HL Deb 08 July 2004 vol 663 cc922-45

11. 38 a.m.

Report received.

Clause 3 [Duty of employer to supply information to the union]:

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade and Industry (Lord Sainsbury of Turville)

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 3, leave out line 1 and insert— (5) For the purposes of this paragraph, the workplace at which a worker works is—

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 2 to 4 and 30 to 36. This first group of amendments contains various minor and consequential changes to the Bill's provisions concerning the statutory recognition and derecognition procedure. However, I should like to mention Amendments Nos. 31 and 33. They deal with the consequences for a union where the Central Arbitration Committee declares that it is not entitled to recognition because of unfair practices that it has committed. In those circumstances, the union is not entitled to reapply under the statutory procedure for recognition in the same or similar bargaining unit for three years. The amendments change the starting point for that three-year period.

Noble Lords will remember that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, tabled an amendment to Clause 9 about the three-year moratorium in Grand Committee. I think that she was then mainly concerned whether there was a moratorium of any sort in such circumstances. In response, my noble friend Lord Treisman reassured the noble Baroness that the union was debarred from reapplying for the same or similar bargaining unit for three years. He stated that the starting point for that three years was the date on which the union's unsuccessful application was declared admissible by the CAC.

However, following remarks of the noble Baroness in Grand Committee, the Government have reconsidered the issue. Those deliberations revealed an inconsistency that Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 are now intended to rectify. The Government consider that the moratorium that results where an application fails because of unfair practices should be consistent with that which applies where the union loses the ballot. Otherwise, a union would have to wait slightly longer before it could apply again for recognition if it lost the ballot fair and square than if it had been guilty of repeated or serious unfair practices. Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 therefore amend the statutory procedure to bring the relevant dates into line.

Amendment No. 31 provides that the three-year moratorium on further Part 1 applications in respect of the same, or substantially the same, bargaining unit contained in the admissibility provisions of Paragraph 40, where the original application failed because of unfair practices, should start on the day after the CAC's declaration of non-entitlement to recognition. Amendment No. 33 makes the same change to the validity provisions contained in Paragraph 48. I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, for her diligent scrutiny that directed attention to that point.

The other amendments—Amendments Nos. 1 to 4, 30, 32 and 34 to 36—either amend cross-references to paragraph numbers that will change as a result of the Bill or make small refinements to the drafting of particular phrases. I beg to move.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 and his kind remark that he was pleased that I had brought the matter to the Government's attention. I agree that most of the amendments concern minor drafting matters. I find it difficult to understand why some of the words sound better than others, but I accept that that is in order. I especially welcome Amendments Nos. 3 and 4, because the Government have conceded the use of the word "coercion" in Clause 9 instead of the words "undue influence". I welcome those amendments and we accept the others.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 9 [Unfair practices in relation to recognition ballots]:

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

moved Amendment No. 2: Page 13, line 44, leave out "paragraph 24(5)" and insert "each of sub-paragraphs (5)(a) and (6)(a) of paragraph 24

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 12 [Unfair practices in relation to derecognition ballots]:

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

moved Amendments Nos. 3 and 4: Page 17, line 35, at end insert— "( ) If a declaration is issued under sub-paragraph (4) the bargaining arrangements shall cease to have effect accordingly." Page 19, line 14, at end insert— "( ) If a declaration is issued under sub-paragraph (5) the bargaining arrangements shall cease to have effect accordingly.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 19 ["Pay" and other matters subject to collective bargaining]:

Baroness Turner of Camden

moved Amendment No. 5: Page 24, line 4, leave out "does not" and insert "shall

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the Bill sets out the core issues on which negotiation may take place once recognition of the trade union has been agreed. Those include wages, hours of work, and so on, but not pensions. In Committee, my noble friends and I sought to include pensions among those core items. We were not especially keen on our wording, but were anxious to get the matter debated and to learn the Government's attitude. We drew attention to the fact that the Government did not seem very sure that it was right to exclude pensions, as, later in the Bill, arrangements are included whereby the Secretary of State can by order arrange for pensions to be included as an item for collective bargaining.

In Committee, the Government did not accept our amendment or the principle involved. At col. GC65 of Hansard, we were told that there was a question whether pensions had achieved the same status as bargaining items as pay, hours and holidays. We were informed that research was being undertaken into actual bargaining procedures. Apparently, where pensions are regularly a bargaining issue, the Government will consider activating the power in the clause enabling the Secretary of State to make an order. We were informed that the Government were sympathetic to the argument behind our amendment and the Minister said that he looked forward to the time when pensions were indeed a core item in collective bargaining, but that the time was not yet.

We were not happy about that response, and I said so. Indeed, I said that we would return to the issue on Report, although we might choose a different form of wording. That is what we have indeed done, although we accept that this wording may not be as complete as it might be. Our amendment simply reverses the clause that removes pensions from the collective bargaining agenda under the Bill.

Recent developments indicate just how important pensions have become for employees. At one time, pension provision was felt to be an item of concern solely to white-collar employees. The large unions organising manual workers were thought to be concerned only with the workaday rate for the job. That was never entirely true and is certainly not now. Recently, one of our most powerful unions achieved a noted success when the employer was forced to abandon its plan to close its final salary scheme to new entrants and gradually phase it out. The final salary scheme was saved when the closure of the whole railway network was narrowly avoided in a dispute not about wages, hours or holidays, but simply to save the final salary scheme. That lesson will not be overlooked by others. Pensions are a core item for employees. I hope that the Government will now agree that they should be included as a core item for collective bargaining.

I emphasise again that unions now take pensions very seriously. They employ people who develop specialist skills and buy in expertise as and when they need it. As I have said on many occasions, my union includes pension training in its schools and specifically runs training courses for members who are nominated to act as pension fund trustees. We need the Government to change their approach on the issue. I beg to move.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, we have had difficulty in finding a form of words acceptable in principle and practice and have tried a different one this time. The amendment would change "does not" to "shall", so that there is a general right for pensions to be included if a union wins a recognition claim. However, it would leave in place the rest of the clause, which enables the Secretary of State to modify, circumscribe or specify what that right would be in practice. That would seem to be in line with what the Government wanted in Committee, if we understood it correctly.

