestion, than of a claim of some foregone agreement. This note was not delivered to general Clarke. There is therefore no answer to it. The next that we hear of uti possidetis, and the very first that the French negociators see of it in a precise and tangible shape, is in the note presented by lord Lauderdale on his arrival. In this note it is distinctly stated, that the king "received a proposition from France to treat generally on the basis of uti possidetis." [p. 145.] And to this distinct statement is returned the next day the peremptory denial: "That it never could have entered into the mind of the French emperor to take the uti possidetis as the basis of negociation." [p. 150.] This is surely the period, at which, if it were resolved to treat this question as a point of honour, as implicating the faith of the French minister on the one hand, and of our negociator on the other, the discussion ought to have broken off. This was the period at which, if it was intended still to pursue the object of obtaining the uti possidetis, it evidently became hopeless to extort it by the assertion that it had been already agreed to; and it would have been necessary therefore to take new ground, to admit the possibility of misapprehension on both sides in the verbal communication which had passed upon the subject, and to make the demand anew, as peremptorily as you might

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think fit,—as a sine quâ non of negociation, if you pleased; but to make it in a way in which it could be conceded to you.—Neither of these courses, however, were adopted: but from this period you begin that series of tiresome and useless repetitions, of which the effect could not well be expected to be other than it was, to irritate and inflame the discussion without producing any satisfactory explanation or beneficial result. If our first demand did not produce the recognition required, why should it be conceived that the multiplied echo would have any better effect?—especially as the repetition grew gradually fainter, and the direct and unqualified assertion in lord Lauderdale's first note which I have just quoted, we find softened down in the subsequent notes, with such modifications and qualifications as these: "The proposition of the French government such as his Britannic majesty understood it to have been made by them;" [p. 161.]—"when the views of the French government shall approach nearer to those which it had been supposed to entertain;" [p. 165.]—the proposition such as his majesty's ministers understood it (l'ont comprise) to have been made by France;" [p. 168.]—the basis which the British government believed (croyoit) to have been proposed in the first place by France;" [p. 175.] — "the conditions understood (censées) to have been proposed by France." [p. 192]—Was it likely that the French government would become more yielding to our demand, in proportion as we appeared to become less confident of the foundation on which it rested? Or could this mode of pressing it for three months lead to any imaginable advantage?—There is one other circumstance and only one, to be noticed, which, added to what I have already mentioned, renders the policy of our government on this point completely inexplicable. And that circumstance is this: if their object really was to obtain the admission of the uti possidetis as a practical basis of negociation, there does appear to have been a period, when for that purpose they had gained their point, and having done so they made no use of it. In the note of the French plenipotentiaries of the 11th of Aug. [p. 159.] it is said "If, in laying down the principle of uti possidetis, the English negociators have in view to propose a mean of exchange and of compensation, the emperor adopts it." And was not this
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what in fact they had in view? I profess I had all along so understood them, and I so understand them still. But the answer of our plenipotentiaries to this note, in conformity, no doubt, to their instructions, is that the basis or principle of the negociation must be "préalablement reconnu." They cannot stir a step without it. And this is the sĺngle instance in which this demand is separately and peremptorily made. Well may the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread) who thinks such a peace as France was now disposed to have given us, a desirable thing, well indeed may he complain that here was an opportunity of entering upon the real business of the negociation thrown away. I, who do not quarrel with the result of the papers in this view, who do not believe that any negociation could have been conducted at this time to a favourable issue, that France had the slightest intention of granting us such a peace, as alone it would have been wise or desirable to accept; who believe that her sole object was to amuse, and delude us,—to occupy our attention, while she was preparing and maturing her plans for the subjugation of what remained of independent Europe; I cannot but complain of the waste of a single hour after this note of the French plenipotentiaries was received.—I say; that upon this particular crisis the policy pursued by his majesty's ministers is wholly unaccountable. Did they mean to make peace if they could? Let them then answer the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread.) Why did they not avail themselves of this opening for negociation on their own terms? Did they think such a peace, as alone they were prepared to accept, hopeless?—then why protract the discussion a single hour beyond that at which they became acquainted with the utmost that France would concede, and found it insufficient?—If they wanted nothing but their basis to proceed upon, here it was offered them, subject to the qualifications and conditions which they themselves had all along annexed to it, and which the declaration itself states to have been, from the first to the last, in their contemplation. If they wanted, further, the admission that this basis had been admitted, nay proposed, by France herself before—was it not plain, even from the concession which France had made, that this further concession was one which she never would make?—And this leads me, sir, to that which is in truth the heaviest charge against ministers, and which I am

