HL Deb 07 November 2002 vol 640 cc917-31

2.13 p.m.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. The Statement is as follows:

"With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a Statement about negotiations on a new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq.

"A revised draft resolution was circulated to all members of the UN Security Council yesterday. The Council is now discussing the text and will vote on it shortly. A vote could come as early as tomorrow night. As we will prorogue later today, I wanted to update the House now the negotiations are entering their final stage.

"I have placed a copy of the joint United Kingdom/United States draft in the Libraries of both Houses.

"As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister reminded the House yesterday, our overriding objective is to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction through an effective inspections regime.

"The Prime Minister and I have made the case for UN action here in the House, to our allies and to the wider world. On 10th September, the Prime Minister told the TUC conference that the UN had to be the means of dealing with this problem, not of avoiding it. Two days later, President Bush in his historic speech to the General Assembly said that the United Nations had either to enforce the writ of its own resolutions or risk becoming irrelevant. On 14th September, in the same forum, I called on the UN to meet the challenge posed by Iraq and to defend its own authority.

"As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the UK has been determined to ensure that the UN emerges from this crisis with its credibility enhanced. During the negotiations, our aim has been to secure consensus on a tough resolution which leaves Iraq under no illusions about the need for disarmament.

"The text currently before the Security Council is the product of eight weeks of intensive negotiations. The UK and the US began to circulate elements of a draft resolution to fellow Security Council members on 25th September, and a draft full text on 23rd October. Throughout these two months the Prime Minister has spoken to President Bush and other heads of government at regular intervals. I have been in daily contact with United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, and I have had detailed discussions with my French, Russian and Chinese counterparts and with Foreign Ministers of the elected 10 of the Security Council on numerous occasions. Our UN ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, and his team have worked tirelessly in New York.

"The draft resolution uses the full power of the UN under Chapter 7 of its charter. The architecture of the draft has been extensively discussed between the permanent members. Let me set out for the House the key points.

"First, the text makes clear in operative paragraph 1 that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions.

"Secondly, in operative paragraph 2, the text affords Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.

"Thirdly, it stipulates—operative paragraph 41—that false statements or omissions in Iraq's declaration of its WMD holdings and failure by Iraq to comply with the resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and provides that this will he reported to the council for assessment.

"Fourthly, the text gives—operative paragraphs 5 to 9—significantly enhanced powers to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct effective, intrusive inspections. Honourable Members may be surprised by the level of detail in the resolution. Our experience with Saddam Hussein has made this necessary. I would draw particular attention to: the provision for conducting interviews with Iraqi citizens inside or outside Iraq, without Iraqi government minders present; the explicit setting-aside of previous arrangements restricting access to so-called presidential sites; provisions for freezing a site to be inspected so that nothing is changed within it nor taken from it while it is being inspected; and making legally binding the 'practical arrangements' set out by the inspectors themselves and covering issues such as regional bases, the right to encrypted communications and so on.

"In sum, this is a basis for an inspection regime designed not to go through the motions, but to achieve active disarmament.

"The text sets out the procedure to be followed in the case of failure by Iraq to comply: it requires—in operative paragraph 4—that any further material breach of Iraq's obligations should be reported to the council for assessment; it directs—in operative paragraph 11—the executive chairman of UNMOVIC and the director general of the IAEA to report immediately to the council any interference by Iraq with their inspection activities or failure to comply with its disarmament obligations; it provides—in operative paragraph 12—that the council will convene immediately upon receipt of a report of non-compliance in order to consider the situation.

"On timing, the text provides that within seven days of adoption of the resolution Iraq must confirm its intention fully to comply; within 30 days Iraq must submit a full and accurate declaration of all aspects of its WM D programmes; within 45 days, inspections should resume; and within 105 days UNMOVIC and the IAEA should report to the Security Council.

"The text concludes in operative paragraph 13 by underlining that Iraq has been repeatedly warned that it will face serious consequences as a result of continuous violations of its obligations.

"I emphasise again that the detailed wording may change further in negotiation. Discussion will resume this afternoon in New York. But the draft resolution meets the United Kingdom's objectives. It takes into account many points raised in the Security Council by other member states and by the chief inspectors, Mr Blix and Mr El Baradei. We are now seeking unanimous support for the resolution in order to send the strongest message to Saddam Hussein.

