Sitting of 20 June 1805

MINUTES.
On the motion of Mr. Huskisson, the house went into a commitee

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on the Distillery,acts. Resolutions, containing certain new regulations respecting the distillation of spirits in England and Scotland,when intended to be exported from either country to the other, were agreed to. The report was received, and a bill ordered accordingly—Mr. Peter Moore presented a petition from the clothiers of YorkShire, Wilts, Somerset, and Gloucester, against the. bill now pending for the suspension of penalties. affecting their trade. The petitioners Were,ordered to be heard on the report to be heard on the report— On Motion for the second reading of this bill for the suspension of penalties in the woollen manufacture, Mr. Brooke opposed the bill,on the ground that it gave a monopoly to those who made use of the prohibited machines, under favour of the suspension. Admiral Berkeley defended. the bill. He hoped that before the expiration of the short period for which it:Was to be in force (till 1st May) a full arrangement would be brought forward by his majesty's, government. Mr. Peter Moore opposed the bill which had only the signatures of 83 manufacturers to recommend it, while the number of its opponents amounted to 200,000 The official proceedings, so far as they went, coincided with the bill brought forward by his hon. friend (Mr. Brooke). Mr. Brooke wished to take the sense of the house on propriety of putting off the further proceedings on this bill till this day three months; but he deferred pressing the division till another day. The bill was read a second time and ordered to be committed to-morrow—Mr. Huskisson presented accounts of the exchequer bills outstanding on the aids of the last year, and gave notice that a motion would be made with respect to them in the committee of ways and means to-morrow—Mr. Foster presented an estimate of the compensation be granted to persons in public offices in Ireland for 1805, for extra trouble,—The Irish Civil List bill went through a committee, in which there was some conversation between Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Sheridan, and sir John Newport, on a clause subjecting the accounts of the expenditure of sums granted for secret service to the approbation of the lord lieutenant. The cause was agreed to, and the report ordered to be received to-morrow,—Mr. Huskisson presented an account of pensions granted by the crown, and a copy off the warrant of the barons of the exchequer in Scotland, for granting certain arrears of the stewardship Fife to lady Melville. Lord Henry petty gave notice, that he would bring forward some resolutions on this sub-
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ject early in the ensuing session—Mr. Alexander brought up the report of the committee of ways and means. Bills were ordered conformably to the resolutions for the appropriation of the surplus of the consolidated fund for the last year.—Mr. Paul deferred till Monday his notice relative to the nabob of Oude. He thought it proper to state particularly that he the same day to bring forward a distinct charge against the marquis Wellesley, from the conduct observed towards that prince.

IMPEACHMENT OF LORD MELVILLE
Mr. Bond wished to put a question hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Whitbread), the answer to which would probably prevent the necessity of a particular Motion. The house having instructed the attorney general to prosecute lord Melville for the criminal matter imputed to him in the tenth report, he conceived it was not in the power of the attorney general to exclude from the range of that prosecution any offence whatsoever contained in that report. If therefore, it was proper that any particular transactions, should be excluded from the prosecution; it was fit the attorney general should be structed as to such exclusion. There could be now no doubt that the forty thousand pounds, advanced to Boyd and Benfield, was one point on which there could be no intention to prosecute. He was of opinion that the case of Jellicoe also should be excluded, as not of sufficient importance to be made a ground of charge. But,as he recollected that the hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Whitbread) made it the ground of one of the articles of impeachment which he Meant to have presented, he asked, that hon. gent. now whether he Meant it should make one of the subjects of the prosecution directed by the house? If the hon. gent. did not think it should, and if no intimation of a contrary sentiment came from any other part of the house, he thought that it would be sufficient to let the attorney general know that this also was not to be included in the prosecution
Mr. Whitbread had certainly considered Jellicoe's business as of importance, and had made it one of the grounds of impeachment. He admitted, however, that it did not make the same impression on the house, and therefore he doubted whether he should have produced that article. He had not any wish individually that this matter should be included in the prosecution by the attorney general.
The Attorney General trusted he should not shew the slightest disrespect for any

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individual, if he wished that the house should honour him collectively should be distinctively expressed. If the house thought proper to supersede that jealousy which seemed constitutionally to belong to it, when one servant of the crown was to be prosecuted by another, he supposed it would at least be thought proper not to leave it matter of question, how far the officer charged with the prosecution should or not comply with the wishes of the house, in the steps he might take. He trusted, therefore, that it would not be thought improper in him, if he wished, instead of collecting indiscriminately from the whole body of the reports, such matter as might be made the ground of criminal charge, that the house should specify what it thought proper to be prosecuted, and what it did not. He should also be glad to have the authority of the house as to whether the civil suit he had been directed to institute against lord Melville and Mr. Trotter should be wholly suspended, or whether he should endeavour to carry it on against Mr. Trotter singly; he said endeavour, because a considerably formal difficulty and delay would arise from suing the one without the other. He also wished to know whether, if he proceeded civilly against Mr. Trotter, he was at liberty to make use of him as a witness against lord Melville. Also, whether he was at liberty to bring in proof against lord Melville what had fallen from him in that house, at the bar, which he could not do without instructions from the house, though he could be under no difficulty as to its being received in the court where the prosecution was to be carried on. These points he thought it necessary to state to the house, not to argue. He had further to remark a difficulty which arose from the practice newly adopted, of ordering prosecutions to be immediately instituted at the command of the house, rather than by address to his majesty, praying his majesty to direct such a prosecution to be instituted. Under the former practice, if any difficulty should arise on any points, and he should find instruction necessary, the course was to report the difficulty to the secretary of state, and the government would give its instructions in consequence. If the difficulties suggested should appear to confine the prosecution within too narrow limits, it was probable a message would be brought down to the house in consequence of the occurrence, and the house would then have an opportunity of learning the particulars,
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and of judging whether the proceedings in the new form would answer its wishes, or whether a new address should be carried up to enforce a more satisfactory course. This would be a better mode than if he were left alone to collect the matter of the charges, to carry on the proceeding, to acquaint,the house of what he had done, and to argue how far he had complied with the wishes of the house. He therefore hoped the house would instruct him more specifically by vote as to what it wished to make matter of particular charge.
Mr. Bond, in explanation, said, he had no,objection to propose a vote for excluding the matter of. Jellicoe, though he thought the simple mode of ascertaining the sense of the house he had already noticed, was sufficient. As to the other difficulties suggested by the attorney general, it Would be presumption in him to notice them. He left it to the attorney general, if he should aftertwards find these, difficulties stand in his way, to make them the subjects of further motions.
Mr Whitbread hoped the house would find a way for the hon. and learned gent to get out of all the embarrassments with which he found himself surrounded, and enable him to do complete justice between the individual who was the object of his prosecution and the public. His own intention was, if the impeachment had been agreed to, to suspend the civil suit with respect to both lord Melville and Mr. Trotter, and if that was not sufficient to enable Mr. Trotter to be a witness, to bring in a bill of indemnity for him, with a view that the whole system of the navy pay office should be laid open. He should be inclined to think the same course ought still to be adopted; but it rested not with him, but with the hon. gent. Who had recommended the mode proceeding agreed on by the house, bring in the regulation which were necessary in consequence.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer thought enough appeared,from What had passed, to shew that it would have been wise in the house,to have proceeded with more deliberation. With respect to the matter now before that house, it Was impossible his hon. and learned friend could collect the wishes of the house from what fell loosely in the expression of individual opinions. It was not enough to leave out the matter of Jellicoe leaving the whole remaining matter of the report for the learned gent. to glean out of. It Would be proper to exclude, by specific resolution.

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such other matter as it Was not advisable to prosecute, and to state, distinctly by other resolutions what was to be prosecuted. The difficulties with,respect to the manner,of proceeding also deserved consideration; and he confessed all these things appeared to him to furnish sufficient ground for reconsidering the resolution the house had come to, and for Again enquiring whether a prosecution by the attorney general should be adhered to rather than an impeachment. He confessed he was still, after all the consideration he had given to the subject, of opinion, that neither ought to have been resorted to thought, after the decision the house had come to, he must feel much delicacy in declaring such an opinion. Being of this opinion, he had not at the time turned his mind to the consideration of which of the two proposed modes was best, in a prosecution which he disapproved of generally. But the more he reflected on this matter, the more he considered the difficulties that had arisen since, the more he considered what was required by the constitution in general, what was due to the privileges of peers, to the substantial justice to which the party was entitled, and to the delicacy owing to the confidential servants of the crown; the more he considered all these things, the more he was convinced, that the mode which had been adopted was not that which he majority of the house would, on reflexion,,think applicable to the proceedings it wished for. He hoped the attention of the house would be called to this, matter on an early day, and that those disapproved of any part of the course lately agreed, upon, would then have an opportunity of supporting the most constitutional measure corresponding to the circumstances.
Mr. Fox said, he would not now enter into particulars, as the whole matter was to be made the subject of future discussion; but he could not admit the difficulties, stated by the attorney-general, as they were insisted upon by the right, hon. gent. (the chancellor of the exchequer) in all prosecutions directed by the house, the attorney-general was responsible. If the prosecution was instituted by address, an intermediate responsibility rested upon him; but the attorney-general was not thereby exempted from all responsibility. With respect to the mode of proceeding, he was one of those who approved of the proceeding by impeachment but though that mode was not proved of he could not admit that the sense
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of the house was not fairly taken upon it. The forms of the house admitted an amendment, by omitting all the original motion but the Word "that;" he could not help thinking, however, that such amendments were disgraceful to the house. The only distinct parliamentary course was a motion, and an amendment upon it. Nothing was more clear, than that this was they proper parliamentary course, though his majesty's ministers had not thought proper to coincide in it. His majesty's ministers, though they then voted against both the modes of prosecution proposed, now did him and his friends the honour to say they would have voted with them in preference. He was glad to hear this even now, but he wished they had thought proper to declare their preference then. The majority was formed of persons some of whom thought one mode preferable, others another, but all agreed that either was desirable rather than no prosecution whatever should take place. This would be the principal subject of the discussion which would take place on another day; but that the attorney-general was not to take upon him the responsibility of the prosecution, or that it might not be put upon him, was what he could not allow. If the mode of impeachment had been adopted, difficulties would have, attended that also; and if the plea of difficulties now offered was to be allowed, there was no one prosecution which might not be stopped and abandoned on the same grounds. He wished gentlemen to bear this in mind when they came to consider the right use to be made of the ulterior proceedings; and when gentlemen came to consider had been resolved upon and what was further to be done, the propriety of departing from a resolution deliberately formed would be a material point of the deliberation, particularly when the reconsideration was suggested by a party which was not friendly to either of the proposed modes of prosecution
Mr. Bond wished here to give notice, that he would the next day move an instruction for excluding the matter of jellicoe; but, on the suggestion of the Chancellor of the exchequer, who thought any motion on the subject likely to greater part of the general question, he deferred his notice till Tuesday.
Mr. Sheridan thought the mode of proceeding by the intervention of the secretary of state, not likely to be always attended with all those advantages the attorney-generad imputed to it. The secretary of state

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might be the person under prosecution, and was the attorney-general to communicate with him on a prosecution against himself for it did not follow that he would be dismissed when a prosecution was ordered against him. Those who were most anxious now to recal the impeachment they before resisted, seconded the difficulties started by the hon. gent. had joined in supporting the original motion, he would have made it impossible for that happened which was now matter of complaint to him, and he would have had the best chance of carrying the point he aimed at, that of preventing all prosecution; because though they who proposed impeachment were content to vote for the criminal prosecution, on the failure of that, those who brought forward the criminal prosecution would not have voted for the impeachment. The right hon. gent. was therefore guilty of a blunder, as he often was, in not taking part with them in the first instance. If the right hon. gent. had followed this course, the house would not have fallen into the situation in which it now stood; for, of 470 who were present, it appeared now that 420 were of the same option; and that a minority. But having once come to the resolution of adopting a criminal prosecution, it was now a delicate question to think of recalling that resolution to return to another, in preference to which it had been adopted. This could not be done without running the risk of having no proceeding at all, for the whole of the existing plan should be rescinded before any thing new could be adopted, and it was matter of chance whether any substitution would be made. The house would expose itself to the imputation of fickleness, and it would shake itself in the opinion of the country by abandoning all that had been done in this case, without the certainly of being able to receive and recover the good opinion it would have lost.
Mr. Canning allowed, that if a minority of 50 imposed its sentiments on a majority of 420 that was not in itself a reason for recalling the consideration for the purpose of reversing the decision so made. But it was worthy of the consideration of the house, whether, if an opportunity was afforded it should not reconsider the great constitutional question, whether a man should be tried by his peers or not.
Mr. Harrison said, this was the first time since he had a seat in that house, that
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he had heard the attorney-general call for instructions, when a prosecution was ordered on points, which he must know better than the house. The imposed the task on him, and confided on him for the proper management of it; and then he came to the house for a specification of the grounds of charge. If the noble lord was to be prosecuted, it was for the learned gent. to judge what could be proved against him, and, how the proof could be brought forward. What was started by the attorney-general, and the other right hon. gent. on the same side, appeared to him but a plan to bring off the criminal from a prosecution directed to be instituted against him. The house had come to a specific resolution that a breach of trust had been committed, and the attorney-general was to prosecute for a gross violation of the law, and a high breach of duty. The attorney-general was the proper person to judge what crimes he would select, and not the house, which had not the same means of judging, as gentlemen were not in general sufficiently conversant with the law.
The Attorney-General, in explanation, said it was not with respect to points of law that he wanted instructions; but, as he was to execute the wishes of the house, he trusted he did not depart from his duty in asking some instructions as to those wishes.
Mr. Bankes saw no reason for altering the resolution the house had come to; and he conceived that those who formerly pressed a different mode, would now see reason to recommend this. With respect to the propriety of a specification of the criminal matter contained in the report now given generally in charge to the attorney-general, he should reserve himself till the day when that was to be the subject of a distinct discussion.
Mr. Rose admitted that there was no instance on the journals of specific instructions to the attorney-general for managing a prosecution; but there was no case on the journals like the present; none of the examples on the journals was so complicated as this—Mr. Bond's notice of an instruction with respect to Jellicoe's business was fixed for Tuesday.

STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRE.
Mr. Crey rose to make his promised motion on the state of public affairs, and spoke, in substance as follows:I rise for the purpose of calling the attention of the house to the present most critical state of the country, and in doing so I am not aware that

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any other apology will be necessary, than what the subject itself will afford. Whether we look to our foreign or our domestic state, whether we fix our view on our colonial establishments, on the situation of our commerce, our finances, of our army or navy, whether we look at the state of the war, and the chance of peace, we shall find that on every one of these points, forming in the aggregate the actual state of the empire at large, there is matter of serious consideration, that upon the whole there is room for much anxiety, and that to carry us safe through the present crisis, will demand all the wisdom and energy we possess. To embrace all this variety of subjects in a single discussion, would exceed any abilities, however great; and for me to offer even a slight sketch of them, might seem presumption, were it not that the state of affairs itself so imperiously calls for investigation and the importance of the interests at stake, renders it the duty of a member of parliament to bring the situation of affairs before the public. It is now two years since the commencement of war, a war in which we are still engaged, undertaken after a short, uncertain interval of unavailing peace. It naturally suggests itself, then, to enquire, what were the grounds on which the war was commenced? what the objects to which it was directed? what the prospects of success with which it is attended? and what the best policy in the conduct of it. The first object which presents itself is the state of our finances, a subject of itself sufficient for more than one day's discussion; upon which, however, I shall enter into no detail, particularly as the end of the session, to lay before the house a statement of the public finances, as they stand at the time and I hope an able and hon. friend of mine (Mr. Johnstone),who has already distinguished himself in this business, will this year favour the house with a similar exertion of his industry. At the beginning of the war we were assured, that the war could be carried on for several years, without any addition to the capital of the debt, by borrowing no more than was extinguished by the operation of the sinking fund. I at the time doubted the solidity of this promise, and we are now certain that it was fallacious. For three years of the war forty millions have already been borrowed, and an addition of at least thirty millions made to the capital of our debt, beyond what the sinking
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fund has redeemed. Such is the effect of the war,as to the capital of our debt already; but when we contemplate the magnitude of our expenditure, when we consider that last year our expense amounted to seventy millions, and that this year in all probability, it will be more, it is impossible not to see that our finances, though undoubtedly they are still great, and with good management adequate to the greatest objects, must deserve the serious attention of every British statesman. They are in such a situation as to render either prodigal administration, or wanton expense, in the highest degree criminal; and in a comparison of our prospects they strongly remind us that war ought not to be pursued, if peace on fair and honourable terms can be obtained. But, it is not the amount of our extraordinary war expenditure only that must increase. Even were war to cease immediately, our permanent expenditure must be greatly increased. I shall not, I believe, be contradicted, when I say that the whole amount of the interest, &c. of our debt, will be at least thirty millions, and looking at the state of Europe after a peace, it cannot be imagined that we could sit down with a peace establishment of less than forty millions a year. At a time, then, when the amount of the taxes is so great, and when for the first time there appears reason to conclude from their produce, that they have been carried as far as they can go, it is the more necessary to enquire whether war be indispensable. But leaving this subject, I shall barely allude to the state of the army, because at the beginning of the session that subject was so completely discussed by my right hon friend (Mr. Windham), and a notice of a motion has been given by an hon. colonel (Craufurd) so well qualified to do it justice. This much however, I may observe generally, that the necessity of an improvement of our army was last year universally admitted. It was so particularly insisted upon by the present minister, in the shape of a charge against his predecessor, that it cannot now be forgotten or disputed. Yet it has been shewn that any improvement that may have taken place is far short both of what the nation had a right to expect, and of what its situation demanded. The supplementary militia has been reduced and this measure, as far as it goes, I do not disapprove of; but let it be remembered, that if it gives us any advantage in point of discipline and quality, it adds nothing to our number for home

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defence. But allowing as much for this as can be claimed, yet, when we compare our whole military force with that of the enemy, with his increasing means, with his uninterrupted exertions, with the menaced attacks upon us, withdrawing our naval protection to foreign stations, we shall be forced to conclude that we have not kept pace with the progress of the foe; that, in comparison with our danger, our means of security have not advanced, and that in reality the country is now less upon an equality with the preparations, and with the means o France, than it was last year when the right hon. gent. so strongly arraigned the imbecility and incapacity of his predecessors in office. It appears from a paper I have before me, that since January 1805, there have been raised four thousand two or three hundred men, by ordinary recruiting. Of these above two thousand have been for regiments at home. It appears, too, that the casualties within that period, to the regiments at home, is within one hundred and seventy of the whole supplies they have received by ordinary recruiting. Any if we reckon, as doubtless we may, the casualties of regiments on foreign stations, at least as great as of those at home, it will follow that the army, on the footing it now stands, can with difficulty be kept up by the recruits it receives. The reduction of the militia, which makes no addition to the numbers for home defence, is the only augmentation which the army of the country has obtained in the course of the last year. The whole of this subject will be so much more ably stated by the hon. colonel (Craufurd) who has turned his attention to it, that I shall abstain from any further remarks, contenting myself with saying, that those facts which are within the level of every man's observation, are of themselves sufficient to excite anxiety in so important a branch of our defence—I proceed now to that which is the grand bulwark of our safety, the navy; and if, as we have seen, there is no cause to congratulate ourselves on the improvement of our finances, or of our army, I fear that the state of the exultation. Last year at this time we had in commission of the line eighty-eight ships, and at the present moment I understand the number of this class in commission is only ninety-one, being an increase of three since last year. There have been added seven frigates, twenty-two loops, and fifty gun brigs. The
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number of seamen voted last year was seventy-eight thousand, and the number actually mustered was above eighty-seven thousand, being above nine thousand more than the vote. What the number now mustered is I cannot say, but I apprehend from the difficulty of manning the ships put in commission, of which I have heard something, that the number now mustered is not greater than that mustered this time twelve-month. The addition of line of battle ships, and of frigates, we see, is very small, and though that of gun-brigs is larger in the amount, I do not think it adds greatly to our security. I fear, indeed, that the right hon. gent. has been deceived s to the importance of this class of vessels. Compared with the immense number of the enemy, they are nothing; and if our defence were to depend on them, we should be wretched indeed. The improvement of the navy in that class of ships which must constitute our chief defence against every naval attempt of the enemy is by no means satisfactory. It is admitted, indeed, by many no the other side, that our navy is not in the state in which it ought to be; but this they assert as matter of charge against a former board of admiralty. That charge, and the defence of the accused party, forms just ground of enquiry into the facts. For my own part, I profess to be little versed in the subject, but as far as authority goes, and as far as my own investigations can form the ground of my judgement, I am decidedly of opinion, that the system of lord St. Vincent was the best and that if he had remained in office he would have placed the navy of England in that state of superiority and of power which all friends to the country must desire to see. This, however, I only state incidentally, and after the deserving of examination; and with a view to our situation either for carrying on war with vigour or negotiating with effect, the navy demands the most serious care and attention of the house—If from these topics we turn to our domestic situation, then indeed there is room for a satisfaction unmingled. Never was there a period when the people were more disposed cheerfully to bear the burden imposed upon them by the circumstances of the times. Never was there loyalty more active and more cordial. Never was the spirit of the whole nation more determined to resist every attack on their independence, and to defend themselves at very hazard. But while we congratulate ourselves on this pleasing picture,

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we cannot help observing, that the burden of taxes presses hard on many classes; and we ought the more to feel that burdens borne with so much loyalty, should be lightened, if possible, at least, should not be increased without necessity. If we look at Ireland, I hope that there too we shall find ground of satisfaction, for, in part, through the conciliating administration of lord Hard wicke, considerable progress has been made in composing that country. More indeed has been done by the example of the consequences of French aid to those who ever looked with any degree of hope to the effects of French co-operation. If the state of Ireland be not yet so satisfactory as it might be, yet there is reason to hope that the Irish now see the advantage of British connexion, and that they know that what they have to expect from the liberality and the policy of Great Britain, would utterly be lost by French conquest; that by contributing to the injury of their natural friends, by a correspondence with France, they would only be adding themselves to the list of, slaves whom France has seduced under her dominion, either in an object dependence, or totally stripped of their name and existence as a nation. Such reflections and such examples must have wrought a great change in the sentiments even of the disaffected. But still there is room for farther improvement. There is room for that entire cordiality between the two countries, or rather between the different parts of the empire, that instead of being our weakness, Ireland should be one of the chief instruments of our greatness; instead of absorbing a large portion of our military force to preserve tranquillity,she might contribute so large a portion to the active military strength of the state. To me it seems, that while any obstacle remains to the entire satisfaction of catholic body, regard to the objects for which they petitioned the legislature, the progress to perfect tranquillity and to complete co-operation must be far short of what it might be. Yet both by legislative measures, and by those of administration, much may be done, I am satisfied that it is the wish of lord Hardwicke to do every thing that depends upon him, but I fear that on the other, side of the channel,as here, they labour under the distraction of a divided government. Lord Hardwicke can never give full effect to his wishes, while the second officer in Ireland is allowed to continue; while the system of the first or second minister of Ireland in this house is so
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different from that which lord Hardwicke would be disposed to adopt. Much, therefore, as has been done, yet much remains, which a wise administration might accomplish; and Ireland still appears that part of the empire to which it is impossible to look without some anxiety, and without feeling that it merits our utmost vigilance and attention—As to the state of the war, it will be found to afford as little ground of exuitation as any of the topics we have reviewed. The war in India may be thought an exception; but on that branch, as indeed not connected with the war with France, and as already discussed at much detail on a motion of my hon. friend (Mr. Francis), I shall not enlarge. Let us then shortly enquire what has been the effect of the war; what the objects of it, and the chances of their attainment? The general object, independent of the particular causes enumerated at the time, I apprehend to have been the necessity of limiting the aggrandizement and restraining the ambition of France; and some, I believe, went so far as to insist on the necessity of reducing her power. What progress, then has been made in these objects? Is the power of France reduced? Has any barrier against its increase been obtained? On the contrary, has not. Buonaparté placed the iron crown of Italy on his head? Has he not converted Spain from a reluctant tributary into an active and efficient ally? Is not Portugal, because we are unable to defend her,compelled to furnish a subsidy to be employed in the annoyance of her most ancient and most sincere friend? Does not Belgium still continue incorporated with France, and is not Holland entirely under her control? Are not both of them compelled to contribute their exertions for the destruction of this country? Are their ports filled with preparations for invading us? Is not Hanover occupied by France, and compelled to furnish supplies for the enemies of her lawful sovereign? Are not the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine and the ocean the boundaries of France? And, while her power on the continent seems both extended and consolidated is there are any prospect of an efficient confederacy to limit her insolence and reduce her power? On the contrary, are not the great powers of the continent averse from any continental war? Does not France occupy Italy and switzerland as positions from which to fall upon Austria? Does she not hold Hanover to watch the north of Europe? And while her strength seems thus extended, and her

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position so formidable, is there any thing in her internal situation to afford a rational prospect of relief from time or accident? Are her finances ruined, her army mutinous, or her navy dilapidated? But this year we have had no comparisons from the right hon. gent. between the resources and the credit of France and this country; we have heard no assertion that she was on the verge, nay, in the gulf of bankruptcy; or any hope whatever, that from want of means she would be compelled to give up the contest. Even sir Francis D'Ivernois, perservering in his warfare with the French finances, affords us, at least up to the present moment, little rooms for congratulation. The expose, some time since presented by the French government to the legislature, asserts, that without new imposts, or extraordinary resources or loans, the war will be maintained by the revenue of thirty millions a year, and that if the war were to last ten years, it would add nothing to the debt of France, while that of England would be increased four milliards. This promise resembles that made by the ministers of this country at the beginning of the war, but I am afraid that hitherto, at least it has been better kept, since even sir Francis D'Ivernois admits that her contributions in time of war will cover the deficiency in her receipts, and that her domestic revenues and her foreign contributions have covered her expenses. Her thinks, indeed, that this must cease, since the supplies from Spain are out off by the vigorous policy of this government; a policy, however, which I fear this country will have cause to rue, when we see the tribute exchanged for a co-operation so active and so effectual, as appears now to be displayed. That such a country as France, with an active and ingenious population, should be ruined in her finances, while her expenditure is confined within thirty millions sterling, it were the height of absurdity to suppose. If, then, the war were to be a war of finances, and allowing every thing for the superior industry, capital, and commerce of this country, it would be vain to attempt to conquer by that means, while our own expenditure was little short of eight millions, a year. But, if we cannot raise our hopes on the approaching bankruptcy of France, can we calculate upon the state of her army? Are not its spirit unbroken? Is it not commanded by the most skilful officers? And does it not on every side occupy the most formidable position?
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Surely this comparison with our own does not encourage any flattering hope of attaining the objects of the war. Is the state of her navy more consolatory to us? We have added three ships of the line to our navy. France, by extraordinary exertions, has in the course of last year, added fleets to hers. The navy of France cannot now be estimated at less than forty-eight ships of the line; the Dutch have eleven sail; Spain in all has sixty-one sail; but, allowing a great number to be unfit for service, I believe I am within the mark when I say, that Spain contributes to the line fit for service, Thus France has in all eighty-three ships of the line at her disposal, being eight less than the force we now have. This disproportion, indeed, is greatly increased, by the superiority of skill and discipline possessed by our seamen. But still we see that France, within so short a space, has made advances towards us altogether unexpected. She has contrived, too, by well combined plans, and through the want of vigour and intelligence in our government, to send to sea considerable expeditions. Occupying large divisions of our fleets in blockades along her whole line of coast, she has equipped armaments that have escaped our vigilance, have gone to our distant colonies, committing depredations, if not to the extend they might have done, depredations highly prejudicial to our interests, and disgraceful to the nation. It certainly is an extraordinary spectacle at the end of two years of a war, undertaken to limit the aggrandizement, and reduce the power of France, and that too under circumstances, particularly as to the naval state of France, peculiarly favourable, that we now continent, growing formidable on the ocean, threatening our foreign possession with a powerful armament, of which though we are ignorant of the destination, we are almost certain that it will go to some quarter where we have not an adequate force to oppose it. The circumstance attending the sailing of the Toulon fleet, and its junction with that of Cudiz, are of themselves sufficiently extraordinary to call for enquiry. The Toulon fleet sailed twice without being met by our fleet in the mediterranean, which not only shews our want of intelligence, but the want of a convenient station in that sea from which to observe the movements of the enemy, a circumstance, by the way, which may serve to illustrate the importance of Malta, to which, at the beginning of the war, so

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much was attached. It sailed twice, however, without interruption, and having effected a junction with the Spaniards at Cadiz on the 9th of April, proceeded to sea again And is it not an extraordinary circumstance, that now, on the 20th of June, we should be ignorant of the destination of so large an armament, which sailed from Cadiz on the 9th of April, to strike a blow at some of our foreign settlements? Indeed, so extraordinary is this affair, that the house ought not to separate till it be investigated. I must add, too, that the conduct of the officer who commanded our fleet off Cadiz, when the French appeared, on the face of it calls for enquiry. I do not mean to say that sir John Orde may not be able to justify himself; he certainly was greatly inferior in point of numbers. We trust, on many occasions, to the superiority of our navy under great inequality of numbers, but nothing has more tended to create that excellence, which justifies the confidence, than the sound discretion exercised in the appointment of naval commanders, a discretion, on which the Public opinion ought to have no inconsiderable Weight, because that opinion calls forth the merit it rewards. I do not blame sir John Orde because he in stantly put to sea as soon as the French fleet appeared; he was inferior to the enemy doubtless; but there are occasions When high Spirit, and a strong feeling of the public cause, will induce men to run great risks for great objects, and it is on such occasions When bold attempts are often crowned with Success, or at least find the best consolation for disappointment. The striking fact is, that sir John Orde Made a retreat from Cadiz at the Moment when a junction was to be effected, from which the most important consequences, and probably great disasters to this country, were likely to ensue. Sir John Orde, however, maybe Perfectly. Justifiable, I only say that the affair calls for investigation. The state of his fleet May have been such as to make it improper for him to do that which, with a fleet in suitable order, he would attempted. I have Seen a paper which gives an account of the fleet, and of each ship respectively of his fleet. The Glory is stated to have hurt, in her mast, and otherwise out of repair; the Agamemnon was likewise defective in various points, so the Polyphemus and renown. If this representation be correct, it involves a most serious charge against the admiralty; but why the
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ships should have wanted water, which might have been had from the coast of Portugal, or from Gibraltar, I am at a loss to say. At any rate, however, why did not sir John Orde leave behind some vessels to watch and to trace the enemy, and to give such information, either to lord Nelson, when he Came down the Mediterranean, or to government at house, that the foe might have been pursued with a probability of overtaking him? Why did not sir John Orde, if he thought himself unequal in any Manner to engage the enemy, stand away to Ferrol, and, joining that squadron, obstruct the sailing of the enemy's armament, and perhaps defeat it? Or, might he not have taken a middle station, to watch them till joined by some other squadron? These are all very important circumstances; the public expects the elucidation of them and it is the duty of the house to lead the way in the enquiry. As to the destination of the fleet, Jamaica appears to me the most likely object, and there is a rumour in town, which at least may be true, that it has been attacked. After that, Brazil appears the most probable object, and it is one every way of vast importance: as a military station, it, would give the enemy the command of our India trade. We could not blockade Rio Janeiro; and our India fleets must go Under a Convoy as strong as the enemy on that Station might be. As auxiliary to ultimate views in India, it would be of vast consequence, and it would supply Ship timber; it would afford immense wealth, and it would affect our interest, by depriving us of the Brazil cotton, so essential in our manufactures. If their object, however, be the East Indies, I shall rejoice, because there I am persuaded, that though they may do considerable injury, they least affect our permanent interests, and will, in the end, most certainly be over come; and with such officers as sir Edward, Pellew and sir Thomas Trowbridge in that quarter, there would be little chance of their acquiring any ascendency by sea. In every quarter to which they may go, however, they can meet with no force adequate to oppose them, and the question appears to be only this, Where are they likely to do the least damage? If We escape We can ascribe it only to providence, unless we calculate on the same mismanagement in this that has been conspicuous in their former naval expeditions, which, however, in the present circumstances, is not so likely as on other occasion—Such, then, is the situation of the war that was to limit the ambition

