Courts Bill [H.L.]

HL Deb 12 May 2003 vol 648 cc46-108

5.4 p.m.

Consideration of amendments on Report resumed on Clause 87.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

moved Amendment No. 145: Page 42, line 8, at end insert— ( ) An order under subsection (1) above shall not be made until a draft has been laid before both Houses of Parliament and approved by resolution of each House. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that the Minister can reassure me that there is a provision somewhere which I may well have missed. When the Lord Chancellor, under Clause 87, prescribes fees payable in respect of anything dealt with by the courts listed, will his order come before this House and another place? The current arrangement is that, before a fee change, the usual statutory instrument is laid before the House. Indeed, such instruments are currently available in the Printed Paper Office in respect of the latest increase. That has been done under the old procedure, involving the 12 per cent increase to which I believe the Minister referred in an earlier debate. She acknowledged that that increase is the first for a while. She explained the position, and as a result I have not sought to pray against those statutory instruments which have been through all the normal procedures. Amendment No. 145 seeks to clarify how the new procedure provided for in Clause 87 will operate. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I warmly support this amendment. It seems to me to be absolutely fundamental. To the extent that Parliament is the sovereign body laying down the foundations of our system of justice, if an important order such as that to which the amendment refers—prescribing that the Lord Chancellor, may with the consent of the Treasury by order prescribe fees payable", in the Supreme Court, the county courts and the magistrates' courts—is not laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament, it would mean that Parliament has surrendered the power that it should have to approve the whole system of charging people under our system of justice. I really do hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, will find this a sympathetic and useful amendment.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who spoke to the amendment. I hope that I can clarify exactly what we intend and give the noble Lord a full answer.

The effect of the amendment would be to make Clause 87 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Previously, over the past 125 years, in none of the three Acts of the Supreme Court—Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 and the Supreme Court Act 1981—and four Acts on county courts (the County Courts Acts of 1888, 1934, 1959 and 1984) has Parliament decided that it was necessary for instruments setting court fees to be subject to the negative or the affirmative resolution procedure. As such, the convention adopted by both Houses of Parliament in respect of fees orders issued under these current powers, is that they are laid before Parliament and are not subject to affirmative or negative resolution. The current draft of Clause 98 maintains that convention.

While the Government already consult widely on proposed fees orders, Clause 87 introduces a specific statutory requirement for wider consultation with the heads of division and, for the first time, the head and deputy head of civil justice and, for civil proceedings, the Civil Justice Council—which I believe the noble Lord has already rightly praised today. This, therefore, provides for much wider consultation than is currently required.

The Lord Chancellor has also carefully considered the views of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform and the points made in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, at Second Reading and considers that it would be appropriate for this clause also to be subject to the negative resolution procedure. That will be introduced by way of a government amendment which will be considered later in this debate.

That would provide for the first time for parliamentary scrutiny of fees orders and would bring the new power in line with other of the Lord Chancellor's powers to set fees; for example, fees charged by the Court of Protection under Section 106(5) of the Mental Health Act 1983. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor is satisfied that this will provide an effective oversight of court fees. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Renton and thank him for his strong support. He made some telling points about the need for effective scrutiny. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. I was checking a point with him and I believe that he was about to intervene. I regard him as a great authority on these matters. The noble Lord correctly forecast exactly what the Minister was about to say and outlined it to me just as the Minister rose thus depriving himself of the opportunity of explaining the position. I apologise to him for that.

I should like to reflect on the points made by the Minister. I am reassured by her reference to a later amendment which I hope we shall reach shortly. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 88 [Award of costs against third parties]:

Lord Hunt of Wirral

moved Amendment No. 145A: Page 42, line 22, at end insert— ( ) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must make provision for independent scrutiny of any decision by a court that there has been serious misconduct. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now come to Clause 88. I have consulted with a number of organisations and understand that there are still considerable concerns about the clause. As noble Lords will recall, the clause entitled "Award of costs against third parties" is viewed with particular concern by the national newspaper industry and a range of broadcasters and especially by regional newspapers which perform a very important local community service in reporting the proceedings of local magistrates' courts and other courts.

I understand that the various bodies to which I have referred fear that the potential use of this new power by magistrates and trial judges to penalise media organisations could well trespass upon their ability lawfully to report local proceedings or even merely to make representations against court reporting restrictions.

As the Minister must concede, "serious misconduct" is a rather uncertain legal concept. Hence, no one can simply rely on reassurances about courts' past practice, for instance, in contempt cases, as the Minister suggested in a previous debate. Nor are there the safeguards of requiring the consent of the Law Officers, or, indeed, independent scrutiny and full hearing by another court of the alleged wrongdoing, as there are in the cases of proceedings for contempt against the media and prosecution for breach of reporting restrictions. I press the Minister to give reassurance on the following. There ought at least to be equivalent safeguards before third party costs orders can be made.

It would be very interesting to know whether media organisations will be consulted on Clause 88 and, if they have already been consulted, the extent of those consultations given the concern that I express on behalf of a number of them. Will they also be consulted on the regulations to be made under Clause 88 with a view to ensuring that there will be proper statutory safeguards against what could be its chilling effect on lawful court reporting?

Is it proposed that there will be guidance and training of magistrates, their clerks, the Crown Prosecution Service and Crown Court judges to stress that the enactment of these provisions should not in any way be used to curb lawful reporting of cases and the public scrutiny of the criminal courts?

5.15 p.m.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, the noble Lord moved a specific amendment. Is there a precedent for that kind of amendment anywhere in the law?

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I indicated that there was independent scrutiny but by another court, for instance where cases of contempt are brought against a newspaper or a media organisation. I am not aware that the amendment is to be found anywhere else in the statute book. Any similarity will be only an accident of drafting. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that the amendment is a genuine attempt to introduce independent scrutiny of a court's decision that there has been serious misconduct. That is strictly necessary as we move down the new road proposed in Clause 88. I beg to move.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I support the principle behind what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, said in moving his amendment. It is important that there should be adequate provision to appeal from an order of this kind against a third party for payment of costs. I assume that the Minister will say that there is such a right of appeal. However, it is absolutely essential to spell that out. I am aware that there are somewhat more rigid restrictions on the right to appeal against orders relating to costs than to appeal against the subject matter of the decision itself. I certainly hope that the Government will assure us that there will be proper and full rights of appeal against a third party costs order. In that case the third party costs order, so far as the third party is concerned, is the substance of the decision against it.

Lord Fraser of Carmyllie

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend Lord Hunt. I say to the noble Lord. Lord Clinton-Davis, that it seems to me that his parallel with the law of contempt is apt. It will be our common experience that from time to time judges, be they magistrates or others, will suffer the problem of the red mist coming over their thinking when confronted by activity that they regard as contemptuous of their court. In those circumstances the law has developed to allow for an independent scrutiny of that conduct by someone who does not share the same anger or irritation about what they have been subjected to in court. It seems to me that the form of independent scrutiny that my noble friend seeks is desirable as the parallel is very precise. The Minister may be able to reassure us that such independent scrutiny will be allowed for. Whether it needs to be in the legislation or not I know not, but the desirability of independent, separate scrutiny would appear to be there.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, made it clear that the amendment seeks to set out in any regulations made under subsection (1) of the new section inserted by Clause 88 that where a court makes a finding of "serious misconduct", that finding must be subject to independent scrutiny. "Serious misconduct" may not be 100 per cent precise but "serious" is enough and should not interfere with lawful reporting, which could not amount to serious misconduct. The provision is not meant in any way to limit the proper reporting and conduct of the media in relation to our criminal courts.

The noble Lord is right to seek to ensure that the findings of the courts are open to independent scrutiny. I hope therefore that he and other noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, will be assured by the knowledge that new Section 19B(5) and (6), which will be inserted by Clause 88, already allows for third party costs orders made in the magistrates' courts to be appealed in the Crown Court and for those made in the Crown Court to be appealed to the Court of Appeal. The provisions in new Section 19B follow the provisions already existing in Section 19A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which deals with wasted costs orders made against legal representatives. That section requires regulations to provide for appeals to be made from the magistrates' court to the Crown Court and from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal. Appeal courts provide the independent scrutiny necessary to ensure that costs orders are properly and fairly made, and if they are not, the appeal court can remedy them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, need not worry too much about the red mist. That can be dispelled elsewhere. In the light of that assurance I hope that the noble Lord will feel content.

I turn to the precise questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The media were informed about proposals in the spring 2002. There have not been any formal consultations because the provision does no more than extend to criminal courts the powers that civil courts already have. It is an obvious lacuna in their powers. We intend the right of appeal to be absolute with no permission requirement. With those safeguards, I hope that all noble Lords will agree that we have the right level of protection to enable proper challenge to be made where the orders are made against third parties. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, my noble and learned friend Lord Fraser of Carmyllie and the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. We were still concerned until, at the last moment. the Minister made it clear that it would not be necessary to appeal in the red mist atmosphere to the court that had just made the order for a right to appeal. The fact that that is not required would enable the sort of independent scrutiny to take place on another day. I was seeking such an assurance.

I thank the Minister for having made it clear that there will be careful consultation on the regulations. I hope that that will include the organisations to which I referred. It is important that the necessary training takes place to ensure that the red mist—or however one describes it—does not descend on the court. Feelings can run very high over reporting but it is generally in the public interest that there should be an unfettered right to report.

I am a little concerned about the definition of "serious". I know that the noble Baroness said that the matter is either serious or it is not. She acknowledged that that is not being 100 per cent precise. I am rather troubled by that, would like to think further about it and may wish to return to it at Third Reading. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 146: Page 42, line 26, at end insert— ( ) make provision for ordering third party costs against the prison service or any security firm for failure to deliver prisoners to the court on time, or at all The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment was moved in Committee by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, who, unfortunately, is unable to be here today because of an important commitment in the courts. I should have preferred him to speak rather than me because he has personal knowledge of the problems that are raised by the amendment. I, as one whose practice has wholly been in the civil courts, do not. However, I am convinced by what he said.

The failure of the Court Service and of private security firms to deliver prisoners to court on time—or, sometimes, to deliver them at all—is a major cause of cost and delay. That is unfair to all concerned: to victims, witnesses, prisoners, the judge, court staff and lawyers. There should clearly be financial penalties for culpable failure.

My noble friend drew attention to a series of problems: the lack of co-operation between the Prison Service and private security firms; the failure of private security firms to employ enough staff to make it possible to do what they should be doing; delays that occur after the arrival of the prisoner at the court building; and failure to have enough staff to open all available interview rooms. The Government's steps to deal with those problems have been inadequate and more should be done. The amendment is a way of putting pressure on those involved to ensure that more is done. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

My Lords, before the noble Lord concludes moving the amendment, could he explain whether the prisoner—

The Deputy Speaker (Lord Murton of Lindisfarne)

My Lords, may I put the Question? Amendment proposed, page 42, line 26, at end insert the words as printed on the Marshalled List.

Lord Renton

My Lords, now the noble Lord will have to wait until he comes to reply before answering my point, which I raised earlier.

If a third party organisation fails to deliver the prisoner in time, the prisoner could suffer with regard to the settlement of his case; perhaps "settlement" is the wrong word and I should refer to the "decisions" in his case. He would be the person who most of all deserved a bit of compensation. When the noble Lord replies—or, if I may dare say so, and better still, when the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, replies—could he or she say how the prisoner will he compensated for being treated in that way?

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, suggested, this is a repeat of a debate we had in Committee. I compliment the noble Lord on picking up the baton left him by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. They are right in identifying this as an important issue.

I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Renton, was on the verge of suggesting that there should be time off for bad behaviour on the part of those who fail to deliver prisoners on time. However, perhaps he was not getting quite as close to that, as I was rather facetiously suggesting.

The effect of the noble Lord's amendment would be to make those who default in failing to deliver the prisoners on time subject to a cost order. The Government's view is that the amendment is unnecessary and, although well meant, is potentially undesirable.

Clause 88 as it stands would allow the court to deal with the late delivery of prisoners as a result of serious misconduct—and we have debated that matter today. If costs are wasted because of late delivery, the court can look behind the issues and at the circumstances that caused the lateness. If the lateness was the result of serious misconduct, appropriate action can be taken.

I cannot see that the noble Lord's amendment would add to that, particularly with no knowledge of what the regulations arising from the amendment might state. Putting unnecessary detail of this kind into regulations can be unhelpful. It might, for instance, encourage people to suggest that one particular type of serious misconduct is more important, and perhaps more appropriate, for the making of an order than another. While we share the noble Lord's concerns about the timely delivery of prisoners, it is right that the court, through this clause, should be able to deal with the costs wasted as a result of late delivery caused by a specific instance of serious misconduct.

However, in our view, it would not be practical or appropriate to extend the scope of the clause beyond clearly identifiable misconduct in a particular case. It is not and could not be the role of the court to oversee the general level of performance of those contracted to deliver prisoners. That seems to be part of the problem with the amendment, as it takes us in that direction.

In so far as the noble Lord's concerns relate to that issue, it is necessary to look to the terms of the contracts under which the prisoner escort services operate. My understanding is that under the contracts all prisoners should be delivered on time for courts; that is, delivered to the courts a minimum of half an hour before courts begin.

The figures on that are helpful and suggest the scope of the problem. At national level for 2002–03, figures indicate that of the 1.25 million prisoners handled during that year, 76 per cent were delivered on time. Of the 24 per cent delivered late under the terms of the contract, 10 per cent were none the less delivered during the half hour before the court started, leaving 14 per cent delivered after the court had started.

Under the terms of the contracts, prisoner escort contractors may be penalised for the late delivery of prisoners to courts where they are found to be at fault. Points applied against a contractor accrue during the year and should they exceed a set baseline, the excess points are converted to a financial remedy.

New contracts are due to be let in 2004. The Prison Service is considering with other criminal justice partners what changes should be made to the terms of the contracts, including more flexible ways of working and financial remedies, to ensure that prisoner delivery is as efficient and cost-effective as possible.

We have listened carefully to the argument and we can agree on the seriousness and importance of the issue. But we are not persuaded that anything can be gained by the amendment and this way of approaching the problem.

5.30 p.m.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Will he address the point effectively raised by my noble friend Lord Renton on compensation?

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, there are no proposals to provide compensation. I return to the point that if the courts believe that there is an issue of serious misconduct, it is for them to deal with it in that way. The financial impact on the contractors delivering prisoners late exists and is subject to the conditions of the contract. That is common in all contractual relationships.

As regards whether prisoners can be compensated, the amendment relates only to costs incurred as a result of lateness. I therefore believe that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Renton, falls outside it. There are no proposals to compensate prisoners in the way suggested.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, first, the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Renton, is important and should receive consideration. I understand that there would not normally be grounds for compensating a prisoner who is convicted and subsequently receives a sentence of imprisonment. Given that time spent on remand—and by definition these people will be on remand—is set off against the term imposed, nothing will be suffered by the prisoner other than the irritation of the failure to deal with the proceedings in time.

However, possibly in cases where the prisoner is not ultimately given a custodial sentence, and clearly in cases where the prisoner is acquitted, it seems that there should be some form of compensation—

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, surely, in those more severe circumstances the prisoner would have a civil remedy.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, there would be a question surrounding how far the prisoner would have a remedy and it could not be ordered by the court hearing the trial. The prisoner would have to go to the civil courts to fight a separate action. Be that as it may, as the noble Lord, Lord Renton, appreciates, the matter is outside the scope of my amendment, but I am grateful to him for having raised the issue.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. The suggestion made by the Minister that civil proceedings should take place as a solution to these problems will cause additional expense and delay. Furthermore, it would be more elaborate and difficult than simply enabling the matter to be dealt with under this provision.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I turn to the substance of the amendment. The Minister's reply was reasonably encouraging because he pointed to the possibility of treating costs incurred in this way as third-party costs. However, the Government were not prepared to commit themselves to put the provision on the face of the regulations, let alone on the face of the Bill. In those circumstances, I am not minded to press the amendment today and must leave it to my noble friend to decide whether it is appropriate to bring it back at Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 147: After Clause 88, insert the following new clause—

"AWARD OF COSTS IN APPEALS UNDER PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 (1) Amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29) as follows. (2) In section 89 (procedure on appeal to the Court of Appeal). after subsection (3) insert— (4) Subject to any rules made under section 91. the costs of and incidental to all proceedings on an appeal to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal under—

1. (a) section 43(1) or (2) (appeals against orders made in restraint proceedings), or
2. (b) section 65 (appeals against, or relating to, the making of receivership orders),

are in the discretion of the court. (5) Such rules may in particular make provision for regulating matters relating to the costs of those proceedings, including prescribing scales of costs to be paid to legal or other representatives. (6) The court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid. (7) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (4), the court may—

1. (a) disallow, or
2. (b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,

the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may he determined in accordance with rules under section 91. (8) In subsection (7) "wasted costs" means any costs incurred by a party—

1. (a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or
2. (b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the court considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.