"Britain wants a peaceful resolution to this crisis; and the United States has shown by its engagement in the long negotiations over the past weeks that it, too, is committed to using the UN route to resolve this problem. Here, I would like to pay my own tribute to President Bush and US Secretary of State Powell for their patience and statesmanship.

"History tells us that if diplomacy is to succeed, it must be combined with the credible threat of force. As Kofi Annan has said, with direct reference to Iraq:

'We have learned that sensitive diplomacy must be backed by the threat of military force if it is to succeed'. It is that threat that in recent weeks has forced Saddam to concede the prospect of readmitting weapons inspectors. The more credible the threat, the more likely it is that Iraq will respond to the demands of the United Nations and meet its obligations under international law.

"As the negotiations at the Security Council enter their final stage, we are approaching a critical moment for the whole of the international community and for the integrity of our system of international law. By adopting the resolution, the Security Council will send the clearest possible signal of its determination to uphold the authority of the United Nations; and we will be one step closer towards resolving a problem that has undermined the security of Iraq's neighbours and the wider world for more than a decade.

"The task of the inspectors is to find and to destroy the weapons of mass destruction. The choice for Saddam Hussein is to comply with the United Nations or face the serious consequences".

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

2.23 p.m.

Lord Howell of Guildford

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving your Lordships that update by repeating the Statement made by the Foreign Secretary. We concur with her view and that of the Foreign Secretary that this is indeed a critical moment in global affairs when clear thinking and strong resolution are needed.

We strongly welcome the revised draft resolution and hope that it will be swiftly and unanimously passed—perhaps as soon as tomorrow night. We also hope that it is as clear, strong and unambiguous as the Foreign Secretary understandably hopes and claims, and that the room for wriggling and delay is minimised by its wording.

I also recognise that considerable hard work has gone into drafting the resolution on the part of both Ministers and officials. I pay particular tribute to Sir Jeremy Greenstock and his team at the United Nations in New York, who have clearly been extremely assiduous in their work.

The timetable for all of this is extremely important. To recap without delaying your Lordships, we know that Iraq has seven days to signify compliance—that it will play ball. It then has 30 days to produce a full and accurate inventory of all of its weapons programmes—the hideous weapons developments believed to be contained in Iraq. Then, the inspectors have 45 days from when the resolution is passed to resume their work. Sixty days thereafter, they must report back to the Security Council and the United Nations. As the noble Baroness said, that adds up to 105 days, which is about three and a half months from when the resolution is passed.

The first and most obvious question is this: does that coincide with the weather window? Will it be possible, if we are talking about late February or, maybe, the middle of March, to manage the constraints imposed by the natural environment? Many people were thinking about an earlier operation, should it prove necessary, perhaps in January. We are now into March: will it all add up?

Secondly, I must ask about the conditions for the reconvening of the Security Council. We understand that the Security Council must meet before military force is used, should that prove necessary. I am not clear about what triggers a re-convened meeting of the Security Council. Is it just the eventual report from the inspectors in 105 days' time? Is it Iraq's failure, as registered by the inspectors, to comply with some aspect? Is it evidence of obstruction? What if, in the next week or so, Iraq does not answer the letter about compliance in seven days' time? Will that mean a re-convening of the Security Council or merely an assessment? It appears that, until that happens, military action cannot go forward.

My third question is on a smaller issue, but clarification would be useful. What does the reference in, I think, paragraph 7 to UN security guards mean? It says:

Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards". How will that work? Are we talking about coercive intervention? If the inspectors run into difficulties, will they be supported by actual force? Is there some other meaning? I would be grateful for clarification.

Finally, we come to the three crucial words "face serious consequences". It is worth noting that the resolution does not tell the Iraqis directly that they will face serious consequences. It says:

the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations". That is not as direct as some would have liked, although I realise that that is where a great deal of the argument has gone on.