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sure the noble lord (Howick) himself feels to be one that it is difficult for them to answer, by the pains that he has taken to anticipate it. 'Where, after all,' says the noble lord, is the great advantage gained to France, what detriment has been sustained by England in consequence of the protraction of the negociation? Can the noble lord be serious in this question? Can it be necessary to argue with the noble lord that the suspense, the anxiety, the uncertainty attendant upon a state of negociation is to any nation matter of inconvenience, but to a commercial country, above all others, of real mischief and distress, from causes too obvious to be particularized? And if this were all, would not even this require some justification on the part of ministers; especially when it appears from the perusal of their papers, that weeks and months elapsed of doubt and solicitude to the public, after they had themselves considered the negociation hopeless, after their plenipotentiary had described it as "a farce?" [p. 173.]—But was this all the advantage which France proposed to herself, and which we suffered her to obtain? Would it were! What was, what must have been, the policy of France from the moment of the overthrow of the last confederacy? What but to dissipate the members of that confederacy, and to put them out of the possibility of uniting and acting cordially together again? Austria, by the fate of war, was, for the time, no object of jealousy. Russia and England remained in their full strength, and remained united in the strictest bonds of amity and intimate concert with each other. But we have Mr. Fox's authority for the fact, that "Russia and England alone are the two powers least calculated to make an impression on France by land;" [p. 99.] that it requires the intervention of a third power as a link in the chain, to give strength and efficacy to such a combination. Austria being out of the question, Prussia was the single state that could furnish this point of union and co-operation.—What was obvious to Mr. Fox, was surely not less so to M. Talleyrand, even if he had not had the advantage of learning it from Mr. Fox himself. He saw, therefore, that if Russia and England could be prevented from acquiring any third auxiliary, France was safe from attack by land, and the continent consequently at her mercy. Was it not natural then for France to turn her anxious attention to that power in which alone such an auxiliary could be found?—
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But neither was this the only motive of France. Prussia, by her accession to the former confederacy, however late, and however little effective, had manifested a disposition which Buonaparte could not forget, and for which no man who has traced the springs of action by which Buonaparte is moved, can doubt that from the moment of the treaty of Potzdam coming to his knowledge, he secretly vowed to take a signal vengeance.—Here, then, were the united motives of passion and policy, which no human being ever found the means of combining with so much dexterity before, of acting upon them with so tremendous a perseverance—these motives were united to stimulate Buonaparte to the destruction of Prussia—and I can entertain no doubt in my own mind that Prussia was Buonaparte's first object throughout the whole of the last year; that all that passed with us (striking and prominent as we may flatter ourselves our part in the political history of the year has been) was but secondary and subservient to that principal design. Even the separation of Russia from this country, important as he felt it to be, he felt to be important chiefly as making his attack upon Prussia more sure. In other respects he might safely trust, (and no doubt he did so,) to the assurance of the English secretary of state, that from the alliance of Russia and England, alone, there was no danger of an active coalition against France.—If such was his object, let us see with what success it was pursued? Prussia herself is no ill judge of this success: and her sense of it is unequivocally expressed in that declaration which she published at the commencement of the late unfortunate campaign—and from which I have already had occasion to quote that part which exhibits her feelings of despair at the apparent disunion which was effected in the course of the negociations, between G. Britain and Russia. But in the earlier part of the year, what was, according to the testimony of Prussia, the course pursued by France with respect to her, and to the powers with whom she had been in alliance? Prussia, at the dissolution of the confederacy by the battle of Austerlitz, or rather by the peace of Presburgh, was compelled to consult her own safety, and to conclude a separate treaty with France. By this treaty France transferred Hanover to Prussia. From good-will to Prussia? O, no. Prussia accepted the transfer in the first instance, "under the condition that her possession

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of Hanover should not be considered as valid till a general peace, and till the consent of the king of Great Britain should be obtained." (See Prussian Declaration.) For a time Buonaparte appeared to acquiesce in this condition; but no sooner was he set at ease by the retirement of the Russian army, no sooner had he secured an opening for negociation with this country, (and perhaps also at Petersburgh —but of that we have no positive evidence) than he found himself at liberty to press Prussia with less reserve—he insisted upon "the recall of the patent by which the occupation of Hanover was declared provisional—and upon the ports being shut against the British flag in the same manner as if the French had returned into the electorate." Prussia had then no choice but war, or compliance, at the risque of war with England. She saw this risque, but could not avoid it. She saw that France "triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her"—(these, sir, are the words of the king of Prussia). We either did not see this, or seeing regarded it not; for we fell into the snare, and the message of the 21st of April placed us in a state of war with