(9) "Legal or other representative", in relation to a party to proceedings means any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct litigation on his behalf. (3) Subsection (2) applies in relation to proceedings on appeals in respect of offences committed or alleged to have been committed on or after 24th March 2003. (4) In section 91 (Crown Court Rules) after "Crown Court Rules" insert "or (as the case may be) Criminal Appeal Rules".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall be brief because the amendments are non-controversial. Amendment No. 147 would insert a new clause which closes a gap in the existing law. It would make clear that the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal has the power to award costs in appeals relating to the making of a restraint order or the appointment of a receiver under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Amendments Nos. 261 and 304 are consequential on Amendment No. 147.

Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 provides a single consolidated scheme for the confiscation of benefit from all criminal conduct. That includes power to make a restraint order, freezing assets which might be used to satisfy a confiscation order and a power to appoint a receiver to manage or realise such assets. All restraint and receivership proceedings under the Act will take place in the Crown Court, which also has the power to make the confiscation order. That is a major change designed to improve efficiency. Under previous legislation. restraint and receivership proceedings were heard by the High Court. Consequently, appeals against restraint and receivership will now go to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal.

The Criminal Division has power to award costs in criminal cases, but not civil cases. It is unclear as a matter of law whether restraint and receivership proceedings are criminal or civil in nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether the Criminal Division can currently award costs in relation to the appeals which it hears. Amendment No. 27 would insert a new clause, which would put the position beyond doubt by amending the Proceeds of Crime Act so that there is explicit provision for the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal to award costs in restraint and receivership appeals.

The new clause will be retrospective to the date of the commencement of the relevant part of the Proceeds of Crime Act, which was 24th March 2003. That will ensure that people whose cases are heard before the commencement of this clause will not be disadvantaged. Rules of court will he drafted to make provision for paying costs. Amendments Nos. 314 and 261 are consequential on Amendment No. 304.

I apologise to your Lordships' House for the omission in the original legislation but I am sure that your Lordships will agree that this new clause is necessary and just in the circumstances. I beg to move.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I raise just one query. The Proceeds of Crime Act had separate parts relating to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. I appreciate that this Bill relates only to England. What arrangements are being made to include equivalent provisions in Scottish or Northern Ireland legislation?

5.45 p.m.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, I think that we are in a position to ensure that there is a follow through or read across to other pieces of legislation. However, the noble Lord has asked for an important point of clarification. Although I cannot give it from the Dispatch Box now, I am happy to clarify that later in correspondence and to share the fruit of that with others involved in the debate today.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 92 [Periodical payments]:

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No.148: Page 44, line 21, at end insert— ( ) Periodical payments shall. unless the court otherwise directs, be increased or decreased in accordance with the Retail Price Index. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the first group of amendments—it forms part of a series of groups—to deal with questions arising from the Government's decision to confer on courts the power to make orders for periodical payments in actions for civil damages. We on these Benches strongly welcome as. indeed, I think does the Conservative Party, the principle of periodic payments as an alternative to fixed sum damages. However, there are a number of issues to be considered.

Amendment No.148 is similar although not identical to an amendment which we tabled in Committee. The earlier amendment made the inflation proofing of orders for periodical payments an absolute requirement. This amendment states that inflation proofing is to apply unless the court directs otherwise.

I believe that the need to inflation proof periodical payments is obvious. It is not clear on the face of the Bill that Clause 92 gives a power to order periodical payments of variable amounts which are uncertain at the time of the order because they are dependent on something which will happen later; namely, the rate of increase in the retail prices index. So, it seems to me that that needs clarification.

Amendment No. 149 raises a new issue. This would have been more appropriate for debate in Committee but I was not then aware of it. I raise it because the problem has been brought to my attention by Mr David Kemp QC. who is the editor of Kemp on Damages and therefore unquestionably one of the country's leading experts on the subject of damages. He feels very strongly about this particular problem.

The problem concerns claimants who have suffered particularly serious injuries which mean that they will require long-term care and medical treatment. The costs of care and treatment have risen faster than the retail prices index and are likely to continue to do so. Therefore, it is not enough to order periodical payments of an amount sufficient to provide care and treatment today and simply index link them. Sadly, in a few years' time, even though index linked, those payments are likely to be inadequate to secure what are then regarded as the appropriate current standards of care and treatment.

This is undoubtedly a serious problem with the law of damages. I also recognise that it is a problem with which it is extremely difficult to deal. After all, periodical payments are similar to a form of annuity. Index-linked annuities are standard nowadays. They are available because the liability to pay the annuity can be met by index-linked government securities.

I believe it would be extremely difficult to produce a corresponding financial instrument which could be linked to the costs of care. It may well be that the only practicable way in which a periodical payments order could be linked to care costs would be for the Government to accept liability to cover the amount by which the increases in care costs exceed the increases in the RPI.

I accept that that would be a major step which would need careful prior consideration and would not be suitable for inclusion in the Bill. Therefore, I have no intention of pressing Amendment No. 149 today. However, at the same time it is an important issue and I should he interested to hear the Government's response. I beg to move.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, pointed out, in this group is not only Amendment No.148 but also Amendment No.149. Although I have the greatest respect for Mr David Kemp QC and those who would argue this case, perhaps I may point out to the Minister that I have considerable sympathy with what, undoubtedly, will be her response. The argument for higher indexation of future loss claims is currently being run in a number of claims for lump sum payments. The effect in one case I have seen is to reduce the discount rate which is used to calculate the effect of accelerated receipt in lump sum payments for future loss and was fixed by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in 2001 at 2.5 per cent.

In the one case I have seen the effect would be to take that 2.5 per cent figure down to nil or close to it. One can well imagine the drastic effect of such an increase in future loss payments, not only for the insurance industry but especially for the National Health Service.

The noble Baroness will recall that she came to the Dispatch Box when a Motion to annul the order for 2.5 per cent was debated in November 2001. If claimants now seek another route to try to erode the discount rate by other means, that certainty which I believe the Baroness stressed on that occasion—there is a need for certainty for all parties to litigation— would be removed for the practitioners and the courts. I should explain that the discount rate already assumes the application of the retail prices index. Therefore, the courts and the Lord Chancellor are familiar with that.

A problem highlighted by the rising care costs returns us to a debate we had in Committee about the fact that at present courts are forbidden from considering what treatment will be available under the National Health Service. The Minister reminded us that we await the report of the Chief Medical Officer. I am not aware that it has yet been published.

However, when it is I hope that it will deal with this difficult anomaly whereby certain individuals are encouraged by those advising them to set up at home 24-hour nursing care just around themselves. That sometimes costs the National Health Service as much as it would to service and look after, say, six people in a private hospital ward. That is the extent of the money which is being spent to set up what are virtually private care hospitals. Further, because they are manned so as to produce 24-hour nursing care, the costs index looks seriously disadvantageous for the claimant. However, there is in reality always the National Health Service. But, at the moment, the courts are specifically forbidden from taking it into account. So we return to the periodical payments debate, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart.

The Master of the Rolls' working party report Structured Settlements last year called for a broadening of the investments available. That needs to be looked at independently of this legislation. It is a far from simple process and one which will need to involve the insurance industry and its regulators at the Financial Services Authority as well as of course—and we have already mentioned it—the Treasury.

The debate as to indexation masks the fact that this legislation is about introducing a fairer system in order to avoid as far as is practicable either over or under compensation. As the Lord Chancellor concluded in 2001 in the order that set the 2.5 per cent rate. that is a balancing act. The noble and learned Lord was then criticised by those who sought to put forward a similar amendment. I think that this is effectively a further round of that kind of criticism, although I thank the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, for giving us the opportunity to debate the matter.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, I add my thanks to those of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The noble Lord is absolutely right: we aim to create a fairer system; and we seek to create balance in order to avoid over or under compensation. Complex and important issues surround both these matters.

Before I respond to this group of amendments, perhaps I may raise one issue on the previous group. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, raised a very important point. I fear that there may have been an oversight in relation to whether we have similar provisions for Scotland and Northern Ireland. We shall look into the matter. If there has been an oversight we shall take steps to ensure that that lacuna is also addressed. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, very much for that point.

I turn to this group of amendments. As I said in Committee, we agree that it is important that the real value of periodical payments is preserved over the whole period for which they are payable. I expressed concern that, although at present it is common practice to link payments to the retail prices index—and it is likely that this will continue to be the case—it would not be appropriate to prescribe this as a blanket index to which all payments must be linked.

Amendment No.148 addresses these concerns and preserves the court's flexibility to link periodical payments to other indices where appropriate. We do not consider that the amendment is necessary as the need to allow for inflation is an inherent part of assessing the quantum of damages, which is already within the court's discretion. The calculation of lump sums allows for inflation, as do structured settlements.

Nevertheless, we recognise that periodical payments ordered under these proposals will differ from structured settlements as they are now—for example, they will not require the consent of the claimant. Given the importance of inflation-proofing damages against future loss, we agree that there could be I repeat, could be—some merit in removing any doubt that the court has power to index-link periodical payments. Therefore, if the House considers that it will act as a useful guide to the courts and parties, we are willing to consider bringing forward an amendment to make this power explicit, provided that and I must emphasise this—a provision can be drafted in a way which is workable.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, correctly identified the difficulties that we have had historically with setting the discount rate. Furthermore, on previous occasions, I and others before me—have emphasised the need for certainty for claimants in this very difficult time. If we are moving to a more settled arrangement for them, we obviously want to limit the opportunity for added insecurity to be built in. Therefore, I add that caveat.

There are several issues which we will need to consider—for example, when and how adjustments for inflation should be calculated and the most suitable definition of the retail prices index. It will also be necessary to ensure that any amendment does not affect out-of-court settlements where, of course, the parties should be able to settle on whatever terms they choose.

So although I am making a clear commitment to look at the matter, I should tell the House that I can by no means guarantee that we will be able to make any movement on the issue. However, I think it is right that we should have a vigorous look to see whether anything may be possible.

Amendment No. 149 provides that a court may order that periodical payments for medicinal care and treatment costs are increased in line with care costs inflation, but should not exceed it. It goes on to provide that if, as a result of those increases, the amount of a payment exceeds that which would have been paid had payments been linked to the retail prices index, then the excess should be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament. I do hear what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, says in relation to the similarity of that provision with earlier provisions, with which we were not able to find favour.

In these cases, the uplifted payments would seek to reflect the true cost of compensation. It is an important point of principle that the negligent party should pay for the costs of his or her negligence. There is no reason why the taxpayer should have to meet those costs. The operation of such a scheme would he complex and would itself create additional costs. Of course we are aware of concerns that there are no suitable investments that would allow life insurers, who are subject to close matching regulations, to offer annuities that would match care and earnings-based indices exactly.

However, it would currently be possible for insurers to provide annuities linked to the retail prices index plus a certain percentage. So it would be open to the court, if it thought that was the most appropriate way to quantify certain future losses, to order that they be linked to the retail prices index plus a percentage as a proxy for some other index. We should also keep in mind that not all periodical payments will be backed by insurance products and that the same regulatory considerations will not apply where payments are funded by other means.

As I explained, the court already has the power to order payments linked to whatever index it considers suitable. A provision allowing it to order payments linked to care costs inflation is therefore unnecessary. It is important that the courts are able to take a flexible approach, so that where the circumstances of the case make it appropriate—if a defendant is unable to meet the terms of the proposed order because funding could not be adequately secured—he or she can inform the court and a different order can be made.

I hope that I have given the noble Lord a comprehensive answer. I therefore invite him to withdraw the amendment.

6 p.m.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for what she said about Amendment No. 148. Although I recognise that she has given no undertaking to act, I am grateful that the Government will at least consider whether something can be done to make clear beyond any doubt that Clause 92 permits payments that are linked to an index—and therefore not ascertainable at the time of the order, which was my concern.

On Amendment No. 149, I am most grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, and the Minister. The matter thoroughly deserves debate although, as I said, I recognise that it cannot be decided during the course of debate on the Bill. The noble Baroness implied that the Government would keep it in mind. There is plainly nothing that I can do to take Amendment No. 149 further at this stage. Returning to Amendment No. 148, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 149 not moved.]

The Deputy Speaker (Viscount Allenby of Megiddo)

My Lords, before I call Amendment No. 150, I must inform the House that if it is agreed to, I shall be unable to call Amendments Nos. 151 to 156 inclusive because of pre-emption.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

moved Amendment No. 150: Page 46, line 16, leave out from beginning to end of line 13 on page 47. The noble Lord said: I immediately point out to the noble Baroness that I do not intend to press the amendment, but it gives the House a further opportunity to consider the whole question of variability or reviewability of the periodic payment provisions. The noble Baroness will be aware that there is ongoing concern about the detail of their implementation. I hope that she will take this opportunity again to address those concerns. There is grave concern about the scope of the review and its operation. It may introduce unwelcome uncertainty into the setting of reserves.

The noble Baroness made clear that the power to vary will be tightly drafted and carefully controlled. Indeed, in Committee, she said: Such a restricted system of variation should not require additional compensation over and above that already payable. Insurers are already providing for such eventualities".—[Official Report, 27/3/03; col. 1006.] That came as considerable reassurance, but the detail has yet to be set out. The noble Baroness would do a great deal to reassure those outside the House if she were now able to enlighten us about the timetable that will operate; the drafting of the regulations; or the extent of the consultation.

Obviously, these are early days, but the noble Baroness will recognise that there has been a desire to write much more of the detail into the primary legislation. She has rightly resisted including too much detail on the assurance that there will be widespread consultation and time during the drafting of the regulations to consider the range of opinion advanced. However, it would reassure a number of people if she were able to provide more detail about the timetable.

She may also be able to assure us that within the draft regulations there will be sufficient control on the use of the power to vary to avoid what could otherwise be endless satellite litigation. When we debated conditional fee agreements, I strongly urged that there should at least be a pilot scheme from which we could learn lessons and that more safeguards should be included.

I suppose that in many ways I have benefited from that. Noble Lords will be aware that I am senior partner of Beachcroft Wansbroughs, which is one litigation firm involved in some of the satellite litigation. But I do not think that anyone has welcomed the extent of that satellite litigation—certainly not those involved in it—as we seek to clarify the extent of the conditional fee agreements. I am indeed pleased to hear the announcement from the Lord Chancellor's Department that the whole matter of conditional fee agreements will be reconsidered.

I should not want us to go further down the road of periodic payments only to discover that a massive amount of satellite litigation again arises as the parties seek to explore the meaning of and intention behind particular words and phrases. Perhaps the noble Baroness can take this opportunity to reassure us all that that is most unlikely to happen. Bearing in mind that the provisions must work, we should like some assurance as to when we may see the draft order and rules of the court and exactly when the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will consult.

Finally, grave concerns remain about how reviewability may operate. An early view of the draft order might do a great deal to alleviate those concerns. We approach Third Reading, with all the proceedings still to follow in another place. I hope that before the Bill finishes its passage through Parliament we may see at least something of the draft order so that we can turn our minds to it during the Bill's final stages.

There is a genuine wish on all sides of the House for periodic payments to be made into a workable alternative. I recall that I, the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, and others spoke at reasonable length on a previous occasion about the need for legislation similar to the periodic payments provisions in Clause 92— although we did not then refer to reviewability—as being a much better system than the rather distasteful practice of producing a lump sum that is then imposed on families least able to cope with it. The guarantee of receiving payments for as long as one may live has enormous attractions when trying to break through the existing straitjacket of difficult and complicated calculations.

We would not want a system to be set up that is even more complicated and difficult to administer than the current one. I hope that the noble Baroness will give us some reassurance about that. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. He is right when he says that there has been a genuine attempt by all involved in the process to make periodic payments a workable alternative. He is also right to highlight the distasteful, and sometimes painful, assessment that must be made of how long a claimant might reasonably be expected to live. That does not come easily at all. I agree wholeheartedly with him that periodical payments are a consummation devoutly to be wished, and for which many people in this field have longed for a long time.

The amendment would remove Section 2B to prevent any variation of periodical payments. I understand the basis on which the noble Lord tabled it. We recognise that, in the majority of cases, a non-variable award is likely to be appropriate. Many foreseeable changes can be built into an annuity, and some are already. But, in cases where there is real difficulty in assessing the likelihood of a claimant developing a particular medical condition or overcoming a particular medical disability when the periodical payments order is made, the present method of compensation is unsatisfactory.