The Government have not come out and said, as they did in 1999, that pensions are insignificant and that workers do not want to negotiate about pensions. No, they admit it. They admit that pensions have become one of the most important items on any negotiation or consultation agenda. There are very good reasons for that. In the absence of any influence over employers on pensions during the past 10 years or so, there have been significant pensions scandals. Companies have gone broke and have had no money to pay contractual pensions. Companies have for years milked their pension funds by reducing their value and giving themselves a pensions holiday. The workers did not know about that.

As my noble friend said when moving the amendment, the Government accept that. They want to do something about it in the Pensions Bill by introducing consultation. But that is not enough. It is not enough for workers to be consulted because all that happens is that when the organisation decides to have a pension scheme, it consults. It has already decided what the pension scheme will be, how much it will pay or whether it will reduce the provisions of an existing scheme, and then it consults. If there is a mechanism for consultation in the firm—there may not be—all that the workers can say, if they have a proper representative system, is that they like the scheme, they do not like it or they wish it were changed.

If there was collective bargaining and if, where the union was recognised for bargaining purposes, that could be done by the Secretary of State, that could be limited so that it was allowed only where there was recognition for collective bargaining. If there was recognition for collective bargaining, then the recognised union would be able to put up its own scheme. From the beginning, it would be involved in the formulation of the scheme.

A pension is regarded by many workers as, in effect, deferred pay—that is what it is. In the present society, it may be even more important than pay, because if you do not like your pay, you can go somewhere else. However, if you retire and find that your pension is not worth anything, there is nothing you can do. Pensions are at least as important as pay. If the Government accept, as they have, that they should assist workers to get trade union recognition for core matters, those core matters should involve pensions. I support the amendment.

Lord Triesman

My Lords, the importance of pensions could hardly be more powerfully stated. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions in Grand Committee and today. The Government understand the strength of feeling that exists on the issue of pensions among trade unions and their members. I am sure that all workers hope that they can look forward to a comfortable and secure retirement without financial hardship. It is right and proper that trade unions should vigorously defend their members' pension rights.

The Government are taking positive steps to address this very serious issue in the Pensions Bill, which includes assistance to those who have lost their pensions and a right for employees and their representatives to be consulted on significant changes to their schemes. There is no question that the importance of the issue to workers and their unions is understood, and we acknowledge the positive effect that employee involvement on pensions can have.

The question is whether it is appropriate at this time to make pensions a subject for statutory collective bargaining. In looking at this, we need to bear in mind the aims of the statutory procedure and the factors which have made it a success to date. Key to this is the principle that the statutory procedure is a fallback. It is designed to encourage the voluntary resolution of recognition claims. It is intended as a last resort, where attempts by the parties to resolve a claim among themselves have ended in failure. That is why the Government do not believe that it would be appropriate at this time to add pensions to the core topics for collective bargaining. The evidence suggests that pensions are not commonly bargained about in voluntary recognition deals. So if we were to add them to the statutory bargaining topics, this would, in effect, make the statutory procedure broader in scope than most voluntary agreements.

That would risk making it far more attractive to unions to go to the CAC than to try to reach a voluntary agreement through dialogue with an employer. For this reason, the Government are making it clear that pensions should not be regarded as part of pay for the purposes of statutory collective bargaining.

I do not accept the contention that the Government are uncertain about this. We are trying to gauge what should be done, and the time at which it should be done, against the realities of experience and the results of research in this area. Recognition of the importance of pensions, and the fact that they appear to be moving up the bargaining agenda, means that we are taking a power so that we can add pensions to the list of core topics at such a time as evidence emerges that their inclusion as a topic for bargaining in voluntary agreements has become typical.

As I indicated in Grand Committee, the Government are undertaking research to get a clearer picture of the coverage and content of agreements signed since 1998. This will act as a benchmark against which to compare the results of further periodic surveys on this subject.

From my own experience, unions often prefer to deal with pensions in ways other than collective bargaining, especially where schemes relate to a specific professional or occupational group, or to a particular tier in a workforce. Unions often elect—sometimes appoint, but generally speaking these days they elect—trustees to pension schemes. This concentrates expertise in a way which is not always apparent in the generality of collective bargaining. From the point of view of the trustees of the scheme—not just the employer trustees, but the union or the workforce trustees—they discuss issues which are for the trustees to decide, not those involved in the practice of voluntary agreements. That is the nature of trusteeship in most cases. It sometimes means that where a union shares collective bargaining responsibilities with other unions, but the pension scheme relates to a particular group or tier of workers for which one union happens to be responsible—rather than all the unions that are involved in that collective bargaining process—then that union can deal with those issues specifically, using its specific expertise. For purposes of illustration, that is the common practice across education at all levels in the arrangements for pensions. A general right would not be helpful or appropriate.

The Government have tried to strike a balance between the desire to encourage dialogue between employers, unions and workers on pensions, and the need to protect the smooth running of the statutory procedure. I hope noble Lords will feel that we have struck the right balance and expressed it. In the light of my explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment, conscious of the fact that I doubt whether there is any lack of understanding on any side of the House of the importance of pension arrangements to workers.

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, he mentioned that evidence is being taken at the present time. Can he give the House any indication of the timescale in relation to the results of this evidence?

Lord Triesman

My Lords, the evidence is being assembled through the research of Dr Sian Moore of the Working Lives Research Institute of the London Metropolitan University. The first phase of research has already taken place and some detailed data have been collected. The second phase is under way, which will look at how recognition has occurred in practice, and whether its scope and depth have developed over time, including in respect of pensions. We hope to publish the results of the second phase later this year.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, he says he is certain and that he does not like general rights, but what would he say "typical" means? If there were 50 per cent recognition of pensions in the recognition sector, would that shift get us a selective or general right? Would it need to be 45 per cent? What is "typical"?