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and reduce the power of France. But we have resisted the threatened invasion! This appears to me a very futile boast. The invasion was threatened at the beginning of the war, and it is threatened now. If it has not hitherto been attempted, that may be ascribed, not so much to our domestic preparation, as to the superiority of our navy I, for one, never believed that the invasion would immediately be attempted. It has,
in a great measure, answered what probably was its end; it has kept the nation in perpetual alarm, and exposed us to immense expense, without at all advancing the objects of the war, and all the preparations for the design are according to the information in the king's speech, still continued That one great object of the enemy was to distract our attention, is highly probable; but; if invasion ever was the object, there is no reason whatever to believe,that it is abandoned. Whatever Buonaparte's character in other respects may be, we have not seen that as a soldier he is subject to passion; he is not to be incited by taunts, to an attempt for which things are not ready; but if affairs here are conducted as they have been, when our fleets are scattered pursuit of the enemy, when our troops are dispersed in foreign settlements, that attempt for which the preparations have never been relaxed a moment, may at last be, tried; and that Buonaparte sees all these combinations there can be no doubt. The boast of not being invaded, is one of the most idle and absurd which it is possible to conceive—Thus, sir, I have shewn, from unquestionable facts, that no material improvement has taken place in our military and naval state; that none of the objects of the war have been attained; and that no progress whatever has been made towards them, or is likely in future. In this situation, it is the imperious duty of the house to call upon ministers to give us some rational prospect of pursuing the war with success, or of explaining to us that peace on equitable and honourable terms not to be obtained—This leads me to notice the state
of our continental alliance, as alluded to in the speech from the throne, in the speeches of the minister, or in other communications. On this head, too, I fear there is nothing on which we can congratulate ourselves. While Buonaparte's power on the continent remains unimpaired.,he exercises over his neighbours an influence of Policy or intimidation which at present leaves little room to hope for efficient co-operation. At the beginning of the session we were told,
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"notwithstanding these transactious, so repugnant to every sentiment of moderation and justice, I have recently received a communication from the French go ermment containing professions of a pacific disposition. I have, in consequence, expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may he consistent with the permanent safety and interests of my dominions; but am confident you will agree with me, that those objects are closely connected with the general security of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation, without previous communication with those powers on the continent with whom I am engaged in confidental intercourse and connexion, with a view to that important object, and especially with the emperor of Russia, Who has given the strongest proof of the wise dignified sentiments by which he is, animated, and of the warm interest be takes in the safety and independence of Europe."—There is no instance, I believe, of the house being thus left so much in the dark, not of the actual state of things, but of the views and objects of government. The former it may be proper to conceal; but of the latter, can it be, fit that the house should be ignorant, when the public is to Undergo the burdens they may involve? The Communications on such. subjects during the war have been generally of three kinds: either they State, that peace, through the spirit and ambition of the enemy, is unattainable; or that propositions received, but not such as to justify relaxation in the conduct of government; or preparations for the war; or, lastly, they have announced negotiations, the result of which would in due time be laid before parliament. But his majesty's speech merely says, that to an overture, on the face of it fair and open, no answer can be given because his majesty is engaged in confidential intercourse with other powers. No views Whatever of the policy to which that intercourse is directed; no hint, whether it is an intercourse pointing to arrangement for peace or for war, is given. Such was the ignorance, of parliament at the opening of the session. from some of the principles stated in another, part of the speech, of which I have read an extract I am so far from dissenting, that I am happy to take this opportunity of expressing my concurrence in them to any fair conse

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quences to which they can be carried. The speech says, that the interest of this country is connected with that of the continent; and that propositions is peculiarly true in the present circumstances of Great-Britain and of Europe. I therefore distinctly avow my assent to this propositions, because without a great and powerful co-operation on the continent there can be no chance of reducing the power of France; and because unless, failing that, the great powers take a part in negotiation in one shape or other, my hope of permanent peace will be much weakened. But in saying this I must say too that unless the co-operation of the continental powers be such as to afford a rational prospect of success, it would not be desirable. In that case, too, it appears to me that a separate peace, on moderate terms, would be preferable to a mere defensive war. If, indeed, the enemy were to be so unreasonable as to reject all equitable terms, the nation would then not only submit to a defensive war, but to every sacrifice and privation, rather than fall down at the feel of France. then, indeed, it would be proper to make no peace, and the spirit of the country would make none till every resource had been exhausted and every exertion tried; till we could say in the words formerly quoted by the right hon. gent—"Potuit quae plurima virtus, &c."—This extreme case is not likely to occur; but if, reduced to the necessity of that defensive war, which is only not worse than an inadequate peace, it would be the duty of the house to see that it was not so conducted as to be even more dangerous than peace, and to take care that every effort should be well directed, and every expense applied with economy. The other alternative I have mentioned is a separate peace, in case the co-operation of the continent or the concert of other powers in negotiation were unavailing. I hope such a peace will not take make place. It is impossible to say beforehand, however, what such a peace might be; it might be better than a mere defensive war. A great responsibility would be on those who concluded it, as to the time and the terms of it, and obtaining the best securities which circumstances would admit. but at any rate they ought to be such as, if violated, would at once shew, in the strongest light, the injustice and violence of the enemy. Upon these points I shall not dilate, as it is impossible to anticipate either the circumstances that would justify or condemn such a transaction,
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whether peace were negotiation in conjunction with our allies or under the mediation or guarantee of other powers. Let us now, then, examine the answer sent by our government to Buonaparte's overture. Had we at that time been engaged in alliance with Russia, or had negotiation with that power been so far advanced as to be on the eve of conclusion, it would have been highly proper to decline any negotiation till Russia was consulted. If the negotiations for alliance were in an advanced progress, surely they ought now to have been brought to a conclusion. If they were not might not ministers have answered Buonaparte, and pointed out a negotiation with other powers, as that most likely to lead to peace? As far as appears, there was not sufficient reason, so far as our intercourse with Russia was concerned, for not giving a more direct answer to a direct overture. There is a want of information on the subject, I confess, which leaves us much in the dark in this discussion; but it is to supply that information that the present motion is, in part, intended. Since the opening of the session, however, we have received another communication—the message now on the table. We are told. "that the communications which have taken place, and are still depending, between his majesty and some of the powers of the continent, have not yet been brought to such a point as to enable his majesty to lay the result of them before the house, or to enter into any farther explanation with the sentiments expressed by his majesty at the opening of the present session." I have said that the speech at the opening of the state session left us ignorant of the state of the intercourse with Russia, and the opening of the budget, the right hon. gent. stated that he proposed to reserve five millions to to be voted afterwards, as subsidies to foreign powers, if circumstances rendered it expedient. Five months have elapsed since that time, and still we have no information, either on the actual state of the negotiation or the objects of it, except as far as it may be gathered from the subsidy we are called on to vote. The mode of proceeding, at the beginning of the session, appeared unprecedented, and this still more so; for we are called on to vote money for objects we do not know, ignorant whether the money is to be in the first instance applied to prosecute the war, or only in case the enemy refuse reasonable

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terms of peace, which it may now be intended to propose. This indeed would be to leave a large discretion with ministers, such as never before was claimed. Last war, indeed, a sum was left at the discretion of ministers, but it was after the object was thoroughly known, the power to which it was granted ascertained, not to mentioned that the amount, a thing of no small practical importance, was so much less. But here the cause, the means, the prospect of co-operation, its value, its application are beforehand unknown, and it is to be left at the discretion of the minister to apply five millions in any manner, to any purpose, and to any power he may think fit. Surely the house will not so far abdicate its functions, as thus, blindfold, to vote away its essential right of controlling the application of the public supplies. Subsidies undoubtedly may sometimes be expedient, but the policy of granting them will depend on the object to which they are directed, the power that is to receive them, and his ability and disposition to render a fair equivalent of service. The time of granting them ought to be considered. But at present how do we know who are the powers to be subsidised? Can we expect an efficient co-operation without one of the great powers, Austria or Prussia? Without them, would the other powers, not to speak of Denmark or Sweden, be worth purchasing? And what is the time? If Russia be the principal power to be subsidised, shall we be told at the end of June that it is necessary to come to this vote for any efficient co-operation this season? Let us at least be informed of the grounds and object of the alliance with Russia. If the negotiation, after so long a delay, be not ready, surely its consummation cannot be distant, if it be at all probable, Then let the house sit till the affair be adjusted; and whatever inconvenience might arise to individuals from a protracted session, it is the duty of all to attend the business of their country on an occasion of such magnitude, involving the highest privileges, and most important functions of house of commons. I have thus laid before the house, at greater length than I could have wished, a few general outlines of the situation of the country, critical, in the opinion of all, beyond any example. Every fact which is before us, every consequence to which those facts evidently lead, impose upon us the duty of investigating our situation; and parliament
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ought not to separate till it has ascertained the real state of the country. If the motion of which I gave notice appeared to me necessary a few days ago, it appears more fit and seasonable, in consequence of the message presented yesterday; and, when called upon to vote a sum of five millions, without information of any kind, I trust the house will hesitate before they pledge their own credit, and the money of their constituents, in a manner so unusual. I therefore move, "that an humble address be presented to his majesty, praying that he will be graciously pleased not to prorogue his parliament until he shall have been enabled to afford to this house more full information with respect both to his majesty's relations with foreign powers, and to his views and prospects in the contest in which his majesty is engaged."
Lord Castlereagh Lord Castlereagh said, he did not mean to follow the hon. gent. through the whole of his statements, but merely to reply to the general points of his argument. The hon. gent. had contended that it was not consistent with the duty of the house to place such a direction in his majesty's government, as the vote of the sum alluded to would amount to; but before he sat down, he trusted he should persuade the house that if they could not intrust such a discretion to the present government, they ought to substitute some other government, to which they could intrust it, and that no case could warrant their with-holding it, but a want of confidence in his majesty's government, that, if an occasion should arise they would not assemble parliament to communicate the matter to them. He concurred in a great part of the speech of the hon. gent. He agreed particularly in what he had stated in the outset of his speech, that there never had been in a period in the history of the country, when the people had been more true to themselves and their real interests. He concurred too with the hon. gent., that if Ireland was not precisely in the state in which it was desirable it should be, it was rapidly advancing towards it. He was ready to join issue with the hon. gent. in his preliminary matter, for he perfectly agreed with him. The hon. gent. might justly call upon his majesty's ministers to justify and explain the manner in which they had applied the resources and facilities of the country, and how they had disposed of them in the prosecution of the war. The hon. gent. had in this view adverted to the state of the army and the

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navy. It was satisfactory, however, to his right hon. friend, as it must have been to the house, that on the first point to which the hon. gent. had adverted, relative to the finances of the country, he had made no charge against the able administration of that department. The prosperity of the country, which was to be inferred from the flourishing state of its finances, was certainly no argument for the prosecution of a war that was not in itself just and necessary. The hon gent. had stated that the war had been begun under an assurance that no addition would be made to the national debt in the prosecution of it. But the hon. gent. must recollect that this statement had been made in the contemplation of a certain quantum of war expenses, and if that ratio of expenditure had not been exceeded, this country would have been in the singular situation of maintaining a war expenditure of 25,000,000l. annually, without adding to its debt. When the war commenced it had a singular character, the enemy threatened our existence, and we had to provide in that instance only for our defence. Since, however, it had been the policy to apply our military resources not only to the purposes of defence, but for active offensive operations if an occasion should offer. The hon. gent. had stated, that now, at the end of two years of war, our debt, had been increased thirty millions. The fact was, that this was the nominal addition to it, and not more than half that sum had been borrowed. The hon. gent. had animadverted on the state of the army and navy, and had made a charge of want of vigour founded upon it against his majesty's government. He had stated that our military situation had not been improved. The hon. gent. could not have looked attentively at the subject, or he would not have rated so low our general military position, nor stated that it had not undergone a considerable improvement since the period with which he had compared it. As to the general amount of the military force, he should not deny that it was highly desirable to add to our military strength as much as possible, and to carry it even beyond what it was at present. But when the hon. gent. represented it as inadequate, he ought to have compared it with its state at some former period of our history. He was aware that this would not be a just criterion of its present adequacy, but it would be a criterion of the power of calling thrill the military strength of the country, and of the
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efforts of former governments for that purpose. In the year 1802, our whole regular force, exclusive of militia, was one hundred and seventy-four thousand men on the 1st June, 1805, it was one hundred and seventy-six thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, so that it was now three thousand more than at the period when it had been higher than at any former period of our history; therefore the picture the hon. gent. had drawn of our military strength was too gloomy and unfounded. If the hon. gent. took the period of the change of administration, it would be found, that the military force had been improved in quality, as well as carried to as high a degree as possible under the circumstances of the country. The gross amount of the military force was, in 1804, two hundred and thirty-two thousand, at present it was two hundred and forty-seven thousand, being an increase of fifteen thousand on the gross force. The troops serving abroad amounted at present to sixty-seven thousand, being an increase of nineteen-thousand above what they were in 1804, so that there was a total increase of thirty-five thousand regular troops since that period. The disposable infantry were, in 1804, ninety-eight thousand; they were now one hundred and twenty thousand, being an increase of twenty-two thousand;. so that our military three was now greater than ever, and proved the country to be in a situation highly encouraging, so far from justifying the gloomy views of the hon. gent. The noble lord then stated, that the regular recruiting had produced within the first four months of this year seven, thousand four hundred and sixty-four, and there had been recruited thirteen thousand front the militia, making together an accession of twenty thousand. There was therefore reason to expect that fifteen thousand more would be obtained by the regular recruiting in the next eight months of the year. By the other means of procuring an accession to the army, three thousand had been obtained during the last five months of last year, and five thousand in the first five months of this year, and without at all interfering with the regular recruiting. The next point to which the hon. member had adverted was the state of the navy. He had considered only the number of ships in commission, but in order to make a fair and impartial comparison, he ought to have taken into his view the number that had been put out of commission. Since the period alluded to there had been added to