Prussia. —And here, sir, I must take the liberty to remind the noble lord of an error into which he fell on the first night of the session, in correcting what he stated, (and, I have no doubt, really thought at the time) to be an error of mine, respecting the co-incidence of our negociation with France, and our war with Prussia. I had said, and I think truly, that the message of the 21st of April did not give to parliament a fair view of the subject on which they were to express an opinion; that whether Prussia had afforded just cause of war, by the occupation of Hanover, and by the shutting of the ports, was one question—a question upon which there could be no difference of opinion, and was none;—but whether it was wise and politic to act upon this cause of war, was a question that could not be fairly decided without reference to the negociation with France, of which not one word was mentioned to parliament: for it might very well be a clear case that it was adviseable to vindicate Hanover by war with Prussia, if there were no other way of attaining the same object,—while if we were at the same moment attempting to gain the same object by negociation with France, it might be matter of very
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doubtful policy whether we would resort to a war which, however just, might be altogether unnecessary.— The noble lord's answer to this argument was extremely short, and, had it been true, would have been conclusive. "What will be the surprise of the hon. gentleman," said the noble lord, "when I tell him that there was no negociation going on with France at the time of the Prussian message? Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March had, in our apprehension, brought the intercourse with France to a close; and the circumstance of a month having elapsed without any new communication from France had confirmed us in that opinion." [p. 65.] I, sir, stood rebuked. I had then taken my information from the French publication, in which that letter of Mr. Fox which alone could be in the noble lord's contemplation, the letter which decisively insists upon the points in dispute between him and M.Talleyrand, and which was followed by a pause of a month in the correspondence, was dated not on the 26th of March, but on the 20th or 21st of April, that is to say, within a day of the Prussian message. Look, sir, at the papers presented to parliament, and see what turns out to be the fact? Why, the letter was written on the 20th of April, and not on the 26th of March. There had, therefore, been no pause of a month to satisfy the noble lord and his colleagues that the negociation was at an end. The whole of the noble lord's argument, as built on this suppositious date, falls to the ground; and the whole of mine, which that false date appeared to overthrow, is replaced (as I presume to think) on the ground on which it was originally founded. I must, however, do the noble lord the justice to say, that as soon as he was aware of his mistake, he shewed his desire to correct it. He did come down to the house the following day, and state that he had been wrong in the date of Mr. Fox's letter; that it was not of the 26th of March, but of the 20th of April. [p. 82.] But the mere correction of the date, without applying that correction to the state of the argument between us, was of little importance, except so far as it evinced the noble lord's candour. It was not the mere mistake of dates, but of facts, and of consequences, that was matter of important consideration.—But, in truth, I cannot help thinking that the noble lord's recollection still deceives him. I cannot now believe that ministers really thought the negociation with

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France at an end on the 20th of April; because if they did so, I cannot frame to my own imagination a plausible excuse for their not having communicated the negociation, so far as it had gone, to parliament. They certainly were proud enough of it—justly —be it so—And then what a help would it have been to any future negociation, to have had the sanction of parliament to so much as had already been done? To have had the determination not to treat except conjointly with Russia adopted and approved by parliament, would have been the securest way of disappointing any subsequent attempt to disunite us. That alone would have prevented M. D'Oubril's separate treaty. That alone would have spared us the unlucky refinement of "separately in form, but substantially in concert with each other." It would have given publicity, and with publicity, stability to our connection with Russia; it would have baffled the policy of France; and saved Prussia from ruin. But, sir, they could not believe the negociation to be at an end. This is the apology which I must make for the noble lord and his colleagues, in spite of his own disclaimer of it.—True it is, that there was a pause in the French correspondence after Mr. Fox's letter of the 20th of April. But why? Because that letter was so formidably decisive as the noble lord would fain represent it? No such thing. Because the negociation with England was itself but a secondary matter in Buonaparte's estimation, and kept pace exactly with the progress of the other more important transactions which he had in hand: because the same courier who carried to M. Talleyrand Mr. Fox's clear and explicit letter of the 20th of April, carried also the copy of that still more clear and explicit document, the king's message, which announced our hostilities with Prussia. And well might M. Talleyrand pause; well might he rest and lie upon his oars for some short interval, after an effort so masterly and so successful; well might he grow comparatively careless and languid in the prosecution of the negociation with England, when the object for which principally that negociation had been undertaken was accomplished! "look," he might say to his master, "look at the work of the last 3 months. You apprehended the union of Prussia with the two great surviving powers of the confederacy; you wished to punish Prussia, to insulate her, to have her at your mercy,
