§ 82A Bad character
§
References in this Part to evidence of a person's bad character are references to evidence which shows that—
§
§ 82B Requirement of leave
§
§ 82C Non-defendant's bad character
§
In the case of evidence of the bad character of a person other than the defendant, the court is not to give leave under section 82B unless the evidence falls within section 82D or 82E.
§ 82D Evidence with explanatory value
§
Evidence falls within this section if—
§
§ 82E Evidence going to a matter in issue
§
§ 82F Defendant's bad character
§
In the case of evidence of the defendant's bad character, the court is not to give leave under section 82B, unless the evidence falls within section 82G, 82H, 82I, 82J or 82K.
§ 82G Evidence with explanatory value
§
§ 82H Evidence going to a matter in issue
§
§ 82I Evidence going to credibility
§
§ 82J Evidence to correct false impression
§
§ 82K Evidence going to an issue between co-defendants
§
§ 82L Trying more than one offence together
§
§ 82M Stopping the case where evidence contaminated
§
§ 82N Assumption of truth in assessment of probative value
§
§ 82O Court's duty to give reasons for rulings
§
§ 82P Rules of court
§
§ 82Q Interpretation
§
§ 82R Minor and consequential amendments
§
§ 82S Repeals
§
§
The Commons disagree to this Amendment for the following Reason—
§ 114A Because they would result in a less satisfactory scheme for dealing with evidence of bad character.
§ Baroness Scotland of AsthalMy Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 114, to which the Commons have disagreed for their reason numbered 114A.
We now come to the part of the Bill dealing with the admissibility of evidence of bad character. There is a wide consensus in support of reform, both across the Floor of this House and throughout the criminal 1985 justice system and public. This part: of the Bill is intended to provide a new statutory framework for admissibility. Amendments adopted when the Bill was considered on Report in this House would, however, replace the scheme proposed by the Government with, almost exactly, the draft Bill drawn up by the Law Commission that accompanied its 2001 report.
As I said at that time, there is much in the Law Commission scheme with which we agree, and much of the Law Commission's work and recommendations can be seen in the Government's proposals. However, we also consider that it is right to go further in certain respects. In particular, the Law Commission considered that a generally exclusionary regime should apply, that the rules should be based on excluding this sort of evidence and restricting its admission to circumstances where a number of conditions had been met.
However, we do not believe that that goes far enough in rebalancing the system to ensure that the rules promote the admission of relevant evidence, subject to considerations of fairness. Without that sort of rebalancing, courts and juries will continue to have withheld from them important evidence that will give them the full and proper picture of a case. In our view, therefore, a different approach is required—one of inclusion, which makes it clear that relevant evidence is admissible.
It will, of course, be for the prosecution to demonstrate in the course of proceedings how the evidence relates to the case. However, on the question of admissibility, we believe that it should be clear that relevant evidence is admissible, subject to the defendant applying for its exclusion. We therefore stand behind the inclusionary approach adopted by the Government in our original proposals. We have, however, always said that we would listen to constructive suggestions for change, to ensure that our proposals are cast in the best possible form. I indicated on Report a number of specific areas where we would look at our proposals to see whether improvements could be made.
We have done so, and noble Lords will see on the Marshalled List a number of proposals to modify the Government's scheme as originally introduced. They address a number of key concerns raised in this House and in another place. I shall set out their effect. Three of them are amendments proposed in another place, which I shall deal with first. The first proposed amendment relates to the definition of evidence of bad character. The definition that the Government originally proposed was that recommended by the Law Commission. However, concern was expressed that it was too vague and enabled evidence that was too remote to be admitted—although it will now find its place in the amendment.
It is important to bear in mind that the Bill will set out the future rules and conditions for admitting that sort of evidence. A wide definition is, therefore, important, otherwise potentially prejudicial evidence will fall outside it and thus outside the rules and safeguards in the Bill. However, we recognise that it is 1986 important to be as clear and precise as possible. We have therefore redrafted the definition to tighten the wording as far as possible, while maintaining a comprehensive ambit.