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his majesty's navy twenty-three ships of the line, fifty-eight frigates, eighty-two gunbrigs, and thirty-two fire-Ships, making in all an addition of one hundred and seventy sail; and notwithstanding the number put out of commission from being unfit for service, and casualties, &c. the number of vessels of all descriptions now in commission exceeded those in 1804 by one hundred and sixty sail. But the comparative state of the navy must depend on the exigency of the moment and the duty it had to perform, and on that ground he was prepared to argue it. The hon. member, in that part of his speech wherein he had stated that all the objects of the war had failed, had appeared to have mistated the objects of the war. His impression of the objects of the war was, (and the house would recollect what objects it had sanctioned by its approbation.) not a of
speculative hope of reducing the power of France, or its influence on the continent; not the speculative hope of being able to confine it within its present limits, or of reducing these limits: no, it was the conviction irresistibly impressed on the minds of his majesty's ministers, and on time country, that they had no choice, that they had only the alternative whether they should engage in the war with some securities in their possession, or endeavour to conciliate, which he contended would have been criminal, and might have afforded the hon. gent. a ground of charge against his majesty's government. The hon. gent. had stated this object of the war to have been to reduce by our own efforts the whole power of France, and then had charged the increased means of the enemy as a proof of the failure of his majesty's ministers, and the objects of the war. But he should have shewn that the French ruler would not have proceeded in his progress of tyranny and usurpation from the throne of France to that of Italy, from the plunder of Holland to the subjection in which he kept Spain, Switzerland, and the continent, if we had continued at peace, in order to prove his majesty's ministers culpable. The hon gent. after having untruly represented the objects of the war, had proceeded to a criticism on the manner in which it had been conducted. He thought as highly as any one of the naval resources of this country, but he did not think them capable of affording us a commanding superiority on foreign stations, and enabling us to continue the blockades at home. We had to choose whether we should keep down our force on
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foreign stations or at home. The enemy at first directed their whole attention to the invasion of this country; before they changed that character of war, the hon. gent. would not have approved of the distribution of the naval force by his majesty's ministers, if whilst the enemy's, fleets were in Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, &c. our force at home were to have been weakened to detach squadrons to the West-Indies. It was sufficient to have the mean of sending a force from home to follow the enemy to any part of the world. The arrangements had been made With a view to keep over the enemy a superiority at Toulon and the Mediterranean, at Calais, Ferrol, Rochefort, Brest, &c. There was besides strong squadron off Ireland. No point had been neglected, and the superiority had been maintained in every station. The argument of the hon. member relative to the the enemy's fleet, would go to give up the blockading system altogether. If a fleet could get out of a port where our force was stronger, it could certainly get into a port where it was weakest. The hon. member appeared to insinuate that blame as imputable to sir John Orde and Lord Nelson, for the escape of the Toulon feet. The nature of a blockade was such, that there was perhaps but one or two ports in the world that could be completely blockaded and therefore when the enemy was watching the opportunity, certainly not glorious to himself, of stealing out, it was not surprising that they had succeeded. He hoped, therefore, the hon. gent. would not persevere in detracting from the glories and the laurels of the noble lord, who was equally distinguished as a patriot and a hero. The hon. gent. had charged upon his majesty's ministers that they did not know to what part of the world the enemy's fleet had proceeded; but the information that a government usually had, was as to the force in the harbours of the enemy,and the nature of their equipments, which might lead to a conjecture of their destination. The noble lord who commanded the channel fleet had general instructions to detach in pursuit of any of the enemy's squadrons that should escape from the. western ports; when the enemy changed their mode of warfare, arrangements had been made without delay to follow them to any part of the world. He now came to that part of the hon. gentleman's speech which was most important. He was happy to find that the hon. gent. had no difference with him on the general

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principles. He admitted that it was impossible to secure the permanent interests of this country, and particularly at this time. The hon. gent. had stated, that the overture of the French government alluded to in the speech from the throne, was frank and open; but if the hon. gent. had adverted to the spirit of the message of the French ruler to his council a few days after, he Would not be likely to designate the overture frank and open, nor would he think that much would have been gained by acting inconsiderately upon it. He trusted the house would adhere to the sentiments in their address, that his majesty would not return any answer to the overture, till he should communicate with the powers of the continent. The hon. gent. had stated, that there were three descriptions of communications usually made to the house at its assembling pending a war, either that the war was to be continued from the impossibility of making peace, or that no eligible terms could be obtained, or that negotiations were going on. As to the latter head, the communication of his majesty's speech was as ample as any the crown usually made. It was impossible that his majesty could give any further communication to parliament, and he called on the house to place confidence in his majesty's ministers. It was impossible, under all the circumstances of the case, to give a more detailed view of the transaction. He asked, whether the negotiations could have been completed in a shorter period? There were three points of view to which our communications with the continent might be directed; whether the powers of the continent would co-operate with us in the war; whether they should co-operate with us in consequence of the refusal on the part of the French government to accept terms of peace; or whether they should act in concert with us, in defensive measures of the continent, to enable the powers there to resist the encroachments of France. He put it to the hon. gent. on the narrowest grounds, whether considering the distance of Russia, and the period of the year, the negotiation could have been brought to a conclusion Sooner? Whether in the present disjointed state of the continent, and the difficulty of communication, the negotiation could be concluded in a shorter period? The hon. gent. seemed to charge it upon his majesty's ministers, that they had not had the negotiations in a more forward state at the commencement of the session, so as to be now more ripe for communication; but
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the house would recollect that it was about that time that the court of Russia became fatigued with its? friendly interference, the multiplied breaches of treaties by the French government, and an opening of prospects was made for continental co-operation. The hon. gent. had argued that, if his majesty's ministers were not prepared to advise him to bring a detailed communication before the house, parliament should continue sitting till such communication could be made. The adoption of the hon. gentleman's motion would betray a jealousy of his majesty's ministers, that they would not be disposed to assemble parliament, if a necessity should occur. The vote would not tetter parliament as to the discussion of the question at its next meeting. The proceeding would be novel and unusual, and might have a very material effect upon the councils of the powers with whom we are negotiating; it has no precedent in the history of the country. The noble lord recapitulated the principal points to which he had adverted, and, contending that the hon. gent. had made no ground for his motion, concluded by expressing his intention to give it a negative.
Mr. Windham observed, that the question to be considered on this occasion was not as the noble lord who just sat down had stated it, whether the amount of the sum proposed to he voted was necessary, or whether that sum would be properly applied, but whether, under all the circumstances of the country, it would be proper that parliament should be prorogued. It was not meant to be argued, nor had any thing of the kind been said by his hon. friend who opened the debate, that ministers could or ought to make any communication to the house at present, with regard to any negotiations they might be engaged in with foreign powers. The position was, that in order to afford the opportunity of making the earliest possible communication upon that important subject, parliament should not prorogued; that was the practical question at issue. But the objection to comply with the motion was, it seemed, that such compliance would imply a want of confidence in his majesty's ministers. To that, however, he would say, that the confidence demanded was more than they or any other ministers were entitled to claim. What! that parliament should separate, leaving the country in such a state, surrounded with such menacing dangers, and so inadequately provided to meet them. Every man out of doors must feel surprise, that the thought

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could be entertained for a moment at such a crisis. Every man must say that we are at present in such a situation that it was impossible to conceive what plan of proceeding government had in contemplation; at what point their policy was leaved; or to what it was likely to lead; whether to peace or the serious prosecution of the war. Nobody could tell or divine, though all were naturally anxious to ascertain their object. At a time, then, that such doubt and anxiety prevailed, and that there was so little disposition to confide in the discretion of his majesty's ministers, could it be seriously urged that it would be wise in parliament to separate? If the personal convenience of members was offered as a ground for prorogation, he would say with his hon. friend, that such a consideration was not to be put in competition with the reasons that pressed upon the house to continue sitting. The consideration of personal convenience was indeed unworthy to be alleged in that house against the performance of a great public duty, when, to say the least, the affairs of the empire, upon a general view, were in such a situation that parliament ought to continue in a state of immediate superintendance. To continue would not, he maintained, imply any undue want of confidence in his majesty's ministers. But they professed to be of a different opinion, and appeared principally to rest their opposition to the motion upon that basis. The claim to confidence upon the part of ministers on this occasion, naturally led him into an examination of the grounds upon which their title was sustained, and it regarded the ministers themselves, and, secondly, as regarding through them the situation of the country. The more the ministers were undeserving of confidence, the more alarming was the situation of the country, and the greater consequently was the confidence required to be reposed. Now, as applying to both those topics, it was to be observed, that there was a remarkable discordancy between what had taken place since ministers came into office, and what they promised at the time they accepted office. They certainly did not fulfil what they so frequently promised respecting the army, the inefficiency of which was the prominent feature of the charge urged against their predecessors. They army which, it was generally supposed, formed a material ingredient in war, was in this peculiar war in which the country is engaged, almost wholly neglected, that is, with regard to a
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provision for its permanent supply. Upon this head ministers had certainly rather broken their pledges to parliament and the country, and this was the more deserving of notice, when it was recollected, that the inattention of their predecessors to the army was the principal cause of their removal from office, and the principal articles of accusation, too exhibited against them by some of their present colleagues. This marked inattention to the army he considered quite a sufficient ground, at least, of distrust, in his majesty's ministers; and it discontent throughout the country. On this subject he cautioned the house against the exaggerated statement which the noble lord had made as to the amount of our force. He did not mean that this statement was purposely exaggerated by the noble lord; but he wished to impress on the house the propriety of analysing such statement before it attached much importance to it. The noble lord had said, that our disposable force had received an increase within the year of no less than 35,000 men. But the question was, of what kind was that increase? We had heard of a transfer of from 15 to 16,000 men from the militia; but of what sort were the remainder of the augmentation? Were they of such a descriptions as the corps talked of at New Brunswick or Ceylon? If they were, they surely formed no material addition to a regular army, although they might swell a statement. As to the addition which the army received from the militia, they could claim no credit for that addition who frequently contended that the militia were as efficient and as material to the strength of the country as the regular army. But in point of fact, however ministers might vaunt of the encrease which had taken place in the regular army, there were no means adopted that promised a regular and efficient supply. This was the general complaint. The militia had furnished one supply; 10,000 men had been obtained from Hanover. But then no permanent resource was provided: the men the army had got were not procured by recruiting, nor by any settled system that was likely to continue productive. No; the means by which the army was augment furnished the extent of their capacity once for all; and the army was absolutely left in future to depend for supply on accidents or shifts—The noble lord, the right hon. gent. observed, had passed on from the army to the navy, and gone into as it were the details of two years

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naval campaigns. But without following the noble lord through all, or any of his details, the general result was before the eyes of parliament and the country, and upon that general result every man could decide. Among all the vicissituoes of war, among all the gloomy and distracting prospects which the present war presented ,parliament and the people were accustomed to hear and derive consolation from the thought that Great Britain had the dominion of the seas. But how did the case now stand? The fleets of the enemy were out in various directions. A formidable forces was shot, and where it might light, time alone could tell us, but that it was likely to give our dominions a serve wound, there was too much reason to dread. Apprehensions were entertained for Ireland, the Indies, &c. Public anxiety eagerly sought the enemy's destination, but all was suspense and uncertainly. The people were uneasy, and the government was ignorant—The right hon. gent. expressed a hope and anxious wish, that notwithstanding the present state of things, particularly with respect to the French fleet, the country should have nothing more in the end to complain of, but the mismanagement of ministers or to enquire about the efficiency or inefficiency of the system of blockade. Every Briton must naturally fell glad if the effect of the present alarming prospects should at least be reparable, and that it should not prove that we had an insecure hold of the dominion of the sea. But he could not help saying, that the appearance of our affairs was by no means calculated to encourage confidence, such as the noble lord endeavoured to excite by a statement that, however, it might tell at a court martial, on the trial of the blockading officer, could make but little impression upon that house, or the thoughtful part of the public, with respect to the general conduct of our finances, the right hon. gent. stated his disinclination to enter into, because he did not think that part of his speech very material to the present question. But yet there was one short remark which he begged to submit. The noble lord, in his endeavour to account for the non performance of that minister's promise, who said, that for a certain period no encrease of our debt would take place, stated indeed, that the disappointment of the expectation excited by that promise (if any one did seriously reply on it), arose from this, that the expenditure was
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higher than the sum provided. Why, truly, it was in that way that estimates were commonly found to fail. Why it should answer the noble lord's purpose better to state that the expenditure exceeded the income, than to say that income fell short of the expenditure, he was not able to discover. It was the fact of the two not meeting that made the failure, and that failure was an additional reason for not relying with equal confidence upon minister—But the strongest ground for distrust arose from the state of the army. If it were said that this state was not wholly chargeable to the present ministers, he would admit it; for it would have been impossible for them since their accession to power, to have repaired what their predecessors had done, and to have supplied what those predecessors had left undone. But yet the present ministers might have put measures in motion, and those measures might have been now in progress, to remove the evil complained of. This, however, was not the case. The army was left to waste away, unless some other country like Hanover should fall into the hands of the enemy. This was a melancholy consideration, for just in proportion as our danger pressed, whether it was our object to concluded a peace or carry on a war with vigour, a formidable army was essentially necessary. —With all the noble lords observations respecting the propriety of cultivating a conclude a peace or carry on war with vigour, a formidable army was essentially necessary—With all the noble lords observations respecting the propriety of cultivating a continental connexion, the right hon. gent. expressed a decided concurrence. He remembered, however, when quite a different sentiment prevailed in that house, and when some gentlemen justified the peace of Amiens, in consequence of its tendency to put an end to such connexions. But he was glad to witness the change that now appeared, and that gentlemen were become sensible of the propriety of continental connexions for this country. Necessity was a harsh teacher, but then she was not a bad one. Much as the house had heard of the pride and honesty of standing alone, it was now found that solitude in danger was not a very consoling situation. After having made use of tauting language; after having endeavoured, under the affectation of magnanimity and lofty professions, to cover the indiscretion, and even the treachery of insulting and deserting our continental friends, it was now felt necessary to resort to them, to court them. Some of them, however, were not to be found. Sardinia was now no more;

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and others were in fetters. But such as felt any wish towards us should be sought after, and their support conciliated if possible. There were powers to which ministers might look for aid, with some hope of success. What they had done yet in this way they declined, perhaps very properly, to communicate to the house. But their declining to do so, and the necessity of the continental concert looked for, formed considerations to shew that parliament should continue to sit to watch the manner in which the ministers should exercise the powers vested in their hands, and to receive the earliest intelligence of the result of their negotiations. In the opinion of the noble lord, however, the want of confidence in ministers which, according to his judgment, the adoption of the motion would infer, was a just ground of objection. Because, as the noble lord argued, to refuse confidence to ministers at present would be to reduce them in the estimation of the country, still more of foreign courts, and thus injure the progress of the pending negotiations. If such an argument, however, were admitted, it would operate for universal confidence in ministers. But it became necessary to take a course between two extremes; to take away from ministers a part of the power of doing good lest they should do harm. It was one of the disadvantages of our constitution, and of every other nation in which there existed a popular assembly, that the government must have a limited confidence. This disadvantage, however, was more than compensated by the advantages resulting from such an arrangement. But this was a disadvantage of which all ministers might equally complain, for all ministers were subject to the same control; and, in order to facilitate the exercise of that control, their powers were limited. To preserve this salutary control over the proceedings of ministers at the present important juncture, it was his wish that parliament should not be prorogued—As to the noble lord's quotation of precedents, of which he seemed very fond, the right hon. gent. observed, that the noble lord often resorted to them, where, in point of fact, they did not form a proper criterion. When the noble lord alluded to the army, instead of dwelling upon the peculiar state of the country, and its capacity to produce a large military force, he went back to other periods, and instituted a comparison between times and circumstances, having no analogy whatever. But whether, in constituting an
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army or demanding confidence, it was the noble lord's pleasure to resort to precedents, it however happened, that the precedent which he had quoted on this occasion could not avail him; for there were not Merely "shades of difference," as the noble lord expressed it, between the circumstances under which the vote of three millions, in 1799, and those which existed at present; but they were essentially different. In the former instance the sum voted was not only much less than that now proposed, but the negotiation was actually concluded, and the line of proceeding clearly marked out, and our continental connexions ascertained. How then, independently of any consideration arising from a difference as to our dangers, could a comparison he said to he as to the two periods? They were, in fact, altogether. dissimilar. Without recollecting all the details, there was, perhaps, one particular reason why that precedent was not applicable. It might very well happen that, although there was an individual in the present administration who also belonged to the administration of 1799, parliament and the country had much more confidence in the administration of 1799 than they were willing to grant to the present—Whether looking to the motion on the broad ground of public safety, or to the degree of confidence due to ministers, the right hon. gent. decidedly thought, that it ought to be acceded to. Parliament would desert its duty if it invested ministers with unlimited power at such a crisis as the present; if it left to them the whole management of public affairs; if it allowed a vast sum of money to be disposed of according to their direction. If all this was to be submitted to, merely in order that prorogation should be preferred to adjournment, it must excite the surprise and discontent of the country—The right hon. gent. concluded with recapitulating his several arguments, and stating that the dangers of the country were such, that whether it was meant to continue the war or take a temporary refuge in peace, it was become necessary always to have in contemplation that we had to contend with an enemy who both followed the ambition of the ancient Romans, and emulated their virtues (if virtues they could be called), and having the same view of universal dominion, was as little likely to desist from it either in war or peace. Into many topics of the noble lord's speech, the right hon. gent. declined to enter for the present, particularly that