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It is done. Three months have changed every thing according to your wish. Instead of Prussia plotting with England and Russia jointly against France, behold Prussia at war with England; and England and Russia separately negociating for peace!"—But to continue and secure to Buonaparte this beneficial state of things, it was necessary that the negociation with England should be resumed. Else we might have begun to see that war with that Power, by whose aid alone we could ever hope to make head effectually against France, was not precisely the policy most consonant to our interests; and we might possibly have corrected it before it was yet too late. 'What?' says the noble lord, 'would your policy have abandoned Hanover?' I answer this question by another, 'Has your policy recovered Hanover?' 'What, would you have made common cause with Prussia while you had such ground of complaint against her unredressed?' I hope we are making, or ready to make, common cause with Prussia now; and I do not see what great benefit we have derived from waiting till now to do so.—To prevent our recurring to this policy, however, at a period when it might have been more advantageous to us, M. Talleyrand resumed the negociation; and then came the message through lord Yarmouth; and then came the separate treaty of M. D'Oubril; a treaty in which, most fortunately for us, Buonaparte and his minister were betrayed by the intoxication of the success, which had so far attended their plans, into the demand of such terms as it was impossible for the emperor of Russia to ratify; and then came those tedious bickerings, those perplexed and wearisome discussions about the uti possidetis, contrived, as it would seem, for the express purpose which France had at heart, of gaining time, of absorbing our whole attention, of making the continent vanish from our view; and thus was the negociation protracted till the fate of Prussia was ripe; and then Buonaparte left Paris for the field of battle (to conquer Hanover for England—no doubt!) and "the farce" (as lord Lauderdale properly calls it) was at length permitted to conclude— And after all this, the noble lord gravely asks "what advantage to France?" And after all this, he adds, "what detriment to Great Britain?"—Really and sincerely, sir, I am at a loss to account for the protraction of the negociation on our part, under

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circumstances so obviously hopeless as to peace; and so obviously disadvantageous to this country, if peace was not to be the issue. But I do not concur with those who lay the blame of this endless delay on lord Lauderdale, still less on lord Yarmouth, and his production of his full powers. The assertion that lord Yarmouth's production of his full powers pledged this country to the continuance of the negociation, (p. 136) I will not say is unfounded; but I confess it is to me perfectly unintelligible. At all events, lord Y.'s recall put an end to that difficulty; and with him and his full powers the negociation might properly have ended. As to lord Lauderdale, I am loth to notice what I think an idle challenge, which has been thrown out to those who disapprove of the length of his stay at Paris, to point out any earlier period at which he could properly have come away. There are many such periods. The very first refusal of passports was one; the insolent excuse assigned for that refusal in M. Talleyrand's note of the 10th of August, (p. 161) an excuse in fact amounting to the declaration that M. Talleyrand will again withhold the passports required, if he again thinks it advisable to do so,—was another the first official denial of the basis was another; the period of lord Lauderdale's discovery that the negociation was "all a farce," was another. At any one of these periods lord L. might hive come away, and I should have thought him right in doing so. But I do not therefore blame him for not having taken a step of so much delicacy on any of these occasions. Lord L. stood in a situation of great difficulty. An error on the side of war might have been less forgiven than one on the side of peace. And I must say that it is the habit of this country, I think I may add of this house, rather to lean hard upon our foreign ministers, and not to make sufficient allowance for the heavy responsibility under which they often have to act, in circumstances, of which we do not see the difficulty, till we see at the same view how it has been got over. I should gladly have excused lord L. if his patience had been sooner exhausted: but I am not unwilling to own he may have judged more wisely in stretching it to the utmost: and to the ability with which he conducted the business of his mission, and executed his instructions, I bear my testimony as unequivocally as any of his friends who have been most forward in his
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commendation.—But the commendation of lord L. is not an apology for the government; what they can have had in view is utterly inscrutable. "Beaucoup se prépare," was the constant language of M. Talleyrand, "we are meditating great things;" and the event has proved that he spoke truth. Had we any mighty preparations on foot, which it required the cloak of a negociation to conceal? Had we any great stroke of policy to execute? any splendid enterprise to achieve, which was to burst forth upon the world at the termination of the negociation, as a counterpart to the battle of Jena? No; but our gain, it seems, is of another sort. We have gained a thorough knowledge of the ambition and artifice of the enemy! We have brought away the conviction that a peace was not attainable; such a peace at least as this country ought to be satisfied to conclude. A great gain, no doubt, to those to whom this knowledge was altogether new: but having been for about 14 years impressed with that opinion of the enemy which is now said to be put beyond all question, I am perhaps the less sensible of the advantage. A salutary conviction I am ready to allow, for those who went in search of such a peace in the sanguine expectation of finding it; but to me who did not suppose it possible even to expect such a peace at this time, the experiment, if not altogether superfluous, appears at least to have been unnecessarily long.—But this is not all; we have established to our own satisfaction the justice of our cause. Here again I am unfortunately insensible of the value of what has been gained: for from the beginning of the war in 1793 (for I reckon as nothing the interval of peace) I have never doubted the justice of the cause of this country against revolutionary France. I am a stranger therefore to those transports which recent proselytism may experience.—But let us not depreciate these advantages, since they are all we have to boast of. If among those upon whom the new light has dawned, there should be any in high trust and confidence with their sovereign; if there be any member of the cabinet who required at this time of day to be convinced, that G. Britain was upon the whole in the right against France; if there be any one who held it as his creed, that France—poor France—had hitherto been "more sinned against than sinning," and who is by the result of this negociation converted to a belief more favourable to