The revised wording will define evidence of a person's "bad character" as evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part. "Misconduct" is further defined as the commission of an offence, or other reprehensible behaviour. Our intention is to ensure that a wide range of potentially prejudicial evidence is caught by the definition, so that the rules and safeguards in this part of the Bill apply. However, the wording offers a tighter formulation for doing so.
The second proposal is to ensure that the defendant has clear notice of the prosecution's intention to rely on evidence of his bad character. That reflects a concern that a more inclusionary approach would lead to the admission of evidence where it was not appropriate or safe for it to be heard.
I make it clear that that is not our intention. We believe that the system needs to be rebalanced to ensure that relevant evidence is admitted unless good reason is shown to exclude it. However, we recognise that there must be a clear opportunity for a defendant to apply to exclude the evidence and for that issue to be decided by the court. That will be facilitated by having a formal requirement of notice. That is achieved by amending the clause dealing with rules of court to make it clear that rules must make provision for the prosecution to give notice.
Thirdly, there is a proposal in relation to the admissibility of juvenile convictions in adult proceedings—an issue which I know greatly exercised the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, among many others. At present, no mention may be made of these convictions. We think that that approach is too restrictive. Our proposals will lift that absolute prohibition, making such evidence admissible subject to the general scheme of the Bill.
Concern has been expressed that that goes too far, that a person's record at that age will not have the relevance of later offending and that particular considerations apply in the context of juvenile offending. We have sympathy that admission here should take place on a more restricted basis and therefore propose that these convictions should be admissible only where the interests of justice specifically require it. We intend this test to exclude a sporadic record for minor offences, while ensuring that continual or persistent offending or convictions for very serious offences are capable of admission.
The Government also propose a fourth amendment which I shall move in this House today relating to the presumption that a conviction for the same or a similar offence should be admitted. We are proposing here a different approach and have now linked it to the category of relevant evidence—Clause 93(1)(e)—to make it absolutely clear that we do not intend that presumption to operate to admit irrelevant convictions. It may be helpful if I explain how the presumption will operate.
1987 Where propensity to commit an offence is a matter in issue in the case, the presumption will be that convictions for the same or a similar offence may be admitted to establish that propensity. Clause 96(1)(a) sets out where a propensity of this kind will be a matter in issue. This is intended to cover all circumstances where this evidence will assist the courts but not where the propensity makes it no more likely that the defendant committed the offence. Where that is so, convictions for the same or a similar offence will, in principle, be admissible. However, that does not mean that such convictions will inevitably be admitted. Subsection (3) makes it clear that the presumption does not apply if the court is satisfied, by reason of the length of time since the conviction, or for any other reason, that it would be unjust. Furthermore, the defendant will be able to apply for the evidence to be excluded on the basis that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
In summary, a person's record for committing the same or similar offences will be admissible, to show propensity, provided that, first, the defendant's propensity to commit the offence charged is relevant to the issues in the case; and, secondly, the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The rules on evidence of bad character are in pressing need of reform. We must ensure that they are restated in a clear and comprehensive form. The Government's proposals have drawn on the existing jurisprudence and the excellent work of the Law Commission. We have responded to the key concerns expressed and believe that our proposals, modified as suggested, represented the clearest and most satisfactory way forward. For that reason, I move that this House does not insist on its amendments, as set out on the Marshalled List, accepts the amendments to the words restored and accepts the amendments in lieu. We have tried in crafting these new amendments to bring even greater clarity to that which we had before so that our intent is the more plain.
§ Moved, That the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 114, to which the Commons have disagreed for their reason numbered 114A.— {Baroness Scotland of Asthal.)
§ 5.45 p.m.
§ 114B Lord Kingsland rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 114 to which the Commons have disagreed for their reason numbered 114A, leave out "not".
§
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall also be speaking to Lords Amendments Nos. 115 to 125 and 127 to 131. These are the consequential amendments in response to the Commons vote to insist on their original text. Before I begin, I should like, if I may, to ask a short question of the noble Baroness. I hope that she will be prepared to answer it. I refer to Clause 105(3)(b) of the Bill as it first reached your Lordships' House, right at the top of page 68. It states:
Nothing in this Chapter affects the exclusion of evidence … on grounds other than the fact that it is evidence of a person's bad character".