Lord Triesman

My Lords, that question was asked in Grand Committee. I shall not answer it at the same length because I am very happy to refer back to what was said then. The Government do not believe that it would be appropriate to set a simple, quantifiable threshold, as that would not take account of the complexities of the issue. Collective bargaining on pensions may take many forms, as my noble friend Lord McCarthy will know. Employers and unions might bargain about the establishment of pension schemes, the eligibility of workers to be members of such schemes, the level of contributions and so on. Likewise, there may be a difference between what a recognition agreement says on paper and what the parties actually bargain about in practice. I know from experience that they are not always one and the same. We want to be able to look at the whole situation and reach a balanced judgment. That is why a simple numerical threshold could not reflect the entire picture. We believe that the research will show whether there is a general mood in the direction that is advocated by my noble friends. I make the point to them again—and I apologise if I repeat it, but it is very important—that many of the schemes in which unions have invested huge amounts of time and trouble, as have employers, are now dealt with by trustees. That is where the work is done, rather than through collective bargaining.

Noon

Baroness Turner of Camden

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response; it is similar to that given in Grand Committee, about which we were not entirely happy. We were told that, although our proposal was regarded sympathetically, it was not felt to be a matter for statutory requirement in the same way as the core items listed in the Bill. We disagree with that concept. We believe that it is very high up the agenda of bargaining nowadays. As I am sure my noble friend is aware, the TUC is running a campaign about pension rights at the moment. It has had meetings and issued a great deal of material about the need for trade union action in the pensions field.

My noble friend referred to trustees. As I indicated, our union and others run training schemes for member-nominated trustees. We are well aware that, when introducing a pension scheme, there is a difference between being a trustee and being a negotiator. In such schemes I have often negotiated with employers, but we have had entirely different members act as trustees, with a different remit—we know that a trustee is responsible in a different way to the whole membership of the scheme, and that the situation as regards negotiation is different.

I regret very much that the Government have not found it possible to move in our direction. I understand that research continues and I am interested and pleased to learn that the time limit is not very long, and that the Government expect to have at least the first tranche of results by the end of the year. We shall watch that with great interest. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 [Information about employees to be balloted on industrial action]:

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

moved Amendment No. 6: Page 26, line 27, leave out "of the employees concerned" and insert "at which the employees concerned work

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 7 to 15. The aim of this group of amendments is to improve the wording used in Clauses 21 and 24 where they refer to workplaces. The current wording in these clauses could give rise to confusion because the language used is not consistent. At some point the clauses refer to, workplaces of the employees affected and at others they refer to, workplaces at which the employees affected work". All the amendments seek to ensure that the latter construction is used consistently throughout the clauses. I should point out that we have already considered a similar amendment to Clause 3. Clearly, these are technical amendments and I urge noble Lords to accept them. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

moved Amendments Nos. 7 and 8: Page 26, line 40, leave out from "workplaces" to "who" in line 41 and insert "at which the employees concerned work and the number of them" Page 27, leave out line 22 and insert— "(21) For the purposes of this section, the workplace at which an employee works is—

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 24 [Information about employees to be contained in notice of industrial action]:

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

moved Amendments Nos. 9 to 15: Page 28, line 22, leave out "of the affected employees" and insert "at which the affected employees work" Page 28, line 35, leave out from "workplaces" to "who" in line 36 and insert "at which the affected employees work and the number of them" Page 29, line 4, leave out "his workplace" and insert "the workplace at which he works" Page 29, line 19, leave out "of some or all of the affected employees" and insert "at which some or all of the affected employees work" Page 29, leave out line 25 and insert— "(5D) For the purposes of this section, the workplace at which an employee works is—" Page 29, line 26, leave out "affected" Page 29, line 28, leave out "affected

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 28 [Inducements relating to union membership or activities]:

Lord McCarthy

moved Amendment No. 16: Page 31, line 40, leave out "sole or main

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, which relate to Clause 28. A related issue, although not quite the same one, arises in Amendments Nos. 28 and 29, which refer to Schedule 1.

The amendments are part of our attempt to get the Government fully to implement the decision in the Wilson and Palmer case. That judgment is supposed to be coercive on this Government, their having passed the Human Rights Act 1998, which was to enforce the European Convention on Human Rights. We argue that our law is in breach of Article 11, and that the court was trying to say that in the case of Wilson and Palmer. Therefore, it is the Government's responsibility to put the law in the right position. Although the Government have gone some way, there are two ways in which they have not gone far enough; therefore if they do not accept our amendment, sooner or later they will be back before the court. I wish to say three things. First, this is a very long story. For a long time, employers have attempted to discourage trade union membership and activism by various inducements: bribes, favours, promotions and so forth. Nothing could be done about that and nobody attempted to do anything about it until Section 53 of the Employment Protection Act 1975. That worked a little, but we never got rid of the problem entirely until the Ullswater amendment in 1993.

We argue that it was discovered in the Wilson and Palmer judgment that the state of English law was almost the same as it had been before any legislation had been enacted. Unless the Government are prepared to accept our amendments—the first set deals with the problem of "sole or main"—we will not comply with the judgment.

Several things are wrong with the way in which the Government have attempted to modify their approach in respect of the employer's purpose. The judgment said that if the purpose involved an attempt to induce workers to leave the union, and if that purpose was detected by a tribunal, it would mean that the worker was not fully protected and therefore was entitled to compensation. But the Government have changed that. They say that that applies only if the court decides that it is "the sole or main purpose". That takes us right back to the Ullswater amendment, and it is not enforceable.

Any employer could say at any time that an element of what he did was not related to putting pressure on the union. For example, he could argue that, although he may have put pressure on the union or the consequence of what he did may have put pressure on the worker to give up the union, he had other considerations also. That is exactly what the Ullswater amendment says. So long as the employer can find that he had a mixed motive or set of motives, it would be easy to argue that there was no sole or main motive and that if there was one, it was not to discriminate against the union.

We have had most of these arguments; I do not want to repeat myself. However, I wish to respond to several things that the Government said in Grand Committee. We were told that if our amendment were agreed it would be disastrous for employers and that it would be impossible for them to manage the plant efficiently. That is complete nonsense. In most of what we seek, it would be the easiest thing in the world, if the Bill read as we want it to, for the employer to show that no part of his purpose involved discriminating against the union. For example, he would have to show that if he promoted someone or gave them a bonus he was not doing it exclusively for non-union members. As in other forms of discrimination, the employer would have to show that he was applying the benefit across the board and that the promotions or benefits were awarded for reasons other than to put pressure on the union.