Has it not been clear all along that the pressure on Iraq to disarm needed to be backed, as the Foreign Secretary said and the noble Baroness repeated, by a convincing and credible readiness to use force? We must have the full contingency plan for when force is used and, indeed, plans for the outcome and aftermath of the use of force. The Foreign Secretary is entirely right to emphasise that point. Do not those who question the threat of force—however well intentioned and sincere—effectively weaken the pressure on Iraq by that questioning? Do they not weaken the authority of the United Nations, encourage Iraq to flout UN resolutions—I am sure that it longs to do so and is deterred only by the genuineness of the threat of force—and increase the threat of violence and the threat to international peace and security? Is not that a necessary question to put to all those who dislike—as we all do, while realising that it is necessary—the use of the threat of military force?

Are we prepared, now that we know the road ahead? Is the military equipment all prepared? Have we got the finances straight? The Chancellor of the Exchequer was reported only a few days ago as saying that there was a shortage of resources? Have we got the up-to-date equipment? We will hear a lot more about the difficulties with army equipment, about which we have already heard. Can we have an assurance that the words "serious consequences" really do mean that it is Saddam's last chance? Will we back the enforcement of those consequences vigorously and provide our forces with the means to do so, when and if the time comes?

2.30 p.m.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire

My Lords, we thank the Government for the Statement and also for placing multiple copies of the draft resolution in the Library. I have often found that when the Government say, We have placed a copy in the Library, it means that it is in a back cupboard somewhere down below. On this occasion we welcome the Government's openness.

The question of the timing of parliamentary Sessions and changing the parliamentary timetable is relevant. It would have been unfortunate if Parliament had been away for a week during this crucial business. It is therefore highly appropriate that the Statement was made today. I add my praise to the Foreign Secretary, to our Permanent Representative in New York, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, and to the Prime Minister for the efforts that have been made to get the issue back on a multilateral track and to find, if we can, a peaceful resolution to this conflict through the resumption of a rigorous inspection process.

We welcome the commitment to a two-stage process in which the effectiveness of a reimposed inspection regime will be reported back to the United Nations for the Security Council to act. I hope that I am correct in reading operative paragraph 12 in confirming that the United Nations Security Council will convene immediately in the event of any disrespect or breakdown in the resumed inspection process.

It was correct to use the UN route. The British Government have happily persuaded the United States that the UN route is the one we should take. However, I have a few critical comments. I regret that the British Government's public diplomacy has not been as good as their private diplomacy. I was in Paris last week for a meeting with a number of French officials and observers. They all assumed that Britain was unconditionally and unreservedly supporting the American position. I wish that we had made it a little more clear that we are a "Yes, but" supporter of the United States, while France has been a "No, unless" supporter.

I recall an article in the Guardian 10 days ago which said how well the British and the French were co-ordinating their critical support for the United States. I wish that they were co-ordinating it rather better. It has been a failure so far for domestic opinion and for our European partners that the Government have not made it clearer that they have been critical rather than full supporters of the American debate.

I regret that the amount of loose talk and over-excited comment in Washington has made it difficult for some of us to defend the British Government's position. Suggestions that after occupation of Iraq the United States should move on to Iran have been the subject of Op-Ed pieces in respectable American newspapers, which also suggest that democracy should then be introduced almost immediately to Saudi Arabia.

Suggestions in authoritative quarters that oil rights in a post-conflict Iraq would be distributed to American companies only have been sufficiently serious to arouse comments from the noble Lord, Lord Browne, who is the chief executive of BP. There has been additional talk of a long-term occupation of Iraq to turn it into a democracy from officials who nevertheless maintain that they are opposed to nation-building as a strategy.

I wish that the Government had also been able to place the matter more explicitly in a European context. We are all conscious that Britain's influence in Washington depends partly on being seen to speak on behalf of its European allies. While welcoming the statement within the Statement that the credible threat of use of force is an important part of foreign policy, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will remind our European partners that commitment to a successful European security and defence policy is essential in maintaining progress towards a common foreign policy and a credible European contribution to NATO.

There is therefore a wider context which we must remember while talking about the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Prime Minister has spoken about reviving a peace conference in the Middle East. The quartet is still working towards that with effective co-operation with Javier Solana and Colin Powell. Will the Minister assure us that the British Government are putting equal efforts into promoting a return to a peace conference which will involve the Israelis and the Palestinians? Will he assure us also that the broader context of world oil markets and the need to reduce demand—which means reminding our American allies that they should be thinking about reducing the level of their increasing imports—is also a wider part of the context?