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which related to the army, as an opportunity for fully discussing that subject would offer itself in a few days.
Mr. Canning saw no advantage that could be derived from the adoption of the proposition before the house; for if the meeting of a parliament should at any time be necessary, it might be convoked with sufficient promptness and facility even after the prorogation. To keep the members in town at this season, did not appear to him to promise any particular public good, while it might be productive of great public mischief. As to the sum proposed to be voted in consequence of his majesty's message, he could not see why his right hon. friend should assume that it would amount to five millions. The right hon. gent. deprecated the idea of fixing a suspicion on his majesty's ministers, by adopting a motion so contrary to general custom as that before the house, and proclaiming to the country and to foreign courts, that they were unworthy of confidence. What the gentlemen on the other side could propose to obtain by pressing this motion, and preventing a prorogation, he confessed himself quite unable to comprehend. If it was their object to discuss and improve the state of the army, they would have a full Opportunity of communicating their, designs on Monday next, for upon that day the house was aware that a great authority was to come forward with great military plans; in consequence of which, the sessions might close with a new military system, that should do away all the blunders that had been heretofore committed; that should set a new military machine in motion quite free from blemish, and incapable of obstruction; that should, in fact, render it unnecessary for parliament, for years, again to consider a military subject. If it was the wish of gentlemen to enquire into the system of blockade as applicable to the escape of the Toulon fleet, with a view to attribute blame to ministers, he called upon them to institute the enquiry immediately, and they would find that lord Nelson's fleet was more than adequate, in every respect, to the French fleet, of course, that adequate provision wars Made on the part of ministers in that quarter. The right hon. gent. combated the various arguments of his right hon. friend in favour of the motion, and contended that two-thirds of his hon. friend's speech made against the motion. From the motion itself, he saw no good that could arise; nor could he conceive it to have any other object in view, than to express a little
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spleen, and to proclaim an unfounded want of confidence in his majesty's ministers.
Mr. Windham stated, in explanation, that his meaning was, that parliament should continue to sit, and not vote the money required, until it should prove to be actually necessary; thus any improper confidence in ministers would be guarded against.
Earl Temple suported the motion of his hon. friend, and particularly argued, that, if his majesty was not yet in a situation that enabled him to make any communication to the house, respecting his foreign relations, they should at least continue to sit, and by that means be in the same situation as at the beginning of the session. What they wanted was, that they should not be out of a situation in which they might receive communications when ready to be made. The sum left at the disposal of the minister, was no doubt great; but it was not the amount to which he objected; it was to the principle, which he regarded as unconstitutional and unprecedented. The vote of credit alluded to in the year 1799, was very different. There was in that case a specific object to which the money was to be applied. There was an existing alliance and an engagement had been formed; but here there was no precise object submitted to the house. The one was a real, the other an eventual expense. There was a great difference, he contended, between adjournment and prorogation. In the one case they were certain of the day of meeting; but in the other, whatever might be the situation of the country, whatever calls there might be for the distribution of the public money, they could have no control over it.
Mr. Fox said, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to give a silent vote upon a question so intimately connected as the present with the rights and privileges of parliament, and the policy of the country; he should, however, endeavour to bring what he had to submit to the house, within as short a compass as possible. The first point, he observed, was, that by the three last loans this country had added to the capital of its debt not less than eighty millions of money. This was a matter of grave consideration, considering the former burthens of the country to which this was an addition, notwithstanding the progress of the consolidated fund, and the salutary system of raising war taxes, and providing for so large a portion of our expenditure within the year. With regard to the army of this country, be should touch upon it slightly, because that

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subject was soon to be discussed at large by an hon. friend of his, who was well qualified for that undertaking (colonel Craufurd); and if that hon. gent. had been thought sanguine as to his plan in that object, yet it must be allowed that the right hon. gent. opposite to him (Mr. Pitt) was also sanguine in his plan, for he had made it one of the great foundations of his attack on the late administration, with part of which he had afterwards joined, that they had not sufficiently provided for the permanent establishment of the army, and he had brought in a bill to supply that defect: that bill had been tried, and without being very sanguine as to the effect of the plan of his hon. friend, he might venture to predict, that if it should be tried, it would be as efficient as the bill of the right hon. gent. for the permanent encrease of our military force; indeed, the bill of the right hon. gent. coming from a person so extraordinary in talents, reminded him of what was said by Dr. Johnson of the poem of Ossian. Being, asked, from what man upon earth, but its author, could it be expected? Did he know any other man upon earth capable of writing such a poem? "O yes," said the doctor, "many men, many women, and many children!" He believed this to be the true description of the bill of the right hon. gent. for the permanent improvement of the army. With regard to the navy, he defended the statement of his hon. friend (Mr. Grey), and maintained that the want of information of our government, with respect to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, was much to be lamented; and he did not approve of the manner in which our naval force was disposed of in the Mediterranean, the faults of which he imputed not to any of the gallant officers, but to government, who gave them orders, and who provided the force. Upon the subject of Ireland, the noble lord (Castlereagh) had agreed to much of what had been stated by his hon. friend in the opening of this debate, and he agreed also with them both, that the state of Ireland was good in some respects; but when he used the word good, he used it its the sense to express the idea that Ireland was considerably amended from the condition it had, been in: and here he must hear an honest tribute to the merit of lord Hardwicke, to whom much of the improvement of the condition of the people of that country was owing. This he should have no difficulty in saying, although there were points in the conduct of that noble lord, as lord-lieutenant
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of Ireland, towards a relation of his (general Fox) while there, which met his disapprobation. However, he could not help lamenting that lord Hardwicke, as he understood from pretty well grounded rumour, was not supported by that cordiality and union, in the administration of that country, which was essential to carry into effect any of the best plans of any government. He understood that some part of the system of that noble lord was opposed by another noble person, who had distinguished himself by his opposition to the catholics (lord Redesdale): much good was not to he expected from any government where perfect harmony did not subsist among all its members. He had had the honour to present to the house a petition on behalf of the catholics of that Country, the prayer of which had been rejected by a large majority. He wished to know, Whether any thing short of that prayer was intended to be granted to that body of persons, containing almost all the population of that country? He had no hesitation in saying, that it behoved government to do all that can be done short of granting the prayer of that petition. He wished the prayer to be granted altogether; but after the sense of parliament had been so fully expressed, he could not expect government to have the same view of that subject. It was not for him who thought the prayer ought to be granted, to point out what other mode should be adopted; but it behoved those who opposed that prayer to look into the case, and devise the best remedy that appeared to them to be applicable to it, for it was not to be expected that the people of that country would be content with every thing remaining exactly in its present condition there. He recommended this subject to the most serious attention of government—He now came to the business of the king's message, and to that which was connected with the speech from the throne, to which he wished the house particularly to attend. The king by that speech told parliament that he had received an offer of negotiation from the French government; that situated as his majesty was, he thought proper to say, that he was engaged in confidential intercourse with a certain great power, meaning the emperor of Russia; that he thought it right to apprise that monarch the overtures which had been made by France to his majesty, and that he must consult with him before he could return any answer to France. Now, he would ask, whit was the nodding of that com-

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munication. He was not now delivering an opinion what the answer of his majesty ought to be. It was natural enough that his majesty should not make any answer to France until he had consulted with the emperor of Russia, possibly until he had agreed upon a treaty with that monarch; but then it was not so likely a way to negotiate with effect for peace, if his majesty had to say to the enemy, "Stay until I can see whether I shall be able to enter into a treaty with another power, for the purpose of our carrying on the war jointly against you." Now, if his majesty's answer to the overture of France for peace was capable of two constructions, it was not wonderful if this was the construction the French put upon it. The question then was, when that period was to come when the house of commons was to have information upon that subject? When so proper to ask it as when the application was made by the crown for money to carry on the plan, whatever it be, which refers to that very subject? The great and fundamental principle of our constitution was, that the house should demand all necessary explanation of the executive government in these important public concerns, and no time was so proper, because none was likely to be so effectual, as when they were voting money to support the system of government; this was the time when the advice of the house of commons to the throne was most seasonable, and likely to be most respected. This was one of the right uses which the house had to make of its power over the public purse, and ministers should, when they came for money, explain this matter to the house. And here he must remind the house, that the right hon. gent., when this subject was mentioned at the opening of the budget, and the sum of five millions was reserved for the probable use of subsidies, candidly stated, that no member of the house was to be understood to have pledged himself to any opinion whatever, not even to the length of granting the money, or any part of it, unless he should approve of the proposed application. The house of commons did not point out any thing concerning the pecuniary arrangement of this matter; and the right hon. gent. had then hopes of being able to give the house some information upon this subject in the course of the present session. He should now ask the right hon. gent. when he could make the Communication? if he could not answer now, the next point was, since the answer cannot be made at the present period
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of the session, let the session be made to continue until the answer comes; since the answer cannot be made to accommodate the session, let the session be made to accommodate the answer. He was sure the right hon. gent. would give the house the information if it was in his power; if he could not do so now, he should allow the house to sit until he could. But this mode of asking the minister to continue parliament together until he could give it some information, was holding forth to the public that government was entitled to a mark of want of confidence in the house! Want of confidence was the constitutional character of that house. It was a mark it ought to set upon every minister of the crown, it was a mark he was entitled to ex officio, and that the more especially under the present circumstances; for here was to be a large sum of money, perhaps five millions, to be proposed to be voted, without any information as to its probable application. There was a distinction between the present case and the former vote of credit of three millions, At the time of that vote we were at .war; so we are now, but then we were engaged in a continental war, and it was then expressed what the money on the vote of credit was to he applied to—that of carrying on a continental war, a war frequently discussed and approved of by the house; but now the house did not know what this money was for, nor could the house have any guess what it was for. The house knew nothing but what was to be collected from the king's speech at the opening of the session, and the message of yesterday; but the message was not clearer than the speech, and perhaps it could not at present be clearer; but then the remedy for that was for parliament to remain together until information came. But it was asked, where the difference was between prorogation, when parliament might assemble in fourteen days, and an adjournment for that time? The difference was, that one of these matters was in the power of the minister, the other in the power of the house of commons; which reminded him of a scene in an excellent comedy, wherein the father takes out a bond, and the son says "Let me hold it in my hand." The father says, "What signifies it which of us should hold it—neither of us shell hold it." And then he puts it in his pocket. So it was in this case. The minister asked, what difference there was between an adjournment and a prorogation? The difference was, that he had the bond in his

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pocket, if there was a prorogation.—He then took notice of the power of parliament to refuse to confirm the engagement of his majesty, in the event of its disapproving of the terms of such engagement, (a power which was unquestionable,) for the purpose of shewing how much right the purpose of shewing how much right the house had to demand explanation before it assented to the granting a vote for a large sum of money; and he apprehended that the government of foreign powers was not so destitute of information of the nature of our constitution as not to be fully aware that all the engagements for our government were subject to the approbation or rejection of parliament; and therefore the argument that this motion, if agreed to, would diminish the respect of foreign powers for our executive government, had no force in it.—He then proceeded to observe on the want of confidence in his majesty's ministers particularly. The right hon. gent. could not expect him to have much confidence in him. He certainly had no particular confidence in the right hon. gent., but he had no difficulty in saying that his want of confidence did not arise from personal considerations, but from his public character as to the situation in which he stood:—the situation in which he stood with reference to the principle on which the present ministry were formed; for the right. hon. gent. was sometimes supported by those with whom he could not agree before his administration was formed, and with whom he could scarcely agree now. It was a system of disputes, forced resignations, and rapid reconciliations; but they now adhered together from a principle which was a very strong one, although it had no cordiality whatever in it, namely, that one party could not remain without the adherence of the other; but when he saw no other principle of cohesion among these persons, he must be allowed to observe that such an administration was not entitled to any peculiar confidence; and without speaking with disrespect of those who composed the present administration, he might fairly say, that, independence of the splendid talents of the right hon. gent. himself, there was nothing in the present administration to entire them to any peculiar confidence, and the house ought to take care not to give too much confidence to them. He was the more confirmed in the appeared in the course of this session, by which he was convinced it was morally impossible for the present administration to expect any extraordinary
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share of confidence. Who, said the hon. gent., can expect, that we should give extraordinary confidence, or that foreign nations should give any confidence at all, to such an administration a the present? I am, perhaps, less sanguine than others, with respect to the good that could be done by the best administration; but I feel myself sure, that an administration formed to comprehend all that is respectable for rank, talents, character and influence in the country, affords the only chance of safety; and I trust, that nobody can suppose that any individual (however he may disapprove, as I certainly do, the unconstitutional principle of exclusion) would suffer any personal object of ambition, if ambition he had, to stand in the way of the formation of such a ministry.ߞ If the present executive government did not feel this truth, it was time that the people told them of it. What might be the effect of such a combination he knew not, but this he knew, that without it there was no chance of this country weathering the storm, and encountering its perils. By this he did not mean that the country would be annihilated, but that the prosperity of it would be at an end.—The hon. gent. then proceeded to observe on the conduct of government with regard to Russia, and thought ministers ought to have put a short question to that court, whether they would consent to our treating with France, or whether they thought we should relieve altogether? and if Russia refused to answer that question, with all his partiality for Russia, the negotiation would not have been worth having without that explicit answer.—He then entered into our general policy, preferred the alliance of Russia to that of any other power; but confessed he saw no prospect of a speedy termination of our contest by that alliance alone, without the assistance of other powers. He disapproved of the,conduct of France in the late war as well as the present, but he disapproved, if possible, still more of any government pursuing under the title of indemnities a system of partition of states, making some republics, some monarchies, and annihilating the political existence of others, without regard to moral rectitude or to the common feelings of mankind, which considerations had more influence on the affairs of the world than some politicians were aware. The partition of Poland, the seizure of Holland, the subjugation of Switzerland, and the division of states, by the agreement of some, and by the fraud and rapacity of others, had