§ Is it the noble Baroness's understanding that that provision has the effect of preserving the protection of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for the bad character chapter?
§ Baroness Scotland of AsthalMy Lords, it is.
§ Lord KingslandMy Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Baroness.
The Government are constantly reminding us of the immense value of the Law Commission, which they themselves established in 1965, and of the high quality of its work. Our Amendment No. 114, except in one minor respect, mirrors precisely the Law Commission's draft Bill. In April 1997, my right honourable friend the Leader of the Opposition, when he was Home Secretary, invited the Law Commission to examine the law of bad character with a view to formulating a comprehensive statutory scheme. After four and a half years' work which, as I said on Report, involved historical analysis, international comparisons and extensive consultation, it produced its proposal.
The Law Commission devoted special attention to the two issues in respect of which we find ourselves at odds with the Government—the issues of the inclusionary presumption and the issue of propensity. The conclusion that the Law Commission reached was based on extensive research and characterised by mature reflection, as anyone reading its report would conclude. If the Government wish to depart from that report and the draft Bill, therefore, they need, in my submission, to demonstrate why the Law Commission report is either flawed or in other respects inferior to their own draft.
In another place yesterday afternoon the honourable Member, Mr Heath, spoke as follows:
If we share"—by "we" the honourable Member meant the Government—the same objective, the Law Commission has provided us with an objective way of achieving it. In that case, why on earth are Ministers holding out for their own interpretation of the best way forward? They can adduce no particular evidence of superiority for that approach, which poses clear dangers as identified by the Law Commission in its evidence".—[Official Report, Commons, 18/11/03; col. 715.]I listened very carefully to what the noble Baroness said in her speech. I notice that on the inclusionary presumption there has, in effect, been no movement by the Government. So I turn now to the second issue which is of concern to us, which is the issue of propensity. Here the Government have made one concession; that is, to delete Clause 93(1)(d) from the original Bill. Your Lordships will recall that Clause 93(1)(d) reads as follows:In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant's bad character is admissible if, but only if…(d) it is evidence of the defendant's conviction for an offence of the same description, or of the same category, as the one with which he is charged".I have to confess that I find it quite extraordinary that the Government ever contemplated including that clause. Clause 93(1)(d) allows evidence of previous convictions to be put in merely because they exist. There is no requirement for relevance whatever.1989 In another place yesterday the honourable Member, Vera Baird, asked rhetorically,
What, therefore, is the purpose of paragraph (d)"?She answers herself by saying:It can only be to include [such convictions] even though they are irrelevant and do not prove anything" —[Official Report, Commons, 18/11/03; col. 717.]On the equally unacceptable relationship between Clause 93(1)(e) and Clause 96(1)(a), despite painstaking discussions with the noble Baroness, who has been the very acme of courtesy and who has made every effort to assist, we have made, I fear, no progress at all.Clause 93(1)(e) states:
In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant's bad character is admissible if, but only if…(e) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution".Clause 96 is headed by the expression,Matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution".Clause 96(1)(a) states:For the purposes of section 93(l)(e) the matters in issue between the defendant and the prosecution include—(a) the question whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence".First, whatever objectives these provisions seek to achieve, they clearly do not achieve them. If propensity is an issue in the case, following Clause 96(1)(a), all Clause 93(1)(e) is saying is that propensity evidence is relevant to propensity evidence. That is obviously true but it gets us no closer to knowing whether propensity evidence is relevant or not.What should your Lordships make of the qualifying word "important" in Clause 93(1)(e)? If the only evidence against the accused is propensity evidence it will certainly be important, but it would be an outrage if an accused could be convicted on propensity evidence alone.
Finally, what about the expression,
except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence"?The law so far is that propensity evidence is always irrelevant precisely because it makes it no more likely than not that the accused is guilty of the offence. The only circumstances in which past conduct may be led by the prosecution is where it is evidence directly relevant to the issues in the case; that is: to say, similar fact evidence.Is this an attempt by the Government to preserve the similar fact rule in Clause 96(1)(a), or not? We have sought assurances to these questions both across the Dispatch Box and in private. But despite the noble Baroness's best efforts, to which I again pay tribute, our endeavours have been to no avail. That is why we have tabled Amendment No. 114B.