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his country; I am willing to rejoice in his Conversion. But let me hope of such a man, that though his conviction is only of this date, he has the candour to carry back the effect and operation of it to those periods and transactions, in his judgment of which he must now more than suspect he Was mistaken. Those who have arraigned former ministers for want of good faith and of pacific disposition in all preceding negociations, and have given the enemy credit for the qualities which they denied to their country, must now begin to suspect that they were not always well-founded in their suspicions, or scrupulously just in their praise. If they have the candour, if they have the modesty to arrogate to themselves the pretension that their accession to office has totally changed the character of British councils, they will still be puzzled to shew how it should also have operated a change, in a precisely opposite direction, upon those of the enemy; and if they cannot do this, and if their earnest and anxious desire of honourable peace has been baffled and disappointed by the unreasonable ambition, the extravagant pride and passion of the French government—what ground can they have now for doubting that the negociations of former ministers were conducted with the same sincerity, and failed only from the same causes?—In this view, the faith which has been imbibed by such illustrious converts, is matter of real joy; it must contribute to the satisfaction of the country, as well as to the unanimity of the cabinet. It is certainly no small satisfaction, that the sincerity of Mr. Pitt in his attempts for peace, questioned as it has so often been by those whom I now see sitting opposite to me, should be vindicated, even according to their own confession, by the result of Mr. Fox's negociations with France; and it may be of no small advantage to the state, in the present composition of the government, that the conduct of the negociations of Basle, of Paris, and of Lisle, should at length be fully justified in the eyes of the colleagues of lord Grenville.—And this suggests to me yet another advantage of the same sort, which has not been so much dwelt upon, but which I think scarcely inferior in importance. There is an end, I hope for ever, of the doctrine of being "agreeable to the enemy." France is no respecter of persons. The single rule for the conduct of a British statesman is, attachment to the interests of
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Great Britain.—I am not aware of any other advantages which we can be supposed to have derived from this negociation. But it is at an end. The course which is now before us, cannot be mistaken; and I trust we shall manfully pursue it. The country has the means, and I am confident it has the spirit and determination, to persevere with firmness in a struggle, from which there is no escape or retreat; and which cannot be concluded, with safety to Great Britain, but in proportion as with that object is united the liberty and tranquillity of Europe.—We have come out of this negociation, in one respect, with honour; as having maintained in substance our faith with our allies. I attach the full value to this circumstance, and give ministers full credit for it. In other respects, I have stated freely what I think of their conduct; and I should not patiently bear to be told, that in doing so I have transgressed the bounds of my duty, as an Englishman, or as a member of parliament. —I have indeed heard it said, that in making such observations as I have taken the liberty to make, in pointing out the errors of ministers, in dwelling upon what (if wrong at all) are represented as merely slips in the declaration, persons who have taken that part have been guilty of petty cavilling, and have exposed the weakness of their own cause. Cause? What cause? I have no cause in this business, but the cause of my country. I know not how I can better serve that than by enquiring into the way in which it has been managed by those who have had the conduct of it; and if it has in any part been misconducted, it is better that we should find out the fault ourselves, than leave it to the detection and comments of the enemy.—But it must indeed be a mismanagement beyond any thing that I have dreamt of imputing to ministers, that could so far change the respective positions of us and our enemy, as to put him wholly in the right and us in the wrong. Pity it is, if in any one particular, appearances have been suffered to be against us. It is for that reason that the slips in the declaration (if such they be), are to be deeply regretted and deplored.—It is deeply to he regretted, that an assertion should have gone forth to the world, in the sacred name of his majesty, which cannot be substantiated by facts. It is deeply to be regretted that the misconception (to give it no harsher name) from which this false assertion flowed, should have perva-