The only situation in which it might be difficult for an employer to defend himself, if the Bill were amended as we wish, is if he wanted to do precisely what was done in the Ullswater case—to move a considerable group of workers out of an area of collective bargaining into an area of non-bargaining and therefore in some way to discriminate against the union as much as against them. What would the consequences of that be? The worker could retain a very large part of the benefits that he enjoyed as a result of union membership—for example, the right to raise grievances and to bring in his trade union official. If the employer was transferring that group of workers into a non-union area to pay them more money, it would be extremely difficult for either the union or the member to show that there had been any disbenefit.

It is almost certain that in most cases it would be easy for the employer to defend himself against a charge of discrimination unless discrimination was his central purpose. So we do not take the view that disastrous things would happen if our amendment were agreed. We commend it to the House. I beg to move.

Baroness Turner of Camden

My Lords, I agree that this section of the Bill was very thoroughly discussed in Grand Committee. It was considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on two occasions and there was an exchange of correspondence with the DTI, which we have seen. According to that correspondence, the DTI accepts that this is a very difficult issue. It says that it is important to ensure that a remedy is available for all cases that fall within the scope of the well known Wilson and Palmer judgment. That is why we have again proposed that "sole and main" be left out, because the purpose of the clause is so important.

It is surely clear that even the purpose of rewarding valuable staff might well be accompanied by another purpose—perhaps even the main purpose—of weaning staff away from union representation. Indeed, plenty of employers would perhaps regard it as rather valuable to have staff who were willing to move to individualised contracts and to give up trade union representation. As we understand it, one of the purposes of the Bill is to protect such people from being intimidated in any way into giving up union representation. As my noble friend Lord McCarthy has explained, we have put the amendment before the Government on a number of occasions. The wording as it now stands contains a loophole which employers can utilise in order to claim that they are not attempting to wean people away from trade union rights and representation and that that is really in the interests of business or the individuals. I ask the Government to think again about the matter.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, this is an extensive group of amendments. They would all delete words from the Bill and they are clearly designed to make an absolute prohibition against offers being made to employees outside collective bargaining which do not interfere at all with union membership. However, the Government have clearly stated both in the White Paper and in our debate in Committee that such offers are not to be prohibited or objectionable.

Amendments Nos. 16 and 18 would preclude an employer from making an offer if there were an element in that offer which might, however fancifully, be construed as one of the matters which the clause, as drafted, already prohibits. In other words, the amendments are too restrictive. Furthermore, the use of the phrase "sole or main" throughout Clause 28 certainly induced me to withdraw the revised version of the "Miller amendment"; that is, Amendment No. 63 in Grand Committee. I hope that the Government will reject the amendments.

As regards Amendments Nos. 22 and 23, the Bill already imposes an onus on the employer to justify his purpose in making such an offer. That should be more than enough protection for the interests of the worker from inappropriate offers. Therefore, the amendments are unnecessary.

The two subsections to which Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 relate are similarly stringent in requiring justification, supported by evidence, for the making of an offer by the employer. Again, that extra obligation should provide more than adequate protection from inappropriate offers being made, thereby dealing with the problems that the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, think are likely to arise.

Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would alter the Government's amendments to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. That Act refers simply to "the purpose". The Government propose to amend that to "sole or main purpose". Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would restore the original wording. I do not understand why the Government want to do that. If carried, the amendment would completely negative the Government's amendment, which could of course be the proposer's intention, but I do not suppose that that is the wish of the Government.

12.15 p.m.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

My Lords, Clause 28 contains the core of our proposals to ensure that UK trade union law complies with the European Convention on Human Rights in the wake of the judgment in the Wilson and Palmer case. This large group of amendments deals with an issue which was examined by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in assessing whether Clause 28 complies with the convention. We discussed the same or very similar amendments in Grand Committee.

I shall discuss the six amendments which would remove the various references in Clause 28 to the "sole or main" purpose of the employer in making offers. The words "sole or main" are an essential component of the regime that we are seeking to construct. They are necessary to ensure that employers have some flexibility in setting their reward systems. We do not consider that employers should be prevented from making offers for justifiable business purposes just because a by-product or incidental consequence of making such offers would be to deter a person's involvement with a trade union.

My noble friends Lord McCarthy and Lady Turner of Camden consider that this will allow ill intentioned employers easily to evade the law. We do not share that view. Tribunals are expert at making the kind of judgments required, and can distinguish between true and fabricated accounts by employers of their underlying purposes. That is what they do every day in unfair dismissal cases. To assist the tribunals, we have placed the burden on the employer to demonstrate what was the sole or main purpose of his action.

Our proposal is fully compatible with the Wilson and Palmer judgment. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has considered the matter in some detail and it now accepts that there is a case for retaining the "sole or main" purpose test. The Minister for Employment Relations, Gerry Sutcliffe, has also written to the Joint Committee confirming that the Government will monitor the operation of these provisions when they come into force.

Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 relate to our proposals to introduce an explicit "sole or main purpose" test into Sections 146 and 148 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Both sections currently refer to the "purpose" of the employer's act or failure to act. As my noble friends would agree, these sections contain important protections against detrimental treatment by the employer on grounds of trade union membership and activities.

As we explained in Grand Committee, our proposals are designed to create a consistent set of provisions across related trade union rights. As we have introduced a "sole or main purpose" test in Clause 28, there are advantages in using the same wording in Sections 146 and 148 of the 1992 Act.

As well as achieving consistency across these closely related provisions, our insertion of the "sole or main" test will clarify the law. The tribunals have to deal with situations where two or more purposes might have driven the employer's conduct. Where that occurs, Sections 146 and 148 of the 1992 Act are unclear about the consequences because they use the term "purpose"; that is, the singular form of the noun.

It is highly likely that, in such cases, the tribunals would interpret the current wording as implying a "sole or main" purpose, but the original wording leaves the position open to at least some doubt. That is a potentially confusing situation which does not help parties to enforce and respect trade union rights.