§ Moved, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 114, to which the Commons have disagreed for their reason numbered 114A, leave out "not".—(Lord Kingsland.)
§ Lord Thomas of GresfordMy Lords, I too pay tribute to the very hard work that the noble Baroness 1990 has done in connection with this part of the Bill. The removal of paragraph (d) is a step very much in the right direction, which we welcome. However, the criticisms that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, has just made about the relationship between Clause 93(1)(e) and Clause 96 are absolutely valid in our opinion.
I have looked at Clause 96(1)(a) and (b) for some time and considered what they meant. The words,
except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence",have troubled me in the middle of the night wondering what on earth they are supposed to mean. I have come to the conclusion that whoever drafted the Bill originally had in mind, through Clause 96(1)(a), putting into statutory form the accepted and well known doctrine of similar fact evidence.With that in mind, I have attempted today to redraft this section—I have given notice to the Minister of the way in which I did so—in order to make absolutely clear the purpose of that clause. My redraft reads as follows:
(1) For the purposes of Section 93(1)(e) the matters in issue between the defendant and the prosecution include:—(a) the question whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, where such a propensity is capable of persuading a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt on some ground other than his bad character".That encompasses the concept of similar fact evidence because similar fact evidence is not introduced simply to introduce evidence of bad character that will tend to make the defendant look worse in the eyes of the jury; it is there in order to deal with specific issues. I have tried to set those out. I continue by suggesting,his propensity may be so capable, where it may assist a jury in determining: whether a crime has been committed;… the identity of the offender;… whether the acts of the defendant were designed or accidental;… whether the defendant was acting under a mistake of fact; … the truth or falsity of the defendant's allegations that witnesses are mistaken or lying".If the noble Baroness will examine the words with those advising her, she will see that it is absolutely clear that Clause 96(1)(a) refers to similar-fact evidence that assists a jury in determining those issues. I hope that we can have some response to that, or that we can have some discussions about it at a later stage.Paragraph (b) as drafted is about,
the question whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful, except where it is not suggested that the defendant's case is untruthful in any respect".What does that mean? In virtually every trial, the issue is whether the defendant is telling the truth or not. On the face of it, the paragraph suggests that it would be possible for the prosecution to introduce evidence of propensity simply by challenging the defendant when he gives his evidence by saying, "You're lying, aren't you?". "No, I am not," he might reply. The prosecution might then say, "Is that what you say? Then let's look at the list of convictions against you".It is not permitted in any circumstances in our current trials for the prosecution to raise an issue in cross-examination of a defendant whereby he may cast 1991 aspersions against another witness or the police and then say, "Aha! You have now thrown away your shield and we are going to introduce evidence of propensity". I cannot believe that those who drafted the Bill and the Minister intend to make it possible for the prosecution to introduce convictions as part of its case simply because it says that the defendant's case is untruthful.
With that in mind, I have tried to redraft paragraph (b) as follows. The matter in issue is,
the question whether the defendant has a propensity to tell lies where such a propensity is capable of persuading a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt on some ground other than that he has told lies in the course of the investigation and trial of the case before them".Defendants have very often told lies in their interviews with the police, and they may very well lie when they give evidence. However, surely a defendant's propensity to tell lies could come into play only when the prosecution sought to establish something other than that he had simply told lies and that his case was untrue.I am sure that I have said enough for noble Lords to appreciate that we are talking about an extremely difficult and technical part of the law, and that it would be far better to fall back on the Law Commission's Bill, which is incorporated by the original amendment and is the result of very considerable research and reflection by that body. Its provisions were in the Bill until the Commons removed them, and in our view they should prevail unless we can come to some very satisfactory understanding with the Government before the Bill is finally put to rest.
§ 6 p.m.
§ Baroness WalmsleyMy Lords, it may be appropriate at this point for me to speak to my Amendment No. 126B, which is in the group. Noble Lords will recall that, right from the beginning of the passage of the Bill through this House, a cross-party group of Peers interested in youth justice has sought to remove from the Bill the measure that takes away the complete ban on using bad character evidence of convictions committed by the defendant when he or she was a child. Indeed, when I tested the opinion of the House, noble Lords agreed with that.