Finally, relations with the Arab world and with the wider Moslem world have not been well affected by much of the loose and occasionally anti-Moslem talk which we have heard in the United States in the past few months. Will the Minister assure us that the British Government, with their partners, will do their best to rebuild a closer relationship with moderate Moslem governments not only in the Arab world?

2.36 p.m.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Howell of Guildford and Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for their remarks. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, got it absolutely right when he emphasised the fact that this is an extraordinarily critical moment. It is precisely because we recognise that that my right honourable friend thought it was right to make a Statement today before proroguement. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for understanding that.

Of course we want the resolution passed as swiftly as possible, but we also want a resolution which enjoys maximum support. My right honourable friend's Statement was careful in its wording in that regard. We hope it will be done within the next couple of days, but it is possible that in order to gain the wider consensus that we believe is important the discussions may go on a little longer.

I thank both noble Lords for their kind remarks in particular about Sir Jeremy Greenstock. He is a tremendous diplomat and we are very lucky to have him representing UK interests at the UN. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for his kind remarks about my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, helpfully took us through the timetable because it is important to understand the stages. He certainly got the timetabling right. It is probably helpful to think of the day that the United Nations resolution is passed, as we hope it will be, as D-day and then to count on the days from then. He was right in saying that it will take some three and a half months to get to the point of the first report-back. I stress to him that this will be the first report-back from the inspectors. It will not necessarily be the end of any process; there may be a first report-back to indicate how the inspections went and further work may be taken on into the future. It is not therefore a point at which the work stops, but the first stage at which the inspectors have to report back.

In drawing up the timetable, the United Nations Security Council has had the explicit participation of both the UNMOVIC and the IAEA inspectorate in order to try to ensure that sufficient time is given for them to undertake their work. It also wanted to ensure that pressure is kept up on the Iraqi regime. In thinking about the timetabling, the noble Lord mentioned the window of opportunity. Of course those matters must be held in the minds of those drawing up the timetable, but the important issue must be that the inspectors are able to do their job properly.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, then asked what triggers the UN Security Council being recalled. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, touched upon that point, too. It can he recalled at any time when Mr Blix and/or Mr El Baradei feel that that is important. When they feel that they have been obstructed or that in their inspections they have not been told the truth about what is going on, it is for them to judge. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, has been most concerned about the matter. But it is for them to judge when to bring the issue back to the United Nations Security Council. So it could be at any point where Iraq is not seen to comply with the Security Council resolution.

As to the UN security guards, they are there to protect the UNMOVIC and the IAEA inspectors. Where the draft resolution refers to serious consequences, it means consequences up to and including the use of military force. The wording is deliberately wide because it is a matter for the UNSCR to decide in the light of the prevailing circumstances. We cannot predict every eventuality. That is the importance of referring this back to the UN Security Council in order that it can look at the nature of the complaint and decide the best way forward.

The noble Lord asked whether it is the case that those who question the use of force weaken the pressure on Iraq. Of course, to a certain extent the noble Lord is right, but the obverse of that case is that we do not allow people free expression. One of our great concerns is that the people of Iraq do not have free expression. I would be loathe to see people in this country who do not agree with what the Government are saying somehow feeling inhibited from expressing that view. We live in a civil society where discussion and argument are vital. We can live with a little disagreement in order to preserve the kind of society that we have.

The noble Lord referred to military equipment if the eventuality were to arise where we deployed troops. If that were the case— it is not inevitable—our troops would be as well equipped as we can make them. I remind the noble Lord and others who have criticised some of the equipment that our Armed Forces are better equipped than they have ever been. As to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, we already have new personal radios—"personal role radios" as they are called—coming in to cover the gap that exists between the equipment that we all know is out of date and the new equipment coming in.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, was worried that our public diplomacy had not been as good as our private diplomacy. I should say to the noble Lord that sometimes a little dash of salt should be taken with some of the delightful French cuisine on these issues. If we were to say in public what we said in private, what we said in private would be far less effective. That is a matter of fact. We can live with a little French criticism while securing a far greater objective—that is, getting this issue before the United Nations and on to a United Nations' track. A few weeks ago many people thought that there was no chance of getting this before the United Nations, let alone a chance of getting a resolution, let alone a chance of getting a resolution as tough as this one.