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ded so large a portion of the negociation, should have exhausted so much fruitless reasoning, and wasted so much precious time, and led to the omission or misuse of opportunities which it may be impossible to retrieve. And it is subject, not of barren regret only, but of prospective anxiety and of exhortation to ministers, that they should revert as quickly as possible to the pursuit of those objects, and that policy, from which they have been so unfortunately and unaccountably led astray; and should seek to recover those advantages which in the hopeless pursuit of unattainable peace they were unavoidably tempted to abandon—the advantages of a cordial co-operation with all the remaining powers of the continent.—Sir, I understand the amendment of the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread) has been disposed of. It is hardly necessary to say, that my vote is given most cordially against it. I cannot agree with him, that such a peace appears to have been within our reach, as would alone justify his insinuation, that a favourable opportunity has been thrown away. I do not wonder indeed at his indignation, at finding himself left alone in opinions which he has held for so many years in common with many of those who sit around him. Consistently with those opinions, the hon. gent. had a right to press such an amendment, and to expect a very different reception of it. I certainly rejoice in that change of opinion which leaves him without support; though, perhaps, I, like him, may be surprised at it. But I am still more surprised that, having determined to make no peace but one of a very different character from that with which the hon. gent. would have been satisfied, his honourable friends should have been eight months in making the discovery, that a peace of a higher character was not to be obtained.—With respect to the address itself, I should be very loth indeed upon any slight ground to break in upon that unanimity which is so desirable in a vote which is to assure his majesty of the support of his people; and which may be considered as addressed, in a certain degree, to the enemy and to Europe. My only difficulty arises from those general expressions of lamentation at the issue of the negociation, in which I cannot concur, without at least explaining and qualifying my concurrence. Regret or satisfaction at any event depends, in a great degree, upon comparison. We compare what we have missed, with what remains to us instead of
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it; and it is thus, in certain cases, very possible to rejoice at having missed what was positively a good, or to regret what would have been a positive evil. —Thus, war is undoubtedly per se a great calamity, and peace an inestimable blessing; but war may yet be felt to be preferable to an inglorious and insecure peace. On the other hand, an inglorious and insecure peace is to be deprecated as an evil; yet it is possible that a war may be so conducted as to render even such a peace an object of desire.—Ministers have so contrived as to make this a question of no small doubt and perplexity. They make the choice between peace and war difficult, or, perhaps, almost indifferent. When I peruse their negociations, and see to what sort of a peace alone they could have led; with what chance of security, with what hope of permanence; I am inclined to congratulate myself on the escape from such a peace to a continuance of the war: but on the other hand, when I observe what sort of a war the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) carries on, I can scarce refrain from casting back a wishful look at the negociation.—If the war were conducted with that ability which we had a right to expect from the character which the present administration gave of themselves, or suffered to be given of them by those nearest in their confidence, and from the unsparing censure and contempt which they lavished on the exertions of their predecessors in office; if it were conducted with that vigour which the country has a right to demand at their hands, trusting them as it does, with all its means, and seconding them with all its zeal and exertion; if any blow had been struck against the enemy in the course of the year, during which these ministers have wielded the whole strength of the empire; if every effort had been made, or even every disposition manifested, to give heart and hope to the nations of the continent,—so that out of such a war might arise the promise of an honourable, a secure, and a permanent peace; unquestionably, in that situation of things the rupture of the late negociation would be matter of unqualified joy, and I could not bring myself to concur in lamenting it.—But if the war that is to come, is to be the counterpart of that which we have hitherto witnessed since the accession of the present administration; if the events and exertions of the last ten months are to be taken as the sample and the measure

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of our activity and achievements; if, while the enemy insultingly tell us at every step of the negociation, beaucoup se prépare;" and telling us so, uniformly keep their word,—on our part such opportunities are to be thrown away as have existed for the last three months, and as exist still, had we the spirit to take advantage of them; if Buonaparte may traverse the continent of Europe to its furthest extremities, and drain France of her last man, relying as fearlessly and as securely upon our supineness, our sloth, and our despondency, as he could have done upon our faithful observance of the stipulations of the most advantageous treaty of peace; and, lastly, if that disheartening maxim, to which I have already had occasion to refer with sorrow and shame; that maxim which was so deeply impressed upon the mind of the government, even so long ago as the beginning of the negociation, that it overflowed in confidential communication to France herself; the maxim that there is nothing so chimerical as any new project of continental confederacy against France; if that, I say, still prevails, and prevails with all the additional weight which it may have acquired from the unfortunate events which have taken place, since it was first promulgated; then indeed seeing little to expect from such a war, conducted on such principles, under such auspices, and with no better hopes in the minds of those who have the charge of it, I can in that sense join in expressing my regret at the failure of the negociation; and with that explanation I am willing to vote for the address as it stands.