Defendants and insurers usually provide for those eventualities by way of contingency payments. However, those payments often compensate for the chance that a future need may arise, rather than the need itself. If, for example, there is a 20 per cent chance of serious loss but the need never arises, the defendant or insurer would have made a payment unnecessarily. If the need arises, the claimant will be seriously under-compensated. In such cases, we believe that a variable order can provide the best solution. Defendants and insurers will not have to make payments for events that do not occur, but, if they do, claimants will receive the full compensation to which they are entitled.

During our debates on this clause, we have all agreed that rehabilitation is of central importance. We believe that the provisions for variation may help to support a programme of rehabilitation. Some specific improvements in the claimant's medical condition could result in a need, for example, to aid mobility. In those instances, our proposals for variation will be able to improve claimants' prospects of rehabilitation by providing the additional support needed to sustain improvement. In other circumstances, improvements may reduce the level of payments needed. We believe that the power to allow scope for variation in defined circumstances provides the fairest system of compensation for both claimants and defendants.

The noble Lord rightly asked about the timetable. I know that it is a matter of anxiety. I can give only my best estimate—I do not say "guesstimate". We will consult on the regulatory impact assessment of the proposed variation order in the autumn. We do not expect to implement the new powers before April 2004. We hope to have drafts of the order and the rules available at about the same time in the autumn. I do not know the precise timetable of when the Bill will go to another place and when it will come back, but we hope that the timing will be relatively robust.

We are currently consulting stakeholders on the content of the rules. Noble Lords will know that the stakeholders have been of great importance in their contributions. They have been able to help us with the practical consequences of how the system will work. We, too, very much want the periodical payment arrangements to work in a way that will benefit claimants overall.

I hope that that helps to clarify issues for the noble Lord. I understand why there is anxiety about the matter. I concur with the noble Lord that the last thing we wish to create is a system of satellite litigation, which would not be to the benefit of any of the parties, and that will involve the parties engaged in the process in expenditure that they could better use to do other things. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

6.15 p.m.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister. I recognise that the timetable is not solely in her hands, but I am grateful to her for giving a reasonable indication. For me, autumn occurs around September. If it were around September. that would be a very good month in which to scrutinise the drafts. Were the noble Baroness able to conjure the drafts earlier for those of us who have taken a particular interest in the Bill, we could not be more delighted. We would never hold the noble Baroness to the wording of the drafts. Therefore, even if the drafts were quite crude, it is their delivery that is important, not the precise detail. We would assist, one would hope, in ensuring that they were grammatically correct, but they do not have to be exact. I know that officials may take that as an indication that perhaps we might have them a few weeks earlier than we might otherwise have done.

I warmly applaud the Minister's reference to rehabilitation. When the Chief Medical Officer's report is published, I very much hope that it will be right at the heart of the process. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, other noble Lords and I know well, there is an inherent injustice in the damages system. A range of people who are just as seriously injured are not entitled to any additional compensation. The rehabilitation of all those who are injured or suffer disease must be at the heart of the National Health Service. Where appropriate, getting them back to work and into the community must be at the heart of any process. I look forward to the publication of the Chief Medical Officer's report, when, no doubt, we will further discuss the matter. In the mean time, I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Goodhart

moved Amendment No. 151: Page 46, line 19, at end insert— ( ) But no order may he made under subsection (1) authorising an increase of periodical payments unless in the proceedings in which the payments were originally ordered—

1. (a) it was proved or admitted that there was a chance that at some definite or indefinite time in the future the injured person would, as result of the act or omission which gave rise to the case of action, develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or mental condition; and
2. (b) the court assessed the periodical payments on the assumption that the injured person would not develop the disease or suffer the deterioration in his condition."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 156. The amendments raise issues that, in many ways, overlap with those raised by the amendment that we have just debated. For some reason. they were de-grouped. I am not entirely sure why.

We accept the principle that there should be a power to vary an order for periodical payments after payment has begun. But Amendment No. 151 restricts that power by allowing variation only on the same basis as that which applies to the variation of lump-sum damages orders, which can be made under Section 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

The closure of a damages claim without undue delay is very important. It is important for the defendants and their insurers. All professionals make mistakes; I certainly have done. The problem applies particularly to doctors, as their errors may lead to the severe physical disability of a patient; therefore, they fall within the category where variations are most likely to be made. Obviously, doctors who have made mistakes should be liable to pay damages. Once the case has been decided, its reopening should not hang over a defendant's head for life, without very strong reason. There are practical drawbacks, such as the need to keep medical records for the life of the claimant. Above all, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, said in Committee, closure is plainly in the interests of claimants. It is of enormous psychological importance for claimants to put the trauma of an accident behind them and to get on with their lives.

Having said that, I recognise that there are exceptional cases. In some cases, it is extremely difficult to make a prognosis at the time of the court hearing; for example, where, if damages are awarded on the basis of the claimant's present condition, they may be too small, but, if it is assumed that the condition will worsen, and then it does not, the claimant could be overcompensated. In such exceptional cases, the best course may be to award damages on the basis of the claimant's present condition but to give leave to return to court for an increase.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, is there any reason why something of that kind should not be dealt with in regulations, rather than in the statute?

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, there is a case for dealing with it in regulations. However, in this case, certainty is of considerable importance with regard to the financial consequences, particularly from the point of view of insurance cover and the role of professional groups, such as the Medical Protection Society.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, would that not be equally the case if regulations, rather than the original statute, applied?

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I accept that there would be some value in putting the matter into regulation. However, in this case, the requirement for certainty is sufficiently great and the need to give assurances to the people who are financially involved sufficiently important to make it desirable to have it in primary legislation and not in regulations, which can be changed at short notice and with relatively little debate.

To get the right balance, we should select a formula and give parties confidence that it will not be altered without good reason. The formula that now applies to provisional damages is correct and should be retained for periodical payments. The Bill simply allows an order for periodical payments to be varied in circumstances specified by the Lord Chancellor, although the fact that the affirmative resolution procedure will he required is welcome.

The intentions of the present Lord Chancellor, as outlined by the noble Baroness, are reasonable, but they are not binding on a future Lord Chancellor. Therefore, Amendment No. 151 would apply to the variation of periodical payments the same formula that applies to provisional damages and would exclude the power to vary the formula otherwise than by primary legislation.

Amendment No. 156 is the corollary of that. New Section 2B(4) of the Damages Act 1996 will allow the Lord Chancellor to make an order varying existing legislation on provisional damages. That would enable the power to award provisional damages to be widened. In the absence of any evidence that the system is working badly, it would be inappropriate to give a power to alter it by statutory instrument. I beg to move.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I am sorry to say that I heard nothing from the noble Lord that indicated that the matter—or something like it—could not be dealt with by order, although the Government ought to have regard to the principles outlined by the noble Lord. I want to consider the matter more than I have done, but I do not think that anything that has been said so far makes it appropriate to amend the Bill. I go a long way with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, on the issue but not as far as he wants me to.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in a debate that is similar to one that we had in Committee. I have already spoken to the matter in general terms in connection with the previous amendment, but. as Amendment No. 153 is included in the group, I thought that I ought to explain why I tabled it.

The amendment would insert the word "only" into Section 2B(3), so that the list of circumstances in which the Lord Chancellor may make an order is restricted to the list set out in that subsection. That would clarify the Government's acceptance of the previous amendment, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, which took out the Lord Chancellor's power to make an order that operated irrespective of the terms of any court order or agreement.

I want to give the Minister the opportunity to satisfy the House that the Government accept that the section, as now drafted, will permit the Lord Chancellor only to make orders that are within the scope of subsection (3)—that is, orders that will only operate wholly or partly by reference to a condition in the court order or agreement. This is the proposed restriction to circumstances equivalent to provisional damages by ensuring that a court order or agreement can be varied only if the original order provides for circumstances in which that variation can take place.

Amendment No. 154 would leave out new Section 2B(3)(d), which would enable the Lord Chancellor to create rules of court in the order. We are aware that the Lord Chancellor will consult widely on the proposed secondary legislation and that such consultation will include practitioners, but we feel that the Civil Procedure Rule Committee is the best place for drafting rules of court. Rules need to work for the judiciary and for practitioners, and I am not sure that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is best placed to make those decisions.

Amendment No. 155 would remove new Section 2B(4), which is, in effect, a Henry VIII clause, entitling the Lord Chancellor to amend primary legislation on provisional or further damages. Can the Minister explain that? Whatever she may say about the restrictive use of such a power, it would enable the Government effectively to change the way in which damages are paid by a substantial extension of the scope of provisional damages. It is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, but I am a little concerned that that is hardly an effective way to amend primary legislation.

Will the Minister give us some reassurance on those points? I thought that it might be helpful if I dealt with those three amendments at this stage.

6.30 p.m.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis for his support on the amendments. I agree with him that they are not appropriate. In the interests of clarity on the issue, I shall go through them amendment by amendment. I accept that it is a difficult area. There has been a lot of discussion and debate about this, but we have an opportunity to see whether we can reach a modicum of agreement.

Amendment No. 151 would restrict the scope of any order that the Lord Chancellor can make allowing the upward variation of periodical payments to the circumstances in which provisional damages can currently be awarded. By preventing the making of any order allowing upward variation in any terms different from those specified, the amendment would defeat the purpose of providing for variation through an order-making power.

As I said in Committee, the Government have no plans to extend the scope of variation after the initial order. However, that should not prevent us from keeping open the option of extending or limiting further the extent of variation, for example, in the light of experience and further developments in the insurance market or making any minor adjustments, should they prove necessary. The order-making power provides the flexibility to do this. It is important that this flexibility is not undermined. In relation to the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised the issue of satellite litigation and the need to hone matters to ensure that they are right. There should be flexibility to change by order affirmative resolutions so that Parliament has an opportunity to look at it. That is what we are seeking to do; namely, to get the structure right but retain the flexibility if, from experience, we find that the assumptions we make now are not founded in fact.

Furthermore, by basing the restrictions to the order-making power on provisional damages legislation and by referring solely to increases in payments resulting from a deterioration in the claimant's condition, the amendment would prevent us from making the initial order in the terms which we propose. Provisional damages do not allow for an improvement in the claimant's condition, nor do they allow the defendant to apply. We believe that variable payments should be available in these circumstances, not least to put claimants and defendants on a level playing field so far as is possible.

Although we recognise the noble Lord's concern that the provisions governing variation should not be too open-ended, we do not believe that restricting them in the way suggested is necessary. The need for consultation and affirmative resolution provides the necessary safeguards to ensure that the order-making power is used reasonably and responsibly.

Amendment No. 153 limits the provisions that may be included in an order to those listed on the face of the Bill. We have all previously said that this is a developing area of law; it is important that the framework for the order-making power is flexible enough to cater for future eventualities that cannot yet be foreseen. We believe that it would therefore be unhelpful to limit the provision in the way suggested.

Amendment No. 154 removes the provision in new Section 2B(3) enabling an order allowing variation to make provision of a kind which could be made by civil procedure rules. I set out the position of the Government on this issue in Committee. The provision will not enable the Government to do any more than can already be provided for under rules of court. But it may be more efficient to deal with all provisions relating to variation wholly by order rather than a mix and match of rules and orders.

As the House is aware, rules of court made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee must first be allowed by the Lord Chancellor and are then subject to negative resolution by Parliament. However, any provision which is implemented by way of an order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. As this provides a higher level of scrutiny than is currently provided by the rules, we do not accept that this provision should cause any concern. In fact, we suggest that it should be welcomed.

Finally, I turn to Amendments Nos. 155 and 156. These would prevent the Lord Chancellor making an order which amended legislation governing provisional damages. Amendment No. 155 would also prevent an order applying such legislation. As I said, again in Committee, to ensure that provisional damages can operate effectively alongside variable periodical payments, it may be necessary to make amendments to the legislation that governs those damages. There may be cases where both lump sums and periodical payments are needed. We believe that the best way of ensuring the combat—that was a Freudian slip, was it not?—I meant "compatibility" of the two systems is through the order-making power.

I am, of course, aware of the concerns that this power could potentially allow substantive amendments to the scope of provisional damages. However, we believe that the need for consultation and affirmative resolution provide adequate safeguards to its use. They will ensure that any future order for variation, including one that made amendments to provisional damages legislation, would be subject to rigorous scrutiny and debate. If Parliament is not satisfied that the power is being used appropriately, it will be able to indicate that under the affirmative resolution procedure.

It should give noble Lords comfort that what we have in the procedure that we are now adopting, and have in practice sought to adopt over a number of years, is the practitioner, the courts and the industry working together to obtain the best solutions possible to resolve these issues of personal injury. We should congratulate the committees which have worked together on the rules and orders which have proved to be sensible and workable and have worked to the advantage of all litigants. I reasonably anticipate that this will be the case too. In the light of all that I have said, I hope that the noble Lord, first, is reassured and, secondly, is content enough to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I am grateful for the comments made by the noble Baroness and I am partly persuaded. Amendment No. 151 is somewhat too rigid. The residual problem is that there should not be a reopening of the case unless at the time of the original order notice is given, in effect, to the parties that the case may be reopened. It is important that where the court hears a case and makes what it and the parties at the time believe to he a final decision, there should not be a subsequent reopening of the case—except, of course, on grounds such as fraud and so forth on which cases can now be reopened.

In the circumstances, in the rather brief time available, I shall consider whether I want to table at Third Reading a more restricted form of amendment which will not put a tight band on the kind of variations which can be made but will limit variations to cases where the court, at the original hearing, has said that variations may subsequently be applied for. Be that as it may, today I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff

moved Amendment No. 152: Page 46, line 19, at end insert— ( ) An order under subsection (1) may not apply to injuries that occurred prior to the date on which sections 2, 2A and 2B came into force. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the debate on amendments in this clause. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has summarised, in Committee 1 raised concerns about the impact of settlement reviews on patients. I highlighted that an ongoing adversarial relationship between the patient/claimant and the defendant might act as a powerful disincentive to recovery and may even promote ongoing worsening of the patient's overall condition physically and psychologically. It will prevent closure on an incident for both patient and clinician.

I accept that the Government have taken a firm position on the proposal to vary periodical payments and therefore seek to minimise the damaging impact of this measure on those involved in clinical negligence cases by proposing an amendment which will make the legislation prospective rather than retrospective.

As currently drafted, Clause 92(2)(b) will apply to all cases settled after the Bill comes into force even if the negligent act occurred over 20 years ago. There is often a significant time lag between when a negligent act occurs, when it is reported and when a claim for compensation is finally settled. According to the Medical Protection Society, one in five claims, where the claim was valued at £500,000 or more, made against their medical members between 1996 and 1999 related to incidents which occurred 10 or more years earlier.

This is an important point for medical defence unions offering indemnity on an occurrence basis. Doctors belong to a defence union and their indemnity is occurrence-based; so provided the doctor was in membership at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim, he or she can apply for assistance even if membership ceased before the making of the claim. To ensure proper funding for claims, it is essential that in each subscription year sufficient income is secured to meet all the claims arising from incidents in that year, irrespective of when the claim is made.

As a consequence, the introduction of rules applying to new claims rather than to new injuries is retrospective, as the rules would apply to years where subscriptions have already been set and collected. Defence union organisations such as the Medical Protection Society, the Medical Defence Union and the Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland will not have had the opportunity to set and collect subscriptions at a level that would encompass the costs of having settlement reviews.

In contrast, the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill currently being considered in the House of Commons introduces the concept of recovery of NHS costs in clinical negligence cases. It will apply to injuries which have occurred only after the date the legislation comes into force. The Department of Health has accepted that it would be unfair on those insurance companies or riot-for-profit organisations which fund the cost of claims to be "caught" for accidents that had taken place long before the measure was even conceived.

If new Section 2B in Clause 92 of the Courts Bill is agreed without amendment, we shall have two new pieces of legislation relating to clinical negligence that take effect in completely different ways. The Courts Bill will impact on injuries that happened many years ago, while the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill will affect injuries that occur only after the Bill is enacted in 2004. The amendment I have proposed would address that inconsistency. If accepted, the proposals to introduce settlement reviews will become truly prospective and thus will reflect the stance that has been embraced by the Department of Health. I beg to move.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, I wish strongly to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and to say that I believe that she has put forward a persuasive argument, in particular over the anomaly between the two Bills. It is surprising that the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill should be framed so differently from the Courts Bill. It may be that the Minister will want some time to reflect on that, but it is a curious anomaly.