In a European context, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has been talking to his opposite number, Mr. Villepin, and on a much wider basis to all of the 10 elected members of the Security Council. So he has been active not only in Europe but elsewhere.

As to the peace conference, the road map is under negotiation at the moment and we hope to take the matter forward. Of course oil is an important factor, but so is religion and a number of other matters. Some very useful work has been carried out by the former Archbishop of Canterbury on the whole axis of the Alexandria declaration and we are committed to pursuing the Middle East peace process as well.

2.44 p.m.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement. I join other noble Lords in congratulating the Government on the patience, perseverance and flexibility with which they have pursued negotiations on this very tricky and vital resolution. I perhaps have more reason than most to know that this is a labour-intensive operation and I therefore join those who have congratulated my former colleagues on the way they have carried it out.

Perhaps I may ask the Minister three questions. Does she feel confident now? Does she not agree that there is a vital need to show Saddam Hussein that there is no third way between compliance and the use of force; that there is no wiggle room left; that he has to co-operate or something extremely unpleasant will be coming down the track? I feel that it should be possible to do that because even those in this country and elsewhere who feel that the avoidance of war is primordial must understand that it is only through compliance that that can be achieved. Those who feel that the disarming of Iraq is primordial—and I am among them—must know that that is a straight choice, not one with three, four or five alternatives.

Secondly, given Saddam Hussein's record and our knowledge of him, we should be wise to assume that at some stage he will not comply. In that circumstance, we need in the period of time set out in the resolution to maximise support for what might then have to happen. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that we must address the issues of Arab/Israel and other matters. If we are forced to use force, only in that way will there be maximum support. That will be crucial when the time comes.

I turn finally to a more technical matter to which I do not ask the Minister to respond now. Clearly, the provision of intelligence to UNMOVIC is crucial. During the 1990s some bad experiences were gone through in which the Iraqis were able to muddy the waters, to imply that intelligence had been improperly produced and so on. Will the United Kingdom and the United States take the greatest care on this occasion? When they and other members states which are called upon in the resolution to provide such intelligence do so, will they do so in a way that does not allow the Iraqis to muddy the waters again?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his kind remarks. I shall make particular effort to ensure that they are drawn to the attention of his former colleagues in the United Nations.

I emphasise, as my right honourable friend in another place has, that we very much hope and believe that this resolution will be passed, but we are not there yet. We must keep on working very hard over the next few days. We shall be relying on our diplomats and our politicians from another place to take this forward.

I agree with the noble Lord's comment that it is vital to show Saddam Hussein that there is no "wiggle room", as he put it, between compliance and force. The United Nations draft resolution is very tough indeed. It makes that clear. One looks at the paragraphs on access, for example, where the inspectors must have "immediate","unimpeded","unconditional","unrestricted" access to "any", to "all". These are uncompromising words. This is very much tougher than any of the previous resolutions.

Yes, of course, Saddam Hussein, has a terrible record on compliance. We know that we possibly have some window of opportunity over the next few months to talk again to our friends in the Middle East—not only in the Palestinian Authority and in Israel but in many of the countries around Palestine and Israel—about what is happening in the Middle East peace process. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has reiterated time and again the importance that he attaches to negotiations and discussions on this in all fora, including the European Union, and with our colleagues in the United States.

On the question of intelligence, the point was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. Dr Blix has made it clear that the intelligence flow will be one way only—that is, to UNMOVIC. It is crucial that he has good intelligence. United States and United Kingdom experts will participate if requested to do so by Dr Blix. I hope that that goes some way towards reassuring the noble Lord on the point that he raised.

The Lord Bishop of Oxford

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I share the admiration of other noble Lords for the work of our Government, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and our diplomats in getting the United Nations so seized of this matter—to use their language.