Lord Henry Pettysaid, that after the excellent speech of his noble friend (lord Howick) which remained in almost every part unanswered, he did not think it necessary to detain the house by many observations. He certainly thought there had been no cause for the surprise expressed by the right hon. gent. who spoke last, at the silence of the side of the house on which he sat, after hearing the speech of his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread). By this silence they had the opportunity of availing themselves of the answer of the right hon. gent. to the opinion of one who thought the French had been sincere in every part of the negociation; they had the advantage of seeing opposed the opinion of another, who considered the French to have been insincere throughout the whole. One who maintained the uti possidetis was not laid
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down as a basis by his majesty's government in the first instance, was answered by another, who maintained that it was rejected by the French negociators at the very outset. It certainly could not be unsatisfactory to his majesty's ministers, to see the discussion carried on in such a manner that their opponents completely answered each other, and left their cause triumphant. There was another satisfaction they had obtained from the right hon. gent.'s speech, which was his unqualified admission that he was now convinced the overture came from the enemy. He had also expressed some degree of satisfaction at the good faith maintained towards our allies, though that satisfaction he now expressed with some qualification. He feared the effects of an opinion which he supposed to have prevailed on the Continent, that a separation of the interests of this country and Russia had taken place. There had, however, been no secrecy preserved on the situation of Great Britain and Russia, and during the last year it was evident to all the world that their relations never had been more intimate. The right hon. gent. was completely mistaken when he imagined that it was these negociations which had disheartened Prussia, and hurried her into the war with France. No communication made by France to Prussia of what was then passing, if any such communication ever was made, could have produced the effect he had supposed. Let him look at the date of Mr. Fox's letter to Talleyrand, in which it is admitted that there was no longer any chance of organizing a combination against France on the Continent, and he would find that the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance betwen Prussia and France was signed one month before the date of that letter. It was impossible, then, that any communication of the negociation made by France, could have instigated Prussia to her subsequent rash conduct. The right hon. gent. had said that he would look at no evidence of lord Yarmouth's, but the paper he communicated to his majesty's government; but the right hon. gent. must know that the paper to which he referred was a memorandum of a verbal communication. Why then so much objection to this verbal evidence? The hon. gent. considered Sicily as an exception to the basis of the uti possidetis. In this instance, however, the enemy had been more liberal, for, on the subject of that island, M. Talleyrand had said to lord Yar-

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mouth, "vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas." It was difficult to discover upon what ground the right hon. gent. supposed the French negociators denied that the basis of uti possidetis had been admitted. Let him look at the papers, and he would find it stated by lord Lauderdale, that when the admission of that basis was urged by lord Yarmouth, general Clarke did not deny it, but pretended that it had been talked of in loose conversations, which he described as "romans politiques." This was certainly a very different thing from a denial. If a bill was presented to the right hon. gent. for acceptance, and he was to say, that when he put his name to it, he meant nothing but a joke, that surely would not amount to a denial of his having accepted it. He would in that case at least acknowledge the face of his having signed the bill. The noble lord then applauded the zeal displayed throughout the negociation by lord Yarmouth, but regretted that he had produced his full powers before he received a satisfactory answer respecting Sicily, though in that instance he did full credit to the good intentions of his noble friend, as well as in every other stage of the transactions. In reply to what had fallen from his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), he contended that no change of system had taken place in his majesty's government after what was called the political death of Mr. Fox. If his hon. friend would compare the instructions given to lord Yarmouth with the first demand made by lord Lauderdale on his arrival in Paris, he would find the basis of the uti possidetis distinctly mentioned in both. This was a proof that the principle of the negociation remained unaltered. To the assertion of the credulity of ministers, it was only necessary to oppose a contrary assertion, since it was incumbent on those who maintained that opinion, to point out the instances in which his majesty's ministers had been duped; no such thing had however, been attempted. Every negociation was liable to some disadvantage, from the suspence it occasioned, and at a time when there was an active concert of allied powers against a common enemy, it might prove injurious; but at the same time, when the third coalition had been destroyed, what injury of this kind could arise? If France had any sinister object in protracting the negociation, it could only be the separation of this country and Russia But did she succeed, or were his majesty's
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ministers in that instance duped by the enemy? The noble lord lamented that no very immediate prospect opened of a restoration of the tranquillity of Europe, but trusted that some check would yet be given to the ambition and domination of France; one step to which he believed, under Providence, had been accomplished in that close union of England and Russia, a country which the machinations of France had now bound to us more intimately than ever. He considered the good faith, candour, and moderation of this country, as conspicuously set forth in the papers before the house. He was one of those who lamented most deeply the death of that great and illustrious person who commenced the work of negociation, so short a time before the stroke of death cut the thread of his life—a life which nothing but death could prevent from being serviceable to his country and mankind. But it had pleased Providence to give him the opportunity of putting upon record those principles of moderation, good faith, and justice, by which he was guided, in those writings. Out of such transactions as these arose the permanent honour and glory of states: these were lasting, while others were transitory. Thus was national honour and true public glory preserved, and handed down to late posterity. These papers would form a volume in the history of the present times, highly honourable to the great person who commenced them, and to those who conducted them.
Mr. Percevalasked, whether it was intended to report this address to-morrow, as in that case he would not trouble the house at the late hour to which the debate had been protracted, but would state what he had to say, on bringing up the report.
Lord Howickthought it an unusual course of proceeding, to adjourn a debate upon the subject of an address where the house was unanimous as to the general object of that address. He had no wish to prevent the learned gent. from addressing the house, and however long his speech might be, he assured him he would listen to it with patience.