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done more to destroy the confidence of mankind in each other, than all the other misconduct of the powers put together. In private society, when men lost their confidence in one another, the compact was dissolved. The same rule applied to states, for they were only aggregates of individuals. He recommended to all the powers of Europe a system of justice and moderation, as the only means of putting an end to the evils under which we labour. He recommended a general congress, and that these principles should be prevalent in its deliberations. He knew he excited a smile when he recommended these notions, because they were thought chimerical; but those who thought so had found their own system had failed, and they had never tried his. Having dwelt on these and other kindred topics for some time, he concluded with giving his hearty concurrence to the motion of his hon. friend.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed his regret that the same circumstances which prevented his majesty from making any more direct communication to the house, than that which the message contained, rendered it impossible for him to follow the hon. member who had just sat down, through many of the details which his speech contained. Before he proceeded to offer a few observations on the question immediately before the house, he was anxious to make one or two remarks on those topics with which the hon member who introduced the business had prefaced his motion. These topics had been so ably commented on by his noble friend near bins (lord Castlereagh) that he should not have thought it necessary to refer to them, if the last speaker had not revived and enforced them. Another reason that rendered it the less requisite for him to enlarge on them was, that they were not practically connected with the question submitted to the consideration of the house. The house had heard in succession of the situation of the finances, of the state of the army, of the extent of our navy, and of the present state of the public mind in Ireland. All these points were urged, and in that way too, which gave rise to an idea that the hon, member wished to have them all made the subject of separate discussions, with the view of removing what was defective, and placing every thing on a different establishment; this idea, however, turned out to be erroneous, for the hon. member would be satisfied with a simple adjournment from week to week, or from fortnight to fort-
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night, not for the purpose of enabling the house to renew any discussions on the general state of our relations, foreign and domestic, but merely for receiving that communication which could not be brought forward under the present circumstances. Such being the state of the case, he was relieved from the necessity of going into any minuteness of detail. Of the state of our finances, he could by no means entertain those gloomy ideas which the hon. gent. entertained. He thought, on the contrary, the prospect they afforded was highly consolatory. As to the promise on which the hon. gent. had insisted, he had to say, that he was not in office at the time it was made, but he was satisfied that if great and unexampled burdens had not been rendered necessary, the pledge would have been amply fulfilled. Even if a sum of seven or eight millions had been sufficient, the sinking fund would have covered it without accumulating more debt. It was consoling and encouraging that, instead of adding to our loans, we could raise by the sinking fund, and the taxes raised within the year, no less a sum than twenty millions this year. This was a most flattering picture of the state of our resources, and the regular payment of near eight millions a year by the sinking fund, in spite of our accumulated difficulties, was the best testimony in favour of public credit. The beneficial effects of this system it was needless for him to insist upon, for they were felt in the general prosperity, industry and comfort of the people. He would not go into detail on this part of the subject, as another opportunity would be afforded him, when an hon. gent., whose ability and accuracy well fitted him for the task, should submit his resolutions to the house. When these resolutions were introduced, he should, he trusted, be able to shew the house that the view which he gave of the financial state of the country was by no means delusive. As to the present state of our army, he declined saying much at present, reserving himself for the day when the subject would be fully discussed. He begged leave however, to allude to what had been said about his promises to place the army on a proper footing, and the disappointment of these promises. He had to complain, that his sentiments and language had on this subject been either misunderstood or misrepresented. As to the actual amount of our military force, he had long since declared that it appeared to him nearly adequate to

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the circumstances of the country. What he objected to was, principally, the manner in which it was distributed. He had complained too, of our deficiency in disposable force, and to supply this deficiency, his most active exertions had been directed. He did not see then any ground for supposing that, for the accomplishment of so desirable an end, temporary expedients the should not be resorted to, and ministers had accordingly combined these with a plan for the regular recruiting of the army. If from this period last year, down to the present day, twenty or thirty thousand men had been added to our disposable force, he did not see with what justice ministers could be accused of neglecting our military resources. He begged gentlemen to reflect on the difficulties attending the recruiting for the army in this commercial country, and yet with all these difficulties, we had now a disposable force of a hundred and forty thousand well disciplined troops, besides a hundred thousand that were stationary. To these were to be added about four hundred thousand volunteers, forming altogether a force which at once shewed the activity of the government, and the zeal and spirit of our general population. The state of our military strength was indeed such as to remove all diffidence or anxiety. The right hon. member next adverted to the state of the navy. It was true that there was in ships of the line a very trifling increase, but when it was considered how many had been necessarily laid up in the docks to be repaired, he was sure that the exertions of the noble lord lately at the head of the admiralty, to expedite this important branch of the public service, was entitled to the gratitude of the country. Equally entitled to approbation was his zealous activity in providing so stores of every description, and his diligence in hastening the fitting out of that inferior species of naval force Which the peculiar circumstances of the country required. He denied that the escape of the French squadrons at all evinced want of knowledge or activity on the part of the admiralty. On every one of the stations where the squadrons of the enemy were, they had been blockaded, and if by accident the blockade was raised, there was no proof of the least blame attached to any one individual. It was quite impossible, great as was the amount of our naval force, to to have squadrons in all parts of the world to which a hostile fleet might by accident
530
direct its course. He vindicated the conduct of the admiralty as to the first sailing of the Toulon fleet. It was not then ascertained that they had gone out of the Mediterranean. On the contrary, there was then reason to suppose that they had in view an object much nearer than any attempt either on our West-India islands or the Brazils, though he was not at liberty to speak with greater freedom on the subject. He denied that the number of troops on board the Toulon fleet had ever been ascertained. On the contrary the most contradictory accounts had at different times come into the possession of ministers. Every reasonable precaution had been taken on the part of government, but no vigilance, however active, could at all times prevent the escape of an enemy, continually on the watch to elude us. He next touched on the state of Ireland, which he allowed was ground of not a little anxiety. A great improvement had taken place, but much yet remained to be done to perfect the advantages of the union. He trusted that every thing inflammatory would be studiously avoided on a subject so delicate, and at the same time so interesting; as it had only been incidentally alluded to, he should not insist on it on the present occasion. After going through these points, the right hon. gent. proceeded to state what had been his original views of the renewal of hostilities, views from which he had never for a moment departed. He had never supposed or maintained that the military force of this country was adequate to reduce the inordinate ambition, or curtail the overgrown power of France. He had maintained, however, that this country could not, consistently with its safet, now retain the relations of peace and amity with a government whose hostile views were so unequivocally manifested. He had thought that the spirit and energy of this nation, properly displayed, might rouse the spirit of the powers of the continent, and that an opportunity might be found of making a common cause with them against the ambition of an individual restrained by none of those laws which regulate the intercourse of civilized kingdoms. Of the power of this country to repel the invasion he never entertained a doubt, and he trusted that the attempt, if made, would be so repelled as to hold out encouragement to those whom fear had bound in slavish obedience, to rise up and shake off their ignominious chains. Such were the views which he

531
had laid down, and such had been the principles on which the confidential communications alluded to in his majesty's message had been conducted. The principle of joint peace or joint war formed the basis of the negotiations, and he was glad to find the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) fully entered into the system. To obtain such a co-operation from Russia was what ministers were desirous of effecting, and what true policy clearly demanded. He allowed, indeed, that Russia alone, independent of other continental powers, was not efficient for effectually reducing the power of France. The interest other powers in the same cause became therefore a matter of the utmost consequence, but to accomplish this, he needed not to apprise the house, was a matter of extreme difficulty. The secresy which such a negotiations required, the discussion of all the circumstances connected with such a close union of interests, and the arrangement of the means by which the different members of the confederacy could be brought to act together, were all reasons why the communication alluded to in the message could not now, after so long an interval, be satisfactorily explained. He trusted, then, the house would not refuse to give on this occasion, the same credit to the message, which other messages, under similar circumstances, had obtained. His majesty stated, that no more distinct communication could be made with safety, and therefore he hoped that no unnecessary obstacle might be thrown in the way of connexions capable of producing the most satisfactory results. The right hon. gent. concluded by giving his negative to the motion.
Mr. Grey, in reply, adverted to the declaration respecting the sufficiency of the produce of the surplus of the Consolidated Fund to defray the expenses of the loans for the three first years during the war. Such, he understood it to have been then asserted, although the hon. member now endeavoured to put another construction on it. Upon the army he would not then say any thing, as that subject was to be brought forward by an hon. member. In the observations which he made respecting the navy, he did not state the small comparative increase of it for the purpose of inculpating the late board of admiralty, but to shew that it was not equal to the situation of the country engaged in hostility with France and Spain. The right hon. gent. had insinuated a heavy charge against lord St. Vincent, and which should not have
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been made unless it was meant to be pursued. The charge, as he could collect, for the right hon. gent. did not openly express it, was, that that noble lord had not exerted himself as he should have done, to supply the usual decay of the navy. But how did the successors of the noble earl supply the deficiencies occasioned by decay? Why, by purchasing from the merchant-yards such sips as might be fairly said to constitute not any portion of the strength, but rather of the weakness of the British navy. He would not deny but that the greatest vigilance might be sometimes baffled, and that a single squadron might escape from the enemy's ports, and yet no blame be imputable either to the board of admiralty, or officer who commanded on the station. But what were the house to think, when one fleet escaped from Toulon, another from Cadiz, two from Rochefort, one of which was now at sea with 2,500 troops on board? surely there was something more than mere accident in so many escapes. He would ask, after two years of war, what had been done? Could ministers say where the fleets of France or Spain were gone? Could they undertake to the assure country, that they were not at the very moment giving a decisive blow to some of the most important interest of the country?—The question being loudly called for, the house divided.

Ayes

110

Noes

261

Majority against Mr. Grey's motion

151

Adjourned at a quarter before three o'clock on Friday morning.

MINUTES
Counsel were further heard in the committee of privilege relative to the claim of sir Cecil Bishop to the Barony of Zouch.—Strangers were then excluded for some time, during which some bills were brought up from the commons. After our re-admission, the Lottery bill, the Militia Pay and Clothing bill, the Militia Adjutant's bill, the Militia Subaltern's bill, and some other bills, were read a third time and passed; as was also the Irish Commissioner's bill, after a few observations from the earl of Suffolk relative to the Barrack Department in Ireland and this country.—The Turnpike Act Amendment bill was also read a third time and passed, after leaving out, on the motion of the duke of Norfolk, the clause which gave the whole penalty to be applied to the repairs of the road.—The earl of Suffolk presented a petition from the churchwardens and inhabitants of St. Pancras against the St. Pancras Poor bill, but in consequence of some informality it was withdrawn, for the purpose of being presented again to-morrow.

HIS MAJESTY'S MESSAGE.
The order, of the day being moved for taking his majes-

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ty's most gracious message into consideration, which, as well as the message in question, (see p. 447) being read,
Lord Mulgrave said, that with respect to the address which he should have the honour of moving on the occasion of his majesty's message, he felt it unnecessary, at least in the first instance, to trouble their lordships with any observations. The address he should propose did not tend to pledge the house to any specific line of proceeding, beyond that which he was confident every one of their lordships would wish to adopt on the occasion. The address, merely founded on the message, would speak for itself, and to its substance, he thought no objection could possibly be made. At the same time, he wished, in case any objection should be made, it might be understood he was at liberty to offer some observations to their lordships upon the subject. The noble secretary then moved an address to the following effect: "to return the thanks of the house to his majesty for his most gracious communication; and to assure his majesty, that the house would readily concur in enabling his majesty to take due advantage of such opportunities as may occur, and to fulfil such engagements as the exigencies of affairs may require."—On the question being put:"
The Earl of Carysfort rose and said, that the question then before the house involved those propositions, on which it had been his intention to have troubled their lordships with his sentiments. In observing upon the proceeding of yesterday, and the question under consideration that evening, he should have to call their lordships' attention to the communication from the throne at the opening of the session, the proceedings adopted in consequence, and the degree of confident expectation which these communications necessarily excited. The question now before their lordships, notwithstanding the way in which the noble secretary seemed to treat it, Was one of great and peculiar importance. He thought he was authoritatively founded, in asserting that the vote of credit, to which the message and the address evidently referred, was to a greater extent than any proposed in similar circumstances, that ever appeared upon the records of parliament. He was authorised to say, because it was publicly spoken of, that the provision intended to be made, for enabling his majesty's, ministers to pursue whatever line of conduct they should think proper, was no less than the enormous sum of five millions; an
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amount equal to the whole revenue of many of the potentates of the first rank in Europe. At a proceeding of this kind, he was perfectly astonished. He would ask upon what grounds ministers could expect so immense a sum to be confided to their disposal, without any knowledge on the part of parliament of any particular object they had in contemplation; or without any intimation whatever being given, as to the political views to which their advice to his majesty was to be directed? He was astonished how the noble secretary of state could imagine it possible that such a proceeding could be passed over in silence in that house. In their capacity of hereditary counsellors of the crown, it was impossible they could so far forget all the duties they owed to their sovereign, as to remain silent on so extraordinary an occasion. They could not, under such a circumstance, forbear to exercise that general superintendance over all the great concerns of the state, which was constitutionally vested in them; particularly with reference to an important crisis in the history of the country, induced by the improvident advice of those whom his majesty had called to his councils; of those who had hitherto given no probable ground of hope that the affairs of the country would be brought to a favourable or happy issue. He had to condemn the general system adopted by ministers with respect to communications to parliament on the state of political affairs: the advice of that great council of the nation should be frequently taken, and communications, containing true information respecting the state of public affairs, ought frequently to be made. If a line of conduct, founded upon that principle, had been pursued, they would not now have to lament that the country Was without a single ally upon the continent of Europe, and that ministers, with respect to forming a connexion with foreign powers, had been for more than six months perfectly inactive. If a different line of conduct from that adopted by his majesty's ministers, had been followed, they should not now have to fear the effects of the preponderating power and influence of France. They would see that foreign powers, instead of resisting our solicitations, and instead of keeping aloof, would court alliance and connexion with Great Britain, and even themselves propose to confederate with it, in order to secure a lasting peace to Europe, founded on the security and independence of every nation in it. But the steps taken of late years, on the part of this country, were such as tended to

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produce effects diametrically opposite; they had a tendency even to shake the confidence of foreign powers in the conduct of Great Britain, and certainly to overturn that wise and vigorous system of our ancestors with respect to their foreign policy. In discussing this important part of the subject, he called their lordships' attention to the late treaty of peace, in consequence of which this country was entirely left by itself, solely dependant on its own strength, and under continual apprehension of invasion by a continental enemy. That measure, and the correspondent line of conduct pursued by his majesty's ministers, reduced this country to the necessity of maintaining a large internal military force, and entailed a great additional burthen upon the people. It was impossible that We could long act Upon such a system; it was incompatible with the interests or security of a country whose prosperity so much depended upon its commerce and the freedom of its constitution—With respect to the occasion to which he had recently adverted (the treaty of Amiens), it was with Satisfaction he reflected that he had concurred with some other noble lords, in declaring at that time his convictions relative to that inauspicious measure, and of those consequences which must, of necessity, result from it; and their lordships could not but recollect, that when the definitive treaty was under consideration, the ministers were not only distinctly Warned of the consequences of the measure, but advised to adopt a specific line of conduct, by which that spirit of encroachment, which, even at that very time, was manifested by France, might be counteracted and those pledges retained, by which the enemy might be compelled, on their parts, to a due execution of the treaty. unfortunately for the country, ministers then thought proper to disregard those warnings, and preferred to act in such a way, as if the situation of Europe and the conduct of France, were not such as must not render it necessary again to recur to force. The measure to which he adverted, could not be called a treaty of peace; it was, in point of fact, a mere suspension of arms. The country was again plunged in war, and it was a duty imposed upon that house to enquire with respect to the system of conducting it; and to consider the probabilities under that system, of its being brought to a safe and favourable issue. In this view of the question, they would have to compare the present situation of the country with that in which it Stood at the commencement of the war. We
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were then masters of every sea in the world, the united naval force of Europe could not act with effect against us. We had a force sufficient, as was stated by ministers, amply sufficient for the defence of the country, and they even boasted, that they had collected in arms, a body of men, constituting a military force, superior to that of any country in the world; that its numbers, of all descriptions, exceeded eight hundred thousand men in arms. Let their lordships contrast that with the present state of the country, and it would be seen what a use ministers made of such extraordinary powers. With a naval force exceeding in number seven hundred ships, the enemy's marine not only received no blow, but they were able to continue, without interruption, all their preparations for the invasion of the country. In every respect were the enemy now superior to us, not only in a military, but in a naval point of view, and the country had reason this moment to tremble for the safety of its foreign possessions, particularly its western possessions; and the security of its trading ships not so much depended on the superiority of its marine as on the favourable effects of chance, and the apparent hope existed of a renewal of those continental connexions; on which the interests and security of Great Britain and Europe reciprocally depended. Their lordships had no information whether the negotiations with Russia, or with any other continental power, were with a view to hostile operations, nor even whether any proofs of a pacific disposition appeared on the part of the enemy; but merely that the sovereign did not think himself enabled to make a communication on the subject to the house. These serious and important considerations, he thought, called for explanation on the part of ministers. Their conduct in these instances, was widely different from that adopted by our ancestors; and, illustrating this, his lordship particularly referred to the communications made to parliament, at and subsequent to the period of forming the grand alliance against France in the reign of William III. Some of these, with the answers, particularly of the commons, were quoted by his lordship, who frequently advised the crown as to the preferable line of conduct to be pursued. The happy and beneficial effects of such a mode of proceeding was, he contended, sufficiently apparent. Let their lordships, on the present occasion, follow these great and patriotic examples of their ancestors. Let them shew, by every means in their power, by