In Grand Committee, my noble friends Lord McCarthy and Lady Turner of Camden asked my noble friend Lord Triesman to cite an actual case where that situation had arisen. We have checked back through some cases. In fact, we did not need to look very far to find one. I refer here to the Employment Appeal Tribunal's judgment of 24 February 2004 by his Honour Judge Richardson in Smyth-Britt v Chubb Security Personnel. In that case, counsel for Mr Smyth-Britt argued that the employer had been motivated by dual purposes in taking detrimental action against him. Although the case did not turn on the point, the Employment Appeal Tribunal gave a clear view on the meaning of Section 146. It said: In our judgment, the statute invites consideration of the main or principal purpose of the employer". My noble friends are concerned that the introduction of an explicit sole or main test will diminish the existing protections that they provide. But, as I have argued, the extent of the existing protections is not as wide as they might think, because the sole or main test would probably be applied anyway when complicated cases arise. In fact, our proposals, taken in the round, significantly enhance the protections for trade unionists under Sections 146 and 148.

We are confident that our proposals are fair and workable. In our view, they comply with the European Convention. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, two points have been made to which I must reply. First, there is the analogy that is constantly drawn with the situation in other forms of discrimination, where the onus of proof is precisely the same as that proposed in the Bill and where it is said that tribunals know how to separate the issues. However, they often have great difficulty in doing that. Those involved in the process often consider that there was discrimination but that it was not possible to prove it. So it is not generally accepted by the parties involved that using this kind of formula has been a total success—not at all.

In any case, there is a substantial difference between the situations. I tried to make this point in Grand Committee, but I probably did not make it well enough. In other types of discrimination case, if the employee wins it is usually because the employer is manifestly a liar. It can be seen that he or she is a liar. When asked, "Why did you fail to promote?", "Why was this excellent person on your shortlist, yet never got the job?", or "Why was there no black face or woman involved at any stage?", they lie because they do not have an answer. They say, "Oh well, this person was a bad performer". When they are asked to provide evidence of that, there is none. When such employers say, "Her attendance record was bad and she kept going off to have a baby", and they are asked for evidence, the employers' answers are manufactured, for the most part. Therefore, when those answers can be shown to be manufactured, the case goes in favour of the employee because the employer has not proved the case.

It is quite different in this case. The employer will not have to manufacture. He or she will not suddenly decide to do something about trade unions, sack the branch secretary and say that is the end of that and all that he says is bogus. It is not bogus. The man is probably a good worker who is entitled to be promoted, moved, made a supervisor or whatever. At least the Government threw out the Ullswater amendment, which was not the same. It specified that even if there was evidence that the employer was discriminating, if he could show that he had some general restructuring reason, he could not be penalised.

The amendment provides for exceptional cases. It will not do all the terrible things that the Government believe. If they do not take the initiative now and fully comply with the decision of the court, they will find themselves back there again. It will be expensive, unjust and the Government would do much better if they took action now. Since no one will take the slightest notice of my argument, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Turner of Camden

moved Amendment No. 17: Page 32, line 28, leave out "which is recognised by his employer

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 19, 20 and 21 in this group.

Essentially, we are talking about trade union rights. Clause 28 sets out a whole package of new rights which have been drafted as a response to the Wilson and Palmer judgments. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made a series of recommendations which we discussed in Grand Committee. However, the new clause limits the protection and rights accorded to members of recognised trade unions only. In Grand Committee we sought to amend that to include members of unrecognised unions. In doing so, we were able to point to the recommendations of the Joint Committee, which also agreed that the clause should cover members of unrecognised unions.

The Government did not accept our view and we have returned to the issue, first, because it is important and secondly, because the Minister at the time gave the impression that the Government were willing to look at the recommendations in the Joint Committee's 13th report, although they made no firm promise that they were likely to alter their view. However, the Bill is about trade union recognition. Its objective, as we understand it, is to make recognition more easily achievable through a set of fairly simple procedures.

All unions are unrecognised before they are recognised. The unrecognised union obviously campaigns to achieve recognition so that it may represent the interests of its members adequately. It will already have members in the employ of the company concerned. Such members are entitled, as individuals, to the protection which Clause 28 offers to members of recognised unions. As we said in Grand Committee, it is a matter of individual human rights. I do not understand the Government's opposition, particularly in the light of the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. For that reason we have returned to this issue on Report.

The other amendments in the group, in particular Amendment No. 21, again deal with union rights. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made it clear that in its view an important part of the ECHR judgment had not been adequately dealt with in this clause. The judgment clearly indicated that by using financial incentives and detriment in order to induce workers to give up their rights to have unions represent them, the rights of both individual workers and the union were infringed.

However, the Bill deals with the rights of individual members only. It has nothing to say about union rights. As it stands the Bill would not enable a trade union to bring proceedings to obtain a remedy for an action taken by an employer to offer inducements for employees not to join a trade union or take part in its activities. The Joint Committee stated categorically that this was wrong. It said that failing to provide unions with an avenue for redressing a violation of their rights under Article 11 could result in a violation of that article.

In Grand Committee we drew the Minister's attention to the findings of the Joint Committee. However, at that stage the Government were unwilling to accept our amendment and said that they did not agree with the Joint Committee. However, the Minister did say that the Government would consider seriously what the Joint Committee had to say before deciding their final position. Therefore we have tabled a slightly reworded amendment in the hope that perhaps the Minister will be able to say that the Government have reconsidered their view on the basis of the Joint Committee's recommendations. Naturally, I hope that their view has changed to accept our arguments. I beg to move.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, this group of amendments deals with the other thing that is wrong with the Government's reaction to the Wilson and Palmer judgment. It will not take long, but I should read a short section of what the court said in the Wilson and Palmer case. Listening to this, how can the Government say that the limitations that they have placed on the rights of non-recognised unions and the rights of unions to defend their members—whether recognised or not—are in conformity with this judgment?

12.30 p.m.