I wish to add my concerns to those expressed by the noble Baroness about the element of retrospection involved in the present provisions. It makes the task of medical defence societies and insurance companies in general very difficult indeed if they are to be faced with retrospective changes to legislation which alter substantially the law on damages. As the Minister will know, it is something in respect of which many representations have been made in the past. The system should be much clearer and more precise. When changes are proposed, they should take effect only so far as the future is concerned rather than seeking to claw back what can be up to 20 years before a claim needs to be made in the first place. That is particularly true in cases involving minors. That is because there is a three-year limitation period coming on to 18 years which may or may not have elapsed in whole or in part.

I hope that the Minister will be able to respond positively to the serious concerns which have been raised.

6.45 p.m.

Lord Chan

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Finlay. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, it is important to ensure that there is no anomaly between this Bill and the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill. Another point should be made about retrospection. In maternity cases and those involving new-horn babies, the 20-year rule is making it extremely difficult to recruit into the relevant professions, although the need for doctors, nurses and midwives in our hospitals continues to grow.

Further anomalies could arise when we take into account the advances in medical care over a period of 20 years. It would be disastrous and bad for the morale of the medical professions and the National Health Service if old cases were to be reopened. Advances in care would mean that cases that had been adjudicated in the past would today no longer be cases with a valid claim of negligence because we have better means of treatment as well as better procedures and guidelines. I support my noble friend's amendment.

Lord Colwyn

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment. I welcome the move away from lump-sum settlements and the provision of periodic payments to patients in clinical negligence cases, but the Government must be realistic about reviews which would create a continuing uncertain liability.

The defence organisations, which are non-profit making, would need to increase their reserves to meet the possibility of an order for increased payments between 10 and 40 years after the initial settlement. For many years I served on the council of the Medical Protection Society and later chaired the dental side of that organisation. It is a mutual body for which subscriptions are collected from members on an annual basis to meet the liabilities arising from that year. The provision of reviewable settlements would introduce huge uncertainty about future liabilities, leaving members either over-funded or under-funded. That burden would have to be borne by the individual doctor.

These costs already represent a tremendous burden. In certain parts of the country it is difficult to encourage doctors to work in obstetrics. Although the legislation introducing reviewable periodic payments is not intended to be retrospective, clinical negligence claims are not normally initiated, let alone decided, until years after the incident. I hope that the Minister will be able to respond positively to the amendment.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I do not have anything to add to what has already been said by noble Lords who are far more competent to speak on these issues from a professional point of view. I wish simply to endorse what has been said by all the speakers. I hope that the Government can see their way to giving some satisfaction as regards the arguments put by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and the noble Lords, Lord Chan and Lord Colwyn; those noble Lords bring to the debate the expertise of practitioners in the field. However, obviously they also bring the attendant anxieties. I hope that I shall be able to explain why the Government have taken the view as set out in the Bill, and that I shall be able to allay some of that anxiety.

Amendment No. 152 would limit the application of an order allowing variation to injuries which occurred after the date on which new Sections 2, 2A and 2B came into force. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for making me aware of her concerns on this issue in advance of our debate. I thank her for that courtesy.

In Committee I explained that although we recognise the general concerns expressed about the "retrospective" effect of legislative change, and the fact that these cases can sometimes take several years to settle, where the court makes a variable periodical payments order, insurers and medical defence organisations should be able to reserve or reinsure against it, as they do now in regard to provisional damages orders. I want to emphasise the fact that, in introducing periodical payments, we are not seeking to change the basis of liability, but rather we seek to change the way in which people are paid. So the issue of liability rests where it is.

If the provisions relating to the court's power to vary periodical payments applied only to injuries occurring after the date of commencement, it could be several years, as the noble Baroness said, before the provisions took effect. In the meantime, in some cases where variation was appropriate, awards would continue to have to include provision for events which might never occur and claimants would continue to be left significantly under-compensated or over-compensated. In other cases, the court would be forced to order a provisional damages lump sum even though periodical payments were more suitable.

I understand and recognise that the provisions of the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill relating to the recovery of NHS costs will take effect differently to the provisions in the Bill relating to periodical payments. However, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, will understand that different considerations can apply when deciding the most appropriate implementation date for any legislation. For example, the introduction of the recovery of NHS costs in clinical negligence cases is a new cost which insurers and medical defence organisations have not previously had to meet, whereas the limited degree of variation that we propose will not introduce any new liability for damages. It is simply a different, and we believe fairer, method of paying for uncertain future costs.

There is agreement around the House that where periodical payments can be made it can quite often inure to the advantage of claimants, who will have the security of knowing that the lump sum will not run out. They will have a set amount of money for every month that they live. They will not have to ask horrible prognosis questions about longevity and expected life span. I am sure that noble Lords who have been directly involved in such clinical assessments know how difficult and painful it can be for the claimants involved. They will know also how complex it can be for a competent clinician to make an accurate assessment. Some people have the great advantage enjoyed by the noble Lord, Lord Renton, who gets riper and richer every year; other people, half his age, struggle—particularly on these Benches. I speak, of course, entirely for myself and not for any of my noble friends.

We know that there are such difficulties. We believe that periodical payments will assist claimants and will not impact in the negative way feared by the noble Baroness. I hope that she will be satisfied with that answer and feel able to withdraw her amendment. We understand why this issue has caused anxiety. I am pleased to be able to make this response in the hope that it may allay some of the anxieties of clinicians.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that detailed response. I continue to have anxieties, particularly in relation to possible variations that may occur and the possibility of re-opening cases. This may cause anxiety both for those who have been claimants but who have made substantial recoveries and rehabilitated well, and for clinicians who have had claims made against them and the defence unions which bear the cost.

I should like to read carefully what has been said by the Minister and other noble Lords who have contributed to the discussion. In that spirit, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave. withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 153 to 156 not moved.]

Clause 94 [Power to alter judicial titles: Northern Ireland]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

moved Amendment No. 157: Page 50, line 13. leave out "or repealing any enactment (whenever passed)" and insert ", repealing or revoking any enactment

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

moved Amendment No. 158: After Clause 96, insert the following new clause—

"EXTENSION OF TIME FOR CRIMINAL APPEALS TO HOUSE OF LORDS: NORTHERN IRELAND (1) Amend paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the 1978 Act (applications for leave to appeal to House of Lords in certain criminal matters) as follows. (2) In sub-paragraph (1)—

1. (a) for "fourteen" (in both places) substitute "28", and
2. (b) for "date of the decision of that court" substitute "relevant date".

(3) After sub-paragraph (1) insert— (1A) In subsection (1), "the relevant date" means—

1. (a) the date of the decision of the court below, or
2. (b) if later, the date on which that court gives reasons for its decision."

(4) Amend section 32 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c. 47) (applications for leave to appeal to the House of Lords) as follows. (5) In subsection (1)—

1. (a) for "fourteen" (in both places) substitute "28", and
2. (b) for "date of the decision of the Court" substitute "relevant date".

(6) After subsection (1) insert— (1A) In subsection (1), "the relevant date" means—

1. (a) the date of the Court of Appeal's decision, or
2. (b) if later, the date on which the Court gives reasons for its decision.""

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 159: After Clause 96, insert the following new clause—

"FEES: NORTHERN IRELAND In section 116 of the 1978 Act (fees) after subsection (1) insert— (1A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an order under that subsection may make provision for exemptions from fees and remission of fees (in whole or in part)." The noble Lord said: My Lords, the amendment will help to facilitate access to justice by allowing for the exemption from, or full or partial remission of. court fees in Northern Ireland.

The new clause provides for the insertion of a new subsection (1A) into Section 116 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. Section 116(1) of the 1978 Act provides for the Lord Chancellor, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice and the Treasury, to fix the fees to be taken in the Northern Ireland courts and the Enforcement of Judgments Office.

The new subsection will allow for any order fixing fees to provide for the exemption from, or full or partial remission of, those fees, thereby taking account of financial hardship. No amendment can be any less controversial than this one. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 97 [Interpretation]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal

moved Amendment No. 160: Page 52. line 9, at end insert— (8) In this Act "enactment" includes subordinate legislation and, except where otherwise provided, any reference to an enactment is to an enactment whenever passed or made; and "subordinate legislation" here has the same meaning as in the Interpretation Act 1978 (c. 30). (9) In sections 94(6) and 99(4)(b) "enactment" also includes Northern Ireland legislation (whenever passed or made); and "Northern Ireland legislation" here has the same meaning as in the Interpretation Act 1978 (c. 30).

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 98 [Rules, regulations and orders]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 161: Page 52, line 13, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert— (2) None of the orders and regulations mentioned in subsection (3) may be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing the order or regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament. (3) The orders and regulations are—

1. (a) the first order to be made under section 4 (areas of courts boards);
2. (b) regulations under section 29(5) (costs in legal proceedings);
3. (c) an order under section 31(6) or (8) (power to make permanent provision about collection of fines by fines officers):
4. (d) an order under—
1. (i) section 68 or 75 (powers to amend enactments in connection with Criminal Procedure Rules and Family Procedure Rules), or
2. (ii) section 99 (power to make consequential provision etc.),
3. which contains any provision (whether alone or with other provisions) amending or repealing any Act or provision of an Act;
5. (e) regulations under Schedule (Constitution and procedure of courts boards)."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, these amendments seek to improve the parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation provided for in the Bill. They are designed to meet parliamentary concerns about the delegated powers in the Bill and fulfil ministerial commitments to bring forward amendments in the light of the recommendations of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform.

Amendments Nos. 161, 165 and 166 seek to amend Clause 98 to increase the level of parliamentary scrutiny which applies to secondary legislation under the Courts Bill. As a result of these amendments, the first order establishing courts boards under Clause 4, as amended, will be subject to affirmative resolution under subsection 3(a). This is in response to parliamentary concern about these areas and will ensure full scrutiny when we establish areas. Similarly, under subsection (3)(e) regulations under the new schedule on constitution and procedure of courts boards will also be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Under subsection (3)(d) of the amendment, any orders under Clauses 68, 75 or 99 of the Bill which contain any provision which amends or repeals any Act or provision of any Act will be subject to affirmative resolution.

These amendments follow the Government's acceptance of the recommendations contained in the second report of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform and fulfils the commitments to bring forward amendments which were given by myself and my noble friend Lady Scotland on 11th and 27th March.

Amendments Nos. 165 and 166 also meet a recommendation of the Select Committee by providing that fees orders under Clause 87 should be subject to negative resolution for the first time. I undertook to bring forward a government amendment when responding to an amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, on 27th March.

There are further minor amendments to clarify the scope of the power to make orders under Clause 99(3). It is likely that we shall need to use the power in this clause to make numerous amendments to subordinate legislation, particularly to change references to justices, chief executives and petty session areas. However. Clause 99 as currently drafted is too restrictive in that it limits the power to subordinate legislation made before the passing of this Bill.

These government amendments have been grouped with Amendment No. 164. That amendment. brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is the same as Amendment No. 145, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Kingsland and Lord Hunt, and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, on 27th March. This amendment would make the first order made under Clause 8 setting up local justice areas subject to the negative resolution procedure. As I think I said during the debate on 27th March, if this amendment has been prompted by concerns that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will radically alter local boundaries when making the first order, the amendment is unnecessary.

Once again, I reassure noble Lords that the boundaries of local justice areas will be the same as those of petty session areas when the first order under Section 8 is made. Paragraph 29 of the Explanatory Notes makes this clear, and we gave assurances in Committee that we will spell this out in the transitional provisions of the Bill. These provisions are now to be introduced as a government amendment in another place. As noble Lords will know, we have recently tabled over 100 consequential amendments and repeals. It has not therefore been possible at this stage to bring forward the schedule of transitional provisions in this House. I invite noble Lords on the Opposition. Benches not to press their amendment. I beg to move.

The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Turner of Camden)

My Lords, I must inform your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 162 and 163 because of pre-emption.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I am particularly glad about the important concession made by the Government in Amendment No. 166, which brings the question of the court fees under some parliamentary control. Speaking from these Benches, we accept, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did, that the negative resolution is the appropriate procedure because, in the great majority of cases, fees orders are not controversial. However, from time to time they are; there was a fees order some two or three years ago which I would certainly have prayed against if it had been possible to do so. So this gives an opportunity for debate, and I very much welcome it.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I, too, welcome these amendments. But I feel obliged to mention again that the vast number of government amendments, some of them very complicated and far-reaching in detail, will have to be considered further and, if I may dare to say so, even more carefully when we see the Bill reprinted, with all these amendments made. It is not easy, quite frankly, to fathom the net effect of some of these amendments. We really will have to consider the matter afresh and carefully before Third Reading. I hope I am not boring your Lordships when I say yet again that I think that we must have a little more freedom at Third Reading than is normally allowed.

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, if the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, had been directed at Amendments Nos. 169 to 303, it would have been more relevant. But as far as this amendment is concerned, I think it is perfectly all right. I have been able to follow, in my own inadequate way, whatever has been said, but I am very troubled by circumstances which come later. The Government may have deliberated upon the matter in a very cogent way—I am not entirely sure about that. However, as far as anything we have considered thus far is concerned, I think the Government have been totally okay.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns

My Lords, of course I am grateful to the Minister for saying that eventually the Government will get around to spelling out those transitional provisions as a government amendment. The problem is that "eventually" will be too late for this House.

Earlier today, my noble friend Lord Hunt made the point that he was not really over-exercised by government amendments arriving late before noble Lords when they are moving in the right direction. This may be moving in the right direction but it will be too late, on this particular occasion, for noble Lords to see what these transitional provisions are.

I raised the issue of local justice areas in Committee, as the Minister said. It was raised very early on, in the sense that these amendments were published back in January, so the Government have had prior warning. I am delighted that ray honourable and right honourable friends in another place will have sight of them, but we will not until they come back as amendments made in another place. I shall welcome the opportunity to see what we can do if there is anything wrong with them, although I am sure that the Government will by then have made sure they are in perfect order.

I agree with the sentiment of my noble friend Lord Renton that where amendments are made that substantially change a Bill, one has to look very carefully at how one reflects on them at Third Reading while keeping very strictly—as I look to my left at the Clerk of the Parliaments—within the rules of Third Reading to allow for clarification and for holding the Government to their commitment. I undertake that, as ever, I will keep within those bounds. We may need to table one or two amendments that probe a little further what the Government have done on Report without. I am sure, worrying the officials of the House.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, I am grateful, as ever, to noble Lords who have contributed to this short discussion and for the general thanks. I suppose one can only observe that in bringing these groupings forward in the way we have, noble Lords who are slightly disturbed by the lateness of the process are almost victims of their own success in persuading us of the strength and power of their arguments at an earlier stage in our deliberations. I would not want to over-egg that point, but it is worth making. We are very grateful for the focus that we have had on some of these important issues. I am grateful for all the comments and commitments that have been made and given.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 162 to 164 not moved.]

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendments Nos. 165 to 168: Page 52, line 21, at end insert "or". Page 52, line 23, leave out from "officers)" to end of line 24. Page 53, line 11, leave out paragraph (b) and insert— (b) amend, repeal or revoke any enactment other than one contained in an Act passed in a Session after that in which this Act is passed. Page 53, line 16, leave out subsection (6).

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Minor and consequential amendments]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 169: Page 76, line 29, after "omit" insert "—

1. (a) "under the hand and seal", and
2. (b) "

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a large group of amendments. I do not think I have ever had the responsibility, awesome as it is, of moving such a large group of amendments before. However, Amendments Nos. 169 to 304 are minor and consequential amendments to the Bill. They contain amendments to and repeals of existing legislation as a consequence of the main clauses of the Bill. There are a total of 72 amendments to Schedule 6 and 42 to Schedule 7.

The amendments are the result of a policy laid before Parliament during debate of the main clauses. The amendments to Schedules 6 and 7 do not put forward any new policy in their own right but are absolutely vital to allow the clauses to work with, and alongside, existing legislation.

As the amendments are rather dry, I do not believe that the House would appreciate my explaining them in any detail. Suffice to say that they are minor and consequential, as I said at the outset, arising from among other things the provisions in the Bill removing magistrates' courts committees, the post of justices' chief executive, commission areas and petty session areas. Without these amendments, existing legislation would fail alongside the Courts Bill.