Since then, however, the other place has agreed to an amendment that states that such evidence,
is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the interests of justice so require".We do not agree with that amendment. The interests of justice can never be served by using in court evidence of offences committed when the defendant was a child, of immature judgment and at an early stage of his or her development, given that at least seven years will have passed since those offences took place.Our reasons for feeling that have been rehearsed at great length at early stages of the Bill, so I shall not weary your Lordships with those again at length. I shall simply list them very briefly to remind the House 1992 of them. First, there has been inadequate consultation on the effects of the matter. Secondly, there has been no call from expert groups or the public for the complete ban on such evidence about childhood offences. Thirdly, it cannot be relevant to bring such evidence forward in the light of the developmental changes that take place between a child's being 14 and 21, the latter age being when such evidence could be put before the court if the measures in the Bill were passed.
As I think I pointed out at an earlier stage, the introduction of such a measure is also inconsistent in the light of other actions and statements that the Government have made. Our law, which makes children criminals at 10, is out of step with most other civilised and developed countries, and we must not make it worse by allowing such a measure to get through the House. Most children who commit crimes are disadvantaged in some way, and should be given a second chance.
While we are considering the Green Paper recently brought forward by the Government, Every Child Matters, which makes many good suggestions, we should bear in mind the need for a youth justice system that is entirely separate from that of adults. All the youth justice and children's organisations are calling for that. Those are the reasons why I will in due course move Amendment No. 126B.
§ Lord Lloyd of BerwickMy Lords, as I understand it, the purpose of the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness to insert the additional provisions at the end of Clause 96 is to clarify the meaning of that clause. I regret to have to say that, although they are obviously there with the best intentions, they do not get away from the fundamental defects in the clause that have been pointed out and developed by the noble Lords, Lord Kingsland and Lord Thomas. I am afraid that I shall be voting with them on the matter.
§ Baroness Scotland of AsthalMy Lords, I say straightaway to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that I am very sorry indeed to have given him sleepless nights. I had hoped that I had delivered the antidote capable of providing a little balm to his troubled spirit in relation to the matter.
I have responded to the substance of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. He posed a number of questions. If I may respectfully say so, that is why, when I opened the debate, I went through with care the way in which we think that the clause will operate. There are three real points. The first is that the Government remain of the view that all relevant evidence should be admissible and capable of going before the jury. However, there should be safeguards which would prevent that relevant evidence going forward if the defendant can establish that it was not relevant; or that it was more prejudicial than probative; or that there was some other cause using the provisions which we have now added. Those safeguards would cause the evidence to be excluded on the basis that the judge would exercise his discretion that it was unjust so to do.
1993 We believe that the new safeguards that we have in place cure all the ills about which noble Lords opposite have complained. It is the most powerful antidote that we can provide and we believe that the solution suffices. However, I listened with great care to what both noble Lords said and I do not know whether after our discussions there may be further or other explanations I may be able to make from the Dispatch Box which may put these issues beyond doubt. I believe that they are beyond doubt already, but in your Lordships' House I have come to recognise that my assessment and the clarity and detail which your Lordships sometimes require do not always coincide. I believe that the Government have clone enough on these issues and I commend the amendment to the House.
§ Lord KingslandMy Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for her courteous response. The difficulty I have with what she has just said, with the best of intentions, is that the difference between her observations about what the text says and the text itself is sufficiently large for me to think it appropriate to test the opinion of the House.
§ 6.12 p.m.
§ On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 114B) shall be agreed to?
§ Their Lordships divided: Contents, 190; Not-Contents, 112.