I have always maintained that war is not inevitable. More importantly, I do not believe that we should think that it is inevitable. However, when I read the draft resolution this morning, the words that came into my mind were quite simply: this means war. It is a very tough resolution. I cannot conceive of how Saddam Hussein could comply with it. It means total, total humiliation. The Chinese have a wonderful proverb, Build golden bridges for your enemy to retreat over". I read in the press about the possibility or hint of lifting sanctions. Can the Minister comment on the possibility of sanctions being lifted if Saddam Hussein complies? The only possibility of his complying together with the threat of force, which I understand and accept, would be for him to have some sort of bridge. That bridge would be something to offer to his poor, long-suffering people. Is there anything that he could offer to his people that might make it possible for him to accept what would be otherwise an abject humiliation?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I am sorry if the right reverend Prelate no longer believes that war is not inevitable. The fact is that I still believe that war is not inevitable. I, too, have read the Security Council resolution. I am bound to say to the right reverend Prelate that, were it not as tough as it is. many people would say, "Well, of course, we are just going to go back over the same ground. Saddam Hussein has not complied. There is always a way that he can find of getting out of his obligations". I stress that this is not being pushed forward solely, as some would have us believe, by the United States or by the United States with the United Kingdom. Saddam Hussein has over and over and over again flouted the United Nations. We must do everything we can to ensure that he no longer has that option; that he no longer has that wiggle room to which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, refers.

He can comply at first instance, in the first seven days, by saying, "Yes, the inspectors can come back", and, within the first 30 days, by supplying a list of weapons of mass destruction and their programme—not to this country or the United States, but to the nominated inspectors of the United Nations. In the Security Council resolution there is a clear pathway for him to follow. Yes, it is explicit; but that is helpful to him, because he knows exactly what is required and he knows that, in the end, if he does not comply, there will be very serious consequences.

What can he offer his people? In the end, were all this to happen as the draft Security Council resolution lays down, he could offer the lifting of sanctions. We have heard time without number of the suffering of the people of Iraq. I believe that that is suffering imposed on them by their leader, but I accept fully that some believe that it is because of the sanctions. I do not believe that is true for one moment. But Saddam Hussein will then have no excuse to hide behind the sanctions any longer, and the poor, suffering people of Iraq can get the medicine, get the food and get the education for their children that they need.

Lord Hardy of Wath

My Lords, in expressing strong support for the Government's position and their approach, I raise one relatively small point. Those countries that rely upon a velvet glove, and, therefore, may contribute to continuing horror, would be unlikely to contribute to the military personnel that needs to be deployed to deal with this problem. Will my noble friend ensure that efforts are made to try to secure any timing to be at such a period in which our personnel would not be exposed to the intense heat of the hottest months in that area? The protective clothing and equipment that they would have to wear would mean that they would face a very severe burden. If possible, can the matter be dealt with before such temperatures have to be experienced?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, let me reiterate again that I do not believe that military action is inevitable. However, if there were a decision that military action was the only way forward, any government committing troops to such action would do so in circumstances that maximised the possibility of that military action being successful. That must take into account all the exigencies that we have discussed. The noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, referred to issues around the time of year. We have also discussed issues around equipment. Any government who put their troops into military theatre must do so on the basis of doing everything that they can to ensure that those troops can be successful in the endeavour to which they set their hand.

Lord Blaker

My Lords, the report of the inspectors after 105 days will be a first report. It seems very unlikely that they will be able to say at that time that Iraq no longer has a programme of making weapons of mass destruction or possesses such weapons. However, if, at some later date not too far away, they were able to say that, do we contemplate that even if Saddam Hussein were still in power, the inspections would come to an end, or do we regard this as a continuing activity?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I stress that D-day plus 105, to use the terminology that I used a little earlier, is specified in the resolution as the time when there must be an initial report. There may be an initial report before that if the inspectors decide that there is a breach that should trigger a report to the United Nations Security Council. The report could come in advance of that date if the inspectors decided that there was something of a nature that had to be reported. Thereafter, there would be further reports as and when the inspectors thought that was appropriate. I do not think that we are yet at the point of being able to say that this is an exercise with a final end day. There will be further meetings of the Security Council, even if not formally, to decide how this is taken forward. There will certainly be a great deal more discussion about that. The initial programme laid down in the Security Council resolution is probably as far as it can be taken at the moment.