The changes to long-established jurisdictions, terminology and roles have resulted in amendments to legislation dating back to the beginning of the 18th century. That vast amount of legislation had to be carefully checked and rechecked to ensure that it would operate alongside the clauses in the Bill. The amendments before the House are the consequence of that careful checking. No doubt we shall find things that we should prefer not to find at some stage, but we have done a thorough job. We hope that everything is in place so that the legislation works together with earlier legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Goodhart

My Lords, I do not believe that I have ever before spoken to a group containing 128 amendments. I have to say that I have no idea whether all these amendments are correct, as I have not investigated all, or indeed any, of them. I am perfectly happy to take them on trust.

What concerns me is that these are almost all amendments of routine detail, which ought to have been in the Bill when published. They should not have been incorporated into the Bill in Committee, let alone on Report. The problem may be due to excessive pressure on the parliamentary draftsman's office. Whatever the cause, it is an example of something that should not be repeated.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I confess that I have been in Parliament for nearly 58 years. Although I have often at Committee stage been asked, along with Parliament, to consider a mass of amendments to schedules that amend or repeal previous legislation, I do not recollect such a mass of amendments on Report.

For the sake of the record, I shall say what has happened here. Schedule 6 already contains 253 amendments to legislation since the year 1708, dealing with our judicial system. Schedule 7 already makes 91 repeals of legislation since 1708, but we are now being asked to make a further 92 amendments, which go back to statutes starting in 1773. We are being asked to make 43 further repeals in statutes going back to 1802.

We want things to be properly done, even at a late stage, but could the Minister—if I may have his attention—give us some reason for this massive, belated collection of amendments to, and repeals of, previous legislation?

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I would not have missed the noble Lord, Lord Renton, for a moment. Of course, he speaks from inordinate experience, although not for one moment do I believe that he goes back to 1708. I do not join him in his comments, but I hope that before Third Reading the Government will give a résumé of what these amendments are all about.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, I have not understood or even contemplated what the amendments mean. They are just too mind-boggling for that. However, the House is entitled to a proper résumé, and we should not be prohibited from discussing the issue on Third Reading. I am sure that the Minister's comments are right, but we are being asked to take this on trust. As a revising Chamber, I do not believe that we should do that.

I am happy to give way to my noble friend. If he says that, yes, he will do that, I shall shut up and not detain the House any longer. It is vitally important that we understand what we are doing and, frankly, I do not understand the amendments. Would my noble friend like me to give way?

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, that is an invitation I cannot refuse.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns

My Lords, as we are at Report stage, is it the case that the Minister will say a quick "Yes" or "No" before I make my speech, or should I make my speech now?

Lord Renton

Make it now.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns

My Lords, after that invitation, I shall make my speech now, to keep to the rules of the Report stage.

I agree with everything said by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, my noble friend Lord Renton and the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, who summarised the situation very effectively. He said that we were the "revising Chamber", and we have been put in a position where we are unable to do our work properly.

The Bill was published at the end of last year, and one would have expected such a huge tranche of amendments to be in the Bill at that stage. In that way, not only we but those interested bodies outwith the House could have had the opportunity properly to consider these matters, as they progressed so slowly through your Lordships' House. We have a bad precedent here for such a large tranche of amendments for repeals coming through at this stage.

I shall not labour the point further, as other noble Lords have made it extremely well. I have tried to look through some of the amendments—although it was no more than an attempt—and one of them caught my eye. I mentioned it earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, but I am not sure whether he will he able to answer my question tonight. We may need to return to it at Third Reading.

Amendment No. 178 refers to,

Jurisdiction over ships lying off the coasts". That caught my eye because of my previous form in putting through your Lordships' House the National Heritage Bill, which was a Private Member's Bill. In the course of that, my noble friend Lady Carnegy made me learn more about territorial waters than I ever thought I would know or want to know.

Paragraph (a)(i) refers to,

any ship or boat which … is on or is lying or passing off the coast of England and Wales". What does, "lying or passing off the coast of England and Wales", mean? How far out? We are talking about our territorial waters, but I am not sure to what the amendment refers. I am sure that the point is very carefully defined somewhere, but the provision does not give the definition. Moreover, as the amendment has been tabled so late, it is not dealt with in the Explanatory Notes.

Sub-paragraph (ii) refers to any ship or boat that, is in or near any bay, channel, lake, river or other navigable water on which any part of England and Wales abuts or into which any part of England and Wales projects". Bearing in mind my noble friend Lady Carnegy—who is always at the back of my mind I —have to ask, what about the Solway Firth? How will it be affected? Is there any reference in the Act we are amending to the statutory instrument which lays down the various co-ordinates? That is the type of matter about which the Scots get very correctly exercised, because of the matter of oil. The noble Lord may be able to give me a very simple answer now. If not, we may have to have the joy of that at Third Reading.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, I thought that this might get more complicated, or at least that your Lordships would find more complications than perhaps there are in reality. 1 say to the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that of course we are happy to provide further information and detail. The usual way of doing that is in correspondence, in a letter placed in the Library and circulated to all noble Lords who have taken part in these discussions.

If noble Lords look at the amendments in this group, I think they will see that they are. to a degree, self-explanatory. Amendment No. 192, for example, will change and modernise the terminology. I am sure that not all noble Lords will be entirely happy with the changes being made. However, the provision will change terms such as "Crown Court rules".

Lord Clinton-Davis

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. Of course he is at liberty to choose whatever he likes to give an explanation. However, at this stage, I do not think that we ought to do that. He has indicated—and I stress this point—that he is prepared between now and Third Reading to give an explanation of all the amendments. That may be unnecessary in some instances. However, having regard to what he said, I do not think that it would be helpful to the House to give us an explanation of individual amendments at this stage.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, I was simply trying to be helpful. If the noble Lord believes that I am not being helpful, then I shall happily rest with what I said earlier. We shall provide a general outline of why the amendments are necessary. This is a complex matter and we have tried to simplify it. That is essentially what this whole group of amendments seeks to achieve. If noble Lords look at the provisions, I am sure they will see that we are seeking to modernise and update the language so that there is consistency throughout the legislation. I return to a point I made earlier. In a sense, some of the amendments may well be the result of earlier arguments in which the Government were persuaded to think again. We have had to reflect that in a change.

The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, asked me a question about territoriality, I think, and coastal waters. I think that she was referring to changes that are required to the Behring Sea Award Act 1894. The issue of coastal jurisdiction is very complex. Having given it some thought, I suppose that although it is reasonably easy to draw a line in the sand. it is more complicated to draw one in the sea. I should therefore like to provide her with a written explanation containing more detail. I think that there is probably a fairly straightforward and simple explanation. I hope that she is happy with that. I think that she will be more satisfied if I can provide her with a more detailed response.

I conclude on a simple point. Although this is a large group —several noble Lords say that they have never seen so large a group at this late stage in legislation—we have tried very hard to ensure consistency in the legislation. Sometimes there are limits to what we can get right before introduction. The House has given the Bill primary consideration. In a sense, I think that this process reflects that.

Lord Hunt of Wirral

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I hope that he recognises that there is considerable disquiet in the House about being asked to approve a whole batch of amendments without proper explanation. I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, on this point. Unless the Minister can satisfy us, it may well be that noble Lords will wish to press some of the amendments to a Division. I hope that we can avoid that by an undertaking that detailed explanations of each of the amendments will be supplied and that the Minister will bring them hack at Third Reading after the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, and other noble Lords have had a chance simply to understand them. Without a proper explanation, it is very difficult for us to approve amendments that we do not understand.

Lord Bassam of Brighton

My Lords, the noble Lord puts me in a difficult position. By picking out examples, I was attempting to describe the simplicity of what we were trying to achieve in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, properly made the point that we should have the opportunity to look at the meaning of the amendments. I am more than happy to provide as much detail as we possibly and reasonably can in correspondence. I gave that assurance earlier, and I thought that I had made it as clear as I could. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with that. I think that he should be. As I explained, these are minor and consequential amendments. They are updating and modernising language. They are attempting to achieve consistency. I hope that that gives the noble Lord sufficient clarification.

7.27 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 169) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 88; Not-Contents, 58.

Division No. 1
CONTENTS
Acton, L.	Gilbert, L.
Alli, L.	Goldsmith, L.
Amos,B.	Gordon of Strathblane, L.
Andrews, B.	Goudie, B.
Bach, L.	Gould of Potternewton, B.
Bassam of Brighton, L.	Grocott, L. [Teller]
Berkeley, L.	Hardy of Wath, L.
Bernstein of Craigweil, L.	Harris of Haringey, L.
Blackstone, B.	Haskel, L.
Bragg, L.	Hayman, B.
Brett, L.	Hogg of Cumbemauld, L.
Brooke of Alverthorpe, L.	Hollis of Heigham, B.
Brookman, L.	Howells of St. Davids, B.
Burlison, L.	Hoyle, L.
Campbell-Savours, L.	Hughes of Woodside, L.
Carter, L.	Hunt of Chesterton, L.
Clark of Windermere, L.	Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
Clarke of Hampstead, L.	Irvine of Lairg, L. (Lord Chancellor)
Clinton-Davis, L.
Cohen of Pimlico,B.	Janner of Braunstone, L.
Corbett of Castle Vale, L.	Jay of Paddington, B.
Crawley, B.	Jones, L.
David, B.	Jordan, L.
Davies of Coity, L.	Kilclooney, L.
Dixon, L.	Lockwood, B.
Dubs,L.	Macdonald of Tradeston, L.
Elder, L.	McIntosh of Haringey, L. [Teller]
Evans of Parkside, L.
Evans of Temple Guiting, L.	McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.	MacKenzie of Culkein, L.
Faulkner of Worcester, L.	Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L.
Filkin,L.	Masham of Ilton, B.
Finlay of Llandaff, B.	Mitchell, L.
Gale,B.	Morris of Aberavon, L.
Gibson of Market Rasen, B.	Pitkeathley, B.

Plant of Highfield, L.	Smith of Leigh, L.
Puttnam, L.	Symons of Vernham Dean, B.
Ramsay of Cartvale, B.	Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Randall of St. Budeaux, L	Temple-Morris, L.
Rendell of Babergh, B.	Turnberg, L.
Renwick of Clifton, L.	Turner of Camden, B.
	Warner, L.
Rooker, L	Warwick of Undercliffe, B.
Scotland of Asthal, B.	Williams of Mostyn, L. (Lord Privy Seal)
Simon, V.
Smith of Gilmorehill, B.	Woolmer of Leeds, L.

NOT-CONTENTS
Addington, L.	MacGregor of Pulham Market, L.
Anelay of St Johns, B.
Arran,E.	Mackie of Benshie, L.
Avebury, L.	Maddock, B.
Blatch, B.	Mancroft, L.
Burnham, L.	Marlesford, L.
Carnegy of Lour, B.	Miller of Chilthorne Domer. B.
Colwyn, L.	Newby, L.
Cope of Berkeley, L. [Teller]	Newton of Braintree. L.
Courtown, E.	Noakes, B.
Dahrendorf, L.	O'Cathain. B.
Dixon-Smith, L.	Palmer, L.
Elton, L.	Phillips of Sudbury, L.
Erroll, E.	Pilkington of Oxenford, L.
Fearn, L.	Rawlings, B.
Fookes, B.	Razzall, L.
Geddes, L.	Rees, L.
Glentoran, L.	Rennard, L.
Goodhart, L.	Renton, L.
	Seccombe, B. [Teller]
Hanham, B.	Sharp of Guildford, B.
Harris of Peckham, L.	Shutt of Greetland, L.
Hooper, B.	Skelmersdale, L.
Howell of Guildford, L.	Smith of Clifton, L.
Hunt of Wirral, L.	Steel of Aikwood, L.
Jenkin of Roding, L.	Thomas of Gresford, L.
Jopling, L.	Waddington, L.
Kirkham, L.	Walmsley. B.
Livsey of Talgarth, L.	Wilcox, B.
Luke, L.	Williams of Crosby, B.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.

7.38 p.m.

Lord Bassam of Brighton moved Amendments Nos. 170 to 261:

Page 77, line 13, at end insert—

"Ordnance Survey Act 1841 (c. 30)

In section 2 (dispute as to damage caused during survey)—

1. (a) for "by any two or more justices in petty sessions assembled of the place in which the lands, grounds, heritages, or trees may be situate" substitute "by a magistrates' court", and
2. (b) for "the justices, may appeal" substitute "the magistrates' court, may appeal".

Railway Regulation Act 1842 (c. 55)

(1)In section 17 (punishment of persons employed on railways guilty of misconduct)—

1. (a) for "before some justice of the peace for the place within which such offence shall be committed" substitute "before a magistrates' court",
2. (b) for "such justice as aforesaid (who is hereby authorised and required, upon complaint to him made, without information in writing, to take cognizance thereof, and to act summarily in the premises), in the discretion of such justice," substitute "a magistrates' court,"
85
3. (c) omit ", in the like discretion of such justice, shall",
4. (d) for "as such justice shall appoint" substitute "as a magistrates' court shall appoint", and
5. (e) omit the words from "and every such penalty" to the end.

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Defence Act 1842 (c. 94)

(1) In section 24 (compensation for damage caused by temporary buildings), omit "of the county, riding, city, or place".

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales."

Page 77, line 15, leave out paragraph 11 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 24 (proceedings with respect to licences on quitting service) as follows.
2. (2) Re-number the existing provision subsection (1).
3. (3) In that subsection—
1. (a) for "any time not exceeding" substitute "a time which, excluding any day mentioned in subsection (2), does not exceed",
2. (b) for "the magistrates' court for the petty sessions area in which the said proprietor shall dwell" substitute "a magistrates' court",
3. (c) for "at the time of applying" substitute "when applying",
4. (d) for "justices' chief executive for such" substitute "designated officer for the",
5. (e) for "twenty-four hours, exclusive of Sunday or any day on which the magistrates' court shall not sit," substitute "that time". and
6. (f) for "at the same magistrates' court" substitute "to a magistrates' court".
4. (4) After that subsection insert —

"(2)The days are—

1. (a) Saturday or Sunday;
2. (b) Christmas Day or Good Friday;
3. (c) a day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 (c. 80).""

Page 77, line 21, at end insert—

"Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (c. 16)

11A In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together in petty sessions".

11B In section 18 (transmission of shares by other means than transfer to be authenticated by a declaration), for the words from "before a justice" to "and such declaration" substitute "before a justice or a person authorised to administer oaths; and such declaration".

11C In section 33 (evidence as to forfeiture of shares), for the words from "before any justice" to "that the call" substitute "before any justice or a person authorised to administer oaths, that the call".

11D Paragraphs 11 A to 11C extend only to England and Wales.

Lands. Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 ( c.18)

11E (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justices"" to "acting together".

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (c. 20)

11F In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:".

11G In section 11 (limiting deviation from datum line described on sections, etc.)—

1. (a) for "in petty sessions assembled for that purpose, and acting for the district" substitute "acting in the local justice area". and
86
2. (b) for the words from "every petty sessions" to "holding of such petty sessions" substitute "every hearing before two or more justices to be held for the purpose of obtaining their consent as mentioned above shall, at least 14 days before the hearing".

11H In section 46 (crossings of roads—level crossings), omit "in petty sessions".

11I In section 59 (proceedings on application to justices to consent to level crossings over highways other than public carriage roads)—

1. (a) for "fourteen days at least previous to the holding of the petty sessions at which such application is intended to be made" substitute "at least 14 days before the application is intended to be made",
2. (b) for "acting for the district" substitute "acting in the local justice area", and
3. (c) omit ", and assembled in petty sessions,".

11J Paragraphs 11F to111 extend only to England and Wales.

Geological Survey Act 1845 (c.63)

11K In section I (dispute as to damage caused during survey), for "by any two or more justices of the peace, in petty sessions assembled, of the place where the lands or trees may be situate" substitute "by a magistrates' court".

11L In section 6 (interpretation), for "the word "justices" shall include all persons acting in the commission of the peace and" substitute "the words "magistrates' court" shall include".

Markets and Fairs Clauses Act 1847 (c.14)

11M (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice— to "acting together:".

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (c 27)

11N (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:",

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847 (c.34)

11O (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice— to "acting together:".

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847 (c.65)

11P (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:".

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c. 89)

11Q (1) In section 3 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:".

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Hares Act 1848 (c. 29)

11R In section 2 (registration of authorisation)—

1. (a) for "clerk of the magistrates acting for the petty sessions area" substitute "designated officer for the local justice area", and
2. (b) for "clerk of the magistrates as" substitute "designated officer as".

