Iraq: Cabinet Meetings (Hansard, 7 October 2003)

§ The Lord President of the Council (Baroness Amos)
My Lords, there was no meeting of the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee during this period because Iraq and the Middle East were the subject of regular Cabinet discussion from September 2002 until after the conflict. Indeed, Iraq was discussed at every regular Cabinet meeting in that period. Additionally, during the course of the conflict, an ad hoc group of Ministers, chaired by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, met 28 times.

§ Lord Wright of Richmond
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. As I have the privilege of being the first Member of the House to have a 141 Question answered by the Minister in her new position, perhaps I may add my personal congratulations.

Noble Lords
Hear! Hear!

§ Lord Wright of Richmond
My Lords, is the Minister aware that after the Falklands war the Franks report drew attention to the failure to call meetings of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee—which was called the Defence Committee in the Franks report— with the implication that had that committee met before the war there might have been a better appreciation of the threat from Argentina? Does she agree that if there had been prior meetings of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee before the Iraq war, the Government might have had a better appreciation of the real and present threat from Iraq?

§ Baroness Amos
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his good wishes. I thank all noble Lords for the support and best wishes that I have received since the announcement yesterday.
There were a number of Cabinet discussions before and during the conflict. In fact, every regular Cabinet meeting discussed this subject and the ad hoc ministerial committee discussed this subject. I am aware of the recommendation of the Franks report but the threat posed to this country and to the international community by Iraq was well understood across government.

§ Lord Howell of Guildford
My Lords, I add my good wishes to the noble Baroness on her new appointment. She has referred to a great many Cabinet meetings and discussions. Does she accept that, from what I can recall, these so-called very full Cabinet discussions are not always all that they are cracked up to be and may not give everyone a chance to express their opinion?
Does the Minister further accept that while there were, in our view, many excellent reasons for getting rid of the Saddam regime, which posed a permanent and dangerous threat to peace in the region—and, indeed, to world peace—not all of those reasons received priority during the run-up to the Iraq invasion? Does she agree that there is a great deal of confusion about what were and are the real and basic reasons and about what is the strategy behind government thinking now as we move forward? Would it not be useful to repeat the experience of the Franks report, to which the noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, referred, and to have a full report on which were the valid reasons and which were the invalid reasons? That may help us to avoid making further mistakes in the future.

§ Baroness Amos
My Lords, as regards Cabinet discussions not being all they are cracked up to be, I can answer only on the basis of the Cabinet discussions in which I have been involved. I can confirm that at no stage during a Cabinet meeting have I ever felt, if I had a point to make, that there was neither the time nor the 142 possibility to make that point. It is difficult for me to report on Cabinet discussions that took place before I was a member of the Cabinet.
There is no confusion across government about why we engaged in this conflict. It is absolutely clear that it was on the basis of the flouting of the authority of the UN and, in particular, the concern about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. That was absolutely consistent and clear in all the debates and discussions. If noble Lords care to look at the debates that we had during that period, they will see that consistency.
As regards where we now stand, we are absolutely clear that we need to work with the UN and the people of Iraq to rebuild Iraq as quickly as possible. We need to ensure that the people of Iraq take control of their country, in a time-scale to be set out, and have responsibility for rebuilding and reconstruction as quickly as possible.

§ Lord King of Bridgwater
My Lords, in adding my personal congratulations, does the Lord President agree that there is a world of difference between general Cabinet discussions and the discussions of a proper sub-committee, appointed and set up for that purpose and containing a number of people with direct and much more accurate knowledge of the issue than, with great respect, many members of the Cabinet would have had?
Was the ad hoc committee officially appointed? Were the names of its members officially published? Was it the same ad hoc committee that met on a regular basis to discuss these issues? Did the ministerial committee on intelligence meet at all during this period?

§ Baroness Amos
My Lords, I am afraid I will have to write to the noble Lord on his final point about the Intelligence Committee.
The members of the ad hoc group of Ministers were the Prime Minister, who chaired it, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Secretary of State for International Development, the Leader of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Attorney-General. That ad hoc group of Ministers met 28 times. I take the point about having a general discussion in Cabinet as opposed to a more detailed discussion. That was the purpose of having a smaller group of Ministers meet on a regular basis.

§ Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, does the Minister accept that the seriousness of the decision to go to war requires, in a constitutional democracy, that one goes through the appropriate procedures very carefully? Many of us have been rather worried by the indications in the Hutton inquiry's evidence so far that the advice of officials to Ministers was not always accepted and that a number of Ministers were left extremely unhappy with the way in which the political debate was going.
143 The Cabinet and its committees are supported by a substructure of official committees. Does the Minister accept that it might be helpful if there were a further inquiry into how far the political drive pushed further than the available information and advice would support?

§ Baroness Amos
My Lords, first, going to war is an extremely serious decision for any government and any Prime Minister to make. It is not at all an easy or straightforward decision, and it certainly was not in this case. The facts were looked at and weighed up very carefully.
On the noble Lord's second point that advice from officials was not always accepted, it is my experience that advice from officials is not always accepted. In my own case, I know that in wanting to make progress on certain issues, if I had accepted official advice, we would not be moving forward. I am sure that that has been the experience of those on the Opposition Benches who have been Ministers as well.
I accept the point about the seriousness of the decision which was taken. I am absolutely confident that the discussions undertaken at the Cabinet table and elsewhere and the information that was available to Ministers were very seriously considered. Putting our troops in a situation in which they faced the possibility of dying for this country is a very serious thing to do, and the decision was taken by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in that full knowledge.