Section 46 says, It is of the essence of the right to join a trade union for the protection of their interests that employees should be free to instruct or permit the union to make representation to their employer or to take action in support of their interests on their behalf". Notice that no one is talking about recognised or non-recognised unions. If workers are prevented from so doing, their freedom to belong to a trade union, for the protection of their interests, becomes illusory". Now, we turn to what the present situation is. However, as the House of Lords judgment made clear, domestic law did not prohibit the employer from offering an inducement to employees who relinquished the right to union representation"— nothing about representation in a recognised situation— even if the aim and outcome of the exercise was to bring an end to collective bargaining and thus substantially to reduce the authority of the union". Notice that we are talking about the authority of the union, not just the worker. This is supposed to affect the influence, power and position of the union. That is what the judgment says, as long as the employer did not act with the purpose of preventing or deterring the individual employee simply from being a member of the trade union". I am almost finished. Under United Kingdom law at the relevant time it was, therefore, possible for an employer effectively to undermine or frustrate a trade union's ability to strive for the protection of its members' interests". Not just to recognise them. Perhaps a recognised union does not have to struggle in the same way. Perhaps an unrecognised union needs more assistance rather than less; that is what the judgment seems to say. The Court … considers that by permitting employers to use financial incentives to induce employees to surrender important union rights, the respondent State failed in its positive obligation to secure the enjoyment of the rights under Article 11 of the Convention. This failure amounted to a violation of Article 11".

Article 11 has two parts. The first part establishes all those rights, and then it lists five specific ways in which you do not have to guarantee those rights. I challenge the Government to tell me any one of those five ways that apply in this case. They apply to the armed services, for example. They have nothing to do with this case. Therefore, I suggest that the judgment affects trade unions as well as workers. It affects trade unionists whether they are recognised or not; it applies across the board, and there are no defences in terms of Article 11 to what the Government are trying to do. I support the amendment.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I will make a few comments on Amendment No. 21. There is a slight difference between the amendment as originally put down by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and the current version.

In the first version, it was proposed that an independent trade union with a member or members whose rights have been contravened may present a complaint to an employment tribunal. The latest version apparently seeks to make the point clearer by saying: Where the rights of a worker who is a member of an independent trade union have been contravened … the union may complain". In both cases, the amendment asks that the union be given a separate right to complain on its own volition. The effect of the amendment would be that it would enable a union to intervene, even one that is not recognised by the employer, and even if the employees themselves did not object to the offer, or may even have welcomed it. In other words, this amendment seeks to impose a union's will on workers irrespective of their wishes and democratic rights. It negates the Government's stated policy of allowing workers to make agreements outside of a collective bargain when it is appropriate for the workers to do so, and in no way do they interfere with the worker being a member of the union.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 17 and 19 deal with another issue discussed in Grand Committee, namely whether new Section 145B should apply in some way to the members of unions which are not recognised by the employer. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is also interested in the position of such workers because they are not currently covered by the rights under new Section 145 B. The Joint Committee's main concern centres on the position of members of non-recognised unions who receive offers to persuade them not to seek recognition for their own union. I note that Amendments Nos. 17 and 19 do not actually deal with that kind of offer. Instead, they focus on offers made to the members of a non-recognised union to opt out of a collective agreement negotiated by another union. We are therefore unsure whether these amendments meet that need, though I thank my noble friends for their suggestions. As I stated in Grand Committee, we are considering the issue again in the light of the Joint Committee's latest report. We have since opened discussions with key stakeholders on the matter, and that consultative process will be completed in time for us to determine our final view for Third Reading.

Amendments Nos. 20 and 21 deal with the question of the union having a right to seek a remedy in its own name. As my noble friends have pointed out, it is the opinion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that such a remedy should be created. This is in fact a far-reaching idea, which runs counter to the way all other individual employment rights are currently enforced, so it requires very close consideration indeed. We are therefore seeking the views of key stakeholders, both employer bodies and unions, before finalising our position. For example, just yesterday my colleague Gerry Sutcliffe met a delegation from the NUJ that included Mr Dave Wilson of Wilson and Palmer. These consultations will be completed by Third Reading. In the light of the ongoing consultations on both issues, I ask my noble friends to withdraw their amendments.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, will he agree that if he does propose a way forward in time for Third Reading he will let us see his proposals in time for us to decide whether to accept, reject or amend them?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville

My Lords, I see no problem in keeping noble Lords informed of our decisions.

Baroness Turner of Camden

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Of course. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, and I will not move the other amendments, on the basis of what he has said. I look forward to seeing the results of the consultations that are now proceeding. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 18 to 25 not moved.]

Clause 32 [Exclusion or expulsion from trade union attributable to conduct]:

Lord McCarthy

moved Amendment No. 26: Page 37, line 41, leave out "contrary to the rules" and insert "inconsistent with stated rules and objectives

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is my last attempt to bother noble Lords this afternoon. Once again this is something on which the Government have moved. At Third Reading in the other place, the Government accepted an amendment to deal with this problem. The problem is that the TUC, which should know, thinks that the amendment does not deal with the problem. I understand that discussions are going on through the usual channels to see whether we can find a form of words. Our form of words was the form of words that the TUC was seeking to press on the Government in Committee. That was not acceptable, and certain things were said by the Ministers, so we tried to combine the reference to what they said in our amendment today.

It is about the circumstances in which unions are now to be allowed to expel or refuse to accept members. The Government accept that infiltrating forces of racist, fascist and extremist groups of various kinds are now making a set at British trade unions. Whereas the union might have been able to have dealt with that before the beneficent effect of a shoal of Government Bills in the days of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, it is now difficult for unions to expel anyone. Of course, there is the case of a union confined to Scotland, which can keep out people who do not live in Scotland; or if you fail to provide subscriptions or run out of dues. After that, it gets extremely difficult. The Government propose that that will be all right if it is in the rules. As I understand it, if it is in the rules, one does not have to admit. But if one does admit, one can expel fascist, racist and other extremist groups, and that is all right.

However, the TUC does not think that is all right. On looking at union rule books—we discussed this in Committee—blanket rules would have to be relied on. As the Minister said in Committee, many such rules are still in place. But the unions do not believe that they can be used because some of them have used them and were caught in the courts. Nevertheless, on looking at those blanket rules and the way in which the courts have always interpreted them—which is nothing to do with recent legislation—it is doubtful whether using the current rules or even changing them would deal with the problem.

I looked at a few rule books in order to see how far that is the case. Really, rule books with blanket rules do two things. They contain a number of extremely wide purposes, some of which are rather frightening. One such purpose refers to "furtherance of political objectives of any kind". One wonders what that would cover: the founding fathers of the union just shoved in the first thing that they could think of in order to cover everything.

Another purpose is to "advance the interests of labour". In what way? How? Why did they put that in? The rules of one very important union refer to "any objectives specified by the executive". One could be frightened by that.