Indictable Offences Act 1848 (c.42)

11S In section 13 (English warrants may be backed in the Isles of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney or Sark, and vice versa)—

1. (a) omit "any county, riding, division, liberty, city. borough, or place in" (in both places),
2. (b) for "and for the county or place into which such person shall escape or go, or where he shall reside or he, or he supposed or suspected to be," substitute "England and Wales",
87
3. (c) for "indorsing the same has jurisdiction" substitute "indorsing the same is acting or has jurisdiction",
4. (d) for "issued such warrant or process shall have jurisdiction" substitute "issued such warrant or process is acting or has jurisdiction", and
5. (e) for "had been apprehended within his jurisdiction" substitute "had been apprehended in England or Wales or (as the case may be) within his jurisdiction"."

Page 77, line 24, at end insert—

"Inclosure Act 1859 (c. 43)

12A In section 4 (how damage to be assessed), for "for the county or riding or other division or place within which" substitute "acting in the local justice area in which".

12B In section 6 (justices' warrant for distress), for "of such county or riding, or other district or place as aforesaid, shall, by warrant under their hands and seals," substitute "acting in the local justice area shall by warrant".

Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 (c.32)

12C In section 2 (offence of making a disturbance in churches, chapels, churchyards etc)

1. (a) for "before two justices of the peace" substitute "by a magistrates' court",
2. (b) for "a penalty of not more than" substitute "a fine not exceeding", and
3. (c) for "for every such offence, or may, if the justices before whom he shall be convicted think fit, instead of being subjected to any pecuniary penalty, be committed to prison for any time" substitute "or to imprisonment for a term".

12D In section 3 (power to arrest offenders and take them before a justice of the peace), for "justice of the peace of the county or place where the said offence shall have been so committed," substitute "magistrates' court".

12E Paragraphs 12C and 12D do not extend to Northern Ireland.

Defence Act 1860 (c.112)

12F (1) In section 47 (interpretation), omit the words from "The word "justices"" to "acting together".

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100)

12G In section 44 (if magistrates dismiss case of assault or battery, they must make out certificate to that effect), omit "under their hands".

12H In section 65 (justices may issue search warrants for explosive substances)—

1. (a) for "Any justice of the peace of any county or place in which" substitute "Where",
2. (b) after "in this Act mentioned," insert "a justice of the peace,", and
3. (c) omit "under his hand and seal".

12I Paragraphs 12G and 12H do not extend to Northern Ireland.

Poaching Prevention Act 1862 (c. 114)

1. (1) In section 1 (interpretation), omit from "; and the words "justice" and "justices"" onwards.
2. (2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

In section 2 (summons to appear before justice of the peace)—

1. (a) after "citing such person to appear before" insert ", in England and Wales, a magistrates' court or",
2. (b) omit "England and", and
3. (c) for "forfeit and pay any sum" substitute "be liable to a fine".

In section 3 (recovery of penalties), omit "in England in the same manner as penalties under the Game Act 1831 and"."

Page 77, line 27, at end insert—

"Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865 (c.125)

1. (1) In section 2 (interpretation), omit the words from "The term "justice"" to "arises:".
2. (2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

(1) In section 22 (jurisdiction of justice of the peace), for "Where any district" substitute—

"(1) For the purposes of this Act, where a local justice area in England and Wales abuts on the shore of the sea or other navigable water, any magistrates' court in England and Wales has jurisdiction over—

1. (a) any vessel which is near or passes near the shore, and
2. (b) every person on board the vessel or belonging to it, as if the vessel or person were in England and Wales.

(2) Where any other district".

Newspapers, Printers and Reading Rooms Repeal Act 1869(c. 24)

In Schedule 2 (which sets out enactments continued in force under section 1)—

1. (a) in section 29 of the Unlawful Societies Act 1799 (penalty for neglecting or refusing to produce copy), for "forfeit and lose the sum" substitute "be liable on summary conviction to a fine",
2. (b) in section 34 of the 1799 Act (prosecutions to be commenced within 3 months), omit "or sued" and ", or such action shall be brought,",
3. (c) omit section 35 of the 1799 Act (recovery of penalties),
4. (d) omit section 36 of the 1799 Act (application of penalties), and
5. (e) in section 2 of the Printers and Publishers Act 1839 (penalty upon printers for not printing their name, etc.), for "forfeit a sum not more than" substitute "be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding"."

Page 77, line 27, at end insert

"Promissory Oaths Act 1871 (c. 48)

In section 2 (persons before whom oaths to be taken), for the paragraph beginning "In England" substitute—

"In England and Wales—

1. (a) before the Lord Chancellor, or
2. (b) in open court before one or more judges of the High Court or before one or more Circuit judges.""

Page 77. line 31, at end insert—

"Fairs Act 1873 (c. 37)

The amendments of section 6 (alteration of fair day on representation of local authority) made by—

1. (a) paragraph 10 of Schedule 10 to the Access to Justice Act 1999 (c. 22), and
2. (b) paragraph 5 of Schedule 13 to that Act, shall be treated as if they had never had effect." Page 78, line 4, at end insert—

"Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c.3)

(1) In section 6(1) (inquiry into offences)—

1. (a) omit "for the county, borough, or place in which the crime was committed or is suspected to have been committed.",
2. (b) omit "sit at a petty sessional or occasional court-house, or police station in the said county, borough or place, and", and
3. (c) for "the next petty sessions, or" substitute "a magistrates' court".

(2) This paragraph does not extend to Northern Ireland.

In section 9(2) (application of Act to Scotland), for ""petty sessional court house"" substitute ""magistrates" court""."

Page 78, line 39, at end insert—

"Behring Sea Award Act 1894 (c.2)

The Behring Sea Award Act 1894 shall have effect in relation to England and Wales as if in Schedule 2 for section 521 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (which under section 1(5) of the 1894 Act is applied to any offence or forfeiture under that Act) there were substituted—

"521 JURISDICTION OVER SHIPS LYING OFF THE COASTS

Courts in England and Wales (including magistrates' courts) have jurisdiction

1. (a) over any ship or boat which—
1. (i) is on or is lying or passing off the coast of England and Wales, or
2. (ii) is in or near any bay, channel, lake, river or other navigable water on which any part of England and Wales abuts or into which any part of England and Wales projects, and
2. (b) over all persons on board the ship or boat or for the time being belonging to it,

as if the ship, boat or persons were in England and Wales.""

Page 79, line 4, at end insert—

"Indictments Act 1915 (c. 90)

In section 2(2) (powers of rule committee), for the words preceding "shall have power" substitute "The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee"."

Page 79, line 21, at end insert—

1. "(1) In section 7(2) (power to make rules about proceedings under the Act), for the words from "Without prejudice" to "such rules" substitute "For the purpose of giving effect to this Act rules of court".
2. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not extend to Northern Ireland.

Criminal Justice Act 1925 (c. 86)

In section 33(4) (rules about service of documents on a corporation), omit ", except in so far as such provision may be made by rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980"."

Page 79, line 25, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 25 (restrictions on persons under IS going abroad to perform for profit) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (6), for "court of summary jurisdiction" substitute "relevant court".
3. (3) After subsection (10), insert—

"(11) In this section "the relevant court"—

1. (a) in relation to England and Wales, means a magistrates' court;
2. (b) in relation to Scotland, means a sheriff court;
3. (c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means a court of summary jurisdiction.""

Page 79, line 36, at end insert—

"Foreign Judgments ( Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (c.13)

(1) In section 3(1) (power to make rules of court for purposes of Act), for "rules of court under section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1981" substitute "Civil Procedure Rules".

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) extends to England and Wales only.

Public Offices (Site) Act 1947 (c.45)

Omit section 7 (correction of errors in deposited plan and book of reference).

The National Assistance Act 1948 (c. 29)

In section 43(4) (interpretation of section 43), for the words from "a court" onwards substitute "—

1. (a) in England and Wales, a magistrates' court acting in the local justice area where the assistance was given or applied for:
2. (b) in Scotland, the sheriff having jurisdiction in the place where the assistance was given or applied for."

1. (1) Amend section 47 (removal to suitable premises of persons in need of care and attention) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (2), for "a court of summary jurisdiction having jurisdiction in the place where the premises are situated" substitute "the court".
3. (3) After subsection (12) insert—

"(12A) In this section, "the court"—

1. (a) in England and Wales, means a magistrates' court acting in the local justice area where the premises are situated;
2. (b) in Scotland, means the sheriff having jurisdiction in the place where the premises are situated."

Omit section 65(c) (in application of Act to Scotland, references to court of summary jurisdiction to he read as references to sheriff).

Criminal Justice Act 1948 (c. 58)

For section 37(4) (recommittal following appeal etc.) substitute—

"(4) Criminal Procedure Rules may be made for authorising the recommittal, in such cases and by such courts or justices as may be prescribed by the rules, of persons released from custody under this section.""

Page 80, line 10, at end insert

"In section 17(1)(a) (registration of maintenance orders in England), for "for the same place" substitute "acting in the same local justice area"."

Page 80, line 32, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 25 (rules as to procedure of magistrates' courts) as follows.
2. (2) Omit subsection (1).
3. (3) In subsection (3)—
1. (a) after "Rules" insert "of court", and
2. (b) in paragraph (a), for the words from "by means of—onwards, substitute "in accordance with the rules".
4. (4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not extend to Northern Ireland.

1. (1) Amend section 28(1) (interpretation) as follows.
2. (2) In the definition of "collecting officer", after "officer"," insert "in relation to a court of summary jurisdiction in England, means the designated officer for the court, and".
3. (3) In the definition of "prescribed", omit—
1. (a) "England or",
2. (b) "by rules made under section fifteen of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949, or", and
3. (c) "as the case may be,"."

Page 81, line 25, after "executive for" insert "the magistrates' court acting for the petty sessions area"

Page 81, line 26, after "officer for" insert "the magistrates' court acting in the local justice area"

Page 82, line 15, leave out paragraph 47 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 18 (powers of magistrates to renew commitals) as follows.
2. (2) For "justices' chief executive for" (in each place) substitute "designated officer for".
3. (3) In subsections (2) and (4), for "acting for the same petty sessions area" substitute "acting in the same local justice area"."

Page 82, line 22, at end insert—

"In section 21(1) (interpretation), omit the definition of "rules of court".

Manoeuvres Act 1958 (7 & 8 Eli:. 2 c. 7)

1. (1) Amend section 3 (power to close highways) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), omit "sitting in petty sessions in the petty sessions area within which that highway or part of a highway is situated".
3. (3) In subsection (2), omit ", being a highway or part within the jurisdiction of those justices".
4. (4) For subsection (5)(c) substitute—

"(c) the references to justices of the peace shall be construed as references to the district court for the area in which the highway or part of a highway is situated."

Obscene Publications Act 1959 (c. 66)

1. (1) Amend section 3 (powers of search, seizure and forfeiture) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), omit "in the petty sessions area for which he acts," and "in that area".
3. (3) In subsection (3)—
1. (a) for "for the same petty sessions area as the justice who issued the warrant, and the justice before whom the articles are brought" substitute "in the local justice area in which the articles were seized, who";
2. (b) for "for that petty sessions area" substitute "acting in that local justice area".

Road Traffic Act 1960 (c.16)

In section 243(a) (proof in summary proceedings of identity of driver), for "rules made under section fifteen of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 82, line 31, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1960 (c. 65)

In section 2(3) (power to extend time for applying for leave to appeal to House of Lords), omit "Except in a case involving sentence of death,".

Omit section 3 (special provision as to capital cases)."

Page 82, line 42, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend Schedule 1 (bookmaker's permits, betting agency permits and betting office licences) as follows.
2. (2) In paragraph 1(a)—
1. (a) for "petty sessions" substitute "local justice", and
2. (b) for "acting for" substitute "acting in".
3. (3) In paragraph 2—
1. (a) in the definition of "appropriate authority", for "petty sessions" substitute "local justice", and
2. (b) in paragraph (a) of the definition of "the proper officer of the appropriate authority", for "chief executive to" substitute "designated officer for".
4. (4) In paragraph 20A(5), for the words from "for a petty" onwards substitute "in a local justice area, is a justices' clerk designated by the Lord Chancellor in relation to the committee"."

Page 83, line 8, at end insert—

"In section 26 (Inner and Middle Temples), omit "commissions of the peace,".

Backing of Warrants ( Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 (c. 45)

In section 1(1) (endorsement of warrants issued in Republic of Ireland)—

1. (a) in paragraph (b) after "within the area" insert "in or", and
2. (b) for "comprising the area for" substitute "which consists of or includes the area in or for".

In section 4(1) (issue of provisional warrant), in paragraph (c), after "within the area" insert "in or".

In section 6(2) (discharge of persons where police of Republic no longer require his delivery into their custody), after "justice of the peace acting" insert "in or".

In section 8(1) (rules of court) for paragraph (a) substitute— "(a) in England and Wales, Criminal Procedure Rules;".

1. (1) Amend the Schedule (supplementary provisions as to proceedings under section 2) as follows.
2. (2) For paragraphs 2 and 2A substitute—"2 The court shall sit in open court and shall consist of—
1. (a) at least two justices, or
2. (b) a District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)."
3. (3) In paragraph 3, for "paragraphs 2 and 2A" substitute "paragraph 2".

Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (c. 56)

Omit section 1(5) (jurisdiction of justices of the peace)."

Page 83, line 12, at end insert—

"Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 (c. 69)

In each of the following provisions, for "Crown Court rules", in each place it occurs, substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"—

1. (a) section 2(7), (8) and (9) (issue of witness summons on application to Crown Court),
2. (b) section 2B(2) and (3) (summons no longer needed),
3. (c) section 2C(2), (3), (5), (6) and (7) (application to make section 2 summons ineffective), and
4. (d) section 2E(3) and (4) (application to make section 2D summons ineffective)."

Page 83, line 20, leave out "31A" and insert "31C"

Page 83, line 27, at end insert—

"Gaming Act 1968 (c. 65)

1. (1) Amend Schedule 2 (court order cancelling licence) as follows.
2. (2) In paragraph 1(1)(a), for "petty sessions" substitute "local justice".
3. (3) In paragraph 2(1), for "petty sessions" substitute "local justice".
4. (4) In paragraph 48(5), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

1. (1) Amend Schedule 3 (registration of members' clubs in England and Wales) as follows.
2. (2) In—
1. (a) paragraph 12(1) (in both places),
2. (b) paragraph 13(1),
3. (c) paragraph 15(1) (in both places),
4. (d) paragraph 16(1),
5. (e) paragraph 17(3) (in both places),
6. (f) paragraph 23, and
7. (g) paragraph 24(1) and (2), for "chief executive to" substitute "designated officer for".
3. (3) In paragraph 17(4), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

In Schedule 7 (registration for gaming by means of machines), in—

1. (a) paragraphs 3(1) and 4(1),
2. (b) paragraph 11(1) (in both places),
3. (c) paragraph 11(2),
4. (d) paragraphs 13(1) and 14,
5. (e) paragraph 20(1) (in both places), and
6. (f) paragraphs 24 and 25(1) and (2), for "chief executive to" substitute "designated officer for"."

Page 83, line 28, at end insert—

"In section 23AA (electronic monitoring of conditions of remand), in each of subsections (4)(a) and (9), for "petty sessions area" substitute "local justice area"."

Page 83, line 35, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1970 (c. 31)

In section 41(5) (enforcement of orders for payment of costs and compensation made before the appointed day), for "the magistrates' court for the petty sessions area" substitute "a magistrates' court acting in the local justice area"."

Page 84, line 5, at end insert—

"In section 52(3) (award of costs where information or complaint is not proceeded with)—

1. (a) in paragraph (b), for "acting for any area" substitute "acting in any local justice area", and
2. (b) for ''for that area" substitute "acting in that area".

" Page 84, line 20, at end insert-—

"In section 25(1) (interpretation), omit the definition of "rules of court" and "and" before it."

Page 84, line 23, at end insert—

''Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)

In section 25D(6)(a) (court to which application may be made following detention of ships, aircraft and vehicles), for subparagraphs (i) and (ii) substitute—

"(ia) if the arrested person has not been charged, or he has been charged but proceedings for the offence have not begun to be heard, a magistrates' court;".

1. (1) Amend section 28K (execution of search warrants issued to immigration officers) as follows.
2. (2) For subsection (9)(a), substitute—
1. "(a) if issued by a justice of the peace in England and Wales, to the designated officer for the local justice area in which the justice was acting when he issued the warrant;".
3. (3) In subsection (10), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".
1. (1) Amend Schedule 2 (administrative provisions about control on entry) as follows.
2. (2) In paragraphs 23(1A)(a) and 31(3A)(a), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".
3. (3) In paragraphs 23(3) and 31(4), for "purposes of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997 and, in particular section 60 of that Act, as being" substitute "purposes of section 33 of the Courts Act 2003 (application of receipts of designated officers) as being".
4. (4) In paragraphs 24(2)(a) and 33(2)(a), after "hours, before" insert "in England and Wales, a justice of the peace, in Northern Ireland,".