1995| Division No.4 | |
| CONTENTS | |
| Ackner, L. | Craig of Radley, L. |
| Addington, L. | Craigavon, V. |
| Alderdice, L. | Crathorne, L. |
| Ampthill, L. | Crickhowell, L. |
| Anelay of St Johns, B. | Cumberlege, B. |
| Arran, E. | Dahrendorf, L. |
| Astor of Hever, L. | Darcy de Knayth, B. |
| Attlee, E. | Dholakia, L. [Teller] |
| Avebury, L. | Dixon-Smith, L. |
| Barker, B. | Donaldson of Lymington, L. |
| Biffen, L. | Dundee, E. |
| Blaker, L. | Eccles of Moulton, B. |
| Blatch,B. | Eden of Winton,L. |
| Bledisloe,V. | Elliott of Morpeth,L. |
| Bowness, L. | Elton, L. |
| Bradshaw, L. | Falkland, V. |
| Bridgeman, V. | Feldman, L. |
| Bridges, L. | Ferrers, E. |
| Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, L. | Flather, B. |
| Brougham and Vaux, L. | Fookes, B. |
| Byford,B. | Fowler, L. |
| Caithness, E. | Fraser of Carmyllie, L. |
| Campbell of Alloway, L. | Freeman, L. |
| Carlile of Berriew, L. | Freyberg, L. |
| Carlisle of Bucklow, L. | Gardner of Parkes, B. |
| Carnegy of Lour, B. | Geraint, L. |
| Chadlington, L. | Gilbert, L. |
| Chalfont, L. | Glentoran, L. |
| Chalker of Wallasey, B. | Goodhart, L. |
| Clement-Jones, L. | Goschen, V. |
| Colville of Culross, V. | Gray of Contin, L. |
| Colwyn, L. | Greaves, L. |
| Cope of Berkeley, L. [Teller] | Greenway, L. |
| Hamwee, B. | Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay, L. |
| Hanham, B. | O'Cathain, B. |
| Hannay of Chiswick, L. | Onslow, E. |
| Harris of Peckham, L. | Park of Monmouth, B. |
| Harris of Richmond, B. | Parkinson, L. |
| Henley, L. | Peel, E. |
| Higgins, L. | Perry of Southwark, B. |
| Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L. | Peyton of Yeovil, L. |
| Hogg, B. | Phillips of Sudbury, L. |
| Holme of Cheltenham, L. | Pilkington of Oxenford, L. |
| Home, E. | Plumb, L. |
| Hooson, L. | Prashar, B. |
| Howe, E. | Rawlings, B. |
| Howe of Aberavon, L. | Razzall, L. |
| Howe of Idlicote, B. | Redesdale, L. |
| Howell of Guildford, L. | Rees, L. |
| Hunt of Wirral, L. | Rees-Mogg, L. |
| Hurd of Westwell, L. | Rennard, L. |
| Jacobs, L. | Renton, L. |
| Jenkin of Roding, L. | Richardson of Calow, B. |
| Jopling, L. | Roberts of Conwy, L. |
| Kennedy of The Shaws, B. | Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L. |
| Kimball, L. | Rogan, L. |
| Kingsland, L. | Roper, L. |
| Kirkham, L. | Rotherwick, L. |
| Knight of Collingtree, B. | Russell, E. |
| Lamont of Lerwick, L. | Russell-Johnston, L. |
| Lester of Herne Hill, L. | Ryder of Wensum,L. |
| Lindsay, E. | Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly. |
| Linklater of Butterstone, B. | Sandberg, L. |
| Listowel, E. | Sanderson of Bowden, L. |
| Liverpool, E. | Sandwich, E. |
| Livsey of Talgarth, L. | Scott of Needham Market, B. |
| Lloyd of Berwick, L. | Seccombe, B. |
| Lyell, L. | Selborne, E. |
| McAlpine of West Green, L. | Selsdon, L. |
| Mackie of Benshie, L. | Sharman, L. |
| Maclennan of Rogart, L. | Sharp of Guildford, B. |
| McNally, L. | Sharpies, B. |
| Maddock, B. | Shaw of Northstead, L. |
| Mallalieu, B. | Shutt of Greetland, L. |
| Mancroft, L. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Mar and Kellie,E. | Smith of Clifton, L. |
| Marlesford, L. | Steel of Aikwood, L. |
| Mayhew of Twysden, L. | Stoddart of Swindon, L. |
| Methuen, L. | Swinfen, L. |