We now have a residue of extremely general rules, which were mostly written by the founding fathers and hardly ever used. But there they are.

There are also the ways in which the unions have interpreted those rules and have sought to expel, exclude or in other ways discriminate against workers who could not be caught by a precise rule. Therefore a blanket rule was used.

Quite rightly, the courts have interpreted those rules very narrowly. They do not think very much of rules such as the "furtherance of political objectives of any kind" or "any objective specified". The courts tended to say that, if a general rule of that sort was being used, there ought to be a lot of precise grounds against the individual. Ultimately, the rule book is supposed to be a contract between the members of the union. That type of thing cannot be called a breach of contract.

The TUC says that there must be something else. It suggests that the unions could be allowed to specify in policy statements—perhaps of some length with some contemporary relevance—who and what it is they want to guard against. Those principles, not necessarily set out in rule books, could be interpreted by the courts.

As I say, the Government have shown sympathy for this, but they will not accept the introduction of principles. The Government have said that these objectives and principles could simply be made by the general secretary at an annual conference. He could say, "We are against the BNP". But that is not good enough. We accept that and we are trying to bring it on board.

I have slightly rewritten our original suggestion. Amendment No. 26 states: leave out 'contrary to the rules' and insert 'inconsistent with stated rules and objectives'". That would include the rule book, which it must because it tells people what to do and how to do it. But then the objectives have to be stated, published or prescribed. If the Government want to go away and add to that, good luck to them. We are doing our best to try to find a way to do what the trade union movement thinks it needs and the Government say they want to do. I beg to move.

12.45 p.m.

Baroness Turner of Camden

My Lords, I support the amendment, which is similar to that which I moved in Grand Committee. I made the point then, which is very relevant, that the trade union movement in this country has very good and progressive policies in relation to the recruitment of people from ethnic minorities. The unions are put in a difficult position if they are not able to deal with awkward people who infiltrate unions in order to carry out anti-ethnic and discriminatory practices from inside the union. We need to have policies and legislation in being that will enable the unions to deal with such people and to enable them to deal with discriminatory practices and attempts at discrimination against their own members from within the union, which does happen.

In Grand Committee, the Minister said that the Government were sympathetic to the aims of the amendment and that they would have discussions with the interested parties with a view to putting forward a form of wording. I hope that the consultations have proceeded and that we will hear from the Minister today that he has something to offer on those lines.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, obviously, I have no idea whether the Minister will offer something to the liking of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy. I can simply state my position. The amendment is extremely similar to Amendment No. 67 in Grand Committee. I use the words "extremely similar" because I cannot use the word "identical". That is because of the words "stated rules".

In Grand Committee, my argument against the amendment was that the words "contrary to the rules", which are in the clause, are absolutely clear and unequivocal. I also said that, inconsistent with the rules and objectives", is a vague and woolly concept. In my view, Amendment No. 26 is not very different.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, that it is dreadful that there are people in the unions who ought not to be. I would not want to make it difficult for a union to expel someone when it ought to be able to expel them. On the other hand, it is not right that a person should be deprived of his or her union membership except in the clearest possible terms. If the Government can introduce clearer terms than before, I would not object to that.

I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury, said: We wanted to ensure that the statute is clear and places reasonable obligations on individual members to act in accordance with widely available and accessible information on the union's policies and positions. That is why we refer to the union's rules".—[Official Report, 15/6/04; col. GC 157.] I would never pretend to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, who would never allow me to do such a thing, that I am as knowledgeable as him about union rules. He made a few remarks about some unions having rules that are simply unacceptable, which may be so.

Perhaps the Minister will suggest that he has better wording. But, in the event that he does not, I object to the amendment as it stands.

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I particularly like the words, "and objectives" of the unions, for the reasons that my noble friends have given. On occasion, union rule books can be strange. They have evolved over the years. As my noble friend Lord McCarthy said, it is important that we include the union's objectives. That would strengthen the union's position in relation, for example, to racists.

Lord Triesman

My Lords, among other things, Clause 32 changes the arrangements whereby employment tribunals award remedies to individuals who have been unlawfully excluded or expelled on grounds of their political party mmbership.

A minimum award, currently set at £5,900, applies where the union has not admitted or re-admitted the individual to the union at the time the application for compensation is made. We think that the tribunal should be given greater discretion to decide the amount of the award in cases when the exclusion was unlawful because it was mainly attributable to membership of a political party, but where there were other reasons for the union's decision concerning conduct that were contrary to the union's rules. In choosing the wording we wanted to ensure that the statute is clear and that it places reasonable obligations on individual members to act in accordance with widely available and accessible information on the union's policies and positions—an aim that is shared on both sides of the House. That is why we refer to the union's rules within the subsection. The amendment returns to the topic that we discussed in Grand Committee, as my noble friends have rightly said. It would broaden the test which disapplies the minimum award so that it includes subsidiary behaviour that is inconsistent with the stated rules and objectives of the union.

The Government consider it extremely important to ensure that the test to disapply the minimum award works in pratice. Union rule books vary, although I should say that the survey carried out on behalf of the TUC in 2003 showed that of the 34 unions considered in the sample, 22 had explicit national rules on equality issues. Therefore, on the basis of the sample, that is a reasonable proportion thus far. Some explicitly refer to the union's opposition to racist attitudes or conduct. Others do not specify many proscribed behaviours, but leave it to other union documents to set out the union's position on such matters. We recognise that the current wording may not be broad enough to meet union concerns, and we have therefore been working closely with the TUC to devise alternative wording.

In assessing the alternatives, we must be sure of the openness and clarity of what I have described. That point was made in Grand Committee, and the inclusion of the word "stated" in the amendment is in response to that. I am not sure, however, that my noble friends' latest approach would fully meet the need. Just because something is stated does not mean that it is sufficiently accessible to the relevant individuals, and therefore capable of influencing their conduct. The amendment uses the word "inconsistent". As was mentioned in Committee, that word is also open to a wide variety of interpretations, and we are not keen to see unnecessary legal debate at tribunals about the meaning of the word.

I also note that my noble friends' amendment refers to conduct that is inconsistent with the stated "rules and objectives" of the union. I am not sure whether that was intentional or whether, on reflection, they would prefer the word "or" rather than "and". The proposed wording has the effect that subsidiary conduct would need to be inconsistent with both the rules and the objectives of the union for the minimum award to be disapplied. I fear that the amendment would narrow the scope for disapplication in a way that I am sure was not intended.