1. (1) Amend Schedule 3 (supplementary provisions about deportation) as follows.
2. (2) After paragraph 6(2) insert— "(2A) Where the Crown Court directed release, the appropriate court is that court or a magistrates' court."
3. (3) In paragraph 6(3), omit "the Crown Court or" and "commission area or".
4. (4) In paragraph 8(1)—
1. (a) for "England or Wales or" substitute "England or Wales in pursuance of paragraph 7 above shall be brought as soon as practicable and in any event within twenty-four hours after his arrest before a justice of the peace in England or Wales, and a person arrested in";
2. (b) omit "area or"."

Page 85, line 11, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 18 (provision that may be made by magistrates' courts rules) as follows.

1. (2) In subsection (1)—
1. (a) for the words preceding paragraph (a) substitute "Rules of court may make provision with respect to—";
2. (b) in paragraph (a), for "for a particular petty sessions area" substitute "in a particular local justice area", and for "for such other petty sessions area" substitute "in such other local justice area".
2. (3) In subsection (1A), for "rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "rules of court".

In section 21(1) (interpretation of Part 1), in the definition of "prescribed", omit—

1. (a) "in England and Wales or",
2. (b) "by rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 or", and
3. (c) "as the case may be,"."

Page 86, line 19, at end insert—

"Civil Evidence Act 1972 (c. 30)

Omit section 2(8) (power to make rules of court under section 2 is without prejudice to other such powers)."

Page 86, line 24, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1973 (c.15)

In section 5 (consequential) omit "Paragraph 7 of".

In Schedule 1 (justices of the peace: consequential reenactments and amendments), omit paragraphs 7 to 7B and 10(1)."

Page 86, line 25, at end insert—

"In section 35(3) (jurisdiction to hear application for alteration of maintenance agreement), for "at least one of the parties is resident within the commission area for which the court is appointed" substitute "the court acts in, or is authorised by the Lord Chancellor to act for, a local justice area in which at least one of the parties is resident"."

Page 86, line 37, at end insert—

"In—

1. (a) section 9(3) (appeal against refusal to excuse from jury service), and
2. (b) section 9A(3) (appeal against refusal to defer jury service), for "Crown Court rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".

In section 14 (views by jurors), for "Crown Court rules, and rules of court for civil cases," substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules and Civil Procedure Rules"."

Page 86, line 39, at end insert—

"Friendly Societies Act 1974 (c. 46)

For section 102 (jurisdiction of magistrates' courts) substitute—

"102 JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES' COURTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. (1) In Northern Ireland, a registered society or branch or any officer thereof may be prosecuted for any summary offence under this Act before a magistrates' court acting for the county court division in which the registered office of the society or branch is situated.
2. (2) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to the provisions of the Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 as to the jurisdiction of a magistrates' court.""

Page 87, line 12, at end insert—

"Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (c. 34)

In section 7 (rules of court)—

1. (a) for the words from "The power" to "1981 or" substitute "Civil Procedure Rules or rules of court under", and
2. (b) for "shall include power to make rules of court under" substitute "may make provision","

Page 87, line 20, leave out paragraph 89 and insert—

"In section 2 (definitions), omit the definitions of "Crown Court rules", "magistrates' courts rules" and "Supreme Court rules".

In section 3AA (electronic monitoring of compliance with bail conditions), in each of subsections (4)(a) and 12, for "petty sessions area" substitute "local justice area".

In section 5(10) (meaning of "prescribed" in section 5), for "Supreme Court rules, Courts-Martial Appeal rules, Crown Court rules or magistrates' courts rules" substitute "Civil Procedure Rules, Courts-Martial Appeal rules or Criminal Procedure Rules".

1. (1) Amend section 5B (reconsideration of decisions granting bail) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (8), omit "for the petty sessions area in which he was arrested".
3. (3) In subsection (9), for "Magistrates' court rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 87, line 27, leave out paragraph 92 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 8 (bail with sureties) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (4)—
1. (a) in paragraph (a), for "magistrates' courts rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules",
2. (b) in paragraph (b), for "Crown Court rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules",
3. (c) in paragraph (c), for "Supreme Court rules" substitute "Civil Procedure Rules or Criminal Procedure Rules", and
4. (d) for "Supreme Court rules, Crown Court rules, Courts-Martial Appeal rules or magistrates' courts rules" substitute "Civil Procedure Rules, Criminal Procedure Rules or Courts-Martial Appeal rules".
3. (3) In subsection (5)(b), omit "for the petty sessions area in which he resides"."

Page 87, line 35, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1977 (c.38)

Omit section 22 (membership of rule committees).

" Page 88, line 20, leave out "1959" and insert "1984"

Page 88, line 23, at end insert—

"In section 48(1) (power to make rules as to furnishing of information by prosecutor in criminal proceedings), for the words from "The power" to "include power to" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules may"."

Page 88, line 24, at end insert—

"In section 6(9) (restrictions on power to make order where respondent not present at hearing), for "rules" substitute "rules of court"."

Page 88, line 32, at end insert—

"( ) In subsection (10), for "the clerk to the justices" substitute "a justices' clerk"."

Page 88, line 35, leave out paragraph 97 and insert—

"In section 30(1) (jurisdiction to hear application for order under Part 1 of the Act)—

1. (a) for "a magistrates' courts committee" substitute "the Lord Chancellor", and
2. (b) for the words from "at the" onwards substitute "it acts in, or is authorised by the Lord Chancellor to act for, a local justice area in which either the applicant or the respondent ordinarily resides at the date of the making of the application".

1. (1) Amend section 32 (enforcement of orders for payment of money) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (2), for "a justices' chief executive" substitute "the designated officer for a magistrates' court".
3. (3) In subsection (6), for "rules" substitute "rules of court".

"Page 89, line 4, leave out paragraph 99 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 88 (interpretation) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), omit the definition of "rules".
3. (3) In subsection (4), for "for the same petty sessions" substitute "in the same local justice".

Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (c. 23)

1. (1) Amend Schedule 1 (appeals to House of Lords in certain criminal matters) as follows.
2. (2) In paragraph 1(2), omit "Except in a case involving sentence of death,".
3. (3) Omit paragraph 2.

Protection of Children Act 1978 (c. 37)

1. (1) Amend section 4 (entry, search and seizure) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), omit "in the petty sessions area for which he acts".
3. (3) In subsection (3), for "for the same petty sessions area as the justice who issued the warrant" substitute "in the local justice area in which the articles were seized".

In section 5(1) (forfeiture of seized articles), for "for that petty sessions area" substitute "acting in that local justice area".

Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980 (c.32)

In section 4 (supplemental), in subsection (4)(a), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer"."

Page 89, line 26, at end insert—

"In section 43(2) (enforcement of recognizance of a surety for person granted bail), for "for the petty sessions" substitute "acting in the local justice".

In section 47 (service of summons out of time after failure to prove service by post) for "the rules" (in the first place where it occurs) substitute "rules of court"."

Page 90, line 34, leave out from beginning to end of line 38 and insert—

"(1) Amend section 59B(5) (interpretation of provisions relating to penalty for failing to comply with maintenance order) as follows.

(2) For the definition of the relevant court" substitute— the relevant court", in relation to an order, means—

1. (a) in a case where payments under the order are required to be made to or through the designated officer for a magistrates' court, that magistrates' court:
2. (b) in a case where such payments are required to be made by any method of payment falling within section 59(6) and the order was made by a magistrates' court, that magistrates' court: and
3. (c) in a case where such payments are required to be made by any method of payment falling within section 59(6) and the order was not made by a magistrates' court, the magistrates' court in which the order is registered;".

(3) In the definition of "relevant justice" for "for the petty sessions area for" substitute "acting in the local justice area in".

(1) Amend section 60 (revocation, variation, etc. of orders for periodical payment) as follows.

(2) In subsection (4), omit "the clerk of".

(3) In subsection (5)—

1. (a) for "the clerk" substitute "a justices' clerk", and
2. (b) for "to the justices' chief executive for the court" substitute "to the designated officer for the court".

(4) In subsection (10), for "the clerk of the court" substitute "a justices' clerk".

(1) In section 61(1) (periodical payments payable by one person under more than one order) for "The power to make rules conferred by section 144 below shall, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of that section, include power to" substitute "Rules of court may".

(2) In paragraph (b) of section 61(1)—" Page 90, line 44, at end insert—

"(1) Amend section 65(1) (proceedings which are family proceedings for purposes of Act) as follows.

(2) After the paragraph (n) inserted by paragraph 8(a) of Schedule 11 to the Children Act 1989 (c. 41), insert— (na) section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (c. 37);".

(3) Renumber the paragraph (n) inserted by paragraph 60 of Schedule 2 to the Social Security (Consequential Provisions) Act 1992 (c. 6) as paragraph (nb)."

Page 90, line 47, at end insert—

"(1) Amend section 70 (jurisdiction of magistrates' courts in inner London for family proceedings) as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

1. (a) for "for an inner London petty sessions" substitute "acting in an inner London local justice",
2. (b) for "for that" substitute "acting in that",
3. (c) for "for any" substitute "acting in any", and
4. (d) for "magistrates' courts committee whose area consists of or includes that petty sessions area" substitute "Lord Chancellor".

(3) In subsection (2)—

1. (a) for "for an inner London petty sessions" substitute "acting in an inner London local justice", and
2. (b) for "magistrates' courts committee whose area consists of or includes that petty sessions area so determine" substitute "Lord Chancellor so determines".

(4) In subsection (3), in the definition of "inner London petty sessions area", for ""inner London petty sessions area" means any petty sessions" substitute ""inner London local justice area" means any local justice".

In section 74(1) (reasons for decisions in family proceedings) for "The power to make rules conferred by section 144 below shall, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of that section, include power to" substitute "Rules of court may"."

Page 91, line 7, at end insert—

"In—

1. (a) section 78(4) (offence of removing impounded goods marked in accordance with rules), and
2. (b) section 79(2) (reduction of period of detention on payment being made in accordance with rules), for "the rules" substitute "rules of court"."

Page 91, line 10, at end insert—

"In section 84(1) (power to require statement of means) for "for the same petty sessions" substitute "in the same local justice"."

Page 91, line 22, leave out paragraph 115 and insert—

"(1) Amend section 89 (transfer of fine order) as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

1. (a) after "Where a magistrates' court" insert "in a local justice area",
2. (b) for "in any petty sessions area other than that for which the court acted" substitute "in England and Wales", and
98
3. (c) for "the petty sessions area in which it appears to the court that he is residing;" substitute "another local justice area".

(3) In subsection (2)—

1. (a) for "justices' chief executive for" (in both places) substitute "designated officer for", and
2. (b) for "for the petty sessions area" substitute -in the local justice area".

(4) For subsection (3) substitute— "(3) A court by which functions in relation to any sum are for the time being exercisable by virtue of a transfer of fine order may make a further transfer of fine order with respect to that sum.""

Page 91, line 26, leave out paragraph 117 and insert—

"(1) Amend section 91 (transfer of fines from Scotland and Northern Ireland) as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)—

1. (a) for "in a specified petty sessions area in England and Wales, a magistrates' court acting for that area," substitute "by a magistrates' court in England and Wales, a magistrates' court acting in the area in which the person subject to the order resides,", and
2. (b) for "justices' chief executive for" substitute "designated officer for".

(3) In subsection (3)—

1. (a) for "in a petty sessions area" substitute "by a magistrates' court", and
2. (b) for "acting for that area" substitute "acting in the area in which the person subject to the order resides".

In section 93(5) (issue of warrant to arrest person defaulting on maintenance order) for "for the same petty sessions" substitute "in the same local justice"."

Page 92, line 4, at end insert—

"In section 107 (false statements in declaration proving service) for "the rules" substitute "rules of court".

In section 109(2) (notice to abandon an appeal), for "Crown Court rules" substitute "rules of court"."

Page 92, line 5, after "stated)" insert "—

1. (a) for "the clerk of a magistrates' court" substitute "a justices' clerk", and
2. (b)"

Page 92, line 24, at end insert—

"In section 125(1) (warrants) for "the rules" substitute "rules of court"."

Page 93, line 9, at end insert—

"In section 126 (execution of certain warrants outside England and Wales)—

1. (a) for "Sections 12 to 14" substitute "Section 13(1) and (2)", and
2. (b) in paragraph (a), for "those referred to in the said sections 12 to 14" substitute "indictable offences"."

Page 93, line 15, at end insert—

"Omit section 141 (clerks to justices)."

Page 93, line 17, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—

"(2) In subsection (1) after "prescribing" insert "except in relation to—

1. (a) any criminal cause or matter, or
2. (b) family proceedings,", and for "and justices' chief executives" substitute "and designated officers for magistrates' courts"."

Page 93, leave out lines 22 to 24 and insert "Court, the Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate )".

(4) In subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert— "(za) one District Judge (Magistrates' Courts);".

(5) Omit subsection (5).

(1) Amend section 145 (rules: supplementary provisions) as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), omit paragraphs (aa), (f) and (i).

(3) Omit subsection (4)."

Page 93, line 29, leave out paragraph 134 and insert—

"134 (1) Amend section 150(1) (interpretation) as follows.

(2) Omit the definitions of "petty-sessional court-house", "the register" and "the rules".

(3) In the definition of "prescribed" for "the rules" substitute "rules of court".

134A In section 152 for "the rules" substitute "rules of court"."

Page 93, line 31, at end insert—

"In section 155(4) (extent of section 126 of 1980 Act) for "sections" substitute "section"."

Page 93, line 32, at end insert—

"criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c. 47)

Omit—

1. (a) section 48 (appeal in capital cases), and
2. (b) Schedule 3 (procedural and other modifications for capital cases)."

Page 93, line 34, leave out paragraph 137 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 47 (power of magistrates' court to declare that an unnecessary highway is not maintainable at public expense) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (5), for "acting for the petty sessions for" substitute "assigned to the local justice area in".
3. (3) In subsection (6), for "chief executive to" substitute "designated officer for".
1. (1) Amend section 116 (power of magistrates' court to authorise stopping up or diversion of highway) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (8)(b), for "for the same petty sessions" substitute "in the same local justice".
3. (3) In subsection (9), for "the clerk of the court" substitute "a justices' clerk"."

Page 93, line 38, leave out "18(1)(a)" and insert "18(1)"

Page 94, line 11, leave out "", 31ZA"" and insert"", 31B, 31 C""

Page 94, line 26, at end insert—

"Betting and Gaming Duties Act 1981 (c. 63)

In paragraph 15(4A) of Schedule 1 (betting duties: notification of forfeiture and cancellation of betting office licence), in paragraph (a) of the definition of "proper officer of the court", for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

In paragraph 15(3)(a) of Schedule 4 (gaming machine licence duty: registers of permits), for "for a petty sessions area, the chief executive to the justices" substitute "in a local justice area, the designated officer for the committee"."

Page 94, line 38, at end insert—

">Administration of Justice Act 1982 (c. 53)

In section 23(6)(a) (fees for deposit of wills), for "section 130 of the Supreme Court Act 1981" substitute "section 87 of the Courts Act 2003.""

Page 97, line 21, at end insert—

"In section 81(1) and (2) (advance notice of expert evidence in Crown Court), for "Crown Court Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 97, line 29, at end insert—

"( ) Omit subsection (5)."

Page 97, line 37, leave out paragraph 166 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 23 (discontinuance of proceedings in magistrates' courts) as follows.
2. (2) In subsections (3), (7) and (8), for "justices' chief executive for" substitute "designated officer for".

1. (3) In subsection (10), for "rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 101, line 24, at end insert—

"In section 7(3) (rules as to service of documents), for "Rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 101, line 32, at end insert—

"In section 13(5)(a) (return to foreign states-supplementary), for "rules under section 84 of the Supreme Court Act 1981" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".

In section 14(2) (simplified procedure)—

1. (a) for "rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules", and
2. (b) for the words from "without" to "include power to" substitute "those rules may"."

Page 101, line 41, at end insert—

"( ) In paragraph 9(2), for "rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 102, line 3, at end insert—

1. "(1) In paragraph 5 of Schedule IA (adaptation of Act where 1995 Convention applies), amend inserted section 14A as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (4), for "rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".
3. (3) In subsection (5)—
1. (a) for the words from "Without" to "includes power to" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules may", and
2. (b) for "a Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate) or another District Judge (Magistrates' Courts) designated by him" substitute "a District Judge (Magistrates' Courts) designated by the Lord Chancellor"."