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their language, and by their actions, their firm determination to give every support to his majesty, but in such a way as may be most conducive to the great ends they all had in view. Let them shew their determination to secure the full benefits of the invaluable constitution of the country. Let them remember, that the king of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was placed in a different situation from that of other potentates in Europe. Let the general sense, spirit, and wishes of his people be expressed to him, by their constitutional organ, the parliament. On these principles, and under the convictions by which he was impressed, he would beg leave to suggest an amendment, the ultimate object of which, however, was, that of the proposed address; it would go to give his majesty the highest assurances of the fullest support of that house; that they would not merely concur in a vote for a limited sum, but assure him of their full and cordial assistance, in enabling his majesty to make the best advantage of any opportunity that might arise. He should therefore move to amend the motion for the address, by leaving out a part of it, as originally proposed, and inserting, instead thereof, a declaration of the house to the above effect; the concluding part of which included a request in purport, "that his majesty would be graciously pleased not to prorogue his parliament, until his majesty should be enabled to communicate more fully the state of his negotiations with foreign powers, &c."—On this the question being put;
Lord Mulgrave rose, and begged permission of the house to offer a few observations; he was not disposed to enter into a discussion of the far greater number of the considerations adverted to by the noble earl who proposed the amendment, as he was totally at a loss to conceive how most of the observations made by him could apply to the question before the house. So far from that question involving any thing tending to separate this country from its connexions with the continent, that principle was expressly recognised, and a disposition on the part of his majesty to uphold that system of connexion between the interests and prosperity of his dominions, with the security and independence of Europe, was expressed in terms. A great part of the noble earl's speech, however, turned on questions, respecting the application of the powers of the country, its means of defence and offence, and the al-
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leged unfitness of his majesty's present ministers to administer those means and powers, with honour to his majesty, or with safety and advantage to his dominions. And, on those questions, as arising out of the noble earl's speech, he begged leave to offer a few remarks.—First, with respect to the state of our military defence, the exertions of government, for the last sixteen months, were such as, he was confident, would give satisfaction to the house. Those, he was sure, never had been exceeded, under similar circumstances, in any country whatever. With in that period no less than 37,000 men had been added to the disposable force of the country. So that at this moment our disposable force was at least one hundred and nineteen thousand men. With respect to the provision made for the defence of our colonial possessions, no less than seventeen thousand men had been dispatched for their security. The relative naval force of this country, compared with that of the enemy, was every way superior. The number of ships actually in commission was no less than ninety-one sail of the line. These were actually in service. The total amount of the enemy's naval force, from the best information they could collect, did not exceed eighty-three ships of the line, including Dutch, Spanish, and French. In addition to our ships of the line, we had in service twelve fifty gun ships. Of that description of force, added to our ships of the line, we had a decided superiority, in point of number, of at least twenty ships. We had still a greater proportion of frigates. With this aggregate force, we had every where a clear and decided superiority; and, until very lately, the whole of the enemy's naval force was closely blocked up in their ports. On this point, their lordships would of course consider the impossibility of any government counting upon that which depended on no human foresight or power—their inability to anticipate or to prevent the changes and fluctuations of winds and weather, and on which these kind of naval operations absolutely depended. From the moment they heard of the escape of a part of the enemy's naval force from their ports, not an instant was lost in sending detachments in pursuit of them. Under such circumstance, it would be equally impossible for any government to obtain accurate information, as to the destination of squadrons which had so escaped. But he could fully assure their lordships, that under these circumstances, every possible precaution had been taken on the part

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of government to counteract and defeat the operations and efforts of the enemy. With respect to the state of the negotiations in question, he had to observe, that their actual state rendered it improper to make a communication to parliament upon them. In the amendment proposed by the noble earl, a request was made to his majesty that parliament should not be prorogued until such communications should be made to the house. With regard to this, he would ask on what ground such a requisition was made? Did such a practice obtain on former occasions? Did it take place at any period of the late extensive and eventful warfare? Certainly not. With respect to the particular object to which the address more immediately referred, it was the uniform practice in all the late wars, to come to a vote of credit similar to that now proposed, to enable government to take advantage of such contingent circumstances as might arise, during the recess of parliament. Under the existing circumstances, the sovereign had not been able to make a direct communication on the topics adverted to by parliament. He would submit to the house, whether it was either constitutional or consistent with the practice of parliament, to interfere with the progress of negotiations, the conduct of which was, by the constitution, exclusively in the crown. His majesty Would be advised by his confidential servants and ministers, when such a communication could properly be made; and he would therefore put it to the house, whether at the present moment, and under the existing circumstances, they would not put the same degree of confidence in ministers, which on similar occasions, they had formerly done?—After the noble secretary had concluded, a pause for two or three minutes took place, and no peer shewed a disposition to speak. At length,
Lord Hawkesbury rose and observed, that he felt it his duty, on the present occasion, to second, by every argument in his power, what had fallen from his noble colleague. Without entering into a minute detail of the objections of the noble earl, he could not allow certain of his allusions to pass without making some observations upon them. First, upon the expediency and advantage of continental connexions, upon which point so much had been said, no peer in that house, he believed, entertained the smallest difference of opinion. Ministers always found it the interest of the country, and always felt it their duty to attend to the relative state of the continent, and
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endeavoured to preserve that degree of connexion with foreign powers, which it was of the utmost importance to the interests of the country to keep up. That this principle was steadily kept in view, and duly asserted, he could refer to the discussions which took place on the late preliminary and definitive treaties of peace. But, he must observe, long before these treaties, that the fate of the continent had been decided—he alluded to the provisions of the treaty of Luneville. After that measure, with a view to our own particular interest, and even to the relative situations of the powers on the continent, it was thought more expedient to husband our resources, than to continue the struggle alone, in which, if this country had persisted, it would be necessary to have engaged single handed with the enemy, without first trying the experiment of peace. He would state distinctly, that the principles upon which the treaty of Amiens proceeded, were not only those which were best for the interests of this country, but for those of the continent of Europe. Ever since that period, he contended there was no opportunity lost whatever, of forming a beneficial connexion with foreign powers; but the circumstances under which, and the reasons why such endeavours did not succeed formed entirely distinct questions; but the object had been constantly pursued, and no ground existed for imputing blame in that respect to the conduct of his majesty's government.—The question now before their lordships might be resolved into a narrow compass. In the opinion of his majesty, considering the season of the year, and the state of the public, it was proper speedily to put an end to the session of parliament. In this view, the usual vote of credit was proposed, and which, in due course, would come before their lordships to be decided on. But it seemed the objections were made not so much for what the message did contain, as for what it did not contain. However, in point of fact, there was nothing in the address which at all militated against those principles which the noble lord so strongly asserted; nor did it go to pledge them to any more than what the house recognised, and by its vote repeatedly sanctioned. Indeed, both the message and the address grew actually out of the speech delivered by his majesty, on the first day of the present session, and from the corresponding address voted by the house—they were, therefore, not called upon to acqui-

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esce under any principles, but those they admitted on the first day of the session; in illustration of which, the noble secretary read a part of the address alluded to, and which particularly referred to the passing communications between his majesty and the emperor of Russia. The negociations which subsequently took place had not yet been brought to that point in which his majesty could make a regular parliamentary communication. Was there any thing in that consideration not arising out of the constitution of this country, or out of the practice of parliament? Did it imply blame to government, because the state of negociations was not laid before parliament before they had come to some result? He did not mean to deny there might exist some particular cases where it might be the duty of parliament to call for the state of negociations while pending. But, he believed, it was the generally understood practice of the house, more especially of late years, and generally admitted, that to communicate negociations while pending would be to frustrate their objects; to render them productive of no real benefit; and lastly, to exonerate ministers from that responsibility which otherwise they would bear. The question before the house was by no means one of principle, it was solely a question of discretion: under a principle generally admitted, they might surely decide upon that which might be fitting the interests of the country, without waiting for the issue of negociations; more especially on a question not involving any principle, but merely its application. Under all the circumstances of the case, he could see no solid reason whatever for adopting the amendment. The address, as his noble friend had well stated, pledged the house to nothing, but what they all concurred in, namely, to support his majesty; and even that did not pledge them in one point beyond their address on the first day of the session. He saw no good ground for voting for the amendment; therefore he should resist its adoption.
The Earl of Carlisle said, the amendment proposed by his noble friend was of so simple a nature, that he thought there could be no hesitation in agreeing to it, as it merely proposed to ask his majesty to suffer parliament to continue sitting for some time longer, in order that they might have the information constitutionally given to them of the result of the negociations with the continental powers. This was, he con-
470
ceived, in many views of the subject, to be considered as the right mode of acting. It could not be supposed for a moment that he could be so absurd as to require information relative to the negociation whilst it was depending; all he wished was, that instead of being prorogued, parliament might be allowed to adjourn, in order that a communication of the result of the negociation now depending, might be made to it as soon as possible after such information had been received. It was well known to what purposes information upon similar subjects might be turned in this country, and it was therefore highly desirable, in that point of view, that the information upon this subject, when received, should be communicated to parliament and the public with all possible dispatch. The state of Ireland also was another material consideration, although, thank God, nothing serious had followed the agitation of the catholic claims. If the amendment of his noble friend was agreed to, there would then also be no necessity for the bill which the noble secretary of state had signified his intention to bring in, and which, perhaps, might not pass the house of commons, for continuing the effect of the proceedings relative to Mr. Justice Fox to the next session, as they might then be continued by adjournment, without the necessity of any bill of that nature. The amendment proposed by his noble friend might be a novel measure; but it was called for by the novelty of our situation. He did not mean to impute any blame to ministers, on account of the sailing of the enemy's fleets, but it was unfortunate, and still more so, that we should have no intelligence of their course, and that his majesty's ministers should be entirely ignorant of their destination. He had heard, however, rumours upon this subject, which he hoped the noble lord whom he now saw for the first time in his place, (lord Barham) would contradict. He had heard it rumoured that Vessels had been given what was considered, as the best cruizing ground, without reference to their stations, when they ought to have been employed in watching the enemy. He hoped, however, that this rumour would be contradicted by the noble lord to whom he had alluded, and declared to be, as very probably it was, entirely destitute of foundation. With respect, however, to what had been stated by the noble lord as to the number of our ships of the line, he believed it would be found that only three additional ships of the line

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were put into commission during the last year. With respect to the army, he admitted that the drafts from the militia had been of use, but with the exception of this measure, what had been done to augment our army, or increase our disposable force? There was still another reason for agreeing to the amendment of his noble friend, and that was the dissentions which were known to exist in his majesty's cabinet. Instead of being employed in considering how the country was to be extricated from its difficulties, almost the whole time of ministers was known to be taken up in endeavouring to reconcile disputes which were continually taking place. These things were notorious, every person in the street talked of them, he could not meet a person in the street that he new, but he was asked who's in, and who's out?—he could only answer I don't know, but the Rochfort squadron have been out, have done great mischief to our West-India possessions, and have returned home unmolested; the Toulon squadron is out, and gone God knows where, or what mischief it may do. For these reasons he should vote for the amendment of his noble friend.
Earl Camden said, he conceived this to be a mere usual proceeding with respect to a Vote of credit, nor could he discover any reason for the amendment moved by the noble lord. The two points which had been chiefly insisted upon by the noble lord who moved the amendment, and by the noble lord who had just sat down, related to the army and the navy. With regard to the former he could confirm the statements of his noble friend that since the 5th January 1804, 37,000 men had been added to our disposable force, and that 17,000 men had been sent to defend our foreign possessions. Added to this, our whole effective regular force amounted to 174,899 men, which was 3,000 more than the greatest army we had during the last war; and of these but a small part were limited in their service. With respect to the navy his noble friend was in an error, as instead of 93 there were now 98 ships of the line in actual service, besides twelve 50-gun ships, whilst last year there were only 81. Since last June 170 vessels of different descriptions had been put into commission, whilst 72 had been lost, taken, or broken up as unfit for service, leaving a balance therefore of near one hundred vessels added to the navy of Great-Britain. He gave these details instead of the noble lord who had been called upon
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by the noble earl who had just sat down, the former having been so short a time in the house. These facts, however, spoke for themselves, as to the exertions of his majesty's ministers; nor could he omit paying a just tribute of applause to the indefatigable exertions of the noble viscount (Melville) who lately quitted the Admiralty, and who had been unceasingly employed during his continuance in office in endeavouring to place the navy upon that footing which the exigencies of the country required. His exertions had been followed up by those of the noble lord now at the head of the Admiralty, whose endeavours were unremittingly directed to the same end. Having made these statements, in answer to the assertion made by noble lords on the other side, he should conclude by expressing his determination to vote against the amendment.
Earl Darnley said, he could not agree in the conclusions drawn by the noble lord from his statements, nor in his determination to vote against the amendment. As to the army, after deducting the draughts from the militia, nothing had been done to increase our disposable force, except by means of the additional force act, the only measure of the present administration, calculated for that purpose, and which, when he last addressed their lordships upon the subject, had produced only 300 men. With respect to the number of vessels mentioned by the noble lord to have been added to the navy, he had endeavoured to prove to their lordships upon a former occasion, and he was still of opinion, that many of those which had been purchased were unfit for the purposes of the public service. When, however, he saw the fleets of the enemy sailing in every direction, and ministers unable even to give a guess as to their destination, he thought it impossible that there could be the least hesitation in agreeing to the amendment proposed by the noble lord. The reason also mentioned by the noble lord (Carlisle) as to the disputes and dissensions notoriously known to exist in the cabinet, was with him also a cogent reason for agreeing to the amendment.
The Earl of Westmoreland said, he had listened attentively to noble lords on the other side, but he had been unable to discover any reason whatever for the new and extraordinary measure which was now proposed, namely, to interfere with the king's prerogative, by praying his majesty not to prorogue his parliament—and until when did