Mr. Pèrcevaltook a review of all the circumstances connected with the negociation, from which he drew these conclusions; that the enemy were never seriously desirous of peace, and that ministers were the dupes of the artifice of the French government. The object of the enemy for engaging in the negociation was to play off England against Russia, and to compel

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M. d' Oubril to sign such a treaty as they wished, by persuading him that the British government was on the point of concluding a separate peace. He considered, as a subject of deep regret, that a man of Mr. Fox's great talents and incorruptible mind, had been betrayed into a private and confidential correspondence with such a man as his attached friend M. Talleyrand. He blamed ministers for not having sooner put an end to the negociation, and declared his firm conviction that no peace could take place with France, at least such a peace as would be worthy of the acceptance of this country, as long as the force and councils of that country were directed by two such men as Buonaparte and Talleyrand. He then adverted to the situation of this country in relation to America. He said he understood that a Treaty of Amity had been concluded between us within these few days. He disapproved of the manner in which our affairs had been conducted with the United States, for they had terrified us into a compliance with their object; and if there had been a spark of spirit in his majesty's councils, that disposition would have been resisted. They had passed a law by which our goods were prohibited to be imported into their territories, and this law he understood to have been actually enforced. The government of this country ought not to have acted in compliance with this dictatorial proceeding; we should have said that we disdained to treat with the United States of America, with a pistol at our breast; and that until they repealed that act by which the importation of our goods was prohibited, we would not treat with them at all. He observed also, that as France had adopted a course by which neutrals were prevented from trading with us, we could easily retaliate, by taking care that no neutrals should trade with them until the goods should first have paid a duty in our ports; and this was not difficult for us under the present condition of things, for we were now literally masters of the whole trade of the world, as far as related to carrying any thing by sea. These were matters which required serious consideration under the present condition of things, for if we were so disposed, we could levy a very heavy tax on our enemies, which they would be compelled to pay, or perish almost for want of many articles of commerce. Having made these observations, he must confess that the support of the government in the most vigor-
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ous prosecution of the war, was a thing so obviously just and necessary, and the good intentions of government were in this negociation so manifest, and the good faith observed to our allies so entirely honourable, that he felt no difficulty whatever in assenting to the address most cordially.
Lord Howickmade a very animated reply, and we are sorry that the hour at which he rose precludes us from following him in detail. He noticed with much animation whad had fallen from the last speaker on the subject of Mr. Fox's correspondence. Language had been used, he observed, which would have been unbecoming in one member towards another sitting on the bench opposite to him, and yet all the scoff's, taunts, and insinuations which had been employed were directed against one who was now no more, and whose answer the learned gent. knew he had no reason to dread. He had commented with much asperity on an attachment which he supposed had been formed between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand. Where did he learn that any such attachment ever existed? He could assure the hon. and learned gent. that no intimate friendship subsisted between M. Talleyrand and Mr. Fox. All the relation in which they stood with respect to each other was that of common acquaintance, and they had no intimacy but that which had arisen in social intercourse. An extract only of one letter, which passed between them, had been given, because the remainder was of a private nature. But was the learned gent. warranted on that account in supposing the remainder of the letter contained something improper? He could assure him that there was no part of the correspondence of which his majesty's ministers were ignorant. Nay, he could further assure him, that every line written by Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand was seen by the king. The noble lord then replied to some of the arguments used by Mr. Canning, and Mr. Whitbread. The hon. gent. he observed, blamed his majesty's ministers for having done too much in the way of negociation, while his hon. friend and relation blamed them for doing too little; but he thought it was not a little in their favour, that they had steered a middle course between the two extremes. The pamphlet which had been alluded to, shewed from the total ignorance with which it was written, that it could come from no official authority, as insinuated. As to the prosecution hinted

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at, he could only say, that those within whose department such proceedings came, would, if they thought fit, prosecute it. With regard to his hon. friend's question, are we to be shut out from all prospect of peace? he could only answer by saying, that, unless a change took place in the temper and character of the French government, peace must, in his view of the subject, be considered as very distant. The chief of that government, it appeared, had lately stated that he would not conduct the present war as he had done those in which he was before engaged. He had declared that he would not leave the shores of the Baltic, nor evacuate any of the countries of which he might take possession, unless this country gave up her maritime conquests. This was what England never could submit to. She must resist a pretension to which it would be dishonourable to yield, or the enemy must abandon it. There was here no choice, the honour of the country must at all hazards be maintained and vindicated, or we must sink under the attack meditated against us. This was a melancholy prospect for humanity, but it was one which rose out of the unfortunate state of the continent, and it seriously called for the pledge of supporting his majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the war, which was contained in the address he had moved.
Mr. Percevalsaid, that with respect to the word "attached," he had taken it from the Correspondence: if the noble lord would refer to No. I. of the Papers, (see p. 93.) he would there find that Mr. Fox, in addressing M. Talleyrand, had subscribed himself "with the most perfect attachment." — The address was then put and carried, and the house adjourned at five o'clock on Tuesday morning.