Page 102, line 5, leave out paragraph 203 and insert—

1. (1) Amend section 7 (disqualification for membership of scheme) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (7)(b), for "justices' chief executive for" substitute "designated officer for".
3. (3) In subsection (10), omit paragraph (c) and the word "and" preceding it."

Page 102, line 11, leave out paragraph 205 and insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 18 (information) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), for "justices' chief executive for" substitute "designated officer for".
3. (3) In subsection (2), for "clerk or' substitute "designated officer for".
4. (4) Omit subsection (4)."

Page 102, line 22, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend section 97 (privacy for children involved in certain proceedings) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), for "Rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Family Procedure Rules".
3. (3) Omit subsection (7)(a).
1. (1) Amend paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 (variation of orders for periodical payments etc. made by magistrates' courts) as follows.
2. (2) In sub-paragraph (2), for "the clerk to the justices for the petty sessions area for which the court is acting" substitute "a magistrates' court acting in the same local justice area as the court which made the order".
3. (3) In sub-paragraph (3)—
1. (a) for "the clerk" substitute "a justices' clerk", and
2. (b) for "to the justices' chief executive for the court" substitute "to the designated officer for the court".
101
4. (4) In sub-paragraph (9), for "the clerk to the justices" substitute "a justices' clerk".

In paragraph 10(6) of Schedule I (jurisdiction to hear application for alteration of maintenance agreement), for "at least one of the parties is resident in the commission area for which the court is appointed" substitute "the court acts in, or is authorised by the Lord Chancellor to act for, a local justice area in which at least one of the parties is resident"."

Page 103, line 12, at end insert—

"In section 10(2) (family proceedings in magistrates' courts), for "Rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Family Procedure Rules"."

Page 103. leave out lines 29 to 34 and insert—

1. "(a) in subsections (5)(c) and (9), for "the clerk to the justices for the petty sessions area for which the court is acting" substitute "a justices' clerk",
2. (b) in subsections (5) and (11), for "to the justices' chief executive for the court" substitute "to the designated officer for the court", and
3. (c) in subsection (15), for the definition of "court" substitute—

""court" (where it occurs other than in the expression "magistrates' court") means in England and Wales a magistrates' court. and in Scotland the sheriff;".

In section 121(1) (unpaid contributions - supplementary)—

1. (a) in paragraph (a), for "rules under section 144 of that Act" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules", and
2. (b) in paragraph (b), for "justices' chief executive for" substitute "designated officer for"."

Page 103, line 36, at end insert—

"Friendly Societies Act 1992 (c. 40)

For section 110 (jurisdiction of magistrates' courts) substitute—

"110 JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES' COURTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. (1) In Northern Ireland, a friendly society or an officer of a friendly society may be prosecuted for a summary offence under this Act before a magistrates' court acting for the county court division in which the registered office of the society is situated.
2. (2) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to the provisions of the Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 as to the jurisdiction of a magistrates' court.""

Page 104, line 16, at end insert—

"Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 (c. 22)

In—

1. (a) section 51(3)(b)(i) (meaning of "appropriately proved"), and
2. (b) section 55(2)(a)(ii) (meaning of "appropriately proved"), for "rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 104, line 20, at end insert—

"Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (c. 37)

In section 55(7) (power to make rules about orders under section 55), for "Crown Court Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 105, line l5, at end insert—

"criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 ( c. 25)

1. (1) Amend section 19 (rules of court) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), for the words from the beginning to "sections" substitute "The power to make Criminal Procedure Rules".
3. (3) In subsection (3), for "Rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules made".

In section 20(3) (rules as to disclosure), for the words from "Without" to "that section" substitute "The power to make Criminal Procedure Rules".

In section 33 (Crown Court Rules)—

1. (a) in subsections (1) and (2), for "Crown Court Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules", and
2. (b) for the section heading, substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".

In paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 (rules about statements and depositions), for the words from "Without prejudice" to "includes power to" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules may".

In paragraph 13(2) of Schedule 4 (modification of section 20(3) in relation to Northern Ireland), for "that section" substitute "Rules"."

Page 105, line 19, at end insert—

"In each of the following provisions, for "rules of court" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"—

1. (a) section 20(6) (applications about special measures directions);
2. (b) section 27(4)(b) (video recorded evidence in chief);
3. (c) section 28(2) and (4) (video recorded cross-examination or re-examination);
4. (d) section 29(3) and (5) (examination of witness through intermediary);
5. (e) section 37(5) (applications about directions under section 36);
6. (f) section 38(6) and (7) (defence representation for purposes of cross-examination);
7. (g) section 43(3) (procedure on applications under section 41);
8. (h) section 65(1) (power to make rules for purposes of Act)."

Page 105, line 20, at end insert—

"In section 44(11) (restrictions on reporting of offences), for "rules of court" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules in England and Wales, or rules of court in Northern Ireland".

Omit section 65(2) (meaning of "rules of court")."

Page 105, line 29, at end insert—

1. "(1) Amend Schedule 5 (terrorist investigations: information) as follows.
2. (2) In paragraph 10(2), for "Crown Court Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".
3. (3) In paragraph 18, after paragraph (d) insert— "(dd) the reference in paragraph 10(2) to "Criminal Procedure Rules" shall be taken as a reference to Crown Court Rules,".
1. (1) Amend paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 (procedure on application for provision of financial information) as follows.
2. (2) In sub-paragraph (1), for "Crown Court Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".
3. (3) After sub-paragraph (2) insert— "(3) Crown Court Rules may make provision about the procedure for an application under paragraph 1.""

Page 106, line 28, leave out "for" substitute "designated officer for"" and insert "for the petty sessions" substitute "designated officer for the local justice""

Page 106, line 30, leave out "executive" substitute "designated officer"" and insert "executive for a petty sessions" substitute "designated officer for a local justice""

Page 107, line 1, at end insert—

"In—

1. (a) section 7(3) (form of consent to surrender), and
2. (b) section 13(3) (form of waiver of right to review),

for "rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c. 43)" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules"."

Page 107, line 3, at end insert—

"In paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 5 (orders under Part I), after "by" insert "Criminal Procedure Rules or, in Northern Ireland,".

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29)

In—

1. (a) section 24(1)(b) (application to discharge confiscation order: inadequacy of available amount), and
2. (b) section 25(1)(b) (application to discharge confiscation order: small amount outstanding), for "a justices' chief executive" substitute "the designated officer for a magistrates' court".

In section 54(6) and (7) (payments by enforcement receivers), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

1. (1) Amend section 55 (sums received by justices' chief executive) as follows.
2. (2) For "justices' chief executive", in each place (including the section heading) substitute "designated officer".
3. (3) In subsection (2), for "chief executive's" substitute "designated officer's".
4. (4) In subsection (6), for "section 60 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1997 (c. 25)" substitute "section 33 of the Courts Act 2003".

In section 67(5) (payment of seized money), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

In section 91 (Crown Court Rules) for "Crown Court Rules or (as the case may be) Criminal Appeal Rules" substitute "Criminal Procedure Rules".

Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38)

In section 13(2) (requirement to provide information relating to adoption), for "justices' chief executive" substitute "designated officer".

In section 55(2) (interpretation of section 55(1)), for "petty sessions" substitute "local justice".

1. (1) Amend section 141 (rules of procedure) as follows.
2. (2) In subsection (1), for "The Lord Chancellor may make rules" substitute "Family Procedure Rules may make provision".
3. (3) Omit subsection (2).

In section 144(1) (interpretation), for the definition of "rules" substitute—

""rules" means Family Procedure Rules made by virtue of section 141(1),"."

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Repeals]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton moved Amendments Nos. 262 to 303: Page 107, line 12, after "4," insert ""under the hand and seal" and Page 107, line 19, at end insert—

"Railway Regulation Act 1842 (c. 55)	In section 17, ", in the like discretion of such justice, shall" and the words from "and every such penalty" to the end.
Defence Act 1842 (c. 94)	In section 24, "of the county, riding, city, or place".
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (c. 16)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice- to "acting together in petty sessions".

Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (c. 18)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justices- to "acting together".
Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (c. 20)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together".
	In section 46, "in petty sessions".
	In section 59, ", and assembled in petty sessions,".
Markets and Fairs Clauses Act 1847 (c. 14)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice- to "acting together:".
Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (c. 27)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:".
Towns Improvement Clauses Act 1847 (c. 34)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together:".
Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847 (c. 65)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together".
Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c. 89)	In section 3, the words from "The word "justice"" to "acting together".
Indictable Offences Act 1848 (c. 42)	In section 13, "any county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place in" (in both places).
Defence Act 1860 (c. 112)	In section 47, the words from. "The word -justices"" to "acting together:".
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100)	In section 44, "under their hands".
	In section 65, "under his hand and seal".
Poaching Prevention Act 1862 (c. 114)	In section 1, the words from and the words "justice" and "justices"" onwards.
	In section 2, "England and".
	In section 3, "in England in the same manner as penalties under the Game Act 1831 and".
Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865 (c. 125)	In section 2, the words from "The term "justice"" to "arises:".
Newspapers, Printers, and Reading Rooms Repeal Act 1869 (c. 24)	In Schedule 2, in section 34 of the Unlawful Societies Act 1799, "or sued" and ", or such action shall be brought", and sections 35 and 36 of the 1799 Act.
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3)	In section 6(1), "for the county, borough, or place in which the crime was committed or is suspected to have been committed," and "sit at a petty sessional or occasional court- house, or police station in the said county, borough or place, and"."

Page 107, line 26, at end insert—

"Criminal Justice Act 1925 (c. 86)

In section 33(4), ", except in so far as such provision may be made by rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980"."

Page 107, line 28, at end insert—

"Public Offices (Site) Act 1947 Section 7. (c. 45)

National Assistance Act 1948 Section 65(c)." (c. 29)

Page 107, line 36,at end insert—

"Maintenance Orders Act 1950 Section. 25(1) (c. 37)

In section 28(1), in the definition of "prescribed", "England or", "by rules made under section fifteen of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949, or" and "as the case may be,"."

Page 107, line 41,at end insert—

"Maintenance Orders Act 1958 (c. 39)	In section 21(1), the definition of "rules of court".
Manoeuvres Act 1958 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2 c. 7)	In section 3, in subsection (1) "sitting in petty sessions in the petty sessions area within which that highway or part of a highway is situated" and in subsection (2) "being a highway or part within the jurisdiction of those justices".
Obscene Publications Act 1959 (c. 66)	In section 3(1), "in the petty sessions area for which he acts "and "in that area".
Game Laws (Amendment) Act 1960 (c. 36)	In section 3(2), the words from "and in section one" onwards."

Page 108, line 8, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1960 (c. 65)

In section 2(3), "Except in a case involving sentence of death, ". Section 3."

Page 108, line 12, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1964 (c. 42)	In section 26, "commissions of the peace,".
Science and Technology Act 1965 (c. 4)	In Schedule 2, the entry relating to section 6 of the Geological Survey Act 1845.
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (c. 56)	Section 1(5)."

Page 108, line 18, column 2, at beginning insert—

"In section 31A(2), at the end of paragraph (b) "and"."

Page 108, line 20, column 2, at beginning insert—

"In section 36(1), at the end of paragraph (f) "and".

In section 36A( 1), at the end of paragraph (a) "and"."

Page 108, line 26, leave out "paragraph" and insert "paragraphs 17 and"

Page 108, line 26, at end insert—

"Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 (c. 32)	In section 25(1), the definition of "rules of court" and "and" before it.
Armed Forces Act 1971 (c. 33)	In Schedule 2, paragraph 1(8)."

Page 108, line 29, at end insert—

"Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)

In Schedule 3, in paragraph 6(3) "the Crown Court or" and "commission area or" and in paragraph 8(1) "area or"."

Page 108, line 30, column 2, at beginning insert—

"In section 21(1), "in England and Wales or", "by rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 Or", and "as the case may be,","

Page 108, line 32, at end insert—

"Civil Evidence Act 1972 (c.30)	Section 2(8)
Administration of Justice Act 1973 (c.15)	In section 5, "Paragraph 7 of".
	In Schedule 1, Paragraphs 7 to 7B and 10(1)."

Page 108, line 42, column 2, at beginning insert—

"In section 2, the definitions of "Crown Court rules" "Magistrates' courts rules" and "Supreme Court rules"."

Page 109, line 5, at end insert—

"Administration of Justice Act 1977 (c.38)

Section 22."

Page 109, line 6, column 2, at beginning insert—

"In section 88(1), the definition of "rules"."

Page 109, line 6, after "2" insert ", 6 "

Page 109, line 13, at end insert—

"In Schedule 1, in paragraph 1(2) "Except in a case involving sentence of death," and paragraph 2."

Page 109, line 15, at end insert—

"Protection of Children Act 1978 (c. 37)

In section 4(1), "in the petty sessions area for which he acts"."

Page 109, line 18, at end insert—

"In section 60(4) "the clerk of."

Page 109, line 38, at end insert—

"Section 141."

Page 109, line 39, leave out from beginning to end of line 40 and insert—

"In section 144, in subsection (2) "the President of the Family Division of the High Court, the Senior District Judge (Chief Magistrate)" and subsection (5)."

Page 109, leave out line 41 arid insert—

"In section 145, in subsection paragraphs (aa), (1) and (i) and subsection (4)."

Page 109, line 44, leave out "definition of "petty-sessional court-house"" and insert "definitions of "petty-sessional court-house", "the register" and "the rules""

Page 109, line 47, at end insert—

	"In Schedule 7, paragraphs 5, 8, 101(a), 106, 107, 113, 131 and 151.
Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c. 47)	Section 48 and Schedule 3."

Page 109, line 48, leave out "18(1)(a)" and insert "18(1)"

Page 109, line 50, at end insert—

"Section 76(4)."

Page 110, line 10, at end insert—

"In Schedule 5, paragraph 1 of the entry relating to the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the entry relating to the Criminal Justice Act 1948, and paragraph 2 of the entry relating to the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975."

Page 110, line 16, at end insert—

"In Schedule 2, paragraph 43."

Page 110, line 17, at end insert—

"In Schedule 1, paragraph 13(b)."

Page 110, line 28, at end insert—

"Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (c. 23)

Section 20(5)."

Page 111, line 2, column 2, at beginning insert—

"Section 7(10)(c) and the word "and" immediately preceding it. Section 18(4)."

Page 111, line 7, column 2, at beginning insert—

"Section 97(7)(a)."

Page 111, line 29, at end insert—

"Maintenance Enforcement Act 1991 (c. 17)

In Schedule 2, paragraph 11(2)."

Page 111. line 35, leave out "paragraph 41(2)(a)" and insert "in paragraph 41(2), paragraphs (a) and (e)"

Page 111, line 37, at end insert—

"Friendly Societies Act 1992 (c. 40)

In Schedule 16, paragraph 44."

Page 111 line 48, at end insert—

"In Schedule 6, paragraph 14(5) and (7)."

Page 112, line 2, after "paragraphs" insert "29, 30"

Page 112, line 34, at end insert—

"In Schedule 10, paragraphs 1 to 5, 6, 7, 9 to 12, 14 to 16, 18 to 20, 21(a), 30(4)(b), 32, 35 36, 39, and 47 to 53.

In Schedule 11, paragraphs 3, 6(a), 12, 18, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36(3) and (4)(a), and 43 to 50."

Page 112, line 35, at end insert—

"In Schedule 13, paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13(2), 14, 15, 25 to 31, 59(2), (3)(a) and (4), 60, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73(4), 74, 77, 78, 81,82,89 to93,96 to 112, 114 to 118, 122(2), 126, 127, 129 to 131, 135 to 138, 147 to 149, 150(3),

153(a), 154 to 156, 159 to 162, 165, 167 to 169 and 171."

Page 112, line 36, at end insert—

"Section 65(2)."

Page 113. line 17, at end insert—

"Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38)	Section 141(2).
	In Schedule 3, paragraph 44.
Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40)	Section 265."

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 100 [Commencement]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 304: Page 53, line 21, after "37," insert "(Award of costs in appeals under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002),

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 101 [Extent]:

Lord Bassam of Brighton

moved Amendment No. 305: Page 53, line 27, leave out "or 96" and insert "96, (Extension of time for criminal appeals to House of Lords: Northern Ireland). (Fees: Northern Ireland) or 99

On Question, amendment agreed to.