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noble lords wish that the session should be be continued? Was it to be continued until they should be pleased to address his majesty to put an end to it, or did they mean that the parliament should continue permanently sitting? Certainly no substantial reason had been alleged for so novel and extraordinary a measure; neither had the measure itself which was proposed, been stated in any intelligible shape. Noble lords had blamed ministers for suffering the enemy's fleets to escape, and upon this subject he expected that a noble friend of his in the blue ribband (earl Spencer) would rise to defend himself. During the period that that noble lord was at the head of the admiralty the Brest fleet came out of port and got to Ireland, without molestation; the Toulon fleet got safe to Egypt, an expedition which gave occasion to the glorious victory gained on that coast; so at this period the enemy's fleets had escaped, but as no blame was imputable to that noble lord when at the head of the admiralty on account of the escape of the enemy's fleets, so no blame was imputable now. Bad weather, false intelligence, and a variety of accidents might contribute to drive off our squadrons, or lead them upon a false chase and permit the escape of the enemy; but the moment that the escape of their fleets was known, squadrons were immediately dispatched after them. It was true the Rochfort squadron had escaped, had gone to the West-Indies, and come back again without molestation; but the circumstances attendant upon this expedition proved the exertions and the care of the ministers for the defence of our foreign possessions. That that squadron could make no impression upon any one of our islands was to be attributed to the excellent state of defence in which ministers had taken care they should be placed. No blame could be imputable to ministers for what was in its nature unavoidable, and which arose from circumstances that could not be controlled. No case whatever had, in his opinion, been made out which could warrant so extraordinary a measure as that now proposed, and, therefore, he should oppose the amendment.
Earl Spencer said, he was in entire ignorance with regard to the objects for which so large a vote of credit was wanted, as that which he was authorised to say would be proposed, namely, 5,000,000l.; but it was that very ignorance which induced him to oppose the motion for giving a pledge such as that demanded by the noble secretary of
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state, as he could not place confidence in those ministers by whom it was asked. He declared he had not confidence enough in his majesty's ministers to entrust them with the disposal of this money. The very circumstance of the enemy's fleets having been suffered to sail from their ports, without their destination being known was a sufficient ground why no confidence should be placed in them. On the subject of the navy he must say he did not know where blame lay, and, therefore, he did not impute blame on that account to any individual. With regard to the military force, the country expected a great deal more to have been done in that department than was done. Upon the whole, it was impossible not to feel a strong suspicion that there was no union of sentiment among the members of his majesty's government; and therefore they were for that reason undeserving of confidence. On the ground, therefore, that parliament was in a situation it had never been in before, and that a sum so large as this had never been left to the discretionary disposal of ministers, he would support the amendment of the noble lord, which required nothing more than that the king should not prorogue the parliament, as long as the government stood in need of the advice and assistance of the members of that house, who were the hereditary counsellors of the crown.
Lord Harrowby maintained, that the vote proposed was not a novel measure, as had been asserted. In 1799, a subsidy of 800,000l. had been voted to Russia for 45,000 men, who were not at the time agreed for, but only meant as an offer to be made for such an object. There was nothing extraordinary, therefore, in asking the house to enable his majesty to conclude such engagements in the course of the negotiation as should appear necessary; and let the government be what it might, would the house, by with-holding its confidence from that government, and the means of fulfilling its engagements, thus diminish the weight of the country in the estimation of those nations which it was our object to combine with us either in carrying on the war, or in bringing about a secure and permanent peace?
The Earl of Suffolk supported the amendment, and, in answer to some observations from the earl of Westmoreland, on the proneness of opposition constantly to condemn the measures of administration, without proposing any of their own, observed, be

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would not tell the noble lord in the blue ribband what he and his friends would do, but what they would not do. They would not, with such a numerous fleet as ministers boasted, suffer the Rochfort squadron to proceed to the West-Indies, and then to ravage our islands, for six whole weeks, unmolested, and afterwards to return to their own ports in safety. They would not suffer the combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, to proceed to sea, upon a distant and unknown destination, without being able to find out that destination. They would not, at a moment when the country was menaced with danger on all hands, refuse a measure of conciliation to the people of Ireland, which would unite the strength and affections of that country for the defence of these islands. They would not suffer the credit and character of this country to sink so low in the estimation of continental nations, as not be able, in a negotiation of six months, to procure a single ally on the continent.
The Earl of Carnarvon said, if the proposition now before the house for allowing so large a sum to government, had any shape at all, it was that of its being a subsidy But nobody knew whether it was a subsidy for peace or for war; for, notwithstanding the professions made from the throne, of intended alliances on the continent, there was not as yet any appearance of a disposition on the part of the powers on the continent to join us in the war. A space of six months had elapsed since that communication, and the public were still in complete ignorance on the subject. The present question was without an example. The house did not know for what purpose ministers wanted the money; whether it was to patch up another miserable peace of Amiens, or to carry on the war. He would now ask the house, whether the public purse was to be given up to men who had misapplied it before? To do so, would be a total breach of trust on the part of the house, which could not be justified in reposing such confidence. He had no opinion whatever of the present administration, as they were now formed, and the house would betray its trust by placing any confidence in them.
Lord Sidmouth, said, that the view in which he held the subject differed so materially from the opinion expressed by the noble lord who spoke last, and many of those noble lords who supported the amendment, that he must entreat the indulgence of the house, in expressing his opinion, and the
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reasons upon which he should resist the amendment. The noble lord who had just sat down said, that this address would be a vote of credit; in this description he could not agree: a vote of credit, as far as his parliamentary experience could inform him, was a vote usually passed by the house of commons at the conclusion of each session of parliament, to enable his majesty to raise a sum for the service of the year, over and above the sums already voted on estimates, in case of any unforeseen exigency that might occur. The measure now proposed was not of this description. It was not a vote to raise money for the exigencies of the year on credit, but a motion to empower his majesty to apply a sum already voted in the last year. He had observed, from the votes of the house of commons, to which he believed it was not unparliamentary to refer, that a large sum had been provided by that house upon the estimates of the last year, over and above the actual exigencies of the year, and for the liberty of appropriating which to the probable or eventual, exigencies of the present year, the original motion was directed, but which he would admit the house was not bound to allow, unless they thought proper; but if this was not a vote of credit properly so called, it was a proof of the anxiety of his majesty's ministers to solicit the assent of the house for the leave of application in a way which they conceived most respectful to parliament. It was to vest the money at the disposal of his majesty for the exigencies that might become eventually necessary for the service of the year; the manner was not, perhaps, formally recognised. It was not, however, unusual or inconsistent with parliamentary usage, to pass votes of credit, without any communication as to those objects which were expressly stated to be casual and unforeseen in the estimates for the general service of the year. But government not being enabled to make any specific or definitive communication on the subject of the pending negotiations; and his majesty's ministers not foreseeing any immediate likelihood of making such a Communication, before the usual time when parliament was prorogued; it was deemed right to make the application for leave to apply this sum, without waiting for an uncertain conclusion to the negotiations, or keeping the houses of parliament sitting beyond the usual time, under an uncertainty. There was, however, another mode of proceeding to which he did not wish to allude, but to which his majesty's ministers might resort;

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namely, to move a committee of supply in the other house of parliament, to refer to that committee his majesty's speech and recent message, and to move that the sum in question be applied by his majesty to the necessary exigencies of the public service in the current year. But the present mode was adopted as more respectful to the dignity of parliament—The noble lord proceeded to answer several of the arguments urged against his majesty's ministers, in the course of the debate. He did not mean to go into a discussion of the arguments objected to the motion of the noble lord, (lord Mulgrave). The noble lord who opened this debate, had said, that the negotiation should be carried on with a large and extended view to continental connexion; and the noble lord had made strong allusions to the subject of the late peace of Amiens, and had said that his majesty's ministers in concluding that peace had betrayed their continental connexions, and totally forfeited their confidence. The subject of that peace had been so amply discussed already, that he felt it unnecessary to go into the subject now, no farther than to declare, that nothing could be farther from the mind of his majesty's ministers, who concluded that peace, than to betray or undervalue their continental connexions. They advised his majesty to that peace, with a hope that it would afford an opportunity for restoring a secure and permanent peace to Europe, but with a persuasion at the time, that if the ambitious views of France should lead to a revival of
the war, we should be enabled, with renewed energies, to recommence hostilities with vigour; and that the continental powers, by an interval of peace, might be enabled to recruit their vigour, and be prepared to cooperate with us, should war become inevitable, and opportunity prove favourable. It the peace had not then been agreed to, we should not now have the important advantage we possessed in the unanimous voice of the people of England in support of that war which they now saw was inevitable, with every disposition and endeavour, on the par of his majesty's government, to avoid it. So that this disposition, to which we were in debted for our security against the menaced attacks of an implacable enemy upon our shores, has proceeded from this reprobated treaty of peace. This was not the only advantage; for besides the physical strength and universal opinion of the country roused in favour of the war, in the short space of 25 Months our revenues had increased to double
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the amount of the interest on the public debt beside Such an increase of our public force by sea and land, as never had been equalled at any period of our history, and this within two years of the commencement of the war. The noble lord strongly professed that a friendly intercourse and connexion with continental powers had always formed a leading object of his administration. He contended, with respect to the present motion, that no occasion whatever existed to impede the prorogation of parliament at the usual time, as his majesty was empowered by law to call it together in fourteen days, should occasion require; and concluded by supporting the original motion.
Lord Holland supported the amendment; and went into a wide field of attack upon the peace of Amiens, and the ministers, who by concluding it and abandoning continental connexions, had so much excited the disgust and hatred of those powers, and precluded themselves from all confidence, that in six months, with all the exertions of diplomatic intrigue, they were not yet able to negotiate an alliance of friendly intercourse with a single power. The answer of Russia to our communication of the late pacific overtures of France proved that power disposed to peace for itself, and mediation for that of Europe, and, therefore, decidedly averse to the views of his majesty's ministers, who shewed themselves, and not the ruler of France, hostile to the peace of mankind—that a bloody warfare was their object, which disgusted and deterred from the connexion and alliance those continental powers, in whom their conduct had begotten a lassitude for war, and an earnest desire for the maintenance of peace. To such ministers he could give no confidence, and, therefore, he would,not place at their disposal the enormous sum of five millions, for objects totally unexplained, and undefined. He thought it absolutely necessary for the parliament to continue at its post, and endeavour to extricate the country from the dangers that surrounded her; a task which ministers were unequal to. When the present administration was formed, he heard of great changes and improvements about to be adopted; but nothing was done except giving the country two "giants refreshed" instead of one. But no one act had been done for the benefit of th country; nothing that could rescue us from our present dreadful situation.
Lord Grenville expressed himself,by no means surprised that noble lords on the other

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side had failed to give any thing like a Satisfactory answer to arguments Which had been adduced in favour of the amendment. They seemed to be conscious that no answer could be given. What, indeed, was the ,object of the motion of the noble lord opposite? That parliament should shut its eyes and ears to the conduct of ministers; should address his majesty to dismiss them from any farther attendance at present on their duty; and thus that five millions of the public money should be left at the disposal of ministers to expend in any manner which they might choose, without regard to the essential interests of the country. A noble lord had asked if the subject had been communicated by his majesty now for the first time, would he have been for opposing the address? If by this it were meant to be asked, if he would decline coming to the conclusion of at taking the five Millions of money out of the hands Of the house, and putting it into the hands of ministers, he had no hesitation in saving, that he certainly would decline coming to any such conclusion. If, on the other hand, the subject were now for the first time started, he must say, that he should he happy to afford every facility for entering into such negotiations as might be calculated to lead to a peace consistent with the safety of this country and the general interests of Europe. Great sacrifices, he was of opinion, should be made to procure the Co-operation of continental powers, particularly of Russia. Till he once knew, however, the nature of the communications which had been going forward, and was in some degree made acquainted with the advantages which they might be likely to produce, he did not feel himself at liberty to say that five millions was no more than a recompense for the part that the country was willing to take in the business. As an argument to shew that the amendment was not necessary, it had been observed, that although parliament might be prorogued, it could be assembled again in fourteen days. This he admitted. But did it follow that it actually would be so re-assembled? And was it not better for them to keep the hold which they at present had over this large sum, and not to give it out of their own hands? This was said to be but the usual confidence reposed in ministers, and it was insinuated, that it would be wrong to express any want of confidence. This he was surprised at hearing from the noble lord who advanced it. He had the happiness about a year ago to concur in opinion with-that noble
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lord, that nothing could be so necessary as for that house to express their opinion that no confidence could be placed in the then ministers. The result, he was happy to think, had been compliance on the part of the king with the opinion expressed by the house; and there had, at the same time been no symptom of despondency manifested among the people. No confidence was placed in that ministry, because they were not deserving of any. He declared he felt the same to be applicable to the present ministry; they were almost entirely composed of the makers of the peace of Amiens, in which were sown the seeds which gave rise to the present war; seeds sown in so fertile a soil as made it next to impossible that it should not yield the fruit it had produced. There never was a transaction in which so total a want of capacity, and of every qualification, was exhibited, as in the management of that treaty. They threw away the Cape, as if they had been eager to get quit of it; and could he place confidence in men guilty of so enormous a crime? But it was not in the instance of the Cape alone they had shewn their total incapacity; they framed a peace on such complicated terms as rendered the meaning of the different parts of it hardly intelligible? and having done so, they recommenced hostilities on such grounds as made the cause of this Country appear unjust in the eyes of almost every foreign power. If there was nothing else this would be to him sufficient ground nothing not entrusting such unheard-of confidence as that now required in the same hands. The noble lord then proceeded to examine the state of our army and navy; the former, he contended, had been only apparently encreased by a sort of hocus pocus transferring of the forces from one head to another. The latter, he said, could hardly have been diminished, and during the war we had not to boast of a single naval triumph. These surely did not conspire to give us additional confidence in our rulers. But there was another circumstance which had been alluded to, and had received no answer, which, independent of any other, was decisive on this point: was it of no consequence that, at so important a crisis, in which every thing essential to the safety of the country was involved, instead of having a ministry completely alive to the urgency of our situation, we should have a set of ministers completely united among themselves, and more anxious to discover and take advantage of the errors of their colleagues than to watch over the

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operation of the enemy? Yet in such men, without knowing whom in particular, or how long they might continue to act together, was the house called on to repose an extraordinary and unprecedented degree of confidence. His lordship declared, that he thought no time ought to be lost in announcing to the whole of Europe our determination to act on such principles as were calculated for the general safety, and best suited to that broad and liberal policy which would have for its basis the independence and security of the whole of Europe. If we could not procure continental powers on such terms to act with us as allies, our next object ought to be to propose to negotiate before them in open progress, taking them as the umpires of our difference. When satisfied that we were sincere in such a system, we might soon depend on having peace on fair and equitable terms, or a vigorous co-operation in carrying on the war. If there could be any reason for supposing an unwillingness in the powers of the continent to trust in our sincerity, we must look back to the treaty of Amines for the causes which gave rise to that suspicion. We must look to the persons at the head of our counsels, as being the great authors and causes of that distrust. To give effect to such a declaration, it ought to be the work of parliament, not of any private proposition, originating with the servants of the crown. These, he thought, were reasons any one of them more than sufficient to shew the necessity of the amendment.
The Lord Chancellor defended the peace of Amines, as the foundation of all that patriotic zeal by which the country was now so effectually defended. He asked, if there was more wisdom shewn in the negociations at Lisle than at Amines? At the time this treaty was made, we had no allies on the continent; we had lost them all during that very administration of which the noble lord who spoke last formed a part. With what justice, then, could that noble lord charge the late administration with having made a treaty by which we lost all continental connexions? the noble lord all gone into an hotch-potch debate upon every topic almost that had been discussed in that house for years past. Instead of so detached, desultory, and irrelevant a mode of proceeding, he wished to have a night set apart for discussing those measures which he had defended before, and would manfully defend again. He thought it very unreasonable to call for the revealment of the whole of the
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secrets of government pending a negotiation, and not less extraordinary that a whole administration should be censured because the conduct of a part of it had been disapproved: As to the question now before the house, he maintained that government required no greater degree of confidence than had usually been given, and that there was no necessity whatever for continuing the session of parliament beyond the usual period.
The Earl of Carliste explained, that the whole secrets of government were by no means called for: all that was wanted being the necessary information to enable the house to judge of the propriety of the present measures of ministers.
Lord Grenville also explained. He did not mean to convey a censure upon the whole of the members of administration; but such of them as had concluded the disadvantageous treaty of Amiens. With respect to the right hon. gent. at the head of administration, he still retained, and he had no doubt always should, the high sentiments he had formerly expressed of his talents and character.
His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales said, that he had delayed rising till that late hour, in expectation of the arrival of a noble relative of his, who had been prevented horn attending the house by particular circumstances. He rose merely for the purpose of stating, that that noble person had intended to deliver his sentiments on the subject now before the house, in favour of the amendment, and in complete unison with the sentiments so ably delivered by his noble friend (lord Grenville). He had no hesitation also in stating, that those sentiments were entirely similar to what his royal highness hint-self entertained.
The question was then put, when the house divided on the motion for the address,

Contents, present

67

Proxies

44

111

Non contents, present

36

Proxies

22

58

Majority

53

Adjourned at two o'clock on Thursday morning.