| Michie of Gallanach, B. | Taverne, L. |
| Miller of Chilthorne Domer, B. | Thomas of Gresford, L. |
| Miller of Hendon, B. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Monro of Langholm, L. | Thomas of Walliswood, B. |
| Monson, L. | Thomson of Monifieth, L. |
| Montrose, D. | Tordoff, L. |
| Moore of Lower Marsh, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Naseby, L. | Ullswater, V. |
| Neill of Bladen,L. | Vivian, L. |
| Newby, L. | Waddington, L. |
| Newton of Braintree, L. | Wade of Chorlton, L. |
| Noakes, B. | Walmsley, B. |
| Northbrook, L. | Watson of Richmond, L. |
| Northesk,E. | Wedderburn of Charlton, L. |
| Northover, B. | Williams of Crosby, B. |
| Norton of Louth, L. | Williamson of Horton, L. |
| NOT-CONTENTS | |
| Acton, L. | Brett, L. |
| Amos, B. (Lord President) | Brooke of Alverthorpe, L. |
| Andrews, B. | Brookman, L. |
| Archer of Sandwell, L. | Brooks of Tremorfa, L. |
| Ashton of Upholland, B. | Burlison, L. |
| Bach, L. | Campbell-Savours, L. |
| Bassam of Brighton, L. | Carter, L. |
| Billingham, B. | Chandos, V. |
| Blackstone, B. | Chorley, L. |
| Borrie, L. | Christopher, L. |
| Bragg, L. | Clark of Windermere, L. |
| Clarke of Hampstead, L. | Jones, L. |
| Cohen of Pimlico,B. | Judd,L. |
| Corbett of Castle Vale, L. | King of West Bromwich, L. |
| Crawley, B. | Lea of Crondall, L. |
| Davies of Coity.L. | Lockwood,B. |
| Davies of Oldham, L. [Teller] | Lofthouse of Pontefract, L. |
| Desai, L. | Macdonald of Tradeston, L. |
| Dixon, L. | McIntosh of Haringey, L. |
| Donoughue, L. | McIntosh of Hudnall, B. |
| Dormand of Easington, L. | MacKenzie of Culkein, L. |
| Dubs, L. | Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L. |
| Elder, L. | Marsh, L. |
| Evans of Parkside, L. | Masham of Ilton, B. |
| Evans of Temple Guiting, L. | Massey of Darwen, B. |
| Falconer of Thoroton, L. (Lord | Mitchell, L. |
| Chancellor) | Morgan of Huyton, B. |
| Falkender,B. | Murray of Epping Forest, L. |
| Farrington of Ribbleton,B. | Pendry, L. |
| Faulkner of Worcester, L. | Pitkeathely, B. |
| Finlay of Llandaff, B. | Plant of Highfield, L. |
| Gale B | Radice,L. |
| Gibson of Market Rasen, B. | Ramsay of Cartvale, B. |
| Golding, B. | Randall of St. Budeaux, L. |
| Goldsmith, L. | Rendell of Babergh, B. |
| Gordon of Strathblane, L. | Rooker, L. |
| Gordon of Strathblane, L. | Sainsbury of Turville, L. |
| Goudie, B. | Sawyer, L. |
| Gould of Potternewton B. | Scotland of Asthal, B. |
| Graham of Edmonton, L. | Simon, V. |
| Grocott, L. [Teller] | Smith of Gilmorehill, B. |
| Harris of Haringey, L. | Smith of Leigh, L. |
| Harrison, L. | Stone of Blackheath, L. |
| Haskel, L. | Taylor of Blackburn, L. |
| Hayman, B. | Temple-Morris, L. |
| Hogg of Cumbernauld, L. | Thornton B |
| Hollis of Heigham, B. | Tomlinson, L. |
| Howells of St. Davids, B. | Turnberg, L. |
| Howie of Troon, L. | Turner of Camden, B. |
| Hoyle, L. | Warner, L. |
| Hughes of Woodside,L. | Warwick of Undercliffe, B. |
| Hunt of Chesterton, L. | Weatherill, L. |
| Hunt of Kings Heath, L. | Whitaker, B. |
| Irvine of Lairg, L. | Whitty, L. |
| Islwyn, L. | Wilkins, B. |
| Janner of Braunstone, L. | Williams of Elvel, L. |
| Jay of Paddington, B. | Woolmer of Leeds, L. |
§ Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
§ Motion, as amended, agreed to.
§ 6.22 p.m.