We are in urgent discussions with the TUC, which are progressing well and should conclude in time for Third Reading. I am grateful to Mr Brendan Barber, the General Secretary of the TUC who has provided me with the TUC's recent documents. I believe that we shall be able to draw on a wealth of sensible thinking, and am confident that that will proceed well in time for Third Reading. In that light, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Lord McCarthy

My Lords, I want to make two things clear. First, it is not and never was, our intention to do something that was inconsistent with the rules. If the wording gives that impression, it must be changed. The rules do a whole series of things, and do not deal only with exclusions and expulsions. They set out the power structure of the union. We do not want another generation of practices that are unlawful or enable the union to exclude or expel, and which are not connected to the rules.

Secondly, it may be that my form of words — inconsistent with stated rules and objectives— confuses that point. Perhaps it would be better to say, "inconsistent with either rules or objectives". I do not mind. We do not want to set up those two things in opposition to one another, and we do not want to make them additional qualifications. We have to show both. It is complicated, but we look forward to seeing what the Government will do, and hope that they find the magic words. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54 [Provision of money for trade union modernisation]:

Lord Triesman

moved Amendment No. 27: Page 59, line 34, at end insert— (4) If money is provided to a trade union under this section, the terms on which it is so provided shall be deemed to include a prohibition ("a political fund prohibition") on any of it being added to the political fund of the union. (5) If a political fund prohibition is contravened, the Secretary of State— (a) is entitled to recover from the trade union as a debt due to him an amount equal to the amount of money added to the union's political fund in contravention of the prohibition (whether or not that money continues to form part of the political fund); and (b) must take such steps as are reasonably practicable to recover that amount. (6) An amount recoverable under subsection (5) is a liability of the trade union's political fund. (7) Subsection (5) does not prevent money provided to a trade union under this section from being provided on terms containing further sanctions for a contravention of the political fund prohibition.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the amendment makes it clear that unions may not use the money received from our proposed union modernisation fund on their political objects. That was always our intention, but the amendment puts a clear and effective legal prohibition in place. There was consensus in Committee on the need for the amendment, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, who cannot be here today, for pressing the case to have the greatest possible clarity.

Clause 54 inserts a new Section 116A into the 1992 Act. The amendment adds four new subsections to that new section. New subsection (4) establishes a prohibition on the payment into a union's political fund of money provided by the Secretary of State under the new section. Under the 1992 Act, all union expenditure on political objects must be made from a separate political fund. The Act also prevents a union transferring money from its general fund into its political fund. The prohibition will ensure that money cannot be paid directly or indirectly into a political fund.

New subsection (5) ensures that the Secretary of State must take such steps as are "reasonably practicable" to recover money which has been added to political funds in contravention of the prohibition. Those steps include the taking of legal action against the union.

New subsection (6) ensures that the repayment of money wrongly added to a political fund must come from that political fund, and not from the union's general fund. If that provision were not there, the union could potentially manipulate the arrangement and, in effect, switch money from its general fund into its political fund.

Finally, new subsection (7) makes it clear that when providing money from the union modernisation fund the Secretary of Sate may include terms providing for other additional sanctions against the union if it breaches the prohibition. Such sanctions will be set out in the contractual terms under which money from the fund is given. For example, the Secretary of State could stipulate that the money must be repaid in full with interest.

The amendment fulfils the commitment we made in Committee. It removes any possibility of a misunderstanding about the use of the fund, and addresses the issues that were put to the Government fully and comprehensively. I beg to move.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for accepting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, in Committee, and which was one part of a larger amendment that I had tabled. There is still a possibility for a union to circumvent it one way or another—I say that because the plain words which I used are not there. Having said that, I look to the Government to prevent abuses of taxpayers' money, which I am sure they will do both with regard to regulations that they may need to make and by the procedures adopted, including the close scrutiny of applications and supervision of the funds. The Minister said in Committee that that would happen. I am grateful that we have clarified the bit that gave us most problems.

Lord Addington

My Lords, speaking as a rather inadequate stand-in for my noble friend Lord Razzall, I can say that he feels that the government amendment achieves, in a slightly better way, what he originally intended with his amendment. He thanks the Government for bringing their amendment forward and hopes that it will deal with this area of possible abuse.

Lord Lea of Crondall

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming this clarification, which has shot Mr Michael Howard's latest fox. If we were to shoot any more such foxes, we would solve the problem of hunting with dogs.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I know not what fox the noble Lord refers to, but I am quite certain that if the amendment was bad for our party I would not have accepted it.

Lord Lea of Crondall

My Lords, perhaps it was not a fox; it may have been a red herring.

Lord Triesman

My Lords, before we go further into the animal realm, I commend the amendment to the House.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Minor and consequential amendments]:

[Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 not moved.]

Lord Triesman

moved Amendments Nos. 30 to 36: Page 63, line 39, leave out "27D(2) or (3)" and insert "27D(31, 27D(4)" Page 63, line 40, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 40 (bar on further application after declaration by the CAC of non-entitlement to recognition), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "27D(4) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged". ( ) In paragraph 41 (bar on further application after declaration by the CAC of end of bargaining arrangements), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "119D(4), 119H(5) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged"." Page 63, line 43, leave out "27D(2) or (3)" and insert "27D(3), 27D(4)" Page 63, 1ine 43, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 48 (invalidity of application after declaration by the CAC of non-entitlement to recognition), in sub-paragraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "27D(4) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged". ( ) In paragraph 49 (invalidity of application after declaration by the CAC of end of bargaining arrangements), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "119D(4), 119H(5) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged"." Page 64, line 12, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 89(8) (effect of declaration of entitlement to recognition), after "27(2)" insert "or 27D(3)". ( ) In paragraph 89, after sub-paragraph (8) add— "(9) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-paragraph (7) also apply if the CAC issues a declaration under paragraph 27D(4)."" Page 64, line 23, leave out "27D(2)" and insert "27D(3)" Page 64, line 25, leave out "27D(2)" and insert "27D(3)

On Question, amendments agreed to.