Lord Campbell-Savours

My Lords, can we be absolutely assured that the UNMOVIC and IAEA contingents will comprise British and American personnel? I congratulate the Government on pursuing their policy of tough brinkmanship, which in my view will lead to the avoidance of a war with Iraq.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I have always regarded brinkmanship as an iffy term, but in the mouth of my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours it sounds positively flattering. The inspection teams must comprise the people who are best equipped to carry out the inspection. By implication, that means that those who have expertise in chemical and biological warfare and in nuclear warfare will be needed on the inspection teams. That does not mean that Britain and America are the only countries with such expertise, but there is an enormous amount of such expertise in both countries.

Lord Avebury

My Lords, I suggest that we refer to R-day when talking about the future course of action rather than D-day, which has historical connotations that might lead people to suppose that we agreed with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford that there is an inevitability of war in these arrangements. I have two questions for the Minister. First, is there any significance in the fact that paragraph 11 does not refer to the Security Council convening immediately after the seven days if Iraq does not indicate its willingness to comply? It refers only to paragraphs 4 and 11, but not to paragraph 9. Will the Minister confirm that the Security Council would reconvene as a matter of course if no reply was received from Iraq within the period specified?

Secondly, the resolution speaks of any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, and "any failure" by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations triggering off reports by the executive chairman of UNMOVIC and the director-general of IAEA. Can the noble Baroness confirm that the Security Council will have full power to consider the nature and extent of any non-compliance and to decide on its future action in full consideration of the need for proportionality in response to the gravity of the non-compliance?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I shall certainly convey to the Foreign Office drafters the noble Lord's preference for R-day rather than D-day. The noble Lord raised a question in relation to paragraph 11. If there is no response from Iraq after seven days, I should be enormously surprised were the Security Council not to reconvene. It would be a most flagrant insult to the United Nations if there were to be no such reply; indeed, that would be of much more importance, perhaps, than some minor difficulties that may be encountered down the path.

The noble Lord also asked whether any failure would have to the reported to the United Nations Security Council. This is really a question for the judgment of Dr Blix and Mr El Baradei. The resolution refers to "any failure". Therefore, it is a matter for them to decide what they believe to be a real failure—a trivial mistake might not be a real failure in their judgment. It is a matter for them to decide what they believe constitutes a real failure, and then to report it accordingly to the Security Council. In the light of all the prevailing circumstances, the Security Council is the appropriate body to decide just how serious it believes such a breach to be, and what appropriate action should be taken. In considering any retaliation, I have always understood that it must be proportional in order for it to be valid in international law.

Lord Craig of Radley

My Lords, I am sure that we all hope to see an agreed United Nations resolution very soon. I join in commending Her Majesty's Government, and the officials concerned, in their efforts to achieve that end. Can the noble Baroness say what steps, if any, will be taken by US and UK Armed Forces to maintain pressure on Saddam Hussein—for example, by increasing rates of readiness or movements into the Middle East theatre? If taken, such steps will need, at least in part, to be overt if they are to be effective in demonstrating our resolve to achieve disarmament, and perhaps even regime change in Iraq.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for his remarks. The Prime Minister has made it clear that military action is not inevitable; but he has also made it clear that the use of force must remain an option. Therefore, it makes sense to go ahead with some sensible planning, which includes military planning. The House will not expect me to go into detail on the matter now. I do not believe that it would be in the best interests of those concerned if I were to do so.

Lord Gilbert

My Lords, the timetable that my noble friend so lucidly set out for the House is clearly predicated on Saddam Hussein maintaining full compliance with the requirements in a United Nations resolution. If the right reverend Prelate is right and it will be impossible for him to do so, we may be faced with a breach by Saddam Hussein in a matter of a very few days after the inspectors arrive. Can we take it that Her Majesty's Government are seized of that possibility and their military planning equally so?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

My Lords, the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, is such that he knows the sort of planning that goes on in the Ministry of Defence. I can assure him that that is also the case in the Foreign Office. Of course, eventualities have to be considered. In the first short while, we have 30 days within which Iraq must submit its declaration. Then, within the first 45 days, UNMOVIC must have started those inspections. I believe that it is the period immediately thereafter that is a matter of concern to the noble Lord. I can assure him that all these eventualities are being worked through in the meticulous way with which I believe the noble Lord is very familiar.

Lord Williams of Mostyn

My Lords, our time for dealing with the Statement has concluded.